THE OTTOMANS AND THE BALKANS

A Discussion of Historiography

EDITED BY

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BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON • KÖLN

2002
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of putting together this volume, we have accumulated quite a few debts. One of the most important is to Jeanne Adamır, without whose help during the editing process, this volume would still be a sheaf of unedited paper. She also has translated the article by Klaus-Peter Matschke from the original German. On the Bochum end, Christian Mady’s help has been much appreciated, especially with the Hungarian material, and Kerstin Engelbrecht and Nicole Opaçchi also have contributed a great deal. As for the Munich part of the operation, Barış Çağşan patiently has dealt with abstruse library requests. Our thanks also go to Halil İnalçık, Gudrun Kraelmer, Klaus Kreiser and Christoph K. Neumann, who have provided many valuable suggestions with respect to content. Apart from the material aid given, all these people’s friendliness and good humor have been a source of joy and inspiration.

We are grateful to our contributors as well; some of them have waited patiently for many years. We also admire the energy of those who have produced articles at very short notice. All of our fellow workers have put up with our sometimes intrusive editing suggestions, and we can never thank them enough for their spirit of cooperation.
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INTRODUCTION

SURAIYA FAROQHI AND FIKRET ADANIR

In the present volume, the authors hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion of historiography concerning the Ottoman Empire, focusing on issues in one way or another relevant to the history of southeastern Europe. Such an enterprise must be viewed in the context of our discipline’s self-examination, which has been going on for more than twenty years, since Edward Said published his scathing critique of ‘orientalism’. Admittedly, Said’s book but marginally addressed itself to the work of Ottomanists; yet it did not fail to make an impact on many thoughtful representatives of our field.¹

In a different vein, our questioning also has been directed at the performance of national states in general, with those established in southeastern Europe, present-day Turkey included, as the center of attention. This questioning has gained in urgency due to the conflicts of recent years. Given the political context, present-day rethinking of Ottoman history will often include a re-examination of sultanic policies vis-à-vis dissident provincials, with special emphasis on those political measures evaluated negatively in the past.² Conflicts encouraging such a re-evaluation of the performance of both multi-ethnic empires and national states include the Cyprus war of 1974, the Lebanon conflagration (1975–1990), repressive measures against the Muslim minority in Bulgaria culminating in the mass expulsion of 1989, serious military confrontations in eastern Anatolia, and especially the horrors of the war in former Yugoslavia, of which the

Muslim Bosnians were among the principal victims. It is difficult to avoid asking oneself how these traumas might have been prevented. Some researchers will also wonder whether integration into a Muslim-based but secularized supranational state might not have opened up the road to a less confrontational future.³

But apart from this background more or less specific to our discipline, there also exist trends in other fields of history which encourage historians working in very different specialties to re-examine the value of their work. To begin with, there is the public concern with memory. While memory coincides with the results of historical research in certain areas, it noticeably diverges from scholarly reconstruction in many others.⁴ Searching investigations into the memory of witnesses have been going on for the past decades, undertaken by historians, journalists and above all, film makers.⁵ But at present this research is if anything intensifying, as the number of people who witnessed World War II and the Nazi mass murders dwindles every year. But by concerning themselves with the memories of eye witnesses, historians have had to confront the challenge that those most immediately involved often do not 'recognize themselves' in the historical reconstructions proposed by members of the discipline. Debating the links and cleavages between history and memory, historians have been obliged to rethink their own procedures. For active fields producing considerable numbers of studies every year, we possess recent book-length summaries which map the state of the field, criticize certain aspects of it and point to the current desiderata.⁶

Within the limits set by our linguistic and other capabilities, the contributors to the present volume attempt something similar. In the body of our text, we will survey the work which has been done by scholars active in the Balkan ‘successor states’ of the Ottoman Empire, and also in republican Turkey. But before we get to this point, it

³ In the economic realm, this questioning has been carried furthest by Michael Palairet, who has defended the thesis that the Ottoman Empire of Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I constituted a better framework for economic development in the Balkans than the nineteenth-century national states: Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800–1914, Evolution without Development (Cambridge, 1997).


⁵ For a historian’s treatment compare Annette Wieviorka, L’Ère du témoin (Paris, 1998).

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seems necessary to discuss the links of twentieth-century historiography with the rich historical tradition of the Ottoman Empire itself. In this introduction, we will consequently examine the manner in which certain underlying themes of the great Ottoman chronicles, such as sultanic power, the Ottoman bureaucracy and warfare, have been treated in twentieth-century Ottomanist historiography.

Certainly, the present authors would submit that twentieth-century historiography departs from its Ottoman predecessor in two major ways. On the one hand, the relationships of the Ottoman world to its neighbors have been viewed by modern historians in a new and different perspective. However, the transition from Ottoman to post-Ottoman was gradual. While Ottoman chronicles down to the early nineteenth century regarded relations with the outside world purely as a matter of campaigns and treaties, authors of the following period attempted to explain the reasons for certain major events taking place outside the Ottoman frontiers. Such developments included the French Revolution or, later, even the rise of socialism. Thus the foundations of a more broadly based history of the Ottoman Empire and its relations to various neighboring states were laid in the closing decades of the Ottoman period, even though more scholarly researches took place only during the later, republican epoch.

In the same vein, Byzantine history entered the consciousness of educated Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, when authors such as Ahmed Midhat, following European models, stigmatized the Byzantine Empire as the abode of ‘fanaticism, absurdity and immorality’. However, even Ahmed Midhat accepted that close parallels existed between Byzantium and the late Ottoman world, if only because both empires were embattled states under attack from all sides. In a lengthy article first published in 1931 and read by most Ottomanists of our generation, Fuat Köprüllü, the founding father of Ottoman cultural history, came to the conclusion that few immediate links between the two socio-political systems can ever have

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existed. After all, Byzantium was long past its prime when the Ottoman Turks appeared on the Anatolian scene. However, while students were for a long time encouraged to think that Köprülı’s article was the final word on the question, recent studies have shown that this is very far from being the case. Quite to the contrary, the Byzantine-Ottoman transition, and thus linkages between the two societies, have turned into a fruitful field of study, and the chapter by Klaus Peter Matschke in the present volume contains a comprehensive survey of recent research in this field.

Ottoman historians made frequent references to the embattled border areas, the serhad. Yet only in the twentieth century did historians working in Turkey begin to study the functioning of the Empire’s sixteenth-century northern, southern and eastern borders in any detail. And even then, this concern was less intensive than one might have expected. On the whole, border relations with the Habsburgs, and with the Russians of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, were left to the attentions of non-Turkish researchers. In the same way, Ottoman-French, Ottoman-English and Ottoman-Dutch relations became the province of European and North American scholars, often though not exclusively from the states immediately concerned. In the Habsburg instance, mainly Austrians and Hungarians were intrigued by the complexities of border relations in peace and war.

On the other hand, economic relations with Europe did become...
a major field of research in Turkey from the 1970s onwards. Scholarly interest focused on the Ottoman Empire’s incorporation into the early modern and, later, into the fully capitalist world economy. Many of the historians concerned worked within the Wallersteinian model and asked themselves how, and at what time, the Ottoman territories became part of a dependent ‘periphery’. At a later stage, the question of how Ottoman producers reacted to their ‘incorporation’, whether they simply went bankrupt or found means of adaptation, equally became a major issue.

Down to the present day, Turkish historians have followed the cues given by their Ottoman predecessors and have shown a strong predilection for the study of the Ottoman center. Yet a second novel aspect of present-day Ottomanist historiography, in which it differs strongly from its Ottoman antecedents, involves the history of individual regions within the Empire. On the whole, these had received short shrift from Ottoman chroniclers, whose lives and careers were so often oriented toward the imperial center. In the present introduction, we will limit ourselves to a cursory glance at the relations between center and provinces, as this theme will dominate many contributions to our volume. Of course, the legitimation of regional studies among historians is inextricably linked with the nationalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even if the more naive attempts at equating eighteenth-century tendencies toward decentralization with proto-nationalist movements now have been overcome. Just a few years ago, an important study has appeared which shows that centralization is not always equivalent to ‘modernity’. In this perspective, local elites’ greater consciousness of the potentialities of ‘their’ respective regions can coexist with close and even intensifying ties to the Ottoman center. This observation is especially applicable to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

For the sake of completeness, this tension between integration and regional consciousness, which is not treated at any great length by our contributors, will briefly occupy us here.

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13 For an overview over the relevant work, see Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge, Paris, 1987).
14 Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, 1993).
15 Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime”.
Every ‘modern-style’ historian is, in one way or another, dependent on the historiographical tradition of the society which he/she sets out to study. This tradition determines what kind of information the researcher will find in the sources at his/her disposal. If chronological precision and attention to political detail were no priorities for the writers of a given age, modern historians will have a lot of trouble determining the when, how and why even of fairly important events. On a deeper level, there is the problem that researchers often will strongly identify with ‘their’ sources, on which, after all, they have to spend such a great deal of time. Frequently a linguistic barrier has to be overcome, made more daunting by the fact that in many cultures it was and is customary to employ languages other than the idiom of everyday communication for courtly, diplomatic or scholarly purposes. All this means a considerable investment of time and effort, and once this investment has been made, researchers often will feel that ‘their’ sources ‘must be getting it right’. For if this were not the case, a new investment would need to be made in order to access novel sources, and a human lifetime, alas, is of limited duration.

Adherence to routine apart, it is this emotional identification with the relevant primary sources which often induces modern historians to accept the views of sixteenth- or nineteenth-century authors without too much criticism. What Ottoman historians regarded as important, will quite ‘naturally’ appear as such to the novice and even to the experienced Ottomanist. Moreover, this de facto dependence soon will be legitimized on a scholarly level as well: We all fear anachronism, that mortal sin of historians, and to accept the perspective of the primary sources at hand seems a sure protection against this danger. An overly close adherence to the statements of chroniclers or memorialists will, however, result in a neglect of every-

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17 As an instructive example, we might point out that the changeover from Arabic to Roman characters in Turkey (1928) was received with great reserve by the foreign scholarly community. This new alphabet had been well thought out, and among other positive points, for the first time ever permitted the cursory reading of Turkish texts. Yet it took several decades before this script was accepted by many foreign Ottomanists, who, after all, had spent a long time mastering its predecessor.
body and every issue which these personages considered *quantité négligeable*, including, in the Ottoman instance, craftsmen, peasants and women. Closeness to the primary sources must thus alternate with a critical contextualization of the relevant authors and the latters' major claims. But all this means that we cannot make sense of Ottomanist historiography without taking the Ottoman historiographical tradition into account.

In their own time, Ottomans close to the court, often active or former officials, wrote numerous histories of the Ottoman dynasty. In the sixteenth century a *şehnameci* was specifically commissioned to produce an account of the current reign in verses inspired by that master of Iranian epic poetry, Firdawsī. This enterprise was not pursued for long, and in the seventeenth century there were no official historiographers. When the sultans once again began to sponsor the production of chronicles at some point in the eighteenth century, the new accounts were written in more or less sober prose, often by highly qualified authors, such as the Aleppine Mustafa Naima or Mehmed Raşid. Until the end of the Empire, the sultanate repeatedly commissioned official histories until the end of the empire. But the authors of these often multi-volume works never monopolized the field; there were always writers who produced histories without official sponsorship, and in the nineteenth century, many such accounts were to be printed. Most authors of officially sponsored chronicles were expected to cover long spans of time which they themselves had not witnessed; this meant that they needed to rely on the works of their predecessors. In certain cases, especially if the authors were present or former high-level bureaucrats, they also might gain access to a selection of official documents.

Moreover, the writing of historical accounts was by no means a lost art in the Ottoman provinces. Even in the sixteenth century, Istanbul intellectuals were impressed by the history, and history-writing, of Mamluk Egypt; but the events of the subsequent period were also recorded in chronicles. Down to the seventeenth century, Ottomans writing on Egypt normally gathered their information from local, Egyptian sources, while from that time onwards, they

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20 See Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, for the manner in which a distinguished politician and intellectual undertook this task in the nineteenth century.
increasingly undertook researches of their own. In the large cities of Syria, the eighteenth century was a time in which both Muslims and Christians wrote about local events. Sometimes they limited themselves to what happened in their respective home cities, but some chroniclers took a wider view and, for instance, included information on the pilgrimage routes to Mecca and the deserts they traversed. In Mosul, local ulama and even craftsmen wrote about life in their city. Particularly fascinating is the poem in which a master textile artisan of the eighteenth century complained about having sunk so low that he was obliged to deal with beyond-the-pale creatures such as women. At the end of the eighteenth century, a modest inhabitant of Sarajevo by the name of Mustafa Başekiya produced a town chronicle as well, written in Ottoman with numerous borrowings from Bosnian. Greek provincial chronicles were composed ever since the seventeenth century; some of them will be treated in the present volume by Johann Strauss.

Sometimes, but by no means always, Ottoman dynastic history was placed into a world historical context, which might include pre-Islamic rulers as well as early Islamic history. But the main focus of interest were the deeds of the Ottoman sultans themselves. Accordingly, the reign of an individual ruler was the normal unit of time to be treated in a single section. Warfare and public construction, which functioned as major sources of imperial legitimacy, were accorded special attention. But Ottoman officialdom also used these chronicles as venues to document its own history; thus appointments to the major offices often were treated in separate chapters. Moreover, after the events of a given reign had been covered, many

24 On chronicles written by Bosnians compare the introduction to Salih Sidki Hadžihuseinović Muvekkit, *Tarih-i Bosna*, trans. and commented by Abdulah Polimac et alii (Sarajevo, 1998), pp. XVII–XXXIII. Salih Sidki (1825–1886) has produced a book midway between a traditional chronicle and a modern study. While he writes in “an epic style” (p. XXX) and is not always concerned about historical accuracy, he has used an impressive array of sources in both Serbian and Ottoman. He thus may be compared to certain Greek authors of the Ottoman period, to whom Johann Strauss will refer in his section of our book. We are grateful to Markus Koller, who has supplied us with this reference.
chronicles included selected biographies of the important figures who had died during the period under consideration. This was another opportunity to supplement the ruler's history by that of the men who had served him. Such a manner of conceiving history made sense from a socio-political viewpoint. After all, from the 1640s onwards, it was increasingly obvious that grand viziers, chief jurists, dowager sultanas, chief eunuchs and Janissary commanders had a major role to play in Ottoman politics. In the worst case, the Ottoman state could now survive a sultan's long minority, the latter's lack of interest in state business, or even, at least for a while, a ruler who was a madman.25

A challenge to twentieth-century historians

All this means that when nineteenth and twentieth-century scholars began to study the history of the Ottoman Empire, they could base themselves on an ongoing historical tradition. This applies both to subjects and former subjects of the sultan and to those who, like the Austrian scholar-diplomat Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, wrote about Ottoman history as outsiders.26 At least where Istanbul-centered histories were concerned, the Ottoman mode of historiography formed part of an imperial tradition; one cannot help remembering that the Chinese court also sponsored official histories of every dynasty. As to the provincial chronicles, their prestige was minimal. Johann Strauss' article shows how long these writings were ignored, even in the places where they had originated and whose history they glorified.

Ottoman imperial history emphasized 'kings and battles' in a fashion quite familiar to European historians working in the aftermath of World War I, and in many instances even much later. Wars, with diplomatic relations a poor second, were considered the stuff of history, both by Ottoman chroniclers and by European historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This remarkable congruence probably was due in part to the monarch-centered style of thinking which characterized the historical professions in the two cultures concerned. Monarchs, along with their ministers and generals, were considered as almost the only legitimate historical 'players'. On

26 However Hammer-Purgstall was a long-term resident of Istanbul.
this issue, comparable styles of thinking prevailed, both in the Ottoman Empire and in nineteenth and twentieth-century central Europe, where interest in things Ottoman was at that time especially strong.27

Sultanic power and magnificence

Given this congruence, it is surprising that only during the last twenty years or so have historians begun to investigate the roots of sultanic power and legitimacy. Up to that time, this legitimacy was taken for granted, at least where the pre-Hamidian period and the Empire’s Muslim subjects were concerned. Or conversely, as apparent from Buşra Ersanlı’s study, in early republican Turkey the Ottoman ruling group was viewed as corrupt and therefore per se illegitimate.28 However, in reality sultanic legitimacy was not as simple a matter as it might appear at first glance.29 In the ‘classical period’ of the sixteenth century, Ottoman sultans do seem to have suffered from a ‘legitimacy deficit’, in the sense that they did not belong to the Quraysh clan from which legitimate caliphs were expected to issue. Moreover, unlike other Islamic dynasties in this position, the Ottoman sultans never made any claims to Quraysh descent either. Nor could these rulers claim Genghis Khan as their ancestor, the dominant form of legitimation in the Turco-Mongol context of Central Asia. Rather, Ottoman sultans normally asserted that their rule was justified by the concrete services they rendered to the Islamic community.30 Victories over the infidels played a major role in this form of legitimation, and even in the later seventeenth century, a sultan who

27 Admittedly, by no means all the scholars who after 1945 were to promote a different type of history, strongly socio-economic in orientation, were notable for their democratic convictions. Yet to an observer of twentieth-century events, it became increasingly difficult to ignore the role of ‘ordinary’ people in contemporary history, however much they might have been manipulated by their ‘betters’. This real-life situation must have appreciably contributed toward discrediting the ‘king and battle’ approach.

28 However, this did not mean that Ottomanist historians became interested in the practices which we, and sometimes contemporaries as well, perceived as ‘corrupt’. One of the few analyses of this kind which has appeared in print is due to Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mustafa ‘Ali (1541–1600) (Princeton, 1986), 85–86, 120–121 and passim. See also Ahmet Mumcu, Osmanlı Devletinde rişvet (Özellikle adli rişvet) (Ankara, 1969).

29 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 270 ff.

30 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 288–89.
INTRODUCTION

suffered defeat against the Habsburgs was liable to lose his throne. But within the Empire's confines, the 'just rule' of the sultan also was a major legitimizing factor. This is apparent from the numerous sultanic commands issued as responses to petitions for the reparation of abuses, which arrived in the capital every year. But Ottoman rulers also demonstrated their right to govern by the care they took to promote the interests of the Empire's subjects. These activities included the protection of merchants, travelers and especially pilgrims to Mecca. But ensuring the grain supply of the Holy Cities in the Hejaz, or establishing impressive pious foundations in highly visible sites also could augment sultanic legitimacy.

Yet this practical aspect to Ottoman legitimation did not exclude the use of symbols, far from it. Gülru Necipoğlu has studied the commissioning of a helmet rather reminiscent of the papal tiara, which the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha undertook in the 1520s, when the entourage of the young Sultan Süleyman evidently hoped for a speedy conquest of central Europe and perhaps also Italy. When these conquests did not materialize, the tiara was melted down. But in the 1550s, the great mosque complex of the Süleymaniye was decorated with inscriptions celebrating the sultan as the victor over Shi'i heretics, a motif later taken up by Sultan Ahmed I in his 'Blue Mosque' as well.

That Ottoman rulers arranged for major public festivals in the capital and also in the larger provincial towns, must have also enhanced their image, at least among a section of their subjects. Recent research moreover has shown that the funeral ceremonies for a deceased sultan and the inthronization of his successor also involved ceremonies intended to further the legitimacy of the dynasty. This remains true even though funerary ceremonies, especially after the sixteenth century, tended to emphasize the religious truth that the dead ruler shared the fate of all deceased Muslims. By this time, Sunni piety had become a major legitimizing feature in and of itself. Moreover, while at first glance the legitimizing value of the central

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enthronement ceremony seems to have been limited, in reality the advent of a new sultan had a wider impact. For in addition to the declaration of loyalty on the part of viziers and high officials, which was concealed from public view by the walls of the Topkapi palace, a novel rite was developed in the seventeenth century. This involved the girding of ‘the sword of Osman’ in the extra muros sanctuary of Eyüp. In the course of this pilgrimage-cum-enthronement rite, the ruler was made visible to the people of Istanbul and symbolically took possession of his capital city.\(^34\)

Many of the events discussed in these modern studies of the sultan’s power and legitimacy were first recorded by chroniclers active in Istanbul, and thus the Ottoman elite must have considered them important. Therefore it makes sense to claim that modern historians concerned with sultanic power and legitimacy link up with the works of their Ottoman predecessors. However, modern historians do study the relevant phenomena in the broader context provided by comparative history and political anthropology.

**Bureaucrats as historical subjects**

The bureaucracy as a historical subject, which figured so prominently in the Ottoman chronicles, also should have made sense to the Ottomanist historian of the early twentieth century. After all, Max Weber recently had suggested that bureaucratic rule was characteristic of ‘mature’ states. However, before the 1940s, Weber did not as yet excite much interest among Ottoman and Turkish historians.\(^35\) On the other hand, European historians dealing with the Ottoman Empire were busy assembling their primary sources, a difficult task when, due to World War I and then to post-war turmoil, libraries were in disarray and travel budgets non-existent. Broader

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perspectives on the role of the Ottoman bureaucracy in a world historical perspective were thus completely missing. Only after 1945, and perhaps with subterranean links to the neo-Weberian current among contemporary American social scientists, did the Ottoman bureaucracy ‘arrive’ as a major scholarly topic.

But a considerable challenge to historians concerned with Ottoman state structures also came from a set of lengthy descriptions of the Ottoman military and central administration. These had been published by Ismail Hakkı Uzuncaštılı during and immediately after World War II, with a latecomer volume on the specialists in Islamic law and religion (ilmiye) appearing in 1965. These books were something of a novelty in the Turkish context, insofar as Ottoman historiography had but rarely produced such tableaux of administrative structure. However, the format was well known to European historians of the Ottoman Empire, as attempts to describe Ottoman ‘institutions’ had been made ever since the sixteenth century, with Joseph von Hammer publishing an especially elaborate version in 1815.

Yet before Uzungarìlì, such surveys had been based on the information contained in the few Ottoman source texts available. Or for the most part, they relayed material gathered by European travelers to the Ottoman Empire, whose sources of information often left a great deal to be desired. At the very best, occasional documents might have been used by those authors who could gain access to them, such as Mouradjea d’Ohsson in the late eighteenth century and Hammer in the early nineteenth.

Uzungarìlì, by contrast, set out to document his descriptions from sources much closer to the structures under consideration, namely Ottoman chronicles and, to a large extent, original archival documents. From a present-day perspective, Uzungarìlì’s great weakness is his
inability, or refusal, to think of the different bureaucracies within the
Ottoman administration as subject to change over time. Even though
he chronicled major reorganizations, particularly those occurring in
the eighteenth century, his institutions appear to exist in a timeless
realm. One might say that for Uzunçarşılı there was a static ‘clas-
sical Ottoman period’, which began in the middle of the fifteenth
century and ended about four hundred years later. During this period,
whatever changes might have happened were no more than the super-
ficial ripples which a deep lake may show on a fine summer’s day.

Nor does Uzunçarşılı transmit a real sense of place. This omis-
sion is all the more remarkable as the author tends to limit himself
to bureaucracies operating in Istanbul. Yet the constantly changing
mammoth capital with its diverse inhabitants rarely enters the pic-
ture. Throughout his volumes, the author never asks himself how
the Ottoman administration reacted to changes within the subject
population. Thus the possibility that administrative reorganizations
might have social or economic backgrounds does not enter the pic-
ture at all. This gives the present-day reader a curious feeling of
abstractness, of living in a never-never land. But these are criticisms
made from a perspective developed during the 1970s and later, when
problems of this type began to enter the field of Ottomanist historical
vision. For the 1940s, Uzunçarşılı’s volumes constituted a tremendous
achievement, and we may even describe scholarly interest in the
Ottoman bureaucracy as developing ‘when Uzunçarşılı met Weber’.

Ottoman warfare

Everybody knows that in ‘king-and-battle’ history, the battles are writ
large, and Ottoman history-writing down to the nineteenth century
is no exception to this rule. Quite to the contrary, as we have seen,
victory in war against the infidels constituted a major legitimizing
device. From the sixteenth century onwards, moreover, European au-
thors have tended to regard the Ottoman Empire as a near-perfect
military society.

However, in the historiography of the last seventy years, Ottoman
warfare has not constituted a favorite field of study. On the Turk-
ish side, this may have something to do with the fact that the suc-
cessive governments of the Republic of Turkey certainly regarded,
and continue to regard, the war against Greece and its British and
other allies as the founding event of the new state. But once the
Peace of Lausanne had been concluded in 1923, the Republic not only proclaimed its desire for international peace, but also managed to steer clear of external wars to a remarkable degree. This may well explain why, even though *sefer ve zafer* ('campaigns and victories', i.e. of the Ottoman sultans) continue to form part of political rhetoric, Turkish historians are not greatly interested in Ottoman warfare. Moreover, many participants in the Ottomanist field, of whatever nationality, may have developed a visceral reaction against warfare of any kind. With the trauma of war and Nazism but a short span of years away, this is not a topic which can be approached with detachment. On the other hand, it also makes little sense to many non-Turkish historians to project their own concerns about the horrors of war upon a fairly remote past and a foreign civilization. Avoidance of the topic thus seems a logical conclusion.

Be that as it may, this outlook is changing. In the beginning there was a seminal article by the economic historian Mehmed Genç, concerning the manner in which Ottoman wars were financed in the eighteenth century. Genç assumes that the military setbacks, especially after 1750, were caused largely by a failure to adequately supply the Ottoman armies with weapons, uniforms and tents. This weakness of the Ottoman craft economy in turn was caused by the fact that payments for war matériel, if they occurred at all, were way below market value. Moreover, the more efficient producers were asked for larger deliveries than their less successful competitors. Collection from a few major suppliers was of course easier from a bureaucrat's point of view. But we also must keep in mind that the ethic of artisan-guildsmen frowned upon anybody who earned more than his fellows, and Ottoman officials may well have endorsed this judgment. In consequence, a war of any length resulted in the near-collapse of capital-starved craft producers, and the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire became a victim of its inadequate system of war financing.

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40 The only exceptions constitute the declaration of war against the Axis powers late in 1946, the sending of a contingent to fight in the Korean war, the landing in Cyprus (1974) and a rather limited involvement in the recent Gulf War.

41 It is of interest that among the emerging group of specialists in the field of Ottoman warfare, we find English, American and Hungarian scholars, but very few Turkish historians.

Genç approached the issue from the viewpoint of the economic historian; his younger colleague Rhoads Murphey was to adopt the social historian’s approach. Murphey sets out to show that the old story, often casually repeated in the secondary literature, of Ottoman soldiers motivated to heroic deeds by religious zeal alone, is no more than a fable. Similarly to other soldiers, Ottoman military men expected tangible rewards in terms of booty, but also in the shape of an albeit rough justice, which awarded merit its due. Here the sultan’s prestige, which stood high throughout most crises of Ottoman history and which was based on his reputation for justice, worked as a major stabilizing factor. In Murphey’s perspective, Ottoman society until about 1700 was organized in a fashion which enabled it to meet the soldiers’ expectations without major stress or strain.

Murphey’s research had first focused on Murad IV and his eastern campaigns. But when writing his monograph, he could also base himself on the work of Caroline Finkel, who previously had studied the logistics of Ottoman campaigns during the Long War in Hungary. Finkel also had pointed out that around 1600, Ottoman military organization was more efficient than had been assumed in earlier years. For she was able to show that most supplies, as well as a considerable number of soldiers, did not come from the Ottoman core lands at all, but from Bosnia, which thus justified its reputation as a serhad, or land of border warfare. Gábor Ágoston pursued this line of work, asking himself how the Ottomans responded to the major features of what in the European context is known as the ‘military revolution’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This spate of innovations included the massive use of firepower and small arms. In Ágoston’s view, it was not an attachment to outmoded armament technology, or even a lack of essential supplies such as lead and gunpowder, which caused the defeats of Ottoman armies in the later seventeenth century. Rather, it was a problem of organization, of getting large quantities of supplies to remote fronts, and, in addition, there also was the difficulty of achieving high and relatively uniform technical quality in firearms.

45 Ágoston, “Habsburgs and Ottomans”.
Virginia Aksan, who has focused on the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768–1774 with its catastrophic outcome for the Ottomans, emphasizes problems of manpower rather than equipment. In Aksan's perspective, Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II, when they attempted to reform the army, not merely were following European models. They also continued the Ottoman tradition, well-established ever since the seventeenth century, of recruiting the 'landless and lawless' into the armed forces. According to Aksan, there were thus Ottoman precedents for the military reforms of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which finally instituted non-janissary military corps. She thus shifts the blame for Selim III's failure against the janissaries away from the 'foreignness' of the military innovations he had attempted to introduce, a feature which had been emphasized by a previous generation of historians. In Aksan's view, the defeat was largely due to the lack of political skill and energy on the Sultan's part, who did not use the forces at his disposal when the janissaries rebelled. Or in the case of Mahmud II, whose well-trained and well-supplied armies suffered a major defeat against Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, Aksan concludes that it was probably a simple matter of Ibrahim Pasha's superior generalship.

Thus the element of 'good fortune', long since known as a major ingredient of success in war, finds itself rehabilitated. But on the whole, modern treatments of Ottoman warfare have concentrated exactly on those aspects which quite a few Ottoman chroniclers tended to pass over in silence, concentrating instead on those aspects of warfare in which political and social history intersect: behind-the-fronts organization, manpower, weaponry and food supplies. Major motifs suggested to historians by the Ottoman historiographical tradition, such as sultanic legitimacy, bureaucratic structures and warfare, thus are being replayed in a new key.

**Toward old-new horizons: Ottomans and Byzantines**

Our next step must be to highlight certain themes in which present-day Ottomanist historians depart from Naima's or Raşid's tradition,

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namely the treatment of Ottoman relations with the outside world, the history of individual regions and, last but not least, the role of non-Muslim nationalism and Great Power intervention in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Among the numerous states which form this ‘outside world’, the Byzantine Empire occupies a place of choice. Not so much because of its real power; after the ‘Latin’ conquest of 1204, Byzantium became a minor state, precariously holding on to a few fortress towns in western Anatolia. Moreover, these Anatolian possessions were rapidly lost after Michael Palaiologos had regained the old capital in 1261. What remained of the once mighty Byzantine Empire were a few minuscule territories on the tip of southeastern Europe. However, the ideological status of Constantinople/Istanbul was quite out of proportion with the real power of the Byzantine emperors. This discrepancy is well known to historians of western Europe, and failed crusades and futile church councils aiming at the incorporation of the Orthodox into the Catholic Church have spawned an extensive historiography.

On the Ottomanist side, the first historian to demonstrate the importance of Istanbul’s conquest and resettlement in the political agenda of Mehmed the Conqueror and his successors was Halil İnalcık. After a series of fundamental studies of the political devices by which the early Ottoman sultans transformed conquered territories into permanent provinces, İnalcık tackled the complicated situation with which the Ottoman government was confronted in the former Byzantine capital. İnalcık has stressed the role of the Aya-sofya as the city’s religious and high-cultural center before the construction of the Fatih complex, but he also has focused on the new commercial buildings, above all the covered market (bedestan), which helped promote trade and thus contributed to the revival of the all but deserted city. Many years later, İnalcık has rounded off his series

INTRODUCTION

of articles on early Ottoman Istanbul by a study of Galata, in the
fifteenth century still largely an Italian-speaking town.48

Through these works, it has become clear that the revival of the
former Byzantine capital was made possible by extensive commer-
cial activity. As the Black Sea increasingly was transformed into an
Ottoman lake, Muslim merchants took over from Venetians and
Genoese, and numerous products of the northern steppe lands became
available to the consumers of the Ottoman capital. It is largely
through İnalcık’s works that we have understood that the Ottoman
ruling group of the fifteenth century was in no way inimical, or even
just indifferent, to long-distance trade. Quite to the contrary, the ten-
dency to leave foreign trade to non-Muslims, so characteristic of nine-
teenth-century Ottoman society, evolved rather late. In the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire emerged as a state
closely concerned with the control of long-distance trade routes, and
not a few of its Muslim subjects made fortunes by traveling them.49

Viewed from a different angle, recent interest in the Byzantino-
Ottoman transition certainly represents an attempt by concerned his-
torians both Turkish and Greek to tone down combative nationalist
rhetoric and establish a scholarly dialogue.50 This interest also doc-
uments the growing maturity of the two historical fields. On both
sides, certain participants now have enough self-confidence to con-
front the ‘other’. After all, it is sometimes possible to make up for
the deficiencies of the late Byzantine or early Ottoman source bases
respectively by calling on those materials now made available by the
efforts of the Ottomanist or Byzantinist ‘neighbors’. As Klaus Peter
Matschke’s article demonstrates, the study of numerous historical
questions stands to gain from this kind of scholarly cooperation.

We will evoke but one example taken from the religious sphere:
Ottomanist historians have to confront the difficult problems linked

48 Halil İnalcık, “The Hub of the City: The Bedestan of Istanbul”, International
in Première rencontre internationale sur l’empire Ottoman et la Turquie moderne, ed. by Edhem
49 Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the
Ottoman Empire 1300–1914 (Cambridge, 1994).
50 The Byzantinist congress recently convened in Istanbul, at the University of
the Bosphorus (1999), should be taken as an indication of these concerns. The Turk-
ish organizers not only expressed their satisfaction at the numerous participants
from within Turkey itself, but also at the fact that after several politically motivated
false starts, such a congress finally had been held in the former Byzantine and
Ottoman capital.
to the heterodoxies which so often flourish in border regions, the fifteenth-century Ottoman serhad not excluded. In this context, the titles of two books by Michel Balivet, both a Byzantinist and an Ottomanist by training, in themselves represent a program: "(une) imbrication gréco-turque" and "Islam mystique et révolution armée dans les Balkans ottomans".\(^{51}\) One of these books deals with the many instances of peaceful cohabitation on the part of Byzantine Greeks and Ottoman Turks. By contrast, the other is concerned with a specific case of armed rebellion, namely the uprisings of Bedred-din Simavi, Torlak Kemal and Börkülce Mustafa. Basing themselves on the traditions of Islamic mysticism, these early fifteenth-century rebels seem to have aimed at a more egalitarian polity than that which Sultan Mehmed I was busily restoring at the time. Since our information on dissident milieus is very limited indeed, it is necessary to bring together whatever can be collected from both Ottoman and Byzantine sources.

On a more mundane level, an international community of scholars has concerned itself with the potential of the Ottoman tax registers for late Byzantine local history. This proceeding was based upon the recognition that Ottoman administrators were not particularly anxious to change taxation practices in newly conquered territories. Provided that there had been a direct transition from Byzantine to Ottoman rule, early sultanic tax registers, produced within a few years after the Ottoman conquest, were likely to contain numerous traces of late Byzantine revenue arrangements. Models for such transition studies had been developed earlier, namely by Nicoară and Irène Beldiceanu in dealing with the little-documented Muslim principality of Karaman finally conquered by Sultan Mehmed II.\(^{52}\) In recent decades, Macedonia, Bithynia, certain Aegean islands and Trabzon have emerged as the favorite testing grounds for the study of the Byzantine countryside, as mirrored, apart from Greek or Italian sources, in Ottoman revenue records.\(^{53}\)


\(^{53}\) Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (eds.), Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society, (Birmingham, Washington, 1986) contains a good bibliography of these studies.
Incorporation into the European world economy

At the very beginning of Ottoman history stood the conflict with Byzantium. Let us now move six hundred years ahead in time. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire's existence, this state was weakened not only by nationalist movements among its subjects and the ambitions of the European Great Powers. At least equally serious was its economic dependence, mainly on Britain, but also on other states of an industrializing Europe. This dependence was a fact of everyday life, which members of the nineteenth-century Ottoman elites, but also peasants prosecuted for tobacco-smuggling by officials in the service of the Dette Publique Ottomane, experienced as a galling humiliation.54

Yet an intellectual framework permitting scholarly discussion of this dependence emerged relatively late, namely in the 1970s. This is the concept known as 'world systems theory', elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein and his collaborators, including quite a few Turkish scholars. From the Ottomanist's viewpoint, Wallerstein's approach has contributed substantially towards making Ottoman history a part of world history in its own right, and not merely an 'exotic' field studied by nationalist Turks and a few oddballs. Moreover Wallerstein's approach has a good deal in common with that proposed by Fernand Braudel, whose work has for a long time been known and esteemed among Ottomanists. In his three-volume work on capitalism and material life, Braudel also has constructed a model of international economic relations during the early modern period, in which the Ottoman Empire, regarded as an independent 'world economy', has been accorded considerable importance.55

To put it very briefly, 'world systems theory' is based upon the following assumptions: Down to the sixteenth century, a European economic system developed largely in the territories to the west of an imaginary line linking Stockholm to Venice. But from the early 1500s, this system expanded to become the core area of an emerging 'world economy'.56 Fundamental to 'world systems theory' is the

54 As the representation of the Ottoman Empire's creditors, the Dette Publique Ottomane had been assigned some of the best-yielding taxes paid by the sultans' subjects.
contrast between such a core region, in which mercantile and later industrial capitalism predominates, and economically subservient 'peripheries'. Territories forming part of the periphery may be formal colonies or retain a measure of political independence. But in any case, they produce foodstuffs and raw materials, while providing a captive market for the products which the 'core country' dominant in the relevant peripheral region wishes to export. As a transitional area between core and periphery, the system also contains semi-peripheries, which may come about when strong states close to the core region effectively resist marginalization. Thus, for example, Spain and Portugal, whose elites had opened up large parts of Asia, Africa and America to European expansion, were unable to maintain themselves as 'core countries'. Yet their monopolistic hold over large overseas territories ensured that these two countries could not be pushed back into the periphery. Of course, relations between core, semi-periphery and periphery are never static. In the early modern period, the principal dynamic factor was the expanding economic power of the European ‘core countries’, which managed to ‘incorporate’ ever more previously independent territories into the area under their control.  

Given the size and importance of the Ottoman world empire, a major political and military competitor of European states from the fifteenth to the very end of the seventeenth century, its fate was of crucial importance to scholars wishing to gauge the usefulness of the ‘world systems’ model. To phrase it differently, these researchers needed to determine at what time the Ottoman territories had been incorporated, as a periphery, into the capitalist world economy. From an Ottomanist’s viewpoint, a study of the Ottoman economy in the framework of ‘world systems theory’ involved deciding when the Ottoman Empire ceased to function as an independent economic world and whether there were regional differences in the process of ‘incorporation’.  

Here there was a choice between two radically different options. If one followed the work of Barkan, Braude or Çizakça during his early years, the conclusion was that peripheralization

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began at the end of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{59} As an alternative one might accept Braudel’s view, shared by many of today’s Ottomanists, namely that European economic domination of the Ottoman Empire was not established until the later eighteenth or even the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{60} Çizakça was to adopt this position in a later article, while Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba refused to take sides in this dispute.\textsuperscript{61} They stressed that ‘incorporation’ was a complex process, different from one region to the next, and that available research did not yet allow them to give a hard-and-fast set of dates for Ottoman incorporation into the ‘world system’.

A very sophisticated discussion of Ottoman history in the Wallersteinian mode has been presented by Huri İslamoğlu.\textsuperscript{62} She has taken up the challenge inherent in the ‘localist’ approach adopted by many historians of the 1980s and 1990s. These scholars have pointed out that the ‘world systems’ approach negated the importance of the previous history of the ‘peripheralized’ regions. No matter what kind of social and political relations existed in a given polity, so this objection runs, what determines history once the region in question has been ‘incorporated’ is merely the dynamic of the core area. Given this set of assumptions, for the social scientist wishing to understand the contemporary situation there is no need to go back beyond 1750, or at most 1590. The social scientist’s ‘cutoff date’ will correspond to the year or years which specialists on the area under study consider the time of the region’s ‘incorporation’. İslamoğlu points out that this objection should be taken very seriously. It does not imply a reversion to the old historicist claim that every major state has an ‘essence’ of its own, which world historical developments may destroy but cannot really modify. To take account of the


\textsuperscript{60} Braudel, \textit{Civilisation matérielle}, vol. 3, 406–11.

\textsuperscript{61} Murat Çizakça, “Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World-Economy,” \textit{Review} 8, 3 (1985), 353–78.

difficulty, she suggests a double-pronged approach: on the one hand, it is legitimate to study the complex political and economic history of the nineteenth century, when a few European ‘core countries’ made large areas of the world into their periphery. But this approach needs to be integrated with a close study of local dynamics, and it is necessary to understand how these forces furthered or hindered the relevant regions’ integration into the capitalist world system. Phrased in an ‘operational’ manner, İslamoğلو calls for a close interaction between Europeanist and Ottomanist historians in studying the genesis of the ‘world system’. Obviously those who engage in this project will need to cope with the tensions between different historiographical traditions, not always an easy task.

Appropriating the Ottoman center

‘World systems theory’, Ottoman style, shows how certain well-established centers, namely Istanbul and the Aegean coastlands, which together formed the Ottoman core provinces, lost their previous positions and became one of several peripheries linked to a European-dominated world economy. Yet this scenario of center-periphery relations is by no means all that can be said on this issue in the Ottoman context. To the contrary, concentration upon the Ottoman center forms part of a historiographical tendency which was obvious in the 1940s, when ‘world systems theory’ did not as yet exist and is still very much with us. By dint of this ‘centralizing’ scholarly tradition, Turkish historians of the republican period, once the initial distaste for Ottoman history had faded away, ‘appropriated’ the Ottoman center. From the perspective of Turkish scholars, the wish to ‘rehabilitate’ the Ottoman Empire undoubtedly was strong, especially after Ottoman victories and cultural florescence had come to be regarded as a source of national pride, from the later 1930s on-

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63 On the centrality of the eastern Balkans and western Anatolia for the functioning of the Ottoman Empire, compare Klaus Kreiser, “Über den Kernraum des Osmanischen Reiches”, in Die Türkei in Europa, ed. by Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen, 1979), 53–63.

64 Turkish scholars have shown interest in Ottoman borderlands mainly where the sixteenth century is concerned. As an exception to this rule, one might however name Akdes Nimet Kurat, with his focus on late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century figures such as Charles XII of Sweden and Peter I of Russia: XII Karl’in Türkiye’de kaliş ve bu sralarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Ankara, 1943).
wards. After all, the Ottoman state had been systematically denigrated, both by European authors and by the nationalist discourses current in many of the states formed on previously Ottoman territory.

For the more naive, historians and others, it was the Ottoman Empire's military glory which formed the principal attraction. For the more sophisticated, the interest of Ottoman history lay, and continues to lie, in the possibility of explicating the workings of a major empire, particularly the linkages between state apparatus and a tax-paying society. For until the opening of the Istanbul and Ankara archives, the Ottoman social formation had been very imperfectly known, and misunderstandings abounded. Considerations of ideology apart, one should not neglect the scholarly impetus to discover a world hitherto little known.

*Economies, cultures and local identities in Ottoman provinces*

A major break with the historiographical tradition of the Ottoman centuries lay in the attention paid, especially from the 1950s onwards, to individual provinces. Generally, the historians of most states located on previously Ottoman territory tended, and still tend, to concentrate upon the lands situated within the borders of the modern country within which they happen to operate. This makes sense in practical terms, as in any given state, university positions and research money depend on definitions of 'legitimate' academic study. Ministerial bureaucracies, to say nothing of the general public, tend to feel that study of the 'national territory', and perhaps of lands to which the relevant government lays claim, should be accorded priority. Thus the geographical delimitations of the area to be investigated are not as innocuous as might be assumed at first glance.

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65 This applies also to some foreign scholars: thus one of the present authors would see herself as a historian of Anatolia.

66 Apart from research in Greek, Bulgarian or Rumanian, there exists a very considerable literature on the Balkans in English, French and German, which can barely be touched upon here. In the German-speaking territories, this concern with the Balkans doubtless was motivated first by the Habsburg legacy. At least in their later years a German-speaking dynasty, the Habsburgs had acquired, and stubbornly held on to, considerable Balkan territories. Moreover, in both World Wars, Germany had possessed Balkan allies and made sizeable conquests in the peninsula. This political situation induced the governments of the time to create an infrastructure for Balkan studies, both within and outside the universities. Balkan studies
Sometimes, as in the case of Tunisia, the borders of a certain modern state more or less correspond to the provincial divisions of Ottoman times, but this is by no means the rule. In fact, the disjunction between Ottoman administrative divisions and modern borders is most unfortunate for the historian. It is impossible to think of any particular state without taking into consideration the regions of which it is made up. Yet it is a major anachronism to assume that relations between regions were what they are today, when the territorial units under consideration, along with many others, formed part of a large-scale empire such as the Ottoman.

In addition, administrative divisions could have a considerable impact upon the lives of ‘ordinary’ Ottoman subjects. It made a difference for a non-Muslim inhabitant of the Empire whether he/she lived in Wallachia, Moldavia or Transylvania, or else in one of the Balkan sub-provinces governed by a beylerbeyi. On the one hand, in the principalities Orthodox hospodars might provide patronage for art and learning of a kind not available to non-Muslims in the ‘core territories’. But on the other hand, the taxes needed to finance the appointments of rapidly changing hospodars weighed heavily on the subjects, to say nothing of the fact that a rebelling governor might cause an invasion by Habsburg or Ottoman armies, or even by both of them. As to the Anatolian context, it would be a mistake to assume that conditions in the large border fortresses of Erzurum or Kars, where central control was well established, were necessarily replicated in Bitlis. For in the seventeenth century, this latter town was ruled by a local Kurdish khan, albeit under Ottoman overlordship. Since we expect a good deal of integration within today’s national states, these and similar differences between regions are easily obscured when seventeenth- or eighteenth-century history is studied within modern territorial limits.

Given the long history of Balkan conflicts, including their most recent avatars, differences in economic and cultural development, ethnicity and identity formation have been much in the foreground in Germany were to stress the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in territories such as Bavaria, this was all the more attractive as a Bavarian prince, admittedly without much political luck or skill, once had occupied the Greek throne. Moreover, this infrastructure survived the Nazi régime quite well. After the end of World War II, the Balkan peninsula was divided, with Greece and Turkey becoming NATO members and all other Balkan countries, apart from Yugoslavia, members of the Warsaw Pact. In the Cold War environment, anti-Communist credentials continued to function for a while; but with the passing of time, a substantive change in personnel and outlook occurred.
of research into the history of the Balkan regions. One focus of
research concerns the vexed question whether, and if applicable to
what extent, Ottoman policies were responsible for the Balkan lands’
late transition to capitalism. Moreover, one may speculate whether
Ottoman political and commercial organization inhibited the develop-
ment of crafts and manufactures, so that when ‘incorporation into
the world economy’ finally arrived, the Balkan territories immediately
were earmarked as agricultural peripheries.

However, if we follow Michael Palairet, many parts of the Ottoman
Balkans were in fact slow to turn into ‘peripheries’ of any kind. While many Ottoman urban textile industries declined under the
impact of early nineteenth-century European competition, rural indus-
tries often expanded, especially in the Rumelian provinces which
later were to become Bulgaria. When the Ottoman state had man-
gaged to ensure minimal security on the roads after about 1830, these
products of a rural ‘proto-industry’ were able to win a large num-
ber of customers. However, the situation changed quite dramatically
from 1878 onwards. After independence, Bulgarian peasants paid
fewer taxes than had been the case during the Ottoman period.
Since land for peasant farming became readily available due to the
expulsion or flight of land-holding Muslims, many peasants reverted
to a subsistence economy. In consequence, urban marketing largely
collapsed, and an almost totally peasant economy established itself.
A similar situation had been characteristic of Serbia, with its lack of
proto-industrial traditions, at an even earlier date. In Palairet’s per-
spective, it was reversion to a peasant economy with little market-
orientation, rather than any outside impact due to peripheralization,
which explains the poor performance of Balkan economies during
the nineteenth century.

