ARISTOTLE
ON THE ART OF POETRY

A REVISED TEXT
WITH CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY

BY

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OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1909
PREFACE

The Translation, which faces the text in the present volume, is added in compliance with what seems to be now almost the rule with Greek texts of this description. The custom is perhaps one more honoured in the breach than the observance; but there is something to be said for it in the instance of the Poetics, because they are read by many whose study of Aristotle begins and ends with this one work of his. And there are certainly difficulties of a special kind throughout the book, which require a version or even a paraphrase to explain them. Aristotle's mode of statement here is often elliptical, allusive, and overcharged with meaning; and he not unfrequently omits to indicate the connexion of ideas in his sentences and paragraphs, so that the logical relation between them is left for us to perceive as best we can. Under these circumstances the freedom of a paraphrase may be at times the only means of making his statement intelligible to the modern reader. If Bernays thought it necessary to adopt this method of interpretation in a rendering of the Politics, there is still more reason for its adoption in one of a book like the Poetics. I have accordingly not scrupled to recast many of Aristotle's sentences, and also to insert here and there words or short clauses, in order to make the sense and sequence of ideas clearer—as I suppose he would have done himself, if
he had foreseen the modern reader, and the difficulties and obscurities he might find in his writings.

The Commentary has extended to a greater length than was originally contemplated owing to the accumulation of passages to be quoted from Aristotle or other writers in illustration of the language and terminology of the Poetics. It is hoped that they may prove of use to those who approach the text without previous study of Isocrates or the Rhetoric and other Aristotelian treatises. I venture to think, too, that some of the quotations will be seen to settle the meaning of certain passages which are not always rightly interpreted, and that others may serve to confirm the traditional text, and vindicate it from some of the doubts and suspicions which have been so freely cast on it. If the language of a passage is found from parallels elsewhere to be in accordance with the usage of Aristotle or other Greek writers, it is evident that corrections based on the assumption of its faultiness may be at once put out of court.

The Introduction is mainly on the two questions which divide the critics of the text at the present moment, the relation between the MS. known as A e and the Renaissance MSS., and the value of the Greek readings which are, or are believed to be, recoverable from the Arabic Version. I have endeavoured to show that the new light we think to get from this Oriental quarter is often that of a mere ignis fatuus, and that the utmost caution is to be used before we allow ourselves to follow its guidance, when the Arabic text diverges in any serious degree from that of our Greek authority.

Aristotle's theory of epic and tragic poetry, as put before us in the Poetics, is presented with such ad-
mirable brevity that I have not deemed it necessary to go over the ground in a preliminary survey of the contents of the book. Nor have I ventured on a discussion of the problem of his general theory of Poetry and Art, as it would require a volume by itself to deal with a matter of such extreme complexity, and we should be taken away at times in the course of the inquiry into regions of thought remote from the avowed subject of the Poetics. The statements and hints in the book would have to be eked out by the aid of others in other writings, wherever passages are to be discovered which have, or seem to have, some sort of aesthetic import; and the data thus collected would have to be made to hold together as parts of a consistent theory. Aristotelian Theories of Art constructed in this way are not unlike the Aristotelian systems of Logic, of which we have seen so many; the parts are Aristotle's, but the synthesis is always to some extent our work, not his. And I cannot repress a suspicion that if he could come back to life again, he would be surprised to find how large a meaning we are able to read into some of his more incidental utterances. We must not forget, too, that the very idea of a Theory of Art is modern, and that our present use of this term 'Art' does not go further back than the age of Winckelmann and Goethe. Aristotle recognizes various analogies between the plastic arts and certain forms of poetry and music; he sees in them, for instance, a common element, 'imitation', by which he generally means the portrayal of humanity and life, 'what men do or suffer'—though the term has no doubt a wider sense in places even in the Poetics. And there are other ideas also in his writings which we should regard as coming under Aesthetics. But they were most of them already
current in his time; and there is very little to show that he had ever thought them out sufficiently to reduce them to system even in his own mind.

The book taken as it is, with perhaps an occasional side-light from some of his other works, is intelligible enough; after a brief introduction he gives us in outline all that he has to say on the subject immediately before him, the technique of the Drama and the Epic. He tells one in fact how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the Rhetoric he tells one how to make a good speech. And in doing this he has succeeded in formulating once for all the great first principles of dramatic art, the canons of dramatic logic which even the most adventurous of modern dramatists can only at his peril forget or set at naught.

It is but right to remember, however, that Tragedy, as Aristotle himself conceives it, is still in many important points and characteristics the Greek form of that art, and that it is limited in various ways by the conditions and conventions of the Greek theatre, not only in the accidents of its stage presentation, but also in its form and structure, its motives and its subjects; so that even as literature Aristotle’s ideal play would have been an essentially Greek play. But if I am not mistaken, his theory has some further limitations. His ideal play would seem to be in many respects a compromise between the play of the great era and that of his own day; he was writing for men of a generation living some seventy years after the death of Euripides, and there is the mark of the age on a good deal of what his theory lays down or assumes. The diction of the tragic dialogue, he thinks, should approximate to that of conversation, the choice of words being like that in the stylistic prose of oratory—as we
may presume it was with Theodectes and some of his contemporaries. Though he disapproves in a well-known passage of the intercalary chorica of the Drama of the time, this is a merely academical expression of opinion and a counsel of perfection; it is clear that he has practically come to regard the Chorus as a sort of negligible quantity, and that that is the ultimate explanation of his persistent silence about it. Even in his theory of the Plot, which he has worked out with so much thought, he is ready to make concessions to the weakness of the audiences in an age which had become too humanitarian to accept the strong situations allowed in the older Tragedy. I mention this because one is apt to forget that in the seventy years before Aristotle Tragedy must have undergone many changes, though perhaps not for the better, and that we cannot always expect to reconcile the practice of the older poets with his rules, or his rules with the practice of the older poets. If his theory of Comedy had come down to us, we should probably find it more applicable to the New Comedy than to that of Aristophanes.

An editor in these days can hardly hope to do much to advance the interpretation of a book which has been so carefully studied and re-studied by a long succession of editors and translators, many of them among the more illustrious names in the history of classical learning. And apart from editions and translations, we have now an incalculable number of contributions to the criticism and illustration of the book, scattered about partly in special articles and monographs, and partly in other writings, which have often no direct or overt relation to the Poetics themselves. The references in the Adnotatio Critica and Commentary will show the extent to which I have been able to use this sporadic literature.
My first and chief debt is to Vahlen, whose Beiträge mark, as all know, an epoch in the modern history of the Poetics, and whose edition has done so much to put the criticism of the text on its true basis, and to keep it within the limits of philological reason. If I have not always found it possible to accept his views on doubtful points or passages, it was assuredly not through any lack of regard for them, or in forgetfulness on my part of his very great services to Aristotelian learning. Speaking of predecessors, an English editor may be permitted to render his tribute of recognition to his English predecessors, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, and Twining. Goulston’s paraphrase, with the marginal commentary which accompanies it, is in a sense the most helpful of the earlier versions, since it is a definite attempt to explain the logical sequence of Aristotle’s ideas, and thus to deal with difficulties of a kind of which the sixteenth-century interpreters would seem to have been unconscious. Tyrwhitt needs no eulogy; his Poetics, both in the translation and in the notes—the one fault of which is that they are so few—show a combination of originality and scholarship which puts him in the first rank among the scholars of the period between Bentley and Porson. And as to Twining, whatever one may think of his translation, his commentary must always have a value as the work of a remarkably well-read man—one familiar, as few are now, with all the best literature, whether ancient or modern.

It is difficult for me to say how much this book owes to the kind assistance of my old friend, Mr. A. O. Prickard, late Fellow of New College, who besides consenting to read the proofs gave me throughout on countless doubtful points the benefit of his own very accurate
knowledge and long study of the Poetics. In the Translation, I think, there is hardly a page to be found without amendments due to his insight and fine sense of language.

I have to thank Mr. R. W. Chapman of Oriel for much timely help in the last stage of the preparation of this volume. It is perhaps needless to add that the present, like so many other Oxford books, is not a little indebted to the attention it has received from the vigilant Corrector of the Clarendon Press.

I. B.
INTRODUCTION

I

The form and structure of the existing Poetics.

The text of the Poetics has been supposed to have suffered more seriously than most prose Greek texts in the process of transmission; and many scholars accordingly have allowed themselves a very free hand in dealing with its difficulties. One cannot help suspecting, however, that not a few of their doubts and suspicions start from a certain preconceived idea, inherited from the Middle Ages, of the general character of the Aristotelian writings—that the ‘master of them that know’ could never for a moment forget his logic; that his mind worked with all the sureness of a machine; and that a treatise of his must not only have been written throughout on the straightest lines, but also have left his hands as free from oversights and inconsistencies as a modern published work is expected to be. The untenableness of these assumptions, as thus stated, is obvious, and no one, I imagine, would confess to them in so many words. But it is impossible to read much of the current criticism on the Poetics without seeing that its working hypothesis is in many instances what I have said.

Aristotle, with all his scientific formalism, is even as a thinker much more human than we are apt to suppose; his writing, too, is marked by great inequalities, passages of admirable lucidity and finish being often followed by a stretch of text in a style so curt and crabbed as to be the despair of his interpreters, ancient as well as modern. The Poetics begin fairly well, but as the work advances there are signs of failing attention to form, and the statement becomes in places little better than a series of notes. The continuity also of the exposition is frequently broken by
parentheses, sometimes on matters of very minor importance for the immediate argument. The digression on the λόγος ἀπὸ μηχανῆς in chap. 15 is a clear instance of matter out of place. We may explain it psychologically, as arising by a natural association of ideas out of the preceding context (15, 1454 a 33–6); but its logical place was assuredly not in a chapter devoted to the ἶθη. Hermann went so far as to take it out of its present setting, and insert it after τέλος in 18, 1455 b 32, not seeing that in thus removing one difficulty he was only creating another.

Judged by our modern standards of literary correctness the Poetics are perpetually open to criticism; but the anomalies and informalities, if I may use the word, are too numerous to be removed by the ordinary emendatorial artifices. Among these anomalies of language or thought the following may be noted:

(1) The anticipatory use of technical terms, which are defined afterwards; e.g.

ἀπλοῖς μῦθοι: its meaning is assumed in 9, 1451 b 33; and it is defined later on, in chap. 10.

λόγος (as a term of grammar or logic): defined in 20, 1457 a 24; but the term had appeared before this in the same sense in 20, 1457 a 6.

λίσις: used without explanation in 15, 1454 a 37, and defined in 18, 1455 b 26.

περιπέτεια and ἀναγινώσκεις: used in 6, 1450 a 34, and explained afterwards in chap. 11.

To account for this kind of procedure I have suggested elsewhere (Festschrift für Th. Gomperz p. 164) that most of these and similar technical terms may have been already sufficiently recognized and established in the language of the period, and that Aristotle only defines them for a special reason, in the interest of scholastic precision or clearness. This postponement of explanation, however, is not peculiar to the Poetics. We have an instance in the Nicomachean Ethics, where προαιρετικὴν, προαίρεσις, and προαιρετική are assumed in Bk. II and explained afterwards in Bk. III. Another instance is the use of κάθαρσις in Pol. 8. 6, the term being in the next chapter (8. 7, 1341 b 38) regarded as one requiring explanation.
(2) Variations of terminology. Aristotle does not always adhere to the same terms even when dealing with the same technical ideas. Thus in chap. 1 he has two terms for the musical element in poetry, μέλος and αρμονία; and two for the literary element also, μέτρον and λόγος. In the same way in chap. 18 the intrigue in a play is termed δέσις in one place and πλοκή in another.

(3) Inconsistency in the use of terms. The following are some of the instances of it:

άπλούς μύθος: the opposite of the πεπληγμένως μύθος in 10, 1452\textsuperscript{a} 12, and that of the διπλούς μύθος in 13, 1453\textsuperscript{a} 13.

ἐπεισόδιον: sometimes a dramatic 'act', sometimes an 'insertion'.

ἐπιεικής: in 15, 1454\textsuperscript{b} 13 it is said that the tragic hero should be, and in 13, 1452\textsuperscript{b} 34 that he should not be, ἐπιεικής.

μυειάθαι: in 3, 1448\textsuperscript{a} 20 and elsewhere it includes the narrative form of imitation; in 24, 1460\textsuperscript{a} 8 it excludes it.

ὁμοίος, said of a dramatic personage, has one sense in 2, 1448\textsuperscript{a} 6 and another in 15, 1454\textsuperscript{a} 24, \textsuperscript{b} 10.

πάθος, though generally used in the theatrical sense defined in 11, 1452\textsuperscript{b} 11, has in two passages (17, 1455\textsuperscript{a} 31; 19, 1456\textsuperscript{a} 38) another sense, that of 'feeling' or 'emotion'.

συλλαβή: its use in 21, 1458\textsuperscript{a} 2, though recognized in common parlance, is not in accordance with the definition in 20, 1456\textsuperscript{b} 35.

These and similar inconsistencies of language are obviously mere accidents of expression, which mislead no one; and it would have been easy to remove them on revision, if the Poetics had ever undergone that process. But, if I am not mistaken, there is evidence, at any rate here and there, of a more serious kind of inconsistency, actual inconsistency of thought.

(4) Inconsistency of thought. The following seem to be instances of this:

In 2, 1448\textsuperscript{a} 4 we are told that the tragic personage is not ὤμοιος but βελτίων ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς, and in 13, 1453\textsuperscript{a} 5 that he must be ὤμοιος, one like ourselves. The discrepancy is not difficult of explanation. In chap. 2 Aristotle is thinking only of the distinction between Tragedy and Comedy. In chap. 13, on the other hand, where the question before him is the emotional effect of Tragedy, he has come to see that, if we
are to ‘fear’ for the tragic hero, he must be ὀμοιος, more or less like ourselves—that being the condition of our human sympathy with him. Aristotle appears to have been not unconscious of the change of view, since in the summary in 13, 1453 a 16 he modifies his second formula, and writes ἣ οἷον ἑρήμων [i.e. ὀμοιος] ἣ βελτίων μᾶλλον ἢ χείρων, where the alternative ἣ βελτίων is obviously intended to bring the statement into line, as far as can be, with that in chap. 2. In 13, 1453 a 22 he approves of a drama with an unhappy ending even when kinsmen are concerned, and declares it to be the theoretically best form of tragedy, ἣ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστην τραγῳδία. But in the following chapter (14, 1454 b 4) he tells us that there is something better than this: when kinsmen are concerned it is best for the unhappy ending to be evaded by means of a timely Discovery. It is clear that he has become aware of there being something μικρὸν in the ordinary tragic situations, and feels that it is to be avoided or reduced to a minimum.

In 23, 1459 b 1 the superior Unity in the two Homeric poems as compared with the later epics is distinctly asserted on the ground that the action in the latter is at best only μία πράξεις πολυμερής. In 26, 1462 b 8, however, a different view is taken of the Iliad and Odyssey, which are said to be each made up of several actions or parts; in other words, the action in them is conceived as being what Aristotle had previously described as μία πράξεις πολυμερής. The exigencies of the argument in chap. 26 have betrayed him into a statement at variance with that in chap. 23; and he has omitted to bring them into formal concordance by modifying one or the other.

In 24, 1459 b 8 in his desire to find points of agreement between epic poetry and Tragedy he tells us that the species of the Epic correspond with those of Tragedy, i.e. with those enumerated in 18, 1455 b 32. But with the text as it stands in the tradition the correspondence cannot be made out. The only possible way of bringing the two statements into harmony is that adopted by Vahlen, who has to assume a lacuna in 18, 1455 b 34 and also to accept a very arbitrary and improbable conjecture, τερατῶδες, in 18, 1456 a 2.
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(5) Lapses of memory. That his memory was sometimes at fault is the only explanation of his misleading account of the Peripety of the Oedipus in 11, 1452 a 24, and of his misquotations from the Iliad in 25, 1461 a 16. But there are also, I think, signs of haste and inexactitude even in some of his references to matters within the Poetics themselves— at any rate in the following instances:—

6, 1450 b 13 ὡσπερ πρῶτερον εἶρηται. The reference is to 6, 1449 b 34—where a different definition is given.
18, 1455 b 32 τοσαύτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἑλέχθη.
18, 1456 a 11 ὀπέρ πολλὰκας εἶρηται.

The second and third of these three references are clearly inexact, and have even created a doubt as to the soundness of the text. At the same time one cannot but see that the first reference, that in 1450 b 13, is equally open to criticism, though no one seems to have thought it necessary to suggest an alteration of text in that passage.

Difficulties and anomalies of this description, i.e. in isolated passages, are not peculiar to the Poetics; they are certainly to be found from time to time in other Aristotelian writings, e.g. in the De Anima, the Rhetoric, and perhaps even the Nicomachean Ethics. I may now leave them, and pass on to a larger question, the difficulties in the general plan and structure of the whole. The scheme of the work as a whole is admirably simple and logical, comprising five main parts or sections:—

1. A preliminary discourse on Tragedy, epic poetry, and Comedy, as the chief forms of imitative poetry, and the subject of the inquiry that is to follow (chaps. 1—5).
2. Definition of a tragedy, and the rules for its construction (chaps. 6—22).
3. Rules for the construction of an epic (chaps. 23—4).
4. Enumeration of the criticisms to which an epic or tragedy may be subjected, and of the various possible replies to them (chap. 25).
5. A comparison of epic poetry and Tragedy, showing the artistic superiority of the latter (chap. 26).
The chief difficulties usually found in the book are in the contents and arrangement of the second section, that dealing with the rules for the construction of a tragedy. Read as it stands, with its matter in the traditional order, the main points in it may be said to be in brief as follows:—

1. Definition of a tragedy (6, 1449 b 24).
2. Analysis of a tragedy into its qualitative parts, μῦθος, ἡθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, ὁψίς; the two last being set aside as not coming within an Art of Poetry (chap. 6).
3. The μῦθος: the general rules for the construction of a μῦθος, and the Unity of action required in every form of it (chaps. 7-11).
4. A note or postscript on the quantitative parts of a tragedy (chap. 12).
5. The special rules for the tragic μῦθος viewed as a means of producing the emotional effect of Tragedy (chaps. 13-14).
6. Rules for the ἡθος of the tragic personages, with a parenthetic note on the use of the μηχανή in Drama (chap. 15).
7. Appendix to the foregoing: i. the various forms of Discovery; ii. certain additional rules to be remembered in practice in the construction of a play (chaps. 16-18).
8. The διάνοια of the tragic personages (chap. 19).
9. The λέξις in Tragedy: i. the ultimate constituents of language; ii. the different kinds of terms; iii. the characteristics of the language of poetry, and the limits to be observed in the use of poetical words and forms (chaps. 20-22).

The above is a synopsis of this section as it might be read by any one prepared to accept the text in the form in which it has come down to us. The doubts which have been thrown on it are of two kinds: (1) the genuineness of certain chapters is questioned; and (2) the order in which the materials now appear is thought to deviate more or less from that of Aristotle himself.

1. The chapters which so many scholars reject as interpolations are chap. 12 and chap. 20. The argument on the other side I must reserve for the Commentary (on 12, 1452 b 14 and 20, 1456 b 20), as the question is too complex to be dealt with in an Introduction.
2. The difficulties in the traditional order of the matter have been met by a free use of transposition. Hermann, for instance, transfers the paragraph on the λίτες ἀπὸ μηχανῆς from chap. 15 (1454b 37-8) to chap. 18, inserting it there after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους in 1455b 32. Susemihl goes further: he lifts the whole of chap. 15 out of its place, in order to make it come immediately after chap. 18. They were both only following hand passibus aequis in the steps of Daniel Heinsius, who went to much greater lengths in this direction. The following comparative table may give an idea of the liberties Heinsius took in his rearrangement of the text:

| Heinsius, c. vii | = chap. 12. |
| "          | c. xiii = chap. 16. |
| "          | c. xiv = 1452b 9-13 + 13, 1452b 30 sqq. |
| "          | c. xv = chap. 14. |
| "          | c. xvi = 13, 1452b 28-30 + chap. 17. |
| "          | c. xvii = chap. 18. |
| "          | c. xviii = chap. 15. |

The changes Heinsius adventured were never wholly motiveless, but the section as thus reformed by him is almost a reductio ad absurdum of this mode of critical procedure. The underlying assumption is that Aristotle, having planned out his work from beginning to end with careful prevision and in accordance with a severely logical scheme, must have thought of everything he had to say in its predestined logical place, and was incapable of saying anything except in its logical place. We have no right to assume this of Aristotle; he was not writing, like Isocrates, for the great world, or with the responsibilities of publication ever before his eyes. But the chief objection to the procedure of the transpositionists is that no vera causa can be assigned for the structural disorder it presupposes. Our ordinary experience of MSS. and the textual faults they sometimes present supplies nothing analogous, nothing that will serve to explain the phenomena. The only conceivable hypothesis is that the Aristotelian materials survived at first simply on loose tablets, or sheets, as we should say; that each one of these contained a definite piece of text of varying
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length, sometimes that of a chapter, and sometimes that of one of the sections or paragraphs of a modern edition; and that the whole was put into its present shape by an early editor. All this, however, is mere surmise. And if there ever was an early editor with a free hand to arrange the materials as he thought fit, the presumption is that his logical instinct would have led him to the same view of the position of chap. 15, for instance, as Heinsius, Susemihl, and others have taken in modern times.

II

The lost Second Book.

Victorius was the first to see that the treatise now known as the Poetics is only the surviving portion of a larger work. The fact is sufficiently assured by the note in the index of Aristotelian writings in Diogenes Laertius (5, 21), who describes the work as being in two Books:

πραγματείας τέχνης ποιητικῆς ἀβ.

We have no further direct testimony to the existence of a Second Book. The additional evidence which is sometimes quoted, that of the Arabic version of the index ascribed to Ptolemaeus ‘the Philosopher’ (v. Berlin Aristotle 1470b), may be set aside without discussion, as having little or nothing to do with our present Poetics (Rose, Aristotelis Fragmenta ed. Teubn. p. 20; Littig, Andronikos von Rhodos 1 p. 38).

Our present Poetics, if we may take the work at its face value, as a fairly complete and consecutive whole so far as it goes, may be regarded as Bk. I of the original treatise. There are certainly indications of there being more to follow; and its concluding paragraph also is in form exactly like the summaries which Aristotle so constantly introduces in other writings, to mark a transition from one section of his general subject to another. That there was even in the latest Aristotelian schools some faint tradition of another
Book is shown by the reference in Eustratius on the Ethics (p. 320 Heylbut) to Poet. 4, 1448b 30, who speaks of the passage as being ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ περὶ ποιητικῆς [i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀ περὶ ποιητικῆς]. As for Bk. II, one thing is quite clear, that it was wanting in the common archetype of Σ, the MS. before the eighth century Syriac translator, and A, our oldest Greek MS. We cannot fix the date of its disappearance; it is practically certain, however, that the loss must have occurred during the papyrus period of the text, when Bk. II was still on a separate roll, so as to be easily detached from Bk. I, which was on another roll. The view of Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 48) is that it survived into the fifth century, and that the statement in Proclus [v. Fr. V note] of the Aristotelian Catharsis theory was based on a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle’s text. The actual words of Proclus hardly justify such a conclusion:

τούτῳ δ’ οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παρασχῦν αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμῆν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων ...

It will be observed that Proclus refers not only to Aristotle but also to other apologists for the Drama; it is quite possible, therefore, that it was from one of the latter rather than Aristotle himself that he derived his knowledge of the Aristotelian idea of catharsis. And in the context in place of the Aristotelian term he substitutes as synonyms ἀφοσίωσις and ἀπέρασις—neither of these words being found either in this or in any other sense in the extant writings of Aristotle.

In Byzantine times Bk. II was so completely forgotten that the inscription of the existing Poetics in A is simply Περὶ ποιητικῆς, and not Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀ, as it would have been if the memory of Bk. II had survived. There is no evidence to show that the later Grammarians knew of Bk. II, or of the theory of Comedy which must have formed part of it. But there is evidence showing it to have been unknown to them. The so-called Tractatus Coislinianus (Kaibel, C G F. 1 p. 50–3) preserves a definition of Comedy, which has no doubt a certain Aristotelian look; any one can see, however, by simple inspection that it is nothing more than
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an adaptation, or rather, as Bernays calls it, a travesty, of the well-known definition of Tragedy in the existing Poetics (6, 1449 b 24):—

TRACT. COISL.

κωμῳδία ἐστὶ μέμησις πράξεως γελοίων καὶ ἀμοίρων μεγέθους τελείους χωρίς ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων ἐν τοῖς εἶδοι, δρώντων καὶ ᾧν ἀπαγγελίας, ᾧν ἰδέως καὶ γέλως περαινοῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων καθάρσιν.

ARISTOTLE.

ἐστίν οὖν κωμῳδία μέμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχουσης, ἕνυσμενὰ λόγῳ χωρίς ἐκάστου [50 Λο] τῶν εἴδων ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ ᾧν ἀπαγγελίας, ᾧν εἰλίω καὶ φόβῳ περαινοῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων καθάρσιν.

It is evident that neither the compiler of the Tractatus nor the older writer from whom he may have been borrowing had the genuine Aristotelian definition of Comedy before him, and that the gap in knowledge had to be filled up by means of the above sorry fabrication. The same marks of origin are observable in what the Tractatus says of the 'matter' of Comedy:—

κωμῳδίας ὡλη, μῦθος θῆσθα διάνοια λέεις μέλος ὑψί (comp. Poet. 6, 1450 a 9);

and of the parts into which Comedy is divided:—


The date of this réchauffé cannot be determined; but an approximation to that of its 'source' may perhaps be hazarded, as the same enumeration of the 'parts' of Comedy appears in Tzetzes (Kaibel, C G F. 1 p. 21; comp. p. 28), who quotes it as that of a certain Euclides—a grammarian of doubtful date but apparently of the classical period. It would seem, therefore, that even at the time of this Euclides Bk. II of the Poetics was lost or inaccessible. It is difficult to believe that, in the course of a comparatively short treatise, Aristotle repeated himself in the purely mechanical fashion of these later compilations on Comedy.
Although Bk. II is now lost, there are indications in Aristotle himself which may give us some idea of the ground it must have covered. It may be taken to have comprised (1) the discussion on Comedy promised in Poet. 6, 1449 b 21, and (2) the Catharsis theory to which reference is made in Pol. 8, 7, 1341 b 32 (v. Fr. V). What we are told in more than one passage in the Rhetoric (v. Fr. III) is enough to show that τα γελοια, the appointed subject of Comedy, must have been considered and examined with the same analytical care as in the treatment of τα φοβερα και ἑλευνα in the surviving theory of Tragedy. And if his theory of Comedy was on much the same lines as that of Tragedy, Aristotle must have had something to say on the μυθοι of Comedy, and also on the ἕθος and λέγεις of the comic personages. The strange expression in Fr. IV, τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντίσαν, may perhaps have been in its original setting an illustration of the possibilities in the way of diction in Comedy. As for the Catharsis theory, the only place we can imagine for it would be, as Vahlen (Aristotelische Aufsätze 3 p. 10) has seen, at the end of Bk. II. In such a position it would come in naturally enough, as a final word on the whole subject of the Drama, justifying the existence of both Tragedy and Comedy in reply to the polemic of Plato in the Republic. The discussion itself can hardly have been a brief one. The subject was too large and too controversial to be disposed of in some one or two short chapters.

III

History of the Poetics.

The history of the book in the classical period is obscure. Much of its teaching and terminology survives in the later literature of compilation, but the book itself seems to have been after a time either ignored or but little studied. There are no traces of an ancient commentary on it, and comparatively few citations, acknowledged or unacknowledged, in ancient writers. Several of the citations, too, are manifestly
second-hand. This may be said also even of the reminiscences of Aristotelian ideas in Polybius, and in the Ars Poetica of Horace; for there is reason to think that Polybius was only following Eratosthenes, and Horace his Greek authority, Neoptolemus of Parium. The more important of the ‘Testimonia’ are noted in their place in the Commentary. Many other more latent references are to be found in the Grammarians, as may be seen from the texts collected in the following monographs:—

Trendelenburg: Grammaticorum graecorum de arte tragica iudiciorum reliquiae (Bonn 1867).

Westphal: Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien (Leipz. 1869).

Kaibel: Die Prolegomena ΠΕΠΙ ΚΩΜΟΙΑΙΑΣ (Berl. 1898).

Adam: Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos (Wiesb. 1889).

Carroll: Aristotle’s Poetics, c. xxv, in the light of the Homeric Scholia (Baltimore 1895).

Apart from the fact of our oldest Greek MS. (A9) having been written somewhere about the year 1000, there is little or no indication of any interest in the book among the Greeks of the Middle Ages. It is clear, however, that it found readers in the East, as it was translated into Syriac in the eighth century, and from the Syriac into Arabic in the eleventh. The Commentary of Averroes, which was based on this Arabic version, was rendered before long into Hebrew, and also, under the title of Aristotelis Poetria (Jourdain, Recherches Critiques ² p. 141), by Hermannus Alemannus into Latin. Roger Bacon (Op. Mai. 1 p. 101 Bridges) knew the work of Hermannus, but not the Greek Poetics or any Latin version made directly from the Greek. The Poetics were not among the many Aristotelian and other philosophic Greek books which found translators in the thirteenth century, when the Latin occupation opened up the Byzantine world to the Westerns. The Rhetoric was translated at this time, but its fellow treatise was left out in the cold.

The modern history of the book begins in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Greek text itself now became known among the learned in Italy; and at the end of the century (1498) the first translation from it, that by
G. Valla, was given to the world. It is difficult to see why the Poetics were not included in the great Aldine Aristotle of 1495-8. The many Renaissance MSS. which we still have are enough to show that the book must have been accessible and in the hands of not a few of the earlier humanists. Valla certainly had a MS. to work on. Politian is known to have been a former possessor of one of the Laurentian MSS. (LX. 14); and his acquaintance with the book is proved by his reference to a well-known passage (Poet. 1, 1447 b 21) in his Panepistemon (1483): *Tum illa obscuriora poematum genera, ithyphallicum, manerus [i.e. maneros] borinus, lytierces [from Athenaeus]. Et item qualis centaurus ille Chaeremonis: quae communi vocabulo poemata dicuntur.*

The *editio princeps* of the Greek text appeared at length in 1508 in what is usually reckoned as Vol. I of the Aldine Rhetores Graeci. It was no little misfortune to learning that, instead of following one of the better apographs, the editor, Demetrius Ducas, sent the text forth in a form which is an almost ideal instance of what a first edition should not be. Who was responsible for the systematic corruptions in the Aldine we cannot now say; one may suspect, however, that the chief offender was no other than Ducas himself—more especially as he claims credit in his preface for the pains he had taken in the correction of the texts in the new volume: τοῖς τῶν βιβλίων, he says, τολλὰ πονησάντες καὶ μοχθήσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἀντιγράφων οἰς ἐνετύχομεν τῶν φιλολόγοις δωρθώσαμεν. The general characteristics of this Aldine text will be examined further on. Here it may be enough to note that the prestige of an Aldine caused it to hold its ground for more than three centuries as a sort of textus receptus; it was, in fact, with some few minor improvements, accepted by editor after editor, and scholar after scholar. In 1555 an effort was made to dislodge it from this position by Gu. Morel, whose recension was based on the MS. now known as Parisinus 2040, a fairly faithful apograph of Αε. Morel’s edition, however, notwithstanding his great name among his contemporaries, left little or no mark on the general criticism of the book; its readings are all but ignored in the *Variaelectiones* in Sylburg’s edition (1584). Several of the sixteenth
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century editors (Paccius, Madius, Robortellus, Victorius) had access to MSS.; but they did little more than turn to them from time to time for a new reading in some particular passage; it does not seem to have occurred to them to raise the larger question of the value and credentials of the Aldine text. Even Victorius, who had had A⁰ in his hands before it left Florence, and was fully aware of its great antiquity, failed to see its superiority as a basis for the text to the Aldine vulgate. Writing in 1560 he says: Videram ipse olim ac diligenter tractaram volumen quoddam antiquissimum in quo ... hic etiam liber esset, nihilò melior illic ille multis locis quam pervulgatus quilibet typisque excusus erat. Quare desperavi: aliquid boni inde posse expectari. And as late as 1831 Bekker, with a fairly complete collation of A⁰ before him, retained nevertheless not a few of the Aldine emblematas. This illusory idea of the value of the Aldine lasted on until 1839, when Ritter at last raised his voice against it, and set it aside as based on a M.S. 'non solùm multis vitiis librariorum culpa depravatum, sed etiam ab Aldo alisque eruditis Italiae viris modo correctum modo interpolatum et corruptum.' It remained for Spengel (1865-6) and Vahlen (1867) to carry Ritter's theory a step further by recognizing the unique authority of A⁰ as the one record of the Greek textual tradition, and the ultimate parent of all our Renaissance texts. There is no doubt a tendency just at present to question this conclusion owing to the effect on opinion of the recently published Arabic Version, which is found to confirm some of the better readings in the Renaissance MSS.; the fact is supposed to imply the survival into Renaissance times of some memory of a text independent of that in A⁰. The point will have to be considered at length in a later section of this Introduction.

IV

The existing data for the constitution of the Text.

If we may disregard for the present the testimony of the Renaissance MSS., as being all of them apographs of the MS. known as A⁰, our authorities for the textual tradition
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of the Poetics are reduced to two, (1) \( A^o \), and (2) in a less definite way, the traces and indications of another Greek text recoverable from the Arabic Version and the surviving fragment of the lost Syriac Version.

\( A^o \).

\( A^o \), i.e. Parisinus 1741, is part of a volume which contains not only the Poetics but also the Rhetoric and several post-Aristotelian works on Rhetoric. In the sixteenth century it was examined by Victorius, while it was still in Florence. Since then it has been repeatedly collated; first by an unnamed friend of Burgess (perhaps Coray) for the critical Appendix to Tyrwhitt's edition (1794); then by Bekker for the Berlin Aristotle (1831); and lastly by Vahlen and others. A description of it, with a full account of its history, will be found in M. H. Omont's Introduction to the facsimile edition of the text published in 1891 by M. F. Allegre. The date of this fine specimen of Byzantine calligraphy is saec. x–xi.

It is hardly possible to overrate the critical value of the texts in the volume. For the non-Aristotelian writings preserved in it it is our first, if not our only, textual authority. In the case of Demetrius \( \Pi \varepsilon \rho i \ \varepsilon \rho \mu \nu \nu \varepsilon i a s \) it is acknowledged to be the archetype of the later MSS., which 'are all derived from P. 1741, the better readings they present pointing rather to individual emendation than to difference of descent' (Rhys Roberts, after Usener). Usener recognizes it as our one great authority for the text of the various treatises of Dionysius included in the volume, and puts aside the later MSS. as being all of them 'apographa exempli Parisini'. Though it cannot be shown to be of such unique importance for Aristotle's Rhetoric, it is confessedly our best source for the text, and a more faithful representative of the common archetype than any of the later MSS. or the version of William of Morbeka (v. Roemer, Praef. p. xxv).

In the Poetics \( A^o \) must always claim the premier place, even if the Arabic Version now and then supplies a better reading or corrects some of its more patent scribal errors. Its general
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credibility as a fairly faithful record of a much older text is sufficiently obvious. (1) It retains errors which go back to the uncial stage of the text; e.g. Διδόμενα for 'Λιδόμενα in 1456 a 28, Δίασ for Λίας in 1462 b 3, Μαθημάτων for Παθημάτων in 1449 b 28. (2) It retains in places traces of an antique spelling1; e.g. πάλμυκρον and πανμέγεθες in 1450 b 37–9, ἐνχεια in 1461 a 2, πλέω in 1461 a 26. (3) Although the text of the ancient archetype was constantly misunderstood by the scribe responsible for accents and breathings, there are but few signs of an attempt to alter the actual letter of the original scripture continua in order to accommodate it to its misconceptions of its meaning.

The following synopsis of errors in Ae may incidentally serve to indicate the kinds of assumption on which the more convincing corrections of the text are based. An asterisk is added when the amended reading is known to be confirmed by the Arabic Version or the Syriac fragment.

1. Confusions through similarity of letters:—

Διδόμενα = 'Λιδόμενα* 1456 a 28; Δειλίαν = 'Δει, λίαν 1461 b 28; Λίασ = Λίας 1462 b 3; Μαθημάτων = Παθημάτων* 1449 b 28; ε'Πει = ε'Πει 1455 b 19; Προμίδεσ = Τρομίδεσ 1459 b 7; οΗσ = δψις 1456 a 2 and 1458 a 5.

2. Confusions through similarity of pronunciation; a few typical instances must suffice:—

ε and αι: ται = τε 1454 b 4, 1458 a 28; σκεπτάια 1461 b 25.—κε = καί 1457 b 14; φαγάδενα 1458 b 23.

η and ι: οιχί = οιχί 1448 b 18; τιλέμαχον 1461 b 5.—σαλαμίη 1459 a 25; μηγνύν 1460 a 2.

η and ει: ἄν ειη = ἄνγει* 1455 a 27; εἰδει = ἑδει 1460 b 31.—δι = δει 1459 b 8, 1460 a 23; ἡ ορ = ει 1460 b 16 (etc.).

η and οι: τῆσ = τοις 1455 a 1; εἰπμι = εἰποι 1458 b 32; μηγνύν = μηγύνοι 1460 a 2.

ι and ει: πειθανόν (passim); εἰδεών 1456 b 3, 1458 b 18.—δψισ = δψεις 1450 a 13; ιαμβίον (passim).

ο and ω: τω = τω (passim); τοῦτο = τοῦτο 1451 b 4; γλοττών 1458 a 26. —οτρώ = ου το* 1451 a 36; χοροῦ = χοροῦ 1452 b 19; ἐπιπίπηλ τωι = ἐπετιμάτο 1455 a 26.

1 Comp. Meisterhans, Gr.® p. 112, and Crönert, Memoria graeca Herculanensis p. 57.
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3. Omission of ἀκαδον, a frequent phenomenon not only in τραγῳδια, κωμῳδια, ἄδειν, etc., but also in the inflexions of nouns and verbs:—

κοινή = κοινῆ 1447 b 15; ἀρετῆ = ἀρετῆ 1448 a 3; ἡ πλείστη = ἡ πλείστη 1454 b 20; ἡπτίθη = ἡπτίθη 1456 a 23.

4. Omission of final Ν:—

ου = οὐν 1447 b 28, 1461 a 1; ἐπεισοδίου = ἐπεισοδίουν 1455 b 1; νήπτρω = Νήπτρον 1460 a 26; οἰνοχοεῖα = οἰνοχοεῖαν 1461 a 30; αὐτὸ = αὐ τὸν 1453 a 1; ἀρώντα = ἀρωντ' ἄν 1455 a 27.

5. Confusions through general resemblance:—

σατυριακοῦ = σατυρικοῦ 1449 a 20; κίνησις = μίμησις 1459 b 37; ἀνάλογον = ἅλογον 1460 a 13; ἀναγρωσία = ἀναγρώσει 1462 a 17.

6. Errors through assimilation of terminations:—

πλειόνων συνδέσμων = πλειόνων συνδέσμῳ 1457 a 29; ἐν τῷ ὀνόματος σημαίνοντος = ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος* 1457 a 33; ἀλλοῦ δὲ τοῦτον ὄντος = ἀλλο ὑπὸ τοῦτον ὄντος 1450 a 23; τρίῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν = τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν 1445 b 27.

7. Errors in accents and breathings, these being often added on mechanically and without regard to rule or sense:—

μεγέθους 1451 a 15; περιπετεία 1452 a 33; ἀμφιβολία (= ἀμφιβολία) 1461 a 25; θεορηταὶ 1458 b 24.—Μεροπῆ 1454 a 5; Ἀγαθῶν 1454 b 14; κυκλωτάς, i.e. κυκλῳ πᾶς (= Κυκλωτάς) 1448 a 15; ἐνα λείψει (= ἐναλείψει) 1450 b 1; πᾶν μικρὸν (= πάνμικρον) 1450 b 37; ὡς τοῦ (= ὡς τ' οὗ) 1451 b 23; ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γε (= ἀλλως τε) 1456 a 4; ἀφώμη μὲν ὄντι (= ἀφώμη-μένον τι) 1458 a 3; οὐδένα ἦθη (= οὐδεν' ἦθη) 1460 a 11; τότε νομίζων (= τοτ' ἐνόμιζον) 1461 a 3.

8. Haplographia:—

προσπημαίνει 1456 a 17; συμβάλεται 1458 b 1; κόμι 1458 a 15; πανεχιον 1461 a 17.

9. Omission of letters or syllables:—

<ε>πλῆξεως 1455 a 17; <ἡ>μαρτήσαμ 1460 b 28; τι (= ὂτι) 1461 b 1; <οι>δίπουν 1462 b 2; χ<ε>ωνιδον* 1448 a 34; ὀτε (= οἵ τε) 1452 b 12; <ν>γ<ε>κιν* 1455 b 29; π<ε>θρον 1456 b 21; κινοῦντα<η> 1461 b 30; ηδονή (= ἤδον η) 1462 b 1.

10. Omission of words:—

tουκαίτα* 1447 b 25; ἀνώνυμος* 1447 b 9; λύσις* 1455 b 31; ἦ 1460 b 11, 1461 a 9; οὔ οὐ διϊν* 1450 a 30, 1455 b 17; οὐδέν* 1456 b 28; ὁ 1448 a 12, 1451 a 6; τὸ 1456 b 26; τοῦ 1461 a 19; οὗ 1462 a 3; καὶ ὁ 1448 a 25; καὶ Σ* 1458 a 9; ἦ μὴ 1460 b 27.
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11. Transposition, more especially of little words liable to omission:—

τὴν κατὰ = κατὰ τὴν 1447 b 15; τὸ κατὰ = κατὰ τὸ 1457 a 19; ἡ μία = μία ἡ 1462 b 3; καὶ τοιχύτης = τοιχύτης καὶ 1451 a 32; ἄν οἷ = οἷ ἄν 1453 a 37.

12. Dittographia:—

τοὐτοὺς = τοὺς 1455 a 34; ἐπείτα τὰ = ἐπεί τὰ 1460 a 14; ἔτι δὲ ἔτι δὲ 1459 b 7; θείη θείη 1462 b 2.

13. Repetition of words from the context:—

ὄσοι 1448 b 38; ἄν 1458 a 24, 1460 b 7; δὲ 1456 a 12, 1462 a 1; ὁσοι 1459 b 13; ἡμαρτήσθαι 1460 b 28; φιλε 1460 b 36; ἐστὶ 1462 a 7.

14. Marginalia in the body of the text. The following would seem to instances of the intrusion of such adscripts:—

ἐποποίησα 1447 a 28; πέντε 1450 b 16; παράδειγμα σκληρότητος 1454 b 14; ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου 1455 b 7.

15. Double readings in the text:—

1449 a 8 κρίνεται ὡν: it may be supposed to represent κρίνεται, i. e. κρίνεται and κρίναι (=κρίναι).

λικά

1449 a 11 παυλικά = παυλα, i. e. παύλα (which is implied in the Arabic Version) and παυλικά.

1452 a 3 καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον, i. e. μᾶλλον and μᾶλλον.

1457 b 14 ἀρίστασαι = ἀρίστας, i. e. ἀρίστας and ἀρίστας.

1461 a 33 σημαινοῦσα = σημαινο, i. e. σημαινο and σημαινει.

16. Errors due to an attempt to emend:—

1450 b 39 παμμέγεθεν] πᾶν μέγεθος Ακ— the compound having been misread as two words.

1451 a 28 οἷ ὧν λέγομεν οἷ ὧν λέγομεν Ακ— apparently through οἵ ὧν having been misread as οἵ ὧν.

1455 a 2 ἀπολύγῳ ἀπὸ λόγων Ακ— another instance of a misunderstood compound.

1455 a 16 ποιήσαι παραλογισμός*] ποιήσαι παραλογισμόν Ακ.

1455 a 26 ἐπιτιμάτο] ἐπιτιμά τῷ Ακ.

1457 a 17 τὸ δὲ βαδίζει[] τὸ δὲ βαδίζει Ακ.

1457 a 22 βάδιζε[] βάδιζεν Ακ— to make it harmonize with the preceding ἐβάδισεν.

1457 a 27 τῷ βαδίζει[] τῷ βαδίζει Ακ.

1461 b 2 ἐιρηκότος] ἐιρηκότες Ακ— to accommodate it to the preceding καταψύχομενα.
This last kind of error is assuredly a very serious one, because it implies a corrector who, instead of emending the text, left it worse than he found it. But corruptions like the above are not numerous; the general impression the MS. must produce is that it is a faithful record of a genuine textual tradition. A large proportion even of its mistakes have the stamp of antiquity upon them, since they often carry one back to the papyrus period of the text, before the accents and breathings were superimposed on the uncial scriptura continua. One of its more obvious faults is its tendency—which it shares with its fellow MS. of the Rhetoric—to omit words or little groups of words. The Arabic Version, which occasionally supplies the missing word or words, shows that the fault must have been in certain passages of comparatively late origin. There are other passages, however, in which the text underlying the Version seems to have been equally defective; in which case the common omissions point to omissions in the common archetype.

The Arabic Version.

Though the Arabic Version (A. V.) seems to have been long known to the French Orientalists, it was reserved for one of our own countrymen, Dr. D. S. Margoliouth, to face the manifold difficulties of the Arabic text, and give it to the world in a printed form in his 'Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam' in 1887. All students of the Poetics owe him a debt of gratitude for making the chief results of the Version accessible to them from the first by translating a series of select extracts into Latin, and by indicating in his notes the use that may be made of the Arabic renderings for the confirmation or criticism of the Greek text.

In the absence of a complete translation our estimate of the A. V. must be based on Dr. Margoliouth's notes and extracts; we may, however, supplement them to some extent from an article in Philologus L.V. by O. Immisch, who had before him a German translation (by Socin) of a longer and more consecutive specimen (1449a9-31) of the Arabic Version. The interpretation of the text (which survives in
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a single MS.) is, I understand, beset with difficulties. Even in the thirteenth century it was felt to be no easy matter by Hermannus Alemannus, an experienced translator from the Arabic, who gave the following as his excuse for evading the work of translation: Postquam cum non modico labore consummaveram translationem rhetoricae Aristotelis ex Arabico in Latinum, volens manum mittere ad eius poetriam tantam inveni difficultatem propter disconvenienciam modi metrificandi in Graeco cum modo metrificandi in Arabico et propter vocabulorum obscuritatem et plures alias causas, quod non sum confisus me posse sane et integre illius operis translationem studiis tradere Latinorum (Aristot. Rhet. lat. Ven. 1481 f. 1).

The use of the A.V. for us is that we are often able to look beyond it, so as to recover the readings of a Greek MS. which was at least three centuries anterior to Ae. But it must always be remembered that it was not made directly from the Greek, but from a now lost Syriac translation of the Greek; it is, therefore, the version of a version, and we have thus to discern the original text as best we can, through the distorting medium of two Oriental translations. In such a work, too, one must not always expect the close literalness we find in medieval Latin translations of Greek writings; nor need we assume a very exact knowledge of Greek on the part of the Syriac interpreter. And in the instance of the Poetics some allowance has to be made for the misconceptions of an Oriental without an idea of the nature of the subject-matter of the treatise. The possibilities of Oriental ignorance may be seen writ large in the Paraphrase of Averroes, which was based on the A.V. Averroes is fairly at home in the more philosophical and grammatical parts of the book; but its meaning, as a theory of Greek Tragedy, was from first to last a hopeless enigma to the great Aristotelian of Cordova.

A word or two must be said here on one of the more marked characteristics of the A.V., its tendency to amplify the text by alternative renderings. Thus in 1449 a 16 ὑποκριτῶν is represented by 'the hypocrites and dissemblers' ('Heuchler und Versteller', Socin), and χοροῦ in the following line by 'chori et cordacis' (Margoliouth), or 'the dance and the
roundel’ (Socin). In 1449* to μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μῦθων becomes ‘primus creavit ex parvis fabulis magnitudinem sermonis et vociferationem et tumultum in sermone’, i.e. with three alternative renderings for μέγεθος. Again in 1453* ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξα να ἀνάγκη ἢ μῆ καὶ εἴδοτας ἢ μῆ εἴδοτας is expanded into ‘necesse est enim aut faciat aut non faciat, cum faciat autem ut faciat sciens aut inscius sed scire destinans, praeterea aut scientibus aut insciis’; this plethora of words being primarily due to the translator’s inability to make up his mind about the accusatives εἴδοτας ἢ μῆ εἴδοτας—whether they were to be taken as appositional to the subject, or as the object, of πρᾶξα. It is clear that amplifications like these may be put down to the Syrian, the original translator—more especially as such alternative renderings are said to be not uncommon in Syriac translations from the Greek (v. Ryssel, Ueber den textkritischen Wert der syrischen Uebersetzungen griechischer Klassiker, II. p. 49).

In any use we may make of the A. V., two facts must always be borne in mind: (1) that the existing text, as it stands in the one MS. which preserves it, is disfigured by corruptions; and (2) that the Arabic translator was not incapable of misunderstanding the Syriac original. This Syriac original is no longer extant, but we need not suppose it to have been free from faults of its own; it is quite possible that its text was at times faulty, as also that the Syrian himself may have either misread or misinterpreted the Greek text before him. This last suspicion seems to be confirmed by the one fragment that survives of the Syriac Version, an excerpt from Poet. 6, 1449* 24–1450a* 9. I give it as rendered into Latin by Dr. Margoliouth (A. O. p. 54), with the Greek of A* en regard for purposes of comparison.

Tragoedia est imitatio actionis eximiae perfectae cui est magnitudo sermone incundo absque una quaque specierum quae in partibus agunt; neque per pollirationem sed per misericordiam et metum temperans pas

*Εστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μύης πράξεως σπονδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἑχούσης, ἧδυνενίω λόγῳ χωρίς ἐκάστοι τῶν εἴδων ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι’ ἀπαγ- γέλιας, δι’ ἐλέον καὶ φόβου περαι-
siones et faciens purgationem eorum qui patiuntur. Facitque hoc quidem sermo iucundus cui est magnitudo [rhythmus] et harmonia et melos; illud vero quod sine speciebus quod propter metra perficiuntur partes nonnullae; rursus alias quod per melos dum recitant, efficient imitationem actionem. Necessario erit pars tragoediae decor personae; tum inter haec opus musicum et elocutio; his enim faciunt imitationem. Dico autem elocutionem quidem ipsam compositionem metrorum: opus musicum vim apertam quam tota possidet. Quoniam imitatione actionem est, agitur vero ab hominibus agentibus iis quos necessitas cogat ut quales homines sint consuetudinibus suis et ingeniis; per enim haec etiam narrationes esse dicimus quales; [et] natural aptae quae existant duae causae ipsarum narrationum, ingenium et consuetudinum sunt; secundum enim haec eae quoque inveniuntur scopum attingentes omnes per haec et a scopo aberrantes. Est autem fabula narrationis imitatio. Dico autem fabulam compositionem actionem; consuetudines vero, quales quisque eorum qui narrant sit et dicatur; qui se tales esse ostendunt ingenii sui, et talem esse opinionem suam apparet. Necesse est ergo ut sint uniuicque tragoediae partes sex, quas supra diximus; secundum vim ipsam Tragoediae.
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It will be seen that in l. 7 the difficult word τοιούτων is ignored. In l. 5 the translator must have misconstrued the passage, taking δρῶντων with the preceding εἰδῶν. He represents πράττοντες in l. 13 by ‘dum recitant’; πράξεις in l. 26 by ‘narrationes’; and τοις πράττοντας in l. 35 by ‘qui narrant’. He expands εἶναι φαμέν in l. 35 into ‘sit et dicatur’; in l. 14 he adds ‘actionum’, and in l. 40 ‘quas supra diximus’. And in l. 20, and again in II. 36–8, his translation is obviously very wide of the mark. If the above, therefore, is a fair specimen of it, the Syriac Version cannot have been an accurate piece of work. This criticism, however, only applies to the translation as a translation. Our problem is to look beyond all this, so as to recover the Greek text— which the Syriac renderings would seem to presuppose. The following Σ readings recovered in this way deserve especial attention:

1. 4. χωρίς ἐκάστον τῶν εἰδῶν Σ, as also Λο.
1. 5. οὐ δὲ ἀπαγγέλλας, δὲ εἷς Σ— anticipating thus the twofold corruption in Pa (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine.
1. 7. παθημάτων Σ— confirming the corrector’s reading in Pa against Λο’s μαθημάτων.
1. 11. χωρίς τοῖς εἰδέσι] χωρίς τῶν εἰδῶν Σ— anticipating the corruption in Pa Aldine.
1. 29. καὶ κατὰ ταύτας] κατὰ γὰρ ταύτα καὶ αὕται Σ.

If the language of the fragment will bear the pressure thus put on it as a means of recovering the Σ readings, it is clear that the Σ text must have been at times faulty enough and vitiated by corruptions of a kind from which Λο is comparatively speaking exempt. The Σ readings, therefore, so far as they can be ascertained, must be considered on their individual merits, without any general assumption of their antecedent superiority to those of Λο. The greater antiquity of Σ is no decisive mark of superiority. In Plato an editor may have to follow an eleventh century MS. (T) in preference to the Clarkianus. For Strabo the eighth century Grotta Ferrata palimpsest is ‘nullius pretii’ according to Cobet (Misc. Crit. p. 87) by comparison with the Paris MS. of the eleventh century.
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The fallibility, however, of the Σ text may be seen on a larger scale in some of the readings recovered from the A.V. The following instances will show that Σ must have had errors of its own, and in many passages errors of a very arbitrary description, which would sadly mislead us, or defy emendation, if we had not Α° to set things right.

1447 a 27 ἀρχηστών] ἀρχηστρών Σ.
1448 a 13 παραθίας] τραγῳδίες Σ.
   — a 21 ἑπαγγέλλοντα] ἑπαγγέλλοντα Σ. Similarly in 1449 b 26 the Syriac (v. supra) presupposes ἑπαγγελίας, not ἑπαγγελίας.
   — b 19 χροών] χόρων Σ.
   — b 27 διοστή ἑτέρου ἵμμον καὶ ἑγκώμια] The A.V. 'postea panegyricum et laudem aliorum' implies ἑστερον ἑτέρων ὕμνους καὶ ἑγκώμια as the reading of Σ.
1449 a 11 φαυλικά] φαύλα Σ. The Α° reading φαυλικά is a conflation of φαυλα and φαλλικά.
   — b 16 ἐπεσιν] ἀπασιν ἐπεσιν Σ—a conflation of two readings.
1450 b 12 καθόλου τι] καθότι Σ.
   — b 34 ἐπί] ἐπὶ Σ (and again in 1451 a 31 and 1453 b 11).
1451 a 7 οὗ] Ὄ Σ.
   — ἐκατόν] ἐκαστὸν Σ.
   — b 21 ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεί] ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἐν θῇ Σ.
   — b 26 ὀλίγον γνώμια ομ. Σ, through the homoeoteleuton.
1452 b 8 ἀνδριάς] Ἀνδρέας Σ.
   — b 14 ἑτέρων] ἑταίρων Σ.
   — b 34 δε] δὲi Σ (also elsewhere).
1453 b 14 οὐ] οὐ Σ.
1455 a 2 ἀπολόγῳ] ἀπὸ λόγων Σ (with Α°).
   — a 33 ἐπιλαστοῦ] The rendering in A.V., 'simplices,' implies ἐπιλαστοῦ in Σ—an instance of the confusion of a and εν common in the minuscule script.
   — b 25 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν—δὲσιν ομ. Σ.
   — b 34 οὗ] ἡθικὴ om. Σ, through the homoeoteleuton.
1456 b 25 ἐνα δε] ἐν ἀδή Σ.
1459 b 23 ἦδον] ἦδον Σ.
1460 a 2 μνημόν] μὴ γνώιν Σ. The reading of the archetype of Σ and Α° was perhaps μνημόνιον; the Σ reading arose through a confusion of ου and υ, which is of comparatively late date.
   — a 11 οὐδεν] ἀδήθη] The A.V. rendering 'non introducens rem non assuetam' seems to imply οὐδὲν ἀνθέος—which would anticipate the corruption in Ρ a Aldine.
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1460 a 13 ἀλογον] ἀνάλογον Σ (with Λα).
1461 a 18 ἀδρήσειν] ἀδροίσειν Σ—an instance of the confusion of η and ο, which points to the Byzantine period.

It is clear, from the above series of readings recovered from the A. V., that the Σ text was not free from corruptions, and also that some of its errors were of recent date, of the Byzantine rather than the classical period. There are a few instances, too, of glosses intruded into the text. Thus in 1454 a 31 Σκελλη is represented in the A. V. by ‘Scylla maritima’, and in 1454 b 27 αλήθις by ‘pustula quae fuit in pede eius’. And in 1461 a 17 we find Σ adding ἵπποκράται, to make the quotation agree with the passage in Homer.

These indications of the Σ text, as known from the A.V., may be combined with those already observed in the Syriac Fragment, as leading to the general conclusion that, even if Σ were before us in its integrity, its readings would still have to be considered one by one on their merits. Its antiquity, as dating from the eighth century, would be only one element in the critical situation; we should still have to submit its readings to the usual tests; to judge of each by reference to the sense, the context, and the various criteria, internal and external, of philological probability. And we must never for an instant lose sight of the fact that after all Σ is not quite the same thing as an actual Greek MS. A Greek text recovered by art and inference from a version of a version—each of them in an Oriental language—is exposed at times to doubts and suspicions of a kind from which that of Λα is free.

Now that the first surprise of discovery is over, we may view the new readings, which seem to be implied in the A.V., with equanimity. Only a few of them need be accepted as of positive critical value; many of them are obviously either no improvement on the traditional text, or so illusive or misleading as to be almost a libel on the memory of Aristotle. The chief result of the A.V., in our present state of knowledge of it, is that it is seen to confirm a certain number of the emendations already suggested by Renaissance or modern scholars. It gives the sanction of tradition to φυσικόν (for μονοτείκον) in 1447 b 16; to ἀπόλον or ἀνάπλον (for
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And so it confirms the excision of ἐποτοία in 1447 a 28; of ὀτι in 1448 b 35; and of πέντε in 1450 b 16. It confirms some of the additions also that have been made in the Ae text; e.g. that of a negative in 1450 a 30 and 1455 b 17; that of τοιαύται in 1447 a 25; that of ἀνώνυμος in 1447 b 2; that of λύσις in 1453 b 31; that of καὶ Σ in 1458 a 9; and that of καὶ εἰ ἀδύνατον (or something equivalent) in 1461 b 12. And besides all this it preserves in two instances traces of an orthography which, whether Aristotle's or not, was certainly antique, Κλυταιμήστρα in 1453 b 23, and Μενέλεως in 1454 a 29.

The better and more convincing of the readings recovered from the A.V. have all one noteworthy characteristic in common: they fall quite naturally into their place in the Ae text, and imply directly or indirectly the existing context; so that the area of disturbance in each instance is of the most limited extent. I am aware that the A.V. is often supposed to reveal in places indications of more extensive textual divergences, and to throw doubt on the soundness of larger portions of our existing Greek text. The only answer is that the evidence, such as it is, of the A.V. may be taken sometimes too seriously. One must never forget that its text is not always certain; that it is the version of a version; that the Arabian may have misunderstood the Syriac, and the Syrian the Greek text; and lastly, that they were both working in the dark, and dealing with matters wholly outside their own literary experience. However we may explain it, the fact itself is indisputable, that in a considerable number of passages, in which the existing Greek text is perfectly sound and satisfactory, the renderings in the A.V. have little or no recognizable relation to it. Many of these renderings we may safely disregard, as representing not a different form of Greek text, but the aberrations of one or other of the two Orientals. In cases of doubt, the antecedent probability must always be on the side of the readings of Ae. The A.V. suggests or confirms a certain number of minor and occasional improvements; but that is for the present at any rate the practical limit of its service. For anything beyond
that its evidence is insufficient—not clear enough to enable us to reconstruct the Σ text, and not certain enough to justify any considerable departure from that in A°.

V

The Apographa.

The Renaissance MSS. of the Greek text, now usually known as the 'Apographa', require discussion because the whole question of their value and position has been recently reopened. Instead of acquiescing in Spengel and Vahlen's view of the unique importance of A° as the ultimate source of the texts of the 'Apographa', many seem more than half inclined to think that some at any rate of the better readings in them, more especially those confirmed by the Arabic Version, point to the survival in the fifteenth century of another textual authority, a now lost Greek MS. independent of A° and free from certain of its errors. The evidence, however, in favour of this remote possibility is as nothing compared with that which tells against it.

Our knowledge of these MSS. is not so complete as one could wish. For Urbinas 47 (B°) we have a collation in Bekker's Aristotle, and for Riccardianus 46 one by Landi in the Studi Italiani 3 p. 68; I have also collations of my own of two Paris MSS., Parisinus 2038 (P°) and Parisinus 2040 (Pb). But for the rest we have still to rely on the Variae lectiones at the end of Tyrwhitt and in Susemihl, and the occasional record of the readings of individual Apographa in Vahlen's notes.

The first and most obvious fact to be noticed in the Apographa is their textual divergence. Whereas in some of them the text is but one remove from that in A°, in others it is seen to be constantly deviating from that, and moreover in a very marked degree. But there is one thing that must be said of them all, that their deviations from A° are manifestly due in a large proportion of instances to a desire to amend the older text, or present it in an easier form. Many of the simpler among the amended readings we may put
down to copyists of the better class, since the scribe of a Renaissance MS. was often a scholar by profession and quite capable of improvising a simple correction of an ordinary clerical error. But this was certainly not the only cause of the appearance of amended readings in the MSS. of this period. As the Renaissance scholar annotated his books just as we do, one may well suppose that some of the textual suggestions thus made on the Poetics have survived and found a place in the text of later transcripts.

The sporadic origin of many of the improved readings scattered up and down the long series of Renaissance MSS. is easily shown. Several of them are not an original part of the text of any known MS.; e.g. παθημάτων in 1449 b 28, in which the π is due to correction in Pa and Laurentianus LX. 21; and ἐπεισιμάτο in 1455 a 26, and Αἰγεί in 1461 b 21, which are both of them from the margin, not the text, of Riccardianus 16. Others again are found in the text of only one or at most two MSS.; e.g.

1448 b 35 ἄλλα καὶ Riccard. 46. 1451 a 17 τῷ ἐνί Guelferbytanus and Riccard. 46. 1455 a 16 παραλογισμός Riccard. 46.—a 27 ἀνήι Guelferbytanus (and marg. Pb).—a 34 ἐκστασικῶι Riccard. 46.—b 19 ἢτι Riccard. 16. 1457 a 22 βάδιζε Riccard. 16.—a 29 συνδέσμωρ Riccard. 16. 1458 a 9 καὶ Σ add. Riccard. 16.—a 31 κεκράσθαι Riccard. 46.—b 25 ἀεικής Riccard. 46. 1460 a 30 Λάος Riccard. 16.—b 1 ποιήσειε Riccard. 46.

The Apographa, as I have said, fall into two main classes, according as they deviate but slightly, or in a more marked degree, from the text in Aε. It may be shown of each, with such probability at any rate as this kind of matter allows, that their texts presuppose that in Aε, and that the better lections they occasionally supply were originally due to conjecture. In order to simplify the inquiry, one may take Bε (Urbinas 47) and Pb (Parisinus 2040) as types of the first class, and Pa (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine as types of the second.

(1) Bε Pb supply a certain number of very simple and necessary corrections of the Aε text; e.g.

1447 b 28 οὖν, for οὖ. 1448 b 38 ὅ, for ὅ. 1453 b 22 δρᾶ, for δράν. 1455 b 1 ἐπεισιδοιοῖν, for ἐπεισιδοίου. 1456 a 12 λέγω, for λέγω δὲ.
These readings, however, do not stand alone; they are only a few out of a large number of alterations, the general quality and character of which may be inferred from the following specimens:—

If one compares the two sets of readings, one cannot but see that they are all on the same lines, and inspired apparently by the same motive; the only visible difference between them is that the first group represents the successes, and the second the failures of a Renaissance corrector. But after all the deviations in Be Pb from the Ae text are few and far between, and of no great moment. The two MSS. are as a whole faithful reproductions of the Ae text, following it even in its accidental faults and errors with an exactness which admits of but one explanation, namely that they are really and truly Apographa, copies of the text of the older MS. we still have, made either from the MS. itself or from some direct transcript of it.

(2) The type of text represented by Pa Aldine reveals the same tendencies in a more pronounced form, as the corrector here has allowed himself to go to far greater lengths. It is to be observed that in several places the Pa text was, as originally written, in agreement with Ae, and that it was then altered (apparently by the same hand) to bring it into closer conformity with that now represented by the Aldine. As an explanation of this one may perhaps suppose that the Aldine additions appeared at first as mar-

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1 This portentous corruption originated in a mere misreading of the text of Ae, the tenth century η being read as a κ (comp. Bast, Comm. Pal. p. 716).
ginalia, and were thus neglected by the scribe of Pa, who had to work them in afterwards, when he came to revise his transcript. This point of difference, however, need not be taken into account, since the general agreement between the two texts is so marked that they may very well serve as representatives of one and the same recension.

One thing is quite clear, that the immediate basis of the Pa Aldine was an Apograph with a distinct textual affinity to Bc Pb. The following omissions will show this:—

1456 a 2 ὁντὸς Α&egrave;: a lacuna here in Bc Pb and in Pa: om. Ald.
1457 a 33 πλην—ἀσήμου: om. Pa Ald. with Bc Pb.

Several of the actual readings also in Pa Aldine point to the same conclusion:—

1451 a 6 τοῦ Α&egrave;: τοῦ δὲ Pa Ald. with Bc Pb.
1454 b 37 ἦτοι τῆς Α&egrave;: τρίτη ἦ Pa Ald. with Pb.
1456 a 31 ἢ εἰ Α&egrave;: ἢ Pa Ald. with Pb.
1458 a 10 ἐκ τούτου Α&egrave;: ἐκ τούτου ἄφωνον Bc: ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ἄφωνων Pa Ald.
1460 a 11 οὐδέν' ἀνήθη] οὐδένα ἀνήθη Α&egrave;: οὐδέν ἀνήθη Bc Pb: οὐδὲν ἀνήθες Pa Ald.
1461 a 33 σημαίνειε Α&egrave;: σημαίνειε Ald. with Bc Pb: σημαίνει Pa.
1462 a 34 ὅθεν ἡ Α&egrave;: ὕδικκος (or ὕδικώς) Bc Pb: ὑδί πώς Pa Ald.

The above instances of agreement may suffice as a proof of the dependence of the Pa Aldine text on that represented by Bc Pb; I pass on, therefore, to consider the differences between the two texts. The note of the Pa Aldine text is its utter disregard of the textual tradition. Every page of it betrays the hand of a reviser; we can almost see him at work, adding or omitting words, altering forms, and often rewriting clauses or sentences, so as to smooth away every sign of difficulty in the older text. All this was said long ago by Ritter, but for reasons already mentioned one cannot even now take the point for granted. The modern apparatus criticus, which gives only the better lections of the Apographa, is often a snare to the unwary reader, who sees their successes, and does not see their failures. It may be worth while, therefore, to look into the
PAldine text more closely, in order to realize what sort of thing it is, and how it has come to be what it is.

(1) PAld. add words freely; e.g.

1447ab 25 οὖσαι (τοιαύται).
— b 22 (οὐκ ἢδη) καὶ πουτήν.
1448ab 25 (καὶ ἀ' ἢδη) καὶ ὅκ.
1449ab 3 oi (δέ), to disguise the omission (with Pb) of the preceding clause παραφανείσθη—κωμῳδίαι.

1449ab 29 (περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα) ἔστω, to fill up a lacuna in Pb.
— b 27 (ἀλλὰ) δὲ ἐλέόν.
1450ab 30 (οὗ) ποιήσει.
1452ab 3 καὶ μάλιστα μάλιστα (τοιαύτα).
1453b 18 μέλλων (δείκνυσι).
1454ab 19 προαιρεσίν τω (φαίλον μὲν ἐὰν φαίλην).
— b 34 A lacuna after εἰκόνος δέ, and then (ταῦτα οὐν) αὐτὸς λέγει.
1455ab 30 συναπεργαζόμενων (ποιεῖν).
— b 13 ἐπιερόδια (σκοπεῖν).
1459b 9 παθητικήν (δέι ἐρωτήσασθαι).
1460b 21 ὅποιον ὁν Λε (ταῦτα οὖν) ὁποία ἄν ἦ.
1461ab 34 (τὸ δὲ) ποσαχῶς.
— b 13 ἄλλα (καὶ πρὸς τὸ) βελτιων.
1462b 6 οὐ (ἀνάγκη) ἦ βραχεώς.
— b 7 (ἐὰν δὲ πλείονς) λέγω.
— b 8 συγκεκριμένη (οὐ μιᾶ, οὐ οὗ μία).

Some few of these insertions we may accept, as filling up real defects in the traditional text. But it must be seen that, as they appear in PAld., they are only part of a series of similar additions, and may be presumed to have had a similar origin and motive. The fact of the reviser having been able to supply the missing word in some three or four instances is no proof that he must have found it in a then existing MS.

(2) Here and there the words thus added dispossess a portion of the original text. Thus in 1448ab 5, where ἀνάγκη μμεᾶσθαι is added, the preceding ἦ καὶ τοιοῦτοις is omitted. The same thing has happened in 1455b 31, where the added word λίθος has usurped the place of καὶ πᾶλιν ἦ αὐτῶν. The phenomenon is easily explained if we may suppose a scribe, with a revised text before him, to have taken some of the reviser's marginal or interlinear additions not as addenda but as corrections of the text.
(3) $P^a$ Ald. are apt to ignore words in cases of difficulty. Thus they omit τουαίτους δίτατος in 1454 $b$ 13, ὥσ τῇτοι (i.e. ὅς ἄγον τοι) in 1461 $a$ 12, and δειλίαν (i.e. ἀεί, λίαν) in 1461 $b$ 28. In this way the reviser has also removed most of the ditto-signs which disfigure the $Λ^c$ text.

(4) The $P^a$ Ald. text embodies a long array of textual deprivations. The following specimens may perhaps give some idea of their general character and motive:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1449 $a$ 28</td>
<td>ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅς ἐκαστά</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1449 $b$ 29</td>
<td>χωρίς τοῖς εἴδεσι</td>
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<tr>
<td>1450 $a$ 17</td>
<td>κακοδαμονία</td>
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<tr>
<td>1453 $b$ 33</td>
<td>ὅ Ἀλκυμιῶν ὅ Ἀστυδάματος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1454 $b$ 13</td>
<td>ἐπιεικεῖας ποιεῖν παράδειγμα σκληρότητος $Λ^c$: ἐπιεικεῖας ποιεῖν παράδειγμα ἥ σκληρότητος δεῖ $P^c$ Ald.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1460 $a$ 11</td>
<td>οὐδέν' ἅμη</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some instances $P^a$ Ald. no doubt supply readings which we accept as improvements on those in $Λ^c$; e.g. ὅν for ὅς in 1452 $b$ 28; ἐκπλήξεως in 1455 $a$ 17; ἐκάστον in 1456 $a$ 6; δέη for ὅς in 1456 $b$ 4. Readings of this kind, however, do not, all told, constitute a tithe of the peculiar readings in $P^a$ Ald.; and there is nothing to mark them off from the rest except the fact that they happen to be successes. As the reviser, whoever he may have been, was evidently a man of some learning, and also of no little ingenuity of a certain rough-and-ready order, one need not be surprised to find in the multitude of his conjectures at any rate some few that have hit the mark.

Looking, therefore, at the actual texts of the Apographa, as seen in these typical instances, and the tendencies which they reveal, I think the facts point very clearly to the conjectural origin of all the improved readings in the later manuscripts. The doubt now thrown upon this view is largely resolvable into a feeling that some of these text improvements are too good and too unexpected to be regarded as the suggestions of Renaissance scholars. The underlying assumption here is an injustice
to these early scholars. Their weakness in dealing with texts was want of critical caution and method; apart from that they had many of the gifts required for the work of textual emendation. They were often men of great natural ability, of surprising learning, and if anything, more completely at home in the classical languages than the moderns. We all know that in Latin the 'Itali' have left a permanent mark on many of our Latin texts. But there is no reason to suppose that the learned Greeks of that age, or their Italian pupils and followers, were as scholars on a much lower level, or that in the correction of Greek texts their limit was reached when some of the more patent clerical errors in them were cleared away. One has only to reflect what Chalcondyles did for the Homeric Hymns (v. Allen and Sikes, Introd. p. xxxiii) and Musurus for Hesychius. In the case of the Poetics, however, the work of revision cannot be connected with any one name. The book was even in the fifteenth century in the hands of many; so that the more striking of the amended readings, which we now gather up from various Apographa—a few from one, and a few from another—may very well have been the happier efforts at emendation of various acute and scholarly readers in the early Renaissance period of the study of the text.

The doubt as to the truth of Spengel and Vahlen's view of the Apographa has had new life put into it through the publication of the readings implied in the Arabic Version, which is found to confirm a certain proportion of the better readings in these manuscripts. A suspicion, accordingly, has arisen that some of these better readings may perhaps have survived in some now lost Greek MS., independent of Aε, and have found their way into the Renaissance manuscripts from that source. All that a coincidence, however, of this kind can be said to prove is the goodness of the readings; for it is no uncommon thing for a good conjecture to be confirmed by a newly-discovered document. In the Poetics the Arabic Version confirms several of Vahlen's emendations, as also many that were made in earlier days by Madius, Victorius Heinsius, and others. It confirms the (οὐ) μακρὸς
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of Vulcanius in 1455 b 17 just as much as the όδοι πουήσει of Pa Ald. in 1450 a 30. And in the latter instance the insertion of the negative would be no great feat, if one happened to remember the parallel in the Rhetoric, όδο πουήσει τό έκαντον έργον (3. 2, 1404 b 3). Another Pa Ald. reading confirmed by the Arabic Version is οὐσα (τοιαύτα) in 1447 a 25, but it loses its significance when one sees the reviser restoring μάλιστα (τοιαύτα) in 1452 a 3, and observes his predilection for such stop-gaps. In 1454 b 2, where Λεες has περί τῶν ὀπλῶν, the rendering in the Arabic Version is de conversione navium, which supports in equal measure both the ἀνάπλων of Pa and the ἀπόστλουν of Riccardianus 16. Which of the two, then, is to be supposed to have got into the text from the hypothetic lost Greek MS.? The question may be dismissed at once, when one reflects how easily ἀπόστλουν or ἀνάπλων might occur to any one familiar with the Second Book of the Iliad.

The truth is that not a few of the more striking of the Apograph readings may be accounted for without difficulty, if one is at liberty to assume some critical ingenuity and a fair acquaintance with literature on the part of the early correctors. Δάιας, for instance, in 1460 a 30 implies nothing more than a knowledge of the Oedipus Tyrannus; and Αἰγεί in 1461 b 21 could hardly be missed by a reader who remembered the story of the Medea. συνδέσμῳ εἰς in 1457 a 30 is immediately suggested, not only by the context, but also by several parallels in other Aristotelian writings. In 1451 a 17 ἄπειρα τῷ ἐνι (for γένει) συμβαίνει stares one in the face, if one happens to have in mind the ἄπειρα γὰρ ἄν τῷ ἐνι συμβαίη of the Physics. παθημάτων in 1449 b 28 may very well have been suggested by the parallel in the Politics; ἐκστασικοῖ in 1455 a 34 by that in the Problems; and άείκης in 1458 b 25 by the passage in the Homeric Scholia, in which it was independently discovered many years afterwards by Gu. Morel. Some of the amended readings, no doubt, show a higher degree of critical insight; e.g. βάδιζε (for ἐβάδιζε) in 1457 a 22, παραλογισμός in 1455 a 16, ἀνῆφε in 1455 a 27, ἀρύσας in 1457 b 14, and μύρισις (for κύνησις) in 1459 b 37. The provenance of these five instances is to be noted. The first is from Riccar-
dianus 16; the second from the margin of the Guelferbytanus; the third from Riccardianus 46 (and marg. P^b); the fourth from the Leidensis and *ex emendatione* Vaticanus 1400; and the fifth from B^o^ P^b^.

If they had ever existed together in the text of some one older and better MS., it is difficult to imagine how they came to be preserved in this separate way, one in one MS. and another in another.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΠΕΡΙ

ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

SIGLA

Αc = cod. Parisinus 1741
* = littera in codice deleta
Ar. = interpretatio Arabica, vel ex ea eruta scriptura Graeca
apogr. = apographa quaedam
1447a  Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἂν των ὀνομάζων ἑκατὸν ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνιστάσθαι τῶν μῦθων εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἐξειν ἡ ποίησις, ἢτι δὲ ἢ πόσων καὶ ποῖων ἢτι μορίων, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἢτι μεθόδου, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων. ἐποτοῖα δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἢτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη καὶ `κιθαριστικῆς πάσας τυχάνουσιν οὐσαί μμησείς τὸ σύνολον διαφέροντι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἐπεραι μμεισθαι ἢ τῷ ἐπεραι ἢ τῷ ἐπεραι καὶ μη τῶν αὐτῶν τροπῶν. ὁσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχῆμας πολλὰ μμούνται τῳς ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθεῖς), ἐπεραὶ δὲ διὰ τῆς φοινῆς, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις ἀπασαί μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ρυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, τούτοις ὃ ἡ χωρίς ἢ μεμεγένους: οἱον ἀρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ ρυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἢ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ καὶ εἰ τῳς ἐπεραι τυχάνουσιν οὐσάι (τοιαῦται) τὴν ὀνομάζων, οὐσον ἢ τῶν συριγγων: αὐ-ὑ ἢ τῷ ρυθμῷ μμούνται χωρίς ἀρμονίας αἰ

Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, \textit{modes of imitation}. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations.

I. Just as form and colour are used as means by some, who (whether by art or constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others; so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony —used, however, either singly or in certain combinations. A combination of rhythm and harmony alone is the means in flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e.g. imitative piping. Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imita-
τῶν ὁρχηστῶν, καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἥθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἦ δὲ [ἐποποιία] μῦνον τοῖς λόγοις ψυλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τούτοις εἶτε

1447b μιγνῦσα μετ’ ἀλλήλων εἴθ’ εἰς τοὺς γένεις χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων (ἀνώνυμος) τυγχάνει οὕσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν

10 ἔχομεν ὅνωμάσαι κοινών τοὺς Σάφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μύμων καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους οὕτω εἰ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείοι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῦτο τήν μύμην—πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε συνάπτουσι τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοτοιούσι τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιοῦν όνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς

15 κατὰ τήν μύμην ποιητῶν ἄλλα κωσῆ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικὸν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰσόδασσιν οὐδὲν δὲ κοινῶν ἑστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τῶν μὲν ποιητῶν δίκαιων καλεῖν, τῶν δὲ φυσιολόγων μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητῆν. ὄριοις δὲ κἂν εἰ τις ἀπαντᾷ τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων ποιοῦτο τήν μύμην καθάπερ Χαρίημαν ἐποίησε Κένταυρον μικτίν βαψφόδιαι ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων, καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορεύειν. περὶ μὲν οὕν τοῦτον διωρίσθω τούτου τῶν τρόπων. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες ἀπ' πᾶσι χρωται τοῖς εἰρήν

20 μένοις, λέγω δὲ οὕσων ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὡσπερ ἢ τε τῶν διθυομαβικῶν ποίησις καὶ ἢ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἢ τε τραγῳδία καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία· διαφέρουσι δὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἀμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταῦτα μὲν οὕν λέγω τῶς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν οἷς ποιοῦται τήν μύμην.

tions; for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may represent men's characters, as well as what they do and suffer. There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony, in prose or in verse, and if in verse, either in some one or in a plurality of metres. This form of imitation is to this day without a name. We have no common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and a Socratic Conversation; and we should still be without one even if the imitation in the two instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse—though it is the way with people to tack on 'poet' to the name of a metre, and talk of elegiac-poets and epic-poets, thinking that they call them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but indiscriminately by reason of the metre they write in. Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from their metre; so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a poet. We should be in the same position also, if the imitation in these instances were in all the metres, like the Centaur (a rhapsody in a medley of all metres) of Chaeremon; and Chaeremon one has to recognize as a poet. So much, then, as to these arts. There are, lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, e.g. Dithyrambic and Nomic poetry, Tragedy and Comedy; with this difference, however, that the three kinds of means are in some of them all employed together, and in others brought in separately, one after the other. These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.
'Επει δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττονται, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαῖος ἢ φανέλως εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἢθη σχεδὸν ἢ τούτους ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄρετῆ τὰ ἢθη διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἦτοι βελτίωνας ἢ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἢ χειρόνας 5 ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὡσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς. Πολὺγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παῦσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίως εἶκαζεν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐκάστη μιμήσεως ἐξει ταῦτα τὰς διαφοράς καὶ ἐσται ἐτέρα τῷ ἐτέρα μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ 10 κινδαρίσει ἐστι γενέσθαι ταῦτα τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἶον ὁμηρὸς μὲν βελτίων, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίως, Ἦγημων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος ὁ δὲ τὰς παροιδίας πουίσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλάδα χείρον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διαθράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς 15 νόμους, ὡσπερ πάσας, Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος, μιμήσατο ἄν τις. ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδίᾳ πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν ἢ μὲν γὰρ χείρον ἢ δὲ βελτίων μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

"Ετὶ δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὅσ ἐκαστα τούτων 3 20 μιμήσατο ἄν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἐστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλουτα δὲ τῇ ἐτέρῳ τι γεγονόμενον ὡσπερ ὁμηρὸς ποιεῖ, ἢ ὅσ τοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ μετα- βάλλουτα, ἡ πάντα ὅσ πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς

II. The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind. It follows therefore, that the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves. It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing objects with this point of difference. Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer's personages, for instance, are better than we are; Cleophon's are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicocharis, the author of the *Diliad*, are beneath it. The same is true of the Dithyramb and the Nome: the personages may be presented in them with the difference exemplified in the... of... and Argas, and in the Cyclopes of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day.

III. A third difference in these arts is in the manner in which each kind of object is represented. Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either (1) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does; or (2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or (3) the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described,
μμουμένους. ἐν τρεῖ δὴ τάταις διαφοραῖς ἢ μύησις ἐστιν,
25 ὡς εἴπομεν κατ’ ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε (καὶ ἄ) καὶ ὡς. ὡστε τῇ
μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη μυητής Ομήρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μμοῦνται
γὰρ ἀμφω σποουδαίοις, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ
μμοῦνται καὶ δρώντας ἀμφω. ὥθεν καὶ δράματα καλεί-
σθαί τινες αὐτὰ φασιν, ὃτι μμοῦνται δρώντας. διὸ καὶ
30 ἀντιποιούνται τῆς τε τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς κωμῳδίας οἱ Δω-
ρεῖς (τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμῳδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς οἱ τε ἐνταῦθα ὡς
ἐπὶ τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σι-
κελίας, ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἑπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητής πολλῷ πρό-
tερος ὃν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔστιν
35 τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ) ποιούμενοι τὰ ὅνωμα σημείου αὐτοῦ
μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιοκίδας καλείς φασιν, Ἀθηναίους
δὲ δήμους, ὡς κωμῳδοὺς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμαξεῖ λεχθέντας
ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνη ἀτιμαζομένους ἐκ τῶν ἀστεως.
1448 b καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοὶ μὲν ὄραν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ πράττειν προσ-
αγορέουσιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ πόσαι καὶ
τίνες τῆς μμήσεως εἰρήσθω ταύτα.
Τὸ δὲ γενεύσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν 4
5 δόο τινές καὶ αὕται φαινεῖ τὸ τε γὰρ μμεῦσθαι σύμφυτον
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παῖδων ἑστὶ καὶ τοῦτῳ διαφέροντο
τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ὧν ὁ μυητικώτατον ἑστὶ καὶ τὰς μαθή-
σεις ποιεῖται διὰ μμήσεως τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν
τοῖς μμήσασθαι πάντα. σημείου δὲ τοῦτον τὸ συμβαίνον
10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἂ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὄρωμεν, τοῦτον τὰς
eἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἥκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦμεν, οἷον

25 καὶ ᾧ add. apogr. 32 δημοκρατείας Α° 34 Χιωνίδου
Robortellus (confirm. Ar.): χιωνίδου Α° fort. τραγῳδίας (δ')
35 αὕτων Spengel: οὗτοι Α° 36 'Αθηναίους Spengel (occupavit
Anonymus in minore ed. Oxon. a. 1760): ἄθηναίοι Α° 1448 b 5
αὕται Parisinus 2038: αὕται Α° 6 τούτω+ Α°
As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in
the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their
means, their objects, and their manner.

So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin
to Homer, both portraying good men; and on another to
Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting
and doing. This in fact, according to some, is the reason for
plays being termed dramas, because in a play the personages
act the story. Hence too both Tragedy and Comedy are
claimed by the Dorians as their discoveries; Comedy by the
Megarians—by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara
became a democracy, and by the Sicilian Megarians on the
ground that the poet Epicharmus was of their country, and
a good deal earlier than Chionides and Magnes; even Tragedy
also is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In
support of this claim they point to the words 'comedy' and
'drama.' Their word for the outlying hamlets, they say, is
comae, whereas Athenians call them demes—thus assuming
that comedians got the name not from their comae or revels,
but from their strolling from hamlet to hamlet, lack of apprecia-
tion keeping them out of the city. Their word also for 'to
act,' they say, is dran, whereas Athenians use prattein.

So much, then, as to the number and nature of the points
of difference in the imitation of these arts.

It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two
causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation
is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over
the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative
creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it
is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The
truth of this second point is shown by experience: though
the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to
view the most realistic representations of them in art, the
θηρίων τε μορφάς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρών, οἰκεῖοι δὲ καὶ τοῦτα, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἤδηστοι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινώσωμεν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίροντες τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦν τας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζοντες τὲ ἔκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὕτως ἐκεῖνος ὅπει ἐὰν μὴ τὸν γένος προερωτήσως, οὐχ ὅμως μὴν ποιήσῃ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τίνα ἀλλήν αἰτιάν. κατὰ φύσιν δὲ οὕτως ἠμῶν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (καὶ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἔστι φαινει) ἐξ ἀρχῆς περικότες καὶ αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὰν προάγωτες ἐγένετον τὴν ποιήσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοχθονικῶν διαστάτων. διεσπασθεὶς δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἡ ἡτή ἡ ποίησις.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμώντεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμμονῶν πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτος ἤσωνοι ποιοῦντες, ὅπερ ἐπέστη ἄμμοι καὶ ἐγκώμια. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὁμήρου οὐδὲν ἐξέχειν εἰπέν τοιοῦτον ποίημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλοῦς, ᾧ ὁ Ὁμήρου ἀρξαμένοις εἰστι, οἴοιν ἐκεῖνον ὁ Μαργάτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐδὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἁρμόστον ιαμβεῖον ἤλθε μέτρον—διὸ καὶ ιαμβεῖον καλεῖται κἂν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ τοῦτῳ ιαμβεῖον ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἤρωικοὶ οἱ δὲ ιάμβιοι ποιηταί. ὅπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὁμήρου ἤν (μόνον γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι οὐ ἄλλα καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικῶς ἐποίησε), οὕτως καὶ τὰ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχῆμα πρῶτος ὑπεδειξεν οὐ ψόγον ἄλλα τὸ γελοῦν δραματοποιήσας· ὅ γὰρ Μαργάτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὅπερ Ἔλιας

12 ἀτιμοτάτων Α° 13 τοῦτον vel tov tovto apogr. 18 οἴχ ὃς
Hermann: οἴχι Α° 27 ἀτεροὶ Spengel 30 μαργάτης Α°
31 ιαμβεῦ (bis) Α° 35 ἄλλα Riccardianus 46, Bonitz (confirm.
Ar.): ἀλλ' ὅτι Α° 36 οὕτω apogr. 38 ὅ] το Α° fort. (ἡ) Ἐλιὰς
forms for example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning—gathering the meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen the thing before, one’s pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some similar cause. Imitation, then, being natural to us—as also the sense of harmony and rhythm, the metres being obviously species of rhythms—it was through their original aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part gradual on their first efforts, that they created poetry out of their improvisations.

Poetry, however, soon broke up into two kinds according to the differences of character in the individual poets; for the graver among them would represent noble actions, and those of noble personages; and the meaner sort the actions of the ignoble. The latter class produced invectives at first, just as others did hymns and panegyrics. We know of no such poem by any of the pre-Homeric poets, though there were probably many such writers among them; instances, however, may be found from Homer downwards, e.g. his Margites, and the similar poems of others. In this poetry of invective its natural fitness brought an iambic metre into use; hence our present term ‘iambic,’ because it was the metre of their ‘iambs’ or invectives against one another. The result was that the old poets became some of them writers of heroic and others of iambic verse. Homer’s position, however, is peculiar: just as he was in the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the dramatic character of his imitations, so too he was the first to outline for us the general forms of Comedy by producing not a dramatic invective, but a dramatic picture of the Ridiculous; his Margites
Κολτ' Οδυσσεία πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὕτος πρὸς τὰς κομῳδίας. παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας καὶ κομῳδίας οἱ ἐφ' ἐκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὄρμωντες κατὰ τὴν οικεῖαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν αὐτὶ τῶν ίάμβων κομῳδοποιοὶ ἔγερνοτο, οἱ δὲ αὐτὶ τῶν ἐπών τραγῳδοδιάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ μείζονα καὶ εὐνυμότερα τὰ σχήματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄρ', ἔχει ἡδή ἡ τραγῳδία τοῖς εὐδεσὶ ικανῶς ἡ οὔ, αὐτὸ τε καθ' αὐτὸ κρίναι καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα, ἀλλὰ λόγος. γενομένης (δ') οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτο-10 σχεδιαστικῆς—καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κομῳδία καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξαρχοντων τῶν διάφραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλ-λικὰ ἢ ἐτί καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεως διαμένει νομοξομέρα—κατὰ μικρῶν ἡξείδη προσαγώντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερῶν αὐτῆς καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ 15 τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἐσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τὸ τε τῶν ὑποκρίτων πλῆθος ἢ ἐν ἐνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύ-λος ἦγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἥλαττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν' τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς. ἐτί δὲ τὸ μέγεθος' ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λε-20 χεως γελοίας διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὡς ἀπε- σφυρύνθη, τὸ τε μέτρων ἐκ τετραμέτρου λαμβείου ἑγένετο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρώστω διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ορχιστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκείον μέτρων ἐδρε' μᾶλλον γὰρ λεκτ-25 κών τῶν μέτρων τὸ λαμβείου ἐστίν' σημείων δὲ τοῦτον, πλείοντα γὰρ λαμβεία λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς

in fact stands in the same relation to our comedies as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to our tragedies. As soon, however, as Tragedy and Comedy appeared in the field, those naturally drawn to the one line of poetry became writers of comedies instead of iambs, and those naturally drawn to the other, writers of tragedies instead of epics, because these new modes of art were grander and of more esteem than the old.

If it be asked whether Tragedy is now all that it need be in its formative elements, to consider that, and decide it theoretically and in relation to the theatres, is a matter for another inquiry.

It certainly began in improvisations—as did also Comedy; the one originating with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which still survive as institutions in many of our cities. And its advance after that was little by little, through their improving on whatever they had before them at each stage. It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form. (1) The number of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue, or spoken portion, take the leading part in the play. (2) A third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles. (3) Tragedy acquired also its magnitude. Discarding short stories and a ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric stage, it assumed, though only at a late point in its progress, a tone of dignity; and its metre changed then from trochaic to iambic. The reason for their original use of the trochaic tetrameter was that their poetry was satyric and more connected with dancing than it now is. As soon, however, as a spoken part came in, nature herself found the appropriate metre. The iambic, we know, is the most speakable of metres, as is shown by the fact that we very often fall into it
αλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ ὁλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβάλουντες τῆς λε-28 κτικῆς ἀρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδών πλήθη. καὶ τὰ ἅλλ᾽ 30 ὡς ἐκαστα κοσμηθήμειν λέγεται ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἦσος ἐργον εἰ ἀπεξείναι καὶ ἐκαστον.

'Η δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὀσπερ εἴπομεν μέμησις φαν-5 λοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τάσαν κακλαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρ-35 τημά τι καὶ αἰσχὸς ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον ἐδύνα τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρὸν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἢνει θεών. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς πραγμάτευσες καὶ δὲ ἦν ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἢ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ 1449 ἑποδοξέσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλαθεν' καὶ γὰρ χρόνων κωμῳδών ὡς ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν. ἦδη δὲ σχήματα των αὐτῆς ἑχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μημονεύονται. τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ 5 πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἡγύνηται. τὸ δὲ μύ-θοις ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις] τὸ μὲν ἐς ἄρχης ἕκ 1449 Σικελίας ἧλθε * *, τῶν δὲ 'Αθήνησιν Κοάτης πρῶτος ὑρέεν ἀφέμενος τῆς λαμβικῆς ἱδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους. ἦ μὲν οὖν ἐποποίηκα τῇ πραγματικά μέχρι μὲν τοῦ 10 (διὰ) μέτρου μεγάλου μέμησις εἴναι σπουδαῖων ἤκολούθησεν τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι, ταῦτῃ διαφέρουσιν ἐτι δὲ τῷ μίκη—ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα πειράται ὑπὸ μῖαν περίοδον ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττεων, ἢ δὲ ἐποποίηκα ἀἵρετος τῷ χρόνῳ—καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει, καίτοι

28 ἀλλὰ ὡς apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἄλλοσ Α" 34 γέλων (bis) Α" 1449 b I κωμῳδό scripseram: κωμῳδοῖς coni. Bernhardy 6 Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις seclusit Susemihl 7 lacunam indicavi; intercidisse videntur ἦσαν γὰρ Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις ἐκείθεν 8 εἰδέας Α" 9 μὲν τοῦ Tyrwhitt: μόνον Α" 10 διὰ add. Ueberweg 11 τοῦ Α" 12 μὲν' μὲν γὰρ apogr. 14 τοῦτο pr. Α"
in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice. (4) Another change was a plurality of episodes or acts. As for the remaining matters, the superadded embellishments and the account of their introduction, these must be taken as said, as it would probably be a long piece of work to go through the details.

As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.

Though the successive changes in Tragedy and their authors are not unknown, we cannot say the same of Comedy; its early stages passed unnoticed, because it was not as yet taken up in a serious way. It was only at a late point in its progress that a chorus of comedians was officially granted by the archon; they used to be mere volunteers. It had also already certain definite forms at the time when the record of those termed comic poets begins. Who it was who supplied it with masks, or prologues, or a plurality of actors and the like, has remained unknown. The invented Fable, or Plot, however, originated in Sicily, with Epicharmus and Phormis; of Athenian poets Crates was the first to drop the Comedy of invective and frame stories of a general and non-personal nature, in other words, Fables or Plots.

Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in a grand kind of verse. It differs from it, however, (1) in that it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form; and (2) in its length—which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that. This, I say, is another point of difference between them, though at first the practice in this respect was just the
15 τὸ πρῶτον ὅμοιος ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τούτο ἐποίησε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσεν. μέρη δ' ἔστι τὰ μὲν ταύτα, τὰ δὲ ὁδαὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας—οὕσπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγῳδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἔπων. ὡ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ὡ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐποποίαι.

Περί (μὲν) οὖν τῆς ἐν ἔξαμετροις μμμητικής καὶ περὶ 6 κωμῳδίας ὡστερον ἐρωτεύει περὶ δὲ τραγῳδίας λέγωμεν ἀναλαβώμες αὐτὴς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τῶν γνωμένων ὄρον τῆς οὐσίας. ἐστὶν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας 25 καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἦδυσμένη λόγῳ χωρίς έκάστη τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, ὅρων καὶ οὐ δι’ ἀπαγγελίας, δι’ ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαιῶνα την τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἦδυσμένην μὲν λόγον τὸν ἐχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ μέλος, τὸ δὲ χωρίς τοῖς 30 εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἐνα μένον περαιώσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἔτερα διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦντα τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀν εἰ ἦν τι μόριον τραγῳδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος, έτι μελοποία καὶ λέξεις ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιοῦντα τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξειν μὲν ταύτην, τὴν τῶν 35 μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιάν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν φανεραν ἔχει πάσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεως ἐστὶ μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὐδὲ ἀνάγκη ποιοῦσ τινας εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ἡθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τῆς 1450a πράξεως εἶναι φαμεν ποιᾶς τινας, πέφυκεν αὐτὰ διὸ τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἡθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἀκολουθοῦνται ἐποίησεν ταῦτα.
same in tragedies as in epic poems. They differ also (3) in their constituents, some being common to both and others peculiar to Tragedy—hence a judge of good and bad in Tragedy is a judge of that in epic poetry also. All the parts of an epic are included in Tragedy; but those of Tragedy are not all of them to be found in the Epic.

Reserving hexameter poetry and Comedy for consideration hereafter, let us proceed now to the discussion of Tragedy; before doing so, however, we must gather up the definition resulting from what has been said. A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. Here by 'language with pleasurable accessories' I mean that with rhythm and harmony or song superadded; and by 'the kinds separately' I mean that some portions are worked out with verse only, and others in turn with song.

I. As they act the stories, it follows that in the first place the Spectacle (or stage-appearance of the actors) must be some part of the whole; and in the second Melody and Diction, these two being the means of their imitation. Here by 'Diction' I mean merely this, the composition of the verses; and by 'Melody,' what is too completely understood to require explanation. But further: the subject represented also is an action; and the action involves agents, who must necessarily have their distinctive qualities both of character and thought, since it is from these that we ascribe certain qualities to their actions. There are in the natural order of things, therefore, two causes, Character and
τυχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυχάνουσι πάντες. ἔστω δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μύθος ἡ μίμησις: λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τούτον, τῆν 5 σώθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἡθη, καθ' ὃ ποιοῦσι τωσ εἴναί φαμεν τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δὲ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγον- τες ἀποδεικνύσιν τι ἦ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. ἀνάγκη ὅνων πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἐξ, καθ' ὃ ποιὰ τις ἔστω ἡ τραγῳδία ταῦτα δ' ἔστι μύθος καὶ ἡθη καὶ λέξεως καὶ 10 διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μμοῦνται, δὸν μέρη ἔστω, ὡς δὲ μμοῦνται, ἐν, ἃ δὲ μμοῦνται, τρία, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὅλῳν αὐτῶν ὡς εἴπειν κέχρηνται τοῖς εἰδέσων καὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔχει πάν καὶ ἢθος καὶ μύθον καὶ λέξως καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ἀσώματος. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτων ἔστω ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις: ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησις ἔστων οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πρά- ξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας * * καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἔστω, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξεσ τις ἔστιν, οὐ ποι- ότης* εἰσὶν δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἡθη ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς 15 πράξεις εὐδαιμονες ἡ τοιναυτίων. οὐκοιν δὲς τὰ ἡθη μι- μήσωνται πράττοντων, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν διὰ τὰς πράξεις* ὡστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μύθος τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπαντῶν. ἐτὶ ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἡθῶν γέ- 20 νοτ' ἂν. οἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀρέσει τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γρα- φέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγυρστον πέπονθεν* ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πο- λύγυρστος ἀγαθὸς ἣθογράφος, ἡ γὰρ Ζεῦξιδος γραφῆ οὐδέν 25 νοτ' ἂν.·

3 ἔστω δὴ conieceram 12 ὡς εἴπειν fortasse post ὄψεις ἔχει τῶν colocandum 13 ὄψεις ἤ Λεa 17 intercidsisse καὶ κακοδαιμονίαι, ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία coni. Vahlen 21 συμπεριλαμβάνουσι Guelferbytanus (m. 1), Spengel 27 Πολύγυρστον et Πολύγυρστος Λεa
Thought, of their actions, and consequently of their success or failure in their lives. Now the action (that which was done) is represented in the play by the Fable or Plot. The Fable, in our present sense of the term, is simply this, the combination of the incidents, or things done in the story; whereas Character is what makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents; and Thought is shown in all they say when proving a particular point or, it may be, enunciating a general truth. There are six parts consequently of every tragedy, as a whole, that is, of such or such quality, viz. a Fable or Plot, Characters, Diction, Thought, Spectacle and Melody; two of them arising from the means, one from the manner, and three from the objects of the dramatic imitation; and there is nothing else besides these six. Of these, its formative elements, then, not a few of the dramatists have made due use, as every play, one may say, admits of Spectacle, Character, Fable, Diction, Melody, and Thought.

II. The most important of the six is the combination of the incidents of the story. Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they include the Characters for the sake of the action. So that it is the action in it, i.e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing. Besides this, a tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without Character. The tragedies of most of the moderns are characterless—a defect common among poets of all kinds, and with its counterpart in painting in Zeuxis as compared with Polygnotus; for whereas the latter is strong in character, the work of Zeuxis is devoid of it. And
6. 1450\textsuperscript{a} 29—1450\textsuperscript{b} 15

ἐχει ἡδος. ἐτι εαν τε ἐφεξῆς θὴ ῥίσεις ἥθικας καὶ λέξει
30 καὶ διανοία εν πεποιημέναις, ἄντι ποιήσει οὔ τε τῆς τραγῳ-
δίας ἐργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ καταδεικτέροις τούτους
κεχρυμένη τραγῳδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μύθον καὶ σύστασιν πρα-
γμάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ
τραγῳδία τοῦ μύθον μέρη ἔστων, αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀνα-
35 γυνώριεσι. ἐτι σημειον ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειριστὲς ποιεῖν πρό-
τερον οὕναι τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἀκριβῶν ἢ 
tὰ πράγματα συνύστασθαι, οὗν καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ σχέδου
ἀπαντες. ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἶνον ψυχὴ ὁ μύθος τῆς τρα-
γῳδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἡθη (παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἔστω καὶ
1450\textsuperscript{b} ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς: εἰ γάρ τε ἐναλείψεις τοῖς καλλίστοις
φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὔκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὑφράνεις καὶ λευκο-
γραφήσας εἰκόνα) ἔστων τε μῆμησις πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην
μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ ἀνάρκης τούτο δὲ
5 ἔστων τὸ λέγειν οὕναι τὰ ἐνώτα καὶ τὰ ἄρμόστοντα,
ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἐργον
ἔστων οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαιοὶ πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντα, οἱ
δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστων δὲ ἡθὸς μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῦ
τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὅποια τέ σὲ ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ προαι-
ρέται ἡ φεύγει—διὰπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἡθος τῶν λόγων ἐν
10 οἷς μηδ' ὄλος ἔστων ὁ τι προαιρετᾶται ἡ φεύγει ὁ λέγων—
ἀνάρκης δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσι τὸ ὅσ ἔστων ἡ ὃς οὐκ ἔστων
ἡ καθόλου τι ἀποφαντοῦται. τεταρτοῦν δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ ἡ
λέξις: λέγω δὲ, ὡσπερ πρότερον εἰρηταί, λέξειν εἶναι τὴν
διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ῥημωμείαν, ὡ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ
15 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἐχει τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιμ. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν

29 λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ Vahlen: λέξεις καὶ διανοίας A\textsuperscript{a}  
30 οὕτω (ni fallor) add. Ar.: οὐ add. apogr. 31 ἡ ἡ A\textsuperscript{b}  
1450\textsuperscript{b} 10  
τι] τις A\textsuperscript{a} 12 ἐν λόγῳ scripsi: μὲν λόγων A\textsuperscript{a}
again: one may string together a series of characteristic speeches of the utmost finish as regards Diction and Thought, and yet fail to produce the true tragic effect; but one will have much better success with a tragedy which, however inferior in these respects, has a Plot, a combination of incidents, in it. And again: the most powerful elements of attraction in Tragedy, the Peripeties and Discoveries, are parts of the Plot. A further proof is in the fact that beginners succeed earlier with the Diction and Characters than with the construction of a story; and the same may be said of nearly all the early dramatists. We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot; and that the Characters come second—compare the parallel in painting, where the most beautiful colours laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait. We maintain that Tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake of the action that it imitates the personal agents. Third comes the element of Thought, i.e. the power of saying whatever can be said, or what is appropriate to the occasion. This is what, in the speeches in Tragedy, falls under the arts of Politics and Rhetoric; for the older poets make their personages discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians. One must not confuse it with Character. Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose of the agents, i.e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious—hence there is no room for Character in a speech on a purely indifferent subject. Thought, on the other hand, is shown in all they say when proving or disproving some particular point, or enunciating some universal proposition. Fourth among the literary elements is the Diction of the personages, i.e. as before explained, the expression of their thoughts in words, which is practically the same thing with verse as with prose. As for the two remaining parts, the Melody.
22
6. 1450b 16—7. 1451a 2

[pénte] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, ἡ ὡς ψυχαγωγικόν μὲν, ἀτεχνώτατον δὲ καὶ ἡκιστα ὀϊκείον τῆς ποιητικῆς· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας οὐναμικαὶ καὶ ἀνευ ἀγώνως καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἑστὶ, ἐτὶ δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὀφειν ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἑστιν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταύτα ποίαν 7 τινὰ δεί τὴν σύστασιν ἐναὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγῳδίας ἑστιν. κείται δὴ ἡ ἡμῶν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως ἐναι μὲν 25 μησῶν ἑξούσιος τι μέγεθος· ἑστὶ γὰρ ὅλων καὶ καθότι ἐχον μέγεθος. ὅλων δὲ ἑστὶ τὸ ἐχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτὴν. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἑστὶν ὁ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ’ ἀλλο ἑστὶν, μετ’ ἑκείνῳ δ’ ἑτέρου πέφυκεν εἶναι ἡ γίνεσθαι· τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίων ὁ αὐτὸ μετ’ ἀλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἡ 30 ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν μέσον δὲ ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ’ ἄλλο καὶ μετ’ ἑκείνῳ ἑτέρου. δεὶ ἀρὰ τοὺς συνεστώτας εὖ μόδοις μὴθ’ ὑπόθεν ἐτυχεῖν ἀρχεῖσαι μήθ’ ὅπων ἐτυχε τελευταῖ, ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ιδέαις. ἔτι δ’ ἐπιεῖ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζωόν καὶ ἀπαν 35 πράγμα ὁ συνεστήκην ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταύτα τεταγμένα δεὶ ἐχεῖν ἄλλα καὶ μέγεθος υπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχῶν τὸ γὰρ καλῶν ἐν μεγεθεί καὶ τάξει ἑστὶν, διὸ οὕτω πάρμικρον ἄν τι γένοιτο καλῶν ζωόν (συνεχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀνασθῆτον χρόνου γυμνομένη) οὕτω παρμέγεθε (οὐ γὰρ 1451α ἀμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ’ οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οὕτω εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη

is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of Tragedy. The Spectacle, though an attraction, is the least artistic of all the parts, and has least to do with the art of poetry. The tragic effect is quite possible without a public performance and actors; and besides, the getting-up of the Spectacle is more a matter for the costumier than the poet.

Having thus distinguished the parts, let us now consider the proper construction of the Fable or Plot, as that is at once the first and the most important thing in Tragedy. We have laid it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude; for a whole may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it. A well-constructed Plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes; beginning and end in it must be of the forms just described. Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible either (1) in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity; or (2) in a creature of vast size—one, say, 1000 miles long—as in that case, instead of
ζῷων ὄστε δει καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ζῷων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τούτῳ δὲ εὐσυνοπτον ἐἶναι, οὔτω
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τούτῳ δὲ εἰμιμημόνευ-
τον ἐἶναι. τοῦ μῆκους ὄρος (ὁ) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας καὶ
τὴν αἰάθησιν οὔ ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔσει ἐκατῶν
τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἀν ἡγούνιζοντο,
ἄσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἐφαίνετ. ὁ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν
φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὄρος, ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνθ-
λος ἐἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος. ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς
dιορίσασται εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ
ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γενομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυσ-
τυχίας ἢ εἰς εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλει, ἰκανὸς
ὀρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους.
Μῦθος δ’ ἐστὶν εἰς ὅπως ἄσπερ τωθείς ὀὐοται ἐὼν
περὶ ἐνα ἢ πολλὰ γάρ καὶ ἀπειρά τῷ ἐνυ συμβαίνει, εἰς ὅν
ἐνυῶν οὔδεν ἐστίν ἐνι οὔτος δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἐνός πολλάκ εἰσιν,
ἐξ δὲ ἐν ὑμανοεσία γίνεται πράξεις. δό πάντες ἐνόικαιν
ἀμαρτάνειν ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακλῆδα Θησηδα καὶ
tα τοιάστα ποιήματα πεπονήκασιν ὀσονται γάρ, ἐπεὶ εἰς
ἂν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἔνα καὶ τὸν μύθον ἐῖναι προσήκεις. ὁ δ’
"Ομηρος ὄσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐοικεν
καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ῬΩΩuvre εμε
γάρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποιήσην ἀπαντα ὅτα αὐτῷ συνεύξη, οὐον
πληγῇσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῇσαι δὲ προσπούσασαι
ἐν τῷ ἄγερμῷ, ὃν οὐδὲ θάτερον γενομένον ἀναγκαίον
ἡ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μιὰν πράξιν ὐἱαν
λέγομεν τὴν ῬΩΩuvre εμε συνεστησεν, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἡλια-

1451α 3 συστημάτων scripsi: σωμάτων Αε 6 ὁ add. Bursian
9 ἄλλοτε φασίν Αε: ἄλλοτ' εἴσωθασιν M. Schmidt
(confirm. Ar.): γένει Αε 18 οὔτω apogr.
 odioν Αε 28 ἐ Spengel: ἕν Αε: ἕν ἐ apogr.
29 λέγομεν Αε
the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder. Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole made up of parts, or a beautiful living creature, must be of some size, a size to be taken in by the eye, so a story or Plot must be of some length, but of a length to be taken in by the memory. As for the limit of its length, so far as that is relative to public performances and spectators, it does not fall within the theory of poetry. If they had to perform a hundred tragedies, they would be timed by water-clocks, as they are said to have been at one period. The limit, however, set by the actual nature of the thing is this: the longer the story, consistently with its being comprehensible as a whole, the finer it is by reason of its magnitude. As a rough general formula, 'a length which allows of the hero passing by a series of probable or necessary stages from misfortune to happiness, or from happiness to misfortune,' may suffice as a limit for the magnitude of the story.

The Unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befell that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action. One sees, therefore, the mistake of all the poets who have written a Heracleid, a Theseid, or similar poems; they suppose that, because Heracles was one man, the story also of Heracles must be one story. Homer, however, evidently understood this point quite well, whether by art or instinct, just in the same way as he excels the rest in every other respect. In writing an Odyssey, he did not make the poem cover all that ever befell his hero—it befell him, for instance, to get wounded on Parnassus and also to feign madness at the time of the call to arms, but the two incidents had no probable or necessary connexion with one another—instead of doing that, he took an action with a Unity of the kind we are describing as the subject of the Odyssey, as also of the Iliad. The truth is
30 δα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μμητικαῖς ἢ μία μᾶλλον τῶν ἑστιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν μόθων, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστι, μᾶς τε εἶναι ταύτης καὶ ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεσταναί τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὡστε μετατιθέμενων τῶν μέρων ἢ ἀφαίρουμενοι διαφέρονται καὶ κυνέσθαι τὸ ὁλον. ο ὑάρ προσών 35 ἢ μή προσών μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίθηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὁλον ἑστιν.

Φανερῶν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενό περ ποιητικὸς καὶ ὅ ποιητῆς οὐ τῷ ἡ ἐμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἀμετρα διαφέρουσιν (εἰ ὑάρ ἂν τὰ Ἡρωδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθήκαι καὶ οὐδεν ὅτιν οὐ εἰ ἴσωρία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἀνεν μέτρων); ἀλλὰ τοῦτο διαφέρει, τῷ τῶν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τῶν δὲ οἰα ἂν γένοιτο. δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφότερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἴσωρίας ἑστιν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ᾽ ἴσωρία τὰ καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν λέγειν.

30 ἐστιν δὲ καθόλου μὲν, τῷ πολὺ τὰ ποιά ἄτα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ στὸ-

31 χάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὕφοματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ ἐκα-

32 στον, τὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τὶ ἐπαθεὶν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὐν τῆς 

κωμῳδίας ὅθεν τοῦτο δήλου γέγονεν· συντιθησαντες γὰρ τῶν 

μῶν διὰ τῶν εἰκότων οὕτω τὰ τιχώντα ὕφοματα ὑποτιθέασιν, καὶ οὐκ ῥαπέρ οἱ ἰαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν 

ποιουσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν γενομένων ὕφομάτων 

ἀντέχονται. αὐτίνω δ᾽ ὅτι πιθανόν ἑστι τὸ δυσατὸν· τὰ μὲν 

οὖν μή γενόμενα οὕτω πιστεῦομεν εἶναι δυνάτα, τὰ δὲ γε-

32 ταύτης καὶ Susemihl (ed. 1): καὶ ταύτης ἄε 36 οὐ τὸ ἀπογρ. 

(confirm. Αρ.): οὗτω Αή 36 ὑνομένα Riccardianus 16: γνώμενα Αή 

1451b 4 τοῦτο Αή, Spengel τῷ] τὸ Spengel 10 το] 

τῶν Αή 1451a 13 οὗτω] οὗτω (ni fallor) Α. 14 περὶ τῶν ἀπογρ. 

16 πειθανόν Αή
that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.

From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters; by a singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when their plot is already made up of probable incidents that they give it a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the historic names; and for this reason: what convinces is the possible; now whereas we are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which has not hap-
νόμενα φανερῶν ὅτι δωσάτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔγενετο, εἰ ἤν ἀόυνατα. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐνίασι μέν ἐν ἡ ὁκ τῶν γνώριμων ἐστίν ὁνόματων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πεποιημένα, ἐν ἐνίασι δὲ οὐθέν, οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθέης ὀμοίως γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τά τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὄνοματα πεποιηται, καὶ οὐθέν ἢττον εὐφραίνει. ὡς τού πάντων ἂν εἶν ἐξητεύον τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὖς αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰς ὑν, ἀντέχεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ γελοίουν τούτο ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώριμα ὁλίγους γνώριμα ἐστών, ἀλλὰ ὀμοίως εὐφραίνει πάντας. δήλου οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τῶν ποιητὴν μάλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι ἔδο θητὴν ἡ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσον ποιητής κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ἐστών, μεμείται ἔδο τάς πράξεις. κἂν ἄρα συμβῆ γενόμενα ποιεῖν, οὐθέν ἢττον ποιητῆς ἐστιν τῶν γὰρ γενομένων ἐνια οὐθέν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἴκος γενέσθαι καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι, καθ' ὃ ἐκείνος αὐτῶν ποιητῆς ἐστών.

τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις εἰς ὑν χείρισται· λέγω δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδη μύθων ἐν ὑ ὅ τα ἐπεισοδιώδεις ὀδια μετὰ ἀλληλα οὕτω εἰκὸς οὕτω ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τουαῦται δὲ ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι’ αὐτῶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἁγαθῶν διὰ τούς ὑποκρίτας· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ ποιοῦντες καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μύθων πολλάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς. ἐπεί δὲ οὐ μόνων τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἡ μίμησις ἄλλα καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἑλεεινῶν, ταύτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα [καὶ μάλλον] ὅταν γέννηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι’ ἀλληλα· τὸ γὰρ θαυμαστὸν οὕτως ἔξει μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοματοῦ καὶ τῆς τύχης, ἐπεί καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταύτα θαυμασώτατα

pened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else it would not have come to pass. Nevertheless even in Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions; and there are some without a single known name, e.g. Agathon's *Antheus*, in which both incidents and names are of the poet's invention; and it is no less delightful on that account. So that one must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact, to do so, as even the known stories are only known to a few, though they are a delight none the less to all.

It is evident from the above that the poet must be more the poet of his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch as he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates. And if he should come to take a subject from actual history, he is none the less a poet for that; since some historic occurrences may very well be in the probable and possible order of things; and it is in that aspect of them that he is their poet.

Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a Plot episodic when there is neither probability nor necessity in the sequence of its episodes. Actions of this sort bad poets construct through their own fault, and good ones on account of the players. His work being for public performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot beyond its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence of incident.

Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the marvellous in them than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is
dòkeî ósta ὁσπερ ἐπίηδες φαύνεται γεγονέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἀυθρός ὁ τοῦ Μίντιος ἐν "Ἀργεὶ ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Μίντι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπεσόν" ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα 10 οὐκ εἰκῆ γενέσθαι. ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτως τοιούτως εἶναι καλλίους μύθους.

Εἰςὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ πεπληγμένοι 10 καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ἃν μμῆσθει σι ὁμοίοι εἰσὶν ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθὺς οὔσαι τοιαῦτα. λέγω δὲ ἀπλὴν μὲν πράξιν ἡ 15 γυνομένης ύστερον ἄριστον συνεχόντο καὶ μᾶς ἄνευ περιπετείας ἡ ἀναγωρισμοῦ ἡ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπληγμένη δὲ ἡ λέξις τε μετὰ ἀναγωρισμοῦ ἡ περιπετείας ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἡ μετάβασις ἐστὶν. ταῦτα δὲ δεὶ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συν- στάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὡστε έκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν 20 ἡ ἑξ ἀνάγκης ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα. διαφέρει γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἡ μετὰ τάδε.

"Εστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν η ἔις τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πρατ- ΠΙ τομέων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εὑρήται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ύστερον λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἡ ἀναγκαῖα, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδί-

25 πωδὶ ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανοῦν τῶν Οἰδίπον καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φάβουν, δηλώσας δς ἢν, τούναντίον ἐποίησεν· καὶ ἐν τῷ Δυργεὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποδανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθήναι. ἀναγώρισις 30 δὲ, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸνόμα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἄγνοιας εἰς γνώσιν μεταβολή, ἡ εἰς φιλίαν ἡ εἰς ἕχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐθυχίαν ἡ δυστυχίαν ὁμισμένον καλλιστὴ ἡ ἀναγώρισις, ὅταν ἀμα περιπέτεια γίνονται, οὕτως ἐξεὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν

an appearance of design as it were in them; as for instance
the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys' death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. A Plot, therefore, of this sort is necessarily finer than others.

Plots are either simple or complex, since the actions they represent are naturally of this twofold description. The action, proceeding in the way defined, as one continuous whole, I call simple, when the change in the hero's fortunes takes place without Peripety or Discovery; and complex, when it involves one or the other, or both. These should each of them arise out of the structure of the Plot itself, so as to be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents. There is a great difference between a thing happening propter hoc and post hoc.

A Peripety is the change from one state of things within the play to its opposite of the kind described, and that too in the way we are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events; as it is for instance in Oedipus: here the opposite state of things is produced by the Messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove his fears as to his mother, reveals the secret of his birth. And in Lynceus: just as he is being led off for execution, with Danaus at his side to put him to death, the incidents preceding this bring it about that he is saved and Danaus put to death. A Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil fortune. The finest form of Discovery is one attended by Peripeties, like that which goes with the Discovery in Oedipus. There are
II. 1452\textsuperscript{a} 34—12. 1452\textsuperscript{b} 22

μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα τάγματα ἐστὶν ὡς ὅπερ εὑρήται συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ πέπραγε τὸ ἡ μὴ πέπραγεν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισαί. ἀλλά ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μόνου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισι καὶ περιπέτεια ἡ ἔλεος

1452\textsuperscript{b} ἐξει ἡ φόβον, οἷον πράξεων ἡ τραγῳδία μέρης ὑπόκειται· ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τουτῶν συμβαίνει. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισις, οἱ μὲν θατέρῳ πρὸς τὸν ἔτερον μόνῳ, ὅταν ἡ δῆλον ἄτερος 5 τίς ἐστιν, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι, οἷον ἡ μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ἱρός τῇ ἀναγνώρισθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνον δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἅλλης ἐδείκνυε·

ὅποι μὲν οὖν τοῦ μόνου μέρη περὶ ταύτ’ ἐστὶ, περιπέτεια 10 καὶ ἀναγνώρισις· τρίτον δὲ πάθος. τούτων δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν καὶ ἀναγνώρισις εὑρήται, πάθος δὲ ἐστὶ πράξεις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά, οἷον οἱ τε ἐν τῷ φανερῷ βάναυσι καὶ αἱ περιωδυνάει καὶ τράστεις καὶ ὁσα τοιαύτα.

Μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οὐς μὲν ὡς εἴδεσθαι δεῖ χρῆσθαι 15 πρότερον ἐπιστομεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἀ ἀναπειρέει κεχωρισμένα τάδε ἐστὶν, πρόλογος ἐπεισόδιον ἐξόδους χορικών, καὶ τούτοις τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον, κοινὰ μὲν ἀπάντων ταύτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κόμμων. ἐστὶν δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὅλου τραγῳδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ 20 παρόδου, ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλου τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλου χορικῶν μελῶν, ἐξόδος δὲ μέρος ὅλου τραγῳδίας μεθ’ ὧν ὡς ἐστὶ χοροῦ μέλος· χορικὸ δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἡ

35 ὅπερ Spengel: ὅστερ A\textsuperscript{c} 36 ἦ] εἰ A\textsuperscript{c} 1452\textsuperscript{b} 1 οἶον A\textsuperscript{o} 3 ἐπεὶ δὴ Parisinus 2038: ἐπειδή A\textsuperscript{o} 4 ἄτερος apogr.: ἐτερος A\textsuperscript{o} 7 ἐκεῖνω scripsi: ἐκεῖνῳ A\textsuperscript{o} 9 περί om. Riccardianus 46 12 οἱ τε] ὡτε A\textsuperscript{o} 19 προχωροῦ A\textsuperscript{o}
no doubt other forms of it; what we have said may happen in a way in reference to inanimate things, even things of a very casual kind; and it is also possible to discover whether some one has done or not done something. But the form most directly connected with the Plot and the action of the piece is the first-mentioned. This, with a Peripety, will arouse either pity or fear—actions of that nature being what Tragedy is assumed to represent; and it will also serve to bring about the happy or unhappy ending. The Discovery, then, being of persons, it may be that of one party only to the other, the latter being already known; or both the parties may have to discover themselves. Iphigenia, for instance, was discovered to Orestes by sending the letter; and another Discovery was required to reveal him to Iphigenia.

Two parts of the Plot, then, Peripety and Discovery, are on matters of this sort. A third part is Suffering; which we may define as an action of a destructive or painful nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, wounding, and the like. The other two have been already explained.

The parts of Tragedy to be treated as formative elements in the whole were mentioned in a previous Chapter. From the point of view, however, of its quantity, i.e. the separate sections into which it is divided, a tragedy has the following parts: Prologue, Episode, Exode, and a choral portion, distinguished into Parode and Stasimon; these two are common to all tragedies, whereas songs from the stage and Commoe are only found in some. The Prologue is all that precedes the Parode of the chorus; an Episode all that comes in between two whole choral songs; the Exode all that follows after the last choral song. In the choral portion the Parode is the whole first statement of the chorus; a Stasimon,
12. I452 b 23—13. I453 a 11

πρώτη λέξις ὅλη χοροῦ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χοροῦ τὸ ἀνευ ἀναπαλστὸν καὶ τροχαίον, κόμμος δὲ θρήνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ 25 ἀπὸ σκηνῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἷς μὲν (ὡς εἴδεσι) δεῖ χρήσκαι πρότερον εἴπαμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς διαφερέται κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ἑστὶ.

Ων δὲ δεὶ στοχαζέσθαι καὶ δεὶ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνι-13 στάσις τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθεν ἑσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐρ- 30 γον, ἐφεξῆς ἀν εἰ ἔλεγεν τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις. ἐπείδη οὖν δεὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλιστῆς τραγῳδίας μὴ ἀπλὴν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτην φοβερὸν καὶ ἑλεεινῶν εἶναι μυμητικήν (τοῦτο γὰρ θὰ ἦν τής τουαίρης μυμησεῶς ἑστὶν), πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι ὡσ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς ἀνθρώπος δεὶ μετα- 35 βάλλουσας φαίνεσθαι εἷς εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, οὐ γὰρ φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἑλεεινὸν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μαρῶν ἑστὶν ὡσ τοὺς μο- χθροὺς εἷς ἁτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίαν, ἁτραγῳδότατον γὰρ τούτ' ἑστὶ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐχεί ὡς δὲ, ὡσ γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον 1453 a ὡστε ἑλεεινῶν οὐτε φοβερῶν ἑστὶν οὕτως αὐ τὸν σφόδρα ποιήσαν τοίς εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπεπτεῖν τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλ- ἀνθρωπον ἔχοι ἀν ἡ τουαίρη σύστασις ἀλλ' ὡσ τε ἑλεον ὡστε φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἑστὶν δυστυχίουτα, ὁ δὲ 5 περὶ τὸν ὁμοίον, ἑλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὁμοίον, ὡστε ὡστε ἑλεεινῶν οὐτε φοβερῶν ἑσται τὸ συμβαῖνον. ὁ μεταξὶ ἄρα τούτων λοιπὸς. ἑστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μὴ ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ μὴτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοιχερίας μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι' 10 ἀμαρτίαιν τιὰ τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ, οἶον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτων γενόν.
a song of the chorus without anapaests or trochees; a
Commnis, a lamentation sung by chorus and actor in concert.
The parts of Tragedy to be used as formative elements in
the whole we have already mentioned; the above are its
parts from the point of view of its quantity, or the separate
sections into which it is divided.

The next points after what we have said above will be
these: (1) What is the poet to aim at, and what is he to
avoid, in constructing his Plots? and (2) What are the
conditions on which the tragic effect depends?

We assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the
Plot must be not simple but complex; and further, that it
must imitate actions arousing pity and fear, since that is the
distinctive function of this kind of imitation. It follows,
therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided.

(1) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness
to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The
first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply
odious to us. The second is the most untragic that can be;
it has no one of the requisites of Tragedy; it does
not appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our
pity, or to our fears. Nor on the other hand should (3) an
extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into
misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in
us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity
is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of
one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either
piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation. There remains, then,
the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently
virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought
upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of
judgement, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great
reputation and prosperity; e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the
men of note of similar families. The perfect Plot, accordingly,
ἐπιφανεῖς ἀνδρεῖς. ἀνάγκη ἁρα τοῦ καλῶς ἔχουσα μύθον ἀπλοὺς εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ διπλοὺς, ἄσπερ των φασί, καὶ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τούτων 15 ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἢ οἶνον ἔρηται ἢ βελτίων μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος. σημείων δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηρίῳσυν, νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλισται τραγῳδίαι συντίθενται, οἰον 20 περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὀσίους ἄλλους συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ πονῆσαι. ἢ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλιστή τραγῳδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεως ἐστι. διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδης ἐγκαλοῦτες [τὸ] αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνουσιν ὅτι τούτο 25 ὑπὸ ταῖς τραγῳδίαις καὶ πολλαὶ αὐτοῖ εἰς δυστυχίας τελευτῶσιν. τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἔρηται ὁρθῶν σημείων δὲ μέγιστον ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικότατος αἱ τοιαύτα φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκουμεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραε-30 γικῶστοι γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται. δευτέρα δὲ ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ των ἐστὶν σύστασις, ἡ διπλὴ τε τὴν σύστα-35 σιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῦς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσι. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τῷ τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειας ἀκολουθοῦσα γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' 35 εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἐστὶν δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἀπὸ τραγῳ-39 δίας ἤδουν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεία: ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἱ ἄν ἔχθιστοι ὡς ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγι-356 σθος, φύλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς εξέρχονται, καὶ ἀπο-39 τιθήσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενὸς.

20 Ἀλκμέωνα scripsi: Ἀλκμαίωνα A 24 τὸ seclusi 31 ἂν A 33 βελτίωσι καὶ χείροσιν A 34 ἂν θεατῶν Riccardianus 16 35 ὡτί A 37 ἂν ὁ Bonitz: ἂν οἱ A 39 ἀποθύρησκει A
must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that. Fact also confirms our theory. Though the poets began by accepting any tragic story that came to hand, in these days the finest tragedies are always on the story of some few houses, on that of Aleeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or any others that may have been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror. The theoretically best tragedy, then, has a Plot of this description. The critics, therefore, are wrong, who blame Euripides for taking this line in his tragedies, and giving many of them an unhappy ending. It is, as we have said, the right line to take. The best proof is this: on the stage, and in the public performances, such plays, properly worked out, are seen to be the most truly tragic; and Euripides, even if his execution be faulty in every other point, is seen to be nevertheless the most tragic certainly of the dramatists. After this comes the construction of Plot which some rank first, one with a double story (like the Odyssey) and an opposite issue for the good and the bad personages. It is ranked as first only through the weakness of the audiences; the poets merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate. But the pleasure here is not that of Tragedy. It belongs rather to Comedy, where the bitterest enemies in the piece (e.g. Orestes and Aegisthus) walk off good friends at the end, with no slaying of any one by any one.
"Εστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὀψεως τὸ γίγνεσθαι, ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ ἔστι πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμεῖνον. δέει γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὀραμὸν οὐτῶν συνεστάναι τῶν μυθῶν ὡστε τὸν ἄκοινον τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φράττειν καὶ ἐλεειν ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνοντων ὡσπερ ἀν πάθοι τις ἄκοινων τοῦ Οἰδίπου μυθοῦ. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως τούτου παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνώτερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενον ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὀψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρα-σκευάζουσιν οὖν τὸν ἀργόν καὶ κοινούσιν οὖν γὰρ πάσαν δεὶ ζητείν ἢδονήν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἔπει δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέους καὶ φόβου διὰ μμήσεως δεὶ ἢδονήν παρα-σκευάζειν τῶν ποιητῆς, φανερῶς ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμα-σιν ἐμπουρέον. ποία οὖν δεινὰ ή ποία οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν συμπάπητων, λάβωμεν. ἀνάγκη δη ἡ φίλων εἴναι πρὸς ἅλλον τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις ἡ ἐχθρῶν ἡ μηδε-τέρων. ἀν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸν ἐχθρῶν, οὕδεν ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλων, πλὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος · οὐδὲ ἄν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες· ὅταν δὲ εἰν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη, οὖν ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ νῦν πατέρα ἢ μήτηρ νῦν ἢ νῦν μητέρα ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ ἢ τί ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἄρα, ταῦτα ζητητέον. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρεκλημένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστω, λέγω δὲ οὖν τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθα-νοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐρυφάλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέ- ὦνος, αὐτῶν δὲ εὐφρίσκειν δεὶ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρή-σθαι καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλὸς τὰ λέγομεν, εἶπομεν σαφέστερον. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξειν, ὡσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ
The tragic fear and pity may be aroused by the Spectacle; but they may also be aroused by the very structure and incidents of the play—which is the better way and shows the better poet. The Plot in fact should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity at the incidents; which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story in *Oedipus* would have on one. To produce this same effect by means of the Spectacle is less artistic, and requires extraneous aid. Those, however, who make use of the Spectacle to put before us that which is merely monstrous and not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch with Tragedy; not every kind of pleasure should be required of a tragedy, but only its own proper pleasure.

The tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear, and the poet has to produce it by a work of imitation; it is clear, therefore, that the causes should be included in the incidents of his story. Let us see, then, what kinds of incident strike one as horrible, or rather as piteous. In a deed of this description the parties must necessarily be either friends, or enemies, or indifferent to one another. Now when enemy does it on enemy, there is nothing to move us to pity either in his doing or in his meditating the deed, except so far as the actual pain of the sufferer is concerned; and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another. Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within the family—when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother—these are the situations the poet should seek after. The traditional stories, accordingly, must be kept as they are, e.g. the murder of Clytaemnестra by Orestes and of Eriphyle by Alcmeon. At the same time even with these there is something left to the poet himself; it is for him to devise the right way of treating them. Let us explain more clearly what we mean by 'the right way.' The deed of horror may be done by the doer knowingly and consciously, as in the old poets, and in Medea’s murder
ἔποιον εἰδότας καὶ γιγνώσκοντας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐρυπίδης ἐπούσεν ἀποκτείνουσαν τοὺς παιδὰς τὴν Μήδειαν. ἔστιν δὲ
30 πράξαι μὲν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πράξαι τὸ δεινὸν, ἐθ' ὅστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὡσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέος Οἰδίπος· τούτο μὲν οὖν ἐξω τοῦ δράματος, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ οὖν ο Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὁ ἐν τῷ τραγῳδίᾳ 'Οδυσσεί. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταύτα τὸ μέλλον-
35 τα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἀγνοιαν ἀναγνωρίσας πρὶν ποίησαι. καὶ παρὰ ταύτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως. ἢ γὰρ πράξαι ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν γιγνώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι χείριστον· τὸ τε γὰρ μιαρών ἤχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικῶν ἀπαθῆς γάρ. διόπερ οὐδεὶς τοὺς ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ ἀληγάκις, οἷον ἐν Ἀντιγόνῃ τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Λίμων. τὸ δὲ πράξαι δεύτερον. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν πράξαι, πράξαντα δὲ ἀναγνωρίσας· τὸ τε γὰρ μιαρῶν οὐ πρόσεστι καὶ ἢ ἀναγνώρισες ἐκπληκτικῶν. κράτιστον δὲ
5 τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τῶν νίων ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὗ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἡ ἀδελφή τῶν ἀδελφῶν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλῆ νίος τὴν μητέρα ἐκδιδόνα διέλθουν μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν. διὰ γὰρ τούτῳ, ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλὰ
10 γένη αἰ τραγῳδίαι εἶσαι. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης ἐδρουν τὸ ποιοῦντα παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς οἰκίας ἀπαντῶν ὡσας τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβεβήκε πάθη. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων συντάσσεως καὶ ποίους τών ἐίναι δεῖ τοὺς μῦ-
15 θους εἴρηται ἰκανῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἠθὶ τέταρα ἐστιν ὥν δεὶ στοχάζεσθαι, ἐν 15

33 Ἀλκμαῖων ὁ Victorius: ἀλκμαῖων Αο 34 τὸ Bonitz: τῶν Αο
1454 a 6 ἀνεγνωρισε Αο
of her children in Euripides. Or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship, and discover that afterwards, as does the Oedipus in Sophocles. Here the deed is outside the play; but it may be within it, like the act of the Alcmeon in Astydamas, or that of the Telephus in *Ulysses Wounded*. A third possibility is for one meditating some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relationship, to make the discovery in time to draw back. These exhaust the possibilities, since the deed must necessarily be either done or not done, and either knowingly or unknowingly.

The worst situation is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the deed, and leaves it undone. It is odious and also (through the absence of suffering) untragic; hence it is that no one is made to act thus except in some few instances, e.g. Haemon and Creon in *Antigone*. Next after this comes the actual perpetration of the deed mediated. A better situation than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance, and the relationship discovered afterwards, since there is nothing odious in it, and the Discovery will serve to astound us. But the best of all is the last; what we have in *Cresphontes*, for example, where Merope, on the point of slaying her son, recognizes him in time; in *Iphigenia*, where sister and brother are in a like position; and in *Helle*, where the son recognizes his mother, when on the point of giving her up to her enemy.

This will explain why our tragedies are restricted (as we said just now) to such a small number of families. It was accident rather than art that led the poets in quest of subjects to embody this kind of incident in their Plots. They are still obliged, accordingly, to have recourse to the families in which such horrors have occurred.

On the construction of the Plot, and the kind of Plot required for Tragedy, enough has now been said.
μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, οὕτως χρηστὰ ἦ. ἔξει δὲ ὡθος μὲν ἐὰν ὦσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιή φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ πράξις προαιρετικῶς των [ἡ], χρηστὸν δὲ ἐὰν χρηστὴν. ἔστιν δὲ ἐν ἐν 20 ἐκάστῳ γένει καὶ γὰρ γυνὶ ἐστὶν χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, καῦτοι γε ὅσως τοῦτο τὸ μὲν χειρὸν, τὸ δὲ ὀλὸς φαΰλων ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμόττοιτα ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀνδρείαν μὲν τὸ ἠθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμόττον γνωικεῖτο τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἡ δεινὴν εἶναι. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὄμων. τούτῳ γὰρ ἐτερον τοῦ 25 χρηστοῦ τὸ ἠθος καὶ ἀρμόττον ποῦσαι ὦσπερ εἰρηται. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὀμαλὸν. καὸν γὰρ ἀνώμαλος τις ἡ ἡ τῆς μύρης παρέχουν καὶ τοιοῦτον ἠθος ὑποτίθεις, ὀμὼς ὅμως ἀνώμαλον δεί εἶναι. ἐστὶν δὲ παράδειγμα ποιηρίας μὲν ἠθος μὴ ἀναγκαίον οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῇ Ὁρέστῃ, τοῦ 30 δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττοιτος ὁ τε θρήνος (ὁ τοῦ) Ὀδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανύπτης ῥήσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμαλῶν ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια: οὔδεν γὰρ ἔουσεν ἡ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρᾳ. χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθεσιν ὦσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συντάσσει ἀεὶ ζητείν ἡ τὸ ἀναγκαίον ἡ τὸ εἰκὸς, 35 ἄστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαύτα λέγειν ἡ πράττειν ἡ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ εἰκὸς καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἡ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ εἰκὸς. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λισσέως τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαινεῖν, καὶ μὴ ὦσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδεία ἀπὸ μηχανής καὶ ἐν τῇ 'Ιλιαίᾳ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀπόσπλουν. ἀλλὰ μηχανὴ χρηστῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἕξιν του ὀράματος, ἡ ὁσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν ἃ οὐχ οἶνον τε ἀνθρωπον εἰδέναι, ἡ ὁσα ὀστερον ἂ

In the Characters there are four points to aim at. First and foremost, that they shall be good. There will be an element of character in the play, if (as has been observed) what a personage says or does reveals a certain moral purpose; and a good element of character, if the purpose so revealed is good. Such goodness is possible in every type of personage, even in a woman or a slave, though the one is perhaps an inferior, and the other a wholly worthless being. The second point is to make them appropriate. The Character before us may be, say, manly; but it is not appropriate in a female Character to be manly, or clever. The third is to make them like the reality, which is not the same as their being good and appropriate, in our sense of the term. The fourth is to make them consistent and the same throughout; even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imitation as presenting that form of character, he should still be consistently inconsistent. We have an instance of baseness of character, not required for the story, in the Menelaus in Orestes; of the incongruous and unbecitting in the lamentation of Ulysses in Scylla, and in the (clever) speech of Melanippe; and of inconsistency in Iphigenia at Aulis, where Iphigenia the suppliant is utterly unlike the later Iphigenia. The right thing, however, is in the Characters just as in the incidents of the play to endeavour always after the necessary or the probable; so that whenever such-and-such a personage says or does such-and-such a thing, it shall be the probable or necessary outcome of his character; and whenever this incident follows on that, it shall be either the necessary or the probable consequence of it. From this one sees (to digress for a moment) that the Dénouement also should arise out of the plot itself, and not depend on a stage-artifice, as in Medea, or in the story of the (arrested) departure of the Greeks in the Iliad. The artifice must be reserved for matters outside the play—for past events beyond human knowledge, or events yet to come, which require to be
5 δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας· ἀπαντα γὰρ ἀποδόσεις τῶν θεῶν ὀρῶν. ἀλογον δὲ μὴν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας, οἶνον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους. ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησις ἔστω ἡ τραγῳδία βελτίωσιν, ἡμᾶς δὲι μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφουσι καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν θείαν μορφὴν ὁμοίους ποιοῦσι καλλίους γράφοντος ὁὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενος καὶ ὁργίδους καὶ ῥαθόμους καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχονται ἐπὶ τῶν ἱδίων τοιούτους ὠντας ἐπεικεῖσες τοιοῖς ποιεῖ ἐρθηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἰκανῶς.

'Αναγνώρισις δὲ τί μὲν ἔστω, ἐρθηται πρότερον δ νύῃ 16 20 δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτῃ μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνοτάτη καὶ ἡ πλείστη χρώνται δι᾽ ἀπορίαν, ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων. τούτων δὲ τα μὲν σύμφωνα, οἶνον "λάχυχην ἤν φοροῦσι Γηγενεῖς" ἡ ἀστέρας οἶνου ἐν τῷ Θεὸντι Καρκίνος, τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἶνον ὀλιγα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, τὰ περί-25 δέραια καὶ οἶνον ἐν τῇ Τυροὶ διὰ τῆς σκάφης. ἔστω δὲ καὶ τούτων χρῆσθαι ἡ βέλτους ἡ χείρον, οἶνον (ὁ) 'Οθυσεύς διὰ τῆς οἰλῆς ἀλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συμβοτῶν εἰς γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἐνεκα ἀτεχνοτεραῖ, καὶ αἱ τοιαύτα πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περιπτελεῖς, ὥστε-30 περ ἐν τοῖς Νίλτροις, βελτίωσ. δεύτερα δὲ αἱ πεποι-
foretold or announced; since it is the privilege of the Gods to know everything. There should be nothing improbable among the actual incidents. If it be unavoidable, however, it should be outside the tragedy, like the improbability in the Oedipus of Sophocles. But to return to the Characters. As Tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man, we in our way should follow the example of good portrait-painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in portraying men quick or slow to anger, or with similar infirmities of character, must know how to represent them as such, and at the same time as good men, as Agathon and Homer have represented Achilles.

All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and further, those also for such points of stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since in these too one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, has been said on the subject in one of our published writings.

Discovery in general has been explained already. As for the species of Discovery, the first to be noted is (1) the least artistic form of it, of which the poets make most use through mere lack of invention, Discovery by signs or marks. Of these signs some are congenital, like the ‘lance-head which the Earth-born have on them,’ or ‘stars,’ such as Carcinus brings in in his Thyestes; others acquired after birth—these latter being either marks on the body, e.g. scars, or external tokens, like necklaces, or to take another sort of instance, the ark in the Discovery in Tyro. Even these, however, admit of two uses, a better and a worse; the scar of Ulysses is an instance; the Discovery of him through it is made in one way by the nurse and in another by the swineherds. A Discovery using signs as a means of assurance is less artistic, as indeed are all such as imply reflection; whereas one bringing them in all of a sudden, as in the Bath-story, is of a better order. Next after these are (2)
46

16. 1454 b 31—1455 a 17

ημέναι ύπο τοῦ ποιητοῦ, διὸ ἀτεχνοῦ. οὗν (δ) Ὠρέστης ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὠρέστης ἑκεῖνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἑκείνως δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει ὃ βούλεται ὁ ποιητής ἀλλ' 35 οὐχ ὁ μύθος· διὸ τι ἐγγὺς τῆς εἰρημένης ἀμαρτίας ἑστῶ, ἐξήν γὰρ ἀν ἐνα καὶ ἑνεγκεῖν. καὶ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Τηρεῖ ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή, ἡ τρίτη διὰ μυῆς, τῷ αἰσθένθαι

1455 a τι ἵδοντα, ὃσπερ ἦν Ἐκτρίνους τοῖς Δίκαιογένεσις, ἰδιὸν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν ἐκλάνθην, καὶ ἦ ἐν Ἀλκίουν ἀπολόγη, ἀκούων γὰρ τοῦ κυθαρίστου καὶ μυηθεὶς ἐδάκρυσεν, ὅθεν ἀνεγνώρισθησαν. τετάρτῃ δὲ ἦ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, οὗν ἐν Χοσφόροις, 5 ὃτι ὁμοίως τις ἐλήλυθεν, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐθεὶς ἀλλ' ἦ ὁ Ὠρέστης, οὗτος ἀρά ἐλήλυθεν. καὶ ἦ Πολυδόου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν Ὠρέστην συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι ἦ τ' ἀδελφή ἐτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμβαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεοδέκτου Τυδεί, ὃτι ἐλθόν ὃς εὐρήσαντοι πνεύμων ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλτον

καὶ ἦ ἐν τοῖς Φυείδαῖς· ἵδοντας γὰρ τοὺς τόπους συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν αὐταῖς, καὶ γὰρ ἑξετήθησαν ἑνταῦθα. ἐστὶν δὲ τις καὶ συνθετῇ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θατέρου, οὗν ἐν τῷ 'Ὀδυσσεῖ τῷ ψευδαγγέλῳ τὸ μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] τόξον ἐφή γνώσεσθαι ὃ ὁμί 15 ἑωράκει, τὸ δὲ ὃς δὴ ἑκεῖνον ἀναγνωρίσατο διὰ τούτου ποίησα παραλογισμὸς. πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δὲ εἰκό-

Discoveries made directly by the poet; which are inartistic for that very reason; e.g. Orestes' Discovery of himself in Iphigenia: whereas his sister reveals who she is by the letter, Orestes is made to say himself what the poet rather than the story demands. This, therefore, is not far removed from the first-mentioned fault, since he might have presented certain tokens as well. Another instance is the 'shuttle's voice' in the Tereus of Sophocles. (3) A third species is Discovery through memory, from a man's consciousness being awakened by something seen or heard. Thus in The Cypriote of Dicaeogenes, the sight of the picture makes the man burst into tears; and in the Tale of Alcinous, hearing the harper Ulysses is reminded of the past and weeps; the Discovery of them being the result. (4) A fourth kind is Discovery through reasoning; e.g. in The Choephoroe: 'One like me is here; there is no one like me but Orestes; he, therefore, must be here.' Or that which Polyidus the Sophist suggested for Iphigenia; since it was natural for Orestes to reflect: 'My sister was sacrificed, and I am to be sacrificed like her.' Or that in the Tydeus of Theodectes: 'I came to find a son, and am to die myself.' Or that in The Phinidae: on seeing the place the women inferred their fate, that they were to die there, since they had also been exposed there. (5) There is, too, a composite Discovery arising from bad reasoning on the side of the other party. An instance of it is in Ulysses the False Messenger: he said he should know the bow—which he had not seen; but to suppose from that that he would know it again (as though he had once seen it) was bad reasoning. (6) The best of all Discoveries, however, is that arising from the
16. 1455א 18—17. 1455ב 6
tων, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι καὶ τῇ 'Ἰφιγενείᾳ:
εἰκός γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐπιθέειν γράμματα. αἱ γὰρ τοιαύται
20 μόνας ἄνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ δεραίων. δέετεραι
δὲ αἱ ἑκ συλλογισμοῖ.

Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπερ-17
γάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὄμματων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ
ἀν ἐναργέστατα [ὅ] ορῶν ὡσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς
25 πραττομένοις εὐρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ήκιστα ἀν λαυθάριον
[τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. σημείων δὲ τούτων ὃ ἐπετυμάτο Καρκίνῳ.
ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἑρωῦ ἀνήι, ὃ μὴ ὀρῶντ’ ἀν τῶν
θεατῶν ἐλάβαναν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν ὑσχερα-
νάντων τούτων θεατῶν. ὥσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχή-
30 μασιν συναπεργαζόμενοι· πιθανῶτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς
φύσεως οἱ εἰ τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσών, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος
καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὁργιζόμενος ἀληθινῶτα. διὸ εὔφωνος ἡ
ποιητική ἔστιν ἡ μαυρικῆ· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὔπλαστοι οἱ δὲ
ἐκεκατοτικοὶ εἰσών. τοὺς τε λόγους καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους
1455ב δεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦτα ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἴδ’ οὕτως ἐπεισ-
οδοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν. λέγω δὲ οὕτως ἀν θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθ-
όλου, οἷον τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· τυθείσης τοῦς κόρης καὶ ἀφα-
νισθείσης ἀδήλως τοὺς θύσαςιν, ἱδρυθείσης δὲ εἰς ἅλλην
5 χώραν, ἐν ᾗ νόμος ἢν τοὺς ξένους θύει τῇ θεῷ, ταῦτην ἐσχέ
τὴν ἱερωστήν· χρόνῳ δὲ ἕστερον τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθέιν
18 τὸ scripsi: ὁ Αε 20 δέρεων Αε: περιδεραίων apogr. 24
ἐνεργεύστατα Αε ὁ om. Parisinus 2038 25 λαυθάριο τῷ Αε:
λαυθάνω τοῖς apographa plurα (τῷ Vahleno teste deletum est in nonnullis)
26 ἐπετυμάτο marg. Riccardiani 16 (confirm. Ar.): ἐπιτυμᾶ τῷ Αε
27 ἀνήι Guelferbytanus (confirm. Ar.): ἐν εἴ Αε ὀρῶντ’ ἀν
Vahlen: ὀρῶντα Αε 31 χειμαζόμενος Αε 34 εκεκατοτικοί
Riccardianus 46 (et Paccius in versionej; confirmare videtur Ar.):
ἐξεταστικοὶ Αε τούς τε Parisinus 2038: τούτους τε Αε 1455ב 1
ἐπεισῳδίον Αε 2 παρατείνειν Riccardianus 46: περιτείνειν Αε
incidents themselves, when the great surprise comes about through a probable incident, like that in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles; and also in *Iphigenia*; for it was not improbable that she should wish to have a letter taken home. These last are the only Discoveries independent of the artifice of signs and necklaces. Next after them come Discoveries through reasoning.

At the time when he is constructing his Plots, and engaged on the Diction in which they are worked out, the poet should remember (1) to put the actual scenes as far as possible before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is appropriate, and be least likely to overlook incongruities. This is shown by what was censured in Carcinus, the return of Amphiaras from the sanctuary; it would have passed unnoticed, if it had not been actually seen by the audience; but on the stage his play failed, the incongruity of the incident offending the spectators. (2) As far as may be, too, the poet should even act his story with the very gestures of his personages. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing; distress and anger, for instance, are portrayed most truthfully by one who is feeling them at the moment. Hence it is that poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion. (3) His story, again, whether already made or of his own making, he should first simplify and reduce to a universal form, before proceeding to lengthen it out by the insertion of episodes. The following will show how the universal element in *Iphigenia*, for instance, may be viewed: A certain maiden having been offered in sacrifice, and spirited away from her sacrificers into another land, where the custom was to sacrifice all strangers to the Goddess, she was made there the priestess of this rite. Long after that the brother
τῆς ἱερείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνείλει ὁ θεὸς διὰ τινα αἰτίαν [ἐξω τοῦ καθόλου] ἔλθειν ἐκεὶ καὶ ἐφ᾿ ὃ τι δὲ ἔξω τοῦ μύθου ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ λυφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἄνεγνώρισεν, εἴθ᾿ ὡς Εὐρι-
πίδης εἴθ᾿ ὡς Πολύνδος ἐποθήσεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκός εἰτῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὴν ἀδέλφην ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν ἔδει τυθῆναι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδίουν· ὅπου δὲ ἔσται οἶκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια, οἶον ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἡ μανία δὲ ἢ ἡ ἐλήφθη καὶ ἡ σω-
τηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμάσιοι τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἢ δ᾿ ἐποποιία τούτους μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὀδυσσείας (οὔ) μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν· ἀποθημοῦτός τινος ἐτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδώνος καὶ μόνον οὕτως, ἐτι δὲ τῶν οὐκοῦ οὕτως ἑχοῦτων ἀστέ τὰ χρή-
ματα ὑπὸ μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τῶν νῦν ἐπιζου-
λεύσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθείς, καὶ ἀναγινώρισας ἑτευάς αὐτὸς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη τοὺς δ᾿ ἐξόρους διεφθείρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑδον τούτο, τὰ δ᾿ ἀλλὰ ἐπεισόδια.

'Εστὶ δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις, τὰ 18

25 μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνα τῶν ἑσωθεν πολλάκις ἢ δέσις, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἡ λύσις,—λέγοι δὲ δέσιω μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἄπτ᾿ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους ὁ ἐσχατὸν ἐστὶν ἐς οὗ μεταβαί-
νεως εἰς εὐτυχίαν * *, λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπό τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μετα-
βάσεως μέχρι τέλους—ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεὶ τῷ Θεοδέκτουν
30 δέσις μὲν τὰ τε προπεραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις καὶ

7 ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου seclusit Duentzer 10 poliæosov A<sup>c</sup> 15
drámai apogr. : ἄρμασιν A<sup>o</sup> 17 οὐ add. Vulcanius (confirm.
Ar.) μικρὸς apogr. 19 ἐτι Riccardianus 16 (confirm.
Ar.) : ἐπεὶ A<sup>a</sup> 22 τυώς] fort. ὅτι 28 εἰς εὐτυχίαν
<συμβαίνει ἡ εἰς δυστυχίαν> (ut videtur) Ar. : εἰς εὐτυχίαν <εἰς
dυστυχίας συμβαίνει ἡ εἰς εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν> coni. Vahlen :
<εἰς δυστυχίας συμβαίνει ἡ> εἰς εὐτυχίαν Gomperz 29 λυγκεὶ
apogr. (confirm. Ar.) : λυκεί A<sup>o</sup>
of the priestess happened to come; the fact, however, of the oracle having for a certain reason bidden him go thither, and his object in going, are outside the Plot of the play. On his coming he was arrested, and about to be sacrificed, when he revealed who he was—either as Euripides puts it, or (as suggested by Polyidus) by the not improbable exclamation, 'So I too am doomed to be sacrificed, as my sister was'; and the disclosure led to his salvation. This done, the next thing, after the proper names have been fixed as a basis for the story, is to work in episodes or accessory incidents. One must mind, however, that the episodes are appropriate, like the fit of madness in Orestes, which led to his arrest, and the purifying, which brought about his salvation. In plays, then, the episodes are short; in epic poetry they serve to lengthen out the poem. The argument of the Odyssey is not a long one. A certain man has been abroad many years; Poseidon is ever on the watch for him, and he is all alone. Matters at home too have come to this, that his substance is being wasted and his son's death plotted by suitors to his wife. Then he arrives there himself after his grievous sufferings; reveals himself, and falls on his enemies; and the end is his salvation and their death. This being all that is proper to the Odyssey, everything else in it is episode. (4) There is a further point to be borne in mind. Every tragedy is in part Complication and in part Dénouement; the incidents before the opening scene, and often certain also of those within the play, forming the Complication; and the rest the Dénouement. By Complication I mean all from the beginning of the story to the point just before the change in the hero's fortunes; by Dénouement, all from the beginning of the change to the end. In the Lynceus of Theodectes, for instance, the Complication includes, together with the presupposed inci-
πάλιν ἡ αὐτών, (λύσις) δ') ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου μέχρι τοῦ τέλους. * *τραγῳδίας δέ εἴην εἰς ἑσάσασα (τοσαυτά γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέξχῃ), ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ὡς τὸ ὄλον ἐστὶν περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισι, ἡ δὲ παθητική, οἷον οἷς τε

1456a Αἵωντες καὶ οἱ Ἰεώνες, ἡ δὲ ἱδική, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ Πηλεὺς· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις, οἷον αἱ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμήθεες καὶ ὁ Σαμίας ἐν ᾧ ἦν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπαντά δεὶ περιπάτησαι ἵμανεν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλείστα, ἀλλως τε 5 καὶ ὠς ἐν τούτῳ κυκφαντουσι τῶν ποιητῶν· γεγονότων γὰρ καθ' ἐκαστὸν μέρος ἀγαθῶν ποιητῶν, ἐκάστου τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἠξίουσι τὸν ἑνά ὑπερβάλλειν. [δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἀλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν οὐδὲν ἵνα τῷ μύθῳ τούτῳ δὲ, ὥς ἡ αὐτὴ πλοκὴ καὶ λύσις. πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ 10 λύσουσι κακῶς· δεὶ δὲ ἀμφό τεί κρατεῦσαι.] χρὴ δὲ ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις μεμνήσαται καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἑποποικὸν σύντομα τραγῳδίαν—ἐποποικὸν δὲ λέγω [δὲ] τὸ πολύμυθον—οἷον εἰ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὄλον ποιεί μύθον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μήκος λαμβάνει τὰ μέρη τοῦ πρέπου μέγεθος, ἐν ἑν 15 δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει. σημεῖον δὲ, ὡςον πέρσων Ἰλίου ὄλην ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ὦσπερ Ἐὐριπίδης, (ἡ) Νιῆθη καὶ μὴ ὦσπερ Αἰσχύλος, ἢ ἐκκιτησοῦσιν ἡ κακῶς ἀγωνιζόται, ἔπει καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέ- πεςεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ ἐν τοῖς ποιητεῖσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς

dents, the seizure of the child and that in turn of the parents; and the Dénoüement all from the indictment for the murder to the end. Now it is right, when one speaks of a tragedy as the same or not the same as another, to do so on the ground before all else of their Plot, i.e. as having the same or not the same Complication and Dénoüement. Yet there are many dramatists who, after a good Complication, fail in the Dénoüement. But it is necessary for both points of construction to be always duly mastered.

There are four distinct species of Tragedy—that being the number of the constituents also that have been mentioned: first, the complex Tragedy, which is all Peripety and Discovery; second, the Tragedy of suffering, e.g. the Ajaxes and Ixions; third, the Tragedy of character, e.g. The Phthiotides and Peleus. The fourth constituent is that of 'Spectacle,' exemplified in The Phorcides, in Prometheus, and in all plays with the scene laid in the nether world. The poet's aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest, if possible, or else the more important and the major part of them. This is now especially necessary owing to the unfair criticism to which the poet is subjected in these days. Just because there have been poets before him strong in the several species of tragedy, the critics now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one of his predecessors.

One should also remember what has been said more than once, and not write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i.e. one with a plurality of stories in it), by attempting to dramatize, for instance, the entire story of the Iliad. In the epic owing to its scale every part is treated at proper length; with a drama, however, on the same story the result is very disappointing. This is shown by the fact that all who have dramatized the fall of Ilium in its entirety, and not part by part, like Euripides, or the whole of the Niobe story, instead of a portion, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or have but ill success on the stage; for that and that alone was enough
20 ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι στοιχάζονται ὡς βούλουνται βαλμαστῶς·
τραγικοῦ γὰρ τούτο καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν. ἐστὶν δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν
ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ ποιμείας (δ') ἐξαπατηθῇ, ὁσπέρ Σίσυ-
φος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείως μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἥττηθ' ἐστὶν δὲ τούτο
eἰκός ὁσπέρ Ἁγάθων λέγει, εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ
25 καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. καὶ τῶν χορῶν δὲ ἐνα δεὶ ὑπολα-
βεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μόριον ἔων τοῦ ὅλου καὶ συναγω-
νύζονται μὴ ὁσπέρ Εὐρυπίδη ἄλλα ὁσπέρ Σοφοκλεῖ.
τοὺς δὲ λυποῦσι τὰ ἀδόμενα (οὐδὲν) μᾶλλον τοῦ μόθου ἡ ἄλλης
τραγῳδίας ἐστὶν διὸ ἐμβάλλει ἁδουσί πρῶτον ἄρεατος
30 Ἁγάθωνος τοῦ τοιούτου. καίτοι τί διαφέρει ἡ ἐμβάλλει
ἀδείῳ ἢ εἰ ῥήσανέ εξ ἄλλον εἰς ἄλλο ἀρμόττοι ἢ ἐπεισόδιον
ὅλου;
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδὴ εἰρηται, λυποῦν δὲ περὶ
λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπτειν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν
35 τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσοντο τούτο γὰρ ἔδωκαν μᾶλλον ἐκείνης
τῆς μεθοδοῦ. ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὡσα ὑπὸ
tοῦ λόγου δὲ παρασκευασθήναι. μέρη δὲ τούτων τὸ τε ἀπο-
δεικνύμαι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οὖν
1456 b ἔλεον ἡ φόβου ἡ ἀργὴν καὶ ὡσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος
καὶ μικρότητα. δὴ λογία δὲ ὡσι καὶ εἰς τῶν πράγμασιν ἀπὸ
tῶν αὐτῶν ἱδεῖν δὲι χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἡ ἐλεων ἡ δεινὰ ἢ
μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέ σε παρασκευάζειν πλὴν τοσοῦτον δια-
5 φέρει, ὡτι τὰ μὲν δὲι φαίνεσθαι ᾧνεν διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ

22 δὲ add. Riccardianus 16 23 ἡττήθη Αο 24 <καί>
eἰκὸς ὁσπέρ Riccardianus 46 et (ut videtur) Ar.
28 ἀδόμενa Madius (confirm. Ar.): ἀδόμεν Αο ἀδείων add. Vahlen
(confirm. Ar.) 33 ἔδωκα] ἔδω Αο: ἔδων (ut videtur) Ar.
34 καὶ Hermann (confirm. Ar.): ἡ Αο 1456 b 2 σμικρότητα
Parisinus 2038 (et fort. Ar.): μικρότητας Αο 3 εἰδεῶν Αο
4 δέν Parisinus 2038: δ' ἡ Αο
to ruin even a play by Agathon. Yet in their Peripeties, as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire—a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e.g. Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrong-doer worsted. This is probable, however, only in Agathon's sense, when he speaks of the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass. (7) The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and take a share in the action—that which it has in Sophocles rather than in Euripides. With the later poets, however, the songs in a play of theirs have no more to do with the Plot of that than of any other tragedy. Hence it is that they are now singing intercalary pieces, a practice first introduced by Agathon. And yet what real difference is there between singing such intercalary pieces, and attempting to fit in a speech, or even a whole act, from one play into another?

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains to consider the Diction and Thought. As for the Thought, we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric, as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry. The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to be effected by their language—in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize or minimize things. It is clear, also, that their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity or horror, or have a look of importance or probability. The only difference is that with the act the impression has to be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker,
τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τι γὰρ ἂν εἰπ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργου, εἰ
φαινοτρὶ δέοι καὶ μη διὰ τοῦ λόγου; τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέ-
ξιν ἐν μεν ἐστὶν εἰδὸς θεωρίας τὰ σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως,
α ἐστὶν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκρισίας καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχον-
tος ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς, οἷον τὸ ἔντολη καὶ τὴ εὐχὴ καὶ δυν-
γησις καὶ ἀπελθῇ καὶ ἔρωτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἰ τὶ ἀλλο τοιαύτῃ. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνώσις ἡ ἀγνοίαν ὑπὸ
eis τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτύμημα φέρεται ὁ τι καὶ ἄξιον στοι-
5 ὑσ. τι γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβῃ ἠμαρτήσασθαι ὑ Πρωταγόρας
ἐπιτμα, ὅτι εὐχέσθαι οὐδὲνος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μὴν ἂι-
δε θεά"; τὸ γὰρ κελεύσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖ τι ἡ μη ἐπίστασις
ἐστι, ὑπ παρεῖσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὑν
θεώρημα.
20 Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τᾷ ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχείων συ-
λλαβῆς σύνδεσμος ἀρθρον ὄνομα ρῆμα πτώσις λόγος.
στοιχείων μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πάσα δὲ
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἃς πέφυκε συνετῆ γίγνεσθαι φωνήν καὶ γὰρ τῶν
θηρῶν εἰς τὸν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναὶ, δὲν οὐδεμιᾶν λέγω στοι-
25 χείων. ταύτης δὲ μέρη τὸ τε φωνῆν καὶ τὸ ἡμιφωνον καὶ
ἀφωνον. ἐστὶν δὲ φωνῆν μὲν (τὸ) ἄνευ προσβολῆς ἔχου
φωνῆν ἄκουστίν, ἡμίφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχου
φωνῆν ἄκουστίν, οἷον τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ ρ, ἀφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ
προσβολῆς καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδεμιᾶν ἔχουν φωνῆν, μετὰ δὲ
30 τῶν ἔχοντων τυπα φωνῆν γινόμενον ἄκουστών, οἷον τὸ Γ καὶ
tὸ Δ. ταύτα δὲ διαφέρει σχῆμας τοῖς τοῦ στομάτως καὶ
tόποις καὶ δασύτητα kai ψιλότητα καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύ-

if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under this head is the turns given to the language when spoken; e.g. the difference between command and prayer, simple statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criticized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's 'Sing of the wrath, Goddess'—which Protagoras has criticized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry.

The Diction viewed as a whole is made up of the following parts: the Letter (or ultimate element), the Syllable, the Conjunction, the Article, the Noun, the Verb, the Case, and the Speech. The Letter is an indivisible sound of a particular kind, one that may become a factor in an intelligible sound. Indivisible sounds are uttered by the brutes also, but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the term. These elementary sounds are either vowels, semivowels, or mutes. A vowel is a Letter having an audible sound without the addition of another Letter. A semivowel, one having an audible sound by the addition of another Letter; e.g. S and R. A mute, one having no sound at all by itself, but becoming audible by an addition, that of one of the Letters which have a sound of some sort of their own; e.g. D and G. The Letters differ in various ways: as produced by different conformations or in different regions of the mouth; as aspirated, not aspirated, or sometimes one
τητι ἢτι δὲ δεξιότητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ περὶ ὧν καθ’ ἐκαστον [ἑν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. συλλαβής
3: δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἁσμός συνθετή ἐξ ἀφώνοι καὶ φωνὴν ἔχον-
tos’ καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἀνευ τοῦ Α συλλαβής καὶ μετὰ τοῦ
Α, οἶνον τὸ ΓΡΑ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρῆσαι τὰς διαφορὰς
τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστὶν. σύνθεσμος δὲ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἁσμός ἢ οὐ-
1457α τε κωλυέι οὐτε ποιεί φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειώνων
φωνῶν περικυκλών συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἢπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἢπὶ τοῦ
μέσου], ἢν μὴ ἀρμότει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγῳ τιθέναι καθ’ αὐτῶν,
οἶνον μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ δὲ: ἢ φωνὴ ἁσμός ἢ ἐκ πλειώνων μὲν φω-
5 νῶν μίας σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν
φωνὴν, * * ἄρθρον δ’ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἁσμός ἢ λόγῳ ἀρχῇ ἢ
τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῦ ἢοἶνον τὸ ἁμφὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνὴ ἁσμός ἢ οὔτε κωλυέι οὔτε ποιεί φωνὴν
μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειώνων φωνῶν] περικύκλω τίθεσθαι καὶ
10 ἢπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἢπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ὁνόμα δὲ ἢπὶ φωνὴ
συνθετή σημαντικὴ ἀνευ χρόνου ἢς μέρος οὐδέν ἢπὶ καθ’
αὐτὸ σημαντικῶν’ ἢ γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρόνεθα ὡς καὶ
αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ σημαίνον, οἶνον ἢ τὸ Θεοδώρῳ τὸ ἀδρον
οὐ σημαίνει. ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρό-
15 νου ἢς οὔδεν μέρος σημαίνει καθ’ αὐτὸ, ὡσπερ καὶ ἢπὶ τῶν
ὄνομάτων’ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρωπος ἢ λευκὸν οὐ σημαίνει τὸ
ποτὲ, τὸ δὲ βαδίζει ἢ βεβάδικεν προσσημαίνει τὸ μὲν τὸν
παρόντα χρόνου τὸ δὲ τοῦ παρεληλυθότα. πτῶσις δ’ ἢπὶ

34 ἐν seclusit Spengel 1457α 2-3 καὶ—μέσου seclusi 4
μὲν] μὲν. Αe δ’ ὑπὸ scripsi: ἑσο. Αe δὲ] δὲ. Αe 5
σημαντικῶν Robortellus: σημαντικῶν Αe 6 lacunam indicavi, huc
transferenda esse suspicatus ea quae infra leguntur, οἶνον τὸ ἁμφὶ καὶ
tὸ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 7-9 οἶνον τὸ ἁμφὶ—φωνῶν seclusi 7 ἁμφὶ
Hartung: φ. μ. i. Αe περὶ] π. ἐ. ῥ. i. Αe 17 poté Spengel
βαδίζει apogr. (confirm. Ar.): βαδίζειν Αe προσσημαίνει Parisinus
2038: προσσημαίνει Αe
and sometimes the other; as long, short, or of variable quantity; and further as having an acute, grave, or intermediate accent. The details of these matters we must leave to the metricians. (2) A Syllable is a non-significant composite sound, made up of a mute and a Letter having a sound (a vowel or semivowel); for GR, without an A, is just as much a Syllable as GRA, with an A. The various forms of the Syllable also belong to the theory of metre. (3) A Conjunction is (a) a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union, and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches) must not be inserted at the beginning of it; e.g. μέν, δὴ, τοῖς, δὲ. Or (b) a non-significant sound capable of combining two or more significant sounds into one; e.g. ἄμφι, περί, etc. (4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech, its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle. (5) A Noun or name is a composite significant sound not involving the idea of time, with parts which have no significance by themselves in it. It is to be remembered that in a compound we do not think of the parts as having a significance also by themselves; in the name ‘Theodorus,’ for instance, the δῶρον means nothing to us. (6) A Verb is a composite significant sound involving the idea of time, with parts which (just as in the Noun) have no significance by themselves in it. Whereas the word ‘man’ or ‘white’ does not imply when, ‘walks’ and ‘has walked’ involve in addition to the idea of walking that of time present or
ονόματος ἢ ρήματος ἢ μὲν κατὰ τὸ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ ση-
μαίνων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἴον
ἀνθρωποὶ ἢ ἀνθρώπος, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἴον κατ'
ἐρώτησιν ἐπίταξιν τὸ γὰρ ἐβάδισεν; ἢ βάδιζε πτῶσις ρή-
ματος κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ εἰδή ἐστίν. λόγοι δὲ φωνῆ συνιστη-
σημαντικὴ ἢ ἐνα μέρη καθ’ αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι (οὐ γὰρ
25 ἂν πας λόγος εκ ρήματων καὶ όνομάτων σύγκειται, οἴον ὁ
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός, ἀλλ’ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ρήματων εἶναι
λόγου, μέρος μὲντοι χεὶ τι σημαίνων ἐξει) οἴον ἐν τῷ βαδι-
ζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἰς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγοι διχῶς, ἥ γὰρ ὁ ἐν
σημαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ πλειοῦν συνδέσμῳ, οἴον ἣ Ἰλώς μὲν
30 συνδέσμῳ εἰς, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῷ ἐν σημαίνει.

'Ονόματος δὲ εἰδὴ τὸ μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ἀπλοῦν δὲ λέγω ὁ
μὴ ἐκ σημαίνωντων σύγκειται, οἴον γῆ, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν· τούτων
dὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ σημαίνωντος καὶ ἀσήμου, πλίμν οὐκ ἐν τῷ
όνοματι σημαίνωντος καὶ ἄσήμου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημαίνωντων
σύγκειται. εἰθ’ ὡ ἀν καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ τετραπλοῦν όνομα καὶ
35 πολλαπλοῦν, οἴον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μεγαλειωτῶν, 'Ερμοκαί-
19 κατὰ τὸ Reiz: τὸ κατὰ Α° 22 ἐβάδισεν;] notam interrogationis add. Tyrwhitt βάδιζε Riccardianus 16: ἐβάδιζεν Α° 22 βάδιζεi Parisinus 2038 (confirm. Ar.): βαδίζειν Α° 29 συνδέσμῳ Riccardianus 16: συνδέσμῳ Α° 30 τὸ apogr.: τὸ Α° 31 εἰδὴ] εἰ· in litura Α° 33 δυόματι Spengel, Vahlen (confirm. Ar.): όνόματος Α° 35 μεγαλιστῶν scripsi: μεγαλιστῶν Α°: μεγαλειῶν ἐν Vahlen: Μασσαλίωτῶν (ex Ar. de Massiliotis) Diels ἔρικοι καί κόσμος Α° 1457b 1 ubi lacunam indicavi addit Ar. quii supplicabatur dominum caelorum (vel Ioveni), unde επενζάμενο τὶς παρ’ restituit Diels; nescio an exemplum lateat nominis quadruplicis 2 ἀφηρημένον Spengel
time past. (7) A Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word means 'of' or 'to' a thing, and so forth, or for one or many (e.g. 'man' and 'men'); or it may consist merely in the mode of utterance, e.g. in question, command, etc. 'Walked?' and 'Walk!' are Cases of the verb 'to walk' of this last kind. (8) A Speech is a composite significant sound, some of the parts of which have a certain significance by themselves. It may be observed that a Speech is not always made up of Noun and Verb; it may be without a Verb, like the definition of man; but it will always have some part with a certain significance by itself. In the Speech 'Cleon walks,' 'Cleon' is an instance of such a part. A Speech is said to be one in two ways, either as signifying one thing, or as a union of several Speeches made into one by conjunction. Thus the Iliad is one Speech by conjunction of several; and the definition of man is one through its signifying one thing.

Nouns are of two kinds, either (1) simple, i.e. made up of non-significant parts, like the word γῆ, or (2) double; in the latter case the word may be made up either of a significant and a non-significant part (a distinction which disappears in the compound), or of two significant parts. It is possible also to have triple, quadruple or higher compounds, like most of our amplified names; e.g. 'Hermocallisxanthus' and the like.

Whatever its structure, a Noun must always be either (1) the ordinary word for the thing, or (2) a strange word, or (3) a metaphor, or (4) an ornamental word, or (5) a coined word, or (6) a word lengthened out, or (7) curtailed, or (8) altered in form. By the ordinary word I mean that in general use in a country; and by a strange word, one in use elsewhere. So that the same word may obviously be
5 ταυ καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτὸ, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ·
τὸ γὰρ σίγυνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἦμων δὲ γλάσσα. με-
ταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁνόματος ἀλλοτριῶν ἐπιφορὰ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ
γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰ-
δους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν
10 ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον "νῦν δὲ μοι ἦδ' ἐστηκεν·" τὸ γὰρ ὅρμευν ἔστω
ἔσταιν τι. ἀπ' εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος "ἡ δὴ μυρί' Ὅδυσ-
σεῦς ἑσθλὰ ἔσφεν·" τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολὺ ἔστω, ὃν ἀντὶ
tοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ' εἶδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον "χαλκῷ
ἀπὸ ψυχῆν ἄρυσας" καὶ "τεμῶν ἀπειρεί χαλκῷ" εἰσταῖθα
15 γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄρυσα ταμείων, τὸ δὲ ταμείων ἄρυσα εἰρήκεν·
ἀμφῶ τὸ γὰρ ἀφελεῖς τί ἔστων. τῷ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν
ομοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον
πρὸς τὸ τρίτον ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δεύτερου τὸ τέταρτον ἡ
ἀντὶ τοῦ τεταρτόν τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασαι ἄνθρ
20 οὗ λέγει πρὸς ὃ ἐστὶ. λέγω δὲ οἰον ὁμοίως ἔχει φιάλη πρὸς
Διώνυσου καὶ ἀπτίς πρὸς 'Ἀρην· ἐρεῖ τοῖς τὴν φιάλην ἀσπίδα
Διώνυσου καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην "Ἀρεως. ἡ δ γῆρας πρὸς
βίου, καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν" ἐρεῖ τοῖς τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆ-
ρας ἡμέρας ἡ ὅσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου
25 ἡ ὄσμας βίου. ἐνίοις δ' οὖκ ἐστὶν ὁνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνα-
λογον, ἀλλ' οὕτω ἕτεν ὁμοίως λεχθῆσεται οἰον τοῦ τοῦ
καρπὸν μὲν ἀφίεσαι στείρεως, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἐπὶ τοῦ
ήλιου ἀνώνυμον ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει τούτῳ πρὸς τὸν ἦλιον καὶ
tὸ στείρεως πρὸς τοῦ καρποῦ, διὸ εἰρήκει "στείρους θεοκτίσταν

6 fort. σίγυνος 10 ὅρμων (-ίν in litura) Αο 11 ἦδη μυριδᾶν-
σεῦς Αο 12 μύριον Αο 13 fort. πολλά 14 ἄρυσας καὶ
Tyrwhitt (ἀρύσας Leidensis et corr. Vaticanus 1400, καὶ Laurentianus
LX 21): ἀξιόπασα Αο τεμῶν Αο: ταμὶον Bekker (ed. 3)
ἀπειρ Αο 16 τῷ scripsi: τὸ Αο 27 ἐπὶ M. Schmidt:
ἀπὸ Αο (et Ar.)
at once strange and ordinary, though not in reference to the same people; ἱδρυς, for instance, is an ordinary word in Cyprus, and a strange word with us. Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is the 'standing' of a particular kind of thing. That from species to species is exemplified in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought,' where 'ten thousand,' which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number.' That from species to species is exemplified in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in 'Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw,' both words meaning to 'take away' something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put B in lieu of D, and D in lieu of B. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the 'shield of Dionysus' (D + A), and the shield as the 'cup of Ares' (B + C). Or to take another instance: As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A). One will accordingly describe evening (B) as the 'old age of the day' (D + A)—or by the Empedoclean equivalent; and old age (D) as the 'evening' or 'sunset of life' (B + C). It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but for all that they will be metaphorically described in just the same way. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act (B), however, stands in just the same relation to its object, sunlight (A), as sowing (D) to the seed-corn (C). Hence the expression in the poet, 'sowing around a god-created
30 φλόγαν." ἐστὶ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρὴσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῇσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἀρεως ἄλλον. * * πεποιημένον δ' ἐστίν ὁ ὀλος μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ των αὐτῶν τίθεται ὁ ποιητὸς, (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐναὶ εἶναι τοιαῦτα) 35 οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἐμφύγας καὶ τὸν ἰερὰ ἀρητῆρα. ἑπεκτεταμένον 1458a δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφηρμένον τὸ μὲν ἔαν φωνῆσαι μακρότερος κεχρημένον ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῇ ἐμβεβλημένη, τὸ δὲ ἂν ἀφηρμένον τι ἢ αὐτοῦ, ἑπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἷον τὸ πόλεως πόλιος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηλημάδεω, ἀφηρμένον δὲ οἷον τὸ 5 κρῆ καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ "μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὤψ." ἐξηλαγμένον δ' ἐστίν ὅταν τοῦ ὄνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπῃ τὸ δὲ ποτή, οἷον τὸ "δεξιτερῶν κατὰ μαζῶν" ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξίων.

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὄνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ, ἄρρενα μὲν οἷα τελευτᾶ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ (καὶ Σ) καὶ 10 οἷα ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται (ταύτα δ' ἐστὶν ὄνο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θήλεα δὲ οἷα ἐκ τῶν φωνημένων εἰς τε τὰ ἄει μακρά, οἷον εἰς Η καὶ Ω, καὶ τῶν ἑπεκτειωμένων εἰς Α' ὥστε ὅσα συμβαίνει πλῆθη εἰς οἷα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα: τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ (τῷ Σ) ταῦτα ἐστίν. εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα τελευτᾷ, 15 οὐδὲ εἰς φωνήν βραχύ. εἰς δὲ τὸ Ι τρία μόνον, μέλη κόμμα πέτερι. εἰς δὲ τὸ Τ πέντε. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταύτα καὶ Ν (καὶ Ρ) καὶ Σ.

flame' (D + A). There is also another form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing the alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it one of the attributes naturally associated with its new name. An instance of this would be to call the shield not the 'cup of Ares,' as in the former case, but a 'cup that holds no wine.' * * * A coined word is a name which, being quite unknown among a people, is given by the poet himself; e.g. (for there are some words that seem to be of this origin) ἐρνύγες for horns, and αὔρηχρό for priest. A word is said to be lengthened out, when it has a short vowel made long, or an extra syllable inserted; e.g. πόλης for πόλεως, Πηλείδω Πηλείδων. It is said to be curtailed, when it has lost a part; e.g. κρι, δω, and ὅψ in μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὅψ. It is an altered word, when part is left as it was and part is of the poet's making; e.g. δεξιτερόν for δεξίων, in δεξιτερόν κατὰ μακόν.

The Nouns themselves (to whatever class they may belong) are either masculines, feminines, or intermediates (neuter). All ending in N, P, Σ, or in the two compounds of this last, Ψ and Ξ, are masculines. All ending in the invariably long vowels, H and Ω, and in Α among the vowels that may be long, are feminines. So that there is an equal number of masculine and feminine terminations, as Ψ and Ξ are the same as Σ, and need not be counted. There is no Noun, however, ending in a mute or in either of the two short vowels, Ε and Ο. Only three (μέλι, κόμμυ, πέπερι) end in Ι, and five in Υ. The intermediates, or neuters, end in the variable vowels or in N, P, Σ.
Λέξεως δὲ ἄρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινῆν εἶναι. σα-22

φεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἄλλα 20 ταπεινήν παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφώτως ποίησις καὶ ἡ Σθενέλου. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἵδιωτικὸν ἢ τοὺς ἥσιν κεχρημένην ἥσιν δὲ λέγω γλώτταν καὶ μετα-

φορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἄλλ᾽ ἂν τις [ἀν] ἀπαντα τοιαύτα ποίησις, ἣ αὐτήν μοι ἔσται ἢ βαρβα-

25 ρισμοῦ: ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αὐτήματα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλώττων, βαρβαρισμός. αὐτήματος τε γὰρ ἴδεα αὐτή ἐστὶ, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχουσα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι—κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἶνον τὸ τούτο ποίησαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται—οἶνον "ἄνδρι εἴδον πιρὶ χαλκὸν 30 ἐπ᾽ ἀνέρι καλλήσαντα," καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα. ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός. δεὶ ᾧλ κεκράσθαι πως τούτους τὸ μὲν γάρ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποίησει μητὶ ταπεινὸν, οἶνον ἢ γλώττα καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰλλα τὰ εἰρημένα εἰδῆ, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος

1458 οὐκ ἐπιβάλλεται εἰς τὸ σαφές τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοσμεί καὶ ἐξαλλαγαί τῶν ὀνομά-

των. διὰ μὲν γάρ τὸ ἀλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ τὸ εἰσόθος γιγνόμενον τὸ μῆ ἰδιωτικὸν ποίησει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοι-

5 ννοεῖν τοῦ εἰσόθοτος τὸ σαφὲς ἔσται. ΄όστε οὖκ ὅρθως ψέγου-

σιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ δια-

κωμῳδούντες τῶν ποιήτων, οἶνον Ἐυκλείδης ὁ ἄρχαιος, ὃς ῥάδιον ποιεῖν, εἰ τις δόσει ἑκτεύειν ἐφ᾽ ὁπόσον βούλεται

24 ἂν ομ. ἀπογρ. τοίοτα Αο 26 Ὀλύττων Αο 27 λέγοντα] λέγον τὰ Αο 28 τῶν (ἀλλών) ὀνομάτων (ut videtur) Αρ. οὐχὶ οὖν τιναί Αο 29 μεταφορῶν scripsi: μεταφορῶν Αο ἕδον Αο

πιρὶ χαλκὸν Victorius: πιρὶ χαλκὸν Aα 31 κεκράσθαι Riccardianus 46 (confirm. Αρ.): κεκράσθαι Aα 1458 ι συμβάλλεται Aα: συμβάλλεται ἀπογρ. 6 ἐπιτιμῶντες Αο
The perfection of Diction is for it to be at once clear and not mean. The clearest indeed is that made up of the ordinary words for things, but it is mean, as is shown by the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand the Diction becomes distinguished and non-prosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms, i.e. strange words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that deviates from the ordinary modes of speech.—But a whole statement in such terms will be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle, if made up of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words. The very nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their metaphorical substitutes); e.g. ‘I saw a man glue brass on another with fire,’ and the like. The corresponding use of strange words results in a barbarism.—A certain admixture, accordingly, of unfamiliar terms is necessary. These, the strange word, the metaphor, the ornamental equivalent, etc., will save the language from seeming mean and prosaic, while the ordinary words in it will secure the requisite clearness. What helps most, however, to render the Diction at once clear and non-prosaic is the use of the lengthened, curtailed, and altered forms of words. Their deviation from the ordinary words will, by making the language unlike that in general use, give it a non-prosaic appearance; and their having much in common with the words in general use will give it the quality of clearness. It is not right, then, to condemn these modes of speech, and ridicule the poet for using them, as some have done; e.g. the elder Euclid, who said it was easy to make poetry if one were to be allowed to lengthen the words in the statement itself as much as one likes—a procedure he
68

22. 1458 b 9—30

†iambopouētās ēn aυtē tē lēxei† "’Επιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθω-
10 νάδε βαδίςοντα," kai "οὐκ ἂν γ’ ἔραμενος †τῶν ἐκεῖνων ἐλ-
λέβορον †." τὸ μὲν οὖν φαύνεσθαι πως χρώμενον τοῦτῳ τῇ
τρόπῳ γελοίον τοῦ δὲ μέτρου κωμων ἄπαντων ἐστὶ τῶν με-
ρῶν καὶ γὰρ μεταφοράς καὶ γλώττας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐίδοει χρώμενος ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπιτήθες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τὸ
15 αὐτὸ ἀν ἀπεργάσατο. τὸ δὲ ἀρμοτόντως ὅσον διαφέρει ἐπὶ
tῶν ἐπών θεωρεῖτο ἐντιδεμένων τῶν ὅνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέ-
tρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὦδεών μετατιθεῖαι αὐτὶ τὰ κύρια ὄνοματα
cατίδου ὅτι ἄλληθ λέγομεν ὅν τὸ αὐτὸ ποιῆσαις λαμ-
20 βεῖον Αἰσχύλον καὶ Εὐριπίδον, ἐν δὲ μόνον ὅνομα μετατιθέν-
tος, ἀντὶ κυρίον ἐισθότοι γλώτται, τὸ μὲν φαύνεται καλὸν
tὸ δ’ εὑτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ψιλοκτήτῃ ἐποίησε
φαγέδαια ἡ μοι σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδῶς,
ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔσθιε τὸ θωνᾶται μετέθηκεν. καὶ
25 νῦν δὲ μ’ ἐδῶν ὄλγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικῆς,
eἰ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθεῖς
νῦν δὲ μ’ ἐδων μικρὸς τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδῆς:
καὶ
dίφρων [τε] ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖς ὀλγήν τε τράπεζαν,
30 δίφρων μοχθηρὸν καταθεῖς μικρὰν τε τράπεζαν.

9 fortasse mutato ordine ēn aυtē tē lēxei, lαμβοποιήτας ’Επιχάρην
Bursian: ἕτει χάριν Ας εἶδον Ας μαραθώνα δὲ Ας 10
ἀν γεράμενος Ας 12 μέτρων Spengel: μέτρων Ας 14 ἐπὶ
τα] ἐπιστα Ας fort. γελούστερα 15 ἀρμοτόντως Tucker:
ἀρμότοντος Ας: ἀρμότον apogr. 18 εἰδῶν Ας 19 λάμβουν
Ας 20 μεταθέσεις apogr. 23 φαγέδαια apogr.: φαγάδαια
Ας: φαγάδαιαν Hermann 25 δὲ μεῶν Ας άεικής Riccardianus
40, Morelius (confirmare videtur Ar.): ἀειδῆς Ας 27 δὲ μεῶν Ας
μικρὸς τε apogr.: μικρὸς δὲ Ας 29 τε πρίου om. apogr.: τε*
(nisi forte tαi fuerat) Ας: τ’ αἰκέλιον reposuit Vahlen
caricatured by reading 'Επιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶναί βαδίζοντα, and οἱκ ἂν γ’ ἐράμενος τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλλέβορον as verses. A too apparent use of these licences has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in that; the rule of moderation applies to all the constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even with metaphors, strange words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them improperly and with a view to provoking laughter. The proper use of them is a very different thing. To realize the difference one should take an epic verse and see how it reads when the normal words are introduced. The same should be done too with the strange word, the metaphor, and the rest; for one has only to put the ordinary words in their place to see the truth of what we are saying. The same iambic, for instance, is found in Aeschylus and Euripides, and as it stands in the former it is a poor line; whereas Euripides, by the change of a single word, the substitution of a strange for what is by usage the ordinary word, has made it seem a fine one. Aeschylus having said in his Philoctetes:

φαγέδαινα ἦ μον σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,

Euripides has merely altered the ἐσθίει here into θοινάται. Or suppose

νῦν δὲ μ’ ἔων δλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανός καὶ ἀεικής
to be altered by the substitution of the ordinary words into

νῦν δὲ μ’ ἔων μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικός καὶ ἀειδής.

Or the line

δέφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖσ δλίγην τε τράπεζαν

into

δέφρον μορθηρόν καταθεῖσ μικράν τε τράπεζαν.
καὶ τὸ "ἡμέρας βοῶσιν," ἡμέρας κράζουσιν. ἔτι δὲ Ἀριφράδης τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς ἐκωμ' ἔδει, ὅτι αὐτὲς ἰᾶν εἶποι ἐν τῇ δια-
λέκτῳ τούτους χρῶνται, οἶον τὸ δωμάτων ἀπὸ ἄλλα μὴ ἀπὸ δωμάτων, καὶ τὸ σέθεν καὶ τὸ ἐγώ δὲ ὦν καὶ τὸ

1459 Ἀχιλλέως πέρι ἄλλα μὴ περί Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διὰ γάρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις ποιεῖ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ἐν τῇ λέξει ἀπαντὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο ἤγνυε. ἐστιν δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόν-
5 τως χρήσθαι, καὶ διπλοὺς ὑνόμας καὶ γλώτταις, σολύ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο ὑπὲρ παρ'
ἀλλον ἐστὶ λαβέων εὐφυίας τε σημείων ἐστὶν τὸ γὰρ εὕ-
μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὄρον θεωρεῖν ἐστὶν. τῶν δ' ὑνόματων τὰ
μὲν διπλὰ μάλιστα ἀρμότερα τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἰ δὲ γλώ-
10 ται τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς, αἰ δὲ μεταφορᾶς τοῖς λαμβείοις. καὶ ἐν
μὲν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς ἀπαντὰ χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
λαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμείσθαι τάδε ἀρ-
μότεραι τῶν ὑνόματων ὅσοι κἂν εὖ [ὅσοι] λόγοι τῆς χρή-
σιον· ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος.
15 περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μμήσεως
ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἰκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μμητικῆς, 23
ὅτι δὲ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τραγῳδίαις συνιστάναι
dramaτικοὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πράξειν ὄλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχου-
20 σαν ἀρχήν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ὡς ὀσπέρ ἐς τὸν ἐοῖ
ποιή τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δὴλον, καὶ μὴ ὑμοῖοι ἱστορίας τὰς

31 τὸ ἱωνεὶ βοῶσιν ἡ ἱωνεὶ Ἀε ἀριφράδησ Ἀε 32 εἰτη
Ἀε 1459 ἅ τοῖ τῶν Ἀε 6 π. ἀλλον Ἁε 10 et 12
ἱμβίους Ἀε 13 καὶ Ἱαροδανιανός 46, Ἰαρλες: καὶ Ἁε
ἀσίσι απερ. ἀπογρ. τις ἀπογρ.: τὶ Ἀε 20 fort.
ἀλλον ὅ (ν) 21 ποιεὶ Ἀε ἱστορίαις τὰς συνθήκες [sic]
Riccardianus 46: ἱστορίαι τὰς συνθήκες Dacier
Or ἡμόνες βοῶσιν into ἡμόνες κράζονσιν. Add to this that Ariphrades used to ridicule the tragedians for introducing expressions unknown in the language of common life, δωμάτων ἀπό (for ἀπὸ δωμάτων), σέθεν, ἐγὼ δὲ νῦν, Ἀχιλλέως πέρι (for περὶ Ἀχιλλέως), and the like. The mere fact of their not being in ordinary speech gives the Diction a non-prosaic character; but Ariphrades was unaware of that. It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.

Of the kinds of words we have enumerated it may be observed that compounds are most in place in the dithyramb, strange words in heroic, and metaphors in iambic poetry. Heroic poetry, indeed, may avail itself of them all. But in iambic verse, which models itself as far as possible on the spoken language, only those kinds of words are in place which are allowable also in an oration, i.e. the ordinary word, the metaphor, and the ornamental equivalent.

Let this, then, suffice as an account of Tragedy, the art imitating by means of action on the stage.

As for the poetry which merely narrates, or imitates by means of versified language (without action), it is evident that it has several points in common with Tragedy.

I. The construction of its stories should clearly be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living
συνήθεις θείναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι δήλωσών ἀλλʼ ἐνὸς χρόνου, οὗτα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα ἢ πλείους, διὸ ἐκαστὸν ὡς ἐτυχέν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. ὥσπερ 25 γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ’ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ᾿Αρχηγονίων μαχὴ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσα τέλος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίστε γίνεται θάτερον μετά θάτερον, ἐξ δὲ ἐν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. σχέδου δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τούτο ἐρέσωσι. διὸ ὥσπερ εἰπομεν ἦδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιον ἂν φανεῖν ὁμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καίπερ ἔχουσα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρήσατο ποιεῖν ὀλον· λίαν ἵνα ἄν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἐμελλέν ἔστεθαι, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένου τῇ ποικίλαι. 35 νῦν δ’ ἐν μέροις ἀπολαβῶν ἐπεισοδίως κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεὼν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίως [δίσ] διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν. οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι περὶ ἔνα ποιοῦν 1459 ἐρέσωσι καὶ περὶ ἕνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πράξειν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ Kύπρια ποίησας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ἡθοσιεῖας μία τραγωδία ποιεῖται ἐκατέρας ἢ δύο μόναι, ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος πλέον ὁκτώ, οἷον ὄπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτήτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Ἐνρύπυλος, πτωχεῖα, Λάκαων, Ἰλιῶν πέρσις καὶ ἀπόπλους, καὶ Σύνων καὶ Τραβάδες. ἔτι δὲ [ἔτι δὲ] τὰ ἐιδή ταύτα δεὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποίαι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῆν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἥδικην ἢ παθητικῆν· καὶ τὰ 10 μέρη ἐξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὅψεως ταύτα· καὶ γὰρ περιπτετεύων

creature. Nor should one suppose that there is anything like them in our usual histories. A history has to deal not with one action, but with one period and all that happened in that to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have been. Just as two events may take place at the same time, e.g. the sea-fight off Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes come after the other with no one end as their common issue. Nevertheless most of our epic poets, one may say, ignore the distinction.

Herein, then, to repeat what we have said before, we have a further proof of Homer's marvellous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, though it was a whole with a definite beginning and end—through a feeling apparently that it was too long a story to be taken in in one view, or if not that, too complicated from the variety of incident in it. As it is, he has singled out one section of the whole; many of the other incidents, however, he brings in as episodes, using the Catalogue of the Ships, for instance, and other episodes to relieve the uniformity of his narrative. As for the other epic poets, they treat of one man, or one period; or else of an action which, although one, has a multiplicity of parts in it. This last is what the authors of the Cypria and Little Iliad have done. And the result is that, whereas the Iliad or Odyssey supplies materials for only one, or at most two tragedies, the Cypria does that for several, and the Little Iliad for more than eight: for an Adjudgment of Arms, a Philoctetes, a Neoptolemus, a Eurypylus, a Ulysses as Beggar, a Laconian Women, a Fall of Ilium, and a Departure of the Fleet; as also a Sinon, and a Women of Troy.

II. Besides this, Epic poetry must divide into the same species as Tragedy; it must be either simple or complex, a story of character or one of suffering. Its parts, too,
δεί καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων· ἐπὶ τὰς διανοιὰς καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. οὐς ἀπασιν ὁμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἵκανος. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκα-
τερον συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιᾶς ἄπλοιν καὶ παθητικόν, ἢ δὲ

15 Ὅδυσσεια πεπλεγμένοιν (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἥβική·
πρὸς γὰρ τούτους λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν.

Διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τὴν συνστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἢ
ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μῆκος ὤρος ἵκανος ὁ
eἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεὶ συναράσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ

20 τέλος. εἰ δὲ ἄν τοῦτο, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαῖων ἐλάττους
αἰ συνστάσεις εἶεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγῳδίων τῶν
εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων παρῆκοεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ
ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ ἵδουν διὰ
τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμα πραττόμενα

25 πολλὰ μέρη μμείζονται ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν
ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνου· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύσησιν
ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἀμα ποιεῖθαι περαιώμενα, ἢφ' ὅν
οἰκείων ὅντων αὐξέται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὁγκος. ὡστε τούτω

30 ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαι καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τῶν
ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδοιῶν ἀνωμοίους ἐπεισοδοῖος· τὸ γὰρ
ὁμοιον ταὐχὲ πληροῦν ἐκκόπτειν ποιεῖ τὰς τραγῳδίας. τὸ δὲ
μέτρον τὸ ἡρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἠείρας ἡμοκεν. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐν ἀλλῳ
tω μέτρῳ διηγητικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῦτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς,
ἀπρεπὲς ἢν φαινοτο· τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμότατον καὶ

35 ὑκῳδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ γλώσσας καὶ με-

13 ἵκανος apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἵκανος Aο ποιημάτων Aο

15 ἀναγνωρίσεις Christ ἥβικόν corr. rcc. Aο

16 γὰρ Aο: δὲ apogr. πάντας apogr.

21 πρὸς δὲ apogr. (confirm. Ar.): προσδέ Aο 29 fort. [τῷ] ἄγαθῳ 32 ἡμοκεν Aο

33 διηγητικὴν apogr.
with the exception of Song and Spectacle, must be the same, as it requires Peripeties, Discoveries, and scenes of suffering just like Tragedy. Lastly, the Thought and Diction in it must be good in their way. All these elements appear in Homer first; and he has made due use of them. His two poems are each examples of construction, the *Iliad* simple and a story of suffering, the *Odyssey* complex (there is Discovery throughout it) and a story of character. And they are more than this, since in Diction and Thought too they surpass all other poems.

There is, however, a difference in the Epic as compared with Tragedy, (1) in its length, and (2) in its metre. (1) As to its length, the limit already suggested will suffice: it must be possible for the beginning and end of the work to be taken in in one view—a condition which will be fulfilled if the poem be shorter than the old epics, and about as long as the series of tragedies offered for one hearing. For the extension of its length epic poetry has a special advantage, of which it makes large use. In a play one cannot represent an action with a number of parts going on simultaneously; one is limited to the part on the stage and connected with the actors. Whereas in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simultaneous incidents; and these, if germane to the subject, increase the body of the poem. This then is a gain to the Epic, tending to give it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds. Uniformity of incident by the satiety it soon creates is apt to ruin tragedies on the stage. (2) As for its metre, the heroic has been assigned it from experience; were any one to attempt a narrative poem in some one, or in several, of the other metres, the incongruity of the thing would be apparent. The heroic in fact is the gravest and weightiest
24. 1459 b 36—1460 a 20

κυνητικά καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν. ἐτὶ δὲ ἀποπτέρων εἰ μιγνύοι τις αὐτά, ὡσπερ Χαρῆμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἀλλῷ πεποίηκεν ἢ τῷ ἱρῴι, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ εἰσπομεν αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις διάδακε τὸ ἀρμόττων αὐτῇ 5 αἵρεσθαι. "Ομορος δὲ ἄλλα τα πολλὰ ἄξιοσ ἐπανεισφθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνον τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ δὲι ποιεῖν αὐτῶν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν; οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητῆς. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δὲ οἶλον ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλγα καὶ ὀλγάκις; δὲ οὐλγα 10 φρομμασάμενοι εὐθὺς οἰσάγει ἀνδρὰ ἡ γυναῖκα ἡ ἄλλο τι ἠθος, καὶ οὐδὲν ' ἀήθη ἄλλε ἔχουσι ἡθη. δεὶ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστὸν, μάλλον οἴ ενδεχεται εν τῇ ἐποτοια τὸ ἄλογον, δὲ ο συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστὸν, διὰ τὸ μή όραν εἰς τῶν πράττοντα· ἐπεί τὰ περὶ 15 τὴν "Εκτόρος δῶξτιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοία ἣν πανέθη, οἱ μὲν ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, δὲ ἄνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοὺς ἑπεσιν λαυθανει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἢδυ· σημεῖον δὲ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζομενοι. δεδῆδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα "Ομορος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδὴ λέγειν ὡς δει. 20 ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν

of metres—which is what makes it more tolerant than the rest of strange words and metaphors, that also being a point in which the narrative form of poetry goes beyond all others. The iambic and trochaic, on the other hand, are metres of movement, the one representing that of life and action, the other that of the dance. Still more unnatural would it appear, if one were to write an epic in a medley of metres, as Chaeremon did. Hence it is that no one has ever written a long story in any but heroic verse; nature herself, as we have said, teaches us to select the metre appropriate to such a story.

Homer, admirable as he is in every other respect, is especially so in this, that he alone among epic poets is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the poem. The poet should say very little in propría persona, as he is no imitator when doing that. Whereas the other poets are perpetually coming forward in person, and say but little, and that only here and there, as imitators, Homer after a brief preface brings in fortwith a man, a woman, or some other Character—no one of them characterless, but each with distinctive characteristics.

The marvellous is certainly required in Tragedy. The Epic, however, affords more opening for the improbable, the chief factor in the marvellous, because in it the agents are not visibly before one. The scene of the pursuit of Hector would be ridiculous on the stage—the Greeks halting instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking his head to stop them; but in the poem the absurdity is overlooked. The marvellous, however, is a cause of pleasure, as is shown by the fact that we all tell a story with additions, in the belief that we are doing our hearers a pleasure.

Homer more than any other has taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right way. I mean the use of
24. 1460 a 21—25. 1460 b 7

τοῦτό ὤντος τοῦτο ἦν γυμνόνιον γύνης, εἰ τὸ ύστερον ἑστώ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ἡ γυνὲσθαι· τούτῳ δὲ ἐστὶν ἔσχος. διὸ δεῖ, ἀν τὸ πρῶτον ἔσχος, ἀλλὰ δὲ τὸ τοῦτο ὄντος ἀράγχη εἶναι ἡ γυνὲσθαι· ὃ, προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἶδέναι ἀλῆθες 25 ὅν παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν. παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νῖπτρων. προαρεῖνθαι τε δεὶ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἡ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα· τοὺς τὲ λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἄλογων, ἄλλα μᾶλλον μὲν μὴ δὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος, ὀστεροὶ

30 οἰδίποτος τὸ μὴ εἴδεναι πῶς ὁ Λάιος ἀπέθανεν, ἄλλα μὴ ἐν τῷ ὀματὶ, ὀστεροὶ ἐν 'Ἡλέκτρα οἱ τὰ Πῦθια ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἡ ἐν Μυσώις ὁ ἀφώνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἦκαν. ὡστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνήρκητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γέλων; εἰς ἄρχες γὰρ οὐ δεὶ συνίστασθαι τοιοῦτος, ἀν δὲ θῇ καὶ φαίνηται 35 εὐλογωτέρως ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄτοπον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὁδύσσεια ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκθέσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἄνεκτα ὄηλον 1460 b ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαίλον ποιήτης ποιήσει· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιήτης ἄφαινει ἡδύων τὸ ἄτοπον. τῇ δὲ λέξει δὲ διαπονεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄργοις μέρεσιν καὶ μήτε ἥδικοις μήτε διανοητικοῖς· ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λίαν λαμπρὰ

5 λέξεις τὰ τῇ θη καὶ τὰς διανοίας.

Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ 25 ποίων [ἀν] εἰδὼν ἑστώ, ὅτι ἂν θεωροῦν γένοιτ' ἂν φανερῶν.

paralogism. Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B, is or happens, men's notion is that, if the B is, the A also is—but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, B, that on the assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is to add on the B. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent. Here is an instance, from the Bath-story in the Odyssey.

A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. The story should never be made up of improbable incidents; there should be nothing of the sort in it. If, however, such incidents are unavoidable, they should be outside the piece, like the hero's ignorance in Oedipus of the circumstances of Laius' death; not within it, like the report of the Pythian games in Electra, or the man's having come to Mysia from Tegea without uttering a word on the way, in The Mysians. So that it is ridiculous to say that one's Plot would have been spoilt without them, since it is fundamentally wrong to make up such Plots. If the poet has taken such a Plot, however, and one sees that he might have put it in a more probable form, he is guilty of absurdity as well as a fault of art. Even in the Odyssey the improbabilities in the setting-ashore of Ulysses would be clearly intolerable in the hands of an inferior poet. As it is, the poet conceals them, his other excellences veiling their absurdity. Elaborate Diction, however, is required only in places where there is no action, and no Character or Thought to be revealed. Where there is Character or Thought, on the other hand, an over-ornate Diction tends to obscure them.

As regards Problems and their Solutions, one may see the number and nature of the assumptions on which they
επει γάρ ἐστι μμητῆς ὁ ποιητὴς ὅσπερανεί ζωγράφος ἡ τις ἀλλὸς εἰκονοποιῶς, ἀνάγκη μμείθθαι τριῳ ὄντων τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ εὖ τι δεῖ, ἣ γὰρ οἷα ἢ ἦ ἢ ἐστιν, ἢ οἷα φασίν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ ὀἷα εἶναι δεῖ. ταύτα δὲ ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεως ἐστι, δίδομεν γὰρ ταύτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἷς ἡ ἀὑτή ἀρθότης ἐστιν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς. αὕτης δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διήτη ἀμαρτία, ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ἀὑτῆς, ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ μὲν προεἰλετο μμῆθησασθαι ἢ ἢ ἀδύναμαν, αὕτης ἡ ἀμαρτία· εἰ δὲ τῷ προελεύσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ἀμφῶ τὰ δεξία προβεβληκότα, ἡ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα (οἷον τὸ κατ' ἀτρικῆν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην) ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὅποι' ἢ οὖν, ὡς καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὡςτε δεῖ τά ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἑπισκοποῦντα λάειν. πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτῆς τὴν τέχνην (εἰ) ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται· ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς, (τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται) εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικῶτερον ἡ αὐτὸ ἡ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παραδείγμα ἡ τοῦ "Εκτερος διώξεις. εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἡ μᾶλλον (ἡ μὴ) ἤττον ἐνεδέχετο ὑπάρχει καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, [ἡμαρτήσαθαι] οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνεδέχεται διὸς μηδαμῆ ἡμαρτήσαθαι. έτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ 30 ἀμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκήπ. 8 ἢ] εἰ πρ. Α 9 τόν ἀριθμῶν apogr.: τῶν ἀριθμῶν Α 11 ἢ ἀθ. apogr. 16 εἰ] εἰ πρ. Α 17 exciderunt fort. ἡμαρτε δὲ δὲ εἰ Riccardianus 16, corr. Parisinus 2038: ἡ Α 18 τῷ corr. Parisinus 2038: τὸ Α 20 ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται induxit Duenter 21 ὅποι' ἢ οὖν scripsi: ὅποι' ἢ οὖν Α  ὁποιαν οὖν vulg.: ὁποιαν Winstanley fort. ἐπιτιμήματα (τὰ) 22 τά] τὰ (εἰ superscr. m. rec.) Α 23 εἰ ἀθ. Parisinus 2038, Vahlen 24 αὐτής apogr.: αὑτῆς Α 27 ἢ μὴ ἀθ. Ueberweg: ἢ ἀθ. corr. Α, apogr. 28 ἡμαρτήσαθαι (μαρτήσαθαι pr. Α) seclusi
proceed by viewing the matter in the following way. (1) The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be. (2) All this he does in language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of words, since the use of these is conceded in poetry. (3) It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art. There is, however, within the limits of poetry itself a possibility of two kinds of error, the one directly, the other only accidentally connected with the art. If the poet meant to describe the thing correctly, and failed through lack of power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But if it was through his having meant to describe it in some incorrect way (e.g. to make the horse in movement have both right legs thrown forward) that the technical error (one in a matter of, say, medicine or some other special science), or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, his error in that case is not in the essentials of the poetic art. These, therefore, must be the premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms involved in the Problems.

I. As to the criticisms relating to the poet's art itself. Any impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of things are faults. But from another point of view they are justifiable, if they serve the end of poetry itself—if (to assume what we have said of that end) they make the effect of some portion of the work more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is an instance in point. If, however, the poetic end might have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness in such matters, the impossibility is not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can, entirely free from error. One may ask, too, whether the error is in a matter directly or only accidentally connected
κόσ; έλαττον γάρ εἰ μὴ ἦδει ὅτι ἐλαφός θῆλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἡ εἰ ἀμμητὸς ἐγραψεν. πρὸς δὲ τούτου εἰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀλήθη, ἀλλ' ἱσως δεί, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἷον δεί ποιεῖν, Ἑυριπίδην δὲ οὗτο εἰσίν, ταύτῃ 35 ήτοι. ἐλ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασί, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν ἱσως γὰρ οὕτε βέλτιον [οὐτὲ] λέγειν οὐτ' ἀλήθη, ἀλλ' ἐτυχεν 1461α ὁσπερ Εὐνοφάνει' ἀλλ' οὕτω φασί. τὰ δὲ ἱσως οὐ βέλτιον μὲν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἴχεν, οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὁπλῶν, "ἔγχεα δὲ τοῦπ ορθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρους" οὕτω γὰρ τὸν ἐνόμισεν, ὁσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυροί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς 5 ἦ εἰρηταί τωι τῇ πέπρακται, οὗ μένον σκεπτέοι εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἦ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἦ φαῦ- λον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τῶν πράσαντα ἦ λέγοντα πρὸς ὑμὶ ὅτε ἦ ὀφτ ἦ οὗ ἑνεκεν, οἷον ἦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γέ- νηται, (ἡ) μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν 10 λείξιν ὀρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλῶττῃ "οὐρῆς μὲν πρῶ- τον" ἱσως γὰρ οὗ τοὺς ἡμιώνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλα- κας καὶ τῶν Δόλωνα, "ὅσ ῥ' ἦ τοι εἴδος μὲν ἐν ἑσν κακός," ὥσ τὸ σώμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἀισχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδές οἱ Κρῆτες (τὸ) εὐπρόσωπον καλούσι καὶ τὸ "ξυρό- 15 τερον δὲ κέρατε" οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οὐνομάζεται ἀλλὰ τὸ θάττων. τὰ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἰρηταί, οἷον ἂν ἄλλοι μὲν

with the poetic art; since it is a lesser error in an artist not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than to produce an unrecognizable picture of one.

II. If the poet's description be criticized as not true to fact, one may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as described—an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they were. If the description, however, be neither true nor of the thing as it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it is in accordance with opinion. The tales about Gods, for instance, may be as wrong as Xenophanes thinks, neither true nor the better thing to say; but they are certainly in accordance with opinion. Of other statements in poetry one may perhaps say, not that they are better than the truth, but that the fact was so at the time; e.g. the description of the arms: 'their spears stood upright, butt-end upon the ground'; for that was the usual way of fixing them then, as it is still with the Illyrians. As for the question whether something said or done in a poem is morally right or not, in dealing with that one should consider not only the intrinsic quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who says or does it, the person to whom he says or does it, the time, the means, and the motive of the agent—whether he does it to attain a greater good, or to avoid a greater evil.

III. Other criticisms one must meet by considering the language of the poet: (1) by the assumption of a strange word in a passage like οὐρήας μὲν πρῶτον, where by οὐρήας Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And in saying of Dolon, ὅς λ' ἡ τοι ἔδος μὲν ἐγν κακός, his meaning may perhaps be, not that Dolon's body was deformed, but that his face was ugly, as ἐνεδής is the Cretan word for handsome-faced. So, too, ζωρύτερον δὲ κέρας may mean not 'mix the wine stronger,' as though for topers, but 'mix it quicker.' (2) Other expressions in Homer may be explained as metaphorical; e.g. in ἄλλοι μὲν ἂν θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνερρις ἔδον
"ρα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὐδόν * * παννύχιοι;" ἀμα δὲ φησιν
"ἡ τοι ὄτ' ἐσ πεδόν το Τρωίκων ἀδριστειν, αὐλών συρίγγων
†τε ὁμαδῶν† το γάρ πάντες ἀντί (τοῦ) πολλοί κατὰ μετα-
20 φοράν εἰρηταί, το γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τύ. καὶ τὸ "οὐδ' ἀμμο-
ροσ" κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γάρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. κατὰ
δὲ προσφοδιάν, ὡσπερ Ἰππίας ἔλευν ὁ Θάσιος, τὸ "ὁδομεν
δε οί" καὶ "τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύτεται ὁμβρώ," τὰ δὲ διαφε-
σει, οίον 'Εμπεδοκλῆς "αἴβα δὲ θύητι' ἐφύοντο, Τά πρὶν μά-
25 θον ἀδάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκριτο." τὰ δὲ ἀμφίβολαι,
"παρφυχεν δὲ πλεώ νύς" τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἀμφίβολον ἐστιν.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. τὸν κεκραμένον οἷον
φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποίηται "κινῆσις νεοτέρκτον κασσιτε-
ρον" καὶ χαλκέας τούς τὸν σύνδρον ἔργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἰ-
30 ρηταί ὁ Γανυμήδης ΔΛ οἰνοχοεύεν, οὐ πωνότων οἴνων. εἰς
ὁ ἀν τοῦτο γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. δεὶ δὲ καὶ ὅταν οἷομαι
τι ὑπεραντώμα τι δοκῇ σημαινέω, ἐπισκοπεῖσι ποσαχῶς ἡν
σημαίνου τούτῳ ἐν τῷ εἰρμενῷ, οίον τῷ "τῇ β' ἐσχέτῳ χάλ-
κεον έγχος" τὸ ταύτῃ κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ενδέχεται—ὅδι ἦ
35 ἀν ἔκολον ὁ π. κατὰ τὴν καταστρυκρή ἦν 1461
ὁς Γλαύκων λέγει, ὅτι ἔνα ἀλόγως προτολαμβάνονος καὶ
αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὡ
(ἀπαντεῖς) παννίχιοι, as compared with what he tells us at the same time, η τοι οὗ' ἐσ τείχων τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀδρήσεων, ἀυλῶν σφράγγων τε ὁμαδῶν, the word ἀπαντεῖς, 'all,' is metaphorically put for 'many,' since 'all' is a species of 'many.' So also his οἷς ὅμορος is metaphorical, the best known standing 'alone.' (3) A change, as Hippias suggested, in the mode of reading a word will solve the difficulty in δίδομεν δὲ οἷ, and τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθηται ὁμβρψ. (4) Other difficulties may be solved by another punctuation; e.g. in Empedocles, αὖφα δὲ θυτ' ἐφύοιτο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκριτο. Or (5) by the assumption of an equivocal term, as in παρφυκέν ὅ δε πλέω νῦξ, where πλέω is equivocal. Or (6) by an appeal to the custom of language. Wine-and-water we call 'wine'; and it is on the same principle that Homer speaks of a κνημίς νεοτεύκτου κατοικέω, a 'greave of new-wrought tin.' A worker in iron we call a 'brazier'; and it is on the same principle that Ganymede is described as the 'wine-server' of Zeus, though the Gods do not drink wine. This latter, however, may be an instance of metaphor. But whenever also a word seems to imply some contradiction, it is necessary to reflect how many ways there may be of understanding it in the passage in question; e.g. in Homer's τῆ φ' ἐχετο χάλκεων ἔγχος one should consider the possible senses of 'was stopped there'—whether by taking it in this sense or in that one will best avoid the fault of which Glaucon speaks: 'They start with some improbable presumption; and having so decreed it themselves, proceed.
τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμᾶσαι, ἄν ὑπεναντίον ἢ τῇ αὐτῶν οἴησει. τούτο τοῦ δὲ πέπουσθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριου. οἶονται γὰρ αὐτῶν Λάκωνα 5 εἰναι ἃ ἡμοὶ ἐνυχθῶν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα, τὸ δὲ ἰσως ἔχει ὁσπέρ ὁ Κεφαλλήνιος φασιν' παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν 'Ὀδυσσέα καὶ εἶναι Ἰκάριον ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰκάριον; δε' ὁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκὸς ἕστην. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν 10 ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεὶ αὐξάνειν. πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετῶτερον πιθανόν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν * * τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οὗν Ζεῦς ἐγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεὶ ὑπερή- χειν. πρὸς δὲ φασιν τάλαγα' οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλο- 15 γὸν ἕστων εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. τὰ δυναμίας εἰρήμενα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὁσπέρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς ἀ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ δ' ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται. ὅρθη δ' ἐπιτιμήσως καὶ ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία, οὗν μὴ ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ οὐσίαν χρῆσται τῷ ἄλογῳ, ὁσπέρ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγέη, ἢ τῇ ποιηρίᾳ, ὅσπερ ἐν 'Ὀρέστῃ (τῇ) τοῦ Μενελάου. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμηματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὣς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἀλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὃς

to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his statement conflicts with their own notion of things. This is how Homer's silence about Icarius has been treated. Starting with the notion of his having been a Lacedaemonian, the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. Whereas the fact may have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses was of a Cephallenian family, and that her father's name was Icadius, not Icarius. So that it is probably a mistake of the critics that has given rise to the Problem.

Speaking generally, one has to justify (1) the Impossible by reference to the requirements of poetry, or to the better, or to opinion. For the purposes of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility; and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist ought to improve on his model. (2) The Improbable one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not improbable; for there is a probability of things happening also against probability. (3) The contradictions found in the poet's language one should first test as one does an opponent's confutation in a dialectical argument, so as to see whether he means the same thing, in the same relation, and in the same sense, before admitting that he has contradicted either something he has said himself or what a man of sound sense assumes as true. But there is no possible apology for improbability of Plot or depravity of character, when they are not necessary and no use is made of them, like the improbability in the appearance of Aegeus in Medea and the baseness of Menelaus in Orestes.

The objections, then, of critics start with faults of five
παρά τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν 25 εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, εἰσών δὲ δώδεκα.

Πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἡ ἐποποική μίμησις ἡ τραγική, 26 διαιροῦσθαι ἂν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἤττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, θυατηρήσειν ἂν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἢ πρὸς βελτίων θεατάς ἐστιν ἂεί, λιών δὴ λόγῳ ὃτι ἡ ἢ πρὸς ἡ ἀπαυγή μιμομενὴ φορτικὴ· ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἀισθανομένων 30 αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ, πολλὴν κάρυσιν κυνώτατα, οἷον οἱ φαύλοι αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι ἃν δίσκον δέχεται, καὶ ἐκκοντεῖς τοὺς κορυφαίους ἃν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδία τοιαύτη ἐστὶν, ὡς καὶ οἱ πρότερον ποὺς ὑστέρους αὐτῶν φοντο ἐποκριτὰς· ὃς λιῶν γὰρ ὑπέρβαλλοντα πίθηκον ὁ Μυμνίακος 35 τοῦ Καλλιπίδην ἐκάλει, τοιαύτῃ δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πυ—

1462 a δάρου ἦν· ὃς δ’ οὗτοι [d’] ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡ δὴ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιῶν ἐχει. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασὶν εἶναι ἂον ὀδὴν δεύονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους· εἰ οὖν φορτικὴ, χείρων δήλον ὃτι αὖ εἰ, 5 πρώτον μὲν οὖ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς, ἐτεί ἐστιν περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημείοις καὶ ῥαψῳδοῦτα, ὡπερ ἡ ἐστὶ Σωσίστρατος, καὶ διάδοτα, ὡπερ ἐποίει Μνασέθεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἀπασα ἀποδοκιμαστέα, εἴπερ μηθ’ ὀρχήσως, ἀλλ’ ἡ φαύλων, ὡπερ καὶ Καλλιπίδη 10 ἐπετιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν ἄλλοις ὡς οὐκ ἐλευθέρας γναίκας μιμομένων. ἐτὶ ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἀνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτής, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγνώσκειν φανερὰ ὅποια

25 σκεπταίαι Λσ 26 βελτίων Λσ 28 δ’ ἡ apogr.: δ’ Λσ ἀεί, λιὼν Vahlen: δειλίαν Λσ 29 πρὸς addidi 30 κυνώταται apogr.: κυνωτά Λσ 1462 a 1 δ’ alterum om. apogr. αὐτοῖς Hermann: αὐτοῖς Λσ 3 οἱ add. Victorius σχημάτων τὴν apogr.: σχῆμα | τα αὐτὴν (τα αὐ m. rec. in loco macula deformato) Λσ 4 εἰ] ἡ Λσ 5 μὲν οὖν] Parisinus 2038 7 ἐστὶ induxit Duentzer διάδοτα apogr.: διαδοῦτα Λσ 8 ὁ poūntios Λσ 10 ἐπτιμῆτο pr. Λσ 11 αὐτῆς Λσ
kinds: the allegation is always that something is either (1) impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory, or (5) against technical correctness. The answers to these objections must be sought under one or other of the above-mentioned heads, which are twelve in number.

The question may be raised whether the epic or the tragic is the higher form of imitation. It may be argued that, if the less vulgar is the higher, and the less vulgar is always that which addresses the better public, an art addressing any and every one is of a very vulgar order. It is a belief that their public cannot see the meaning, unless they add something themselves, that causes the perpetual movements of the performers—bad flute-players, for instance, rolling about, if quoit-throwing is to be represented, and pulling at the conductor, if Scylla is the subject of the piece. Tragedy, then, is said to be an art of this order—to be in fact just what the later actors were in the eyes of their predecessors; for Mynniscus used to call Callippides 'the ape,' because he thought he so overacted his parts; and a similar view was taken of Pindarus also. All Tragedy, however, is said to stand to the Epic as the newer to the older school of actors. The one, accordingly, is said to address a cultivated audience, which does not need the accompaniment of gesture; the other, an uncultivated one. If, therefore, Tragedy is a vulgar art, it must clearly be lower than the Epic.

The answer to this is twofold. In the first place, one may urge (1) that the censure does not touch the art of the dramatic poet, but only that of his interpreter; for it is quite possible to overdo the gesturing even in an epic recital, as did Sosistratus, and in a singing contest, as did Mnasitheus of Opus. (2) That one should not condemn all movement, unless one means to condemn even the dance, but only that of ignoble people—which is the point of the criticism passed on Callippides and in the present day on others, that their women are not like gentlewomen. (3) That Tragedy may produce its effect even without movement or action in just the same way as Epic poetry; for from
τὸς ἔστω· εἰ οὖν ἔστι τὰ γ' ἄλλα κρείττων, τούτῳ γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῇ ὑπάρχειν. ἔσπειτα διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὁσπαρὴ ἐπο-
15 ποιὰ (καὶ γὰρ τῷ μέτρῳ ἐξεστὶ χρήσθαι), καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν μέρος τὴν μονασκήνη καὶ τὰς ὀψεις, δι' ἣς αἱ ἰδοναὶ συνισταν-
tαι ἐναργ衎πατα· εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργ⇉· ἐχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώ-
σει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργῶν· ἔτι τὸ ἐν ἐλάττων μήκες τὸ τέλος
1462 b τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἀθροῖτερον ἦδιον ἢ πολλῷ λεκρα-
mένου τῷ χρόνῳ, λέγω δ' οἶνον εἰ τις τὸν Ὀἰδίπουν θεὶ
tὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσω ὅσοις ἢ Ἰλιᾶς)· ἔτι ἤπτον μᾶ ἡ
μύης ἡ τῶν ἐποποιῶν (σημεῖον δὲ, ἐκ γὰρ ὄποιας ὅν
5 μιμήσεως πλεῖστοι τραγῳδία πάνται), ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἑνα
μῆθον ποιῶν, ἡ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μείουρον φαίνεσθαι, ἡ
ἀκολουθοῦσα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκες ὑδαρῆ· λέγω δὲ οἶνον
ἐὰν ἐκ πλειώνων πράξεων ἢ συγκεκριμένη, ὅπερ ἢ Ἰλιᾶς
ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη καὶ ἢ Ὄδυσσεια, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ
10 ἔχει μέγεθος (κατοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιῆματα συνεστηκέν ὡς ἐν-
δεχεται ἄριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μίας πράξεως μύης)
—εἰ οὖν τούτοις τε διαφέρει πάσων καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης
ἔργῳ (δεὶ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχὸνταν ἦδονην ποιῶν αὐτᾶς ἄλλα
tῆν εἰρημένην), φανερὸν ὅτι κρεῖττων ἂν ἐκ μᾶλλον τοῦ
15 τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἐποποιας.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ ἐποποιας, καὶ αὐτῶν
καὶ τῶν εἴδων καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τὶ διαφέρει,
καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἢ μὴ τίνες αἰτίαι, καὶ περὶ ἐπιμιμήσεων καὶ
λύσεων, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα. * * *

14 αὐτή pr. AReLU 17 ἀναγρ.- Madius (e. codd. quibusdam):
ἀναγιροῖτε AReLU 18 ἔτι τὸ coni. Jortin, Winstanley: ἐτὶ τῶι AReLU
ἐλάττωνi AReLU 1462 b 1 ἢδιον ἢ Madius (confirm. Ar.): θεὶ διπ. AReLU
2 τῶι δίπου pr. AReLU 3 τῶι] pr. AReLU 3 τῶι] pr. AReLU ἢ Ἰλιᾶς
Riccardianus 16: ἢ Ἰλιᾶς (fuit idem) AReLU μία ἢ Spengel: ἢ μία AReLU
6 μείουρον Parisinus 2038: μέιουρον AReLU 7 τοῦ μέτρου] συμμέτρῃ
Bernays 9 post Ὄδυσσεια add. ἢ apogr. 10 κατοι ταῦτα
τὰ apogr.: καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἀττα AReLU 18 ἢ] εὶ AReLU
the mere reading of a play its quality may be seen. So that, if it be superior in all other respects, this element of inferiority is no necessary part of it.

In the second place, one must remember (1) that Tragedy has everything that the Epic has (even the epic metre being admissible), together with a not inconsiderable addition in the shape of the Music (a very real factor in the pleasure of the drama) and the Spectacle. (2) That its reality of presentation is felt in the play as read, as well as in the play as acted. (3) That the tragic imitation requires less space for the attainment of its end; which is a great advantage, since the more concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one with a large admixture of time to dilute it—consider the Oedipus of Sophocles, for instance, and the effect of expanding it into the number of lines of the Iliad. (4) That there is less unity in the imitation of the epic poets, as is proved by the fact that any one work of theirs supplies matter for several tragedies; the result being that, if they take what is really a single story, it seems curt when briefly told, and thin and waterish when on the scale of length usual with their verse. In saying that there is less unity in an epic, I mean an epic made up of a plurality of actions, in the same way as the Iliad and Odyssey have many such parts, each one of them in itself of some magnitude; yet the structure of the two Homeric poems is as perfect as can be, and the action in them is as nearly as possible one action. If then, Tragedy is superior in these respects, and also besides these, in its poetic effect (since the two forms of poetry should give us, not any or every pleasure, but the very special kind we have mentioned), it is clear that, as attaining the poetic effect better than the Epic, it will be the higher form of art.

So much for Tragedy and Epic poetry—for these two arts in general and their species; the number and nature of their constituent parts; the causes of success and failure in them; the Objections of the critics, and the Solutions in answer to them.
FRAGMENTA

I.

Aristoteles Rhet. 3. 2, 1404b 37: τῶν δ' ὅνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὑμωνυμίᾳ χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταῦτα γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίᾳ. λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συνωνυμίᾳ οἶον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνωνυμία ἀλλήλους. τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἑκατὸν ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη μεταφορᾶς καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον ὄνοματι καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραὶ, εὑρήται καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Simplicius in Categ. 36. 13 Kalbfleisch: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς συνωνυμίᾳ εἰπεν εἶναι ὅν πλεῖστο ἡμὲν τὰ ὄνοματα λόγος δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς, οἷα δὴ ἐστὶ τὰ πολυωνυμία, τὸ τε λόσιον καὶ ἴματιον καὶ τὸ φάρος.

II.

Aristoteles Poct. 6, 1449b 21: περὶ κωμῳδίας ὑστερον ἔρουμεν.

III.

Aristoteles Rhet. 1. 11, 1371b 33: ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδίᾳ τῶν ἰδέων καὶ πάσα ἀνεσίς καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἰδέων,
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\text{ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἢδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἕργα: διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Idem Rhet. 3. 18, 1419b 2: περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινὰ δοκεῖ χρήσων ἔχει ἐν τοῖς ἀγώνι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπονδὴν διαφθείρει τῶν ἐναυτῶν γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπονδὴ ὅρβως λέγων, εἰρήται πόσα εἶδο γελοίων ἐστίν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὖν ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήφεται. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἔτέρων.

Conf. Cicero de Oratore 2. 58: Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi . . . turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem alienam non turpiter . . . nec insignis improbitas et scelere uncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos maiorem quadam vi quam ridiculi vulnerari volunt; miseris inluti nolunt, nisi se forte iactant; parcum autem maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas qui diliguntur. haec igitur adhibienda est primum in locando moderatio, itaque ea facillime luduntur quae neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt; quam ob rem materies omnis ridiculorum est in iis vittis quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum neque eorum qui ob facinus ad supplicium rapiendi videntur; eaque belle agitata ridentur.

IV.

Antiatticista in Anecdotis Bekkeri 101. 32: κυνότατον: 'Αριστοτέλης περὶ ποιητικῆς τὸ δὲ πάντων κυνότατον.

V.

Aristoteles Pol. 8. 7, 1341b 32: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαφρεσὶν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαμορφεῖ τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ήθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ
τῶν ἀρμονίων τῆς φύσεως πρὸς ἐκαστὰ τούτων οἰκεῖαν ἀλλήν πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμέν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκα ὡφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρήσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειονὸν χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθαρσίν, νῦν μὲν ἄπλως, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρωτήματι σαφές—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, πρὸς ἀνεσί τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερῶν ὅτι χρηστῶν μὲν πάσας ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον πάσας χρηστῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἰδιικώταται, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργοῦντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὃ γὰρ περὶ οὔποτε συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἀφθονῶς τούτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἦττων διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μάλλῳ, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐτὶ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς καμάσεως κατακόχυμοι τυχές εἶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὑπόμεναι τούτων, ὅταν χρῆσται τοῖς ἐξοργίάζοντο τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὡσπερ ἱατρεῖας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταύτῳ δὴ τούτῳ ἀναγκαίον πάσχει καὶ τοὺς ἐλείμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλους παθητικοὺς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἑπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστω, καὶ πάσι γίγνεσθαι των καθαρσιν καὶ κοιφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἰδιοῦσι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Conf. Aristoteles Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21: ἕτε δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἰδιικὸν ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὀργιαστικὸν, ὡστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτὸ καιρὸς χρηστῶν ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία καθαρευὴν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν.

Proclus in Plat. Remp. 1 p. 42 Kroll: εἰτέιν χρῆ... δεύτερον, τι δόποτε μίλιστα τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν κομηκὴν οὐ παραδέχεται [sic. Plato] καὶ ταῦτα συντελοῦσα πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἢ μήτε παντατέσσαρες ἀποκλίνειν δυνατὸν μήτε ἐμπιστεύει πάλιν ἀσφαλὲς, δειμένα δὲ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως, ἢν ἐν ταῖς τοιοῦτοι ἀκρόασιν ἐκεληρουμένης ἀνευπολίτους ἢμας ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν... p. 49: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον [sic. πρόβλημα]—τούτῳ δ' ἢν τὸ τῶν τραγῳδίων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ κομηκῶν ἀποτύπωσε, εἴπερ δι' αὐτῶν δυνατὸν ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιστεύει τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλήσαστας ἑυεργά πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχειν
τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαται—τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστο-
τέλει παρασχῶν αὐτάσως ἀφομήν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Ἄρταμων λόγων οὗτοι πῶς ἡμεῖς ἐπόμενοι τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν διαλύσομεν... p. 50: δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμερχανάσθαι τινας τῶν παθῶν τοῦτων ἀπεράσει καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' οἷς ὡστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προσπαθεῖας συντείνειν, τοῦναντίον μὲν οὖν ὡστε χαλινοὶ καὶ τὰς καὶς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστέλλειν' ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἀρα τὰς ποιήσεις πρὸς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀμετρον ἐχούσας ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθῶν τούτων προκλήσει πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς ἀφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους. αἰ γὰρ ἀφοσίωσεις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσίν ἀλλ' ἐν συνεσταλμέναις εὐεργείαις, σμικρὰν ὁμοίότητα πρὸς ἐκείνα ἐχούσαις ἐν εἰσιν ἀφοσίωσεις.