Linked to this question is the problem why what is known as the
‘Balkan Renaissance’ is such a ‘late’ phenomenon, post-1750 for the
most part. Peter Sugar has pointed to the lack, in most provinces,
of a local aristocracy which could have patronized the arts and learn-
ing. In the artistic realm it was assumed for a long time that

67 Antonina Zhelyazkova and Johann Strauss will discuss these issues in extenso,
but the topic is well-nigh inexhaustible.
68 A similar problématique is favored in Hungary, compare the contribution of
Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor to the present volume.
70 Peter Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804 (Seattle, London,
Ottoman restrictions upon church building were responsible for cultural stagnation, as churches, even in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, constituted major venues for architecture and the decorative arts. But the work of Machiel Kiel has made us at least seriously qualify this judgment. Kiel has demonstrated that in certain Ottoman provinces more opportunities for building and painting by the Empire’s Orthodox artists existed than had been suspected previously. Recently, more attention has been paid to the extreme competition for positions within the Orthodox church, along with the attendant expenditures. Thus money which could have been made available for schools or libraries reached the coffers of Ottoman dignitaries in the shape of bribes and the state treasury in the form of accession fees.

As to the formation of national identities, debates and disagreements concern not only the relationship between the Ottoman authorities and their Orthodox subjects, but also conflicts within the Orthodox Church itself. Where the Ottoman-Orthodox conflict is concerned, much debate hinges on conversions, and on the relative weight, in the formation of the Balkan Muslim communities, of immigration from Anatolia and the conversion of autochthonous people. Potential for disagreement is exacerbated by the lack of sources. After all, the Ottomans often were not interested in differentiating between Muslims of Turkish and those of Slavic background. Thus in many cases, it is none too clear whether a given person, of whom we may know very little beyond his given name and that of his father, belonged to one or the other category. Likewise, it is often difficult to differentiate between the late medieval abandonment of settlements due to the plague or to warfare between Balkan rulers, which were not at all rare, and the flight of local populations from Ottoman raiders and armies. A special issue is the claim that certain populations were converted by force, which in the case of the Muslims inhabiting the Rhodopes is deconstructed in the present volume by Antonina Zheljazkova. Due to the frequent lack of solid information, the scope for politically inspired rhetoric is greater than in most other historical subfields.

With respect to relations between different Orthodox groups, recent work has emphasized that the millets in their centralized form, includ-
ing the Orthodox variety, are largely a creation of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{72} In earlier periods, relations between laity and churchmen remained relatively unstructured; they were to become increasingly conflictual with the growth of an educated lay public. By contrast, the church itself was strongly centralized, insisted on a Greek liturgy to the exclusion of Slavic varieties, and \textit{de facto}, only Greek priests could obtain higher positions in the hierarchy. These privileges of Greek speakers and the Greek language led to considerable tensions at the time of the different national revivals, with the mid-nineteenth century formation of a Bulgarian autocephalous church a particularly dramatic climax.\textsuperscript{73} That scholarly controversies concerning the identities of different Balkan communities were often overdetermined by current political rivalries goes without saying. It is also typical of these debates that quite a few groups and individuals who sought accommodation with the Ottoman state and its ruling stratum were conveniently ‘forgotten’.\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{Integration and decentralization}

Authors, who in the 1950s and 1960s dealt with evidence on provincial magnates, often assumed that the activities of these personages constituted evidence of ‘Ottoman decline’ and autonomist, if not proto-nationalist, movements in the provinces. On the Turkish side, such magnates were viewed as rebels against the Ottoman center. In the course of a long career, Albert Hourani has contributed to a less simplistic and parochial view by drawing attention to the alliances which particularly in the Arab provinces were formed between well-to-do merchants or religious scholars, on the one hand,

\textsuperscript{72} Paraskevas Konortas, “From Tāife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Greek Orthodox Community,” in \textit{Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism, Politics, Economy and Society in the Nineteenth Century} (Princeton, NJ, 1999), 169–80.


\textsuperscript{74} For a perceptive discussion of these issues, to which we are much indebted, see Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in L. Carl Brown (ed.), \textit{Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East} (New York, 1996), pp. 45–77. However previous authors also have dwelt on these issues: Karl Barbir, “From Pasha to Efendi: The Assimilation of Ottomans into Damascene Society 1516–1783”, \textit{International Journal of Turkish Studies} 1, 1 (1979–80), 68–83; Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, \textit{Families in Politics, Damascene Fractions and Estates in the 18th and 19th Centuries} (Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, 1985).
and, on the other, administrators and military men. For the latter, often well integrated into Arab society despite their Ottoman origins, Hourani has coined the term 'local Ottomans'; the cultural and social borders which such people crossed in becoming Damascenes have been studied in some detail. In certain places, such as Damascus or Mosul, local dynasties were able to monopolize governorships for several generations. By contrast in Egypt or Iraq, power lay in the hands of grandees who owed their ascent to their membership in a Mamluk political household. Local magnates who actually aimed at political independence were rare; and even when the early nineteenth-century vali of Egypt Mehmed Ali Pasha did make a bid for separate statehood, the cultural flavor of his court was Ottoman and not Egyptian. Recent research thus has led us to stress the integrative powers which the Ottoman center retained even when it was politically very weak in the years around 1800.

Ottomanist historians, for the last ten or fifteen years, have been attracted to this remarkable strength-in-weakness which kept the Empire going, more or less, until the end of World War I. As a subtext we can discern the claim that decentralization had its advantages, and this view is probably connected to the work of the New York historical sociologist Charles Tilly. The latter has done much to demystify state formation and centralization by pointing to the heavy costs of these operations. Several other studies concerning the multiple economic crises which plagued most states of seventeenth-century Europe have reached similar conclusions. Niels Steensgaard has linked these recurrent economic and financial difficulties to the tendency of seventeenth-century rulers to spend more on warfare than the fragile economies of their respective territories could afford.

With centralization no longer the summa bonum which it had been to Europeanists—or even Indianists—of an earlier generation, Ottomanists have also begun to ask themselves whether increasing the power of the central authorities was necessarily a sign of 'political progress'.

75 Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York, 1991), 249–56; Barbir, "From Pasha to Efendi".
After all, as Engin Akarlı has pointed out, the recentralization engineered by Mahmud II demanded a stiff price: the Porte was able to prevent Mehmed Ali Pasha from setting up his Egyptian state only by involving England and other European powers in the internal disputes of the Ottoman Empire. As a counterfactual hypothesis, one may venture the suggestion that by accommodating Mehmed Ali Pasha and foregoing certain attempts at imperial centralization, a much modified Ottoman sultanate could have retained more independence from foreign governments than it actually was able to achieve.80

In this context, tax farming, much maligned in the past because it cost the taxpayers money and yet failed to fill the coffers of the central state, has experienced a partial rehabilitation. When tax farms were sold on a life-time basis starting in 1695, this arrangement certainly consolidated the formation of an Ottoman ‘aristocracy’, which Lady Mary Montagu discerned even in the 1720s.81 From the very beginning, members of the subject population were excluded from the bidding, which had been open to all moneyed persons as long as tax farms had been limited to only a few years’ duration. By contrast, privilege was accorded to figures strategically situated within the Ottoman administration. Generally, these men had secured their positions by affiliation with a personage already established in government service, and of course they possessed the necessary financial resources. Such personages could retain the tax farms awarded to them as profitable investments, and, in practice if not in theory, often pass them on to their sons.

But at the same time, life-time tax farming allowed the Ottoman central government to ensure the loyalty of the members of great households, in other words, the Ottoman aristocracy in the process of formation. ‘Local Ottomans’ attachment to the central state was of major significance, as from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards ‘political households’ constituted a major avenue of recruitment into the ruling groups of both the capital and the provinces. It was mainly—and in most instances only—through their

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legitimation as 'servants of the sultan' that tax farmers were able to collect dues from peasants and guildsmen. While local magnates might supplement their incomes by commerce, the basis of their fortunes was and remained political.82 Thus by assigning revenues to notables and magnates, the Ottoman government had instituted a kind of power-sharing familiar to historians of the Mongols and their Chinese empire, but until very recently unknown, even as a mental category, to historians of the Ottoman world.83 In certain instances, such as eighteenth-century Mosul, links to the Ottoman center actually may have been closer in the eighteenth century, when the Jalili magnate family was in power, than they had been two hundred years earlier. While in the seventeenth century the central power theoretically was absolute, its actual control over the border territories of modern Iraq often remained quite limited.84

_The center and its subjects: the Tanzimat Years_

Up to this point, we have focused on the pre-Tanzimat period. Yet it is especially after the 1839 Gülhane Rescript had assured all Ottoman subjects that their lives, properties and honor were henceforth to be guaranteed, that tensions between the government in Istanbul and its non-Muslim subjects, particularly those living in the Balkans, really erupted.85 Nationalist ambitions in southeastern Europe already had led to the formation of the Greek state in 1830, that is, in the pre-Tanzimat period. However, the Kingdom of Greece was established after the Greek uprising itself had been defeated by

82 Halil İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700,” _Archivum Ottomanicum_ 6 (1980), 283–337.
84 Khoury, _Mosul_, p. 25.
the troops of Mehmed Ali Pasha, governor of Egypt, and owed its existence to the military and diplomatic intervention of the Great Powers in favor of a Greek state. Yet even so, the Ottoman Empire retained a sizeable number of Orthodox Christian subjects. It was the ambition of Czar Nicholas I to establish a protectorate over these people as a preliminary to future Russian hegemony in the Balkans—the demise of the Ottoman Empire being viewed as imminent in St. Petersburg. These policies formed the major cause of the Crimean War (1853–1856). Evidently in the eyes of French and British politicians, such an expansion of the Russian sphere of influence was regarded as unacceptable, as a significant threat to the Mediterranean interests of the two states involved.

The Crimean War was fought out on the Crimea only in part; there were also Danube and Caucasus fronts. At the very end of the war, the Russian army succeeded in conquering the Ottoman fortress of Kars. Moreover, in the plans of the Czar and his minister Nesselrode, a Russian occupation of the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, still under Ottoman suzerainty, was to have sparked an overall uprising of the Orthodox throughout southeastern Europe. However, such an uprising never materialized, only a limited number of volunteers serving in the Russian armies. Thus the Crimean War, in the short run, brought the Ottoman central government a certain respite. For even though its military contribution, after the naval disaster of Sinop and the all but total loss of its battleships, had not been very great, at least the government in Istanbul did find itself


on the winning side. However, it proved impossible to continue the war without resorting to loans from European bankers. Given high interest rates and commission payments, in addition to a constant need for fresh loans to finance armaments and an albeit limited modernization of the infrastructure, the Ottoman government was bankrupt within less than twenty years after the end of the war (1875).90

For the better-off among Ottoman non-Muslims, the years following the Crimean War were a time of ambiguity. On the one hand, nationalist ambitions had spread yet further among the Christian inhabitants of southeastern Europe. Thus, after the Serbs and Greeks, Bulgarians now began to demand greater influence over the institutions which governed them. While in the earlier nineteenth century, considerable mutual sympathy had existed among the different national movements of the Balkans, the Bulgarian drive for autonomy was at first directed largely against the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church and the latter's upper clergy. By contrast, during the first stages of the movement to form an autocephalous Bulgarian Church, Bulgarian political leaders could count on a degree of sympathy from members of the Ottoman ruling group.91

Such temporary alliances were promoted by a considerable de facto secularization of the Ottoman political elite during the Tanzimat period. Now the latter aimed not so much at the promotion of Islam, as at the focusing of the loyalties of all Ottoman subjects upon the sultan and the state (ittihad-i anasir). During this period and well into the 1870s, 'Ottomanism' as an ideology aimed at the formation of a 'political nation'. The reforms of 1839, expanded through a solemn sultanic edict of 1856, promised Ottoman non-Muslims equal rights and, among other things, employment in responsible positions within the developing Ottoman bureaucracy.92 These advantages explain why the mid-century restructuring of the Ottoman state was supported

92 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (Princeton, 1963); Irina Evgen’evna Fadeeva, Official’nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Omskoy imperii (Osmanizm-Panislamizm) (Moscow, 1985); Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte 1789–1922 (Princeton, 1980); idem, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton, 1989).
by quite a few non-Muslims, while many Muslims felt that they were losing ground and were not slow in expressing their resentment.93

On the other hand, from the perspective of Balkan nationalists, this situation involved considerable danger, as it meant that potential supporters of a variety of nationalist projects reaffirmed their ties to the Ottoman state.94 This view explains the emergence of political terrorism during the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Macedonian variety constituting the best known but by no means the only example.95 For as the terrorists saw it, their acts would elicit a violent response from the Ottoman administration, and in most cases reprisals would be directed at non-Muslim subjects completely uninvolved in the acts in question. In response, the victims would see little alternative to espousing the cause of this or that emerging Balkan nationality; and, in fact, terrorism contributed substantially to the fears of disloyalty which many Ottoman administrators were more than ready to express vis-à-vis their non-Muslim subjects.

In a nineteenth-century context, military service constituted a core feature both of state formation and of nation-building. Thus, for instance in France, performing military service became a conditio sine qua non for citizenship, and at the same time, ‘peasants’ were turned ‘into Frenchmen’, to quote Eugen Weber’s well-known study, not least through the instruction provided in the course of military service.96 Moreover, mixing men from different regions often resulted in a growing uniformity of customs back home. Spaghetti spread throughout Italy after conscripts had encountered them during their military service, and in Germany after 1870, the Christmas tree ceased to be regarded as a Protestant peculiarity after Catholic ex-soldiers had brought the custom back to their villages. This assimilatory effect, which made itself felt all over Europe, was well-known to Ottoman policy makers at various levels, and when a possible

‘military adventure’ of Ottoman non-Muslims was discussed, the question whether the latter should serve alongside Muslims or in separate units was very much in the foreground of the debate.97

Things looked rather different in the perspective of European observers, among whom it was generally assumed that their Muslim beliefs did not permit Ottoman statesmen to place arms in the hands of Christians. Historically speaking, this was an oversimplification: Among border warriors and irregulars on the Habsburg frontier, Christians long had been well represented, to say nothing of the pass-guards (derbendci, armatoloi), whose duty it was to protect travelers on the high roads. However, the increasing intensity of nationalist sentiment among Balkan Christians did raise the specter of such troops deserting or even going over to the enemy. But even when cases of this type did occur with some frequency during the Balkan wars of 1912–13, Ottoman generals insisted that these events had not been the cause of the catastrophic defeats suffered by the army they had commanded.98

Significant opposition to non-Muslim military service came from leading figures among these communities themselves; here it was exactly the power of assimilation in which shared military service might result which formed the major reason for protests. Representatives of the non-Muslim communities often suggested that paying an extra tax in lieu of military service was preferable, and Sultan Abdülhamid II, who believed that non-Muslim soldiers made no sense in an Islamic caliphate, tended to agree with them.99 A long-term consequence of this dispute was that in World War I, many Greeks and Armenians were forced to do their military service in labor battalions instead of in the regular army.100 But that had not been the issue back in 1858.

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97 This formulation is taken from Ufuk Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni (Istanbul, 2000).
Abdülhamid II came to power in 1876. He soon suspended the constitution by which Tanzimat statesmen such as Midhat Pasha had hoped to integrate the non-Muslims, and, by the same stroke, make the attacks of European politicians and writers against the sultan’s supposed ‘Asiatic despotism’ appear less convincing.\(^{101}\) Shortly after Abdülhamid’s enthronement, another war was waged with Czarist Russia, which soon turned into a major military disaster (1877).\(^{102}\) With the Russian army in the suburbs of Istanbul, the Czar concluded the peace treaty of San Stefano (today: Yeşilköy) which established a large Bulgarian state with comfortable access to the Aegean Sea. This once again was regarded by the western European powers as a territorial gain which they were not willing to grant the Russian Empire, as the new Bulgarian principality was widely regarded as a client state of the Czars. In the following year, an international congress held in Berlin permitted only the institution of a much diminished Bulgarian principality, which moreover remained, for the time being, under the sultan’s suzerainty.\(^{103}\)

Due to the war, a large number of Muslim refugees inundated Istanbul, some of them having fled the immediate vicinity of the battlefields, while others had been expelled from what was now Bulgarian territory.\(^{104}\) On the Bulgarian side as well, the war left a legacy of

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lasting bitterness; this was largely due to the depredations of Circassian irregulars, themselves poorly integrated recent refugees from the Czarist empire, who ran out of control and caused much bloodshed.\(^{105}\)

Given these conditions, Sultan Abdülhamid and his advisers considered that Ottomanism and the integration of non-Muslim subjects should be written off as failures. Instead Islam was now expected to provide the ideological ties which, hopefully, would bind together what remained of the Empire.\(^{106}\) In consequence, southeastern Europe, where the Ottomans in the meantime held only a limited amount of territory, lost much of its previous importance in the eyes of the Istanbul government. However, Bosnian Muslims arriving on Ottoman territory after the Austrian occupation of 1878 and the refugees from other southeastern European territories were seen as a source of manpower to be settled wherever the government considered it desirable to increase the number of Muslims and to diminish the concentration of the local non-Muslim population.\(^{107}\)

**Ethnic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire during the last decades of its existence**

This changing mood was reflected also in the economic philosophy of the period. The Hamidian regime saw the first instances of an étatistic interpretation of the emerging national economy. In the long run, this policy implied the elimination of the non-Muslim intermediary groups, whose members formed the only commercial bourgeoisie existing in the Ottoman Empire around 1900. Inspired by the ideas of Friedrich List, a popularizing writer such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi frequently discussed the preconditions for the develop-

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\(^{107}\) Fikret Adanır and Hilmar Kaiser, “Migration, Deportation, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Ottoman Empire”, in *Migrations and Migrants in Historical Perspective. Permanencies and Innovations*, ed. by René Lebourette (Brussels, 2000), 273–292. On Bosnian Muslim immigration into the Ottoman Empire, see also F. Adanır’s contribution in this volume.
opment of a Turkish middle class. However, in practice, Abdülhamid II maintained good relations with quite a few non-Muslim businessmen, who were given marks of sultanic favor in the form of decorations and honorific titles. Only after 1908 was the creation of a ‘national bourgeoisie’ on the part of the state put on the official agenda, and it was only in the 1920s, when war, flight and massacre had decimated the non-Muslims of what had recently become the Republic of Turkey, that this policy was implemented in earnest.

However, major steps on this road were taken after the Ottoman catastrophe of the Balkan War in 1912, when the original liberal project of the Young Turks was abandoned entirely in favor of a petit-bourgeois populism that instrumentalized Muslim grievances at the expense of non-Muslim citizens. Consequently, already in the first half of 1914 about 100,000 Greeks were compelled to leave Aegean Anatolia for the nearby islands. Once the First World War began, the forced transfer of Greek population continued, this time to places in the Anatolian interior. Yet more comprehensive and radical measures were taken against the Armenians living in the eastern provinces. Their indiscriminate deportation after 1915 was a virtual “ethnic cleansing” leading in some places to wholesale extermination.

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112 For a discussion of the relevant literature, see Fikret Adanır, “Die Arme- nische Frage und der Völkermond an den Armeniern im Osmanischen Reich: Betroff enheit im Reflex nationalistischer Geschichtsschreibung”, in Erlebnis-Gedächtnis-Sinn.
Thus it can be argued that the response of the Ottoman ruling group to ethnic nationalism was basically a kind of imperial nationalism. A similar ideology was in fact developed by the ruling classes of the Habsburg Empire in its final stages, perhaps with the difference that in the Ottoman instance, this way of thinking articulated itself in more militant terms. In any case, the abandonment of pluralist positions was concomitant with the ascendancy of ethnic exclusiveness, the final implications of which surpassed by far the narrow boundaries of inter-communal rivalries within the ancien régime. Significantly enough, neither the Ottoman nor the Habsburg Empire survived the First World War, and the legacy of both has been stained by deportations, massacres and even genocide.

In conclusion: reflections of nationalism in the historiography

Given this conflict-ridden history, the historical sciences in the Balkans have developed along lines determined by the needs of the emerging nation-states. An adequate understanding of the specificities of nation-state formation is therefore essential in order to explain how historical tradition has evolved in this part of Europe. The liberation struggles in Ottoman Serbia, Greece or Bulgaria originated in rural conflicts in which semi-military elements such as 


geois’ groups play in these processes? Even in the Greek case, where a relatively developed ‘national bourgeoisie’ stood behind the insurrectionary movement, it was hardly the aim of merchants operating throughout the Mediterranean and Black Sea basins to establish a small Greek state at the southern tip of the Balkan peninsula. To the contrary, urban commercial groups hoped, together with the Phanariote aristocracy, to transform Ottoman rule into a Greek-controlled multi-ethnic oriental empire. Intellectuals such as Adamantios Korais or Rhigas Velestinlis also seem to have thought in ‘imperialist’ categories, envisioning a Greek ‘republic’ which would include the Balkans, the Archipelago and Asia Minor.  

It is true that the Bulgarian national movement, which gained momentum after the Crimean War, operated in a different socio-political setting. It began, as we have seen, as a struggle against Greek ecclesiastical and cultural dominance, whereby Bulgarians even counted on the support of the Ottoman reform bureaucracy. In addition, it was no longer Russia, the loser of the Crimean War, that extended protection, but rather the liberal West to which one turned for help and guidance. Emerging ‘bourgeois’ or ‘petit-bourgeois’ elements within Bulgarian society therefore had a better chance of asserting themselves. But once again, the national question was not resolved by a political compromise articulating the internal dynamics of the local civil society, but by an external factor, namely the victory of the Czarist armies.

Thus it can be argued that nation-state formation in Ottoman Europe was hardly a corollary of bourgeois aspirations for social and political emancipation. Independence, attained in the wake of an Ottoman military defeat, brought the most militant factions of the relevant elites to the forefront. Consequently, nation-states were created before the corresponding national societies had developed, and the new rulers had to embark upon daring projects of nation-building ‘from above’. In this context, we have referred to the Ottoman


and later the Turkish case, but there were others as well. As a result, historical scholarship was made to play a predominantly ideological role.\textsuperscript{118} Creating historical traditions—and the interpretation which the Ottoman period received in that context—served not only to legitimize the new regimes internally. Equally important was the external justification \textit{vis-à-vis} a European world which cherished its own notions of nationhood and which was eager to dispatch its princes, generals, bankers or missionaries into the region. In this way the romantic concept of the uniqueness of nation, the novel idea of nationhood based on language, the employment of history in support of irredentist projects and similar modern concepts entered the Balkans. No wonder that the Balkan states from their inception were bent on reattaining their medieval or ancient grandeur. Even present-day conflicts are internally vindicated, and acquire significance internationally, with reference to imperial inspirations from the past.\textsuperscript{119}

In the light of the above, the nineteenth-century European image of Ottoman rule has had a direct relevance for the emerging Balkan historiographies. Philhellenic sentiments of the post-Napoleonic era fostered in the West a deep interest for the fortunes of Ottoman subject populations in southeastern Europe. Even the positivist school, which is credited with impartiality based on a dispassionate and critical investigation of historical questions, often indulged in sweeping generalizations which confirmed Eurocentric theoretical constructs reflecting political and moral prejudices against an ‘external principle’ such as ‘Islam’ or ‘Asia’. In the same vein, an observer as sympathetic as Joseph von Hammer could not desist, when judging the Ottomans, from assuming the stance of a morally and intellectually superior European. Upon reaching the period of the first westernizing influences in his multi-volume history, he could not help but exclaim: “Both the author and the reader of Ottoman history can finally breathe more freely... Given the warm winds generated by contact with European politics and culture, at least the edges of the rigid ice crust of the Turk are thawing, and a gentler breeze of humane mildness and civilization blows.”\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{118} Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans”, \textit{European History Quarterly} 19 (1989), 149–194.


\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches}, vol. 7 (Pest, 1831), 1–2.
Legitimizing one's own state in the eyes of western European scholars and literati thus became a project of some significance for historians of the newly independent Balkan states, and, particularly after the founding of the Republic of Turkey, for Turkish historians as well. Yet the stance taken by Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian historians was the exact opposite of that later adopted by their Turkish colleagues. For nineteenth-century authors of non-Muslim background, it was easy to adopt the image of the ‘terrible Turk’, which, as we have seen, already had become an established cliché among their western European colleagues. Thus the contemporary misery experienced in every corner of the Peninsula could be conveniently explained as resulting from Ottoman occupation. Jireček’s “History of the Bulgarians”, published in 1875, a work “written in the best tradition of nineteenth-century European historiography”, introduced the notion of the ‘Turkish yoke’ into the Balkan historiographical scene.121 Ironically, in the very year of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, it was Nicolae Iorga who claimed that, despite remarkable efforts to reform state and society, the Ottomans were—not least due to the rigidity of Islam—doomed to fail. Iorga thought that, although the Turkish body politic still showed signs of life (“Der türkische Staatskörper lebt noch”), the Turkish soul was long dead (“Aber die türkische Seele ist . . . erloschen”).122

On the Turkish side, by contrast, certain historiographical characteristics of late nineteenth-century western European historiography, such as the widespread denigration of Byzantium, were adopted as a legitimizing device; after all, it was the Ottomans who had defeated the Byzantines.123 At a later stage, after the Ottoman Empire once again had become a ‘fashionable’ topic among Turkish scholars and politicians, a new argument emerged. In the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, it was the ‘state’ founded by the sultans as a non-feudal entity, which ended the oppression of Balkan feudal lords and liberated the peasants.124 Furthermore, attempts in the European secondary literature to deny systematically the originality of Ottoman architecture by viewing it as an inferior copy of the Aya Sofya,

122 Nicolae Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. 1 (Gotha, 1908), viii.
123 Michael Ursinus, “Byzantine History in Late Ottoman Turkish Historiography”, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 10 (1986), 211–222.
124 Omer Liitfi Barkan, “Türkiye’de toprak meselesinin tarihi esaslanması”, Ulkü 11 (1938), No. 61, 53.
resulted in an exaggerated emphasis on all architectural features which could conceivably be considered ‘central Asian’.\textsuperscript{125} To sum up, legitimizing the nation-state doubtlessly has inspired a number of serious studies, but it has also saddled present-day historical scholarship with a problematic legacy of which it is not easy to divest oneself.\textsuperscript{126}

The Contributions

It is in this research context, which highlights centralization and its opposite, as well as legitimacy, power-sharing, identity and nationalism that we must view the studies forming part of the present book. It has been long in the making, much too long for comfort. About nine years ago, a panel at the Congress of German Historians brought together an international group of scholars interested in the manner in which Ottoman history was perceived, mainly but not exclusively in the twentieth century. The participants liked each others’ papers well enough to plan for a common volume. However, that was easier said than done. As a single panel does not normally make a book, extra papers were commissioned, promised, and then sometimes delivered and sometimes not. Certain lacunae in the coverage thus are due to the fact that the editors waited very long for the relevant papers to be submitted, and then they realized it was too late to commission new ones. It is this situation that explains the lack of contributions concerning Serbs and Albanians. ‘We crave the readers’ indulgence’.

Our volume begins with a discussion of how members of the Ottoman elite saw themselves at a particularly critical stage of the Empire’s history, namely Christoph Neumann’s study “Bad times and better self: definitions of identity and strategies for development in late Ottoman historiography (1850–1900)”. This chapter deals with the attempts of authors such as Namik Kemal, Hayrullah, Ahmed Cevdet, Ahmed Vefik and Mustafa Nuri to come to terms with Ottoman history during the troubled years of the later nineteenth century. Given European encroachments on Ottoman territory and the role of Christianity as a device for legitimizing these


\textsuperscript{126} Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, \textit{Approaching Ottoman History: an Introduction to the Sources} (Cambridge, 1999), 176-220.
encroachments, it is not surprising that late Ottoman authors were on the lookout for a Muslim or, at the very least, non-Christian model of political success against European powers. Legitimizing the Ottoman state and ensuring its survival were given top priority. Even if these writers were less than sympathetic toward the current régime of Sultan Abdülhamid II, they were public employees, and no alternative state model could offer them the opportunities available in the Ottoman Empire as it actually existed.

Japanese successes against Russia in 1905 thus were received with great satisfaction. But an older model also was available, namely Mehmed Ali Pasha’s attempt to develop Egyptian industry in tandem with military power. Neumann concentrates on the manner in which late Ottoman authors treated—or, in some instances, failed to treat—the policies of the erstwhile rebellious governor and opponent of Mahmud II. Here was the example of a Muslim ruler who, for a while, been successful in ‘modernizing’ his state, even if by the 1880s, the failure of his policies had become obvious. But at the very end of the Empire, Abdürrahman Şeref, the last imperial historiographer and first head of the Historical Commission of the Republic of Turkey, wrote approvingly of Mehmed Ali Pasha’s autocratic centralism. Maybe this judgment indicated the policies which the Empire’s last official chronicler, and with him other members of the former Ottoman elite, considered appropriate for the newly founded Republic of Turkey.

The defense of this new state of Turkey, a novel and rather special case among the Ottoman Empire’s successor states, was undertaken by Turkish historians but encouraged by the powerful Kemalist state apparatus. This enterprise constitutes the topic of Büşra Ersanlı’s contribution. She is concerned with the precarious coexistence in the authoritarian climate of the 1930s of scholarly research interests, on the one hand, and an identification with the official Turkish ‘party line’ on the other. Ideological tension stemmed from the fact that in those years the elite of the Republic of Turkey saw itself as the carrier of a ‘cultural revolution’ against an ancien régime described as profoundly corrupt. This was the brief phase which Halil Berktay has called ‘Jacobin’ and in which a major scholar such as Fuat Köprülü opened up new scholarly horizons.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Halil Berktay, “Der Aufstieg und die gegenwärtige Krise der nationalistischen
In contradistinction to the defunct elite, the supporters of the Republican government regarded themselves as Turkish nationalists, and saw this nationality as reaching back in time far beyond the Ottoman age. Given the racialist undertone of many if not most nationalisms of the 1930s, it is not surprising that race also played a role in the ‘ideology of origins’ propounded by many Turkish nationalist historians. However, the emphasis was defensive rather than offensive: Turkish nationalists were simply defining themselves as members of the white race, regarded as superior throughout Europe and North America. In consequence emphasizing possible links to the Mongols was considered ‘bad form’. Many historians and ideologues also believed that among the peoples of pre- and protohistory, the Turks had played a preponderant role.

But at the same time, it was difficult to deny that the Republic of Turkey had been formed out of quite a few of the defunct Empire’s core provinces. If one took a closer look, it also became obvious that there existed no sharp break between the late Ottoman elite and its early Republican successor. Moreover, particularly in the non-elite sectors of society, the prestige of the Ottoman sultans still stood high. Thus it seemed inadvisable to neglect this important source of national pride, which could, after all, be useful in legitimizing even the Republic. Yet when glorifying the ‘campaigns and victories’ of Ottoman rulers, it was difficult to avoid discussing Islam, as the Ottoman sultans had defined themselves above all as Sunni Muslim rulers. An emphasis on religion, however, conflicted with the militant secularism which characterized the Republican elite down to the election of 1950.

Büşra Ersanlı has shown how these tensions worked themselves out in the committees which planned the school books of the period, but also in the papers read at the different officially sponsored history congresses of the 1930s. In her perspective, the underlying tensions were never resolved. This led to a monotonous repetition of unproven and unprovable claims, and, as an unintended result, the historiography of the early Republic in its dogmatism rather resembled the state-legitimizing Ottoman historiography it had set out to supplant.

Geschichtsschreibung in der Türkei,” Periplus 1 (1991), 102-125. Berktay’s views of the Turkish historiography of the early 1930s are, however, much more optimistic than Ersanlı’s.
INTRODUCTION

Thus Neumann and Ersanlı critically reflect upon the work of late Ottoman and early Republican authors concerning the Empire’s history and structure. Next in line, there are three articles which deal with Byzantines, Ottoman Greeks and the way in which the different groups of people which can be subsumed under these headings are reflected in recent historiography. In “Research problems concerning the transition to Tourkokratia: the Byzantinist standpoint”, Klaus-Peter Matschke deals first with the long-term socio-economic aspects of the transition, namely population changes, the situation of peasants, urban history and commercial exchanges at fairs. The following section covers autochthonous populations actively participating in the Ottoman expansion, either as military men or due to their business activities. How the Orthodox Church and the major monasteries coped with Ottoman rule constitutes yet another variant of the Byzantino-Ottoman transition. The last major section concerns the Byzantine aristocracy, or, to put it differently, the way in which members of the old ruling group attempted to survive under the new dispensation.

Among other studies, Matschke draws on the work of the Dumbarton Oaks-Birmingham group, which has done a great deal to elucidate the Byzantino-Ottoman transition on a regional level. But he also highlights the work of Machiel Kiel, who for many years has struggled to free the historiography, especially of Bulgaria, of the nationalist mythologies which have accumulated since the second half of the nineteenth century. In this indirect fashion, Matschke’s survey is connected to the study of Antonina Zhelyazkova, also to be found in the present volume, and dedicated to the Ottoman Balkans.

Matschke arrives at a conclusion diametrically opposite to the claims often made by Balkan historians: Ottoman rule did not mean the cessation of commercial activity in favor of a purely landlord-peasant economy, quite to the contrary. In Matschke’s perspective, late Byzantine towns were often largely agricultural settlements, while the ‘new towns’ established in the Balkans by the Ottomans often became the sites of flourishing trade and crafts. Principally, the beneficiaries of this commercial revival were the largely Muslim

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128 For a discussion, see Faroqhi’s contribution at the end of this volume.
129 For a further recent refutation of such claims, linked to the Veneto-Ottoman transition, see Molly Greene, *A Shared World, Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, 2000), 121.
inhabitants of these towns. But indirectly even the rural Christian population might benefit from the new opportunities.

Matschke also stresses an element of continuity between the late Byzantine and the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, namely the existence of aristocratic Byzantine families active as entrepreneurs. These people managed the finances of the Patriarchate, thus allowing the Patriarchs to accumulate the important sums of money needed to maintain themselves in office. Moreover, even though Matschke expresses himself with great reserve, he does not deny that there may have been links between these sixteenth-century aristocratic entrepreneurs and the Phanariotes of the following century.

This tale of Greco-Ottoman imbrication is continued in Johann Strauss’ contribution “Ottoman rule experienced and remembered, remarks on some local Greek chronicles of the Tourkokratia”. Strauss has analyzed three narratives dealing with Greek-speaking territories under Ottoman rule. A seventeenth-century priest from Serres (Serrai) named Papasynadinos has left a chronicle of his town which contains some autobiographical information and plenty of detail on the small-town Orthodox notability of which the author was a member. Strauss shows that quite a bit of information concerning the affairs of the sultanate must have filtered down to the author and his friends. Interestingly enough, the violent and, to the modern observer, often irrational punishments meted out by Sultan Murad IV were received positively by Papasynadinos—he sympathized with a ruler who could strike terror in the hearts of ‘the Turks’. Intercommunal tensions thus are highlighted, although the legitimacy of the Ottoman ruler, whom Papasynadinos calls by a title normally used for the Byzantine emperor, is never questioned.

By contrast, Ottoman legitimacy among many inhabitants of present-day Greece had long been a thing of the past when Panayis Skouzes wrote his chronicle of late eighteenth-century Athens. A veteran of the 1821 war, Skouzes wrote about the ‘bad old days’ when the Haseki Haci Ali, the financial manager of an Ottoman princess, made life difficult for the local notables. Strauss also highlights the information on social ranking among the Christian inhabitants of eighteenth-century Athens, an intricate structure which is not reflected in Ottoman sources.

While both Papasynadinos and Skouzes were townsmen, the third chronicle is special in having been authored by a villager, who unfor-
tunately remains anonymous. Events of empire-wide importance and even international politics attracted the attention of the author, who covered the last decennia of Ottoman Cyprus. Yet not these events, but rather the state of the harvest determined whether a given year would be classed as good, bad or indifferent. Harvests could be ruined by climatic factors, epidemics and locusts, but also by local rebellions and banditry. In consequence, such events were regarded as much more important than the fall of Selim III or the institution of the Tanzimat.

As a logical counterpart, the topic ‘Greeks looking at Ottoman rule’ calls for a discussion of Ottomans or Republican Turks and their vision of the Empire’s Greeks. Hercules Millas’ “Non-Muslim minorities in the historiography of republican Turkey, the Greek case” adopts the second perspective. Millas’ article is openly polemical in character and in part reflects debates which have taken place among Turkish intellectuals during the last decade or so. His text attacks all ‘essentialist’ visions of the Turko-Greek relationship. Millas’ polemic is directed at the judgements which are phrased most clearly in Turkish history books aimed at the general reader, but which, in varying degrees, have left traces in academic production as well. While the more scholarly authors often will admit that non-Muslims did not enjoy equal rights in the Ottoman Empire, it is readily assumed that the ‘Rum milleti’ was ‘ungrateful’ for those privileges which it did receive. Discontent is regarded as mainly incited by European powers, with no basis in the real lives of the Empire’s Orthodox. In consonance with the work of historians such as Çağlar Keyder, Millas demands a more detached discussion of ethnogenesis and the rise of capitalism in the late Ottoman context.\(^{130}\)

Among historians concerned with Ottoman and post-Ottoman Bulgaria, discussions concerning the implications of nationalist self-definition in opposition to the Ottoman Empire have been going on for over fifteen years. Antonina Zhelyazkova takes up this thread in her study of “Islamization in the Balkans as a historiographic problem”. She opposes the ‘romantic’ visions concerning the Ottoman conquest widespread in Balkan historiography. On the one hand, notions are bandied around of a local, particularly Bulgarian population, swamped

by immigrants, most of them nomads (yūrūk). On the other hand, Bulgarian nationalist historians tend to make much of the notion that large sectors of the autochthonous population converted to Islam and were ‘Ottomanized’ (or even ‘Turkified’). Among those historians least afraid of anachronism, we even find the notion that the Ottoman state aimed at the ‘denationalization’ of the Balkan subject population, an interpretation for which there is no basis in the sources.

Against this background, Zhelyazkova tackles a story which has achieved some notoriety, namely the supposed forced conversion of the mountain population of the Rhodopes. She points out that the sources which claim such a forced conversion are in reality nineteenth-century fakes, composed by people (there was a woman among them) who wanted to mobilize their fellow countrymen in favor of the nationalist cause. Such falsifications were quite often perpetrated in the process of nation building. However, it is remarkable that Antonina Zhelyazkova has been obliged to denounce this major ‘invention’ as late as 1988, while for instance in the Czech context, Thomas Masaryk exploded a similar ‘invented source’ before World War I.

Among Balkan nationalities, the Muslim Bosnaks of Bosnia-Hercegovina hold a special place. This is due not merely to the recent war or to the fact that, apart from Turks and Albanians, the Bosnaks constitute the only major Muslim group present in southeastern Europe. Ethnogenesis, which has been continuing ever since the 1878 Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, has been particularly complicated due to the special links which the Bosnian upper classes had established with the Ottoman government. For the Bosnian gentry had legitimized its privileged position by its tenacious defense of the frontier of Islam (serhad) and, by extension, of the Ottoman sultanate. However, after 1878, and even more drastically after the Austro-Hungarian annexation of 1908, it became obvious that the sultans were no longer able to defend their Bosnack subjects. Gentry and commoners both were confronted with a difficult situation. For those who wished to remain under Muslim government, emigration was the only viable alternative; and this option was taken by tens of thousands of people.

Further problematic adjustments became necessary after 1918, in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later to become the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As the older name indicates, the Bosnaks were not recognized as a separate ethnic group. Only in Tito’s
Yugoslavia did they finally gain an—albeit grudging—recognition as a separate ethnic entity. And as the breakup of Yugoslavia amply demonstrated, this recognition proved fragile indeed.

All this meant that Boshnak historians, in the modern sense of the term, whose activity began in the interwar period and intensified after World War II, oriented their work in several different directions. One of their concerns was the genesis of Islam in the region, which Fikret Adanır discusses by confronting the tenets of Boshnak historians with those defended by certain of their American and western European colleagues. At issue is the role of the medieval Bosnian Church, which according to Catholic sources was heretic or at least schismatic; to what extent it was Bogumil is a subject for debate. Boshnak historians assume that dissatisfaction with oppression on the part of Catholics and Orthodox alike was a major factor in explaining the rapid Islamization of much of the Boshnak population. By contrast, western European and American specialists tend to assume that the Bosnian Church had become extinct before the Ottomans ever appeared in the region. Adanır has taken up a point originally made by Tayyib Okç, reminding us that the early Ottoman tax registers of Bosnia contain a category known as kristiyani; this name does not correspond to the Ottoman terminology for Christians, who are called kāfir or else gebrān. Moreover, these kristiyani progressively disappear as conversions to Islam take place. This would indicate that the theory which assumes that some Muslim Boshnaks originally had been adherents of the Bosnian Church may be valid after all. For in the fifteenth century, the Ottoman conquerors had little interest in the sectarian divisions among non-Muslims and would not have recorded the kristiyani under a distinctive name if the people in question had not described themselves as such. Yet Adanır warns against exaggerated claims, for the number of people involved was quite limited, and endless debate is possible on the reasons for this state of affairs.

Up to this point, our concern has been with Anatolia and especially the Balkans; in dealing with Hungary, the next chapter will transport us to the uttermost limits of the Ottoman Empire, well into central Europe. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor have discussed the enormous number of studies which during the past century have covered the territories of present-day Hungary and Transylvania, that is Ottoman Erdel, a western province of today’s Rumania.
Ottomanist history in Hungary has had to struggle in order to avoid being something the German language, with an unkind but telling phrase, calls 'Legitimationswissenschaft', a branch of scholarship designed to legitimate existing power structures.\textsuperscript{131} For as Dávid and Fodor put it, Hungarian historians of the period following World War I, when the 'Hungarian' half of the defunct Habsburg empire was cut down to a fraction of its original size, were concerned with the explanation of this unsatisfactory state of affairs. In so doing they often focused on the retreat of the Magyar population, while under Ottoman rule, from many territories of medieval Hungary. After 1526, the largest section of the former kingdom of the Angevins, and later of the conqueror of Vienna Matthias Corvinus (1443–1490), became an Ottoman border province. Certain parts of the country, laid waste by warfare, were repopulated with southern Slavs; historians could thus argue that the Ottoman conquest was responsible for the dismemberment of medieval Hungary, with patriotic rhetoric as a constant temptation.

Such a concern with the increase of the non-Magyar population of the former Hungarian kingdom during the Ottoman period gave rise to a particular interest, on the part of Hungarian Ottomanists, in historical demography. This was quickened once the latter had come into its own as a separate discipline after 1945, first in England and France and then in other European countries as well.\textsuperscript{132} When summarizing the results of Ottomanist research in demography undertaken by Hungarians, based on a systematic confrontation of Ottoman and Habsburg records, Dávid and Fodor discount exaggerated notions of early Ottoman Hungary as a 'disturbed beehive', in which the population fled hither and thither due to the Ottoman invasion. They also point out that at least in some parts of the territory administered by the sultans' governors, population turnover was no more intensive than in the western provinces which passed under Habsburg control.

Yet the nationalist project in Hungary has thrown up further questions which Hungarian Ottomanists are expected to answer. One of

\textsuperscript{131} Peter Schöttler (ed.), \textit{Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945} (Frankfurt/Main, 1999).

them rather resembles a problem frequently discussed in Balkan historiography, namely the question whether Ottoman control prevented Hungary from developing culturally and economically according to the model proposed by Renaissance Europe. This problématique gains scholarly legitimacy if one takes into account the efforts of Matthias Corvinus, highlighted by the recent synthesis of Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, to acclimatize High Renaissance architectural forms in Hungary.\footnote{Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, \textit{Court, Cloister and City. The Art and Culture of Central Europe 1450–1800} (London, 1995), 39–46.} For these efforts predate all other such attempts north of the Alps. Between the World Wars, some Hungarian historians focused on the ‘alienness’ of the Ottoman conquerors’ culture, positing a dichotomy which anticipates present-day ideologies constructed around a supposed ‘clash of civilizations’. Recent researchers rather have tended to highlight the fact that throughout the Ottoman period, Hungary was an outlying border province and Buda reduced to the status of a mere garrison town in which cultural investment on the part of the Ottoman elite remained limited. Moreover, some emphasis has been placed on the weaknesses of the Hungarian economy well before the conquest. Recent specialists on Ottoman Hungary judge that even without the battle of Mohács (1526) and its aftermath, there would have been a gap between Hungary and western Europe. But decades of warfare ensured that the lag was greater than it would otherwise have been.

To outsiders such as the present authors, it is of some interest to note the manner in which the ‘double taxation’, to which a significant part of Ottoman Hungary was subjected, is regarded by present-day Hungarian historians. That nobles residing on Habsburg territory, as well as of course the Ottoman authorities, collected dues from Hungarian peasants is described as a situation which allowed the perpetuation of institutions typical of Christian central Europe. That is as it may be. But surely ‘double taxation’ also must have affected the welfare of a peasantry already disturbed by frequent warfare.

Moreover, a recurrent theme in Hungarian historiography concerns the question whether after 1526 it would have been possible to construct a kingdom of Hungary under Ottoman suzerainty, thus preventing the ‘provincialization’ of the country. This matter has been considered important because if such an option had in fact
existed, Hungary might have had a better chance of becoming a medium-sized rather than a small national state in the twentieth century. Accordingly the issue was discussed with some heat in the 1970s and 1980s. But Dávid and Fodor assume that once Süleyman the Magnificent’s armies had defeated the king of Hungary, the establishment of direct control was well-nigh inevitable, given the secular conflict between the Ottoman sultans and the Habsburgs. Only the conquest of Vienna might have rescued the Hungarian territories from their unenviable position at the center of a battlefield.

Diverging and often incompatible visions of Ottoman history thus have been produced in the different territories which once formed part of the Ottoman Empire. This situation calls for a study of the manner in which Ottoman provincial diversity, which long preceded all nationalisms, has been treated in the secondary literature. Suraiya Faroqhi discusses the paradigms through which Ottomanists have attempted to make sense of this diversity. All the models at issue focus on the relations of the Ottoman center to provincial ruling groups, both those elites which were already present at the time of the Ottoman conquest, and, more importantly, those who owed their positions to the responsibilities they had been given by the sultan’s government. Our concluding chapter thus highlights the theories of centrality which in the 1960s and 1970s interested many geographers and regional planners and which were taken up by Ottomanist social historians. It is the purpose of any historiographical project to make the impulses which history receives from more ‘practical’ pursuits visible and intelligible. Therefore, demonstrating a linkage between the theories of urban and regional planners and the recent concerns of historians seems a fitting way to conclude our enterprise.