Iamblichus de Myst. I. 11: οἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀθροπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντη μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθόταται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς εὐεργείαις δὲ βραχείας [ita Bernays; βραχείς vulg.] καὶ ἀχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμεναι χαίρουσι μετρῖς καὶ ἀποπληροῦσι, καὶ ἐντείθεν ἀποκα-
θαλρόμεναι πεθαί καὶ οὐ πρὸς βιαν ἀναστιναίαν. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη δεορούντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἴκεια πάθη καὶ μετρώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαρομένες.

VI.

Philoponus in Aristot. de Anima p. 269, 28 ed. Hayduck: διὰ τούτῳ φησὶν ὅτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τούτεστι τὸ τέλος, διητόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ δὲ φ', ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ποιητικῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ Περὶ γενέσεως εἶπεν.
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τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς. The εἰδή meant are epic poetry, Tragedy, and Comedy, as is clear from 6, 1449 b 21, where the main subjects for consideration in the Poetics are enumerated. Lyric poetry, apart from an occasional reference to the Dihyramb and Nome, or the chorica in Tragedy, is ignored in the existing Poetics; and there is little or no reason to suppose it to have been discussed in the lost portion of the book. The probability is that, from the importance of its musical element, it belonged in Aristotle's classification of the arts to the theory of μελοποιία rather than to that of poetry proper. The work of the two lyric poets Phrynis and Timotheus is put under the head of μελοποιία in Metaph. a 1, 993 b 15; and in the Problems, where Phrynichus is said to have been a μελοποιός rather than a tragedian (Probl. 18. 31, 920 a 11), the same view is implied of the lyric parts of Tragedy. It is to be remembered too that Aristophanes in Ran. 1250 makes Euripides begin his criticism of the chorica in Aeschylus by calling him a κακός μελοποίος.

For the antithesis in the text comp. 26, 1462 b 16 καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν.—Top. 1. 15, 106 b 37 ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων [scil. ὅμοιοι]; δέν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ ἡ πτώσις ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτώσις, καὶ αὐτό.—Eth. E. 7. 15, 1248 b 22 δικαωσών καὶ αὐτή καὶ αἱ πράξεις.

ἲν τινα δύναμιν ἐκαστὸν ἔχει = ὃ τί δύναται ἐκαστὸν: comp. Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 5 τοῦτων δὲ ὅβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αὕτη, σχεδὸν ἐστι φανερῶν . . . δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αὕτη στάσεως. Each species of poetry has its special capacities, which enable it to do what the rest either cannot do at all or cannot do so well and effectively. Other Aristotelian instances of δύναμις with a sense approximating to our 'function' or 'effect' will be found in Bon. Ind. 206 b 29.

σωστασθαι is a passive in 26, 1462 a 16, and probably also in 924, 1460 a 28. That it is a passive in the present passage is shown

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by the parallels, τοὺς συνεστώτας εἶς μῦθοις in 7, 1450b32, and ὦτῳ συνεστάναι τῶν μύθων in 14, 1453b4.

καλῶς ἔχειν: 13, 1453a12 τῶν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον.—24, 1459b12 τὰς διάνυσι καὶ τῶν λέειν ἔχειν καλῶς. As anything good of its kind may be said to be καλῶς, so anything that is in the condition in which it ought to be is said to καλῶς ἔχειν (comp. Bon. Ind. 360b38).

εἰ δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων, scil. ἡ ποίησις. Many of the translators, however, suppose the subject to be ἐκαστὸν ἔδος ('ex quot et cujusmodi partibus constant singulae species,' Goulston). The question is considered in chap. 6 in reference to Tragedy, and in 24, 1450b10 in reference to epic poetry.

περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχοντας τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ μεθόδου: Soph. el. 33, 183b12 διδόμεναι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχοντας τῆς αὐτῆς μεθόδου τῶν λόγων ἐστίν. The meaning of μέθοδος, a favourite word with Aristotle, has been discussed by Waitz, Org. 2 p. 297 (comp. Bon. Ind. 449b43).

λέγωμεν ἄρξάμενοι κτέ. The language here is very like that in Soph. el. 1, 164a20 περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων... λέγωμεν ἄρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων (comp. De sensu 1, 436a6; De part. an. 1, 5, 646a3; 2, 10, 655b28; Eth. E. 1, 7, 1217a18; Rhet. 1, 13, 1373b1). In order to determine the definition of poetry, or rather of Tragedy as the highest form of the art, Aristotle starts with the assumption that Tragedy, together with certain other allied arts, comes under the general head of μῆχος, 'imitation,' and then proceeds by successive divisions of this genus to note one by one the various points which differentiate it from the rest. (1) Tragedy has language, metre, and music as its means of imitation; the music in it, however, comes in only from time to time, in the choral parts—which distinguishes it from the Nome and the Dithyramb. (2) It represents noble personages—which distinguishes it from Comedy. (3) It has a dramatic form—which distinguishes it from the Epic. These with other differentiae less clearly accounted for are combined in the definition of Tragedy at the opening of chap. 6. The logical order here exemplified is what Aristotle regards as the natural order of procedure: Phys. 1, 7, 189b31 ἐστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπόντας ὦτῳ τὰ περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἱδα θεωρεῖν.

ἐποποιία κτέ. This enumeration of imitative arts comprises the four great species of poetry distinguished by Plato in Rep. 394c, together with two purely musical arts, ἀθλητικὸς and κιθαριστικὸς.
These last may be supposed to be added partly on account of the manifest analogy between them and poetry, both being imitative arts appealing to the ear, and partly also on account of the historical connexion of poetry with music (comp. Cicero De Orat. 3, 174 musici, qui erant quondam idem poetae). Even Plato occasionally merges the one in the other. In the Republic ουσική includes poetry, and in Symp. 205 c poetry includes τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικήν.

Ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις: b 26 ἢ τῶν διθυραμβίκων ποίησις.—Plato Gorg. 501 ε ἢ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις.—502 b ἢ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις.

Διθυραμβοποιική. Plato cites the Dithyramb as an instance of the non-imitative type of poetry: Rep. 394 c τῆς ποιήσεως... ἢ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ἀλη ἀστίν, ἄσπερ σὺν λέγεισ, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἢ δὲ δὲ ἀπαγγελόμενον αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὔροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστα ποιεῖν ἐν διθυράμβοις. By Aristotle's time, however, the Dithyramb (as also the Name) had lost its original form, and become 'imitative' or semi-dramatic, a sort of musical counterpart of the Drama, dealing with the same kinds of subject as Tragedy, and with solos by professional singers corresponding to the speeches of the tragic actors. This change in the character of the Dithyramb is noted in Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 18 οἱ διθυράμβοι, ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὸν ἐγένοιτο, οὐκέτι ἠχοῦσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρότερον δὲ εἴχον ἀίτων δὲ ὅτι τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ ἑλεύθεροι ἠχόμενοι αὐτοί· πολλοὶ δὲν ἀγωνιστικῶς ἂδειν χαλεπῶν ἦν, ὡστε ἐναρμόνια μέλη ἐνδόν μεταβάλλειν γὰρ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς τῷ ἐνι βάσιν ἠ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ τῷ ἀγωνισκῷ τοῖς τῷ ἑθος φιλαττοῦσιν (comp. Bergk, Gr. Litt. 2 p. 529, and Wilamowitz, Euripides Herakles 1 p. 79). In this mention of the Dithyramb, therefore, Aristotle does not cite it as a type of lyric poetry in general (as is often supposed), but as representing an imitative or dramatic form of lyric—a lyrical μίμησις or picture of life and manners. A certain approximation to this later form of Dithyramb is to be seen in Bacchylides (Comparetti, Mélanges Weil p. 30).

Τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλειστὴ: De Caelo 3. 1, 298 b 2 τῆς πλείστην τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3. 2. 1 p. 279). The αὐλός was the accompaniment of the Dithyrambi and the κιθάρα of the Nome. That, however, is not the reason for this reference to them, as it is clear from a 23 that Aristotle is thinking rather of music without words, i.e. of that which was termed in antiquity ψυλὴ αὐλῆς and ψυλὴ κιθάρης. Plato in the Laws (669 ε) sets his face against this purely instrumental music, which had evidently attained
1447 a 15 to a high degree of perfection in his time, on the ground that it ends in a mere display of technical execution (θαυμάτουργία) and a 'brutish noise' (φωνής θηριώδους σφόδρα φιλον). Aristotle's language in Pol. 8, 6, 1347 a 11 τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων ἀ νῦν ἐλλυθεὶ σὲ τοὺς ἄγωνας, seems to imply that there was in his view some truth in Plato's criticism. In the present passage accordingly, instead of saying ἥ ἀδηλτικὴ, or ἥ ἀδηλτικὴ πάσα, he adopts the qualified form of expression, τῆς ἀδηλτικῆς ἥ πλειοτη, in order to show that he is not unaware of there being exceptions to the rule.

a 16 μιμήσεις. The general meaning of μιμέωςθαί is either 'to do what another has done', or 'to make something like something else', i.e. to represent by means of a copy or counterfeit of some sort. The primitive sense of the word must have been 'to play the μῖμος,' to reproduce the language, tones, gestures, etc., of another—a sense which survives in the use of the term for the imitation of persons by actors on the stage. In actual use the word is wide enough to include the counterfeiting of movement and attitude by the dancer, that of voice and sound by the singer and musician, that of the forms and colours of things by the sculptor and painter, and even the representation of things in words, as in speech and literature. A noteworthy variation, however, is to be observed in the application of the word to a work of literature. Owing to the traditional associations connected with it Plato in the Republic opposes μιμήσις to narrative, restricting it to the dramatic mode of statement, in which the speaker effaces himself, as it were, and identifies himself with his personages: Rep. 393 b οὐκοίν διήγησις μὲν ἔστι καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἐκάστοτε λέγη [scil. ὁμηρός] καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 'Ἀλλὰ ὅταν γε τινα λέγη ῥῆσιν ὃς τις ἄλλος ὄν, ἄρ' οὐ τότε ὄμοιον αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μᾶλλον τὴν αὐτοῦ λέξειν ἐκάστῳ ὅν ἰν προεῖπη ὡς ἐρούτα; Φήσομεν; τί γάρ; Οὐκοίν τὸ γε ὄμοιον ἐαυτὸν ἄλλω ἢ κατὰ φωνήν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαι ἐστὶν ἐκείνοις ὃ ἔν τις ὄμοις; Τί μὴν; Ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς οὐκεν, οὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταῖ δία μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάντα μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δὲ γε μισθαρὰν ἐαυτὸν ἀποκριθύπτω λο οιοχης, πᾶσα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνεν μιμήσεως ἡ ποιήσις τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονεῖν ἑτῆ.—394 b τῆς ποιήσεως τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἢ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὠθή ἐστίν, ωσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγωδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἢ δὲ δέ ἀπαγγελέα αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὕρως δ' ἐν αὐτήν μᾶλλον όν ἐν διηθράμβοις—ἡ δ' αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐπών ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλος. In his use of μιμεῖσθαι in
the Poetics Aristotle has fallen into a grave inconsistency, as he distinctly makes it in one place (3, I448 a 21) include narrative, and in another (24, I460 a 9) exclude it.

τὸ σύνολον qualifies πάσα, what is said of the class as a whole being opposed to the specific differences which reveal themselves in it on closer examination; comp. Plato Soph. 220 b ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ ἐνδόρου [scil. γένους ἢ θῆρα] σχεῦν τὸ σύνολον ἀληθητικὴ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι. ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; ταῦτην αὖ τὴν θῆραν ἄρ' οὐκ ἄν κατὰ μέγαστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;

τῷ γένει ἐτέροις. Forchhammer's correction τῷ ἐν ἐτέροις is a 17 supposed to be confirmed by the use of the preposition to denote the means or vehicle of imitation in a 22 and b 29, and also elsewhere (3, I448 a 20 etc.). The sense, however, is just as well expressed by the simple dative, as it is for instance in the immediate context in a 18 and a 26; and as the means under consideration, λόγος, ἀρμονία, and μυθοῦς, differ in kind, they are rightly described as γένει ἐτέρα. There is no need to restore τῷ γένει; Aristotle not unfrequently omits the article in this and cognate formulas, e.g. in Top. 1. 7, 103 b 13 γένει ταύτα, in H. A. 2. 1, 497 b 9 and Metaph. I 10, 1059 a 14 γένει ἐτέρα. In An. post. 2. 15, 98 a 26–28 we find him saying τῷ γένει and γένει, and in Eth. N. 10, 5, 1175 a 25 τῷ εἴδει and εἴδει without perceptible difference of meaning. The distinction in fact between γένει ἐτέρα and τῷ γένει ἐτέρα is not greater than that between 'different in kind' and 'different in their kind' in English. A confirmation of Forchhammer's reading has been seen in the fact that in 8, I451 a 17 has τῷ γένει instead of the true reading τῷ ἐν. The two cases, however, are not quite parallel. ΤΟΓΕΝΕΙΤΟΙΕΝΤΟΙΕΝ assumes only a very familiar kind of corruption, whereas ΤΟΓΕΝΕΙΤΟΙΕΝ leaves an important part of the word (the termination) unexplained. It is also to be observed that the comparison in the next line, ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώματι κτέν, seems to presuppose γένει ἐτέροις, as χρώματα καὶ σχήματα and φωνή, which appeal to different senses, are marked instances of things γένει ἐτέρα (comp. An. post. 2. 13, 97 b 34). There is no doubt a certain inelegance in τῷ γένει ἐτέροις μιμεῖσθαι, but it is not greater than that in Phys. 1. 7, 191 a 1 διὰ τὸ ἐτέρον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, or that in Plato Rep. 534 b διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκδόσ του λαμβάνοντά τις ὁσίας.

ἡ τῷ ἐτέρα ἡ τῷ ἐτέρως. The distinction is already in Plato, Rep. 398 b τῷ γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἶπηται.
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1447\(^a\)\(^18\) καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Other instances of parallelismus anti-
theticus will be found in 3, 1448\(^a\)\(^22\), 6, 1449\(^b\)\(^26\), 15, 1454\(^a\)\(^30\),
24, 1460\(^a\)\(^16\).

Ωστερ γὰρ κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the difference of means
in these arts by pointing to the difference of means in a larger
group of imitative arts. The distinction between the arts that
address the eye and those that address the ear is frequently noted
by Plato in similar terms, e.g. in Rep. 373 \(B\) οἱ τε μυηηαι, πολλοί
μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματα τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοί δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικῆν,
ποιηταί τε καὶ τοῦτων ὑπηρέται, βασιλείδοι ὑποκριται χορευται κτέ. (comp.
Rep. 603 \(B\); Crat. 423 \(D\); Gorg. 474 \(E\). It is assumed also in
a number of Aristotelian passages (e.g. in An. post. 2. 13, 97 \(b\) 35;
Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118\(^a\)\(^3\); Pol. 8. 5, 1340\(^a\)\(^34\)). Aristotle has a
special reason for saying ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, because the great
imitative capacity of the voice is what renders language and poetry
possible, together with many of the arts subsidiary to the latter:
Rhet. 3. 1, 1404\(^a\)\(^21\) ὑπήρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μυθικόστατον
τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνεστησαν, ἡ τε βασιλεία καὶ ἡ ὑπο-
κριτική καὶ ἀλλαί γε.

\(^a\)\(^19\) πολλά is not otiose. The art of the painter or sculptor has
certain limits; it can represent many things; but there are some
(e.g. character and feeling) that it can only imperfectly or
indirectly express (Pol. 8. 5, 1340\(^a\)\(^32\); comp. Xenophon Mem.
3. 10, 1). The theory in Lessing’s Laocoon is based on an idea
already in Aristotle.

μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες: Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1 σώματα
diὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεώσθηκαν.

οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνθείας is thrown in parenthetically,
like the very similar remark in 8, 1451\(^a\)\(^24\), ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἡ διὰ
φύσιν. As opposed to τέχνη, συνθεία means much the same
as ἐμπειρία, with which it is coupled in Eth. N. 8. 7, 1158\(^a\)\(^14\)
dει δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λάβειν καὶ ἐν συνθείαις γενέσθαι, and in 10. 10,
1181\(^a\)\(^9\) οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε ἐοικέν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαί οὐδὲ γὰρ
ἐγένοντ' ἀν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνθείας πολιτικοῦ. The contrast is
between the skill depending on mere practice or habitude, and
that directed by a consciousness of the rules and principles of the
art which deals with the particular subject. On this distinction
see Metaph. A 1, 980\(^b\)\(^28\), and Mill's Logic Bk. II. ch. 3 (1,
p. 214, ed. 4).

\(^a\)\(^20\) ἑτεροι δὲ corresponds to a foregoing τινες in Eth. N. 1. 1,
1094\(^b\)\(^18\) ἣν γὰρ τινες ἀπάλουντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἑτεροι δὲ δὲ ἀνδρείαν.
Compare also Plato Rep. 349 d µουσικών δὲ τίνα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ι. 1447 a 20 ἀμονειν;

διὰ τῆς φωνῆς = τῆ φωνή. Aristotle has allowed himself to repeat the prepositional construction used in the parenthesis. The emendation of Madius, διὰ τῆς φύσεως, besides making too much of a merely incidental remark in a parenthesis, leaves χρώματι καὶ σχῆμασιν without an antithesis; it ignores in fact the whole point of the analogy to which attention is drawn, the diversity of means. The diversity of means, λόγος, ῥυθμός, and ἀρμονία, in the group of imitative arts under consideration is said to be like the diversity of means, χρώματα καὶ σχῆματα and φωνή, observable in a larger group of imitative arts.

ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ. The three terms had already appeared in the same sense in Plato's analysis of the song or choral in Rep. 398 d τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστι συγκείμενον, λόγον τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ (comp. Laws 661 c; 669 ν). His terminology, however, is not always quite the same; he sometimes says ῥυθμὸς καὶ μέτρον (Phil. 17 ν, Gorg. 502 c) or μέτρον καὶ ῥυθμός (Rep. 601 λ) in lieu of ῥυθμός; and μέλος, 'melody' or 'tune', in lieu of ἀρμονία (Rep. 400 λ, Gorg. 502 c, Laws 656 c, etc.). Aristotle also, in more than one passage in the Poetics (1, 1447 b 25; 6, 1449 b 31), has put μέλος in place of ἀρμονία; and in one instance (6, 1449 b 29) he combines the two terms as synonyms. It is clear, therefore, that in its present application ἀρμονία means no more than 'melody' or 'tune'. ῥυθμός is properly 'time' or 'pace'. It is a very general word, since it includes the element of rhythm in language and in the movements of the dance, as well as that in music; comp. Plato Laws 665 λ τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει [scil. εἴτε ὡς] ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἶη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ῥητοίς ἀμα καὶ βαρέως συγκεκριμένων, ἀρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύωντο, χορεία δὲ τὸ ξυναμφότερον κληθεῖν.—672 Ε Ὄλη μὲν ποι χορεία ὅλη παιδευσίη ἦν ἤμι, τοῦτον δ' αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμότετο καὶ ἀρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ... τὸ δὲ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σῶματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς ἐχει κινήσει, σχῆμα δ' ἔχων. ἐκεὶ δὲ μέλος ἦ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις (see also Symp. 187 b and Phil. 17 c). The various applications of ῥυθμός are thus summarized in Aristoxenus (p. 411, 8 Marquard): ἐστι δὲ τὰ ῥυθμιζόμενα τριάν: λέξεις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική. Plato's view as to the great imitative capacities of rhythm and harmony and music generally may be seen in Rep. 399 λ sqq., in Laws 668 λ sqq., and more briefly put, in Laws 798 ν τὰ περὶ τῶν
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1447 a 22 ἰδριμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μονοτικὴν ἐστὶ τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιώνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων. The point is recognized with equal clearness by Aristotle in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 18, ἂστι δ’ ὄρθωματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀλήθειας φύτες ἐν τοῖς ἰδριμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὄργας καὶ πραστήσος, ἂστι δ’ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἤθικών ... (a 38) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτούς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἤθων ... (b 7) τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἰδριμοὺς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἢθος ἔχουσι στασιμότερον οἱ δὲ κινητικῶν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἔλευθεροτέρας.

a 23 ἡ χωρίς ἡ μεμηγέναις: a reminiscence of Plato Laws 669 ν διαστῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ἰδριμοῦ μὲν καὶ σχῆματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψυλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἰδριμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψυλῆς καθαρίσει τε καὶ αἴλησει προορχόμενοι.

χρώμεναι, scil. ποιοῦνται τὴν μέμησιν.

a 25 τυχάνουσιν. On the construction with κἀν εἰ see Vahlen, Beitr. 1, p. 35. Mr. Newman in a note on Pol. 2. 1, 1260 b 31 seems to doubt the necessity of restoring the indicative in this and other similar places in Aristotelian texts.

ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. The word to be supplied is apparently μέμησις—not τέχνη, as is assumed in HSt. s.v. σύριγξ, and in Bon. Ind. 735 a 39. The Platonic ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη in Phaedr. 260 ν is not a true parallel. For a similar genitive after μέμησις comp. Lucian De salt. 64 ἡ μέμησις τῆς ὀρχήσεως.

a 26 αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἰδριμῷ κτέ. is an unnecessary clause, as ὀρχηστικὴ is not one of the arts in the list in a 13; it will be observed too that there is a change in the form of expression, μεμοῦνται, instead of χρώμεναι with ποιοῦνται τὴν μέμησιν understood. The clause would seem to have been originally an afterthought, worked in by Aristotle as soon as he saw that there was an art that used rhythm alone. His giving a reason for this mention of ὀρχηστική may be supposed to imply a consciousness of its being a new point, and one requiring demonstration.

αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν. The traditional reading οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν has been corrected into ἐνοικὸν τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Twining; into οἱ (πολλοὶ) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Heinsius; and into οἱ (χαριέντες) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Zeller. It is assumed that Aristotle may have wished to recognize the fact, of which Plato had spoken in Laws 795 Ε, that dancing is sometimes a mere exercise of the body and without dramatic meaning. A much simpler correction, however, is αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, with μεμήσεις (rather than τέχναι) understood from the context.
Aristotle is thinking of the professional dancers, who told a story in 1447 a 26 pantomime, by the mere movements and attitudes of their bodies (comp. Sittl, Die Gebäuden der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244).

σχηματιζομένων ρυθμῶν: the rhythms in their movements, in the a 27 succession of their σχήματα, their gestures or attitudes (see on 26, 1462 a 3). The emphasis is on ρυθμῶν; that the attitudes of the dancer might be dramatic, and represent 'what men do or have done to them', was too obvious to require saying. Aristotle is insisting on the 'ethical' significance which rhythm imparts to the dance. On rhythm as expressive of character and temperament see Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 18 and the Platonic passages referred to on a 22.

ήθη: the character and temperament of the personages represented, as distinct from their πάθη καὶ πράξεις, 'what they do or have done to them'. The meaning of πάθη καὶ πράξεις is sufficiently shown by 9, 1451 b 11 τί 'Αλκιβίαδης ἐπραξέν ἢ τί ἐπαθεν, and 13, 1453 a 22 παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιήσαι (see also on 11, 1452 b 11). πάθη is generally assumed (e.g. in Bon. Ind. 557 a 49) to denote in this passage 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The words πάθη καὶ πράξεις cover the whole ground of the story in the dance; so that Aristotle, if he had cared to anticipate the term used later on in 6, 1450 a 4, might have said here, without difference of meaning, ήθη καὶ μύθους.

ή δὲ [ἐποποιία] κτέ. Suckow's correction, τυχικάνει νόσα, is to be found in his Form der Platonischen Schriften p. 53. With it, and the readings implied in the Arabic Version, the whole passage becomes intelligible and in harmony with the context. We were told at the outset in a 22 that the three means of imitation, ρυθμός, λόγος, and ἀρμονία, may be employed either singly or in certain combinations. Having just spoken (1) of imitation ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ καὶ ρυθμῷ, and (2) of imitation ἐν ρυθμῷ alone, Aristotle passes on (3) to imitation ἐν λόγῳ—whether alone, or in combination with rhythm or metre, and finally (4) to imitation ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ καὶ ρυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ. This exhausts the possibilities, since it is evident that ἀρμονία alone, and the combination ἀρμονία + λόγος, need not be taken into account. The third of his four heads Aristotle divides, and recognizes three possible forms of means, (1) λόγος alone, (2) λόγος + some one kind of metre, and (3) λόγος + a plurality of metres. In other words he distinguishes between (1) imitations in prose, (2) imitations in some one metre (hexameters, trimeters, etc.), and (3) imitations in a plurality of metres. Of this large and well-
marked class of imitative literature, which includes the Mime, the 'imaginary conversations' of Socrates, the Epic, and Chaeremon's Centaur, Aristotle observes that it has 'remained to this day without a distinctive name'. The common fact here is μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ, but there is, he says, no one common name connoting the common fact and equally applicable to all the kinds within the class.

Those who retain ἐπιτοιχία, with the addition of ἀνώνυμος at the end of the sentence, suppose it to mean 'word-poetry' (Wordbildung, Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81). Such a special and unique sense, however, for a term like ἐπιτοιχία is highly improbable, and also against the analogy of all the similar compounds (e.g. λογοποία, μελοποία, µυθοποία, ὀνοματοποία), in which the -τοιχία means simply the making of something, just as much as in ἀρτοποία, ὀδοποία, παιδοποία and the like. And even if the word could bear its new meaning, it would be inappropriate here, as the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversation' were prose imitations—not poems. To a Greek of Aristotle's time the idea of a prose poem would have seemed a contradiction in terms.

τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἦ τοῖς μέτροις = τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἦ τοῖς μέτροις ψιλοῖς: comp. 2, 1448 a 11 τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν. ψιλοῖς, which in this connexion means χωρίς ἁρμονίας, 'without melody' (v. Tyrwhitt ad loc. and Bon. Ind. 433 b 29), differentiates this group of imitative arts from the semi-musical arts considered later on, at the end of the chapter; comp. Plato Phaedr. 278 c ποίησιν ψιλήν ἦ ἐν φύσις συντέθηκε, and Laws 669 D (quoted on a 23). λόγοις ψιλοῖς has been taken by several (including Bon. Ind. 862 b 31) to mean 'prose' in the present passage—a sense which ψιλὸς λόγος has no doubt in a good many instances, e.g. in Rhet. 3. 2, 1494 b 14, 33. But there is nothing in the general meaning of the word to necessitate this interpretation here. ψιλὸς means simply 'by itself', without some accessory, whatever the accessory thus excluded may happen to be (v. HSt. s. v.). ἦ τοῖς μέτροις. μέτρα has to be understood in the concrete sense of 'kinds of verse', i.e. as equivalent to λόγοι ἐμετροῖ or λόγοι ἀριθμοῖ. Aristotle remembers that the literary form of imitation is generally in verse, and accordingly adds ἦ τοῖς μέτροις. The addition, however, has a sort of reflex influence on the general term λόγοις which precedes it, and by the contrast it suggests gives the word for the moment the special sense of 'prose', as distinct from verse. Other instances of a general term with its meaning
modified by what follows will be found in 22, 1458 a 28 and 25, 1447 a 29. The logical scheme of the statement in a 29- b 23 may be thus exhibited:

Language \{ prose \} \begin{cases} \text{in some one kind of metre} \\ \text{music} \{ verse \} \end{cases} \begin{cases} \text{in a plurality of metres} \\ \end{cases}

Plato has the same division in Laws 810 b, where he is protesting against the divorce of poetry and literature from music: πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἀλυρὰ ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοὺς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοὺς δ' ἄνεν [ῥυθμῶν τμημάτων], ἀ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, πηγάμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ' ἡμῖν ἔστι παρὰ τινον . . . καταλελειμένα. Here ἀλυρὰ corresponds to Aristotle's ψιλοῖς, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ' ἄνεοι to his τοῖς λόγοις ἣ τοῖς μέτροις, and κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον πηγάμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας to his μόνοι τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς.

ἀνώνυμοι: Phys. 5. 2, 226 a 26 ἢ μὲν ὅνω κατὰ τὸ ποιοῦν κύκριος \begin{cases} \text{ἄλλοιοτα ἐστὶν} \end{cases} τοῦτο ὄρα ἐπεξεύκται κοινών όνομα . . . ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἀνώνυμων, καθ' ἐκάτερον δ' αἰδέσις καὶ φήσις.—De anima 2. 7, 418 a 26 ὅρατον δ' ἐστὶν χρώμα τε, καὶ δ' λόγῳ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπίτευξιν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν.—H. A. 10. 40, 623 b 5 ἐστι δὲ τι γένος τῶν ἐντὸν, δ' ἐνι μὲν ὕψωτα ἀνώνυμον ἐστίν.—Pol. 3. 1, 1275 b 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. For other instances see Bon. Ind. 69 b 2. Aristotle has often to speak of a class as being still without a name, because its existence has not yet been recognized by ordinary thought (comp. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81).

τυγχάνει οὔσα. Similarly in De sensu 5, 447 b 7 Thurot would restore ὑπάρχει οὔσα for ὑπάρχουσα.

ὑπάρχουσα κοινῶν: scil. όνομα; comp. Meteor. 4. 9, 387 b 2 οὔ γάρ b 10 κείται όνομα κοινῶν.—H. A. 4. 7, 531 b 22 οὔκ ἐπεξεύκται κοινῶν όνομα οὐδὲν.

τοὺς Σάφρωνος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους. The surviving fragments (Kaibel, CGF. 1 pp. 152 and 182) show that the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus were in prose (comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 3. 2. 2 p. 533). And as their very name is suggestive of μίμησις, Aristotle points to them as an indisputable example of prose-imitation, μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ χωρίς ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ. A very similar view of them is implied in a fr. of the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν (72 Teubn.): οὐκόν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους τοὺς καλομέσους

1 These two words seem to represent a gloss, ῥυθμῶν τητώμενα.
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1447b 10 Σώφρονος μίμονς μὴ φύμεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις, ἣ τοὺς Ἁλέξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τημίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 82; Kaibel l. c., p. 152). The fr. makes it clear that Aristotle saw a certain affinity between the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversations' of Alexamenus; and with it before us, it is not difficult to divine the reason for the juxtaposition of the Mime and the Σωκρατικὸς λόγος in the present passage of the Poetics; the two things differed in name, but at the same time they had an essential element in common, that of being prose-imitations, μιμήσεις ἐν λόγῳ, and not (like poetry) ἐν μέτρῳ.

b II τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους. As used here and in Rhet. 3. 16, 1417a 20, the term Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι must be taken to cover the ground of the whole of this species of literature, the 'Socratic Conversations' not only of Alexamenus, but also of Plato, Aeschines and the rest (comp. Joel, Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil. 8, 468). A certain resemblance between the Platonic Dialogue and the Mime is presupposed in the story (Duris fr. 45 in Müller, FHG. 2 p. 480) of Plato having been a zealous student and imitator of Sophron. It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Teichmüller's view, that Aristotle's intention was to contrast the Mime and the Dialogue, and insist on the difference between them.

οὐδὲ εἰ: De interpr. II, 20b 25 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρωτησὶς μία οὐδὲ εἰ ἢ ἀληθῆς.—14, 24a 3 οὐδὲν διώκει οὐδὲν ἀν καθόλου τιθῷμεν τὴν κατάφασιν.—Soph. el. II, 171b 12 τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐρωτικὰ . . . οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τι ἐπτε ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθῆς.

At this point Aristotle runs off into a digression (comp. 9, 1451b 1) in order to minimize the importance of the element of metre in the imitative forms of literature. Even if a mime and a dialogue were both written in verse, either in some one (b II–12) or in several kinds of metre (b 20), they would still be without a common name connoting the μίμησις in them, which is their essential point of agreement. The writer of such a versified mime or dialogue might no doubt be described in ordinary parlance as an ἐποιητός or ἑλεγχοιτός, or by some similar name indicating the kind of verse in which his work happens to be written. Names of this kind, however, are misleading, since they imply that the verse rather than the μίμησις embodied in it is the essence of the literary form of imitation. Metre, in Aristotle's view, is only one of the accidents of poetry; and the use of it does not make a writer like Empedocles a poet in any true sense of the word.
1447b 10-20

There is no need to understand, still less insert, τοὺς μὲν before ἔλεγειοποιοῦς (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 2 p. 265); comp. the instances cited by Vahlen (ad loc.) to which may be added Soph. el. 21, 178 a 3, Metaph. Δ 28, 1024 a 33.

οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν = ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν. For the position of the negative comp. Plato Phaed. 77 Ε ὡς δεδομένοι . . . πειρῷ ἀναπέθειν, μάλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδομένων, ἄλλ' ἵσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἠμῖν παῖς, ὥστε τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.

In a fragment (fr. 70 Teubn.) of the dialogue Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. The poet is declared to have been a master of all the resources of epic language: 'Ομηρικός ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δαινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικός τ' ὅν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῶν ἐπιτυγμασὶ χρώμενος. This is not inconsistent with the present passage; Aristotle's meaning is that, though Empedocles may be a poet in his form, he is not a poet in his matter. A philosophic poem comes under the head of what the ancients termed didascalice, its purpose being to teach or instruct, rather than to interest us in a μίμησις, a picture of life and manners. That Empedocles was not in any real sense a poet is implied in Plato Theaet. 152 Ε καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἔξης οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ἐξυμφέρεσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν 'Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὁμήρος—where Empedocles, it will be observed, is put into distinct contrast with Homer. This view of him is more clearly stated in later writers, e.g. in Plutarch, De audit. poet. 16 C τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέως ἐπὶ καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηρικὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος λόγοι εἰς τι κεχρημένοι παρὰ ποιητικῆς ἄστερ ὄχυμα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν διαφύγωσιν.—Schol. Dionys. Thr. p. 166. 13 Hilgard oὐκ ἔστι ποιητὴς ὁ μέτρου μόνῳ χρώμενος: οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ τὰ φυσικὰ γράφας, οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐπίτοντες, οὐδὲ ὁ Πῦθιος ἑμετέρως χρησμοῦν. ποιητὴν. The poet is tacitly assumed to be a μιμητὴς ἐν μέτροις ὁμοίως (comp. 24, 1460 a 7; 25, 1460 b 8).

ὁμοίως recalls the idea of the original assertion in ὁμοίως ὁμοῖος καὶ καὶ καὶ τὴν Σώφρωνος καὶ Ἐκένδρου μίμου καὶ καὶ τῶν Ἁρτεμισίους ὁμοίως. Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 1. 12, 1101 b 21 ὅπι τῶν ἁγίων οὐκ ἔστιν ἑπαύνου . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων—where oὐκ ἔστιν ἑπαύνου is to be understood. ὁμοίως often represents the apodosis of a conditional sentence (v. An. pr. 1. 9, 30 b 1; 1. 14, 33 a 12; 1. 38, 49 a 22; De caelo 1. 4, 271 a 13; 2. 4, 287 a 19; De anima 1. 1, 402 b 8). The equivalent τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων
1447 \textsuperscript{b} 20 is used in just the same way in An. pr. 2. 24, 69\textsuperscript{a} 11 τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον κἀν εἰ διὰ πλείων τῶν ὀμοίων ἡ πίστις γίνετο.

\textsuperscript{b} 21 Χαρῆμον. For the little that remains of his \textit{Κένταυρος} see Nauck, TGF.\textsuperscript{a} p. 784. Aristotle terms it a \textit{ραψῳδία} as though it were a sort of epic; and it is clear that in 24, 1460\textsuperscript{b} 2 he still regards it as coming under that head. If Athenaeus 60\textsuperscript{e} 6 speaks of it as a \textit{δράμα πολύμετρον}, the explanation is that such a bizarre experiment in literature might very well be placed in more than one class. The title was no doubt taken from its subject; not from its monstrous combination of metres, as Welcker imagines (Nachtrag zu der Schrift über die Aeschyische Trilogie p. 71). There were several comedies (Kock, CAF. 3 p. 698) and also an ode (by Lasus of Hermione) with this or a very similar title.

\textsuperscript{b} 22 \textit{ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων}: to be taken with \textit{μικτὴν} (comp. Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 2 p. 42). \textit{ἀπάντων} must be an exaggeration, since it is inconceivable that every kind of metre was represented in Chaeremon’s poem. Similar instances of overstatement are to be found in \textsuperscript{b} 28 (πᾶσιν), in 18, 1455 \textsuperscript{b} 33 (τὸ διὸν), in 22, 1458\textsuperscript{a} 24 (ἀπαντα), and in De anima 2. 6, 418\textsuperscript{a} 11, 19 (v. Rodier ad loc.).

καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέων has been altered in some apographs into \textit{οῖκ ἡδῆ} καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέων and in others into καὶ \textit{τοῦτον} ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέων. Various other corrections have been recently suggested, e. g. κατὰ \textit{τοῦτο} ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον (M. Schmidt), δικαίως ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον (Ueberweg), καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς προσαγορευτέον (Rassow and Gomperz). Susemihl omits the clause (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 38), but finds a place for προσαγορευτέον by inserting it after ποιητὴν in \textsuperscript{b} 20.

The clause (if we retain the reading of the MS.) seems to come in in much the same way as that in \textsuperscript{b} 18, διὸ τῶν μὲν ποιητὴν δικαίων καλεῖν, τῶν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἡ ποιητὴν. As an illustration of the third of his three possibilities (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 4) Aristotle cites Chaeremon’s \textit{Centaur}; and his assumption is that, as a work of this description is a \textit{μίμησις} (comp. \textsuperscript{b} 21 ποιητὸ τὴν μίμησιν) and also in verse (\textsuperscript{b} 22 \textit{ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων}), the author is a \textit{μιμητὴς ἐν μέτροις}, and therefore rightly regarded as a poet, though popular language does not give him a special name of the type of those considered in the preceding section (\textsuperscript{b} 13–19). The argument, therefore, will come to this: If a mime and a dialogue were written in a medley of metres, the writers would have to be recognized as poets; but we should have no common
name for the two works themselves, notwithstanding their similarity \textit{\textit{imitation}} in form as well as nature. Some such meaning seems to be demanded by the general logic of the argument, which is directed to show that not only the prose forms of the literary ‘imitation’, but also the various poetic forms of it are ‘to this day’ without a general name (b 9 \textit{ανώνυμος} \textit{τυγχάνει} \textit{οὐσα} \textit{μέχρι τοῦ} \textit{νῦν}). The only difficulty is to see how the clause \textit{καὶ} \textit{ποιητὴν} \textit{προσαγορευτέον} is brought in. Vahlen (ad loc.) takes it as following after the apodosis implied in \textit{ομοίωσις}—‘adnecti non positae sed cogitatae apodosi sententiam (\textit{καὶ} \textit{ποιητὴ} \textit{προσαγορευτέον})’. I suspect that it was primarily meant to apply to Chaeremon, and that it is loosely subjoined to what is said of him in the context, as an assertion of his claim to be ranked among the poets in spite of his metrical absurdities.

The question may perhaps be asked: If it was possible to give \textit{ποιητὴς} the sense assumed for it in this chapter and elsewhere, why did not Aristotle recognize the word \textit{ποίημα} as an equally legitimate ‘common name’ for all the various species of verse-imitation? The answer may perhaps be this, that he thought it to be (like \textit{ἐποτούσ}, \textit{ἐλεγειωτούσ}, etc.) too directly suggestive of the metrical form (comp. Rhet. 3. 8, \textit{1408 b} 30), which he puts aside as only one of the accidents even of the poetical ‘imitation’.

The term ‘Poet’, as used by most of the ancients, is the subject of a valuable inquiry by H. Weil (\textit{Études sur l’antiquité grecque}, p. 237), who shows that the nearest modern representative of it is ‘author’ or ‘composer’. Its primary meaning is the man who writes the words, or composes the music, in contradistinction to the rhapsodists, actors, singers or musicians, who present the work to the public (comp. Plato Rep. 373 B \textit{ποιηταί} \textit{τε} \textit{καὶ} \textit{τοὺτων ὑπηρέται,} \textit{ραψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί,} \textit{χορευταί, κτλ.}). But as the literary work which had to be thus recited or sung was by custom in verse, the ‘poet’ was also a writer of verses. The idea of verse in fact became part of the conventional meaning of the word—as also of the verb \textit{ποιεῖν}, which often means to write or say in verse; the compounds, likewise, \textit{ἐποτοῦσ}, \textit{ἐλεγειωτοῦσ}, etc., all denote writers of some kind of verse. \textit{ποιεῖν} is thus opposed to \textit{λέγειν}, to speak in prose, and the \textit{ποιητῆς} either to the \textit{γραφεῖν}, who writes prose, or to the \textit{ἰδιώτης}, the ordinary man who speaks in prose. Another association attaching to the word had its origin in the matter with which early Greek poetry was connected. The poet was distinguished from the historian or chronicler by the fact
that he was so constantly dealing with a remote or legendary past, in the treatment of which there was ample room for play of imagination. All the great poetical subjects are classed by Plato under the general head of ‘myths’ or fictions (Rep. 377 a and 382 d; comp. Xenophanes fr. 1, 21 Diels); and it was an understood thing that a free use of fiction was one of the privileges of the poet: Solon fr. 29 Bergk πολλά ψεύδοντα ἀοιδοῖ.—Isocrates 195 ὑπὸ τῶν γε παλαιῶν καθόδων αὐτὰ μάλιστ' εὐδοκίμοντι, ἂς παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκόουμεν οὕτω γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν γεγενημένων τῶν καλλίστας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλοντων, ἄλλα καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν κακῶς συντιθέασιν (also Horace A. P. 9). This recognition of an element of fiction in poetry is perhaps the nearest approach the ancients make to our idea of ‘poetic creation’. The ordinary conception in antiquity of the poet was that he was, just like the painter (v. Poet. 15, 1454 b 9, and 25, 1460 b 8), an imitator, and that his work was not so much a creation as a copy, more or less faithful, of something already existing in legend or life.

μετρόν, which now takes the place of the original term λόγῳ in a 22, has the concrete sense of ‘verse’ or versified language, i.e. as equivalent to λόγος ἐμμετρος or λόγος ἐρμβος (comp. 4, 1448 b 21). It is an ill-chosen word, therefore, as it says too much, and, if understood strictly, would make the ἐρμβό, with which the enumeration begins, a superfluity.

As Teichmüller points out, πᾶσιν repeats the πᾶσιν in b 24, χρώματι having to be supplied. The antithesis is between ἀμα and κατά μέρος; so that in lieu of the latter Aristotle might have said οἷς ἀμα ἄλλα κατὰ μέρος. Comp. Meteor. 1. 14, 351 a 28 ἑκατόν μὲν οὖ κατὰ μέρος ταῦτα συμβαίνει πᾶσιν, ἄλλ' ἀμα πᾶν ἀκμάζειν καὶ φθίνειν ἀναγκαῖον.—Plato Theaet. 189 e ἦτοι ἀμα γε ἦ ἐν μέρει (also Bon. Ind. 455 b 14 and 571 b 47). Aristotle’s language would naturally imply that, whereas the three means of expression, language, metre, and music, are inseparable in the Dithyramb and Nome, they appear separately and by turns in the Drama. This, however, is an overstatement (see on ἀπαντῶν in b 22), as it is only the musical element that comes in intermittently, in the choral parts of the play (6, 1449 b 30).

μιμοῦντι οἱ μιμοῦμενοι πράττονται: comp. 1, 1447 a 28; 3, 1448 a 27; 6, 1449 b 36; 1450 b 3, 9; 1451 b 29. This is to all appearance another reminiscence of Plato: Rep. 396 c μιμού-
From Plato still 17 πιπωραὶ, the I
The will nearly aXXai.
I toioutous, 15
illustrates ToiovTovs πιπωντας, φαμεν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητική βιαῖος ἡ ἐκονσίας πράξεις.

ἡ σπουδαίος ἡ φαύλους is explained by what follows, κακία γὰρ ἡ σπουδαίος ἡ φαύλους is explained by what follows, κακία γὰρ ἡ σπουδαίος ἡ φαύλους is explained by what follows, κακία γὰρ 2 καὶ ἄρετη τὰ ἦθη διαφέρουσι πάντες (comp. 5, 1449 a 32). This, Aristotle adds, is the primary and most universal distinction between man and man; nearly all other distinctions of character may be classed under this one common head.

ἀκολουθεῖ: De part. an. 2. 1, 646 a 17 αἱ δὲ ἄλλα διαφορὰ ταύταις 3 ἀκολούθοις.

κακία γὰρ καὶ ἄρετη κτε. Pol. 5. 2, 1303 b 15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἵκος διάστασις ἄρετη καὶ μοχθηρία.

ἡτοι βελτίωνας . . . τοιοῦτους, scil. μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμοῦμενοι. We 4 have been prepared for this distinction by the preceding ἐπεὶ μιμοῦνται ὁι μιμοῦμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων ἡ σπουδαίος ἡ φαύλους εἶναι; but the third possibility, that the personages represented may be on the same level as ourselves (ἡ καὶ τοιοῦτος), is a new point, which is felt to require a word of proof. Aristotle accordingly reminds us of a similar fact in painting (a 5): the personages in the works of Dionysius are just like ourselves (ὑμοίους). The three possibilities being thus generally established, Aristotle proceeds to say, by way of corollary (δῆλον δὲ a 7), that the same distinction is to be seen in the poetical arts, in epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry (a 11), and that it constitutes also the essential point of difference between Tragedy and Comedy (a 16). That μιμοῦνται may be supplied from the protasis (a 1) after ἡ καὶ τοιοῦτος in a 5 is assumed by all the older translators. Vahlen illustrates the construction from Metaph. Δ 7, 1017 a 13 τῶν γὰρ ἀνθρωπον ὅταν μονικὸν λέγομεν καὶ τὸν μονικὸν ἀνθρωπον, ἡ τὸν ἵκον μονικόν ἡ τοῦτον ἵκον, τὸ μὲν (scil. λέγομεν) ἄτι ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασι κτε. Other instances of a verb having to be understood in the principal from a subordinate clause will be found in Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 2, p. 574; an exact parallel, however, to the construction in the present passage is still wanting. The only alternative is to suppose the apodosis to begin at δῆλον δὲ (a 7) —in which case it will be necessary to restore δῆλον δῆλον, and to take the words ἡτοί βελτίωνας κτε. as appositional to the η σπουδαίος ἡ φαύλους εἶναι in a 2. The clause, however, that follows, ὀσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς (scil. μιμοῦνται), seems to show that ἡτοί βελτίωνας κτε. = ἡτοί βελτίωνας . . . μιμοῦνται.

ἀσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς. Plutarch, who defines poetry as a μιμητική 5

POETICS
1448a5 τέχνη καὶ δύναμις ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ, quotes a saying, commonly attributed to Simonides, ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι φθεγγομένην τὴν ποίησιν, ποίησιν δὲ στυγώσαν τὴν ζωγραφίαν (De aud. poct. 17 f., with Wyttenbach's note). The comparison, which reappears in Poet. 6, 1450a26, b1; 15, 1454b9; 25, 1460b8, and indirectly elsewhere, is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (v. Rep. 377ε, 597ε, 603β, 605α etc.).

γραφεῖς. The Attic form γραφής has survived in the text of Meteor. 3. 2, 372a7, and De sensu 3, 440a8.

Πολύγυρωτος: comp. 6, 1450a27.

a6 Παύσων: Pol. 8. 5, 1340a36 δει μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγύρωτον κἂν εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφεῶν ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἣδικός. If he was the same as the Pauson of Aristoph. Ach. 854, he must have had a certain sort of affinity to our modern caricaturists (comp. Hor. Ep. 2. 1, 264; Aelian V. H. 4. 4); it will be seen also that Aristotle regards his work as the analogue of that of the parodists and comic poets in literature.

Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίως εἰκαζεῖν. ὁμοίως, as the context shows (comp. τοῦτος in a5), means 'like ourselves', neither better nor worse than the average man. εἰκαζεῖν (= to produce an eikon or portrait) is practically synonymous with μιμεῖσθαι, the word ordinarily used by Aristotle even of a painter. In 1, 1447a19 he has the more precise expression, μιμοῦνται ἀπεικάζοντες. The Dionysius meant is Dionysius of Colophon. It is a disputed point (Overbeck, Schriftquellen 1136) whether he is to be identified with the painter of whom Pliny N. H. 35. 113 says: Contra Dionysius nihil aliud quam homines pinxit, ob id anthropographos cognominatus. The epithet anthropographeos would certainly seem peculiarly applicable to Aristotle's Dionysius, as a realistic painter, whose gods and heroes were too like ordinary men.

a8 έτερα is qualified and explained by the τούτων τῶν τρόπων that follows. The personages represented differ in the way just described, i.e. as being either better or worse than, or on the same level as, the ordinary man. For the neater έτερα see on a19.

a9 ὁρχήσει: Plato Laws 814ε δύο μὲν αὐτῆς (scil. ὁρχήσεως) εἶδη χρῆ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιώνων σωμάτων ἐπι τὸ σεμνόν μιμομένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αλεξιῶν ἐπι τὸ φαίνον (comp. also 655c; 798b). For the kind of dancing Aristotle has in mind here see on 1, 1447a27.

αὔλησει καὶ κιβαρίσει: see on 1, 1447a15.
2. 1448 a 5-12

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν is a general expression 1448 a 10 for the group of purely literary imitative arts, which were described in 1, 1447 a 29 as using τοὺς λόγους ψιλοῖς ἢ τοὺς μέτρους. Ψιλομετρία—a term misunderstood by later writers (v. Bernays, Heraklit. Breie p. 116)—means verse without music (χωρίς ἀρμονίας; see on 1, 1447 a 29). The qualifying addition ‘without music’ might no doubt have been appended to τοὺς λόγους also; but it is more wanted where it is, so as to distinguish the verse that was simply recited from the verse that was sung. From this point onward Aristotle ignores the prose imitations (the Mime and the Dialogue), and deals only with ‘poetry’, the versified forms of imitative literature (μέμηρος ἐν μέτροις; see on 1, 1447 a 23).

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, the preposition being understood from the preceding context (comp. Bon. Ind. 630 a 40). The restoration of τῷ for το in 25, 1461 a 33 admits of the same explanation. For τῷ περὶ τί in the sense of ‘the class comprising’ see Plato Soph. 221 b (with Campbell’s note), Symp. 205 c, Rep. 394 b.

Κλεόφων. In 22, 1458 a 20 his diction is said to be ταπευητός. a 12 Aristotle notes elsewhere the ludicrous effect his occasional attempts at fine language produced owing to the incongruity between the expression and the matter he dealt with: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 10 τὸ δὲ πρᾶπτον ἐξεῖ η λέξεις, ὡμ η...τοῖς ὕποκειστήν πράγμασι ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ’ ἀνάλογον ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐδοκίμων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ’ επὶ τῷ εὐτελέων ὀνόματι επη κόσμος. εἰ δὲ μη, κωμῳδία ['a comic joke', Casaubon on Ath. 3. 12] φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεόφων ὄρμως γὰρ ἐνα ἐλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπεσθαι ἀν τοῦτοι συκῆ. In the present passage we are told that his personages were ‘like ourselves’ (διόμοιοι), neither better than the ordinary man, like those in Homer, nor worse, like those in a parody. From the context as well as the company in which he is placed it is plain that he is to be regarded as a sort of epic poet. He is taken as the representative of the prosaic Epic—the Epic of the commonplace, as distinct from the noble Epic of Homer and the debased Epic known as parody. His work being put under the head of ψιλομετρία, ‘verse without the accompaniment of song,’ he cannot have been in Aristotle’s view either a lyric or a dramatic poet (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). The notion that he was the writer of a dialogue entitled the ‘Mandrobulus’ is based on an erroneous interpretation of Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19 (see J. of Phil. 12 p. 17).

'Ἡγήμων: see Brandt, Parodorum epicorum reliq., p. 37, and
Parody was an element in the humour of the Old Comedy, as also of Epicharmus; and there were certainly others before Hegemon who travestied Homer. What Aristotle means, however, is that Hegemon was the first to take up parody as a special form of poetical literature (Schrader, Rh. Mus. N. F. 20, p. 186). According to Athenaeus 699 Α (comp. 407 Α) he was the first to present a parody in the poetical contests in the theatre: πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγώνας τοὺς θυμελκούς 'Ἡγήμων, καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίων ἐνίκησεν ἄλλας τε παρφίδιας καὶ τῇ Γεγαντομαχίᾳ.

A παρφίδιας. A παρφίδια, in Aristotle's sense of the word, is a mock epic, a poem on an ignoble theme in epic language and metre.

Νικοχάρης: he may perhaps be the same as the comic poet of the same name (Kock, CAF. I p. 770). We know nothing more of his work, and there is some uncertainty even as to its title. Δειλαίας (which is assonant to Ηλιαίας) would mean, as Twining says, the 'Poltroniad'; Δειλαίας, either the 'Tale of Delos', or the 'Tale of Delium'; it is practically impossible to say which.

δ'σπερ ** γᾶς κτὲ. It is important to bear in mind that in Αε the δ'σπερ here ends a line, and that the γᾶς stands at the beginning of another. The better apographs have either ὅς περγάς or ὅς πέργας. The reading ὅς Πέρσας καὶ Κύκλωπας was probably due to a corrector who knew of the Πέρσας as a name of Timotheus; it may be seen in the process of genesis in the text of Parisinus 2038. In his latest edition (comp. Hermes 12, p. 192) Vahlen puts a colon after νόμους, and suggests that δ'σπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας should be restored—on the supposition (1) that Timotheus and Philoxenus may represent the ignoble Nome and Dithyramb, and (2) that instances of the opposite were not wanted, as the Nome and Dithyramb were so generally associated with noble subjects. However attractive this explanation may be, Vahlen's reading fails to account for the accent in the traditional δ'σπερ γᾶς of the Paris MS. Castelvetro was probably right in recognizing in γᾶς the second half of Ἀργάς, the name of one notorious in antiquity as the writer of a debased kind of nome (Meineke, FCG. 3, p. 388). If we accept Castelvetro's suggestion, a question naturally arises as to the extent of the lacuna before the γᾶς of the MS. The original statement may have been something like what Vahlen formerly supposed, δ'σπερ (θεῶς Ἀρ-)γᾶσ; but it is quite as likely that more than this has been lost, and that the text, when entire, gave the name of another writer of nomes, who
was put in contrast with Argas, and also the name of a common subject differently treated by the two poets (οὐσιορ <---καὶ Ἀρπ> γὰς); so that this clause may have said of the Nome what the next (Κύκλωμας Τιμόθεως καὶ Φιλόξενος) says of the Dithyramb. If it be objected that, on this hypothesis, Aristotle ought to have considered also, as a third possibility, the 'realistic' or intermediate type of Nome and Dithyramb, the reply is that, if it ever existed, it was of no real importance for his purpose. He is simply preparing us for the distinction in the Drama between Tragedy and Comedy; and when he comes to the subject of the Drama in \(a\) 16, we see that he omits to recognize an intermediate or 'realistic' drama, in which the chief personages were ὁμοιοὶ, like the ordinary man.

**Κύκλωμας.** Polyphemus must have been a stock-subject in literature, as there were dramas with the title Κύκλωψ, dealing with him and his story, by Epicharmus, Aristias, and Antiphanes, as well as the existing play of Euripides. The plural here, as Düntzer points out, denotes not several Cyclopes, but Polyphemus as treated in different poems. For the Κύκλωψ ᾶ Γαλάτεια of Philoxenus see Bergk, L.G.\(^4\) 3 p. 609, and Schmidt's Diatribe in dithyrambium, p. 54. It seems to have been a covert satire on the elder Dionysius, who had offended the poet; we may suppose, then, that Philoxenus made his Cyclops an ignoble personage, χείρων ᾶ καθ' ἡμᾶς. We have no evidence even of this indirect kind as to the Polyphemus of Timotheus (see Bergk l.c. p. 620; Schmidt l.c. p. 102), but it is a natural inference from what Aristotle implies in the context, that he was not like the Cyclops of Philoxenus.

\(\text{ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφόρᾳ.}\) Vahlen retains the traditional \(\text{ἐν αὐτῇ}\); \(\text{δὲ τῇ διαφόρᾳ,}\) taking it to mean 'in ipsa quam dico differentia'.

**βούλεται:** this is their general tendency and intention, though \(\text{οὐσιερ}\) there may be exceptions to the rule (comp. Bon. Ind. \(\text{ίαρο}\) 41).

\(\text{τῶν νῦν}\) replaces the ᾶ καθ' ἡμᾶς in \(\alpha\) 4. Aristotle is thinking more of the chief personages in Tragedy, who belong in most instances to the heroic age; comp. 13, \(\text{ιαρο}\) 20 and Probl. 19. 48, \(\text{καταξείοι [i.e. the tragic actors as distinct from the chorus]}\) μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μυρηταὶ, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μοῦν ἦραν ἡρωεὶ· οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἀνθρώποι, ὅν ἐστιν ὁ χορός.

\(\text{τούτων τρίτῃ διαφόρᾳ. τούτων = τῶν λεξιθεωτῶν μυρητῶν} \) in \(\text{οὐσιερ}\); \(\text{οὐσιερ}\) comp. 1, \(\text{καταξείοι} \) in \(\text{τῶν} \) τεχνῶν. Vahlen supposes the words to mean 'harum quas recenseo differentiarum tertia'.
COMMENTARY

1448 a 19 ἑκαστα τούτων: the objects with the possibilities of difference described in chap. 2. Though the objects of the poetic imitations are properly persons, the neuter is used as a more general way of designating them; it reappears in the context in τὰ αὐτὰ (a 20) and ἔτερον τι (a 21), as well as in the formula (repeated from 1, 1447 a 17) ἐν ὁδῷ τε καὶ ἀ καὶ ὁς in a 25.

a 20 τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι. The subject understood with μιμεῖσθαι is τῶν μιμούμενον; and the participles which follow in a 21–22, to describe the differences of manner, are in apposition to that. In a 23, however, where Aristotle is dealing with the Drama, in which there is a plurality of imitators, he has to put the participles in the plural (ὡς πράττοντας), and the subject, instead of being left to be supplied, is definitely mentioned, and in the plural (τῶν μιμούμενων, a 24).

a 21 ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα κτέ. The amended reading of this passage (ἢ) ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἔτερον τι γεγόμενον is anticipated in Goulston’s paraphrase,’ aut ut interdum eos exponat poeta, et interdum ipse alius quid, i. alia persona, fiat.’ The ἢ which the MS. has before ἔτερον may very well be supposed to have been omitted (comp. 25, 1461 a 9), and then re-inserted in the wrong place, as a correction of ὅτε δὲ (comp. my ‘Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics’, p. 18).

ἔτερον τι. Ulrici’s correction ἔτερον τινα (suggested by Plato’s ὃς τις ἄλλος ὁν in Rep. 393 c) is the result of a curious oversight. As Aristotle began by speaking of the objects imitated in the neuter (τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι: see on ἑκαστα τούτων in a 19), he was bound to describe the imitator as identifying himself, not with ‘some one else’, but with ‘something else’ (ἔτερον τι).

The statement in the text in a 21–24 is on the same lines as that in Plato Rep. 392 b–394 b; its very terminology is a reminiscence of Plato’s; and it would be a mere enigma to us, if we had not the key to it in the Republic. Plato distinguishes between three forms of δἰγγισ: (1) simple narration, in which the poet speaks throughout in prōpria persona; (2) imitative or dramatic narration, in which he effaces himself as it were, and speaks in the person of another; and (3) the mixed manner, narrative and dramatic by turns, which we see in Homer. Aristotle’s ἀπαγγέλλοντα recalls Plato’s δὲ ἀπαγγέλλας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (Rep. 394 c); and his ἔτερον τι γεγόμενον the Platonic ὃς τις ἄλλος ὁν (Rep. 393 c). The combination also of the two manners in Homer (ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἔτερον τι γεγόμενον) is a point
which Plato works out and explains at some length: μέχρι μὲν 1448 a 21 τούτων τῶν ἐπών, καὶ ἐλάσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιῶν; Ἀτρείδα δὲ μάλιστα διῶ, κοσμήματο λαών, λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ἦμων τὴν διάνοιαν ἀλλοιοτρίτες, ώς ἄλλος τις οἱ λέγων ἢ αὐτὸς· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὁπερ αὐτὸς ὃν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειράται ἦμας ὅ τι μάλιστα ποιήσαι μὴ ὁμορρος δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἄλλα τὸν ἱέρα, πρεσβευτών δοντα (Rep. 393 λ). Plato's concluding formula for the Homeric or mixed mode of representation, τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι ... τὰ μὲν μιμοῦμένοις τὰ δὲ μὴ (Rep. 394 b), is the all but exact equivalent of Aristotle's μιμεῖσθαι ... ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἑτερον τι γιγνόμενον. At the same time it must be admitted that there are certain noteworthy points of differences between the two statements. (1) With Plato the term μιμεῖσθαι is restricted to the dramatic mode of representation; whereas Aristotle uses it in a much wider sense (see on 1, 1447 a 16). (2) The order also, in which the three possibilities are arranged, is different, since Aristotle takes them, not in the order of logic, but in that of time; and begins with Homer and the Homeric manner. And (3) when he comes (in a 23) to the third possibility, the purely dramatic form of expression, he is apparently thinking more of the actors than of the dramatic author himself (v. on a 23). Aristotle's general view in fact of the Epic is that it comes under the head of narrative, as distinct from dramatic, imitation (5, 1449 b 11 τῶ ... ἀπαγγελλῶν εἰναί; comp. 6, 1449 b 26 δρώντων καὶ οὗ δὲ ἀπαγγελλας); and in his two chapters (23 and 24) specially dealing with epic poetry the Epic in ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις (23, 1459 a 17; 24, 1459 b 36)—the Drama being ἡ ἐν τῷ πράττειν μίμησις (22, 1459 a 15). This, however, does not prevent him from recognizing the Epic (as Plato had done before him) as a quasi-dramatic form of poetry. Every epic is said to have a quasi-dramatic element in it to some extent (μιμοῦμαι δὲ ὀλέγα, 24, 1460 a 9), and the Homeric Epic has it in a very marked degree. Homer is said to reduce the element of narrative to a minimum (ὀλέγα φρομμασάμενος, 24, 1460 a 9; comp. ἐλάχιστα λέγειν, a 7), taking every opportunity of making his personages come forward and speak for themselves, just as though they were characters in a play and on the stage (ἐσθιει ἐσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθος, 24, 1460 a 10). The 'mixed manner' of Homer, therefore, is acknowledged in chap. 24, as clearly and in much the same way as it seems to be in the words of the present passage (as amended), ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἑτερον τι γιγνόμενον.
If the traditional text be retained (with Ritter, Vahlen, and others), it has to be read thus: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μυμείσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα—ἡ ἐτερῶν τι γεγομένων ὡσπερ Ὄμηρος ποιεῖ, ἡ ὥς τοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα—ἡ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμομένους. According to this view the words ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα have to be taken as a general description of the narrative as opposed to the purely dramatic manner (πάντας ὡς πράττοντας κτλ.), the parenthesis recognizing the two possibilities within the sphere of narrative poetry. This interpretation of the passage (1) implies, to my mind, too wide a divergence from the scheme in the Republic; and (2) it practically assumes that ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα means no more than ἀπαγγέλλοντα or ἡ ἀπαγγέλλοντα; it also involves (3) what seems to me a hardly tenable interpretation of the concluding clause (see on a 23).

Once τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα: another instance of parallelismus antitheticus (see on 1, 1447 a 18); it is the converse in sense of that in De caelo 2. 6, 288 a 31 εἰτε . . . ἀλλοιῶτο καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό. It is not necessary to bracket the article before αὐτον, though the omission would certainly bring the present statement into closer conformity with that in Plato Rep. 393 λ—δ, and make the antithesis to be between what the poet says in propria persona (comp. 24, 1460 a 6, 11) and what he says in an assumed character.

The correction of Casaubon (De Sat. Poesi p. 82 Rambach), was tacitly adopted by Goulston. It is in apposition to the τὰ αὐτά in a 20, and serves to distinguish the Drama from the Epic, which is at best only partially dramatic. If πάντας be retained, it has to be taken with τοὺς μιμομένους as the object after μυμείσθαι understood from a 21. μυμείσθαι, however, is already provided with an object, viz. τὰ αὐτά (a 20); and τὰ αὐτά is much too important logically to be ignored through a change of construction. In chap. 2 Aristotle has shown how the subjects of the representation may differ. He tells us now that there are possibilities of difference also in the mode or manner of the representation, even when the subjects are the same (τὰ αὐτὰ); these differences of manner are indicated by the circumstantial participles in the clauses which follow τὰ αὐτὰ μυμείσθαι ἔστιν. It will be observed that in this third participial clause the participles are in the plural, and that the grammatical subject, instead of being understood, as it was in a 20, is expressed, and also in the plural, τοὺς μιμομένους of the object. It is not only the object which is expressed, but the same subject is expressed independently in the final clause, as if it were the subject of ποιεῖ. Since these participles are in the plural, the subject is a plural, and therefore the ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα means no more than ἀπαγγέλλοντα or ἡ ἀπαγγέλλοντα; it also involves (3) what seems to me a hardly tenable interpretation of the concluding clause (see on a 23).
This, that Aristotle is thinking for the moment of the authors rather than of the poet himself. There are certainly several passages in the Poetics, very closely resembling that before us, in which the reference must be to the authors, a play being conceived to be something which 'they act', i.e. with a plurality of imitators concerned in it: comp. 6, 1449 b 26 δρώτων; b 31 πράττοντες ποιοίτεραι τὴν μίμησιν; 1450 a 21 πράττονσιν. The suggestion that τοῖς μιμούμενοις refers to the authors is due to E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 18. The clause, with the reading πάντας, is generally supposed to mean 'aut omnes qui imitatione exprimuntur quasi agentes et operantes imitari' (Tyrwhitt), τοῖς μιμούμενοις being taken as a passive in the sense of the 'personages imitated'. The use of the present of μιμεῖσθαι as a passive is not impossible, but there is, as far as I am aware, no clear instance of it1; it may be observed too that in 15, 1454 a 26, where Aristotle wants a present passive of μιμεῖσθαι, he does not say δ μιμούμενοι, but has recourse to a periphrasis, δ τὰν μίμησιν παρέχων.

ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταῦτας κτέ. Comp. 1, 1447 a 16 διαφέροσι δὲ ἄλλης τρισί κτέ. The preposition here (unlike that in the following ἐν οἷς) denotes the sphere within which the poetical imitation works. ταὐτας is the real subject of the proposition (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 628), and preparative to the enumeration that follows, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὠς (comp. De caelo 2. 2, 285 a 11). The whole statement, therefore, is practically the same thing as ταῦτα δή, τὰ ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὠς, τρεῖς διαφοράς ἔστω ἐν αἷς ἡ μίμησις ἔστων, or as Bon. Ind. 546 a 57 puts it, ἐν αἷς δή διαφοράς ἡ μίμησις γίγνεται, αὕτη τρεῖς ἔστω, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὠς.

ὥστε τῇ μὲν κτέ. is a sort of corollary to what was said in chap. 2 a 25 and the opening section of chap. 3. Aristotle is now once more viewing plays in their relation to the authors, and the actors are ignored. In chap. 6 there are several instances of his passing unconsciously from the one point of view to the other. Thus in 6, 1449 b 26, 31, 1450 a 10, 21, b 11 the reference is to the play as acted; whereas in 6, 1440 b 34, 1450 a 25-37, b 7 it is to the play as a literary production, the work of the poet.

πράττοντας γάρ μιμοῦται. The dramatic poet, instead of giving us a merely verbal description of the incidents, makes his person-

1 The passage in Plato Rep. 604 ε (if μιμούμενον be retained) admits of another interpretation.
ages appear on the stage, and go through a semblance of action. The difference between Aristotle’s language here and in a 23 is to be noted: the dramatic poet μιμεῖται πράττοντας; the actor μιμεῖ
tαι ὡς πράττων.

This reminds Aristotle of a current explanation of the word drúma, ὃτι μιμοῦνται drúma, and leads him off into a digression on the claim of the Dori ans to the discovery of the Drama. This claim, he says, they support by an appeal to lan-

guage; they maintain that not only κωμῳδία but also the general term dráma are words of Dorian origin. The statement here being quite sufficient for its purpose, it is not necessary to suppose (with Egger) a lacuna in the text, on the assumption that a Dorian etymology of τραγῳδία also must have been mentioned. The present passage is clearly the ultimate source of the corresponding statements in the grammarians: Anon. De Comoedia (Kaibel, CGF. i p. 6) τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἠφησαντιά φασιν ὧτ' Σουσαρώνος: τὴν
de ὄνομασαν ἔχειν οἱ μὲν ὃτι περὶ τὰς κωμὰς περιμνήτες ἤδον καὶ ἐπεδείκνυτο, μῆς τὸλεον οὐσὼν ἀλλ' ἐν κώμαις οἰκούντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ ἀντλέγοντες φασὶ μὴ κώμας καλεῖσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλὰ ἐδήμους, καὶ κωμῳδίαιν αὕτην καλοῦντες ἐπεὶ ἐν ταῖς οὐσίς ἐκόμαζον.

—Diomedes 486 P. (= Kaibel, l.c. p. 57) Comoedia dicta ἀπὸ τῶν κωμῶν; κώμαι enim appellantur pagi, id est conventicula rusticorum . . . τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ κώμου, id est comisatione, quia olim in eiusmodi fabulis amantium ius venit κώμαι canebantur (v. Reifferscheid, Suetonii Reliq. p. 7).

οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. On the Megarian Comedy see Meineke, FCG. i p. 18. The doubts about it raised by Wilamowitz (Herm. 9 p. 319) have been examined by Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsb. 1888 p. 12) and Zielinski (Gliederung der altattischen Komödie p. 243). The Megarian claim to Comedy is noted by the anonymous commentator on Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 24 (p. 186 Heyl.): διασύναπτει γὰρ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄντι-

ποιοῦνται αὐτῆς ως παρ' αὐτοῖς πρῶτον εὑρεθείσης, εἰ γε καὶ Σουσα-

ρῶν ὁ κατάρεξις κωμῳδίας Μεγαρεῖς ἑὗρε; κτλ.; his parenthetical recognition of it, however, has no independent value, as it is obviously only an amplification of the words in the text. It will be observed that Aristotle says nothing about Susarion either here or in chap. 5—where he expressly tells us that the earlier history of Comedy is not known.

tῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας. Megara is said to have expelled the tyrant Theagenes about B.C. 600.
οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας, the Megarians of Megara Hyblaea—literally, the Megarians ‘on the Sicilian side’. For this use of the preposition comp. Pol. 8, 7, 1341 b 28 οἱ ἐκ φιλοσοφῶν, ‘those on the philosophic side’.

3. Επίχαρμος. In 5, 1449 b 6 he and Phormis are said to have been the first to discard the Comedy of personalities; so that from this point of view he was the forerunner of the New Comedy, i.e. of what Aristotle regards as Comedy proper. Plato had already given him the premier place in Comedy: Theaet. 152 ἐ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἀκροὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὀμήρος. The Sicilian origin of Comedy is often asserted by post-Aristotelian writers: Theocritus Ep. 17. ἰ ὁ τῶν κωμῳδιάν εὑρὼν Ἐπίχαρμος.—Solinus 5. 13 Hic [scil. in Sicilia] primum inventa comedia.—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἢρξατο μὲν ἀπὸ Σικελίας· ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦσσιν Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμις [see on 5, 1449 b 6] κάλλιον δὲ Λυκίναξις συμποτζηθή.—Prol. de Comedia 3 = Kaibel CGF. ἰ p. 7 Ἐπίχαρμος· οὗτος πρῶτος τῆς κωμῳδίας διερρυμένην ἀνέκτησατο πολλὰ προσ-φιλοτεχνῆς.—Suidas Ἐπίχαρμος: εἰρή τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἀμα Φόρμῳ. The whole question has been discussed by Bentley, Wks. ἰ p. 251 Dyce, and by Welcker, Kl. Schr. ἰ p. 273.

Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος. From this mention of them here, as also from the allusion to them further on, in 5, 1449 b 3, it is clear that Aristotle knows of no Attic writers of Comedy earlier than Chionides and Magnes; and even these apparently are mere names to him (see on 5, 1449 b 4). The comedies usually ascribed to them (Kock, CAF. ἰ pp. 4–9) were no doubt the work of a much later age (comp. Wilamowitz, l. c. p. 335). As regards Chionides, his appearance as a comic poet has been placed as early as b. c. 487 on the strength of the statement in Suidas: Χιωνίδης, Ἀθηναῖος, κωμικὸς τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ὁν καὶ λέγοισιν πρωτα-γωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας, διδάσκειν δὲ ἔτεσιν ὅκτω πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν. Magnes, who is known from an inscription (694 Dittenberger 3) to have been exhibiting a play at the city Dionysia in or shortly after b. c. 464 (v. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 475), is expressly described by Suidas as a much younger man than Epicharmus: ἐπιβαλλεῖ δ’ Ἐπιχάρμῳ νέος προσβούτι. The chronology of the life of Epicharmus is beset with difficulties. He is said to have lived to a very great age (90, or even 97), and to have ‘flourished’ at the time of Gelo and Hiero, the tyrants of Syracuse (b. c. 485–467); we may very well suppose him, however,
to have written comedies before this period, as also to have lived beyond its limits. Suidas' statement that he was producing comedies at Syracuse six years before the Persian war (i.e. in B.C. 485: comp. Clinton FH. 2 p. 31), when 'Euetes, Euxenides, and Myllus were performing at Athens' (ὅν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν ἔτη ἑξὶ διδάσκων ἐν Συρακούσαις' ἐν δὲ 'Αθήναις Εἰδέτης καὶ Εὐξενίδης καὶ Μύλλος ἐπεδείκνυτο), is of some importance, as showing that Epicharmus was conceived to be coeval with a generation at Athens anterior to Chionides and the regular drama which began with him (comp. Usener, Rh. Mus. 28 p. 423). There is no very serious difference, therefore, between Suidas and Aristotle as to the priority of Epicharmus.

καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας = τῆς δὲ τραγῳδίας. Vahlen illustrates the change of construction by Soph. el. 11, 171 b 8 συλλογισμὸς ἑρωτικὸς καὶ συφραστικὸς ἐστιν εἰς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς . . . καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κτλ.—where καὶ ὅσοι seems to stand for ἄτεροι δὲ ὅσοι; comp. also Hartung, Lehre v. d. Partikeln 2 p. 410. It would be a very simple alteration, and an improvement to the sense, to read καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας ⟨δ’⟩ ένωι (J. of Phil. 10 p. 67).

ένοι, i.e. the Sicyonians: Herod. 5. 67 τά τε δὴ ἄλλα οἱ Σικυώνιοι εἶμιν τὸν Ἀδριστον καὶ δὴ πρῶς τὰ πάθη αὐτοῦ τραγικοῦσι χροίσι εὐφέραιρον, τὸν μὲν Διώνυσον οὐ τιμῶντες, τὸν δὲ Ἀδριστόν.—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ τραγῳδίας εὑρέται μὲν Σικυώνωι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ποιηταί.—Suidas: Θέσπις, Ἰκαρίον πόλεως Ἀττικῆς, τραγικὸς ἐκκαθηκατος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτον γενομένων τραγωδωποῦ Ἐπιγένους τοῦ Σικυώνων τιθέμενος, ὅς δὲ τινες, δεύτερος μετὰ Ἐπιγένουν ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν πρῶτον τραγικῶν γενέσθαι φαίνει (comp. also Suid. s.v. Ωίδεν πρὸς τὸν Δίονυσον). On Epigenes see Bentley, Wks. 1 p. 286 Dyce, and Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 1 p. 430.

περιοικίδαις: Pol. 6. 5, 1320 b 6 ἀλε γὰρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εἴπόρους. As understood at Athens the term κώμη meant a quarter of the city, as distinct from the outlying townships (δήμου): Plato Laws 746 ν φρατρίαι καὶ δήμους καὶ κώμας.—Isocrates 149 λ διελόμεναι τίν μὲν πόλιν κατὰ κώμας τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δήμους (ὑ. also Photius Lex. s.v. κώμην, and Suidas s.v. with the commentators).

κωμφάδους . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάχεων. The connexion is indirectly implied in the juxtaposition of the two words in the law cited (or interpolated) in Demosthenes 21. 10 ἡ τομῆ καὶ οἱ παιδες καὶ οἱ κώμοι καὶ οἱ κωμφαδοὶ καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ.

καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν κτέ. The argument comes practically to this:
Plays confessedly represent *actions*: now if they had been originally an Athenian invention, one would expect them to have been called *πράγματα* rather than *δράματα*; *πράττειν* being the ordinary Athenian word for *to act*. That Aristotle does not accept this view of *δραματικά* and *πράττειν* is indirectly shown by his own use of the words. He has just said (*a 27*) *πράττοντας καὶ δράντας*, and in his definition of Tragedy (*6, 1449 b 26*) his word is *δράντων*, though he might easily have said *πραττόντων*.

*τῆς μυθήσεως* is the genitive after *τῶν διαφορῶν*. Vahlen illustrates the order by Plato, Phil. 17 c ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν *τῆς φωνῆς*.

ēikos. Setting aside the antiquarian questions raised in chap. 3, Aristotle asserts that the birth of poetry was due to large natural causes. The origin of poetry generally (*γεννᾶται μὲν ὅλως*) is attributable to the imitative instinct in all men. The origin of the two great kinds of poetry (*διεσπάρσθη δὲ b 24*), of which Tragedy and Comedy were the ultimate developments, is attributable to the personal tendencies and differences of character in the individual poets (*τὰ ὁικεῖα ἡθος b 24*).

αἵτι᾽ δὸ. The two causes are those mentioned in the immediate context, *τὸ μυθικόκατα* (*a 5*) and *τὸ χαῖρεν τοῖς μυθήμασι* (*a 8*). These Aristotle regards as two distinguishable facts in human nature; it will be observed too that he proves the second point by a formal argument, which he has not thought necessary to do in the case of the first. *τὸ χαῖρεν τοῖς μυθήμασι*, instead of coming in as a mere afterthought after *τὸ μυθικόκατα*, involves a different idea, and relates to a different class of persons—the public interested in works of art, as distinct from the artists who produce them. Aristotle is perfectly aware that the cultivation of an art implies not only artists but also a public to accept and reward their work (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 2 p. 203).

*μυθικοκώτατον*: Probl. 30. 6, 956 a 14 Διὰ τί ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον *b 7* μάλλον ἡ ἄλλῳ ζῷῳ; . . . ἡ ὅτι μυθικόκωταν; μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τούτο. Vahlen illustrates this use of the neuter singular by De somn. 3, 457 b 24 καταπίπτονσι . . . οἱ ἀνθρώποι, μόνον γὰρ ὅρθον τῶν ζῴων, and Pol. 1. 2, 1253 a 16 τούτο γὰρ πρὸς τάλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἵδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν . . . αἰσθηθησον ἐξειν.

*μαθήσεις*: Quintilian 10. 2, 1 Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna continetur imitatione. nam ut invenire primum fuit estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi. atque omnis vitae ratio sic constat, ut quae probamus in aliis facere
ipsi velimus. sic litterarum duc tus, ut scribendi fiat usus, pueri sequuntur; sic musici vocem docentium, pictores opera priorum, rustici probalam experimento culturam in exemplum intuentur; omnis denique disciplinae initia ad propositum sibi praescipium formari videmus.

9 σημεῖον. A σημεῖον is that which proves or confirms a proposition; an αἰτίαν, something that explains or gives a reason for it. Aristotle defines a σημεῖον in An. pr. 2. 27, 70 a 7 σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρόσασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ ἐνδοξὸς ὡς γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἢ ὃς γενομένου πρῶτον ἢ υστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τούτο σημεῖον ὀστὶ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι (comp. Bon. Ind. 677 b 1).

10 ἔπει τῶν ἔργων: 'τε ipsa' (Tyrwhitt; ν. Bon. Ind. 286 a 43 and Schwegler on Metaph. A 3, 984 a 12). τῶν ἔργων here is often rendered by 'works of art' ('in operibus opificum', Victorius).

ἀ γὰρ αὕτα λυπηροὶς ὀρῶμεν: Rhet. i. 11, 1371 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἢδυ καὶ τὸ θυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ ταὐτὰ ἀνάγκη ἢδα εἶναι οἷον τὸ τέ μεριμνημένον [μητηκικὸν Vet. Vets.], ὀστερ γραφική καὶ ἀνδριαντοποια καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πάν ὁ ἢ ἢ ἐφ μεμιμημένον ἢ, καὶ ὁ μή ἢδυ αὕτω τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ὑπό τούτῳ χάριν, ἀλλὰ συναλλογισμὸς ἐστίν ὅτι τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ, ὡστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.—De part. an. i. 5, 645 a 11 καὶ ἐὰν ἢ ἐν παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὕτων [i.e. τῶν ἐφόν τῶν μη κεχαρισμένον] θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργίαν τε τῆς συνθεωρούμε. οἷον τὴν γραφικήν ἡ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστῶτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπώμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αὕτις καθορᾶν. διὸ δὲ μὴ δυσχεραίνων πανδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ἐφόν ἐπισκεψὶν. Plutarch also (De aud. poet. 18 a; Qu. conv. 5. 1, 674 a) has a good deal to say on this point.

12 ἀτιμοτάτων: De anima 1. 2, 404 b 3 ἐν ἀπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὕτων [i.e. νοῦν] τοῖς ἐφόν, καὶ μεγάλους καὶ μικροὺς καὶ τιμίους καὶ ἀτιμοτάτους.—De part. an. i. 5, 645 a 15 (see on b 10).

13 καὶ τούτῳ. For the conjunction comp. 13, 1453 a 17 σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γεγονός.—De sommo 3, 456 b 28 σημεῖον δὲ τούτων καὶ τὰ ὑπονοητικά.—Meteor. 2. 8, 367 a 11 τεκμηρίων δὴ ἐστί... καὶ τὸ γεγονός.—Xenoph. An. i. 9. 29 τεκμηρίων δὲ τούτων καὶ τόδε.

16 θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν: comp. Rhet. i. c., and Plato Rep. 475 D οὐ... φιλοκράτοις τάντας ἔφοιτε δοκοῦντες καὶ καταμνηθάνειν χαίρομεν τοιοῦτοι εἶναι. Belger (De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica componenta Platonis discipulo p. 45) finds some further traces of Plato in this portion of the Poetics. Our pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or other work of imitative art is explained here
to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery of or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture (comp. Probl. 19. 5. 918 a 3).

οὐχ ἐὰν. οὐχὶ for οὐχ ἐὰν is found in K b in Eth. N. 8. 12, 1161 a 1, b 18 and in D (the Marcianus) in An. post. i. 23, 84 b 8.

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ διότι ἡμῖν τοῦ μυεῖσθαι. This has been supposed to stand somewhat loosely for the two things previously mentioned, τὸ μυεῖσθαι and τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μυρήμασι; but a little reflexion will show that Aristotle has not fallen into any such inexactness of language. What he is now considering is the evolution of the poet; and he tells us that the imitative aptitude of the poet is only a higher and more developed form of that natural aptitude for imitation which is common to all mankind. There is no reason why he should also remind us at this point of the naturalness of the pleasure that we derive from poetry and other kinds of imitation.

καὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ seem to be added as an afterthought, in recognition of the historical connexion between music and poetry. Except in its lyric forms, however, poetry was now no longer combined with music; in Aristotle's view, also, even metre is at the most only one of its accidents (1, 1447 b 11). A very different view has been taken of these words by Tyrwhitt and Vahlen—and long before their time by Averroes and Sigonius (Emend. p. 152)—who suppose harmony and rhythm to be the second of the αἰτίαι διόν φυσικά mentioned in the early part of the chapter (b 5). There are two objections to this interpretation: (1) it ignores the significance of the distinction between τὸ μυεῖσθαι and τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μυρήμασι (v. on b 4); and (2) if τῆς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ are to bear this emphasis, one would expect them to be brought in in a less incidental way, and with a reason of some sort to justify the position ascribed to them. As the matter is in Aristotle's opinion of such secondary importance, he does not stop to show that our sense of harmony and rhythm is natural, or to explain how it has come to be natural to us (comp. Probl. 19. 38. 920 b 29). Metre is said to be a mode of rhythm in Rhet. 3. 8. 1408 b 28, ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχῆματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἔστω, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητὰ [Ἡμήματα]. On the difference between them see Cicero Orator 67, Quintilian 9. 4. 45, and Schol. Hephaest. p. 144 Gaisf.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς is much the same thing as ἐν ἀρχῇ (Eucken, Sprachgebr. b 22 p. 10). If it may be taken not with ἐγέννησαν but with the
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1448 b 22 participle, the antithesis between ἐξ ἀρχής πεφυκότες and προάγοντες will be not unlike that in Metaph. A 2, 982 b 13 ἐξ ἀρχής μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάζοντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προΪόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες.

ἀντὶ: loosely used for 'their work' or 'performances'; it anticipates what is termed in the next line 'their improvisations'. προάγοντες is here (and again in 4, 1449 a 13) a transitive verb; in the Aristotelian passages in which it seems to be intransitive (ἐπὶ προϊόντα) an object can generally be supplied without difficulty from the context (comp. Bon. Ind. 633 b 10). The meaning of the word in the present context is to 'advance', or 'carry a stage further' (comp. Plato Polit. 262 c), as may be seen from the parallel in Soph. el. 33, 183 b, in which the gradual progress or advance of Rhetoric and other arts is described: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρέντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι προϊόγαγον οἱ δὲ νῦν εἰδοκομοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οὕτω ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ἡμίχρισιν.

b 23 αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. On the verb αὐτοσχεδιάζειν = 'to speak off-hand, without premeditation or previous study' see Ernasti, Lex. techn. gr. s.v. The fact is described in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 54 θεὸς δ’ ὑπὸ καλῶν ἀειδεῖν, ἐξ αὐτοσχεδής περιόμενος, ήπει κοῦροι ἥβηται θαλάσσι παραβόλα κερημεώνυσιν, ἀρφὶ Δία Κροῦδην καὶ Μαιάδα καλλιτέθελον. A similar view of the origin of poetry is implied in Quintilian 9. 4, 114 poema nemo dubitaverit imperito quodam initio fusum et aurium mensura et similiter decurrentium spatiorum observationem esse generatnm, max in eo repertos pedes.—Maximus Tyt. 37. 4 'Ἀθραντὸς δὲ ἦ μὲν παλαιὰ μύστα χοροὶ παιδῶν ἦσαν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, γῆς ἐγράφη κατὰ δῆμους ἵσταμενοι ... ἄσματα ἄδοντες αὐτοσχέδια (comp. on 4, 1449 b 9, and Bentley, Wks. i p. 250 Dyce). The phallic-song, in which Aristotle finds the germ of Comedy, was sometimes described as αὐτοσχέδιος (see on 4, 1449 b 12).

b 24 διεσπάσθη δὲ corresponds with the γεννῆται μὲν ὄλως in b 4.

b 25 τὰς καλὰς ... πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιοῦτων. As Düntzer (Rettung der aristotelischen Poetik p. 129) and Bernays (Zwei Abh. p. 28) have shown, this is not a tautology, as the actions of those who are καλοὶ (τῶν τοιοῦτων) are not always καλαὶ πράξεις; comp. Plato Rep. 396 c μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἄγαθον ἄσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἦτον ἦ ὑπὸ νόσου ἦ ὑπὸ ἐρωτῶν ἐσφαλμένον ἦ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἦ τινος ἄλλης ἐμφόρας.
ψόγους has the same concrete sense of ‘inventives’ in Plato 1448 b 27

Laws 829 c ἐγκώμια τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν. The earliest, as well as the most eminent representative of this kind of literature, was Archilochus, the ψογερός 'Ἀρχιλόχος βαρυλόγους έχθεσιν πιανόμενος of Pindar (Pyth. 2. 100).


εἰκὸς δὲ ἔναι πολλούς, scil. τοιούτοις; comp. Goulston’s version. b 29

‘verisimile autem est, qui talia condiderint, exitisse multos.’

Aristotle says this because he thinks that even in those days the baser sort (οἱ εὐτελεστέρου b 26) were probably in a majority; he has no romantic illusions as to the superiority of the men of an earlier age (Pol. 2. 8, 1269 a 5). On the pre-Homeric poets, to whom Aristotle refers, comp. Sextus Emp. Adv. math. i. 204 οὗ ὡς ὅτι πάντων ὁμολογᾶται ποιητὴς ἄρχαιότατος εἶναι.”Ομήρου’ ἔννοι γὰρ Ἱσόδον προῆκεν τοῖς χρόνοις λέγουσιν, Δίον τε καὶ Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουνταῖον καὶ ἄλλους παμπληθεῖς: see also Bernhardy Gr. Litt. i 3 p. 308. Aristotle, however, was quite aware that the writings which bore the names of these legendary poets were not really by them (H. A. 6. 6, 563 a 18; see Bernays, Dialogue d. Aristot. p. 95).

ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης: Eustratius on Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141 b 14 (p. 320 b 30

Heylb.) παράγει ... καὶ τίνα ποίησιν Μαργίτην ὄνομαζομένην Ὀμήρου. μνημονεύει δ’ αὕτης οὐ μόνον αὐτός Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ. Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλα καὶ Ἀρχιλόχους καὶ Κρατίνος καὶ Καλλίμαχους εἰν τῷ ἐπιγράμματι καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν εἶναι Ὀμήρου τὸ ποίημα. On the Margites, which Aristotle thus attributes to Homer, see Kinkel, EGF. p. 64. This statement in the Poetics does not throw any light on the question of the original form of the Margites, whether the iambic lines in it were a primitive part of the poem, or subsequently added by Pigres (see Goettling, Op. Acad. p. 167, and Hiller, N. Jahrb. f. Phil. 1887 p. 13 for a discussion of it); it stands in a parenthesis, and must not be taken in any direct connexion with the ἐν οἷς ... ἑκβείον ἔλθε μέτρον that follows.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to writings more or less like the Margites by post-Homeric poets—not to other minor poems of a light order attributable to Homer himself, as Bergk (Gr. Litt. i p. 775) suggests.

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1448 b 30 ev ois = et de toutois, scil. tois phoiois, the relative beginning a new sentence, as in 24, 1459 b 12 ois apasiv.—Phys. 8. 3, 253 b 12 pro's ois . . . oj xalepov apantaqou. —Metaph. Θ 3, 1046 b 33 ois ta symbalainonta atosa oj xalepov idew. —Δ 8, 1074 b 8

katà to årmôston: 17, 1455 b 10 katà to ekos.—Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 22 and 9, 1367 b 12 katà to prosqêkon (opposed to para to prosqêkon).—Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 20 para to deon. The reading of the Aldine (and of Parisinus 2038), kai to årmôston, has been accepted by Bon. Ind. 357 b 48.

31 ἡλθέ: the verb has the same sense in Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 20 ἐφ' o to nómosma Ἑλληνικά.—Pol. 1. 9, 1258 a 6 to ἐτερον διὸς τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦ Ἑλληνικά.


33 tov παλαιων. The reference is apparently to Homer and Archilochus, as the first and greatest representatives of the two great directions in poetry; comp. Velleius Paterc. 1. 5 Neque guenquam alium, cuius operis primus auctor fuerit, in eo perfectissimum praeter Homerum et Archilochum referrius.—Dio Chrysost. Or. 33. p. 5 R. δύο γὰρ ποιητῶν γεγονότοι εἶ ᾧ παντος τῶν αἰῶνων, ois othdâna tov tâllon symballevei axron, 'Oμηρου τε καὶ 'Αρχιλοχον, tovotov 'Oμηρος μὲν σχεδὸν πάντα ενεκωμίασε . . . 'Αρχιλοχος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναιτίαν ἥκε [fort. ἥκε], τὸ ψέγειν. Their pre-eminence is implied in the juxtaposition of the two names in Heraclitus fr. 119 (42 Diels), τὸν τὲ 'Ομηρον ἐφιασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥατιζέσθαι καὶ 'Αρχιλοχον ὁμοιως.

34 tâ spoudaîa . . . poiîth: comp. Plato Apol. 18 B tâ metêora phrontisth. 

35 oux ôtî eî, scil. époûseve. Homer ‘wrote well’, as a master of
the art of poetic expression (comp. 24, 1459 b 16; 1460 b 1); his poems are ‘imitations’, or pictures of human life, which distinguishes them from those of Empedocles and others (comp. 1, 1447 b 15); and they are moreover ‘dramatic imitations’, i.e. not unlike those in the Drama (comp. 24, 1460 a 5). In this way, then, Aristotle intimates that Homer not only dealt with the same kind of subject as Tragedy (τὰ σπουδαῖα), but also anticipated the dramatic manner.

σχήματα ... ὑπεδείξεν, ‘marked out for us the great outlines of Comedy’. σχήμα has the same sense in 5, 1449 b 3, and in Plato Laws 5, 737 D σχήματος ἐνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς. For the use of ὑπεδείξει comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 25 ὅπερ ἐυριπίδῆς ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπεδείξῃ πρῶτος.—Ath. Pol. 41 Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπεδείξεν, Ἐφύμαλγης δ' ὑπετέλεσεν.—Isocrates 268 η ταύτα πράττοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποδεικνύοντες.

οὗ ψόγον ἄλλα τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας. The sense is that, when Homer passed from σπουδαῖα to φαῦλα, his treatment of the latter was more akin to that in the comic poets than to that in the ἱαμβοσοιαί; Margites with him was only ridiculous—not vicious or held up to obloquy as vicious, as a writer of ψόγοι would have made him. Ψόγος dwells on some serious vice of character; whereas Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, deals only with those lesser faults which we are able to laugh at (see on 5, 1449 a 33). This view of the Margites is not quite in harmony with that in 4, 1448 b 30, where it is regarded as a ψόγος, the first known instance of the kind.

With οὗ ψόγον Vahlen supplies ποιήσας from the δραματοποιήσας that follows. This is legitimate enough, but hardly necessary, as δραματοποιεῖν, ‘to write, or describe, as a dramatist would’ (see on 22, 1458 b 9) is just as applicable to ψόγον as it is to τὸ γελοῖον (comp. Tyrwhitt’s rendering ‘non vituperium sed ridiculum dramatice exprimens’). The meaning Aristotle attaches to it may be seen from μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν in b 35 (v. ad loc.).

ὡσπερ Ἰλιᾶς καὶ Ἡ Ὀδύσσεια. Vahlen illustrates this insertion of b 38 the article before Ὀδύσσεια by De resp. 17, 478 b 28 ἐστι δὲ θάνατος καὶ ἡ φθορὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς μὴ ἀτελεῖς, and Rhet. 3. 13, 1414 b 13 ἐστιν οὖν ... διήγησι ἐτερον καὶ ἡ ἑπειδήγησι καὶ προειδήγησι, and a number of other passages in Aristotle (comp. also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 240 6). On the other hand Spengel would restore the article before Ἰλιᾶς on account of its appearance in the parallel in 26, 1462 b 8 ὡσπερ ἦ Ἰλιᾶς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα.
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1448 b 38 μέρη καὶ ἡ 'Οδύσσεια (comp. also 24, 1459 b 14 ἡ μὲν Ἰλιάς . . . ἡ δὲ 'Οδύσσεια). There is as a rule nothing exceptional or anomalous in Aristotle's usage in reference to the article with the titles of books. He is apt to omit it, just as Athenaeus does, when the title is given in the actual form which it would have as the heading of a MS. (comp. Apollonius Synt. i, 26), after the preposition en. The Poetics supply a number of examples of this usage, e.g. 16, 1455 a 2 ἐν 'Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγησι.—24, 1460 a 35 ἐν Ἰνδισσεῖα ἀλογα.—14, 1454 a 1 ἐν Ἀντιγόνη.—16, 1455 a 4 ἐν Χοιφάρωι.—24, 1460 a 31 ἐν Ἡλέκτρα.—a 32 ἐν Μυσώι.—25, 1461 b 21 ἐν Ὀρέστη. In 24, 1460 a 30, however, the traditional text omits the article with a title in the nominative; for it is clear that Ὀιδέσπονς in this place means the Oedipus Tyrannus, in the same way as with us 'Hamlet' may mean the play, not the person. In many places in which the article is omitted, the title is used in a general sense as a common noun; thus in Soph. el. 24, 180 a 21 δός μοι Ἰλίαδα means 'give me an Iliad' (i.e. a copy of the Iliad). Instances of this in the Poetics are 8, 1451 b 20 Ἡρακλῆδα Θρησκία, 'a Heralcids, a Theseid'.—a 24 'Οδύσσειαν, 'an Odyssey'.—23, 1459 b 3 Ιλιάδος καὶ Ὀδύσσειας, 'a poem like the Iliad or Odyssey'.—b 4 Κυπρίων, 'a poem like the Kýptra'. I am inclined to think, therefore, that Spengel was right in suggesting ὀστερ (ἡ) Ἰλιάς in the present passage; and also that in 24, 1460 a 30 the true reading must be ὀστερ (ὁ) Ὀιδέσπονς.

1449 a 3 ἐκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν recalls the distinction drawn in 4, 1448 b 24 between the two great forms of poetry, the higher and the lower.
κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν: 4, 1448 b 24 κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ὐθη. a 4 ἀντί τῶν ἱἀμβον κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἔγενοντο. Vahlen compares De part. an. 2. 13, 657 b 34 ἀντὶ ταῦτης τῆς φυλακῆς πάντα σκληρῶς. b 7 ἔχει . . . τοῖς ἔδεσον ἰκανῶς. For the dative comp. Meteor. i. 3, 330 b 5 πῶς ἔχει τάξει πρὸς τάλλα.—De anima 2. 3, 414 b 33 τὸ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχοντι.

For the sense of ἔδεσον in this passage, Vahlen (Beitr. i p. 22) compares that of σχῆμα in the account of Comedy in 4, 1448 b 36 and 5, 1449 b 3. ἔδοι seems to mean the formative constituents of Tragedy, the forms it must embody in order to realize its nature in its completeness. Aristotle assumes that Tragedy has by this time attained to its natural form (a 15 ὁ χέρι τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν); but he declines to consider the question whether there is still a possibility
of improvement in the treatment of its various formative con-
stituents. The suggestion that the εἰση here meant are the same
as the μέρη distinguished in chap. 6, from another point of view, is
due to Madius. εἰσος in the sense of a formative constituent
is perhaps unique in Aristotle, but there are certainly a few
instances of it in Plato Rep. iv (comp. Campbell, 2 p. 298),
where the three faculties in the soul are sometimes described as
εἰση (434 d, 439 e, 440 b) and sometimes as μέρη (442 b, c). The
alternative interpretation is to take εἰση in the logical sense of
'species'. This view, though not improbable in itself (comp. 18,
1455 b 32), is hardly reconcilable with the use of εἰση in 6, 1450 a 13
as a designation for the μέρη with which the chapter is dealing.

αὐτὸ τε καθ' αὐτὸ κρίναι. On the reading here see J. of Phil. 5 a 8
p. 117. The conjunction serves to connect κρίναι with ἐπισκόπεῖν,
the second clause being complementary to the first (comp. 6,
1450 b 3). Similarly in De anima 3. 3, 427 b 15 φαντασία γὰρ
ἐτέρων καὶ αἰσθητῶν καὶ διανοίας αὐτῇ τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθητῶν,
καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπόλεμος, the second clause (αὐτῇ τε κτέ.)
is explanatory of the first. κρίναι has been taken as an infinitive of
limitation by Wahlen, who quotes H. A. 9. 38, 622 b 20 τῶν
δὲ ἐντόμων ἐργατικῶτατον ἔφων ἐστὶ, σχέδου δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα συγκρι-
νόμεθαι πάντα, τὸ τε τῶν μομένων γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιτῶν. As
far as I can see, an infinitive of limitation would not be quite in
place in a passage like the present.

For the antithesis between καθ' αὐτὸ and πρὸς τὰ θεάτρα comp.
Top. 5. 1, 128 b 16 ἀποδιδότατε δὲ τὸ ἱδιον ἣ καθ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἄδι 
πρὸς ἐτέρων καὶ ποτέ.— Cat. 6. 5 b 16 οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ μέγα λέγεται
ἡ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἐτέρων ἀναφέρεσθαι (comp. Bon. Ind. 212 a 2),
κρίνειν has an indirect question after it in Metaph. A 4, 984 b 31
τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρῆ διανεῖμαι . . εξέστω κρίνειν ύπέτερον.

γενομένης δ' οὖν ἄπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς = γενομένη δ' οὖν ἄπ' 
ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ. Having begun with γενομένης . . . αὐτο-
σχεδιαστικῆς, scil. τῆς τραγῳδίας, Aristotle sees that the same is true
of Comedy, and adds a parenthesis to show that; after which he
says in 13 ἦξεῖθεν, just as though γενομένη . . . αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆ
had begun the clause. For another instance of a gen. abs. in lieu
of a nominative see 17, 1455 b 3 (comp. Bon. Ind. 149 b 26 and
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2. 2 p. 110). A parenthetical addition of very
similar form is found in 5, 1449 b 12, and also (with Christ's punc-
tuation) in Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 b 11. ἄπ' ἀρχῆς is used adverbially
(comp. Pol. 7. 16, 1334 b 29, and Plato Crit. 112 e) in the same
COMMENTARY

1449 a 9 sense as ἐκ ἀρχῆς. Several of the recent editors and translators, however, accepting the reading γενομένη of certain apographs, take ἀρχῆς and αὐτοςχεδιάστικης together as meaning an ‘improvisational beginning’. This certainly simplifies matters, but it may be doubted whether ἀρχὴ αὐτοςχεδιάστικη would naturally bear that meaning.

a 11 τῶν ἐξαρχῶντων. ‘ἐξάρχειν τῶν διθύραμβον, ἥ τὰ φαλλικά, ii dicebantur qui choro utrīvis canendo praeiverunt; qui ut verisimil est, ab initio poetae ipsī fuerunt’, says Tyrwhitt, quoting Archilochus (fr. 77 Bergk ὃς Διωνύσοι ἀνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξας μέλος οἶδα διθύραμβον. By the ἐξάρχων here Aristotle means the poet-composer, who supplied both words and air, and taught them to the chorus—not as is sometimes supposed, the κορυφαῖος, who was only one of the chorus (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 325). ἐξάρχειν διθύραμβον is practically a synonym for διδάσκειν διθύραμβον, the expression in Herodotus i. 23.

It is clear that Aristotle has in his own mind a general view of the historical development of early Greek poetry, but he tells us as little as possible about it—in fact no more than is absolutely necessary for present purposes. The intention of the Poetics is to give us a theory of the Epic and of the Drama (see on 1, 1447 a 8), not a treatise on the history and archaeology of the Drama. The Epic having been traced to its origin (4, 1448 b 23–33), Aristotle turns to the question of the rise and progress of the Drama. Both forms of Drama, he thinks, arose out of lyric or choral poetry. Tragedy began when the author of the dithyramb came forward with an ‘improvisation’, i.e. with a ῥήσις or spoken statement, which he improvised in the interval between the two halves of the song of the chorus—that being the origin of the two great constituents of a Greek drama, a spoken part and a sung part, an actor and a chorus. This is a sufficient account of the facts; and there was no need for Aristotle to go off into a multiplicity of historical or antiquarian details. His silence on such points is no proof of his ignorance of the legendary history of Attic Tragedy. The allusion in τῶν ἐξαρχῶντων in the text is probably to Thespis, whom he is known to have mentioned, in a fragment (probably of the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν) preserved byThemistius Or. 26, 382 Dind.: οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρώτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσόων ἤδειν εἰς τῶν θεῶν, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλαγών τε καὶ ῥήσιν ἐξεύρεν; (comp. Heitz, Fr. Arist. 19 and Bernays, Dial. d. Aristot. p. 139). Here the ‘hymn to the gods’ corresponds with
the Dithyramb; and the ‘prologue and speech’ introduced by Thespis may be identified with the improvisations of the actor-poet, which transformed the Dithyramb into Tragedy. It is clear from Aristotle’s confession of ignorance as to Comedy in 5, 1449 a. 37 that he knows more of the history of Tragedy than he actually tells us, and that he is not aware of there being any serious lacuna in it (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 320).

φαλλικά: Photius Lex. Φαλλικῶν τοίμα αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ αὐτομενον.—Hesychius Φαλλικῶν ὀρχημά τιν οἱ δὲ μέλος ἄλλοι φόνον αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ αὐτομενην. In these phallic songs, which were a widespread institution in Greece (comp. Heraclitus fr. 127, and Herodotus 2, 48), Aristotle sees the origin of Comedy; it arose, he thinks, through the author of the song ‘improvising’ some scurrilous tale—no doubt in the interval between the parts of the song—and becoming in this way the forerunner of the single actor of the earliest form of Comedy. It will be observed that he supposes Tragedy and Comedy to have developed on exactly the same lines. A coarse and irregular Comedy, not unlike what Aristotle seems to be assuming, is known to have survived in certain parts of Greece even in post-Aristotelian times (Athenaeus 621 ε sqq.).

προαγότων: see on 4, 1448 b. 22.

μεταβολάς: 5, 1449 a. 37 αἱ τῆς πραγματικῆς μεταβάσεις.

ἡ πραγματική. The word is repeated, because Comedy is in a somewhat different position (5, 1449 a. 38).

ἐπαύσατο. For the tense of the participle (misunderstood by Elmsley on Eurip. Heracl. 721) comp. An. post. 2. 1, 89 b. 27 εἰρόντες γὰρ ὅτι ἔκκλείπει πεπαύμεθα.—Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b. 32 θεωρήσατε ἀν τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα ... ἢ ἄν ἐπαύσατο ταῦτης τῆς παιδικῆς δόξης.—De mem. 2, 453 a. 24 ό γὰρ ἰδίως παύεται κανηθείσα.

φῶν: Pol. 1. 2, 1252 b. 32 ἢ δὲ φῶς τέλος ἐστίν οἷον γὰρ ἐκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεῖσας, ταῦτην φαμὲν τὴν φῶσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτον οἰκίας. όν φῶς in the sense of the natural form of a thing see Bon. Ind. 838 a. 41.

καὶ τὸ τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλήθος. There is no need to assume a lacuna here (with Ueberweg). Having shown how Tragedy began with a single actor (a. 11), Aristotle proceeds to note the introduction of a second, and after that, of a third actor. The increasing prominence of the actor is in his view the most significant fact in the evolution of the Drama; the other points
1449\textsuperscript{a} 15 mentioned are either of minor importance or the direct consequence of the change in the number of actors. A difficulty may perhaps be found in the language in the text, as the καί, with which the statement begins, cannot be taken as connecting ἣγαγέ etc. with the ἐπαύσατο or the ἔσχε τῆν αὐτῆς φύσιν in the preceding sentence. The difficulty disappears if one observes that the emphasis there is on the participial πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβάλοντα (comp. 5, 1449\textsuperscript{b} 2 ἣδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἔχοντας), which repeats the idea of the κατὰ μικρὸν ῥήσῃ in \textsuperscript{a} 13. The καί in fact is explanatory, introducing a series of statements in support of the original assertion that Tragedy underwent many changes before attaining to its ultimate form.

[label=15] ὑποκριτῶν. The actor is called a ὑποκριτῆς not (as is so often said) because he answered the chorus, but because he was the poet’s spokesman, who interpreted his text to the public (see Heimsoeth, De voce ὑποκριτῆς, and Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 259, 289). The term must have acquired this sense at the time when, by a division of labour, the poet left the acting to others, instead of being himself the performer of his pieces, as he originally was according to Rhet. 3. 1, 1403\textsuperscript{b} 23 ὑπεκράνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. The position of the ὑποκριτῆς in fact was analogous to that of the μασυφόδος; they were both of them intermediaries, who interpreted the words of a poet to the public. It is to be noted in describing the rhapsodist in the Ion Plato in one place terms him a ἔρμηνεύς and in another a ὑποκριτῆς, apparently without any difference of meaning: Ion 530 οὗ τὸν γὰρ μασυφόδον ἐρμηνεύει δεῖ τοῦ ποιητὸς τῆς διανοίας γέγοναι τῷ ἀκούσει, and 535 οὗ οὗτος ἀνήκε ὁ θεάτης τῶν δακτυλῶν ὁ ἔσχατος... δὲ μέσος ὁ μασυφόδος καὶ ὑποκριτῆς, οὗὶ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής. For the sense of the derivative ὑποκριτικῆ see on 19, 1456\textsuperscript{b} 10.

\textsuperscript{a} 16 Αἰσχύλος: comp. the Aristotelian survey of the progress of the Drama in Themistius Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. (v. on \textsuperscript{a} 11): οὗ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσίν ἦδὲν εἰς τῶν θεοῦς, Θέατης δὲ πρόλογον τε καὶ ῥήσιν ἔξερεν, Αἰσχύλος δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτῆν καὶ ὄρκισαντας, τὰ δὲ πλεῖω τούτων Σοφοκλέους ἀπελαύσαμεν καὶ Εἰρηπίδου; There is no doubt a discrepancy between this and the statement in the text about Aeschylus, but it need not disturb us, unless we assume Aristotle to have been incapable of a change of opinion even on a small matter of learned research. Ancient opinion was divided on the point: Vita Aeschylí
(Dindorf, Poet. scen. 5 prol. p. 3): ἐχθρόσατο δ’ ὑποκριτῆ πρῶτῳ μὲν 1449 ἃ
16

Κλεάνδρῳ, ἐπετει καὶ τὸν δεύτερον αὐτῷ προσῆψε Μυστισκὸν τὸν
Χαλκίδα: τὸν δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτῆ αὐτὸς ἐξεύρεν, δὲ δὲ Δικαίορχος ὁ
Μεστήμος, Σοφοκλῆς.

τὸν λόγον: the portion recited or spoken, as opposed to τὰ 17

τοῦ χοροῦ, the portion sung (τὰ ἵδομεν in 18, 1456 28); comp.
the use of λόγοι in 6, 1450 ἃ 6, 9 in the sense of the speeches or
ῥήσεις in a play. Λόγος is a word with a Protean variety of
meanings even in the Poetics. In 1, 1447 ἃ 22 (etc.) it means
‘language’, as opposed to metre and music; in 6, 1450 ἃ 15
‘prose’, as distinct from verse; in 22, 1459 ἃ 13 an ‘oration’, as
opposed to a poem; in 15, 1454 ἃ 18 (comp. 19, 1456 ἃ 37, ἃ 6),
the ‘language’, as distinct from the action, of the personages; in
17, 1455 ἃ 17 (comp. ἃ 34; 5, 1449 ἃ 8; 24, 1460 ἃ 27), the ‘story’,
as distinct from its setting in the actual poem. And in 20, 1457 ἃ 23
it is one of the technical terms of Aristotelian logic or grammar.

πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, ‘made it assume the leading part 18

in the play’. For this metaphorical use of πρωταγωνιστῆς comp.
that of the derivative πρωταγωνιστεῖν in Pol. 8, 4, 1338 ἃ 29 ὡστε
τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ’ ὀν τὸ θηρίων δὲι πρωταγωνιστεῖν οὐ γὰρ λύκος ὀδὲ
τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἀγονίσατο ἀν οὐθένα καλὸν κινόμενον, ἄλλα
μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγάθος. Instances of this extension of meaning
(which is common enough in later Greek) will be found in HST.
s.v. πρωταγωνιστῆς and πρωταγωνιστῶν. Aristotle is apt to use
technical terms of theatrical origin in their popular sense (see on
14, 1453 ἃ 8 χορηγίας) even in a book like the Poetics.

σκηνογραφίαν: i. e. Sophocles was the first to have the screen
behind the actors painted to represent the façade of a palace or
a temple, or whatever else the play required as its background.
The improvement here ascribed to Sophocles was sometimes
attributed to Aeschylus (Sommerbrodt, Scaena p. 142; Haigh, Attic
Th. 3 p. 181).

ἔτη δὲ τὸ μέγεθος: comp. ἃ 28 ἔτη ἃ ἐτευσοδίων πλῆθη. τὸ μέγεθος ἃ 19

is apparently a nominative extra structuram, like an item in an
inventory. There are some fairly well-established instances of this
anomalous use of the nominative (Bon. Ind. 46 ἃ 41; Meisterhans,
Gr. 3 p. 203; Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2. 1 p. 45). τὸ μέγεθος=its magnitude,
or extent, i. e. the length now usual in Tragedy. The word,
however, is not always a purely neutral term; as the opposite of
μικρότης (comp. the ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων in the context), it may very

well mean a ‘considerable length’ (or ‘size’), so as to suggest an
idea of the importance or dignity of the object; comp. Eth. N. 4. 4, 1449 \( ^a \) 19

\[ \mu \gamma \varepsilon \theta o s \ \xi \chi e i \ k a l \ \dot{\alpha} \dot{\varepsilon} \omega m a. - P o l. 5, 10, 1313 \( ^a \) 7 \] 

to \( \mu \gamma \varepsilon \theta o s \) 

\[ k a i \ t o \ \dot{\alpha} \dot{\varepsilon} \omega m a \ t i s \ \dot{\alpha} \rchi s. \] 

The άπεσεμωνή in the next line shows this to be at any rate by implication the sense of \( \mu \gamma \varepsilon \theta o s \) in the present passage.

Aristotle evidently had in his own mind a clear and precise conception of the origin of Tragedy, though it is difficult for us to recover more than fragments of it from a statement so brief and allusive as that in the text. He merely tells us (1) that the most primitive tragedies dealt with short stories; (2) that the language of the primitive actor, instead of being serious and solemn, was sportive or jocose, and (3) in trochaics, not in iambics. By way of explanation of this last point, he adds that, as Tragedy was originally akin to the satyric drama, the language of the primitive tragic actor had still something of the rhythm of the dance about it. Aristotle's idea of the original tragic actor may possibly have been that he also was made up as a satyr (comp. Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles \( ^4 \) 1. p. 87). He certainly mentions one characteristic of the stage-satyr, his jesting language, and seems to imply another, viz. his dance-like movements (comp. Welcker, Nachtrag zu der Schrift ü. d. Aesch. Tril. p. 337).

\( \varepsilon k \ \mu i k r o n \ \mu \u0350n o n \) : such as might be told, for instance, in a single act. For the asyndeton comp. 5, \( ^4 \) 1449 \( ^b \) 12; De animes 3. 2, 1426 \( ^b \) 24; De sensu 3, 440 \( ^a \) 8 (οιν διοτε οι γραφής ποιούσιν' 

\[ \epsilon \tau \rho \acute{e} \rho a n \ \chi \rho \acute{o} \acute{a} \nu \acute{e} \rho \acute{a} \nu \ \epsilon \tau \rho \acute{e} \rho a n \ \epsilon \nu r \acute{a} \gamma \epsilon s \tau \acute{e} \parkinglos \nu s \; \epsilon \\sigma \alpha \underline{\tau} \epsilon \_{\iota} \nu s i o n s; \] 

Metaph. Ζ 10, 1051 \( ^b \) 11 (ed. Christ).

\( ^a \) 20 ούθε άπεσεμωνήν. The time meant is presumably the age of Phrynicus.

\( ^a \) 21 ούθε τετραμέτρου ίαμβειον έγένετο. Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 \( ^a \) 30 οι τας 

\[ \tau \rho \acute{a} \gamma \omega \delta i a s \ \pi o i o n v t e s \ldots \] 

\[ \epsilon k \ t o n \ \tau e t r a m é t r o n \] 

\[ e i s \ t o \ \iota \alpha m b e i o n \ \mu e t \varepsilon \beta \sigma \lambda e n \] 

\[ \lambda i a \ t o \ \tau \omega \ \l o \gamma \acute{o} \nu \ \tau o \tau \nu o \] 

\[ \mu \epsilon \tau r o n \ \dot{\alpha} \dot{\omega} \mu o \dot{\alpha} \tau o n \ \epsilon i n a \ t o n \ \alpha l l o n. \]

\( ^a \) 23 ούθε τετραμετράν: 24, 1459 \( ^b \) 37 το \( \delta e \) ιαμβείων και τετράμετρων 

\[ \kappa i n t i k a \] 

\[ k a i \ t o \ \mu e n \ \dot{\alpha} \rchi s t i k o n \] 

\[ t o \ \tau e t r a m é t r o n. \] 

Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 \( ^b \) 32 των \( \delta e \) ρυθμών \( \delta e \) \( \mu i n \) \( \dot{\alpha} \rchi sos \) \( \sigma e m o s \) και \( \lambda e k t i k i s \) \( \dot{\alpha} \rchi s i a s \) 

\[ \delta e \] 

\[ \varepsilon \] 

\[ \dot{\alpha} \rchi s e i s \] 

\[ \dot{\alpha} \] 

\[ \tau o n \] 

\[ \dot{\alpha} \rchi s i o n \] 

\[ \epsilon \] 

\[ \kappa e t \} \tau i a s. \] 

\[ \delta e \] 

\[ \mu e n \] 

\[ \tau e t r a m e t r o s. \] 

Longinus 41, 1 μικροποιουν \( \delta e \) \( \dot{\alpha} \) \( \gamma \dfk \) \( \dot{\alpha} \rchi s e i o s \) \( \epsilon n \) \( \tau o t h \) υψήλοις \( \delta e \) \( \rho y h m o s \) κεκλα- 

\[ \sigma m é n o s \] 

\[ \lambda o g o u \ kai \ \sigma e s o b h m é n o s, \] 

\[ \delta e \] 

\[ \mu e r r á r i o u \] 

\[ \tau o \] 

\[ \mu e r r á r i o u \] 

\[ \mu e r r á r i o u \] 

\[ \delta e \] 

\[ \dot{\alpha} \rchi s i o n \] 

\[ \sigma e n k e p t ó n t o s. \] 

\[ \dot{\alpha} \rchi s t i k o s \] 

in this
connexion means practically μημητικός ὁρχήσεως, just as ἄθικος in 1449 a 23
the Poetics (see on 6, 1450 a 29) means μημητικός ἦθους. Similarly
λεκτικός = μημητικός λέξεως (comp. 21, 1459 a 12), πρακτικός = μημη-
tικός πράξεως, and παθητικός = μημητικός πάθους.