In conclusion

From these summaries a degree of commonality emerges, of which the struggle against anachronisms born from the nationalist paradigm in history is the most important. In the same vein, the contributors have distanced themselves from the nostalgia for ‘the past greatness’ of certain rulers of yore, a latter-day version of the ‘Golden Age’ which continues to attract followers the world over. All contributors view twentieth-century nations not as communities formed
at the dawn of history, but as shaped by a variety of political, religious and economic contingencies, many of them of fairly recent date.\footnote{Particularly Antonina Zhelyazkova and Klaus-Peter Matschke have stressed the fact that the Byzantino-Ottoman transition was not an undifferentiated process without any internal contradictions. Quite to the contrary, temporary alignments between social groups emerged and then dissolved. Therefore what is valid for the middle of the fifteenth century may be inapplicable thirty to forty years later. These two authors also tend to deemphasize conscious political planning on the part of early Ottoman sultans. Such planning \textit{avant la lettre} at one time was much favored among Ottomanist historians, but Matschke and Zhelyazkova remain sceptical concerning the degree of planning possible to early Ottoman rulers, in the complicated situation of the fifteenth century.}

Hopefully it will become clear that Ottomanist historiography has made some significant progress in evaluating the vast information available in the Ottoman archives and is now ready to engage in debate with specialists from other historical disciplines. If the present volume has helped to promote that kind of debate, it will have fulfilled its purpose.
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CHAPTER ONE

BAD TIMES AND BETTER SELF. DEFINITIONS OF IDENTITY AND STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LATE OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY (1850–1900)*

CHRISTOPH K. NEUMANN

Military and economic weakness, territorial losses and the growing influence of the European powers in Ottoman domestic politics have induced many historians of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire to describe this phase in the latter’s existence as an era of “decline”. The main function of this “decline” concept has been to explain the final breakup of the empire. From the middle of the 1970s on, however, another paradigm has been gaining ground: seeing nineteenth-century Ottoman history as an era of reform has become current among specialists. Today the focus of interest has shifted towards the centralization and rationalization of the state apparatus, the

* This is a revised and enlarged version of a paper entitled “Strategien zur Bewältigung des schlechten Jetzt: Beiträge der Historiographie zur spätsmanischen Identitätsfindung”, read at the Thirty-ninth Deutscher Historikertag in Hannover on 23.-26.9.1992. Work on the text was completed in autumn, 1995. The main points of my text were outlined before the current debate on identity began to gather momentum in Turkey. Therefore, this article does not reflect that debate. On this “identity” discussion, see Bozkurt Güvenc, Türk kimliği: Kültür tarihinin kaynakları (Ankara, 1993), and Sabahattin Şen (ed.), Türk aydın ve kimlik sorunu (İstanbul, 1995). A starting point was provided by Nilüfer Gölc in her Modern mahrem: Medeniyet ve örgütüme (İstanbul, 1991). The fora for this discussion are the intellectual periodicals of Turkey which have now and then published special issues concerned with this theme, e.g. Bilgi ve hikmet 4 (Güz 1993) [İslâm ve modern kimlikler] or Türkiye günlükleri 33 (Mart-Nisan 1995) [Kimlik tartışmaları ve etnik mesele].—I thank Suraiya Faroqhi, of Munich, and Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, of Chicago, who have read this paper, and also the colleagues who participated in the panel in which it was presented at the Thirty-ninth Deutscher Historikertag. I am indebted to Charles Brown, of Istanbul, who helped me to find the right ways to express my thoughts in English.

1 Characteristically, the chapter on the nineteenth century in the recent handbook An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, ed. by Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, 1994) is entitled “The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914” (author Donald Quataert). The paradigm is furthermore the central focus of widely read collective works such as Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, ed. by Cyril E. Black and L. Carl Brown (Princeton, N.J., 1992).
enlargement of infrastructure, the integration of the empire into the world market, and Ottoman involvement with "western" scientific, literary, and philosophical concepts.

The paradigm of reform, which incidentally was shared by many contemporary European observers, has the merit of correcting the notion of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire as little more than an object of scorn for Europe. It also provides a criterion by which one can separate the sheep from the goats, i.e. on the one side are the reformists and modernists who are the "good guys", on the other the reactionaries, traditionalists (and the Islamists of 1990s Turkey), who are seen as the "bad guys". The relevance of the paradigm, however, is seriously limited by the fact that the controversies occurring within the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire cannot be described as a clear-cut case of reform versus reaction. When these controversies are examined more closely, it becomes rather difficult to categorize a person or stance as being either reformist or reactionary.

The codification of Hanafite law, the main school of Islamic law (mezheb) in the Ottoman Empire, may serve as an example. It was quite late, in the year 1867, that the systematic codification of the stipulations of the shari‘a according to the Hanafi school was undertaken. It was, primarily, the compilation along Western lines of a civil law founded on Islamic principles and rules. This constituted, on the one side, an 'act of reform', since it contributed to the centralization of state institutions and the unification of the empire’s system of law. On the other hand, it was a 'reactionary' act, since it countered a proposal to adopt a version of the French civil code. The codification of the Hanafite shari‘a meant the victory of the holy over the secular law. It must be noted, however, that the greatest opposition to the codification of Hanafite law came from the office of the şeyhiilislam. In the final analysis, can this codification, the results of which were known as the Mecelle, be termed a progressive enterprise?

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2 As expressed in the titles of books such as La Turquie et ses réformes, by Eugène Morel (Paris, 1866).
From the above it should not be deduced that I regard the paradigm of reform as devoid of meaning for the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. What seems necessary, however, is to temper this paradigm by setting it in the context of the controversies during the Tanzimat period. Politically these controversies dealt, in Turkish circles especially, with the problem of finding ways to strengthen the empire. Intellectually, they inevitably took the shape of a debate on self-image. Political and intellectual controversies were closely interwoven.

Two factors informed these controversies. Firstly, from the point of view of its Turcophone inhabitants there existed no alternative to the Ottoman Empire. A Muslim whose main language was Turkish and who hailed from the middle or upper strata of society was better off in the Ottoman Empire than he would have been in a Turkish nation-state or utopian pan-Islamic society, the latter of which would presumably have been dominated by speakers of Arabic.

Secondly, most Turkish intellectuals, even those who opposed the status quo, were salaried servants of the state in one capacity or another. There was practically no career other than state service open to an intellectual in Ottoman society. The dervish convents offered a sort of shelter, but the cultural orientation demanded of their habitués was generally not one to which an intellectuel engagé would have been attracted. Journalism was a possibility, but periodicals usually earned enough to support only their publishers, not their editors or contributors. The same conditions applied to historiography; it is not by chance that the historians here treated were also civil servants.

In the Turkish context, ideological concepts of Islamism, constitutionalism, or nationalism developed almost exclusively within the conceptual framework of an Ottoman Empire that had been or was to be improved. This applied to the official strategies of legitimization employed by Sultan Abdülhamid II, who made use of pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic, and supra-confessional Ottomanist reasoning as the situation required. But the same approach was also taken by an oppositional writer such as Namik Kemal, who combined, at

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least in principle, romantic nationalism with loyalty to the multi-national Ottoman state.⁷

The second factor informing these controversies was an intensive feeling of crisis. For example, when in the years 1861 and 1862 an experiment with paper money failed and the state was forced to return to a metal currency, the treasury was at a low ebb. One of the ways in which the government reacted to this situation was to declare a ban on silver and gold vessels and tableware, a prohibition familiar from many earlier crises in Ottoman history. Such objects were to be melted down and fed back into the economy as money. The newly enthroned Sultan Abdülaziz complained about this to his grand vizier Fuad Pasha. In the sultan’s opinion the silver bowls used by the imperial ladies during their excursions to places near Istanbul should not be taken from them. The grand-vizier’s reply was as follows: “Certainly, Your Majesty, we take them as well. Or are their Highnesses going to drink from them at the Aynlıkçeşme [the “Fountain of separation” at Haydarpaşa] when the Exalted State [i.e. the Ottoman Empire] gets into a bad situation and Your Majesty leaves for Konya with me at the side of your stirrup?”⁸

This appears to me to be a remarkable answer if one takes into account that Fuad Pasha was the highest minister of an empire which had survived many severe financial crises. It was, however, a fairly typical answer for a high dignitary in the post-1856 era, when, after the treaty of Paris, the imperial reform edict (İslâhat fermanı) had opened the door to foreign intervention and at least officially terminated the supremacy of the Muslim population in the empire. From the viewpoint of an Ottoman Turk, the second half of the nineteenth century was a bad time indeed. Military weakness, fiscal decline, and economic difficulties, together with political instability and separatism in many of the provinces, made for no bright future for an empire that continued to label itself the devlet-i ebed-müddet (“eternally lasting state”).

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Various notions first expressed in Ibn Haldun’s *Mukaddima* in the fourteenth century played an important rôle in Ottoman historical thought. One of these consisted of the concept that every state passes through a cycle of life resembling that of a man, with old age and death as the ultimate stage. For seventeenth-century authors such as Kâtib Çelebi this was an acceptable model, but by the beginning of the eighteenth century it had become somewhat problematic. We thus see the historian Naima theorizing about ways of impeding the advance of this cycle. In the nineteenth century this model ceased to be acceptable, as demontrated by Ahmed Vefik Pasha’s (1813[?]-1891) *Fezleke-i Ta’rih-i Osmani* (“Summary of Ottoman history”), first published in 1271 (1869-70). This work, widely used as a textbook in elementary schools, views history in periods of the length of roughly a century, each of which can be loaded with meaning at will. History was thus seen by Ahmed Vefik Paşa as an open-ended affair. His *Fezleke* initiated a real change of paradigm in Ottoman historiography. In another study, I have shown how authors like Ahmed Cevdet Pasha or Mustafa Nuri Pasha tried to reach a synthesis by integrating the ‘life cycle’ of Ibn Haldun into the recently conceived secular order of history. Thus they provided their educated readers with a frame of reference and could nevertheless—at least in theory—save the Ottoman Empire from final decay. In this new view of history the Ottomans could envisage new centuries, each provided with its own cycle of life, on the condition, of course, of taking certain precautions.

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It here becomes obvious why historiography was so important in the search for Ottoman identity. Any state (or society) that cannot claim actual superiority over its rivals, either perceived or real, and that cannot establish its legitimacy using concepts derived from metaphysics or natural law, has to define and legitimate itself historically. As members of the Ottoman elite in the second half of the nineteenth century saw their state as weaker than the European powers, they therefore had to reshape their legitimizing ideology.

The reading public in the Ottoman Empire played an important rôle in this reshaping. Although it was still small, it had grown and continued to grow in size. The improvements in the educational system and the growing output of the Turkish press made the reading of historiographical works a relatively widespread occupation. It was in this period that the work of the major chroniclers of the Ottoman past was issued in printed form (for many chroniclers, the Ottoman historian of today still has to rely on these uncritical editions). Translations of works by European historians, often accompanied by commentaries made by the translators, were published as well. Although these activities had taken place in both the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century as well, the scale of the earlier efforts was quite small when compared to that of the Tanzimat period. The Üss-i zafer, written by the official historiographer Mehmed Es'ad Efendi, was one of the first of these histories. Probably written for a wide readership and published in 1827 by the state printing house (Dar ü-Tibaat il-Amire), it described the annihilation of the Janissary corps in 1826. The Üss-i zafer constituted historiography put to the service of the state. It could even be called governmental propaganda for the general public, something which was new in the Ottoman Empire. Takvim-i vekayi, the official gazette of the gov-
ernment first published in 1831, represented a similar effort at propaganda. It was also the first Turkish periodical to be published in Istanbul.

The publication of books dealing with history soon, however, spread to the private sector. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II a remarkable number of historical works were published. In this era journalists, high-ranking bureaucrats, and politicians began to write historical works. At the same time the rôle of the state chronicler came to be marginal.

What caused the writing and reading of historiography to be so popular? One reason must have been historiography’s deep roots in Ottoman culture. The writing of novels, on the other hand, only began in the 1870s. Historiography was practically unrivaled as a prose genre. Moreover, there was no tradition of public political discussion or of public political discourse through the written word. The establishment of state censorship in 1864 and the attempt by Abdülhamid II after 1878 to establish a system of absolute rule quite effectively prevented or at least delayed the development of other prose genres.

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16 Thomas Scheben, *Verwaltungsreformen der frühen Tanzimatzeit: Gesetze, Maßnahmen, Auswirkungen* (Bern et al., 1991), 30–32. On the official gazette see also: Orhan Koloğlu, *Takvim-i vekayi: Türk basında 150 yıl, 1831–1981* (Ankara, [1981]); Nesimi Yazıcı, *Takvim-i vekayi: Belgeler* (Ankara, 1983). At first, authors of works not sponsored by state institutions found it almost impossible to get their books printed, as was the case with the *Mür‘i‘tevarih*. This chronicle, written by Şem‘danizade Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi in the 1770s, is probably the first Ottoman history written for the press. It was published only in 1976–1981 by the University of Istanbul in a critical edition by Munir Aktepe (on Süleyman Efendi’s intention to print the book see p. XXIII in the introduction to vol. 1).

17 The conservative *alim* Ahmed Lütfi Efendi (1817–1907) held the post from 1866 to his death. On him see M. Munir Aktepe, “Vak’a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi ve Tarihi hakkında bazı bilgiler”, *Tarih Enstitüsü dergisi* 10–11 (1981), 121–52. The famous *Ta’rih-i Cevdet*, however, is not really the work of a *vak’anüvis*. Although Cevdet was the official chronicler between 1855 and 1866, the order for him to compile the *Ta’rih* came, in 1851, from the *Encümen-i daniş*, the modest Ottoman version of an academy of sciences. Cevdet completed the work only in 1884, long after he had ceased to be *vak’anüvis*.

18 It is still an open question as to which book should be regarded as the “first” Ottoman-Turkish novel. See: Ahmet O. Evin, *Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel* (Minneapolis, 1983), 41–78; Berna Moran, *Türk Romanına eleştirel bir bakış*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1987), 25–41. If one does not regard it as a necessity that the Turkish text be printed in Arabic characters, the first Turkish novel is Vartan Paşa’s *Akhıbi Hükâyesi*, which was printed in Armenian characters in 1851 and transcribed into Latin characters by Andreas Tietze in 1991 (both editions appeared in Istanbul).
As already mentioned, the authors to be investigated in this article did not aim at a fundamental criticism of the Ottoman Empire in the sense of a plea for the abolition of the sultanate or a radical secularization of the state. This is as true for the opposition as it was for the supporters of the regime. It is a general characteristic of the Turkish-speaking opposition in the Ottoman Empire that it aimed at the preservation of the empire, not at its destruction, a reaction to separatist tendencies among the minorities constituting a significant motif in this type of thinking. These authors preferred to discuss the true character of the empire and the reasons for its past success and, in so doing, they had the present in mind. History thus became—very much in conformity with Ottoman tradition—\(^{19}\) the model for the solution of present problems. Time and again, political statement and historical judgement were identical.

The perspectives from which these authors looked at history were quite varied. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, one of the leading politicians of his time, almost always wrote from the perspective of a high official when judging historical events. By contrast, the famous poet and writer Namik Kemal was careful to adjust his perspective to fit the subject discussed.

\section*{The foundation of the Ottoman state as a historiographic topic}

The story of the foundation of the Ottoman state furnishes an interesting example of how historiography can be used in the search for identity. The prominence of this topic in the historiography of the early Republic of Turkey is well known, and in this context it will suffice to mention the name of Mehmet Fuat Köprüülü. Owing to the work of Halil Berktay and Cemal Kafadar, the ideological and intellectual background of the interest in Ottoman state formation is now well known.\(^{20}\)

\footnote{\(^{19}\) Political theory made to masquerade as history (or rather as an integral topic of historiography) can be found in the works of much earlier Ottoman historians such as Taşköprizade (1495–1561) and Mustafa Ali (1541–1600). Cf. Zeki Ankan, "Osmanlı tarih anlayışının evrimi", in "Tarih ve sosyoloji semineri, 28–29 Mayıs 1990: Bildiriler" (Istanbul, 1991), 77–91, here 81–83; Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541–1600) (Princeton, NJ, 1986), e.g. 243–44.

\(^{20}\) Halil Berktay, Cumhuriyet ideolojisi ve Fuat Köprüülü (Istanbul, 1983), especially 47–80; The "Other" Feudalism: a Critique of 20th Century Turkish Historiography and its
The first stages of Ottoman history are easily imbued with political meaning because the origins of the Ottoman Empire are, in Colin Imber’s phrase, “totally obscure”. As early as the fifteenth century the Ottoman chronicles were producing myths to legitimize the rule of the by then well-established Ottoman dynasty. Turkish sources contemporary with Osman Gazi are either lacking or do not mention him at all.

The credit for the (re-)discovery of this topic among the Ottoman historians of the nineteenth century goes to Hayrullah Efendi (1817–1866), an alim and physician belonging to a family that produced a number of Ottoman intellectuals, the Hekimbaşızadeler. He was vice-president of the Encümen-i daniş, the Tanzimat’s equivalent of an academy of sciences. It is possible that Hayrullah composed his history of the Ottoman Empire, the Ta’rih-i Devlet-i Aliye ve Saltanat-i Seniye-i Osmaniye, in response to the encouragement of this academy. One of the peculiarities of this history was its organization: the reign of every sultan was treated in a separate volume, the last volume dealing with the reign of Ahmed I at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Hayrullah’s death prevented the completion of the work). An important innovation was the incorporation of chapters on European history. Hayrullah made extensive use of historical works in French, among them the translation of Hammer-Purgstall’s Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches.


The Ménage festschrift contains a number of studies which elucidate this very point in different ways. Apart from Imber’s article one should also mention: Halil İnalcık, “How to Read ‘Ashk Pasha-zade’s History”, pp. 139–156; Cemal Kafadar, “‘Osman Beg and his Uncle: Murder in the Family?”’, pp. 157–163; and Rudi Paul Lindner, “Beginning Ottoman History”, pp. 199–208.

The subject of the first volume of Hayrullah’s history, which is more than one hundred pages long and one of the larger ones in the series, is not, as could have been expected, Osman himself, but his father Ertuğrul and the latter’s ancestors. This contrasts with the traditional historiography on the dynasty, in which Osman Gazi is seen as its founder and almost no importance is given to his forefathers. The monumental early sixteenth-century chronicle *Tevârıh-i Al-i Osman*, composed at the sultan’s request by the alim Kemalpaşazade Şems üd-Din Ahmed, presents an excellent example of this approach: the first of the ten *defters* of the work is devoted to Osman Gazi, and Ertuğrul and his lineage are treated only in the introductory chapters of this first portion of the dynastic history. What Hayrullah does, is to put back the beginning of the Ottoman dynasty from 1299 (the accepted date of Osman’s accession to rule/independence) to Ertuğrul Gazi’s settling in Anatolia, which supposedly took place in the 1230s.

What does Hayrullah say about Ottoman prehistory? He claims to have collected the documented traditions concerning Ertuğrul which later on served as examples for his descendents, to have removed the panegyric, and to have made what was left into a new and comprehensive picture. Furthermore, he eliminated passages that were included for convention’s sake, intended to comply with the elaborate rules that governed the writing of Ottoman historical works. Finally, he excluded descriptions of wonders and supernatural occurrences. Writing about his historiographical method, Hayrullah says: “... even if [the events] are here described in the new way so that they relate to general matters and are at the same time useful and short, it was preferred to append some anecdotes that do not conform with this narrative as they were encountered during the reading of other books.”

This is not, of course, European historical method. What Hayrullah called the “new way” (*usul-i cedid*) was rather a style of historiography that embraced stylistic lucidity and simplicity, the omission

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of commonplace or "purely ceremonial" events, and the principle of impartiality. This last principle was to be understood as the rejection of any historiography in the service of direct political or personal profit. *Usul-i cedid* was a doctrine that had become widely accepted by the middle of the century. Ahmed Gevdet can be regarded as one of its representatives.

Hayrullah’s method of presenting historical evidence is basically one of collating various sources without critically analyzing or comparing them. As a result, one finds among the historical facts that Hayrullah regarded as documented two instances of visions that occurred in dreams.

Hayrullah presents all or nearly all of the statements about the beginnings of the Ottoman dynasty made by those chroniclers of the fifteenth century who were known to him. These are principally descriptions of the route followed by the Oghuz tribe, from which the Ottomans sprang before the tribesmen settled down in Anatolia, together with genealogies of the house of Osman. One of these genealogies traces the family back to Noah.

There is a certain inconsistency between the scrupulous care with which Hayrullah reproduces all these traditions and his consciousness of the fact that they were traditions meant to enhance the dynasty's stature. He even states that it is impossible to use genealogy as a basis for demonstrating the superiority of the Ottomans to all other dynasties, since, in the final analysis, all people are relatives. Instead he sets forth three factors that attest to the superiority of the Ottomans with regard to all other dynasties and to their unique place in history. The first of these is that the Ottomans did not acquire their state by rebelling against an Islamic overlord. Hayrullah takes great pains to demonstrate the Ottomans’ loyalty to the Seljuks as long as the latter existed. Only when the Seljuks ceased to be, the sultanate naturally devolved upon the Ottomans:

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26 Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, 198-203. A good formulation of this *usul-i cedid* was given by Cevdet in the same year that Hayrullah Efendi’s first volume was published. See: *Vekayi-i Devlet-i Aliye*, vol. 1 [Istanbul, 1271], 84-85 (which bears the heading “İşba’t Ta’rihin keyfiyet-i emi’ ve tel’ifi beyanımda’dır”). The same chapter is also in the second edition of the *Ta’rih-i Cevdet*, this time it goes under the heading “Muhtura”. It is placed in a prominent place just after the introduction: *Ta’rih-i Cevdet: tertib-i cedid*, vol. 1, 2nd edition (Der Seadet, 1309), 14–15. Namık Kemal believed that history should be written in a simple style: “Müverrihlik vazifesinin mükteziyatuna riayeten kitabı mümkün olduğu kadar sade yazamaño çalıdım” (“I have tried to write the book as simply as possible as it is one of the obligations of a historian”): *Osmanlı Ta’rih*, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1326), 32.
“the reins of the sultanate have passed in a natural way to them from the Seljuks”. The second factor concerns the fact that the Ottoman sultans have always ruled personally and absolutely and have never been dominated or overthrown by their own advisors, much less an outside power. The third factor involves the events of 1517, when the Ottomans became spiritual as well as temporal rulers and never surrendered either their spiritual or their temporal authority, as did the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids. In fact, there had never been any spiritual ruler over the Ottomans even before Selim I invested himself with the caliphate in 1517.

Although these three claims of Hayrullah’s are relatively trivial (and already at the time quite questionable) in themselves, they are important for understanding his concept of political legitimacy. By emphasizing these particular claims, Hayrullah seems to be telling us that the power of the ruler should be unrestricted. The sultan remains justified as long as his conduct is in conformity to the political theory and moral code of Islam. What matters in Hayrullah’s eyes is the organic combination of Ottoman dynastic rule with Islamic sovereignty, which is seen in terms of Sunnite orthodoxy. For this reason Hayrullah ascribes to Ertuğrul a major rôle in the suppression of the Babai rebellion.

History here means the history of the dynasty, and thus the legitimation of the dynasty equals the legitimation of the state. Hayrullah also explicitly legitimizes the Ottoman Empire by arguing that there was no other dynasty available to assume the rôle that the Ottomans played. Hayrullah’s book in effect urges its readers to make the Ottoman dynasty the basis of their own political identity. This idea was something with which Hayrullah’s readers would have been familiar. Hayrullah had merely put it into a new guise.

A second historical work of that time deals at length with the emergence of the Ottoman Empire, namely Namık Kemal’s Osmanlı Ta’rihi. The author, perhaps the most celebrated Ottoman poet, journalist, and political intellectual of his age (1840–1888), wrote this book during his last years, which he spent as the mutasarrif (governor) of various islands in the Aegean. His appointment to these places constituted a kind of exile, designed to remove a defender of

28 Ibid., p. 105.
29 This is reflected in the numerous secondary studies on Kemal. Apart from his
constitutional government from the political center. When he wrote his history, Kemal was seriously ill and far away from the Istanbul libraries in which the sources necessary for his work were to be found. As he died while working on the chapter concerning Selim I, his _Osmanlı ta’rhi_ was never completed. In its incomplete state it was not published until after 1908, since the first fascicule had been confiscated immediately after its publication in 1888.

Kemal’s text has not been well received as a work of history. Its writer’s lack of access to the necessary source material quickly becomes evident. For a long time no one was even prepared to take seriously its author’s claim that it constituted an explanation of Ottoman history.

The first sentence of the chapter entitled “The Emergence of the Ottomans” (“Osmanlarnın zuhuru”) establishes the tone that dominates the narrative: “The seventh century of the hijra had begun as the bloodiest, the most terrible period of calamity for the Muslim world.” In Kemal’s view, it was the Ottomans who brought this world out of its calamitous age. He emphasizes that they saved the Islamic world, not only from Western crusades, but also from the Mongols, who, in Kemal’s view, were the greatest disaster the Islamic world ever experienced.

In contrast to Hayrullah, Namık Kemal appears interested in accurately determining both the lineage of the Ottoman dynasty (though not to the time of Noah) and the events that led to the arrival of the Ottomans in Anatolia. On this latter topic, Kemal does not hesitate to engage in reckless conjecture when he accepts or rejects information from his sources in the light of what he must have

letters, critical editions of his works are still lacking. See Namuk Kemal’ın hususi mektupları, ed. by Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, 4 vols. (Ankara, 1967–1986)—The last volume encompasses the letters written during his time in Rhodes. These are important for Namık Kemal’s views on history and historiography.


It was first published by the _Matbaa-i Ebu ‘z-Ziya_ with the permission of the ministry of education. Cf. M. Seyrettin Özgeze, _Eski harflertre basılmış Türkçe eserler kataloğu_, vol. 3 (Istanbul, 1975), p. 1377, n. 15994. On the prohibition, see the note on the page opposite the title page of the first volume, 1326.


“Hicretin karnı sahibi İslamiyet içinden kanlı, en midihî bir devr-i nuhuset olarak ibtida etmişdir.” _Ibid._, p. 35.
regarded as an event’s inner plausibility.\textsuperscript{34} For example, he goes so far as to accept as authentic a passage in a letter sent by the Seljuk Sultan of Rum, Alâüeddin Keykubad III, to Osman Gazi because it ‘proves’ that Seljuks and Oghuzes had migrated from Central Asia to Iran together. On the other hand, he rejects half of a sentence that speaks of the Seljuks and the Ottomans fighting together against the Byzantines, because he feels that it was inserted merely to round out a line of shaped prose.\textsuperscript{35}

Kemal’s historical method is one of accepting anything that shows the Ottomans to be heroic Muslims fighting against Mongol aggression and rejecting anything that contradicts this image. This method enables him to demonstrate that the immediate ancestors of the Ottomans participated in the liberation of Jerusalem from the rule of the crusaders.\textsuperscript{36} It also enables him to show that the Ottomans belonged to the troops of the Khvârezm-shâh Jalâl al-Dîn, famous for his long resistance to the assaults of the Mongols. In Kemal’s view it was under the leadership of this Jalâl al-Dîn, whom he had idealized in a play some years earlier,\textsuperscript{37} that the Ottomans found the opportunity to develop their exceptional bravery and heroism.\textsuperscript{38}

Kemal’s history thus becomes a kind of epic about the heroism, military bravery, and Islamic virtue of the early Ottomans. Unlike Hayrullah, Namik Kemal does not have recourse to dreams and visions, divine intervention and miracles.\textsuperscript{39} In Kemal’s presentation, the Ottomans’ successes stemmed from the freedom and justice that Islam nurtures in its adherents. Their history becomes part of the mission Islam has to the world. If a group of four or five hundred horsemen was able to found the Ottoman Empire, this was possible, not because of some miraculous intervention on the part of God, but because of the Ottomans’ bravery and virtue, both of which were instilled in them by their cultural background.

\textsuperscript{34} Some of his judgements take on the following form: “is apparently one of the facts which has to be accepted according to reason.” (“akla göre teslimi zaruri olan hakikatlardan görünür.”)

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 40.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 48.

\textsuperscript{37} Celâeddin Hvârezmşâh, s. l. 1292. The play was not originally intended for the stage, although it was performed in the era of the Young Turks. Today its introduction, the “Mukaddime-i Celâl”, a central text of Ottoman literary criticism, is more renowned than the drama itself.

\textsuperscript{38} Osmanh Ta’rihi, vol. 1, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{39} He developed, however, a different and complex reasoning about the meaning of some traditions concerning dreams seen by Osman Gazi, ibid., pp. 66–68.
What made Kemal’s *Osmanlı tarihi* unpalatable to the censors of 1888 was most probably the thought that the regime of Abdülhamid II could not possibly have attained the epic virtue of Kemal’s early Ottomans. Kemal, however, was criticizing not just the Ottoman government of his own age, but the West: “Indeed, when this century [again the 7th century of the hijra] of calamities approached the occident of disaster leaving behind a picture of decay which drowned one fifth of the world in blood and fire, the moon and star of the High Sultanate began to rise felicitously in Western Asia to submerge the world of Islam and even the whole mankind in an abundance of light.”

By rehearsing the earliest phases of Ottoman history in this way, Kemal formulated an Ottoman moral superiority itself related to religion. Whereas Hayrullah compared the Ottoman state to other Islamic states in order to prove its special historical place, Kemal stressed its difference from non-Islamic states. But neither Hayrullah nor Kemal employed early Ottoman history as a vehicle for promoting nationalism, as did some of their successors in the twentieth century.

*Muhammad Ali of Egypt as an alternative model for political development*

By the 1880s, the assumption of early Ottoman reformers that the importation of certain European techniques would suffice to solve their own problems was long obsolete. The serious repercussions of the nineteenth-century technological, administrative and economic transformations in Ottoman society had become undeniable. The notion that the Ottomans were essentially different from Westerners was perhaps more sharply felt than before, even if the world views of Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals had become an eclectic combination of Islamic and European (mostly French) features. This perception

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40 “İste bu asr-i masaib, ara­sından dünyânın bir huma vi­s’a­tında kan­lara, ateş­lere müstegark bir gurub le­vhasi birakarak magreb-i fenaya takarrub etmekde iken, (sultanat-i seniye)nîn, yüzlerce seneler alem-i islâmiyet ve belki bitin cihân-i insanîyeti şâ’sâ-an füyyüza­tına gark eden necm u hilal-i ikbâh Asyânın gar­bindan pertev ef­jan-i i’tîla olma­ğa baş­ladi.” *Osmanlı Tarihi,* vol. 1, p. 37. The play upon the words “garb” and “gark” should be noted because of its relevance to the topic of “the West” (garb).

of a great difference between themselves and Westerners impeded the process of change within the empire.

As the intellectuals felt their difference from Westerners so keenly, they began to look for political models that were not Western; hence their lively interest in the reforms that came about in Petrine Russia\(^\text{42}\) and their delight at the victory of the Japanese in the Russian-Japanese war of 1905, which they saw as the triumph of an Asian power over a European one.\(^\text{43}\)

The Ottomans had, however, a non-Western model at their own doorstep (or, rather, in their own entrance hall), namely Muhammad Ali, the first khedive of Egypt. This potentate, who started his career as a commander of some Ottoman troops in Cairo, both repelled and fascinated the Ottomans. He repelled them by assuming the governorship of Egypt against the will of the Istanbul administration and by effecting the notorious massacre of the Mamluks (1811), the class which had controlled Egypt for centuries. As a result of this massacre, he was able to set himself up as a ruler practically independent from the sultan. This situation was finally accepted by the Porte after it had been heavily defeated in two wars, and after European powers had exerted pressure on both sides to make peace. On the other hand, Muhammad Ali fascinated the Ottomans because he had effectively organized his military force on European lines. He also had brought about a thorough financial and fiscal reform and the organization of a state-run industry long before the government in Istanbul could boast of such achievements. The second half of the nineteenth century, however, saw the failure of the course taken by Muhammad Ali and his successors. In that period, Egypt fell under the financial control of its creditors and was occupied by English forces in 1882. At the same time a \textit{modus vivendi} between Cairo and Istanbul had been reached, by which the sultan's government allowed the khedive's administration a free hand in Egypt-

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\text{43}] That the Ottomans sometimes regarded Russia as Asian, and sometimes as European, is an phenomenon requiring closer attention. On the reaction to the Japanese victory cf. Klaus Kreiser, “Der japanische Sieg über Rußland (1905) und sein Echo unter den Muslimen”, \textit{Welt des Islams} 21 (1982), 209–39.
\end{itemize}
ian affairs, in return for the khedive’s acknowledging the Ottoman sultan to be his suzerain.

This might have been one of the reasons why Ahmed Vefik avoided mentioning Muhammad Ali in his *Fezleke*. He treated the delicate period of 1789–1869 in thirteen pages and interpreted it, somewhat arbitrarily, as an age of transition to a better state. The lack of discipline among the janissaries, which Ahmed Vefik regarded as the main cause of Ottoman difficulties, had been terminated with the bloodshed of 1826. In his view the reform edict of Gülhane (1839) was the fruit of this “Fortunate Event” (*vak’a-i hayriye*), the term used by the Ottomans to designate this massacre of their own army. In the eighth edition of the *Fezleke* (1877/78) one encounters a revision of this history. The volume had originally ended with a bright picture of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. But as the years passed by and Abdülhamid II ascended to the throne, the situation changed (the Ottomans had just lost another war against Russia). Speaking about the present, Ahmed Vefik states in just six and a half lines that the mistakes of avaricious ministers had led to disorder in the administration, emptied the treasury and caused the present grievances. He concludes by imploring God to grant success and victory to Sultan Abdülhamid.

The rôle of Muhammad Ali is barely touched upon in the *Fezleke*; his name does not even occur. The reader is only informed that after the Russian advance to Edirne in 1829, “instigated by other enemies the governor of Egypt openly began a rebellion, sending troops as far as Adana. Many wealthy provinces were destroyed at the hands of the barbarians.” This is certainly not a presentation of an alternative model of development. Ahmed Vefik does not delve into the reasons for the military success of the Egyptians against the troops of the sultan. He simply notes that “in a short time the governor of Egypt was confined to his province [Egypt] owing to the Ottomans’ good administration of the affairs of state.” The author takes no note of foreign pressure or of concessions made to the rebellious governor-turned-khedive.

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45 Ibid., p. 290: “... diğer düşmanların tahrik ile Misir valisi alenen asi olub Adana’ya varına asker yürüderek niçe [!] eyalât-i vasiy vaşışler elinde harab olub...”.

46 Ibid., p. 291: “... umur-i devletin hüsn-i idaresiyle az zaman içinde Misir valisi dahil-i eyaletine sürülüb...”.
Around the year 1883, however, there appeared a number of historiographical works that dealt more profoundly with the issues raised by Muhammad Ali. All of them are part of larger chronicles: Volume IV and V of Ahmed Lutfi Efendi’s Ta’rih,\textsuperscript{47} volumes X to XII of the aforementioned Ta’rih-i Cevdet,\textsuperscript{48} and the fourth (and last) volume of Mustafa Nuri Pasha’s history, the Netayic ül-vukuat.\textsuperscript{49} This last volume, however, could only be published after the Young Turk Revolution in 1909, when its author was already dead. This part of the Netayic ül-Vukuat, owing to its author’s frankness, did not meet the approval of Abdülhamid’s censors: Mustafa Nuri, albeit a loyal Ottoman, for example, did not gloss over the fact that Mahmud II had died from the consequences of alcoholism.\textsuperscript{50}

In his treatment of Muhammad Ali, Ahmed Lutfi Efendi merely repeats the information given by his sources. Most prominent among these are the Takvim-i vekeyi’ and the chronicle of the official historiographer Es’ad Efendi, although Ahmed Lutfi also relies on some governmental documents and oral reports. As Ahmed Lutfi is less an analytical historian than an uncritical collector of secondary sources, his work falls short of the historiography of his aforementioned contemporaries. It is also regarded as inferior to that of Hayrullah Efendi or the encyclopaedic writer and journalist, Ahmed Midhat Efendi, both of whom have tried to give a more complete picture of history.\textsuperscript{51} His more or less unconnected rendering of information which was, however, arranged by topic, was typical of the vak’anüvis tradition, to the maintainance of which Ahmed Lutfi seems to have dedicated himself.

Lutfi makes few outspoken judgements and is always chary of recording unpleasant occurrences.\textsuperscript{52} When describing the events of 1833, he writes that an order of Mahmud II to Muhammad Ali,

\textsuperscript{47} Vol. 4 bears no date; vol. 5 was published in Istanbul in 1302.
\textsuperscript{49} Vol. 4, ed. by Mehmed Galib ([Istanbul] 1327), p. 112, gives the date 1301 as the year of its writing, p. 116 gives 1300. It is equally unclear whether Mustafa Nuri had planned a continuation that would have covered the period up to his own time: cf. p. 115 with p. 121.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 93.
\textsuperscript{51} Cf. the evaluation of Abdürrahman Şeref, the last official historiographer of the Empire, in his introduction to the eighth volume of the \textit{Ahmed Lutfi Efendi ta’rihi} (Istanbul, 1328), pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{52} E.g. some cutting remarks against Europe see Ahmed Lutfi, \textit{Ta’rih-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmanîye}, vol. 4, p. 35.
which the latter had not obeyed, was repeated out of "respect to his past services, old age and venerability". What this line conceals is that the sultan had no choice but to repeat his commands, since he had no viable sanctions to employ against his rebellious governor.

Nevertheless, it becomes sufficiently clear that in Ahmed Lutfi’s eyes, Muhammad Ali was nothing but a rebellious governor, who could be mentioned in the same breath with Albanian insurgents. For this reason he does not criticize the rebel, who is not to be taken seriously in any case, but the policy of the Ottoman administration. Any policy predicated upon the de facto independence of Egypt becomes the object of criticism. As a result, Ahmed Lutfi is unable to pinpoint the causes of Egyptian superiority over the Ottomans during the 1820’s and 1830’s.

Quite different was the approach taken by Mustafa Nuri, author of the strongly analytical history \textit{Netayic il-vukuat}. In short, clear paragraphs the author describes the policies of Muhammad Ali and gives reasons for their success. He treats the khedive’s fiscal and financial measures in some detail, partly, no doubt, because Mustafa Nuri was himself a high official in the empire’s financial departments. He sees Muhammad Ali’s success as based more on his financial and fiscal reforms than on the strategic mistakes of the Ottoman military. On the other hand, the defeat of Muhammad Ali’s son and army commander Ibrahim Pasha in 1840, is in Mustafa Nuri’s eyes, due to the injustice of the Egyptians’ rule in Syria. They had not fulfilled the hopes for more justice (\textit{adalet}) which had been placed in them.

\begin{quote}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} "[H]idemat-i sabika ve sinn ve şeyhuhetine hürmeten", \textit{ibid.}, vol. 4, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 47. Against both of them he proposes the same policy: "It is no use to try to do away with a rebellion only with the help of despotic actions and measures, without finding a way to win the hearts of the populace" ("Ehalin\'in celb-i kulub esbabna bakılmayubda harekât ve muamelât-i istibdadiye ile def-i ihtilâla kalkısmak abesle iştigaldır").
\item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, 39, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{56} The only exceptions are remarks to the effect that the Egyptian soldiers, trained in a modern way, ("nizam askeri", \textit{ibid.}, vol. 4, p. 41) were naturally more effective than the Ottoman irregulars. Opinions like this were obviously not the result of deep thought. For the contemporary reader they merely constituted received wisdom.
\item \textsuperscript{57} \textit{Netayic il-vukuat}, vol. 4, pp. 86-87, 118.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Mustafa Nuri is very critical of Mahmud's II decision to seek battle at Nizip against von Moltke's suggestions, \textit{ibid.}, vol. 4, p. 92.
\item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 95-96.
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}
At this point it becomes clear why Muhammad Ali’s policy could not serve as a model for development in Mustafa Nuri’s eyes, for this historian sees Muhammad Ali’s rule as one based on injustice: he had come to power by massacring the Mamluks and by giving bribes. Mustafa Nuri seems to be more troubled by the bribery than by the massacre.\textsuperscript{60}

Ahmed Cevdet’s treatment of Muhammad Ali was partly shaped by the fact that his history only covered the period 1774–1826. Before 1826, relations between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali had not yet become rancorous, and open war was yet far away. For this reason Cevdet was able to appreciate the successes of the Egyptian governor without seeming disloyal to the Ottoman rulers.\textsuperscript{61} Cevdet described in detail and with sympathy, the steps by which Muhammad Ali secured an unrivalled position of power in Cairo.\textsuperscript{62} He was fascinated with Muhammad Ali’s creation of a modern army and with his systematic attempts to improve the infrastructure and the economic situation.\textsuperscript{63} Notwithstanding his loyalty to the empire, Cevdet’s attitude sometimes bordered on admiration. It is probably for this reason that he sometimes tried (certainly despite his better knowledge) to reconcile the aims of Muhammad Ali with those of the sultan.\textsuperscript{64}

Cevdet’s sympathy for Muhammad Ali is informed by two ideas: The first is that only a strong ruler can be a good ruler, because only he is able to protect the weak. This idea, deeply rooted in the Ottoman tradition of political thought,\textsuperscript{65} tends to legitimize every

\textsuperscript{60} In this, vol. 1, pp. 85, 87-88. Referring to Namık Paşa, a special envoy sent to Europe by the Porte to work against Muhammad Ali, Mustafa Nuri accuses the khedive of scheming to accede to the Ottoman throne (pp. 90–91). In another case, he suspects Muhammad Ali of plotting to depose Mahmud II in order to wage war against Russia together with Sultan Abdülmecid (p. 120).

\textsuperscript{61} On the question (and meaning) of impartiality as a requirement for the historian cf. Neumann, 

\textsuperscript{62} Ta’rīh-i Cevdet, vol. 10, pp. 95–96, 101–102, 153–155, 207; vol. 11, pp. 191–192. The following paragraphs partly have been derived from Neumann, Das indirekte Argument, pp. 163–165.

\textsuperscript{63} Ta’rīh-i Cevdet, vol. 10, pp. 95, 208–209; vol. 12, pp. 97–98, 146–47.

\textsuperscript{64} Especially in connection to the Greek war of independence, ibid., vol. 11, pp. 183–188; vol. 12, pp. 93, 96–97.

\textsuperscript{65} Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 289–91, on Mustafa Ali and the heritage of the Turco-Mongol political tradition. Fleischer is concerned with the ottomanization of this tradition, with special regard to the position of the ruler in and versus society.
ruler who is able to enforce his orders. The second idea is that a ruler should take any step which will serve to better secure the control of the state over society. This pragmatic approach the author had imbibed from his mentor, Mustafa Resid Pasha. In a letter written to Sa'dullah Pasha, then the ambassador of the Porte at Vienna, Cevdet compares Muhammad Ali with Mahmoud II and Peter the Great of Russia. Cevdet states that Muhammad Ali had succeeded in forming a vigorous government. He also had built a strong army and a productive economy, all without imitating the West. Cevdet finds these achievements are comparable to those of Peter, who, as stated earlier, was a model for Ottoman reformers, because Muhammad Ali's reforms, like those of Peter, furthered ter-akki ("progress"). Of Mahmoud II, however, Cevdet says that, although he was possessed of the will (irade) and ability (kudret), he lacked the knowledge (ilm) he needed to realize his political projects. Muhammad Ali, on the other hand, is seen as being in possession of the necessary will, ability, and knowledge and as having employed them all to good purpose.

Cevdet regards Muhammad Ali as a discerning, cautious, highly intelligent, self-controlled, and pious ruler, but not as the great moral hero portrayed by Muhammad Ali's own historiographer and propagandist, Rifā'a at-Tahtāwī. In Cevdet's pragmatic view, a lack of peculiar moral excellence does not necessarily prevent a person from being an able ruler.

There is no doubt that, in Cevdet's eyes, the policies pursued by Muhammad Ali provided a model for imitation even in 1884, when Egypt was already controlled by Western powers. But which opinion was to dominate later Ottoman historiography: Was the khedive to be regarded as an oppressor or as a reformer?

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66 Neumann, Das indirekte Argument, 159–60.
69 On the meaning of this idea in Cevdet's work, cf. Neumann, Das indirekte Argument, 183–90.
During the last few decades, Turkish historiography has treated Muhammad Ali in a rather sympathetic fashion. The 'missing link' between Cevdet's treatment and the account given by today's Turkish historians is apparently the Ta’rih-i Devlet-i Osmaniye ("History of the Ottoman State"), a textbook for secondary schools written by the last official historiographer Abdürrahman Şeref Efendi (1853–1925). The relevant second volume of his book was published for the first time in 1896.

When writing his textbook, Abdürrahman Şeref was supervised by a commission, with Ahmed Cevdet Pasha being one of its three members. The passages on Muhammad Ali Pasha in this book rely heavily on the information contained in the then unpublished Netayic îl-vaqiat, but negative judgements are either altered or suppressed to present a positive overall picture. According to Abdürrahman Şeref, Muhammad Ali was "born for leadership and government".

Thus, belatedly, Ottoman historiography had found a non-Western model for development, one which had the additional advantage of being both Islamic and nearly-Ottoman. To judge whether the autocratic centralism of Muhammad Ali was a fortunate or a necessary model, however, is beyond the scope of this article.

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73 There exists a little-known, short biography of this author by one of his students: Efdal üd-Din, Abdürrahman Şeref Efendi: Tercümê-i halî, hayat-ı resmiye ve hususîye (İstanbul, 1927).

74 Mekâtib-i âlîyede tedris olunmak üzerine iki cild olarak tertib olmuşdur, vol. 2 (İstanbul, 1315). I use the second edition of 1318.

75 On this commission cf. Neumann, Das indirekte Argument, 231.

That Byzantinists, Slavists and Ottomanists have something to say to each other is not new, nor is it a novelty that they have frequently talked at cross-purposes. It is all the more encouraging that for some time now, they no longer have been speaking mostly about and against one another, but increasingly have come to address one another. In this process they have even developed entirely new forms of cooperation. This applies especially to a pilot project initiated in 1978 by the Centre for Byzantine Studies at the University of Birmingham and at Harvard University in Dumbarton Oaks. By comparatively evaluating the accounts of late Byzantine documents from Mount Athos and early Ottoman tax registers, in conjunction with other documentary evidence of the transitional period, this project aimed at determining more precisely to what extent these different accounts are compatible. In this manner a better understanding of several problems of the transitional period was to be achieved. Presented at the spring symposium in 1982 in Dumbarton Oaks, case studies focused on Chalcidice and the Strymon area in Central Macedonia, the Matzuka valley in the hinterland of Trabzon and the island of Lemnos/Limnos in the northeastern Aegean, supplemented by two cities, namely Trapezunt/Trabzon and Thessalonike/Selânik.\(^1\) No other comparative project of this magnitude has yet been attempted. However, recently there have been signs of similar forms of cooperation for the central area of Byzantine-Turkish confrontation, namely western Asia Minor and the Marmara region. This latter venture has reached its climax in a symposium on the Ottoman Emirate between 1300 and 1389, organized by the Institute for Mediterranean

\(^1\) *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, ed. by Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham – Washington, 1986).
Studies in Crete. Apart from regional monographs, more and more topics equally seem to demand cooperation between different historical specialists. This applies, for instance, to trade and the behavior of merchants around 1453, which during the last months of 1994 formed the subject of a conference at Princeton University. Moreover, the role of the Athos monasteries and their monks in the transitional period between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries has been discussed in the fall of 1995, at a conference in Athens. These and other comparable “transition problems” also have engaged scholars at various other national and international conferences. Not only Byzantinists and Ottomanists participate in these discussions. Scholars of modern Greek language and history and of Balkan history as well as representatives of other disciplines likewise take part, thereby demonstrating the complexity of the field. Convincing answers now can be found only in the larger framework of a history of the Mediterranean world in its entirety. The future will show whether a qualified team of Ottomanists, Slavists and Byzantinists can be assembled to screen and evaluate the voluminous Turkish archival material.

A systematic registration of the antiquities still buried in the ground and the architectural remains usable for an analysis of the transition to Ottoman rule is being undertaken to my knowledge only by a research team of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The scholars in-

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2 The Ottoman Empire (1300–1389), ed. by Elisabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993).
4 To Άγιον Όρος ὁπό τῇ βυζαντινή στήν οθωμανική πραγματικότητα (14th/16th c.), Athens, 17 October 1995.
5 I would like to refer to the section “Byzantium and the Muslim World” at the 18th International Byzantine Congress in Moscow in August, 1991, with many contributions on the problem of transition, for example, the paper of the young Turkish Byzantinist Nevra Necipoğlu, “Ottoman Merchants in Constantinople During the First Half of the Fifteenth Century”, which has since been published in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 16 (1992), 158–69.
6 Günther Weiß, who died much too young, reached this conclusion with respect to Byzantine Studies in the summary of his report on current research (Historische Zeitschrift, Sonderheft 14, 1986, 305). As for Turkology, the Institute for Mediterranean Studies in Crete has taken very interesting initiatives. It has established a post-graduate course of study of Turkish History, Language and Paleography and in 1991 organized the conference on the Ottoman emirate. Cf. The Ottoman Empire, ed. Zachariadou, Foreword, IX.
7 Among others, Machiel Kiel refers to this necessity in his study “Urban Development in Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: the Place of Turkish Architecture in the Process”, in The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority, ed. by K. H. Karpat (Istanbul, 1990), 129, and on other occasions.
volved in this project are in the course of preparing a Tabula Imperii Byzantini.\(^8\) In many articles Machiel Kiel has demonstrated convincingly that much can be gained, even in a one-man effort, by bringing together the relevant sources from art and economic history and by undertaking a comparative analysis.\(^9\) Both Ottoman studies in Greece and Byzantine studies in Turkey, currently in the process of development, promise important impulses for research on the transitional period linking the Byzantine millenium to the Tourkokratia.