λέξεως, 'speech' as opposed to song (comp. on 21, 1459 a 12).

αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις: 24, 1460 a 4 αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διάδακτο τὸ ἀρμότον a 24
ἀυτῆ αἰρέσθαι.—De caelo 3, 8, 306 b 15 έξωκεν ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τούτο σημαίνει ἡμᾶς.—Hippocrates 3 p. 606 K. ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τὰς ἑφόδους οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας, οἷον τὸ σκαρδαμίζειν καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα ὑποργεῖ καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα ταῦτα ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐδόθα καὶ οὐ μαθούσα τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖ.

λεκτικών: 21, 1459 a 11 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἀρμότει ὁσοι καὶ ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσατο.
Comp. also Rhet. 3, 1, 1404 a 30, 3, 8, 1408 b 32 (quoted on a 21 and a 23). The term is sufficiently explained by a 26 πλείστα γὰρ ἱαμβεία λέγομεν ἐν τῷ διάλεκτῳ τῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

dιαλέκτῳ, 'talk', 'converse', as in Plato Symp. 203 a 26 πᾶσα ἐστὶν ἡ ὄμιλα καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεώς πρὸς ἄνθρωποι: comp.
Rhet. 3, 8, 1408 b 34 μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεία φθέγ-
γονται λέγοντες, and 3, 2, 1404 b 34 πάντες γὰρ μεταφοράς δια-
λέγονται. For the general meaning of διάλεκτος see on 22, 1458 b 32. Horace's altertis aptus sermonilbus (A. P. 81) is a distant echo of this statement of Aristotle's. Cicero also observes that ordinary speech constantly falls into iambics: Orator 189 senarios vero el Hipponacteos effugere vix possimus; magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio.

λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας. ἀρμονία here seems to mean 'pitch' (τόνος) a 27
as in Rhet. 3, 1, 1403 b 31 (v. Monro, Modes of ancient Greek
music p. 15). Aristoxenus recognizes a similar distinction between
the musical and the conversational μέλος: λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογοδύει τι μέλος, τὸ συγκεκόμενον ἐκ τῶν προσῳδῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν φυσικῶν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιστέαναι καὶ ἀνίεαι ἐν τῷ διάλεγεσθαι
(p. 24 Marquard).

ἐπεισδοχών: see on 12, 1452 b 20.

ὡς ἑκατά κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται is added to explain the main a 30
statement, ἔν τα ἄλλα . . . ἐστώ εἰρημένα (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.2 2
p. 495). For the general form of the sentence Vahlen compares
Metaph. I 3, 1005 b 19 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μη ὑπάρ-
χειν ἁδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα προσῳ-
δοςαίμεθ' αὖ, ἐστώ προσδιωρισμένα.

κοσμηθῆναι = ἐπικοσμηθῆναι. Certain elements in a play Aris-
1449 a 30 toto dismisses as κόσμου, decorative accessories rather than structural parts of the work. With this use of κοσμεῖν we may compare that of ἡδύνειν in 6, 1449 b 28 and 24, 1460 b 2, to denote the addition of accessories designed to make the work agreeable to us.

\[1449 a 32 \ \eta \ \delta \ \kappaωμήδεια \ \kτέ. \] The progress of Tragedy having been sketched, the next point to be considered is the progress of Comedy (\(a \ 37 - b \ 8\)). The statement is introduced by a definition (\(a \ 32 - 37\)) based on hints already given in preceding chapters as to the nature of Comedy. In 2, 1448 a 16 Comedy was said to deal with personages worse than the average man (\(\chiερός = \phiαυλό-\ \tauερού\) in the present passage); and in 4, 1448 b 36 its subject was assumed to be τὸ γελοίον. These two points Aristotle reconciles and combines in a rough provisional definition (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.), before proceeding to the question more immediately before him, that of the μεταβάσεις of Comedy. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose this defining clause to be out of place. If we try the experiment of transferring it to another place, by putting it for instance after λόγοις καὶ μύθους in b 8 (with Thurol), or after ἐποποιήσα in b 20 (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 48), it will be found that little or nothing is gained by this disturbance of the traditional order (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 1 p. 34).

\[1449 a 33 \ \υσπερ \ εὔπομεν: \ \text{in } 2, 1448 a 17 \ \text{and } 4, 1448 b 37.\]

\[1449 a 33 \ \πᾶσαν \ \κακίαν: \ \text{Plato Rep. 490 d ὁραν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἄχριστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν}. \]—Demosthenes 18, 279 τὸ δὲ ἤ καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἔμι αὐτὸν ἀγώνας ἐσάσατα νῦν ἐπὶ τόνδ' ἥκειν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐξει κακίαν.

\[1449 a 33 \ \ άλλα τὸν αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοίον μόριον: \ \text{a compressed statement, practically equivalent to οἷς ἄπλος ἄλλα καθ' ἐν τι ἔτοις κακίαις τοῦ γὰρ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοίον μόριον.} \] The personages in Comedy are worse than most men, but only in one particular respect, as presenting a certain harmless deformity or ugliness of character, which makes them ridiculous only—not objects for blame or aversion. It is, in Aristotle's view, the harmlessness of the evil in them that makes them fit objects of laughter.

\[1449 a 34 \ \tauὸ \ γὰρ \ γελοίον \ \kτέ. \] Two kinds of possible objects of laughter are implied in the text. (1) An act is γελοίον when it is of the nature of a harmless mistake or blunder (ἀμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον); and (2) a person is γελόως when he presents some moral or physical deformity of the same harmless kind (αἰσχρός ἀνώδυνον). The negative element here is a very essential part of the definition. Plato also, who thinks that the spectacle of human ignorance is the
true object of laughter in Comedy, explains that, to be laughable, the ignorance must be harmless (ἀβλαβής τοῦς ἀλλος Phil. 49 ε).

As γελοια are the basis of all Comedy, Aristotle must be assumed to have devoted a section of his theory of Comedy (in the lost Second Book) to the causes and conditions of laughter, in the same way as we find him analysing τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλεενὸν in chapters 13–14 of the existing Poetics. It is not impossible that several traces of his theory survive in Cicero’s discussion of the ‘Ridiculous’ in De Oratore 2, 58–59, which seems to be on distinctly Aristotelian lines. Part of it has been quoted under Fr. III.

ἀμάρτημα: see on 13, 1453 a 16.

αἰσχρός (like the adj. αἰσχρῶς) includes moral as well as physical deformity. Though the illustration in a 36 relates to physical ugliness, Aristotle is really thinking of the ugliness of character in the personages of Comedy, who have been described as being χείρως τῶν νῦν (2, 1448 a 17). Their visible ugliness is part of their ὀψις (see on 6, 1449 b 33), which lies outside the limits of the art of the poet himself.

ἀνάδουνον: comp. a 37 ἀνευ ἀνύης. ἀνύη is a pain that one feels strongly: Plato Crat. 419 c ἀνύη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδότευσις τῆς λύπης κεκλημένη ἐοικεν. The Stoic definition (Diog. Laert. 7. 112) was ἀνύη λύπη ἔπινονος, translated by Cicero (Tusc. 4. 8) by aequum aegriñudo laboriosa.

εὐθὺς: ‘to take the first instance that occurs’; in 10, 1452 a 14 a 36 it means suapté natura (Bon. Ind. 296 a 13).

τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον. For the masks in Comedy see Pollux 4, 143, and Haigh, Att. Th. a 31 p. 242.

αἰσχρὸν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον: Plato Rep. 506 c βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλὰ τε καὶ σκολιά, ἔξω παρ’ ἀλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;

κωμῳδῶν. The correction κωμῳδῶν, which I have now relegated to a note, was suggested by Tyrwhitt’s interpretation of ἑθελονταί, the word being intended to bear the sense of the comic actor, i.e. the actor-poet, since Aristotle is referring to the time when the actor was the poet himself (comp. Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 23). This sense of the word in the Greek of Aristotle’s period has been contested by Mr. H. P. Richards (Class. Rev. 14 p. 201); but I think he has carried his negation too far, more especially as we find

1 Prof. E. Capps also (Trans. of the American Philological Association 31 p. 117) is unable to accept Mr. Richards’ view.
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1449 \*1 the corresponding word τραγῳδοί in the sense of the tragic actors in Poet. 22, 1458 \*32 (v. ad loc.). The traditional doctrine of the grammarians was that κωμῳδοί was used for the actors as well as for the members of the chorus in Comedy: Ammonius π. διαφ. λεξ. p. 86 Valck. Κωμῳδοί καὶ Τραγῳδοί λέγεται ὁ χορευτής καὶ ὑποκριτής (v. also p. 138; comp. Rohde, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 408). That κωμῳδοί may refer to the actors even in strict Attic seems to be shown by Plato Phaedr. 236 c ἐν μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πράγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν, ἀνταποδιδόντες ἄλληλος, in illustration of which W. H. Thompson quotes Aristoph. Eq. 286 sqq. and 361 sqq. For Aristotle’s time, however, the use seems to be pretty clearly established by the language of his contemporary, Chares of Mytilene (ap. Ath. 538 ε): ὑπεκρίθησαν δὲ τραγῳδοὶ μὲν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Ἀριστόκριτος, κωμῳδοὶ δὲ Δικόν καὶ Φορμίων καὶ Ἀρίστων. And half a century after Aristotle this was the normal sense of the term, as is proved by inscriptions of the period (Dittenberger, Syll. p. 517, 519; Lüders, Die dionysischen Künstler p. 187–97), in which the κωμῳδοί or actors are expressly distinguished from the χορευταὶ κωμικοί, who had taken the place occupied by the chorus in the older Comedy. The history of the word, therefore, runs parallel with that of the comic chorus. Whether the comic chorus in its original form was actually extinct or only verging on extinction at the time when Aristotle was writing the Poetics, it is impossible to say (comp. E. Capps, American J. of Archaeology x p. 319); but there is evidence that, whatever its form may have been, it was no longer a very important part of a comedy. And if that was the fact, the gradual restriction of the term κωμῳδοί to the actor would be the natural result of the absence or diminished importance of the chorus in the Comedy of the period.

1450 \*2 ὃδε ποτὲ. Aristotle seems to have had a definite date in his mind. He conceives the history of Attic Comedy to begin with Chionides, who is said to have exhibited as early as B.C. 487 (see on 4, 1448 a 34); but the formal recognition of it by the state must have come later, probably about B.C. 465 (Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles 1 p. 51; comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 503).

Et sic fortasse rectius. Hinc enim poetarum, nascente Comoedia, conditio difficilis maxime apparat, quod non modo Chorum docere sed etiam conducere, nutrire, vestibus alioque omni apparatu instruere necesse haberent (Tyrwhitt). A somewhat similar use of the term seems to have survived at Thebes, where ἐθέλοντις is said to have been the name for the actor in a rude species of burlesque (Sosibius ap. Ath. 621 d)—presumably because the performance was at his own charge and risk. The alternative to Tyrwhitt's interpretation is to suppose the reference to be either to volunteer χορηγοί (comp. Demosth. 21. 13 ὑπεσχόμεν ἐγὼ χορηγήσεων ἐθέλοντις, and Hesych. ἐθέλοντας τοὺς βουλομένους ἃ χορηγοίς), or as Usener (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 424) has suggested, to volunteer actors and chorus-singers.

**σχήματα:** comp. 4, 1448 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 740 a 24. b 3

οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτής, scil. τῆς κωμῳδίας. It has been thought that the form of expression here may imply some slowness to grant the name ποιητής to a comedian (Neil on Aristoph. Eq. 507).

**μημονεύονται.** As soon as Comedy became a state institution, b 4

an official record of the successful poets must have been kept in the public archives; the successful χορηγοί also sometimes set up a similar record on their own account in temples (Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 35; comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 2. 2 p. 152).

**ἀπέδωκεν:** De sensu 2, 438 b 17 ἀποδίδοναι καὶ προσάπτεται ἐκαστὸν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐν τῶν στοιχείοις. In Plato Laws 2, 669 c ἀποδίδοναι and προσαρμόττεται are treated as synonyms.

**προλόγους.** The term is defined in 12, 1452 b 19. The introduction of a 'prologue' in Tragedy was sometimes said to have been due to Thespis: Themist. Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. Θέστις δὲ πρόλογον καὶ ῥήτων ἑξεύρεν. It was obviously a significant moment in the history of the Drama when the play, instead of beginning with a choral song, opened with a statement spoken by an actor.

**πλήθη:** comp. the use of πλήθη in 4, 1449 a 28 and 21, 1458 a 13. b 5

The plural is in keeping with that in προλόγους and μίθους in the context.

**μύθους:** see on b 9.

**Επίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις.** These words, which were first bracketed b 6

by Susemihl (Rh. Mus. 18 p. 376), cannot be retained where they stand. No appropriate verb can be supplied with them; for though Aristotle might have said μύθους ἀπέδωκε, he could hardly have meant to say μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκε. And even if ἀπέδωκε is to be understood, there is an awkward asyndeton in τὸ μὲν ἐξ
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1449a6 ἀρχής, which on this assumption should surely be τὸ μὲν ἄρχης, as is actually read in certain of the apographs. From the reminiscence of this passage (comp. Welcker, Kl. Scr. i p. 330) in Themistius Or. 27 p. 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἡράκτιο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας (ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦσαν Ἑπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμασ), κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηψηθῇ, it would seem that the words Ἑπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμασ were originally part of a clause which came in after ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν, and that what Aristotle wrote was something like this: τὸ δὲ μὲν οὖς ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν (ἦσαν γὰρ Ἑπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμας ἐκείθεν), τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης κτέ. (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 118).

Φόρμας, sometimes called in later writers Φόρμας. On the two forms of the name see Lobeck Pathol. serm. gr. prolegomena p. 502. All that is known of him will be found in Grysar, De Doriensium comedias p. 76 (comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 2. 2 p. 520, and Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 148).

b7 Κράτης: his 'floruit' may be put about b.c. 450. For the fragments of his comedies see Kock, CAF. i p. 130; Meineke, FCG. i p. 58.

b8 ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας. 'Ac mihi quidem hoc Aristoteles significare voluisse videtur, cum Cratinus ceterique antiquiores comici certos quosdam homines in fabulis suis exagitassent populoque ridendos propinassent, Cratenum primum apud Athenien- ses extitisse qui Epicharmi exemplo comicae poesios materiam a singularum hominum irrisione ad generales morum notationes rerumque descriptiones traduceret. . . Quod autem laecessendi consuetudinem omisisse Crates ab Aristotele dicitur, id plane fragmenta fabularum confirmant, in quibus nihil prorsus reperias ex quo certos quosdam homines eum carpsisse intellegatur' (Meineke l. c. p. 59). The 'iambic form' of Comedy is the Old Comedy, which, from the personal nature of its satire, was only one remove from the 'invective' of Archilochus and the Iambo- graphers (4, 1449a4). It is thus characterized in Horace Sat. i. 4. 1: Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae Alque alii, quorum comedia prisca viorum est, Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus aut fur, Quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui Famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.

καθάδου ποιεῖν λόγους is the opposite of περὶ τὸν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ποιεῖν (see 9, 1451b14). The implied antithesis is between a story about some particular person, e.g. Alcibiades, and one about (for instance) 'a man', or 'a man of such and such a type'
(ὁ τοιόνοδε, Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 30), i.e. as we should say, ‘a character’, the representative of a possible class. A ‘character’ is a coherent group of qualities disengaged from the various accidents which coexist with it in the concrete individual; it is therefore in the nature of things something general and attributable to several, whereas the individual as such is unique. Aristotle’s view is that the personages in Crates, as in all the higher forms of poetry, are ‘characters’, i.e. more or less idealized personages, not real men as in History, the Ὑγόσ, and the Old Comedy. How these abstracts of human personality come to get proper names attached to them in the Drama is a point which Aristotle considers at some length in 9, 1451 b 13–22 (comp. 17, 1455 b 12).

μῦθους: i.e. his stories were as imaginary as his personages. b 9
A μῦθος according to Plato Rep. 377 a is a λόγος ψευδής (either taken from legend or invented by the poet himself), though there may be some element of truth in it.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἑποποιία κτ.ē. At this point, the evolution of the Drama having been sketched, Aristotle inserts a provisional note on the points of agreement and difference between Tragedy and epic poetry, which anticipates to a certain extent the longer statement in chaps. 23–24. The two points of agreement had been already intimated, the first in 4, 1448 b 34, and the second in 5, 1449 a 20.

μέχρι μὲν τοῦ . . . εἶναι: 7, 1451 a 10 μέχρι τοῦ σύνθηλος εἶναι.—
Top. 8. 1, 155 b 7 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦ εὐρείν τῶν τόπων ὅμώς τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἡ σκέψις. The construction συνακολούθησιν μέχρι occurs in Phys. 1. 5, 188 b 26 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου σχεδόν συνακολούθησαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι,—where also συνακολούθησιν, just like ἀκολούθησιν here, is the opposite of διαφέρειν (188 b 30: comp. Bon. Ind. 26 a 23). In these and similar instances the preposition μέχρι is to be understood as inclusive of that which is mentioned as the limit (comp. Eucken, Sprachgebr. p. 17). A difficulty has been found in ἡ κολούθησιν (by Thurot and Spengel), on the ground that it would be more natural to speak of Tragedy following the Epic than of the Epic following Tragedy. This view assumes that ἀκολούθησιν must mean to ‘follow after’ in order of time, whereas the word may very well mean ‘go with’ (comp. Rhet. 1. 6, 1362 a 29), i.e. ‘agree with’. The aorist seems to imply that the fact has been already recognized.

μὲν τοῦ. With the traditional reading μόνον (retained by Vahlen) the infinitive εἶναι which follows is out of construction.

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1449 b 10 (διὰ) μέτρου μεγάλου. For the preposition comp. 1, 1447 a 27 διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων μυθμῶν.—b 11 διὰ τριμέτρων.—b 16 διὰ τῶν μέτρων.—b 1449 b 30 διὰ μέτρων. As here used, μέτρον μέγα seems to mean a large kind of verse, one fitted for a large subject (comp. 4, 1449 a 6 μείζονα σχήματα). The hexameter is a metre of this description (24, 1460 a 3); and Aristotle may be presumed, I think, to have taken the same view of the tragic iambic as corresponding to the μέγεθος of the tragic stories, and the gravity of the tragic diction (comp. 4, 1449 b 19). Vahlen, retaining the manuscript reading μέχρι μόνον μέτρου μεγάλου, takes μέτρον μέγα to mean 'spatium magnum sive lines ampli'; this, however, is hardly probable with τὸ μέτρον in the sense of 'metre' in the very next line (comp. Gomperz, Zu Aristoteles' Poetik i p. 25).

The following are some of the attempts at emending this passage: μέχρι μόνον μέτρου μετὰ λόγου (the Aldine, and corr. Parisinus 2038 b); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μέτρου [μετὰ λόγου] (Tyrwhitt); μέχρι μόνον τοῦ διὰ λόγου έμμέτρου μεγάλου (Ueberweg); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ [μέτρου μεγάλου] (Christ).

μίμησις ... σπουδαίων: as was said in 4, 1448 b 34. σπουδαίων is presumably neuter (comp. 4, 1448 b 34, and the note on 3, 1448 a 19).

b 11 τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν, scil. τὴν ἐποποιίαν. ἀπλοῦν is the opposite of ποικίλον (comp. Bon. Ind. 76 b 12); the contrast is between the one metre of the Epic (v. 24, 1459 b 32) and the variety of metres in Tragedy.

ταύτη. In illustration of the construction Vahlen quotes 23, 1459 a 30 ταύτη θεσπέσιος ἐν φανείῃ ... τῷ μηδὲ τῶν πάλευμαν ... ἐπιχειρήσας ποιεῖν ὀλον.—Pol. 7. 15, 1334 a 41 ὁδ ταύτη διαφέροντες τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν.—Plato Rep. 605 a τῷ πρὸς έτερον τοιούτων ὁμολείων ... ταύτη ὡραται.

b 12 ἐτι δὲ τῷ μήκει: scil. διαφέρει ἡ ἑποποιία. Having laid this down, however, Aristotle remembers that the difference did not always exist; he accordingly repeats his original proposition by a resumptive καὶ τοὺτο διαφέρει (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. b 2. 1 p. 660), in order to introduce a qualifying clause, καὶ τοῦ τὸ πρῶτον κτέ. The clause marked as a parenthesis is equivalent to ἡ μὲν γὰρ κτέ. (actually found in some apographs), and is similar in form to that in 4, 1449 a 19 (v. ad loc.).

1 Perhaps also the Arabic translation (Margoliouth, A. O. p. 54); it is certainly implied in the paraphrase 'metrico sermone' of Averroes (p. 359 Heidenhain).
tô μήκει. Aristotle is thinking of a very obvious fact, viz. that an epic (the Iliad or Odyssey, for instance) runs to several thousand lines, whereas a tragedy rarely exceeds some 1,600. This difference he never loses sight of; he notes it in 17, 1455 b 16, and (in a context just like the present) in 24, 1459 b 17 (διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συντάξεως τὸ μήκος ἡ ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον); and he returns to it in his concluding chapter (26, 1462 a 18), where the comparative merits of the two forms of poetry are under discussion. These parallels, as Teichmüller has seen, are enough to show that μήκος must denote here not the ambitus actionis, the imaginary duration of the action of the poem, as is often supposed, but rather the real length of the work itself, a length to be measured by the number of lines the work would take up in a book, or the hours it would need for recitation. It has the same sense in 7, 1451 a 6 and in 24, 1459 b 18. A reason for this difference of length, one quite sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, is given in the parenthesis, ἡ μὲν δὲ μάλιστα κτῆ. He regards it as the natural consequence of another kind of difference, viz. the fact that the action in a Greek tragedy is as a rule kept within a limit of some 24 hours, whereas that in an epic may extend over weeks, or even years. There being this difference, therefore, in the extent of the action, the quantum of matter to be included in the story, it is only natural that there should be a corresponding difference in the length of the literary statement in the two instances, and that an epic poem accordingly should be of greater length than a tragedy. A certain correspondence between the length and the quantum of matter in a poem is recognized in 26, 1462 b 2. Assuming this correspondence, Aristotle explains the great length of an epic, as compared with a tragedy, as due to the great length of time over which the epic action extends. In other words, he passes from the idea of the actual length, the actual time required for the recitation, to that of the imaginary time covered by the action of the poem; and he does this on the tacit assumption that the two things are so closely connected that the one may serve to explain the other (comp. Ueberweg, Aristoteles über Dichtkunst p. 57). Teichmüller's theory, that Aristotle is referring in the parenthesis to the time of the actual recitation or performance 1, and thinking

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1 The idea of some of the older dramatic critics, that in a perfect drama the actual time of the performance and the supposed time of the action of the piece would coincide, is not unlike that which Teichmüller reads into the text of Aristotle.
of the series of dramas (a trilogy or tetralogy) presented on the stage in a single day, may be set aside at once, not only on archaeological grounds, but also because it assumes an impossible sense for ἐπὶ μᾶλλον περίοδον ἡλιοῦ.

περίοδος means much the same thing as βούλεται in 2, 1448 ἐ 18. The same anxiety to avoid overstatement is to be seen in ὅτι μάλιστα and ἡ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν in the context.

μᾶλλον περίοδον ἡλιοῦ cannot be, as Teichmüller imagines, a way of describing the natural day of 12 hours or so; the periphrasis is deliberately chosen in order to make it clear that the solar day of 24 hours is meant. A περίοδος of the sun is not its half-circuit, but its circuit, i.e. the time it takes to come round again to an assumed starting-point. For other Aristotelian instances of this sense of the word see Bon. Ind. 582 ἐ 29. The statement in the text was often quoted in former times as evidence for the assertion that the so-called 'Unity of Time' was one of Aristotle's rules for the Drama. 'The stage', says Sydney in his Apology for Poetry (p. 63 Arber), 'should always represent but one place; and the uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by Aristotle's precept and common sense, but one day.' What Aristotle actually says is not a precept, but only an incidental recognition of a fact in the practice of the theatre in his age. The same is true also of the 'Unity of Place', which was believed to be implied as a rule in 24, 1459 ἐ 25. The 'Unity of Action', however, is very emphatically asserted in chaps. 8-11 and elsewhere.

μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν = 'to vary, or depart, from that only a little', i.e. 'to exceed that limit only a little'. The reference is not to variation within the limit, but to variation beyond it.

In the earliest drama, says Aristotle, the Unity of Time was not observed with strictness, any more than it is in epic poetry. This passage has been discussed by M. Maurice Croiset (Rev. des Études grecques 1 p. 373; comp. Heimsoeth, De tragœdias graecae trilogiis p. iv), who suggests that Aristotle may be referring to the period anterior to the institution of the trilogy, when a long tragic story, instead of being dealt with in three tragedies, may be supposed to have been told in one. It is clear that the action in such a play would be very like that of an epic, and cover a longer time than 24 hours. One may ask how in the absence of some device like the modern curtain the lapse of time between act and act could be sufficiently indicated; and one may also ask whether there was the same chorus throughout the
performance. These are difficulties which we have now no means of answering.

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις. The preposition shows that Aristotle is thinking not of the time of the performance, but of something within the play, the imaginary time of the action in it (Ribbeck, Rh. Mus. 24, 135); comp. 13, 1453 b 25 τούτο δρᾶ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις.

μέρη: i.e. the constituents enumerated and distinguished in 6, 1449 b 31 sqq. The parts peculiar to Tragedy are melody and 'spectacle' (24, 1459 b 10).

διόπερ κτλ. Similarly in chaps. 23-24, before explaining the differences between epic poetry and Tragedy, Aristotle is at some pains to show that a good epic will have much the same structure as a good tragedy, and that in most respects the same canons of construction are applicable to it (23, 1459 a 17-24, b 17). The corollary ends at ἐπὶ ὅν; what follows (ἀ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.) is a reason in support of the main statement (b 16).

περὶ ... τῆς ἐν ἐξαμέτρους μυητικῆς: in chaps. 23-24.

περὶ κωμῳδίας: in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.

ἀναλαβόντες: Top. 6, 14, 151 b 19 καλῶς εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβέν. 1449 b 23
—Meteor. i. 3, 339 a 33 ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς εἶκ ἀρχῆς θέσεις .... λέγομεν.—1. 8, 345 b 31 ὡμείς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ἑποκειμένην ἀρχὴν ἡμᾶς.—Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 27 ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγομεν.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τῶν γινόμενον = τὸν γινόμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. For the hyperbaton comp. Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 a 12 τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ο λέγων ἥ εἶναι ἡ ἑσεθαι ψεύσται.—Eth. N. 8. 16, 1163 b 18 εἰς δύναμιν δὲ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ (also Kühner, Gr. Gr. 9 2. 1 p. 616).1

ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας: the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp. Metaph. Z 13, 1039 a 19 δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἑλέχθη πάλαι ἡ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὅρον ἡ μάλιστα.—De part. an. i. 1, 642 a 26 ὄρισασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν.—4. 5, 678 a 34 τῷ λόγῳ ... τῷ ὄριζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν.

ἐστὶν οὖν τραγῳδία κτλ. The definition, which is in logical form, per genus et differentias, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that.

1 There is no hyperbaton in An. post. i. 34, 89 b 14 πάντα γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ μέσα ὅ iδιον τὰ ἀκρα ἐγνώρισε, which has been cited as an instance of it. The sense shows that ὅ iδιον is to be taken with τὰ ἀκρα, and that the accusatives before it are the object of ἐγνώρισε.
That Tragedy is a μίμησις was said in 1, 1447a13; and that it is a μίμησις πράξεως is implied in 1, 1447a28. (2) σπουδαίας, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and 4, 1448b34—καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχουσης being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in 4, 1449a19. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in 1, 1447b24-8; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in 3, 1448a23-28. But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it, δι' ἐλέον καὶ φόβου, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term προαιρετική in the definition of virtue in Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106b36, and reserving the formal explanation of προαιρετικός for 3. 4, 1111b4. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (De anima 1. 1, 403a25; Metaph. H 2, 1043a14).

τελείας μέγεθος ἔχουσης. The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (7, 1450b24). We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a τελεία πράξεις, but from the explanatory μέγεθος ἔχουσης Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the μέγεθος mentioned already in 4, 1449a19 as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.

ηδυσμένως: Plato Rep. 607a εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦςαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἡ ἐπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλείσσετον. The word is taken from cookery (comp. De sensu 4, 442a10). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive ἡδυσμη, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406a19 οὐ γὰρ ἡδόςματι χρήσῃ ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδόματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ('the sauce with him is the dish'). Said of language ἡδυσμένος implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as κοσμηθήσαται in 4, 1449a29 meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp. 6, 1450b11) may perhaps be recognized in Plutarch Erot. 769c λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδόςματα τὰ μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ μυθικοῦ καὶ παραμόστασα, also in Strabo 818 Cas.
The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare, Hamlet 2. 2 I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury.

έκαστόν τῶν εἰδῶν: scil. τῶν ἢδυσμάτων, understood from ἢδυσμένην. Similarly in Isocrates 190 οδ περὶ τοῦτον δηλῶσαι μὴ μάνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασίν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔνοις τὰ δὲ κανοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπετον ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διασταυρίζει τὴν ποίησιν one may supply τῶν ὀνόματων with εἰδεσι. For another instance of this allusive use of εἰδος see 25, 1461 b 22. In what follows (b 29) εκάστω τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by τοῖς εἴδεσι; the reading of the MS., έκάστων, seems to have arisen through χωρίς having been mistaken for a preposition. The juxtaposition of χωρίς and εκάστω εἰδῶν is just like that in Pol. 7, 1, 1323 b 41 καὶ χωρίς εκάστων καὶ κοινῆ ταῖς πόλεσιν (comp. χωρίς εκάστων in De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13, b 27). The implied antithesis in the present passage is between ‘each separately’ (χωρίς), and ‘all together, and at once’ (ἄμα: comp. De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13, and Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the ἢδυσμα of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on 1, 1447 b 28). έκάστω, therefore, is loosely put for έκατέρω (comp. Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38, and HSt. s. v.).

δρώτων: scil. τῶν μιμομένων, the subject being omitted as it is b 26 in a 13, b 31, 1450 a 10, a 21, and 26, 1461 b 29. Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in Bon. Ind. 149 b 29. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies μίμησις with δρώτων, comparing 3, 1448 a 29 μιμοέναι δρώτας.

οὐ δὲ ἀπαγγέλλα: scil. μιμομένων.

δὲ ἔλεος καὶ φόβος means practically δὲ ἔλεεινων καὶ φοβερῶν, ‘by b 27 piteous and alarming scenes’; comp. Goulston’s paraphrase, ‘per misericordiam metumque factis expressum’. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp. b 30 διὰ μέτρων περαιόνσθαι.—De part. an. 3. 4, 666 b 15 περαιόνσηται [scil. αἱ κινήσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἔλεειν καὶ ἀνέναλ.—Plato Gorg. 450 ν διὰ λόγου πάν περαιόνση.—Rep. 392 ν διὰ ἀρμοφι-τέρων περαιόνσην (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85). This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its κάθαρσις of such emotions.
t€v tov toioitov ev.thmatov katharov, 'its catharsis of such emotions', just as πoioi sarai t€v miropov (1, 1447 b 22 ; 6, 1449 b 31) means 'to make their imitation, and πoioi t€v idouyn (4, 1448 b 18), 'to produce its pleasure' (comp. 4, 1448 b 7, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 593). The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in Pol. 8, 7 (v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed. Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. t€v toioitov ev.thmatov, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general.

The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of katharos. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away'; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation.

I.

This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage: 'Ex his quae de Musica dicuntur [i.e. in Pol. 8, 7], colligere licet, opinor, Aristotelem similem quandam ratiocinationem de poesi etiam

1 See H. Weil, Ueber die Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles, Verhandl. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel, p. 149 (comp. his Études sur le drame antique, p. 158); the article of Bernays is reprinted in his Zwei Abhandlungen p. 1. I have shown elsewhere (J. of Phil. 27 p. 267) that the pathological interpretation of katharos was not unknown in Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
tragedia instituisset, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoedii vehementissime excitatur, non ex eo nutriti et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectionem magis aptae sint.'

To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (τό θρηνόδες, τό ἀλεοφόρον) and our faculty for laughter; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (Rep. 605 c–606 c). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment. Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction: οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ ἄλλος ἡλικίων ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀρχαιοτήτων, διὸτε πρὸς τὸν τοιούτου ἀντὶς καιρὸς χρηστέον ἐν ὑδίς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δίναται ἢ μάθησιν. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music; and that κάθαρσις is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter. A much more important passage, however, is that in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32, which will be found in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into ἡλικία, πρακτική, and ἐνθουσιαστική μέλη, and a similar

1 The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 6); (2) that which imitates action (comp. Plato Rep. 399 A), and moves us to it; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'.
classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree (ισχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions. Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (κατοκώχιμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (καθωσταμένοι: comp. Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8), just as though they had undergone a cure or catharsis at the hands of a physician (ώσπερ ιατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως). The same sort of treatment (πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings; all want a certain catharsis, a pleasurable relief (κοπτιξειθεία) from emotion. And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of καθάρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on 8. 6, 1341 a 23: 'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'; and again in that on 8. 7, 1342 a 6 (τῶ δὲ ἦττον διαφέρει καὶ τῶ μάλλον) : 'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur' (comp. J. of Phil. 27 p. 269). The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine, 

1 To the passages in Italian writers quoted in this article I may add one from A. S. Minturnus (1559), De Poeta p. 64: 'Quamobrem cum miserabiles horribilesque eventus Tragoedia spectandos ad perturbationum vacuitatem in medium proferat, non est profecto, si miserationem commovet pavoremque infert, quod morbos animi alere atque augere videatur. An Platoni, nedum Aristoteli Musica probatur, quae nisi motus in animo cieret, nunquam sane eum purgaret. Nam aequo sunt oris qui essent concitati, cum modis ac numeris canticisque sacris, qui ad animi expiationem adhiberi solent, uterentur, seu quidem ita explabantur, ac si aliqua potione purgaretur; Homericca poesis, quod vir mentis et ad miserationem et ad timendum movemant, improbanda est! Scilicet ad depellendam negrationem, quae veneni instar habet, vis ciens in corpore motiones medicina vehementis noxiaque naturae excitatur; ad morborum expiationem animus commoveri non debet?' The parallel statement in his Arte Poetica p. 77 is: 'Nè più forza haurà il Physico di spengere il fervido veleno della infermità, che'l corpo afflige, con la velenosas medicina; che 'l Tragico di purgar l'animo delle impetuose perturbationi.'
as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for iatreia (ὡσπερ Ι449b 27
iatreias τυχόντας καὶ καθάροσεως), in a context too which presents a
whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical
meaning (πάθος, πάσχειν, λογισμός, κίνησις, κατοκώχυμοι, καθιστα-
μένοις, κοψίζονται, καθαρίκαι)¹. In Greek physiology and pathology
katharos is a very general term for a physical clearance or
discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some
bodily product (some περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which,
if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm. The
katharos of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process
in reference to certain emotions (πάθη)—the tacit assumption
being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to
those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient
humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system
by the appropriate katharos. With some adaptation of the state-
ments and hints in Pol. 8. 7, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to
recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the
cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human
nature, and in some men (τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς) they
are present in a disquieting degree (逻χυρός). With these latter the
tragic excitement is a necessity (ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν); but it is also
in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine,
producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the soul (κοψί-
ζονται²) of the accumulated emotion within it; and as the relief is
wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process
of relief. This, then, may be taken as Aristotle’s answer to the
Platonic argument in the Republic; it shows that the pleasure we
derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had
maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure
(χαρὰ ἄβλαβής). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed
throughout the Poetics (see especially 14.1453b 11), but its pre-
cise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or else-
where, by Aristotle. It falls naturally enough, however, into its
place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics,
which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable
not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of
the nature of cures or remedies (iatreiai) to remove the disquietude

¹ Nearly all these terms are to be found in the Oeconomia Hippocratis of
Foës; see Döring’s Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 319 for a discussion of them.
² Comp. Probl. 4. 30, 880a 31 ὁδὸς οὖν πολὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη πολλάκις
ἐπιθυμεῖν τούτους ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι κοψίζονται γὰρ.
arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal con-
dition of body or mind (Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34; 7. 15, 1154 b 17).
The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts
as an ἱατρεία or κάθαρσις, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one
of those described by Aristotle as ἱατρείωντα ὑδέα. A further point
in his idea of κάθαρσις may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at
any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on
the mind. A catharsis in the medical sense of the word is an ἱατρεία,
and only for occasional use; and its analogue, the παθη-
μάτων κάθαρσις, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this
respect. In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic
rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have
been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to
have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not
sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or
make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point
overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the
modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp.

In the phrase παθημάτων κάθαρσις the genitive after κάθαρσις,
denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction
not uncommon in Aristotle’s physiological writings (v. Bon. Ind.
354 b 22); and it is found also in other authors, e.g. Hippocrates 1
p. 104 K. πτυχέων καβάρσεις.—p. 654 καβάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ
σώματος.—3 p. 502 τῶν ἀπὸ πλευρικῶν καβάρσεις.—Thucydidès
2. 49 ἀποκαβάρσεις χολής.—Demosthenes 64. 12 κάθαρσις αἵματος.
—Polybius 5. 100. 6 ἀνακάθαρσις πτώματος. The same construc-
tion is found with κάθαρσις (etc.) in its metaphorical application to
the analogous process in the mind: Plato Phaed. 69 b κάθαρσις τις
τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, ‘a purging away of all such things’ (Jowett),
where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context
to be certain affections of the soul (ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων).—Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 f τῶν
παθῶν τοιῶν τοιούμενοι εἰς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποκαβάρσεις.—Iamblichus
De myst. 1. 12 κάθαρσις παθῶν.—Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124
(Needham) ἡ τῶν ὕμνιμωσίνων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις.—p. 134 κάθαρσις
τῆς σοφίας.—p. 194 ἀποκαβάρσις νείκους.

1 Comp. what is said of the flute and its cathartic music in Pol. 8. 6,
1341 a 21.
2 Aristotle’s τῆς τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσις may perhaps be an
unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato.
The idea of κάθαρσις, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics.

(1) In his very curious chapter on the ἀκροβούρακες, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (Qu. conv. 3, 6, 657 A) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—

ἀστερ γὰρ ἡ θρησκεία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλός ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κυνεῖ καὶ δάκρυνον ἐκβάλλει [ἐκκατε Ἐμπεριός], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οίκτον οὔτα κατὰ μικρὸν ἔξαιρε [ἐξερὰ Bernays] καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικὸν ὁμοίως θῶς δυν καὶ τῶν εἰδών, ὡς ἐκάθαρτος καὶ παροξύζῃ τὸ ἀκμαίον καὶ θυμοειδὲς, αὐτὸς καταδύοντα [ἡ καταδύοντα], καὶ καθίστάντα τὴν διάνυσιν ὑπὸ πορρωτέρω μέθης προϊόουσαν ἃσωχάζειν.

(2) The language in Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn), on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—

dιὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ἄστις ταῦτας παραπλῆσιοι λόγοι τυός ἐκσθαί φασιν, ὅπος ἄν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἡ τύχην ὕπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῦτας μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ἀρχήσεων ἀμα παρισίας ἐκκαθαίρηται.

(3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of κάθαρσις. In De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey), writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere ἀποκάθαρσις, a working-off or evacuation (ἀπέρασις) of some morbid product within the soul:—

ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν εἰστειλαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτῷ κλητον. ὅθεν γὰρ κατὰ νόσημα τι ἠ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρῶτος ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δὲ αὐτὸν συνιστάται ἡ πάσα ἀνωθεν ἀρχή καὶ καταβολή.

There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage har-
monizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula, ὁσπερ
iatreías τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage
is in De myst. I. 11:—

αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν
εἰργάσεις καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, καὶ ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχείαν [so
Bernays; βραχείς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προσγομένου
χαίροντες μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦντα, καὶ ἐνέτειθεν ἀποκαθαίρομεναι
πεῖθι καὶ οὐ πρὸς βιαν ἀναπαῦνται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τε κωμῳδίᾳ
καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἄλλοτρα πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη καὶ
μετρώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.

The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the
passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with
impunity; that they require an occasional outlet (comp. ἀποκαθαίρο-
μεναι) to keep them quiet; and that the secret of our interest
in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (τὰ οἰκεία πάθη
ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a
pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him.
But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it
an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the catharsis of
passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (μετρώ-
tερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many
centuries the interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις now usually
associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing.

(4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many contro-
sensual points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's
Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under
Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was
that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions
which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were
not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of
some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view
of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle; his
reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make
one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the
now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its
existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower
of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing
the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original.

Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus
and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus
reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. Proclus ὑπηματῶν κάθαρσις) rather than a directly moral effect; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus δεόμενα δὲ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp. παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus πάθη ... ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus ἀνεισχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ... ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with ἀποκάθαρσις or ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term, κάθαρσις.

II.

Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of παθηματῶν κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day. Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i.e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of κάθαρσις. The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows:

1. Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.).

2. The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.).

3. The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary

woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.).

(4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl).

(5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann).

The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind. But as with every virtue, according to Aristotle, there are on either side of it extremes of excess and defect, between which it stands as a mean, Tragedy, if it is to turn pity into virtue, must be able to purify us from both extremes of pity; and it must do the same thing with fear likewise.' The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too

1 'Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts andern beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserem Philosophen, sich diesesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen. Das tragische Mitleid muss nicht allein, in Ansehung des Mitleids, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher zu viel Mitleid fühlt, sondern auch desjenigen, welcher zu wenig empfindet. Die tragische Furcht muss nicht allein, in Ansehung der Furcht, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher sich ganz und gar keines Unglücks befurchtet, sondern auch desjenigen, den ein jedes Unglück, auch das entfernteste, auch das unwahrscheinlichste, in Angst setzt' (Hamb. Dram. St. 78). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him (v. Zerbst, Ein Vorläufer Lessing's in der Aristotelesinterpretation p. 29), Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement.
occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers (v. supra, p. 176). (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e.g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities, ἐκ τῶν ὀρμοίων ἐνεργεῖας αἱ ἔξεσι γίνονται (Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103b 21). We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (Poet. 14, 1453 b 11). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of catharsis of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true raison d'être of the theatre.

ἀρμονίαν καὶ μέλος. The καὶ is explanatory, μέλος being added b 29 as a synonym to explain ἀρμονία (v. on i, 1447 b 22).

διὰ μέτρων is opposed to διὰ μέλους: comp. Probl. 19. 31, b 30 920a 12 διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων.—Plato Symp. 187 δ μέλεσι τε καὶ μέτροις.—Lysis 205 λ ὅ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκούσται οὐδὲ μέλος.—Isocrates 191 β ταῖς χώδει καὶ τοῖς μέτροις.
COMMENTARY

1449 b 31 πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μύησιν, scil. oi μμούμενοι. Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on 3, 1443 a 23). πράττοντες recalls the idea of the ὃρωντων in the preceding definition of Tragedy.

b 33 ὁ τῆς ὀψεως κόσμος. ὡφις is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or mise en scène; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre.' This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the actors when got up in character by the σκηνοποιός or costumier (see on 6, 1450 b 20). Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula ὁ τῆς ὀψεως κόσμος implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on 4, 1449 a 29), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v. 6, 1450 b 16), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v. 14, 1453 b 7). The term ὡφις like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166).

μελοποιία (properly the making of μέλη) replaces the original term μέλος as a synonym for it; comp. 6, 1450 b 16, and Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 23 τὴν μουσικὴν ὃρωμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν ὁδον.

b 34 λέγω δὲ λέειν μὲν ταὐτήν is to be compared with λέγω γὰρ μὴν τοῦτον in 6, 1450 a 4 (v. ad loc.). A definition is given because λέεις is a term with several meanings (v. on 21, 1459 a 12). The present definition describes the λέεις in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in 6, 1450 b 13, views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.

b 35 μέτρον has the concrete sense of 'verses', like τοῖς μέτροισ in 1, 1447 a 29 (comp. on b 30).

b 36 πᾶσαν. πᾶσαν, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus (fr. 165 Diels), ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ πάντες ἵσμεν. But no change is really wanted; instead of defining μελοποιία Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεως ἔστι κτέ. Comp. μίμησις πράξεως in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its ὡφις, λέεις and μελοποιία, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content. The subject in a
tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as agents. The μῦθος, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the ήθος and διάνοια manifested in the language of the dramatic personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp. 9, 1451 b 7).

ποιούσ τινας εἶναι κατά τὸ ήθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Intellectual as well as moral states are included under ποιώντες (Cat. 8, 8 b 29). A little further on, however, in 1450 a 5, Aristotle uses the term ποιούσ τινας as though it naturally referred rather to the ήθος or moral character. For the antithesis between ήθος and διάνοια comp. Pol. 8. i, 1337 a 38 οὐδὲ φανέρων πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ήθος, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the ἡθικὰ and the διανοητικὰ ἀρτηρία.

πέφυκεν begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his ήθος and his διάνοια; these are the inner causes of men's actions, and of the success or failure of their lives. πέφυκεν is, like the Platonic φύσιν ἔχει (Rep. 473 a, 489 b), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from Pol. 2. 2, 1261 b 7 οὐτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.—4. 12, 1296 b 26 ἑνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, and Demothenes 14, 30 τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν.

κατὰ ταύτας = κατὰ τὰς πράξεις; comp. a 19 κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις 2 εἰδαίμονες ἡ τούναντίον.

τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μύθουσ. To complete the statement Aristotle might very well have added a clause like τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἡθη καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι; and it has been suggested (J. of Phil. 5 p. 119) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out. In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point (τῆς μὲν πράξεως κτέ.) is enough to suggest it (comp. De interpr. 14, 23 b 30, and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of μὲν solitarius comp. 26, 1462 b 5, and Waitz on An. pr. 2. 11, 61 a 19.

tοῦτον (= τοῦτο) is preparative and explained by τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in 22, 1458 a 26.


1450a4 ἀνίγματος τε γὰρ ἰδέα ἀυτὴ ἐστὶ, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάγαγι (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.2 2, 1 p. 74).

6 διάνοιαν, scil. εἶναι λέγω. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that διάνοια is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatis personae (comp. infra b 11). The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in 19, 1456a34—b 8—where we are told among other things that the διάνοια of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words. Διάνοια in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like ἵθος, an element in the personality of the dramatis personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do. Hence it is that the general theory of the διάνοια in a play is said (19, 1456a34) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of διάνοια in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on b 6). The term answering to Aristotle’s διάνοια in Isocrates is ἔνθυμήματα, arguments: Isocr. 191 λ ἐμὲ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἀπαντὰ ποιοῦσιν . . . ἀ τοσαίτην ἔχει χάριν, ὅστ’ ἀν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχοι κακός, ὅμοις αὐταῖς ταῖς εἰρήμησις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις φυσιγγυγούσα τοῖς ἀκούονται.—319 φ καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικότερα καὶ ποικιλώτερα τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὑγιωδεστέρους καὶ καυστέρους χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσι κ.λ.γ.λ.γ.λ.γ.λ.γ.

λέγοντες: comp. b 6 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων, and b 7 πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας. Aristotle is thinking more immediately of the ῥήσεις in a tragedy, and of the intellectual, i.e. the rhetorical or argumentative, capacity they may reveal in the personages.

7 ἀποδεικνύοντι τι: b 11 ἀποδεικνύοντο τι ὡς ἐστιν ἢ ὡς οἷς ἐστιν.—19, 1456a37 τὸ τε ἀποδεικνύονται καὶ τὸ λέειν.—Rhet. I. I. 1355a5 ἢ δὲ πίστεις ἀπόδειξις τοῖς τὸ γὰρ πιστεύομεν μᾶλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεῖξθαι ὑπολάβωμεν.

ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. The equivalent in b 12 is the more general expression, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται, but it is hardly worth while to bring the two passages into unison by restoring here (with Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 155) ἢ καθόλου ἀποφαίνοντα, on the assumption that γνώμην may have come in as a gloss. A γνώμη as defined in the Rhetoric is a maxim, or general proposition relating to the conduct of life: Rhet. 2. 21, 1394a21 ἐστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπό-
μέρη εἶναι ἔξ. An answer to the question announced in 1, 8 1447 a 10 ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποιῶν ἑστὶ μορέων.

καθ' ὁ ποιά τις ἐστίν ἡ πραγματία. The word μέρος being ambiguous (Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12; Z 10, 1034 b 32), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12. The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as ποία τις—as good or bad, as ἐθική or πεπλεγμένη or παθητική, or whatever else may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.

οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν = οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν. The ὁς εἰπεῖν which 12 follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after πάν in the next line. Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian, οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ἄλλα πάντες, on which that formerly suggested by myself, ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ἄπαντες (J. of Phil. 14 p. 44), was based. οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness. The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in a 15, a 36, and 18, 1456 a 3, where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts. For the sense of ἔχει in this passage (= 'admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp. 2, 1448 a 7; and for the distinction between it and κέχρηται, Eth. N. 7, 4, 1146 b 32 ὁ ἐξών μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.—1147 a 1 ἔχοντα μὲν ἄμφοτέρας [scil. τὰς προτάσεις] οὖσι καλεῖ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μείτοι τῇ καθόλου ἄλλα μῇ τῇ κατὰ μέρος (comp. Bon. Ind. 854 b 37).

εἰδεῖν: see on 4, 1449 a 7.

ὄψεις: see on 6, 1449 b 33.
1450 a 13 πάν, i.e. every play; comp. 12, 1452 b 18 ἀπάντων.—18, 1456 a 31 εἴς ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο.

a 15 μέγιστον κτί. Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the μὐθος. As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the μὐθος or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the μὐθος. The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: 'The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play' (H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379).

η τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις = δ μὐθος. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp. 4, 1449 a 19; 6, 1449 b 25), it must have a plurality of incidents (πράγματα) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 2 sqq.

a 17 βίον: Plato Laws 817 b ἁμέσως ἐσμέν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὑπὶ καλλιστῆς ἀμα καὶ ἀριστης' πάσα οὖν [Π τοῦ] ήμιν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μιμησις τοῦ καλλιστοῦ καὶ ἀριστοῦ βίου, δ ἰη φαμεν ἁμέσως γε ἀνταποδιδοῖ τὴν ἄληθεστάτην.—Lycurgus in Leocr. 102 οἱ ποιηται μομούμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βίων. Alcides described the Odyssey as a καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνον βίων κάτωτερον (Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 12). Of Menander also it was said: Ὡ Μένανδρο καὶ βίε, πότερον ἀρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμισήσατο; (Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249).

καὶ εὐδαιμονίας: Plato Rep. 603 c πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητική βιαίως ἡ εὐκοινίας πράξεως καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἡ εὐ ολομένων ἡ κακῶς πεπραγέναι.

a 18 ἐν πράξει. According to the definition in Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098 a 16 happiness is a certain kind of activity, a ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν. Comp. Phys. 2. 6, 197 b 4 ἡ δε εὐδαιμονία πράξεος τύς ἐνπραξία γάρ. —Pol. 7. 3, 1325 a 32 ἡ γάρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεος ἐστιν (also Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 21; Rhet. 1. 5, 1360 b 14).

tὸ τέλος: Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 18 πράξεως τυεσ λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ τέλος.
6. 1450 a 13-26

οὐ ποιότης: Eth. N. 10. 2, i173 a 14 οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνερ- 1450 a 18
gεια ποιότητες εἶσαι, οὐδὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

πράττονει: scil. οἱ μυμᾶσσαν. The reference is to the actors a 21

(see on 3. 1448 a 23) rather than the poets.

συμπεριλαμβάνοντες, scil. ἐν τῇ μυμᾶσσα, 'they include in the
representation'; συμπεριλαμβάνοντες in this sense is not infrequent
in later Greek (v. HSt. s. v.). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to
reject it for the reading of one of the apographs, συμπεριλαμβάνοντες,
though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are
apt to confuse the two prepositions.

διὰ τὰς πράξεις: διὰ in this connexion must mean 'with a view a 22
to', 'for the sake of', as in Thuc. 2. 89. 4 διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν.
καὶ ὁ μύθος. The καὶ is explanatory, 'that is to say'.

τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων: modelled on the proverb in Plato a 23
Rep. 377 λ ἀρχὴ παντός ἔργον μέγιστον, which reappears in Aris-
totle Soph. cl. 33, 183 b 22 μέγιστον γὰρ ὑπὸς ἀρχῆς παντὸς, ὥσπερ
λέγεται.—Probl. 10. 13, 892 a 29 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργον
μέγιστον ἦμισυ γὰρ.

τῶν νέων. As it is clear from 14, 1453 b 28 that Euripides is not a 25
classed among the old poets (οἱ παλαιοὶ), οἱ νέοι, 'the moderns,'
must mean the poets from Euripides downwards. It is to be
observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter
distinguishes between οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ νέοι, the point noted as
characteristic of 'the moderns' (ῥητορικὸς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας) is
manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him
by the ancients themselves (see on ῥητορικὸς, b 8).

ἄθροις: 24, 1460 a 11 οὐδὲν ἄθροι ἄλλα ἐχοῦσα ἡθο. ἄθροις is,
like other compounds of a privativum (De anima 2. 10, 422 a 26;
Metaph. Δ 22, 1022 b 32), an ambiguous word, as it may mean
either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'.
Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with
personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable.
The language in the illustration which follows from painting,
οὐδὲν ἔχει ἡθος, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration,
just like that in the saying of Pope, Most women have no
characters at all.

τοιοῦτοι: i. e. ἄθροις. a 26

οἶνον . . . πέπονθεν: De gen. an. 5. 3, 783 a 6 ἐστὶ ὁ ἐνα τῶν
ζῴων ὀ ἀληθῶν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ἦττον δὲ λεπτὴν, οἶνον τὸ τῶν
dαυσπίδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν.—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 22
οἶνον ἐὰν ῥηγίδωρον φωνῇ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὕποκρίτων.
COMMENTARY

1450 a 26 γραφέων. For other illustrations from painting see on 2. 1448 a 5.

a 27 Πολύγνωτον. The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 37 τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἡ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἦστιν ἡβικός.

a 28 Ζεύξιδος. This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in 25, 1461 b 12, would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.

a 29 ὑψηλος: i. e. the speeches put into the mouths of the personages in a play or poem (comp. 15, 1454 a 31; 18, 1456 a 31). The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.

ηβικὸς. In the Rhetoric the ηβικὸς λόγος is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's ήθος, in contradistinction to the παθητικὸς λόγος, which addresses the feelings, and the ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος, which addresses the reason of his audience. In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of ηβικὸς is μιμητικὸς ήθος, 'expressive of character' (comp. Bon. Ind. 315 b 21)—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics. Thus in 18, 1456 a 1 a certain kind of tragedy is termed the ηβικὴ τραγῳδία, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in 23, 1459 b 16 the Odyssey is described as ηβικὴ, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in 24, 1460 b 3 certain passages in a poem are termed ηβικὰ μέρη, as serving to bring out the ήθος of the personages in the story.

λέξει καὶ διανοαὶ εὖ πεποιημέναι, 'made perfect in the matter of language and thought'. The same use of the dative is found in a 36 τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ήθεσιν ἀκριβῶς.—24, 1460 b 2 τῇ δὲ λέξει δὲι διαπονέων; and in Alcidamas De soph. 12 οἱ τοῖς ὑνόμαις ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασμένοι [scil. λόγοι].

a 30 οὐτῷ ποίησε δ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2 ὦ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποίησε τὸ ἱαντοῦ ἔργον. The Arabic version seems to suggest οὐτῳ (see on 9, 1451 b 13) rather than οὐ. For the fut. with οὐτῳ comp. Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 a 22 ὠστε ἐσται τι ἀδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὐτῳ, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔκοσίον προστῇ.—6. 13, 1144 b 35 ὠστε τὴν μὲν ἵπτῃ τὴν δ' οὐτῳ εἰληφὼς ἐσται. The imperfect in δ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 40), the reference being presumably to 6, 1449 b 36, where Tragedy is said to be a μύησις πράξεως.
Aristotle’s or eiSoJS eiveKov. For the form of antithesis comp. De caelo 2. 3. 286 \( \delta \) oiv oiv to to tópou, poli div méllon to... délyvyn éxewn aivthvys, and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad loc.) and Schwab (Schanz’s Beiträge 4. 1. p. 66).

́tovtojs refers back to the ῥήσεις ἴθικα καὶ λέξει καὶ διανο�ὶ ἐi πεποιημέναι of a 29. Aristotle’s point is, that the dramatic effectiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.

ψυχαγωγηί: comp. b 17 ψυχαγωγικά. Said of a work of art the a 33 word means no more than to ‘move’ or ‘rivet the attention’, and is thus the equivalent of our word ‘attract’ or (as people now sometimes say) ‘fascinate’. This sense of ψυχαγωγηί is as old as Xenophon: Mem. 3. 10. 6 ð δε μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεί διὰ τῆς ὀψως τούς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ τιστικόν φαύνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; It is found more than once in Isocrates: 24 ἁ δεδεικται τοῖς ἐπίθυμοισ τὸς ἀκρομαίνους ψυχαγωγεί ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετῶν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφετέκτων, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέων οἷς ὀρῶσι τοῖς ὀχλοίς μάλιστα χάρωντας.—191 α τοσαύτην ἑρχεί χάριν, ὥστε ἄν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμαισιν ἑρχεί κακῶς, ὀρῶς ἀεταῖς ταῖς εἰρηνείαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετείς ἑρμαγωγοῦσι τοῖς ἀκούοντας. Later writers also often use the word in the sense of to ‘attract’ or ‘please’; comp. the Antiatticista in Bekker’s Anecdota 116 ψυχαγωγείν: τὸ τέρπειν, and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.

αἳ τε περιπτέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. These are considered later a 34 on in chap. 11. It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two terms without explanation, as though they were already part of the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it illustrates (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3. 1. p. 282).

συνίστασθαι is apparently a middle in 24, 1460 a 34 also (v. ad loc.). a 37

οἶνο καὶ introduces not an instance but a parallel from a different class of things just like ὀστερ καί, from which it is often hardly distinguishable in sense (comp. Top. 6. 9, 148 a 4; Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 15; Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 a 11; 3. 12, 1413 b 25). In De mem. 1, 450 b 20 and in Plato Phaedr. 255 c οἶνο is so completely equivalent to ὀστερ as to have a οὔτως as its antecedent. In Poet. 25, 1460 b 33 οἶνο... ταῖτη is practically the same thing as ὀστερ... οὔτως.
A little before this the μιθὸς was said to be the τέλος τῆς πραγμάτων (a 22). From one point of view it is the ἀρχή, as being the necessary basis of every tragedy; from another it is the τέλος, because it is this much more than the characters that Tragedy as a μέρησι πράξεως has to represent.

ψυχῇ: Isocrates 142 c ἐστὶ γὰρ ψυχή πόλεως οἶδεν ἔτερον ἦ πολιτεία.—261 c πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχή πόλεως ἐστιν.—[Demosthenes] 60. 23 ἢ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετή τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχή τάληθες εἰπείν—Martianus Capella 3, 268 Est accentus, ut quidam putaverunt, anima vocis.

τὰ παραπλήσια κτῆ. This clause Castelvetro and others would transpose and insert after σύστασιν πραγμάτων in a 33. It comes in, however, naturally enough where it stands, as an afterthought to illustrate the secondary position (δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἡθοῦ) of the element of character in a play. So also in the sister art of painting, says Aristotle, the colouring is of subordinate importance in comparison with the design which makes the work to mean something and be like something; a portrait is a portrait, and will give us the pleasure of one, even though executed in mere whites and greys; whereas a medley of much more beautiful colours without a design to give them meaning will not produce the same pleasure, because we cannot see that it represents anything. The nature of the pleasure found in a work of imitative art was explained in 4, 1448 b 13.

εἰ γὰρ τις ἐναλείψει κτῆ. The sense is thus given by Goulston: 'si quis tabulam, pigmentis licet pulcherrimis, temere fusimque illeverit; non perinde spectantem oblectet, ac si, albo licet colore, imaginem delinearet certam: pari modo in tragoedias absque constitutione rerum minus valent mores quam morum expers fabula.'

The object left to be understood with ἐναλείψει is τὸν πίνακα, the 'panel' or 'canvas', as we should say; ἀλείφεων and ἐπαλείφεων are used in just the same way, in the sense of covering a surface with colour. ἐναλείφειν, it is to be observed, has apparently a different kind of object in De gen. an. 2. 6, 743 b 23 οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτω ἐναλείφοντο τοῖς χρώμασι τῷ ζῷον ('painters first sketch the outline of the figure before proceeding to work it out in colour'). χύδην means 'without system or order', i.e. without a design to give form and sense to the whole. The direct opposite of this unmeaning medley of the most beautiful colours (εἰ τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην) is a portrait in plain whites and greys (λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα); in what follows,
therefore, \textit{eikôna} serves as an antithesis to \textit{χύδην} (comp. Vahlen, \textit{I450 b1 Symb. Phil. Bonn.} p. 166) and \textit{λευκογραφήσας} to \textit{τῶς καλλίστων φαρμάκων}. \textit{λευκογραφεῖν}, as a derivative from \textit{λευκογράφος} (a word no longer to be found), is to `paint monochromes in white', i.e. in shades of white and grey (it would seem) on a dark ground. Zeuxis, whom Aristotle has just mentioned in \textit{a 27}, was among other things a painter of monochromes in white—\textit{pinxit et monochromata ex albo} (Pliny \textit{N. H.} 35. 64; comp. Brunn, Gr. \textit{Künstler} \textit{2} p. 55). A portrait, however, even though it be a mere monochrome in whites (comp. \textit{λευκογραφήσας eikôna}), will have a meaning, and give the mind the intellectual pleasure which accompanies the recognition of the meaning (comp. \textit{4, I448 b15}); whereas a medley of beautiful colours has no meaning, and the pleasure it gives the beholder is of a wholly different order (comp. \textit{4, I448 b18 ὅχι ἡ μίρημα τοιήτε τῆν ἕδων ἀλλὰ διὰ ... τὴν χροὰν}). The antithesis, therefore, is simply between beautiful colours without an \textit{eikôn}, and an \textit{eikôn} without any beauty of colour. Vahlen's view of the import of these words is somewhat different. He thinks that \textit{λευκογραφήσας} may denote the preliminary sketch (like \textit{ὑπογράφεων} in the above-quoted passage in the \textit{De gen. an.}) in white, which is afterwards filled in with colour, when the picture comes to be finished; so that the clause may be taken to describe two stages in the process of painting, (1) \textit{λευκογραφεῖν eikôna}, and (2) \textit{ἐναλείψειν φαρμάκοις}, and serves to illustrate the order of procedure in Tragedy, where the \textit{μῦθος} is said to come first, as the \textit{ἀρχὴ τῆς τραγῳδίας}, and the \textit{ἡθ} second: 'orationis formam sic accipio, \textit{e} τις \textit{ἐναλεῖψθα τῶς καλλίστων φαρμάκων χύδην}, \textit{οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα \textit{e} ἐναλεῖψθε φαρμάκοις}', ut \textit{χύδην}, h. e. nulla ante delineatione facta, et \textit{λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα inter se opponantur'. This very subtle interpretation seems to me to read more into Aristotle's words than is required for the argument.

\textit{ἐστιν τε μὴν ψισταὶ πράξεως κτέ.} supports the statement (\textit{a 38–39}) \textit{b 3} before the parenthesis by recalling the general fact on which it is based (\textit{v. a 20–23}).

\textit{πρῖτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια.} As the intellectual quality of the \textit{dramatis personae} comes out mainly in what they are made to say, \textit{διάνοια} is provisionally explained (see on \textit{a 6}) as a power of making the best of one's case or of saying the right thing.

\footnote{1 Aristotle would perhaps have said: \textit{οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειν καὶ \textit{e} λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα οὕτως ἐναλεῖψθε τῶς φαρμάκως}.}
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1450 a 5 τὰ ἐνότα, scil. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, as in Isocr. 292 ε ὑποχροντα
tωυτοὺς ῥήτορας τοὺς συνόντας πονύσειν ὡστε μηδὲν τῶν ἐνότων ἐν
tοῖς πράγμασι παραλυτῶν (comp. Bon. Ind. 250 a 56). The
whole expression τὰ ἐνότα καὶ τὰ ἀρμότοντα covers the same
ground as that in Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 b 5, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ
ἐπικαρυότατα.

b 6 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων has been taken to mean 'in soluta oratione'
(Paccius), and 'in orationibus' (Valla) or 'in eloquentia', 'bei der
Beredsamkeit' (Vahlen). The explanation, however, in the con-
text, ἐποίουν λέγοντας (b 7), is enough to show that the λόγοι
Aristotle has in mind are the λόγοι in a play, i.e. the ῥήσεις
put into the mouths of the personages. This is apparently the sense
the word bears in the next sentence also, τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ' ἀλως
ἐστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἣ φεύγει ὁ λόγων (b 9).

τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἡρων. Aristotle seems to be think-
ing of what is said in a play by the chief personages (e.g. the
tragic hero), and of the kind of intellectual capacity (διάνοια)
revealed in their statements. One has to remember that the chief
personages in ancient Tragedy are not ordinary men, and that
the tragic hero is expressly said by Aristotle (13, 1453 a 10-21)
to be always in the best tragedies a man of great position and
lineage. In a play, therefore, such personages might very well
be made to speak πολιτικῶς, 'like statesmen', and to show a
statesmanlike power of saying what is appropriate to the situation
before them (τὰ ἀρμότοντα). But it would also be possible to
make them speak ῥητορικῶς, 'like rhetors', with something of the
rhetor's cleverness in seizing on the various possible points that
may be urged on the occasion (τὰ ἐνότα, i.e. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα).
Though ῥητορική stands in a certain relation to πολιτική (Rhet.
1. 2, 1356 a 27), the distinction between them is a very real one
with Aristotle; πολιτική is with him the practical wisdom of the
statesman (Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 23), and ῥητορική only a form of
the art of argumentation—a δύναμις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους (Rhet. 1. 2,
1356 a 33), or a δύναμις περὶ ἐκάστου τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον
πολιτικόν (Rhet. 1. 2, 1355 b 26). There is no reference to πολιτική
in chap. 19. Aristotle may perhaps have felt that the practice of
the later dramatists (οἱ νῦν) was too firmly established to admit
of change, and that the tragic personages accordingly must still be
allowed to speak ῥητορικῶς, as they did in the Tragedy of his time.

b 7 ἄρχαῖοι: the dramatists anterior to Euripides (see on 6,
1450 a 25).
politeia...logou, which Valla rendered by 'civiler di-

centes', is often taken to mean 'to speak the language of civil

life', like ordinary citizens, as distinct from the professional orator.

But as the context shows that the ability to speak politeia implies something of politeia in the speaker (comp. Newman

on Pol. 2. 11, 1273 b 12), politeia would seem rather to mean

'like a politeia'—the statesman being assumed to say that which

is befitting (τὰ δρμάττοντα) without any ostentation of rhetorical

cleverness (comp. HSt. s. v. politeia). Vahlen (Symb. phil. Bonn.
p. 175) supposes the expression to coincide in sense with the

tokeis logeon of Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 a 38, which means ἀπὸ προαι-

ρέσεως λέγει, as opposed to ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγει (Rhet. 3. 16,

1417 a 23). The objection to this interpretation is twofold. (1)

Aristotle is to all appearance not contrasting διάνοια with ἃθος, but
distinguishing between the two forms it may assume in the dramatic

ῥήσεις. (2) politeia λέγει can hardly be identical with ἃθος

λέγει; the personages in Comedy speak ἃθος, but it would be

a paradox to say of them that they speak politeia, in the sense

of there being something of politeia in their utterances.

ῥητορικῶς. Euripides is termed by Aristophanes (Pax 534) a 8

ποιητής ῥηματῶν δικαικῶν. Quintilian also (io. 1, 68) thinks

the study of his plays one of the best preparations for the bar:

Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesset esse, iis qui se ad agendum

comparant utiliorem longe fore Euripidem. namque et sermone

... magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiiis densus et in iis quae

a sapientibus tradita sunt paene ipsis par, et dicendo ac respondendo

cui libel eorum qui fuerunt in foro diserti comparandus.

ἳθος. A statement is said to have ἰθος in it when it reveals the

moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do

or not to do. ἰθος is an element in oratory also, as the credibility

of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of

his character. The language in the text may be compared with

that in Rhet. 2. 21, 1395 b 13 ἰθός δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσιος ὕβλη

ἡ προαίρεσις: αἳ δὲ γνώμαι πάσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι

τῶν τῆς γνώμης λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὡστ' ἂν χρηστὰ

ὡςν αἱ γνώμαι, καὶ χρηστοθῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τῶν λέγοντα.—3. 16,

1417 a 16 ἰθικὴν δὲ χρῆ τὴν διήγησιν εἰσὶν. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν εἰδίῳν

τῷ ἰθῶς ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὲ τὸ προαιρέσιν ὤδηλοὺ, ποιῶ δὲ τὸ ἰθὸς τῷ

ποιῶν ταύτῃ; ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν

οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἰθῆ, ὥστε οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἐνεκα οὐκ

ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ ᾧκρατικοὶ περὶ τοιοῦτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.
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1450 b 9 ὅποιά τις. This (the reading of Α) is very rightly retained by Vahlen, who translates the clause by 'quod aperiat voluntatem, qualia quis in quibus apertum non est aut appetat aut fugiat'; the explanation is added to show that προαιρεσις is to be taken in a wide sense, which may include aversion as well as desire. For an explanatory clause of this form comp. 16, 1455 a 10 συνελογισμῷ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ ἐμαρτό ἀποθανεῖν, and Plato Rep. 535 a μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογήν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷον ἐξελέξαμεν;

ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐστὶ δῆλων is added because there are situations in which the moral purpose of the agent is too obvious to require to be revealed in an 'ethical' speech; see 19, 1456 b 7 for a parallel statement on the subject of διάνοια.

προαιρεῖται. Though the usual opposite of φεύγειν is the simple verb αἱρεῖται (Bon. Ind. 18 b 3), there is a certain propriety in προαιρεῖται in a clause explanatory of προαιρεσις. The word is found in a similar antithesis in Eth. N. 10. 1, 1172 a 25 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἢδεα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν.

b 9* διότερ κτέ. In the Rhetoric we are told that a mathematical argument does not admit of any colouring of character, because the facts with which it deals are indifferent to us—not objects of either desire or aversion: Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 19 διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγου ἡθή, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαιρέσειν τὸ γὰρ οὖν ἐνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. In like manner a speech in a play may be on a subject wholly indifferent to the speaker, and in that case there is no room for any infusion of ἢθος into his statement.

b 12 καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται replaces the ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην in a 7 (v. ad loc.).

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ κτέ. On the reading which I have ventured to introduce into the text see the J. of Phil. 5 p. 119 1. It is clear that the four elements in a tragedy, the μέθοδος ἡθῆ διάνοια and λέξις, belong to it as a work of literature, and that the music and 'spectacle' are accessories, which attach to it only when it comes to be acted on the stage. Apart from these accessories, a tragedy is, like an epic (comp. 23, 1459 b 10), a μῦθος ἐν λόγῳ (see on 1, 1447 a 29), and all the elements which constitute it are ἐν λόγῳ. τὰ ἐν λόγῳ, therefore, is a comprehensive designation for the four literary elements, as distinct from the non-literary elements (τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν b 15), the music and 'spectacle', with which the enumeration concludes. If τῶν μὲν λόγων be retained, the genitive

1 Comp. Markland's ἀτέντι ἐν ὑπολόγισθαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ λόγῳ in Lysias 4. 18, and Canter's ἄκου ἐν ἡμῖν for ἄκου μὲν ἡμῖν in Clem. Al. Str. 7. 36, 852 P.
has to be taken as an objective gen. after λέξις. Valla renders the words by ‘orationum dictio’, Pacchius by ‘sermonum dictio’, and Goulston by ‘ipsarum orationum elocutio’. The main difficulty, however, is in the particle, which has never been satisfactorily explained. Vahlen formerly (Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 181) connected the clause with that which follows in b 15 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κτλ., supposing the sense to be ‘viertens für die Dialoge (τῶν λόγων) die sprachliche Form; für das übrige (τῶν λοιπῶν) die Melopöie’. His later view (1885) is that the μέν in τῶν μὲν λόγων may be an instance of μέν solitarium, and that Aristotle may have meant at first to append something about the μελή (τῶν δὲ μελῶν . . .). Such a division of the fourth part, it seems to me, is wholly inconsistent with the general scheme of the six parts, which is throughout this chapter so clearly before Aristotle’s mind, as well as with the express mention of the μελοποιία in its proper place in the next sentence.

ώστερ πρότερον εἴρηται. If the reference is to 6, 1449 b 34, where the λέξις is defined as η τῶν μετρων σύνθεσις, Aristotle must have forgotten the exact terms of his previous formula. The point, however, is practically the same in both instances; λέξις is to be understood in the sense of ‘diction’ or ‘expression in language’, and not in any of the other senses which the word might bear (see on 23, 1459 a 12).

dίὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας = δίὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, i. e. by means of the words or language of the speaker. As the ὄνομα, which includes the verb and the adverb as well as the noun, is the directly significant part of all language, ὀνομασία means practically the same thing as vocabulary or language.

ἐρμηνείαν, ‘communication’, ‘expression’; the Latin equivalent for it is interpretatio. After ἐρμηνείαν we may supply τῶν εἰς τὴν διανοία, the spoken word being the outward sign or expression of a thought in the mind: De interpr. 1, 16 a 3 εἰσί τινες συν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. On the meaning of ἐρμηνεία in Aristotle see Waitz, Organon 1 p. 323, and Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft 2 1 p. 235.

ἐξεί τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν = ταύτῳ δύναται, ‘is practically the same thing’ (see on 1, 1447 a 8).

[pέντε]. Similar instances of an intrusive numeral will be found in Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 21, and 1. 13, 1373 b 3 (v. Roemer ad loc.). Vahlen accepts the correction πέμπτων, in the sense of quinto loco: 'reliquarum autem partium (h. e. quae post illas quattuor iam
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reliquae sunt duae) quintō loco melopōia gravissimum est condimentum, óψε autem ad poeticaam artem omnino non pertinent.'

μέγιστον τῶν ἢδυσμάτων: see on 6, 1449 b 25 (ἡδυσμένων). For the pleasure given by music comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 20 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἢδιστων. —1340 a 2 δὲ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἢδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες ἀκόησον ἐχεῖ γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἢδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσας ἥλικιας καὶ πάσων ἢδοσ εἶναι ἡ χρὴσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλία.—b 15 οἷς μὲν γὰρ νέοι diâ τὴν ἢλικίαν ἀνήδοντον οἰδέν ὑπομένοντες ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσις τῶν ἢδυσμάτων [ἡδυσμάτων] ἐστὶν. Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 157) supposed that a further statement on the subject of music, like that in the Anonymus De Comœdia (Kaiibel, CGF. i p. 52), μέλος τῆς μουσικῆς ἐστίν ἐδιον, ὅθεν ἀπ’ εἰκόνις τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς ἀφορμᾶς δεῖσει λαμβάνειν, may have dropped out after ἢδυσμάτων.

ψυχαγωγικῶν: see on a 33.

ἀτεχνότατον: 13, 1453 b 7 τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως τοῦτο παρασκευαζεῖν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χαραγμαί δειμένων ἐστιν. ἀτεχνός is frequently used in the sense of 'depending on means outside the art itself'; comp. Rhet. 3. 16, 1416 b 18 ὑγίειαν γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ λόγον τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνόν, οὕτως γὰρ μὲν ὁ λόγος τῶν πράξεων, τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῆς τεχνῆς. The opposite of it in this sense is ἐτεχνος (Bon. Ind. 119 b 4).

ἡ γὰρ τῆς πραγματίας δύναμις κτ.

The tragic effect may be produced by a good tragedy even without any actual performance of it on a stage, i.e. as a mere work of literature (comp. 140, 1453 b 4, and 26, 1462 a 11). The reading of Αο here, ὡς γὰρ, is defended by Vahlen, who translates it by quia enim (wenn nämlich), on the assumption that the apodosis is omitted in the same way as in Eth. N. 8. 6, 1157 b 3 οἷς δ’ ἀγαθοὶ δὲ αὐτοῖς φιλῶν ἥ γὰρ ἀγαθόν [scil. φιλὸν εἰς]. —8. 10, 1159 b 10 οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἤδεις ἐπὶ πλείον διαμένοντο· ἔως γὰρ ἀν πορίζωσιν ἢδονας ἢ ὀφθεῖας ἀλλήλος [scil. διαμένουσιν], and certain more or less similar passages. The present passage (with the reading ὡς γὰρ) does not seem to me to be a genuine parallel. On behalf of the amended reading (ἡ γὰρ) it has to be remembered that a confusion between ἡ and the compendium for ὡς is not so uncommon in MSS. of a certain date (Bast, Comm. Palaeogr. p. 780).

ἀνεσε ἄγωνος. ἄγων is generally rendered by cestamen or ‘contest’, but it is not clear that that is the sense Aristotle attaches to it in the present and other places (7, 145] a 6; 13, 1453 a 27) of the Poetics. It seems to mean rather little more than a 'public performance'. Similarly ἄγωνιζεσθαι in 7, 1451 a 8 and 24, 1460 a 9.
means apparently 'to perform in public', συναγωνίζονται in 18, I450 b 18 I456 a 26 'to take part in such a performance'; and ἀγώνισμα in 9, I451 b 37 a 'work to be performed in public'. The word ἀγωνιστής, likewise, in Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 18 and Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 28, means no more than a 'public' or 'professional performer' (comp. πρωταγωνιστής etc.). In Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 4 ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις means the style allowable in public speaking, as distinct from the γραφικὴ λέξις, the more formal style required for a purely literary work. The idea of contest or competition, therefore, is not always a recognizable element in the meaning of this group of words (comp. Nitzsch, De historia Homeri 2 p. 113).

ἀγώνος καὶ ὑποκρίτων: 13, I453 a 27 ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων.—Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 28 ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκρίτης ἀγωνιστής.—Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 8 ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφική μὲν ἢ ἀκραβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἢ ὑποκριτικοστάτῃ κτε. The present clause shows that the ὄψις is ἕκαστα οἰκείων τῆς ποιητικῆς; the next, that it is ἄτεχνοτάτων.

ὄψεως: for the plural see on 6, I449 b 33.


κεῖται: as has been stated in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 23 I449 b 25 (comp. Bon. Ind. 380 b 43).

τελείας καὶ δόλης. Although there is strictly speaking a certain distinction between the idea of 'complete' (τέλειος: v. Metaph. Δ 16, 1021 b 12) and that of 'whole' (ὁλός: v. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 26), the two terms are so closely allied in sense as to be all but synonymous: Phys. 3. 6, 207 a 7 ἀπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὕτω κατὰ πρόσων λαμβάνοντι αἰτε τι λαβέτω ἐστιν ζω. οὐ δὲ μηδὲν ἐξω, τοῦτ’ ἐστι τέλεον καὶ ὀλον’ οὕτω γὰρ ὀρχὺμεθα τὸ ὀλον, οὐ μηθεν’ ἀπετειν ... ὀλον δὲ καὶ τέλεον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάμπαν ἢ σύνεγγυ τῆν φύσιν ἐστίν.

ἐξοφύσις τι μέγεθος: see on 4, I449 a 19 and 6, I449 b 25.
1450 b 25 μὴ δὲν ἔχων μέγεθος, ‘of no size,’ as we say, means the same thing as πᾶμμικρόν in b 37 (Sauppe ap. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 1 p. 54), just as in 6, 1450 a 28 οὖν ἔχει ἤðος means practically ‘has but very little character’ in it.

b 27 μὴ ἦς ἀνάγκης. By a ‘beginning’ Aristotle does not mean something without antecedents, but only something that may be detached as it were from its antecedents, and viewed apart from them as the first term in a new series of events.

b 28 μετ’ ἐκείνο δ’; comp. b 30 μετὰ δὲ τούτο.—b 31 καὶ μετ’ ἐκείνο.—An. pr. 1. 4, 25 b 35 καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν δ καὶ αὐτό ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἑστὶν.

b 34 ἰδέαις. ἰδέα, ‘form,’ ‘sort,’ or ‘kind,’ is frequently used, just like ἤδος, which has much the same sense, without any genitive to explain it. Instances of this allusive, or rather evasive, use will be found in 5, 1449 b 8, in 19, 1456 b 3, and in 22, 1458 b 18. It is a favourite term with Isocrates also: 24 c ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἰδέαις ταῦταις κατεχόμεντο.—36 ἑχεῖ δὲ δοκιμάζειν τὰς ἄρετας οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἰδέαις ἀπάσας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς διυπατεῖσθαι κτέ.—319 δ’ ταῖς ἀλλαὶ ἰδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλέον ὄλον τὸν λόγον διακοσμοῦν.—De perm. § 183 τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας, ἀλλ’ ὁ λόγος τυχαίαν χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. For instances from other authors see Campbell’s Essay on Plato’s use of language, Rep. of Plato 2 p. 301.

τὸ καλὸν κτῆ. Having just laid it down that the μὴδος must be a complete whole, Aristotle assumes that it must also be a beautiful whole, and proceeds to show that, if it is to be that, it must be of a certain magnitude, neither too long nor too short. Beauty, he says, depends on two conditions: the beautiful object must be (1) large enough to allow of our seeing the orderly arrangement of its parts, and (2) not so large as to be incapable of being taken in as a whole in one coup d’œil. With this we may compare Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδή τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὁρισμένον—where τάξις corresponds with the first, and τὸ ὁρισμένον with the second of the two conditions in the present passage. For the form of the opening statement comp. De long. vitae 5, 466 a 26 τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά.

ξέφων: 23, 1459 a 20 ὡστερ ἤξων ἐν ὅλον ποιή τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἤδον. The analogy between a literary whole and a living organism is postulated in Plato Phaedr. 264 c ἀλλὰ τόδε γε σοφία σε φᾶναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὡστερ ἤξων συνεστάναι σοφία τε ἡχοντα αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ, ὡστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄποναν, ἀλλὰ
μέσα τα ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρότεινται ἀλλήλους καὶ τῷ ὀλῳ γεγραμμένα ἔνα 1450 b 34 (comp. Hermias and W. H. Thompson ad loc., and Dionysius Hal. 5, p. 381 R.); and also in Rhet. 3, 14, 1415 b 7 ἄν μὴ τοιοῦτος 
[scil. ὁ ἀκροατής], οὕτων δὲι προοίμου, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅσον τὸ πράγμα εἰπείν 
κεφαλαίως, ἦν ἐξή ὡστερ σῶμα κεφαλήν [scil. ὁ λόγος]—where the 
exordium of a speech is likened to the head of a body. The 
same assumption underlies many of the terms of early grammar 
or rhetoric, e.g. καλόν, ἄρθρον, σύνδεσμος (see on 20, 1456 b 38), 
ἀκέφαλος, κολοβός, μείουρος (see on 26, 1462 b 6). I am 
unaware, therefore, to accept Susemihl's view, that ζῷον both here and in 
chap. 23 means a picture or statue (Gemälde, Bild)—though it 
certainly has that sense in a passage not very unlike this in form, 
in Plato Polit. 277 b ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἦμιν ὡσπερ ζῷον τὴν ἐξωθεῖν 
μὴν περιγραφῆν ἐοίκεν ἴκανος ἔχειν κτῆ. It seems to mean here 
a living, as distinct from an artificial, whole, as it clearly does 
in another Aristotelian passage, Top. I. 15, 106 a 20 τῷ καὶ τῷ 
μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῷον τὸ αἰώρχον [scil. ἑναντίων], τῷ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς ὦκας τὸ 
μοχθηρόν. In saying καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἀπαν πράγμα δι συνεστηκεν ἐκ 
tiwōn Aristotle passes from the living wholes called ζῷον to a 
large kind of whole, 'everything made up of parts', a formula wide 
regularity to include the creations of human art as well as those 
of nature. This addition is of some importance for the argument; 
it prepares us for the application of the general law to the 
case of the μῦθος, which, as a σύστημα or σύστασις πραγμάτων 
(comp. 6, 1450 a 15), is a πράγμα δι συνεστηκεν ἐκ τιων. I may add 
that the conjunctions in Aristotle's statement (καὶ . . . καὶ = cum . . . iam) seem to imply that the stress is really on the second of the two points. 

πράγμα, a 'thing': Top. I. 5, 102 a 18 ἔδων δ᾽ εστὶν δ ὁ δηλος b 35 
μὲν τῷ τί ήν εἶναι, μόνοι δ᾽ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικητηροείται τοῦ πράγματος, 
ὅτῳ ἔδων ἀνθρώπον τὸ γραμματικὴς εἶναι δεκτικὸν.—De anima 3, 8, 
432 a 3 πράγμα αὑτόν ἐστὶν παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
κεχωριζόμενα.—Plato Crat. 390 δ Κρατίλος ἀλῆθη λέγει λέγων 
φύσα τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοὺς πράγμασιν. 

ταῦτα = τὰ μέρη, implied in συνεστηκεν ἐκ τιων. 

μεγέθος ὑπάρχει μὴ τῷ τιχών: De gen. an. 2, 6, 745 a 5 ἐστὶ γὰρ b 36 
τὶ πάσι τοὺς ἐφοίς πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους.—Pol. 7, 4, 1326 a 35 ἐστὶ τι 
καὶ πόλεις μεγέθους μέτρου, ὡστερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ἐφοί 
φύτων ὀργάνων. 

μεγέθες: Eth. N. 4, 7, 1123 b 6 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἤ μεγαλοφυxia, b 37 
ὡστερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οῖ μικροὶ δ᾽ ἀστεῖοι καὶ
Similarly in Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 33, speaking of the size of the καλλιστή πόλις, Aristotle explains that τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλάθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.

τάξει. According to Top. 3. 1, 116 b 21, beauty is thought to consist in συμμετρία (τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι); and according to Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 in τάξει καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὁμομένων. In the beauty of a μῦθος, however, there is no room for the idea of συμμετρία. A well-constructed story involves a certain order in its incidents and a limit of length; but there is nothing in it directly corresponding to the symmetry or proportion which is one element in the beauty of a living creature.

συγχείται. The reason for our not seeing any beauty in a very minute creature is that we perceive it as a whole too quickly to discern the parts and the order and symmetry there may be in them. συγχείται = 'becomes blurred, or indistinct', as in H. A. 7. 5, 58 b 34 συγκεχυμένων μέλων, and the other passages noted in Bon. Ind. 709 b 43.

θεωρία, 'sight' or 'view' (comp. Bon. Ind. 329 a 31).

άναίσθητον χρόνου. There is no necessity to bracket χρόνου (with Bonitz). The time a thing takes to be seen may be of perceptible or of imperceptible duration; and in the latter case it may very well be described as an ἀναίσθητος χρόνος, a time too short for one to be conscious of its duration. This expression, ἀναίσθητος χρόνος, appears in the definition of the 'sudden' or 'instantaneous' in Phys. 4. 13, 222 b 15 τὸ δὲ ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναίσθητῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκείνῳ (comp. Probl. 3. 10, 872 b 9). The equivalent in the Analytics is, ἀσκεπτος χρόνος: An. post. 1. 34, 89 b 10 ἢ δ᾽ ἀγχινοία ἐστὶν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου, οἶον εἰ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρόν ἀεὶ ἐχεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἡλίον, ταχῦ ἑνενόησε διὰ τὸ τύτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίουν. The converse of all this is the assertion in Probl. 19. 21, 919 a 32, that the longer the time is, the more perceptible it is: πλεῖων δ᾽ χρόνος ὃ τοῦ βαρέος, οὗτος δὲ μᾶλλον αἰσθητὸς. According to the stricter psychology of the De sensu (7, 448 a 24) there is no such thing as a χρόνος ἀναίσθητος.

οὗτο παμμέγεθε: comp. the rule for the size of the πόλις in Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 35 and 7. 4, 1326 a 35.
7. 1450 b 37—1451 a 3

1457 a 27; 22, 1458 a 29; 26, 1462 b 7. Comp. Soph. el. 24, 1451 a 2
180 a 20 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμιον εἰπώτες τοῦ ἐπον δός μοι Ἡλίαδα
σημαίνομεν, οἷον τὸ μήτην ἀείδε θεά; and Eth. N. 1. 9, 1099 b 2
ἐνιον δὲ τητῶμον ῥυταίνουν τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας,
κάλλος.

όστε marks the apodosis (comp. 9, 1452 a 10 and Bon. Ind. a 3
873 a 31).

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων. The argument proceeds on the
assumption of an analogy between a beautiful whole that addresses
the eye, and one that addresses the mind; and the conclusion is
that as the one is εὐγενεῖα, so the other must be εὐμηρόνεινον.
At this point Aristotle changes his construction, repeating his
original statement (1450 b 34) in the form required for an argument
from analogy, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων . . . οὐτω
cαὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων, with συστημάτων as a short equivalent for the
foregoing ἄπαν πράγμα ὅ συνεστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. Α σύστημα is
a product of combination, something that comes into being
through a union, natural or artificial, of parts into a whole;
a state, for instance, is a σύστημα (Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168 b 32) as
being due to a combination of classes or individuals, and a ζώον is
a σύστημα (De gen. an. 2. 4, 740 a 20), as being an organized
whole of parts. The present passage, however, implies a more
restricted sense of σύστημα, as though the term were properly
applicable only to a whole that is made, as distinct from an organic
whole, which grows to be what it is. This or some similar sense
is suggested by the passage also in Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168 b 32 ὅστε
δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὰν ἄλλο σύστημα,
οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπως—where the implication is that a man is not a
σύστημα proper, though his composite nature gives him a certain
resemblance to one.

The difficulty in the manuscript reading σωμάτων is that the word
would have to be understood in one of two senses, either in that of
'material substances', or in that of 'living bodies'. The first
interpretation is out of the question, since beauty is in the τάξις or
συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν, and, therefore, in the form, not in the matter,
of things. The second, which makes ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων and ἐπὶ τῶν
ζῴων mere synonyms, leaves us without any equivalent for the
ἄπαν πράγμα ὅ συνεστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν of his original statement
(1450 b 34), which was, if I am not mistaken, far too important
for Aristotle's argument to be ignored in any résumé of it (comp.
J. of Phil. 5 p. 120).
COMMENTARY

1451a3 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔφων: see on 1450b36.
a4 εὐσύνοπτον, 'easily taken in as a whole by the eye', as opposed to εὐμυθμόνευτον (a 5), 'easily taken in as a whole by the memory'. The word, however, is metaphorically used as equivalent to εὐμυθμόνευτον in 23, 1459a33, as also in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409a35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἠχοῦναι ἄρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἢδεια δ' ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής ... εὐμαθής δὲ ὧν εὐμυθμόνευτον.
a6 ὁρὸς (ὁ) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἄγωνας: the limit in practice, in contradistinction to the theoretic limit of length, ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρὸς (b 9). In actual practice the length of the play is determined by the conditions of the public performances (ἀγώνες) in which it will be presented on the stage; the time it is to occupy there is fixed by custom and convention rather than theory.
a7 τὴν αἰσθήσιν, scil. τῶν θεάτων (see on 15, 1454b15); comp. 4, 1449a8 πρὸς τὰ θεάτρα. The language here, though quite general, seems to refer more especially to the power of attention in the audiences.

ἐκατόν τραγῳδίας ἄγωνίζεσθαι: an extreme instance like the μυρίων σταδίων εὖν in a 2. The subject of ἄγωνίζεσθαι, if expressed, would be 'the performers', ἄγωνίζεσθαι τι in stage matters being synonymous with ὑποκράνεσθαι τι; comp. Demosth. 19, 246 τούτο δὲ τὸ δράμα ... Μόλων ἡγωνίζετο.—250 ἢ ἡγωνίζω καὶ ἄκρι- βος ἐξαιτίασα.—337 τὰ Θεάτρον ... ἡγωνίζετο (see on 6, 1450b18).

In the sense of 'contend', as said of the dramatic poet, it would require an instrumental dative (τραγῳδίαις) after it. The personification implied in Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'si centum tragedias in theatro certare oporteret', is (I think) questionable in Aristotle. Goulston takes ἄγωνίζεσθαι as a passive (=agr?), as it certainly sometimes is.

a8 πρὸς κλεψύδρας. For the preposition comp. fr. 468 Teubn. μέτρον τί ἔστω ὦδας πρὸς μετρηθέντων ὑμέρας διάστημα μέον ... πρὸς δὴ τούτῳ ἡγωνίζοντο οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἄγωνες.
a9 ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν. The idea of tragedies having been at some date or other timed by the clepsydra is to my mind highly improbable, and there is no hint of such a thing elsewhere. The language also here is not free from difficulties. Tyrwhitt translates it by 'quemadmodum aliquando alias etiam factum esse perhibent'; and Vahlen (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1897 p. 639) by 'wie man sagt, dass sie auch sonst gespielt haben'. To get this out of the words, and make them relate to Tragedy,
or rather the past history of Tragedy, it becomes necessary to supply (with Vahlen) an aorist infinitive, ἀγωνίσασθαι, from the preceding imperfect ἤγωνιζοντο, and also to make ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε mean simply 'once' or 'formerly', though its natural meaning would be 'at a certain other time'. Two instances have been pointed out of ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε: Xenophon Anab. 6. 4. 12 ὑμᾶς δὲ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μαχομένους εἰ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε [\("si unquam alias\')]; Lucian Hermot. 24 ἦδη γὰρ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε [\("alias quondam\')] πρεσβύτου ἀνδρὸς ἥκουσα διεξίστος. These, however, are not enough to show that ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε can only refer to an indefinite past or future; with a verb in the present it may very well refer to the indefinite present also, and have the sense of 'at certain other times', just in the same way as ποτὲ, with a present, means 'at certain times' in Soph. el. 16, 175 a 27 συμβαίνει δὲ ποτὲ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν, and in the familiar antithesis of ποτὲ and ἄει. M. Schmidt's correction, εἰώθασιν (for φασιν), though perhaps too bold, yields an unimpeachable sense, 'as is regularly done at certain other times', i.e. by another class of ἀγωνίσται, the pleaders in the law-courts. As a variation on it, to make the sense clearer, I would suggest ὁστερο ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοι εἰώθασιν.

οδὲ... ὃρος is appositional to what follows.

ο μεῖζων, scil. μύθος; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'quod maior est a 10 fabula'.

ὁ σώδηλος is explained in the reference to this passage in 24, 1459 b 18 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκος ὃρος ἵκανος ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δὲι συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος.

ἐν δὲι μεγέθει κτῆ. A reminiscence apparently of the language of Plato Rep. 423 b Οὐκοῦν, ἢν ὃ ἐγὼ, οὕτως ἂν ἔγνω καὶ κάλλιστος ὃρος τοῖς ἥμετεροις ἀρχουσιν, ὅσιν δὲι τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι ... Τίς, ἐφὴ, ὃρος; Οἶμαι μὲν, ἢν ὃ ἐγὼ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὐ ἂν ἐβέλη αὐξανομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τοῦτον αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή.

κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων, scil. τῶν πραγμάτων (see on 6, 1449 b 26). The consequents must be always the natural or necessary effect of the antecedents. A well-constructed μύθος is a consecutive whole, not a mere series of incidents which happen to follow one after the other in actual order of time (comp. 10, 1452 a 19); and it is this that differentiates it from a history or a biography (comp. 9, 1451 a 36), which records everything that may have befallen a community or an individual, however loose and separate the various incidents were in themselves.
The poetic story in fact must satisfy our sense of logic, incident following after incident as its necessary and inevitable, or as its probable and natural consequence. The technical meaning of the terms eikós and anagynaión in Aristotle may be seen from An. post. 2. 27, 70 a 4 to μὲν eikós esti prōtaires éndooös δ' γὰρ ὡς ἔπτι τὸ πολὺ ἵσασιν οὕτω γινόμενον ἦ μὴ γινόμενον, ἥ ὡς ἦ μὴ ὦν, τοῦτ' ἐστιν eikós, οἷον τὸ μισεῖν τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους.—Rhet. i. 1, 1357 a 34 τὸ μὲν γὰρ eikós esti (τὸ) ὡς ἔπτι τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον . . . τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.—Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 b 28 τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδεχέσται ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. —Δ 5, 1015 a 34 τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλος ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν. The distinction between the two terms had been already recognized by Plato: Theaet. 149c eikós τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.—Tim. 40 c ἀνευ τε ἐκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγομεν. They were, it would seem, already established in the rhetorical terminology of the sophists (Stallbaum on Tim. 40 c).

This is obviously meant to apply only to the tragic hero, not to the secondary personages in the play, about whom Aristotle has very little to say. Though he acknowledges the legitimacy of a transition from misery to happiness as a dramatic motive—it will be remembered that it is the motive in the Iphigenia in Tauris (comp. 17, 1455 b 12 καὶ ἐνετέθεν ἥ σωτηρία)—he does not think it so distinctively tragic or so effective in Tragedy as the opposite kind of transition, that from happiness to misery (13, 1453 a 14 sqq.).

The synonym for this in 13, 1453 a 2 is metápittein. The implied subject of metábalλειν is the tragic hero;

The theory apparently is inferred from their practice (comp. a 21).

Also Plato Theaet. 159 a ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἰπ’ τὰ τοιοῦτα καὶ ἀπειρά ὡς τὰ τοῖοοι εἰπ’ τὰ οὕτως εἰς διαφοράς καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων εἰς ἀνετίας μεταπίπτειν.

See Schoemann, Opusc. Acad. 3 p. 31.

i.e. certain post-Homeriac poets, whose theory apparently is inferred from their practice (comp. a 21).

Also Plato Theaet. 159 a ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἰπ’ τὰ τοιοῦτα καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων εἰς διαφοράς καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων εἰς διαφοράς καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων εἰς διαφοράς καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων εἰς διαφοράς καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων εἰς διαφοράς καὶ ἀπειράς ποιήτων.
τό ἐνι in the present passage is taken as a neuter by Vahlen, who translates the clause accordingly by ‘in unam rem innumeram cadunt’. This interpretation, it seems to me, misses the point—the distinction Aristotle assumes between the many things that befall the individual (πολλὰ τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει), i.e. that he suffers or has done to him, and the many things that he does (πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλαὶ εἰσιν). That τῷ ἐνὶ is masculine here is shown not only by περὶ ἑνα (a 17), πράξεις ἐνὸς (a 18), and ὅσα αὑτῷ συνέβη (a 25) in the context, but also by the parallel in 23, 1459 a 23, ὅσα εἰ τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἑνα ἡ πλείους.

ἐνίων, which has been questioned by Spengel and others, is an understatement of a kind not so uncommon in Aristotle (see on 6, 1450 a 12). The sense is: In the infinite variety of things that befall the individual in the course of his life there are some [i.e. many] which it is impossible to bring into relation with the rest, as parts of one connected whole. The qualifying ἐνίων is like ἐνίστε in 23, 1459 a 27 οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίστε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἐν οἴδεν γίνεται τέλος. ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων has been rendered by ‘ex quorum aliquibus’ (Tyrwhitt), or ‘quorum ex quibusdam’ (Hermann). In the parallel, however, in Dem. 18.12 περὶ ὧν ἐνίων both Well and Goodwin regard ἐνίων as appositional; and the same view has been taken of the word in Dem. 19.260 (τὰς ἀκρόπολες αὐτῶν ἐνίων), and in Xen. Anab. 6.6.34 (περὶ ὧν ἐνίων). Another instance of this same ambiguity is in Meteor. i. 3, 339 b 9 πολὺ καὶ τῶν ἀστρῶν ἐνίων ἐλάττων ἐστίν (comp. L. Dindorf in HSt. s. v. ἐνιώ). There is a clear instance of the appositional use of ἐνίων, in a different case, in Poet. 9, 1451 b 19 ἐν τοῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐνίων μὲν κτὲ.

πάντες ἔσοικάν καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν: comp. 23, 1459 a 29, 37. Ἡρακλεία. Several Ἡράκλειαι were known in antiquity (Kinkel, a EGF. i. p. 212, 249, 254).

ὁμηρία: Kinkel, i. p. 217.

προσήκειν = ‘must be’, ‘ought to be’ according to the fitness of things, as in Meteor. i. 3, 340 a 26, De anima i. 5, 411 b 15, Rhet. 2. 2, 1379 b 3, and Plato Rep. 362 c.

Ὁὐκ ἐποιήσεν ἄπαντα ὅσα αὑτῷ συνέβη: i.e. his poem was not made to cover the whole ground of the life of Ulysses, but only a selected section of it, a limited group of incidents sufficiently

1 The version in the Paraphrase of Averroes, uni ret multa accident, implies the same interpretation.
coherent and connected to form a single action of the requisite kind (μίαν πραξίν οἶναν λέγομεν a 28). The unity in the story of the Odyssey, as Aristotle conceives it, may be seen from his survey of the poem in 17, 1455 b 17. The sense of the οὖν ἐποίησον ἄραντα in the text may be illustrated by the very similar expressions in 18, 1456 a 13 τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὀλὸν ποιεῖν μῦθον, a 16 πέρον 'Ιλίου ὰληρν ποιεῖν, and 23, 1459 a 32 τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖν ὄλον.

οἶνον πληγήναι μὲν, scil. αὐτῷ συνέβη. This and the second incident, μανήνα δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἄγερμῳ, are given as examples of two disconnected events in the life of Ulysses (ὅν οὐδὲ θαύρων γενομένον ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, a 27). The antithetic particles (μὲν, δὲ) imply a difference between them; the one (πληγήναι) is a πάθος, and the other (μανήνα προσποιήσασθαι) a πραξίς— a distinction which the preceding context (see on a 17) shows to have been already present in Aristotle’s mind. I have ventured to restore οὐδὲ in place of οἴδεν for two reasons, partly because with οἴδεν the verb (γενέσθαι) seems to have two subjects (οἴδεν and θάτερον), and partly because the οὖν being followed by θάτερον and θάτερον naturally refers to the two incidents just mentioned. It has been urged, as one of the difficulties in this statement, that the wounding of Ulysses is actually part of the Odyssey, being described at considerable length in the story of the Discovery in Od. 19, 392-466. The Discovery is certainly part of the action of the Odyssey (v. 17, 1455 b 21), but the incident on Parnassus is in a very different position; it comes in as an episode (v. 17, 1455 b 23), not as one of the series of incidents which form the action of the poem. The action in the Odyssey (summarized in 17, 1455 b 17 sqq.) extends over a space of some six weeks; but the encounter of the boy Ulysses with the boar belonged to a period of his life not covered by the Odyssey. The second incident, his feigned madness, is said to have been part of the story in the Cypria (Kinkel, EGF. p. 18). Bergk (Gr. Litt. i p. 711) thinks there may have been some epic in which both incidents were included. The superior unity of the Homeric Epic is emphatically reasserted in 23, 1459 a 30.

a 27 οὖν = ἄλλα τούτων.

a 28 μίαν πράξιν οἶναν λέγομεν, ‘a single action of the kind we are describing’, i.e. one that forms a coherent and closely connected whole. The opposite of this is the μία πράξις πολυμερῆς of the inferior epics (23, 1459 b 1). The reading of Αἰ, οἶναν λέγομεν, may have arisen through ΟΙΑΝ being misread, and taken to stand for ο/umd αῦν.
diaféresvai kai kineíthai has been rendered in various ways—\textit{I451\textsuperscript{a} 34} by 'dissolvatur vel moveatur' (Victorius), by 'dissolvatur et luxetur' (Heinsius), and by 'differatur et moveatur' (Tyrwhitt). The general sense is clear: when a part in a whole is removed, by being transferred to another place or withdrawn altogether, the continuity of the whole is broken at that point. Both \textit{diaféresvai} and \textit{kineíthai} seem to be (as Heinsius must have seen) metaphors from surgery. \textit{Diaféresvai} may be regarded as a synonym for \textit{disíastaða}, the term in use in medical Greek for the diastasis of a limb as distinct from a complete luxation (ἐξίστασθαι or διλωθάνειν); comp. Hippocrates 3 p. 132 K. ὅκόσα διώσταται καὶ ὅκόσα διλωθάνει. If this view is correct, the \textit{kineíthai} which follows will mean to be 'dislocated'. Hippocrates often has \textit{kineíthai} and 
\textit{kínημα} in the sense of 'displacement' as an equivalent for diastasis (comp. 3 p. 81 K. ἂν δὲ τι κυνηθῇ ἐκ τῆς χώρης).

\textit{προσοῦν ἦ μὴ προσοῦν}: comp. Metaph. \textit{A} i0, \textit{1076\textsuperscript{a} 2} ὅθεν γάρ ἢ ἐτέρα [scil. οὔσια] τῇ ἐτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὔσα ἢ μὴ οὔσα, and Plato Rep. 449 D μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα ἑφέσω καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ἀρθός ἢ μὴ ἀρθός γεγονόμενον. For this use of the participle see Goodwin, Syntax of Gk. moods and tenses § 829 (b).

\textit{oúthēn mórion}: it is not a part of the whole, but an accident or \textit{a35} addition to it; comp. De gen. an. \textit{i}. 4, \textit{717\textsuperscript{a} 34} ὅθεν γάρ εἰσὶ μόριον τῶν πόρων οἰ ὀρχεῖς, ἀλλὰ πρόσκειται καθάπερ τὰς λαίας προσάπτουσιν αἱ ὑφάινονται τῶν ἱστών. In Metaph. \textit{Γ} 5, \textit{1010\textsuperscript{a} 30} ὁστός [scil. ὃ περὶ ἡμᾶς τόπος] ὅθεν ὅς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν, the phrase means practically 'is as nothing compared with', just like ὅθεν μέρος in Isocrates \textit{90ε} εἰ τὶς ἀθρήσκει καὶ σκέψαμο τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμφοράς, ὅθεν ἂν μέρος ὅσται ναναίν τῶν ... ἡμῶν γεγονομένων.

\textit{φανερόν δὲ κτῆ}. In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or \textit{a36} register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves (23, \textit{1459\textsuperscript{a} 21}). The present distinction between a history, in this sense of the term, and a poetic story is a corollary to what he lays down in chaps. 7–8 on the unity and logical coherence of the parts in a well-constructed story. The action in such a story is a πράξεις μία καὶ ὅλη (a 32), i.e. a whole with a beginning, middle, and end (7, \textit{1450b} 26); each incident resulting from something that goes before it, and the entire series from the state of things presupposed, as the ἀρχὴ of the whole, at the opening. Given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the
beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation. Hence it follows that the incidents in the poetic story are not only possible but also always possible, because they are such as may or must happen at any time, whenever the man and the circumstances are found together. Aristotle accordingly notes two great points of contrast between history and poetry: (1) whereas the former is a record of actual events (τὰ γενόμενα), the latter describes rather possible incidents of another kind, τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (a 38); (2) whereas the one tells us what is true only of some particular person (or persons) at a particular time, the other tells us something universally true (τὰ καθόλου b γ), something that will hold good at all times of all persons of the same type in a similar set of circumstances.

a 38 τὰ δυνατὰ, scil. γενόμενα (comp. b 32). The qualifying κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον excludes the third kind of δυνατά, viz. τὰ γενόμενα. These also are obviously possible (see b 17 and De interpr. 13, 23 a 7), but as mere γενόμενα they belong to history rather than poetry. A little further on, however (b 29), Aristotle explains that under certain conditions even historic incidents may be a legitimate subject for poetry.

b 1 οὐ τοῦ ἢ ἐμμετρα λέγειν κτ.: see i, 1447 b 11, where it is shown that metre is only one of the accidents of poetry.

b 4 διαφέρει, scil. ὁ ἱστορικός τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

b 6 σπουδαίοτερον is the opposite of φαύλοτερον. In Plato also σπουδαῖος (v. Ast, Lex. s.v.) is applied to things in the sense of ἄξιος σπουδής, 'of serious value or interest', as the opposite of either 'trivial' (φαύλος) or 'ludicrous' (γελοῖος: see on 4, 1448 b 34). Poetry, as Aristotle conceives it, is 'more philosophic', because of the large and generalized view of human nature which it implies; it tells us in effect what all men of a certain character may or must do in a certain set of circumstances, whereas historic truth is limited to particular times and persons. A great master of rhetoric, Diderot, has enlarged on this text in a well-known passage in his Éloge de Richardson (Œuvres t. 3 p. 18 ed. 1821): 'O Richardson! j'oserai dire que l'histoire la plus vraie est pleine de mensonges, et que ton roman est plein de vérités. L'histoire peint quelques individus; tu peins l'espèce humaine; l'histoire attribue à quelques individus ce qu'ils n'ont ni dit, ni fait; tout ce que tu attributes à l'homme, il l'a dit et fait: l'histoire n'embrasse qu'une portion de la durée, qu'un point de la surface du globe; tu
as embrassé tous les lieux et tous les temps. Le cœur humain, 1451 b 6 qui a été, est et sera toujours le même, est le modèle d’après lequel tu copies. Si l’on appliquait au meilleur historien une critique sévère, y en a-t-il aucun qui la soutint comme toi? Sous ce point de vue, j’oserai dire que souvent l’histoire est un mauvais roman; et que le roman, comme tu l’as fait, est une bonne histoire. O peintre de la nature! c’est toi qui ne mens jamais.’

µάλλον τὰ καθόλου. µάλλον implies a qualification, which re- 7 appears in another form in b 9 οὐ στοχάζεται ἢ ποίησις ὑνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη. Poetry deals with ‘characters’ rather than actual individuals, and with universal rather than particular truth. Its universality, however, is somewhat disguised by the proper names it attaches to its characters, which acquire in this way a certain resemblance to the real personages of history. A reason for the retention in Tragedy of traditional names is given further on, in b 15.

tὰ καθόλου . . . τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστον. The present explanation of the terms may be compared with that in De interpr. 7. 17 a 39 λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ’ ἔκαστον δὲ ὃ µή, οἶον ἄνθρωπος µὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστων: comp. also Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 28 οἴδεμα δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἔκαστον, οἶον ἡ ιατρική ὁπ’ τὶ Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιείνων ἐστιν ἡ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τὶ τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τούς τοιούτους.—2. 4, 1382 a 4 ἡ µὲν ὄργη αἰὲ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα, οἶον Καλλία ἡ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ µίσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη. For a similar use of καθόλου see 17, 1455 b 1. The element of ‘universality’ in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time (b 11); and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, ‘characters’, in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each. The novel, however (owing in some degree to its length), admits of characters of a subtlety and complexity which would have been simply impossible in the ancient Drama. The Greek dramatist was practically restricted to the larger and more obvious types of character, which did not require much explanation to make them intelligible to his public in the brief space of time allotted to his work.
1451 b 10 ὄνοματα ἐπιτιθεμένη = καίπερ ὄνοματα ἐπιτιθεμένη; comp. 25, 1461 a 30 οὐ παύοντον οἶνον. The characters in the Drama are 'universals', i.e. types of character rather than actual individuals; that is what poetry really means them to be, notwithstanding the individualizing proper names it attaches to them. The alternative rendering of ὄνοματα ἐπιτιθεμένη, 'in giving names to its personages' ('dum nomina imponit', Heinsius), would imply that the names were definitely chosen as significant of character. This would be true to some extent of those in Comedy (see infra on b 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὄνοματα), but not of those in Tragedy. As abstractions of character the personages ought to have general names, like those in Theophrastus, instead of the individualizing proper names given them in Drama.

For the use of the middle verb in this connexion comp. 21, 1457 b 34 and Homer Od. 8. 552: οὐ μὲν γὰρ τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων . . . ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τίθενται, ἐπεὶ κείκωσι, τοκῆς.

b 12 ἦδη: i.e. now that the New Comedy has taken the place of the Old (see on 5, 1449 b 8), Comedy instead of satirizing individuals (like Cleon or Socrates) tells imaginary stories of imaginary personages labelled with imaginary names.

b 13 διὰ τῶν εἰκότων. The same use of the preposition is found in 26, 1462 a 16 δι' ἤδη αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνιστάται. It denotes the basis or chief ingredient in a compound, as it often does in later Greek, e.g. in expressions like τὸ δι’ ἄλογος, τὸ δι’ αὐτοκυνθίδος, etc. in the medical writers; comp. also Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 14 R. διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐπλεκτάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὄνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα η λέξις.

οὕτω, the reading of Αε, is too idiomatic to be lightly surrendered (comp. Bon. Ind. 546 b 13). The Arabic version is said to imply not οὕτω but οὐ; the same Arabic word, however, which Dr. Margoliouth renders by nequaquam, would seem to occur also in the Arabic text in 6, 1450 a 30, where it may be taken to represent οὕτω. One may suspect, therefore, that the Greek reading before the Syriac translator in the present passage was οὕτω, a mere corruption of οὕτω.

tὰ τυχόντα ὄνοματα. Ritter has a note here on the names of the characters in the New Comedy. Aristotle's point is this. In the Old Comedy the names of the chief characters were already fixed and prescribed for the poet, because actually borne by the persons whom he wished to satirize. Socrates, Cleon, Agathon, Euripides are instances of such names in Aristophanes. But in the New Comedy the names were not thus fixed. In calling a
soldier Thraso or Pyrgopolinices, for instance, the poet did not mean to satirize some actual person of that name; the name was a matter of choice or accident—invented it may be by the poet himself, or borrowed by him from his predecessors or from life. Such names may no doubt be stock-names, or have a certain conventional or etymological appropriateness as suggestive of certain types of character (comp. Dieterich, Pulcinella p. 45); but they obviously stand on quite a different footing from the real names in Aristophanes. Names also like Phormio, Chremes, Menedemus, etc., were in Comedy fictitious names, though outside Comedy they may have been borne by real persons (comp. on b 21).

"τοὺς γενομένων ὄνομάτων ἀντίχονταί: comp. Evanthius De Comedia 4, 2 (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 66) omnis comoedia de fictis est argumentis; tragoeidia saepe ab historica fide petitur. The reading γενομένων has been questioned, but (as it seems to me) without sufficient reason. τὰ γενόμενα ὄνοματα are the already existing names, as fixed in history or legend (γνώριμα b 20), in contradistinction to a newly-invented name (comp. τὰ ὄνοματα πεποίηται b 22), or one which, whether new or not, is arbitrarily assigned to a character by the poet (τὰ τυχόντα ὄνοματα b 13) at the time of writing.

πιθανὸν (comp. πιστεύομεν in the next line) is the Greek equivalent of our modern term 'convincing', and practically synonymous with ἔκος (comp. 24, 1460 a 27) and ἐνδοξον (Bon. Ind. 593 a 45). The word was sufficiently established to be applied even by Xenophon to a work of art which has a look of life and reality: Mem. 3. 10, 7 ὄμοιοτά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι. In 17, 1455 a 30 πιθανὸς is said of a person, the poet who writes 'convincingly'. The adv. πιθανῶς has the same sense in Aristophanes Thesm. 266 ἀνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν ὀφθοί καὶ δὴ γυνὴ τὸ γ᾽ ἐδος ᾗν λαλήσῃς δ’, ὡς τῷ φθέγματι γυναικείς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς ('play the woman well and convincingly').