In articles on the themes of downfall, transition and new beginning, scholars more and more acknowledge consultations with colleagues from different subfields and the important impulses they have derived from these contacts.\(^10\) This should be a normal way of proceeding, but unfortunately it is not; all too often it is held up by material and political adversities. But even though we still have a long way to go, it has already become apparent how important interdisciplinary border crossings are for genuine progress in research.\(^11\)

1. Population Development between Byzantine Rule and Tourkokratia

Byzantine was replaced by Turkish rule on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus between the early fourteenth and the late fifteenth centuries primarily by means of war, entailing the destruction

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of the material and human resources of the peoples and states involved. Nearly continuous warfare on land and on sea constitutes the main focus of our sources, and in the cities, villages and regions on both sides of the Straits, the cries of war drown out all expressions both of peaceful work and social tensions. Continuous destruction, expulsion and enslavement made broad sections of the population long for a reliable peace under any ruler, a very strong longing which led to contradictory reactions. This longing for peace constitutes the explanation for certain individual and group behavior which otherwise would appear inexplicable.

Various contributions which have appeared in the last two decades indicate, however, that military conflict, aiming at domination in the region, was not the only reason for a dramatic population decline. Demographic development in the transitional period also was significantly influenced by supraregional, trans-European events and developments. Thus, Jacques Lefort, in his contribution to the Dumbarton Oaks Symposium of 1982, showed that the decline in population of the village of Radolibos near Serres, from its highest level around 1340 to its lowest level in the middle of the fifteenth century, was largely due to the Black Death. By the fifteenth century the population had fallen back to the twelfth-century level. Furthermore, the reduction in cultivated and agriculturally used land within the village boundaries, and the disappearance of various hamlets belonging to Radolibos and also to neighboring villages—a development which may have begun before the middle of the fourteenth century—partly can be traced back to previous excessive demands on the soil. The cultivation of poorer lands and the reduction of forested area within the village boundaries contributed to the agricultural crisis.\(^\text{12}\)

Machiel Kiel reaches similar conclusions in his broad study on Turkish Thessaly. Here urban and rural settlements are subjected to a close analysis, in which the plague and village desertion play a dominant role.\(^\text{13}\) Thus it appears that the depopulation of late Byzantine towns and the desertion of many rural settlements were not merely and perhaps not even primarily a result of war. Advancing Turkish

\(^{12}\) J. Lefort, “Population and Landscape in Eastern Macedonia during the Middle Ages: The Example of Radolibos”, in Continuity and Change, ed. by Bryer/Lowry, 11 ff.

soldiers and infiltrating settlers could not have expelled autochthonous populations, because they hardly encountered any such populations.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, population growth since the late fifteenth century was not due to the \textit{pax Ottomanica} and the purposeful population and colonization policies of the Ottoman state and its ruling classes. Rather population expansion corresponded to the general trend of the times, taking place independently of any given regime. Likewise, the tendency toward ‘proto-industrialization’ and the development of rural trade resulted not only from the Ottoman promotion of commerce, but also from a growing population pressure on available natural resources, which forced the peasants to find new, non-agrarian sources of income.\textsuperscript{15}

The migrations of Turkic tribes to the west and later, the foundation of the Ottoman state, encountered a Byzantine society torn apart by internal contradictions and impaired in its development by external invasions. In addition, this society also suffered from a serious demographic crisis. All problems, whether of local or foreign origin, were intensified in consequence. This explains why even localities and regions which for a time had served as places of refuge for threatened populations and in which exodus was at least compensated by afflux, were hardly less affected by the decline in population than easily accessible territories where the fighting was often especially intense.\textsuperscript{16} Dramatic losses of population sometimes can even be traced back to individual families.\textsuperscript{17} From the Ottoman viewpoint, conquest therefore proved far easier than the consolidation of power; if conquest implied “lesser wars”, then consolidation could be regarded as “the mightiest war”.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, 162. A systematic registration of deserted villages in the Byzantine-Greek region has, to my knowledge, not been attempted since H. Antoniadis-Bibicou, “Villages déserts en Grèce. Un bilan provisoire”, in \textit{Villages déserts et histoire économique, XI\textsuperscript{e}-XVII\textsuperscript{e} siècles} (Paris, 1965), 343–417, despite a notable increase in insights and source material. Compare \textit{eadem}, “Mouvement de la population et villages déserts: quelques remarques de méthode”, in \textit{Actes du XV\textsuperscript{e} Congrès International d’Études Byzantines, Athènes, Sept. 1976}, vol. 4 (Athens, 1980), 19–27. Antoniadis-Bibicou has calculated a particularly high number of deserted villages for the fourteenth century. These calculations are not unproblematic as noted by A. Každan in his review, \textit{Vizantijskij Vremennik} 29 (1968), 309 f.

\textsuperscript{15} Kiel, “Das türkische Thessalien”, 179.

\textsuperscript{16} This would seem to apply particularly to the capital, Constantinople, as I have attempted to show in an unpublished study about immigration and emigration in the last hundred years of Byzantine existence.

\textsuperscript{17} Compare Klaus-Peter Matschke, “Byzantinische Politiker und byzantinische Kaufleute im Ringen um die Beteiligung am Schwarzmeerhandel in der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts”, \textit{Mitteilungen des Bulgarischen Forschungsinstitutes in Österreich} VI/2 (1984), 78.

\textsuperscript{18} Compare Heath Lowry, “From Lesser Wars to the Mightiest War: The Ottoman
In only a few instances is it possible to follow the development of villages from Byzantine, respectively Slavic times, to the Tourkokratia. One of these fortunate cases is the village of Radolibos already mentioned. According to various praktika dating from the early fourteenth century, the titles to arable, pastures, gardens and vineyards, as well as the rights to peasant services were split between the two Athos monasteries of Lavra and Iberon. In the fifteenth century, the settlement appears under the name of Radilofo in two tahrir defteri, paying its taxes to an Ottoman timariot (1465, 1478). This illustrates that in the second half of the fifteenth century the village recovered gradually from the demographic blows which wars and epidemics had inflicted. Step by step the inhabitants of Radilofo passed from a subsistence to a market type economy, as apparent from the increasing cultivation of products such as wine and saffron and in the establishment of a rural market at which these products were probably sold.  

Settlement processes in the rural areas of Thessaly are also very interesting. Of the twenty-three villages, which M. Kiel identified in the tahrir defteri of 1455 for the nahiye of Kastritza, apparently only four Christian villages with Greek names, located on the periphery of the plain, survived the storms of the fourteenth century. By contrast, five or six new settlements, some of which already were located in the mountainous part of the district, probably arose where earlier on, in the fourteenth century, villages had been deserted because of their poor soil or location. The names of thirteen Turkish villages, mainly in the lowlands, reveal a great deal about the origin of the new settlers, who came from various emirates in Asia Minor, but nothing about possible predecessor settlements and their fates in the period of transition. Some of the new settlers continued their semi-nomadic way of life—according to M. Kiel, this was one of the reasons why Christian peasants at first avoided the plains. Increases in the Christian population resulted not only in the cultivation of specialty crops such as cotton and rice, but also in the development of textile production. And in the unique case of the Christian set-


20 Kiel, “Das türkische Thessaliens”, 159 ff.
transit of Tyrnabos, reestablished after a period of desertion, a rural trade center developed at virtually “American speed”, surpassing at times all other Thessalian towns with respect to size and prosperity.\(^\text{21}\)

As for the Marmara region and the neighboring areas in Asia Minor, very interesting results have become available through the coordinated work of Byzantinists and Ottomanists. Analyzing forty-three settlements on the coast and in the Bithynian hinterland, I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr concludes that by the late fourteenth and in the fifteenth century, the non-Muslim population in this area was no longer very large and in the course of the sixteenth century diminished even more. One must assume that these Christians probably constituted prisoners of war forcibly settled in the locality, and not truly autochthonous elements.\(^\text{22}\) J. Lefort comes to basically the same conclusion after a comparative evaluation of Byzantine and Ottoman data. In addition, Lefort emphasizes that, unlike Thessaly, the mountainous regions of Bithynia assumed a Turkish character at a very early stage.\(^\text{23}\) Both authors present findings concerning pre-Turkish settlement patterns and the shifts which occurred during the transition to Tourkokratia. Lefort concludes that until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries non-Turkish, and that means most probably Byzantine, toponyms continued to exist in various mountainous regions and in the hills of Bithynia. At least at times the soil in these regions must have been cultivated intensively, and possibly these high-altitude villages, or at least their names, date back to the thirteenth century.\(^\text{24}\)

The dense settlement and the satisfactory military protection of Bithynia on the eve of the Turkish conquest, according to Lefort, are confirmed by the contemporary Byzantine and Turkish chronicles.\(^\text{25}\) This could mean that those areas of Asia Minor situated near the capital followed the general demographic and settlement trend, even if some isolated sources name uninhabited old settlements in the vicinity of Nicaea and Nicomedia.\(^\text{26}\) I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr considers the dominance of vakif and miri over timar in early Ottoman Bithynia.

\(^\text{21}\) Ibid., 126 ff.
\(^\text{22}\) Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La population non-musulmane de Bithynie (deuxième moitié du XIV\textsuperscript{e} s.—première moitié du XV\textsuperscript{e} s.), in The Ottoman Emirate, ed. Zachariadou, 7–22.
\(^\text{23}\) Lefort, “Tableau de la Bithynie”, 108.
\(^\text{24}\) Ibid., 109.
\(^\text{25}\) Ibid., 116.
\(^\text{26}\) Cf. I. Sakkelion, “Μιχαήλ Παλαιωλόγου ἀνέκδοτον χρυσόβουλλον περὶ τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῦ τῇ Μ. Ἐκκλησίας διωρηθέντων κτημάτων”, Πανδώρα 15 (1864), 28 f. There
as evidence for the fact that in pre Ottoman times, these lands must have belonged to the emperor, to the grandees of his entourage and to Constantinople monasteries under imperial protection. Moreover she assumes that villages with many vintners and individual cattle breeders are rooted in Byzantine tradition, and that in these instances there was a certain amount of settlement continuity. This is confirmed, more or less, by various observations of Halil İnalcık, who points out that the coastal towns of Mudanya, Kurşunlu and Gemlik remained under Byzantine rule until 1370 and then came directly under Ottoman control as has and vakif. Long after the Turkish conquest, many Greeks lived in these settlements as vintners, and in the early sixteenth century some of them even became typical “village capitalists”, their economic base being the possession of vineyards and private houses or shops. On occasion they were engaged in weaving, but primarily they acted as moneylenders to the peasants of their own or neighbouring villages.

In the middle of the fifteenth century, there were also places in the Marmara region which like Tyrnabos in Thessaly concentrated on trade, Madytos/Mayton constituting a case in point. Byzantinists are concerned with the following question: To what extent did such developments, caused by the growth in population and the cultivation of inferior land, occur already in Byzantine times? Specialization in winegrowing for the supply of the Byzantine capital and for export existed in the Asiatic coastal region of the Sea of Marmara already before 1350.

are interesting comments about individual settlements, such as the chora (not a fortress as in the text of Anna Komnene) of Kyr Georios (“as the inhabitants call it”) with proasteia agridia, choria palaiochoria and an olive plantation. The latter is divided into ten shares, three of which support the Great Church. Five shares stay with the state treasury, the emperor’s bestiarion, while a single share has been granted to a stratiotes from Nicaea.

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28 Ibid., 8 f.
30 Reise des K. französischen Gesandtschafts-Secretärs und Geographen Nikolaus von Nikolai von Marseille nach Konstantinopel 1551. Taschenbibliothek der wichtigsten und interessantesten Reisen in die Türkei, ed. by J. H. Jäck, 1, Theil, 2nd vol. (Graz, 1831), 75 f. İnalcık also refers to “a very fine cotton yarn . . . made in Maydos” in his “A Case Study of the Village Microeconomy”, 295, but without any bibliographic reference.
31 A compilation of sources and literature is available in the pertinent chapters of A. E. Laiou’s The Economic History of Byzantium (forthcoming).
there. But this apparently exhausts the scope of economic activity in the Byzantine Empire, perhaps because of minimal population pressure. Or alternatively economic competition from the outside may have been too great, or perhaps both these factors operated, of course at different times or in different locations.

However, it cannot be excluded that other factors altogether were responsible for the limited development of rural crafts. We also need to ask whether some large villages had not already grown into towns. As far as Radolibos is concerned, with 226 hearths and 868 persons in the year 1316 Angeliki E. Laiou answers this question in the affirmative. According to I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, an Ottoman settlement, to be counted as a town, apart from a market must also possess a minimum of craft activity, such as soap manufactories, dye works, candlemakers and a brewhouse for millet beer. Size is not the determining factor. Similarly, the fortified locality Sakkos near Selymbria, which around 1320 was inhabited by at least five hundred peasants, is referred to in the sources as chorion, respectively frurion, but not once as polichnion. The borderline between town and country seems to have been more fluid in the late Byzantine period than under the early Ottomans, although even in the later case, it is not easy to ascertain how sharply the distinction between town and village was drawn in every-day life.

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32 Compare, for instance, the twenty-three shoemakers living in Radolibos. According to a protocol prepared by members of the “Séminaire de J. Lefort, E. H. E. (IV” Section), Anthroponymie et société villageoise (X-XIV siècle), Hommes et richesses dans l’Empire byzantin, VIII-XVI siècle,” Paris 1991, 237, this is rather a large figure even for a village of the size of Radolibos, and indicates “une véritable industrie de la chaussure”. Based on certain evidence, which cannot be discussed here, I am convinced that villages existed in the late Byzantine period which manufactured textiles, canvas, wool fabric and rugs beyond their own needs, but which did not however lose their agrarian character. Clearly this applies to village iron production traded interregionally, which is mentioned in early Ottoman sources in connection with various taxes—resm-i samakov and resm-i hadi. The term samakov/samakov is clearly of Slavic origin and refers to pre-Turkish conditions: Nicoara Beldiceanu, “Margarid: un timar monastique”, Revue des Etudes Byzantines 33 (1975), 243 f.


34 Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La population”, 10. The observations of Lefort and his seminar show, however, that this village was the site of some manufacturing, so that Laiou can support her assessment with more data than the mere size of the village.

35 Ioannis Cantacuzeni Historiarum libri IV, ed. L. Schopen, vols. 1–3, Bonn 1828–1832, I, 28, 30: I, 136 and 144 f. The population is specifically described as consisting only of peasants working the fields (Johannes Kantakuzenos, Geschichte I, translated by G. Fatouros and T. Krischer, Stuttgart 1982, 104). However, this does not mean that no trade was carried out on the side.

36 On the relationship between town and country in the Ottoman Empire, see
3. *Towns and urban regions during the period of transition*

Doubtless a specifically urban realm existed in the Byzantine Empire and the medieval Slavic Balkan states, and also in the succeeding empire of the Ottomans. Yet on urban sites, continuity of settlement did not always prevail. Some towns were economically drained by long years of siege and blockade. At least for a time, the conquest in such localities put an end to urban life. In his paper, read at the 1982 spring symposium at Dumbarton Oaks, Speros Vryonis has convincingly demonstrated this fact even for a large and important city such as Thessaloniki. Other towns, such as Larissa in Thessaly, had apparently been abandoned entirely by their inhabitants before the Turkish conquest, and only some ruins remained. According to Machiel Kiel, the successor settlement of Yenişehir was really a new entity.

In the Thracian town of Arkadiupolis, which the Emperor Andronikos III wished to renovate in the 1330s, a similar situation seems to have prevailed; when the Turks temporarily occupied it, Arkadiupolis consisted only of empty ruins. Apparently, as Bergos, it later made a remarkable comeback and still later, under the name of Lüle Burgazi, it came to be home to a partly Christian population.

Some towns were destroyed and depopulated only to be revived much later, as happened to the coastal town of Kavala on the Via Egnatia which became an urban center of significance.

Balkan or Bithynian towns in transition thus present a most diverse and contradictory picture, which defies clear-cut classification. Discussions of historic urban development involve the delineation of urban structure and emphasize continuity or urban change in the

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Suraiya Faroqhi, *Kultur und Alltag im Osmanischen Reich* (Munich, 1995), 71 ff. In Byzantine times the distinction between 'urban' and 'rural', on the cultural level, did not coincide with the limits established on the socio-economic plane. Where Byzantine culture and education were concerned, the dividing line ran between the capital Constantinople (and a few larger cities) on the one hand and the remaining towns and villages on the other. In the Ottoman world, however, the distinction between 'urban' and 'rural' may have been more clear-cut.


transition to Tourkokratia. Machiel Kiel summarizes the opinion of many Middle Eastern specialists and Turkologists when he writes: "Die spätabyzantinische Stadt war ja größtenteils agrarisch ausgerichtet, die orientalische Stadt hingegen, die durch die Osmanen auf den Balkan verpflanzt wurde, war viel stärker auf Handwerk und Gewerbe orientiert".42 A great deal can be said in favor of this distinction between the (late) Byzantine "garden city"43/agropolis and the (early) Ottoman commercial town, between Byzantine town-dwelling peasants and Ottoman town-dwelling craftsmen. By the middle of the fifteenth century, Yenisehir/Larissa, the new town described by Kiel, was a "real" town, despite its small population of only 2,000. Not merely an administrative center, Yenisehir was at the same time a focus for crafts and trade, where 75 percent of all taxes stemmed from market fees. Commerce in this town was developed primarily by the Muslim inhabitants, who made up 83 percent of the population; not a single head of a Christian household is assigned a professional specialization in the register, which means that practically all of them must have been peasants. Per household the Christians produced six times more grain than their Muslim fellow townsmen.44 It seems that Thessaloniki experienced a similar development. Only fifty years after the Ottoman conquest—that is, before the immigration of numerous economically active Jews—a high percentage of the population was involved in textile and leather processing. These activities were mainly carried out, albeit not as exclusively as in the case of Yenisehir/Larissa, by immigrant Muslims.45 Even the fact that distinct Christian-Greek and/or Christian-Slav trade centers developed side-by-side with their Muslim-Ottoman counterparts is not a valid argument against this assumed Muslim preponderance in crafts and trade,46 for there is no reason why the Christian population should not have shared in the commerce generated by the new Ottoman, Middle Eastern style towns.

42 Kiel, "Das türkische Thessalien", 154.
44 Kiel, "Das türkische Thessalien", 154.
46 As was the case in Tyrnabos in Thessaly and Mayton in the area of the Straits, both of which were populated almost exclusively by Christians.
By contrast Byzantinists still have great difficulty in finding evidence for a stable commercial sphere in late Byzantine cities. A. E. Laiou recently located town-dwelling craftsmen in Thessaloniki and Serres.\(^47\) But she states quite clearly that urban crafts did not keep pace with trade and strongly opposes my suggestion that textile production, at least in Thessaloniki, may have been of supraregional importance.\(^48\) In my recent study of late Byzantine urban activities, I also have described commercially-oriented production as the sore point of this economy. In this context, I have attempted a taxonomy of late Byzantine urban economic activities, introducing the category of the ‘landworkers’, who formed the largest group of urban dwellers next to construction workers and, on occasion, seamen. Obviously in the late Byzantine context the term ‘landworkers’ can stand for urban peasants, but its meaning is broader and it perhaps corresponds better to the prevailing conditions, at least in the larger towns.\(^49\)

Moreover, numerous questions arise when we attempt to understand the point of view of our sources, and gauge the depth of field typical of the picture which they present. The “surviving late Byzantine charters give an impression of a clerical and monastic economy and society of almost Tibetan proportions”.\(^50\) However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that we are obliged to analyze Italian economic history basing our work on sources of the type available for the late Byzantine Empire. We would be hard put to discover the widespread and highly specialized textile production and the other late medieval crafts so prevalent in Italian cities. Economic activity other than agriculture also is very difficult to discern on the basis of Ottoman tax registers, since crafts were not (directly) taxed


\(^{49}\) See the chapters “The late Byzantine Urban Economy” and “Exchange, Commercial Activities and Market Relations in Late Byzantium” by Klaus-Peter Matschke, in The Economic History of Byzantium, ed. by A. E. Laiou (forthcoming).

\(^{50}\) Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry, “Introduction”, in Continuity and Change, ed. Bryer/Lowry, 3.
and thus hardly any data is given. Nevertheless, there are some indications of commercial activity, since the Ottomans, unlike the Byzantines who taxed the land itself, taxed the products of the land. Thus changes in the tax payments demanded permit some insights into the production structures of Ottoman cities, as evident in the case of Yenişehir/Larissa.

Indubitably, Ottoman sources yield more information on crafts and trade than their Byzantine counterparts. But even so, some data can be culled from Byzantine or else from “Frankish” sources. Yet, in the late Byzantine Empire there were not only monastic praktika, but also confirmations of possession and tax exemptions granted to people of secular status, both individually and in groups. Such documents dealt not only with fields and vineyards, but also with urban workshops and stores, in addition to the rents which could be demanded for these buildings. On urban development in general, however, only the epilogue to a Latin document (prostagma) concerning the town of Lampsakos on the Sea of Marmara is relevant. Dating from the period of Crusader rule, this 1219 survey recorded sources of income other than agricultural taxes, such as schale or ship landing fees, commercial or craft-based taxes, redditus or services rendered in accordance with customary law, operating fees and others. Kommerkion, skaliatikon and dues levied on the sale of meat made up about 10 percent of the total tax revenue. In addition, mills, saltworks and fishing rights also gave rise to revenues, while references to other craft activities are missing. This picture is surprisingly similar to the tax structure of Peloponnese towns shortly after their takeover by the Turks. In Corinth the market and transit taxes made up about 11 percent of the total, in Chlumutzi barely 7.5 percent. On the peninsula we find the taxes on saltworks, grain mills, oil presses and fishponds familiar from the Lampsakos document. However, we also encounter dues payable from silk reels, mulberry trees and linen, totally absent in the Lampsakos area, which speak for rural textile


production at least as a supplementary source of income.\textsuperscript{54} With 113 households and an additional 60 single men, according to the calculations of D. Jacoby, the thirteenth-century Lampsakos had a population of between 500 and 600 persons.\textsuperscript{55} For the sake of comparison, here are the figures on record for two Peloponnese towns toward the end of the fifteenth century: 106 houses for Kalavryta and 437 for Corinth.\textsuperscript{56} There was no significant economic difference between larger and smaller towns of the Peloponnese shortly after the Turkish conquest, and their economic structures certainly resembled those prevailing in Lampsakos shortly after the Latin takeover. But in his 1993 article Jacoby points out that in the first half of the thirteenth century, there were towns under Venetian rule on the coast of the Propontis, whose tax income from schale, commercia and redditus must have been much higher. Here commercial dues most probably constituted the main sources of tax revenue.\textsuperscript{57} Something rather similar can be claimed for Yenişehir around 1450. In all these cases we are dealing with settlements which the Byzantines no longer controlled.

Both in the case of the Venetian towns and in Ottoman Yenişehir we are concerned with settlements experiencing demographic upswing. Or at least they were not suffering from demographic depression or acute population loss due to the plague and soil exhaustion. Possibly the economic weakness of Byzantine towns between 1350 and 1450, especially in the commercial sector, can be explained not just by a structural deficit and the coincidental burden of the conquest itself. During the main period of Ottoman invasion and occupation, these towns were affected by a long-term demographic decline, which hit them in a particularly critical phase of their existence and which paralyzed their power of resistance by weakening the non-agrarian tendencies and strengthening the agrarianization of the towns.

This rather complicated explanation has just one purpose: To show how problematic our information on late Byzantine cities is and how much care is necessary when we generalize about them. A comparative analysis of the transitional process shows the dilemma even more relentlessly, but perhaps this procedure will open the way to

\textsuperscript{54} Nicoară Beldiceanu and Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Recherches sur la Morée”, Südost-Forschungen 39 (1980), 42.
\textsuperscript{55} Jacoby, “The Venetian Presence”, 175, Footnote 112.
\textsuperscript{56} Beldiceanu/Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Recherches”, 41.
\textsuperscript{57} Jacoby, “The Venetian Presence”, 181 f.
a more precise evaluation of the urban situation in the late Byzantine Empire by including the Ottoman sources. However, the results obtained to date are not very promising.\textsuperscript{58} But where the institutional realm is involved, at least we may shed light on the structure of the late Byzantine tax farm (\textit{topike}) by presenting evidence for its closeness to the Ottoman \textit{mukata'a} and by a typological comparison of these two major modes of tax collection.\textsuperscript{59} One can also profit from a comparative study of the silver refineries and mints of the late Byzantine period and their early Ottoman counterparts.\textsuperscript{60} We know very little concerning possible continuities in craft skills during the Byzantine—Ottoman transition; silk production may have survived in Philadelphia/Alaşehir.\textsuperscript{61} Such continuity is less probable, however, for the ceramics production of Belokoma/Bilecik and Nicaea/Iznik.\textsuperscript{62} Already in the 1980’s G. G. Litavrin suggested possible congruences between Byzantine and Ottoman forms of organizing the urban economy, and he was by no means the first to do so.\textsuperscript{63} Perhaps these congruences can be found more on the level of mentalities or administrative attitudes, as Cemal Kaşfarad once has suggested.\textsuperscript{64} But such matters are very hard to grasp and have not left any concrete traces in the sources of the transitional period.

\textsuperscript{58} The most significant result, which however still awaits final proof, concerns the emergence of urban wards. Anthony Bryer has observed that already in late Byzantine cities, socio-environmental units were in the making, which the Ottomans inherited as \textit{mahalles}, that is, as neighborhoods with a tendency to close in on themselves. Bryer, “The Structure”, 264; cf. the review of the collective volume \textit{Continuity and Change}, ed. Bryer/Lowry, by Klaus-Peter Matschke in \textit{Deutsche Literaturzeitung} 4 (1989), 298 f.


\textsuperscript{64} Oral communication (Princeton, 1994).
4. Fairs in the period of transition

A very special problem of the economic transition to Tourkokratia concerns the history of fairs, mostly held in the Balkan countryside, and particularly their continuity between Byzantine and Ottoman times. With reference to Thessaly, A. Rizos writes that here as everywhere else in pre-Ottoman times, fairs existed. Yet under the Ottomans these fairs handled much more turnover than had previously been the case. Moreover, fairs were no longer connected to religious festivals.\(^{65}\) Suraiya Faroqhi and Speros Vryonis, in particular, have dealt with the development of the Balkan fairs in early Ottoman times.\(^ {66}\) They can identify several instances of continuity, mostly located in rural areas. In no case, however, were they able to identify Byzantine or other Balkan predecessors of well-known Ottoman fairs. Nor does the fair which developed in the second half of the fifteenth century in post-conquest Radilofo, seem to have had any counterpart in the Byzantine village of Radolibos.\(^ {67}\) Yet the term \textit{panegyris}/\textit{panayir}, employed in addition to the generic Turkish term \textit{pazar}, remained in use for many Ottoman fairs, and this usage speaks at least for a conceptual continuity.\(^ {68}\) It is also interesting that some of the more important Ottoman fairs did possess close ties to religious and public foundations, their earnings financing the upkeep of mosques and the maintenance of public kitchens.\(^ {69}\) The fair of Seyyid Gazi in Anatolia was combined with religious ceremonies, performed by heterodox dervishes, which made the place famous.\(^ {70}\) A Rumelian counterpart may have been the \textit{panayir} in the Thracian town of Bergos, probably Lüle Burgaz/Arkadiupolis, where, in 1572, a fair reportedly was connected to a church ceremony. During this event both Christians and Muslims accompanied a "board" decorated with silk and silver through the town—according to Faroqhi, probably a Chris-

\(^{65}\) Rizos, \textit{Wirtschaft}, 2.5.1.


\(^{67}\) Lowry, "Changes", 33 f.

\(^{68}\) Faroqhi, "The Early History", 52, 54.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 62.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
She interprets this description in an Ottoman document as referring to a procession linked to the local church, which at the same time served as a fertility rite for the benefit of animals and fields—an aspect which made it attractive to the local Muslims as well. And in my opinion, this shows how close Christianity and Islam were on the level of folk religion. As to the Ottoman authorities, they instructed the local Christians to confine their religious services to the church, and their Muslim neighbors were warned under threat of punishment not to participate in Christian festivals.

We may wonder whether the local church was responsible for the fair and whether it received any income from booths or stands. At the turn of the sixteenth century, the Orthodox Church and its organizations often were guaranteed income not only from their own vineyards, gardens and mills, but also from fairs/panegyria. Protection against Muslim encroachments was provided by various sultanic commands. We may gather that this income most probably stemmed not only from collections in the churches during the festivals of their respective patron saints, but also from the dues paid by fair participants. The case of the monks of St. Sava/Sabas in the Herzegovinian village of Mileševa/Milaševa near Pripolje, mentioned by Faroqhi, points in the same direction. In this particular instance, the monks requested that the local fair be abolished, because they did not want to be responsible for the disorders which often occurred at such events. Their wish was fulfilled, but only after they agreed to compensate the local military men for the income lost. Apparently

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71 Faroqhi, Kultur und Alltag, 205 f. Ms. Faroqhi kindly furnished me with the pertinent text from the mahimime defterleri and helped with the interpretation.

72 The problems of religious brotherhoods, religious syncretism and the rapprochement between various groups in Byzantino-Ottoman society have been treated in detail by Michel Balivet, Romanie byzantine et pays de Rum ture (Istanbul, 1994). In this study Balivet describes the replacement or modification of the Demetrios cult, which formed the religious basis for the famous Byzantine fair of Thessaloniki. In Ottoman Selânik it was replaced by the Muslim cult of Kasim Baba.

73 Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, Δέκα τουρκικά έγγραφα για την Μεγάλη Εκκλησία (1483–1567) (Athens, 1995), 158, 175, 180, 181, and the commentary of the editor, 105, with bibliography. For the towns of Zichna and Drama there is concrete evidence concerning the income various Christian churches and monasteries gained from panayirs see Petre S. Năsturel and Nicoară Beldiceanu, “Les églises byzantines et la situation économique de Drama, Serrès et Zichna aux XIVe et XVe siècles”, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 27 (1978), 282 ff. The authors point out that the resm-i panayar was also awarded to timariots, ibid., 282, footnote 72. Likewise, the fair dues (hisse-i panayar) of Radilofo were part of a timariot's income.
in the past these men had been responsible for maintaining public peace and order at the fair and had been paid for this service. These cases point to a continuity of ideas concerning fairs, rather than to historical continuity in the narrow sense of the word; after all, Lüle Burgazi itself, as we have seen, had at one time been deserted, so that the Byzantine and Ottoman periods were separated by a clear break. More important than these conceptual and religious-cultural continuities are, however, the possible economic parallels which persisted beyond political cataclysms and administrative changes. According to Faroqhi, Kiel and other specialists on this subject, the fairs in the early phase of the Ottoman Empire served to develop the domestic market and to permit the peasants a share in the exchange of goods. In a similar fashion we can explain the increase in fairs on Byzantine and Latin territory during the early fourteenth century. Byzantine, Slavic and Ottoman fairs indicate that a similar economic situation prevailed before and after the long time of troubles beginning in the middle of the fourteenth and lasting until the end of the fifteenth centuries. Furthermore, we may regard the fairs as evidence of a similar organization of town-countryside relationships in pre-Ottoman and in Ottoman times.

5. The Share of the Autochthonous Population in the Military Expansion and Defense of the Ottoman State

Scholars have known for quite a long time that successful state formation and a systematic expansion of borders, which ultimately led to the formation of the Ottoman Empire, were the work of very heterogeneous groups. Among them were booty makers of mixed origin, dervishes with very unorthodox beliefs, leaders and members of different nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and, last but not least, many members of the autochthonous population from various social strata who put their faith in the new rulers and converted to the latters’ religion. The more or less legendary adventures of the late thirteenth-century Turkish border chieftain Osman and his contemporary the Byzantine archon Köse Mihal in western Asia Minor

74 Faroqhi, "The Early History", 53, and Footnote 19. Is there a connection between the unrest feared by the monks and the developing Serbian movement of resistance, which soon after led to the removal and destruction of the bones of Saint Sava by the Ottomans?
75 Faroqhi, "The Early History", 55; Kiel, "Das türkische Thessalien", 142, 179.
became symbolic of Ottoman methods of conquest. Halil İnalcık has illustrated this process many years ago, and Cemal Kafadar recently has confirmed his analysis.76

The whole extension of military collaboration on the part of Byzantine Christians with the emergent Ottoman power has become visible only now that a systematic evaluation of the Ottoman tax registers is being undertaken. Not only the conquest of foreign lands, but also and in particular the protection of conquered territories was made possible by alliances between Turkish conquerors and local people. Conversion to the religion of the conqueror was not necessary for those who hoped to enjoy Ottoman favor, although the logic of cooperation suggested and even encouraged such a conversion. For a long time after 1461 the territory of the former empire of Trapezunt was militarily protected in part by Christian timariots, Christian müsellem and Christian başına-holders.77 And the waters of the Pontus were guarded by armed Christian seamen from various ports—our sources speak of ships based in Kerasus/Giresun, Koralla/Görele and Tripolis/Tirebolu.78 Western fleets and vessels entered the Dardanelles after being announced to Ottoman headquarters by the monks of a small monastery on the Rabbit Island near Tenedos, who in turn were confirmed in their property rights and accorded favorable tax rates.79 After the conquest of Lemnos/Limnos by the Ottomans, the military protection of the island rested largely in the hands of a cema‘at of garrison troops (asesan), a regiment of guard troops (pasban) and a further military unit (müsellem). All three units were under the command of men with obvious Christian names, who came from well-known Christian families or had military titles dating back to Byzantine times.80 Certain defensive tasks also were assigned to a small military unit serving on a vessel (keştiban), presumably

not oarsmen but seamen of all kinds.\footnote{Ibid. At the same time in the nearby military port of Gallipoli, there was a cema’at of kürekçiyän or oarsmen. See Halil Inalcik, “Gelibolu”, EI, 985.} These four Christian cema’at were not granted a part of the island’s tax revenue, but, similar to the few Turkish timariots stationed on the island, they made a living from properties they owned. Furthermore they were not exempted from the personal taxes ciyze and ispence, to which all non-Muslims were subject, but were granted a reduced rate.\footnote{Lowry, “The Island of Limnos”, 244 f.} In addition, the entire male population of the villages had the duty of guarding the island’s coasts and of manning the guard towers. In return they were exempted from the special taxes known as avanz-i divaniye and various customary duties (tekalif-i orfiyye).\footnote{Ibid., 246; cf. Marie-Magdeleine Lefebvre, “Actes ottomans concernant Gallipoli, la Mer Egée et la Grèce au XVIe siècle”, Südost-Forschungen 17 (1983), no. II, 129 f. and the Texts no. IV and V which seem to indicate that on the islands of Imbros and Thasos, these arrangements did not exist.} In Rumelia, too, quite a number of fortified towns in the fifteenth and even the sixteenth century were inhabited by Christians who were responsible for the protection of fortifications and strategic roads in return for generous tax reductions—Platamona in Thessaly, Korinth/Qoritos and Arachova/Rahova on the Peloponnese constitute well-known examples.\footnote{Kiel, “Das türkische Thessalien”, 117 ff.; Beldiceanu/Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Recherches”, 41 ff.}

Of particular interest and importance to Byzantinists are several terms used in the Ottoman tax registers, which indicate a pre-Turkish origin of the institutions referred to, and various passages in these same registers which directly prove such an origin. The term baştina, used in various Ottoman tax registers (tahrir) since 1486, is very puzzling. As is well known, this Slavic word denotes a form of freehold property; the owner is obliged to perform military service. The Ottomans encountered this institution in the Balkans and used it to integrate Christian vojnuci into their military organization.\footnote{Cf. Ernst Werner, Die Geburt einer Großmacht—Die Osmanen, 4th edition (Weimar, 1985), 215 f.} At first historians attempted to explain the appearance of the baştina in Ottoman sources concerning the Pontic region with the forced resettlement of Albanian timariots in Asia Minor.\footnote{Among others Beldiceanu, “L’Empire de Trébizonde”, 61 ff.} Contemporary research tends to see the appearance of the Slavic term in Anatolian tax registers as an indication that institutions and practices existed in the pre-Ottoman Balkans which resembled those of the Trapezunt empire;
and in their temporary holders we see Christian müslelm and other groups of indigenous inhabitants performing military services. In his search for the Greek-Trapezuntian prototypes, A. Bryer has suggested the property category known as gonikon and the military unit termed allagion, but the link has not so far been proven.

Just as interesting is the term droman, which appears in the tax register of 1487 in a list concerning the fortress of Kerasus/Giresun. This tax corresponded to a right conceded by the sultan. Nicoară Beldiceanu, on the basis of previous work by Hélène Ahrweiler, interprets this right as the permission to build (war)ships, as before the collapse of the Trapezunt empire, the port had contained a naval arsenal. In consequence, Beldiceanu expressed the opinion, well-founded in my view, that the naval service of the inhabitants of Kerasus and their regular patrols could have been a Byzantine/Trapezuntian heritage. Similarly the service on ships performed by a group of Christians from Limnos can most likely be traced back to Byzantine obligations and habits, which were taken over by the new rulers without much modification.

Moreover, we also must take into consideration the general obligation of the population of Limnos to perform guard duties, which according to John Haldon must have been common in Byzantine times. All these observations indicate that contrary to older ideas and convictions, an important part of the population of the late Byzantine and Trapezunt empires were included in the military defence of both states. More recent studies on the military services and obligations of town dwellers and countrymen, who were of course not part of the central military organization, arrive at similar results. Guard duty in late Byzantine towns was sometimes performed by all inhabitants. But at times, it was also delegated to special guard troops, who were paid for their services either by taxes set aside for this purpose (viglatikoni) or were furnished with special land allotments.

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87 Lowry, “Privilege and Property”, 113 ff.
90 Beldiceanu, “L’Empire de Trézzone”, 70.
91 Lowry, “The Island of Limnos”, 244 f.
(so-called *tzakonikai hypostaseis*). And Mark Bartusis, upon whose research this discussion is based, also draws a parallel between *tzakonikon* or *tzakonike phylaxis* and the *prosalentikon*, that is to say, the smallholdings, which in his opinion were at the disposal of oarsmen from coastal settlements. In addition, further groups of smallholding soldiers are mentioned, who in the opinion of the author were involved in defense, although they were not highly respected in late Byzantine society and eked out a rather marginal existence.

If that was the case, then perhaps these formerly despised soldiers even experienced a bit of an upgrading due to the pragmatic approach characteristic of Ottoman rule. Moreover, the picture given by Bartusis on the basis of Byzantine sources can be extended still further by taking into account the findings and ideas of certain Ottomanists. Let us consider for a moment a source on the Athos monastery of Zographou dating from the early Palaiologi period. This text concerns a certain Michael, son of Daniel, who in the text is called dependent peasant (*paroikos*) and perhaps also soldier (*stratiotes*) and who is supposed to serve and pay dues to the aforementioned monastery upon order of the emperor. He has since been released from this duty. In Angeliki E. Laiou's opinion, this Michael is a non-aristocratic late Byzantine soldier, who, in this particular case, lost his military status and became a dependent peasant. Bartusis disagrees and considers him a *paroikos* assigned to the monastery, whose taxes have been transferred temporarily to a military man holding a tax grant (*pronoia*). A good deal can be said in favor of his argumentation, but against it speaks the circumstance, stressed already by Laiou, that Michael was served by one or perhaps several *paroikoi*. In fact this case could have come close to the late Trapezuntian and early Ottoman *baština/gonika* described in the Pontic *tahrîr* registers already discussed. For all holdings of this type an owner is named, and generally we also find the name of the usufruc-

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95 Ibid., 25.
97 Laiou, *Peasant Society*, 143 f.
tuary peasant, whose labor enables the owner to perform military service in the first place. The obscure and perhaps even falsified text of this Athos document could, contrary to Bartusis' opinion, form a "hot lead" to a category of soldiers intermediate between the aristocratic pronoia holders and the dependent peasants. Such a category already can be identified in the Slavic Balkans and in Pontic Trapezunt thanks to Ottoman source material. But something similar also must have existed in the Byzantine Empire of the Palaiologii, and the institution may well have been adopted for a time by the Turkish conquerors. In my opinion the sources dealing with the character and extent of the late Byzantine gonika must be reexamined systematically in the light of recent research concerning the relevant Ottoman documents. Hopefully this will allow us to attain a clearer picture of the relationship between smallholding soldiers and landed property, while we also may refine Bartusis' definition of smallholding in the late Byzantine Empire.

When discussing the important role of authochthonous elements in the early Ottoman military establishment, we should not ignore the fact that the central military organization of the former Balkan states, and their most important military command structures were destroyed systematically and without hesitation by the Ottomans. In other words, only those—admittedly quite sizeable—sectors of the old system survived which the Ottomans needed for the preservation of their own power. And as Ottomanist research shows more and more clearly, this survival was only temporary, for as long as the Ottoman rulers deemed it necessary and useful. Heath Lowry has proven this for the Pontic area. Immediately after the conquest of Trapezunt, the new rulers used a large number of Christian timariots from the local aristocracy to install and stabilize their own power. Toward the end of the century, some of the latter were forcibly exchanged against Christian timariots from Albania in order to eliminate possible sources of political instability. Moreover, since many Christian timariots of the first generation converted to Islam, by 1515 all timars of the area were in the hands of Muslims. The Christian müsellems also gradually lost their military status and their tax exemptions and became, if they continued to hold fast to their religion, peasant bastina holders. As such they probably could or had to perform certain services as military auxiliaries, but they no longer played

a real role in the Ottoman military organization. And what is valid for the Pontic area can be applied to practically the entire expanding Ottoman state. To a varying extent the newly conquered areas were at first protected militarily by elements stemming from the local aristocracy, because the Ottoman troops were virtually fighting a permanent war on many fronts. At the turn to the sixteenth century, however, when Bayezid II temporarily slowed down the pace of Ottoman expansion, the participation of Christian subjects in the military protection of the state lost its previous importance, and increasingly these auxiliaries were replaced by janissary garrisons and sipahi forces.

6. Byzantine-Greek entrepreneurship and its role in the economic development of the early Ottoman state

While the military class of the Byzantine state and also of the Slavic Balkan countries was decimated and neutralized—and more or less eliminated if they did not completely assimilate—the aristocratic entrepreneurs of Byzantine origin managed to avoid such a fate.

Entrepreneurship on the part of Byzantine grandees had existed even before the fall of Constantinople. But immediately after 1453 these aristocratic figures extended their activities into the field of Ottoman tax and revenue farming. This tendency was known long before systematic research on the basis of Ottoman registers began. Traces of the activities of former Byzantine grandees can be found not so much in the tax registers, but primarily in the sultanic commands issued by the first Ottoman rulers to organize economic life in their empire. Already Franz Babinger lists in detail the names of various persons belonging to the former imperial families of the Palaiologi and Kantakuzenos. He has highlighted the role of men such as Andreas Chalkokondyles, presumably from a provincial aristocratic family, who participated in extensive tax-, customs- and general revenue farming in the 1460’s and 1470’s, both in the new Ottoman capital and in the mining regions of the Balkans. And

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100 Lowry, “Privilege and Property”, 106 ff.
101 Ibid., 112.
then there is the remarkable career of Michael Kantakuzenos nickname Şeytanoğlu (son of the Devil), aided by his whole clan. At one time or another, Michael Kantakuzenos was the highest Ottoman customs official, revenue-farmer, saline master, fish tax collector, protegé of many sultans, friend of the famous Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu—after all, the latter protected the Christians and the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate. Ever since Ch. Du Cange, this meteoric career and its abrupt end in 1579/80 have been the object of continuous historical interest.\[103\]

At first these revenue-farmers and monied men, despite their famous Byzantine names, aroused the interest only of Ottomanist historians. By contrast Byzantinists felt uneasy—they could not and did not want to explain how the crème of Byzantine society could debase itself by taking on tax farming. Ultimately, however, scientific curiosity won out, and Byzantinists began a purposeful search for personal links and concrete interlinks in order to understand this phenomenon. Present-day results, though provisional, are quite surprising: These Greek entrepreneurs with Byzantine roots not only found very fertile fields for activity in early Ottoman society, in a way they owed their very existence to the rise of the Ottomans. If the hypotheses and lines of argumentation suggested so far are correct, Ottoman expansion induced a section of the late Byzantine ruling class to turn their attention to finance and trade. Byzantine aristocrats lost their traditional sources of income in the form of large landed property and state bestowals and were on the lookout for a profitable alternative.

Aristocratic entrepreneurship, moreover, was linked to the powerful Latin presence in the eastern Mediterranean, often taking the shape of a junior partnership with ‘Frankish’ businessmen. In the face of a mounting Ottoman threat to their own property, Italian entrepreneurs and colonizers relaxed the restrictions and barriers they originally had imposed and enforced against Byzantine competition, at least to an extent which permitted a small group of late Byzantine aristocrats to establish new forms of cooperation and economic contacts. Noble Byzantine entreprenuers set out to follow in the steps of the successful Latins, studying modern forms of business activity and copying them as far as possible. This permitted Greek aristocrats to conclude mutually lucrative transactions with Venetians and Genoese.

in the capital of Constantinople and elsewhere, and to participate in other joint efforts with Latin traders as well. At the same time another group of these aristocrats used the islands of Chios and Crete, the cities of the Crimea and other colonized territories in the Romania as fields of experiment and transformation. Step-by-step these Byzantine noblemen changed their profiles and finally acquired such a weight and scope of their own that they coalesced with entrepreneurs in the remaining Byzantine territories into a more or less homogenous group acting jointly in many economic fields.\footnote{Compare Klaus-Peter Matschke, “Griechische Kaufleute im Übergang von der byzantinischen Epoche zur Türkenzeit”, \textit{Die Kultur Griechlands}, ed. Lauer/Schreiner, 73–88.}

That these entrepreneurs owed their rise in the first place to their cooperation with the Ottomans against the Latins, as Halil İnalcık notes in his survey of Ottoman economic and social history, is certainly not correct.\footnote{Halil İnalcık, \textit{An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire}, vol. 1: 1300–1600 (Cambridge, 1994), 209 ff. Compare Kate Fleet, \textit{Europeans and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey} (Cambridge, 1999).} Recent studies, however, have demonstrated that very early on there were contacts to Ottoman business circles.\footnote{Compare Necipoğlu, “Ottoman Merchants”, 158 ff.} Quite often the same persons who pioneered economic ties to the West also extended their feelers to the Ottomans. It was thus not so much a matter of alternatives, but rather the use of a strategic position which permitted contacts in both directions.