ἐνίας: see on 8, 1451 a 18 for this appositional use of the word.

'Ἀρδεῖ' was first suggested, somewhat tentatively, by Welcker in his Gr. Tragödien p. 995. 'The Flower' would certainly be a very strange title for a Greek tragedy. The play being on a purely fictitious story, the names also of the characters, instead of being taken over from legend or history, were fictions, and due to the choice of the poet himself. But they need not be supposed
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1451 b 21 to have been new or newly-coined names. 'Ανθεσ, for instance, seems to have been known already in mythical history as the name of certain legendary personages; and not so very long after Agathon's time it was actually borne by an Athenian citizen (Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica 953). In this respect, therefore, it was in just the same position as so many of the names in Comedy, Chremes, Menedemus, Phormio, and the like.

b 23 εφραίνει: an incidental recognition of pleasure as the immediate end of Tragedy (see 14, 1453 b 12, and Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 104). εφραίνει serves as a transitive to χαίρειν: Top. 2. 6, 112 b 21 ετι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμβεβηκός ἔθηκεν ὡς ἔτερον διὰ τὸ ἔτερον εἶναι οὖναι, καθάπερ Πράδικος δήματο τάς ἡδονάς εἰς χαράν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀνόματα ἔστων. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τὸ εφραίνειαν φήσει συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἃν αὐτῷ φαίνη συμβεβηκέναι.—Eth. E. 3. 2, 1231 b 6 τῶν ὁμιῶν ταῦτας χαίροντας ὁσα κατὰ συμβεβηκός εφραίνονται. The word may describe the pleasurable effect of anything, e.g. that of a painting (Poet. 6, 1450 b 2), of music (Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 24), and of odours (Eth. E. l. c.; Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 10).

ὡτ' οὖ πάντως ἀν εἶνες ξητητέον. Spengel suggested that the ωταί of the MS. should be bracketed. In these negative statements of result with ὡτε οὖ, which are so common in Aristotle, the verb is usually either in the indicative, (1) expressed or (2) understood, or (3) in the potential optative, as the following passages from the Organon may suffice to show: (1) An. pr. i. 36, 48 a 36 ὡτε οὖκ ἦσαν μέσον τοῦ Ἀ.Β.—Top. 8. 11, 151 b 30 ὡτε οὖ τῷ ταύτ' εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός [comp. Poet. 22, 1458 b 5]. (2) An. pr. i. 32, 47 a 35 ὡτ' οὖκ εἰ τι συμβαίνει τεθέντων τινών, πεπραγμέναν ἀναγένει εἴθησι.—Top. 6. 5, 142 a 4 ὡτ' οὖσα πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν αἰτίναν ὁ αὐτός ὁρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος. [comp. Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a 12]. (3) An. post. i. 12, 77 b 12 ὡτ' οὖκ ἄν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμέτρητοις περὶ γεωμέτρειας διαλεκτέον.—An. pr. i. 16, 36 a 14 ὡτε στρατευθείη ὡς στρατεύσω τῷ Γ τῷ Β ἐνδέχοντα τὸν υπάρχον.—Top. 6. 12, 149 b 2 ὡτ' οὐκ ἄν εἴη χρώμα τυρί μεγίστον.—Soph. el. 6, 168 b 4 ὡτ' εἰς ἔλεγχος συλλογισμὸς τούτος, οὖκ ἄν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος. Two instances of εἴναι for ἄν εἴη are to be found in MSS. of great antiquity and value, one in Par. A of Plato (Tim. 17 b), and the other in K b of the Nicomachean Ethics (8. 2, 1155 b 20). The error may have arisen either from the omission of ἄν, a word very apt to be lost in MSS., or through ὡτ' οὖ being misread and turned into ὡς τοῦ (as it has been in fact in Λο).
It may be observed here that Antiphanes, who belonged to the generation before Aristotle, was not of the same opinion on this point (v. fr. 191 Kock).

The earlier part of the chap. (1451 b 1–5) between a poetic story and a history; a history was said to be still a history even if put into a metrical form. From this Aristotle once more (v. 1, 1447 b 11) draws the conclusion that the story is a more essential part of a poem than the language or versification.

This is added as a further reason for regarding the story (rather than the verse) as the great and essential thing in a poem. The argument, which might have been more clearly stated, tacitly assumes what we have been told of the μῦθος and its pre-eminent importance in chap. 6. The poet’s function, says Aristotle, is to imitate (ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μύησιν), and it is actions that he imitates (μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις): but the μῦθος in a poem is what represents the action (τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μύησις, 6, 1450 a 4); the μῦθος therefore is the poet’s first business, and he must be accordingly a ποιητὴς τῶν μῦθων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μέτρων.

Aristotle, however, now remembers that there may be such a thing as an historical play, one with incidents taken from actual history (γενόμενα). Such incidents, he explains, are legitimate subjects for poetry, if they admit of being exhibited as probable and natural, as well as actual occurrences. It is only
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1451\textsuperscript{b} 29 in this aspect, and on this condition, that they are admissible in poetry; as so many mere facts they belong to the domain of history. \(k\alpha\nu\ \alpha'\rho\alpha = k\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\iota\nu\ \alpha'\rho\alpha\), the \(\alpha'\rho\alpha\) implying that the supposition is not very probable (Kühner, Gr. Gr.\textsuperscript{3} 2. 2 p. 324).

\textsuperscript{b} 33 \(\tau\omega\nu\ \delta\varepsilon\ \alpha\pi\lambda\omega\nu\ \mu\upsilon\theta\omega\nu\ \kappa\tau\epsilon\). An episodic story, as here defined, offends against the rule of unity and consequitiveness of incident laid down in chap. 8. Aristotle’s theory is that in a well-constructed story every incident is wanted (8, 1451\textsuperscript{a} 32); so that a plot with irrelevant incidents violates a fundamental principle of dramatic construction. Plots of this faulty kind, he adds, are sometimes produced even by good poets through the practical exigencies of the theatre; as a play is expected to be of a certain length, if the story proves too short, it may have to be artificially lengthened out by the insertion of superfluous episodes. Tyrwhitt points to the Prometheus as an instance of this: ‘Fabulae \(\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\delta\delta\iota\omega\delta\iota\omega\) luculentum satis exemplum habemus Prometheus Aeschyli. Episodia enim Oceani, 284–396. et Iūs, 563–885. nec inter se, neque cum fabula principali ullam habent connexionem aut necessariam aut verisimilem . . . Satis manifestum est et Iō et Oceanum, et ipsas etiam Oceanidas, quae chorum constituunt, in id tantum sine ulla verisimilitudine induci, ut argumentum tenue in iustam Tragoediae magnitudinem extendant.’ The episodic plot is mentioned here because of its resemblance to a history, since its incidents have no more necessary interconnexion than those in a chronicle. The paragraph, therefore, is a very natural sequel to the preceding discussion (\(b\ 1–32\)); and it is in its right place where it stands. Those who wish to find another place for it do so mainly on the ground that the text presupposes the distinction between the \(\alpha\pi\lambda\omega\nu\) and the \(\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\) \(\mu\upsilon\theta\omega\) explained in the next chapter. This anticipatory use of a technical term, however, is not so uncommon in Aristotle. Thus—to say nothing of his use of \(k\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\epsilon\iota\) in 6, 1449\textsuperscript{b} 28—we find him talking of \(\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\alpha\iota\) and \(\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\nu\omega\rho\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\omega\) or \(\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\nu\omega\rho\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\omega\) in 6, 1450\textsuperscript{a} 34 and 10, 1452\textsuperscript{a} 16, and giving an explanation of them afterwards in chap. 11. Besides this it has to be remembered that the expression \(\alpha\pi\lambda\omega\nu\ \mu\upsilon\theta\omega\) need not be assumed to have been an invention of Aristotle’s; for it may very well have been merely adopted by him as one of the already existing terms of dramatic criticism (see infra on \(\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\delta\delta\iota\omega\delta\iota\omega\), and on 6, 1449\textsuperscript{b} 33, 1450\textsuperscript{a} 34). Another difficulty was found in the text by Tyrwhitt, who proposed to remove it by reading \(\tau\omega\nu\ \delta\varepsilon\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\omega\nu\ \mu\upsilon\theta\omega\nu\), a suggestion which the Arabic Version is believed to
confirm. The traditional reading τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων is supposed to restrict the fault in question to the ἀπλῶς μύθος, whereas the same fault was no doubt quite possible in the πεπλεγμένος μύθος also. No such restriction, however, is involved in the text. All that Aristotle implies here is a distinction between the worst form of the ἀπλῶς μύθος and the worst form of the πεπλεγμένος μύθος. The worst fault in the one is the irrelevant episode. That in the other is no doubt the ἀναγγέλλεις διὰ σημείων, which is so emphatically condemned in 16, 1454 b 20 as the least artistic of Discoveries.

ἐπεισοδιώδεις. An ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is a plot in which the continuity of the action is not maintained. That the term was fairly established in this sense is shown by the metaphorical use of it in Metaph. Α 10, 1076 a 1 ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦν οὐθὲν ὑπὲρ ἢ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὐσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα.—N 3, 1090 b 19 οὔκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἢ ὅπερ μοιχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.

tά ἐπεισοδία: for the origin of the term see on 12, 1452 b 20. b 34

In this definition of the ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος, as also in 4, 1449 a 28 and 18, 1456 a 31, ἐπεισοδίων has the technical sense given it in 12, 1452 b 20 ἐπεισοδίων δὲ μέρος ὀλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὀλον χορικῶν μελῶν, 'an episode is all that comes in in the interspace between two entire choral songs'. In other words the ἐπεισόδια together with the πρόλογος and ἔξοδος are the acted parts of the play, the 'acts', as we should say. The term, however, often has the more general meaning of an 'insertion'; a sense which takes us back to the early days of the Drama, when Tragedy was still essentially choral, and the episode, or acted part, was only a sort of interlude in the singing. There are several instances even in the Poetics of this sense of the word. In 17, 1455 b 13 the accessories worked into the story are termed 'episodes'—the process of working them in being ἐπεισοδιών (v. 17, 1455 b 1; 24, 1459 b 30); and in 23, 1459 a 36 the Catalogue of the Ships is said to be one of the 'episodes' in the Iliad. The adj. ἐπεισοδιώδης in the present context involves the same notion; the ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is one with acts or incidents inserted into it, i.e. only loosely connected with the main course of the story.

ὑποκρίτας. κριτάς, the reading of certain of the apographs, has an air of plausibility, but it is difficult to see how the judges, whatever their weaknesses, could be responsible for the particular fault under consideration, the undue lengthening out of the story through the insertion of irrelevant episodes. The statement in
the text has to be read in the light of that in 7, 1451a 6, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the theoretical and the practical limit of length, and explains that the latter depends on conditions imposed by the public performances (πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας καὶ τὴν αἰσθήσιν). As every play, as an acting play (comp. ἀγωνίσματα in the context), has by custom to be of a certain length, the poet, if his story proves too short, may have to spin it out (παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες) by the insertion of additional incidents, which will break the sequence of the story (διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς, 1452a 1). διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς, 'with a view to the actors,' may be taken as equivalent to διὰ τὴν ἐπόκρισιν, 'because the play has to be acted' (comp. Ueberweg ad loc.); the more concrete form of expression makes an antithesis to the δὶ αὐτοῖς in b 36. A much less probable interpretation of these words is that the actors are assumed to put pressure on the poet to make him provide them with parts of sufficient importance.


παρατείναντες. The story being too short, they stretch it out, as it were, to make it fill up the time. This can only be done in two ways, either by a diffuse treatment of the incidents (comp. 26, 1462b 2–7), or by the insertion of additional incidents not wanted for the main purpose of the story. A similar combination of a present and an aorist participle is found in 16, 1455a 2 ἀκούων . . . καὶ μηνοθέεις, and in 22, 1458b 19 ποιήσαντος . . . μεταπιθέντος.

diastrephein . . . to efexis: comp. Aeschylus Suppl. 1017 ἵχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὗ διαστρέψω φρενός. The sense is that a side incident is introduced, one not in the natural course of the story—not in line with the rest.

ἀναγκαζομαι. They do so because they cannot help it, not like the inferior order of poets, through their own fault (δὶ αὐτοῖς). For another instance of ἀναγκαζομαι see 14, 1454a 12.

καὶ μᾶλιστα. The καὶ emphasizes μᾶλιστα (comp. De sensu 3, 440b 12; De part. an. i. 5, 643a 24; also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 133). At this point Aristotle recognizes a new element of interest in Tragedy, the element of surprise, but only incidentally, in order to bring it under the canon of construction laid down in
chap. 7. The φοβερά καὶ ἠλευνά of Tragedy, he says, have the 1452 a 3 very greatest effect on the mind, when they come in unexpectedly, but at the same time as the natural or necessary consequence of incidents within the play itself (δὲ ἄλληλα).

τὸ θαυμαστῶν, the element of the marvellous, is recognized as a 4 a legitimate source of interest in Tragedy in 24, 1460 a 12. Teichmüller has a lengthy discussion on it (Aristotelische Forschungen 2 p. 282 sqq.).

οὕτως, i.e. if they come about δὲ ἄλληλα, through incidents in a 5 the preceding part of the play.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης. Aristotle treats the two terms here as synonymous, though a distinction is drawn between them in Phys. 2. 4–6 (Bon. Ind. 780 b 33; comp. Torstrik, Hermes 9 p. 425).

ὁσπερ ἐπίτηδες: De caelo 2. 8, 290 a 33 ἡ φύσις ... ἐκουσ ὁσπερ a 7 ἐπίτηδες ἀφελείν πάντα δὲ ἄν ἐνεδέχετο προϊέναι καθ' αὐτά.

ἀνδριάς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυσκτε. Excerpted by the compiler of the a 8 De mirab. ausc. 156, 846 a 22. The same story is told, apparently from another source, by Plutarch, De sera num. vind. 553 d καὶ τὸ Μίτυς τοῦ Ἀργείου κατὰ στάσιν ἀναρεβέντος ἀνδριάντα χαλκοῦν ἐν ἅγορα θέας οὕρης ἐμπεσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτυν καὶ ἀνελέιν. A certain Mitys of Argos is mentioned in [Demosthenes] 59, 33 in connexion with an occurrence which took place in b. c. 374.

θεωροῦντι is usually understood to mean ‘when he was looking a 9 at it’ (spectanti incidens, Tyrwhitt; comp. Bon. Ind. 328 a 5). But as the parallel in Plutarch has θέας οὕρης, Dacier would seem to be right in translating it by ‘au milieu d’ une grande fête’, taking it in the sense of ‘being present at a θεωρία, or public spectacle’.

ὁστε: see on 7, 1451 a 3.

εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μυθῶν κτε. Chap. 10 is a sequel to 9. 1452 a 1–11, a 12 and an application of its results. The real point is not in the formalistic distinction between the two kinds of μῦθοι, with which it opens (a 12–18), but in the assertion that follows, viz. that even the complex story comes under the general canon of construction laid down in chap. 7, and that the element of surprise (the ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια) must be, like everything else in a play, part of the unity of the whole, the natural or necessary consequence of something before it (ἐκ τῶν προ γεγεννημένων a 19).

εὖθυς: see on 5, 1449 a 36.

ὁσπερ ὁρισται, i.e. in chaps. 7–8.

περιπέτειας ἡ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ: see on 6, 1450 a 34. Both terms are explained in the next chapter.
the editors generally acquiesce in the corrected reading δὲ ἔξις, in lieu of which Vahlen has δὲ ἐστὶν ἔξις, and Susemihl δὲ ἐστὶν ἔξις. I have suggested that Aristotle may possibly have written πεπληγμένην δὲ λέγω ἔξις, on the supposition that λέξει may be taken to represent λέγης.

If any correction is wanted, αὐτά or τὰ μετ' αὐτά is perhaps simpler than either τὰ ύστερα (Gomperz) or τὰναντία (Bonitz)—though this last has certainly the great advantage of supplying an easy explanation of the καθάπερ ἐφρηται in 11, 1452a23. The objection to ταύτα is its supposed inelegance and superfluity. It is not more inelegant, however, than the γίγνεσθαι that immediately precedes it (ταύτα δὲ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ... ὡστε ... γίγνεσθαι ταύτα); and its apparent superfluity is a common phenomenon with demonstratives in Greek (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 660).

Aristotle’s construction after διαφέρει is not always quite the same as that in the present passage. (1) The disjunctive is sometimes doubled: Rhet. 1. 15, 1375b20 οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἤ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἤ μὴ χρῆσθαι [comp. Poet. 9, 1451b1; 18, 1456a30]. (2) It may be replaced by a καί: An. post. 1. 11, 77a13 τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λαβεῖν—or by τε καί: Soph. el. 18, 177a6 διαφέρει δὲ πλείστον ἐφωτώμενον τε καὶ μὴ λίων λόγον. (3) A clause also with εἰ may take the place of one with the infinitive: De interpr. 9, 18b36 οὐδὲν ταύτῳ διαφέρει εἰ τινὲς εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον.—Soph. el. 17, 176a6 οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῳ διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἤτετο κτέ. [comp. Poet. 18, 1456a30].

περιπέτεια, as a stage-term, seems to mean a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act [v. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 168]. Apart from the stage it has the sense of a sudden change of fortune in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371b10, καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι [τερπένιαι μετατομαι, Goulston] καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν συζευγαίρει ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων [scil. ἡδί]. πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταύτα; and that of a reversal of the natural order of things in H. A. 8. 2, 590b13.1 This same idea of an unforeseen reversal of fortune is implied also in the adj. περιπέτης in Herod. 8. 20 περιπέτεια τε ἐποίησαντο σφάζοι αὐτοῦς τὰ πρῆγματα, and in

1 Bekker's punctuation of this passage requires to be amended, as the whole statement from καὶ τις συμβαίνει in b 13 to σαρκοφάγα ἐστίν in b 20 is a digression. The clause that precedes it, οἱ δὲ κάραβοι κρατοῦσι μὲν τῶν μεγάλων ἰχθύων (b 12), is answered by νεμονται δ' οἱ κάραβοι τὰ ἰχθύδια in b 20.
Eurip. Andr. 982 περιπέτειας ἐχεῖς τύχας, καὶ ἔνμφοράν τίμιον ἐπεσεόντες. Every tragedy, according to Aristotle (7, 1451 a 13), describes a transition from happiness to misery or vice versa; but in the ‘complex story’ the change, however gradual it may be, seems to the hero to come upon him all at once, by a sudden reversal of the state of things; he thinks himself a happy man (let us say) at the beginning of an act, and a miserable man at the end of it. It has been argued, however, by Vahlen (Beitr. 2 p. 6), and more recently by Dr. Lock (Class. Rev. 9, 251), that a περιπέτεια in Aristotle’s sense of the term is something different from this—that it is conceived as arising when a man’s actions (τῶν πραττομένων) are found to have consequences the direct opposite of what the agent meant or expected. The language in a 25 (v. ad loc.) hardly justifies such a very artificial interpretation of a word like περιπέτεια, which must be presumed to have been already an established and well-understood term of dramatic technique (see on 6, 1450 a 34, and comp. 10, 1452 a 15). If we refrain from putting pressure on isolated points, the general sense and connexion of ideas in Aristotle’s statement is sufficiently clear. He begins by assuming (1) a working definition of περιπέτεια (ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἰρηταί), with an addition to remind us (2) that even an incident like this (καὶ τοῦτο δὲ) is in a well-constructed play κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαίον, i.e. the natural or necessary consequence of antecedents in the story (10, 1452 a 18–20), as it is for instance (3) in the Oedipus Tyrannus (a 24–26), and (4) in the Lyncæus (a 27–29). In the O. T. the sudden fall of Oedipus is the consequence of the revelation of his parentage (δηλώσας δὲ ἦν a 26), and the revelation of his parentage the consequence of the presence of the messenger from Corinth (ἐλθὼν a 25). Similarly in the Lyncæus the sudden change of situation—the salvation of Lyncæus and death of his enemy (a 29)—is the consequence of certain incidents in a previous act (σωῆσα ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων a 28). This second instance—which seems to be added as a reminder that the περιπέτεια may be a turn for good (comp. τὸν δὲ σωῆναι a 29) as well as a turn for evil—is too clearly described to leave any opening for any subtleties of interpretation. Aristotle’s language puts before us an act or scene, which begins with Lyncæus being led off for execution (ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενος a 27) and ends with his salvation (σωῆναι a 29). This was the περιπέτεια—the εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ (a 22)—of the Lyncæus;

1 Pye anticipated this suggestion in his Commentary on the present passage.
and as it came about according to Aristotle through incidents in the preceding portion of the play (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων a 28), it was in conformity with the great law of construction laid down in the preceding chapter and elsewhere.

καθάπερ εἴρηται may be taken (with Vahlen) as = κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους, i.e. εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν, as was said in 7, 1451 a 13, and tacitly assumed in 6, 1450 a 3, a 17. If we accept Bonitz's correction in 10, 1452 a 20, the reference will be to that passage.

καὶ τοῦτο δὲ κτέ. By omitting the stop before these words Vahlen makes them part of the definition of περιπέτεια. But it is much more natural to take them as an additional clause, like that in 10, 1452 a 18 ταῦτα δὲ δεὶ γίνεσθαι κτέ.—in which case the illustrations from the O.T. and Lyceus are given as instances not of περιπέτεια in general, but of the kind of περιπέτεια which accords with Aristotelian principles of construction.

ωσπέρ λέγομεν: 'in the way we are saying', what follows being the explanation of this. The reference is to the formula at the end of chap. 10, ἢ ξὺς ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γέγυνεσθαι ταῦτα.

τὸ οἰδίποδι: Soph. O. T. 924. The Oedipus Coloneus is never mentioned in the Poetics or elsewhere in Aristotle.

εἰλθὼν κτέ. 'Bene factum est quod ipsam tragoediam adhuc superstitem habemus, nam alioquì ex Aristotelis verbis credere deberemus Nuntium eo consilio venisse ut Oedipum a metu circa matrem liberaret' (Tyrwhitt). It is to be remembered that the Messenger in the O. T. arrives in the scene (911-1085) preceding the peripety (1110-1185). Even after the announcement of the death of Polybus Oedipus is not quite freed from his old anxieties, as Merope, his supposed mother, is still living; all further disquietude on that account the Messenger seeks to allay by his assurance that Oedipus was no son of Merope but a foundling, whom he had himself received from one of the servants of Laius. This disclosure is enough for Iocasta (1056); but neither Oedipus nor the chorus has as yet any suspicion of its import. It is only in the next scene (1110-1185) that he learns the whole truth, and thus falls, all at once as it were, from happiness into misery. This is in brief the peripety in the O. T.; and it is, as Aristotle says, the natural result of the arrival of the Messenger and his disclosure in the preceding scene. Vahlen and others point to this passage, εἰλθὼν ώς εὐφρανὺν ... τοιναυτίν έποίησεν, as evidence for their contention, that a peripety is said to take place when something
done by a man with a certain end in view has consequences of a directly opposite kind. If that were the meaning, the peripety in the O.T. would surely be a fact in the life of the Messenger, not the turning-point in that of Oedipus.

εὐφρανόν: O.T. 934 sqq.

ἀπαλλάξων κτ.: O.T. 989 sqq.

δηλώσας δὲ ἦν: O.T. 1016 sqq. It is this that leads to the examination of the Servant in the following scene, which is the immediate cause of the catastrophe.

τοῦναυτίον: not the opposite of what the man intended, but the changed situation. The meaning is sufficiently shown by the use of τὸ ἐναυτίῳ in the first line of the chapter.

Ἀνυκέ: the Lyceus of Theocles; comp. 18, 1455 b 29 and a 27 Nauck, TGF.. It is clear from Aristotle’s account that it must have been a play with a ‘double plot’ (v. 13, 1453 a 30).

τὸν μὲν συνέβη κτ.: The construction is changed in order to show that the new situation was the result of something that had gone before it, some incident in a preceding scene (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων).

τῶν πεπραγμένων: comp. 10, 1452 a 19 ὡστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνει κτ., and 18, 1455 b 30 δέοις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καί ἡ τοῦ παιδιών λήψις.

ἀναγνώρισις. Aristotle has already laid it down in 10, 1452 a 18 a 29 that the Discovery should arise εἰ αὐτής τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου, and he does not repeat his rule in the present chapter. He assumes that in a 37 (ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου), and also later on, in chap. 16, which is a sort of appendix to this discussion (see esp. 16, 1455 a 16).


περιπέτειαι. The plural is used, just as in 6, 1450 a 34, 18, a 33 1456 a 19, 24, 1459 b 10, to denote the concrete instances of peripéteia, as actual incidents in plays. The formal incongruity of number in the juxtaposition of ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτειαι in the present passage is certainly not greater than that in 9, 1451 b 3 μετὰ μέτρον ἡ ἀκόντα μέτρων, or Thuc. 2. 4. 2 λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμως βαλλόντων. See also the instances quoted on 19, 1456 b 1 (μέγεθος καὶ μικρότερα).

οἶαν. Bon. Ind. 50 a 26 would restore{o}αν for{o}ων in Magna mor. 2. 8, 1207 b 18. If (with Vahlen) we retain the MS. reading
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1452a 33 ὄνον (= e. g.), it becomes necessary to understand περιπέτειαν after ἐξει.

ἡ ἐν τῷ Ὀδιπόδι, scil. ἀναγνώρισις.

a 34 πρὸς ἄφυξα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα. The καί here means 'even', not 'and', as is often assumed by the interpreters. Aristotle distinguishes between three possible forms of Discovery, according as it relates to (1) persons, (2) things, or (3) acts or deeds. In dealing with the second form he adds that the things recognized may be even of a very casual kind, καὶ τὰ τυχόντα—thinking perhaps of objects like certain of the σημεῖα mentioned in 16, 1454b 21 sqq.

a 35 ἔστιν ὡς ὀπέρ εἰρηται συμβαίνει. If we adopt Vahlen's suggestion, ἔστιν, ἦς ὀπέρ εἰρηται συμβαίνει, we have to dissever τὰ τυχόντα from ἄφυξα, and take ἦς ὀπέρ εἰρηται συμβαίνει as an explanation of it. It is not easy to see how τὰ τυχόντα, i.e. concrete things of some sort or other, can be said to 'happen' or 'come about' (συμβαίνει) in a particular way. Spengel's reading ὀπέρ εἰρηται aptly recalls the idea of ἀναγνώρισις as defined at the beginning of this paragraph, ἦς ἄγνωσας εἰς γνώσιν μεταβολήν, ἦ εἰς φυλαγν ἦ εἰς ἔνθραν. As this recognition of 'things' however is not a μεταβολή εἰς φυλαγν ἦ εἰς ἔνθραν, but at best only a means to that, Aristotle throws in the qualifying ἕστιν ὡς ('in a way', 'in a sense')—an expression that always implies some reserve or limitation; comp. Phys. 2. 5, 197a 10 ἕστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁδέων δύσειν ἄν γίνεσθαι.—De anima 3. 2, 425b 22 καὶ τὸ ὄριον ἕστιν ὡς κεκρωμάτιστα.—De mem. 1. 450b 20 ἦ ἕστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο;—Eth. N. 5. 12, 1136b 30 καὶ ἕστιν ὡς τὰ ἄφυξα κτείνειν. The construction πρὸς ἄφυξα συμβαίνει is sufficiently assured by the parallel in Pol. 7. 17, 1336b 31 συμβαίνει δὲ ταύτῳ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δύμας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων—where ταύτῳ τούτῳ recalls a previous statement just in the same way as the ὀπέρ εἰρηται in the amended text of the present passage (comp. J. of Phil. 14 p. 45).

a 36 πέπραγε is transitive, as often in Aristotle, if our existing texts are to be trusted (comp. Bon. Ind. 632a 17).

ἀναγνωρίσαι: see on b 5.

a 37 μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου: comp. 10, 1452a 18 γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συντάσσεσ τοῦ μύθου. As the relationship between the parties is presupposed, the discovery of it in the course of the play is a very natural kind of incident.

μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως is explained by what follows, ἦ γὰρ τουσώτη ἀναγνώρισις κτέ.
The grammatical subject is ἀναγνώρισις, 1452ª 38 καὶ περιπέτεια being overlooked (see on 26, 1462ª 16). The Discovery will produce pity, when it synchronizes with the πάθος or anguish of the hero, as it does in the O. T.; but may also only suggest the coming of evil, in which case it will arouse fear. It is to be remembered that pity arises through the spectacle of suffering actually present and before us; whereas fear is apprehension of evil still to come (see on 13, 1452ª 32).

έτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀνυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν κτέ. is a further reason for b 2 saying that the discovery of relationships is ἥ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως (ª 37). If the play has a happy ending, like the Lyceus (ª 27) or the Iphigenia in Tauris for instance, such a Discovery will be a very natural way of bringing that about; and it is equally natural in the O. T. and other plays with an unhappy ending.

τινῶν ἄστιν ἀναγνώρισις. For the emphatic position of the in-definite pronoun comp. Soph. el. 13, 173ª 3 ἢ τε ὅρεξις τινὸς ὅρεξις καὶ ἥ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον.

ἀναγνώρισαι, scil. τίνες εἰσὶν (to be supplied from the preceding δῆλος ἄτερος τίς ἔστω), 'to reveal who they are', 'to make themselves known'—not as Tyrwhitt renders it, 'se invicem agnoscere'. The simple verb γνωρίζεω has (just like our English 'discover') two meanings, that of 'to learn' (= γνωρίσκειν) and that of 'to make known' (= γνώριμον ποιεῖν or δηλοῦν). The first sense reappears in certain of the compounds (προγνωρίζεων, συγγνωρίζεων), and the second in others (διαγνωρίζεων, ἐπιγνωρίζεων). ἀναγνωρίζειν recalls both senses of γνωρίζειν, sometimes meaning 'to recognize', and sometimes 'to reveal'. (1) It means to 'recognize' in 14, 1453b 31 ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, and (with φιλίαν or some such word understood) in 14, 1453b 35, 1454ª 3, 6, 8. This is the sense of ἀναγνωρισώτωσα also in 16, 1455ª 15—where τὸ τῶν is understood, as the context (τὸ τῶν γνώσεσθαι) will show; and of ἀναγνωρίσαι in 11, 1452ª 35 εἰ πέτραγε τίς ἢ μὴ πέτραγεν ἀναγνωρίσαι, 'utrum fecerit aliquis an non fecerit agnoscere' (Ritter). Another instance is in the passive, ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὅπο τῆς τροφοῦ, in 16, 1454ª 27. (2) On the other hand the word must mean 'reveal' in 16, 1454ª 32 ἀνεγνώριζεν ὅτι Ὁρέστης, 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' (Ritter), and in the parallel in 17, 1455ª 9, where ὅτι Ὁρέστης or some equivalent has to be understood after ἀνεγνώριζεν (comp. 17, 1455ª 21). The same sense is found in the passive in the present context (ª 6), τὸ Ὁρέστη ἀνεγνωρίσθη, which means 'was revealed to Orestes', rather than 'was recog-
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1452 b 5 nized’ by him; and also (if I am not mistaken) in ἀναγνωρίσθησαν in 16, 1455 a 3. A third sense has been found for ἀναγνωρίσας in 17, 1455 b 21, on which see note.

b 6 ἰφύγεια: comp. 16, 1454 b 32. The reference is to Eurip. Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

τῷ Ὀρέστῃ is probably not a dative of the agent but equivalent to πρὸς τὸν Ὀρέστην.

b 7 ἐκείνου is to be taken as a genitive after the ἀναγνωρίσεως that follows in b 8 (comp. τινῶν b 3, and ὄντος b 4). For a genitive depending on a following genitive compare ἐκάστου in 18, 1456 a 6 (v. ad loc.), and Plato Rep. 534 B λόγον ἐκάστου ... τῆς οὕσεως [comp. Campbell, Rep. of Plato p. 185].

b 9 περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι. There is no reason to delete the preposition. The μύθος being a μῖμησις πράξεως (comp. esp. 10, 1452 a 13), two parts of the μύθος (the περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις) are said to relate to certain portions of the πράξεις, i.e. to the kind of incidents already considered in the preceding statement (10, 1452 a 12—11, 1452 b 8). The μύθος in fact has a περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις because the πράξεις which it represents is conceived as having them. It will be observed that the ‘simple plot’ of 10, 1452 a 12 is now tacitly set aside, no doubt on account of its inferior dramatic value (v. 13, 1452 b 31).

bII εἴρηται, ‘has been already described, or explained’; comp. 25, 1460 b 24 τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται.—De anima 2. 8, 420 b 21 τὸ δ’ αὕτων ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρησται.—Eth. N. 4. 7, 1127 a 18 οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λυπὴν ὑμλοῦντες εἴρηται.

πάθος δ’ ἐστὶ πράξεις κτέ. The term πάθος requires definition because of the variety of senses attaching to it. In ordinary language it often involves the idea of great suffering, and has the concrete sense of a great trouble or affliction of body or mind: Metaph. Δ 21, 1022 b 19 πάθος λέγεται ... αἱ βλάβειαι ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ καθήσεις, καὶ μᾶλλον αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι. ἐτὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται (comp. Bon. Ind. 557 a 26). The sense the present definition gives the word was probably one already established in theatrical usage (see on 6, 1450 a 34). The πάθος is, just like the ἀναγνώρισις and the περιπέτεια, one of the incidents of the play and as such part of the πράξεις or action. Aristotle defines it accordingly as a πράξεις of a certain kind, a πράξεις φθαρτή καὶ ὀδυνηρὰ. Apart from the theatre the terms πάθος and πράξεις are natural opposites (comp. 1, 1447 a 28 and Eth. N. 5. 7, 1132 a 9).
things piteous' (έλεεωνά) in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 4 ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ δυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἔλεεωνά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναφετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἢ τίχω αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθες ἔχοντων. ἐστὶ δ' ὄνειρα μὲν καὶ φθαρτικά βάναυσι καὶ αἰκία σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γήρας καὶ νόσι καὶ τροφῆς ἐνδείᾳ κτῆ.

ἐν τῷ φανερῷ βάναυσι: i.e. violent deaths on the stage, before the eyes of the spectators, such as Horace condemns in A. P. 185 (comp. Tumlirz, Die tragischen Affecte Miteil und Furcht nach Aristoteles, p. 16).

περισυναί signifies bodily agonies, as the context shows; comp. Eth. E. 1. 5, 1215 b 18 πολλά γὰρ ἐστι ταυάτα τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων, δι' ἣ προείποι τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους περισυναίς χείμωνας.

ἀσα τοιαύτα serves to include the less physical forms of pain. 13

In the Oedipus Tyrannus, which Aristotle so constantly holds up as the perfect model of a tragedy, the πάθος is the mental anguish of Oedipus (O. T. 1317 sqq.) much more than the physical horror of his self-inflicted blindness.

Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 167) and Bernhardy (Gr. Litt. 2. 2a b 14 p. 236), as well as most of the recent editors of the Poetics, agree with Ritter in rejecting chapter 12 as an interpolation. The reasons advanced by Ritter against it are threefold:—(1) that it breaks the continuity of the main discussion; (2) that it gives us a string of names and definitions of the external accidents of Tragedy, which it was not at all necessary for Aristotle's purposes to consider—'non nisi nuda nomina exhibentur, quorum descriptio non ex fine tragoediae proposito, non ex interna eius forma et constitutione, id quod deceret philosophum, sed ex habitu illius externo petitur'; (3) that the form of the conclusion, a mere repetition of the opening sentence, betrays the hand of an interpolator. These arguments, however, which are hardly so conclusive as has been supposed, ignore a good many points which have to be taken into account in the general balance of probabilities. 

(1) There is the mark of style; the terminology in κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἄ διαφέρῃ κεχωρισμένα is Aristotelian, and the brevity of these clear-cut definitions can hardly be said to be un-Aristotelian. 

(2) Aristotle may very well be conceived to have felt that the 'parts' κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν were not only of great technical importance but also too obvious and too recognized to be passed over in silence; and further that, as certain of them (πρόλογος and ἐπεισόδιον) had been already mentioned in the book, a short note
1452 b 14 explaining what they were might be expected. (3) Besides this, it has to be borne in mind that the very term 'parts', in the present sense of the word, had actually appeared in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 25 ἡνομενω λόγῳ χωρίς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἴδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. In the analysis also of Tragedy in 6, 1450 a 7 ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἔξ, καθ' ὁ ποιώ τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία, the only motive for the qualifying clause καθ' ὁ ποιώ τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία is to distinguish the parts under consideration from another series of parts of a different kind — the μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσῶν of the present chapter. It is clear that Aristotle was already thinking of these latter; and the clause added prepares us, as it were, for a more formal recognition of them.

The doubt as to the genuineness of this chapter is often supposed to be confirmed by the difficulty of reconciling one or two of its definitions with the known facts of the Drama as seen in the works of the three great tragedians. If we look at the structure of our surviving Greek tragedies, certain of these definitions are either inadequate or untrue. 'It is not true to say that the stasimon is distinguished from the parodos by the absence of anapaests and trochaeas. Anapaests are far from being universal in the parodos, while they occur not uncommonly at the beginning of stasima... and in the Medea one of the stasima (1081–1115) is anapaestic through. Again, the ordinary trochaic metre is frequently found in stasima, while trochaic tetrameters are equally unknown both to the stasima and the parode of tragedy' (Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 356; comp. Westphal, Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien p. 57). The question, however, on which so much ingenuity has been expended, admits of another answer if one remembers Aristotle's purpose in writing. His work is, in intention at any rate, a practical treatise, an Art of Poetry, not a record of learned research; and it was written for the benefit of the men of his own day, and with reference to the theatrical conditions of the time. Although he thinks that in certain particulars the existing practice of the stage should be reformed by a return to that of the older dramatists, the general assumption in the Poetics is the theatre as it was in the middle of the Fourth Century. One of the chief difficulties a student of the older Drama finds in this chapter is in a point relating to the Chorus. We do not know much of the economy of the later Tragedy; but one thing is fairly ascertained, that the chorus was no longer what it had been in the age of Sophocles and Euripides.
Aristotle himself tells us (r8, 1456 a 28) that its songs, instead of forming a more or less integral part of the play, had degenerated into mere lyrical intermezzii (ἐμβαλιμα). This, however, can hardly have been the only change it had undergone. The probability is that the dramatic dance also had been curtailed, and that, when once in its place in the orchestra, the chorus simply sang its pieces without any accompanying dance. What the comic poet Plato (fr. 130 Kock) said of the choruses of his day:

\[ \alpha\omega\tau' \varepsilon\iota\' \tau\iota\varepsilon\deltou\varepsilon', \theta\eta\alpha\mu' \iota' \nu\nu' \delta' \delta\varphi\omega\iota\nu\nu' \omicron\nu\omicron\nu', \\
\alpha\lambda' \omicron\nu\nu\nu\epsilon\nu\pi\nu\pi\nu\varphi\nu\pi\epsilon\nu\pi\nu\pi\nu\tau\iota\nu\nu\tau\iota\nu\nu, \]

was presumably as true of those of Tragedy as of the rest in Aristotle's age. If it was true of Tragedy, however, the new state of things would naturally imply a new technique in the treatment of the χορικα; the so-called στάσιμα would be what their name in fact suggests, stationary songs, as opposed to the πάροδος or entrance-songs; and there would accordingly be no place in them for verses in a metre of movement. The definition of the στάσιμον, therefore, as a μέλος ἀνεν ἀναπαίστον καὶ τροχαῖον may not be quite so paradoxical as it seems at first sight (comp. Westphal l.c. p. 64). The difficulty we find in this instance seems to be really due to the grammarians having transferred the word στάσιμον from the later to the earlier Tragedy, where the position of the 'sung parts' (as Aristotle calls them) was the same, though their structure and dramatic importance were not the same. This conclusion is confirmed by the way in which the ancients dealt with this chapter. The explanations of πάροδος, στάσιμον, etc., in the grammarians (to be seen in Westphal l.c. and elsewhere) reproduce the definitions in the text, but with modifications manifestly due to a desire to re-shape them into conformity with the actual facts of the great Drama, that of Sophocles and Euripides. 'Duodecimi capitis circumscripto cum haud quaquam ad omnes tragœdias quadrare, pars eorum qui postea id genus tractarunt eam additis aliis notionibus amplificare, pars eam vocibus accuratius terminatis emendare, pars eam aliquo modo varietati rerum quae apud poetas obversatur adaptare studuerunt, unde hauad paucae dissensiones manarunt' (L. Schmidt, De parodi et stasimis nominibus p. viii). This may perhaps be taken as evidence not only for the antiquity of the definitions in this chapter (comp. Consbruch, Comm. in honorem Gu. Studemund p. 223), but also for their having made their appearance in a work of considerable authority at the time.
pra
ter
: in chap. 6.
eis & diaire
tai: Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12 μέρος λέγεται ένα μεν τρόπον εις & diairethe
ν άν το ποσον ὑπωσουν.

18 ἀπάντων. The sense of this sentence seems to be rightly un-
derstood by Tyrwhitt (who is here only following Goulston): 'Atque
hae quidem communes sunt tragoediarum omnium; propriae vero
quarundam sunt e scena cantus et κόμμοι, sive planctus.' For the
neuter ἀπάντων comp. τὰν in 6, 1450 a 13 and εἴς ἄλλον εἰς ἄλλοιν
18, 1456 a 31. Hermann with less probability supposes χορε
tων to be understood (comp. Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks
p. 361). Others, understanding δραμάτων, imagine Comedy as well
as Tragedy to be meant.

ta
. It is not clear whether this refers to all the parts men-
tioned, or only to the two chorica, the πάροδος and στάσιμον.
I incline to the second alternative, notwithstanding the arguments
that have been urged against it (Klein, De partibus formisque
quibus tragoediam constare voluerit Aristoteles p. 5). Aristotle is
thinking primarily of the parts sung; and by a very natural
association of ideas he passes from the parts sung by the chorus
first to the lyrical passages sung by an actor (or actors), and then
to the dirges sung by an actor (or actors) and the chorus in
conjunction.

ta ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, the solos (μονῳδίαι), duets, and trios sung by
the characters on the stage. These dramatic lyrics are recognized
in Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 26, and contrasted with the songs of the
chorus: τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ
ἀντίστροφα: ο μὲν γὰρ οποκριτῆς ἀγωνιστῆς καὶ μιμητῆς, ο δὲ χορὸς
ήτων μειᾶται (see also Probl. 19. 30, 920 a 8—48, 922 b 16).
Comp. Suidas Μονωδία: ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς ώδη ἐν τοῖς δράμασιν.
καὶ μονῳδεῖν τὸ θρησκεία
. μονῳδία λέγεται ὅταν εἰς μόνον λέγη τὴν ώδην
καὶ οὐχ ὅμως ο χορὸς.

19 πρόλογος. The term, which appears several times in Aristophanes,
is used in the sense the present definition gives it in 5, 1449 b
, and in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415 b 8 τὰ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεί λαβεῖν ὅτι
tαιτο δύνατο νπὲρ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ
προοίμια . . . (a 18) καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλόουσι περὶ ὦ τὸ δράμα, κἂν
μὴ εὔθυς ὡστερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προόλογῳ γές τον.

20 ἐπεισόδιον may be compared with ἔξοδον (from ἐξοδος); it seems
to be derived from ἐπεισόδος, in the sense the word has in Sophocles
O. C. 729 ὅρῳ τίν' ἡμᾶς δημάτων εἰληφότας φόβδον νεώρη τῆς ἐμῆς
ἐπεισόδου ('my coming in upon you'). This seems to me a more
probable explanation than those noted by Haigh, Tragic Drama 1452 b 20 of the Greeks p. 353.

πάροδος. For the definitions of it in the grammarians see b 22 J. Aschauer, Ueber die Parodos und Epiparodos in der griechischen Tragödie p. 5. As the negative part of the definition of στάσιμον, ἀνευ ἀναπαλοτοῦ καὶ τροχαίου, must be supposed to differentiate it from the parodos, it seems clear that in the view of the writer of this chapter anapaestic and trochaic passages were not out of place in the parodos. In the existing Greek tragedies, however, trochaic passages are all but unknown in the parodi, though they are common enough in Comedy: there is no instance of them in Sophocles or Euripides, and apparently only one in Aeschylus (Persae 155). All this points to the conclusion (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64) that it is a later form of Tragedy that Aristotle is thinking of, and that the practice of the tragedians in this matter had changed since the time of Euripides. For the actual use of trochaics in the tragic parodi there is some faint evidence in Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 204 γέγραπτας δὲ τὸ μέτρον τροχαίκων πρόσφορον τῷ τῶν διωκόντων σπουδῇ. ταῦτα δὲ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν οἱ τῶν δραμάτων ποιηταὶ κυμικοὶ καὶ τραγικοὶ, ἐπειδὰν δραμαῖος εἰςάγωσι τοὺς χοροὺς, ἃνα δ λόγος συντρέχῃ τῷ δράματι.

λέξις ὁλη. Ever since Twining's time there has been a tendency b 23 to press the meaning of λέξις, and distinguish it from μέλος (comp. K. O. Müller, Kleine deutsche Schriften i p. 510); it is supposed to stand for recitative, or to be a general term including recitative and song. This interpretation is hardly reconcilable with the language of the adjacent definitions. (1) The definition of the στάσιμον, as a μέλος ἀνευ ἀναπαλοτοῦ καὶ τροχαίου, presupposes the possibility of a μέλος with anapaests and trochaics; (2) the definition also of ἐπεισόδιον, as that which is μεταξὶ ὁλων χορικῶν μελῶν, will not apply to the first ἐπεισόδιον, if the parodos which precedes it is not to be regarded as a μέλος (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 58). λέξις ὁλη is to be compared with the μέρος ὁλων in the preceding definitions of πρόλογος, ἐπεισόδιον and ἔξοδος. The traditional reading λέξις ὁλων χοροῦ involves a distinction between the entire chorus and individual χορευταί, which would probably have had very little meaning in Aristotle's day, when the chorus had practically ceased to take a serious part in the action of the play.

στάσιμον. For the origin of this technical sense of the word it is usual to refer to Aristophanes Vesp. 270 ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ στάσιμος ἐνθάδ' ἄνδρες, ἀφοῦτας αὐτῶν ἐκκαλεῖν, as showing that
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οτάσιμον meant the song sung when the chorus had taken up its position in the orchestra; and to Ran. 1280 μῆ, πρὶν γὰρ ἄκοινης χάτεραν στάσιν μελῶν—where the Scholiast explains στάσιν μελῶν by στάσιμον μέλος οὐ ζηδοσβιν Ἰστάμενοι οἱ χορευταί. The interpretation, however, of this second passage is by no means clear, as στάσις μελῶν may very well mean a 'set of songs', a σύστημα μελῶν. The general sense of the adj. στάσιμος is 'without movement' or 'action' (= ἀκίνητος), and hence 'steady', 'stable', 'quiet'. The στάσιμον, accordingly, should be the 'stationary song', as distinct from the πάροδος, a song of movement. This is exactly what Plato Comicus implies in his description of the chorus of his time (see above); and it is in accordance with the statements of the grammarians, e.g. that in Schol. Eurip. Phoen. 202 τοῦτο τὸ μέλος στάσιμον λέγεται; οὔταν γὰρ ὁ χορὸς μετὰ τὴν πάροδον λέγῃ τι μέλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνήκει τὸ ἀκίνητος μέλος, στάσιμον λέγεται τὸ ἅμα, and that in Schol. Soph. Trach. 216 τὸ μελεδάριον οὖν ἐστὶ στάσιμον ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἱδονῆς ὀρχοῦνται. If we may suppose that in Aristotle's time the chorus after the πάροδος stood motionless in its place in the orchestra, the songs in this part of a tragedy would be rightly termed στάσιμα; and the absence of anaepasts and trochaics would be a good formal mark of distinction between them and the πάροδος.

24 ἀναπαίστων: not the foot itself, but the verse or verses made up of it.

τροχαῖον: trochaic verse or verses, in the same way as ἱαμβός often means an iambic verse. The reason for the exclusion of the trochaic tetrameter is that, as one of the κινητικὰ μέτρα, it has a special fitness for the dance (see on Poet. 4, 1449 a 21).

30 τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις, i.e. in the discussion in chaps. 7-11, which dealt with the μῦθος in general and its unity of structure. Aristotle now turns to the question of the particular form of μῦθος required to produce the emotional effect of Tragedy (pity and fear).

31 μῆ ἀπλὴν ἄλλα πεπλεγμένην: see the explanation of these terms in 10, 1452 a 12-18. The finest kind of tragedy involves a complex plot, because the element of surprise (comp. 9, 1452 a 4, and 14, 1454 a 4) in the complex plot accentuates the tragic impression (comp. 6, 1450 a 33 and 9, 1452 a 4). It may be observed, as an instance of Aristotle's inconsistency in matters of language, that in 13, 1453 a 13 the ἄπλοις μῦθος is the opposite of the ἰπλοῖς, not (as here) of the πεπλεγμένοις μῦθος.

32 φοβερῶν καὶ ἑλεεινῶν εἶναι μυητικὴν: as was assumed in the definition of Tragedy (6, 1449 b 27), and again in 9, 1452 a 2 and
hensive designation for the incidents distinctive of Tragedy, just as γελοιος describes those of Comedy. A tragic scene may be either φοβερόν, ‘alarming’, suggestive of coming evil or danger to the hero, or ἠλεεινόν, ‘piteous’, a representation of his anguish and suffering. Fear (the opposite of hope) relates to the future; pity to evil or suffering actually present and before us. In Aristotle’s time the definition of fear was ‘expectation of coming evil’, προσδοκία κακοῦ (Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115a 9), or προσδοκία μέλλοντος κακοῦ (Plato Laches 198b); or, as he puts it in Rhet. 2. 5, 1382a 21, λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἡ λυπηρὸν. In pity on the other hand the evil or suffering, instead of being possible and prospective, is actual and before our eyes as it were: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385b 13 έστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φανομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἡ λυπηρὸν (comp. Tumlirz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 15). The distinction between the φοβερό and ἠλεεινό in a play may be seen in the Oedipus Tyrannus, in which we are gradually prepared for the piteous incidents of the catastrophe by a series of premonitions of coming evil in the earlier scenes. The sympathetic interest we are thus made to take in the fortunes of the tragic hero depends, according to Aristotle, on one condition, his being more or less like ourselves (δύοιοι), i.e. neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally wicked. This ethical similarity is what renders fear for another possible with us, as we are told in the context, 13, 1453a 5 φόβος περὶ τὸν δύοιον; and in the Rhetoric the same is said of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386a 24 τοῖς δύοιοις ἐλεοῦσι ... κατὰ ἡθη. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to amplify the present statement by further illustrations from the corresponding chapters of the Rhetoric (2. 5 and 2. 8). The general point of view, however, in the two discussions is not the same. The pity and fear of the Rhetoric are the pity and fear of the judges whom the rhetor is addressing; it is part of his art to work, it may be, on their fears, and deter them from an adverse decision by showing how injurious its consequences may be to them and theirs. But the apprehension the tragic poet arouses in us is not of this personal description; it is a disinterested fear for another, the danger that arouses it being that of the hero, not that of the audience in the theatre. The point being so obvious, it is strange to see a diametrically opposite view taken by a critic of such distinction as Lessing. ‘Aristotle’s fear (he tells us) is not the fear which the impending evil of another arouses in us for
that other; it is the fear that arises for ourselves from our likeness to the sufferer; it is the fear that the misfortunes, which we see hanging over him, may befall ourselves; it is the fear that we may ourselves become the pitied object' (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). The rhetoric of Lessing's statement may perhaps conceal the underlying confusion of thought: he has confused our fear that something will happen with our recognition of the possibility that something may happen to us. This latter is the general condition of all sensibility to pity and fear; but it is not a ἀγάπος, and cannot, therefore, be identical with either of these emotions (comp. Tumlirz l.c. p. 7; Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. 2. 29 p. 783). Lessing has an equally paradoxical view of the Aristotelian ἔλεος—one inspired, if I am not mistaken, by Hobbes rather than by Aristotle himself. He thinks that according to Aristotle the feeling of pity is impossible without fear for ourselves... fear is a necessary ingredient in pity' (Hamb. Dram. St. 77); one of his modern followers even goes so far as to assert that the Aristotelian pity is only 'a disguised fear' ('eine verkappte Furcht', Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 310). This rapprochement of the two feelings is not warranted by the texts in the Rhetoric 1. A distinction between them is implied not only in the present, but also in other passages of the Poetics; comp. ἔλεος καὶ φόβος (6, 1449 b 27; 14, 1453 b 12), ἡ ἔλεος ἔχει ἡ φόβον (11, 1452 a 38), οὕτε ἔλεος οὕτε φόβον (scil. ἔχοι ἄν, 13, 1453 a 3), φοβέρα καὶ ἐλεεῖνον (9, 1452 a 2; 13, 1452 b 32; 14, 1453 b 1), οὕτε ἐλεεῖνον οὕτε φοβέρον (13, 1453 a 1, 1452 b 32).

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1 The logical weakness of Lessing's reasoning at times may be seen from his interpretation of Rhet. 2. 5, 1382 b 26, where the enumeration of φοβερά is summed up in a brief formula, ὡς ἐπαράστηκα, φοβερά ἑτερων δέον ἐμοί ἐτέρων γινόμενα ἡ μελλοντα ἐλεεινά ἑτερον—speaking generally, one may say that all evils are fearful, which arouse pity when they befall or are about to befall others'. On the strength of this Lessing tells us that with Aristotle pity necessarily involves a feeling of fear: 'So dachte Aristoteles von dem Mitleiden, und nur hieraus wird die wahre Ursache begreiflich, warum er in der Erklärung der Tragödie nächst dem Mitleiden, nur die einzige Furcht nannte. Nicht als ob diese Furcht hier eine besondere von dem Mitleiden unabhängige Leidenschaft sey... sondern weil, nach seiner Erklärung des Mitleides, dieses die Furcht nothwendig einschliesst; weil nichts unser Mitleid erregt, als was zugleich unsere Furcht erwecken kann' (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). But the fact that a particular kind of evil (e.g. a painful death) is in one relation a cause of fear and in another of pity is not enough to show the substantial identity of the two feelings, or to prove that one of them includes the other. Aristotle's φοβερά ἑτερον ἰσα ἐλεεινά ἑτερον is not an analysis of the feeling of φόβος, but merely an attempt to determine the kind of facts to which it relates.
6). It will be seen from the instances just quoted that in the formula ‘pity and fear’, pity comes first, whereas in the corresponding formula φοβηρά often precedes ἐλεημονία. The explanation may perhaps be this, that Aristotle (like Plato) assumes a tragedy to be a picture of human suffering (πάθος); so that the excitation of pity is its primary and essential purpose, the element of fear coming in as a sort of secondary matter, to quicken our sympathy with the tragic hero, and prepare us for a catastrophe. In a play like the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, which Aristotle has so constantly in mind, the φοβηρά precede the ἐλεημονία and lead up to them; but the great tragic interest is in the later scenes, in which Oedipus becomes an object of pity.

πρῶτον μὲν is answered by ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ in \(1453^a i\) (comp. Plato \(b 34\) Symp. 219 e; Laws 935 a).

The connexion between the main points in the discussion in this and the next chapter is as follows. After laying down (1) the general rule that, if a tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in us, the tragic hero must be a man of a certain type of character (13, \(1452^b 34\)), Aristotle adds (2) that the tragic effect is enhanced by the play having an unhappy ending (13, \(1453^a i 12\)), and (3) weakened by a ‘double plot’, in which the unhappiness of certain of the personages is balanced by the happiness of others (13, \(1453^a 30\)); and (4) that stories of horror in which kinsmen are involved have an especial tragic interest and value (14, \(1453^b 14\)). This last leads him off (5) into a discussion on Discovery and its place in a play (14, \(1453^b 26\); the conclusion being (6) that, where kinsmen are concerned, the best form of tragedy is one in which a timely Discovery prevents the actual perpetration of the contemplated deed of horror (14, \(1454^a 4\).

ἐπιευκῆς, the opposite of ὑποθηροῦς in \(a 36\); in ordinary usage ἐπιευκῆς is often synonymous with στοινδαῖος or χρηστός (comp. 15, \(1454^b 13\)), and opposed to φαιλός (comp. 26, \(1462^a 2\)) and similar terms (Bon. Ind. 271 b 36). The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in 13, \(1453^a 8\) ἀρετῆς διαφέρων καὶ δικαιονύμνη. Aristotle tells us that a man of great worth and virtue is not sufficiently like ourselves (ὁμοιός) for the purposes of Tragedy, because his sufferings will create an overpowering feeling of indignation or disgust instead of pity. It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on 13, \(1453^a 16\)), or his present use of the term ἐπιευκῆς with that in 15, \(1454^b 13\).
Besides this, according to the Rhetoric it is quite possible for one who is ἐπιεικής to be an object of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 34 κἂν οἴωντα τίνας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν (scil. ἐλεοῦσα). All this may perhaps show that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in Aristotle.

μιαρόν: as an offence to our moral or religious feelings; comp. Rhet. 2, 18, 1366 a 21, as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of φιλανθρωπία, 'fellow-feeling', 'kindliness', 'tender-heartedness' (comp. L. Schmidt, Ethik der Gr. 2 p. 277). A certain affinity between φιλανθρωπία and pity is recognized in Rhet. 2, 13, 1390 a 19, where the tender-heartedness of the young is said to make them easily moved to pity: ἔλεγχοι δὲ καὶ οἱ γέρωντες εἰσὶν ἄλλ' οὗ διὰ ταύτα τοὺς νέους οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δὲ ἀσθένειαν (comp. Tumlirz l.c. p. 13). A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as φιλανθρωπία is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what φιλανθρωπία meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of ἐπιεικής in Aristotle.

μετατίπτειν: comp. the use of μεταβάλλειν in 7, 1351 a 14 (and passim), and that of μεταβαίνειν in 18, 1455 b 27.

περί τῶν ἀνάξιων. περί = 'in the case of', i. e. as we say, 'for'; the preposition enables Aristotle to join φόβος and ἕλεος in the same construction. For this use of περί comp. Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115 a 22 εἰ τὰς ὑβρίν περὶ πάθας ἡ γνώμη φοβηταὶ. Plato Rep. 539 a ἦνα μὴ γέγοντα ὁ ἐλεος οὗτος περὶ τοῦ ἱσχυροῦτας σοι.—Lylias 168, 39 περὶ τούς οὐδὲν ἔχοντας κακῶν ἐλεημονεύστατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι.
13. 1452 b 34—1453 a 10

ἀνάξιον: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 13 ἐστώ δὴ ἐλεος λύπη τις ἕπτοι φαινο- 1453 a 4

μενω κακω φθαρτικῶ ᾧ λυπηρῶ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνει, ὁ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἀν παθὴν ᾧ τῶν αὐτῶν τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίων φαύνηται.

δυστυχοῦντα: for the participle see Goodwin, Synt. of Gr. Moods and Tenses 829 (δ). Another instance of the construction will be found in 14, 1453 b 23.

περὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον. This disinterested fear, which rests, just like a 5 pity, on a basis of sympathy, is not recognized in the Rhetoric, where the point of view from which the emotions are considered is different (see on 13, 1452 b 32). The antithesis in the text, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἐστω ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, is too strongly put, since pity also is περὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, as one may see from Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 24 καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἁλικίας, κατὰ ἡθη, κατὰ ξεῖς, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη.

δι’ ἀμαρτίαν τινὰ: a 16 δι’ ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην. ἀμαρτία in the a 10 Aristotelian sense of the term is a mistake or error of judgement (error in Lat.), and the deed done in consequence of it is an ἀμάρτημα (erratum). In the Ethics an ἀμάρτημα is said to originate not in vice or depravity but in ignorance of some material fact or circumstance: Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 b 12 τὰ μὲν μεν’ ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτηματά ἐστιν ὅταν μὴ ὑπὲρ ὁ μὴ ὁ μὴ οὗ ἐνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ ή γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τοῦτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτῳ οὗ τούτῳ ἐνεκα ψήθη . . . ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἥ θελη γένηται, ἀτέχνημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως ἀνεν δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα (comp. Rhet. 1. 13, 1374 b 6). This ignorance, we are told in another passage, takes the deed out of the class of voluntary acts, and enables one to forgive or even pity the doer: Eth. N. 3. 2, 1110 b 31 οὖ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἁγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μονοθείας, οὐδ’ ἡ καθόλου (ψέρονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην), ὅλ’ ἢ καθ’ ἐκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ᾧ πρᾶξει· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἐλεος καὶ συγκύρωμα (comp. Thuc. 1. 32. 5). In thus making the tragic story turn on an ἀμαρτία Aristotle is probably thinking more immediately of the Oedipus Tyrannus (comp. 14, 1453 b 29).

It is strange that the ἀμαρτία or ἀμαρτία μεγάλη, of which Aristotle is speaking, should have been taken by Tumlirz (l.c. p. 25) and others to mean not an error of judgement, but some ethical fault or infirmity of character, like those indicated in 15, 1454 b 12. The Sophoclean Oedipus is a man of hasty temper (comp. O. T. 807), but his ἀμαρτία was not in that, but in the 'great mistake' he made, when he became unwittingly the slayer of his own father.
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1453 a 12 ἀνάγκη ἁρά κτέ. is a corollary to what has just been said on the construction of the καλλιστὴ τραγῳδία; two other forms of Tragedy, which had often been adopted by poets, are pronounced to be of inferior tragic quality and value.

tὸν καλὸν ἐχοντα μέθον: comp. the expressions in the context, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς καλλιστῆς τραγῳδίας (13, 1452 b 31), and ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλιστῇ τραγῳδίᾳ (13, 1453 a 22).

a 13 ἀπλοὺν . . . διπλοὺν: see on 13, 1452 b 31. The meaning of διπλοὺς in this connexion is explained later on, in a 31.

a 16 ἡ βελτίων μᾶλλον ἡ χείρονος. No reason is given for this significant addition, but the intention of it is clear enough; it is an attempt to bring the present conception of the tragic hero as being ὀμοιος, like ourselves, of only average character and virtue, into line with that in certain other statements about him. Apart from this chapter, in fact, the general assumption in the Poetics is that the tragic hero should be not like the average man, but better than that—βελτίων ἡ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς (2, 1448 a 4, 18; 16, 1454 b 9; comp. 25, 1460 b 34). For the purposes of the present chapter, however, which deals with the emotional effect of Tragedy and its conditions another and a somewhat different conception of the tragic hero is required; if we are to pity him and fear for him, he must be, like Oedipus and the pathetic characters in Euripides, a personage of a very human type, one like what we are ourselves. It would take some discussion to reconcile the two views, and explain away the inconsistency of language into which Aristotle has drifted.

a 17 τὸ γεγονόμενον: Meteor. 1. 14, 352 b 19 δηλαοὶ δὲ τὸ γεγονόμενον.—2. 8, 367 a 11 τεκμηρίων δ᾽ ἀστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ γεγονόμενον περὶ ταῦτα τῶν νότουσ.—De resp. 21, 480 b 26 μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γεγονόμενον.—Pol. 7. 14, 1334 a 5 μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γεγονόμενα τοῖς λόγοις.—Xenophon Hiero 9. 3 οὐ δὲ ταῦτα καλὸς ἐχει, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γεγονόμενα (="quod vere fit, die Erfahrung": Sauppe, Lexil. Xenoph. p. 25).

a 18 ἀπαρθιμων: perhaps a metaphor from the counting of money, in which each coin has to be accepted and allowed to pass as good. 'ἀπαρθιμων nova significatione dicit . . . est ergo ἀπαρθιμων recevoir, mettre en conte, et approuver'. (Casaubon, in Musæi Oxon. litt. conspectus i p. 28.) In HSt. it is rendered by 'narrare', and in Liddell and Scott by 'recount'.

a 20 Ἀλκμεώνα. On this (the Attic) form of the name see HSt. s. v. and Meisterhans, Gr.3 p. 35. It survives in Ἀ in Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 3 and it is implied in Ἀλκμεώνός, the form the patronymic always has in the Ath. Pol.
Aristotle’s conclusion as to the best form of Tragedy enables him to say a good word for Euripides, who had been blamed by critics for the unhappy ending of many of his plays. He insists that the procedure of Euripides is right, and points in confirmation to the eminent success of his plays on the stage, where in spite of all his faults Euripides is acknowledged to be the most moving and the most tragic of the tragedians. With this we may compare the estimate of Euripides in Quintilian 10. 1. 68 in *adfectibus vero cum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui in miseratione constant facile praecipuum*. There is a long discussion of this passage by Neidhardt, Diss. Halenses 3 p. 279.

αὐτῷ: the object after ἐγκαλοῦντες, and preparative to ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾶ. For the construction comp. Eth. N. 4. I, 1120 b 17 ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μᾶλλον ἄξιοι ἀνεῖσ ἥκιστα πλούσιον.—9. 8, 1168 a 32 ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἶον ὅτι οὔθεν ἄφ’ ἐαντοῦ πράττει.

τοῦτο δρᾶ: comp. 23, 1459 a 29 and Bon. Ind. 205 a 42.

ἀγώνων: see on 6, 1450 b 18.

τραγικόταται: i.e. as arousing most directly the two distinctively tragic emotions of pity and fear (comp. 13, 1452 b 33 τοῦτο γὰρ ἵδουν τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεως ἔστων). Similarly in the context (a 29) Euripides is termed τραγικότατος τῶν ποιητῶν, because he is the greatest master of the art of arousing these same emotions (comp. Neidhardt l.c. p. 281).

ἀι τοιαύται = αἰ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσαι.

ἀν κατορθωθῶσιν. The proper management Aristotle has in mind is often supposed to be that of the actors, stage-managers, etc., responsible for the execution of the piece. This interpretation, as was long ago pointed out by Düntzer (Rettung d. aristot. Poetik p. 159), makes the clause a superfluity, since it is obvious that, to succeed on the stage, every play requires fairly good acting and an adequate presentation. After ἀν κατορθωθῶσιν we have to supply ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (comp. ἐδ οἰκονομεῖ, scil. Euripides, in the next line); the sense is that the poet, having chosen a good tragic subject, must handle it with all due skill and care to secure a satisfactory result (comp. 14, 1453 b 25). κατορθῶσιν is practically synonymous with ἐδ οἰκονομεῖν, the term which replaces it in the context (a 29).

τὰ ὅλα. An admission that Euripides, though a master of emotional effect (τραγικότατος), is not always equally admirable in his treatment of the other points in a tragedy. His artistic shortcomings are often noted in the Poetics. His plots are directly
or indirectly criticized in 14, 1453b 28, in 15, 1454a 1, and in 16, 1454b 31; his characters in 15, 1454a 28–32, and in 25, 1461b 20; and his choruses in 18, 1456a 27.

οικονομεῖ. This seems to be the first instance of the use of the word in literary criticism. In the grammarians and writers on style οικονομία (οικονομιά, οικονομικός, etc.) is the regular technical word for the disposition of the materials and management of the various points in an oration or a poem (v. HSt. s.v., and Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poetica iudiciorum rel. p. 91 and p. 149).

α 31 ὄποι τῶν. A reference perhaps to the critics who are said to have disapproved of the sad ending of so many of the tragedies of Euripides (supra a 24).

σύστασις ἡ διπλὴν τὴν σύστασιν ἔξουσι. Aristotle has to use the periphrasis σύστασιν ἔξουσι instead of the simple συνεστῶσα, since διπλὴ συνεστῶσα would not have conveyed the sense required. Though there is a certain inelegance in this juxtaposition of σύστασις and σύστασιν, the reading is sufficiently certified by the very similar repetition of φύσις in several Aristotelian passages: De part. an. 2, 8, 653b 33 ἡ τῶν ὄστων φύσις... σκληρὰ τὴν φύσιν οὐσὰ.—De gen. an. 5, 5, 785a 23 φύσει λευκοτέραν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πτερῶν φύσιν.—Eth. N. 7, 15, 1154b 20 φύσει δ’ ἤδεα, ἃ ποιεῖ πράξεων τῆς τοιῶδε φύσεως, and in the Platonic Epinomis 990b οὐκ ἂν μᾶθεσιν ποτέ πάσα φύσις ἰκανή γένους θεωρήσας μὴ θαναμασθῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως (comp. Lobeck on Sophocles Aj. 277, cited by Vahlen).

α 32 καθάπερ ὡς ὀδύσσεια: see the synopsis of the Odyssey in 17, 1455b 16–23.

καὶ τελευτῶσα κτέ. explains διπλὴν την σύστασιν ἔξουσι, as is sometimes the case with the second of two words or clauses coupled by τε καί (v. Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 365, and Torstrik on De anima 1. 2, 405a 27).

α 34 θεάτρων: comp. 4, 1449a 9 πρῶς τὰ θεάτρα.—Plato Laws 700ε τὰ θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνῆντ᾽ ἐγένοντο.—Aristoxenus ap. Ath. 632b τὰ θεάτρα ἐκβεβαιβᾶρωται. θεάτρων, in the sense of ‘the audience’, is common enough, but the above quoted passages show that the word may be used in the plural also, in the sense of ‘the audiences’. The audiences in these days, says Aristotle, are too weak to like the strong situations of the great Tragedy.

α 35 καὶ εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοὺς θεάτας: Plato Gorg. 502 ξαράξεσθαι τοὺς θεάτας.
13. 1453 a 29–14. 1453 b 5

"εστιν δὲ οὖν αὐτή. The οὖν here negatives the proposition, and 1453 a 35 not the proximate word, αὐτή. Bäumlein, Gr. Partikeln p. 308 (followed by Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 179), quotes a very similar passage from Isocrates 4, 130 ἐστὶ δ’ οὖν οἶδαν τ’ ἄποτρέπειν, and explains the position of the negative as due to a desire to avoid the collocation οὖν ἔστιν (i.e. οὖν δὲ ἔστι). αὐτὴ (=τοῦτο) is the subject with its gender assimilated to that of the predicate (v. on 6, 1450 a 4).

ἀπὸ τραγῳδιῶν ἡδονή: ‘the pleasure of Tragedy,’ as we should say (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 336). For this use of the preposition comp. Top. 1. 15, 106 a 37 τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν ἡδονῆ.—Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 b 28 αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἡδοναί.—Plato Rep. 582 b τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς. For the absence of the article see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51.

κωμῳδίας οἰκεία. The conclusions of the Orestes and Alcestis of Euripides were said to verge on Comedy (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poetica judiciorum rel. p. 36).

ἐκεῖ γὰρ κτῆ. The reference is probably to the Orestes of Alexis or some other comedy on the same subject (comp. Kock, CAF. 2 p. 358).

"Εστιν μὲν οὖν κτῆ. Aristotle now passes on to the second of the two points announced at the beginning of chap. 13, πῶθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδιῶν ἔργον (13, 1452 b 29).

δφεως: see on 6, 1449 b 33. We may suppose him to be thinking of such theatrical artifices as the fearful appearance of the Furies in the Eumenides, and the rags and tatters of certain of the heroes of Euripides.

πρότερον, ‘naturally prior’, i.e. better, as in Aristoph. Ran. 76 b 3 and Plato Lach. 183 b. This sense of πρότερον is recognized in Cat. 12, 14 b 6 εἰσάγαγε δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντυμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἄγαπωμένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πρότερον φάσκειν παρ’ αὐτῶς εἶναι. Compare also the use of πρῶτη in a 30 and a 33.

ποιητῶν ἀμεινονος. As the poet is an imitative artist in language, a μιμητὴς ἐν λόγῳ (v. on 1, 1447 a 28), it follows that the poetic effect has to be produced by language, and not by means other than language.

ὁρᾶν: i.e. ὁρᾶν τὰ πράγματα γνώμενα.

φρίττευ denotes the cold shudder (φρίκη: v. W. H. Thompson on Plato Phaedr. 251 a) experienced in moments of intense fear or horror. This may arise even from the mere thought of something horrible: De motu an. 7, 701 b 22 διὸ καὶ φρίττονοι καὶ φοβοῦνται
νοίταντες μόνον. And it is often said to arise from what one hears: Aeschylus Ag. 1242 τὴν μὲν Θυάτον δαίτα ταυδείων κρεών ἔννικα καὶ πέφρικα.—Sophocles El. 1408 ήκουσ᾽ ἀνήκουστα δύστανος ὡστε φριέα.—Trach. 1044 κλίουσ᾽ ἐφριεά.—Plato Rep. 387 β τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὁμόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητή, Κωκυτοῦ τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας καὶ ἄλλα ὡστε τοῦτον ὀνομαξόμενα φριττεῖν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς ταῦτα τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

ἄτεχνότερον: see on 6, 1450 b 17. In such instances the effect depends too much on the 'σκευοποιῶς (or costumier), and too little on the poet himself.

χορηγία. The word has been taken to mean 'adiminicum' (Valla), 'impedium' (Paccius), 'choragi opera et sumptus' (Heinsius), 'suppeditatio aliena' (Tyrwhitt), 'expensive apparatus' (Twining, Hermann), 'apparatus' (L. and S.), and 'Unterstützung durch äussere Mittel' (Ueberweg, after Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 20). This last rendering, which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's, is probably right. It aptly points the contrast between the means supplied by the poet himself, and those which are outside his art and have to be furnished by others; and it is also in accordance with Aristotle's use of χορηγία and χορηγεῖν in the Ethics and Politics (v. Bon. Ind. 852 b 52 and 60). Thus in Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178 a 24 he says τὶς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπὶ ἔλαττον δείται (scil. ἢ τοῦ νοῦ ἄρετή), and in 1. 11, 1101 a 15 (comp. 10. 9, 1179 a 11) τὸν κατ᾽ ἄρετῆν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένον. More than one, however, of the recent interpreters of the Poetics seem to have assumed (with Heinsius) that in a discussion on matters theatrical χορηγία must be supposed to retain its original theatrical sense, that of the service of a choregus. The answer to this is that we constantly find Aristotle even in the Poetics using the technical terms of the theatre in the more general sense they had or had acquired in ordinary language. Instances of this are ἄγωνιζεσθαι (24, 1460 a 9), συναγωγίζεσθαι (18, 1456 a 26), πρωταγωνιστής (4, 1449 a 18), ἐπεισόδιον (17, 1455 b 23), ἐπεισοδίων (17, 1455 b 1), ἐπεισοδωδυς (9, 1451 b 34), ἀπὸ μικρῆς (15, 1454 b 2), ἐκ περιστεῖας (16, 1454 b 29), ὑποκριτικὰ (20, 1457 a 21). It seems to be agreed too that the duties of the choregus were mainly, if not entirely, with the chorus, and that he had nothing to do with the make-up of the actors (A. Müller, Gr. Bühnenalterthümer p. 336).

tὸ τερατώδες. The reference here is to the appearance of certain of the more monstrous creations of Greek mythology. Such
abnormal personages required on the stage a peculiar make-up and special masks: Pollux 4. 141 τὰ δὲ ἐκσκεφαλὰς πρόσωπα Ἀκταίων ἐστὶ κερασφόροι ... ἤ Ἀργος πολυφθαλός, ἢ Εὔππητ ἢ Χείρων ἐπιλαττομομένη εἰς ἵππον παρ' Ἐφιπτοθ (comp. Sommerbrodt, Scae- nica p. 204). In existing plays we have a clear instance of a personage of this kind in the _βοῦκερος_ παρβένος, 10, in Prom. 588 (comp. 674), and in the Furies in the Eumenides, who are said to look more like Gorgons than women (Eum. 48). The prominence of such figures in the dramas of Aeschylus was noted by the ancients: Vita Aeschyli (p. 2 Dind.) ταῖς τε γὰρ ὄψει καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἐκπλήξιν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται.

τὸ τερατῶδες on the stage may be φοβερόν, and thus a means—though an illegitimate one (supra b 7)—of producing a tragic effect (φοβόσ). When it does not serve this dramatic purpose (τὸ τερατῶδες μοῦνον), however, it is out of place in Tragedy, since the pleasure it gives us is not the true tragic pleasure, which depends on the excitement of pity and fear (τὴν ἄπ’ ἐλέον καὶ φόβον ὕδυς b 12), and on that alone. Aristotle does not stop to explain our pleasure in τὸ τερατῶδες, but it is easy to supply the omission, if one remem- bers that anything of the nature of a τέρας is marvellous (θαυμαστόν; comp. Herodotus 4. 28 and Plato Hipp. mai. 283 c), and that the marvellous is recognized by Aristotle (τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἔδυ; 24, 1460 a 17) as one of the great causes of human pleasure (see on 9, 1452 a 4).

κοινωνοῦσιν = κοινὸν ἕξουσιν (Bon. Ind. 400 a 39).

_Φονερόν_. The argument here may be thus restated: A play is b 10 essentially a μύθος πράξεως (6, 1449 b 36 and passim); if it is to arouse pity and fear, therefore, it must do so through the ἐλεεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ in its πράξεις (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν), not through merely material accessories supplied ab extra by others (comp. supra b 7).

_Τοῦτο_: i.e. τὸ ἔλεεινὸν καὶ φοβερὰν. For similar instances of this allusive use of the neuter of the demonstrative, which is so common in all Greek (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 35), see 13, 1453 a 24; 17, 1455 a 26; 24, 1460 a 8.

ποία ὁνὶ δεινὰ ἢ ποία οἰκτρά. Aristotle amends his question b 13 for the alternative ποία οἰκτρά. The tragic poet is not concerned with δεινὰ in general, but only with those calculated to arouse pity (οἰκτρά). ἦν ὁλίκιον as in De anima 2. 5, 417 a 5 δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθητὸς καθ’ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῦτος (v. Pacius ad loc. and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2. p. 297). As Aristotle proceeds to show, the deed of horror (τὸ δεινὸν) may be either actual or only
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1453 b 14 contemplated; and if actual, it may be either within the play itself, and identical with the πάθος (v. II, 1452 b 11), or anterior to the action of the play, and distinct from the πάθος. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, the deed of horror, the slaying of Laius, takes place before the opening of the play, the action of which is made up (1) of a series of φοβερά ( alarming incidents) leading up to the catastrophe, and (2) a πάθος, which consists in the agony and remorse of Oedipus (see on II, 1452 b 13).

b 16 τάς τοιαύτας πράξεις = τάς δεινός πράξεις. With such actions there are three possibilities: the parties concerned (the slayer and the slain, for instance) may be either (1) friends, or (2) enemies, or (3) indifferent to each other; in all three situations there is something δεινόν, but it is only the first that is felt to be especially piteous; it is therefore at once δεινόν and οἰκτρόν, and thus eminently adapted for the purposes of Tragedy (ταύτα ζητητέον b 22).

b 17 ἂν μὲν οὖν ἔχθρος ἔχθρον, scil. τοιαύτα ποιητικα, understood from the preceding εἶναι ... τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις. In many instances the ellipsis is not so easily supplied, e.g. in Rhet. 1. 6, 1363 b 27 (ἀγαθά ἐστι) καὶ τὰ ἰδια καὶ ἀ μηδέες, καὶ τὰ περιττά.—Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 20 καὶ ὅτι εἰ μηδὲ Θησείου ἠδύκησαν, οὔτε Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδὲ οἱ Τιναρίδαι, οὔτε Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἐκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος (comp. Vahlen on the present passage).

οὔτε ἐλεεινόν, scil. ποιεῖ. There is nothing in the deed then to call forth pity either for the doer or the sufferer. That the doer of the deed may sometimes claim our pity, is not distinctly said, but it is clear from the instances which follow, Orestes, Medea, Oedipus, etc.; it is incidentally recognized also in the analysis of 'the involuntary' in Eth. N. 3. 1, 1109 b 31 ἕπι μὲν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις ἔταινον καὶ ψόγων γιγαντίων, ἕπι δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συγγρώμαθι, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέον (comp. 3. 2, 1111 b 1).

b 18 μέλλων, scil. ποιεῖν, just as in b 21 μέλλῃ = μέλλῃ ἀποκτείνειν. The alternative οὔτε μέλλων is added because pity may be aroused by the spectacle of impending, as well as by that of actually present anguish: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 b 1 τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἡ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεωνότερα (comp. 2. 5, 1382 b 26).

πλὴν κατ' αὐτῷ τὸ πάθος: i.e. in this, as also in the following case (οὔτ' ἂν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες), the spectacle of suffering humanity may arouse a certain human feeling (akin to pity) for the sufferer (see on 13, 1452 b 38), but it is not, in the proper sense of the term, 'piteous', since the moral condition of pity is wanting; we cannot say that the man ought not to suffer (comp. 13, 1453 a 4).
When the parties, however, are related to one another (ὅταν δὲ ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη), the evil comes from a quarter from which it was not to be expected, and the situation is 'piteous' as well as horrible; comp. Rhet. 2. 8, 1386ᵃ 11 (ἕλεενών ἐστι) τὸ ὅθεν προσήκειν ἁγαθόν τι πράξαι [ὑπάρξαι Vahlen] κακὸν τι συμβηναί.

ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις. φιλία here practically means 'cognatio' (comp. Rhet. 2. 12, 1378ᵃ ἐφισεν). For this use of the participle see on 13, 1453ᵇ 4 (ὁμορφά). On the alternative spelling Κλυταιμήστρα see Roscher’s Lex. s. v. and Vitelli, Studi Italiani i p. 239. There is hardly a trace of it in the MSS. of Homer (Ludwich, Homerica I–V p. 5; comp. Wilamowitz, Commentariolum grammaticum IV p. 11).

αὐτῶν: emphatic as in 9, 1451ᵇ 36; 21, 1457ᵇ 34; 24, 1460ᵃ 6. 18 εὑρίσκειν is followed by an infinitive in 14, 1454ᵇ 11 εἴρον ... παρασκενάζειν, and (in the middle) in Eurip. Med. 195 οὐδεὶς λίπασν ἤφετο μούσῃ καὶ πολυσύρδοις φίδαις παιεῖν.

εἰδότα καὶ γιγνώσκοντα, scil. πράττοντας. Instead of saying 19 ἐστι γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξιν ὑπ’ εἰδότων καὶ γιγνώσκοντος, Aristotle introduces the qualification in the clause with ὡσπερ, which thus becomes a substantive part of the statement (comp. 11, 1452ᵃ 23; 18, 1456ᵃ 27; 21, 1457ᵇ 24).

γιγνώσκοντας: Rhet. 2. 1, 1378ᵃ 14 ἐνδεχεται μή τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας.—Demosth. 10. 17 ταῦτα τοῖνυν ἔκαστον εἰδότα καὶ γιγνώσκοντα παρ’ αὐτῷ κτέ.

Εὑριπίδης: see on 6, 1450ᵃ 25.

Μήδειαι: Eurip. Med. 1236. 29 ο Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους: comp. 15, 1454ᵇ 8. Sophocles is named because there were others who had dramatized the Oedipus story (Nauck, TGF,² p. 967) as well as Sophocles.

μὲν οὖν: see on 22, 1458ᵃ 25.

ἐξω τοῦ δράματος: 15, 1454ᵇ 7 ἐξω τῆς τραγῳδίας.—17, 1455ᵇ 8 ἐξω τοῦ μύθου.—24, 1460ᵃ 29 ἐξω τοῦ μυθεύματος. There is a reference to this form of dramatic construction in Eth. N. 1. 11, 1101ᵃ 32 τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προκύπταρξεν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις.

ὁ Αλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυπάμαντος: Nauck, TGF,² p. 777 and 964.

τῷ τραμάτῳ Οἰδίπους: another name perhaps for the ὅπο τραγῳδικής ἀκανθοτόλης of Sophocles (Nauck l. c. p. 230).

ἀνάγνωρίσαι, scil. τὴν φιλίαν, as in 31 (see on 16, 1454ᵃ 32).
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1453 b 38 τὸ τε γάρ μιαρὸν κτῆ.: i.e. it offends our moral sensibilities (see on 13, 1452 b 36) as a sin against the laws of natural affection; and it is untragic also, through the absence of the element of suffering.

1454 a 1 ποιεῖ διμοίως, said of a dramatic personage, recalls the idea of γινώσκοντα μελλήσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι in 1453 b 38.

εὐ 'Αντιγόνη: Soph. Ant. 1231.

τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἴμων, scil. τοῦτο ποιεῖ, i.e. μέλλει ἀποκτείνειν ἀποκτείναι δὲ οὖ (comp. a 6), as is implied in Goulston's paraphrase, 'Creontem patrem Haemon sciens permere conatus est, nec perfect tamen.' The ellipse is not unlike that in ἀν μὲν οὖν ἔχθρος ἔχθρον in 1453 b 17.

a 2 βέλτων, scil. τοῦ γινώσκοντα πράξαι.

a 4 ἐκπληκτικὸν. ἐκπληξίς is a very general term for the loss of self-possession that may result from a mental shock. In use, however, it often has the more special sense of extreme surprise; the definition of it in fact in Top. 4. 5, 126 b 17 is θαυμασίωσις ὑπερβάλλουσα, 'admiratio exsuperans' (Pacius). The Discovery is said both here and in 16, 1455 a 17 to be 'astounding,' just in the same way as a περιπέτεια—which in a play is so intimately connected with the Discovery—is said in Rhet. i. 11, 1371 b 10 to be θαυμαστὸν. The affinity of sense between ἐκπληκτικὸν and θαυμαστὸν is indirectly shown by the fact that Aristotle describes the 'pursuit of Hector' in the Iliad in one place as θαυμαστὸν (24, 1460 a 14), and in another as ἐκπληκτικὸν (25, 1460 b 25). I cannot agree with Tumlirz (Die tragischen Affecte Míleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 34), who supposes that, as used in the Poetics, the terms ἐκπληξίς and ἐκπληκτικὸν denote the excitement or tension with which the audience awaits the Discovery.

κράτιστον = potissimum. Aristotle's view of the construction exemplified in the Iphigenia in Tauris is presumably this, that the full effect of Tragedy is attained in the most artistic way, without the adjunct of physical suffering, and with the minimum of offence to our moral sensibilities. His ultimate preference for this construction is intelligible enough in itself; and we have been prepared for it to some extent by his recognition throughout this chapter of the legitimacy of a situation like that in the Iphigenia, in which the deed of horror, though contemplated, is not actually carried out (comp. μέλλων 1453 b 18, μέλλη b 21, μέλλοντα b 34). The criterion which now determines the relative value of these
possible situations in Tragedy is a moral one, their effect not on the emotions, but on the moral sensibility of the audience. The first of the four situations is set aside as μιαρόν, 'morally offensive' (1453 b 38); the second (τὸ γυνώσκοντα πράξαι; see on a 2) also is μιαρόν; the third just avoids being that (1454 a 3), because the unholy deed is done in ignorance; the fourth, however, in which a timely Discovery saves us from the rude shock to our moral feelings which is inevitable even with the third kind of plot, is pronounced to be κράτιστον. This seems to be the rationale of the present classification, and the explanation of the discrepancy between the statement in the text and that in 13, 1453 a 24. In chap. 13 Aristotle was thinking only of the emotional effect of tragedy as produced by the most obvious means; here he comes to see that the same effect may be produced in a finer form without their aid. It is his somewhat tardy recognition of the necessity of avoiding τὸ μιαρόν that has caused this change of view.

ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ: a play of Euripides (Nauck, TGF.2 p. 497). It is referred to in Eth. N. 3. 2. 1111 a 11 ὥπλευθη δ᾽ ἐν τίς καὶ τὸν νιὸν πολέμων εἶναι ἀσεπτὴν ἴ Μερόπην. 

ἐν τῇ Ἱφιγηνείᾳ: comp. 17, 1455 b 9. 

ἐν τῇ Εἰλλῇ. Nothing more seems to be known of the play (Nauck p. 837).

διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο reverts to what was said as far back as 1453 b 19—22; the whole of the intervening statement (1453 b 22 τοῖς μὲν οὖν—1454 a 8 ἀνεγνώρισσαν) is a digression. Other digressions of considerable length are found in chap. 1 (see on 1, 1447 b 11), in chap. 9 (see on 9, 1451 b 27), in chap. 15 (see on 15, 1454 b 8), and in chap. 22 (see on 22, 1458 a 31).

πάλαι: in 13, 1453 a 19. Aristotelian instances of πάλαι in a back-reference may be seen in An. post. 2. 19, 100 a 14 (comp. 13, 97 b 7), in Phys. 8. 3, 254 a 16 (comp. 253 a 32 and b 10), in Pol. 2. 4, 1262 b 29 (comp. 1262 a 26), and 3. 11, 1282 a 15 (comp. 1281 a 42).

ξητοῦντες: comp. Metaph. Θ 6, 1048 a 30 διὸ ξητοῦντες καὶ περὶ τοῦτων διήλθομεν.—Xenophanes Fr. 18 (Diels) οὗτοι ἄρ' ἄρχον τὰ πάντα θεοὶ θνητοὶ ὑπέδεικαν, ἀλλὰ χρῶν ξητοῦντες ἐφευράσκομαι ἀνεμον. Quintilian (5. 10. 120) has a very similar observation on the discovery of the various forms of argument in oratory: Nēque enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inventremus, sed dicta sunt omnia antiquam praeclarerunt, mox ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt.
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1454 a 12 ἀναγκάζονται: comp. 9, 1452 a 1. They are obliged to keep to these well-known stories (comp. 9, 1451 b 23), because they have not the art to discover or invent new ones equally fitted for the purposes of Tragedy.

a 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα... παθῆ: see 14, 1453 b 19–22.

a 17 χρηστὰ. χρηστός, which, as Aristotle tells us in the context (a 20), may be applied to anything good of its kind, is replaced in b 13 by ἐπεικής; it is equivalent to σπουδάως as used in 2, 1448 a 2, the common opposite of both being φαῖλος or ποιηρός.

a 18 ὀστερ ἐλέξθη: in 6, 1450 b 8.

a 21 τὸ μὲν χεῖρον: Pol. 1. 5, 1254 b 13 τὸ ἄρρεν πρῶς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χείρον.—Η. Α. 9. 1, 608 b 8 διόστερ γυνὴ ἀνδρός ἐλεγμονέστερον καὶ ἀρίσταρχον μᾶλλον, ἕτι δὲ φθονερώτερον καὶ μεμψιμουρέστερον καὶ μικροίστερον καὶ πληκτικώτερον ἕτι δὲ καὶ δισθενέστερον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι καὶ ἀναίδεστερον καὶ πειθοῦστερον κτέ. In the Politics we are told that owing to the weakness of the rational faculty in them, the virtue of which women are capable is not so high as that of a man (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 20). Rhet. 1. 5, 1361 a 6 summarizes the Greek idea on this point: θηλείων ἀρετὴς σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνή καὶ φιλεργία ἀνεφιλεθερίας.

ἥλως φαῖλον. In the Politics, where the slave is viewed as a being of the very lowest intellectual and moral capacity, Aristotle allows him only the bare modicum of virtue requisite to enable him to do his work: ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικράς καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δὲ ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 35).

a 22 τὸ ἀρμόττοντα, scil. τὰ ἠθή ποιεῖται (see on a 24 τρίτον τὸ ὁμοῦν). In the individual character there must be nothing at variance with that of the class to which the individual belongs; in a woman, for instance, there should be nothing ‘unwomanly’. The opposite of ἀρμόττον in a 30 is ἀπερετῆς καὶ μὴ ἄρμόττον. This same use of the term is occasionally found in later criticism, e.g. in Schol. Soph. El. 126 τὸ 'εἰ μοι θέμις τὰδ' αἰϑάν' λίαν ἠθικὸν καὶ ἄρμοζον γυναιξίν.

a 23 γυναικεῖω, scil. ηθεί; comp. Plato Laws 790 a γυναικείῳ τέ καὶ δούλεια ηθῆ. ηθος in this connexion practically means a ‘character’, i.e. one of the personages, just as it does again further on in 24, 1460 a 11. An approximation to this sense is found in Plato, who uses the word now and then for a man or other creature possessing character: Phaed. 81 ε ἐνδούνται δέ [scil. αἱ ψυχαί], ὀστερ ἐκάς, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἡθῆ, ὅποι' ἀπτ' ἄν καὶ μεμελητηκίαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, οἴον τοὺς μὲν γαστρομαργίας... μεμελητηκότας... εἰς τὰ τῶν ὁφν

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γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδοέσθαι [v. Stallb. ad loc.].—


Andreibai. On the ἄνδρεα of women see Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 22 and 3. 4, 1277 b 21. In the present passage, however, Aristotle finds a certain incongruity in the idea of an ἄνδρεα γυνῇ, as though the affinity of ἄνδρειος with ἄνδρες were still felt.

dewv' has been rightly explained by Günther (Grundzüge der trag. Kunst p. 280) as meaning 'clever', i.e. 'clever in speech and argument' ('tüchtig im Reden', 'beredt')—a quality which according to Greek notions was quite out of place in a woman (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 30; 3. 4, 1277 b 23). That this rather than 'terrible' is the meaning of dewv' here is shown by the illustration in a 31, ἦ ὑπὸς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, where the reference is to the dewntos or rhetorical 'cleverness' of the speech put into the mouth of Melanippe by Euripides.

τὸ ὅμων, scil. τὸ ἱθὸς τούχησαι, as is implied in the clause of interpretation, τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτερον τὸν χρηστὸν τὸ ἱθὸς καὶ ἀρμόττον τούχησαι. Instead of saying ὅμων, to correspond with ἀρμόττοντα in a 22, Aristotle lapses into the singular ὅμων, through the influence, as it would seem, of the singular in ἄνδρειος μὲν τὸ ἱθὸς in the context. In the absence of an example in a 28 sqq. to illustrate the neglect of this canon, the meaning of ὅμων is not very clear; but a hint of it may be gathered from the language in the analogy in 1454 b 10 ὅμων τοιούταις καλλίων γράφουσαι, where ὅμων (said of a portrait) means 'like the original'. This may very well be the sense of ὅμων in the present passage; the literary portrait produced by the poet should be 'like the original', i.e. like what the personage in question is in history or legend (comp. 1454 b 12). The fact of ὅμων being used in a somewhat different sense in 2, 1448 a 6, 12 and 13, 1453 a 5 only shows how inattentive Aristotle is at times to uniformity of language.

ἀπερ εἰρήται, 'in the present sense of this term (ἀρμόττον').

ὅμαλόν: i.e. the character should always remain the same, without change or modification in the course of the play. The canon reappears in Horace A.P. 126 servetur ad inum [scil. persona] qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet. The logical scheme of these four canons of character may be presented thus: the ἱθὸς of the dramatic personage should be (1) χρηστόν, not inconsistent with goodness of disposition; (2) ἀρμόττον, not inconsistent with the ἱθὸς of the class to which the personage belongs; (3) ὅμων, not
inconsistent with the received idea of the particular personage; (4) ἀμαλν, not inconsistent with itself.

ἀνώμαλος τις. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of Achilles, as a character subject to sudden changes of mood; comp. fr. 168 (Teubn.) Ἀριστοτέλης φησιν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι το Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος, and Eustathius on II. 24, 569 (v. Roemer, Bavarian Academy, Sitzungsbs. 1884 p. 297).

ο τίν μήμην παρέχων, as the explanatory καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτιθεῖται, means the original of the dramatic portrait, the personage as known from history or legend.

a 29 μὴ ἀναγκαῖον: 'not required for the purposes of the story'. The gratuitous πονηρία of Menelaus in the Orestes is noted again in 25, 1461b 20; the Scholiast also on the Orestes more than once draws attention to the evil nature Euripides has given him (<το κακόθενς τῆς γνώμης). On the reading ἀναγκαῖον see J. of Phil. 14 p. 46. I am not able to quote an Aristotelian instance of ἀναγκαῖον as a feminine, but it is certainly good Attic, and common enough in Plato. Though Aristotle's tendency was to treat such adjectives as of three terminations, his practice varied in the case of several (e.g. βέβαιος, ἐκώστος, ἑλευθέρος, ἑός, τέλεως), if our existing texts are to be trusted.

a 30 (ὁ τοῦ) Ὀδυσσεώς: comp. τῆς Μελανίππης in the next line. The article has to be restored in like manner before Ὀδυσσεώς in 16, 1454b 26 and Ὀρέστης in 16, 1454b 31. In all other passages in the Poetics—and they are very numerous—the rule laid down by Fitzgerald (Selections from the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, p. 163) as to the use of the article in Aristotle with the names of dramatis personae is duly observed. The same is true of the Nicomachean Ethics (see my Textual criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 52), and Politics. In the Politics ὁ Σωκράτης is regularly used for the Socrates in Plato's dialogues, and in 2. 4, 1262b 11 ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης means the Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium. The rule in fact is observed in twenty passages in the Politics, and ignored in two only, in 8. 3. 1338a 28—where we may restore ὁ Ὀδυσσεώς, and in 8. 7, 1342b 23—where the true reading is probably ἡ Ὁ Ὁ Ὁ Ὁ Ὁ. Similarly in the Rhetoric there are at least eighteen instances of the observance of the rule and but two exceptions, viz. 2. 23, 1400a 27—where we may restore ὁ Ὀδυσσεώς (comp. 3. 15, 1416b 1 and 14b 12), and 3. 14, 1415b 30—where the correction ὁ Ὁ Ὁ Ὁ Ὁ is confirmed by the parallel in 1. 9, 1367b 8.
ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ: comp. 26, 1.461 b 32. The Scylla Aristotle has in mind has been often supposed to be a tragedy of Euripides. But there is apparently no mention elsewhere of a tragedy with this title by Euripides (comp. Wilamowitz, Analecta Eurip. p. 159), and the language in 26, 1.461 b 32 seems to point rather to a dithyramb.

All discussion has been set at rest by Gomperz’s recovery among the Vienna papyri of a fragment of some ancient critical treatise, which mentions the θρήνος of Ulysses (i.e. a portion of the Scylla) as the work of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus: εἰσὶν δὲ τινὲς οἷς ὃν μὲν πρὸτείνεται οὕς μεμοίρυται [ὥς], ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τούτον καλῶς, εἰ τυχάνοις ἐνέχοντες ἡνοικοὶ καὶ παράδειγμα παρ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶς, ὁσπερ καὶ Τεμονέας ἐν τῷ θρήνῳ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως εἰ μὲν τινα μεμεῖται καὶ τὸ ὁμοίον τινώσκει, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ Ὀδυσσεί (v. Gomperz, Vienna Academy Anz. der phil. hist. Classe 1886, v; comp. Wilamowitz, Timotheos p. 111). To this Aristotle appends a second instance, one from a tragedy, as though conscious of the first being not quite to the point.

ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, in the Μελανίππη ἡ σοφή of Euripides (Nauck, TGF." p. 509). The rationalistic argument put into her mouth against the popular idea of monsters (τέρατα) was in Aristotle’s view (see on δεινον a 24) an exhibition of cleverness out of place in a woman.

ἐν Ἀδύθῃ Ἰψιγένεια: Iph. Aul. 1211 sqq. and 1368 sqq. 3a 32

χρῆ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσιν κτέ. There should be a unity of character just as there should be a unity of action in every play.

This incidental reference to the action reminds Aristotle of a point (the use of the μηχανή) which had not been considered in his general theory of the plot in chaps. 8–11.

τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ τὸ εἰκός: comp. especially 9. 1.451 a 38 and 10. 3a 34

1.452 a 24.

ἡ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ εἰκός, scil. εἶναι (Bon. Ind. 239 a 22; see on 24, a 35

1.459 b 9).

λύσεις: see 18, 1.455 a 24, 1.456 a 9, where the λύσις (the unravelling, or dénouement) is distinguished from the δέσις or πακόκη (the knotting, or intrigue). This is the first appearance of these terms in this sense, though they may be presumed to have been already well established in the technical language of the theatre see on 10, 1.452 a 15).


μηχανῆς. On the mechanical contrivance, whereby a god or ther personage was suddenly brought on, or removed from
1454 the stage, see Haigh, Attic Theatre p. 209. Aristotle regards a dénouement effected by such means as an inartistic way out of the difficulty, or else allowable only in certain exceptional cases (3-6). A similar view of the μηχανή is implied in Plato Crat. 425D οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ἐπειδὰν τί ἀπορῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς κατα-
θείζουσι θεῶν αἴροιτες. From this theatrical use the term is sometimes metaphorically extended to matters apart from the stage, when a difficulty is solved by means which savour too much of artifice or miracle. Thus even in the present context (b 2) the sudden appearance of Athené in II. 2. 166 is said to be ἀπὸ μηχανῆς; and in Metaph. Α 5, 985b 18 reason is said to come in as a deus ex machina in the cosmonomy of Anaxagoras: 'Ἀναξ-
γόρας τε γὰρ μηχανή χρήται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήγη διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, τότε παρέλεικε αὐτῶν.

b 2 τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀπόπλουν: II. 2. 155; comp. Porphyry on II. 2. 144, p. 26 Schrader: ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ παραγίνεται ἀπὸ μηχανῆς [so cod. Townl.] ὡσπερ καθεύδοντα τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ἐγείρουσα. His note on II. 2. 73 (where Agamemnon tries the feeling of his army) is worth quoting as a typical attempt to reconcile Homeric practice and Aristotelian theory: διὰ τὶ δ' Ἀγαμέμνων ἀπεπειράτο τῶν Ἀχιλῶν, καὶ ὀφείλεται ὡστε ἀλλού τὰ ἐναντία συμβῆναι ἡ ἐβουλεύσεως; καὶ τὸ κόλπα ἀπὸ μηχανῆς ἡ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ ἐκόλουθεν ἐστὶ δὲ ἀπόφημον τὸ μηχανῆμα λυόντων ἄλλως εἰ μὴ ἐκ αὐτῶν τοῦ μύθου. φησὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστο-
tέλης (Fr. 142 Teubn.) ποιητικόν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μμείσθαι τὰ εἰσπούσα καὶ ποιητῶν ἀμλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ καθός παρεισάγειν εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ εἰκὸς εἰς τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπανθανόμενος . . . μὴ εἴθις παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξόδον ἀμλλὰ περαιράθηναι ἡγήσασθαι διεἰν εἰ ὀφείλεται ἑκούσι τοῦ . . . ἢ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐκ τῆς μήχανῆς ὡστεν γὰρ διὰ τῶν εἰκότων γέγονεν, οὐ μηχανὴ τοῦτ' ἐστιν, ἀμ' ἢ ἀλλ' ὃτε πρόσκειται θεῶς ἀμλλὰ τοῦτ' εἰπὼν δ' εἰκὸς ἃν αὐτοῦ γένεσθαι εἰς θέου ἀνέθηκε τὸν Ὀδυσσέα διανοηθῆναι τὰτά δρᾶν δ' προμαχή αἰ προμαχή αἰ εἰκός ἐστιν (p. 24-25 Schrader).

ἀλλὰ μηχανή κτί.: 'μηχανή breviter dicit pro θεῶ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς' (Ritter). This clause (which ends apparently with θεῶς ὃρα in b 6) is a digression within a digression; Aristotle remembers

1 Instead of καὶ ποιητῶν (for which various corrections have been proposed) I would restore κατοίχην (v. J. of Phil. 28 p. 252). The sense is: 'Though as a rule it is artistic to represent what is usual, and inartistic (ἀπόθεμα) to introduce hazardous situations (καθός), still under the circumstances there is a certain propriety and probability (ἐκός ἀλλ') in the Homeric story.' If this view is correct, the quotation from Aristotle's Ἀπο. Ομ. does not end at the words καθός παρεισάγειν, as is supposed by Rose and Heitz.
that the appearance of a god on the stage may be necessary for a certain purpose, to reveal matters of interest which lie outside the play itself as being either anterior or subsequent to the action of the piece. This may be taken as a tacit apology for the procedure of Euripides, who opens several of his plays with a prologue delivered by a god to explain the historical antecedents of the situation, and concludes others with a sort of epilogue, in which a god announces the future fortunes of the personages (see Haigh, Tragic Drama p. 246-7). A distorted reminiscence of this statement may be recognized in the Horatian precept, A. P. 191 nec 
deus intersil nisi dignus vindice nodus incident.

Δλογον is a general term for that which cannot be seen to be 
either necessary or probable (see above 1454 a 36 ἄναγκατον ἢ εἰκός), 
in other words for that which does not admit of explanation, that 
which we find unaccountable. It is of frequent occurrence in the 
later chapters of the Poetics (see esp. 24, 1460 a 28 and 25, 1461 b 14). The clause continues the statement in 1454 a 37-b 2. 
No improbability can be allowed within the story (ἐν τοῖς πρα-
γμασι) of the play, unless it happens to be in the part only pre-
supposed and not actually presented on the stage (ἐξώ τῆς πραγμα-
δίας). Bonitz (Ind. 343 a 32) seems to take a different view of 
the clause, connecting it with that which immediately precedes it, 
μηχανή χρηστέων κτὲ. The rule in the text is repeated in very 
similar terms in 24, 1460 a 27.

μηδέν εἶναι, scil. δὲι, understood from a 37. 
ἐξω τῆς πραγμαδίας: see on 14, 1453 b 32. 
τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι: see 24, 1460 a 29. 

ἐπεί δὲ κτὲ. At this point Aristotle returns to the subject of the 
ἡθη, which according to his theory (1454 a 17-26) should be at 
once χρηστὰ, ἀρμότοντα, ὀμοία, and ὀμιλὰ, in order to meet any 
doubt that may arise as to the possibility of an ἡθὸς being at once 
χρηστῶν and ὀμοῖων. He shows that the corresponding difficulty 
has been solved in a sister art, that of the portrait-painter, who 
without sacrificing the likeness makes a man look handsomer than 
he is (ὁμοῖοι ποιοῦται καλλίους γράφουσιν); so that, if the painter 
can do this, there is no reason why the literary artist also should 
not be able to represent a tragic personage truthfully, with any 
infirmities of character which form part of the received idea of him 
(ἄργυλος καὶ ἐρυθύμων καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἔπι τῶν ἡθῶν 
b 12), and at the same time as a good man (ἐπιεικεῖσ b 13).

βελτιώνων: see 2, 1448 a 4, 11, 18.
COMMENTARY

1454 b 9 ἡμᾶς, 'we poets', as is shown by what follows in b 11 οὕτω καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν. Aristotle speaks as though his hearers were poets, and studying the art of poetry for practical purposes. The Poetics in fact, whatever else they may be, are a practical treatise on Poetry; and the assumption throughout is that one is to learn from them how to write a good poem. Similarly in Rhet. i. 8, 1366 a 12 ἡμᾶς means 'we orators' (δέοι ἂν τὰ ἡθη τῶν ποιητών ἐκάστης ἐξεν ἡμᾶς).

b 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι. Aristotle might no doubt have said ὀσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι. Vahlen illustrates the construction from Soph. el. 16, 175 a 27 συμβαίνει δὲ ποτὲ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεὶ ἀναλύοντας ἐνώπετε συνθέων πάλιν ἄδυντομεν οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑλέγχοις εἰσότεις παρ᾽ ὦ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνάραι διαλύεται τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν, and other parallels in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 546 b 25).

b 12 ὅργαλον καὶ ρηθύμον, 'too quick or too slow to anger'; the contrast is like that between ἐξεῖς and ρηθύμοι in Eth. E. 8. 5, 1240 b 1 ἀνομοῖοι χαίρονται, οὐν αὖστημοι εὐστρατέλοι καὶ ἐξεῖς ρηθύμοι. καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐχόντως is added in order to include all similar defects of character, i.e. defects which are not incompatible with a general goodness of disposition.

b 14 [παράδεισμα σκληρότητος]. For the reason for bracketing the two words see J. of Phil. 14 p. 47. If they are not an ordinary 'adscript', they may possibly represent a marginal note by Aristotle himself to indicate that a second instance, one of σκληρότης [obstnacy ?], was to be added. According to Galen (t. 18. 2 p. 879–80 K.) notes of a very similar description were to be found embedded in the text of Hippocrates.

'Ἀγάθων: perhaps, as Tyrwhitt suggests, in his Telephus (Nauck, TGF.3 p. 764).

b 15 διατηρεῖν. This quasi-imperatival use of the infinitive (without ἔν or χρῆ) is common enough in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 343 b 22). For the compound διατηρεῖν comp. Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178 a 13 διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστης.—Aeschines in Ctes. 6 ὃταν διατηρηθέωσιν ὁ νόμοι.—Philemon 94. 6 Kock ὃς γε ταῦτα πάντα διατηρεῖ. At this point Aristotle sums up by saying that the rules laid down for the ἔθος and ἡθη in a play must be observed throughout by the poet. But besides these general principles of construction, it is necessary in practice to consider the spectators (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 2 p. 204) and the impression (αισθήσεα) the work is likely to make on them when presented on the stage, as it is easy to produce a bad impression through some fault of practical stage-craft. This seems to be the sense of the present
passage; Aristotle, however, avoids details, and refers to another writing of his for a fuller explanation of his precept. The incident mentioned in 17, 1455 a 26 may perhaps be taken as an instance of the kind of fault he has in mind.

τὰ παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθοῦσας αἰσθήσεις. For παρὰ in a sense approximating to that of διὰ see Bon Ind. 562 a 10 and Bernays, Dialoge des Aristot. p. 138. αἰσθήσεις means the impression produced on the spectators, i.e. as we should say, the stage-effect of a play. The qualification, however, τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθοῦσας τῆς ποιητικῆς, limits the responsibility of the poet to that part of the stage-effect which directly depends on his own art (ἀκολουθοῦσας τῆς ποιητικῆς); so far as it depends on that of others—actors, costumiers, and the like—it is not within his province (6, 1450 b 17). This interpretation, which is as old as Victorius, is much more probable than that of Bernays and others, who suppose the reference in the text to be to the business of the costumier and stage-manager. Throughout the Poetics Aristotle resolutely ignores all such matters as outside the art of poetry proper; and it is inconceivable that he should have given them any special attention in a work like the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν (ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις). For the plural αἰσθήσεις comp. ὅψεις in 6, 1450 a 13, b 20, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2. 1 p. 17.

ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις: i.e. in the now lost dialogue περὶ b 18 ποιητῶν, as Bernays following Victorius has shown (Dialoge des Aristot. p. 27; comp. Bon Ind. 226 b 35). The reference must be to a work (1) by Aristotle himself, (2) published and written for publication, and (3) on a kindred subject.

This and the next two chapters form a sort of Appendix; b 19 they discuss a series of special points and rules of construction which had been omitted in the sketch of the general theory of the μῦθος. If these afterthoughts seem out of place here, it is to be remembered that there is an even stronger instance of matter out of place in 15, 1454 a 37. An excursus on the different forms of Discovery is justified not only by the great dramatic interest of the Discovery (6, 1450 a 33), but also by the important part it plays in 14, 1453 b 30.

ἐφηται πρότερον: 11, 1452 a 29.
COMMENTARY

1454 b 22 σύμφωνα: comp. Η. Α. 7. 5, 585 b 31.

λόγχην κτέ. From some unknown play (Nauck, TGF. p. 855); the allusion is to the mark said to have been visible on the Σπαρτοί of Thebes. The accusative λόγχην Aristotle seems to regard as an instance of attraction inversa, since he continues the construction by saying στήρες instead of στήρες.

b 23 Καρκίνος: Nauck, TGF. p. 797. For the ellipse of the verb (ἐποίησε) see on 14, 1453 b 17.

ἐπίκτητα: De gen. an. 1. 17. 721 b 29 οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ σύμφωνα προσεοικάτες γίνονται τοῖς γονεῖσιν οἱ παιδεῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα: οὐλὰς τε γὰρ ἐχόντων τῶν γεννησάντων ἰδίᾳ τινὲς ἔχον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις τῶν ἐκανόνων τῶν τύπων τῆς οὐλῆς, καὶ στίγμα ἔχοντος ἐν τῷ βραχίονι τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπεσήμηνεν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι τῷ τέκνῳ ... τὸ γράμμα.

b 24 οὐλαί: as in Od. 19. 392 and Eurip. El. 573.

τὰ δὲ ἔκτος. The term in the New Comedy for tokens of this kind was γνωρίσματα (see on 17, 1455 a 20).

b 25 ἐν τῇ Τυροί: a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF. p. 272). With οἶον we have to understand ἡ ἀναγνώρισις γίνεται—the construction changing, as sometimes happens when a second instance of not quite the same order is introduced by οἶον; comp. De anima 2. 10, 422 b 5 σημεειοῦν δὲ τὸ μῆτα κατάξησσον οἴσαν τὴν γλώσσαν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λαίνῃ ἄγραν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀφί γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ἄγρου, ὡσπερ ὅταν προγενιματίσαι τις ἰσχυρὸν χυμόν γεύσῃ ἐτέρου, καὶ οἶον τοῖς κάμμουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώσσῃ πλῆρει τοιαύτης ἄγροτητος αἰσθάνεσθαι.—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 18 διὸ δὲι λανθάνειν ποιοῦτας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένος ἀλλὰ πεφυκότος· τοῦτο γὰρ πεθανοῦν, ἔκειν δὲ τοιναντίαν· ὥσ γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύωσα διαβάλλεται, καθα- περ πρὸς τοὺς οἶνους τοὺς μεμυγμένους, καὶ οἶον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκρίτων· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἐσικεῖν εἶναι, αὐτὰ δὲν ἀλλότρια.

b 27 ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ: Od. 19. 386—475.

b 28 ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν: Od. 21. 205—225. The distinction Aristotle finds between the two instances is this: whereas the scar is seen by Euryclia by accident and in the natural course of things, with the herdsmen Ulysses directly points to it πίστεως ἐνεκα, in order to convince them of the truth of his disclosure: Od. 21. 217 καὶ σῆμα ἀριφραδεῖς ἄλλο τι δεῖξο, σφρα μ᾽ ἐν γεώτων πιστωθήτων τ᾽ ἐν θυμῷ, οὐλήν, τῇ ποτὲ μὲ σὺν ἥλασε λευκῷ ὀδόντι. In one of his lost writings, perhaps the Ἀπορήματα 'Ὁμηρικά, Aristotle criticized this Discovery as resting on an error of logic: 'Αριστοτέλης δέ, φασὶν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιούτου ἀναγνωρισμοῦ, λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τῶν
It’s in the repentino (Tyrwhitt), 
Tois (Victorius), 
lovs' Iph. 
Comp. to II 29 the refer. 

Tτραταλα, 

παλκυρίας 

Tn tois Νύππροις: Od. 19, 392 (comp. 26, 1460 a 26). On this, b 30 the earliest mode of citing Homer, see Bergk, Gr. Litteraturgeschichte 1 p. 496.

ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης: ‘manifestum fecit se esse Orestem’ b 32 (Ritter), as the context shows, ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει κτέ.; comp. the parallel in 17, 1455 b 9 θυσιῶν μέλιών ἀνεγνώρισεν . . . ἐπίων ὅτι κτέ. For the senses of ἀναγνώρισεν in the Poetics see on 11, 1452 b 5.

διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, scil. ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι 'Ἰφιγένεια. The reference is to Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

αὐτὸς λέγει: Iph. Taur. 800 sqq. In Aristotle’s view this latter b 34 Discovery is very like that in Od. 21, 205: just as Ulysses points to his scar to convince the herdsmen, so Orestes, to convince his sister (comp. 808 ἐχεις τι τώνδε μοι τεκμηρίων), makes a statement showing his familiarity with their family history and the old home in Argos (comp. 822 α διὸ ἐδὸν αὐτός, τάδε φράσῳ τεκμήρια).

διὸ τι ἐγγύς. Vahlen restores διὸ ἐγγύς τι, which is no doubt the b 35 more usual order when τι is connected with an adverb. But there are certainly some instances of the order in the text, e.g. Thuc. 7. 57. I οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον.—Xen. Hiero 1. 21 ἢ οὖν ὅρας τι τοῖς τυράννους ἦδων . . . ἱοντας;—Cyr. 1. 6. 11 οἰκε τι, ἐφη, ἦτον τούτο ἐναὶ αἰσχρῶν;—Plato Prot. 327 b οἰκε ἂν τι, ἐφη, μᾶλλον κτέ.

Τηρεῖ: Nauck, TGF.2 p. 257.

ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή, the actual expression of Sophocles (as it b 37 would seem) is to be compared with the Euripidean ἵστοτονα πιθώματα, κερκίδος αὐοδοῦ μελέτας in Aristophanes Ran. 1315—
where the allusion is to the humming-sound of the shuttle in its passage to and fro (comp. Dict. of Antiq. 2 p. 767). In κερκίδος φωνή, however, there is a suggestion that the shuttle told Philomela's story for her; comp. Achilles Tatius 5. 5 ἃ γὰρ Φελορήλας έτέχην σιώπωσαν εἰρήκε φωνήν ύπαίνει γὰρ πέτλον ... καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν [scil. Πρόκυνη] ἀ πέπονθε τῇ κερκίδι λαλεῖ. In Aristotle's view a disclosure by such means as these is quite as inartistic as that of Orestes in the Iphigenia (800).

διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τὶ ἴδοντα. Vahlen (omitting the comma) supposes this to be the same as τῷ διὰ μνήμης αἰσθέσθαι τὶ ἴδοντα, and explains it thus: 'τῷ αἰσθέσθαι ... non tam percipiendo significat quam offerendo obiectiendo quod sensibus percipi possit, ut quae in exemplis dicuntur κλαίσαι, δακρύσαι.' τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τὶ ἴδοντα accordingly has been taken to mean 'when the sight of some object awakens a feeling' (Butcher), or 'indem ein Anblick schmerzliche Empfindungen wachruft' (Comperz). It is more natural, however, to take τῷ αἰσθάνεται in the sense of 'by becoming conscious of' (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 43 for the aorist), and as an equivalent for τῷ μνησθήναι. The connexion between the two terms may be seen from De mem. 1, 450 b 18 δ ἄφρον ἐνεργῶν τῷ μνήμης θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τούτῳ [i.e. the impression left by experience] καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτῳ. In default of a word corresponding to our 'consciousness', Aristotle has to use αἰσθήσεως and αἰσθάνεσθαι in lieu of it (Bon. Ind. 21 a 1; comp. my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 65). In the illustrations which follow the emphasis is on the participle ἴδον and ἀκοίνων ... καὶ μνησθείς, not on ἐκλαυσθεὶν and ἐδάκρυσθεν; the actual manifestations of the awakened memories (ἐκλαυσθεὶν, ἐδάκρυσθεν) are only the accidents, which happen to be found in the instances under consideration. ἴδοντα is a circumstantial participle (comp. μεταβαλόντα in 4, 1449 a 14). It is loosely put for 'seeing or hearing' (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2. p. 570).

1455 a 1 ἐν Κυπρίοις: Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 775. Nothing more is known of the play.

a 2 ἐν 'Αλκίνου ἀπολογῷ: Od. 8. 521 sqq. (comp. 8. 83 sqq.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 13 the designation covers the ground of Od. 9–12. See on 1454 b 30 for this mode of citing Homer.

a 4 ἐν Χορφόροις: Aesch. Choeph. 168–234 (comp. Eurip. El. 520). Electra reflects on what she sees, and concludes that it is her brother Orestes who has come home. It will be observed that in
the other instances of ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ the discovery is 455 a
made by the party who overhears the reflexion of the other.

ο Ὀρέστης. For the article compare Herod. i. 68 συνεβάλλετο a 5
τὸν Ὀρέστηα ... τοῦτον εἶναι.

Πολυίδου. It is agreed that this was the Attic form of the name a 6
(Kock, CAF. i p. 508; Schulze, Qu. Epicae p. 111). As literary
criticism was part of the business of a sophist, the probability is
that this suggestion of the 'Sophist Polyidus' was propounded in
some critical discussion on the technique of the dramatists; it is
quite unnecessary to suppose him to have been also a dramatic
poet (with Welcker, Gr. Trag. 1043), or to identify him with
a certain dithyrambic poet of the same name (with Bernhardy,
Gr. Litt. 2 p. 756). Aristotle reverts to this suggestion in 17,
1455 b 10.

Τυδεί: Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 803. Nothing more is known either a 9
of this or of the other two plays mentioned, the Φινείδαι (Nauck
p. 841) and Ὀδυσσεΐς ψευδάγγελος (Nauck p. 839). It is impossible
to say who the personage here referred to was (comp.
Tyrwhitt on ii, 1452 a 27).

ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ: comp. a 4 ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ. Vahlen, who a 13
connects this directly with συνθετῇ, supposes the two factors in
the Discovery to be a συλλογισμός on the side of the one, and a
παραλογισμός on the side of the other of the two parties: 'quae
[scil. ἀναγνώρισις] ut ex simplici unius ratiocinatione prodris, ita
composita esse potest alterius ex syllogismo, paralogismo alterius'
(comp. also the discussion in his 'Zur Kritik Aristotelischer
Schriften' p. 16). The illustration, however, from the Ὀδυσσεΐς
ψευδάγγελος does not seem to imply anything more than an erro-
neous inference by one party (παραλογισμός ὑποτέρων) from some
statement made by the other. The reasoning in this instance
Aristotle appears to regard as the illogical parallel to that in the
Choephoroe: just as the recognition of Orestes by Electra came
about through a συλλογισμός on her part, so that of A by B, the
two personages in the Ὀδυσσεΐς ψευδάγγελος, is supposed to come
about through a παραλογισμός on the part of the latter. The
fallacy to be found there may have arisen from the ambiguity of
the word 'know'. A having said 'I shall know the bow', B may
have taken this to mean that he would 'know it again' (ἀναγνω-
ριστείν)—which was not true (comp. δ οἶχ ἐστὶκε). In our
ignorance of the play and its plot it is idle to speculate further as
to the way in which the actual Discovery may have been worked
1455 a 13 out in it. The present is one of many passages showing Aristotle's affection for the forms of logic even when dealing with matters of poetry (see on 16, 1454 b 28).

θατέρου: comp. 11, 1452 b 4. The error in the text of Αε (θεάτρου) is the converse of that in the inferior MSS. of Plato's Laws 659 a (θατέρου for θεάτρου).

a 15 ὡς δὴ κτε. Both text and interpretation here are in the highest degree doubtful. ὡς δὴ ἐκεῖνον ἀναγνωριστὸς seems to be practically an object-clause after ποιησαί; for this use of the gen. absol. with ὡς see Kühner, Gr. Gr. 8. 2. 2 p. 93, or Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 917 (comp. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 281). After ἀναγνωριστὸς we may understand τὸ τόξον, from τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι in the preceding line—the distinction between γνώσεσθαι and ἀναγνωριστὸς being like that between λήψις and ἀνάληψις in De mem. 2. 451 a 20 ὡτε γὰρ μνήμης ἔστιν ἀνάληψις ἢ ἀνάμνησις ὡτε λήψις.

διὰ τοῦτο ποιησαί. ποιησαί here may perhaps have the sense of 'suppose' or 'assume' (comp. Herod. 7. 184; Xenoph. An. 5. 7. 9; Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 136). The comma usually placed after τοῦτο has been removed in order that διὰ τοῦτο may be connected with ποιησαί, so as to mean 'through' or 'in consequence of this statement'; comp. the use of διὰ in Soph. el. 1, 165 a 1 ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶν τεθέντων ὡτε λέγειν ἐτερῶν τί εἶ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων. If the comma is retained, ἀναγνωριστὸς διὰ τοῦτο must mean either 'would reveal himself by this' (see on 11, 1452 b 5), or 'would recognize him by this'. Butcher, keeping παραλογισμοῖς, and reading with Bekker and the Aldine ἐποίησε instead of ποιησαί, translates the clause thus: 'This remark led Odysseus to imagine that the other would recognize him through the bow, thus suggesting a false inference.'

a 18 οἶνον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφικλέους Οἰδίποδι: comp. 15, 1454 b 7 οἴνον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι—where a certain incident in the story of the O. T. is said to be ἀλογον, just as here another is said to be εἰκός. That the Discovery in the O. T. is probable was shown in 11, 1452 a 26 (δηλώσας δὲ ἢν).

τῇ ἤφινενεία: Iph. Taur. 582.

a 19 ἐπιθείναι γράμματα is 'dare epistolam' (comp. Iph. Taur. 770 ἐπιστολαίει), not as Bon. Ind. 281 a 44 says, 'addere epistolam'. The dative of the person to whom is omitted, for reasons which a reader of the play will easily understand. It is omitted also for the sake of brevity in Herod. 3. 43 γράφας δὲ ἢς Ἀλυππον ἐπέθηκε
(scil. τὸ βυβλίον), which Valckenaer explains as meaning 'tradidit epistolam in Aegyptum perferendam'.

ai γάρ τοιαύτα μόνα κτέ. The difficulty in this clause is obvious, and it has long been recognized. Vahlen's explanation is as follows: 'haec planissima sunt quamquam a Spengelio prave intellecta. neque enim hoc voluit illas agnitiones unicas esse quae careant indicis et monilibus, sed hoc dicit: haec ἀναγνώρισεις per se sola sunt (constant) sine illis extrinsecus adminiculis ascitis. et haec quidem sic universum significantur verbis τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περὶ δεραίων, quoniam ea nunc non attinerebat singillatim per suas species referre.' The real crux of the passage, however, is in σημείων; as used at the beginning of the chapter, in the account of the first species of Discovery (ἡ δὲ τῶν σημείων ἀναγνώρισεις, 1454 b 21), the term denotes a visible mark or token; but the absence of a σημείων of that description is obviously not peculiar to this fifth and best Discovery — hē ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. Twining plausibly suggests that Aristotle may be using σημείων in a more general sense, and that it denotes here—as it might very well do—anything that serves as a 'sign' in the less artistic forms of Discovery. Thus in the second of these the statement of Orestes is a sort of σημείων; in Euripides it is actually described as a τεκμήριον (see on 1454 b 34). The same may be said of the tears (ἐκλαυσθενεὶς, ἐδάκρυσθε) in the third species of Discovery. As for the fourth (ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ), to judge from the instances, it may depend on a sign (comp. τεκμήριον, Aesch. Choeph. 203), or it may result from a reflexion overheard, which thus serves as a sign. In comparison however with that in the O. T. or Iphigenia, all these forms of Discovery are in Aristotle's judgment more or less artificial (comp. πεποιημένων), and thus of inferior artistic value.

δεραίων: comp. Eurip. Ion 1431 δέραια παϊδὶ νεαγόνῳ φέρειν.— a 20

Menander (Lefebvre, Fragments d'un MS. de M.) Επιτρέποντες 28 κάκκειμενον παιδάριον εὐρον νήπιον ἔχον δέραια καὶ τοιούτοι ταν κόσμον.—86 δὸς μοι, γύναι, τὰ δέραια καὶ γνωρίσματα.—Alciphron Ep. 3. 63 μετὰ τῶν σταργάνων δέραια τινα καὶ γνωρίσματα περιέθεται.

δεί δὲ τῶς μύθους κτέ. This begins a series of supplementary rules for the guidance of the dramatic poet in practice. When writing his play in the study he must (1) see the various incidents in it as it were, so as to anticipate the impression they are likely to produce on the stage; and also (2) feel to some extent the
various emotions of his personages, if his picture of emotion is to be convincing (1455 a 23-34). After these five further rules are added in the course of this and the following chapter.

συναπεργάζεσθαι: comp. a 30 συναπεργαζόμενον, and Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 31 ἀνάγκη τοῦ συναπεργαζόμενου σχήματι καὶ ἐσθήτη καὶ ὁλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἔλεενοτέρους εἶναι. συναπεργάζεσθαι, 'to finish off', stands in the same relation to ἀπεργάζεσθαι as συμπληρῶν and συντελεῖν to πληροῦν and τελεῖν. It is to be remembered that in Aristotle's view (6, 1450 a 36; 9, 1451 b 28) the language is but a secondary matter by comparison with the μίθος. Plutarch's story of Menander's mode of working may be worth quoting:

De gloria Ath. 4, 347 e λέγεται δὲ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ τῶν συνήθων τις εἰπὼν Ἐγγὺς οὖν, Μενάνδρε, τὰ Διονύστα, καὶ όυ τὴν κωμῳδίαν οὐ πεποίηκας; τὸν δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔγωγε πεποίηκα τὴν κωμῳδίαν φοινοῦμαι γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις [= 'the plan']. δεῖ δ' αὐτῷ τὰ στιχίδια ἐπισάζει.

πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενον: De mem. 1. 450 a 4 ὁ νοῶν, κἀν μὴ ποιῶν νοητία, τίθεται πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιῶν, νοεῖ δ' οὐχ ἢ ποιῶν.—Probl. 40. 14, 957 a 22 τὸ τε ἐνυπνών ἐστιν ὅταν διανοοῦμένου καὶ πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενοι ὅπως ἐπέλθῃ (comp. Bon. Ind. 509 b 30).

οὕτω repeats the idea of πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενον; what follows, ἐναργεστάτα ὀρῶν κτέ., is added as an explanation.

ὁρῶν. Vahlen retains the article before ὁρῶν, and supposes an hyperbaton like that in 6, 1449 b 23. The article, however, is certainly not wanted, and may easily be explained as a dittographia.

Καρκίνος. The play referred to is assumed on the strength of this statement to have been entitled the Amphiarous. Nothing more is known of it than what Aristotle here tells us, that the incongruity of a certain incident in it was observed and resented by the audience.

εἰς ἑρωοῦ ἀνήει: 'e templ o exibat' (Paccius), 'e fano exiit' (Victorius), 'e templ o ascenderat' (Tyrwhitt), 'had left the temple' (Twining), 'ex delubro redibat' (Ritter), 'was on his way from the temple' (Butcher), 'hatte das Heiligtum bereits verlassen' (Gomperz).

ὁ μὴ ὁρῶντ' ἄν τὸν θεατὴν κτέ. The sense is: If the incident had not been visibly before them, as part of the action of the piece (τὰ παρτόμενα), the incongruity would not have been noticed by the audience (τὸν θεατὴν: see on 26, 1461 b 28); but they could not help observing it when actually put before their eyes on the stage. To guard against this kind of mistake, therefore, the poet
should in his mind's eye see his various incidents beforehand, so as to anticipate the impression they will make in the theatre. In the same way we are told in another place (24, 1460\textsuperscript{a} 15) that the absurdity in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad would be observed on the stage, though it passes unnoticed in the poem.

οὐ δὲ δυνατὸν: comp. \textsuperscript{a} 23 ὅτι μάλιστα.

tοῖς σχῆμασιν: the attitudes and gestures in which great emotion finds expression. The meaning here is apparently this: If the poet is to portray great emotion convincingly, he must feel it himself; and if he feels it, he cannot but express it to some extent in gesture as well as in word. Aristotle, therefore, does not agree with the theory that the poet should write in cold blood, and that poetry is a matter of pure art and intellect; his view rather is that some emotional excitement is one of the conditions required for a strong and convincing picture of passion. With this we may compare the Horatian maxim, \textit{Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi} (A. P. 102), and that of Pope (Eloisa to Abelard 366), 'He best can paint 'em [i.e. their woes] who can feel 'em most'; or the perhaps even weightier dictum of Wordsworth (Pref. to Lyrical Ballads), 'It will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time, perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings with theirs.' How consonant all this is with the actual experience of many great imaginative writers may be seen from the evidence cited by Biese, \textit{Das Metaphorische in der dichterischen Phantasie} p. 24 (Berl. 1889). In the Carpentariana p. 193 a story is told of Domenichino as showing that the same emotional excitability is not unknown even among painters: 'Le Dominiquin avoit coutume de jouer, pour ainsi dire, le rôle de toutes les figures qu'il voulait representer; & de dire tout haut ce que la passion qu'il leur donnait, pouvait inspirer. Lorsqu'il peignoit le Martyre de S. André, le Carache le surprit comme il étoit en colère, parlant d'une voix terrible & menaçante; & il travailloit pour lors à un Soldat qui menace le Saint. Après que l'enthousiasme fut passé, le Carache courut l'embrasser, & lui avoua qu'il avoit été ce jour-là on Maître; & qu'il venoit d'apprendre de lui, la véritable manière de réussir dans les expressions.'

πιθανωτάτου . . . οί ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν: Quintilian 6. 2. 27 \textit{In iis a 30 aequae verisimilia esse volemus, simus ipsi similis eorum qui vere summantur affectibus}. In the next clause χειμαίνει . . . καὶ χαλεπαίνει.
1455 a 30 . . . ἀληθινότατα explains πιθανότατοι, and ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ . . . ὁ ὄργιόμενος corresponds with οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. For the meaning of πιθανός see on 9, 1451 b 16.

ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεώς. The same use of ἀπὸ is found in Eth. N. 4. 4, 1122 b 13 ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.—Meteor. 2. 3, 359 a 7 ὡστε τὰ πλοῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀγνώμονων βάρους ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποταμοῖς ὀλίγον καταδύνειν, ἐν δὲ τῇ θαλάσσῃ μετρῖοι ἔξευν.—Mech. 22. 854 b 7 ὅσο γὰρ ἐν πλείον ἀπέχει τοῦ ὑπομοχλίου ὁ μοχλὸς, μᾶς καὶ καὶ πλείον ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσχύος τῆς αὐτῆς.

a 31 ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν: De insomn. 2, 460 b 3 ῥαδίως ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τῶς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀντές, ἀλλοι δὲ ἐν ἀλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλός ἐν φόβῳ, τὸ ὕπομοχλίου ἐν ἑρωτί.

χειμαίνει . . . χαλεπάνει are intransitive (comp. HSi. s.v. χειμαίνων). The usual interpretation is that of Victorius, who makes them mean ‘fluctuare facit alium’ (or ‘excitat fluctus in animis auditorum’) and ‘ad iram commovet’. As far, however, as the present passage is concerned, any such reference to the feelings of the audience is out of place; the poet is not supposed to make them angry (for instance), but to put before them a picture of anger which they can accept as sufficiently like reality (see on 19, 1456 b 1). The clause in fact is only an amplification of the πιθανότατοι οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσίν which precedes it.

χειμαζόμενος: comp. infra b 21 χειμασθεὶς. The subst. χειμὼν is similarly used of mental distress or agitation in Epicurus, p. 62, 18 Usener, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν, where it is the opposite of ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία (comp. Lobeck, Phryn. p. 387, and the Index to Meineke’s FCG. p. 1148).

a 32 ἀληθινότατα, which qualifies χειμαίνει as well as χαλεπάνει, is emphatic, as its position shows. It is stronger than πιθανότατα, the word which Aristotle might very well have used in this context.

διὸ εὐφυοῦς κτέ. Aristotle’s curt and allusive statement needs some little expansion to bring out his meaning. It may perhaps be rewritten thus: the imaginative power of identifying oneself for the time with one’s personages, which poetry demands, is a matter not of art, but of nature and temperament; it requires a natural gift or else a touch of madness in the poet’s mental constitution. This natural gift consists in a certain impression-ability of soul; and the illusions of madness arise from a distempered form of the same quality.

εὐφυοῦς. εὐφυής (more fully εὐφυνῆς πρὸς τι) is a general term
for one with a natural gift and aptitude for something, as distinct from one who acquires a power by training or study; comp. 22, 1.459 a 7, and Top. 3. 2, 118 a 22. φιλοτονεῖν ἄρνομέθα, ἵνα εὐφωνεῖ εἶναι δόξωμεν. The word is of frequent occurrence in Plato, as well as in Aristotle, and it is occasionally found in Isocrates also. In the present passage the poetic imagination is tacitly assumed to be a matter of nature, and to be the outcome in some instances of a healthy, and in others, of an unhealthy nature. The alternative εὐφωνος ἡ μανικοῦ might be largely illustrated from Probl. 30. 1, where the connexion between 'great wit' (as Dryden calls εὐφωνία) and madness is considered at length. The writer of the Problem (one of Aristotle's immediate followers, as it would seem) shows that they have a common physiological basis—that the 'melancholic temperament' underlies all exceptional ability, and that a more or less morbid form of it is to be seen in madness, and in certain states of mind akin to madness, e.g. enthusiasm and 'ecstasy'; comp. esp. Probl. 30. 1, 954 a 34. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ... νοσήμασιν ἀλάσκονται μανικοῖς ἡ ἐνθονομαστικῶς, ὥθην Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάκκες καὶ οἱ ἔθνοι γίνονται πάντες ... Μαρακὸς δὲ ὁ Σινακούσιος καὶ ἀμείων ἣν ποιητὴς, ὅτ' ἐκστασί. A close relation between genius and madness is implied also in Rhet. 2. 15, 1390 b 26 καὶ ἑνότε ἃν ἡ ἀγαθόν τοῦ γένους, ἐγγίνονται διὰ τῶν χρόνων ἄνδρες περίττοι, κἀπεται πάλιν ἀναδίδοσιν' εξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφωνα ['clever', 'quick-witted'] γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἡθν ... τὰ δὲ στάσιμα ['steady', 'painstaking'] εἰς ἀβέλτεριαν καὶ νωθρότητα.

ἡ μανικοῦ. The alternative here is a rationalistic recognition of the ancient idea of the poet being 'possessed' and 'inspired' at the moment of poetic creation. Plato plays on this idea in his 'praise of madness' in Phaedr. 245 a δὲ δ' ἢν αἷν μανίας Μοῦσών ἐτή ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκεται, πειθεῖς ὡς ἀρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητής ἐσώμεν, ἀτελῆς αὐτός τε καὶ ἢ ποιήσις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μανικών ἢ τοῦ συφρονόντος ἡμιαίσθη; and he returns to it in other dialogues (comp. Apol. 22 b, Meno 99 c, Ion 533 c sqq., Laws 719 c). For the survival of the notion in later literature see W. H. Thompson's note on Phaedr. 245 a.

οὶ μὲν ... οὶ δὲ. The singulars which precede are practically equivalent to plurals, εὐφωνοι ... μανικοί (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. i p. 86).

εὐπλαστοὶ, 'capable of assuming a variety of moods', i.e. as we would say, 'impressionable' or 'emotional'; comp. the Platonic παλη ὑπρη in Phaedr. 245 a τρίτη δ' ἀπὸ Μοῦσῶν κατοκωχή τε
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1455 καὶ μανία, λαβώσα ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἀβατον ψυχὴν, and the explanation of Hermias (p. 98 Couvreur) ἀπαλὴν δὲ λέγει τὴν εὐπλαστὸν καὶ ἐσπαθὼς ἔχουσαν πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θείου. The word is properly used of material substances which, instead of being hard and rigid, are easily made to take various shapes; comp. De gen. an. 3. 11, 761 τὸν ὑγρὸν μᾶλλον ἔστι τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ τὸ τε γὰρ ὑγρὸν εὐπλαστότεραν ἔχει τῇ φύσιν τῆς γῆς (also Plato Rep. 588 δ). A metaphorical extension of meaning, not unlike that in the text, is found in Plato Laws 666 β ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐτηρότητος ἔδωρόν τῷ ὁνὸν φάρμακον, ὅστε ἀνθιζόν ἡμᾶς καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθην γύρνησθαι, μαλακῶτερον τ' ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶς, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα, γεγυμένου, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι. This impressionability of soul, which marks the poetic genius (εὐφώς), may be explained on the principles set forth in Probl. 30. 1, where the melancholic temperament is said to show itself in a certain variability of mood (ἀνώμαλοι εἰσὶ οἱ μελαγχολικοί), and a general capacity for strong feeling (ἡ φύσις δὴ γέγονε πρὸς τὰ πάθη).

34 κατασταῖκοι describes the extreme form of the emotionalism of the melancholic temperament; some of the ‘melancholic’ are apt to be so completely carried away by their feelings as to be actually beside themselves for the time. According to Probl. 30. 1 a tendency to this description of ‘melancholy’ was observable in most of the poets (τῶν περὶ τὴν ποιήσιν οἱ πλείστοι, 953 28); a certain Maracus of Syracuse—like our own Christopher Smart and others—was said to have been at his best in moments of derangement, Μαρακὸς ὁ Συρακοῦσιος καὶ ἀμείβων ἅν ποιήσῃ, οὗτ' ἐκσταίη (954 38). Among Aristotelian instances of ἐξστασιά, ἐκστασις, and ἐκστατικος, as terms of mental pathology, the following may be noted: De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 19 οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μανικόν ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὡστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον.—H. A. 6. 22, 577 12 εξίστασαι καὶ μανίσται.—Cat. 8, 9 36 ἥ τε μανικὴ ἐκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργή καὶ τὸ τοιαῦτα [scil. ποιήσεις]· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτα λέγονται, ὄργηλοι τε καὶ μανικοὶ.—Probl. 30. 1, 953 17 ἡ περὶ τοῦ παιδὸς ἐκστασις [said of Hercules slaying his children in his madness]. —α 22 ὁ μὲν [i.e. Ajax] ἐκστατικὸς ἐγένετο παυτελῶς.—b 14 τῶν μελαγχολικῶν οὗτοι ἐκστατικοί. Theophrastus H. P. 9. 13, 4 has ἐκστατικὸς in the active sense of producing ἐκστασις: γίνονται δὲ τινες τῶν γλυκείων [scil. μεθ.] αἱ μὲν ἐκστατικαι καθάπερ ἡ ὁμοια τῷ σκολιώῳ περὶ Τετέλον, ἢν καὶ Πάυδεος ὁ ἀνδραντοποιός φαγὼν ἐργαζόμενος ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἐξέστη· αἱ δὲ θανατηφόρου κτέ. This technical
use of these words is perhaps another proof of the influence of the language of Hippocrates (v. Foes, Oeconomia Hippocratis s.v. ἐκτασιας) on that of Aristotle and his school.

ἐκτασικόι, the reading of the MS., is surely impossible in a context like the present. ἐκτάζεων denotes to ‘scrutinize’ or ‘examine’, i.e. to examine one’s critical faculty on something. It is clear, however, as any reader of Probl. 30. 1 must see, that Aristotle is not thinking here of the critical but of the imaginative power of the poet, and that he wishes to distinguish two forms of it, one springing from a healthy, and the other from a more or less morbid state of mind. An instance of the corruption of ἐκτασικός into ἐκτασιτικός is found in the MSS. of Aspasius’ commentary on the Nic. Ethics, p. 136. 3 ed. Heylbut. Mr. A. O. Prickard has pointed out to me a similar corruption in Longinus 38. 5 (ἐκτάσεως for ἐκτασιτικός).

tοὺς τε λόγους: comp. 24, 1460 a 27. A new point is introduced in the same way in 24, 1460 a 26 (προαφείσθαί τε δει), and in several places in the later Books of the Nicomachean Ethics (e.g. 8. 1, 1155 a 11, 16; 9. 1, 1164 b 1, etc.). This is the third of Aristotle’s supplementary rules (see on a 22). It will be observed that he now changes his construction, infinitives taking the place of the preceding participles, just as though he had begun by saying δει δε τοὺς μίθους συναντάτα καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργαζόμενον οτι μάλιστα προ ὁμμάτων τίθεσθαι ... καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργά-ζεσθαι. For λόγος in the sense of the argument in a play or poem comp. 17, 1455 b 17 and 24, 1460 a 27 (also Aristoph. Pax 148, and Hesychius λόγος: ἦ τοῦ δράματος ὑπόθεσι).

ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου: i.e. to set out in a general form, to reduce it b 1 to its simplest terms by ignoring its accidents, its personal and other accessories. On the logical or philosophic use of ἐκτίθεσθαι in Aristotle see Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 83 and Poste’s Sophistici Elenchi p. 153 (comp. Maier, Sylllogistik des Aristoteles 2, 2 p. 142).

ἐπεισοδιούν, scil. τοὺς λόγους, as in Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 a 33 δει τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαινοῦν. It means to work in the accessory incidents (ἐπεισόδια; see on 9, 1451 b 33) into the story as outlined in the preliminary sketch.

τῇ θεῷ. The goddess meant is Artemis, to whom Iphigenia b 5 had been offered in sacrifice (τυθείσης τυνός κόρης b 3) at Aulis.

ἄνειλεν ὁ θεός ... ἔλθειν ἐκεί. The reading here was practically b 7 settled long ago by Düntzer (Rettung d. Aristot. Poetik p. 180). Aristotle is merely reproducing in his own form the statement in
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1455 b 7 Iph. Taur. 82, where Orestes, in an address to Apollo, is made to say: ἡτὶν δὲ σ’ ἡρώτησα πῶς τροχηλάτον μανίας ἣν ἐλθομ’ ἐς τέλος πάνων τ’ ἐμῶν σύ δ’ εἶπας [= ἀνείλεν ὁ θεὸς] ἐλθεῖν Ταυρικὴς μ’ ὄρους ἵθηνος [= ἐλθείν εἴκει], ἔνθ’ Ἀρτεμίσι σῇ ἔνγγον βωμών ἐκεί, λαβεῖν τ’ ἀγαλμα θεᾶς . . . λαβόντα δ’ . . . Ἀθηναίων χθονὶ δοῦναι. This incident in the previous history of Orestes is outside the actual story or plot of the Iphigenia (ἐξω τοῦ μιθου); all that is really essential for the dramatic situation is that τῷ ἀδηλφῷ συνεβῇ ἐλθεῖν τῆς ἱερείας.

b 8 ἐξω τοῦ μιθου, which seems to have been explained by the adscript ἐξω τοῦ καθόλου, is equivalent to ἐξω τοῦ δράματος (see on 14, 1453 b 32), outside the action of the piece.

b 9 ληφθεῖς = συλληφθεῖς (comp. Brems on Lysias in Eratosth. § 16). ἀνεγνώρισεν, scil. ὁ Ορέστης (see on 11, 1452 b 5).

b 10 Πολύδος: see on 16, 1455 a 6.

b 12 ὑποθέντα τὰ ὑπόματα: 9, 1451 b 13 τὰ τινόντα ὑπόματα ὑποθέσαν. The proper names are required to serve as a basis for the story, and impart to it an appearance of reality. Aristotle seems to speak for the moment as though the whole story, names and all, were of the poet's creation, as it was in the New Comedy and in certain tragedies (9, 1451 b 11, 19). If the stories, however, were traditional, the chief names were generally part of the tradition, and taken over from it by the dramatist. A reason for the retention of historic names in Tragedy has been given in 9, 1451 b 15.

b 13 ἐπεισδοδοῦν: comp. b 1 ἐπεισδοδοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν.

ὁπως δὲ ἐσται. Another, perhaps the only other Aristotelian instance of this quasi-imperative, is in Rhet. 3. 18, 1419 b 6 ὅπως οἷν τὸ ἀρµόττων αὐτῷ λήψεται. Aristotle addresses his audience (see on 15, 1454 b 9), as he does in the concluding paragraph of the Sophistici Elenchi (33, 184 b 3), and exhorts them to bear in mind the rule he is pointing out.

οἴκεια: appropriate to the person. The madness of Orestes in the Iphigenia is a return of that which seized him just after the murder of his mother (Iph. Taur. 83); his purification also is naturally suggested by his guilt as a matricide (Iph. Taur. 1031 sqq.).

b 14 ἡ μανία: Iph. Taur. 281 sqq.


b 18 παραφυλαττοµένοι: comp. the use of φυλάττειν in Hom. Od. 670 ὁφρα μιν αὐτὸν ἵνα λοχύσομαι ήδε φυλάξω ἐν πορῆμι.
αὐτὸς δέ. In Aristotle, just as in other writers, a δέ is occasion-ally used after a participial clause to mark a contrast between the two parts of the sentence (see my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 34).

χειμασθείς: comp. 17, 1455 a 31.

ἀναγωρίσας τινα κατ' αὐτὸς. On behalf of the amended reading (ὁτι instead of τινάς) it may be noted that in 25, 1461 b 1 A in has τι instead of ὅτι. The language here is a reminiscence of that in Od. 21. 207, where Ulysses reveals himself to the herdsmen: ἐνδόν μὲν δὴ ὃδ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ κακὰ πολλὰ μογήσας ἥλυθον—the Homeric κακὰ πολλὰ μογήσας being represented by Aristotle’s χειμασθείς, ἥλυθον by ἀφυκνεύται, and ὃδ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ by ἀναγωρίσας ὅτι αὐτός. Twining (followed by Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 86; comp. Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1898, p. 266) adopts a suggestion of Castelvetro’s, that ἀναγωρίσας τινάς (the traditional reading) may be taken to mean ‘making himself known to some of his people’. The interpretation, besides being against Aristotelian usage (see on 16, 1454 b 32), requires us to take αὐτός with ἐπιθέμενος, and gives it an undue degree of emphasis. There is no point in saying that Ulysses attacked the suitors ‘himself’; and it was not true that he attacked them ‘by himself’ or ‘alone’ (comp. Aristot. fr. 176 Teubn.). This difficulty was not felt by either Castelvetro or Twining, as the reading in the texts of their time was not αὐτός but αὐτοῖς.

ἐσώθη: comp. the use of σωτηρία in b 12, 14. The double ending of the Odyssey has been formally recognized already, in 13, 1453 a 32.

τὸ ἱδιόν: the peculiar or characteristic part of the Odyssey, as b 23 distinct from the ‘episodes’, or accessories.

1 Vahlen (in this paper in the Sitzungsberichte) points to an instance of ἀναγωρίζειν τινά, in the sense of ‘cause some one to recognize’ in Diodorus Sic. 4. 59. 6 κατορθώσας δὲ τὰ προερχόμενα [sell. Theseus] κατήργησεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθῆνας καὶ τὸν Αἰγέα διὰ τῶν συμβολῶν ἀνεγώρφασεν. This solitary instance, however, occurring as it does in an author like Diodorus, and in a passage which is certainly not free from difficulties, is hardly sufficient to show that the word may have had the same sense and construction in Aristotle; the sense given it is too abnormal, too unlike the Aristotelian use of the word in other passages in the Poetics and elsewhere, to be accepted as probable. Vahlen thinks the simple γενώριζεν also is used in the same way in Plutarch Theseus 12 τὸν δὲ νῦν ἀναγώρων ἡσπάζοται καὶ χαναγωγὸν τῶν πολίστις ἐγώρωρεν, ἤτεις δεχόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπιάν. It seems to me that the object after ἀναγώρωρεν in this passage is τῶν νῦν (comp. Meursius, Theseus c. 8), and that ἀναγώρωρεν means either ‘introduced him’ (comp. Plut. Fab. Max. 21) or ‘acknowledged him’. 
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1455 b 24 "Εστι δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας κτέ. The fourth of these supplementary rules. The complication and dénouement are of such paramount importance, that two tragedies with the same sort of complication and dénouement should be regarded as substantially the same, however different they may be in other respects. It is quite possible to succeed in the one point and fail in the other; but they are both of equal moment, and require equal attention from the poet. This view of the drift of the paragraph assumes that the sentence δίκαιον . . . κρατεῖσθαι in 1456 a 7–10 should follow after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους in 1455 b 32. A mere definition of δέσις and λύσις would have no place in these chapters, unless it were made to lead up to some practical precept, such as we have in δέ δέ ἀμφοὶ δὲι κρατεῖσθαι in 1456 a 10.

δέσις . . . λύσις: see on 15, 1454 a 37.

b 25 εξωθεν: see on 14, 1453 b 32.

ἐνια τῶν ἐσωθεν πολλάκις. It is not necessary to transpose πολλάκις and insert it after the preceding τὰ μὲν εξωθεν. The δέσις, says Aristotle, comprises not only the presupposed part of the story (τὰ ἐξωθεν, or τὰ προτεπραγμένα), but also in many instances (πολλάκις) some portion of the action within the play. In the Iph. Taur. the δέσις extends as far as l. 391. In the O. T. on the other hand the entire δέσις is presupposed, the λύσις beginning with the opening scene.

b 29 Ανυγκεί: see on 11, 1452 a 27. The Lyceus is cited as an instance of a play with a δέσις partly presupposed and partly within the limits of the action of the piece.

b 30 τοῦ παῖδιον, Abas, the child of Lyceus and Danaus' daughter Hypermnestra.

b 32 τραγῳδίας δὲ εἰδη κτέ. The fifth of the supplementary rules. There are four species of Tragedy—each arising apparently (like the species of Democracy in Pol. 4. 4, 1296 b 27) through the prominence in it of some one of the several elements in a play. Aristotle insists that for an ideally good tragedy all these elements of interest are wanted, and that in so critical an age none can be neglected with impunity (μᾶλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπαντᾶ δὲι περιστραγμένον ἐχειν κτέ. 1456 a 3). The species he is now talking of, or at any rate three out of the number, were probably no discovery of his; terms like πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία, παθητική τραγῳδία, and ἡμικυκλόπεια τραγῳδία may very well be supposed to have been already sanctioned and current in the technical language of the theatre (comp. on 9, 1451 b 33). If the περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις are
'the whole thing' (as we say), the play is πεπλεγμένη; if the 1455 b 32 element of πάθος is especially prominent, it is παθητική; if it is mainly a portraiture of character, it is ἓθική; and if it depends largely on the 'spectacle', it is 'spectacular'. This last species Aristotle recognizes as a fact, but as there was no derivative from ὀψις corresponding to our 'spectacular', he has to change his form of expression and speak not of the fourth 'species', but of the fourth element (τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὀψις), with instances, however, (αἰ τε Φορκίδες κτλ.) relating to the species of drama in which the element of ὀψις was prominent (see J. of Phil. 14 p. 50). These four elements have been already considered, though not quite so directly as Aristotle's language would imply. The περιπέτεια and ἄναγνώρισις, which are assumed to go together (comp. 11, 1452 a 32), and the πάθος have been distinguished already as elements in the μῦθος (comp. 11, 1452 b 9); and they are counted here as two parts of the play because each is the prominent factor in a distinct species of tragedy. Two other parts are mentioned, the ἓθη and the ὀψις, apparently for the same reason. If nothing is said of the remaining 'parts' of Tragedy, the reason is obvious; there was no existing species of Tragedy that could be described as consisting mainly of διάνοια or λέξις or μελοποιία. Vahlen and others assume a lacuna in b 34 (after ἄναγνώρισις), on the supposition that Aristotle must have had something to say about the ἀπλὴ τραγῳδία. The ἀπλὴ τραγῳδία, however, is not a species in Aristotle's present sense of the term; and if we are to find a place for it in the text, the same logic would require a recognition of the ἕθικη τραγῳδία (6, 1450 a 25), as being the logical opposite of the ἕθικη τραγῳδία in the passage before us. The insertion too, which is due to a desire to bring the present statement into line with that in 24, 1459 b 8, makes it necessary to adopt a highly improbable correction, τερατώδες, in the context (1456 a 2).

τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέξθη. In lieu of τὰ μέρη Tyrwhitt suggests τὰ μῦθον, and Ueberweg τὰ μῦθον or τοῦ μῦθον—which would mean, if I understand Tyrwhitt's note correctly, that the ἕθικη τραγῳδία is based on an ἕθικος μῦθος. This, however, can hardly be right, if one remembers the sharp distinction drawn between ἕθος and μῦθος in 6, 1450 a 4. The present passage, due allowance being made for the Aristotelian brevity of expression, is intelligible enough in itself; the difficulty is to bring it into harmony with what is said elsewhere in other parts of the book. τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέξθη, no doubt, implies a previous
statement, which it is impossible to find in the earlier chapters; and the passage in 24, 1459 b 9 implies that a διλη as well as a πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία had been recognized among the four species of Tragedy in the passage before us. Difficulties of this kind it is better to acknowledge than to remove at the cost of reforming the text. The truth is that Aristotle is more human than we commonly suppose—that his memory is sometimes at fault, and also that he sometimes writes down what occurs to him at the moment, without stopping to reflect whether it is quite reconcilable with what he has said elsewhere. Though there are chapters in the Poetics, more especially in the early part, which are models of careful drafting, I think it clear that, as the work advances, the statement is not always equally admirable, and that it would require a great deal of revision to make it consistent throughout. The difficulty in the reference τοσαίτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη is not unlike that in ὀσπέρ πρότερον ἔριρται in 6, 1450 b 13, and ὀσπέρ ἔριρται πολλάκις in 18, 1456 a 10.

b 33 ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη κτέ, appositional to the preceding εἰδη τέσσαρα (comp. 16, 1454 b 20; 21, 1457 a 31).

b 34 παθητική. No definition is given, as though the term (as also ἔθικη in the next line) were sufficiently understood without one.

1456 a 1 Αἰάντες: see Nauck, TGF. p. 963 for a list of plays entitled Αἰάς.

áticas: see Nauck p. 965.

Φηδώτιδες, a play by Sophocles (Nauck p. 282).

2 ηλεός. The reference is perhaps to the Peleus of Sophocles (Nauck p. 239) rather than that of Euripides (Nauck p. 554).

τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὅψις is closer to the MS. reading than Schrader’s τὸ δὲ τεταρτῶδες, which has been so generally approved by recent editors. The unmeaning ὁντρ of the MS. here, and again in 21, 1458 a 51, is but one remove from ὅψις as it might be written in an uncial MS. (ΟΗΚ = Ο + Ι). The illustrations no doubt refer to the ‘kind’ instead of the ‘part’ brought into prominence in the kind. A certain formal incongruence, however, is not uncommon with instances introduced by ὁντρ (comp. 16, 1454 b 25; 25, 1461 a 24; Eth N. 4. 4, 1122 a 27; Rhet. 3. 3, 1405 b 35);

1 See J. of Phil. 14 p. 50. The ὁντρ of the MS. in the second instance has been supposed to represent ΟΠΣ, and in this way ὅψις. In early inscriptions ψ may appear as φσ or πσ (Meisterhans, Gr. p. 3; Hoffmann, Gr. Dialekte 3 p. 612); but, as far as I am aware, there is no trace of this mode of writing in the manuscript tradition of a classical author.
Aristotle is often content to note the fact, and leave us to see its logical relation to what precedes.

Φορκίδες, a satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 83).

Προμηθεύς, probably another satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 62). There is a good deal to be said, however, in favour of Bergk's suggestion (Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753) that the plural Προμηθεύς should be restored in the text.

ὅσα ἐν ἔδωκεν. The reference may perhaps be to plays like the Ψυχαγωγός of Aeschylus (Nauck p. 87). In these last instances, owing to the nature of the subject and situation, the ὁς, the make-up (see on 6, 1449 b 33) of the strange personages introduced, may well be supposed to have been a great feature in the play. Aeschylus, who was an innovator in matters of stage-apparatus (Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 183), is said to have made large use of this device: Vita Aeschylis (p. 2 Dind.) ταῖς τε γάρ ὀνεικαί καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἑκτηλείειν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπατήν κέρχηται.

μάλιστα μὲν ὦν κτῆ. A reminiscence of Aristotle's language here may be traced in Polybius 16. 20. 2: διὸ δὲι μάλιστα μὲν περάσθαι πάντων κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν καλῶν γάρ: εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτῳ δυνάτων, τῶν ἀναγκαιότάτων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῇ πλείστην ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν.

ἐκάστοις is masculine, 'each of his various predecessors'—the genitive being dependent on ιδὼν as in 5, 1449 b 16, 13, 1452 b 33, and 19, 1456 a 35. For the hyperbaton see on 6, 1449 b 23.

διάκαιον κτῆ. This and the next sentence (πολλοὶ — κρατεῖσθαι) are probably out of place (see above, on 18, 1455 b 24).

ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν. The point here, the conditions under which two tragedies may be said to be the same or not, is very like that in De anima 2. 4, 416 a 5 χρὴ τὸ ὄργανον λέγειν ἑτέρα καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἔργων, and in Pol. 3. 3, 1276 a 18 πῶς ποτε χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πάλιν ἐναὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄλλη ἑτέραν.

οὖδεὶς ἵππως τῷ μυθῷ, 'ob nihil acque ac ob fabulum' (Tyrwhitt). The dative οὐδεὶς is to be taken with λέγειν in the sense of 'by reason of' or 'on account of'; comp. De anima 2. 4, 416 a 5 (quoted above).—De sensu 7, 447 b 24 φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ἣ ψυχῇ οὐδεὶς ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἄλλη ἢ τῷ ἁμα.—Eth. N. 3. 12, 1117 a 32 ὃς ὦ τὰ λυπηρὰ ἐπομένει τοῖς ἄνθρωποι λέγοντα. The construction in ἵππως τῷ μυθῷ ('equally with the story') is normal (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 411); but I am not able to point out an exact parallel. It may be compared, however, with
that in Eth. N. 1. 4, 1096 a 23 τὰγαθὸν ἱσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, and in Plato Parm. 150 οὕτω τὸ ἐνὶ δὲ ὄλον αὐτὸν τεταμένη; and with the use of ὀμοίως in Pol. 3. 11, 1282 b 8 ὀμοίως ταῖς πολεμεῖαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις φαίνουσιν ἣ σπουδαίως εἶναι, and elsewhere. ὦσς has the sense of 'equally' in Pol. 4, 14, 1298 b 23 (Bekker), in Plato Laws 805 A, and in Demosth. 10. 74 (v. Weil ad loc.).

tούτῳ δὲ (=τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶ) introduces an explaining clause of similar form in De gen. et corr. 1. 6, 323 a 17 οὐ γὰρ οὖν τὲ πάν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἶπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιθησομεν τῷ πάσχοντι τοῦτο δ' οἷς ἢ κίνησις πάθος.

a 9 ἡ αὐτή. Aristotle, thinking only of the identity of the two tragedies, omits to recognize the possible alternative ἡ ᾿Αλλή (comp. 19, 1456 b 4).

a 10 κρατείσθαι = 'obtineri'. Vahlen illustrates this use of the word from Pol. 7. 13, 1331 b 37 δὲ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς ἀμφότεραι κρατείσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις, and Dion. Hal. 5. 556 τῆς δὲ σαφρείας καὶ τῆς ἐναρχείας ἀμφότερος κρατεῖν ἀπεφηνάμεν. Comp. also Polyb. 16, 20. 2 (quoted above on a 3).

χρῆ δὲ κτέ. The sixth of Aristotle's supplementary rules.

a 11 εἱρταί πολλάκις. Though some hint of this may perhaps be discerned in 5, 1449 b 12 and 17, 1455 b 15, the reference here is clearly one of Aristotle's oversights (see on 18, 1455 b 32); it is not true that he has more than once laid down the rule μὴ ποιεῖν ἑποτουκὸν σύστημα τραγῳδίαν. πολλάκις, 'more than once', is the opposite of ἄπαξ (comp. Meteor. 2. 3, 356 b 27) as well as of ὀλγάκις, just as πολλά is the opposite of ἐν as well as of ὀλέγα (Metaph. I 6, 1056 b 23).

μεμνήσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. For the conjunction Vahlen quotes Eth. N. I. 7, 1098 a 26 μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρῆ καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὀμοίως ἐν ἀπασίν ἐπιλείπειν.

σύστημα, scil. πραγμάτων. The μίθος or story has been repeatedly described as a σύστασις πραγμάτων (v. 6, 1450 a 15, 32, b 32, etc.).

a 12 ἑποτουκὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, scil. σύστημα. The common punctuation (with a full stop before, and a comma after it) makes this clause the beginning of a new sentence. It is clear, I think, that it is a parenthesis, and that the illustration οὖν εἴ τις κτέ. (comp. 26, 1462 b 2) refers back to the principal statement, μὴ ποιεῖν ἑποτουκὸν σύστημα τραγῳδιὰν in a 11. For other illustrations at some distance from the statements to which they relate see on 7, 1451 b 2.
The assumption here is that the story in the Iliad 1456 a 12 is a πολύμυθον σύστημα, one with a plurality of stories in it (comp. 24, 1462 b 8). It is not easy to reconcile this with what we are told in a later chapter (23, 1459 a 30) where the unity of story in the Iliad is emphasized.

δόσιν πέρεσιν Ἰλίου δὴν ἐποίησαν. We do not know to whom a 16 Aristotle is referring; it is just possible that Agathon may have been one of the number. For the tragedies entitled 'Ιλίων πέρεσις (or simply Πέρεσις) see on 23, 1459 b 6.

'Αγάθων. Aristotle's sense of the importance of Agathon is a 18 shown by his many quotations from him (Bon. Ind. 4 b 5), as well as by the present and other references in the Poetics (9, 1451 b 21; 15, 1454 b 14). The context (a 21) implies that the pathos in Agathon's situations was not always of the most legitimate kind; and in the next paragraph (a 29) he is said to have set a bad precedent in the treatment of the Chorus. But whatever his artistic shortcomings may have been, we have evidence enough even in Aristophanes of his success with his own generation. There is a good deal of point, therefore, in what Aristotle is saying in support of his rule (μὴ τοιεύν ἐποιοῦκαν σύστημα τραγῳδιαν), that 'even Agathon failed' when he neglected it.

ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ, 'in this, and in this alone'—a pregnant use of a 19 μόνος like that in De somno 2, 455 a 27 διὸ καὶ τάσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις ... καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἄφις μονή πάσιν.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι. I cannot think it necessary to bracket these words (with Susemihl). As περιπτέται, which is the mark of the 'complex' story (10, 1452 a 16; comp. 11, 1452 a 32), is directly suggestive of it, ἐν τοῖς περιπτέταις is practically equivalent to ἐν τοῖς πεπληγμένοις πράγμασι. Aristotle adds καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι, in order to make his statement cover the whole ground by including both forms of plot. The failure of these unsuccessful poets, he says in effect, was really due not to any fault of execution, but to an initial mistake in their choice of subjects; they forgot the limitations of the Drama, and undertook to dramatize a story too long and too complex for the purposes of the stage.

ἐν βουλονται, 'the effects they desire'. The kind of effect, which a 20 is explained in the next clause (τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον), may not be of the best order; but it is that which, in their anxiety to please their public, they wish to produce.

τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. For the change of number a 21 in τοῦτο comp. 19, 1456 a 35; it is the converse of that in 17,
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1456ᵃ 21 1455ᵃ 33 (comp. Bon. Ind. 490ᵇ 17). Aristotle's theory is that the tragic situation should be ἐλεεύνον—which implies that the sufferer does not deserve his misfortunes (13, 1453ᵃ 4); he incidentally admits, however, that it may be only φλάνθρωπον (see on 13, 1452ᵇ 38), as it is, for instance, when the sufferings of the wicked are put before us in such a way as to arouse a certain commiseration or human feeling for the sufferers. The later Tragedy would seem to have affected this inferior form of tragic motive.

ἐστίν δὲ τούτο κτέ. The illustrations which follow were probably taken from actual plays. The tragedies Aristotle has in mind must have involved a strong περιπέτεια with all the interest and excitement attending it; they failed, however (we are told), in spite of this and other attractions (comp. στοχάζονται ὅν βούλονται θαν-μαστῶς), through an initial mistake in their subject, which was one more fitted for an epic than a play.

ᵃ 23 ἐστίν δὲ τούτο εἰκός: comp. 25, 1461ᵇ 15. The reference is to the sophistical saying of Agathon (fr. 6 Nauckᵃ), τάξ᾽ ἂν τις εἰκός αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι λέγοι, βροτοῦσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὓς εἰκότα, which Aristotle has examined in Rhet. 2. 24, 1402ᵃ 10. There is some variation of text here, as another reading, ἐστίν δὲ τῶτῳ <καὶ> εἰκός, is believed to underlie the Arabic Version. With the καὶ the clause adds a further point in favour of these unsuccessful plays: the kind of incident just mentioned is said to be 'probable also'. Without the καὶ the clause involves a criticism or condemnation, not unlike that in 13, 1453ᵃ 35 (ἐστίν δὲ οἶχ αὕτη κτέ), 'this is probable, however, only in Agathon's non-natural sense of the word'. A qualification of this kind (introduced by ὀστερ or καθάπερ) is found more than once in this same chapter (ᵃ 17 and ᵃ 27), and again in 21, 1457ᵇ 24; comp. also Metaph. B 2, 998ᵃ 2 ἀπτεται γὰρ τῶν κανόνων οὗ κατὰ στυγμήν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ' ὀστερ Πρωταγόρας ἐλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας.—Rhet. 1. 5, 1361ᵇ 4 πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐγκαίνιοντον ὀστερ Ἡρώδικος λέγεται.

ᵃ 25 καὶ τὸν χορὸν κτέ. The seventh and last of these practical rules. It reappears in the well-known precept of Horace A. P. 193 Actoris partes chorus officiumque virile defendat, nee quid medios intercinal actus, quod non proposito conducet et haeret apte.

ᵃ 27 Εὐριπίδης. For the dative (conventionally rendered by ἀρν) comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339ᵇ 8 οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἐδει καὶ καθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς.—Plato Rep. 389 Ῥ ὀία καὶ Ὄμηρῳ Διαμφίδης λέγει.—Laws 706 ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς γὰρ αὐτῷ [scil. Ὅμηρῳ] λοιποὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα. The tacit assumption here is perhaps this, that the choral songs in
Euripides, though no mere ἐμβάλλωμα (like those in the later Drama), were not always very closely connected with the action of the piece.

A tradition of this criticism survives in the grammarians. The chorus in Phoen. 1019 the scholiast condemns as irrelevant: πρὸς οὖν ταύτη ἔδει γὰρ τῶν χωρὸν οἰκτύσασθαι τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Μενοίκου ἢ ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν εὐψυχίαν τοῦ νεανίσκου. ἄλλα περὶ Οἰδήπου καὶ τῆς Σφυγγῆς διηγεῖται τὰ πολλάκις εἰρημένα. A more general condemnation is found in the scholiast on Aristoph. Ach. 443: καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸν Εὐριπίδην διασύρει. οὖν γὰρ εἰσάγει τοὺς χωροὺς οὔτε τὰ ἀκόλουθα φθεγγομένου τῇ ὑπόθεσι, ἄλλη ἱστορία τινὰς ἀπαγγέλλωντας, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, οὔτε ἐμπαθῶς ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἄλλα μεταξὺ ἀντιπότοντας. The Roman poet Accius also must have been of the same opinion, to judge from the mutilated fragment of his Didascalica in Nonius 178, 23, sed Euripidis, qui chorus temerius in fabulis * * *

τὰ ἀδόμενα: the choral, as opposed to τὰ λεγόμενα, the spoken parts of the play. In [Demosthenes] 60. 9 τοὺς τῶν ἄδομένων ποιητῶν is a way of describing the lyric poets; comp. also Plato Rep. 398 ν οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αἰτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὖν δὴν διαφέρει [scil. τὸ μέλος] τοῦ μὴ ἄδομένου λόγου.

ἐμβάλλωμα: 'carmina intercalaria' (Budaeus). The word is usually a term of chronology, as in Herod. 1. 32 and 2. 4. With the grammarians it seems to have meant 'interpolated': Hesychius ἐμβάλλωμα ἔπη τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν ὡς ἀλλότρια καὶ νόθα ἄθετον-μένα. Cicero has the very similar word ἐμβάλλων in Ep. ad Q. Fr. 3. 1, 24, in the sense of an 'insertion' or 'interlude' (v. Ernesti, Lex. tech. gr. p. 118).

Twining's note on this passage is well worth quoting: 'It is curious to trace the gradual extinction of the Chorus. At first, it was all; then, relieved by the intermixture of dialogue, but still principal; then, subordinate to the dialogue; then digressive, and ill connected with the piece; then borrowed from other pieces at pleasure—and so on, to the fiddles and act-tunes, at which Dacier is so angry.'

λέξεως καὶ διανοιάς. This is the usual order of the two terms in the Poetics (v. 6, 1450 a 9, 14, 29 and 24, 1459 b 16). The only instance of the reverse order, which is that of their logical importance (6, 1450 b 12; comp. Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 a 36), is in 24, 1459 b 12 ἄτι ταῖς διανοιαῖς καὶ τὴν λέξειν ἐχεῖν καλὸς. For the meaning of διάνοια see on 6, 1450 a 6.

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν: comp. Phys. 4. 14, 222 b 31 τὸ θαύμων καὶ a 36
1456 a 36 ἑβαδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσιν ἐστὶ μεταβολήν. In Bon. Ind. 369 a 28 κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν is explained as equivalent to διανοητικά.

οδα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κτ. In the Rhetoric three kinds of speech are recognized, according as the aim of the speaker is (1) to gain the confidence of his audience by creating in their minds a favourable idea of himself and his general credibility; or (2) to work on their feelings; or (3) to convince their reason: Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 1 τῶν δὲ δία τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἰδή ἐστὶν: αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν ἐν τῷ ἡθεὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατήν διαθέναι πῶς, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἡ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι κτέ.

The present summary notes the second and third of these three εἴδη, but ignores the first, though there is certainly nothing to exclude that sort of speech from the rhetoric of Tragedy.

a 38 πάθη. The instances ὅλων ἑλεον ἢ φόβον κτέ. are added, because up to this point πάθος has usually meant 'suffering' or 'calamity' (τι, 1452 b 11).

b I ἑλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὑφηγήν ἢ οδα τοιαῦτα. According to Tumlírz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 28) this shows that Aristotle supposes Tragedy to arouse anger and other emotions as well as pity and fear in the mind of the spectators. There is no such reference here to the spectators; the effect meant is that on the hearer on the stage. One might just as well say that the arguments put into the mouth of a personage (τὸ τε ἀποδεικνυόντα κτέ.) are addressed to the spectators, and not to some other personage in the play. The rhetoric of the speaker in a tragedy is dramatically directed to the hearer on the stage, i.e. to another of the dramatis personae. When Plato says of Euripides ἐπώσταται ... ῥήσεις ... ποιεῖν ... οὐκτρῶς καὶ τοιναντίον αὖ φοβερῶς καὶ ἀπειλητικῶς (Phaedr. 268 c), he does not suppose him to threaten the hearers of his pieces.

μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, scil. παρασκευάζειν. The clause is an afterthought, as its logical place would be after τὸ τε ἀποδεικνυόντα καὶ τὸ λύειν. The corresponding formula in Isocrates 42 c is τὰ τε μεγάλα ταπευτά ποιήσατε καὶ τοὺς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιβέβαιναι; and in the Rhetoric αὖξει καὶ μειοῦν: Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 a 20 τὸ ἄξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἡ μικρόν, ὥστε καὶ ὅτι ἄγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν ἡ δύκαιον ἢ ἄδικον. The reading μικρότητας is retained by Vahlen, who defends the change of number by quoting (among other instances) De part. an. 4. 5, 679 b 37 διαφέρει τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσι.—680 a 29 ἐν τῷ φύσει καὶ ταῖς ἀλέαις.—Plato Laws 734 a μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν.—
It is difficult, however, to explain the change of number with two
words so closely related as μέγεθος and μικρότης, and in a formula
so technical as the present. The sense also of the plural μικρότητας
is obscure, as it does not seem to fall under any of the heads
recognized by Bernhardy, Synt. p. 62 or Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 17.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: comp. 15, 1454 a 18 ὁ λόγος ἦ ἡ πράξις.
Aristotle is quite aware that there is a rhetoric of action as well as a
rhetoric of words. The διάνοια of the dramatic personae may
be shown in their acts; they may do things, just as they say things,
with a view to exciting pity, fear, etc., or with a view to creating an
idea that something is or is not true, etc.; and whichever mode of
expression be used, they have to follow, according to Aristotle,
the same method and principles.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδών ἱδεῶν δεὶ χρήσθαι, scil. τῇ διανοίᾳ, or τοῖς τῆς
διανοίας μέρεσιν. For the meaning of ἵδα see on 7, 1450 b 34.
ἀπὸ denotes here the logical starting-point.

μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα. Aristotle might have expressed himself more
fully by saying μεγάλα ἢ μικρὰ ἢ εἰκότα ἢ ἀπίθανα (comp. on 18,
1456 a 9).

ἀνευ διδασκαλίας = ἀνευ λόγου, 'sine docentis opera' (Tyrwhitt)
it is explained by what follows, τι γὰρ ἄν εἰη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργων;
The party instructed or informed here is one of the dramatic
personae, who learns the mind of another either through some
act of his, or through some statement by him in words.

τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, scil. ἐλεεώτα, δεινά, μεγάλα κτέ.

παρὰ τὸν λόγον. For the preposition comp. b 13 and 15, b 6
1454 b 15.

εἰ φάνοιτο ἢ δέοι. The traditional εἰ φανοῖτο (which would have b 7
to be equivalent to εἰ μέλλοι φανερθαι) is against the rule
laid down by Madvig, Gr. Synt. p. 119 Eng. tr. There is not
much to choose between Vahlen's ἢ δέοι and Castelvetro's ἦδρη.
ἡ δέοι, however, is somewhat nearer the manuscript reading ἦδα, and
much more probable than either Tyrwhitt's ἦ δέοι or Spengel's
ἡ διάνοια. It means 'in the required light', i.e. as ἐλεεά, or
dεινά, etc. If things appear of themselves in this light, without
the aid of the rhetorical art of the speaker, the speaker is not
wanted. The present remark may be compared with that in
8, 1450 b 8 ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐστι δῆλον κτέ.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν. Having briefly considered the διάνοια, b 8
the intellectual or rhetorical power revealed in the speeches of the
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dramatic personages, Aristotle passes on to their λέξεως, the diction or language in which they are made to express themselves. This point he investigates under three heads:—(1) the parts or constituents of the diction as a whole; (2) the various kinds of names in it; and (3) the limits within which unusual names or forms of names are admissible in poetry. Before entering on this line of discussion, however, he sets aside a matter which might perhaps seem germane to his subject, the elocutionary element in the spoken language. The word βασίλευς, for instance, according to one’s tone in uttering it, may mean ‘he walks’, or ‘does he walk?’; and ἀσεμιδει may be uttered as a command (‘sing!’) or as a prayer. These and similar distinctions, in Aristotle’s view, belong to the language as spoken rather than to the language as written, and thus come within the province of elocution (ὕποκριτική) rather than that of poetry or literature proper.

τὰ σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως means literally the different ‘attitudes’ or turns of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken. The same idea underlies the expression σχῆματα λέξεως of the grammarians, as one may see from Cicero Orator 83 Verborum collocationem illustrat iis luminibus quae Graeci quasi aliquos gestus orationis σχῆματα appellant.—Quintilian 9.1.13 Si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic [scil. σχῆματα] appellandi sunt. σχῆμα = ‘gestus’ occurs in 17, 1455 ² 29 and 26, 1462 ² 3 (comp. 1, 1447 ² 27). Aristotle’s σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως, however, must not be identified with the σχῆματα λέξεως or ‘figures of speech’, as we call them, of later writers. A ‘figure of speech’ is a literary artifice, a deviation from the simple and usual mode of expression for purposes of literary effect; Quintilian defines it as a conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente racione (9.1.4), or as an oratio a simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa (9.3.3; comp. Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. p. 338). In a ‘figure of speech’, as compared with the simple form of expression (e.g. ‘Macedonia’s madman’ and ‘Alexander’), we have a difference of words without any difference of sense; whereas in the Aristotelian σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως we have the same words and a different sense—the difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation.

ὑποκριτικής. ὑπόκρισις, the Latin pronunciatio, means ‘delivery’ or ‘elocution’. In the Rhetoric two styles of oratory are distinguished, the ‘graphic’ style in which the sense is fully expressed by the actual language, and the ‘hypocritic’ style, which requires
certain artifices of elocution to bring out the meaning: Rhet. 3. 12, 1456b10
1413 b 17 τὰ ἐποκριτικὰ ἄφημι καὶ τὸς ὕποκρίσεως οἷς ποιότος τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὔβοη, οἶον τὰ τέ ἀσύνθετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ ἀντὸ εἰπέων εἰ τῇ γραφικῇ ὤρθος ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ἠμέροις χρῶται έστι γὰρ ἐποκριτικὰ (comp. 3. 12, 1414 a 5).

ἀρχιτεκτονικῆ. The ἀρχιτέκτων is properly the master-builder,11 who knows the scheme of the whole work and directs the artisans and others under him: Plato Polit. 259 ε ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὖν αὐτῶς ἐργατικὸς ἀλλ' ἐργατῶν ἄρχων... παρεχόμενος γε τοῦ γνώσιν ἀλλ' οὖς χειροτονίαν. Aristotle recognizes a similar distinction in other arts, even in medicine: Pol. 3. 11, 1282 a 3 λατρὸς ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς. The 'architectonic' form of ἐποκριτική involves a knowledge of its rationale and general principles, as distinct from the empiric knowledge possessed by rhapsodists, actors, orators, and other practitioners.

οἶον τὶ ἐντολῆ κτῆ. refers back to τὰ σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως in b 9 (comp. on 7, 1451 a 2). The classification in the text originated with Protagoras, who is said to have distinguished four (or perhaps seven) fundamental differences in our mode of speech: Diog. Laer. 9. 53 διείλε τὸν λόγον πρώτος εἰς τέταρα, εὕχωλην ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολῆ—οἱ δὲ εἰς ἑπτά, διήγησιν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολὴν ἀπαγγελέαν εὐχωλήν κλῆσιν —, ὡς καὶ πυθμένας ἑπτά λόγων.

—Quintilian 3. 4. 10 Protagoram transse, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi, quod εὐχωλὴν dixit, partes solas putat. It will be seen that Aristotle has arranged the σχῆματα in pairs; one kind of speech may be made by a difference of intonation to mean either a command or a prayer, another either a simple statement or a threat, another either a question or an answer, and so forth with the rest. Aristotle's instances may be compared with those in Dion. Hal. 5. 46 R. τὰ μὲν ὃς ἀποφαινόμενοι λέγομεν, τὰ δ' ὃς πυθικόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὃς εὐχωλήμενοι, τὰ δ' ὃς ἑπτατόμοντες, τὰ δ' ὃς διαπροφάντες, τὰ δ' ὃς ἐποιτεμένοι, τὰ δ' ἀλλ' τῶς σχηματίζοντες.

παρὰ γάρ τὴν τούτων γνώσιν κτῆ. The argument here comes13 practically to this: That these σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως are something outside the art of Poetry itself is shown by the fact that ignorance of them is not one of the usual charges brought by hostile critics against a poet; Protagoras' criticism on the first line of the Iliad may be dismissed as too trivial to deserve attention.

1 ol δὲ = ol δὲ φασιν, 'according to others', as it so often does in the grammarians.
éπιτύμημα: see on 25, 1460 b 6.

καὶ ἀξιον: Pol. 2. 11, 1272 b 32 ὁ τι καὶ ἄξιον ἔπειν (comp. Riddell, 'Digest of Idioms' § 132).

ἀείδε. The imperative as such merely expresses a bidding (κελεύω), but a tone of authority may turn it into a command (ἐπιτάττειν; comp. Schmidt, Handbuch der lat. u. gr. Synonymik p. 51). Protagoras professed to understand Homer's ἀείδε in this dictatorial sense of the imperative, on the assumption that it was to be read as 'ἀείδε!' Aristotle's answer is that if ἀείδε gets this sense, it is through the fault not of the poet but of the reciter. An echo of the criticism ascribed to Protagoras survives in Schol. Ven. A on II. i. 1, where ἀείδε is said to be an instance of the poetic use of the imperative for the optative: ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἡτο ἀείδειν ἕν συνήθειαν λαμβάνει [i.e. Homer] τὰ προστατικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν.

τῆς δὲ λέξεως κτέ. This whole chapter has been condemned by Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry. Aristotle's divisions, however, are not always the same as ours, as his relegation of the theory of the simple sounds in language to 'metric' in the De Partibus (2. 16, 660 a 7) is enough to prove. The writer of the chapter takes the same view of the simple sounds, and tells us that they need not be discussed at any length in a book like the Poetics. The main difficulty, accordingly, is in his assumption that in some way or other the other 'parts of speech' come within the scope of a work on poetry. He may perhaps have thought that some analysis of language in general was logically required as a preparation for the theory of poetical language in the next two chapters, which are unquestionably germane to the main subject of the book. And apart from this one has to remember the historical connexion between grammar and poetry in Greek antiquity. Grammar seems to have originated in Greece in the criticism and interpretation of poetry; its relation to poetry was felt and acknowledged even in the time of Dionysius Thrax, who begins his treatise with the definition, γραμματικὴ ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιητῶς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων (p. 5 Uhlig). That certain matters of grammar come under the cognizance of poetry is implied apparently in De interpr. 4, 17 b 5, when a distinction is made between the logical and the extra-logical
forms of statement: οί μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι] ἀφεῖσθωσαν 1456b 20

\[\text{\textit{aptos}}, \text{\textit{taken as a whole}}, \text{as opposed to the parts into which it may be divided}; \text{comp. Meteor. 4.1, 379b 5 η θάλασσα κατὰ μέρος μὲν διαιρομένη τάχα σφίστας}, \text{aptasa} \text{δ}' οὐ.—Plato Theae. 147 ε τῶν ἄρθρων πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν.—Gorg. 502c c οἱ τῶν περιέ-

\[\text{λουτο} \text{τῆς} \text{ποιήσεως} \text{πάσης} \text{τὸ} \text{τε} \text{μέλος κτέ.—Laws} 737 ε \text{δόο} \text{μέρη} \text{τού} \text{παντὸς} \text{ἄρθρων.} \text{The Latin omnis is used in just the same way in}

\[\text{Caesar B. G. 1. 1 Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.}

\[\text{τὰ μέρη.} \text{Aristotle's μέρη τῆς λέξεως is an anticipation of our}

\[\text{'parts of speech'; but the term covers more ground; his list of}

\[\text{μέρη comprises three distinct kinds of 'parts': (1) the elements}

\[\text{into which words are analyzable (στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή); (2) the}

\[\text{various kinds of words (σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, etc.); and (3) the λόγος—}

\[\text{the actual λέξεις being a series of λόγοι.} \text{It includes, therefore,}

\[\text{all the elements of language in every stage of analysis, from the}

\[\text{simplest sounds to the proposition.} \text{It is only under the second}

\[\text{of the above heads, i.e. in his classification of words, that Aristotle}

\[\text{deals with the 'parts of speech' of later grammar. This passage is}

\[\text{cited by Ammonius on the De Interpretatione: λόγοι μὲν ταῦτα}

\[\text{[i.e. articles, conjunctions, etc.] οὕ μέρη, λέξεως δὲ μέρη, ἃς καὶ ὃ}

\[\text{λόγος αὐτὸς μέρος, καθάπερ εἰν τοῖς Περὶ ποιητικῆς εἰμηται (p. 12}

\[\text{Busse); and there is more than one reference to it in Boethius on}

\[\text{the same book:} \text{Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scripsit locutionis}

\[\text{partes esse syllabas vel etiam conjunctiones tradidit (2, p. 6 Meiser).}

\[\text{In opere vero de poetica non codem modo dividit locutionem, sed}

\[\text{omnes omnino locutionis partes adposuit, confirmans esse locutionis}

\[\text{partes elementa syllabas conjunctiones articulos nominas casus verba}
orationes. locutio namque non in solis significativis vocibus constat, sed supergradiens significations vocum ad articulatos sonos usque consistit (2, p. 8).

The classification before us which distinguishes words into σύνδεσμοι, ἀφθα, ὑσματα, ρήματα and πτώσεις, is an advance on that in the lost Aristotelian work known as the τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγῆ (fr. 127 Teubn.), which recognized only three kinds of words, ὑσματα, ρήματα, and σύνδεσμοι. This lost book is mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quinilius in their sketches of the history of the ‘parts of speech’; but they both ignore the present chapter of the Poetics. The omission, instead of justifying Ritter’s athetesis of the chapter, merely shows that the Poetics were but little read in certain periods of antiquity.

That the word has to be transposed is shown by the position of the explanation in the following statement about it (1457 a 6).

stoicheion: comp. Metaph. Δ 3, 1014 a 26 στοιχεῖον λέγεται εἷς τῶν σύγκειται πρώτον ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαμέτρου τῷ εἴδει εἰς ἄλλο εἴδος. οὗτον φωνής στοιχεία εἷς ἐν σύγκειται ἡ φωνή καὶ εἰς ἀδιαμέτρο εἴσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνάς ἐτέρας τῷ εἴδει αὐτῶν. στοιχεῖον was properly a letter of the alphabet; it was Plato (v. Eudemus ap. Simplic. in Phys. 1 p. 7. 13 Diels) who gave it the philosophical sense of ‘element’, which it so often has in Aristotle. The present definition shows the influence of the philosophical associations connected with the word; a στοιχεῖον is defined as an indivisible voice-sound capable of serving as a constituent, or element, in an intelligible voice-sound (συνετή φωνή). In thus describing it as a ‘sound’ Aristotle implicitly distinguishes it from the γράμμα, or written symbol which stands for the sound (comp. Metaph. B 4, 1000 a 2); the distinction, however, is very far from being generally observed in Aristotle (see Diels, Elementum p. 33). The two terms are treated as synonyms in Plato Crat. 426 d.

συνετή. The alternative reading συνθετή has been accepted by several editors, as also by Steinthal (Gesch. d. Sprachwissenschaft 1 p. 253) and Diels (Elementum p. 33). The main argument in favour of συνθετή is that, as defined in b 34, the syllable is a φωνή συνθετή, and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (Bon. Ind. 702 b 39) as a synthesis of στοιχεία. This is true enough. But it has to be remembered on the other side that Aristotle often speaks of the στοιχεία as στοιχεία φωνής (Bon. Ind.
20. 1456 b 20-25

702 b 35)—where φωνή means the same thing as the συνετή φωνή of the present passage. And if we assume συνετή to be the original reading, the excepting clause (οὐ πᾶσα δὲ κτέ.), which puts the ‘indivisible sounds’ of the brutes into a different category, is irrelevant. Aristotle’s argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these ‘noises’ of theirs are directly significant in themselves (De interpr. 2, 16 a 29); they are not στοιχεῖα φωνῆς, because they do not combine as elements to form a φωνή συνετή. The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human speech exist as elements in speech, and they have no meaning in themselves; the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions—not in the ‘elements’ which analysis reveals in them (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 3 p. 220). φωνή συνετή is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term ‘word’. It may be taken as including not only the φωνή σημαντική, the word that stands for something, but also the φωνή ἀσημικός—words like ἂμφι, περὶ, μέν, δὲ, etc. (Aristotle’s ἀρθρα and σύνδεσμοι), which stand for nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech.

ταύτης δὲ μέρη κτ.: Plato Crat. 424 C ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὗτος δὲ 25 πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήντα διελέσθαι, ἐπειτα τῶν ἐπέρων κατὰ εἴδη τὰ τε ᾠνά καὶ ἄφθογγα οὕτως γάρ ποιοῦσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ τὰ αὐτοὶ φωνήντα μὲν οὐ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα;—Phil. 18 b ἐπειδῆ φωνὴν ἄπερων κατενόησεν ἐπεὶ τις θεὸς ἐπεὶ καὶ θείος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Δηλάπτῳ Θείῳ τινα τούτον γενέσθαι λέγων, δὲ πρῶτος τὰ φωνήντα ἐν τῷ ἄπερῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν οὕτω ἄλλα πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἐπέρα φωνῆ μὲν οὐ, φθόγγον δὲ μετέχοντα τυνός, ἄρθρον δὲ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι τρίτον δὲ ἐδώξαν γραμμάτων διεστίσαστο τὰ νῦν λαγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν τὸ μέτα τοῦτο διήρεσε τὰ τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνός ἐκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἄρθρον αὐτὸν λαβὼν ἐνὶ τε ἐκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπισταίνασθε. Here Plato’s μέσα are Aristotle’s ἡμίφωνα. In later theory the ἡμίφωνα and ἄφωνα of Aristotle come under the more general designation of ‘consonants’, σύμφωνα: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. i. 100 τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν [scil. τῶν στοιχείων] φωνάντα προσαγορεύονται τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ φωνάντα μὲν ἐπτά, α. ε. ι. ο. ο. σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπά . . . 102 τῶν δὲ συμφώνων τὰ μὲν ἡμίφωνα ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα.

φωνήν. The word had been already used by Euripides, fr. 578 ed. Nauck ἄφωνα φωνήντα συλλαβᾶς τιθεῖσι ἐξήφορον ἀνθρώποις
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1456 b 25 γράμματ' ειδέναι. It may be observed that both Plato (Theaet. 203 b) and Aristotle (Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 13) recognize the vowels as being seven in number.

b 26 ἀνευ προσβολῆς: the opposite of μετὰ προσβολῆς in the next line. The difference between the vowels and consonants is that the latter imply a certain προσβολή as the condition of their becoming audible, whereas no such προσβολή is required to make the vowels audible. The sense of the word προσβολή as here used is far from clear. It has been taken to mean additio (Valla), adiectio (Paccius), ictus (Victorius), percussio (Robortello), and allitus (Goulston); Castelvetro, who renders it by percossa, confesses that he does not know what it means. The idea of most interpreters is that the term refers in some way or other to the physical mechanism of speech; to the impact of the tongue, for instance, on the parts within the mouth, or something of that sort. Twining, who translates it by articulation (with Batteux), tells us in a note that it is "literally percussion: i.e. of the tongue against the palate or teeth, the lips against the teeth or against each other, and all other modes of consonant articulation". In support of this physiological interpretation Vahlen (Beitr. 3 p. 224) quotes De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 2 ὁ λόγος ὁ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων σύγκειται, τῆς δὲ γλώττης μὴ τοιαύτης οὔς, μηδὲ τῶν χειλῶν ὕψων οὔκ ἂν ἦν φθέγγεσθαι τὰ πλείστα τῶν γραμμάτων τὰ μὲν γάρ τῆς γλώττης εἰσὶ προσβολαί, τὰ δὲ συμβολαὶ τῶν χειλῶν; and argues to show that προσβολή may be used here in a sense wide enough to include the συμβολή τῶν χειλῶν, as well as the προσβολή τῆς γλώττης, of the De Partibus. This view, however, is open to more than one objection. (1) It is hard to see how, in the absence of some explanation in the context, προσβολή can stand for προσβολή γλώττης, or can be taken to include the notion of συμβολή χειλῶν. (2) Such a reference to the physiology of articulation would be out of place in the definition; the differences in the mechanism of articulation are a separate point, which Aristotle recognizes apparently for the first time in another section further on in the chapter (b 31 παῦτα δὲ διαφέρει συχέμασι τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τῶν). I think that Valla was probably right in taking προσβολή in the sense of additio or adiectio, i.e. as equivalent to προσθήκη—the word actually used by Lucian in a very similar context to mark the distinction between the vowels and semivowels (Iud. Voc. 5, 88 R.). It may be observed, too, that προσβάλλειν and προστιθέναι are synonyms in Antiphanes fr. 206 Kock. The general
sense, then, according to this view of προσβολή, will be that the
vowels are audible by themselves (ἀνευ προσβολῆς); whereas the
semivowels and mutes (the consonants) require the support or
addition of a vowel (μετὰ προσβολῆς) to make them audible. This
was certainly the distinction in later grammar: Dionysius Thrax
p. 11 Uhlig σύμφωνα δὲ λέγονται ὅτι αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτά φωνῆς
οὐκ ἔχει, συντασσόμενα δὲ μετὰ τῶν φωνήστων φωνῆς ἀποτελεῖ—
Sexius Emp. Adv. math. i. 102 ἄφωνα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ... μετὰ τῶν
ἀλλῶν συνεκφωνοῦμεν.—Diomedes 418 P. mutae dictae quod per se
sine adomin culo vocalium non possunt enuntiari.

Ημίφωνα: Aristoxenus (quoted below).—Dionysius Thrax p. 12
Uhlig ημίφωνα δὲ λέγεται [ὅτι] παρόσον ἦττον τῶν φωνήστων εἴφωνα
i. 102 ημίφωνα μὲν δόσα δὲ αὐτῶν ροῖον ἢ συνμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τινα
παραπλησίων ἄχον κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν ἀποτελεῖν περιφότα.—
Diomedes 416 P. Semivocales dictae quod dimidium eius potestatis
habent: etenim per se enuntiatur, sed per se nec syllabam nec plenam
vocem faciunt. Plato only knows the semivowels as τὰ μέσα
(v. supra on b 24).

ἔχον φωνῆς ἀκοιντὴν. Apart from the vowels the semivowels
have some sort of sound as noises, not a distinctly audible voice-
sound (φωνῆ ἀκοιντῆ) like the vowels; this it is that distinguishes
them from the mutes, which have no sound at all by themselves.
Comp. Plato Theaet. 203 b τὸ τε σῆμα τῶν ἄφωνων ἐστὶ, ψόφος
tis μόνον οἷον σπερματοῦσας τῆς γλώττης τοῦ δ’ αὐτ’ ὑπὲ φωνῆς
οὕτε ψόφος, οὔτε τῶν πλείωτων στοιχείων.—Aristoxenus ap. Dion.
Hal. 5 p. 72 R. τῶν μὴ φωνήστων δ’ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ψόφους ὀσίους
ἄτι τινας ἀποτελεῖν πέρικε, ροίον ἢ συγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τοιούτων τινῶν
ἄλλων ἄχον ὄρατοικοι, δ’ ἐστὶν ἀπάνθισεν ᾧμορα φωνῆς καὶ ψόφου,
καὶ οὔτ’ οὐ τῇ ἁκοιντῇ καθ’ ἑαυτά’ διὸ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν ἄφωνα τινα
ἐκάλεσαν, θάτερα δὲ ημίφωνα.

ἄφωνον. In the definition μετὰ προσβολῆς serves to distinguish
the mute from the vowel; the idea of it, however, is repeated in
a more explicit form in μετὰ τῶν ἐχόντων τῶν φωνῆς. The
expression τῶν ἔχοντων τινά φωνῆς is wide enough to include the
semivowels as well as the vowels. The semivowels are audible by
themselves, though only as noises (comp. Plato Phileb. 18 c ἂτερα
φωνῆς μὲν οὗ, φθόγγον δὲ μετέχοντα τινῶς); and a semivowel is
sufficient to make a mute audible, though only as a noise—not
as a φωνῆ ἀκοιντῆ. Aristotle carefully chooses his words, therefore,
in saying γνωμένου ἀκοιντῶν; since ἔχον φωνῆς ἀκοιντῆ, 'with
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1456 b 28 an audible voice-sound', would have been true only of the combination of a mute and a vowel.

31 ταύτα δε διαφέρει. Of the five differences here noted the first and second relate to the physiological mechanism of speech; the remainder come under the head of προφυσία—a term which with the ancients included breathing and accent, as well as quantity (see on 25, 1461 a 22).

σχήμασιν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόπων. Plato (Tim. 75 d) is aware of the function of the teeth, lips, and tongue in the formation of speech, and has also described (Crat. 426 ε) the various movements of the tongue in the utterance of certain letters (comp. Xenophon Mem. 1. 4, 12). From Alexander’s comment on Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 23 (p. 883 Hayduck) we learn that these points in the physiology of speech had long before this engaged the attention of Archinus, the statesman to whom Athens owed the introduction of the Ionic alphabet in 403 (see Usener, Rh. Mus. 25 p. 591).

For the σχήμα τοῦ στόματος comp. De audib. 800 a 16 ἀναπνέουμεν δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀέρα πάντες τῶν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸς φωνᾶς ἐκπέμπτομεν ἄλλοις διὰ τῶν ὄντοκειμένων ἀγγείων διαφοράς . . . ταύτα δὲ ἕστων ἢ τε ἀρτηρία [i.e. wind-pipe] καὶ δὲ πνεύμων καὶ τὸ στόμα. πλεώταν μὲν δὲν διαφορὰν ἀπεργάζονται τῆς φωνῆς αἱ τε τοῦ ἀέρος πληγαὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ ἱστόματος σχηματισμοὶ.

For the τόπων τοῦ στόματος as factors in articulation see more especially H. A. 4. 9, 535 a 28; De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 1; 3. 1, 661 b 14; and Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 23 (with Alexander’s note).

32 δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι . . . καὶ τῷ μέσῳ. The καί τῷ μέσῳ in the next line belongs equally to each of the three pairs of opposites, and not merely to the last of them.

The meaning of δασύτησις and ψιλότης in speech may be seen from De audib. 804 b 8 δασεῖται δ’ εἰς τῶν φωνῶν οὐκαίς ἐσθωθεν τὸ πνεῦμα εὐθέως συνεβάλλομεν μετά τῶν φθόγγων, ψιλαῖ δ’ εἰς τοῦναττόν οὐκαίς γίνονται χωρίς τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκβολῆς; and from Dion. Hal. 5 p. 85 R. ταύτα [i.e. τὰ ψιλά] μὲν γὰρ τὴν έαυτῶν δύναμιν ἔχει μόνην, τὰ δὲ δασία καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προσθήκην. ψιλός, ‘without addition’ (see on 1, 1447 a 29), means in this connexion ‘without aspiration’. The threefold distinction in the text, as applied to the mutes, passed on to the grammarians, and became an accepted part of grammar (comp. Dion. Thrax p. 12 τούτων [scil. τῶν ἀδύφων] ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, κῦ ῆ, δασέα δὲ τρία, δither φ Χ, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, βγ δ’ μέσα δὲ εἴρηται ότι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστὶ δασύτηρα, τῶν δὲ δασίων ψιλότερα, and Priscian 549 P.) and it still appears in our familiar
division of mutes into aspiratae, mediae, and teneues—where the teneues represent the πυλα of the Greeks.¹

μήκει καὶ βραχυτὴτι. The intermediates (μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels a, i, u: Dion. Thrax p. 10 τὸν δὲ φωνητὸν μακρὰ μὲν ἐστὶ δύο, ἤ καὶ ὁ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, ἐ καὶ ὁ, δίχρονα δὲ τρία, ᾧ ἤ ἥ δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἔτει ἐκτείνεται καὶ συντελεῖται.—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. I. 100 τῶν δὲ φωνητῶν τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφοράς: δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγονται τυγ-
χάνειν, τὸ ἤ καὶ τὸ ὁ, ἵσαρμια δὲ βραχέα, τὸ ἐ καὶ τὸ ὁ, τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, ἐ ᾧ ἤ ἥ ἀπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικὰ καλοῦσιν ἐκατον γὰρ αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὧτε μὲν ἐκτείνεταὶ ὧτε δὲ συντελεῖται (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R., and Aulus Gellius 16. 18. 5).

δέρτητι καὶ βραχύτητι. A third kind of difference is to be seen in the differences of accent. Accent with Aristotle is a part of προσῳδία (see on b 31), but he has no special name for it; the word τῶν in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 29 relates to the tone or key in which something may be said, and not, as is sometimes supposed (e. g. by Cope), to the syllabic accent in words. Aristotle’s intermediate accent is clearly that conventionally indicated by a circumflex, as standing between the acute and grave, and having thus something of the nature of both. This was the received view of the phonetic value of the ‘circumflex’ in antiquity, though the names by which it was known referred to the form of the mark rather than the nature of the accent itself; comp. the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 531 Keil Ammonius Alexandrius qui Aristarchi scholae successit δεῖβαρν vocat, Ephorus autem Cymaeus περιστάσιν, Dionysius Olympos [read: Olynthius] διστον, Hermocrates Iasius σύμπλεκτον, Epicharmus Syracusius κεκλασμένον; verum ea nunc ab omnibus περιστώμενη Graece vocatur, apud nos flexa, quoniam primo erecia rursus in graven flexituir. For further illustrations of the notion of the circumflex in antiquity see Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fragmenta p. 13, and Wilmanns, De Varronis libris grammaticis p. 187. It is to be observed that (like Plato Crat. 399 a) Aristotle ignores the circumflex in the passage in Soph. el. 23, 179 a 14 ἐ παρὰ προσῳδίαν δέξειν [scil. ὥ λόγος ἐστί], ἡ βαρέια προσῳδία λύσεις.

¹ This technical use of teneus may be traced back to Lascaris, who naturalized it among the moderns; but it is not easy to see how Lascaris came by it. He may possibly have remembered the language of the pseudo-Sergius 4 p. 526 Keil: Crassitudo [i.e. δαόνη] in spirite est... nam omnes voces au. aspirando facimus pinguiores aut sine aspiratu pronuntiando teneues.]
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1456 b 33 ei δὲ παρὰ βαρεῖαν, ἢ ἰεία, and speaks as though the only substantial difference in accent were that between acute and grave. His view of it in fact was probably very like that ascribed to the Peripatetic Athenodorus in the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 529 Keil Athenodorus duas esse prosodias putavit, unam inferiorem, alteram superiorem; flexam autem (nam nostra lingua περαστομένη vocamus) nihil alid esse quam has duas in una syllaba.

b 34 [ίν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς: comp. infra b 38. The preposition has to be bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by Aristotle himself (comp. Bergh, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753). He leaves the subject to the μετρικοῖ, just as he does in the parallel in De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 7 ποιάς δὲ ταύτα [scil. τὰ γράμματα] καὶ πόσας καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, δὲι πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν. The theory of metre, in its primitive form, took cognizance of many matters which we should relegate to grammar or phonology. It started, like grammar, with the στοιχεία or elementary sounds in language (Longinus Proli. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf. τοῦ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοί πολλαχῶς ἐξέστησα, οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόλευον); and, as the passage in the De Partibus intimates (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R.), it dealt with the whole question of the number and nature of these elements.

συλλαβὴ. As here defined a συλλαβὴ is a combination of a mute and a 'letter with a sound', i.e. either a vowel or a semivowel (see on b 28), to make the mute audible. An instance of the first combination is BA (see Metaph. Z 17, 1041 b 13); of the second ΓΠ (comp. Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 22), where the Γ becomes audible at any rate as part of a complex 'noise'. In the further combination ΓΠΑ we have an articulate, as well as an audible, sound—a φωνὴ ἀκοντιστὴ, not a mere ἀκοντιστῶν. Aristotle, however, does not stop to note the difference. The meaning given to συλλαβὴ in the Aristotelian definition is apparently the proper technical sense of the term: Dionysius Thrax p. 16 Uhlig συλλαβὴ ἐτεί κυρίως σύλλαβὴς συμφωνῶν μετὰ φωνῆτων ἢ φωνητῶν, οἷον καρ, βοὺς· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἢ ἤ ἤ ἤν ἤνοι φωνητῶν, οἷον ὅ, ἤ (see also Charisius 2 P., and Marius Victorinus 2470—5 P.). In ordinary speech, however, the term was often used to denote the units of sound or 'syllables' (as we say) into which a word, a foot, or a verse is divisible. Plato, for instance, speaks of ΣΩ as the 'first syllable' in Socrates (Theaet. 203 c), and of words as 'made up of syllables' (Crat. 424 e συλλαβᾶς συνιθέντες, ἢ δὲν τὰ τε νόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συνιθέντα); words also like ἄᾳ and ἅᾳ etc. were said to
be disyllables, trisyllables, etc. Aristotle has lapsed into this use of the term even in the Poetics, in 21, 1458\(^a\) 2, where the \(a\) in \(Πηληκαὶδὲω\) is regarded as a \(συλλαβή\) \(ἐμβεβλημένη\) (see note on the passage); and it is by no means uncommon in other Aristotelian writings; see Cat. 6, 4\(^b\) 33; De interpr. 4, 16\(^b\) 31; De gen. an. 1. 18, 722\(^a\) 32; Metaph. N 6, 1093\(^b\) 11; Rhet. 3. 2, 1405\(^a\) 31 (comp. Bon. Ind. 710\(^b\) 45; and for the general history of the term Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 126).

It is to be observed that Aristotle ignores the \(φωναὶ\) \(συνθεταί\) called diphthongs; for the ancient view of them see Blass, Aussprache\(^b\) p. 20.

\(φωνὴ\) \(εξοντος\) includes the semivowel as well as the vowel (see \(b\) 35 on \(b\) 28).

καὶ \(γάρ\) τὸ \(ΓΡ\) \(ἄνευ\) τοῦ \(Λ\) = τὸ \(γάρ\) \(ΓΡ\) καὶ \(ἄνευ\) τοῦ \(Λ\).

\(τῆς\) \(μετρικῆς\): see on \(b\) 34. As the foot is made up of syllables, the theory of the \(συλλαβή\) belonged to metre just as much as to grammar: Aristides Quintil. 1. 20, p. 28 Jahn \(αρχὴ\) \(μὲν\) \(οὖν\) \(ἡ\) \(τῆς\) \(μετρικῆς\) \(ὁ\) \(περὶ\) \(στοιχείων\) \(λόγος\), \(εἴθο\) \(ὁ\) \(περὶ\) \(συλλαβῆς\), \(εἴθο\) \(ὁ\) \(περὶ\) \(τοῦ\) \(διδό\), \(εἴθο\) \(οὔ\) \(τοῖς\) \(ὁ\) \(περὶ\) \(μέτρων\).—Longinus Proiol. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf. τὸ \(δὲ\) \(περὶ\) \(μέτρων\) \(λόγου\) \(πολλοὶ\) \(πολλαχῶς\) \(ηρεμάντο\), \(οἱ\) \(μὲν\) \(ἄπο\) \(στοιχείων\), \(ὡς\) \(Φιλόδηνος\), \(οἱ\) \(δὲ\) \(ἀπὸ\) \(τοῦ\) \(μέτρου\) \(ἀρνοῦ\), \(ὡς\) \(Ηλιάδωρος\), \(ἡμεῖς\) \(δὲ\) \(Ἡφαιστίωνι\) \(κατακολούθησομεν\) \(ἄπο\) \(συλλαβῆς\) \(ἀρκάμενοι\). By \(τοὺθ\) \(τὰ\) \(διαφόρα\) Aristotle probably meant not only the familiar distinction of syllables into long and short, but also the finer differences the ancient theory of rhythmic recognized in the times of syllables, when the time of the consonant or consonants in them is taken into account (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.\(^b\) 1. 1 p. 300).

\(σύνδεσμος\). The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the \(ἀρθρον\)) is confessedly corrupt. Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp. Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft\(^b\) 1 p. 263); and Vahlen, besides bracketing \(η\) \(φωνη—μέσου\) in 1457\(^a\) 8–10, has to assume two lacunas, one after \(συντιθέσθαι\) in 1457\(^a\) 2, and another after \(δηλοι\) in 1457\(^a\) 7.

At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are \(φωναὶ\) \(ἀσημοι\), and others \(φωναὶ\) \(σημαντικαί\); these latter being the nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The \(σύνδεσμοι\) and \(ἀρθρα\), however, are said to be \(φωναὶ\) \(ἀσημοι\); i.e., they convey no meaning when
uttered by themselves. If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex \( \phiων\ ν\ σημαντική \), called a \( \lambdaόγος \) a little further on in the chapter (1457 \textsuperscript{a} 23). It is necessary, therefore, to go back to his idea of \( \lambdaόγος \), and consider the various forms of \( \lambdaόγοι \) which he either recognizes or may be presumed to have recognized. \( \lambdaόγος \) in the present sense of the term has no exact English equivalent, though 'speech', 'discourse', or 'phrase' is sometimes conventionally made to stand for it. According to the definition in 1457 \textsuperscript{a} 23 it is a significant combination of significant words, e.g. of two (or more) nouns, or verbs (including what Aristotle would call their \( \piτών \), or of a verb and a noun, or of a noun and a verb. A \( \lambdaόγος \), in Aristotle's sense of the term, does not necessarily involve predication. The instance he gives in 1457 \textsuperscript{a} 25 of a non-predicative \( \lambdaόγος \) is a definition, that of 'man', e.g. \( \zeta\phiων\ πε\zeta\ον\ δι\πον\)—where the combination of the three nouns is equivalent to 'man', and may replace it as one of the terms of a proposition. This form of \( \lambdaόγος \) is the \( \lambdaόγος\ δνοματώδης \) of An. post. 2, 10, 93 \textsuperscript{b} 31. Under this same head we may include certain other forms of expression, e.g. \( \beta\alpha\delta\ι\ζε\i\i\i\i\ ι\αιρον \) (a combination of two verbs), and \( \omegaι\κ\omegaι\ νή\σον \) (a verb + a noun). A more complex instance of the same type would be a combination like of \'Αθηναίοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where the terms are combined into one by the copulative, and \( \omegaι\κ\ωι\ περ\ δυ\σ\μάς \), where the terms are hyphenated together by the preposition \textsuperscript{1} (comp. Hartung, Lehren der Allen über die Dichtkunst p. 284). The other form of \( \lambdaόγος \) is that which involves predication—the \( \lambdaόγος\ \alpha\ποφαντικός \) of the De Interpretatione (4. 17 \textsuperscript{a} 2 seqq.). If we may work out the hint in De Interpretatione 5, 17 \textsuperscript{a} 20, we may divide the \( \lambdaόγοι \) of this description into two kinds, the simple and the composite, and take the example in 1457 \textsuperscript{a} 28, \( \Κ\λέ\ων\ \beta\α\δ\ι\ζε\i\i\i\i \), as the type of the simple predicational \( \lambdaόγος \). It is not so easy to find an Aristotelian instance of the composite predicational \( \lambdaόγος \); but its nature is indicated in general terms in the passage in the De Interpretatione: it consists of two or more simple predicational \( \lambdaόγοι \) combined in some way or

\textsuperscript{1} With the Stoic grammarians the prepositions were classed originally under the \( \σύνδεσμοι \), and afterwards distinguished from the others as \( \προθετικοι\ \sigmaύνδεσμοι \).
other into one single λόγος. How, then, and by means of what kinds of words is this combination effected? The De Interpretatione ignores this question. We may perhaps supply the omission, however, by reflecting for a moment on the structure of complex sentences and observing the different relations of the parts or members to the whole. In some instances the simple λόγοι ἀποφαντικοὶ are merely co-ordinated, and held together by copulative or similar conjunctions, as in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται, Κλέων μὲν βαδίζει Σωκράτης δὲ κάθηται, Κλέων βαδίζει ἄλλα Σωκράτης κάθηται (comp. σύνδεσμον εἰς in 1457 a 30); in others they are subordinated to one another, and form a sort of organic whole knit into one by words which indicate relation and interdependence. This last point in the theory of the λόγος would have to be recognized in any grammatical analysis of the sentence and its construction. I venture to suggest that it may have been actually present in Aristotle's mind at the time of framing his definitions of σύνδεσμος and ἀρθρον, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:—

σύνδεσμος δὲ ἐστι φωνῆ ἀσημος, ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνῆ μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν περικείσθαι συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων], ἢν μὴ ἀρμότετο ἐν ἄρχῃ λόγῳ τιθέναι καθ' αὐτόν, οἷον μὲν, δὴ, τοῖς ἐγεῖ. ἢ φωνῆ ἁσημος ἢ ἐκ 5 πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μίας σημαντικῆς δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνῆ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄμφι καὶ τῷ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἀρθρον δὲ ἐστὶ φωνῆ ἁσημος, ἢ λόγου ἄρχῃ ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δὴłoς [οἷον τῷ ἄμφι καὶ τῷ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνῆ ἁσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνῆ μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν], πεφυκια τίθεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἀκροῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων.

The words bracketed after συντίθεσθαι in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after τίθεσθαι in l. 9; and the clause ἢ φωνῆ—φωνῶν in ll. 8—9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of σύνδεσμος in l. 1 (comp. Dünzter, Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194). It will be seen also that the illustration οἷον τῷ ἄμφι—τὰ ἄλλα is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of σύνδεσμος—a view which has been anticipated by Hartung. Two kinds of σύνδεσμον, then, are recognized in the text as amended. The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in a λόγος does not affect
the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if Κλέων and βαδίζει are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition Κλέων βαδίζει is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a μέν, a δέ, a δή, or a τάλ. Little words of this description are what the grammarians called 'expletives'. Though they stand at the beginning of the λόγος, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not per se (καθ' αὐτόν), but per accidens, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other λόγος before or after it. In contradistinction to these Aristotle recognizes a second species of σύνδεσμος (l. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the λόγος into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of λόγος, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjunctions. Aristotle's σύνδεσμος, therefore, whatever else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjunction, and also certain particles. The sense of the word ἄρθρον is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of connexive required for a particular kind of λόγος. The kind of λόγος Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the ἄρθρον in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a λόγος may be assumed to be a composite proposition, and moreover one of a more complex form than that in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτῃς κάθηται and the like. The two constituent propositions in it are either intimately connected by being related in such a way that the one is the beginning and the other the end of the whole; or they are in some way divided or separated one from the other. With this we may compare the definition of the 'period' in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 Α 35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξειν ἔχουσαν ἀρχήν καὶ τελευτήν αὐτῆν καθ’ αὐτήν καὶ μέγεθος εὐθυνόπτον. As a conjectural interpretation of this statement it may be suggested (1) that the ἄρθρα which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjunctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjunctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives. The kinds of proposition which involve the use of such words as these are ignored in Aristotle's logical writings, but it seems to me that he may very well have had something to say of them in an analysis like that
in the present chapter of the forms and constituents of ordinary speech. I am not unaware of the lacunas that may be found in this interpretation of the Aristotelian ἀρθρον. It must be taken for what it is worth, and with many allowances, as an attempt to recover the rough draft of an ali but lost chapter of early grammar. For a discussion of the textual and other difficulties in these two sections I may refer to Vahlen's Beiträge, 3 p. 229 and 306, and Schömann's Animadversiones ad veterum grammaticorum doctrinam de articulo (Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V p. 5).

Both σύνδεσμος and ἀρθρον were terms taken by grammar from anatomy (see on 7, 1450b34); the former is properly a 'ligament', and the latter a 'joint'. The language in the text as to the function of the ἀρθρον or joint-word, ἦ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἡ τέλος ... ἐν δηλοῖ, recalls that in the passage in De anima 3. 10, 433b21, which describes the physical joint as the means of locomotion in the animal: τὸ δὲ κινῶν ὄργανως, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή τὸ αὐτό, ὅτι ὁ γαγγυλομός ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ κάλου τὸ μὲν τελευτή τὸ δ' ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἅρμας δὲ κυρτοῦ), λόγῳ μὲν ἑτέρα ὄντα μεγέθει δ' ἀρχώμενα (comp. J. of Phil. 17 p. 64). The joint-word in grammar, therefore, would naturally imply a more structural and organic connexion than is to be found when the λόγου are simply strung together by σύνδεσμοι. I should add that the instances of σύνδεσμοι in Rhet. 3. 5, 1407a20 are μὲν and δ', together with γὰρ, τέ, καί, and apparently ἐπεί [? ἐπὶ]; and that a distinction not unlike that in the text between the two kinds of σύνδεσμοι is implied in Probl. 16. 20, 919a22 ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐνώσεν ἐξαιρεθέντων συνδέσμοιν οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ λόγος Ελληνικός, ὅτι τὸ τέ καὶ τὸ καί, ἐνοι δὲ οὕθεν λυποῦσι διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρήσθαι πολλάκις, εἰ ἐστι καὶ λόγος, τοὺς δὲ μή.

κολύει, scil. ποιεῖσθαι.

φωνῆν: i.e. φωνῶν σημαντικών.

λόγου. The term is explained in a 23. Aristotle is using it without explanation, as though it were a familiar and well-understood word. Just before this (in a 1) he employed the periphrasis φωνῆς μία σημαντικῆ in lieu of it.

καθ' αὐτόν is to be taken with λόγου (comp. Top. 8. 11, 161b19).

The λόγος as such is tactily distinguished from the λόγος as brought into relation with some other λόγος by the insertion of a word which is no integral part of it per se. καθ' αὐτὸ is the opposite of πρὸς ἔτερον or κατὰ συμβεβηκός (Bon. Ind. 212a3).

διορισμὸς seems to mean here 'separation' or 'disjunction', a 7.
metaphorical extension of the sense it has in the De Partibus: 3. 10, 672 b 14 τον διαραμοιον χαριν ἐστι (scil. το διάζωμα) του τε περὶ την κουλιαν τόπου και του περὶ την καρδιαν.

In this definition συμβετή differentiates the ὅνομα from the στοιχεῖον, σημαντική from the ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος, ἀνευ χρώνον from the ῥῆμα, and what remains (.getSharedPreferences κτε.) from the λόγος. In a λόγος (ἐ.δ. τετον δίπου, or Κλέων βαδίζει) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an ὅνομα, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter; Ἐπωδώρος for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift: De interpr. 2, 16 a 19 ὅνομα μὲν ὃν ἐστι φωνή σημαντική κατὰ συνβήκην ἀνευ χρώνου, ἢς μορφεῖς ἐστί σημαντικῶν κεχορομένων ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος ὀδέν αὐτῷ καθ’ έαυτό σημαίνει, ὅσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἱππός.

The general term ὅνομα must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the ἄρθρα. A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an ὅνομα, as it is for instance in 21, 1457 b 25; 22, 1458 b 20; 25, 1461 a 31; comp. De interpr. 3, 16 b 19 αὐτὰ μὲν ὃν καθ’ ἐαυτὰ λέγομεν ὅνοματα ἐστὶ [scil. τὰ ῥῆματα] καὶ σημαίνει τι (ὑπηρετ. γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἤρέμμησεν), ἀλλ’ εἶ ἐστὶν ἡ μὴ ὀνύμω σημαίνει. It is a ῥῆμα proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.

οὗ χρώμεθα: comp. 21, 1457 a 33 πλῆν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὅνωματι σημαίνετο. The construction in the clause may be seen from Vahlen's paraphrase, ἐν τοῖς διπλοῖς οὗ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἡγουμένοι καὶ αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ σημαίνειν. The participial ὃς καὶ αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ σημαίνον is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448 a 37 and 26, 1462 a 10.

τῷ Θεοδώρῳ: i.e. 'the word Θεοδώρος'; comp. infra a 28 δ Ἐκλέων, 'the word Ἐκλέων'—Plato Crat. 392 γ τῶν 'Ἀστυνάκτα, 'the name Astyanax'; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on Cicero De Oratore 2, 193. In the De interpr. we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative, ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος.
to δώρον: i.e. the word δώρον implied in Θεόδωρος. As the parallel in the De interpr. is ἐν τῷ Κάλλιπποσ τὸ ἔπος οὐδὲν αὐτῷ καθ’ έαυτό σημαίνει, it has been proposed to restore here τὸ δώρος for τὸ δώρον. The two cases, however, as Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since δώρος does not exist as a separate word, as ἔπος does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning (οὐ σημαίνει).

ῥήμα: De interpr. 3, 16 b 6 ῥήμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσομημαίνον χρόνον, oὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἐστὶν ἄεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημείων. Λέγω δ’ ὅτι προσομημάτωι χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια, μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγίαινε ῥήμα: προσομημαίνει γὰρ τὸ τόν ὑπάρχει ... 16 τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιαίνει οὐ ῥήμα ἄλλα πτῶσεις ῥήματος· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσομημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέρειξ. In this passage (though not in De interpr. 10, 19 b 13) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as πτώσεις, the verb in the logical theory of predication being always in the present (comp. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like Κλέων or Κορίκος is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With Plato, it may be observed, the ῥήμα includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v. Crat. 399 a).

προσομημαίνει. Boethius, In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser, translates this by consignificat, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word συνσημαίνει.

πτώσις, as a term of grammar, has not yet acquired the special sense of ‘case’ which it has in the grammarians; and there is no equivalent for it in our modern terminology. We may perhaps translate it by ‘modification’ or ‘mode’. Given a word, a noun or a verb, with a certain meaning, a πτώσις of it embodies that meaning with some secondary idea superadded. It does not necessarily involve a difference of form; βαδίζει; as a question, is a πτώσις of the affirmative βαδίζει, ‘he walks’, and δώρον as an accusative a πτώσις of δώρον as a nominative. In most instances, however, a πτώσις is distinguished from the original noun or verb by some difference of form, e.g. by a difference of termination. Under the general head of πτώσεως Aristotle includes the following species of words:—

(1) the oblique cases of all nouns, as compared with the nominative, e.g. Φιλόντος etc. from Φιλόν (De interpr. 2, 16 a 33). (2) The nominative also of common nouns; it is a πτώσις through the idea of number which it suggests: thus ἄνθρωπος is ‘a man’, and

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āνθρωπον 'several men' (3) The forms involving a distinction of gender, e.g. οίτος, αὐτή, τοῦτο and the like (Soph. el. 14, 173 b 27). (4) The paronymous adjectives, e.g. χαλκοῦς from χάλκος (Rhet. 3. 9, 1410 a 32), ἀνδρεώς as compared with the substantive ἄνδρα (Rhet. 1. 7, 1364 b 36; Cat. 1, 1 a 14). (5) The comparatives and superlatives as compared with the positive adjectives, e.g. βέλτιστος from ἁγαθός (Top. 5. 7, 136 b 30). (6) The adverbs as compared with the corresponding adjectives, e.g. δικαίως from δίκαιος (Top. 1. 15, 106 b 29; 5. 7, 136 b 15). (7) The past and future tenses of the verb (De interp. 3, 16 b 16); and presumably also the forms embodying distinctions of person, number, voice, etc. To these must be added (8) τὰ ὑποκριτικά, the modifications of sense words may acquire through differences in the mode of enunciation. This synopsis of the different uses of the term in Aristotle may be sufficient to show that πτώσεις with him is a logical rather than a philological conception, and that it is only in certain of its applications that it corresponds to our declension or inflexion or derivation. It is the sense rather than the word itself that is conceived as derivative; a πτώσεις takes its meaning, i.e. the fundamental part of it, from the primary word; and the idea of this latter is involved in any explanation we give of the πτώσεις; Φιλονος for instance means 'of Φίλων', and γραμματικός means 'possessing γραμματική'—both being accordingly πτώσεις, the one of Φίλων and the other of γραμματική. With Aristotle's use of πτώσεις we may compare Varro's equally heterogeneous instances of 'declinatio': a Ierentius Ierentii, ab equo equo, ab homine homunculus, a mamma mammaeae, a prudentia prudens, a pugnando et currendo pugiles et cursores (L. L. 8, 14).

a 21 ἀνθρωπος: Phys. 3. 7, 207 b 8 ἀνθρωπος εἰς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ πολλοί.

a 22 ἐπίταξιν: see on 19, 1456 b 10.

a 23 λόγος. The definition is framed to distinguish a λόγος from an ὄνομα; see above on a 10, and comp. De interp. 4, 16 b 26 λόγος δὲ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντική κατὰ συνθήκην, ὡς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικῶν ἐστι κεχωρισμένων, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οἷς ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δὲ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οἷς ὡς ἐστίν ἢ οἷς ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἕως τι προστήθη. The clause ὡς ἐνα μέρη καθ' αὐτἀ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all λόγοι; the σύνθεσις
and ἄρθρα are φωναὶ ἄσημοι. For the meaning of λόγος and the various forms of λόγοι see on 20, 1456b38 (also Bon. Ind. 433b48).

οὐ γὰρ ἄπας, κτε. An indirect reproof, perhaps, to Plato, who seems to speak as though a λόγος were always in the form of a proposition: Soph. 262 λοικοῖν ἐξ ὄνοματων μὲν μόνον συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, αὐτὸ ἀν ἰδιότητον χωρὶς ὄνοματων λεχθέντων.

οὗ τού ἀνθρωπότων ὄρισμός: e.g. ζωὸν πεξος ἄποιν (Top. 1. 7, 26
103a27) οὐ ζωὸν ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (Top. 5. 2, 130b8).

ἔνδεχεται άνευ ἰδιότητον εἶναι λόγον. This is the λόγος ὄνοματώδης of An. post. 2. 10, 93b31—a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp. De interpr. 11, 21a29). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what Aristotle calls a definition (comp. Metaph. Z 4, 1030a14).

eἰς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος διχως. That a λόγος, in spite of its composite nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in 23 λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνεθῇ κτε. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of λόγοι. A definition (a λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing (ἐν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e.g. Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp. De interpr. 5, 17a16 ὅ ἐν δηλῶν λόγος), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The Iliad is an extreme instance of such a λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of λόγοι, is more than once noticed by Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms: De interpr. 5, 17a8 ἐστι δὲ ἐστὶ πρῶτος [πρῶτος] λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς καταφανεῖς, εἶτα ἀποφανεῖς οἱ δ' ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι ἀποφανικοῖ] πάντες συνεδρζω εἰς . . . ἐστὶ δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὅ ἐν δηλών ἢ συνεδρζω εἰς πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλα καὶ μῆ ἢ οἱ ἀσυνέδετοι.—An. post. 2. 10, 93b35 λόγος δ' εἰς ἐστὶ δικός, ὁ μὲν συνεδρζω, ὑπερ ἦ Ἰλιά, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ ἐν καθ' ἐν δηλών μῆ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—Metaph. H 6, 1045a12 ὅ δ' ὀριζόμενος λόγος ἐστίν εἰς οὖ συνεδρζω καθάπερ ἦ Ἰλιά, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνὸς εἶναι (comp. also Metaph. Z 4, 1030b9).
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1457 a 29 ἐκ πλειώνων, scil. λόγων.

a 31 ἀπλοῦν ... διπλοῦν: see 20, 1457 a 12, and De interpr. 2, 16 a 19 (quoted above on 20, 1457 a 10). In the De Interpretatione (2, 16 a 23) the general term for a compound is συμπεπλεγμένον όνομα.

The Rhetoric has more than one reference to this chapter on the species of names: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 36 ὅπερ ἀπαντᾷ όσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστω εἰπτεὶν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμᾶς; ἀλλ' ὀσα περὶ τοιαύτης ῃώς λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἰρηταί ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικάς.—3. 2, 1404 b 5 τῶν δ' όνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινῶν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τάλλα ὀνόματα ὁσα εἰρηταί ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικάς.

—b 26 ὄντων δ' όνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ δὲ τὸ νόμος συνάστηκε, τῶν δ' όνομάτων τοσαῦτ' ἐχόντων εἰδή όσα τεθεόρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώσσως μὲν καὶ διπλοῦ ὀνόματι καὶ πεποιημένους ὀλγάκες καὶ ὀλγαχοῦ χρηστέον ... τὸ δ' κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορά μόνα χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων λέειν.

The writer of the De Interpretatione has a phrase ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου. Aristotle is probably thinking here of words like ἀρφυλογος, περιβλέπειν, στινόκος, ὑποτος, etc., compounded of a noun or verb (or a πτώσις of the same) and a preposition, which is in his classification a φωνή ἀσήμου.

a 33 μεγαλειώτων is all but identical with the reading in Αε, μεγαλιώων, and simpler than Tyrwhitt’s μεγαλείων ὃς or Vahlen’s μεγαλείων ὃν. A μεγαλειώτων όνομα would be a name that has been ‘made grand’, an exaggerated or amplified name. Though a verb μεγαλείον is not found in extant literature, it is a legitimate derivative from μεγαλείω, which is sometimes used of words (e.g. in Xenophon Mem. 2. 1. 34); and it is presupposed in the LXX. word μεγαλείωμα. After μεγαλειώτων we may supply ὅν = e.g. For similar instances of the omission of ὅν see 25, 1461 a 26; An. pr. 1. 4, 26 a 8; De gen. et corr. 2. 5, 332 b 14; Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 7; Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 38; 3. 6, 1408 a 6 (etc.).

In lieu of μεγαλειώτων (or μεγαλειωτῶν) the Arabic version is said to imply Μασσαλιώτων—a reading which has met with the approval of Diels (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsbl. 1888 p. 53) as well as others. An expression like τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Μασσαλιώτων, however, is certainly not free from difficulty. The general view seems to be that it is practically equivalent to τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Μασσαλιστικῶν; so that Aristotle is to be credited with the statement that the majority (τὰ πολλὰ) of the proper or other names in use at Massilia were of the abnormal type described in the text. There is, as far as I know, no hint of anything of the kind in any ancient writer; and it is to my thinking too im-
probable to be believed without very distinct evidence. The recent\textsuperscript{a} 35 translators, who accept the new reading, must have felt the difficulty, as they tone down the expression by a free rendering of τὰ πολλά, making the clause mean either ‘like so many Massilian expressions’ (Butcher), or ‘wie jene massaliotischen Namen’ (Gomperz). It has to be remembered also that it was hardly necessary for Aristotle to go as far as Marseilles for instances of such names. They were certainly not unknown in Athens (Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen 2 p. 29); and to judge from their appearance in Plautus, they must have been common enough in the later Attic Comedy.

\textsuperscript{a}Ερμοκαίκοξανθός: a compound of three river-names, Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus (comp. Dindorf in HSt. s.v., and Letronne, Étude des noms propres grecs p. 62). After this the Greek text must have lost something, as the Arabic version, as translated by Margoliouth, renders the passage by \textit{Ermocaiikon Xanthus qui supplicabatur Dominum caelorum} (or \textit{Ioew}), which Diels supposes to represent an hexameter line, \textit{Ερμοκαίκοξανθός, ἐπενξάμενος Δια πατρί.} I hesitate to adopt this very attractive conjecture, though it has been accepted by both Butcher and Gomperz, because the context seems to me to suggest rather a second instance of the same kind of word, a τετραπλοῖον ὄνομα of some sort. Some such compound as ἐπενξιθεῦνας, if one may venture to invent the word, would represent the general sense of the Arabic. As these abnormal compounds were characteristic of the Dithyramb (see on 22, 1450\textsuperscript{a} 9), and not uncommon in Comedy, it is difficult to see why Aristotle should have had recourse to what would seem to be an epic or a mock epic for an instance of a τριπλοῖον ὄνομα.

\textsuperscript{b}ιὰπαν δὲ ὄνομα κτέ. The present survey of the vocabulary of poetry may be compared with that in Isocrates 190 in τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ταυταῖς πολλὰ δέδονται κόσμου καὶ γὰρ ... οἴνον τ᾿ αὐτοῖς ... δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔνειοι, τὰ δὲ κανοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰδεσθε διαισεκώλαι τήν ποίησιν.