This general picture has been confirmed and diversified in various recent studies. İnalcık himself, for example, not long ago proved that the suburb Pera/Galata developed into a center of Greek entrepreneurs while still under Genoese rule and that this preferential position was even strengthened after the fall of the Byzantine capital to the Ottomans in 1453. Many rich Genoese families left the former center of Genoa’s rule in the Romania during and after the Ottoman conquest. The vacuum they left behind was filled by their former Greek partners.\footnote{Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Galata, 1453–1553”, in \textit{Premiere rencontre internationale sur l’empire Ottoman et la Turquie moderne}, ed. E. Eldem (Istanbul, 1991), 44–57. Also see Laura Balletto/Geo Pistarino, “De Péra gréco-genoise à Galata turque”, in \textit{Kulturni istoricheski i etnopoliticheski otoshenija mezhdu christianstvom i islamom na Balkanite XIV–XV vek} (Sofia, 1995), 153–163.} By referring to the studies of Angeliki E. Laiou, İnalcık has, moreover, modified and corrected his previous assumptions concerning the rise of Greek entrepreneurship against the Italians and with the Ottomans. In İnalcık’s most recent work,
he considers it probable that relationships of Greek entrepreneurs to the Ottomans date back to the middle of the fourteenth century and that after 1453 the Greeks extended their trade activity even further, both within the new empire and beyond its borders. In this fashion Greek aristocratic families came to play a key role in Ottoman state finances and moneyed circles during the period following the conquest of Constantinople.\footnote{Halil Inalcik, “Greeks in the Ottoman Economy and Finances 1453–1500”, To ‘EkhriviKov. Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr. (New Rochelle/New York, 1993), vol. 2, 307–19.}

Our sources permit us to propose a series of “snapshots” which more or less accurately reflect events typical of the Byzantino-Ottoman transition period. These show a leading role of Greek entrepreneurs in economic transactions of differing size and range. However, it is very difficult to link up these isolated scenes into actual biographies of aristocratic Greek entrepreneurs spanning the break of 1453. We cannot as yet answer Cemal Kafadar’s question concerning the fate of the Chozas Ise family in the decades after 1440, when this businessman appeared, along with his son Jakobos Palaiologos, in the accounts of Giacomo Badoer, a Venetian active for a time on the Golden Horn.\footnote{Cemal Kafadar, “A Death in Venice: Anatolian Muslim Merchants in the Serenissima”, Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986), 193, Footnote 8.} Here is a conspectus of our knowledge about this unusual family: Apparently of Byzantine origin Chozas Ise’s ancestors formed part of the early Palaiologean aristocracy. For unknown reasons a member of this family went to Kaffa and Sugdaia on the Crimea around 1320, where he or his descendants adopted the title choza, often given to rich merchants, although they probably were not islamized. As wealthy people the members of this family returned via Pera, to the economic center of the remaining Byzantine Empire, in the early fifteenth century to reestablish social ties previously broken.\footnote{Cf. Klaus-Peter Matschke, “Some Merchant Families in Constantinople before, during and after the Fall of the City”, Balkan Studies 38/2 (1997), 219–238. Additional information and considerations: Idem, “Die Bedeutung des Schwarzmeerraumes für Stadtwirtschaft und Stadtgesellschaft von Konstantinopel in spätbyzantinischer Zeit: Das Chogia-Ise-Puzzle”, unpublished contribution to the conference on Bulgaria Medii Aevi VI, Nessebar, May 1995.} This family’s history certainly predestined it for a career under Ottoman rule, but unfortunately we do not yet know whether such prominence ever really materialized. Entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial families and family clans of Greek origin with ambitions to succeed...
in the Tourkokratia have already been studied in considerable detail.\textsuperscript{111} Such studies, in my perspective, have the great merit of highlighting both objective necessities and personal decisions. This in turn permits the identification of continuities and changes, both in terms of personal strategies and in their effects over and beyond the individual.

Historically speaking, the aristocratic entrepreneurs of Byzantine origin, who in the fifteenth century had to cope with the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire, were certainly a more recent phenomenon than the aristocratic military class, which was confronted with a similar situation. The military class, despite its long tradition, was quite quickly islamized and even turkified in the course of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; in any case, Christian sipahis and müsellems practically disappeared. By contrast, the more recently established Byzantine-Greek entrepreneurs retained their Christian faith and their aristocratic positions and apparently were able to protect their economic fortunes for the first hundred years of the Ottoman Empire. In this way, they created a very special kind of historical continuity in a period of enormous change.

7. The Orthodox Patriarchate and the major Christian monasteries in a period of social change

Greek aristocratic entrepreneurship survived into the period of Tourkokratia not least by leaning closely on the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. For a long time we have known that adhering to their religion did not spare the Greeks and other Balkan peoples the Tourkokratia, but it did protect them from entirely losing their identity under Muslim rule. Ultimately this steadfast adherence to Orthodoxy even permitted them to develop national identities in the nineteenth century. Only recently, however, has it become visible that the use of church institutions and the instrumentalization of church structures also facilitated adaptation to the social order of the conquerors, for sections of the old society had been crushed by the Ottoman conquest. By making skillful use of church institutions, certain former subjects of the Byzantine ruler, along with their Slavic

\textsuperscript{111} Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, "Wealthy Greeks and the Patriarchate of Constantinople ca. 1453", contribution to the conference mentioned in Footnote 3; Matschke, "Griechische Kaufleute", 73 ff.
confrères, not only retained their social positions, but even strengthened and developed them.

The Patriarchate could acquire such a key role because the religion of the conquerors did not demand the elimination of Orthodoxy, only its subordination. Moreover it was politically wise for the conquerors not only to tolerate this religion, but to use it in order to assign the new subjects their places in the Ottoman-Islamic order. On the basis of source material edited and evaluated for the first time, Elisabeth A. Zachariadou has proven convincingly that the Orthodox Church leadership began to reorient itself toward the Turkish conquerors as early as the fourteenth century. Accommodation to the new order of things is especially visible in the efforts of the Patriarchate to maintain its grip on the taxes normally paid by Orthodox believers under Turkish rule. Quite frequently these dues were farmed out to private persons who were compensated by an appropriate share of the collected sum.\(^\text{112}\)

The history of the Patriarchate during the years immediately preceding the fall of Constantinople cannot as yet be traced in detail. But immediately after the Ottoman victory of 1453, certain wealthy Greeks came to control the destiny of the Patriarchate and the Patriarch. Two rich Greek archons, who had great influence at the sultan’s court in Adrianople, bought the release from prison of the spokesman of the Orthodox Church, Gregorios Scholarios, and thereby smoothed the way for his appointment as the first Orthodox patriarch under Ottoman rule. Representatives of this Greek moneyed aristocracy gathered around the new Patriarchate, assumed important administrative offices in the church, gained influence on the appointment of the patriarch, and even launched themselves into this leading church position. From this circle, credits were made available in order to fulfill the financial obligations of the Patriarchate toward the Ottoman rulers. From the ranks of this wealthy aristocracy came the experts who organized and managed the collection of patriarchal taxes. In this way the church became the extended arm of special economic interests and simultaneously was a reliable protector of its supporters. This dual role enabled the Orthodox Church to make profitable transactions with the new Muslim rulers and, at the same time, cling to its traditional beliefs and the inherited aristocratic position of its chief adherents.\(^\text{113}\)

\(^{112}\) Zachariadou, Δεκα τουρκικα εγγραφα, 63 f.

\(^{113}\) Ibid., 73 f. among others.
Various aristocratic entrepreneurial families seem to disappear from the patriarchal milieu in the course of and toward the end of the sixteenth century, thus noticeably weakening the genealogical links to the late Byzantine world. Yet the emerging Phanariote oligarchy of the seventeenth century did not entirely lack Byzantine traditions either. Without doubt the Phanariots were at home in the entrepreneurial circles of late Byzantine origin we have just described, and they not only retained their Orthodox faith but also their orientation toward Byzantine-Greek culture. However, the links between the older “Byzantine-style” and the newer Phanariot entrepreneurs remain obscure. Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, who with her numerous publications has helped us understand the structures and orientations of Greek entrepreneurship, almost totally avoids, presumably with good reason, any reference to the Phanariots. Yet to describe fifteenth and sixteenth-century Greek entrepreneurs connected to the Patriarchate as pre- or proto-Phanariots, as D. M. Pippidi and E. Stanescu have done, is not very helpful either. However, some of their observations and assumptions are interesting and worth discussing; particularly they have shown how Greek enterprise moved from Pera to Phanar.

Moreover the major late Byzantine monasteries in the provinces very early on formed links to the Ottoman conquerors. As some of these monasteries received concessions from the sultans in the form of properties and tax privileges, they became interesting in a new way to those threatened by the conquest, especially to members of

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114 Cf. Cyril Mango, “The Phanariots and the Byzantine Tradition”, in The Struggle for Greek Independence. Essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, ed. by R. Clogg, London 1973, 41–66, who comes to the conclusion “that the Phanariots, not by virtue of their descent, but by virtue of their position in the Ottoman Empire, the sources of their wealth, and their close identification with the Church, represented a Byzantine tradition . . .” (58 f.). Stephen Runciman, Das Patriarchat von Konstantinopel. Vom Vorabend der türkischen Eroberung bis zum griechischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg, München 1970, Chapter 10: Die Fanarioten, 348 ff. is less categorical on the question of origins. Runciman, however, does endorse the traditional opinion that the “Greek merchant dynasties” appeared only after (for him: soon after) the conquest of Constantinople.

115 I have located only one very general reference to the early Ottoman Phanar, namely in Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, “‘A Safe and Holy Mountain’: Early Ottoman Athos”, in Mount Athos and Byzantine Monasticism, ed. by A. Bryer/M. Cunningham (Aldershot, 1996), 129.

the propertied classes. Nicolas Oikonomides some time ago has demonstrated how a monastery might acquire properties which their owners no longer could maintain. He has studied a family of landed aristocrats from the city of Thessaloniki and its surroundings performing military service, documented between the middle of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century. In addition to other landed property, the Deblitzenoi owned a demesne in the village of Hermileia on the Chalcidice, whose taxes had been transferred in 1349 by way of imperial grant (prostagma) to Demetrios Deblitzenos. Yet the family lost the power of disposition over this property due to the advance of the Serbs and was unable to retrieve it after the Serbian withdrawal. Furthermore, the Ottomans appeared near Thessaloniki posing a new and acute danger, and as a result the son of the original grantee, Manuel Deblitzenos, decided to transfer the family estate to the monastery Docheiariou in return for three adelphates, that is, rights to reside on monastic territory and receive subsidies from monastic resources. Apparently the monks made use of their good connections to the Ottomans and took advantage of the giver’s predicament by fixing payment far below the value of the property. When Demetrios soon afterward fell in battle against the Ottomans, the monks tried under various pretenses to evade their responsibilities toward the widow.¹¹⁸

For the subsequent period we have the case described by Elisabeth A. Zachariadou concerning the better known Čelnik Radić, a military chief in the service of the Serbian despots Stefan Lazarević and Georg Branković, who in 1433 withdrew as a monk to the monastery Kastamonitou on Mount Athos. He became the monastery’s major benefactor (ktitor), because after a great fire he restored it and made generous donations, among others by transferring the revenue he received from a Serbian silver mine. When the mountain town of Novo Brdo was occupied by the Ottomans five years later, this distinguished monk used his old connections to obtain from the new rulers the confirmation of his possession of an urban house, and he was promised the continuing usufruct of shares in the local silver mine. Moreover, he was involved in a legal case in an Ottoman court disputing money and valuables to which two brothers, apparently also of Slavic origin, asserted vague claims.¹¹⁹ It seems that even

¹¹⁹ Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, “The Worrisome Wealth of the Čelnik Radić, in
from the monastery, Čelnik Radić displayed intense economic activity.

Disputes of a similar nature are recorded far beyond the middle of the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{120} Financial and entrepreneurial circles primarily of Greek origin gathered around the Patriarchate of Constantinople and blocked off any non-Greek influences.\textsuperscript{121} By contrast Mount Athos was open to the propertied classes of both the Greek and the Slavic worlds. Greek and Serbian aristocrats accommodated themselves and their property in the monasteries, tolerated and protected by the Ottomans. Monastery adelphates acquired the character of securities and thus became the objects of purchase and sale, permitting the owners an existence appropriate to their station both inside and outside the monastery walls.\textsuperscript{122} As apparent from the Radić case, individual representatives of the old elite were apparently quite successful in transforming their monastic cells into "headquarters" for private business. Behind the monastery walls they thus not only lived as before, but were engaged in "business as usual".

However, when propertied figures formed links to the Athos monasteries, annuities were the primary concern, not profits. While profitable transactions became the rule for the Patriarchate in the capital, they remained an exception in the Athos monasteries. A long-term community of interest between Orthodox Church institutions and personages linked to the old elites was apparently more difficult to organize in the monasteries, because the latter were weaker vis-à-vis the new rulers than was the Orthodox Patriarchate. Later some of these monasteries had to accept considerable losses of landed property and tax privileges.\textsuperscript{123} In any case, the monasteries played a very special role in this period of transition, and Byzantinists, Slavists and Ottomanists can only gain by together studying this role.


\textsuperscript{121} Cf. Zachariadou, \textit{Δέκα τουρκικά ἐγγράφα}, 74 f.


\textsuperscript{123} Some time ago Anthony Bryer referred to the varying fates of rural and urban monasteries: "The Late Byzantine Monastery in Town and Countryside", in \textit{The Church in Town and Countryside}, ed. by D. Baker (Oxford, 1979), 233 ff. More recent and more concrete is Nevra Necipoğlu, "Byzantine Monasteries and Monastic Property in Thessalonike and Constantinople during the Period of Ottoman Conquest", \textit{The Journal of Ottoman Studies} 15 (1995), 123–35. Necipoğlu also has shown that the Ottomans treated urban monasteries differently from those located in the country-
Now we finally turn our attention to the political dimension, in a narrower sense, of the transition from the Byzantine millenium to the Tourkokratia. In his original and brilliant analysis of the structure of the Ottoman state, Cemal Kafadar recently has demonstrated that the creation of the Ottoman Empire on the border between Asia and Europe was carried through by forces difficult to withstand, because for a long time they resisted detection by their enemies. Kafadar also has pointed out that these forces did not proceed in accordance with concerted or coordinated plans. In fact they hardly acted together and quite often against one another. Thus the Ottoman Empire was by no means an inevitable result of the actions of these forces. However, from hindsight, the history of Ottoman state formation was constructed to prove just this inevitability. Yet Ottoman structures themselves show numerous traces of the vicissitudes which shaped them, if only we examine them closely and analyze them without prejudice.

The approach presented by Kafadar and substantiated by valid arguments permits a synthesis and evaluation of past research, and, in my opinion, his approach is most promising for the future. As he shows the manifold alternatives to the notion of a monolithic and, sit venia verbo, intellectually 'tedious' transition, the contradictory behaviour of the historical actors appears in a new light. Our understanding of the Byzantine-Ottoman transition thus is freed from the often one-sided and simplistic judgements which used to bedevil it. Did the counter-emperor Johannes Kantakuzenos commit treason side. Moreover, contrary to the general trend, some of the monasteries' property found its way, during periods of crisis and upheaval, into the hands of representatives of the old elite who had come to terms with the new rulers. Even a metropolitan of Thessaloniki took part in this struggle for land.

On the development of the Athos monasteries after 1453 see Heath W. Lowry, "A Note on the Population and Status of the Athonite Monasteries under Ottoman Rule (ca. 1520)", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 73 (1981), 114–134; idem, "The Fate of Byzantine Monastic Properties under the Ottomans: Examples from Mount Athos, Limnos and Trabzon", Byzantinische Forschungen 16 (1990), 275–311. According to Lowry, the Athos monasteries kept a good part of their property during the first two centuries of the Tourkokratia, though by no means all of it. Moreover, the Johannes Prodromos monastery near Serres presumably lost the dominium plenum to its landed property and had to be content with the usufruct, cf. Elisabeth A. Zachariadou, "Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodromos Monastery (Serres)", Südost-Forschungen 29 (1969), 1–12; Beldiceanu, "Margarid", 234.

\[\text{Kafadar, Between Two Worlds.}\]
against the Byzantine cause already in the 1340’s, when in accordance with good Byzantine tradition he used “barbarian” auxiliary soldiers from Turkish Asia Minor in order to overwhelm his enemy in the civil war. Are the discussions on religion, which the captured archbishop of Thessaloniki, Gregorios Palamas, conducted a little later with influential Muslim partners in various Ottoman towns, already the first sign of a reorientation of the Orthodox church toward the new political power in the region along the Straits? Did Şeyh Bedr ed-Din’s concept of tolerance really have no chance whatsoever in the fifteenth-century world, and was his revolt against Bayezid’s successful son, Mehmed, therefore a betrayal of the Ottoman cause? And what about the forces which gathered around the Byzantine dignitary Lukas Notaras, the entrepreneur Francesco Drape- rio from Pera, and the Ottoman Grand Vizier Halil Pasha, forces which aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Romania, considered by all three as endangered by Western crusade plans and crusades? Do these plans have a historical legitimacy, were their authors in some way pragmatists or just simply dreamers? Did Lukas Notaras become a ‘martyr’ to the Orthodox cause because Mehmed the Conqueror executed him shortly after taking Constantinople? Would Notaras have been a traitor to the same cause, if the sultan had offered him the governorship of the conquered Byzantine capital, and if he had accepted? Were the personages close to, or else spatially and intellectually distant from, the ever victorious Khan, people who criticized the shift of the capital from Adrianople/Edirne to Constantinople and who perhaps even resisted it, just a bunch of poor madmen? Or did their stand, as late as the second half of the fifteenth century, reveal something like a fundamental opposition to a victorious Ottoman centralism and despotism?

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123 On this problem cf. Eva de Vries-Van der Velden, *L’élite byzantine devant l’avance turque à l’époque de la guerre civile de 1341 à 1354* (Amsterdam, 1989), Part 2, Ch. 1, 81 ff.
126 Cf. *ibid.*, Part 2, Ch. 3, 149 ff.
127 In Werner’s opinion Sultan Murad abandoned utopian plans and practices: *Die Geburt einer Großmacht*, 230.
129 Cf. *idem*, “Familien geschichten und Lebensschicksale am Bosporus um 1453”, (forthcoming)
From the vantage point of "history as it happened", these and other questions are merely irritating. But should a scientific, interdisciplinary analysis succeed in synthesizing individual opinions and suppositions of this kind, thus determining the role of political activities and mentalities in an extremely complex process, a great deal could be gained. For the scholarly disciplines involved this would mean a great step forward. But more importantly, such a synthetic image of varying political intentions and changing political mentalities will further our understanding of historical linkages in general.
Historians of the Kemalist era had mixed feelings about Ottoman history.1 Was the Ottoman Empire really a political predecessor of Republican Turkey? What were the ethnic origins of the Ottoman rulers? To what extent, if at all, did late Ottoman patriotic intellectuals have an impact on Republican nationalists? How could one manage to inherit the heroic and victorious Ottoman past without inheriting the political traditions—and defects—of the régime? These and similar questions necessitated a new, original historical vision, and this perspective the historians of the early Republic set out to devise. But before discussing the various answers given to such questions, we will briefly summarize the main tenets of Kemalist historiography with respect to the history of the Turkic peoples in general.2 These were officially formulated between the late 1920s and late 1930s, but with intellectual roots extending far back into the nineteenth century.

Stated very briefly, the official line in historiography was based on the following assumptions: 1. Ottoman history is insufficient to explain the origins of the people of the new Republic; for while modern Turkey is a national state, Ottoman society consisted of a wide variety of ethnic groups. 2. Turkic history goes back to pre-Ottoman
and pre-Islamic times; Central Asian Turks migrated to Anatolia and the Middle East in general, thus establishing links between their old and new homes. 3. Turkic peoples have created the most ancient civilization of the world, which has influenced all other notable cultures. 4. The Turks have no connection with the ‘yellow race’ or with the Mongols; quite to the contrary, as Aryans, they belong to the white race. 5. Except during the period of expansion between 1450 and 1600, Ottoman political life showed grave defects; in the later stages, and especially during the last two centuries of the Empire’s existence, ‘corruption’ was rife. 6. A revolutionary break therefore became necessary, politically as well as culturally.

Although these assumptions appear clear and neat, and seem to follow a logical sequence, the ‘official history thesis’ matured painfully over a timespan of three decades. Moreover, the ‘official history thesis’ never gained universal adherence among Republican intellectuals, and many of its points continued to be controversial. Yet the Kemalist government and the historians allied with it remained firmly committed to these tenets, deemed indispensable to the consolidation of the Turkish ‘cultural revolution’ and the liquidation of all manner of opposition.

In the early Republican period, Turkish historians had attempted a number of different approaches to the Ottoman world, and within the span of a very few years, these people could hardly be persuaded to adopt a single, uniform approach. Thus convincing historians active in the recently established Republic of the merits of the ‘official line’ took a certain amount of time and persuasion. Controversies involved variant interpretations of Turkish nationalism. Moreover, certain historians went through several phases in their intellectual development and, in the course of time, expressed different or even contradictory opinions. However, with the consolidation of the Republican régime in the second half of the 1930s, most historians who wished to pursue an academic career in Turkey toed the official line. The others were marginalized, some losing their positions in the university in the course of the reforms which this institution underwent in the 1930s, and their studies only appeared in publications lacking official support. In certain instances, scholars left Turkey to pursue their academic careers abroad.

In the present paper, we will analyze the processes by which the ‘official line’ dominating early Republican historiography affected Ottoman history. A brief prelude will introduce the different approaches
to nationalism and Turkic identity which were developed by writers and ideologues of the late Ottoman period. Subsequently, we will discuss the manner in which the Ottoman past was treated by the small group of historians then active in Turkey, identifying the problematics which characterized their writings. A significant focus of interest was the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and the origins of the first Ottomans, a problem we will analyze in a separate section. Secondly, some of these authors reflected on the idea of historical change in the Ottoman context, with special emphasis on the notions of 'corruption' and 'reform'. Thirdly, the role of religion in the Ottoman polity was brought into focus, including, as a secondary topic, the foundations of law. As a fourth point, certain Turkish historians viewed the Ottoman past as an entity to be approached through the documentation which it had left behind. Soon it was


4 In the context of historiography relating to the Ottoman Empire, the meaning of the term ‘reform’ is relatively clear. It denotes the attempts of Selim III to establish a state-of-the-art, non-janissary army, Mahmud II’s elimination of ‘rebellious’ notables and janissaries, the Tanzimat rescripts of 1839 and 1856, the constitution of 1876 and its reestablishment in 1908, and, last but not least, the foundation of the Republic and the ‘cultural revolution’ which followed it.

Much less clear is the meaning of the different terms which in Turkish denote ‘corruption’, such as rüşvet or the more general bozulma. The only relevant monograph, to my knowledge, has been produced by the legal historian Ahmet Mumcu, *Tarih içindeki gelişimyle birlikte Osmanlı Devletinde rüşvet (Özellikle adlı rüşvet)* (Ankara, reprint 1985). While the ‘venality of offices’ and related phenomena in early modern Europe have formed the subject of numerous studies, very little of the kind is as yet available for the Ottoman Empire. In consequence, an imprecise use of the term ‘corruption’ was and is widespread, and the same applies to ‘decay’, into which ‘corruption’ often will shade off. Apart from the more conventional use in the sense of financial malfeasance, ‘corruption’ in the minds of early Republican authors may be used for whatever the author in question happens to disapprove of. Generally speaking, ‘corruption’ and loss of territory are perceived as concomitant. There was not much ‘corruption’ when the Ottomans were victorious.

All notions of ‘corruption’ involve the existence of a realm of ‘purity’, which may be located in metaphysical space or time, or else, more frequently among present-day historians, in some, at least in principle, historical ‘Golden Age’. In the Ottoman instance, this was often the formative period of the Empire, including the earlier years of Süleyman the Magnificent. For earlier authors, the Golden Age obviously would be pushed back in time. Thus Halil İnalcık has pointed out that references to the earliest Ottoman ruler were used in order to criticize the ‘abuses’ of Bayezid I (1389–1402): Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, in Historians of the Middle East, ed. by Bernard Lewis and Peter M. Holt (London, 1962), 159–60.
recognized that especially the archival sources were rich enough to make political, social and economic developments amenable to study by professional historians. In our conclusion, we will dwell on the contradictions within early Republican historiography, which resulted from the split between political ideology and a concern for document-based study.

Ottoman political power as viewed from 'within' and 'without'

The difficulty was that the ethnic nationalism implicit in the works of many European authors writing on nationality issues, and which often was readily taken up by Ottoman and Tatar or Bashkir intellectuals, was incompatible with an empire such as the Ottoman, which was still multi-ethnic. Moreover, with the loss of most territories inhabited by Christians, the Ottoman ruling group of the late nineteenth century came to rely heavily upon Islam as an ideology to hold together Turkish, Kurdish, Albanian and Arabic speakers in loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph. Ottoman cohesion thus depended upon continued acceptance of the Sultan-Caliph and Sunni Islam. Under these conditions, ethnic nationalism espoused by Turks easily could be regarded as a destabilizing ideology, linked to western European tendencies regarded as hostile to the government of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Before 1908, this ideology did not in fact gain many adherents outside of the anti-Hamidian opposition.

Some of the major tenets of early Republican historiography evolved in the later Ottoman Empire. An important 'ancestor' was the poet and journalist Namık Kemal (1840–1888), who, without having trained as a historian, did write quite extensively on Ottoman history. For Namık Kemal, who at times served the state as a provincial administrator, a major concern was Ottoman patriotism, and his play on the rescue of the threatened border town of Silistria, in which a heroic young girl plays a major role, is still one of his best-known works. But for Namık Kemal himself, adherence to Islam, reforms in language and culture as well as the rejection of arbitrary power also formed central issues. In this author's perspective, Tanzimat officials might be guilty of political arbitrariness, but the same thing

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applied to a sultan not restrained by a well-established system of popular checks and balances.\textsuperscript{6}

To later generations, Namık Kemal’s late Ottoman patriotism, designed as a means of ‘saving the state’, constituted the starting point for their own concept of ethnic nationalism. In this mutation, the contributions of emigrés from the empire of the czars were of major significance. In his work \textit{Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset} (Three types of politics) published in 1904, Yusuf Akçura, originally from Kazan, promoted ethnic identity as opposed to an Ottomanism now rendered obsolete by events.\textsuperscript{7} But Akçura also set the new ethnic nationalism against the Islamism espoused by Namık Kemal, and by the Hamidian regime as well. In Akçura’s understanding, nationalism went far beyond language reforms and westernization. He believed that nationalism would make it possible for Turks to gain political power, and on the cultural plane, the products of a new ‘scientific’ history would help secure them a place on the world map. Other emigré intellectuals came to the Ottoman Empire from nearby Azerbaijan, with the liberal Ahmet Ağaoğlu being one of the most influential.\textsuperscript{8} Ağaoğlu placed a greater emphasis than Akçura on Islam as a culturally defining criterion of Turkic nationality. He also pointed out that the political identity of the Turks as a whole was difficult to define, and given this deficit, Ottomanist loyalties also played a more important role in his thinking.

Turkists from outside the Ottoman Empire, such as Ağaoğlu, had a special reason to respect sultanic power, since they had lived under Russian rule themselves. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the empire of the czars was undergoing rapid ‘modernization’ in the institutional and economic spheres. But these processes also involved a centralization of power, which threatened the elites

\textsuperscript{6} On Namık Kemal’s political thinking, see Mardin, \textit{The Genesis}, 283–336.

\textsuperscript{7} As family names became obligatory only in 1934, figures of the period are mentioned with their last name in square brackets whenever we are concerned with pre-1934 events. As exceptional cases, people such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura or Fuat Köprülü, who even in the late Ottoman period used a variant of their later surnames, have been referred to by this family name without further qualification.

\textsuperscript{8} Other Azeri Turkists included M. E. Resulzade and Hüseyinçâde Ali.
of the non-Russian provinces. In consequence Tatar, Bashkir or Azeri opposition figures hoped for political support from Istanbul, and especially after Sultan Abdülhamid had lost power in 1908, some of them even chose to continue their struggle in the Ottoman capital. However, attempting to enlist the sultans’ support did not necessarily mean that these oppositionists wished to exchange the domination of one empire for that of another. Emphasizing ethnic nationalism thus might involve the demand for a totally new political identity, different from both the Ottoman and the Czarist varieties. Moreover, after 1908, it became possible to be both a loyal Ottoman and an adherent of a Turkic (or at least Turkish) nationalism. For to the discontent of certain educated Arabs, the new régime set out to promote ‘Turkishness’ in the late Ottoman administration.

Ottoman history as an ideological problem

This was also the time in which certain nationalist historians, who were to be active during the early Republican period, first developed their ideas concerning Ottoman identity. Given the close connections between many practising historians and the ruling elite of the time, it is not surprising that the latter’s contribution to the empire’s survival was given special prominence. The elite’s Turkish identity was stressed, while the cultural and linguistic implications of being a Turk were discussed as well. Yusuf Akgür laid the foundations for his later historical work during the early 1900s. These were also the formative years of Ahmed Refik [Altınay] (1880—1937), one of the few professional historians of his generation. Specialized history journals, such as the Milli tettebüleri mecmuasi (Journal of National Studies) and the Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni mecmuasi (Journal of the society for Ottoman History), came into being. A multi-volume Ottoman history was also planned, but only one volume, written by Necip Aşım, actually appeared.¹⁰


¹⁰ This was not well received by Fuat Köprülü, (1890—1966), the major historian of the early Republic: “Bizde tarih ve müverihiler,” Bilgi mecmuasi 5 (1913), 187–90.
At this early stage of their careers, none of the personalities introduced above had yet adopted a revolutionary or republican interpretation of the Ottoman past. Yet with the establishment of the Republic, the views of these intellectuals were to change. During the later 1920s and particularly the 1930s, the ‘official line’ proclaimed that the Ottoman Empire should not be regarded as a legitimate predecessor of the newly founded Republic. In a sense this ‘dismantling’ from the Ottoman past can be regarded as analogous to what happened in newly independent Balkan countries, whose elites set out to eliminate Ottoman features from the yet-to-be-formed ‘national culture’ as rapidly as possible.\(^{11}\)

But there was an important difference, as the Republic of Turkey only in a very secondary sense could be regarded as the product of a confrontation between a group of Ottoman subjects and the state apparatus of the late Ottoman Empire. Rather the Republic had been formed after the Turkish-speaking population of Anatolia and eastern Thrace had successfully resisted incorporation into Greece or reduction to colonial status. Thus the Republic of Turkey resulted not from a secession from the Ottoman Empire, as did all other Balkan states, but rather its territory and population constituted the remnants of a defunct empire. Dissociating the new state from this past, which was viewed as a source of trouble above all in the international arena, may be seen as part of a process of legitimization. On the external level, the Republican elite seriously wished to gain acceptance for their state among members of the League of Nations, including the erstwhile opponent Great Britain.

On the domestic level, proclaiming the Republic a novel departure, radically opposed to the Ottoman past, also presented certain advantages. As long as only a restricted bureaucratic elite was taken into consideration as addressees of the legitimizing discourse, the ‘discontinuity thesis’ probably had some merit. This thesis must have been considered attractive by those members of the elite who had made major sacrifices during the War of Independence (1919–1923). By distancing ‘their’ state from the Ottoman past, these people could reassure themselves that their own and and their relatives’ sacrifices had not been in vain.

Yet this anti-Ottoman stance of the early Republican elites did not mean that history-writing was neglected. Quite to the contrary, publications with a historical content multiplied. For the authoritarian government of the Kemalist period, school textbooks, whose content could be directly controlled from above, became a major arena for the inculcation of the régime’s policies, decisions and ideals. Here was an opportunity for the régime to legitimize itself in the eyes of future generations. But seizing this chance meant that the recent past had to be confronted; it was impossible to let the ‘history’ taught in schools end at a ‘safe distance’ from current political conflicts, as was customary in quite a few countries at the time.

Moreover, a major problem was inherent in the ‘discontinuity thesis’. If claims for ‘discontinuity’ between the Ottoman and the Republican régimes were carried to extremes, what would be left of the Turks as historical subjects? Yet if the undoubted continuities between the two régimes were to be emphasized, a cautious approach was necessary as well. Did it make sense to stress the victories of the Ottoman forefathers, if these victories merely had served the expansion of the domains of a dynasty just deposed, whose members had been driven out of the country? Moreover, how was one to evaluate the undoubted continuities in the governing apparatuses, if the Ottoman state had been a multi-national empire, and the Republic a national state with a few residual minorities? Or did the promotion of westernizing and modernizing ideals by Tanzimat intellectuals make them into worthy ‘ancestors’ of the Republic, even if a Namık Kemal had views on religion completely at variance with those of another Kemal, soon to be Atatürk?

If the beginnings of Ottoman history in the fourteenth century were not a suitable starting point for Republican textbooks, then where was this historical narrative supposed to begin? Here the ideas of Ziya Gökalp concerning the national mode of history-writing provided plausible answers. “For Ziya Gökalp, objective-neutral history was the memory of humanity whereas national history was the consciousness of the nation”.12 For Gökalp, pedagogical, value-oriented history in the Ottoman and later Turkish context involved promoting the ideal of a broadly defined Turkic community, for which Gökalp used the term ‘Turan’. An orientation toward Turan could

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boost national self-esteem, and thus in Gökalp’s perspective, Turan was “the reality of the past, the educator of the present and the creator of the future”. This meant that history textbooks were to begin with a section on various Turkic states in Central Asia, including pre-Islamic polities. Although Kemalist and post-Kemalist foreign policy involved a clear rejection of all irredentisms, on a cultural plane the new generation was to develop a certain perspective on the Turkic world in its entirety.

*From ideology to historiographical practice*

But given the present volume’s orientation toward Ottoman history, the treatment of Central Asian Turks will not concern us here. As to Ottoman history, we already have had occasion to note that the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and the ethnic origins of the first Ottomans contributed a major focus of interest. When treating this subject, the historian needed to situate the early sultans and their followers, both within the migrants from Central Asia who entered Anatolia from the eleventh century onwards, and with respect to the Byzantine population of Asia Minor. Secondly there was the problem of change in the Ottoman state administration. In the tradition of many nineteenth-century historians, this was viewed largely in moralistic terms, namely as a matter of ‘corruption’ and subsequent attempts at ‘reform’. Moreover, we will need to discuss whether Republican historians really believed the Ottoman polity capable of change, or whether this state was regarded as more or less unchangeable. A third major issue was the role of religion in Ottoman society. This included problems related to education, which before the late eighteenth century always took place in a religious context, and, most seriously, the dominant role of a supposedly immutable religious law (şeriat). Last but not least, there was the question of how Ziya Gökald’s ‘neutral-objective’, that is source-oriented, research work might be promoted and the results of such work incorporated into the more pedagogical writings typically produced during the

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early Republic. For while library holdings were only very partially accessible and the archives still mostly closed, scholars and journalists such as Ahmed Refik never tired of pointing out the unexploited riches available in Istanbul and elsewhere. In the present paper, these four problem complexes will be discussed in sequence. But before embarking on such an analysis, it is necessary to briefly introduce the historical publications, both scholarly and directed at a broader public, on which our conclusions will be based.

Textbooks from the Kemalist era and the drafts preceding the published versions constitute our first source of information. Immediately after the proclamation of the Republic, in 1924, and still prior to the 1928 changeover to Roman characters, there appeared the *Türkiye tarihi* (History of Turkey) by Hamid and Muhsin. This was essentially a textbook on Ottoman history, which, at the end, included a few pages on the newly formed Republic. The authors adopted the periodization current in European works on Ottoman history, in which the rise and expansion of the Empire were followed by a period of stagnation and then of decline. They roundly criticized the old-style chronicle writing with its emphasis on heroes and their victories, a remark indicating some formal historical training.

Yet a much more ambitious project already was underway. This was called the *Türk Tarihinin anahatları* (Outlines of Turkish history), initiated in 1929. This was to provide a model for history textbooks intended for both primary and secondary schools. The ‘Outlines’ constituted a multi-author volume, published in a limited edition of less than 200 copies. A broad array of political figures, of whom only a few had some claim to historical professionalism, participated in the project. These included Atatürk’s adopted daughter Afet [İnan], his General Secretary Mehmet Tevfik [Biyikoglu], Yusuf Akçura, MP for Istanbul and professor at Ankara’s newly founded

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14 Ten thousand copies of this book were republished in Istanbul in 1930, this time in Latin characters, with minor additions and supplementary illustrations.

15 However, as similar views were not unfamiliar to Ottoman observers either, this periodization has enjoyed a double legitimation and, in variants, is still employed in many modern works.

16 *Türk tarihinin anahatları* (Istanbul, 1930). Other contributors include Samih Rifat MP for Çanakkale, Hasan Cemil [Çambel], MP for Bolu and father to the noted archeologist Halet Çambel, Sadri Maksudi [Arsal], and Yusuf Ziya, professor at Istanbul University’s Faculty of Law. For an overview of the development of history teaching in this period, see Fikret Adanır, “Turkey”, in *Historical Culture—Historical Communication. International Bibliography*, ed. by Karl Pellens, Siegfried Quandt and Hans Süssmuth (Frankfurt/Main 1994), 367–93.
Faculty of Law, Dr. Reşit Galip, MP and General Secretary to the Society for Turkish Historical Research, in addition to Şemsettin Güngaltay, MP for Sivas, who also pursued an academic career. Furthermore, over the following years, no less than 168 drafts were produced by these and other personages. Only some of these latter texts were published, while others remained in manuscript form. From both the Türk Tarihinin Anahatları and subsequent books and papers, we gain extensive information on the debates pursued within the Republican political class of the time. We can discern currents of opinion and sometimes follow the different positions taken by one and the same individual in the course of these debates.

Because of its numerous errors and other imperfections, Atatürk, and also some historians of the period, strongly criticized this collection of drafts. However, it was decided that the framework of the ‘Outlines’ was basically acceptable. Yet the text seemed to need a fuller debate before it could be used as a guide to textbook writing. Therefore in 1931, the Ministry of Education published a condensed version in pamphlet form, of which 30,000 copies were circulated. Abridgement obviously implied overall simplification; in addition, certain sections were totally eliminated. These lacunae included pre- and proto-history and, surprisingly, the entire Ottoman period as well. By contrast, a strong emphasis was placed on the ancient Turks of Central Asia, their origins, homeland and migrations. Both the ‘Outlines’ and the ‘Introduction’ formed the basis for the well-known lycée history text Tarih.

17 Afet İnan (1908-1985) had begun to intervene in debates on Ottoman and Turkish history as a very young woman under the direct guidance of Kemal Atatürk. In her memoirs she highlights Atatürk’s mentorship, which, as she puts it, helped her overcome her diffidence vis à vis more established politicians and scholars: Afet İnan, Atatürk’den mektuplar (Ankara, 1981). When attending the Congress of 1932, Afet İnan had not yet completed her academic training, which she was to do only later, earning a doctorate at the university of Geneva. She played an important role in the formulation and implantation of the Republican Turkish ‘official line’ in history. But although she gained a professorship, she never worked much with primary sources, nor did she become an academic historian of the Ottoman world.

18 Türk tarihinin anahatlarına medhal (Istanbul, 1930).

19 Only the first volume, written by Şemsettin Güngaltay, was delayed until 1939: Şemsettin Güngaltay, Tarih I (Istanbul, 1939) (History). The other volumes, namely Tarih II: Orta zamanlar, III: Yeni ve yakın zamanlarda Osmanlı-Türk tarihi, IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti were all published in Istanbul in 1931. While most of the contributors also had worked on the ‘Outlines’, for vols II and III, they were joined by two authors of army background, namely Baki Bey and Şemsi Bey. Both of them wrote on military history.
As a second source of information, I have used the journals of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. My selection includes periodicals addressed to a scholarly audience such as Belleten, and others directed at the general reader. Some of the authors who collaborated on the textbook project also have written for the more popular journals, both those published privately and those issued by the provincial adult education organizations known as the Halkevleri (People’s houses). Yet in the journals, personages who disagreed with the official view on Ottoman history have found a forum, so that the periodical press presents more variety than the textbook drafts.

As a third source of information, I have analyzed the writings of the major nationalist historians of the period. Apart from Yusuf Akçura, these include Fuat Köprülü, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı (1888–1977) and Ömer Lütфи Barkan (1905–1979). In some instances, the works published by the historians in question during the period under study actually constitute extended versions of the drafts originally prepared for the Türk tarihinin anahatları. This fact once more demonstrates that the need for school texts was at the root of the historical enterprise during the early years of the Republic. By studying the manner in which these publications treated the origins of the Ottoman Empire, later changes in this polity’s governing and educational apparatus, and last but not least the role of religion, we will show how the Republic was legitimized by its official historiography. Yet within this framework, tension was by no means absent. This will become clear when we discuss the attempts of some his-

20 The journals investigated often indicate their program so clearly by their very titles that I have decided to include an English translation: Belleten (Bulletin), published by the Turkish Society for Historical Research (1937–1945); Fikir hareketleri (Intellectual movements), edited by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1933–1935); Türkiyat mecmuası (Journal of Turkic Studies), edited by Fuat Köprülü (1925–1936); Hukuk ve iktisat tarihi mecmuası (Journal for the history of law and economics), edited by Fuat Köprülü (1925–1939); Teni adam (New Man), edited by Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1935–1937); Fikirler (Ideas), edited by Haydar Candanlar (1940–1944); Hayat (Life), edited by Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad = Fuat Köprülü (1928–29); Tarih vesikaları (Historical Documents), published by the Ministry of Education (1939–1949); Samsun Kültür Dergisi (Samsun cultural journal), published by Samsun Halkevi (1943–1948); Servet-i fünn (The Wealth of Arts and Sciences), edited by Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz (only the 1933 issue has been consulted here); Ulku (The Ideal) published by the Republican People’s Party (1929–1932); Politika gazetesi (The Paper for Politics) (1935–1938); Kaynak (The Source), published by the Balıkesir Halkevi (1933–1939); La Turquie kémalisie (government publication) (1934–1935); Uludağ, published by the Bursa Halkevleri; Türklik (The Turkic World), edited by Hüseyin Saadettin Arel and İsmail Hami Daşanmış (1939–1940); Un (Fame), published by the İsparta Halkevi (1934–35). The dates indicate the issues analyzed in preparation of the present study.
torians to produce ‘objective-neutral’ studies in the sense advocated by Emile Durkheim and Ziya Gökalp, basing themselves on the Ottoman source materials whose importance, from the later 1930s onwards, was coming to be better understood.

**The foundation and origins of the Ottoman Empire**

In the formative years of the Republic, historians were profoundly interested in the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, as indeed they continue to be down to the present day.\(^{21}\) This problématique, which can be broken down into a number of separate questions, presented a formidable historiographical challenge. Who were the Ottomans, and did they start out as a loose tribal organization? How did they manage the transition to statehood, and when did they develop a central organization?

Scholarly concerns apart, even authors who stressed the discontinuities between the Ottoman Empire and the new Republic considered this a matter of national pride. Such a view may have been partly due to personal reasons. As we have noted, at least some members of the late Ottoman elite had participated in the Turkish War of Independence. And while these personages valued their wartime experience highly enough to at least acquiesce in some version of the ‘discontinuity thesis’, they were not willing to deny the earlier stages of their political biographies altogether.\(^{22}\) But a question of identity was also involved: For when discussing the early Ottomans, one could draw attention to the latters’ Turkish lineage as well as to the ethnicity of the peoples of Anatolia.

At the very origins of Republican historiography, Hamid and Muhsin explained the foundation of the Empire in the following terms:

The Ottoman state, founded by the initiative of a tribe, during the early years of the Empire did not establish contacts with foreign cultures. Occupation of the Balkan peninsula, however, paved the way for a closer relationship with other elements, principally the Byzantines. Istanbul became the capital. Although it was Turkish inspiration and dynamism which made the formation of a state possible, since the mid-fifteenth century, Byzantine culture was more and more influential \ldots

\(^{21}\) For an interpretation of this debate compare Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds, the Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1995).

\(^{22}\) This continuity between the ‘young Turks’ of the late Empire and the early Republic forms a major focus of Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History* (London, 1993), cf. 4.
[Furthermore] beginning with the sixteenth century, conquests in southern and eastern lands were carried out, and of course permitted a renewed Iranian and Arab impact on the Anatolian Turks, who had already undergone this impact once before, through the mediation of the Seljuks (pp. 468-469) . . . [In tribal life], the crucial element of solidarity was that based on common descent, that is on blood ties . . . [With the impact of the Muslim and Christian faiths, the Turks entered a period in which racial features ceased to be the determining element in bringing about solidarity, namely the middle ages (p. 470).]

While the authors emphasized the point that certain Turkic communities retaining their tribal structure founded the Ottoman Empire, they also strongly believed that such a great state could not have originated in a tribe consisting of just a few tents.

A few years later, when the collection of drafts known as the Türk tarihinin anahattan was being prepared, the historian, writer and journalist Ahmed Refik [Altunay] contributed a paper under the title "Osman Oğulları". Here Ahmed Refik discussed the end of the Seljukid and Byzantine states, and the inception of Ottoman rule in Anatolia. Ahmed Refik highlighted the victories of the Ottoman dynasty and drew attention to some of their members' close relations with the Byzantines, which included several family alliances. At the present stage of historiography, these features are once again regarded as being of some importance. But at the time, Ahmed Refik’s presumed sympathies with the Ottomans made him appear to be politically unreliable. In 1927 he was induced to resign from the chairmanship of the Society for Turkish Historical Research, while at the First Turkish History Congress of 1932, he was forced into a humiliating ‘self criticism’. Even this did not allow him to retain his position at Istanbul University; during the reorganization of this institution in 1933, his teaching position (müderrislik) was terminated. This elimination of the old-style historians probably also was intended to intimidate those who questioned the ‘official history thesis’.

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Yusuf Akcura’s contribution to the same ‘Outlines’ project underlines the lack of reliable sources on the formative years of the Ottoman Empire, especially the time of Osman I (1299–1326). This was a novel statement, as questioning the sources was not a frequent practice in ‘old-style’ Ottoman historiography. Moreover, Akcura referred to quite a few sources both primary and secondary, including some which were relatively new at the time, such as certain articles by Franz Babinger.\(^{26}\) Akcura’s study had made him conscious of the strong legendary element inherent in all stories concerning the beginnings of the Ottoman dynasty. In his opinion, reliable historical accounts began late, only with the reign of Bayezid I (1389–1402). Akcura’s account thus differed substantially from that of Ahmed Refik, who accepted as historical the stories found in the fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicles concerning the rise of Osman and his descendants. As to the Turkic origins of the Ottomans, Akcura avoided clear-cut statements.


Other secondary sources referred to by Akcura include Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1827); Hammer’s work was available not only in a revised French translation, but also in an Ottoman version by Ata. Herbert Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 1916) was also cited, in addition to unspecified works by the late Ottoman author Necip Asım. Among the primary sources on early Ottoman history known to Akcura we find the Dusturname-i Enveri, which under the title Le destan d’Umur Pacha today is available in a French translation by Irène Mélíkoff-Sayar (Paris, 1954). Şükullah, Behçeti-t-tevârîth, which also occurs in Akcura’s draft, is available in a modern Turkish translation by Nihal Atısz (XV. asr tarihçisi Şükullah. Dökaz Boy Türkler ve Osmanlı Sultanları tarihleri, ed. by N. Atısz, Istanbul, 1939 and in Osmanlı tarihleri, Istanbul 1947).


\(^{27}\) Mehmet Ali Şevki, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun kuruluşu bahşi,” Türk Tarih Encümeni mecmuası, New Series, V, I/1 (June–August 1929), 30–51. Four years earlier, another critical review of Gibbons’ book already had been translated into Turkish: Fredrik Geze [Friedrich Giese], “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun teşekkürü meselesi,”
Şevki compared Gibbons’ work with that of Vasiliy V. Barthold, while praising the latter for his more profound sociological and anthropological analysis. As support for his criticism, the author cited Ziya Gökalp’s claim that the Turks had existed even before historical ages and that thus there could be no discussion of their origins. This criticism was aimed at Gibbons’ assumption that the Ottomans formed a special race—a new race, in fact, whose origins would have to be investigated. Mehmet Ali Şevki equally referred to a remark of Fuat Köprülü’s, namely that it was crucial to understand whether the integration (today we would say the ethnogenesis) of the Turks was a political or an ethnological phenomenon. This remark shows that an understanding of the different methodologies of the various social sciences had become accepted in the Ottoman scholarly milieu.

For the purposes of the present study, the importance of Mehmed Ali Şevki’s article is due to two rival and incompatible claims which it brought up and which were to play an important role in subsequent discussions. One of these tenets can be summarized in the statement that ‘the Ottoman Empire was alien and non-Turkish’. This was the expression, in a nationalist idiom, of the ‘discontinuity thesis’ we have already encountered. While statements of this kind were to go out of fashion after the late 1930s, the opposite claim, namely that ‘the Ottoman state is the penultimate of a long line of Turkic states and as such worthy of special attention’, was to have a long sequel. It still occurs quite often whenever Turkic history is recounted in a propagandistic mode.

In spite of all this discussion on the origins of the Ottoman Empire, in the final version of the *Türk tarihinin anahatlan*, published in 1930, the Ottomans did not receive much credit. The authors quite simply agreed that what made the Empire great was its ‘Turkishness’, while the Ottomans came to carry the blame for the disintegration of the Empire. As to the subject population, its members supposedly “stayed on their feet due to the strong racial solidarity of the Turks”.

Similar observations apply to volume IV of the textbook *Tarih*, intended for lycée students, and which we have briefly encountered in a different context. Again, the Ottoman Empire, and *a fortiori* its

*Türk tarihinin anahatlan*, 1 (1925), 151–73. Giese’s article drew attention to the successes of the Ottoman, rather than the Christian forces during the campaigns of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

*Türk tarihinin anahatlan*, 604.
origins, received short shrift. However, the authors were less inclined than the contributors to the ‘Outlines’ to attribute the strength of the Ottoman Empire to the extraordinary racial capacities of the Turks. They were quite prepared to admit that the origins of the Ottoman Empire were as yet little known:

The origin and the timing of the arrival to Anatolia of those Turks who founded the Ottoman Empire and later took on the name of ‘Ottomans’, have not been scientifically documented. It is said that these Turkic [or Turkish] tribes, like all the others, started moving westward from Central Asia, passed through Persia and settled in Anatolia under the orders and guidance of their chief Ertogrul Gazi. The genealogical tree of the Ottoman sultans, taking their ancestors as far back as Oğuz Han, was invented much later. 29

A more scholarly treatment of Ottoman origins was given in a book by Fuat Köprülü, the product of a 1934 lecture series at the Sorbonne’s Institute for Turkish Studies. Even though Köprülü had made his reputation as a specialist on popular religion and religious poetry, his study emphasizes political history, including ethno-history, rather than religious developments. 30 In a recent article on the occasion of the translation into English of Köprüli’s major works, Denis Sinor explains Köprüli’s emphasis on the advent of the Kayi tribe in Anatolia, from which the Ottoman dynasty was supposedly descended, as “serving his purpose to show that the Turkish advance in Anatolia had no religious motivations”. 31

29 Tarih III, 150 ch.
30 Fuat Köprüli, Türk edebiyatında ilk mutasavvıflar (Istanbul, 1918, 2nd ed. with a preface by Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, Ankara, 1966). For an analysis of Köprüli’s work, from a perspective rather different from the present one, see Halil Berktay, Cumhuriyet ideolojisi ve Fuat Köprüli (Istanbul, 1983).

Berktay’s book has the merit of showing the towering importance of Fuat Köprüli in the intellectual history of the early Republic. However I do not believe that Köprüli’s scholarly strengths directly were linked to his involvement with the new state. Rather Köprüli developed his ideas on critical historiography to a significant extent during his youth in the late Ottoman Empire. If anything, his political importance in the new state made it more difficult for him to carry on his critical investigations. Compare Ersanli Behar, İktidar ve tarih, 136–37.

31 Denis Sinor, review of M. Fuad Köprüli, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire; The Seljuks in Anatolia: Their History and Culture According to Local Muslim Sources; Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Prolegomena), all translated and annotated by Gary Leiser, Journal of Asian History 30 (1996), 82–84. By contrast, Köprüli’s contemporary Paul Wittek, in his book The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1938) did place considerable emphasis on religious factors. Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, provides an discerning discussion of this debate.
Of most significance for Köprülü at this stage of his scholarly work is the Turkic background of the Ottoman dynasty. He defends the Kayı and thereby Oğuz descent of the early Ottoman sultans, who thus belonged to the Turkic populations which had appeared in Anatolia long before the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. But Köprülü avoids any claims that this Turkic descent gave the Ottomans particular virtues. By contrast, he stresses political factors, especially the availability of human and material resources to the early sultans, due to the latters’ role in border warfare.

Köprülü returned to this question of ethnicity in a long article published in 1943, in one of the very few scholarly historical journals then existing in Turkey. This was an extensive polemic with colleagues both Turkish and foreign, in which Köprülü once again defended the notion that the Kayı had arrived in Anatolia with the earliest Central Asian conquerors. He thus wished to stress the homogeneous ethnic origins of the Ottomans, who were considered to have come, by a relatively direct route, from western Central Asia. Given this timing, the Kayı according to Köprülü could not have fled to Asia Minor from the invading Mongols in the early thirteenth century, as some Ottoman chronicles proclaimed. Moreover the Ottomans did not originate in Khurasan, as Köprülü’s rival Zeki Velidi Togan had suggested. While some small splinters of this large tribal confederation did find their ways both to Khurasan and the Caucasus, the bulk of the group passed into Anatolia early enough to participate in the foundation of the Artuk-öğulları principality, one of the earliest Turkish states on Anatolian soil. In support of his claim, Köprülü adduced both numismatic evidence and different Anatolian place names, which correspond to tribes belonging to the Oğuz branch of the Turks.

Moreover, Köprülü rejected all links between the eastern Turkic group known as Kay, believed to be turkified Mongols, and the Oğuz tribe of Kayı. This connection once again was one of the tenets of Zeki Velidi Togan, one of the very few specialists on Turkic Central Asia then active in Turkey. Köprülü’s denial of all links

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34 Zeki Velidi Togan (1890–1970), after a political career in his Bashkir homeland was invited to teach at the Istanbul Darülfüün in 1924–5, but left after the First Turkish History Congress to continue his career in Vienna. He returned to Turkey in 1939.
to the Mongols and his insistence on a lineage specific to Anatolia may be regarded as a concession to the ‘official history thesis’, which the author indirectly had questioned at the First Turkish History Congress of 1932. His assumption of a ‘simple’ ethnic identity for the Ottoman rulers was supposed to eliminate potentially troublesome connections to Iran or Mongolia. However, on the difficult question of the role of semi-nomadic and urban elements in early Ottoman society, Köprülü made some pertinent remarks, which may command assent even today.

Apart from Köprülü, few scholars during the 1930s devoted themselves to the early years of the Ottoman Empire. As an exception

In his historical work, Togan was well aware that the official tenet, which would have it that both Central Asian and Anatolian Turks were Aryans—whatever that might mean—sat ill with the attempts to construct a special Anatolian identity. Neither was Togan anxious to insist on the ‘European’ character of the new Republic, nor did he assume that such an identity somehow conferred a ‘scientific’ character on Turkish nationalism.

For a critical analysis of the first two official Turkish History Congresses see Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 119–94.

In Köprülü’s perspective, during the early fourteenth century, the Ottomans were semi-nomads. However, they soon came to operate in a much wider context, in which this “small ethnic core” (p. 303) was swamped by other players in the political game. Thus the organization of the Ottoman state never showed any tribal characteristics.

The papers presented at the First, Second and Third Turkish History Congresses (1932, 1937, 1943) may be relegated to a footnote, as they contained very little reference to early Ottoman history. At the First History Congress, Yusuf Akcura’s concluding paper only dwelt on the discontinuities between Ottoman and Republican history, while, as we have seen, Ahmed Refik was obliged to dissociate himself from his previous historical work. As to the Second History Congress, only two papers out of ninety were directly related to Ottoman history, one of them representing the ‘official line’. More remarkable was the second paper, which was not read during the Congress but published later on. Its author was Ömer Lütfi Barkan, soon to become one of the ‘founding fathers’ of Ottoman social and economic history, but then still at the beginning of his career. Otherwise, the bulk of the papers presented was devoted to prehistorical and archeological research.

At the Third History Congress, held in 1943, the general trend had not significantly changed. As President of the Turkish Historical Society, Şemseddin Günaltaý in his opening speech argued that, until recently, the Turks had not paid much attention to their own past. But even Günaltaý was not prepared to accord Ottoman history any special significance. Quite to the contrary, he stressed that Ottoman history was only a limited phase in the long history of the Anatolian Turks, which was full of victories and heroic incidents: Şemseddin Günaltaý, “III. Türk Tarih Kongresi açılış nutku”, *Belleten* 8, 29 (1944), 6.

Similar tendencies are apparent in the activity reports presented by the Turkish Historical Society. Archeological excavations were given pride of place, and the prehistoric and pre-Islamic periods had priority. In one of the reports read at the opening session of the Third History Congress, Muzaffer Goker, General Secretary to the Turkish Historical Society, mentioned a variety of important primary sources, with the Ottoman archival documents only occurring at the very end. However,
to this general lack of interest, Nihal Atsiz (1905–1975) worked on the fifteenth-century historian Şükrullah, producing a book called *Dokuz Boy Türkler ve Osmanlı sultanları* (The Turks of the Nine Tribes and the Ottoman Sultans). As the title indicates, this publication certainly was intended to draw attention to the Turkic background of the early Ottoman Sultans. Atsiz was regarded as an ardent advocate of Turanism and for this reason marginalized ever since the early 1930s. Albeit to a less extreme degree, this also applied to Akdes Nimet Kurat (1903—1971), another Tatar who played a role on the Turkish historical scene of the 1930s. Kurat is mainly known for his work on the Swedish king Charles XII and his connections with the Ottoman Empire, which he studied on the basis of documents in the Swedish archives. He never adopted the ‘official line’ on Ottoman and Turkish history and later in life was associated with the Pan-Turkists. In consequence, at certain times of his life he had to leave the university and teach in secondary schools. For our purposes, one of Kurat’s rare comparative articles is relevant, in which he discusses late Byzantine and early Ottoman historians in order to determine their reliability with respect to a specific fifteenth-century event. In this and other works, a concern with academic neutrality is evident.  

*Change and ‘decay’ in the Ottoman Empire*

As we have had occasion to note in our discussion of Hamid’s and Muhsin’s textbook, it has become conventional to divide Ottoman history into three or, more commonly, four stages. The period of foundation and the rise and expansion of the Empire are seen as either a single unit or, more frequently, as two separate units. On the whole these early periods are viewed in a positive light both in school textbooks and in historical accounts. By contrast the two later
phases supposedly are characterized by processes leading to stagnation and decline. Among the latter, ‘corruption’ of the ruling elites played a major role. Here twentieth-century historians followed in the footsteps of their sixteenth-century Ottoman predecessor Mustafa Ali, who had identified this failing as an evil innovation of his own time. However, early Republican historians, in both their narrative and their analytical works, did not discuss ‘Ottoman corruption’ as something inherent in the governmental system itself. Rather, ‘corruption’ was viewed as something that concerned individual sultans, viziers or sultanas. Thus historical change was defined very narrowly: once the Ottoman governmental system was in place, it could only change due to the moral failings of members of the elite; in an ideal world, it would have remained static. As to the ‘corruption’ of the system, it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that a ‘reform elite’, in a way the ‘ancestors’ of the first Republican generation, attempted to reverse the trend. In the long run, their efforts were to result in the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

In a very long article, İhsan Sungu reported the criticism levelled by Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Şinasi against the governing elite of the Tanzimat period, which also implied a kind of self-criticism on the part of these Young Ottoman intellectuals themselves. Sungu’s attitude is ambiguous: on the one hand, he wishes to pay homage to the most prominent figures of the period of Ottoman constitutional reform. But at the same time, Sungu uses the works of some of the period’s most prominent writers to criticize the entire reform elite ‘from within’. In Namık Kemal’s own words, the purpose of constitutional reform was not to guarantee individual freedoms, a classic liberal goal, but to ensure the survival of the Ottoman state. Thus the constitution of 1876 was principally instituted to save the Ottoman state from complete destruction. In Sungu’s perspective, even the reform movement of the later nineteenth century hoped to preserve the old order and régime, while at the same time, criticizing it as ‘corrupt’. Presumably Sungu’s article was meant to show the contradictions in the thinking of the nineteenth-century Ottoman reform elite and thus implied that these politicians could not have

41 On Namık Kemal’s idea that political and educational reforms could ensure the survival of the Ottoman Empire, see Mardin, The Genesis, 329–30.
brought about the secular state established after 1923. But at the same time, Sungu’s article also can be read as a text pointing to tensions within the Kemalist elite, where radical secularism may not have been completely accepted either.

Yusuf Akçura’s book *Osmanlı devletinin dağılma devri* (The Ottoman state’s period of disintegration) was initially a long article written for the *Türk tarihinin anahatları*. In 1934, Akçura began to rewrite this text for publication as a book, but due to the author’s death the following year, the new version remained incomplete. Covering mainly the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was finally published in 1940. Akçura portrays Ottoman rule as a permanently escalating ‘corruption’ in the political, economic and military spheres. Yet when discussing Ottoman history in detail, Akçura did go beyond these simplistic notions, linking Ottoman decline with the absence of anything resembling a reformation or renaissance. In the author’s mind, this failure was linked to the supposed immutability of Muslim religious law, the şeriat. Another deficit of Ottoman history, in Akçura’s mind, was the absence of overseas colonies, with all the benefits these could have brought to the Ottoman economy. Rather, economic growth remained dependent on territorial expansion, largely through continental wars, and ran into difficulties when this expansion ceased. Another set of problems could be derived from the fact that a unification of the Empire’s various provinces never took place. Given the latter’s heterogeneous composition, the ultimate struggle of various nations for secession was difficult to avoid.

Although the work remained unfinished, Akçura does indicate what his conclusions would have been. On the one hand, a sultan such as Selim III was willing to import western innovations in the military and administrative spheres. Yet at the same time and in accordance with the interests of the ruling elite, many of the Empire’s ‘eastern’ features were also retained. Thus Akçura had come to outline a historiographical problem, namely how to explain the heterogeneous nature of the thinking of late eighteenth and nineteenth-century educated Ottomans: “thus Ottoman society in its majority continues to be strongly attached to eastern civilization through both material and non-material forces”.

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44 Akçura, *Dağılma devri*, 163. On a much more sophisticated level, this problématique has been tackled by Şerif Mardin in many of his works, including *The Genesis*. 
In 1937, Atatürk’s adopted daughter Afet İnan wrote an article concerning the reasons for the failure of the Ottoman Empire. Focusing on the nineteenth century, she criticized the Young Ottomans for having underrated the importance of national ideals. At the same time, she viewed the various national movements among the subject peoples of the Empire as the principal cause for the latter’s dissolution, and regretfully noted that nationalism was so very rapid in spreading. Thus to express it clearly, in İnan’s view, the Young Ottomans should have been more and the subject peoples less nationalist. In this article as well as in her contribution to the Second History Congress the following year, İnan concludes that overall the Ottoman Turks had made many positive contributions, but that at later stages, some individuals had misused their powers. Terminology used for the Ottomans in European diplomatic and historical texts, such as ‘the sick man of Europe’ or ‘the Empire’s fatal decline’, are taken over without much further questioning or contextualization.45 This rather simplistic approach to historical change in the Ottoman world was very common in the 1930s, and was still to be reiterated in schoolbooks for many decades after professional historians had begun to explore other avenues.

The notion that, in the Ottoman context, change necessarily signified ‘corruption’, was elaborated in a chapter of a school textbook of history published during the early forties.46 According to Samih Nafiz Tansu, ‘corruption’ had existed ever since the fifteenth century. Accordingly his text implied that the Ottoman Empire had decayed ever since the time of its major expansion, or even from the very period of foundation. But Tansu made no attempt to support his claim by what was then known about the comparative development of empires, nor did he attempt an analysis of the Ottoman Empire itself.

Instead, visions of ‘national purity’ are given pride of place. Accordingly the physical relationships between male members of the Ottoman dynasty and women of non-Muslim background were sharply criticized. This was common in nationalist discourse throughout the 1930s

45 Afet İnan, “Osmanlı tarihine bir bakış ve Türk İnkılabı,” Ulku 5 (October 1937), 99. Another version of this article was presented as a paper at the Second History Congress as “Türk-Osmanlı tarihinin karakteristik noktalarına bir bakış,” in 8üncü Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul 20—25 Eylül 1937. Kongre nin çalısmaları, kongreye sundan tebligler (İstanbul, 1943), 756–69.
46 Sami Nafiz Tansu, “Yayılış devri” in Osmanlı tarihi özlü, Orta ve Lise ler için (İstanbul, 2nd printing 1943).
and 1940s. Extreme nationalists, such as Ismail Hami Danişmend, even in the 1950s were to proclaim that the Ottoman dignitaries recruited through the ‘levy of boys’ were, as potential traitors and sources of ‘impurity’, a major danger to the Ottoman state.  

At the same time, Tansu stressed Ottoman territorial expansion and military valor, even though the absolutism, ‘reactionary politics’ and pan-Islamist leanings of certain rulers were sharply commented upon—in all likelihood, these were mainly directed at Abdülhamid II. But due to this ahistorical conception of change in the Ottoman world, Tansu was quite unable to explain the political background of the actions of different sultans. Neither could he make it clear why secularism and ‘westernization’ could have been regarded as means of saving the empire by sections of the late Ottoman elite. Tansu thus was confronted with a historiographical puzzle of his own making: how could the victories and territorial expansion, which this author and doubtless many others continued to see as a source of national pride, come about in a polity ‘corrupt’ almost from its very inception?

Tansu’s obsession with ‘national purity’ also leads him into contradictions when he discusses the rise of the Ottoman state and the struggle against the various Turkish principalities of Anatolia which this ascent involved. Here the opponents of the Ottomans, Timurids or others, are defined as ‘enemies’ in the most Manichean sense of the term. Yet this contradicts earlier chapters in which the Central Asian Turks of early historical ages are highlighted. For, after all, many of the fourteenth and early fifteenth-century dynasties were themselves of Oğuz background and thus should have formed part of an ‘in-group’ including the Ottomans as well. All this indicates fuzzy thinking, in which emotions have been allowed to overcome considerations of logic and common sense. Even if one choses to write nationalist history with an emphasis on ‘imagined communities’, this obviously necessitates a carefully constructed method and the appropriate research.

During the 1940s, many articles in newspapers and the more popular journals continued to carry stories of ‘corruption’ and ‘degeneration’. Both in the moral and the financial realm, ‘corruption’ was

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47 Ismail Hami Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi, 5 vols. (İstanbul, 1971), passim.
viewed as a typical feature of palace life under the Tanzimat ruler Abdülmecid, but also, and more surprisingly, under Selim III, who was otherwise praised for his reform-mindedness as well as his love for the arts and music.  

**Concepts of change and continuity**

As we have had occasion to note, debates on significant historical and political concepts were more likely to be carried on in publications directed at the general reader than in specialist journals. After all, the latter could not finance themselves without official sponsorship. However in such ‘popular’ journals and newspapers, the educational level of the audience precluded all too theoretical disquisitions. Yet the significance of the terms ‘old’ and ‘new’ did constitute a subject for reflection. In the journal *Yeni adam*, officially promoted notions concerning the value of ‘radical breaks’ was questioned, and an alternative definition of ‘new’ proposed: “Whatever is new is a different form of appearance of the old”.  

Thus A. Seni attempted to differentiate between ‘reforms’ and ‘radical change’; the latter was viewed negatively, as creating a *tabula rasa*.

As an example, A. Seni discusses language change. This process, officially encouraged, involved the elimination of words of foreign origin, Arabic, Persian and, to a lesser degree, French. They were to be replaced by words found either in source texts from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries or by words derived from existing Turkish roots. This process was not only meant to affect ordinary educated speech, but also permit the creation of specialized terminologies. Not unexpectedly, our author advocates a cautious approach. Whatever is ‘necessary and helpful’ to the Turks is to be retained, especially since there are still many people alive for whom Ottoman constitutes a living language. But with the inconsistency typical for the Republican elites of the time, the author himself uses some of the newly created words in his text.

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51 The notion that the ‘old’ was liable to reappear in a ‘new’ guise, also is expressed by Nefi Duman in the periodical *Yeni adam*, which, as we have seen, was edited by Ismail Hakki Baltacoğlu, an intellectual marginalized for his views. Duman
Radical reform of both the alphabet and the language as a whole was implied in the sixth point of the official history thesis, which demanded a complete break with Ottoman traditions on both the political and cultural planes. Among the late Ottoman and early Republican elites, these were highly contentious issues. Attempts to adapt the Arabic alphabet to the requirements of Turkish phonology had been advocated even in Ottoman times. In the early 1860s, the Azeri intellectual Fethali Ahundzade had aroused considerable opposition by proposing just such an approach. In the years preceding World War I, there were serious attempts to simplify spelling. Debate on this issue continued well into the 1940s, that is, for about twenty years after the introduction of the Roman alphabet. In response to conservative criticism, some mainstream intellectuals adopted an extremist approach, condemning the Ottoman language and script as one of the major causes of the Empire’s decay and as a serious barrier hampering the progress of Kemalist revolutionary youth.

At this juncture, neither reform nor historical change in general were regarded as socio-political phenomena to be analyzed systematically. Often enough, change was viewed as a kind of accident, for instance due to the activity of a successful leader, which, as we have seen, could occur in a socio-political system viewed in principle as unchanging. Comparative perspectives were generally lacking. There was no systematic confrontation of Ottoman historical processes either with contemporary European developments, or else with changes occurring in contemporary Iran or India. In consequence, among Turkish intellectuals there was little interest in European, Iranian or Indian history per se. The Ottoman and later the Turkish reforms were viewed as unique cases, by which the relevant elites asserted the role of their states, both in Europe and in the world in general. Due to the narrow perspective of most writers on Ottoman ‘change and decline’, simplistic and arbitrary explanations abounded.

takes issue with the view of the conservative novelist Peyami Safa, who in an article in the daily Cumhuriyet had claimed that after the university reform of 1933, Istanbul University had radically changed. To the contrary, in Duman’s perspective, the negative features of the old institution survived, albeit in a different guise: Nefi Duman, “Darülfunun hortuluyor mu?,” Yeni adam (October 1937), 8–10.

Quite often, the Kemalist elite took pride in its ‘uniqueness’ and radicalism; in consequence, many nineteenth-century political figures were criticized for their pragmatic, piecemeal approach to political and social change. In this context, certain Republican authors were able to identify the link which existed between reform-oriented Tanzimat bureaucratic intellectuals, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Palace, generally described as nefarious, on the other.

Albeit very much a minority phenomenon, proto-socialist interpretations of the changeover from Ottoman to Turkish historiography also emerged during the 1930s. Hüseyin Avni Şanda, a publicist much read during the 1960s and even later, viewed historiographical change as part of the anti-imperialist struggle. The development of Republican historiography was interpreted as a victory over Europeans, particularly Germans, whose ally the late Ottoman political elite had been during World War I. According to Şanda, the role of history in the Ottoman Empire was to recite the victories of heroic rulers. However the Turkish Republic “had abolished this idea of history and begun an anti-imperialist struggle against the expansionist and conservative trend of Europe”.

This ‘reappropriation’, in an anti-imperialist context, of history in general, and Ottoman history in particular, may be viewed as a reformulation of Mustafa Kemal’s claim from his famous Nutuk (Speech), many years before the official view of Turkish history was ever expressed:

the Ottomans had usurped the sovereignty of the Turkish nation. And they continued this usurpation for six hundred years. Now the Turkish nation has put an end to this and taken back its sovereignty. This is a revolution.

Ottoman politics, the legal framework and Islam

When cultural Turkism was first developed as an educational and historiographical enterprise during the first two decades of the twentieth century, Islam formed an integral part of this new nationalism. For immigrants arriving in the Ottoman Empire from Kazan, Ufa,

53 Hamit Altay, “Bizde islahat ve Halil Hamit Paşa,” Kaynak, 7–8, 87 (1940), 88–89.
the Crimea or Azerbaijan, being 'Turkic' necessarily involved being a Muslim, and the same thing applied to Ziya Gökalp, a native of the Anatolian city of Diyarbakır. In the latter's perspective, 'becoming a Turk, becoming a Muslim, becoming a modern human being' were inseparable. Yet after the establishment of the Republic, there was a shift in emphasis. Islam was still of great significance in defining nationality. Thus the Karamanlıs of central Anatolia were categorized as 'Greeks' and had to leave Turkey after 1923, even though their native language was Turkish, for they were Orthodox Christians. Yet increasingly, Islam came to be viewed by the ruling elites mainly as a force for mobilizing the population and less as a system of beliefs shared by themselves. In the course of this shift, Ottoman failure came to be viewed largely as a consequence of the conservative inclinations of the sultans and their appointees, the members of the Islamic religious establishment.

We will begin our discussion of the rather meagre historiography related to religious issues with academic journals such as Tarih vesikalan and Türkiyat mecmuasi. Here the Ottoman past was documented and discussed, but religious factors were downplayed as much as possible. Tarih vesikalan published diaries, diplomatic correspondence of Ottoman ambassadors, and also archival sources relevant to social and economic history, such as lists of administratively imposed prices or documents.

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56 This is indicated by the title of his book Türkleşmek, islamlaşmak, muasırlaşmak (reprint, Istanbul, 1960).
58 In the 1930s even conservative intellectuals tended to tread cautiously when discussing religion. Thus Peyami Safa in his book Türk Inkişafına bakışlar, first published in 1938, spoke of the cultural impact of Islam and Turkish culture, only implicitly favoring the former. According to this writer, both in the Christian West and the Islamic East, religion had always formed the basis of political and military organization. At the end of his book Peyami Safa expresses his unconditional adherence to the reforms decreed by the political leaders of the time, including those in the realm of historiography.

In a later edition, published in 1958, the author himself acknowledged that he had been forced to express himself 'diplomatically', due to the atmosphere of the 1930s. My references are to an even later edition: Türk inkişafına bakışlar (Ankara, 1988), 3–4, 13–16, 61–63, 125–128.
59 As an attempt to provide a non-religious origin for a major human phenomenon such as language, the myth of the Sun Language Theory was devised. As this myth is not directly relevant to Ottoman history, it will not concern us here. However, it is worth noting that Şemsettin Günlaltay and H. Reşit Tankut once commented that "with the Sun Language Theory, the Turkish language was freed from the Islamic yoke": Dil ve Tarih Tezleri üzerine gerekli bazı izahlar (İstanbul, 1938), 27.
regulating the operation of Anatolian mines. However, documents concerning religion were all but absent. In the *Türkiyat mecmuasi* between 1934 and 1939, the religious aspect was represented largely by Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, former Mevlevi dervish and Fuat Köprülü’s student. Gölpınarlı’s interests focused on dervishes and the intellectual and artistic milieu in which the latter moved and which they had partially created. To the *Türkiyat mecmuasi* he contributed, among other studies, an article on the mystical poetry of the early Ottoman author Aşık Paşa. In addition, the journal published a number of articles highlighting religious tolerance among the Turks of Central Asia and their indifference to Islamic philosophy. These included a study by V. V. Barthold on Central Asian Christianity and a piece on religious doctrines in Seljukid times by Şerifettin [Yaltkaya].

In a review article already discussed in a different context, Mehmet Ali Şevki saw a major disagreement between V. Barthold and Herbert Gibbons concerning the motivations of the Turks in their movement westwards, and definitely sympathized with Barthold. For according to Mehmed Ali Şevki’s interpretation of the latter’s work, the Russian scholar saw the Turks motivated by a ‘natural’ urge to conquer. Religion played no role in this movement, which was dictated by material interests; and once a region had been conquered, Muslims and Christians received more or less equal treatment. Gibbons, by contrast, had emphasized a strong connection between religion and ethnic identity in the Turkic world, a view Mehmet Ali Şevki regarded with disfavor. All in all, the contributors to academic journals certainly did not see religion as one of their major interests, even though the history of Islam in the Seljukid

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60 Among the authors writing for this journal, we find well-known names such as Ömer Lütfü Barkan, Aziz Berker, Neşet Çağatay, Halil İnalçık, Enver Ziya Karal, M. Çağatay Uluçay and Faik Reşat Unat.

61 Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı (1900–1982) was an enormously productive scholar of excentric personality, whose importance is still underestimated. For the period under study, his works include Melâmlık ve Melâmiller (Istanbul, 1931) and Tunus Emre, hayatı (Istanbul, 1936), as well as numerous journal articles concerning the ‘interface’ between religion and literature. For a full biblio-biography, compare the relevant article in the *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 14 (Istanbul, 1996), by Ömer Faruk Akın.


64 Mehmet Ali Şevki, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun kuruluşu”. 
and Ottoman states was studied from time to time. Anti-religious polemics, though not totally absent, were generally muted. However, even a major historian such as Fuat Köprülü occasionally indulged in a bit of nationalist polemics against religion. When discussing a passage in the seventeenth-century travelogue of Evliya Çelebi, one of the major sources for the social history and geography of this period, Köprülü faults the author for not having recognized that certain Anatolian Muslims, newly converted at the time of Evliya’s visit, were in fact ethnic Turks; “that a scholarly traveller such as Evliya Çelebi has not understood that these [people] are really Turks, demonstrates well how religious fanaticism hinders free observation”.

Non-academic publications were less reticent in their polemics. The lycée textbook *Tarih*, volume III, which, as we have seen, contains a summary treatment of Ottoman history, is full of negative stereotypes concerning the impact of Islam on Ottoman political, social and artistic life. We are told that the Ottoman rulers derived no benefit at all from their adoption of the title ‘caliph’; at any rate, Selim I assumed the title when it already had become meaningless. Wherever possible, political problems encountered by the Ottoman sultans are linked to the latters’ religious roles. The authors even fantasize that Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*) was responsible for what they view as a degradation of Ottoman literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

But the most overt anti-religious polemics can be found in the journals published for non-specialist audiences. This is probably linked to the fact that the legitimization of the Ottoman dynasty, which had been deposed less than twenty years previously, had employed religious motifs to a considerable extent. Secularists writing for such journals thus were trying to dislodge the image of the Sultan-Caliph, protector of Islam, from the minds of their readers. In an article

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66 *Tarih*, III (Istanbul, 1931), 38 and 78.
67 In addition to the Ottoman dynasty itself, religious dignitaries were often faulted for their conservatism and supposedly excessive concern for their own material interests. Thus in an article on Selim III’s Chief Mufti Mustafa Efendi, himself an adherent of the Sultan’s reforms, Neşet Köseoğlu cited the distinguished nineteenth-century historian and Grand Vizier Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, himself originally a religious scholar and high dignitary. At issue was a remark by Ahmed Cevdet concerning the intractability of the members of the religious establishment, once their opinions and material concerns were at stake. Compare Neşet Köseoğlu, “Üçüncü Selim devrinin ıslahatçısı Şeyhülislam Mustafa,” *Ün*, V, 2, No. 21 (January 1935).
published in the Kemalist party’s official journal *Ulkü*, the caliphate is described as a black bird, probably a crow, which as an evil omen has hovered over the Turks for centuries. Reşit Galip [Atabinen] also regards the caliphate as an alien institution. But no less dubious in this author’s eyes was the sultanate, which allegedly had arrived in the Ottoman lands as a result of Selim I’s victory at Çaldırán. As this ruler also brought back the caliphate from his campaign to Egypt, Selim I, in spite of his status as a conquering hero, is made responsible for much that is ‘evil’ about the Ottoman polity.\(^6\)

All this belongs to the realm of—rather uninformed—political polemics rather than to historiography proper. The problem was that with such assumptions, Ottoman state and society became completely unintelligible to both authors and readers. A quotation will show how alien the Ottoman system had become to a first-generation Republican: “the Ottoman state is a very strange thing. It is hard to understand how it survived for six hundred years”.\(^6\)

In an article published by a provincial association for adult education, the Ottoman system once again is decried, in a now familiar fashion, as being ‘corrupt’ and decadent ever since the sixteenth century. According to the author, this is due to the impact of a legal system dating from the seventh century, which, in particular, resulted in the degradation of women.\(^7\)

Adherence to the Islamic legal system (*ṣeriat*) also constituted the major fault which early Republican writers saw in their ‘predecessors in spirit’, the Young Ottomans. After all, Namik Kemal, in an often quoted remark, had insisted that Ottoman laws were, and should remain, based on the *ṣeriat*: “why should we base our laws on human actions, necessarily variable, if in the *ṣeriat* we already possess a foundation which is exempt from corruption?”.\(^7\)

To İhsan Sungu, this attitude was highly regrettable, as both Namik Kemal and his fellow constitutionalist Ziya Pasha were otherwise ‘progressive’. That these nineteenth-century authors moreover advocated religious education was another ‘point’ against them. Due to their religious commitments, Namik Kemal’s or Ziya Pasha’s stand

\(^6\) Reşit Galip [Atabinen], “Türk Tarihi İnkılabı ve yabancı tezler,” *Ulkü* (October 1933), 164–77.

\(^6\) Kazım Nami, “Cumhuriyet terbiyesi,” *Ulkü* 2 (1938), 421.

\(^7\) Nazım, “Türk inkılabının anahatları”, *Kaynak* 2, 13–15 (1934), 357.

\(^7\) Here quoted after Sungu, “Tanzimat”, 30.
against bureaucratc and sultanic absolutism was judged weak and vacillating.

Adopting a different and less critical approach, Nihal Atsiz, when discussing the contemporary poet Mehmet Akif, due to the latter's religious convictions linked this important literary figure and author of the Turkish national anthem to his Young Ottoman predecessors: "Religion has been the major element in the great socio-political system created by the Ottomans, therefore Ottoman nationalists appeared mostly as religious figures".72

All this indicates that among publicists of the early Republic, religion was regarded as a major factor making for the decay of the Ottoman polity. Republican leaders espoused secularism, and this belief formed the background to the 'official line' in Turkish history. This situation explains why Ottoman conquests were viewed in a tradition derived from the pre-Islamic Turks of Central Asia. By contrast motivations linked to Islamic traditions of gaza, war against the infidels, often were downplayed—even though one of Atatürk's most often used titles was exactly that of gazi, 'warrior for the faith'.73 Yet the Ottomans' possible links with Central Asian Turkic traditions were never investigated with the necessary thoroughness, and serious scholarship on Central Asia remained confined to a very limited number of people. Most historians contented themselves with the simple claim of having effected a historiographical revolution. But only the shadow was conjured up, the substance was missing.

Discovering the documents: the administrative, social and economic history of the Ottoman Empire

Ottoman history in a scholarly mode so far has been given relatively short shrift; yet especially from the later 1930s onwards, there were new developments in this sector. Two 'branches' of academic historiography first emerged during this period. One of them concerned itself with the preparation of sometimes rather descriptive and pedestrian, or in the case of Ahmed Refik, romantically 'colored' narrative accounts of Ottoman political and administrative history. More

72 Yeni Adam, 172 (1935), 11.
73 However in the 1959 version of Köprülü, Osmanlı Devletinin kuruluşu, the 'islamization' of the Turkic warriors known as alp into Muslim gazis is discussed in extenso: 84–89.
novel was the concern with economic and social developments, which was emerging in France at that time, and which, simultaneously, Köprülü pioneered in the Turkish context.

But these two branches of historiography, so to say, grew from a common trunk; and this common basis was the need to locate and analyze hitherto unknown primary sources, without which neither traditional narrative, nor the new economic and social history could progress. With some qualifications, we may regard Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı and Ahmed Refik as representatives of ‘traditional’ narrative history. On the other hand, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, who published his first important articles at the very end of the 1930s, along with Köprülü constituted for about a decade, almost the only representative of the ‘new style’ on the Turkish academic scene. Yet the concern with unearthing, publishing and commenting on archival, and, more rarely, literary sources was common to all these very different historians.

Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı has been much criticized, and not without some justification, for his lack of analysis and limited historical sophistication. Yet his unrivalled knowledge of the Ottoman and pre-Ottoman primary sources has ensured his works a lasting popularity. Especially his series of studies on the Ottoman administration in its different branches even today constitutes a mine of information, consulted by every scholar. Uzunçarşılı had studied at the Darülfi- nun, that is Istanbul University in its pre-1933 form, and then taught in the western Anatolian town of Kütahya for nine years. Still before the Greek occupation of Kütahya in 1921, he had written a book about the history of this town. However, his study was published only in 1932, after the author had joined the Kemalist party and become a member of parliament for Balıkesir. In this book, Uzunçarşılı focused on inscriptions, quite a few of which he documented with good quality photographs. Since some of these priceless historical sources presumably disappeared during the War of Independence, but also as a result of much more recent land speculation,

71 İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti teşkilâtına medhal (İstanbul, 1941); idem, Osmanlı Devleti teşkilâtından kapıdkulu ocakları, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1943, 1944); idem, Osmanlı Devletinin saray teşkilatı (Ankara, 1945); idem, Osmanlı Devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilatı (Ankara, 1948); idem, Osmanlı Devletinin imiye teşkilatı (Ankara, 1965).

75 İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, Bizans ve Selçukluları Germiyano ve Osmanlı Oğulları zamanında Kütahya şehri (İstanbul, 1932). The order of the Ministry of Education for the printing of this volume already dates from 1930.
Uzunçarşılı’s volume today constitutes a significant primary source. But the author also discusses the mosques, theological schools, and other public buildings to which most inscriptions once were attached. Moreover, he adds information on the biographies of important people linked to the town, as had been customary in Ottoman times as well. More importantly, he also makes use of the registers kept by the local kadis and thus must be viewed as one of the very first historians to recognize the importance of these documents, today very much in the foreground of Ottomanist research. Uzunçarşılı, whose energy seems to have been inexhaustible, also toured Anatolia in search of further inscriptions. A study of the region of Tokat was published even before the volume on Kütahya finally appeared.\textsuperscript{76}

Although he became a member of the Turkish Historical Society in 1931, Uzunçarşılı intervened only briefly in the debates of the First Turkish History Congress, where he merely pointed out some obvious factual errors. At the Second Turkish History Congress, he presented a paper focusing on the administration of land and people in the post-Seljuk Anatolian principalities, on which in that very same year he also published a book.\textsuperscript{77}

When dealing with the pre-Ottoman history of Anatolia, Uzunçarşılı apparently was engaged in a debate with Fuat Köprülü. In spite of their pertinence in terms of historical accuracy, it is thus also as indicators of scholarly rivalry that we must evaluate his claims. Uzunçarşılı stated that the Anatolian administrative and political systems of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had little or no connection with those of the Byzantines. Rather, in Uzunçarşılı’s perspective, the models for Anatolian political organization should be sought among the Seljukids and Ilkhanids, where, the author believed, the means of enforcing justice had been more highly developed. Here the author took up a motif which he had introduced back in 1929–30, contributing a long article to the \textit{Türk tarihinin anahatları}. In this piece, Uzunçarşılı had faulted Köprülü for having overemphasized the impact of the Byzantine state system on Ottoman administrative development.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{76} İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Anadolu Türk tarihi vesikalardan Tokat, Niksar, Zile, Turhal, Pazar, Amasya, vilayet, kaza ve nahîye merkezlerinde kitabeler} (İstanbul, 1345/1927).

\textsuperscript{77} İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Anadolu Boyilikleri ve Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu devletleri} (Ankara, 1937).

\textsuperscript{78} Uzunçarşılioğlu İsmail Hakki, “Kuruluşundan onbeşinci asrın ilk yarısına kadar Osmanlı İmparatorluğu teşkilatı”, in \textit{Türk tarihinin anahatları}, seri II, no. 3, 4–5.
The latter responded by an article which has remained famous to the present day, in which he argued that Byzantine institutions had had little direct impact upon the Ottomans. But an indirect impact they surely did possess. For it was in the early middle ages that Byzantine institutions had impressed the Umayyads and thus had been copied in the early Islamic empires. In Köprülü’s view, it was from this source, and not from Byzantium directly, that the Ottomans had absorbed some Byzantine traditions. Once again Köprülü’s argumentation was remarkable for his broadness of view.

In most contexts, Uzunçarşı’s concerns were those of the professional historian, as he emphasized factual accuracy and the critical use of sources. Thus Uzunçarşı pointed out errors in the chronology of certain western authors, but also wryly remarked that Yusuf Akçura had reproduced certain errors of Abdûrrahman Şeref, the last Ottoman court historian. Nor is this concern with professionalism merely the impression of readers who look back at Uzunçarşı’s work from the perspective of the year 2000. In an article published in 1939, this historian himself wrote that in the preparatory meetings in which the ‘Outlines’ first were planned, he had warned against assuming that such a book could be written in a very short time. But his colleagues did not listen to him, and as we have seen, the ‘Outlines’ were not a success.

Ahmed Refik’s contribution to the ‘Outlines’ was published posthumously, as the author already had died in 1937. His article dealt with the ‘levy of boys’, the drafting and Islamization of young Christian peasants to serve in the Janissary corps, or, if they showed great promise, to be educated in the palace school for pages. Following the extreme nationalist temper of the times, Ahmed Refik tried to show that these boys were of Turkish origin, a propagandistic claim which, at the very most, makes sense only in a small minority of cases. But it would be unfair to judge Ahmed Refik by this piece alone. In the long run, what has remained of his work are mainly the numerous sixteenth and seventeenth-century sultanic rescripts which he published in the course of several decades of intense activity.

80 İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşı, “Türk tarihi yazılırken”, Belleten 3 (1939), 349.
He was the first scholar to make copious use of the ‘Registers of Important Affairs’ and to point out their importance to both Ottomanists and the general reader. Most historians trained between the 1940s and the 1990s have encountered his collection of rescripts on the urban affairs of Istanbul at an early stage of their education. Only during the last decades new source publications have begun to replace this series.\footnote{Ahmed Refik’s edition of rescripts on Istanbul were reissued in the late 1980s: Onuncu asr-i hizri de Istanbul hayati (1495–1591), Onbirinci asr-i hizri de Istanbul hayati (1592–1668), Onikinci asr-i hizri de Istanbul hayati (1689–1785), Onucuncu asr-i hizri de Istanbul hayati (1786–1882) (all of them Istanbul, 1988).}

Fuat Köprülü and his work have occupied us in several different contexts already. Yet now that we are concerned with the emergence of historical professionalism, Köprülü’s critical and analytic approach at the Second Turkish History Congress once again needs to be stressed. During those years, Köprülü was concerned with the emergence of legal institutions during the pre- and proto-Ottoman period. Unlike what we have observed in other instances, Köprülü knew well that a knowledge of the application of Islamic religious law was by no means sufficient to understand Ottoman institutional history. Moreover, Köprülü showed that whoever wished to understand Ottoman legal institutions would have to take the major characteristics of Ottoman society as a totality into account. In Köprülü’s perspective, Ottoman society formed but one instance of a type which had occurred more than once in human history. Legal sociology and the ethnology of law in general thus had a contribution to make to Ottoman legal history.\footnote{M. Fuat Köprülü, “Ortazaman Türk hukuki müesseseleri”, in İhınç Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul 20–25 Eylül 1937, Kongre nin çalısmaları, kongreye sunulan tebliğler [İstanbul, 1943], 399–400.}

Ömer Lütfi Barkan, who also participated in this congress, began his career with a strong interest in legal history as well. He was probably more conscious than anyone else among his contemporaries of the importance of peasants for the Ottoman system. As a result, he insisted that a clear understanding of the taxes and labor services which the Ottoman elite extracted from ‘its’ peasantry, constituted the basis for any analysis of the Ottoman system of state and society.
Barkan strongly identified with ‘the state’ as an abstract entity; this included both the Ottoman version, into which he had been born, and the Turkish Republic, of which he was a citizen. By contrast, he was deeply distrustful of all ‘intermediaries’ who placed themselves between ‘state’ and ‘peasant’, and obviously profited from their mediating roles. Barkan’s mistrust of all intermediaries between state and peasant also included the pre-Ottoman Turkish aristocracies of Anatolia, who as Muslims with a local power base could not immediately be dislodged once the Ottomans had taken over the regions in which these local lords were established. In an early and often cited article, Barkan was able to show that post-Seljuk local Anatolian elites were rewarded for their submission to the Ottomans with a share of peasant taxes known as malikâne. But these rights to tax collection, as private property, were inherited according to Islamic religious law. Thus they were split up into numerous shares and lost all importance within a generation or two. At least this was the way things developed if the owners did not take the precaution of transforming their shares in peasant taxes into pious foundations. By contrast, Barkan regarded the holders of tax assignments (timar) as officials in the service of the state. These men made up the cavalry army which assumed a pivotal role in the earlier Ottoman conquests. Timar-holders could be moved at will from one part of the Empire to another and thus formed part of the state apparatus itself, rather than acting as in some way aristocratic ‘intermediaries’. As Barkan summarized in his communication submitted to the Second Turkish History Congress:

We shall try in this essay to emphasize how the laws and organization of the Empire opposed landed and hereditary aristocracies. We shall also try to determine the effects of this struggle on the agrarian question, and as a result, establish the different phases of the transition from the malikâne system to [that based on the employment of] timariş sipahis... The statistical registers, as set down at the beginning of the

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83 This kind of malikâne must not be confused with the lifetime tax farm, for which the same term was used. However, the malikânes of the post-conquest period largely had become obsolete when life-time tax farms were introduced in 1695. See Mehmet Genc, “Osmanlı malîyesinde malikâne sistemi,” in Türkiye iktisat tarihi semineri. Metinler—tartışmalar, ed. by Osman Okyar and Unal Nabantoglu (Ankara, 1975), 231–96.

sixteenth century, will show us the geographical distribution and relative proportions of the different types of landholding. The statistical tables which we have derived from these registers will help us gain a clear idea of this issue, based on definite, quantitative data.\textsuperscript{84}

Thus, one or two Ottomanist historians had expressed their commitment to the search for novel sources and to more sophisticated methodologies at the very Turkish History Congress, which ironically had been heralded as a celebration of the victory of the ‘official history thesis’. Quite soon, professional historians also directed their attention to the history textbooks; but on the whole, the latter turned out to be quite resistant to scholarly criticism.\textsuperscript{85} In the following years, the study of Ottoman history in a professional mode was to gain new adherents; thus in 1942 Halil İnalcık published his doctoral thesis. From the 1970s onwards, he was to become the dominant figure of Ottoman history.\textsuperscript{86} With the opening of the Prime Minister’s and Topkapı archives, and even later, with the growing accessibility of the kadi registers, a more careful and critical treatment of Ottoman history emerged, even though the process was a slow and painful one.

\textit{Concluding remarks}

As we have seen, Ottoman history did not fit well into the ‘official history thesis’ of the Kemalist era. There were two major reasons for this: first, it was impossible to make sense of Ottoman state and society without emphasizing the role of religion. This, however, was exactly what the secular nationalists who had founded the Republic of Turkey were unwilling to do. At the very most, they were pre-

\textsuperscript{84} Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda kuruluş devrinin toprak meseleleri”, in \textit{İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, İstanbul 20–25 Eylül 1937. Kongre\'nin \c{c}al\textsuperscript{\textperiodcentered}malar\textsuperscript{\textperiodcentered}, kongreye sunulan teb\textsuperscript{\textperiodcentered}iller} (İstanbul, 1943), 1003 and 1007.

\textsuperscript{85} At the second Congress of Education \textit{İkinci Maarif \c{c}urası} (Ankara, 1943), 241–263, Ömer Lütfi Barkan freely expressed his criticisms; others were soon to follow. A long-lasting debate ensued between Akdes Nimet Kurat and Enver Ziya Karal concerning the deficiencies of the textbooks, see Ersanlı, \textit{İktidar ve tarih}, 194, note 51. Among other points, Kurat criticized that some Asian countries such as Iran had not been treated extensively enough, and the same thing applied to major tendencies in European thought, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the intellectual currents of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Furthermore, the numerous mistakes in the textbooks made it difficult for the students to develop confidence in their knowledge, and thereby impeded the formation of confident personalities.

\textsuperscript{86} Halil İnalcık, \textit{Tanzimat ve Bulgar meselesi} (reprint Istanbul, 1992).
pared to employ religion in order to explain certain features of Ottoman social or political organization.