κύριον. The κύριον ὄνομα is the established and familiar term for a thing, as distinct from the γλῶττα, the μεταφορά and the other ἔσομα ὀνόματα (see on 22, 1458\textsuperscript{a} 22). In actual usage, however, the κύριον ὄνομα is more especially opposed to the metaphor. As the metaphor is an ἄλλοτριον ὄνομα (infra \textsuperscript{b}7), the κύριον ὄνομα is much the same thing as the οἰκεῖον or ‘proper’ name for the thing; comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404\textsuperscript{b} 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον [= i.e. τὸ
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1457 \[οἰκείον\] καὶ μεταφορὰ μόνα χρῆσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. Hence it is that in Latin *proprie* often represents the κύριος, and *propria nomina* the κύρια ὀνόματα of Greek writers. Horace has an attempt at a more literal translation of the latter term in A. P. 234. *Non ego inornata et dominantium nomina solum verbaque, Pisones, satyrorum scriptor amabo.* In Isocrates 190 d–e the designation for the words in common use, in contradistinction to those belonging more especially to poetry, is *τὰ τεταγμένα* or *τὰ πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα.*

b 2 κόσμος. The term reappears in 22, 1458 a 33. As Aristotle's explanation is lost (see on \[b 33\]), the technical sense to be attached to it is a matter of conjecture. In Isocrates 190 d (see above on \[b 1\]) the metaphor, the strange word, and the coined word are grouped together under the general head of κόσμος; and Aristotle himself in the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 5 and 1405 a 14) uses the verb κοσμεῖν in an equally wide sense, to denote the embellishment of style by means of metaphor and other unusual forms of expression. In the present passage, however, it is clear that the term κόσμος must have a special meaning, since instead of including the γλῶττα, the μεταφορά, etc., it is expressly distinguished and made to stand apart from them. The only positive hint we have in the Poetics of the sense of the term is in 22, 1459 a 11, where it is said to be allowable not only in epic poetry, but also in oratory and in the iambic parts of Tragedy: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς λαμβείοις διὰ τὸ στὶ μᾶλιστα λέξιν μμείωσαι ταῦτα ἀρμόστει τῶν ὄνομάτων ὅσης κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρῆσαιτον ἐστι δὲ τὰ τεταιτὰ τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος. Aristotle is generally supposed to be referring to the *epitheton ornans*; in support of which interpretation Tyrwhitt and others point to the use of κόσμος in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 13 μὴ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος: εἰ δὲ μῆ, κωμῳδία φαινέται, οἷον τοιεὶ Κλεοφόρων ὀμοίως γὰρ ἐνα ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ ἔπειεν ἀν τότιν τια σκηνῆ. This passage in the Rhetoric, however, does not justfy this view. *πότνια* is regarded there as a κόσμος, not because it is a certain kind of epithet, but because it is a *γλῶττα* (v. on \[b 4\]), and therefore one of the unusual words which according to the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 5) serve to embellish the style. An *epitheton ornans* need not be of this kind; in γάλα λευκῶν, for instance, the epithet is a κύριον ὄνομα. As the κόσμος, according to the classification in the text, is a special kind of word, distinguished from the κύριον ὄνομα on the one side and the γλῶττα, μεταφορά, etc., on the other, we may perhaps suppose it to be the ornamental synonym, a word,
for example, like Πηλέαδος for Achilles, "Ήφαιστος for fire, ὀλεθρος for one who causes destruction—the kind of word which in the ancient classification of tropes came under the heads of synecdoche, antonomasia, and metonymia (comp. Volkmann, Rhetorik der Gr. u. Röm. 2 p. 421-5). If Aristotle’s κόσμος does not include such synonyms, he has ignored what he elsewhere (Rhet. 3, 2, 1404 b 39) knows to be an important element in the poetic vocabulary. Cicero De Oratore 3, 167 distinguishes between the ‘coined’ word, factum verbum (Aristotle’s πεπουμένων ὄνομα), the ‘transferred’ word, translatum verbum (i.e. μεταφορά), and the ‘ornamental equivalent’, ornandi causa proprium proprio commutatum; this last being apparently identical with the κόσμος of the Poetics. We must not forget that Aristotle recognizes some words as being more beautiful than others: Rhet. 3, 2, 1405 b 6 καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν [scil. δὲ μεταφέρειν] κάλλος δὲ ὄνοματος τὸ μὲν, ὄστερ δικήμινος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ [i.e. either in its sound or in its associations], καὶ ἄξος δὲ ὀσαίτως— with which we may compare the definition of Theophrastus (ap. Demetr. De eloc. 173), κάλλος ὄνοματος ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἄκοψν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὑφήν ἢδυν ἢ τῷ διανοίᾳ ἐντιμον (v. Rabe, De Theophrasti libris peri λέξεως p. 44). It would be strange if this very obvious artifice of poetical expression were overlooked by Aristotle in a book like the Poetics.

γλώτταν. The term is sufficiently general to include foreign, dialectical, and also obsolete words—all words (or senses) in fact which require explanation, because outside the limits of ordinary Attic Greek (comp. Rhet. 3, 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ὄνοματων ἀφεικασιν [i.e. the tragedians] ὡσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον ἐστὶν). For instances in the Poetics see 22, 1458 b 21 and 25, 1461 a 10; others are to be found in Rhet. 3, 3, 1406 a 7, where the use of γλώτταν in prose is said to be a frigid affectation: μιὰ δὲ [scil. αἰτία ψυχρότητος] τὸ χρηστάλε γλώττας, οἰνον Δικόφρων Ἐξέφην τέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σῶνις ἀνήρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἀθυμα τῇ πουήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀπασχολάν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ τῆς διανοίας ὅργῃ τεσσαράκοντα.

μὴ τοῖς ἀπότοις δὲ: De caelo 1, 3, 269 b 26 ἀνάγκη δὲ παῦν τὸ ἐφερόμενον ἢ κατώ ἢ ἄνο ἢ κονφότητ' ἐξείν ἢ βάρος ἢ ἀμφώμοι, μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὔτο δὲ.

σύγνον. The gloss in Hesychius is σύγνον: τὰ ἐν τὰ δόρατα, ἡ τοῖς ἀλογοσύνοις αὐκοτάσα (comp. Schol. Plat. Amat. p. 87 R. and Apoll. Rh. 2, 99). The word exists in a variety of forms (HSt. s.v. συβύνη). That it belonged to the Cyprian dialect is said also
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by Herodotus 5. 9 στιγμὰς δὲ καλέοντι Λύγες . . . τοὺς καπήλους, Κύπριοι δὲ τὰ δόρατα, and by Schol. Apoll. Rh. 2. 99 στιγμὰς δὲ καλοῦντι οἱ Κύπριοι τὰ ἄκώνια. I suspect we should restore στιγμὸς in the present passage, as there seems to be no trace elsewhere of a neuter form. Herwerden also (Lex. gr. suppl.) tacitly assumes στιγμὸς as the nominative in Aristotle.

μεταφορά. μεταφέρειν, said of a word, means to transfer it from its proper object to another more or less like that (v. 22, I459 a 8 and Bon. Ind. 462 a 1). The substantive μεταφορά has two meanings, (1) the abstract sense of transference (e.g. in the present passage, and infra b 30), and (2) the concrete sense of the word in its transferred or metaphorical application (e.g. supra b 1; 22, I458 a 22, 25, 33, etc.).

Metaphor, according to Aristotle, consists in transferring a word from the object to which it is appropriate to another kind of object more or less like it; comp. 22, I459 a 8, and Top. 6. 2, 140 a 9 ἡ μεταφορά ποιεῖ πως γνώριμον τὸ σημανώμενον διὰ τὴν ὁμοίωτας πάντες γὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατὰ τινὰ ὁμοίωτητα μεταφέρουσιν. Four kinds of similarity are noted in the text, that between genus and species, that between species and genus, that between species and species, and that between a thing and its analogue—where there is a similarity of relations. The present classification of metaphors is assumed in Rhet. 3. 2, I405 a 3 and 3. 10, I410 b 36.

b 9 λέγω δὲ, scil. ἐπιφοράν, οὐ μεταφοράν.

b 10 νῆς κτῆ.: Od. 1, 185 and 24, 308.

b 11 ἐστάναι τι: comp. infra b 16 ἄφελεῖν τι. In the present passage, however, the indefinite τι is the subject of the infinitive, in the same way for instance as in Phys. 5. 1, 224 a 23 τὸ τοῦτον τι μεταβάλλειν (intr.), and in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 12, 13. It is just as much the subject as τοῦτο is in Eth. N. 3. 7, I114 b 11 τὸ κάλῳ τοῦτο πεφυκέα φυσικῶς νὰ τελεία καὶ Ἀληθεία ἃν εἶδος εὐφυία. Compare also Metaph. Θ 4, I047 b 13 τὸ γὰρ σὲ ἐστάναι νὰ ἄπειθεῖς μὲν, ὡς ἀδύνατον δὲ. The traditional rendering of ἐστάναι τι is 'a kind of standing' (stare aliquod, or stare quoddam in the old versions), but it has not the sanction of Tyrwhitt and Hermann, who translate ἐστάναι τι simply by stare; which shows that they were not insensible to the grammatical objection against making the τι qualify an infinitive. See infra on b 16 (ἄφελεῖν τι).

ἡ δὴ μυρί' ὄνουσεσ κτῆ.: II. 2, 272.

b 13 ἀπ' εἴδους: Rhet. 3. II, I413 a 14 καὶ αἱ παρομοία μεταφορά ἀπ' εἴδους ἐπ' εἴδος εἰσὶν οἶον ἃν τις ὡς ἄγαθον παραχόμενος αὐτός ἐπαγά-
The two quotations in the text, which have been supposed to be fragments either of some epic poet (Kinkel, EGF. p. 72) or of a parodist (Brandt, Parod. gr. rel. p. 112), were probably both of them from the Καθαρμοὶ of Empedocles. The second, τεµῶν ἀτεφύα χαλκὸς, is, as Vahlen has pointed out, identical with part of the Empedoclean line (fr. 143 Diels), preserved by Theo Snyrnaeus: Aithrm. p. 20 Gelder (=p. 15 Hiller) ἕ των πολιτικῶν [Πλατωνικῶν Hiller] λόγων παράδοσις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχει καθαρμὸν τῶν... δὲ μὲν γὰρ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς κρηνάων ἀπὸ πέντε ἀνυμωτά φρήσιν ἀτεφύα χαλκὸς δεύτερον μὲν ἀπορρίπτεται, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τέτρα μαθημάτων δεύτερον φρήσιν ποιεῖται τὴν κάθαρσιν. The exact form of the verse of Empedocles is perhaps irrecoverable, but it is not difficult to see that Theo’s ἀνυμωτα is a prosaic substitute for the τεµῶν preserved by Aristotle (comp. Diels, Hermes 15, 173). ἀτεφύα—a favourite epithet with Empedocles (v. Diels, Index p. 232)—is a reminiscence of Homer. The same may be said also of χαλκὸς, if it meant, as it probably did in Empedocles (v. Bullialdus ad loc. p. 128 ed. Gelder), a brazen urn, such as was used in certain rites. Aristotle elsewhere refers to Empedocles in a way which implies that his poems might be assumed to be familiar to every one (v. on b 24). As he regards him as a master of metaphor (μεταφορικὸς fr. 70; see on 1, 1447 b 18), there is a special propriety in his quoting instances of metaphor from the writings of Empedocles.

άφελεν τι. The recent interpreters seem to agree in supposing this to mean ‘a kind of removing’ (auferre aliquid in Lat.), though a very different view was taken of it by Victorius, Heinsius, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, Hermann, and Ritter, who represent it by auferre aliquid or auferre quiddam. The now usual rendering implies that the infinitive is treated as an ordinary substantive, with the indefinite pronoun attached to it in the same way as in ἵδων τις, γένεσίς τις, and the like. There is no recorded instance of this construction in classical Greek. In the parallels in the Sophistici Elenchi (22, 178 b 12 sqq.) the τι in ποιεῖν τι, πάρχειν τι, and αἰσθάνομαι τι is assuredly (as Pacius saw) the object after these verbs. Aristotle’s assumption is that a generic may be supplanted by a specific term, when it comes to be applied to a special kind of object. Thus ἐστάναι, said of a ship, is
1457 b 16 supplanted by δρμεῖν, and ἄφελεῖν, said of water, by ἄφεσιν. If he had had the instance cited in b 27 before him here, he might very well have said τὸ σπείρων ἄφεναι τί ἐστι—where the τί would have represented the accusative, τῶν καρπῶν, of the later passage.

τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον (comp. Metaph. I 4, 1070 b 17) replaces the κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον in b 9, ἐπιφοράν being again understood. Analogy or proportion is thus defined in Eth. N. 5. 5. 1131 a 31, ἢ ἀναλογία ἵστης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέταρτων ἐλαχίστοις. In the statement in the text the general form of analogy, B : A :: D : C, is illustrated by an example:—φιάλη (B) : Διώνυσος (A) :: ἀσπίς (D) : "Ἀρης (C). Metaphor consists in giving the φιάλη (B) the name belonging to its analogue (D), viz. ἀσπίς, or vice versa. This transference of a name, as Aristotle proceeds to tell us (καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν, b 19), is sometimes softened by an explanatory addition to the word in its new application. The addition may be either (1) positive or (2) negative. Thus instead of simply speaking of the shield (D) as a cup (B), we may (1) add the term to which the shield is properly related (C), i.e. Ares, and thus call the shield the 'cup of Ares' (B+C); or (2) we may add a negative epithet, to show that the word is used in a non-natural sense, and describe the shield as 'a cup that holds no wine' (φιάλη ἄουνος). A string of metaphors from analogy is quoted in Rhet. 3. 10, 1410 b 36 τὸν δὲ μεταφορῶν τετάρτων οὐσῶν εἰδοκιμοῦν μάλατα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἕφανενθα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἶ τις τὸ ἐαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἑναντίου ἐξέλεξεν κτλ. The use of such metaphors, as serving for instance to give life to a description of things inanimate, is considered at length in Rhet. 3. 11; comp. esp. 3. 11, 1411 b 32 ἐν πάσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν τούτων εἰδοκιμεῖ οἷον ἐν τούτῳ, "αὕτης ἐπὶ διαπενδέω κυλώδει λαία ἀναλογή", καὶ "ἐπταὶ ὀστός", ... καὶ "ἀρχη ἐς στέρνου διάσωτο μαμώσωσα". ἐν πάσι γὰρ τούτως διὰ τὸ ἐμφύσα ἢμαρτοῦτα ἡμαῖροντα τὸ ἀνασώκυντων γὰρ καὶ μαμάν καὶ τὸ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. ταύτη δὲ προσήθη διὰ τῆς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Τίτανόν, ὁ ἀνασώκυντων πρὸς τὸν ἀνασώκυντομένον.

b 18 ἔρει: comp. infra b 21, 23, and ἔρηκεν and λέγει in the context (b 15, 20). The subject, if one must be supplied, is 'the poet', just as in the parallels in the Topics it would be 'the disputant'.

b 19 προστιθέασιν. Instead of the metaphor pure and simple, i.e. 'cup' for shield, they add on to it the term to which the proper word (i.e. shield) supplanted by the metaphor (i.e. cup), is relative. The shield being relative to Ares, the metaphor may be softened
by describing it as 'the cup of Ares'. In the Greek here ἄνθ' οὗ 1457b 19 λέγει=tο ἄνθ' οὗ λέγει τὴν μεταφοράν, 'the original term supplanted by the metaphor'; and it has to be taken as the subject of the ἡστί in πρὸς ἡ ἑστί; the clause, therefore, might have been thus given: προστίθεασαν το πρὸς ἡ ἑστὶ το ἄνθ' οὗ λέγει τὴν μεταφοράν; comp. Castelvetro's rendering (in his Basel edition), 'aggiungono la cosa a che ha riguardo quello, in iscambio di che dice'; and Tyrwhitt's, 'adjiciunt illud, ad quod relativum est id, pro quo translatum dicit.' The distinction here described, between the metaphor with a qualifying addition (positive or negative) and the metaphor without it, is recognized in Rhet. 3. 11, 1412b 32 αι elkonέσα... πρὸς την μεταφοράν: ἀει γὰρ ἐκ δυνῶν λέγονται, ὀσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφοράν οἷον ἡ ἀστίας, φαρμέν, ἡστί φιάλη "Ἀρεώς καὶ ἦτο τοὺς φόρμης ἀχρόδως. οὕτω μὲν οἷον λέγοντον οὐχ ἀπλοῖον, τὸ δ ἐπετεὶ τὸ τόξον φόρμωμεν ἡ τὴν ἁστίδα φιάλην ἀπλοῖον. For the singular λέγει v. supra on ἐρεῖ, b 18. For the difference of number in προστίθεασιν comp. 4, 1448b 17; 26, 1461b 30; Eth. N. 5, 8, 1132b 34 ἡ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσαν εἰ δὲ μῆ, δουλειά δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιτοῦσει (see Vahlen on 26, 1461b 30, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 8, 1 p. 87).

ἐρεῖ τοῖνυν κτῆ: Rhet. 3. 4, 1407a 14 (Roemer) ἀεῖ δὲ δὲ τὴν b 21 μεταφοράν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρα [καὶ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὁμογενῶν οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἁστίς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἁστίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην "Ἀρεώς. φιάλη "Ἀρεώς was the bold metaphor of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus (fr. 16 Bergk=22 Wilamowitz). The idea was doubtless suggested by the similarity of shape between a shield and the φιάλη which Dionysus sometimes had in his hand in ancient art.

ἡ ὀσπερ ἔμπεδοκλῆς. The actual words of Empedocles, which Aristotle supposes us to know, are not to be found among his extant fragments; all that can be said of them is that they must have been something like γῆρας ἡμέρας but different from that in point of phraseology. The metaphor in Emped. 20. 5 Diels, περὶ ῥηγαμέν βίου, is not sufficiently like this to be what Aristotle had in mind. This allusive way of referring to something supposed to be known to the reader is not uncommon in Aristotle; see 17, 1455b 9 (ἐβ' ὡς Εὐρυτίδης), 25, 1460b 36 (ἐτυχεν ὀσπερ Ξενοφάνει); comp. Metaph. Γ 5, 1010a 5 οὕτω γὰρ ἀρμόττει μᾶλλον ἐπιτις ἡ ὀσπερ 'Επίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην.

ἔσπεραν βίου: Alexis fr. 228 Köck ἡδη γὰρ ὁ βίος οὐμός ἐσπέραν ἀγα.
1457 b 25 δυσμῆς βίου: Plato Laws 6, 770 a ἐν δυσμᾳὶς τοῦ βίου.

όνομα κείμενον, an existing or established name, as in Top. 6. 2,
140 a 3 ἐπὶ εἰς μὴ κειμένος ὅνομας χρήσται, οἷον Πλάτων ὄφρονικων
tὸν ὀψιλαμών, ἡ τοῦ φαλάγγων σηψιδακές, ἡ τοῦ μυελῶν ὀστεογενές
πάν γὰρ ἀσαφές τὸ μὴ εἰωθὸς; comp. also Top. 2. 1, 109 a 28 εἰς
dιαταί [scil. καὶ άμαρτιά], ἡ τῷ πεφιάδευται ἡ τῷ παραβαίνειν τὴν
κειμένην λέξει... τοῖς ἀλλοτρίως ὅνομας τὰ πράγματα προσαγο-
ρεύοντες, οἷον τὴν πλάτανον ἄνθρωπον, παραβαίνοντο τὴν κειμένην
όνομασίαν (comp. Bon. Ind. 380 b 31).

Metaphor is often a way of supplying the deficiencies of ordinary
language (Meteor. 4. 3. 380 a 18, b 28; Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 36;
Quintilian 8. 6, 5, 18). In the present passage Aristotle reminds
us that, if one of the terms in an analogy has no special name of
its own, it may still be described in just the same way as in the
preceding instances (ὁμοίως λέξησται), i.e. by a metaphor
softened or explained by the mention of that to which the name-
less thing or act is relative. Thus the sowing (B) of seed (A) on
the part of the husbandman is analogous to the scattering (D)
abroad of light or flame (C) on the part of the sun. This act of
the sun has no special name; but we may metaphorically call it
'sowing' (B), and then qualify the metaphor by adding the term to
which the act (D) itself is relative, viz. 'flame' (C), and speak of
the sun as 'sowing flame'—σπείρων φλόγα (B+C). σπείρων
φλόγα is a qualified metaphor on exactly the same lines as φῶλη
"Ἀρεως (see on b 16); the only difference is that in the one case there
is an ὄνομα κείμενον for the thing meant (viz. ἄσπις), whereas in the
other such a name does not exist in actual language.

b 27 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνόνυμον: for the preposition, comp. Pol. 3. 1,
1275 a 30 ἀνόνυμον τὸ κοῦν ἐπὶ δικαστῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν.
Aristotle’s use of ἀνόνυμος has been already considered (on 1,
1447 b 9).

b 28 πρὸς τοῦ ἡλίου. Aristotle, unconsciously passing from one sense
of ἡλίος to another, is now using it as the proasic equivalent
for the word ἄσπις in the poetical quotation in the next line, i.e.
in the sense of sunshine or sunlight, the meaning ἡλίος has in
Herodotus 8. 23 ἀμα ἡλίῳ σκύδωμαν πᾶσα ἡ στρατη ἐπέπλεε ἄλης
ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀρσεμίτων, and in several well-known expressions.

b 29 πρὸς τόν καρπόν. Castelvetro’s πρὸς τὸν ἀφιέντα τὸν καρπόν,
which has been accepted by several editors, rests on the assumption
that the analogy in Aristotle’s mind was simply that between
sowing (B) on the part of the husbandman (A), and the nameless
act, the emission of light (D), on the part of the sun (C). In \textit{1457b} 29 that case the epithet \textit{θεοκτίσταν} in the quotation must be taken to represent the addition required to soften the metaphor.

\textit{διὸ εἰρήται:} comp. \textit{δὲν πεποίηται} and \textit{δὲν εἰρήται} in 25, \textit{1461a} 28, 29. Quotations similarly introduced will be found in Rhet. 2. 9, \textit{1387a} 33, and in 2. 10, \textit{1388a} 7, 15. That in the text was perhaps from a tragedy (Nauck, TGF.\textsuperscript{2} p. 856).

\textit{ἐστὶ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦτῳ κτ.:} see above on \textit{b} 16.

\textit{προσαγορεύοντα} τὸ ἀλλότριον, scil. ὄνομα, as in Pol. 4. 7, \textit{b} 30 \textit{1293a} 39 πέμπτη δ' ἐστιν [scil. πολιτεία] ἢ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν. The more usual construction in Aristotle is \textit{προσαγορεύειν} ὄνυματι. In saying \textit{προσαγορεύεται} τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν ὀικείων τι he seems to have fallen into a false antithesis. \textit{φιάλη}, in the illustration, is ἀλλότριον in relation to the shield, and \textit{ἀόων} negatives something ὀικεῖον in relation to a cup. Words like \textit{ἀόως} come under the general designation of \textit{στερήσεις} (Bon. Ind. \textit{699 b} 42). The free use of them in the metaphors of poetry is noted in Rhet. 3. 6, \textit{1408a} 6 ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὄνυματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσι, τὸ ἀχρόδον καὶ τὸ ἀληφρόν μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερησεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν. εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἶον τὸ φαναὶ τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἀληφρόν. The instance in Rhet. 3. 11, \textit{1413a} 1 is φόρμιγγες ἀχρόδος, a way of describing a bow.

\textit{πεποιημένον}. \textit{A πεποιημένον ὄνομα} is a word coined by the \textit{b} 33 poet for the occasion, and in this respect unlike the words hitherto considered (the κύριον ὄνομα, the γλώττα, and the μεταφορά), which are parts of an already existing vocabulary. Such coining of new words was termed \textit{ὀνοματοσκία} (Volkmann, Rhetorik\textsuperscript{2} p. 425).

\textit{καλούμενον:} comp. 21, \textit{1458a} 6 ὄνομακαλομένον.

\textit{τίθεται}. For the middle comp. H. A. 7. 12, \textit{588a} 9 δὲ καὶ τὰ \textit{b} 34 ὄνυματα τότε τίθενται, ὡς πιστεύοντες ἡδὴ μάλλον τῇ σωτηρίᾳ.—Rhet. 3. 13, \textit{1414b} 15: δεῖ δὲ εἰδὸς τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθενται.

\textit{δοκεὶ γὰρ ἕνα έναι τοιαῦτα} is a parenthesis giving a reason for the instances that come after it; comp. 25, \textit{1460b} 24, and the note on Eth. N. 5. 1, \textit{1129a} 29 in my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 43; also Kühner, Gr. Gr.\textsuperscript{2} 2 p. 853.

\textit{ἐρνύγος}, scil. καλεῖ or λέγει, to be understood from \textit{τίθεται} in the \textit{b} 35 preceding line; comp. Top. 6. 2, \textit{140a} 3 (quoted on \textit{b} 25), Rhet. 3. 3, \textit{1406a} 7 (quoted on \textit{b} 4), and Eth. N. 6. 7, \textit{1141a} 9 τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς téχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάταις τὰς téχνας ἀποδι-
COMMENTARY

1457 b 35 δομεν, διον Φειδιάν λιθουργόν σοφόν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν [sic. λέγομεν].

We do not know where Aristotle found the word, and there is no evidence for the form of the nom. sing.; the correction of Victorius, ἠφωνγας, assumes it to have been ἠφωνξ, like ἄντυξ; but it is just as likely that it was ἠφωνη. An explanation of the word survives in Hesychius: ἠφωντας [sic]. ἠφωνη, βλαστήματα. κλάδου. The form in Hesychius, with a τ instead of a γ, has been defended by Meineke as the acc. pl. of a Cretan word ἠφων (sic. = ἠφων) supposed to be implied in Ἐπιρνύτιος, a Cretan name for Zeus according to Hesychius s. v. (see note in M. Schmidt's ed.). Aristotle's view of it, however, is that it is a coined word, not a γλώττα as a Cretan word would be; it is to be remembered too that he shows himself elsewhere (25, 1461 a 14) not wholly unfamiliar with the Cretan dialect.

ἀρητῆρα. The reference is no doubt to the use of the word in II. i. 11 οὖνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ητύμασεν ἀρητῆρα. Hesychius has the same explanation: ἀρητῆρα ἵερα.

ἐπεκτεταμένων κτὲ. The three kinds of word remaining for consideration are abnormal only in form. As they are substantially the same as the usual words, they are said to be intelligible to all (22, 1458 b 4), i.e. they do not require explanation as a γλώττα might do. The ἐπεκτεταμένων ὄνομα is the ordinary word lengthened out in one or other of two ways, either through the lengthening of a syllable normally short, or through the insertion of an extra syllable. Aristotle's standard being Attic, he regards πόλης for instance as a lengthened form of πόλεως. ἐπεκτείνεις has this same sense in Metaph. Α. 4, 1014 b 17 εἰ τις ἐπεκτείνεις λέγω τὸ u (in the word φύσις).

1458 a 4 Πηλείδου. The reading of Α. Πηλέως, is retained by Vahlen, who marks a lacuna after the word. M. Schmidt fills up the assumed gap by the following restoration: τὸ Πηλέως (Πηλής καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου) Πηλημέδω. It is quite as easy, however, to suppose Πηλέως to have got in by assimilation to the preceding πόλεως (or πόλεως, as it is in Α.); and it must be admitted that a second instance of this sort of lengthening is hardly wanted. As regards Πηλημέδω for Πηλείδου, Aristotle's view apparently is that the -ά- in it is epenthetic, a συλλαβή ἐμβιβλημένη (v. on 20, 1456 b 34). Its other deviations from the normal word (-η- = -ε-, and -εω = -ευ) would be, according to ancient theory, instances of
διάφωσις, 'resolution', with a lengthening of vowels in the resolved \textsuperscript{1458}a 4 diphthongs.

άφημιμένον. As the αφημιμένον is the opposite of the ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα (v. supra a 1), we may take the term to include (1) a word with a shortened vowel, and (2) a word shortened by the omission of a syllable, whether in the beginning, middle, or end of it, i.e. a word which in the terminology of the grammarians has suffered αφαίρεσις, συγκοπή, or ἀποκοπή. Aristotle's examples, however, κρ, δω, ὑψ, are all instances of ἀποκοπή—the term he himself uses with reference to this class of words in 22, \textsuperscript{1458}b 2; comp. Strabo's (364 Cas.) explanation of Μέση in II. 2. 582: ἕνοι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀποκοπὴν δέχονται τὴν Μεσοτήν ...

... παραδεύγματι δὲ χρῶνται τοῦ μὲν ποιητοῦ τῷ κρι καὶ δω καὶ μᾶς, καὶ ἄριστος ἀλτομέδων τε καὶ Ἀλκιμος' ἀντὶ τοῦ Ἀλκιμέδων ... παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὑψ', ἡ ὑψ. It is clear that Aristotle's ἀφημιμένον ὄνομα covers a wider ground than the αφαίρεσις of the grammarians, and that it must include their ἀποκοπή and συγκοπή. In the preliminary statement in 21, \textsuperscript{1457}b 2 the shortened word is termed the εφημένον, not the αφημιμένον ὄνομα. In the interests of uniformity—which one can hardly suppose Aristotle to have ignored in a matter so technical as this—one must either read ἀφημιμένον in 21, \textsuperscript{1457}b 2 (with Spengel), or restore εφημιμένον throughout the present section. Some of the grammarians seem to have used εφαιμένον (v. HSt. s.v.) for the dropping of a letter in the middle of a word.

μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὑψ: Empedocles fr. 88 Diels. The a 5 reading of the MS. οὖς (see on 18, \textsuperscript{1456}a 2) must represent ὑψ, a gloss on ὑψ (comp. Strabo 364, quoted above on a 4).

ἐξηλαγμένον. The 'changed' word is in regard to some one part of it the invention of the poet. To that extent, therefore, it has a certain affinity with the 'coined' word, the πετωμένον ὄνομα (21, \textsuperscript{1457}b 33).

δεξιερόν κατὰ μαζέων: II. 5. 393 (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. a 7 4, p. 677 d, and Athenaeus 423 e).

αὐτών δὲ τῶν ὄνοματων κτ. Up to this point names have been a 8 viewed in reference to their origin, sense, or form. Apart from these aspects, however, they may also be classified according to their gender, and distinguished as masculine, feminine, and neuter. This classification of names according to gender will be seen to be founded on the terminations of the nominatives in Attic. The primary distinction between masculine and feminine termi-
nations seems to have been generalized from the names of objects in which there is a visible distinction of sex, and more especially from the names of men and women (comp. Aristotle. Nub. 682). Thus nouns ending in the consonants N, P, Σ, Ψ, Ξ are regarded as normally masculine, because names like Δίων, Νέστωρ, Πάρος, Πέλοψ, Κόραξ, are names of males; those ending in the vowels Η, Ω, and Λ (long or short) are normally feminine, because Ἐλένη, Κλεώ, Ἡρα, Μοῦσα are names of females. The names of sexless things (the neuters, as we call them) Aristotle terms τὰ μεταξὺ, because as a class these words occupy an ambiguous position, their final letters being sometimes those of the masculines and sometimes those of the feminines. Thus δεῖδρον, ἦτορ, τέχνος, as ending in the consonants N, P, Σ, have what Aristotle regards as masculine terminations; whereas κάρα, τέρμα, etc., have feminine ones; the other neuters also, μέλι, γόνυ, etc., as ending in vowels, show a certain affinity with the feminines. This seems to be the rationale of the present scheme of genders; and it is in essentials the same as that of the grammarians, though theirs no doubt is both fuller and more systematic, and leaves fewer facts to be treated as anomalies or exceptions (comp. Dionysius Thrax p. 15 Uhlig). Aristotle’s classification is based on that of Protagoras, who distinguished nouns into masculine, feminine, and σκεύη (Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b7 Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὄνομάτων διήρω, ἀρρενα καὶ θῆλεα καὶ σκεύη)—the last of the three terms meaning with him not ‘things’ but ‘names of things’, as it does also in Aristotle, in Soph. el. 14, 173 b39 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλεῶν ὄνομάτων ὁπαίτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκεύοις ἐξώτων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἀρρενος κλῆσιν. In Soph. el. 14, 173 b19 we are told that Protagoras said it was a solecism to make μήνις and πύρης feminine, evidently because he thought Σ and Ξ to be normally masculine terminations, just as Aristotle does. Aristophanes, Nub. 658, ridicules this new ὀρθοπεία of Protagoras in the matter of gender. Stilpo is said to have disputed the propriety of speaking of Athene as a θεός: μὴ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὴν θεόν ἄλλα θεόν θεοῦς δὲ εἶναι τοῦ ἀρρενᾶς (Diog. Laert. 2. 116).

This may seem an overstatement, as there are neuters which have these endings (see a 17). The explanation is to be found in Aristotle’s view of the neuters: he does not conceive them as having terminations peculiar to themselves, but as holding an intermediate position between the two main classes, some of them having a masculine and other a feminine termination.
21. 1458 a 8–16

ἐκ τῶν φωνήμενων is equivalent to a partitive genitive (comp. 1458 a 11 Pol. 5. 1, I 1302 a 4; Rhet. 1. 9, I 1367 a 36; 10, I 1369 b 7). Van Cleef, Index Antiphonteus p. 58, has noted several instances of this use of ἐκ in Antiphon.

τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Λ, 'in Λ among the vowels capable of being lengthened'. The remaining dichronous vowels (see on 20, 1456 b 32), I and Y, are said a little further on to be found in the terminations of neuters (a 15).

Ἃσα ... πλῆθη. πλῆθη is 'numbers', as the plural of πλῆθος, numerus or summa. It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore πλῆθει from certain of the apographs.

οὐδὲ εἰς φωνὴν βραχύ. It is to be remembered that there is no a 15 Greek noun ending in E or O. A neuter pronoun, like τοῦτο or τοῦτο (comp. Herodian 2 p. 764 Lentz), would be in Aristotle's classification (see on 20, I 1457 a 18) not an ὄνομα proper but a πτῶσις ὄνυματος.

τρία. No mention is made here of κύια, which Plato had used in Tim. 60 a. This and sundry other words of the same order (see Lobeck, Phryn. p. 288) may perhaps have been in Aristotle's view not sufficiently naturalized to require recognition.

πέντε. The old editions (with some few of the apographs) a 16 explain this by adding τὸ πῶν τὸ νάτυ τὸ γόνυ τὸ δόρυ τὸ ἄστυ after πέντε. The nouns ending in Y are certainly more than five in number (comp. Herodian 1 p. 354 Lentz). We may perhaps suppose Aristotle to have arrived at this number by ignoring words like γλάφυ, δάκρυ, μέθυ, μῶλυ, φύτυ as antiquated, and taking account only of those which formed part of the existing Attic vocabulary.

τὰ δὲ μεταξύ: see above on a 8. Our word 'neuters', which represents the οἰδέτερα of the grammarians, points to the difference between the neuters and the masculines and feminines; Aristotle's τὰ μεταξύ to their resemblance; they are said to occupy an intermediate position, because in their terminations some of them resemble the masculine and others the feminine nouns; they have in fact no distinctive terminations of their own.

εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν ἄν Καὶ Ρ καὶ Σ. The text, as thus amended, acknowledges the neuters ending in P (ὑδωρ, ἵππαρ, etc.); but it apparently says nothing of those ending in A (κύμα, πούμα, κάρα, etc.). It has been proposed accordingly to insert καὶ Α after ταῦτα, so as to complete the list of neuter endings (comp. Herodian 2 p. 646 Lentz τελικά οἰδέτερων ὄνυμάτων ἔξ, ἴ, ἀ, ὑ, ὑ, ἵ, ἢ).
1458 a 16 It is just possible to keep to the traditional text here, by supposing that in a statement so loosely drafted as this ταῦτα was meant to recall not only the two vowels (I and Y) just considered, but also Λ, which has been described in the preceding context (a 12) as one of the ἐπικεντώμενα or dichronous vowels. In that case ταῦτα will stand allusively for τὰ ἐπικεντώμενα, and include Α as well as Ι and Υ.

a 18 λέξεως: 6, 1450 b 13 λέγω δὲ ... λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐφημενάν. In this chapter Aristotle does not deal with style in general, but only with the portion of it which relates to the choice of words, the ἐκλογή ὀνομάτων of the grammarians; his aim is to describe the poetic vocabulary, and determine the limits to the use of exceptional words and expressions in poetry. This chapter is referred to in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 28, where the language of oratory is contrasted with that of poetry: ἐτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστιν. δὴ λοι δὲ τὸ συνμβαίνων οὐδὲ γὰρ οἳ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἐτι χρώματι τῶν αὐτῶν τροπῶν, ἀλλὰ ὄσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἴσον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τὸ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὀμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνόματος ἀφείκασαν ὀσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον ἐστιν, οἷς ὤ το πρῶτον ἐκόμισαν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξέμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφείκασιν διὰ γελοίον μεμείσθαι τοῦτοι οἳ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρώματι ἐκεῖνω τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οἷς ἄπαντα ὁσα περὶ λέξεως ἐστιν εἰσεῖν, ἀκριβολογητέον ἢμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁσα περὶ τοιαῦτης οἷας λέγομεν. περὶ δὲ ἑκείνης εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

λέξεως ἁρετὴ κτε.: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 1 ὅρισθαι λέξεως ἁρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημειών γὰρ ὅτι τὸ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιῆσε τὸ ἐαυτὸν ἔργον), καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴ μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄξιωμα ἀλλὰ πρέπονταν ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἰσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλὰ οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ. τὸν δὲ ὀνόματον καὶ τηρῆσαι σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴ δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένῃ τάλλα ὀνόματα ὤσα εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάζει ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμιντεράν.

a 20 ταπεινή. For ταπεινή as the opposite of σεμινή (a 21) comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 3, 8, Isocrates 35 c, and the antithesis between τὸ ταπεινὸν and τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς in Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 31. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 15 R. finds an instance of meanness of diction even in Homer, in the language in Od. 16. 1-16: διὰ γὰρ τῶν εἰστελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνόματόν πέπλεκται πάσα ἡ λέξις, οἷς ἀν καὶ γεωργός καὶ θαλασσιώτης καὶ χειριστήρας καὶ πᾶς ὁ μηδεμίαν ὤραν τοῦ λέγειν εἰς ποιήσεις εἰς ἔτοιμον λαβῶν ἐχρήσατο. λυθέντος γοῦν τοῦ μέτρου φαιλλα φανήσεται τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα καὶ ἀξηλα ὡσε ὡσε γὰρ μεταφοραὶ πτερόν ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσειν ἐτεισὶν ὡσε ὡσε ὡσεν τε ἐπιπλαγα.
οϊτε καταχρήσεις οϊτε ἄλλη τροπική διάλεκτος οἰδεμία, οϊδε δή γυλώτικον. Κλειστόνως: see on 2, 1458 a 12.

Σθενελόυ. This Sthenelus is presumably the tragic poet mentioned more than once by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1313 and fr. 151 Kock). It is doubtful whether a single line of his has come down to us (Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 762).

έξαλλάσσουσα τὸ ἴδιωτικόν: Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 15 ἐξαλλάσσει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς [scil. τὰ ἐπίθετα], καὶ ἴδιωτικὸν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. It will be observed that Aristotle is now using ἐξαλλάσσει in a large sense, to denote all possible deviations from the ordinary forms of expression (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον, 1458 4 6), instead of restricting it to the kind of deviation presented in the ἐξαλλαγμένον ὄνομα (21, 1458 a 6).

τὸ ἴδιωτικὸν = τὸ εἰωθός, or τὸ κύριον; but the point of view is not quite the same. τὸ ἴδιωτικὸν is the language of the ordinary man, the prosaic as opposed to the poetic mode of expression; the antithesis of ἴδιωτις and ποιητής is already in Plato (Phaedr. 258 b, Symp. 178 b, Laws 890 a). Ἰσορρόπες 203 b has ἴδιωτικὰ ὄνομα, but in a different sense.

ἐξεικόνισις. In Plato (e.g. in Crat. 401 b, 417 c) a ἐξεικόνις ὄνομα is a non-Attic word or form, what Aristotle calls a γυλώττα (see on 21, 1457 b 4). Ἰσορρόπες 190 d (quoted above on 21, 1457 b 1) uses ἐξαλλαγμένα in the same sense. Aristotle's ἐξεικόνις ὄνομα, however, is a wider term; it comprises all the various deviations from the usual form of expression (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον, 1458 a 23)—the metathesis, the ἐπεκτεινόμενον ὄνομα, etc., as well as the γυλώττα. In the Rhetoric also τὸ ἐξεικόνις is the general opposite of τὸ εἰωθός: Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 15 ἐξαλλάσσει τὸ εἰωθός, καὶ ἴδιωτικοὶ ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν.—3. 12, 1414 a 26 τὸ εἰωθός καὶ ἴδιωτικόν. The attraction such unfamiliar words have for us is explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 8: τὸ ἐξαλλάσσει τοιεῦσθαι σεμνοτέραν [scil. τὴν λέξιν]; ὦ διὰ τὸ ἔστω πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωνοὶ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἐξεικόνισις τὴν διάλεκτον λαμπραστὶ τὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπόλυτων εἰσὶν, ὡς δὲ τὸ λαμπραστὶν.

ἀπαντά τοιαῦτα is an exaggeration, like ἀπαντῶν in 1, 1447 b 22. All that Aristotle really means is that too much metaphor, or an undue proportion of strange words makes the sentence an enigma or a 'barbarism'. τοιαῦτα = ἐξεικόνις, or ἐκ ἐξεικόνων.

This passage is quoted in a fragment attributed to Longinus Rhet. Gr. 1, 325 Spengel: ὥτε ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοὺς πάντα μεταβέβηται αἰνίγματα γράφειν ἐλέγειν.
COMMENTARY

1458 a 25 μὲν οὖν 'saepè usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur', Bon. Ind. 540 b 42; comp. 14, 1453 b 32, and Vahlen's note on the present passage.

αἰνγμα. The puzzle in a riddle Aristotle explains as arising from the presence of metaphors, i.e. of words used in a transferred sense. The element of metaphors in riddles is noted again in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 4 καὶ δῶς ἐκ τῶν εὖ ἔφηγμένοι ἔστι μεταφοράς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς (μεταφοράι γὰρ αἰνύττονται), ὡστε δῆλον [ἰ δῆλον] ὅτι εὖ μετενήφεκται.—3. 11, 1412 a 24 καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔφηγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδεια μάθησις γὰρ καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά [μεταφορᾷ]. Quintilian also (8. 6, 14) speaks of the riddle-like effect of too much metaphor: Ut modicem autem atque opportunum eius usus illustrat orationem, illa frequens et obscurum et taeio compleat, continuas vero in allegoriam et aenigmata exit.

a 26 τε γὰρ is practically no more than γὰρ in this and many other Aristotelian passages (comp. Bon. Ind. 750 a 5, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 244).

iδέα: equivalent here to οἰδία (see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 406).

a 28 τῶν ὅνομάτων. ὅνωμα has been used before this as a generic term including the metaphor, etc., as well as what Aristotle calls the κύριον ὅνωμα (see 21, 1457 b 1). When opposed, however, to the metaphor, as in the present passage, it may easily mean the name (as we say) for the thing, i.e. its proper name, its κύριον ὅνωμα. It recurs in this more specific sense in 22, 1458 b 2 and b 16. It is not so absolutely necessary, therefore, to adopt the emendation of Heinsius, τῶν <κυρίων> ὅνομάτων, or the reading which the Arabic Version is believed to imply, τῶν <ἀλλών> ὅνομάτων. For other instances of the same use of general terms in a restricted sense see on 1, 1447 a 29 (οὐ τοὺς μέτρους).

a 29 κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφοράν, scil. συνήθειν. The correction μεταφορῶν seems to be required not only by the form of the antithesis, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅνομάτων συνήθειν, in the preceding line, but also by the meaning. It is the combination of metaphors that produces the sense of impossibility (comp. ἀδίνατα συνάψαι a 27) which is of the essence of an αἰνγμα.

ἀνδρ' εἰδον κτέ.: a line traditionally ascribed to Cleobulina, fr. 1 Bergk. The riddle is partially explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 35 o' πόρρωθεν δὲι ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοιών μεταφέρειν τὰ ἁνώνυμα [ἐπὶ τὰ ἁνώνυμα ?] ὅνωμασμένοις, ὁ λέχθην δῆλον ἐστιν ὅτι συγγενεῖς, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνύματι τῷ εἰδικομοιτὶ ἀνδρ' εἰδον τὴν ἀλλ' λάμβανεν ἐπὶ ἀνέφι κολλησίσαιτα'. ἁνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἐστι δ' ἀμφο
pros thesis τις: κόλλησιν τούν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σει ς προσβολήν. Lampros (scil. cecurbitula) altera parte patet, altera clausa est . . . in aeneam linamentum ardens conicitur, ac sic os eius corpori aptatur imprimiturque donec inhaeret . . . ubi inhaesit, si concisa ante scalpello cutis est, sanguinem extrahit; si integra est, spiritum (comp. Aristot. Probl. 9. 9–12, 890 b 7–37; Mayor on Juv. 14. 58; and the monograph of K. P. I. Lampros, Peri σικυών καὶ σικυάσεως, Athens 1895).

κολλήσαντα: a metaphor ἀπ' εἰδοὺς ἐπὶ εἰδος (see 21, 1457 b 13). For the tense of the participle see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses § 148.

ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός: a mere repetition of the εἰς δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός in a 25, and brought in also without syntactical connexion with the context. The words may be the residue of a longer statement now lost, or a stop-gap to disguise a lacuna, or a rough note by Aristotle himself to indicate a point to be worked out at length at some future time.

βαρβαρισμός is the opposite of ἐλληνισμός. ἐλληνίζεων in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 238 b 53) means to speak Greek like a native, i.e. correctly, and βαρβαρίζεων to speak it like a foreigner, whether through the use of ‘strange words’ (γλώτται), or through that of strange or unauthorized forms of words. That βαρβαρίζεων had this wide sense is clear from the explanation of σολοκίζεων (‘to speak incorrectly’) in Soph. el. 3, 165 b 20 τέταρτον δὲ σολοκίζεων ποιεῖν, τούτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζεων, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τῶν ἀποκρινόμενων (comp. Bon. Ind. 688 a 54). In later theory, however, ‘barbarism’ denotes more especially a faulty use of particular words, and ‘solecism’ a fault of construction or syntax: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 210 βαρβαρισμός ἐστι παραπτώσις ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ σολοκισμός ἐστι παράπτωσις ἀσυνήθης κατὰ τὴν ὀλην σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθος (v. Volkmann, Rhetorik 2 p. 396). Quintilian (1. 5, 8) distinguishes three senses of ‘barbarismus’ in Latin: Barbarismum pluribus modis accipimus: unum gente [?genus], quale sit si quis Afrum vel Hispanum latinae orationem nomen inscrat ... alterum genus barbarismi accipimus quod sit animi natura ... tertium est illud vitium barbarismi cuius exempla vulgo sunt plurima, sibi etiam
quisque fingere potest, ut verbo cui liberit additum litteram syllabamque vel detrahat, aut etiam aliam pro alia aut eandem alio quam rectum est loco ponat.

\[1458^{a30}\]

Dei āra kekrāṣvai pws touτois, scil. τὴν λέξιν; the language of poetry should have some admixture of unusual words or forms in it. Similarly in the Rhetoric a certain combination of familiar and unfamiliar words is said to be an element of pleasure in a speech: Rhet. 3. 12, 1414 a 25 καὶ τὸ ἱδεῖν [scil. τὴν λέξιν εἰναι] τὰ εἰρήμενα ποιήσει ἄν εἴ μιχθῇ τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ εἰνικόν. In the text τοῦτος refers back to the ἔξινκά in a 22; all from ὀλλ' ἂν τις in a 23 to barbaραισμὸς in a 31 is digression. For the qualifying τοσ in this connexion comp. Probl. 30. 1, 954 b 27 ἢν δὲ τοὺς κραδὼς.

to μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἰδωτικὸν ποιήσει, scil. ταῦτα, i.e. τὰ ἔξινκά. The οἶνος prefixed to the list of ἔξινκα which follows is the appositional and explanatory οἶνος, ἓπειρο or scilicet (comp. Bon. Ind. 502 a 7). There is a reference to this place in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 5: τὸν δ’ οὖν μάτων καὶ ὑμάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ὀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τάλλα ὅνωμα ὅσα εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

\[1459^{a4}\]

εἶδη, scil. ἔνωμάτων.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος συμβάλλεται: Isocrates 156 b οὔ γὰρ ἐλάχιστον μέρος τὰ γένη ταῦτα συμβάλλεται πρὸς εἴδαμοναν.—Hippocrates 1 p. 525 K. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος συμβάλλεται ἀστρονομὴ ἐς ἑρακλῆς.

\[1460^{b1}\]

The singular verb may be explained by supposing the real subject to be τὰ ἐπεκτεταμένα καὶ ἀποκεκομένα καὶ ἑξιλλαγμένα ὅνωμα rather than the various processes they exemplify. Other instances of a singular verb with several subjects in the plural will be found in Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 81. The anomaly in the present instance is not so harsh as it might have been, as the verb precedes its subjects, and is also at some distance from them: it may be illustrated also by the common use of ἐστι, ἄν, and γίγνεται followed by a plural subject (see Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 68). Vahlen quotes a similar construction with δοκεῖ in H. L. 4. 9, 536 a 17 δοκεῖ δὲ ... ὡστε λίχνου φαίνεσθαι οἱ ὀφθαλμοί.

\[1461^{b5}\]

ὡστε οὖκ ὀρθῶς ψέγουσιν κτέ. In this long digression, which extends to ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο ἑγγοι in 1459 a 4, Aristotle insists on the literary value and effect of the various poetical forms of expression, and defends their use by the poets. He first answers the critics of the epic (b 7–31), and then those of the tragic diction (b 31–1459 a 4).

\[1462^{b7}\]

toν ποιητήν, the poet, whoever he may be. It is evident, how-
ever, that Aristotle is mainly concerned with Homer (comp. Bon. 1458 b 7
Ind. 609 b 57); the licences he considers are all epic licences; and
the instances quoted in b 9–10 were presumably meant to carica-
ture the Homeric hexameter. It was generally admitted that
Homer was ready enough metri gratia to take great liberties with
language (see Ludwich, Aristarch's Homerische Textkritik 2 p. 127;
Schulze, Qu. epicæ p. 3). Throughout this chapter Aristotle is
thinking quite as much of the epic poet as of the tragedian, though
his theory of the Epic is still to come (in 23–24).

Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος. Nothing further is known of him. As
a surmise, which must be taken for what it is worth, I would
suggest that he may possibly be the Euclid who was Archon in the
year 403, when the reformed alphabet was officially adopted at
Athens. At that moment considerable attention seems to have
been devoted to questions of phonetics (see on 20, 1456 b 31);
and the anomalies and licences of Homeric metre may very well
have been one of the facts to which the reforming party pointed in
proof of the need of a fuller alphabet.

ὅς ῥάδιον ποιεῖν = ὅς ῥάδιον ἐν ποιεῖν. For the omission of ἐν
see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses 875. 1.

ἐκτείνειν. From the definition of the ἐπεκτειναμένον ὄνομα in 21, b 8
1457 b 35 it is clear that Aristotle is referring not only to the
lengthening of a short vowel but also to the insertion of an extra
syllable in a word.

ἰαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει. The sense of these words and their
connexion with the lines which follow have been a difficulty
with the interpreters from the days of Victorius, who gives up
the passage in despair. Goulston renders them by 'qui etiam
in ipsa oratione soluta iambica confecit'; Tyrwhitt by 'in ipsa
oratione soluta cavillatio facto'; M. Schmidt by 'ihr Verfahren in
seinem eignen Ausdruck persiflirte'; Ueberweg by 'er legt den
Spott in die Redeform selbst (durch Sylbenverlängerung) hinein'.
Vahlen's interpretation (which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's)
is 'iambum sive carmen probosum et cavillatorium faciens mero
sermone pedestri (in purer prosi)'. It is not so easy to see how
ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει can mean the same thing as ἐν ψιλῇ λέξει; nor is
ἰαμβοποιήσας quite the same thing as ἰαμβὸν ποιήσας. Perhaps
the simplest solution of the difficulty is to transpose ἰαμβοποιήσας,
placing it after ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, and then take the two lines of
parody which follow as its object. ἰαμβοποιεῖν τι may very well
mean to 'write, or say, something as an ἰαμβοποίος' (i.e. as a
Caricaturist), just in the same way as δραματοποιεῖν τι means to
'describe as a δραματοποιοῦ' (4, 1448 b 37), and λογοποιεῖν τι to
'describe as a λογοποιοῦ'.

'Επιχάρην κτέ. This and the next quotation are given as
specimens of prose which by a liberal use of epic licences may
be made to read as verse. By the artifice of lengthening two
short syllables 'Επιχάρην εἶδον κτέ. becomes an hexameter—the
lengthening required with 'Επιχάρῃν being like that in ἐπίτονος in
Od. 12. 423. But it may be observed, is not an epic word.
How the second instance was to be read as a verse is not equally
clear, the text here being obviously corrupt. If we may suppose
ἐλλέβορον to be a scribal error for ἐλλεβόρον, the parodist may have
proposed to read this as ἐλλεβόρων.

Maραθωναδε. The accentuation in Λε (Maραθωνα δε) is in
accordance with the rule of Apollonius and Herodian (La Roche,
Homerische Textkritik p. 221).

II φαίνεσθαι πως χρώμενον: De gen. et corr. 1. 10, 328 b 10
φαίνεσθαι γάρ πως καὶ μικτὰ ήρέμα. A visible use of these artifices
is one thing and a discreet use of them (τὸ μέτρον, b 12) another.
For the antithesis comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 28 ρεὶ τὲ τὰς ἀπολαι-
σεις τὰς σωματικὰς [scil. δε] τοῖναντιον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν τινὲς τῶν
tυράννων τοιοῦτων οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἴδος ἐωθὲν τότῳ δρῶν καὶ
συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βοῦλονται
τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἢ γε εἰδαίμονες καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάζοντες ἢ
μᾶλιστα μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τουοῦτοις, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ γε φαίνεσθαι
tοῖς ἄλλοις διαφείγειν. In the Rhetoric Aristotle lays down the
same rule for oratory: the orator must use all the arts of lan-
guage, but with discretion, so as not to allow his use of them to
become too apparent: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 18 διὸ δὲ λαθάνειν
ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένοις ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως (comp.
also 3. 7, 1408 b 4).

tοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ, scil. τῆς διαλέκτου; comp. οἱ ἐπιτιμώντες τῷ
tουοῦτο τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου in b 6, and τῶ τρόπῳ τοῦτο τῆς μετα-
φορᾶς χρῆσθαι in 21, 1457 b 30. Vahlen, who supplies ἐπεκτάσει
after χρώμενον, takes τοῦτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ as equivalent to τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων.

b 12 τὸ δὲ μέτρον. If the traditional reading, τὸ δὲ μέτρον, be
retained, we have to understand μέτρον in the sense of 'measure'
or 'limit'. The objection to this interpretation is that μέτρον has
the sense of 'metre' in the immediate context (b 16), and that any
other sense would be somewhat confusing in a passage dealing
with 'metrical' licences. τὸ μέτρον, on the other hand, is certified
by more than one parallel in the Rhetoric: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 32 1458 b 12
ei!aseitthai de de kai paratiph
ein armpov to metrop. — 3. 3,
i406 a 16 alla de stoxahethai tou metrop, etpei meizon toiei kakov

tou eikhe legen h. met yap ouk exei to ei, h de to kakos. dia ta
'Allkodamatos psyche faivetai ou yap hdnismati krhtai all' ois
edeixai tois eipisthos, owtos puknois kai meizos kai epidhlos.

In another passage, Rhet. 2. 14, 1390 b 8 osa d epierbalkovn h
elleipous, toetwv to metropiv kai to armpoton, we find Aristotle

passing from the idea of to metropiv to that of to armpoton just as
he does here in the context (b 15).

kouv apantwv esti twn merwv: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 36 to d'
evkaivos h. me evakaivos yrhsethai kouv apantwv twn eidoiv estin.

aprepous. In the Rhetoric an unsuitable metaphor is said to be b 14
one of the faults which make the style of an orator 'frigid':
Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 5 to yrhriv en tais metatparaiv ginetaiv eivai yap
kai metatparov aprepesis ait mev dia to yeloiv (xroniai yap kai oi
comydosioi metatparaiv) ait de dia to semvnon yagan kai tragikov.

etpithdes eti ta yeloi.a. eti ta yeloa, which has been bracketed
(by Gomperz), seems to be wanted to keep up the parallelism with
what is said in b 5 sqq. on the subject of the epic licences,
which Euclid had parodied and turned to ridicule. Aristotle's
reply to Euclid is that it is quite possible to misuse metaphors,
etc., for the same purpose, eti ta yeloa (comp. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 5,
quoted above). The comparative eti ta yeloiveta would be more in
accordance with usage (comp. Stallb. on Plato Symp. 214 e).

to de armpottovs. This is considered (1) in reference to these b 15
epic licences (epetkatai, apokopii, ecallagii), and (2) in reference
to the use of metaphor, etc. (b 17).

doivn diafeirei: Isocrates 87 c kaitoiv me olyiheven doivn diafeironvi
twv logon eis to peithen oiv leghemoi twv anagignwskomenv.

etpi twv etpown theoreioth: because these metrical licences are so b 16
marked a feature in the epic diction (see on b 7). The proof here
is not unlike that by which Isocrates 191 a shows the literary value
of metre: oit mev metat metrop kai rhrivn apanta pouin, oit d'
oidevoi tovtov kouwovn twv toutwv en eikonei twv ouk te
lexei kai tws evthymasaiv yehi kakos, dmos autais tws eirunhmas
kai tws symmetrias ynychagwnoi tws akouontaivas. ynoai d' an tw
ekethei twn dunamivn auton h. yar tis twv poumatoiv twv eido
cymvntov tw mev onomata kai tws diwvias katalpteta, to de metrop
dialysa, faivsetai polv kataleosteiv tis dyefivs h. en evom evi
auton.
COMMENTARY

1458 b 16 τῶν ὄνομάτων: i.e. the normal words, the words themselves, as distinct from the ἐπεκτάσεις, etc., of them (see above on a 28).

b 18 ιδεῶν. For ιδέα = ιδίος, 'species', see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 416, and Bon. Ind. 338 b 34. In De caelo 1. 7 Aristotle says, within the space of a few lines, πεπερασμένων εἴδων (274 a 32) and ιδέας πεπερασμένας (b 2) without perceptible difference of meaning.

b 20 ἐν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα. A verb taken by itself, i.e. apart from a subject, may be termed an ὄνομα (see on 20, 1457 a 10).

b 21 κύριον εἰωθότος. Though κύριον and εἰωθός ὄνομα are often used as synonyms, there is a certain difference between them, as the εἰωθός ὄνομα may be a metaphor. ἐσθέα in the line of Aeschylus (b 23) is the word in general use (τὸ εἰωθός), but it is a metaphor, and therefore not a κύριον ὄνομα (see on 21, 1457 b 1) in the stricter sense of the term. By comparison with θοινάται, however, it is the κύριον ὄνομα. Aristotle gets out of the difficulty by terming it the κύριον εἰωθός, the usual κύριον, because it has by custom and use come to be treated as a κύριον ὄνομα, and is no longer felt to be a metaphor.

b 22 εὔτελές. The epithet is applied to a certain kind of word in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 13 (see on κόσμος; 21, 1457 b 2), and in the passage from Dionysius quoted above on a 20. 

Αἰσχύλος: Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 81 and 618.

b 24 θοινάται, which is not uncommon in poetry, is regarded by Aristotle as a γλώττα (see on 21, 1457 b 4). It is explained in Hesychius, θοινάται εἰωθέων.

b 25 νῦν δὲ μ' εὖν κτέ.: Od. 9. 515 νῦν δὲ μ' εὖν ἄλγος τε καὶ οὕτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκικος.

ἄκικος. The traditional text of the Poetics has ἄειδῆς, and that of Homer ἄκικος—with an ancient variant, however, ἄκικος. The restoration of ἄκικος in the quotation, as the reading which Aristotle must have had before him, is believed to be confirmed by the Arabic Version. ἄειδῆς is open to two objections: (1) it is the word actually used in b 27 in Aristotle's metaphrasis of the Homeric line; (2) it is also a late word, and in the sense which it seems to bear here, that of 'unsightly' or 'ugly' (= δυσειδῆς), not to be found in pre-Aristotelian Greek. On the other hand, if the old poetical word ἄκικος had to be interpreted as an epithet of a person, ἄειδῆς in its later sense might very well be chosen to represent it.

b 29 διπρον ἄεικελλον κτέ.: Od. 20. 259. Several of the manuscripts of the Odyssey read παραβείς in lieu of καταβείς.
Aphraïdès is perhaps the Ariphrades whose name occurs in Aristophanes, and who is said to have been a κιθαριστής by profession (Bergk, De rel. com. Att. p. 232). It is not necessary to suppose him to have given expression to this criticism in a book.

tous  

tragedóu: i.e. the tragic actors, who are made responsible for what the poet puts into their mouth. It will be observed that the expressions singled out for censure are taken apparently from the dialogue of Tragedy; there would have been no point in saying that the language of the choral part was παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον.

A similar use of the word tragedoι is found, a few years after Aristotle's time, in Diphilus, fr. 30 Kock ὤ τὸν ἐποπτεύοντα καὶ κεκτημένη Βραυνῶν ἰερὸν θεοφιλέστατον τῶν, Λητοῦς Δίως τε τοξόδαμεν παρθένε, ὡς οἱ τραγῳδοὶ φασιν, οἷς ἔνθος ἔστιν λέγειν ἀπάντα καὶ ποιεῖν μόνοι.

tῇ διαλέκτῳ, the spoken, as distinct from the written language. διάλεκτος has the same sense in 4, 1449 a 26 πλείστα γὰρ ἱρμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλοις, and in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὡσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον ἔστιν. The ordinary meaning of the term in Aristotle is either 'speech' (i.e. articulate language) or 'mode of speech'.

ἐγὼ δέ νῦν: Sophocles O. C. 986. The rest of the instances in the text were no doubt taken from existing plays (v. Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 856).

ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων: the ἐπεκτάσεις, ἀποκοπαί, and ἐξαλλαγαὶ I459 a 4 τῶν ὀνομάτων mentioned in I458 b 2 before the digression (I458 b 5 — ἤγνει I459 a 4).

καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις is a sort of afterthought. Aristotle remembers that, as artifices of poetic expression, these are in just the same position as the forms of language he has been considering, and admit of the same justification.

πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον. In the Rhetoric metaphor is shown to hold an equally important place in the diction of oratory (Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 32 sqq.).

μεταφορικῶν: comp. the eulogy of Empedocles as a master of poetic expression in fr. 70 (Teubn.) from the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν: καὶ Ὀμπρίκος ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δείνος περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικὸς τ' ὄν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτείγμασι χρόμενος.
With this use of *μεταφορικός*, i.e. as applied to a person, Vahlen compares that of *ἐνθυμηματικός* in Rhet. 1. 1, 1354 b 22, etc., and of *αναλογικός* in Top. 8. 14, 163 b 30.

Instead in *Aristotel.* a *μεταφορά* is given as a gift of nature, i.e. an aptitude not to be acquired by education or study; see on 17, 1455 a 32, and comp. Eth. N. 3. 7, 1114 b 6 φιναί δει ὀσπερ ῥήμα δέχονται ὑπ’ ἱκανά καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσταται. καὶ ἐστίν εὐφνία, τὸ τότο καλῶς πεφικεῖν. τὸ γὰρ μέγατον καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ δ’ παρ’ ἐτέρων μὴ οὖν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐφ’ οὐκοῦν ἐξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τότο πεφικέναι ἦ τελεία καὶ ἀληθὴν ἄν εὖ εὐφνία. The originality shown in metaphor is noted also in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 9 καὶ λαβεῖν οὖν ἐστιν αὐτὴν παρ’ ἄλλον. This power, according to Aristotle, depends on a rapid and intuitive perception of similarity in difference, i.e. of the resemblances between things not obviously alike; comp. Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 a 10; δέι δὲ μεταφάρειν ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φαινομένων, οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ ἐν τολὴ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐτύχον. For the kinds of similarity underlying metaphors see 21, 1457 b 7.

*ἐν* μεταφάρειν. Aristotle is apparently setting aside far-fetched metaphors (Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 35; 3. 3, 1406 b 8), in which the underlying resemblance is not so real and clear as it should be.

For other instances of concurrence of identical forms of the article see Soph. el. 13, 173 b 15; Meteor. 1. 3, 341 a 30; De resp. 2, 471 a 7; Metaph. N 2, 1089 a 14.

A very similar distinction is made in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 1: χρησιμοτάτη ἥ διπλὴ λέξις τοῦ διθυραμβοῦσιν οὕτω γὰρ ψοφώδεις αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐπτομοῖς σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αἴθαδες ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις τοῦτοι γὰρ νῦν χρωταίνῃ.

†τοῦ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρεῖν. Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsberichte 123 p. 66) : τὸ μακροσῦνθεν ἀνίαν μὲν ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ ἡ τοῖς ἐπτομοῖς ἢ τοῖς ἐπτομοῖς ἢ τοῖς διθυράμβοις—Demetrius De eloc. 91 λῆπτον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύμφωνα ὁμόματα, ὥσ τὸ διθυραμβικόν συγκείμενα, ὅσον θεοτράτους πλάνας, οἴδε ἄστρων δορύπνου στρατόν, ἀλλ’ ἐσικτά τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνθείας συγκειμένοις.

†τοῖς ἢρωικοῖς: comp. 23, 1459 b 34.

†τοῖς ἱαμβείοις: i.e. the tragic dialogue (v. 4, 1449 a 24).

†λέξιν ἰαμβείωσα. Instead of its usual sense of diction or language, λέξις in this passage must mean (like διάλεκτος in 1458 b 32) the spoken as distinct from the literary language. The present statement, therefore, is in harmony with that in
Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33, where Tragedy is said to have learnt to reject words outside the ordinary spoken language (ὀσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτὸν ἔστιν). With this use of λέξεις we may compare that of λέξεις, λεκτικὸν μέτρον, and λεκτικὴ ἀρμονία in 4, 1449 a 23–8; and also that of λόγος in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30 ἐκ τῶν τετραμετρῶν εἷς τὸ λαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ἰδιωτα-τον ἐναὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Goulston renders λέξεις here by vulgaris sermo; Bonitz (Ind. 427 b 31) by sermo pedestris, on the assumption that it stands for ψυλή λέξεις, as it no doubt sometimes does. In 4, 1449 a 23 λέξεις is the opposite of 'song'.

ἐν λόγοις has been taken to mean 'in common speech, or con- versation' ('in familiari colloquio', Goulston), 'in prose' ('oratio pedestris', Bon. Ind. 433 b 20), and 'in speeches' ('in orationibus', Tyrwhitt). Though it is not always possible to determine the exact meaning of a word like λόγος (v. on 4, 1449 a 17), the balance of probability is rather in favour of Tyrwhitt's 'in orationibus'. Aristotle's meaning would seem to be this, that the tragic dialogue (ἐν ταμβεσίοις) is limited to the same species of words as oratory (ἐν λόγοις)—those found in the language of common life (λέξεις), viz. the κύριον, the μεταφορά, and the κόσμος. The appropriateness of the κύριον and μεταφορά for oratory is distinctly affirmed in the Rhetoric, and for the same reason, that they are in common use: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὕπλων λόγων λέξειν σημεῖον δὲ, ὅτι τούτως μόνοι πάντες χρώνται, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διάλεγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κύριοις (comp. Isocrates 190 ε). The reference in the text to the language of 'speeches' may serve to remind us of the fact that even in Aristotle's time the theory of literary prose was still studied mainly in connexion with oratory, and as part of the art of Rhetoric. According to the canon here laid down by Aristotle, the highly-coloured diction of Aeschylus would be inappropriate in Tragedy; and he tells us elsewhere that it was eschewed by the dramatists of his time: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ὅνωμάτων ἀφείκαστι [i.e. the tragedians] ὃσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον ἔστιν, οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκόσμησαν . . . ἀφείκασιν. From the days of Euripides in fact (comp. Aristoph. Ran. 939) the language of Tragedy had been approximating to that of ordinary life; and in Aristotle's age there was probably no very serious difference between it and that of the Comedy of the period.

κόσμος: see on 21, 1457 b 2. The parallel in the Rhetoric (3. 2, a 14 1404 b 31, quoted above) ignores the κόσμος.
1459 a 15 τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως. A tragedy is something to be acted, an epic something to be recited or read. This makes a fundamental distinction between them, though Aristotle admits that as a work of literature a tragedy is quite possible without performance on a stage (6, 1450 b 18; 26, 1462 a 12, 17).

a 17 peri δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς κτέ. The natural division in the matter of this and the next chapter would be at 24, 1459 b 17, so as to make διαφέρει δὲ the beginning of the second half of the discussion. Throughout these two chapters Aristotle has Homer constantly in view; if he mentions other epic writings, it is only to show their artistic inferiority to the Iliad and Odyssey. The general intention of the present statement is to bring the Epic under the rules of construction laid down for Tragedy. Though the enumeration of the points of agreement and difference between the two is so much longer than that in 5, 1449 b 9–20, it ignores one characteristic of the Epic, its being a μίμησις σπουδαίως — on which no little stress was laid in the earlier chapters (3, 1448 a 26; 4, 1448 b 38 sqq.). Taking this for granted, it would seem, Aristotle proceeds to insist (1) that a good epic must conform to the tragic rule of Unity of story (1459 a 18–b 7); (2) that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy (1459 b 8–10); and (3) that it involves the same literary elements (1459 b 10–17). After this he passes on to its points of difference, its length (b 17–31), its metre (b 31–1460 a 4), its form (a 5–11), and its greater tolerance of διόγα (a 11–b 5). A valuable discussion on Aristotle's theory of the Epic will be found in Schoemann's Opuscula (3 p. 30). For traces of Aristotelian ideas in later Greek writers see Adam, Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos (Wiesbaden 1889).

peri δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς. peri = 'as for', or 'as regards' (comp. Metaph. H 6, 1045 a 7).

diηγηματικῆς, scil. μιμήσεως, understood from a 15 (comp. 24, 1459 b 33, and the note on 1, 1447 a 27 αὐτῶν ὁρχηστῶν). The καὶ that follows is the appositional καὶ (= i.e.), which is so common in Aristotle.

ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς may be compared with 6, 1449 b 21 τῆς ἐν ἔκαμετροις μιμητικῆς. ἐν μέτρῳ, 'in verse (= ἐν λόγῳ ἐμέτρῳ), is the opposite of ἐν τῷ πράττειν, just as in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 26 δὲ ἀπαγγελίας (scil. μιμουμένων) is the opposite of ὁρχηστῶν.

a 18 συνιστάναι δραματικοῦς. A predicative adjective after συνιστάναι
is found also in 24, 1459 b 14, 1460 a 34, and in Plato Phaedr. 1459 a 18
268 D τὴν τοῦτων σὺντασσῶν πρέπουσαν ἄλληλοις τε καὶ τῷ διός
συνισταμένην. For the construction συνιστάναι περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν
comp. 8, 1451 a 28 περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἶαν λέγομεν τὴν 'Οδύσσειαν
συνέτρησεν. δραματικῶς, which means properly 'such as is re-
quired for a drama' (comp. 4, 1448 b 35), is explained by what
follows (καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν κτ.), as referring more especially to
the Unity of the dramatic story. Aristotle now definitely applies
to the Epic the rule of Unity laid down for Tragedy in chaps. 7–8;
it applicability, however, has already been assumed in the
digression on the Epic in 8, 1451 a 19–29.
ὡσπερ ζῷον ἐν ὀλοβ. If it is permissible to restore ὄλον (ὅν) here, a 20
the expression will be equivalent to οὕσα ἐν ὀλοβ. ὡσπερ ζῷον (see
Bernhardy, Syntax p. 337, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 202 b).
For the meaning of ζῷον see on 7, 1450 b 34.
καὶ μὴ ὄμοιας ἱστορίας τὰς συνῆθεις θείαι
is another instance of a 21
parallelismus antitheticus; it is the negative complement of the
precept in a 18 δεῖ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι δραματικῶς, the construc-
tion being δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους . . . συνιστάναι δραματικῶς . . .
kαὶ μὴ ὄμοιας [scil. αὐτοῖς] ἱστορίας τὰς συνῆθεις θείαι.
For the position of δῆλον comp. De sensu 3, 440 b 14 ὅτι ἀνάγκη μεγαλύ
cαι τὰς χρόας μέγιστα, δῆλον, καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ
πολλαὶ εἶναι χρόας. ὄμοιας θείαι may very well mean 'to regard
as like them' (comp. Bon. Ind. § 61 a 27). According to this view
of the text, the general sense of the passage is shortly this: Epic
stories should be in structure like those of Tragedy (δραματικῶς),
and not, as is so often supposed (see 8, 1451 a 21 and 9, 1451 b 4),
like the records of ordinary history. This latter point,
however, Aristotle puts in a somewhat different form, 'One must not
assume our ordinary histories to be like them'; he inverts the
order of the terms, in fact, as he sometimes does in comparisons
introduced by ὄμοιος (see Vahlen ad loc., and my Textual Criti-
cism of the Nic. Ethics p. 63). The reading εἶναι, which I have
altered into θείαι1 (on the assumption that ΕΙΝΑΙ represents
ΘΕΙΑΙ), makes him say that our ordinary histories should not be
like tragedies or epics, as though there were something in the
practice of the historians that he wished to set right. The
absurdity of such a notion was felt by one of the Renaissance
correctors and by Dacier; but the correction they proposed, καὶ μὴ
ὁμοίας ἱστορίαις τὰς συνήθεις εἶναι, is to my mind too artificial, and

1 The same correction was made by Francken in Lysias 10. 18.
too great a departure from the reading of the MS., to deserve a place in the text. In saying ἱστοριάς τὰς συνήθεις Aristotle seems to be aware of there being exceptions to the rule. We have been told in 9, 1451 b 30 that a poetical subject may sometimes be found in history.

Aristotle's conception of a history is that it is a sort of chronicle (see on 9, 1451 a 36) recording all the various occurrences within a certain period of time, however loose and separate they may have been in themselves. As an instance of such a disconnected event he cites Gelo's defeat of the Carthaginians in 480; it happened about the same time—Herodotus 7, 166 says on the same day—as the Battle of Salamis, but it obviously had no connexion with that battle, or with the issue of the Persian War. And the same would have to be said, if it had taken place just before or after Salamis (ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις a 27). In this way Aristotle reasserts the point on which he has insisted in the earlier chapters (8, 1451 a 27; 10, 1452 a 20), that two events may come in succession without forming part of one single action.

Vahlen supposes ἐδει or ἀναγκαίον ὑπὲρ ἐδει to be understood from the ἐμελλέν ἐσεθαι in the preceding clause. The sense of the passage is clear enough: The Trojan War was a real whole in itself (ἐχοντα ἄρχων καὶ τέλος ὄλον; v. 7, 1450 b 26); but Homer declined to deal with it in its entirety (ποιεῖν ὄλον), through a feeling apparently that it was too long for his purpose (λίαν μέγας; comp. 7, 1451 a 5), or if not too long (τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα), too full of matter through the variety of incident in it (καταπετλεγμένον τῇ ποικίλῳ). The explanation of the grammatical difficulty may perhaps be that Aristotle has lapsed into obliqua oratio. λίαν γὰρ ἐν μέγας κτε. is virtually oratio obliqua, like the clause of explanation in 3, 1448 a 33.

μετριάζοντα is intransitive, as it generally is in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 463 b 23). For the dative with it comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 33 μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις.

392 E ὃν κατὰ ὅλον ἄλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράζομαι σοι ἐν τούτω ἡ ἡλίκως ὁ βουλόμαι. By this ἐν μέρος in the history of the Trojan War Aristotle means the 'Wrath of Achilles' and its consequences; see Adam I. c. p. 43.

αὐτῶν = τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πραγμάτων, a construction κατὰ σύνεσις such as we often find with pronouns (comp. I. 13, 1453a 24, 23, 1459a 29, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1, p. 54). Vahlen quotes Eih. N. 4. 1, 1120 a 2 δοκεῖ δ' ἀπόλεια τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οἰσίας φθορά, ὁς τοῦ ξῆν διὰ τούτων [= τῶν χρημάτων, implied in τῆς οἰσίας] ὄντος.

dialambάνει: comp. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 543 R. ὧν διαλαμ- 37 βάνεθαι τὴν ὄμοιες ἰδαίας μεταβολὰς καὶ ἔννοιας ἐπιστόδιαν. The proper meaning of the word is to 'break the continuity of' a thing, as in Phys. 4. 6, 213a 32 οὐκ ἐστι διάστημα... διαλαμ- βάνει τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ὥστε εἶναι μὴ συνεχές. Its present meaning, that of to 'break the uniformity of', or 'diversify', is found also in Plato Phaed. 110 b γγ... ἄρωμασι διειλημμένη. Closely allied to this is the sense in Pol. 7. 12, 1331a 20 τὰ δὲ τεῖχη διειλήφθαι φυλακτήρους καὶ πύργους—where it denotes to 'break the line of' the walls, not the walls themselves.

The use of episodes as giving an element of variety in the Epic is noted again in 24, 1459b 30. An echo of Aristotle's approval of Homer's episodes survives in Eustathius on Il. 3. 230, p. 409, 20 R.; αὐτῶν εὐγχάνοντο ὁμορος τὰς ἕξῳ τε [?] ἕξῳ] τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ ἱστορίας ἐπιστοδιαί τῇ ποιήσει καὶ ταῖς μεθόδοις αὐτὴν καταποίκιλλε τῶν ἀφηγήσεων, and in the Schol. on Od. 1. 284: τῆς Ὀδυσσείας οὐκ ἔχουσις ἐς αὐτὴς ποικιλών ἵκανη τῶν Τηλέμαχον ἐξελθέν εἰς Σπάρτην καὶ Πέλον ποιεῖ, ὅπως ἄν τῶν Ἰλιακῶν ἐν παρεκβάσει πολλά λεχθείν διὰ τοῦ Νέστορος καὶ τοῦ Μενελάου (comp. the second Schol. ad loc.). ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὴν [scil. τῆς ἀποδημίας Τηλέμαχον] πεποίηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς ποικιλίας λόγων καὶ ἐξαλλαγῆς ἰδεῶν, ἵνα μὴ μονότροπος ἢ τῆς ποιήσεως ὁ τρόπος).

περὶ ἐνα ποιούσι κτε.: i.e. they write just like chroniclers (comp. a 23) or biographers (comp. 8, 1451a 21). In some of the inferior epics, however, there is, says Aristotle, a certain Unity of story; but it is not of the right kind (comp. 8, 1451a 28 περὶ μιᾶν πράξεων ἢ τῶν λέγομεν), as the action there consists of a plurality of parts (πολυμερῆ), each of them easily detached from the rest of the work. The consequence is that several tragedies may be made out of a single epic of this type; whereas the Iliad or Odyssey does not supply materials for more than one or two. This
emphatic assertion of the Unity of action in the Homeric epic, and of its affinity in this respect to Tragedy, is not quite in harmony with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In 18, 1456 a 13 the story of the Iliad is said to be a πολεμικόν σεύστημα, one with a plurality of stories in it, and therefore incapable of being successfully dramatized in one single tragedy. And in 26, 1462 b 8 we are expressly told that the action in the Iliad and Odyssey is made up of several actions (ἐκ πλειώνων πράξεων) and of many parts (ἐχει πολλὰ τοιαύτα μέρη); in other words, it is conceived to be a μία πράξεις πολυμερής, and not so unlike that of the inferior epics as is assumed in the present passage.

μίαν πράξιν = περὶ μιᾶν πράξιν (comp. 8, 1451 a 28).

ο τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας: Herodotus 2, 117 δηλοὶ ὅτι οὐκ Ὀμήρον τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεα ἐστὶ ἄλλα ἄλλοι τινος.—Athenaeus 334 b ο τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας ἐπη, εἴτε Κυπριώς τὸς ἐστὶν ἢ Στασίνος ἢ ὀστίς δὴ ποτὲ χαρεὶ ὄνομαξόμενοι. For the ancient ideas as to the authorship of the Κύπρια see Welcker, Ep. Cycl. 1 p. 279 (comp. Wilamowitz, Phil. Untersuch. 7 p. 337).

τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλίαδα = ὁ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλίαδα (comp. Bon. Ind. 109 b 48). The book is treated as anonymous even by Pausanias (3, 26, 7 and 10, 26, 2) and by several of the grammarians who quote from it (comp. Wilamowitz l.c. p. 341).

'Ἰλιάδος, 'a poem like the Iliad' (see on 4, 1448 b 38).

ἡ δύο μόνα. The reference here is apparently rather to the Odyssey with its διπλῆ σύστασις (13, 1453 a 31); the double story would supply a subject for two tragedies, one dealing more especially with the fortunes of Ulysses, and the other with those of the Suitors.

ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαί. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 873, gives a list of the plays supposed to be based on stories in the Κύπρια. An abstract of the poem survives in the Chrestomathy of Proclus (Kinkel, EGF. I p. 16).

τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλίαδος πλέον δεκτῶ. The names in Aristotle's list of possible tragedies are sufficient indication of the ground covered by the Μικρὰ Ἰλιάς as he knew it; it is clear that the poem must have taken up the story of the war at the death of Achilles, and carried it down to the departure of the Greeks after the sack of Troy. The Fragments also show that it must have included the last scenes of the war and the division of the spoils. Some difficulty may perhaps be felt from the fact that the abstract in Proclus (Kinkel l.c. p. 36) makes the Little Iliad end somewhat
abruptly with the admission of the Wooden Horse within the walls, and that, to complete the record of the war, he subjoins an abstract of what he regards as a distinct poem, an Ῥάον πέρας sometimes ascribed to Arctinus. In all probability this Ῥάον πέρας was only the concluding part of the Little Iliad under another name (comp. Wilamowitz l.c. p. 359).

**Proclus** l.c. ῶ τῶν ὀπλῶν κρίσις γίνεται καὶ Ῥάοσσεῖς κατὰ βούλησιν Ἀθηρᾶς λαμβάνει, Δίας δ’ ἐμμανής γενόμενος τῆν τε λείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν λυμαίνεται καὶ έαντόν ἀναίρεται. Besides the existing Ajax of Sophocles, there was a ὀπλῶν κρίσις by Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF.² p. 57), based presumably on this section of the Little Iliad.

**Filoctήτης** Proclus l.c. μετὰ τὰ ταῦτα Ῥάοσσεῖς λαχήσας Ῥάελινα λαμβάνει, καὶ χρήσατος περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τοῦτον Διῳμήδης ἐκ Λήμανον Filoκήτην ἀνάγεις λαδεῖς δὲ ὀφθος ὑπὸ Μαχίώδος καὶ μινομαχήσας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ κταίει. Several lost plays are recorded as bearing this title (Nauck l.c. p. 968 ; Welcker, Kl. Schr. 4, p. 180) ; and we still have the Philoctetes of Sophocles.

**Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος** Proclus l.c. καὶ Νεοπτόλεμον Ῥάοσσεῖςἲκ Σκύρου ἀγαγόν τὰ ὀπλα δίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Ἀχηλλεῖς αὐτῷ φαντάζεται. Εὐρύπυλος δὲ θαλέφου ἐπίκουρος τοῦς Τροῶνι παραγίνεται, καὶ ἀρατεύοντα αὐτοῦ ἀποκτείνει Νεοπτόλεμος. A Νεοπτόλεμος is mentioned in Suidas’ list of the plays of Nicomachus (v. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 1015. and Kayser, Hist. Trag. Gr. p. 316). There is no record of Εὐρύπυλος as the title of a tragedy.

**πτωχεία, Λάκαυια** Proclus l.c. Ῥάοσσεῖς τε αἰκιστάμενος ἕαντων κατάκριτος εἰς Ῥάελιν παραγίνεται καὶ ἀναγωρισθείς ὑφ’ Ἕλενης περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τῆς πόλεως συντιθέται, κτείνας τε τινας τῶν Τρώων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῖς ἀφκυνότα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στὶν Διῳμήδαι τὸ Παλλάδιον ἐκομιζέτα εἰς τῆς Ῥάελιν. The story of Ulysses entering Troy in the guise of a beggar is briefly told in Od. 4. 247 ἀλλῳ δ’ αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρίτων ἠμεκ δέκτη, δι’ οὖν τῶν ἐξ ἐπὶ νηρᾶς Ἀχαιῶν. τῷ ἱκελῷ κατέδυ Τρώων πόλιν κτε.; and referred to in Eurip. Rhes. 503 ἢδ’ ἀγνίτης πτωχικὴν ἐχον στολὴν εἰσήλθε πύργοις (comp. Plautus Bacch. 936). There is no tradition of πτωχεία as the title of a tragedy. Λάκαυια was the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.² p. 210), turning apparently on the carrying off of the Palladium, with which Helen seems to have been associated in some form of the legend (v. Roscher’s Lexicon 1, 1944); the title was no doubt taken from the chorus of Laconian women, whom we may have to have been brought in as Helen’s handmaids.
4159>b 6 'Iλον πέρσις: one play certainly is mentioned as having this title, the 'Iλον πέρσις of Iophon. There was also a Πέρσις ἡ Πολυφέιη attributed to Nicomachus, and a Πέρσις attributed to Cleophon (comp. Meineke, Hist. Com. Gr. p. 497).

b 7 ἀπόπλοος may very well have been the title of a play, but if it was, no record has come down to us of one so named. The closing scene of the war, the division of the spoils and the fate of the Trojan captives, was naturally fitted for Tragedy, as one may see from the abstract in Proclus of the final section of the 'Iλον πέρσις: ἐπειτα ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν Πολυφείην σφαγαῖάουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ 'Αχιλλέως τάφον. καὶ Ὀδυσσέως Ἀστιώακτα ἀνελώντος Νεοπτόλεμος Ἀνδρομάχην γέρας λαμβάνει [comp. Μικρὰ 'Ἰλ. fr. 18]; καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ λάφυρα διανέμονται. Δημηφῶν δὲ καὶ Ἀκάμας Αἴθραν εὑρόντες ἀγοῦσι μεθ᾽ εὐαντῶν [comp. Μικρὰ 'Ἰλ. fr. 17]. ἐπειτα ἀπαπλέωσιν οἱ Ἐλληνες. Welecker (Gr. Trag. p. 179) suggests that ἀπόπλοος may possibly have been an alternative title for the Polyxena of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF. p. 245), the scene of which, as we know from Strabo (10, 470 Σοφοκλῆς ποιήσας τὸν Μενέλαον ἐκ τῆς Τροίας ἀπαίρεως σπείδωντα ἐν τῇ Πολυφέιῃ), was placed at the time of the departure of the Greek host. Whether we accept this suggestion or not, it seems pretty clear from the position of the title in Aristotle's list that the ἀπόπλοος must have related to the concluding act of the war, and not (as Vahlen thinks) to the withdrawal of the Greek fleet to Tenedos before the treachery of Sinon.

καὶ Σάνων καὶ Τροφάδες. Having thus run over the eight sections of the Μικρὰ 'Ἰλιάς and mentioned a tragedy, actual or possible, in connexion with each, Aristotle appends two additional names to show how easily the list might be enlarged. The first is a Σάνων—the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF. p. 251); the second a Τροφάδες—the name of a still extant play of Euripides. A Σάνων proves the possibility of more than one tragedy on the seventh section of the poem; and a Τροφάδες proves the same of the eighth. One can hardly doubt that Aristotle means the existing play of Euripides, the scene of which is placed at the time of the ἀπόπλοος or departure from Troy (comp. Troad. 18 παλής δὲ χρυσὸς Φρύγια τε σκυλεύματα πρὸς ναῦς Ἀχαιῶν πέμπτησα· μένουσι δὲ πρόμνησθεν οὖροι, ὡς δεκασπάρῳ χρόνῳ ἄλοχοι τε καὶ τέκν' εἰσιοδό- σιν ἀσμένοι).

ἐτὶ δὲ τὰ εἰδῆ κτὲ. As a further point of resemblance Aristotle observes that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy; and he illustrates this in b 14 by noting the difference between the
Iliad and Odyssey. This statement about the four species is not quite consistent with that in 18, I 455 b 32 (where see note); as there was no such thing as a 'spectacular' epic, Aristotle makes out the parallelism by recognizing the ἀπλὴ ἐποποιεῖν as a distinct species of epic. The difficulty here is like that in τοῦχα ἡγέρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέγχθη in 18, I 455 b 32 (where see note); we have to admit that Aristotle has been carried away for the moment by his desire to find coincidences and correspondences.

δεὶ ἔχειν, 'must necessarily have', 'in the nature of things has', b 8 or 'involves'. ἔχειν stands in a certain antithesis to κέχρηται in b 12 (comp. 6, I 450 a 13); epic poetry has in it these various possibilities; and they are all to be seen in actual use in Homer.

ἀπλην, scil. δεὶ εἶναι. δεὶ is easily supplied from what precedes, b 9 just as it is in 15, I 454 b 13 (where ποιεῖν = δεὶ ποιεῖν), and in Rhet. 3, 14, I 414 b 26 (where ἔκδοιναι = δεὶ ἐκδοιναι: comp. Bon. Ind. 146 a 50). The ellipse of εἶναι may perhaps seem more difficult to explain; it is, however, occasionally found in Aristotle not only after δεὶ (comp. 25, I 460 b 34, and Bon. Ind. 239 a 16), but also in other constructions, as Vahlen shows in his note on this passage. A very strong instance of the omission of εἶναι is that in Eth. N. 7, 14, II 53 b 2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακῶν, ἦ δὲ τῷ τῆς ἐμποδιστική [scil. εἶναι].

καὶ τὰ μέρη κτῆ. This has been assumed from the first (see 5, I 449 b 16), and needs no demonstration. Aristotle, however, avails himself of the opportunity to add that a good epic, just as much as a tragedy, requires not only a story but also a powerful story, one with elements of surprise and suffering in it; and that the language and thought in it also demand the same care as in Tragedy. After this, reverting to the four μέρη indicated in b 10, he reminds us that they are all to be found in perfection in Homer (οἶς ἄπασιν Ὀμνήρος κέχρηται, b 12): (1) as regards the μῦθος, the Iliad is a story of suffering (παθητικῶν), and the Odyssey a story of surprises (πεπλεγμένων); (2) as regards the element of ἵθος, the Odyssey is full of character (ἵθηκη); while as regards (3) the λέξεις and (4) the διάνοια, Homer's two poems confessedly surpass everything of the kind in these matters.

καὶ γὰρ περιπετείων δεὶ καὶ ἀναγωρίσεων, as is the case with b 10 the complex tragedy (comp. 10, I 452 a 16; 13, I 452 b 31).

ἐν τὰς διανοιὰς καὶ τῆν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. Aristotle adds as an b 11 afterthought (ἐν) that a good epic requires not only an effective story, but also effective language. In the speeches in an epic the
same rhetorical art is wanted as in a play (τὰς διανοιὰς ἐξειν καλῶς); and the diction, both in the speeches and elsewhere (comp. 24, 1460 b 3), demands the same care and elaboration (τὴν λέξιν ἐξειν καλῶς). It may perhaps be thought that Aristotle was logically bound to recognize the element of ἕθος also, so as to remind us in some way or other of the rules laid down in chap. 15 as equally applicable to the ἕθη in a good epic. To supply the supposed omission Bursian wished to restore in the text ἐτι (τὰ ἕθη καὶ) τὰς διανοιὰς καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐξειν καλῶς. The difficulty arises from a misconception of the clause beginning καὶ γὰρ περιπέτειων δὲ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων, which is taken as a proof of the existence of the four μέρη in an epic—a point which hardly needed demonstration (see 5, 1449 b 16). The real purpose of the clause is to make us see the possibility of a πεπληγμένη and a παθητικὴ ἐποποιία, as assumed in b 9. A similar explanation of the ἥθική ἐποποιία is not equally necessary (see on 18, 1455 b 34); and if it were, it would require a fuller statement than is supplied by Bursian's insertion.

For the combination of adj. and adv. comp. 24, 1460 a 9 ὀλγα καὶ ὀλγάκες.—Eth. N. 8. 1, 1155 a 8 μάλιστα καὶ ἑπανευετωτάτη.—Hippocrates i p. 557 K. ὀλγάκες καὶ ἀσθενέα.—Isocrates 36 ἐκόντα καὶ προθύμοι.

καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον: a reminiscence perhaps of Plato Hipp. min. 363 B ἐκάτερον γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὀδυσσέα ἕθη πεποιήθαι τὸ δ' εἰς Ἀχιλλεά. It will be observed that Aristotle does not find every perfection in one poem; in his view the Iliad is παθητικῶν, without being πεπληγμένον or especially ἥθικῶν, and the Odyssey πεπληγμένον and ἥθικων, without being especially παθητικῶν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἰς 'et enim et'.

ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διάλογ. 'Agnoscitur Telemachus ab Nestore, a Menelao, ab Helena. Agnoscit Ulysses a Cyclope, a Phaeacibus, a Euryclea, a subulcis, a Telemacho, a procis, a Penelope, denique a patre' (Hermann).

ἕθικη: a characteristic noted by Longinus 9. 15 as showing the Odyssey to have been the work of Homer's later years: προσιστορίσθω τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδυσσείαν, ὡς ἦ σοι γνώριμον ὡς ἦ ἀπακημή τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγγραφεύσι καὶ ποιητῖς εἰς ἔθος ἐκλείται. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ποι ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἥθικός αὐτῷ βιολογογίμων οἰκίαν, οἰόνει κομφόδια τὶς ἔσται ἔθολος; For the change of gender (παθητικῶν ... ἥθικῆ) comp. Eth. N. 4. 3, 1121 b 13 ἦ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνιατός τ' ἔστιν ... καὶ συμφνέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle now passes on from the cons-truction (comp. I 4 συνεστηκεν) to the literary execution of the two Homeric poems. We should expect here καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτέ., to correspond with the preceding καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων κτέ. The clause is apparently a reason for something which, though unsaid, was present in Aristotle's mind—something like καὶ ἄλλα ἐξεῖ ἄγαθα. Another instance of the same type is in 24, I 460 b 4 (comp. Bon. Ind. I 46 b 15, and Waitz, Org. 2 p. 470).

λέξει. The graphic vigour of Homer’s metaphors, for instance, is recognized in Rhet. 3. I 1, I 11 b 31.

καὶ διάνοια refers more especially to the rhetorical skill in the speeches in Homer. Cicero says of him that he is ornatus in dicendo ac plane orator (Brutus 40); Quintilian also (io. 46) eulogizes his mastery over all the arts of rhetoric.

πάντα ὑπερβεβληκεν: the subject is not ‘Homer’ (as is generally assumed) but ‘these two poems’, understood from τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον in b 14. There is no need, therefore, to restore πάντας (from sundry apographs), or to take πάντα as practically equivalent to πάντας.

διαφέρει: comp. 5. I 449 b II.

συστάσεως, scil. τῶν πραγμάτων.

ὁ εἰρημένος, in 7, I 451 a 3. The epic story must be εὐσύνοπτος (comp. 23, I 459 a 33), and not of a length which would make it impossible for the mind to take it in in its entirety; it must be a whole but not too long a whole. This condition, Aristotle adds, will be fulfilled (εἰη δ’ ἄν τοῖτο), if one’s epic is of about the length of a trilogy, and thus considerably shorter than the Iliad and Odyssey. Here again he shows himself mindful of the practical purpose of his treatise; he evidently thinks that an epic on the old Homeric scale of length would prove too great a strain on the memory and attention of the literary public of his own time. Apollonius Rhodius may have been mindful of Aristotle’s view when he limited his Argonautica to four Books.

εἰη δ’ ἄν τοῖτο: Top. 8. 1, I 56 a 9 εἰη δ’ ἄν τοῖτο, ε’ τει μῆ μόνον b 20 τὰς ἀναγκαίας, scil. προτάσεις, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν πρὸς ταῖτας χρησίμων τιαὶ συλλογίζοντο (comp. also An. post. 2. 13, 97 b 33; Rhet. 3. 8, I 408 b 31).

πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πραγμάτων κτέ. ‘Res ipsa unius poetae b 21 tragoedias una triglogia comprehensas intelligi postulat. Hae interpretatio quum mensurarum aptam comparisonem continet, tum alia etiam ratione ad epicae poeseos naturam accommodata
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b 25 τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς κτὲ. An indirect recognition of the Unity of Place as a fact in normal Greek Tragedy. Only one part of the story, that immediately connected with one single place (represented by the stage) and one set of persons (represented by the actors), can be told in a play; whereas an epic may include incidents occurring at one and the same time in other places and in connexion with other personages.

b 27 ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἀμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα corresponds with διὰ τὸ . . . μὴ εἰνδεξέσθαι κτὲ. in b 23.

b 28 ὁγκος = weight, as suggestive of dignity or importance (comp. on μέγεθος, 4, 1449 a 19). A little further on (b 35) the adj. ὁγκόδης is applied to the hexameter, as a weighty or impressive metre. In Rhet. 3. 6, 1407 b 26 Aristotle—without defining the term—has a discussion on 'weightiness' of style (ὁγκος τῆς λέξεως) and the kind of language which produces that effect.

ὁστε τοῦτ' ἐχει τὸ ἁγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν κτὲ. The advantage its length gives the Epic over Tragedy is twofold, (1) greater grandeur of scale, and (2) greater variety of incident. If we bracket the article before it, ἁγαθὸν becomes a quasi-predicate, as in Rhet. 2. 20, 1394 a 2 καὶ ἔχουσιν ἁγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ἄμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπῶν, λόγους δὲ βαρον. ἁγαθὸν in the sense of 'an advantage' occurs in Rhet. 1. 2, 1336 b 18, ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἁγαθὸν τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς. For the preposition comp. Plato Rep. 462 l τὸ μέγατον ἁγαθὸν . . . εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν.—Xenophon Cyrt. 2. 1, 27 ἁγαθὸν . . . εἰς τὸ μῆτερτεσθαι.

b 29 τὸ μεταβάλλειν = εἰς τὸ μεταβάλλειν. μεταβάλλειν, being followed by ἔπεισοδιοῦν, is probably transitive, 'to produce a change of mind or mood,' as it is instance in Probl. 30. 1, 953 a 39 ἵδοι δ' ἐν τις ὅτι παντοδατοῦ ἄπεργαζέται [scil. ὃ οὐς], θεωρῶν ὡς μεταβάλλει τοὺς πίνοντας. The sense may be illustrated by the use of the verb in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 22 (where it is intransitive), μεταβάλλομεν τὴν ψυχήν ἀκρούμενοι τοιοῦτον [i.e. certain rhythms and airs]—which is explained by what follows (b 40), ἢ τοῦν ἀρμονίων διάστρεκε φύσις ὁμοία ἀκούστας ἀλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν.
The episodes supply an element of variety breaking the monotony of the story. ἀνόμοιος means 'dissimilar', 'unlike one another', as in the formula πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι in H. Λ. 4. 1, 523 b 12 (comp. Plato Tim. 83 c), and in Phys. 3. 5, 205 a 19 ἐ ή ἀνόμοιον τὸ πάν ἀνόμοιοι καὶ οἱ τόποι.—Pol. 3. 4, 1277 a 5 ἐξ ἀνόμοιον ἡ πόλις.

The necessity of change is explained in Rhet. i. 11, 1371 a 25: τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἢ δὲ εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίνεται μεταβάλλειν τὸ γὰρ αἰτῶ [= τὸ ὁμοιον] ἀεὶ ἑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τὴς καθεστώτης ἐξεως. ὅθεν εὑρηται "μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκῆς". Comp. also Cicero De Inv. i. 41 Variare autem orationem magnopere oportebit; nam omnibus in rebus simililiudo est satietatis mater.

ἄπο τῆς πειρᾶς ἡμοικεν. The iambic is said to have become 32 established in Tragedy in the same way (see 4, 1449 a 24). Similarly in Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 37 experience is said to have led to the rejection of the flute as part of a liberal education: ὥστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη [scil. ἡ ἀλήθεια] δά τῆς πειρᾶς αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κράτειν τὸ πρὸς ἁρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἁρετὴν συντεῖνον.

ἀρηητικῆς. The editors prefer the reading of sundry apographs, 33 δηγγαματικῶς, the form which appears in the context, 36, and in 23, 1459 a 17. There is no reason, however, why Aristotle should not say δηγγαματικῆς, as δηγγαμικῶς is certainly a good Aristotelian word (v. Eth. N. 3. 13, 1117 b 34). He shows perhaps too little regard for uniformity in such matters. Thus we find him speaking in 34 of the ἱμωκόν, and a few lines further on (1460 a 3) of the ἱφων μέτρων; and in the Rhetoric ξένος and ξεικός are both used of language without perceptible difference of meaning (v. Bon. Ind. 493 a 45, 24),

στατισμῶτατον: comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 9 (quoted on 1460 a 1), 34 and 8. 7, 1342 b 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὑμαλογοῦσιν ὅς στατισμῶτατις ὑσθης.

γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα: comp. 22, 1459 a 9. 35

περιττῇ γὰρ καὶ * ή δηγγαματικῆς μέμησις τῶν ἄλλων. Before 36 ἡ δηγγαματικῆς some such word as ταῦτη or ταύτας seems to have dropped out; the point apparently is this, that epic goes beyond all other kinds of poetry (περιττῇ τῶν ἄλλων) not only, as has been already shown, in the matter of length, but also in the admission of γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς; the clause, therefore, as emended, comes in naturally enough to confirm the preceding statement, γλώττας.
1459b 36 καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα. Vahlen acquiesces in the traditional text, and explains it thus: 'non recipit διηγηματικὴ μέρης alius metrum quam heroicum: nam heroicum est metrum gravissimum ac ponderosum maxime, eximia autem etiam narrativa imitatio prae ceteris'. It seems to me that this explanation, besides assuming περιττὴ γὰρ to stand for περιττὴ δὲ, hardly does justice to the καὶ before ἡ διηγηματικὴ. For the gen. τῶν ἄλλων, due to the comparative sense of περιττὴ (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1, p. 391), comp. Xenophon Cyr. 8. 2. 21 τῶν ἀρκοῦντων περιττὰ.—Hier. i. 19 περιττὰ τῶν ἰκανῶν.—Antiphon Tetral 2. 4. 6 περισσῶν τοιῶν.

1460a 1 κινητικά, as opposed to the hexameter, which has just been said to be στασιμώσατον. The antithesis is like that in Pol. 8. 5, 1340b 9 οἱ μὲν γὰρ [scil. τῶν μεθομών] ἠδὲ ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικοί, καὶ τοιὼν οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσιν τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρας.

όρχηστοκ: see on 4, 1449a 23.

πρακτικῶν. This is what Horace meant when speaking of the iambic as natum.DecimalField(82).  The word has the same sense in the classification of tunes in Pol. 8. 7, 1341b 32: τὴν διαίρεσαν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσι τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δὲ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες. For the meaning of πρακτικῶν in this connexion see on 4, 1449a 23.

ἔτι δὲ ἀποτάστερον carries on the idea of ἀπρατής ἃν φαινοτο in 1459b 34.

a 2 Χαρῆμων: see on 1, 1447b 21.

a 3 ἰσαρθερέων: in 4, 1449a 24.

a 4 αὐτὴ = μακρὰ συντάσσει.

a 5 Ὁμηρὸς. In 5, 1449b 11 and 6, 1449b 26 the narrative form (ἀπαγγελία) was noted as one of differences between the Epic and Tragedy; and it has been also assumed in this discussion on the Epic, in 23, 1459a 17. Aristotle now passes on to this, but without any formal introduction or hint as to the connexion in his statement. His aim apparently is to show that, although narrative is an element in every epic, it is reduced to a minimum in the best Epic, that of Homer; so that this point of difference is not so serious as might be supposed. The semi-dramatic character of Homer's mode of statement is directly or indirectly recognized in 3, 1448a 21, and in 4, 1448b 37 (see note on the passage). In his reference to the practice of the 'other poets' (οἱ μὲν ὅπων
Aristotle must be supposed to mean ‘not only the more recent epic writers, like Antimachus and Choeirus, but also the immediate continuators of Homer, the Cyclic poets’ (Bergk, Gr. Litt. 1 p. 830).

δει ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτόν is emphatic, as in Top. 8. 2, 157 a 29 a 6 περιστοί ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιοῦτων ὑνοματοποιεῖν αὐτόν.—Pol. 8. 5, 1339 a 42 ταύτα γάρ τί δει μαθιάνει αὐτοῖς;

ἀγωνίζονται: see on 6, 1450 b 18.

μεμονται: see on 1, 1447 a 16.

ὁλιγά καὶ ὀλγάκις: De gen. an. 1. 19, 727 b 28 ὀλλγαὶ καὶ ὀλγάκις συμβαίνει.—3. 5, 756 a 17 ὀλγαὶ δὲ καὶ ὀλγάκις.—Eth. N. 7. 11, 1151 b 30 ἐν ὀλγαῖς καὶ ὀλγάκις (v. Bon. Ind. 503 a 37).—Plato Rep. 491 b ὀλγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύσεωι καὶ ὀλγας. For instances of other combinations of the same kind see on 24, 1459 b 13.

εἰσάγει: a metaphor from the stage, as may be seen from the Platonic use of the word (v. Ast, Lex. s.v.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 b 7 and 3. 17, 1418 a 32 it denotes the introduction of a person into a speech.

ὢδοὶ: see on 15, 1454 a 23.

οὐδὲν ἄκριτον ἄλλ᾽ ἔχοντα ἔδη: an instance of parallelismus antitheticus not unlike that in Plato Phaedr. 277 Α καὶ οὐκ ἄκρατοι ἄλλ᾽ ἔχοντας σπέρμα. With ἔχοντα the affirmative ἔκαστον has to be supplied (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 567). ἔδη, as used here in the plural of an individual, means ‘points’ or ‘traits of character’, as we say, ‘characteristics’. It has the same sense in Plato Rep. 402 D ὅτι̇ν ἐν ἐμπιστοτη ἐν τῇ πτη̇ν ψυχῇ καλὰ ἔδη ἐνώτα καὶ ἐν τῇ εἰδεί ὑμολογοῦντα ἐκεῖνοι ... τοῦτ ἄν εἴη κάλλουστον θέαμα.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν. μὲν οὖν marks a transition to a new point (Bon. Ind. 540 b 58). A fourth difference in epic poetry as compared with Tragedy is its great tolerance of ὀλογα; it can admit impossibilities which on the stage, where everything is actually seen, would ruin the success of a tragedy. This gives it a distinct advantage over Tragedy, as the ‘improbable’ is an element in the ‘marvellous’ (τὸ θαυμαστῶν), and the marvellous is a cause of pleasure to us (γόδ). It will be observed that pleasure is once more posited as the immediate end of poetry.

ἐν ταῖσ τραγῳδίαις: as has been assumed in 9, 1452 a 4 and 14, 1454 a 4.

τὸ θαυμαστῶν: see on 9, 1452 a 4.

τὸ ὀλογον: see on 15, 1454 b 6.
COMMENTARY

1460 a 14 διὰ τὸ μὴ ὅραν: comp. 17, 1453 a 27.

τὰ περὶ τὴν "Εκτορὸς διώξειν is explained by the participial clause in apposition (comp. Bernhardy, Syntax p. 472); the reference is to the statement in ll. 22, 205 λαοῦσιν ἐπειδή αἱ ἀνένευ καρῆται δίος Ἀχιλλεὺς, οὗτο ἐὰν ἔμεναι ἐπὶ Ἐκτορὶ πικρὰ βέλεμα. Aristotle reverts to this incident in 25, 1460 b 26, where he suggests an explanation to save the credit of Homer. An echo of the criticism in the text survives in Schol. Ven. B on ll. 22, 205, Μεγακλέδης [v. Schrader, Porphy. Q. H. in ll. p. 414] πλάσμα εἶναι φήσι τῶν ἀπὸ τὸ μονομάχιον πῶς γὰρ τοσοῦτο μυρίαδας νεῦματ' Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέστρεφεν;

a 17 τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἤδυ: Rhet. 3, 2, 1404 b 10 δὴ δὲι ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεξιν θαυμαστὴ γὰρ [scil. οἱ ἀνθρώποι] τῶν ἀπότων εἰσίν, ἤδυ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν. A reason is given in Rhet. 1, 11, 1371 a 31: καὶ τὸ μανθάνει καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἠδυ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθαίνει εἰς, ὅπερ τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητὸν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνει εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.

a 18 προστιθέντες, 'with additions'; the same absolute use of the word is found in 26, 1461 b 30 (προσθήκη).

δεδιδαχεῖν κτέ. Another of Homer's merits is said to be his mastery of the artistic lie—one that has something true super-added to make it seem credible. In illustration of this Aristotle points to the story in Od. 19, 164–248; where Ulysses astutely adds certain particulars (203–248), which Penelope knows to be true, and which beguile her into accepting the first part of his story as true. The connexion between this and the preceding section (a 11–18) is left unexplained, and it is certainly far from being obvious. If one may imagine the association of ideas in Aristotle's mind, it may perhaps have been something like this, that τὸ θαυμαστὸν is a truth with a πρόσθεσις of falsehood, and the lie artistic (ψευδὴ λέγειν ὡς δὲ) a falsehood with a πρόσθεσις of truth; so that the one is as it were the converse of the other.

a 20 ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμὸς, 'i.e. the use of paralogism'. παραλογισμός is like παραλογίζεσθαι (v. infra on a 25) an ambiguous term; it may mean either a fallacious argument (ψευδὴς συνλογισμὸς) or a deception caused by such an argument (ἀπάτη διὰ ψευδοῦς συνλογισμοῦ)—this latter being apparently its sense in the present passage, where it comes in to explain ψευδὴ λέγειν ὡς δὲ. The distinction, however, is probably clearer to us than it was to Aristotle himself. The general assumption in his logical writings is that an argument is addressed to some one—to a hearer who
has to be convinced or refuted; a fallacious argument is not only logically incorrect but also calculated to mislead the hearer who fails to see the fallacy in it.

οἰόντα γὰρ ἀνθρωπος. The artifice depends for its success on a natural weakness of the human intellect, our readiness to infer the presence of the thing from the presence of a 'sign' of it, or the truth of the antecedent from the truth of the consequent. The 'fallacia consequentis' is considered at length in Soph. el. 5, 167 b 1: ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἷοσκει αὐτωτέρους τὴν ἀκολουθίαν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ὄντος εἰς ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἢ, καὶ τοῦτο ὄντος οἰόντα καὶ θάτερον εἶναι εἰς ἀνάγκης ὅδε καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξην ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χαλάν μέλι ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἔπεσκει τὸ ἔανθον χρώμα τῷ μέλιτι καὶ ἐπεί συμβάλει τὴν γῆν ὑπάντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχον, κἂν ἤ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσιο τὸ δ' ὅν ἀναγκαίον. ἐν τε τοῖς ἡμιτονικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἔκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσὶν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖται ὅτι μοιχὸς, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐλαβον ὅτι καλλωπιστής ἢ ὅτι νῦκτωρ ὄραται πλανόμενοι. πολλοὶς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγοροῦμενον ὅχι ὑπάρχει. It is recognized as one of the arts of rhetoric in Rhet. 2. 19, 1392 b 16, and more fully in 2. 24, 1401 b 9, 20.

ἀνθρωπος or οἰόντα ἀνθρωπος seems to be required here; comp. the parallels in 1, 1447 b 13; Phys. 4. 6, 213 a 23, 27; Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12; Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 15, and 3. 2, 1404 b 9.

τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ψεύδος. τοῦτο has been taken to refer to τὸ πρῶτον, a 22 the antecedent, which, though not true, we imagine to be true. But it probably refers rather to the mode of argument, which is 'false', i.e. logically incorrect; comp. An. pr. i. 17, 37 a 2; i. 46, 52 b 28; Rhet. 2. 23, 1400 b 2.

πρῶτον = πρῶτον. Vahlen illustrates this from Top. 3. 5, a 23 119 a 22. For instances in other writers see Sauppe's Lexil. Xenophon. p. 112 and HSt. s.v.

προσθέτω, scil. τοῦτο τῷ ψεύδει, i.e. to provide the lie with a 24 a πρόσθεσις of truth, in order to beguile the hearer into accepting it as true.

παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχῆ; i.e. we on our side are quite ready a 25 to draw the false inference, which a lie of this kind is calculated to suggest. παραλογίζεσθαι has a noteworthy diversity of senses in Aristotle, sometimes meaning to draw a false inference, sometimes (with an acc. pers.) to deceive or beguile by a fallacy, and sometimes (as a passive) to be so deceived or beguiled (comp. Bon. Ind. 565 a 11); and it is not always easy to see the sense intended. In
the present passage the word must have the first of these three senses, as the emphasis on the pronoun in ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή points to something that we ourselves are supposed to do: we on our side, knowing the truth of the consequent (ὅτα τὸ τούτο εἰδέναι ἄληθές ὑν), are ready enough, owing to a natural infirmity of the human mind, to infer the truth of the antecedent; which is what the skilful deceiver wants us to do.

παράδειγμα δὲ τούτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων is a note more fitted for the rough draft of a lecture than for a book (see on 15, 1454 b 14 and 22, 1458 a 30). The quotation or explanation is left to be supplied afterwards. How it might have come in may be seen from the parallels in Rhet. 2. 23, 1399 a 7 παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου “εἰς ποίον ἵπτον ἑστήκηκεν; τίνας θεών οὐ τετήρηκεν ἃν ἡ πόλις νομίζει,” and Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 29 παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μάλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἑκάθετο ἡ ἄνδρος ἡ τέκνων τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄν γενέσθαι ἀπολογήματα, “μητρὸς δ' ἐν "Αἰδον καὶ πατρὸς βεβηγότον οὐκ ἐστ' ἀδελφὸς ὀστίς ἄν βλάστηκεν τοτε’

ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων: Od. 19. 164-260 (see on 16, 1454 b 30). Penelope was the victim of a ‘fallacia consequentis’, as her only reason for accepting Ulysses’ statement in 164-200 as true was her recognition of the truth of that in 220-248.

προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ κτέ. Aristotle returns to τὸ ἄλογον (a 13-17) and its general inadmissibility in the Drama. The illustrations in a 30-32 show him to be now thinking only of Tragedy; the rule here laid down is a restatement of one already formulated for Tragedy (15, 1454 b 6); and the distinction between ἔξω τοῦ μυθεῖματος and ἐν τῷ δράματi has no immediate relation to the technique of the Epic.

ἀδύνατα εἰκότα κτέ. According to 9, 1451 a 38 the subject of the poetic story should be something that is possible as being either probable or necessary, τὰ δύνατα κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. In the present passage Aristotle considers two inferior kinds of subject, one that is εἰκός without being δύνατον (ἀδύνατα εἰκότα), and one that is δύνατον without being εἰκός (δύνατα ἀπίθανα). The former, he says, is poetically preferable to the latter; poetry demands not so much truth as a passable semblance of truth (comp. 25, 1461 b 11).

λόγοι: i.e. the μύθου or stories embodied in the play or poem (see on 4, 1449 a 17). τούς λόγους, which is the subject of ἔχειν in a 29, is apparently the subject of συνιστασθαι. συνιστασθαι, though a middle in a 34 (comp. 6, 1450 a 37), must be a passive
here, as it certainly is in 26, 1462 a 16 (see on 1, 1447 a 9). The 1460 a 27
same rule has already appeared in a slightly different form in
15. 1454 b 6.

\[\text{εξω των μυθειματος} : \text{see on 14, 1453 b 32.}\]

\[\text{Οδιττονς : see on 14, 1453 b 32, a 30.}\]

The article seems to have dropped out before the name (see on 4, 1448 b 38). \(\text{εχει}\) has to be supplied from the \(\text{εχειν}\) in the preceding line.

\(\text{το μη ειδεναι, scil. των Οδιττονων, just as in 16, 1455 a 19 \text{βουλεσθαι}} \)
means \(\text{βουλεσθαι την Ιφιγένειαν,}\) the names being understood from
the titles of the plays. In some instances, however (16, 1455 a 1, a 3, a 10), the personages referred to are not indicated even in this
indirect way. The fact of Oedipus remaining for years in igno-
rance of the circumstances of the death of Laius is an improbability in
the O. T.; but in Aristotle's view it is not so serious a fault as it
might seem, since it is all anterior to the action, and outside the
play itself.