As the second reason why the first generation of Republican powerholders felt uncomfortable with their own background, we may identify the ethnic heterogeneity of the— but recently defunct— Ottoman state apparatus and society. Early Republican ideologues were as obsessed with 'national purity' as were most other representatives of ethnic secular nationalism. Given these conditions, two contradictory reactions to the Ottoman past were possible, and both were in fact attempted. As one possibility, the Turkic or at least Turkish origins of the Ottomans could be stressed to the exclusion of anything else, Köprüli’s disquisitions on the Kayı origins of the Ottoman dynasty forming a case in point. In the writings of less scholarly authors, we might even find the more extreme claim that the Ottomans’ successes as conquerors were to be attributed uniquely to the Turkic traditions they had inherited.

As an alternative, the Ottomans were defined as an alien group, which, being ‘un-Turkish’, had no place in the history of the ‘new’ national state that was the Republic. In this context it was common enough to evoke the faults of the ruling elite, cosmopolitan in its makeup, which by its defects and ‘corruption’ had caused the ‘decline’ of the Ottoman state. Of course, none of these claims was amenable to proof; and ironically enough, it was the later centuries of the Empire, with their more abundant documentation, which offered the greatest opportunities to Ottomanist historians.

Things were made even more troublesome by the fact that the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, whom the Turkish nationalists claimed as their ‘ancestors’, were no more homogeneous than the Ottomans had been. It was common enough for nomad groupings to change their affiliation to a more encompassing entity, ‘tribe’ or ‘state’ according to the circumstances. This happened whenever a leader was victorious in battle, for then his ‘tribe’ came to absorb many newcomers, while the reverse often occurred in case of military defeat. Such changes of allegiance even might result in the members of a weaker group changing their religion and, in the long run, sometimes their language as well. In consequence, to make the ancient Turks of

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87 This does not however mean that these opportunities were always taken: apart from a number of articles written during his early years as a legal historian, Omer Lütfi Barkan concentrated on the pre-1650 period.
Central Asia usable ‘ancestors’ for modern Turks, it was necessary to endow them with a homogeneous identity they never in fact had possessed. Thus, for instance, the Mongol connections of certain Turkic tribes had to be downplayed as much as possible.

Yet the long history of the Turkic peoples, of which the Ottoman Empire constituted merely an episode, was a legitimizing feature which representatives of the Kemalist ‘party line’, with their strong emphasis on ethnic nationalism, were unwilling to give up. Accordingly, archeology and physical anthropology were pressed into service. But here the difficulty was that the Turkish government could sponsor excavations only on its own territory, and certainly not in Soviet Central Asia. Given this lack of solid information on the different Turkic peoples, much of the writing on Central Asian topics produced in the 1930s was of doubtful scholarly value. It therefore comes as no surprise that real experts on Central Asia, particularly Zeki Velidi Togan, were highly critical of the superficial and unscholarly use of inadequate sources which characterized so much writing on Turkic history during that period.

On the other hand, Ottoman history remained close to the minds, if not the hearts, of Republican historians. Figures such as Fuat Köprüli and İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı were able to establish themselves as influential personages, whose prestige was mainly scholarly, but to a certain extent, political as well. Moreover, modern methods of writing history, in so far as they found adherents in the 1930s in Turkey at all, found them among Ottomanist historians and nowhere else: Fuat Köprüli and Ömer Lütfi Barkan come to mind most readily. Thus, whether its representatives liked it or not, whatever scholarly historiography existed in Turkey during the 1930s that was also capable of making an international impact was basically concerned with the Ottoman world—theories of ‘fatal decline’ notwithstanding.
Among the different ethnic groups resident in the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were one of the last to develop a ‘national consciousness’. Yet with the breakaway of more and more provinces in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, an emerging nationalist intelligentsia developed a project of asserting the Turkish presence within what was still a multi-ethnic empire. After 1908, measures were taken to promote the use of Turkish even in the local administration of areas inhabited by non-Turks. This gave rise to some dissatisfaction, particularly among the Albanians, and non-Muslims resident in the Empire frequently reacted by refusing to learn Turkish at all. On the economic level, representatives of the Committee for Union and Progress also adumbrated projects to create a Turkish bourgeoisie.

All these plans really came to fruition after the Ottoman defeat in World War I, when the Empire finally collapsed. After a major war, in which Greece and the Turkish nationalist forces centered in Ankara were the principal opponents, the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. During the following years, the formative stage of the Republic, establishing a unitary national state on the territories still in Ottoman hands at the time of the Mudros armistice (1918) came to be the avowed aim of the new state’s government. Quite a few of the nation-building projects which originally had been developed during the last years of the Empire were taken up once

again at this time, including a reform of the alphabet and the written language.\textsuperscript{4}

All manner of nation-building projects were facilitated by the exchange of populations decided in Lausanne (1923), by which, with certain exceptions, the Greek—Orthodox population of Turkey and the Muslim population of Greece were forced to leave their respective homelands. These population movements further reinforced the ‘national’ character of the new Turkish state. After 1923, only the Greeks of the former Ottoman capital were allowed to remain in Turkey.\textsuperscript{5} As for the Armenians, many had been victims of fighting and state repression during World War I; those who survived generally emigrated after the war.\textsuperscript{6}

In the Republic of Turkey, the non-Muslim presence largely was limited to Istanbul. Salonica with its sizeable Jewish and Christian populations had been lost to the Empire already in 1912 and thus remained outside the borders of the Republic. The former Ottoman capital constituted a possible place of emigration for those Jews who did not wish to become Greek subjects. In addition, the Armenians resident in Istanbul largely had escaped deportation. Moreover, while the Catholic Assyro-Chaldean and the Orthodox Assyrian communities were originally resident in eastern Anatolia, many of their members migrated to Istanbul in the course of time.\textsuperscript{7} In consequence, during the 1920s and 1930s, Pera/Beyoğlu retained some of its cosmopolitan atmosphere.

Yet the capital levy of 1942–1943, known as the Varlık Vergisi (‘Tax on Wealth), caused great losses to many non-Muslim businessmen, and this fact contributed to the ‘Turkification’ of Istanbul’s

\textsuperscript{4} For the reforms of the Kemalists and their antecedents under the Committee of Union and Progress, see Erik Jan Zürcher, \textit{Turkey, A Modern History} (London, 1994), 181 and elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{5} The same thing applied to Greece, where only the Muslims of western Thrace were permitted to remain.

\textsuperscript{6} According to the Lausanne treaty of 1923, the existence of the non-Muslim minorities inhabiting Turkey at that time was acknowledged. The Turkish government accepted the obligation to protect all its citizens regardless of creed, but no special rights or foreign interference were recognized in the case of Greeks, Armenians and Jews. See Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, 170.

\textsuperscript{7} Today, the Suryanis have largely disappeared from Turkey. See H. Poulton, \textit{Top Hat, Gray Wolf and Crescent. Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic} (London, 1997), 114–29 and 272–84. On the Greek community compare Alexis Alexandris, \textit{The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1976} (Athens, 1983).
Moreover, in 1965 a series of measures against Greeks who lived in Turkey without possessing Turkish passports obliged a large number of Greek families to leave the country. This included numerous citizens of Turkey married or otherwise related to the expellees. As a result, after the mid-1960s the number of Greek speakers in Istanbul dwindled to almost nil.

‘Turkification’ also meant that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the new national state were Muslims. Even though the constitution and the laws of the Republic do not permit discrimination against any citizen on the basis of his/her religion, the belief that Islam is a prerequisite of ‘Turkishness’ was and is widespread. This applied even in the late 1950s, when Istanbul still housed a compact group of Greek speakers. Moreover, with the virtual disappearance of Christians and Jews, this identification of ‘being Turkish’ and ‘being Muslim’ became even more convincing on an empirical level. Forty years ago, Bernard Lewis put this situation in a nutshell when he wrote that “a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk”.

Nation-building, historiography and non-Muslims

Historiography had a significant role to play in the Turkish nation-building project, as was true in almost every national state forged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Turkish historiography of the republican period recognized a special link to the Ottoman past. Thus, the Turkish-speaking Muslims of the defunct polity were cast as the ‘imagined community’, which after the establishment of the Republic continued to live on as the ‘Turkish nation’.

Furthermore, historians who supported the early Republic were placed in the uncomfortable position of having to explain why the new state had limited the role of Islam in public life by defining itself as...
'secular'. After all, for the mass of the citizenry, Islam continued to determine the parameters of their world. In addition, the new régime needed to alleviate the odium of having deposed not merely an individual sultan-caliph—that had happened many times previously—but the dynasty as a whole. After all, for over five hundred years, the loyalties of Ottoman subjects had focused on the house of Osman. This meant that historians had to confront the recent past, including the end of the sultanate and the establishment of the Republic. They could not possibly avoid such a discussion as a methodologically unwholesome mixture of 'scientific' history and 'politicized' current affairs.

Now in the 1930s and even 1940s, the very recent past did hold a major war between Greece and Turkey. The Turkish national state had been forged in the course of this extremely bitter and destructive sequence of campaigns. In consequence, the events of the period between 1919 and 1923 were crucial in defining the identity not only of the new state itself, but also the identities of many individual people inhabiting this polity. As a result, the relationship between 'the' Greeks, on the one hand, and the Ottoman (and later Turkish republican) state, on the other, was drawn into the vortex of nationalist polemics. The millets of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the non-Muslims of republican times, were and often still are viewed as 'parts' of some foreign nation. That Ottoman millets were defined on the basis of religion and not of ethnicity was conveniently forgotten. Similarly, the fact that the Greeks under discussion might be subjects of Greece, the Ottoman Empire or later the Republic of Turkey, and that these different 'passports' might condition their attitudes, was not given due consideration by many such polemicists. However, even in these writings, there did appear some gradations of 'foreignness'. For instance, the situation of the Jews was somewhat special;

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12 As the work by Johann Strauss in the present volume shows, in the seventeenth century, this also applied to many provincial Greeks.

13 By the term millet we mean the officially recognized organizations of the different non-Muslim religious groups, which mediated the relations of their members with the Ottoman state. To what extent these organizations formed part of the 'classical' Ottoman state system, and to what extent they were a nineteenth-century innovation, still is a contentious matter among Ottomanists. For some pertinent studies see Bernard Lewis and Benjamin Braude eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 2 vols. (New York, London, 1982).

In the present paper, we will use the term millet when dealing with the non-Muslim groups of the Ottoman period. The term 'minority' will be reserved for the republican years.
even though Jewish immigration into Palestine had constituted a bone of contention in the late Ottoman period, the loss of Syria in 1917 made this a non-issue as far as the Republic of Turkey was concerned. With no possible or actual territorial conflict involved in the Jewish case, Turkish nationalist authors generally are inclined to reserve most of their polemics for Greeks and Armenians. This development also is linked to the fiercely contentious Greek and Armenian national historiographies, which have no parallel among Jewish historians in Israel or elsewhere. Quite a few Greek and Armenian authors base their entire view of history on the notion that ‘their’ community in the course of its existence has been confronted with a ‘national enemy’. This enemy is identified first with a ‘Turkish’ Ottoman Empire and later with its ‘continuation’, the Republic of Turkey. Greek historians, for instance, often will depict the Ottoman history of this or that province of modern Greece as a constant retrogression of trade and crafts to ‘primitive’ levels. Therefore, the very few ‘bright spots’ in an otherwise bleak picture will be those activities which Greeks were able to establish or maintain without major involvement on the part of the Ottoman state. As examples, one might mention the maritime trade of eighteenth-century Hydra and Psara, or the relatively autonomous community organization set up especially on the Greek islands.

On a different level, the accusatory stance typical of these historiographies has impelled the Turkish side to devise a propagandistic counteroffensive. Thus in his recent book *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, Salahi Sonyel does not deal with Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians or Christian Arabs. Yet it is undeniable that all these groups, alone or, in the Arab case, together with their Muslim neighbors, at one time or another broke away from the Ottoman Empire. One might assume that Sonyel selected the Greeks and Armenians because they waged war against the Turkish nationalist forces in 1919–1923. Moreover, political rivalries and, due to the

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16 On this debate compare Eleni Gara, “In Search of Communities in Seventeenth-century Ottoman Sources: the Case of the Kara Ferye District”, *Turcica* 30 (1998), 135–162.
Cyprus conflict, even military confrontation occasionally occurred in the post-1923 period as well. Presumably Sonyel has included the Jews, normally of less importance in the context of Turkish nationalist polemics, because the post-World War II Arab-Israeli conflict had conferred a retrospective importance on the political aims of Ottoman Jewry.  

Defining the aims of our study

To keep the present paper within manageable limits, I have selected only one case, namely the Greeks, from among the Ottoman millets and republican minorities. Since the Greek minority, or millet as the case may be, typically is accorded more space than other non-Muslim ethnic and/or religious groups in Turkish historiography, this seems a rational choice. The following factors could account for the special attention Turkish authors pay to the Greeks: To begin with, in the Ottoman realm certain members of the Rum milleti were permitted access to positions of power. Not only the official translators of the Sultan’s council, the tercümans or dragomans, but also the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia occupied places in the state hierarchy which were not normally accessible to other non-Muslims. Secondly, apart from the Serbs, the Greeks were the first ethnic group to mutate into a nation and stage an uprising with the aim of setting up a sovereign state (1821). Although the revolt was defeated, the Greeks, with the help of European states, ultimately were able to secede from the Ottoman Empire. Turkish historians therefore have tended to regard the Greeks as responsible for starting the ethnic turmoil in the Balkans, which within less than a century resulted in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. As a third point, the Greek state formed in 1830 repeatedly extended its frontiers by waging war against the Ottoman Empire (1881, 1908, 1912–1913). In addition, there were numerous attacks by irredentist bands on Ottoman territory which occurred frequently throughout the nineteenth century, even in times of peace.  

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18 Yet this explanation does not account for the fact that the Bulgarians are omitted from Sonyel’s account. After all, Bulgarian activity in Macedonia, to say nothing of the early twentieth-century Balkan wars and the post-World War II mistreatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, combine to make for rather a conflictual history.  

attacks appear as directed against ‘Turkish lands’, to cite a frequently used phrase. A fourth reason for viewing the Greeks with special, suspicious attention is doubtless the memory of the bitter war years (1919–1923) which we already have referred to. A fifth point is linked to the fact that Greece and Turkey even today have not resolved their political differences, which include a dispute related to sovereignty rights in the Aegean shelf and, more acutely, the Cyprus affair. Last but not least, to pass from the realm of events remembered to that of more explicit ideology, certain Turkish scholars passionately negate the view, espoused with equal passion by Greek national historiography, that the Greeks as the former inhabitants of much of Anatolia constitute the autochthonous inhabitants of the region. For within the nationalist paradigm, such ‘anteriority’ somehow conveys special ‘rights’. All these considerations have colored much of what is being written on Greeks and Greek history in the Republic of Turkey.

The sources for my study consist of primary and secondary school textbooks, in addition to historical accounts directed at the non-specialist reader which, for the sake of brevity, sometimes will be referred to as ‘popular’ literature. Furthermore, I will focus on academic works of history in which Greeks occur, often merely as one issue among others. According to the styles of argument and writing which, in my perspective, characterize these different publications, I have grouped them into four categories, one of which has been further divided into three sub-categories. First there are the textbooks written for the purpose of imparting an account of Ottoman and Turkish history to schoolchildren. In recent years, various competing versions have come into existence. Yet given the fact that these textbooks, mostly on history and civics must be accepted by the Ministry of Education, I assume that they reflect the official view of the government under which they were admitted for use in schools.20 Secondly, there are books written for the general reader with little historical background beyond what he/she may remember of his/her school textbooks, and maybe from movies and comics dealing with more or less historical topics. As these books are produced for sale, they reflect what their authors assume to be the predilections of the ‘ordinary’ literate man/woman.

20 For a list of the textbooks examined see Herkül Millas, “Türk ders kitaplarında ‘Yunanlar’: Bütünleştirici bir yaklaşım”, in Tarih eğitimi ve tarihte “öteki Sorunu” (Istanbul, 1998), 262–63.
In the third category, I place those studies which I would view as reflecting a 'traditional' academic outlook. Given the very small number of Turkish academics with a knowledge of Greek, the books in this category usually are written on the basis of Turkish sources, with or without an interlacing of source texts in English and French. According to the style of argument involved, I distinguish between three sub-categories, which I call 'confrontationist', 'moderate' and 'liberal'. As we will see, these categories, based on the style of debate, have very little connection to the place which the relevant author may occupy in the political spectrum. Authors in the first sub-category tend to not only emphasize the conflicts between 'Greeks' and 'Turks' to the exclusion of anything else, they also will assume some kind of 'hereditary enmity' of the type we have already encountered among Greek nationalist historians. As to the 'moderates', they also will side with the Ottoman or republican Turkish state through thick and thin, but they normally have a broader worldview than their 'confrontationist' colleagues, and are less inclined to see the world in terms of 'black and white'. Thus their arguments will normally be more finely crafted and less emotional. To an even greater extent this applies to the 'liberals', whose inclination to 'defend the state' is less marked as well and who in addition pay greater attention to historical change. Last but not least, there is a category which I have named 'critical'. Again these people may profoundly disagree among themselves on many questions of political import, but many of these historians and social scientists do share the assumption that nations are not eternal, that they have come into being, often in the fairly recent past, and that having emerged, presumably they also can disappear. Moreover, these people also will assume that encouraging hatreds of people of differing religions, nationalities or ethnicities is profoundly dangerous politically, for such feelings easily can be mobilized by would-be dictators, as the example of Nazi Germany, among others, has clearly demonstrated.21

‘Tit for tat’: refuting Greek claims in Turkish textbooks

In the Turkish context, the teaching of history recently has been subjected to a considerable amount of criticism. Thus Salih Özbaran, who practices history apart from reflecting on the methodology of teaching this discipline, has asked himself:

Is history a means of inciting to bitter rivalries, by foregrounding Reagan’s wish that the XXI. century should be an American century, or, as Turkish nationalists rather would have it, the ‘century of the Turks’? [Is history] a means of producing enemies where none existed before, of using the tensions inherent in racism and religious fanaticism in order to prepare for future wars?  

A critical view of the role of history teaching, of course, involves criticism of the existing textbooks. Or maybe it would be better to say that once the principle was accepted that more than one set of history textbooks might be available for school directors, teachers and possibly even parents to chose from, the criticism of history textbooks, which long had remained private, became part of public discussion. In another work, originally published as a separate essay, Özbaran pointed out the weaknesses of history teaching which ensured that children and young people, mildly speaking, generally disliked history classes.

Two congresses totally dedicated to the teaching of history and the role of schoolbooks followed. In both instances, the proceedings were published soon after. In these two volumes, history teachers on the secondary level as well as academics expressed their frustration with the current teaching of history. In addition, the social scientist and regional planner İlhan Tekeli published an empirical study, in which the historical consciousness of European and Turkish students was investigated in a comparative perspective. At a congress dedicated to the image of ‘the other’ in Turkish schoolbooks, and in a separate volume as well, the present author, moreover, has tackled the thorny question of how the non-Muslim

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inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey have fared in modern Turkish schoolbooks.\(^{26}\)

Among the criticisms directed at these textbooks, accusations of 'conservative nationalism' are quite widespread. Throughout, the textbook accounts given of Greeks and Greek affairs reflect the tense relations between Greece and Turkey. Often the claims concerning the Greeks which are made in Turkish schoolbooks seem to have been conceived as responses to the claims which originate, or are thought by the textbook authors to have originated, in Greek nationalist historiography. This implicit attempt at refutation is one possible reason why children or juveniles, normally unfamiliar with the preceding polemics, often find their textbooks quite simply difficult to believe. Thus as we have seen, there exist Greek claims to historical priority on Anatolian soil and therefore to a 'right' to these lands. In Turkish schoolbooks, this claim will be countered by a variety of argumentative devices. At least until 1993, many textbook authors still liked to state that all creators of the great civilizations of antiquity were of Turkish stock.\(^{27}\) Or the Achaeans, Dorians and Ionians were all subsumed under a single catchall phrase, namely the 'Ionians'. The latter, as the creators of the western Anatolian towns and pre-Socratic philosophy, were positively evaluated by Turkish textbook authors. But supposedly these people had nothing in common with the Greeks. As one primary school textbook put it:

> the name 'Ionians' belonged to the grandfathers of the native people who lived for a long time on the western coast of Anatolia. This name had no connection whatsoever with the 'Greek' tribes.\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Herkül Millas, _Yunan ulusunun doğusu_ (Istanbul, 1994) and _idem_, "Türk ders kitaplannda 'Yunanlıklar'".

\(^{27}\) The new textbooks published after 1993 no longer contain many of the negative stereotypes previously attributed to the Greeks. On these improvements compare Millas, "Türk Ders Kitaplarnda 'Yunanlıklar'" and _idem_, _Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine bir önsöz_ (Istanbul, 1995).

Since however there seems to be no silver lining without a cloud, these new textbooks all but exclude the ancient civilizations of Anatolia: Recep Yıldırım, "Tarih ders kitaplarnda Anadolu uygarlıklar", in Özbaran ed., _Tarih öğretimi ve ders kitapları_, 161–66.

\(^{28}\) Ferruh Sanr, Tarık Asal, Niyazi Akşit, _İlkokul Sosyal Bilgiler—4_, p. 192 (Istanbul, 1986). For details see Millas, "Türk Ders Kitaplarnda 'Yunanlıklar'". Amusingly enough, from an etymological point of view the word 'Yunan', an ancient term which in modern Turkish denotes the Greek citizens of Greece, is actually derived from the term 'Ionian' (Ottoman subjects and citizens of the Republic of Turkey with a Greek ethnic affiliation are known as 'Rum').
Ignoring ‘uncomfortable’ periods also forms a common response; thus, for example, Turkish schoolbooks reserve at most a few sentences for the entire Byzantine period. Yet the latter lasted for almost a thousand years and at the time of its apogee, the Byzantine Empire controlled most of the territories forming the present-day Turkish Republic. Nor does the student receive much of an introduction to the major buildings of the Byzantine period, such as Aya Sofya, Aya Irini or the city walls of Istanbul, to say nothing of provincial structures such as the churches of St John in Selçuk or St Nicholas in Kale (Demre) near Finike.

When history textbooks ‘reach’ the nineteenth century, we witness a more obvious attempt to counter the claims of Greek national historiography. Here the Greek interpretation states that the uprising of 1821 and the events which followed it down to the foundation of an independent state in 1830 constituted an authentic revolution and a war of national liberation. In the Turkish schoolbooks I have analyzed, this subject is approached in an oblique fashion. As we have seen, the Greeks are passed over in silence throughout almost the entire account of Ottoman history, only surfacing in 1821, when they were in armed confrontation with the Ottoman government. However, there is no attempt to explain the conditions which had led up to the events of 1821. According to the textbook authors, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, a ‘happy millet’, had no reason whatsoever for discontent. Not only were the Ottoman authorities tolerant, permitting the Orthodox Christians freedom of religion, the latter even enjoyed a kind of self-government under the Istanbul Patriarchs. By contrast, the students learn nothing about the century-long conflicts in the eighteenth-century Peloponnese or the expansion of the Greek trading diaspora of that period, which in its wake brought about the prosperity of merchants and ship captains, as well as a broadening of political and intellectual horizons. As to the impact of the French Revolution, it is viewed in entirely negative terms, and the students are given no information at all about Romantic nationalism and its vogue in Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe.

As no internal reasons are acknowledged which explain the Greek revolt, the entire blame comes to rest upon the foreign powers and their Philhellenism. As a result of the latter movement, so the version relayed to Turkish students runs, foreigners encouraged the Ottoman ‘Rum’ to believe that they were descendents of the ancient
Greeks. Thus it was the foreigners who originally conceived the idea of a Greek state. Admittedly such statements, while hyperbolic in form, do have some basis in the scholarly literature. Thus the account given of the Greek uprising and the subsequent war by the American historian Barbara Jelavich also stresses the role of the Great Powers of Europe, especially England, in securing statehood for Greece after the uprising itself had been put down by Muhammad Ali Pasha’s troops. In the same context we must view the destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet at Navarino (1827) by a detachment of ships belonging to countries with whose government Sultan Mahmud II was not even at war. Thus in terms of historical accuracy, it is only fair to admit that Greece came into being in 1830 as a result of Great Power intervention. Yet neither from a scholarly nor from a pedagogical viewpoint does it make sense to leave the students with the impression that the Greeks of the Peloponnese and elsewhere had no grievances and did not fight for their statehood. Nor is it a good idea to leave the readers ignorant of the reasons which prompted many but by no means all Greeks to struggle for an independent state. The textbooks generally will limit themselves to the assertion that the Greeks attempted to reestablish the Byzantine Empire under the banner of an expansionist policy called the ‘Megali Idea’.

29 Here we can discern an echo of the claims of the German-language scholar Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790–1861), author of a history of the ‘empire’ of Trapezunt. Fallmerayer, who had travelled extensively in the Ottoman lands, defended the thesis that Slav and later Albanian immigration virtually had swamped the Greek population of medieval Greece. It was therefore meaningless to claim that the Greeks of his own time were descended from the Greeks of antiquity.

Of course Fallmerayer’s claims, whatever their historical accuracy, are important only if national or racial ‘purity’ are important considerations. This seems to apply to certain authors of Turkish textbooks, who, in a derogatory sense, call the Greeks ‘half-cast’ (melez).


31 Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 226.

The intellectual background of textbook writers: a few notes

One major avenue toward the refutation of the Greek claims, which occurs quite readily to the ‘post-nationalist’ political intellectual, remains closed to the authors of Turkish history textbooks. For regardless of the ethnicity of the Ionians, Dorians and Achaeans, and admitting without hesitation the long Byzantine implantation in much of Asia Minor; it is in no way necessary to assume that these facts de-legitimize the present-day Turkish position. After all, it is perfectly possible to view nations in the modern sense as emerging in a process which began in the late eighteenth century. It is likewise an obvious fact that, the 1921–1922 episode apart, the Greek nation state never controlled any part of Anatolia. But this argument is convincing only if we assume that most nations have had a short history, and that is exactly the opposite of what Turkish textbook authors claim for their own nation. When, however, a perennial Turkish nation is assumed, then it makes sense that its ‘ungrateful’ opponent, the Greek nation, also has had a long existence. When and how the latter came into being the Turkish textbooks do not tell us, they only insinuate that the origins of the Greeks were rather less than glorious.

This rather simplistic discourse has, however, fairly complicated antecedents. One is the ‘official thesis’ concerning Turkish history, which assumes a perennial Turkish nation, part of the ‘white race’, some of whose members migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia and later to the Balkans as well. Wherever they went, the Turks acted as bringers of civilization, and most of the peoples who founded the ancient civilizations of Anatolia were assumed to have been Turks. This thesis was soon abandoned in scholarly discourse, but traces survived in school textbooks down to 1993.

More long-lived was a second factor, which for the sake of convenience we may call ‘Anatolianism’. One version stems from the novelist Kemal Tahir (1910–1973) who in 1967 published a novel named Devlet Ana. Its story is set in fourteenth-century Bithynia, at a time

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33 For further details, see the article by Büşra Ersanlı in the present volume. For the racialist implications of this theory, compare Afet İnan, L’Anatolie, le pays de la ‘race’ turque (Geneva, 1941). Publication was sponsored by the Republic of Turkey.

when the Ottomans had just formed a minor principality, and conveys the author’s conviction that in the Ottoman state, justice and tolerance reigned. The Ottomans had no truck with the violence and injustice of European feudalism. To the contrary, their state and society formed a prime example of the Asiatic ‘mode of production’, where land was not private property, but lay in the hands of the state. While much less satisfying from a literary viewpoint than many of the author’s other works, *Devlet Ana* highlights the integration (and ultimate islamization) of a local Greek warrior into the emerging Ottoman state. This figure, perhaps loosely patterned on the semi-mythical ancestors of the Evrenos- or Mihal-oğulları, is depicted in a very positive light, and so are the early Ottomans. On the other hand, those considered ‘outsiders’ to Anatolia, Mongols and Crusaders alike, are cast as the villains of the story.

Widely read during the 1970s, Kemal Tahir is not, however, the inventor of ‘Anatolianism’. This notion previously had been promoted by the novelist Cevat Şakir Kabaağaçlı (1886–1973), who from his exile in Bodrum, first imposed and later voluntary, wrote books which celebrate the beauties of the Aegean coast. Cevat Şakir gained literary fame under the pen name of Halikarnas Balıkçısı (the fisherman of Halikarnassos). Along with his younger associates the critic, essayist and one-time official Sabahettin Eyüboğlu (1908–1973) and the classical scholar Azra Erhat (1915–1982), Halikarnas Balıkçısı popularized the notion that the Turks were heirs to the peoples and civilizations which had flourished in Anatolia before the great migrations of the eleventh century and after. With their emphasis on the multi-cultural history of Anatolia, the members of this group for a long time were highly suspect in official circles, and both Eyüboğlu and Erhat lost their university and other official positions. Moreover, with their emphasis on the peaceful joys of exploring the beauties of landscape and experiencing the magic of extinct civilizations, these writers appealed to a left-wing, pacifist segment of the Turkish readership.

But even so, there were significant omissions. In her travel guide to southwestern Anatolia, for instance, Erhat gives prominence to the Greeks of the classical period, even acquainting the reader with

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36 In 1971 Eyüboğlu was imprisoned under the accusation of having formed a secret organization. The charges were finally dropped.
Homeric verses in her own translation. Yet the Byzantine remains of the area are mentioned very briefly, if at all. It is worth noting that after the authors in question were safely dead, their views were appropriated by the Turkish prime minister and later president Turgut Özal, who in 1988 defended the ‘European’ character of Turkey because it had inherited the ‘Ionian’ civilization.  

Change-resistant textbooks

On a more mundane plane, however, the considerations of writers, historians and social scientists are only of very minor importance in determining the contents of textbooks. As is well known, the Turkish political scene is characterized by serious dissensions. The best known of these conflicts is the split between secularists and those who feel that a greater role should be given to organized Islam in public life. On the foreign policy level, we observe a serious division between those who think that Turkey should make great efforts to join the European Union, and those who assume that Turkey’s ‘natural’ allies are to be found in other Islamic states. Lately, the majority of the Islamists is in favor of joining the European Union, because they believe they will be better protected within this community. The contenders in these two disputes do not necessarily coincide; thus among secularists, there exists a current of opinion whose adherents opt not for integration into Europe, but view themselves as representatives of an ‘anti-imperialist’ tradition. On the foreign policy level, these people would appear to favor strict neutrality. In addition, the Kurdish rebellions also have given rise to a split between those who opt for a ‘political’ settlement and those who rely mainly on military repression. To further complicate the situation, the recent elections have shown that a party of extreme rightist leanings has captured significant sections of the electorate. In consequence of these deep divisions, the political equilibrium is quite unstable, and anything increasing stability and consensus will be welcomed by the political class.

History textbooks provide just such a possibility. Of particular relevance to our study, the tendency to denigrate the Greeks, even if the most obvious instances now have been removed from the

textbooks, will satisfy nationalists with a strong anti-western slant. ‘Anatolianism’, on the other hand, will appeal to people whose sympathies are, to a degree, with Europe, and, in the present-day context, Kemalist intellectuals and left-wingers also will assent, albeit with qualifications. A strong anti-western stance, as we have seen, can make both nationalists with Islamicist leanings and militant secularists happy, and the same thing applies to the neglect of the Byzantines, who have found few defenders.

All these views compete and conflict within a tension-ridden search for national identity; every group will oppose all suggestions which it interprets as running counter to its own aims and ideologies. By objections and delaying tactics, [each group] tries to ensure the victory of its own ideas.38

‘Popular’ historiography

Given the rarity of scholarly works on Greece and the Greeks in Turkey, the public must gain information almost exclusively from books and articles of no particular academic standing. For such publications, we have decided to use the expression ‘popular’. They strike the eye for their crude and sometimes even vulgar language, and at first glance, one is tempted to ignore these writings as unworthy of serious academic consideration. This, however, would be a mistake. Firstly, at some stage of their careers, some of these authors do gain academic positions. Moreover, quite a few intellectuals and public figures seem to gain their notions about Greece and the Greeks from literature of this type. And because the public is used to reading the epitheta ‘ungrateful’ or even ‘our ex-slaves’, some politicians will adopt them in their public speeches, especially at election time. The same thing applies to journalists, who, when in need of ‘background information’ in a hurry, also will turn to sources of this type.

As an example, let us take a brief look at an older work concerning Greco-Turkish relations.39 Here we find quite a florilegium of derogatory expressions to designate Greeks, which even includes ‘plunderers and murderers’.40 Racially speaking, the modern Greeks

39 S. Salışlık, Türk-Yunan i ilişkileri tarihi ve Etniki Eteyia (İstanbul, 1968).
40 Salışlık, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, 77.
are depicted as being of Slavic origin; as to the ancient Greeks, from Homer to Heraclitus, they are all supposed to be Turks.\textsuperscript{41} Unsurprisingly, the Greek \textit{millet} has owed its survival to Turkish tolerance.\textsuperscript{42} Yet the most remarkable feature about this work is probably the fact that in 1967 it was recommended by the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Ministry of Defense as constituting a ‘serious study’.\textsuperscript{43}

Quite a few of the ‘popular’ writings have been produced by military and secret service personnel, both on active duty and retired. Thus, General Faruk Güventürk published a book on the political aims of the Greek government, insofar as they were directed against the state of Turkey.\textsuperscript{44} In a seminar on Greco-Turkish relations, whose proceedings later were published, many of the views characteristic of the ‘popular’ literature were voiced, even though academic participation was substantial. This volume has since become an important work of reference for students writing papers on Greco-Turkish relations.\textsuperscript{45}

To summarize, the statements found most often in the ‘popular’ literature, when combined, form a reasonably coherent account. Among the supposedly immutable characteristics of the Greek \textit{millet} or minority, the following are given special prominence: the Rum \textit{milleti}, that is, Ottoman subjects or republican Turkish citizens of Greek ethnicity, all form part of the ‘Greek nation’. The tolerant Ottoman State had granted this \textit{millet} all kinds of liberties. Thus the Greeks were able to practice their religion, build their own educational institutions, and enrich themselves through commerce.

In consequence, this \textit{millet} has lived a richer and more agreeable life than the average member of the ‘in-group’, that is, the Muslim Turks. These advantages, however, have been gained by ‘unfair’ means, that is, the Greeks have joined the foreign powers in exploiting the Muslim Turks. While the attitude of the Ottoman government to its Greek subjects never wavered, the latter did change their earlier and presumably more loyal attitudes. At one point in time,

\textsuperscript{41} Salişik, \textit{Türk-Yunan ilişkileri}, 300.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{44} Faruk Güventürk, \textit{Türklere karşı Yunan milli hedefleri ve genel politika, stratejileri nedir?} (Ankara, 1976).
they revolted and tried to appropriate lands which by right belonged to the Ottoman state, that is, the Muslim-Turkish ‘in-group’. As ‘the West’ supported this policy, ‘our’ Ottoman Empire collapsed. Even today, the modern Greek nation continues the same irredentist policies against ‘us’, keeping alive the expansionist Megali Idea.

Given this scenario, there are certain permanent—and negative—characteristics which, according to the authors of ‘popular’ writings, may be attributed to the Greek nation. Throughout, these authors seem to take the following approach: the Greeks are ungrateful, traitors to and aggressors of the Ottoman Empire and, at least potentially, the Republic of Turkey as well. Moreover, they are slavish, having willingly played the role of puppets to the western powers. To put it in a nutshell, ‘they’ are on a lower moral level than ‘us’.

‘Confrontationists’, ‘moderates’ and ‘liberals’: ‘traditional’ academic views

A systematic discussion of the views of Turkish academics concerning the Greek uprising of 1821 has been undertaken in a previous study. In the present paper, I hope to present rather broader, more encompassing observations in a much more succinct form. Unfortunately, the requirements of brevity frequently do not permit me to present the finer nuances and subtle differences of opinion which exist especially among those scholars who have worked extensively on topics related to Ottoman Greeks or the Greeks of independent Greece. All cases presented here are only intended as examples, and I do not claim to have identified the ‘principal’ representatives of any given trend.

As stated already in the introductory paragraphs of this paper, I have divided the ‘traditional’ historians into three sub-categories, namely the ‘confrontationists’, the ‘moderates’ and the ‘liberals’. Of course these categories are in no way absolutes, but denote positions on a continuous spectrum of attitudes. Thus certain authors of a ‘confrontationist’ bent have a good deal in common with the ‘popular’ historiography, while the opinions of some of the authors classed here as ‘liberal’ shade off into the ‘critical’ section of our attitudinal spectrum. Between ‘moderates’ and ‘liberals’, there are also no hard

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46 Millas, Yımnulusunun doğuşu, 201–243.
and fast limits. Yet to a greater or lesser extent, ‘confrontationists’, ‘moderates’ and ‘liberals’ all aim at defending the Ottoman state and/or the Turkish Republic. However, it is noteworthy that the degree often differs according to the audience envisaged. When texts are published in Turkish, the apologetics are more obvious, while in many instances, they are considerably toned down when the author addresses an international audience.

This combination of scholarly and apologetic concerns is typical for nationalist historiography in general, and our observations with respect to the Turkish case thus form part of a much larger pattern. As we have already noted in the case of the textbooks, some of the apologetics in the scholarly realm should equally be regarded as ‘reactive’. In European historiography, there exists a long tradition of denigrating the Ottoman Empire as an outmoded organization dominated by religion, as a land whose socio-political system impeded economic growth and political centralization. In a sense of course, the anti-Ottoman criticism of early republican intellectuals took up some of these motifs. But at the same time, Turkish republican authors viewed the Ottoman Empire’s conquests and ‘just’ administration as a major source of legitimation of the Republic, or, as they often put it, ‘the state’ tout court. As a result, they were much inclined toward defending the Ottoman achievement against all comers, and for many of them, this meant a denigration of the non-Muslim millets.


48 As an example of this tendency one might mention an article by Ömer Lütfi Barkan, which was published as the author’s contribution to a Festschrift celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the Tanzimat. Here Barkan discusses the land law of 1858, which, under certain conditions, sanctioned private property in land. Barkan was profoundly sceptical of the commercial sector of the economy in general, which he tended to regard as a potential enemy of the peasant and, more importantly still, of ‘the state’. Barkan thus viewed the right to purchase land, which the 1858 law granted to anybody with the requisite means, “Greek and Armenian money changers” included, as “one of our unpardonable errors of neglect and one of the sad necessities to which we have bowed”: Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Türk toprak hukuku tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi”, reprinted in Tiirk toprak meselesi, Istanbul, 1980, 349. For a criticism of Barkan’s ‘statism’ see Halil Berktay, “Der Aufstieg und die gegenwartige Krise der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung in der Türkei”, Periplius, 1 (1991), 102–125.

Moreover Barkan was not unique. Thus for example the influential nationalist historian and publicist Yusuf Akçura, and also the historian Ismail Hakki Uzuncaşrılı,
Almost none of the historians under discussion here reads Greek; therefore they are able to study only that part of the Greek secondary literature which has been published in French or English. Moreover quite a few scholars limit themselves even further and use only Ottoman or Turkish primary sources. However, researchers such as Salahi Sonyel, Gülnihal Bozkurt and Ali İhsan Bağş have worked extensively in the Public Record Office in London. This limitation in the use of sources makes it difficult to enter into a dialogue with scholars working outside of Turkey, in Greece or elsewhere.

The 'confrontationists'

Many of the 'confrontationist' authors will adopt an extremely emotional tone when discussing the 'Greek issue'. A good example is a work by Niyazi Berkes, a distinguished historian and social scientist, who for a long time, taught at McGill University in Montréal, Canada. Among the myths Berkes propagated, in a book first published in the year of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, we find the claim that the patriarchate in Istanbul had fomented the Greek rebellion. Amusingly enough, Berkes shares this error with some of the most conservative Greek historians. In fact, as can be seen from Barbara Jelavich's account, certain high church dignitaries did join the uprising in Moldavia and Wallachia, as did some of their colleagues offici-
ating in the Peloponnese. Yet the Patriarch and his entourage are conspicuous by their absence from all preparations for the uprising. Only when military action just was about to begin did the head of the Orthodox Church intervene, declaring that all rebels were to be anathema.\footnote{Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 204–17. In a frequently used French work of reference (Georges Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans, XIV*-XIX\textsuperscript{e} siècle, Paris, 1991, 260–70), the bishop Germanos of Patras is given a prominent role, but once again the Patriarch himself appears only at the moment of his execution. For a Turkish translation of the ‘Paternal Admonition’ issued by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Anthimos in 1798, according to which those who ‘dreamt of liberty’ had been seduced by the Devil, see Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğu*, 133–134. According to Castellan (p. 261) this text had been issued by Patriarch Gregorios himself.}

But Berkes obviously did not much trouble himself with the—already quite substantial—secondary literature available at the time of writing. For Berkes it is the Orthodox Church which constitutes the source of all evil by introducing bribery into the Ottoman state. However, in this endeavor the church was not without competition: in the second half of the sixteenth century, this dubious distinction already had been attributed to Şemsi Pasha, who supposedly wanted to avenge the fall of the İsfendiyar-oğlu dynasty, from which he himself had issued.\footnote{Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541–1600)* (Princeton, 1986), 259.} Be that as it may, ecclesiastical bribery resulted in an ungovernable Ottoman Empire, and throughout, the Orthodox Church proved its visceral ingratitude: For all these misdeeds were perpetrated even though “the Church was saved from the danger of Catholicism because of Turkish power”.\footnote{Berkes, *Teokrasi ve laiklik*, 119.} In addition, both the Greeks and the Orthodox Church are described as ‘megalomaniacs’, and in the Greek context, politics is supposed to mean “robbery, political murder or conspiracy”.\footnote{For a lengthy selection of Berkes’ phraseology, see my *Yunan ulusunun doğusu*, 213.}

In *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, destined for an international audience, Berkes uses a more restrained language. Even so, he claims that throughout Ottoman history, the Greek millet was antagonistic to the ‘Turkish’ side, both economically and politically. As the main reason for Turkish nationalism, Berkes views the *Megali Idea* and its avowed intention of resuscitating the Byzantine Empire.\footnote{Berkes, *Secularism*, 432.} It seems that Berkes was mainly concerned by the fact that the Greek presence in the Ottoman Empire impeded the emergence of a Turkish
bourgeoisie; this worry probably was what caused him to quote at length a comment by the nationalist writer Yusuf Akcura from 1914:

... it was the native Jews, Greeks and Armenians who were the agents and middlemen of European capitalism... If the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class... the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim.56

Berkes' tendency to equate the Ottomans and the Turks also can be found in Salahi Sonyel's book Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which we already have encountered in a different context.57 According to the author, the very existence of the non-Muslim minorities accounts to a large extent for the 'destruction' of the Ottoman state. By contrast, the Ottoman government's attitude with respect to the non-Muslim population was "socially egalitarian" and the sultan aimed at an "impartial dispensation of law between Muslims and non-Muslims".58 The Greeks had no reason for complaint against the Ottoman administration, as the freedom of the Christians was secured.59 In fact, the minorities benefited enormously from the Ottoman leniency, magnanimity and tolerance, and from all the other benefits provided by a strong, just and benevolent Muslim state.60

In actuality, Sonyel finds that the non-Muslims lived better than the Muslims, and even at the expense of the latter. For the power of the European states, and sometimes also the Greeks' trading partners from among the western merchants, protected non-Muslim Ottoman subjects from the tax demands of the Ottoman state. Yet the members of Greek families who in the eighteenth century were sent to govern Moldavia and Wallachia, the so-called Phanariots, fomented Greek nationalism, in close conjunction with the Orthodox Church. Once again, 'ingratitude' appears as the archetypical sin of 'the Greeks'.

56 Berkes, Secularism, 426. On Akcura as an historian compare the study by Ersanlı in the present volume, while a more ample treatment can be found in François Georgeon, Türk milliyetçiliğinin kökenleri—Yusuf Akcura (1876–1935), transl. by Alev Er (Ankara, 1986).

57 This work was published, in English, by the Turkish Historical Society, known for its close relations to the Turkish government. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that throughout the nineteenth century and even earlier, the confusion between 'Ottomans' and 'Turks' was very common in the secondary literature written by Europeans.

58 Sonyel, Minorities, 7 and 17.

59 Sonyel, Minorities, 98 and 102.

60 Sonyel, Minorities, 445.
The ‘moderates’

If Berkes and Sonyel thus employ a terminology closely akin to that of the ‘popular’ literature, there are other studies in which the apologetic intention coexists with a will to produce a fair and realistic work. In this ‘moderate’ category I would place three studies, which have been authored by Gülünhal Bozkurt, Bilal Eryılmaz and Ali İhsan Bağış. Gülünhal Bozkurt’s work constitutes a study in legal history, encompassing the period from the promulgation of the Tanzimat rescript in 1839 to World War I. Although in principle the study ends in 1914, the closing chapter does touch upon the Ottoman family law, which was only promulgated during World War I. The author has consulted German and British diplomatic correspondence of the period; as to French source materials, she has studied selected materials in translation.

At the beginning of her study, which has resulted from post-doctoral work in (West) Germany and Great Britain, the author explains that in the last decades of its existence, the Ottoman government legislated on all problems related to its non-Muslim subjects with a constant attention to the international implications. Bozkurt’s work therefore contains a detailed discussion of the political contexts in which individual laws were decided upon, and herein lies the value of her work. On the basis largely of consular reports, she attempts a close analysis of the reasons which caused Ottoman non-Muslims to be dissatisfied with the reform edicts of the Tanzimat. She thus concludes that given non-Muslim nationalism and Great Power pressures, the Ottoman government’s attempts to gain the hearts and minds of its non-Muslim subjects by the Tanzimat and reform edicts of 1839 and 1856 resulted only in a fatal weakening of state structures.

While Bozkurt has done a considerable amount of work in the archives, the study of Bilal Eryılmaz, which covers more or less the same topics, is based on published sources, such as the writings of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and Abdürrahman Şereฟ. Similarly to Bozkurt, Eryılmaz opens his study with a chapter on the regulations concerning non-Muslims decreed at the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, which in their basic features constituted the legal framework for the status of non-Muslims down to the Tanzimat. Here Eryılmaz quite realistically recognizes that the political organization of the Ottoman

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62 Bilal Eryılmaz, Osmanlı devletinde gayrimiislim tepkileri yönetimi (İstanbul, 1990).
Empire was based on a differentiation according to religious criteria, and that the Muslims held the dominant positions. Non-Muslims were supposed to ‘avoid getting involved in politics’, but were also subject to various disabilities in social life. These included not only the prohibition to ride horses (according to the author, horseback riding was a privilege which, at least in Istanbul, was not extended to many Muslims either), but also the obligation to wear special clothes, avoid walking on the sidewalks or use the public baths without protecting the feet by wooden pattens. Moreover, Christians were not allowed to build new churches. Eryilmaz readily admits that some of these discriminatory measures, such as the prohibition to ride horses or use the sidewalks, were “wrong and unnecessary”, their chief disadvantage being that they alienated the non-Muslims both from the state and their Muslim neighbors. In Eryilmaz’s perspective, nationalist movements thus can partly be explained on the background of such disabilities. Yet at the same time, Eryilmaz places a high degree of confidence in the ability of wronged non-Muslims to obtain justice through the intervention of the sultans. Even so, he himself admits that “financial corruption, confiscations and favoritism” played a role in augmenting the difficulties of the state and also of its subjects, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Whether under these circumstances, the author’s confidence in sultanic intervention is justified remains another matter entirely.