\(\text{εν Ηλλακτρα : Sophocles El. 660 sqq. The precise fault Arist-}\)
totle saw in the story is not quite clear; as the stress, however,
seems to be on \(\tau\) \text{Πουθα, the probability is that it was the anachronism}
in the reference to the Pythian games; the fault
is noted by the Scholiast on El. 682 (\(\text{oυπω \ ην \ επι \ 'Ορέστου \ δ' \ Πυθικός \ αγών}: \text{comp. Schol. on El. 47, 49,}\) who may be assumed to be reproducing a traditional criticism. The alternative is
to suppose the absurdity to consist in Clytaemnestra having to learn
the news for the first time from the \(\text{παιδαγωγός: 'an credibile est}
nullum Argivum hominem ludis interfuisse, qui spectare Orestae
exitium posset; cum ex universa Graecia eo fieret concursus?'}
(Robortello).

\(\text{εν Μυρωιδ : probably in the Μυρωι} \text{of Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF, 2 a 32 p. 47). The personage described as \(\text{Αφωνος \ εκ Τεγέας \ εις την Μυρωι \ ηκων \ was no doubt Telephus, a favourite subject for}\) Tragedy (comp. 13, 1453 a 21). His long-maintained silence, which
was an element of improbability in the play, passed into a proverb
in the later Comedy: Amphis fr. 30, 6 Kock \(\text{εκαψεν \ ουσπερ Τήλεφος}
\text{πρωτον \ σιωπη—και δικαιώς τούτο γε \ άπαντες \ άνδροφόνου γάρ 
\text{είσον \ ένι \ λάγο.} —Alexis fr. 178 K. \text{δεπτει \ δ' \ άφωνος Τήλεφος, νευόν
\text{μόνον \ πρός τους \ έπερατωτίσ τι.}}\)

\(\text{συνιστάθαι, which seems to have the same subject as \(\text{θη\) in αν \ δε a 34}
θη, must be a middle here (see on a 27).}\)

\(\text{αν \ δε \ θη, scil. τοιοτων \ μόθουν \ δ' \ ποιητής, or perhaps (as Bon. Ind.}
751 a 25 suggests) \(\text{το \ αλογον \ εν \ της \ συντάσσει \ του \ μίθου}. \text{The usual}\)

\(\text{POETICS}\)
punctuation of this passage is ἄν δὲ θῆ, καὶ φαίνεται εἰλογωτέρως, ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἀτοπον, which Tyrwhitt, with the old reading εἰλογώ-
tέρον before him, supposes to mean 'sin constitut quis et rationi consentaneum magis videatur, admirtere etiam aliquid absurdi' [scil. oportet]. Vahlen, who takes the same view, thinks that εἰλογωτέρως may stand for εἰλογωτέρως ἔχει (comp. Bon. Ind. 306 a 16), that δὲ may be supplied with ἐνδέχεσθαι from the context (a 34), and also that ἐνδέχεσθαι may mean 'admittere,' like δέχεσθαι or ἀποδέχεσθαι. With the amended punctuation the following will be the general drift of the passage: having just declared a certain procedure to be wrong (ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐ δὲ συνίστα-
σθαί τούτους), Aristotle adds that in a certain case—ἄν δὲ θῆ καὶ φαίνεται εἰλογωτέρως ἐνδέχεσθαι—it is not only wrong but also absurd (καὶ ἀτοπον). With ἐνδέχεσθαι we may supply θεία, from ἄν δὲ θῆ; comp. 25. 1461 a 34 ποσαχὸς ἐνδέχεται (where σημαίνει is understood from the preceding ποσαχὸς ἄν σημαίνη), and An. pr. 1. 15, 34 a 34 ύπαρχέτω τὸ Λ παντὶ τῷ B, τὸ δὲ B παντὶ τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεσθω (where ἐνδέχεσθω = ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν). For the use of ἀτοπον comp. De div. per somn. 1, 462 b 20 τὸ τε γὰρ θέων εἶναι τοῦν πέμποντα [scil. τὰ ἐνύπνα], πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς βελτίωτοις καὶ φρονιμωνατὸς ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχόντες πέμπειν ἀτοπον.

35 ἐν Ὀδυσσεία. In Od. 1. 116 sqq. Ulysses is said to have slept on even when the Phaeacians were setting him ashore. Porphyry ad loc. (p. 115 Schrader) recognizes the difficulty in the story, and quotes the explanation of Heraclides Ponticus: τὴν τῶν Φαύακων ἀτοπῶν, καθ' ἵν τὸν Ὀδυσσεά καθείδοντα μὴ δυνατόν τινι κατέθεντο, τοῦ τὲ Ὀδυσσεώς τὸν ἀκαίρον ὑπόν διαλύειν πεπρώμενος ὁ Ποντικὸς Ἥρακλείδης φηνὶν ἄτοπον εἶναι τοὺς ἓς ἔνθεν ὅ πουντις 
μὴ στοιχαζομένους πείρα τοῦ παντὸς τρόπον τῶν Φαύακων κτέ. 

2 ἀφαιλίζει: see Bon. Ind. 127 a 1. The sense is that the attractiveness of the accessories (ἡδωνέω; see on 6, 1449 b 25) disguises the inherent absurdity of the situation.

3 ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρει. The meaning of these words has been supposed to be explained by what follows, καὶ μήτε ἥθικος μήτε διανοητικὸς; comp. Goulston's version of the clause, 'in partibus fabulæ ignavis, is scilicet quae neque moratae sunt neque senten-
tiiss munitæ.' The sense, however, may very well be, 'in the parts in which there is no movement, and no ethical or rhetorical interest,' i.e. in the purely descriptive parts. For the form of the statement comp. Rhet. 3, 2, 1404 b 2 σαφῆ... καὶ μήτε ταπεινήν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄξιομα.
On Aristotle's was he the examined Problem 8 was ανεποητοκ. It is added as a sort of Appendix, in recognition of the fact that a poem, when once before the world, may be exposed to criticism. A 'Problem' was originally a question propounded for discussion, whether in schools or in social gatherings such as Plato supposes in his dialogues. The general logic of such discussions is examined and reduced to formula in the Topics; but Aristotle takes no account in the Topics of the particular kind of Problem with which he is now dealing, the literary or critical Problem. This kind of question turns on some difficulty in a poem, which an adverse critic will censure as a mistake. By an analysis of the postulates and conditions of poetry Aristotle is able to determine and classify not only the various possible grounds of censure (ἐπιτίμησις), but also the various possible lines of defence, by indicating the solution (λύσις) or solutions applicable to each kind of objection. In illustrating the methods of defence he takes his instances mainly from the Homeric poems. Homer had long been a mark for criticism. Every kind of defect had been discovered in his two poems, offences against morality, absurdities, contradictions and other faults of construction, and even errors of language; the result being that Aristotle's contemporary Zölius, the 'Homeromastix', was able to write a regular treatise (of considerable magnitude, it would seem) κατὰ τῆς τοῦ Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως, on the manifold faults in Homer. The position of Aristotle himself in this controversy is clear: he is on the side of the apologists, and an opponent of the kind of criticism represented by Zölius. He is ready to meet the critics on their own ground with an answer of some sort or description for almost every difficulty they can start. The fragments of his ἀπορίματα Ὀμηρικά, a systematic work on this subject (fr. 142-178 Teubn.), exhibit the same tendency, and reveal him as a master of all the arts of critical casuistry.

ὡδ' ἄν θεωροῦσι γένοιτ' ἄν φανερόν. For other Aristotelian instances of this repetition of ἄν see Bon. Ind. 41 a 6o.

ἐπει γάρ ἔστι κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the various kinds of ὅσεις by laying down a series of postulates, which may supply the defence with arguments to meet the attacks of the critics. In the first place, he tells us, as the poet is an imitator in much the same way as a painter is that, one must remember that his imitation or picture of things may be either of things as they are (or were), or
of things as they should be, or of things as they are said or
supposed to be. Secondly, as an imitator in language, the poet
has by custom more liberty in the use of words than is allowed
to a prose writer. Thirdly, if the technical correctness of his
derscription of a thing is questioned, it is to be remembered that
poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, and that the
right in poetry is not the same thing as the right in other arts or
sciences, in politics for instance. At the same time, as the matter
of poetry brings it into relation with other arts and sciences, their
standard of correctness cannot be ignored in poetry. An offence,
however, against their rule of correctness may often be condoned;
and in certain cases it even admits of justification (b 24), if it is seen
to conduce to the poetical effect.

The term ἐικονοποίος comprises the sculptor as well as the painter of
portraits.

οἶα ἡν ἡ ἔστιν. In chap. 2 Aristotle was speaking of persons
only. In the present passage he uses the neuter in order to include
the poetic descriptions of things and acts. The order of
the words ἡν ἡ ἔστιν is intentional, stories of the past being
regarded as the normal subjects of both epic poetry and Tragedy
(see on 2, 1448a18). It may be observed that in 1461a2
Aristotle avails himself of the distinction implied in οἶα ἡν ἡ ἔστιν,
and suggests that a certain incident, which had been criticized in
Homer, may have been probable enough in Homeric times.

οἶα φασὶν καὶ δοκεῖ, scil. εἴναι (which covers the ground of both
ἡν and ἔστιν). The difference between the two things (οἶα φασὶν,
οἶα δοκεῖ), so far as there is one, is like that between τὰ λεγόμενα
and τὰ δοκοῦσα—'what people usually say', and 'what people
usually think, or suppose'.

λέξει ἡ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ. λέξει is properly a generic term,
including the metaphor, the strange word, etc. Here, however,
Aristotle adds ἡ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ, in order to remind us of the
fact that these various unusual forms of expression are a recognized
part of the poetic vocabulary. The practical effect of the addition
is to modify the sense of λέξει, and make it stand for κυρία λέξει,
just as in 1, 1447a29 (v. ad loc.) the addition of τοῖς μέτροις has
a reflex influence on the preceding word λόγος, limiting it for
the moment to the sense of 'prose'. The generic word ὁμορράον
likewise is occasionally used in a context which gives it the more
specific sense of κύριον όνόμα (see on 22, 1458 a 28). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore κυρία with Heinsius, or λέξεις κυρία with Twining, or λέξεις κυρίας όνόματι with Vahlen.

πάθη τῆς λέξεως: i.e. the modifications seen in the ἐπεκτεταμένον the φησίν ημένον, and the ἐξηλλαγμένον όνόμα (21, 1458 a 1), which, though substantially identical with the ordinary words (22, 1458 b 4), are distinguished from them through some deviation of form. The term πάθος is used in this same sense by Theophrastus in a fragment of his Περί λέξεως (Rabe, De Theophrasti libris περί λέξεως p. 6): τὸς ἡ κυρία λέξεις, τὸς δ' ἡ μεταφορική; καὶ τῶν τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς, οἴον τι ἀποκοπή, τι συγκοπή, τι ἀφαίρεσις.

διδομέν γὰρ ταύτα: a recognition of what were afterwards known as poetic licences. Aristotle has already shown their use and legitimacy in poetry (22, 1458 a 34).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ. The kind of criticism Aristotle has in mind is one sufficiently familiar to us moderns; we know that a picture, for instance, is often censured for errors of anatomy, and a novel for errors of history or archaeology. In Aristotle's view technical accuracy in such points, though desirable (b 27), is neither the one thing nor the first thing needful in a poem. Poetry, as a distinct art, has an end, a procedure, and a correctness of its own; and it is thus quite possible for a description in a poem to be poetically right, even though it may be wrong in some technical detail.

τῆς πολιτικῆς. Πολιτική, as the art which deals with human life and conduct, might easily seem to stand in a very intimate relation to poetry, which has to depict human life and conduct (comp. 6, 1450 a 16 μύροις πράγμα καὶ βίον); and as a matter of history the connexion between the two arts was posited in the common notion of the older poets being authorities on all questions of πολιτική, and the great teachers of moral and political wisdom (comp. Plato Rep. 598 d, 606 e; also Dümmler, Kl. Schriften 1 p. 30). It is not without reason, therefore, that Aristotle takes πολιτική as his instance here, and emphasizes the distinction between the 'political' and the 'poetical' standard of right.

It may perhaps be thought that in affirming this distinction Aristotle anticipates the idea of 'Art for Art', and regards poetry as raised above the limitations imposed on all ordinary human activities by social or moral law. Such a notion would ill accord with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In Aristotle's view
a deviation in poetry from the ethically right is, just like one from probability or truth, an exceptional procedure, and to be condoned only when it is seen to be necessary for the ultimate poetical effect. The tragic hero, if one is to feel pity for him in his misfortunes, should be a good man—either better than, or at least as good as, the average of mankind. The secondary personages too should be each good in their way, unless the plot happens to require a character of a lower type; in which case his baseness should be no more than is wanted for the evolution of the story. Even Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, has its ethical limitations: the comic personage, though by hypothesis worse than the average man, is worse only up to a certain point; his faults of character or conduct being such as may be laughed at, i.e. they do not excite anger or abhorrence in the normally minded spectator in the theatre. The tacit assumption throughout the Poetics is that the theatrical public is on the whole normal in its moral instincts and sympathies, and that the poet should never lose sight of the fact. Readers of the Nicomachean Ethics will remember that in the Aristotelian hierarchy of arts all the other arts are regarded as subordinate to πολιτική, the supreme art, which deals with the whole social and moral order of the State, and that there is no hint of the so-called ‘aesthetic’ arts being outside its purview and control.

The argument may be thus restated: There is always a twofold possibility of error in the poet’s μέμησις or description of things. (1) Starting with a correct idea of the object to be described, he may fail to express his own meaning; in which case his art as a poet (or μεμητής) is at fault, and his faulty description is a sign of artistic or literary incapacity. (2) On the other hand the error may be simply due to his starting with an erroneous idea of the object; in which case it arises not from lack of descriptive power on his part, but from insufficient knowledge of something outside poetry, and it is thus in the accidents rather than the essentials of the poetic art. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 33, 182 b 33 ἀπορία δ’ εστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... ἡ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἀριστικοῖς, to show that an article is not wanted before ἀμαρτία.

δύναμίαν: comp. 16, 1454 b 21 δι’ ἀπορίαν. δι’ ἀδυναμίαν is practically equivalent to δι’ ἀτεχνίαν, through lack of artistic power—art being with Aristotle a kind of δύναμις or power (v. Bon. Ind. 207 b 6).
25. I 1460 b 14-18

 eğ ò το προελέσθαι κτέ. I have not been able to follow Vahlen 1460 b 18

 in his general view of this passage, which in his edition reads thus: —

 eğ ò το προελέσθαι μη ὄρθως ἄλλα τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα ἢ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα οἰον τὸ κατ' ἰατρικῆν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἡ ἄδινατα πεποίηται] ὀποιαιούν, οὐ καθ' ἐκάστην.

 This reading requires us to take μη ὄρθως as standing for μη ὄρθως εἰχεν, and ἄλλα τὸν ἵππον κτέ. as a short way of saying ἄλλα προελεύτερο μυκήσασθαι οἰον τὸν ἵππον κτέ. It is, however, much simpler to suppose that μη ὄρθως = μη ὄρθως μυκήσασθαι, and to take ἄλλα τὸν ἵππον κτέ. (scil. μυκήσασθαι) as a concrete instance of the opposite of ὄρθως μυκήσασθαι. The insertion also of ἀμά μα before ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα is unnecessary; these words (as the tense of the participle is enough to show) suggest a picture; and the fault in the picture consists in the horse in motion being depicted with both right legs thrown forward, instead of only one of them. As regards the clause ἦ ἄδινατα πεποίηται, which Vahlen (after Düntzer) excises as a dittography of the ἄδινατα πεποίηται in b 23, it seems to me that the words are wanted for two reasons, (1) to enable us to supply πεποίηται after τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα, and (2) to give the statement the requisite breadth. The error in the poet’s picture or description (comp. πεποίηται) may be in matters which come under the cognition of some special art or science (τὸ καθ’ ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα), but it may also be in matters of a less distinctly technical nature. Aristotle adds ἦ ἄδινατα πεποίηται ὑποί' ἄν εἰ ὄιν in order to include this latter kind of error. The instance of it in the context (b 26) is the absurdity (comp. 24, 1460 a 15), or rather the offence against common sense, in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad. That given in b 31 of the other form of error is a mistake in natural history, i.e. in a matter of technical knowledge. The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of error is a very real one, at any rate in controversy (v. on 25, 1461 b 24).

 τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, scil. μυκήσασθαι. In Aristotle’s view this is a mistake in natural history, and inconsistent with the general law of the diagonal movement of the legs of quadrupeds walking as laid down in the De Incessu an. 14, 712 a 24: καὶνίται δὲ τὰ ὤπίσθια πρὸς τὰ ἐμπροσθέν κατὰ διάμετρον’ μετα γὰρ τὸ δεξιῶν τῶν ἐμπροσθέν τὸ ἀριστερόν τῶν ὤπισθεν κυνοὺσιν, εἴτε τὸ ἀριστερόν τῶν ἐμπροσθέν, μετα δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δεξιῶν τῶν ὤπισθεν... δὲ τοῖς δεξιοῖς ἀμφιτέρως πρώτοις [scil. ἐπωοῦντο τὴν κίνησιν], ἐκω
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1460 b 18 ἂν ἐγγύνοντο τὸν ἐρωσμάτων καὶ ἐπιπτον ϑὰν. He was apparently unaware of the fact that the legs of the horse are actually in the position assumed to be impossible in certain stages of the amble and the rack. A horse with legs in this position is to be seen in modern art in Meissonier’s ‘Cavaliers en marche’ (Exposition Meissonier, No. 114—Paris 1893). Illustrations from the life will be found in E. Muybridge’s ‘Animal Locomotion’—Philadelphia 1872–93.

b 21 ὅσο᾽ ἂν ὄνω, scil. ή or πεποιημένα ή. For the omission of the verb comp. Soph. el. 17, 175 b 27 ὅποτέρῳ γὰρ ἂν ὄντων διαφέρει.—Eth. N. 3. 10. 1115 b 19 ὅς ἂν ὁ λόγος.—Pol. 6. 3, 1318 a 22 ὅ τι ἂν οἱ δόλοι (also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 255). We should expect simply ὅσοιανων, the formula ordinarily used by Aristotle in passages like the present.

οὐ καθ᾽ ἐστιν (scil. ἡ ἀμαρτία τῆς ποιημάτος) is the apodosis, and the opposite of that in the preceding clause (b 17), αὐτὴς ἡ ἀμαρτία. The general sense of the passage (with the reading τῷ προελέσθαι) is briefly this: If it was through a mistake in his original conception of the thing that either the technical error, or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, the error in that case does not belong to the art of the poet per se, but only per accident.

㧑οτε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα κτέ. A Problem in Aristotle’s sense of the term is only a kind of question (v. on b 6); but the mere fact of a question being raised in reference to the poet’s work involves the possibility of an answer unfavourable to him, i.e. of ἐπιτιμίμα, a censure or condemnation of what he has said. We have had ἐπιτιμήμα in this technical sense in 19, 1456 b 14, and the verb ἐπιτιμᾶν in 17, 1455 a 26, in 19, 1456 b 16, and in 22, 1458 b 6. The criticisms to which a poem is exposed Aristotle examines under the three heads indicated in the preceding statement (b 7–21), but in reverse order: (1) the strictures passed on the poet’s descriptions of things (b 22–32); (2) those relating to the kind of subject he has chosen to depict (b 32–1461 a 9); and (3) the faults found in his language (1461 a 9–31). After that he shows in what way or ways each kind of criticism has to be answered.

b 23 τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐπιτιμήματα, the censures relating to the artistic execution in his imitations.

<ei> ἀδύνατα πεποίηται. Ueberweg suggests that the traditional ἀδύνατα πεποίηται (without the insertion of ei) may be a rhetorical
way of putting the supposition, such as might be used in an actual 1460 b 23
debate or discussion. In the course of this chapter Aristotle more
than once writes as if he were simply reporting a possible debate
(v. on b 33 ἀλλ' ἵπτως δεῖ, and on 1461 a 1 ἀλλ' εἰν ἄκαρ).

ήμαρτησαι is the natural opposite of the ὥρθος ἔχει in the next line; comp. Eth. E. 2. 11, 1227 b 21 ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν σκοτὸν ἰμαρτήσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνον περαιόντα ὥρθος ἔχειν.—Eth. N. 8. 12, 1160 b 30 αὕτη μὲν οὖν [scl. ἡ ἄρχη] ὥρθη φαίνεται, ἡ Περσική δ' ἰμαρτημένη.—Eth. N. 6. 10, 1142 b 10 ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστω ὥρθος, οὔδ' ὡς ἀμαρτία.—2. 2, 1104 b 32 περὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικὸς ἔστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικὸς.

τὸ γὰρ τέλος εὑρήσαι: a reason for the statement that follows b 24 (see on 21, 1457 b 34). For the use of εὑρήσαι (which has been very unadvisedly questioned and altered into εὑρισκεῖ, αἰρεῖται, εἰληφθηται, or ἰηρεῖται) see on 11, 1452 b 11.

εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικῶτερον κτδ. is appositional to εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ b 25 τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς. Vahlen compares Metaph. E 3, 1027 a 30 εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, εἷς ανάγκης πάντ' ἐσται, εἰ τοῦ γενομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός αὐτῶν τι ἀνάγκη ἔστω.—Plato Gorg. 522 C ἐι ἐκεῖνῳ γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχω, δ' Καλλικλεῖς, δ' σὺ πολλάκις ὑμολόγησας, εἶ βεβοθήκος εἰς αὐτῷ κτδ.; and Hyperides Euxen. 23, 24, Lysias 3, 38. The clause only gives an illustration, not a complete account of the end of poetry. That surprise is one of the legitimate effects of poetry was definitely said, though the point is nowhere demonstrated, in 24, 1460 a 11; it has been assumed also in 9, 1452 a 4, in 14, 1454 a 4, and in 16, 1455 a 17. For the meaning of ἐκπληκτικῶτερον see on 14, 1454 a 4.

〈ἡ μὴ〉 ἦττον: Metaph. K 5, 1062 a 25 δοξεῖε δὲ κἂν οὐδ' ἦττον b 27 εἶναι φάκτων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἦττον ἄλθεσεν ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον.

ἡμαρτήσαι here seems to be a dittographia of the ἰμαρτήσαι b 28 in the next line (J. of Phil. 14, p. 52).

δεῖ γὰρ κτέ.: comp. the parallel statement as to the avoidance of ἀλογα in 24, 1460 a 28. The general rule is that the descriptions in poetry should be in accordance with the technical standard of correctness; but at the same time there are cases in which some sacrifice of technical accuracy may be requisite to produce the poetic effect (b 24; comp. 1461 b 11 πρὸς τὴν ποιήσασαν), and in these the end justifies the means. This is the only direct answer to an objection of this kind. But if such an answer is not possible, it may perhaps be urged, in mitigation of censure at
any rate, that the technical error is in a minor matter (31), and as such, a venial fault in an imitative art.

29 ἐτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀμάρτημα κτλ. is not a λύσις proper, but an attempt to minimize the offence. In a λύσις proper the point to which the opponent has taken exception is shown to have another aspect, and to be right (ὄρθως ἑξει 24) when viewed in that other aspect.

30 τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην: in matters belonging to his art, i.e. the art of poetry, as distinct from matters outside poetry, and only accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) connected with it. Vahlen draws attention to the change of construction, κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός instead of τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For the appositional clause after ποτέρων comp. Eth. N. 9. 1, 116422, and Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b 15.

31 ἔλαφος θῆλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἑξει: H. A. 4. 11, 538 b 18 κέρατα έλαφος θῆλεια οὐκ ἑξει.—De part. an. 3. 1, 662 a 1 τῶν ἔλαφον οἱ μὲν ἄρρενες ἐξουνι κέρατα, αἱ δὲ θῆλειαι οὐκ ἑξουνι. The hind seems to have often been represented as having horns not only by poets (v. Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fr. p. 61), but also by artists; comp. the Scholiast on Pindar Ol. 3. 52: ἐπιμελῶς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὴν θῆλειαν ἐλαφὸν κέρατα ἐξουνι εἰσάγουσιν καθάπερ καὶ τὴν θηλάζουσιν τῶν Τήλεφον γράφουσι καὶ πλάττουσι.

32 ἀμυητῶς is the opposite of μιμητικῶς. In Probl. 29. 10, 951 a 6 (the only Aristotelian passage in which it recurs) ἀμυητῶς is the opposite of μιμητός; but it is not uncommon with negative words of this type to have two senses, an active as well as a passive; ἀναίσθητος, for instance, is the opposite not only of αἰσθητός but also of αἰσθητικός. The negative idea in this and similar privative terms must not be pressed too far (see on ἀφέως 6. 1450 a 25); ἀμυητῶς ἔγραψεν only means that the picture did not adequately express the artist’s meaning, i.e. did not express it in a way to be understood by others. A failure of this kind, which arises δὲ ἄδυναμίαν, through lack of artistic capacity (see above on b 17), is inexcusable in a μιμητής, whose work must be intelligible, if it is to give us the pleasure of a μίμημα (v. 4. 1448 b 15).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ. Aristotle passes on to the ἐπιτιμήματα which come under the first of the three heads in the survey in b 8 sqq. The objector is supposed to urge either that the poetic picture is not true to fact (comp. οἶα ἄν ἢ ἐστιν, b 10), or that it is not better than the reality (comp. οἶα εἶναι δὲ, b 11), or that it is not in harmony with tradition or opinion (comp. οἶα φασώ καὶ δοκεῖ b 10). The answers to these criticisms may take the follow-
ing forms:—(1) If not true to fact, the picture is perhaps better than the reality; (2) if neither true to fact nor better than the reality, it is perhaps in accordance with opinion; (3) if not in accordance with opinion, it is perhaps true to fact. There are thus three λύσεις for this class of ἑπταμήνατα. Aristotle omits to mention a fourth λύσις, the plea of poetic necessity (πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν, 1461 b 9), which is, wherever possible, a valid answer to almost any criticism.

ἀλλ' ἵσως δὲὶ—ἀλλ' ἵσως δὲὶ εἶναι, just as in the next line οἶνος δὲὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τινός, διαὶ Ἵοφολῆς χρηστάς παρεισάγει τᾶς γνώσεως αὐτῶς δὲ φαινᾶσ, εἶπεν, "ὅτι Ἵοφολῆς μὲν οὐς δὲὶ εἶναι τᾶς γνώσεως λέγει, ἔγω δὲ οὐαὶ εἶσαι (S. Maximus Conf. 2 p. 632 Combeft.).

ταύτη λυτέον. Having introduced an illustration (the saying of Sophocles), Aristotle adds ταύτη λυτέον, repeating the sense of the words preceding the illustration. This is an instance of what Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 209, terms the Binary structure with comparisons, when 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it.' For other Aristotelian instances see Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze i p. 6, and my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 27.

ὅτι οὔτω φασίν = λυτέον οὔτι οὔτω φασίν εἶναι. The construction (10 refute by saying that') is found in Soph. el. 24, 179 b 34 ἀμαρτάνοντι καὶ οἱ λύνοντες οὔτι ἀπασ ἀριθμός ἀλέγος.—Rhet. 2. 25, 1402 b 34 οὐκ ον κακῶν ἢν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαίον, ἀλλὰ δὲι λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.—Fr. 166 (Teubn.) ἐστὶ δὲ λύειν . . . ὅτι τουσάτα ἤν.

τὰ περὶ θεῶν: i.e. the poetic statements about Gods, though neither true nor better than the truth, may perhaps be said to be sanctioned by opinion, and to be what people are in the habit of repeating of the Gods.

ἔστερρ ἐνοφάνει, scil. ἐστίν, 'as they are in the view of Xenophanes' (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1, p. 421). Other Aristotelian instances of this use of the dative are De caelo 3. 8, 307 a 16 Δημη-

κράτῳ δὲ κα ἡ σφαίρα ὡς γυναί τις οὕσα τέμνει ὡς εὐκάτεντον.—De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 b 15 Ἐμπεδοκλεί τίνα τρόπον ἐσται γένεσίς καὶ φθορά καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, οὗ δῆλον. Xenophanes, we must remember,
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1461a 1 was the first to lift up his voice against Homer and Hesiod, as the
great exponents of a false and immoral conception of the Gods
(see fr. 10–12 Diels).

ἀλλ' ὅν = 'but at any rate' (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2. 2 p. 160;
comp. Bon. Ind. 33 b 33).

a 2 ἡγεῖα δὲ σφυν κτέ.: II. 10. 152 ἡγεῖα δὲ σφυν ἀρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρος
ἐλάπατο. The difficulty here is thus stated in a fragment of the
Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά (fr. 160 Teubn. = Porphyry. in II. 1. c. p. 145
Schrader), where the same solution is suggested: φαίλη δοκεὶ
εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρας στάσις· καὶ δὴ παντάχουνθάρυβον
ἥδη πεποίηκε νῦκτῳ ἐν μόνον πεσόν· λύνα δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων ὅτι
tουαύτα δὲ ποιεὶ Ὀμηρος οἷα ἤν τότε. ἤν δὲ τουαύτα τὰ παλαιά
οὐστερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις πολλοὶ δὲ οὔτω χρώνται τῶν
βαρβάρων. A similar justification of Homer, by reference to
a primitive custom still surviving among barbarians, is found in fr.
166 (= Porphyry. in II. 24. 15, p. 267 Schr.): διὰ τέ ὧν Ἀχιλλεὺς τὸν
'Εκτορα ἠλέκε περὶ τῶν τάφων τοῦ Πατράκλου παρὰ τὰ νενυμμενὰ
ποιῶν εἰς τῶν νεκρῶν; . . . ἔστι δὲ λύνειν, φησιν Ὀμηροτέλης, καὶ εἰς τὸς
ὑπάρχοντα ἀνάγοντα ἑθή, ὅτι τουαύτα ἤν, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ
περιέλκουν περὶ τοὺς τάφους.

a 3 σαυρωτήρος. If the form in the quotation in the Ἀπορήματα
Ὡμηρικά is to be trusted, Aristotle’s text of Homer would seem to
have had σαυρωτήρας, the reading of Aristophanes.

a 4 καλῶς ἢ μῆ καλῶς = πότερον καλῶς ἢ μῆ καλὸς (v. Kühner, Gr.
Gr. 3 2. 2 p. 532). The objection Aristotle is now considering is the
moral objection, the criticism that something said or done by
a personage in a poem was not morally right (ὅν ἐναι δὲ
1460 b 11). His point is that, before admitting the validity of such
an objection, it is proper to take the circumstances of the word
or deed into account, e.g. (1) the person to whom it was said or
done, (2) the moment, (3) the instrument used, and (4) the motive
in the mind of the speaker or agent. Eth. N. 3, 1, 1111 a 4
contains a fuller statement of the circumstances that may lead us
to modify the severity of our moral judgements (comp. fr. 174
Teubn.).

a 7 πρὸς ὅν κτέ.: i.e. πρὸς ὅν . . . ἔπραξεν ἢ ἐλέες ὧν ὁ πράττων ἢ
λέγων.

a 8 ὅτε. Plutarch (De aud. poet. 26 f) defends the four lines in
II. 9. 458–61, which Aristarchus is said to have excised, as being
πρὸς τὸν καυρὸν; comp. Porphyry. in II. 9. 203, p. 135. Schr. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καυροῦ, ὅτε νῦς.
μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ: An. pr. 2. 22, 68 a 35 αἱρετῶτερον δὲ τὸ μείζον 1461 a 8 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐλάττον κακὸν ἢ τὸ ἐλάττον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μείζον κακὸν (comp. Rhet. i. 10, 1369 b 25).—Porphyr. in Od. 13, 119, p. 117 Schr. πολλάκις γὰρ τῶν ἐν μιᾷ πράξει καὶ δυσχερές ὑπάρχει τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐστιν αἱρετῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν φευκτὸν διότερ οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὸς τοιούτας πράξεις.

τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξην κτέ. Aristotle's examples show that the difficulties coming under this head are of every possible kind; the one point they have in common is that they turn on language, and may be met by the discovery or adoption of another interpretation of the language in the incriminated statement.

διαλέγειν is simply a synonym for λύειν (Bon. Ind. 184 a 43; a 10 HSt. s.v.).

γλώττῃ: i.e. by taking some word in the passage as a γλώττα (see 21, 1457 b 4). For the instrumental dative, of which there are so many other instances in the context, comp. Soph. el. 24, 179 b 38 ἐνοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διττῷ λίτως τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς.

οὐρήμας μὲν πρῶτον: Il. i. 50 οὐρήμας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπόχετο καὶ κόνως ἄργοις. The difficulty the ancients found here was to understand why the mules were made to suffer first (v. Porphyr. ad loc. p. 4 Schrader). Aristotle's interpretation of οὐρήμας, which survives in Hesychius (s. v. οὐρήμα and οὐρήμασ), is condemned in Schol.Ven. A on Il. 1. c. (presumably from Aristonicus): ὅτι οὐκ ὑγίος τινες οὐρήμα τοῖς φυλακας αὐτιοπελλε τῷ διὰ τοῦ αὑτοῦ, and again on Il. 10. 84: ἄθετεται, ὅτι οὐρήμαν βούλεται λέγειν τῶν φυλακῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐκράτησεν τοῦ σχήματος οὐρήμαν γὰρ λέγει ὡς κούρων τῶν φυλακᾶ, οὐρήμα δὲ τῶν ἡμῶν.

δος β' ἡ τοι εἶδος: Il. 10. 316 δος δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἐπὶν κακὸς, ἄλλα a 12 ποδώκης. The question raised was apparently this: How could Dolon, if ill-shaped, have been swift of foot? The answer of Aristotle is that εἶδος κακὸς may have meant in Homer not 'ill-shaped', but simply 'ugly' or 'ill-looking'; he suggests that εἶδος may have been used not in its normal sense of 'shape', but in a strange sense (as a γλώττα) corresponding to that of the derivative εὐειδῆς in the Cretan dialect. His explanation of the word reappears in Schol. Bachm. on Il. 2. 58: εἶδος ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, and in Hesychius (s. v. εἶδη): εἶδος . . . ὑπῆς, πρόσωπον.

τὸ γὰρ εὐειδῆς κτέ. The traditional reading τὸ γὰρ εὐειδῆς οἱ a 13 Κρήτες εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦντι is supposed to mean that the word εὐειδῆς is applied by the Cretans to that which is εὐπρόσωπον; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'Cretenses εὐειδῆς vocant quod facie
speciosum est’, and Vahlen’s ‘vocabulo quod est εἰνέδεσ Cretes εὑπρόσωπον appellant’. The difficulty however is in the absence of the article with the subject, which produces an intolerable ambiguity. I have accordingly ventured to restore <τὸ> εὑπρόσωπον on the analogy of Aristotelian usage in the context (τὸ ἀκρατὸν ... τὸ βάττον) and in 6, 1449 b 29, as also elsewhere, e. g. in Metaph. Δ 29, 1025 a 11 τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ μυμείσθαι λέγων. Vahlen quotes a number of passages from other writers in defence of the vulgate, but as it seems to me, they are not all quite to the point; those from Plato (Theaet. 190 a and Crat. 416 c) at any rate may very well admit of another interpretation. The more important of his instances were discussed by W. Dindorf, Preface to Demosthenes p. lxii ed. Teubn. In two of them the anomaly may be removed at once by the same expedient, the insertion of a second article: Demosthenes 23, 33 τὰ γὰρ ἀσωματικὰ <τὰ> χρήματα ὑ方位αζον οἱ παλαιοὶ.—Xenophon Mem. 3. Υ. 7 ἐλευθέρως καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἀκρατάτερα, καθίστα, ἡμῶν δὲ κέραιε. Porphyry’s note on this is: ἀπετέρων ὡς γὰρ ἔπειραν ἤκουαν ἀκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τῆς λεῖας λύουσιν τὸ γὰρ ἦπερ ἀκρατότερου εἶναι τάχιον κτ. (p. 135 Schrader). Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 ἣ tells us that this was one of the many Homeric statements to which Zoilus took exception.

The comparative ἀκρατότερον is the usual equivalent for ἦπερ ἀκρατοσκέπασμα, and in the lexicographers: Apollonius Lex. p. 81 Bekk. ἦπερ ἀκρατότερον. — Hesychius ἦπερ ἀκρατότερον ἤνω αὐτῷ τάχιον. The reading ἦπερ, however, is sufficiently certified by Ath. 423 ε τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ ἦπερ ἀκρατότερον δὲ κέραιε’ ὥσαν ἀκρατοσκέπασμα ήμείσθαι φασίν, ἀλλὰ θέρμων ... ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ εὐκρατον ἄντὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 d).

ὦς οἰνόφλυξιν: comp. Probl. 3. 5, 871 a 27 διὰ τί οἱ οἰνόφλυγγες τρέμουσι, καὶ μάλλον ὡς αὐτὸν ἀκρατότερον;

Ἄλλοι μὲν βα λα κτ.: II. 10. 1 ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νυνὶν ἄριστης Παναγιώτικος ηὐδον παννύχιοι must be the passage Aristotle had in mind; but he seems to have mixed it up with that in II. 2. 1 ἄλλοι μὲν βα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἀποκορυφώσται ἠδον παννύχιοι. The difficulty in the passage was its inconsistency with II. 10. 11–13 (on the revelry and other signs of life among the Trojans), ἢ τοι ὤτ’ ἐσ πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήτειε, θαυμάζειν πυρὰ πολλά, τὰ καίτε Ἡλίθι
πρό, αἰλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοτὴν ὁμαδόν τ' ἄνθρωπων. Aristotle's 1461a 16 solution, it will be observed, consists in saying that πάντες may mean practically no more than 'many', and be an instance of the metaphorical substitution of a specific in lieu of a generic term (v. 21, 1457b 8). The word πάντες, therefore, must have appeared somewhere or other in the text of the Aristotelian quotation (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). Gräfenhan found a place for it by writing πάντες instead of ἄλλοι, and Tyrwhitt by restoring πάντες ὁμοῦ for παννύχιοι. A simpler expedient would perhaps be to suppose the passage, as Aristotle remembered it, to have run thus: ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ θεοὶ θεὶ καὶ ἀνέφες εἴδον ἀπάντες | παννύχιοι.

The omission of the line θαύραξεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι πρό may very well be due to Aristotle himself; it is difficult, however, to hold him responsible for the form the next line has in the MS., αἰλῶν συρίγγων τε ὁμαδόν—which the editors (following Syllburg) have made into αἰλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὁμαδόν (or ὁμαδόν); he must have known that the meaning thus given to ὁμαδός was not in accordance with Homeric usage. The accentuation too of the word in the manuscript (ὁμαδόν) is difficult to account for. I think that it may perhaps represent ὁμάδον, i.e. ὁμαδόν with an enclitic after it; so that the reading in the MS. may be the wreckage of an older reading, αἰλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοτήν ὁμαδόν οτ' ἄνθρωπων, in other words, of the line as it appears in the ordinary text of Homer.

tὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ. Porphyry on Od. 12. 374a 19 (p. 113 Schrader) records a similar interpretation of πάντα in Il. 3. 277: ἐναντίον τοῦτο [scil. Od. 12. 374] τῷ 'Ηλιόθι θ' ὅς πάντι ἐφορεῖς καὶ πάντι ἐπακούεις ἄφεν ἐναντίον γὰρ ἑχρῆν ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πάντα ἑφορῶντα. Λόγους δ' ἀν ἦ τῇ λέξει τὸ γὰρ πάντα δηλοὶ τὰ πλείστα κτε.

οἴη δ' ἀμμορός: Il. 18. 489 (= Od. 5. 275) οἴη δ' ἀμμορός ἐστὶ λοετρόν Ὀκεανῶν (said of the Great Bear). The astronomical difficulty in the line, which even led some of the Homeric critics of antiquity to alter the text (v. Strabo p. 3 Cas. and Apollonius Lex. p. 29 Bekk.), is thus stated by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 225 Schrader): ἀναστροφήν ἐστὶ τοῦτο καθηγοροῦντι μὲν γάρ κατὰ τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἀρκτοῦ λόγον φάσκοντος οἴη δ' ἀμμορός ἐστὶ λοετρόν Ὀκεανοῦ καθὸλου γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἄρκτικῷ μὴ δύνειν. Aristotle’s solution (which is not mentioned in the Scholia or elsewhere) is to take οἴη as a generic in the place of a specific word, i.e. as an
instance of a kind of metaphor already recognized in 21, 1457 b 7
(ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἴδος).

a 21 ἐπὶ γὰρ γνωριμῶσαν μόνον. Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 7, 14,
1153 b 35 διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας [scil. τὰς ἡδονὰς]
μόνας οἶονται εἶναι. For the substitution of μόνον, as a synonym
for οὖν, compare the use of κωλυθῆναι in a 34 to represent Homer’s
ἔσχετο.

κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, scil. δὲ λύειν (or διαλύειν), understood from
a 9 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὅρωντα δὲ διαλύειν. κατὰ means ‘by
reference to’, as in κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως in a 27; it is the
equivalent of the instrumental dative we find elsewhere in the context
(see on a 10) with λύειν (or διαλύειν).

Προσῳδία with Aristotle comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient
mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader. For
accent as a form of προσῳδία see Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1 (v. infra on
a 23); 21, 177 b 35; and 23, 179 a 14. Breathing is distinctly
said to come under this head in Soph. el. 20, 177 b 3 τὸ ὀρος καὶ
ὀρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἕτερον. ἄλλα ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμ-
μένοις ταῦταν ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον "καὶ
ὡςαίτως, κάκει δὲ ἡ ἡδὴ παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ
tαῦτα. That quantity also was regarded by Aristotle as part of
προσῳδία may be inferred from the position of μῆκει καὶ βραχύτητι
in the enumeration in 20, 1456 b 32 (v. Schmidt, Beitr. zur Gesch.
der Grammatik p. 188). His idea of προσῳδία, therefore, agreed
with that of Choeroboscus (Schollia in Dionys. Thraecis art. gramm.
p. 124. Hilgard), ἱστέων δὲ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς προσῳδίαις τρία ἐστίν κινή-
τον γὰρ τόνον, χρόνον, πνεύμα (comp. Egger, Apollonius Dyscole
p. 29, and Schmidt, l. c. p. 185).

a 22 Ἰππίας. The view of Senebusch (Hom. Diss. prior p. 206) is
that he lived in the second half of the fifth century, and may perhaps
be identified with the Hippias of Thasos mentioned by Lysias
(13. 54 and 61) as one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants.
Schrader (Porphyr. in II. p. 413) doubts whether there is any
sufficient evidence for this date.

διδομεν δὲ οἱ. The parallel in Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1 (v. on a 23)
shows that διδομεν δὲ οἱ εἰχος ἀρέσθαι was the reading in Aristotle’s
Homer in II. 2. 15, where our existing vulgate has Τρώωσαι δὲ
κηδε ἐφηπται; the reference too in the parenthesis, ὅστερ Ἰππίας
ἔλειν ὅ Θάσιος, shows that Hippias must have had the same reading
before him. It is clear that we have in this instance at any rate

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a real variant, and not one of Aristotle's misquotations. διδόμεν 1461 22
de τοι εἰχος ἀρέσθαι occurs in Il. 21. 297, but in a context very
unlike that of Il. 2. 15. The deceptive dream of Agamemnon in
Il. 2. 8 sqq. had been criticized by Plato Rep. 382 e, as making
Zeus a deceiver; and it was felt to be a difficulty by several of
the grammarians (v. Porphyri. in Il. l.c. p. 23 Schr.). As the half-line
διδόμεν δε οἱ εἰχος ἀρέσθαι seems to credit Zeus with a direct
lie, this was doubtless the difficulty which Aristotle and Hippias
thought to remove by the artifice of reading ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ not as
διδόμεν, but as δίδομεν, i.e. as an infinitive in the sense of an
imperative, so as to shift the actual falsehood from Zeus himself
Peppmüller).

τὸ μὲν οὖν καταπῆθεται ὄμβρῳ: Il. 23. 327 ἔστηκε ξύλον αὖν ὅσον a 23
τ' ὄργυν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, ἦ δρόνος ἡ πεύκης τὸ μὲν οὖν καταπῆθεται ὄμβρῳ.
Our text of Homer embodies the suggestion of Hippias, of for οὖ.
The objection to the older mode of reading the word (οὖ) was
probably this, that the statement was against scientific truth, oak
and pine being held to be among the woods least liable to rot
through moisture (Theophr. H. P. 3: 4, 3).

The view of Hippias is given with greater fullness in Soph. el.
4, 166 b 1: παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσφορὰν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διάλεκτι-
κοῖς οὗ ῥάδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιῆσαι
μᾶλλον, ὅπως καὶ τὸν Ὄμηρον ἔννοι διωρθοῦνται πρὸς τούς ἐλέγχοντας
ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα "τὸ μὲν οὖν καταπῆθεται ὄμβρῳ". λύοντι γὰρ
αὕτῳ τῇ προσφορᾷ λέγοντες τὸ ΟΥ ὄξυτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον
τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, οτι οἳκ αὕτος ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "διδόμεν δὲ οἱ εἰχος
ἀρέσθαι", ἄλλα τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐντέλλετο διδόναι. On this passage
Alexander, or rather Michael Ephesius (p. 33 Wallies), has a
comment which, besides serving to explain the passage in the
Soph. el., is not without interest for the history of the early cri-
icisms on Homer: τινὲς οὖν ἐκάκισον τὸν Ὄμηρον, περισσωμένως τὸ
ἀναγινώσκοντες καὶ λέγοντες ἄτοπον τι αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι διὰ τοῦτο,
ὡς λέγοντα δῆθεν ὅτι τοῦ ξύλου ἐκείνου ... τι μὲν καταστήται τι δὲ
οὗ καταστήται εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ τούτο ἑξῆλθον ἑναργώς, τὸ τι δὲ οὖ
καταστήται λέγοντας ἀντικρὴν δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τοῦ εἰρημένον, τοῦ "οὐ
τὸ μὲν καταπῆθεται" ...... ἐπιδιωρθοῦται δὲ τοῦτος [ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιη-
tικός], ωσ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ῥητορικῇ [read with Vahlen,
ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς] φησιν, Ἰππίας ὁ Θάσιος μὴ περισσομένως
ἀναγινώσκον τὸ οὖ ἀλλʼ ἀποφατικῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὀξύτερον εἰρηκεν,
ὅτα ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἡ πεύκη τὸ δένδρον οἷς καταπῆθεται ὄμβρῳ ... .

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1461 a 23 τὸ δ’ ἐτερον [scil. παράδειγμα] τὸ ἐπαγόμενον, τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνίπτνον τοῦ 'Αγαμέμνονος, ὁ φησὶ τοῦ Δία εἰπεῖν τῷ "διόδομεν δὲ οἱ εἴχοσ ἀρέσθαι", οὐδαμοῦ κεῖται ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι . . . . εἰσὶν οὖν τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Δία πρὸς τὸν ὑπεραφὸν ὅτι βὰς ταῦτα εἰπὲ τῷ 'Αγαμέμνονι ὅτι διόδομεν αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῆς νίκης. φασιν οὖν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ὡς εἰτάθαι ἀμαρτάνει οἱ ποιητής εἰσάγον τὸν Δία διαλεγόμενον ταῦτα τῷ ὑνείρῳ καὶ τρό- πον τοῦν τευχόδομεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἐστὶ θεοῦ. οἱ γονῖς ἐπιδιορθούμενοι τοῦτον φασιν ὡς οὐ τῷ 'Αγαμέμνονι ὁ Ζεὺς ἔληγε τῷ εἵχοσ δοθήναι ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑνείρῳ κατὰ τοῦ 'Αγαμέμνονος' ἀναγνώσκωσι δε ὀντος, "διόδομεν δὲ οἱ", ἀντί τοῦ σοι, τῷ ὑνείρῳ. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ψεύδος: ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς νοῦς ἐστὶ κἂν τὸν οὖν ἀναβιβασθεὶ κἂν περι- στασεῖ ἡ ἀντωνιμία ή οὐ. τοῦ γονίπ [? οὖν] ἐστιν ἡ ἀμαρτία; ή οὖν εἰς τῷ "δὲ οἱ" ἀλλ' εἰς τῷ "διόδομεν" . . . εἰ γονίπ [? μὲν οὖν] τῷ "διόδομεν δὲ οἱ εἴχοσ ἀρέσθαι" ἀναγνίσει τοῦ τόνων θείες ἐς τῷ δ, τοῦ Δία ποικὶ ψευδόμενοι, ὥς υπηχυριμένων διδόναι τὴν νίκην καὶ µέ εἰς ἐργον ἐξήγουσα τὴν ὑπόθεσιν; εἰ δὲ εἰς τῷ δ δε τῶν τόνων θείς ἀναγνίς τοῦ ἐξῆς, καὶ τοῦ Δία τοῦ ψευδόμενοι ἀπολύσει, καὶ τῷ ὘μηρῷ περιποι- σεται τὸ ἀνέγκλητον, ὃς τοῦ Δία λέγοντος τῷ ὑνείρῳ καὶ ἐπιτάτουν διδόμεναι αὐτῶν τοῦ ὑπεραφον τοῦ εἵχοσ τοῦ 'Αγαμέμνον καὶ µή αὐτοῦ τοῦ Δίας. καὶ γονίπ ὃν ὑποχνεῖται τῷ 'Αγαμέμνον τῷ εἵχοσ καὶ ψεύδειται, καὶ οἷς ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς.

It will be observed that in the explanation of II. 23. 328 in the Soph. el. the negative o' is said to be distinguished from the pronoun o' by being pronounced δέτερον, i.e. δέτωνος. This takes us back to a time when o' was oxytone wheresoever it occurs (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 9 1. 1 p. 331), as it was held to be by more than one of the grammarians: Herodian 1 p. 504;凭借 tē eis o' περιστάτωμαι, πανταχῦν, ἀγχῦν, . . . καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πλῆν τοῦ [!] τοῦ ἱδού τὸ δεικτικὸν, ἵον τὸ σχετικιστικὸν, καὶ οὗ τὸ ἀρνητικὸν τούτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνετείᾳ δεύνεται.

τὰ δὲ διαίρεσι, scil. ἀντέον. Διαίρεσις—a wider term than our 'punctuation'—is the opposite of σύνθεσις (comp. Soph. el. 4, 166 a 23), and includes every sort of break in reading, even one only just enough to keep words from being taken together in construction. The kind of difficulty to which this solution is applicable, may be seen from the instances in the Sophistici elenchii, ἐγὼ σ' ἐθήκα δοῦλον ἐντ' ἐλεύθερον (4, 166 a 36), and ἄρ' ἐστιν ἄγαθον ὑντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶνα; (20, 177 b 14)—where the words are ambiguous and admit of being construed in two different ways. With this may be compared what Aristotle says in the Rhetoric (3. 5, 1407 b 14) on the ambiguities in Hera-
25. 1461 a 23-24

clitus: ὁ γὰρ Ἰππασίαν διαστῆται ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι. 1461 a 23

ποτέρῳ πρὸςκεῖται, τῷ ὑστερῷ ἤ τῷ πρῶτερῳ, οἷς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγραμματος: φησί γὰρ "τοῦ λόγου τοῦτο ἐώς τε ἀπένειπεν ἀνθρώπων γίγνονταν". ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἄδει πρὸς ἀπόκρισιν (ἰδι) διαστῆται. On the beginnings of formal punctuation in Greece see Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 506, and Meisterhans, Grammatik 3 p. 11.

Εμπεδοκλῆς. The passage here quoted appears in the editions a 24 of Empedocles in a somewhat different form, αὐτὰ δὲ βνήτ’ ἐφόντο, τά πρὶν μάθων ἀβαντ’ εἶναι, ζωρά τε τά πρὶν ἀκρητα, διαλλαξάντα κελεῦνς (fr. 35, 14-15 Diels); and it is known that Theophrastus read it thus, as he addeduced it to show that ζωρότερον in Homer meant τὸ κεκραμένον: Athenaeus 423 F Θεόφραστος δ’ ἐν τῷ περὶ μέθης ζωρότερον φησιν εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον. This is not the place to consider either the reading recognized by Theophrastus or his interpretation of ζωρότερον and ζωρά. Aristotle has a different reading, ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο; and any difficulty that may have been found in it he meets by simply affirming the possibility of another διαφρασμα, another way of construing the words. He does not dispute the meaning which was assigned to ζωρά; his assumption presumably was that ζωρά = ἀκρητα (v. a 15). The positive ζωρός no longer existed in Attic; but in Ionic the comparative ζωρότερον was to be found in Herodotus and Hippocrates, in the sense of ‘having but a small admixture of water’: Herod. 6, 84 Κλεομένεα δέ λέγουσι ἥκοντων τῶν Σκύθων . . . μαθεῖ τὴν ἀκρητοποποσίαν παρ’ αὐτῶν . . . ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ὃς αὐτοὶ λέγοντο, ἐπεισὶν ζωρότερον βούλονται πιεῖν, “ἐπισκιθάθων” λέγοντο (where ζωρότερον πιεῖν = ἀκρατοποτεῖν).—Hippocrates 2, 654 K. οἶνον, ἣν μὴ τι κωλύῃ, πίνειν ζωρότερον παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τέσσαρας ἦμερας. There is one instance of it in Attic prose, in Theophrastus Char. 4, 9 δενὸς φαγεῖν καὶ ζωρότερον πιεῖν (‘ungemischten Wein zu trinken’, R. Meister). Aristotle does not say what the question was that had been raised by the critics; it may be supposed, however (comp. Hermann ad loc.), to have turned on the πρὶν before κέκρητο, which owing to its ambiguous position may be construed with either ζωρά or κέκρητο. If one construes it with κέκρητο, the clause will mean ‘things pure had been before that mixed’; but in that case an objector might very well urge the inconsistency between this and the statement in the preceding line, in which Empedocles speaks of the ‘mortal’ forms as assumed by the elements only when mixed up together in the actual world (comp. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.
On the other hand, if the πρὶν be taken with ἡφαίστεια, the sense will be ‘things before that pure were found mixed up together’ (for the tense of κέκρητον v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. i. 1 p. 152; Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 52); and the objection of the critic is answered. The integrity of the text of the present passage has been doubted in recent times by several scholars of distinction. Bergk (Kl. Schriften 2 p. 86) has suggested ἡφαίστεια τε πρὶν τὰ κέκρητον; Gomperz (Hermes 31 p. 469) ἡφαίστεια τὲ αὐτῷ (i.e. θ' α') πρὶν κέκρητον; and Diels (on Emped. l. c.) ἡφαίστεια τὲ τὰ πρὶν ἐκρητοῦ (on the analogy of ἐπιληφτοῦ).

The problem was to explain how, if more than two-thirds of the night had gone, a third could be still left. According to Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147 Schr.) this was one of the earliest difficulties found in Homer: τῶν παλαιῶν ἔγγυμάτων ὡμολόγηται ἐναί τὸ τουτότα, ἐν οἷς φέρον ἂντρα . . . λέλειπται. τῶν γὰρ, εἰ αἱ δυὸ μοῖραι ἐξήκοναν αὐταὶ τέ καὶ ἐτὶ τοῦτον πλέον, ἣ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ἀλλ' οὐξ ἔτη τρίτης μάριον; Among the many solutions he mentions is one from the Aristotelian 'Ἀπορρίματα Ὀμηρικά (fr. 161 Teubn.), ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς αἱ δώδεκα μοίραι εἰς δύο ἢγα μερίδας μερίζεσθαι δύναται,
25. 1461 a 24–27

eis eis, neK'by d' eis Kal pl'oev yegonoV bate'ropn meros, d'hopla d' koi pl'oteias 1461 a 26 ovaies (kal g'ary mi kal dni kai tri'c kal pl'oe'wav e a'xiriseis d'natai gia'vetai). afro'cious d' pout'hy d' aoristou to pl'oevnon podos y'n kai d'ti b ovaies neK'by, et'pi'gag eis tri'cata myora leleipptai, o's o'kto m'en yeg'etbai tau parox'nyias ovaie, kataleipstbhai d' te'stoparas, ai'ter eis Kai to podon tri'ton. This highly artificial interpretation, which makes pl'oev ni'x tov dni mou'rayn mean 'the greater part of two-thirds of the night', can hardly be what Aristotle has in mind, as he distinctly says that the solution of the difficulty may be found in recognizing pl'oev as an amphibolous word, i.e. in giving it not its usual sense of 'more', but some different sense. This other sense was probably that of 'full', which is mentioned by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147) as the suggestion of a certain Metrodorus: Mepro'doros men ou pl'oev dni s'mai'nenv phi's ei' par' 'Omor' n' kai g'ary to s'n'ny'es ... kai to pl'oreis, ou's ei' f'ou d' pl'oev d'pas a'ei e's'tyme, kai ei' f'ou pl'ea'ei tov xalkou klawiai. n'v ou pl'oev to pl'oev anti to pl'oreis eir'etbhai pl'orh's y'par e ni'x tov dni mou'rayn parox'nye, tri'cata ei' eti perileipptai. Aristonicus seems to have accepted this interpretation of pl'oev as anti tov pl'orh's (Schol. Ven. A. II. 9. 71); and it survives also in the gloss of Hesychius pl'oev' pl'orh's.

to edos ths lexeow. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 4, 166 a 14 elat d' a 27 treis' tropoi tov par'a thn or'movn'sai kai thn amfibolai, eis men othan e o'logos e to'noma kyrio's s'manw pl'oev, o'vov ad'tos kai k'w()) eis d' eis d' oswotes o'men o'two legeow.

tov kekramenov is to my mind a much more probable correction here than the others that have been suggested, to kekramenon (Madius), tav kekramenon (Bursian), (3) tov kekramenon (Vahlen), tov kekramenon (Oio'ov) (Tucker). tov kekramenon, with oiovon in close proximity in the context, means tov kekramenon oiovon. There is the same ellipse in Aristotle. Eq. 1187 pi'ev kekramenov tria kai dni (comp. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk. 32); and it is certainly not uncommon with akrapos (comp. akraposop'th'k, etc.). The general sense then of the whole passage will be this: In common parlance a mixture of wine and water is said to be 'wine'; and on the same principle Homer's 'tin' may be an amalgam of tin and another metal. Aristotle is apparently replying to some critic who took exception to the idea of the greaves being made of so soft a metal as tin, a point which modern archaeologists also have some difficulty in explaining (comp. Helbig, Das homerische Epos. p. 196).
COMMENTARY

Aristotle

1461 a 27 οἶνον: Plutarch Coni. praec. 140 f τὸ κράμα καίτοι ὑδατος μετέχον πλέονοις οἶνον καλοῦμεν. The fact is recognized and explained in De gen. et corr. I. 5. 321 a 35 τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῷ μίξει, οἶνον ὅτι οἶνος ὑπελόγει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἐργον ἀλλ' οὗ τὸ τοῦ ὑδατος τὸ σύνολον μέγα.


χαλκέας. Aristotle adduces this use of χαλκέας, to justify the language in II. 20. 234, on the assumption that by a similar extension of meaning οἶνος χαλκέας may be used for the serving out of nectar as well as that of wine. χαλκέας and its cognates are often found in this more general sense in the literature after Homer: Schol. Ven. B. II. 19. 283 παλαιὰ ἡ χρήσις τοῦ χαλκῶν ὄνομάζειν τῶν σιδηρῶν. ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκέας λέγομεν τῶν τοῦ σιδηρον ἐργαζόμενοι.—Pollux 7. 106 χαλκέεν τἴ καὶ τὸ σιδηρεύεν ἐλέγουν, καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σιδηρον ἐργαζόμενος. The language in these two passages may be a distant reminiscence of Aristotle's words.

οἶνος χαλκέας: II. 20. 256 τῶν καὶ ἀντιδεικτον θεοῦ Δίον οἶνος χαλκέας. On the other hand, we are told elsewhere (II. 5. 341) that the gods do not drink wine, οὐ πίνουσιν ἀθέτα οἶνον. For the infinitive—actually found in the Homeric text—comp. An. post. 2. 30. 97 b 6 τοῦτο δ' εἰρηται μὴ διάφερειν.—Top. 2. 3. 110 a 33 οὔτε εἰ παντί οὔτε εἰ μηδένει ἐπάρχειν εἰρηται.

εἴη δ' ἐν τούτῳ γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. Aristotle apparently prefers to explain Homer's use of οἶνος χαλκέας as a metaphor; referring, it would seem, to the μεταφορά κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον considered in 21, 1457 b 16 sqq.

dεὶ δὲ κτί. This is a general word of caution very like that in a 4. Just as we have to consider all the attendant circumstances before condemning an act as wrong or immoral, so too, when the question turns on a word, we should consider its context and its possible meanings in the context before pronouncing it to be improper; we must be quite sure of our interpretation before passing an adverse judgement on the poet.

οἶνος τῷ = οἶνον εἰν τῷ, the preposition being understood from the preceding εἰν τῷ εἰρημένῳ (see on 2, 1448 a 10).

tῇ ρ' ἐσχέτω χαλκέων ἔχος: II. 20. 267 οὔτε τὸν Άλεανον διαφόρον ὁμοίων ἔχος ρήξε σάκος χρυσός γὰρ ἐρύκαικε, δώρα θεοῦ ἀλλὰ δῶν μὲν ἑλάσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἀρ' ἐν ταῖς ἱσαν, ἕπει πέντε πτύχας ἑλάσε κυλλοποδίων, τῶς δύο χαλκέας, δύο δ' ἐνδοθεν κασσιτέρωι, τῶν δὲ μᾶν χρυσέννυν τῇ ρ' ἐσχέτω μελίνων ἔχοσ. The difficulty found here may be seen from the note of Porphyry (p. 244
Schr.): τῆς γὰρ χρυσῆς πτυχῆς δοκοῦσθαι πρῶτης εἶναι, εἰ γε κόσμουν I461 a 33 ένεκα τήν χρυσῶν εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ ὠρώμενον πρῶτην ἐνέθηκεν, ὡς αυτὴν δὲ στερεώτιτος ἐνεκα τὸς δύο χαλκῶς, μαλάγματος χάριν καὶ τελευταίας τὰς καταστερίνας, τῶς δύο τε διέκοψε πτυχὰς, καὶ ἐν τῇ χρυσῆ πτυχῇ ἔξω ὄσυν καὶ διατμηθεῖσα ἐνεσχέθη τὸ δόρυ; The answer of Aristotle was perhaps this, that the plate of gold sufficed to stop the course of the spear, though the spear-point actually pierced it and indented the underlying plates of brass. This is practically the same as the solution quoted from Autoclethôn in Schol. Ven. B and Eustathius ad loc. Aristarchus also is said to have acknowledged its plausibility: Schol. Ven. Ἀ. II. 20. 269 ὥν δὲ μὴ δοκῆ αὐτῆς ἢπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἢβετηκέναι, φησιν ὅτι τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχῆς πρῶτης κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κειμένας νοητόν τὸ δόρυ τῆς πλεύσεως ὁμοίας ἐγκοπῆν εἰληφέναι [=Aristotle’s κωλυθῆκε], δια- κεκόθη καὶ μέντοι τὸ σίκακος ἐως τῆς τρίτης πτυχῆς, ἐν τριτῶν ἐπὶ τῆς πτυχῆς Μενελίου λέγει "ἡ οί πλεύσων ἔφευρ, διὰ πρὸ δὲ εὐατό καὶ τῇ". κωλυθῆκε: Metaph. Δ 23, 1023 a 17 ἐπὶ τὸ κωλύνων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ a 34 ὀμηρή τι κανέσθα φι πράττειν ἐξείν λέγεται τούτῳ αὕτῳ, οἷον καὶ οἱ κιόνες τα ἐπίκειμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τῶν "Ἀλαντα πανοικίν τῶν οὐρανῶν ἑκέν ὡς συμπεσοντ᾽ ἐν ἑπὶ τὴν γῆν.

ἐνδέχεται, scil. σημαίνειν (see on 24, 1460 a 34). ὤδι ή ὤδι = πότερον ὤδι ή ὄδι (see on a 4). The clause, with the punctuation given in the text, is appositional to ποσαχὸς ἰν σημαίνοι (see on 25, 1460 b 25). For ὤδι ή ὄδι comp. An. pr. i. 31, 46 b 28 ἀγγονεῖται τὸ πότερον ὁδε ή δε ἐξεὶ.—Soph. el. 18, 177 a 5 ἀναφροντες ή δε ή δε.—Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 10 διαφερεῖ γάρ τι πρὸσ τὸ δηλώσαν ὁδι ή ὄδι εἴπειν.

μάλιστ' ἐν τίς ὑπολαβο. The comma (or colon) which recent a 35 editors place after this I have removed in order that μάλιστα may be taken with κατά τὴν καταντικρὺ; comp. Metaph. Α 8, 989 a 30 μάλιστ' ἐν υπολαβοι κατά λόγον ἐν ἐκεῖνοι μεν ὡς διήρθωσεν κτέ. (also Phys. 7. 3, 245 b 6; Metaph. Z 16, 1404 b 10).

κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ—ἐξ ἐναντίας οι ἐναντίως. The ἦ ὡς which follows Vahllen illustrates from 22, 1458 b 3 ἄλλως ἐξειν ἦ ὡς τὸ κύριον.—An. post. i. 17, 80 b 35 λῃπῇα ἐναντίως ἦ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις.—De caelo 2. 2, 285 b 25 ἐναντίως ἦ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν.—Meteor. i. 12, 348 b 12 τοῦντιαν ἦ ὡς Ἀναζαγόρας λέγει. A similar construction is found after a comparative adverb in Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118 b 23 μάλλον ἦ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ. The clause ὡς ἐναντίον is explanatory of ὡς Πλαῦκων λέγει, ‘the way described by Glaucos’, and apparently a quotation.
1461 a 1 Γλαύκων. Aristotle is probably referring to the Glaucon mentioned as an authority in Homeric matters in Plato's Ion 530 d, where the rhapsoist says of himself: καὶ ὁμαί κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὀμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Δαμψακρός οὔτε Στηνημέρος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πόστεν γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰτέν οὐτῷ πολλὰς καὶ καλὸς διανοίας περὶ Ὀμήρου ὡσα ἐγώ. The absence of a local appellative here seems to imply that the Glaucon in question was an Athenian. If this inference is right, we cannot identify him with the Γλαύκων ὁ Τῆμος of Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 26 or with Glaucus of Rhegium (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 41 p. 398); he may perhaps be the same as the Glaucus or Glaucion (v. Düntzer, Rettung der aristot. Poetik p. 227) mentioned by Porphyry on Il. 11. 636 (p. 168 Schr.) along with other early interpreters of Homer.

b 2 αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι resumes the idea of ἔνα ἀλόγοι πρωτολαμβάνουσιν, and anticipates that in τῇ αὐτῶν οὐσία. The common rendering, 'postquam ipsi condemnationis sententiam tulerint' (Tyrwhitt), gives καταψηφισάμενοι a sense too near to that of the ἔπτιμῳς in the following line. The probability is, as Vahlen has seen (comp. Bon. Ind. 376 a 56), that it means in the present instance to 'decide', or to 'affirm' or 'accept' something. As a term of politics καταψηφίζεσθαι is the opposite of ἀποψηφίζεσθαι (to reject a proposal): Pol. 4. 14, 1298 b 36 ἀποψηφίζομεν μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφίζομεν δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλὰ ἐπαναγέννητο πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντετραμμένως ποιοῦσιν οἱ γὰρ ἀλογοί ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριον, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ τὸ κύριον, ἀλλὰ ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείοντος αἰεί.

εἰρηκότος, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ (see on 6, 1449 b 26).

b 3 τοῦτο δὲ πέπουθε: De anima 1. 5, 410 b 27 τοῦτο δὲ πέπουθε καὶ δὲ τοῖς Ὁρφικοῖς ἐπεσει καλουμένοις λόγοι.

b 4 τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον. The question which Aristotle regards as based on a mere assumption, survives in Porphyry on Od. 4. 1 (p. 40 Schr.) διὰ τί ὁ Τηλέμαχος εἰς Λακεδαιμονίαν ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐνέτυχε τῷ Ἰκάρῳ; καὶ κατοὶ ἄλογον ἐλθόντα τῷ πατρὶ τῆς μητρὸς μὴ ἐντυχεῖν, and in Schol. Od. 1. 285 (comp. Schol. Od. 2. 52) τὸς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντυχάναι Ἰκάρῳ; The assumption of the critics, that the father of Penelope (called in Homer Icarus) was a Lacedaemonian, Aristotle meets by quoting on the other side the Cephalenian tradition which made him a Cephalenian. This same solution of the difficulty reappears incidentally in Schol. Od. 15. 16 ὅτι Ἰθακήσιος ὁ Ἰκάριος, οὐ Σπαρτιάτης, ἀδελφὸς Τυνδάρεω . . . ὁ δὲ
25. ΙΑ61 b 1-9

Iκάριος έκ Μεσσήνης ὦ τῆς Κεφαλληνικῆς, ἐπεῖ οὐχ ὅραται ἐν ΙΑ61 b 4

Ἰθάκη ἀναστρέφομεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Λάκων ὧθεν οὐδὲ ἐνέτυχεν αὐτῷ

Τηλέμαχος ἐν τῇ εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα ἀποδημεῖ. (comp. Ε. Μeyer, 

Hermes 30 p. 265).

to δ' ίσως: comp. An. post. 1. 9, 76 a 29; Soph. el. 1, 165 a 10. b 6

Κεφαλήνες. Though the form Κεφαλήνε is found in the text of H. Α. 8. 28, 605 b 27, there is little doubt that Aristotle must have written the word with a double λ. This is the normal spelling in Attic Inscriptions (Meisterhans, Gr.3 p. 96), and also in literature, according to Eustathius on Dion. Perieg. 431, τῶν δὲ Κεφαλήνες καὶ τήν Κεφαλήναν ἐν δυσὶ ἅλ ἢ παλαιὰ χρήσει οὔτε ἔχει.

παρ' αὐτῶν γάρ γῆμαι. For the preposition comp. Plato Polit. b 7

310 ο γαμοῦσι τε παρὰ τοῦτων.—Isocrates 386 Α έγγενεν έκ Σερόφου παρ' ἄνθρωπων πολλῷ πλείονος ἀξίων ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν, ἢ ἢς ἐγένετο Σώπαλις.

Ικάδιον. The name is presumably the same as Εικάδιος, on b 8

which see Fick, Gr. Personennamen² p. 296.

εἰκός ἐστιν, scil. εἶναι (see on 24, 1459 b 9). The alternative is b 9

take to the clause (with Madius) as meaning 'it is through an error that the question (i.e. the objection), seems probable and reasonable'.

δὼσ δὲ κτῇ. This concluding paragraph, in intention at any rate, puts the main points in the preceding discussion into a more general form. The language in b 23 is to be noticed; ἀδύνατα is clearly used as the opposite of the οἷα ὣν ἢ ἐστιν, ἀλογα of the οἷα φασὶν καὶ δοκεῖ, and βλαβερά of the οἷα εἶναι δὲ in 25, 1460 b 10. Some of the points in the previous statement are either passed over or only just hinted at. On the other hand two new points are introduced: the plea of poetical necessity, instead of being limited to 'impossibilities' (comp. 25, 1460 b 23), is indirectly said to be an excuse for the 'improbable' and the 'morally offensive' also (comp. b 19 ἀλογα καὶ μοχθηρία); and besides this we have the dialectical rule of caution in b 15, which might very well have found a place in the main discussion, as a pendant to that in a 31. The whole chapter in fact, however excellent in substance, is hardly a model of logical arrangement.

τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποιήσιν. Vahlen takes these words together in the sense of 'the impossible in poetry', and supposes only two solutions to be recognized, those denoted by πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἡ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. The chief objection to this view is that
1461 b 9 it seems to exclude the solution given in 25, 1460 b 24, where poetical necessity is said to justify even ‘impossibilities’. The reason that follows, πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν κτέ., adds a very necessary qualification, viz. that the impossibility has to be disguised and made credible (πιθανὸν) by arts of expression; comp. 24, 1460 a 27 ἄδυνητα εἰκότα, and 24, 1460 b 2 ἀφανίζει ήδύνων τὸ ἀτύπον. A second solution is by reference πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον—a point which Aristotle illustrates here from painting, and not as in 25, 1460 b 33 from poetry. A third is by reference πρὸς τὴν δύσιν, i.e. by showing that the impossibility has been accepted and sanctioned by opinion (comp. 25, 1460 b 10 οἶδά φασίν καὶ δοκεῖ, and 1460 b 35 οὕτω φασίν).

πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν: Meteor. 2. 3, 357 a 26 πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἶπον [scil. Empedocles] ἵνως εὑρηκαί ἰκανός (ἣ γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικῶν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνώναι τὴν φύσιν οὐ̇χ ἰκανός.—Fr. 147 (Teubn.) οἴδα γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἕργου ἤν ἡ τούτων μνήμη.

b 10 ἀνάγειν, to explain by reference to something (comp. Bon. Ind. 42 a 37).

b 11 αἵρετῶτερον πιθανὸν ἄδυνατον: 24, 1460 a 26 προαιρεῖτοι τε δὲ τὸ ἄδυνητα εἰκότα μάλλον ἡ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.

b 12 οἶος Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν. In 25, 1460 b 18 also the allusion is apparently to a picture. We have been told in an earlier chapter (6, 1450 a 27) that the personages of Zeuxis lacked character, i.e. that he sacrificed expression to beauty. The criticism implied in the present passage is that they are ‘impossibilities’, in other words, of an impossible beauty, not like real men and women (i.e. not οἶα ἤν ἡ ἔστω, 25, 1460 b 10). The answer to this is that they are, like the characters in Sophocles (25, 1460 b 33), better than the reality, what men and women ought to be. This justification of Zeuxis, which recalls what has been said elsewhere of Polygnotus (2, 1448 a 5), and of Homer (15, 1454 b 14), may very well represent Aristotle’s own view of him and his work. It was certainly a common view of him in antiquity (comp. Maximus Tyrlius Diss. 32. 5).

b 13 ἀλλὰ βέλτιον (scil. τουούτος εἶναι) is a vivid way of putting the respondent’s answer to the objection (see on 25, 1460 b 33).

τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν. As Aristotle says in 15, 1454 b 9, a true artist, instead of keeping too closely to his model, will make his portrait more beautiful than the real man.

b 14 πρὸς ἄ φασιν τάλογα, scil. δεῖ ἀνάγειν. It will be seen that a δὲ is wanting, and also that the next clause (οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτε ποτὲ οὐκ


The first appearance of the word in this chapter, though it has been used more than once in chap. 24. τὸ ἄλογον, said of a fact or statement, means that which we cannot account for, and thus find a difficulty in accepting as either true or possible (see on 15, 1454 b 6). There is an obvious distinction between it and τὸ ἀδύνατον, that which is not and cannot be true, the one being only 'improbable', and the other 'impossible'. The charge of improbability according to Aristotle may be met in two ways: one may urge (1) that the statement criticized has the sanction of opinion (ἀ φασώ), or (2) that the incident was not so improbable, if one remembers the time (ποτὲ) when it is supposed to have occurred. These two solutions have already appeared in the main discussion in 1460 b 35–1461 a 4, but in answer to a somewhat different allegation, that of untruth (ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ 1460 b 33). A third answer, the plea of poetical necessity, is indirectly suggested in b 19.

ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογον: comp. fr. 164 (Teubn.) λέων οἶν Ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ τάλαντον οὔτε ἱον φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀφωρισμένῳ χρήσαται σταθμῷ, and the passages quoted above on 25, 1461 a 2. For the emphatic ποτὲ comp. Top. 3. 2, 117 a 36 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ δὲ ποτὲ χρησιμή (also Top. 3. 1, 128 b 20).

ἐκὸς γὰρ κτὲ. See on 18, 1456 a 23 (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἴκος). b 15

The maxim being Agathon's, it might be quoted for controversial purposes when better arguments were not to be had.

tὰ ὅπεναντίως εἰρημένα covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in 1461 a 9–31. The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind. In the second (εἴδος κακὸς a 12), fourth (ἄλλοι μὲν a 16), eighth (αἶμα δὲ a 24), and eleventh (ὁνοματευτω a 30) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third (ὡρότερον a 14) and sixth (διδομέν a 22), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth (οἶν a 20), seventh (οὐ a 23), and ninth
and wffT€

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toiv.

b 16 ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι. The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτῶ) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative ὡσπερ σφαίρα in De anima 3. 11, 434 a 13, where κινεῖται is probably to be supplied from the κινή which precedes the comparison (see J. of Phil. 17 p. 67). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in Metaph. 1 2, 1053 b 14 πῶς δὲ γνωριμιότεροι λεγήσαι καὶ μᾶλλον ὡσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως (scil. λέγουσιν). The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in a 4 and a 31. Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one’s opponent—which is sometimes a genuine refutation (ἔλεγχος ἀληθινός), and sometimes only the semblance of one (ἔλεγχος φανόμανος: v. Bon. Ind. 235 b 42). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context, εἷ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαίτως. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine ἔλεγχος is found in Soph. el. 5, 167 a 23 ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνός, μὴ ὁνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὁνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναρμομενοῦ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαίτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.—26, 181 a 1 τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὀρισμόν γνωμένον τοῦ ἔλεγχου . . . ἀπαιτητένα λογοῦνται τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαίτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

b 18 ὡστε καὶ αὐτῶν κτέ. = ὡστε καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὑπεναντίως εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ὑ αὐτῶς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ὑ ἄν φρόνιμος ὑποθῇται (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere,
or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In saying δ’ δὲν φρόνιμος ὑπόθεται Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see b 3 sqq.). The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19 ἐὰν καθώς καὶ ἐὰν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐὰν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὤμοις τὰ ἐναντίωματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ’ ἕαντος λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὖς ὄμολογει καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. In the note on this passage in his edition Vahlen supposes the clause to mean ὅστε καὶ αὐτῶν, scil. σκοτεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν—as though Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed ὑπεναντία and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the ἐναντιώματα in a genuine confutation, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confutation in argument may be only a sham confutation.

ἄλογα καὶ μοιχηρίᾳ. For the datives see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61, b 19 281 b 24, and 875 a 53.

μὴ ἀνάγκης οὕσης: 15, 1454 a 28 παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἢθους μὴ ἀναγκαίον οἶνον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὄρεστῃ. The plea of poetic necessity was indirectly recognized as a valid answer to certain criticisms in 25, 1460 b 24, and before that in 15, 1454 a 28; comp. also 24, 1460 a 12.

Αἰγές: Eurip. Med. 663. The appearance of Aegeus is in Aristotle’s view (1) ἄλογον, because no sufficient reason can be given for it, and (2) unnecessary, because no use is made of it in the after-part of the play. The explanations of certain of the editors of Euripides are hardly an adequate answer to Aristotle’s criticism.

ἐν Ὅρεστῃ: see on 15, 1454 a 29 (μὴ ἀναγκαίον).

εἰ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν. The various heads under which the faults in poetry have been classified are termed εἴδη, because they represent distinct ‘kinds’ of faults. It is one thing to say of something that it is ἀδύνατον, another that it is ἄλογον, and another that it is βλαβερόν (etc.). For this use of φέρειν comp. 19, 1456 b 14 ἐπιτύμμα φέρεται.—An. pr. 2. 26, 69 b 1 φέρεται ἡ ἐνστασις.—An. post. 1. 14, 79 a 19 φέροντι τὰς ἀποδείξεις.—Rhet. 2. 18, 1391 b 24 δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, ἐς ὅν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν.
COMMENTARY

1461b 23 ὃς ἄδυνατα, scil. ὅτα τὰ εἰρημένα.

βλαβερὰ: the opposite of the οία εἶναι δεῖ in 25, 1460b 11. The word may be a reminiscence of Plato’s condemnation of certain legends in Rep. 391 D οἷδ᾽ ὅσια ταύτα οὕτ᾽ ἀληθὺ ... καὶ μὴν τοὺς γε ἄκοινον βλαβερὰ πᾶσι γὰρ ἐκατοτὶ εὐγγυνὼμεν ἐξείς κακῷ ὄντι, πειραθείς ὃς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττοντι τε καὶ ἐπιταυτὶ καὶ "οἱ θεῶν ἀγχισσόροι".

ὑπεναντία: the ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα of b 15.

b 24 παρὰ τὴν ὅρθοτητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην must refer, as Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in 25, 1460b 16 sqq. It is to be observed that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distinguished in the early part of the chapter (25, 1460b 20), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility. κατὰ τέχνην is apparently used as an equivalent for the καθ’ ἐκάστην τέχνην in 25, 1460b 19. The older interpreters understand the passage differently. Goulston makes it mean ‘tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate discedunt’, thus giving κατὰ τέχνην a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as ἰατρικῆ, πολιτικῆ, etc. Heinsius (after Victoriius) renders it by ‘ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura’—just as though the text had either κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (which Hermann wished to restore) or κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the ἐπιτιμήματα considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν. The precise meaning of this is far from clear. Goulston’s paraphrase is ‘ex antedictis formarum numeris, seu specialibus differentiis’; and Vahlen’s ‘aus den genannten Zahlen oder Stücken’ (Beitr. 4, 389). To illustrate the sense of ἀριθμῶν Tyrwhitt quotes Isocrates 224 D ἀπαντὸς τῶν ἀριθμῶν περιλαβῶν ἐξ ὕπν ἄριστ’ ἀν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειν.—Plutarch De aud. 45c τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν ἴον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἕνα καὶ ὅν ἡκότων ἐπὶ συμμετρίας τυπὸ καὶ ἀρμονίας ἐπιτελείται;

1 Goulston may possibly have remembered the expression τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐκάστου τῶν νοημάτων in Hippocrates 2 p. 27 K. as interpreted by Foes, Oec. Hippocr. p. 92.
comparing also the similar use of numeri in Latin. Another of 1461b 24
Tywhitt's quotations is perhaps more directly to the purpose, 
Eurip. Ion 1014 δ δευτέρος δ' ἀριθμός δὲν [δὲν L. Dindorf] λέγεις τι 
δρα;—to which may be added Eurip. Heracl. 997 εἰδὼς μὲν οίκ 
ἀριθμον ἀλλ' ἐπητύμως ἀνδρ' ὀίτα τὸν σῶν παίδα, and the passage in 
Aristotle (cited by Teichmüller) in De gen. an. 3. 10, 760a 33 
αἰτοῖ μὲν γὰρ γίγνονται, ἄλλο δ' οἴδεν γεννώσων, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ 
ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἢ γένεσιν. It would seem from these instances 
that ἀριθμὸς may sometimes have the sense of an item or term in 
a series, and that ἀριθμῶν in the present passage may thus stand for 
'points enumerated’.1 If this interpretation is possible, the 
reference in έκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is to the list of assumptions in 
the opening of this chapter. Twining draws attention to the parallelism 
between the language in the text, άι λύσεις έκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν 
σκεπτέω, and that in 1460b 21 ὡστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτίμηματα ... ἐκ τούτων 
ἔπισκοποῦντα λύειν. The advantage of this view of the reference 
in έκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is that it simplifies the explanation of 
the next clause, εἰτὶ δὲ δώδεκα (scil. οἱ ἀριθμοὶ). It is usual to 
explain the number by adding up the various λύσεις actually found 
and described in the preceding discussion (1460b 21–1461b 21), 
and counting in statements like those in 1460b 29 and 1461a 4, 31 
(v. ad loc.), though they are hardly λύσεις in the present sense of 
the term (see on 1460b 29). If we look back, however, to the 
opening paragraph in the chapter, it will be seen that Aristotle 
begins by laying down a series of postulates concerning poetry. 
The first is that, as the poet is an imitator, the poetic picture may 
represent either οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστων ὁ οἷα φασίν καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ οἷα ἦν 
δεί. There are thus, if we separate the alternatives (as Aristotle himself 
has done in the course of the discussion), five possibilities, οἷα ἦν, 
οἷα ἔστων, οἷα φασίν (εἶναι), οἷα δοκεῖ (εἶναι), οἷα ἦν 
δεί; and they are each of them available in reply to criticism; if the critic, for 
instance, says that the picture is not of things οἷα ἦν δεί, it is a 
valid answer to reply that it represents οἷα ἦν (v. 1461b 2) or οἷα 
ἔστων, etc. The second postulate is that, as poetic language is not 
quite the same as ordinary speech, it may have to be explained by 
certain arts of interpretation. This point is merely indicated in 
1460b 11–13; the statement there has to be supplemented from

1 The word seems to bear the same sense in [Dion. Hal.] Ars Rhet. p. 414 R. 
γίνεται δὲ τούτο ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οῖς ἐλπομεν, τοῖς ἐπτά—where ἀριθμοῖς represents 
the τόποι of p. 400.
that in 1461a 9–31, where we are told that six modes of interpretation of the written letter of poetry (γλώττη ἑυαρητοί μεταφοράς, κατά προσφιδαν, διαφέρει, ἀμφιβολία, κατά τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως) are available, and may be legitimately assumed, whenever a λύσις of difficulties arising from the poet’s language is wanted. The third postulate is that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, apart from that of every other art or science—which implies, as the next section (1460b 23–29) explains, that a description may be poetically right, even though it involves some impossibility, or offends against some technical standard of correctness. The various assumptions, therefore, in this series of postulates may serve as major premises for the apologist; and as a matter of fact every one of them appears in some form or other in the specimen λύσις in this chapter. It will be seen, too, that they are just 12 (5 + 6 + 1) in number.

The interpretation of this chapter has been considered at length by Gomperz in Erano Vindobonensis p. 71 sqq. Aristotle rounds off his theory of Tragedy and epic poetry with an appendix on a question which was, no doubt, often discussed in his time, that of the comparative value of the two forms of art. In the view of certain critics Tragedy was artistically inferior to epic poetry (comp. Plato Laws 658 b). The reasons for this view are stated (1461b 27–1462a 4), and then shown to be inconclusive (1462a 4–14); after which four positive arguments are adduced as turning the scale in favour of Tragedy. The case against Tragedy may be put into the form of an enthymeme ἐκ σημείων: The inferior art is one that addresses an inferior public; Tragedy addresses an inferior public; it must, therefore, be the inferior art. The truth of the minor premiss is shown by the evidence, or rather the practice, of actors and other public performers, who may be presumed to know their public and to have taken the measure of its intelligence.

φορτικῆ, ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’ (comp. Twining ad loc.), as in Pol. 8. 5, 1340b 9 τούτων [i.e. τῶν ἠθος κινητικῶν ἔχοντων ὑθομών] οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέραις ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέραι.—Pol. 8. 6, 1341b 11 οὗ τῆς ἀυτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάρων ἄρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ὑδότης, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς. διότερ οὖ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέρων. καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι ποιητὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοτός πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος. ὁ γὰρ θεάτης φορτικὸς ὃν μεταβάλλειν εἴσεθε τὴν μονασκίαν. Comp. also Aristophanes Vesp. 66 κυμαφώσας δὲ φορτικῆς σοφώτερον,
and the Platonic passages in Ast, Lex. s. v. The word is sometimes taken here in the sense of ‘extravagant’ or ‘overdone’ (‘überladen’, Bernays, Zwei Abh. p. 182).

The explained p. select overdone some-A that, 453 irpds (Vahlen), oix i2i). is p.h' little Be vw extravagant. Gorg. or diravra ffiopriK-Q ffimiat every of mean average el. diravn a Oeards the Brj-opov ovKovv 6

The idea of the kath' aitó which precedes. The form of argument in this chapter of the Posterior Analytics is very similar to that in the present section of the Poetics.

Théatás. The term is sometimes used even of the audience of b 28 a purely musical performance (Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 16; Plato Gorg. 502 λ).

æi. For the position of the word comp. Eth. N. 1. 5, 1097 b 19 ágathon το μείζον αἱρετωτέρον æi.—Pol. 4. 14, 1298 b 40 ἐπανάγεται εἰς τῶν πλείστους æi.

Niaq qualifies the following φορτική (Bon. Ind. 430 b 15). For the insertion of δήλον ὅτι comp. Bon. Ind. 173 b 31.

〈πρός〉 ἀπαντα. The traditional reading, ἥ ἀπαντα μιμουμέν, b 29 which is explained as meaning ‘the imitation which extends to every circumstance’ (Twining), or ‘quae motu et gestibus omnia similat’ (Vahlen), does not fit into the argument in this passage, though it may perhaps seem to be confirmed by Plato Rep. 397 λ. The logic of the present argument requires not ἀπαντα but πρός ἀπαντα (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 121). The sense is that Tragedy is φορτική because, instead of appealing to a select public (πρός θεάτας ἔπιεικείς, 1462 a 3), it is πρός ἀπαντα, or as we are told a little further on, πρός φαύλους (1462 a 3). For this use of ἀπαντα (‘any one and every one’) comp. Top. 8. 14, 164 b 8 οἵ ἀπαντα δὲ διαλεκτέων οὔτε πρός τὸν τυχόντα γυμναστέων.—Soph. el. 5, 167 a 10 παντὶ θεωρήσαι βάδιον. Aristotle’s estimate of the average θεάτης in the theatres may be seen from 13, 453 a 34, and from the distinction in Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 18 ὁ θεάτης διήτος, ὁ μὲν ἔλευθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκεκριμένος. Plato had an equally mean opinion of the theatrical public of his day: Gorg. 502 c οὗκον πρός πολύν ὦχλον καὶ δόμον οὐτοί λέγονται οἱ λόγοι [i.e. those of the tragedians]; ... νῦν ἀρα ἡμεῖς ἑρήμακεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δόμον τοιούτου οἶνον παιδῶν τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἄνδρων, καὶ διόλων καὶ ἔλευθερῶν (comp. Laws 658 b).

οὐκ ἀσθανομένων, scil. τῶν θεάτων, understood from πρός ἀπαντα (see on 6, 1449 b 26).
COMMENTARY

1461b 30 προσηγεί: used absolutely in the sense of ‘adds something’ (comp. 24, 1460a 18).

κινοῦνται: for the change of number see on λέγει in 21, 1457b 19.

οι φανοὶ αὐληταί: i.e. indifferent flute-players, in their anxiety to make the music intelligible, accompany it by a sort of pantomimic movement of the body. According to Theophrastus (fr. 92 Wimmer) this combination of music and pantomime originated in Sicily: Θεόφραστος πρῶτον φησιν Ἀνδρων τὸν Καταναίων αὐλητήν κινήσεις καὶ μυθοὺς ποιήσας τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα (ὅθεν σικελίζειν τὸ ὀρχείαθαι παρά τοῖς παλαιώσ.), μεθ’ ὑπὲρ Κλεόλαν τὸν Θηβαίον. Other references to it will be found in Sittl, Die Gebärdern der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244.

b 31 δίσκον μυμείσθαι seems to mean ‘to imitate the act of throwing a quoit’.

b 32 Σκύλλαν αὐλώσων, ‘play music descriptive of Scylla’. Aristotle may be referring to the dithyramb mentioned in 15, 1454a 31; but the probability is that he is thinking rather of a purely instrumental piece of music (see on 1, 1447a 15) on the same subject. In the Greek αὐλών τινα = δὶ αὐλήσεως μυμείσθαι τινα, in the same way as ὀρχείαθαι τινα = δὲ ὀρχήσεως μυμείσθαι τινα.

b 34 Μύννισκος. On Mynniscus of Chalcis (the protagonist in some of the later plays of Aeschylus) and his younger contemporary, Callipides, see Völker, Diss. Halens. 4 pp. 153, 177. In calling Callipides an ‘ape’ Mynniscus may have meant no more than this, that his acting was so exaggerated as to be ridiculous and a mere caricature, the ape being a sort of caricature of humanity (comp. Top. 3. 2, 117b 17 σκοτείν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔπι τὸ γελοιότερον εἴη ὄμως, καθάπερ ὁ πιθήκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ).

b 35 Πινδάρου. Nothing further is known of this actor (Völker l.c. p. 155).

1462a 3 σχημάτων: the attitudes or postures assumed by the dancer. In the dance, which, it is to be remembered, was a species of acting (see on 1, 1447a 27), σχῆμα had the technical sense explained by Plutarch, Qu. conv. 9. 15, 747 c-e ἥ γάρ ὀρχήσεις ἐκ τε κινήσεων καὶ σχέσεων συνεστήκηκεν, ὡς τὸ μέλος τῶν φθόγγον καὶ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐνταῦθα δ’ αἱ μοναὶ πέρατα τῶν κινήσεων εἰσὶ. φοράς μὲν οὖν τὰς κινήσεις ὁνομάζωμεν, σχῆματα δὲ σχέσεις καὶ διάβεσεις, εἰς δὲ φερόμεναι τελευτῶσιν αἱ κινήσεις, ὡς τὰ Ἀπολλάνως ἢ Παιός ἢ τὸν Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέτει ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικὸς τοῖς εἶδουσ

\[ \text{σμείειος: i.e. the significant movements, of hand or head for an instance, by which the spoken word may be accompanied (comp. Aristoxenus p. 411, 13 Marquard, and Ath. 628 p; see also Sommerbrodt l. c. p. 213).} \]

\[ \text{ραψυλούσα. The ραψυλός is tacitly assumed to be a kind of υποκριτής (see on 5, 1449 a 15).} \]

\[ \text{Σωσίστρατος ... Μνασίθεος. Nothing further is known of either.} \]

It is evident that the one was a rhapsodist and the other a professional singer.

\[ \text{διόδοντα. As Tyrwhitt (quoting Theocritus 5. 22) points out, διδάω is ‘certatim sive in certamine canere’; it implies that Mnasitheus sang, no doubt as a κιθαρωδός, in an ἀγών, i.e. in a public performance in the theatre. The word is explained in the Lexicon in Bekker’s Anecdota 37, διάσσασθαι τὸ διαμιλλήσασθαι ἐν μοῖραν ταῖς. The same idea of competition is found in διαθέω, διακολακεύοσθαι, διαπίνειν, etc. Gomperz aptly compares the saying ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic (Stob. Fl. 4. 112), Διωγένης ἔλεγε διαπαλάντας μὲν τόλλοις ὀραν καὶ διατρέχοντας, διακαλοκυανομένοις δὲ οὕ.} \]

\[ \text{ἀποδικημαστέα. ἀποδικήματεῖν, ‘to reject as inadmissible’, is the opposite of δοκιμάζειν, ‘to approve, or sanction’ (Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 34; comp. Bon. Ind. 80 b 48).} \]

\[ \text{φαίλων, ‘turpium personarum’ (Victorius)—not as Paccius renders it, ‘ineptorum’, as we hardly need to be told that bad acting is to be rejected. What Aristotle means is clear from his instance: Callipides in his impersonations of the heroines of Greek Tragedy, did not make them move and deport themselves like ladies. The assumption here is that character comes out in movement, and that some sorts of movement are naturally noble and others ignoble; comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 7 τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθῆσιν στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ καπητικοί, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κυνήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρας.} \]

\[ \text{διά γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγνώσκειν φανερὰ ὑπόπαι τὸς ἔστιν: comp. infra a 17 a 12 τὸ ἐναργῆς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, and 6, 1450 b 18 ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνει ἀγώνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν. But though Aristotle draws a line between a tragedy} \]
as literature and its stage presentation (comp. 1.4, 1.453 b 2), he has no idea of a reading as distinct from an acting tragedy; a tragedy with him is essentially something to be acted. The notion of a reading play has been found in Rhet. 3.12, 1.413 b 12, in the use of the word ἀναγνωστικῶν of Chaeremon and others. The term, however, merely denotes a fact of style; these writers were ἀναγνωστικῶν because their language could be read by any one, not requiring any special arts of elocution to bring out the meaning (comp. Demetrius De eloc. 193).

\[\text{ COMMENTARY}\]

\[\text{1462 a 12}\] corresponds with the πρῶτον μὲν in a 5. There is the same or an even greater interval between the words in Metaph. N. 2, 1.089 a 15, in Pol. 5.11, 1.314 b 14, in Aeschines in Tim. 1.61, in Isocrates 197 a, and in Alcidamas De Soph. 3. The answer to the opponents of Tragedy is twofold: (1) that their reasoning is not quite conclusive; and (2) that they ignore a whole series of facts which tell in favour of Tragedy. The series begins with διὸν πάντες ἔχεις ὑπατήρ καὶ ἐπιστοίλα, and ends with ἦτο ἔττον μᾶς ἡ μίμησις ἢ τῶν ἐπιστοιῶν (b 3); all that follows as far as μίμησις in b 11 is a justification of this last proposition. To this, however, is added a further point, ἐτί τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἐργα (scil. διάφερει), in the short formula which summarizes this part of the argument in b 12, εἴ σον τοιοῦτος διάφερει πᾶσιν καὶ ἐτί το羔 τῆς τέχνης ἐργα.

\[\text{15}\] τῷ μέτρῳ: as for instance in Soph. Trach. 1.009, Phil. 8.40, and Eurip. Troad. 590 (Tyrwhitt).

οὗ μικρὸν μέρος, scil. ἔχει.

\[\text{16}\]

δι’ ἢς refers to τὴν μοντικὴν, which is the more important of the two things (comp. 6, 1.450 b 16). The neglect of καὶ τὰς ὀψεις in the construction is not unlike that of καὶ περιστέτεια in 11, 1.452 a 38. Other instances to be explained on the same principle are Soph. el. 16, 175 a 21 ἰδέων καὶ λίται τὴν μοχθηράν (i.e. ἰδέων ... τῆν μοχθηράν), and De anima 3.7, 431 b 7 λογιζέται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μελλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα (i.e. λογιζέται ... τὰ μέλλοντα κτ.).

\[\text{18}\]

tὸ ἐν ἑλάττων ... εἶναι, scil. ἔχει; comp. 24, 1.460 a 30 [Δ] Οἰδίπους (scil. ἔχει) τὸ μὴ εἶδεναι. The same construction is found after λαμβάνειν in Isocrates 225 A τὸ μιμῆς τῶν μαχιμῶν ἄνω τῆς τῶν ἀρχοντῶν γνώμης ἀποδημείν ... ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ μιμῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροίτως τῶν κοινῶν προσταγμάτων ἀμελεῖν, μηδ’ ἐτὶ ταῖς ἀλλαίς τέχναις διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπλοὶς καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαιτα ταῦτ’ εἰλήφασιν.

\[\text{b 1}\]

πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ: Plato Critias 121 A πολλῷ τῷ θνητῷ καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακεραυνμένη. The lengthiness of the statement is
said to dilute the pleasure of the story and make it thin and watery. The clause which follows (λέγω δ' οὖν κτέ.) is an illustration of this: if the matter of the Oedipus Tyrannus (see on 11, 1452 a 24) were treated at great length, in a poem as long as the Iliad, for instance, it would be only a thin and diluted pleasure that we should derive from it in its amplified form.

η ἠλλάς, scil. κέιται, understood from the preceding βεγη. In order to provide an antithesis, the old editors, with certain of the apographs (e.g. Par. 2038), re-write the text after ἐδαρη (b 7) thus: ἐὰν δὲ πλείους, λέγω δὲ οὖν ἐὰν ἐκ πλείουν πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη, ὡστε πτέτε; and both Vahlen and Gomperz assume a lacuna after ἐδαρη. All that Aristotle has to show, however, is that the epic μίμησις is in the nature of things ἢττον μία; and he does this by an indirect argument, by insisting that an epic is always a failure, if the dramatic rule of Unity of action is too strictly observed in it.

μείονων. Although μύνωρον is the spelling both here and elsewhere in the principal MSS. of Aristotle, the evidence (v. HSt. s. v.) is on the whole in favour of the alternative form μείονωρος—that in use in the writers on metre. Both spellings are found in the existing text of Galen, but his explanations (8 p. 524 and 9 p. 509 K.) show that he connected the first syllable with μείον; so that μείονος must have been the form he had before him. The proper sense of the word is said to be 'contracted, or thinning away, at the end ': Etym. Magn. μύνωρον τὸ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς λεπτωνο- μεῖον. In Greek medicine σφυγμός μείονωρος (or μύνωρος) meant a tapering-off pulse: Galen 8 p. 524 K. ἐστω τοίνυν δὲ μὲν δεύτερος σφυγμός τοῦ πρῶτου βραχῦ μικρότερος δὲ τρίτος τοῦ δευτέρου τουσκότιν πάλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δ' τέταρτος τοῦ τρίτου τῷ ἵπτυ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀχρί πλείωνος ἕφεξης γενέσθω. τούς τοιούτους σφυγμοὶ μειονενίοις τε καὶ μειονεροὺς καλοῦσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς δέν τελευτωτίν σχημάτων τούνομα μεταφέροντες. In metre an hexameter which 'halts' through a metrical deficiency at the end, like the Homeric Ἰρώς

1  Eustathius on II. 12, 208 recognizes both forms: Ἐν δὲ τῷ "Ἐρρέγον... ὄραν" στιχον ἐστὶ πάθος, δὲ λέγεται καὶ μυονία διὰ διχοῦν τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἄρχην καὶ μειονία διὰ τῆς εἰ διχοῦν, ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει πυρριχοσθεῖν τοῦ στίχου καὶ συστολὴν παθήσοντα κατὰ μνῆς οὐράν, ἦ κατὰ μείωσιν οὐραλοῦ ἦτοι τέλοιο ἄκρον.
COMMENTARY

1462 b 6 ἐφρέγησαν, ὅπως ἦδον αἰώλον ὄφιν (II. 12. 208), was termed a στύχος μείωρος (Athenaeus 632 ε; comp. Schol. Hephaest. 194–6 Gaisf.). The Latin rendering of it in this sense is ecaudis. Aristotle has the word in a physical sense in two places of the De Partibus, 3. 1, 662 a 24 and 4. 13, 696 b 34, where the carnivorous fishes are said to have an ἀνερρυγός, and the non-carnivorous, a μύουρον στόμα. In both passages μύουρον στόμα denotes a mouth with a narrow orifice, i.e. one with an opening small by comparison with the interior cavity, just as ἀνερρυγός στόμα means one with a wide orifice. In the Rhetoric, where it is a term of literary criticism, μύουρος is applied to a clause or period which seems too short and to end abruptly: Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 b 17 δὲ δὲ καὶ τὰ κόλα καὶ τὰς περιδοὺς μήτε μυουροὺς εἶναι μήτε μακρᾶς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν [= τὸ μύουρον] προσπαίηει πολλὰκε ποὺεί τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἐπὶ ὁμών ἐπὶ τὸ πάρρῳ καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισταθή πανσαμένου, οἶον προσπαίηει γέγενθαι διὰ τὴν ἀ ντίκρυσιν. This is apparently the sense of μείωρος in the present passage also—where it is usually rendered by ‘curtus’ (Tyrwhitt), ‘truncatus’ (Hermann), ‘in extremo inminutus’ (Victorius), or the like. The general meaning is clear enough: If the epic poet takes a story that is one in the strict dramatic sense of the term, and tells it with befitting rapidity and without diffuseness, the result will be that it will seem to end up too soon. The assumption is that an epic is naturally, and is always expected to be, a work of considerable length (comp. 5, 1449 b 12; 24, 1459 b 17; 24, 1460 a 3).

b 7 τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μῆκε. In lieu of this Bernay suggested τῷ συμ-μέτρῳ μῆκε. As the hexameter, however, has been said to be the only metre fit for a long poem (24, 1460 a 3), it is possible that τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μῆκε may be meant to stand for τῷ τοῦ μέτρου οἰκείῳ μῆκε, the length one ordinarily associates with this description of verse. The rendering of Gomperz, ‘wenn er der Länge des epischen Versmasses entspricht’, has met with the approval of Zeller (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 9 p. 539).

ῦδαρη: Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 659 R. ὑδαρής τε γὰρ καὶ ἄσθενῆς καὶ ψυχρὸς ἐστὶν (scil. ὁ λόγος). Similarly in Pol. 2. 4, 1262 b 15 Aristotle describes affection as becoming a ὑδαρῆς φιλία when spread over too large a circle of friends or relations.

λέγω δὲ οἶον ἕαν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ἑν συγκειμένη illustrates the principal statement, ἦττον μία ἡ μίρησις ἡ τῶν ἐποποιών (b 3); for the position of the illustration see on 6, 1450 a 34. The main
point is proved by showing that even the best epics, those of Homer, are made up of a plurality of actions, each of them of some magnitude and importance by itself.

τοιαύτα μέρη: i.e. sections embodying so many distinguishable πράξεις or stories.

καὶ καθ' εαυτὰ ἔχει. It is usual to write here ἄτοκε καὶ καθ' εαυτὰ with certain of the apographs; but a subject τὰ μέρη may easily be supplied from the preceding τοιαύτα μέρη (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 2. i. p. 35, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 234).

καίτοι ταύτα τὰ ποιήματα. The error here in Λ, καὶ τοιαύτα ἄττα (sic) for καίτοι ταύτα.

εἰ οὖν τούτοις κτέ. In summing up the series of reasons introduced by διώτι in 14 Aristotle changes his construction, treating them as a series of assumptions. Here also, at the last moment as it were, he recognizes another and an even more important point of superiority, the superior emotional effect of Tragedy (τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἐργώ). An additional argument is introduced in just the same way in De caelo 2. 14, 297 b 17, and 3. 5, 304 b 19, and in De part. an. 2. 10, 656 a 9.

τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἐργώ. In Aristotle’s view epic poetry has the same end as Tragedy; and its immediate effect (ἐργώ) is the same in kind, the pleasurable excitement of the emotions of pity and fear. The affinity of the Homeric Epic and Tragedy in this respect was acknowledged in antiquity by the ancient commentators on Homer (Adam, Die aristotelische Theorie vom Epos p. 33 sqq.) as well as by Plato (Rep. 605 c). Aristotle’s view is that the difference between them is mainly one of manner; so that apart from that they are fundamentally alike—with the same literary elements, the same canons of procedure, the same emotional effect, and the same ultimate end and justification.

τὴν τυχόνταν ἰδιόνυσ: Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 32 ἔχει γὰρ ἦσσον ἰδιόνυσ b 13 των καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὖ τὴν τυχόνταν.

αὖτά: i.e. Tragedy and epic poetry. The pleasure they give is essentially the same (see above on b 12), though Tragedy gives it in a finer and more concentrated form.

τὴν εἰρήμενην: i. 3, 1452 b 32 and i. 4, 1453 b 10. b 14

περὶ μὲν οὖν κτέ. This list of points in the preceding theory of Tragedy and epic poetry is preparatory to a discussion on another matter, no doubt the theory of Comedy (see 6, 1449 b 22). Summaries of the same type are constantly introduced by Aristotle.
1462 b 16 as connecting links between one discussion and another; see more especially De gen. et corr. 2. 1, 328 b 26; Meteor. 1. 14, 353 a 25; De mem. 2, 453 b 8; H. A. 3. 1, 509 a 26; Eth. N. 7. 15, 1154 b 32; Pol. 6. 1, 1316 b 31; Rhet. 2. 1, 1377 b 15. To judge from these parallels, the next paragraph must have opened with περὶ δὲ κωμῳδίας λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν or some equivalent formula.
APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON 6. 1449b 27

The following synopsis of versions and paraphrases of the clause 6' ἐλέων καὶ φόβου περαιόντα τῆν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may give some idea of the variations of opinion at different times in regard to this much-debated passage. The extracts without references are to be understood to come from commentaries or translations.

1527. Paccius: 'per misericordiam... atque terrorem perturbationes huiusmodi purgans.'

1549. Segni: 'conducendo l' espurgatione degli affetti... per via di misericordia et di timore.'

1559. Minturnus (De Poeta p. 63): 'tragica poesia id sibi potissimum proponit, ut misericordia captanda incutiendoque terrore animum a perturbationibus expiet.' Comp. his Arte Poetica (1564) p. 77.

1560. Victorius: 'per misericordiam et metum conficiens huiusce modi perturbationum purgationem.'

1570. Castelvetro: 'induca per misericordia e per ispavento purga zione di così fatte passioni.' In his commentary he explains this as meaning that: 'la tragedia con le predette passioni, spavento e misericordia, purga e scaccia dal cuore degli huomini quelle predette medesime passioni.'

1572. Piccolomini: 'a fine che... col mezo della compassione e del timore, si purghino gli animi da così fatte lor passioni & perturbationi.'

1587. Riccobonus: 'per misericordiam et metum inducens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1588. Denores (Poetica f. 6r): 'per purgar gli spettatori col diletto che nasce dalla imitacione, & dalla representatione dal terrore, & dalla misericordia.'

1590. Rossi (Discorsi f. 21r): 'per purgare gli animi, con la compassione, & con lo spavento da simili affetti.'

1596. Pinciano (Philosophia antiqua poetica p. 332): 'Tragedia dixer a yque es imitacion activa de accion grave, hecha para limpiar los animos de perturbaciones, por medio de misericordia y miedo.'

1610. Heinsius: 'ut... per misericordiam et metum inducat
similium perturbationum expiationem.' Comp. his De Tragoediae constitutione p. 29 ed. 1611.

1613. Benius: 'per misericordiam et metum peragens talium perturbationem purgationem.'

1621. Gallutius (Virgilianae Vindicationes p. 252): 'Id igitur ait Aristoteles Tragoediam agere ac veluti finem intuerti: ut sicut affecta corpora purgatis atque abstersis curantur humoribus, ita animum sanet ipsa, duobus affectibus nominatim, commiseratione ac metu purgatis, hoc est, ab ea liberatis exsuperantia, a qua animi quaedam aegrotatio promanabat.'

1623. Goulston: 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum eiusmodi vehementes animorum perturbationes undequaque purgans expiansque.'

1626. Ordoñez: 'conduciendo la expurgacion de los afectos ... por via de misericordia y terror.'

1633. Gonçalez de Salas (Nueva Idea de la Tragedia antigua p. 11): 'de modo sea imitada la Accion [p. 17: 'de modo sea su Representacion'], que mueva a Lastima, y a Miedo, para que el animo se purgue de los afectos semejantes.'

1640. Mesnardière (Poétique p. 8): 'qui produit par elle mesme la terreur et la pitié, et qui sert à modérer ces deux mouvemens de l'âme.'

1671. Milton (Pref. to Samson Agonistes): 'Tragedy ... said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions.' But his Latin version of the words is: 'per misericordiam et metum perficiens talium affectuum lustrationem.'

1692. Dacier: 'qui ... par le moyen de la compassion et de la terreur, achève de purger en nous ces sortes de passions et toutes les autres semblables.'

1705. Anon.: 'which ... by means of Compassion and Terror perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.'


1763. Moor (On the End of Tragedy p. 42): 'And thus, says Aristotle, Tragedy, by calling in Musick to its aid in exciting Pity and Terror, proposes to charm away, out of human life, such calamities as are exhibited in the Drama.'

1768. Lessing (Hamburgische Dramaturgie St. 77): 'Die Tragödie ist die Nachahmung einer Handlung, die ... vermittelt des Mitleids und der Furcht die Reinigung dieser und dergleichen Leidenschaften bewirkt.'

1771. Batteux: 'pour opérer ... par la terreur et par la pitié la purgation de ces mêmes passions.' Comp. his paraphrase in the Mém.
de l'Académie des Inscriptions for 1771: 'qui se fait ... par un spectacle de terreur et de pitié, pour nous faire ressentir ces deux passions purgées de ce qui les rend désagréables.'

1775. Anon.: 'with Terror and Pity, effectually purifying such like Passions.'

1789. Twining: 'effecting through pity and terror the correction and refining of such passions.'

1792. Pye: 'effecting through the means of pity and terror the purgation of such passions.'

1794. Tyrwhitt: 'per misericordiam et metum hujusmodi affectuum purgationem efficiens.' In his note he explains the meaning to be that 'affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragodiis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato crimina-batur, sed contra levari et exhauriri' (comp. Matthiae, Misc. Phil. 2. 1, p. 24).

1798. Buhle: 'um durch Mitleid und Furcht die Veredlung gewisser Leidenschaften zu bewirken.'

1802. Hermann: 'miseratione et terrore harum et similium perturbationum purgationem perficiens.'

— Sahl: 'ut per misericordiam metumque velut lustrationem quandam talium calamitatum perficiat.'

1811. Taylor: 'through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions.' In the Introd. to the ed. of 1818 the meaning is said to be that 'the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form the catastrophe of the tragedy.'

1821. Gräfenhan: 'durchgehends durch Mitleid und Furcht, die im Zuschauer erregt werden, die Reinigung eben solcher unwill-kührlieh entstehenden Gefühle bewirkend.'

1824. Weise: 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht eine Reinigung dieser Gemüthsbewegungen bewirkt.'


1839. Ritter: 'miseratione ac metu perficiens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1848. Weil (Verh. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel p. 140): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten eigenthümliche Reinigung.' In 1889 (Études sur le drame antique p. 162) thus in French: 'La tragédie est l’image d’une action ... qui, par la pitié et la crainte, accomplit la catharsis propre aux émotions de cette nature.'

1849. Egger (La Critique chez les Grecs p. 321): 'employant la terreur et la pitié pour purger les passions de ce genre.'

1857. Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 21): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt
APPENDIX

durch (Erregung von) Mitleid und Furcht die erleichternde Entladung solcher (miteidigen und furchtsamen) Gemüthsaffectionen.'

1858. Saint-Hilaire: 'arrivant, tout en excitant la pitié et la terreur, à purifier en nous ces deux sentiments.'

1859. Stahr (Aristoteles und die Wirkung der Tragödie p. 32): 'welche . . . durch Mitleid und Furcht (die beiden nothwendigen Elemente jeder solchen Handlung, welche keiner tragischen Dichtung fehlen dürfen) die reinigende Erleichterung von solchen Erleidnissen zu Wege bringt.'

1865. Susemihl: 'und dies Alles in einer Weise, dass diese Darstellung durch Furcht und Mitleid eine Reinigung eben dieser Affecte erzielt.' In his ed. of 1874: 'eine Reinigung von eben dieser Art von Affecten erzielt.'

1869. Ueberweg: 'welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die (zeitweilige) Befreiung von derartigen Gefühlen zum Enderfolg hat.'

1875. M. Schmidt: 'so angelegt, dass sie durch Furcht und Mitleid eine von derartigen Affecten reinigende Wirkung übt.'

1876. Barco: 'la quale per via della pietà e del terrore libera l'animo da siffatti sentimenti.'

— Doering (Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 254): 'Durch Mitleid und Furcht, d. h. durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht, vollbringt die Tragödie die Katharsis der jenen gleichartigen Affecte.'

— Manns (Emmerich Progr. p. 5): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten (oder . . . die solchen Mitteln) eigenthümliche Reinigung' (comp. his Lehre des Aristoteles von der tragischen Katharsis und Hamartia p. 25).

1878. Reinkens (Aristoteles über Kunst p. 158): 'welche durch Mitleid und Furch die Reinigung von solchen Affekten bewirkt.'

1883. Ruelle: 'opérant par la pitié et la terreur la purgation des passions de la même nature.'

1885. Günther (Grundzüge der tragischen Kunst p. 258): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Rührung und Erschütterung die gerade auf derartige Seelenzustände sich erstreckende Gemüthsklärung.'

1887. Baumgart (Handbuch der Poetik p. 424): 'welche die Kraft besitzt, durch die Empfändungen des Mitleids und der Furcht die Läuterung der entsprechenden Gemüthsbewegungen zu vollenden.'

1891. Wecklein (Ueber die Stoffe und die Wirkung der griechischen Tragödie p. 35): 'die Tragödie ist eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furch die Erleichterung von dieser Art von Gemüthsverregungen erzielt.'

1892. Bosanquet (History of Aesthetic p. 64); 'producing by (the stimulation of) pity and fear the alleviating discharge of emotions of that nature.'

1894. Bernardakis (Mon édition d'Euripide p. 60): 'qui par la pitié et la crainte mène à sa fin l'expiation des faits de mal qui causent cette pitié et cette crainte.'
1895. Butcher: 'through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.'

1896. Laehr (Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles p. 65): 'Eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung derartiger Gefühle ... vollbringt.' Explained in p. 69 as meaning: 'die Tragödie vollbringt durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung aller derartigen Gefühle.'

1897. Gomperz: 'eine Darstellung, welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die Entladung dieser Affecte herbeiführt.'

1899. Hatzfeld et Dufour: 'opérant par la pitié et la crainte (au théâtre) la purification des passions de ce genre (dans la réalité).'
INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

The references are to Bekker's pages and lines as given in the margin of this edition of the text. The first two figures are omitted; so that Bekker's 1456 b 36, for instance, becomes here 56 b 36.

A + after a reference means that the word recurs more than once in the context.

Α 56 b 36; 58 a 12
άγαθος 50 a 28; 54 b 9; 56 a 6 — opp.
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