Ali İhsan Bağış’s short book on the capitulations and their effects upon the status of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century non-Muslim Ottomans is based on his London dissertation for which he has consulted documents both in the Public Record Office and the Prime Minister’s archives in Istanbul. While today a number of studies exist concerning the problems of non-Muslim Ottomans and their links to the foreign communities resident in the Empire, this was much less true at the time of writing, and thus Bağış genuinely broke some new ground. It is probably fair to say that the author

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63 Eryilmaz, Gayrimüslimler, 48–49.
64 Eryilmaz, Gayrimüslimler, 216–18.
65 Ali İhsan Bağış, Osmanlı ticaretinde gayri müslimler (Ankara, 1983).
views the behavior of non-Muslims seeking the protection of foreign embassies exclusively from the viewpoint of the Ottoman state administration; and from that perspective, obtaining spurious appointments as ‘translators’ and other consular employees doubtless constituted a major abuse. But on the other hand, Bağış himself admits that the non-Muslims who sought foreign protection did this in order to shield themselves from “confiscation, which was much feared by the [non-Muslim] Ottoman subjects” (and, although this is outside of Bağış’s topic, by the Muslims as well). Moreover, Mahmud II’s attempt to create two special categories of privileged traders (Avrupa tıccarları for the non-Muslims, Hayriye tıccarları for the Muslims) in itself implies the admission that to compete successfully with European merchants, Ottoman subjects needed special protection from the state. In the light of all this, it does not seem quite fair to place the major onus of responsibility for eighteenth-century abuses on the shoulders of the non-Muslims alone.

The ‘liberals’

In this group I would place some of the most distinguished figures in present-day Ottoman studies. Among these scholars, the tendency to defend the Ottoman Empire against all possible criticism is much less obvious than among the ‘moderates’, to say nothing of the ‘confrontationists’. Praise for Ottoman statesmanship, as evidenced by the treatment of the Empire’s Greek subjects, only is expressed in a muted fashion, often by pointing out the real advantages which the Greek Orthodox might expect from the Ottoman state. By contrast, the difficulties with which non-Muslims had to contend are rarely discussed.

Thus when analyzing the resettlement of Istanbul after the Ottoman conquest, Halil İnalcık dwells on the ‘equality’ granted to Christian
subjects of the Empire after they had paid the special capitation tax, to which Muslims were not liable.\textsuperscript{69} This author stresses that after the conquest of the Byzantine capital, Mehmed II went out of his way to mitigate the consequences which, according to Islamic religious law, should have befallen the inhabitants of the conquered city. The slaves who had fallen to the Sultan as his one-fifth share of the war booty gained in Constantinople, were not sent off to distant provinces, but settled in the city proper. Moreover, many of the former Byzantine churches were, at least for the time being, left to the Orthodox.\textsuperscript{70} In another work İnalçik points to the tax exemptions which readily were accorded to Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire who did service in the sultans’ armies, stressing that in the fifteenth century it was possible to enter the Ottoman military class without previously having accepted Islam.\textsuperscript{71} Likewise, scions of certain great Byzantine families in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were successful as Ottoman tax farmers on a grand scale.\textsuperscript{72} “For the interests of their empire the Ottomans applied the Islamic prescriptions in a particularly liberal way in favor of their dhimmi subjects”.\textsuperscript{73}

In İnalçik’s perspective, what counts is the raison d’état of the Ottoman state, whose policy, differently from the way in which Barkan usually perceived it, included a full-scale involvement in international trade and the money economy. In an Ottoman state for which control of trade routes constituted a major issue, Muslims and in a less prominent role, the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Empire found their respective places. What the latter may have thought of their station in life is of much less import.

While İnalçik has authored a major and extremely influential article on the ‘capitulations’ granted to the subjects of foreign rulers residing on Ottoman territory, he has been less interested in the internal organization of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, the so-called


\textsuperscript{70} İnalçik, “The Policy”, 235.

\textsuperscript{71} Halil İnalçik, The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age 1300–1600 (reprint London, 1994), 114.

\textsuperscript{72} Halil İnalçik, “Greeks in Ottoman Economy and Finances, 1453–1500”, reprinted in idem, Essays in Ottoman History (Istanbul, 1998), 379–89. For more recent work on these ex-Byzantine businessmen, compare the study by Klaus-Peter Matschke in the present volume.

\textsuperscript{73} İnalçik, “Greeks”, 380.
millet system. Nor has he been greatly concerned by the role which these organizations played in the perpetuation of the Ottoman state. On this matter, however, we possess an important study by Kemal Karpat. The author attempts to construct a model of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century changes in the Ottoman millet system, which is intended to explain why in the former Ottoman lands, national identity did not become divorced from religion as was the case in western Europe. It is Karpat’s thesis that nation... formation was conditioned to an important extent by the socio-ethnic structure and the religious identity engendered by the millet system.

In Karpat’s perspective, Ottoman non-Muslims divided their loyalties, of course under the Sultan who alone could command undivided allegiance. One claimant to non-Muslim loyalty was their millet, that is the officially recognized religion/denomination, to which the person in question happened to belong. Another such focus of loyalty was the ethnic and cultural group of which every Ottoman subject constituted a member—there might be many such communities within one and the same millet. Finally, not the least among the claimants to the loyalty of any Ottoman subject was his family, the setting where religious and cultural values were inculcated in each new generation. Linguistic differences were of limited political significance until the eighteenth century, when the leaders of the Greek Orthodox church attempted to ‘byzantinize’ and thereby ‘grecicize’ the multi-cultural organization under their control.

In the nineteenth century, non-Muslim nationalisms were strongly colored by the experience of religious community which Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians or Armenians had gone through within their respective millets. On the one hand, the millets lost much of their previous importance, as the central state of the Tanzimat now claimed to be the fountainhead of people’s civic rights. On the other hand, the ‘small groups’ which had existed within the millets, with predominantly

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76 Karpat, “Millets”, 141.
77 In a recently published work: Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem (Leiden, 2001), Oded Peri has shown that this process actually began in the seventeenth century.
familial and parochial values, now 'de-universalized' religion. In the form of a particular denomination, 'parochialized' religion came to be seen as the apanage of one or the other ethnic group. In Karpat's view, the Ottoman elite committed a serious policy error when, instead of legitimizing the mosaic of different religious and cultural entities which had emerged after the decline of the millets, it attempted to impose a unitary Ottoman nationhood, of the kind which at the time had become popular in western Europe.

According to Karpat's model, Ottoman millets were transformed during the eighteenth century, not only because of the policies of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy, but also due to the rise of local notables, both Muslim and Christian. The conflicts between these latter two competing elites encouraged disaffection among the non-Muslims, who, on the whole, could count on less support from the central state. Economic factors, such as the enrichment of many Balkan merchants, also had a role to play, as wealthy traders reacted against an underdeveloped school system shaped by clerical priorities and demanded a say in the business of the millet. And last but not least, it was the centralizing Tanzimat bureaucracy which, by its attempts to direct and control, succeeded in transforming and, in the end, fatally weakening the millet as an institution.

All this explains only the genesis of nationalism in a non-Muslim context, for instance the Serbian, Greek, or Bulgarian cases. In Karpat's view, Muslim nationalisms were, at least to a great extent, mere responses to developments within the non-Muslim millets. Muslims reacted to the loss of religiously motivated privilege which had been theirs during the Ottoman heyday and to the foreign protection upon which so many non-Muslims now could rely. Thus, as in a game of dominoes, changes in one section of the gameboard ultimately led to changes in the total configuration. However, this model does not help us to account for the fact that the Muslims also adopted a division into different nations according to linguistic allegiance. Within the framework of Karpat's model, asserting a unified Muslim identity probably would have made more sense.

Karpat makes another important point when he states that the position of a given person vis-à-vis the Ottoman state was more important in determining his tax status than even his religious affiliation. He thus demonstrates that the millets were part of an interlocking political system, and not an absolute and isolated 'given'. In the picture drawn by this author, the internal balance within a millet might be disturbed if
the representatives of a *millet* attempted to tailor religion according to the political aspirations of an ethnic group.

In such cases, certain members of a *millet* might sever their ties to the organization to which they had originally belonged. However, given Ottoman political organization, for the individual person who did not leave the sultan's domains abandoning one such group always meant that he or she came to join another.

*The ‘critical’ historians*

These ideas have been carried further by a number of historians, sociologists and political scientists who, from the 1960s onward, have begun to pioneer a different understanding of both the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects. These academics constitute a minority within the Turkish intellectual community, but their professional standing is often high. For the scholars sharing this outlook, the practices and policies of the Ottoman Empire have lost much of their relevance for the present. Often they see themselves as part of an international community of scholars, which makes them less inclined to defend the Ottoman elite as their own ‘ancestry’. As will have become clear in the course of this chapter, these are the people who view nations as comparatively recent creations, so that the history of the present is not too closely connected to what happened in the fifteenth or even the nineteenth century. Unfortunately however, none of these ‘critical’ scholars has written a major study of the Greek Orthodox or any other *millet*. Therefore, their critical comments mostly are made ‘in passing’ and very few of them have actually tackled the complex of ‘traditional’ attitudes which have been discussed in the present study.

However, in spite of these limitations, the critical stance adopted is worth noting. Thus for example, the highly respected archeologist

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79 Critics of the apologetic stance of Turkish historians dealing with Greek affairs can look back upon a distinguished ‘ancestor’ in the person of Osman Nuri Ergin (1883–1961), whose knowledge of Istanbul’s urban administration remains unrivalled even today. In his *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi* (repr. Istanbul, 1977, 740) the author draws a realistic picture of the “educational system of the minorities”. He also criticizes implicitly various state policies with respect to the *millets*, and explicitly the execution of many official translators, who in the eighteenth century, were usually Greeks.

Another critical voice comes from the analysis of Turkish schoolbooks, whom we already have encountered in a different context. Apart from the previously cited
Ekrem Akurgal, who has taught an entire generation of Turkish archeologists and ancient historians, at the very General Staff conference already referred to, warned against naive and chauvinistic attitudes toward the Greeks. As Akurgal put it, Greeks had intermingled considerably with Turks, even if this fact did not please many of his compatriots.  

The economic historians Zafer Toprak and Çağlar Keyder, who focus on Turkish-republican history while taking late Ottoman developments into account, both have pointed the way to a more balanced evaluation of the Greek role. The same can be said of the economic and monetary historian Şevket Pamuk, whose publications span the entire Ottoman period; and the political scientist Taner Timur forcefully has expressed his impatience with the ‘apologetic’ historiography which has occupied us here.

As we have seen, most Turkish historians view Turkish nationalism during the late Ottoman period as a reaction against minority nationalisms. While this is certainly justified, there is another side to the coin: Zafer Toprak points out that during the last years of the Empire, and especially during the war years, eliminating the non-Muslims from economic life became an avowed government policy. By implication, this cannot have had a favorable impact on the loyalty of non-Muslim businessmen still active in the Empire, of which, at least in principle, they were considered subjects.

In his influential introduction to Ottoman economic history, Şevket Pamuk is critical of eighteenth and nineteenth-century official policies, which did not aim at protecting local merchants and producers against competition on the part of European traders. Here the effects were felt by Muslims and non-Muslims alike; and Pamuk strongly qualifies the ‘traditional’ notion of non-Muslim merchants as the ‘collaborationist’ associates of European traders. The author points out that from the eighteenth century onwards, non-Muslim merchants played an important role also as the associates of the Ottoman administration, whose activities they helped to finance. As to the relations of non-Muslim merchants with their European coun-

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terparts, they were based on competition, particularly in regional trade, more than on subservient association. By this differentiated explanation, Pamuk has thus proposed a rational analysis of the role of Ottoman non-Muslims, instead of the emotional moralism so frequent in ‘traditional’ historiography.  

Çağlar Keyder first made a name for himself by ‘situating’ Ottoman and Turkish history within the ‘world systems’ framework of Immanuel Wallerstein. In 1987 he brought out a synthetic work on this topic, which focused on the relationship between ‘the state’ and ‘social class(es)’, a problématique very much favored by historians of a Marxian background. In Keyder’s perspective, ‘incorporation’ of the Ottoman territories into the European world economy permitted the emergence of a bourgeoisie, which in Keyder’s perspective had been absent from the Ottoman Empire during its ‘classical’ period. However, this bourgeoisie was mainly non-Muslim; it was unable to secure state support, and subsequently was eliminated during the upheavals of World War I and its aftermath. This disappearance of the bourgeoisie allowed the state bureaucracy, which had been the dominant class during earlier centuries, to gain a new lease on life. Only after World War II had ‘bourgeoisie formation with state aid’, whose beginnings Toprak had noted for the late Ottoman Empire, proceeded far enough that the bureaucracy was obliged to renounce its exclusive control of the state. In this context, it is worth noting that Keyder views the Greek, Armenian and Jewish merchants, compradors though they may have been, as an integral part of a ‘peripheralized’ Ottoman society, and not as some ‘foreign’ element which ultimately ‘had to’ be excluded.

When merchants and manufacturers, in their overwhelming majority Greeks and Armenians, became politically committed, the inter-state system had already condemned the Empire to dissolution. Under different conditions, with higher odds in favour of the survival of the Empire, they might have taken a different tack. As it was, their politics gambled on the breakup of the Ottoman realm.

The political scientist Taner Timur has analyzed Ottoman history as a process leading from ‘primitive’ (or ‘early’) feudalism to a ‘semicolonial economy’. In this context he emphasizes that down to the

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84 Keyder, State and Class, 47.
middle of the nineteenth century, and in some instances even beyond, the Ottoman state structure involved a ‘caste-like’ separation between rulers and ruled. Moreover, the ruled themselves were further divided into the Muslim ‘first class’ subjects, and the ‘second-class’ non-Muslims. Even after all subjects had been rendered legally equal by the Tanzimat and reform rescripts of 1839 and 1856, the integration of the non-Muslim subjects was a problematic process. Timur also stresses that Ottoman liberals evinced scant sympathies for the non-Muslims. Even the oppositionist poet Namik Kemal (1840–1888) did not demand a political order in which Muslims and non-Muslims would be legal equals; if anything, he criticized the Tanzimat bureaucracy because the latter did not take Islamic religious law seriously enough. Timur concludes that

A [political] movement occurring a hundred years after the French Revolution and not aiming at the removal of legal privileges cannot be regarded as a ‘struggle for freedom’, and [this deficiency] cannot be excused by the ‘conditions of the times’.85

Presumably a notable improvement of the quality of historical studies, at least at the elite universities, constitutes a major precondition for the emergence of the ‘critical’ historiography. Toprak, Pamuk, Keyder and Timur all work at such elite universities, or, as in Keyder’s case, principally abroad. Their discourse thus is directed at ‘educated readers’ familiar with the major debates going on in the social sciences on an international level. Among these readers, students and fellow professionals probably make up a fairly high percentage. But given the number of university students and graduates, this is already a reading public of appreciable size. At the Foundation for Turkish Social and Economic History, with its headquarters in Istanbul and branches in Ankara and the major provincial cities, the ‘critical’ scholars have found a forum where their ideas can be discussed.

85 Taner Timur, Osmanlı Çalışmaları. İlk Feodalizmden Yarı Sömürge Ekonomisine (Ankara, 1989), 299.

An even sharper formulation of similar views is found in Taner Akçam, Türk ulusal kimliği ve Ermeni sorunu (Istanbul, 1993), 66. Akçam’s criticism apparently is directed at the Turkish political left, namely when he remarks that the non-Muslims have been equated with the capitalist class, “nourished by the capitulations”. In the struggle against this class, every means seems to become legitimate, and even “the principle of general equality becomes suspect as if it were an imperialist trick”.

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In addition, one should not underestimate the importance of the fact that the Republic of Turkey is now over seventy-five years old, and the tense period of nation formation is largely over. With telecommunications widespread and relatively cheap and access to the internet increasing, certain sections of the academic milieu and big city readership in general are also more attuned to intellectual trends outside of Turkey. In the long run, some of the young people who have attended school abroad as the children of Turkish workers and who now have entered into the Istanbul or Ankara milieu presumably also will also increase the readership of the ‘critical’ historians.

Some indications of this trend well may be visible even today. In a few cases, the views of the ‘critical’ academics have been taken up by authors whose style is more journalistic; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue. Books on the cosmopolitan culture of the nineteenth-century Ottoman capital, as well as photographs which allow us to visualize the same milieu, enjoy a fairly wide appeal in present-day Istanbul. Beyoğlu, the former Pera, where many Greeks used to live, has become a major focus of the ‘nostalgia culture’ of the last twenty years or so. It also is notable that many Istanbul cultural institutions currently are establishing themselves in this same area. A cynic might add that the absence of real-life non-Muslims probably has added to the appeal of this old town quarter and its ‘intercultural’ history. Whatever the causes, a new interest in ‘minority culture’ is perceivable.

A provisional conclusion

Intersecting with scholarly concerns, the desire to ‘defend’ the Ottoman Empire thus plays a significant role in all writings concerning Ottoman non-Muslim millets and Turkish-republican minorities, at least if we disregard the small number of scholars belonging to the ‘critical’


87 In this context, it is worth noting that a few Greeks resident in Istanbul, or formerly resident in this city, also have become interested in the affairs of the Rum milleti. The present author apart, one might point to Y. Benlisoy and E. Macar, Fener Patrikhanesi (Ankara, 1996) and Stéphane Yerasimos, Azgelmişlik sürecinde Türkiye, Bizans’tan 1971’e, 3 vols. in one (Istanbul, 3rd printing 1980).
group. This apologetic tendency, by the way, is by no means limited to Turkish scholars. To many American, Dutch, French or German Ottomanists, refuting various and sundry accusations directed against the Empire also constitutes a significant reason for their scholarly endeavors. This 'slant' goes far to explain certain lacunae in Turkish Ottomanist historiography. To begin with, the early Ottoman period until 1453 receives very little scholarly attention as far as the Greek subjects of the Empire and their Byzantine opponents are concerned. Such a neglect doubtless is due in part to the lack of sources. But more must be involved; for in the 'transition studies' which deal with the end of Byzantine and 'Latin' ascendancy in the Mediterranean and the concomitant rise of the Ottomans, the participation of Turkish Ottomanist historians is limited indeed.\textsuperscript{88} Barringer oversight, only İnalcık, Necipoğlu, Delilbaşı and Kafadar have made major contributions to this noteworthy sub-field of late medieval studies. Linguistic problems apart, presumably the fact that the early Ottomans were imbricated to such a degree with their non-Muslim neighbors has contributed toward making this field less than attractive to historians of lingering nationalist inclinations.

As a second 'gap' in Turkish Ottomanist studies relevant to Greeks, one might point to the extreme rarity with which documents emanating from Ottoman Greeks themselves are taken into account. Again, there is a trivial reason, namely, that so few historians active in Turkey know modern Greek. But beyond this simple fact, one could point to more profound motives. Identifying the 'voices', that is, the self-interpertation of Ottoman subjects, of the non-members of the ruling elite, is still very much a minor concern among Turkish historians. And when attempts of this kind are undertaken, they are usually limited to the early twentieth, or at most, the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{90} It is to be hoped that recent efforts, still rather isolated, to 'place' the non-Muslims of the late Ottoman period in their Istanbul context will inspire the specialists on earlier periods as well.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{88} As a major exception, however, there is Cemal Kafadar's sophisticated book \textit{Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State} (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1995).

\textsuperscript{89} For the new directions taken in 'transition studies', compare the article by Klaus Peter Matschke in the present volume.

\textsuperscript{90} As document publications in this vein, one might mention \textit{Ertuğrul süvarisi Ali Bey'den Ayşe Hanım'a mektuplar}, ed. by Canan Eronat (İstanbul, 1995) and Ahmet Nefim Servet Tör, \textit{Nevhzî'nin günlükü, Deftər-i hatırı}, ed. by Kaya Şahin (İstanbul, 2000).

\textsuperscript{91} On the employees of the Osmanlı Bankası around 1900, where many non-
As a third ‘blank spot’ in the history of Ottoman Greeks, and of non-Muslims in general, the slave status of many members of this group rarely is taken into consideration. Yet this situation also is beginning to change. In a recent book, Hakan Erdem has developed the hypothesis that at least during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, most Ottoman zimmis were not ‘really’ zimmis at all, but, at least in principle, slaves of the state by law of conquest. Their original status was, so to say, reactivated when their sons were recruited into the levy of boys (devşirme)—by this hypothesis, Erdem resolves the contradiction that cizye-paying subjects legally could not be enslaved, while devşirme recruits definitely bore certain marks of slavery.92 It is still too early to say whether this hypothesis will gain general acceptance, but it does have the merit of highlighting the significance of slavery for many Ottoman non-Muslims in the early centuries of the Empire. On a more empirical level, the existence of agricultural slaves in the vicinity of fifteenth-century Istanbul, some of whom tried to pass themselves off as free non-Muslim subjects, recently has been emphasized by the historian Stéphane Yérasimos.93 But these few swallows do not necessarily make a summer.

Another problem, the fourth, is linked to what might be called a tendency toward excessive simplification, which means that regional and local specificities are lost from view. Thus we may note the absence from the Turkish historiography on Ottoman Greeks of those people who were not under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox patriarch. Albeit grecophone, these men and women were Roman Catholics. Yet particularly on the Mediterranean islands, Greek-speaking Catholics formed a small but by no means insignificant group. Presumably a simplistic understanding of late medieval history lies at the root of the problem. As we have seen, ‘popular’ Turkish historiography makes much of the claim that the Ottomans ‘saved’ the Greek-Orthodox from being overwhelmed by the Catholic church; the existence of grecophone Catholics disturbs this tidy picture. Another example

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of such excessive simplification can be discerned when Greeks are viewed as constantly forming a ‘minority’ within the Ottoman Empire. Of course, this is accurate if the Empire is being considered as a totality. But on the regional or sub-regional plane, the Peloponnese or the Aegean islands constituting prime examples, Greeks in fact might form a majority. Yet as Karpat has pointed out, local dynamics played a significant role in the emergence of non-Muslim nationalisms, so that it is not a good idea to limit one’s study to the empire-wide perspective alone.\textsuperscript{94}

A fifth and final point concerns the tendency of many Turkish scholars to place a possibly excessive confidence in the good-neighborly relations between Muslims and their Greek fellow townsmen or villagers. Doubtless numerous cases of this sort existed, and if only because Greek nationalist historians have so often claimed the contrary, such cases deserve close analysis. Yet especially at times of external tension, such as the Russo-Ottoman conflict of 1768–1774, pogroms did occur. Moreover, similarly to other non-Muslims, the Orthodox could get chased out of their homes and churches. Sometimes the houses were deemed too close to a mosque, or churches were converted into mosques because a ruler or vizier sought to gain support by a show of piety. Such events did not happen every day, but a working historian should not try to persuade him/herself that they did not happen at all.

Despite these deficiencies, especially the ‘liberal’ historians dealing with the Greeks in Ottoman history also have some solid achievements to their credit. To begin with, these historians have substituted historical analysis for mere assertions of moral superiority. In addition, the work of İnalcık and Karpat has made it clear that Ottoman millets were not immutable institutions within an unchanging Ottoman state. Quite to the contrary, the status of every millet, including of course the Greek-Orthodox, changed according to political conjunctures. Thus even though certain ground rules were laid in the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, the Greek millet of the sixteenth century differed substantially from that of the post-Tanzimat period.\textsuperscript{95} Thus a concern with social and political dynamics in Ottoman

\textsuperscript{94} Karpat, "Millet and Nationality", 153–54.
\textsuperscript{95} In the volume in which Karpat’s article on millets appeared, we also find a study by Benjamin Braude which casts doubt on the entire history of the millets as
history in general has revitalized the study of the Greek Orthodox millet. Moreover in the last two decades, 'critical' historians, with little stake in the 'defence of the state', are attempting to take the Greek perspective into account when working towards an historical synthesis. Much remains to be done, but at least a beginning has been made.

commonly accepted in the secondary literature: “Foundation Myths of the Millet System”, in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Braude and Lewis, vol. 1, 69–88. On pp. 77–81, Braude concludes that the Greeks of Mehmed II's time possessed an institution of their own, namely the Orthodox Church, and a communal leader, namely Patriarch Gennadios, but that the grant of formal privileges to the latter is not well attested. It is therefore doubtful whether the institution of the Greek millet really goes back to the Conqueror's time. However, we find little reference to Braude's work in the studies of Turkish historians dealing with Ottoman Greeks.
CHAPTER FIVE

OTTOMAN RULE EXPERIENCED AND REMEMBERED: REMARKS ON SOME LOCAL GREEK CHRONICLES OF THE TOURKOKRATIA

JOHANN STRAUSS

It seems inevitable that after the collapse of multiethnic empires (and even during the periods preceding their disintegration) a variety of national historiographies should develop, based on the determination of the individual ethnic groups getting ready to reconstruct their own history out of a multiethnic past. Whatever the results, we should not be surprised to find ourselves confronted with a fundamental divergence in the perception of the past. For various reasons—not all of them due to nationalism—the perspectives of the former rulers and the formerly ruled hardly ever coincide. Ottomanist scholars—both Turkish and Western—have been accustomed to writing Ottoman history basically from the perspective of the Ottoman chroniclers, thanks to their familiarity with the Ottoman-Turkish language that has given them access to narrative sources considered to be of primary importance. Even more recent research, focusing on social and economic history, still tends to adopt a somewhat similar view, “the bureaucrats’ perspective”, i.e., that of the Ottoman administration. No doubt this is due to the almost inexhaustible mass of material preserved in the Turkish archives. Impatient with the national stereotypes propagated by Balkan historiography in particular, Ottomanists have paid little attention to certain aspects of the internal life of the various ethnic communities, subsumed under the convenient, but excessively vague term millet.¹

This tendency toward exclusion is regrettable from several points of view. First of all, the image of a society, which in many respects was remarkably differentiated, remains incomplete. Moreover, non-Muslims can provide the Ottomanist with a certain type of narrative source which is extremely rare in Ottoman-Turkish: the local chronicle, sometimes of an autobiographical character. After the rapid decline of Byzantine historiography in the wake of the fall of Constantinople, it took a long time for a universal historiography to develop among the subject population. This was due to the absence of patrons, but also to ignorance of the Ottoman language and the historical works written in Ottoman. Those non-Muslims who sought to produce chronicles, sometimes with pedagogical intentions, quite naturally emphasized their immediate environment, and even their own person. As far as the Muslim population was concerned, we hardly have any personal testimonies of the way the lower social classes experienced history. Of course, research in this field has only just begun, and many personal testimonies have been irretrievably lost. Yet it seems that Ottoman subjects for the most part remained historiographically silent; it is only in folksongs that we can detect traces of the impact of even the most momentous events on the collective mind.

In this contribution, we take as our point of departure the premise that when studying multiethnic and multireligious societies inhabiting the Ottoman territories, we must avoid the rigid selectivity com-

The term millet only really gained popularity in the nineteenth century; see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society, vols. 1–2 (London, 1982); on millet see also the article “Millet” by Michael O. H. Ursinus in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, vol. 7, 61–64. It should be noted that the term millet never occurs in the works dealt with here.

2 On those extant (most of them unpublished), see Cengiz Orhonlu, “Bir Türk kadi’nin yazdığı Atina Tarihi (Tarih-i Medinetü l-hükema)”, Güney-Duğu Avrupa Araştırma Dergisi 2–3 (1973–74), 118–36, here 118–20. Not all of the works listed by Orhonlu, (e.g., the treatises describing a conquest (feth-nâme) belong to the category of local chronicles in the proper sense.

3 Significantly enough, this situation only changed in the eighteenth century, when more suitable conditions had been created by the Phanariot rulers in the Danubian principalities. On historiographical works concerning the Ottoman Empire, see Ion Matei, “Contributions aux début des études de turcologie en Roumanie, XV–XVIIIe siècles”, Revue des Études sud-est européennes 26, 2 (1988), 99–111, esp. 109 f.

monly practised by national historiographies. We are also convinced that despite the fundamental antagonism between Christians and Muslims, which pervades all writings by non-Muslims, at least in certain periods testimonies such as local chronicles and first-person narratives can shed considerable light on Ottoman society as a whole. Moreover, these texts offer important insights into the history of mentalities, and, in particular, they represent a unique source for what may be termed the subjects’ (teya) perspective.

The three testimonies chosen for this paper were all written in Greek. For the purposes of our study, this seems a particularly apt choice, since, apart from Ottoman-Turkish and Arabic, Greek was the most important written language of the Ottoman Empire. All three texts were written in, or at least refer to, the period which is known in Greek national historiography as Tourkokratia. It should be noted that in the Greek domain, too, this kind of historical narrative is very rare, especially when written by authors living within the boundaries of the Ottoman state. Unlike the works of more prestigious historians, both official and otherwise, they were accessible only in manuscript form to an extremely restricted readership. Some of them even needed to be rediscovered long after they had been written. Thus, the first chronicle to be dealt with here, that of the priest Synadinos (“Papasynadinos”, 1600–?) from the Macedonian town of Serres, was found at the end of the nineteenth century in the Kutlumush Monastery of Mount Athos. It was partially published in 1938. The third text to be discussed, an anonymous local chronicle

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6 The situation is entirely different as far as historiographical works written by emigrants trained in western Europe are concerned. Some of these were also printed, such as the outstanding “History of Cyprus” (Exronomikì tis Nísoù Kýperou) by the Archimandrite Kyprianos, Venice, 1788 (reprinted Nicosia, 1971). Despite its undeniable importance for intellectual history, this type of “westernized” historiography, very much like Ottoman historiography in the post-Tanzimat period, is in some respects less interesting to the Ottomanist scholar.

7 See Petros Pennas, “Τῷ Χρονικόν τῶν Σερρών τοῦ Παπασυναδίνου µετ’ εἰσαγωγής µελέτης”, Serraika Chronika 1 (1938), 7–72. In this paper the annotated edition by Giorgos Kaftantzis, Η Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία τοῦ Παπασυναδίνου (Salonica, 1989), is used. [Also see postscriptum].
from Cyprus, comprising an account of the years 1800–1878, was included in a simple notebook, together with poems and hymns, which a local historian came across in the 1920s. Even the memoirs of Panayis Skouzes (1777–1847), written in 1841, remained unpublished for a remarkably long period, although the author belonged to a prominent Athenian family. The manuscript passed from hand to hand until it was published for the first time in 1902 as part of a comprehensive history of the city of Athens under Ottoman rule.

Due to the social and intellectual background of these authors, their works cannot be classified as products of a genuine historiographical tradition. They do not use Byzantine or other chronicles as models, by which the authors’ expect their performance to be judged. The language is mainly colloquial, and the editors sometimes found it difficult to decipher the handwriting of scribes or authors. But as the latter were neither learned nor literary-minded, these works are all the more attractive for the modern historian looking for the writing of people outside the traditional intellectual élites.

**The Chronicle of Serres by Papasynadinos**

The first chronicle dealt with here, known as the “Chronicle of Serres”, dates from the first half of the seventeenth century. As regards the biography of the author, the priest Synadinos, we have to rely on the data given by the author himself. He was born in 1600, the son of a clergyman, in the village of Melenikitsi near Serres. Apart from a pilgrimage in 1629/30 to Mount Athos, of which he pro-

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9 Th. N. Philadelphus, Ιστορία τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐπὶ Τουρκοκρατίας (1400–1800), vol. 2 (Athens, 1902), 328–62; this volume also contains a chronicle of Athens by another, more learned contemporary, the “Teacher of Athens”, John Benizelos (263–313).
10 This work, although rightfully considered a unique source, cannot be said to figure prominently in major works on modern Greek history or literature, where very few references to the “Chronicle of Serres” can be found. See, for example, Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, The Greek Nation, 1453–1669. The Cultural and Economic Background of Modern Greek Society, translated by Ian and Phania Moles (New Brunswick, 1976) [original Greek version: Ιστορία τού νέου Ελληνισμοῦ, vol. 2nd edition (Salonica, 1976)], p. 303, fn. 39; p. 356, fn. 262. As far as works on modern Greek literature are concerned, Börje Knös’ L’Histoire de la littérature néo-grecque. La période jusqu’en 1821 (Stockholm et al., 1962), seems to be the notable exception (cf. op. cit., p. 449).
vides us with a very interesting description, he never seems to have left his native district.\textsuperscript{11}

The Macedonian town of Serres (Greek Σέρρες, Ott. Siroz, Serez), some forty miles northeast of Salonica and the residence of a Greek Orthodox Metropolitan, was one of the earliest Ottoman conquests in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{12} In 1667–1668 it was visited by the Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi on his way to Crete.\textsuperscript{13} Evliya describes Serres as a flourishing town, with thirty town quarters (mahalles) inhabited by Muslims and ten by Christians and Jews.\textsuperscript{14} According to Evliya the reaya mainly consisted of Greeks (Rum), Bulgars, Rumelian Turks (Çitak) and Türüks.\textsuperscript{15} Papasynadinos, who uses somewhat different categories, mainly refers to “Christians”, Jews, gypsies and the so-called Koïnari.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{11} The different monasteries are described in Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 36v–39r.
\textsuperscript{12} On Ottoman sources concerning Serres, see art. “Serez”, in İslâm Ansiklopedisi, by Besim Darkoć; Evangelia Balta, Les Vakifs de Serrès et de sa région (XVe et XVIe s.) (Athens, 1995); also see the article “Siroz” by Alexandra Yerolympos in Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., and Socrate Petmezas, “Serrès et sa région sous les Ottomans”, in Conseils et mémoires de Synadinos prêtre de Serrès en Macédoine (XVIIe siècle), ed. by Paolo Odorico (Paris, 1996), 430–483. It should be noted that, apart from Evliya Çelebi’s account, the picture remains remarkably bleak for the seventeenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century the German Balkanologist Gustav Weigand described the town as follows: “Serres has played for Hellenism a similar role as Ohrid for the Bulgarians, from the political point of view as well as from the ecclesiastical, being the residence of an archbishop. Hellenism has maintained its position quite well there, although the surrounding areas have a more Bulgarian population. The bulk of the population, however, is—or rather was—Turkish. Among its 20,000 inhabitants, 10,000 are Turks, 6,000 Greeks and hellenized Bulgars, 2,500 Aromunians (whose younger generation has also become hellenized), 3,000 Bulgarians and 1,500 Spanish-speaking Jews.” See his Ethnographie von Makedonien (Leipzig, 1924), p. 97.
\textsuperscript{13} See Seyahatname, vol. 8 (Istanbul, 1928), 128–140.
\textsuperscript{14} Seyahatname, vol. 8, 129 ff.—A thorough comparison of the images of Serres conveyed by the visitor Evliya and the local resident Papasynadinos would be a very rewarding task.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 133.
\textsuperscript{16} Different etymological explanations of this terms (usually spelled Koniarí) persist: The derivation from ‘Konya’, where the Koniarí are said to have originated from, seems to be the most popular one. The term Koniarí also gained popularity among the Ottomans during the nineteenth century. Kafantzis (Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, p. 65, fn. 367) explains its meaning as “beggar”, “Turkish gypsy”, and derives it from Greek διακονινός “beggar”. Another etymological explanation involves the Turkish term koyun eri, “sheep people”, which is also closer to the form Koïnari that occurs in Papasynadinos’ chronicle. Cf. Machiel Kiel, “Das türkische Thessalien”, in B. Lauer and P. Schreiner (eds.), Die Kultur Griechenlands in Mittelalter und Neuzeit, (Göttingen, 1996), 109–96, here 163–64. A derivation from Slavonic konjarí, “horse breeder”, has also been suggested. Most of the Koïnari or Konari used to live in Thessaly until 1881 and were then resettled by the Ottoman authorities in Macedonia. It seems as if the Koïnari mentioned in the Chronicle are in fact the Türüks of Evliya Çelebi (a term which is not used by Papasynadinos). At the turn of the century,
The chronicle covers the years 1598-1642. Since it begins two years before the birth of the author, it does not reproduce his own experiences as far as the first years are concerned. In the following sections of the chronicle, however, autobiographical data have been incorporated to an extent that is unusual in traditional Ottoman historiography (with notable exceptions such as Papasynadinos' contemporary, Evliya Çelebi). These data concern not only Papasynadinos' career in the service of the Orthodox church, but also more personal experiences such as the death of his parents, children and relatives. His life was in fact full of vicissitudes. In the atmosphere of all-pervasive venality that characterized the Orthodox clergy of the time, the author seems to have suffered in particular from the persecution of personal enemies. Given the role of the "innocent victim" that the author likes to adopt, the chronicle at times resembles another famous autobiography, *The Life and Sufferings of the Sinful Sophronius* (1805), by the Bulgarian bishop Sophronius of Vratsa ("Sofroniy Vrachanski", 1739–1813).

The Serres chronicle is apparently based on notes by the author written down in Melenikitsi where he had sought refuge from the plague (Θανατικό) in 1642. He later added various events and exhortations; these are, however, undated. Some entries are based on second-hand information. The author deliberately wrote in colloquial language (πομαίκα), so his work naturally includes many Turkish terms. Typologically, the chronicle stands in the tradition of the

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17 On the peculiarities of Evliya's narrative, see The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman, Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588–1662) as portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's Book of Travels (Seyahat-name), translation and commentary by Robert Dankoff, with a historical introduction by Rhoads Murphey (New York, 1991), esp. 15–17.

18 Житие и страдания грешнаго Софрония, first published in Belgrade in 1861. There are also German and French translations of this work. The author was born as Stoyko Vladislavov in Kotel. Later ordained Bishop of Vratsa, he took the monastic name of Sophronius.

19 Such as the story of the horrible end of the Patriarch Cyril of Verroia (1639) which ends with the remark: "This is what has been heard" (έτ' ακούστη). See Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 71r.

20 In order to justify this style to his readers, the author explains: "[You may say] that he [i.e., the writer of this chronicle] truly uses too many Turkish words. Well, I will tell you, just as all people in this place, great and small, are accustomed to converse in this way, I also write for you according to their language, their custom and their habit so that even a small child can understand." See Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 194r.
Byzantine Chronographia with its characteristic features. The chronology used is also Byzantine. Events are recorded in chronological order and no attempts made at causal explanations. This account is interspersed with exhortations whose number and length increase steadily towards the end of the chronicle and which aim at his (young) readers. These exhortations and admonitions alone would deserve a more comprehensive treatment, as they provide us with invaluable details not only on mentalities, but also about the most intimate aspects of social and economic life. But here we shall focus on other aspects which are of particular interest to Ottomanist scholars, such as the micro- and macrocosm of a homo ottomanicus, his attitudes towards the Ottoman sovereign, and problems related to deveşirme and conversion to Islam.

Micro- and Macrocosm

Papasynadinos' account clearly demonstrates that for the homo ottomanicus of the seventeenth century, firmly rooted in the Ottoman universe, the 'world' seems to be largely confined to, or even identical with, the Ottoman Empire. Remembering the Great Plague of 1641, the author enumerates the places—in decreasing order of significance—which to him make up the 'whole world' (ὅλος ὁ κόσμος): "Egypt (Μεσόπτ) and Anatolia, Bursa, Istanbul, the Islands, Rumelia, Thessaly, Serbia, Bulgaria, Philippopolis, Melnik, Siderokastro, Drama, the villages around Zichne, and Serres." In ethnico-sociological terms, it means that the plague had caused the death of numerous "Turks and Christians, Jews and gypsies, Kuiari (i.e., Yörüks), peasants, Armenians and Karamanlis, Arabs ('Αραπηδες) and Anatolians (ὀτευκαλίδες), Franks and Islanders, Serbs and Bulgars, Vlachs and Albanians."
Although Papasynadinos deals mainly with local affairs, important events that occurred in the wider Ottoman world, in Istanbul or elsewhere, occasionally intrude. This is not surprising since the first half of the seventeenth century abounds in dramatic events: For the first time a sultan, namely Osman II (‘Genç’ Osman, 1618–1622), falls victim to a rebellion; Sultan Murad IV (1623–1640) undertakes a drastic program of reform and, after several campaigns, definitely asserts his superiority over the Iranians. His successor, Ibrahim I (1640–1648), is the first reigning sultan to be described as ‘mad’ (deli); under the grand vezirate of ‘Kemankes’ (or ‘Kara’), Mustafa Pasha (1638–1644), a monetary reform was attempted whose effects were felt everywhere. As far as the history of the Greek-Orthodox Church is concerned, the attempt of Patriarch Cyril Lucaris (1572–1638) to establish a union with the Protestants—which ended with the execution of this prelate—is particularly significant.

At times ‘supernatural’ features intrude into the narrative. Thus during the battle of Hotin (1620) against the Poles, which went badly for the Ottomans, seven flaming pillars appeared in the sky as a bad omen. But on the whole, Papasynadinos’ account is characterized by sobriety and common sense.

Ottoman subjects (reaya) and the ruler

It is the author’s attitude towards the Ottoman sultan, often referred to as the basileus in the Byzantine fashion, which may surprise those accustomed to the stereotypes of nationalist historiography. There are no indications that the legitimacy of the sultan’s rule was ever called into question. To the contrary, Papasynadinos shows himself deeply depressed by the fate of the “young and handsome” Sultan Velkov.

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27 See George A. Hadjiantoniou, Protestant Patriarch. The Life of Cyril Lucaris (1572–1638). Patriarch of Constantinople (Richmond, Virginia, 1961). Papasynadinos does not seem to have been aware of the Patriarch’s religious inclinations. Papasynadinos describes Lucaris as “a learned man, much wiser than all the scholars” (“οχι σοφότερος διδάσκαλος, σοφός ἀπὸ ὅλως τῶν μαθηματικῶν”). See Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 55r.

28 Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 23r.

29 This term is still used in the local chronicle from Cyprus, which, however, dates from a period when bosilidze had already been abandoned by Ottoman Greeks in favor of αὐτοκράτωρ, or σουλτάνος.
Osman, to whom the janissaries and other rebels did an unprecedented injustice: “they had never done [anything like this] to their people (γένος) before.”

Addressing his readers, the author stresses that “it behoves all of us to deplore his fate.”

Papasynadinos’ attitude towards Murad IV, generally known as a ruthless despot, is particularly interesting. It truly verges on admiration. Whereas under his predecessors “injustice and polyarchia” had reigned “all over the world”, Murad took draconian measures not only against tobacco smokers, but against all tyrants “even if they were vezirs or pashas, mustis or chief military judges (κατιλεσκέρπιδες), cadis or beys, aghas or aghas of the janissaries, odabashis or zobabashis.” The author seems particularly pleased to note that “the Turks almost died of fear every day.” Examples of punitive measures in Papasynadinos’ own immediate environment are also recorded in the chronicle. When the vezir Kenan Pasha arrives in Serres in 1625 on a tour of inspection, he metes out terrible punishment to some of the wrongdoers and oppressors. Two of them named Kouloghlis from the town of Demirhisar and Toupalis from Salonica are strangled after a banquet and thrown out into the street. Reactions to these events are described in a stereotyped fashion:

the Turks and the traitors (οβάνιδες) were frightened, whereas all the Christians admired the unexpected, praised the Lord and wished Sultan Murad a long life.
After the execution of another wrongdoer, Dramali Yusuf Agha, "all the Turks mended their ways, were afraid of Sultan Murad, and stopped their misdeeds."38

Murad IV's policy also had other repercussions in Serres itself. One of them was the obligatory public celebration of military victories or other joyful events known as donanma (ντονάνμα). Apparently these festivities, sometimes quite elaborate, were ordered not only for the capital, but also for the Ottoman provinces.39 Contributing considerably to the cohesion of the population, they created a sort of community spirit. After the capture of Erivan (Ott. Revan) in August, 1634, as well as after the return of the sultan to the capital, three days of donanma took place in which everybody participated since "the people rejoiced over the victory of the Emperor."40 Moreover, the tax registration (ταχρίμι; Ott. tahrib) of the year 1640, conducted by Haci Ahmed in Macedonia, Thessaly and Bulgaria, also seems to have been welcomed. Its purpose was, as the author states, to diminish the poll tax (χαράτζι)41 of villages with high taxation and to increase it elsewhere.42

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38 "Καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὦν λέγεται ἡ Τουρκοὶ ἑσοφρονητικὰν καὶ ἑτρόμαχαν τῶν σουλτάν Μουράτ καὶ ἔσωσαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας." Σερραϊκὴ Χρονογραφία, fol. 33v.
39 There seem to have been different regulations for towns and villages. According to Papasynadinos, after the capture of Baghdad, twenty days of donanma were ordered for towns, but only three days for villages or the nomadic Köahari (Τιρκς). Cf. Σερραϊκὴ Χρονογραφία, fol. 60r.
40 "... ἔστειλαν εἰς τὸν κόσμον τοῦ ὦν νὰ καυμὸν ντονανμᾶν καὶ νὰ χαροῦν νοῦντες εἰς τὴν νίκην τοῦ βασιλέα." Σερραϊκὴ Χρονογραφία, fol. 60r.
41 On this poll tax, assessed on non-Muslim households in the Ottoman Empire, see the article "Djizya", by Halil Inalcik Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, vol. 3, pp. 562–66. In Greek, as in other Balkan languages, the term haraj (χαράτζι; Ott. harac from Arabic kharaj, originally a land tax) was used instead of cizye, a term that seems to have been more or less unknown to the non-Muslim population.
42 "... and so he registered everybody in every town and in every village wherever he stayed. Once again, everyone only was to give his present (καινόσκιν) to his sipahi, and whatever he did, good and bad, everything was confirmed and they registered it in the register of the Empire [i.e., the Defter-i hakani] where it is still found today." Σερραϊκὴ Χρονογραφία, fol. 76v–77r. It is quite probable that this last observation is true. Unfortunately, however, none of the Ottoman cizye registers of the seventeenth century from this area, preserved at the Prime Minister's Archives in Istanbul, seems to have been studied as yet. See Bruce McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land 1600–1800 (Cambridge/Paris, 1981), 81, 201; on tax registers (Ott. tahrib defterleri) of earlier periods, see Historische Bücherkunde Südosteuropa, vol. II/1, Osmanisches Reich, Makedonien, Albanien (Munich, 1988), p. 313.
Another measure of the central government which directly affected the subject population was the levy of boys (Turkish *devşirme*; Papasynadinos uses the term γαυντιζερουμαζοι “janissary recruitment”) which was still periodically carried out under Murad IV. Papasynadinos mentions such an event on two occasions: one in March, 1623, the other in December, 1637. It is worth taking a closer look at these two cases, since fanciful views concerning this levy of boys are still frequently expressed.

In the first case—which occurred under Mustafa I—“the slave Bariam Pasha [Bayram Pasha]” levied six children in the town. In the second case, it was “the slave Dervish Agha” who levied five. This seems to be a relatively small number for a town with ten mahalles inhabited by Christians. But one has to bear in mind that, in principle, the *devşirme* should not have been applied to children of townsfolk at all. What is striking, however, is that both events are recorded by Papasynadinos without any comment. As far as Bayram Pasha (who later became Grand Vezir) is concerned, on other pages of his chronicle the author is even full of praise for this

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43 According to Vacalopoulos, the term *paidomazoma* dates from 1675. Vacalopoulos, *The Greek Nation*, p. 303, fn. 39.
44 We still lack precise information on this period when the *devşirme* was already falling in disuse or had been completely abandoned. Vacalopoulos (*The Greek Nation*, p. 303, fn. 39) says that in 1622 and 1636 “the first recruitment of children took place in Serrai”. Papasynadinos’ account does not give the impression that the levy of boys constituted a novelty. See also article “Devşirme” by V. L. Menage, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, vol. 2, pp. 210–13, and article “Devşirme” by I. H. Uzunçarşı, *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3, pp. 563–65. Basilike D. Papoulia (see her *Ursprung und Wesen der “Knabenlese” im Osmanischen Reich*, Munich, 1963), though generously quoting from Western sources (which have to be treated with caution, as Menage rightly states), does not refer to the testimony of Papasynadinos.
45 According to Joseph von Hammer, this was the last *devşirme* known to have occurred in Ottoman history: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 5 (Pest, 1829), p. 244.
47 Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 53v.
dignitary.49 Derviş Agha, on the other hand, was beheaded for embezzlement.50

Papasynadinos’ sincere though somewhat melodramatic lament of the death of Murad IV should not therefore surprise us: “It is also incumbent on us, brother, to mourn the loss of such an Emperor, to mourn his passing and to regret it, saying: Woe is us miserable, destitute, wicked and orphaned! Since never again in our whole lives will we find such an Emperor!”51

The loyalty demonstrated in this way to the person recognized as the legitimate heir of the Byzantine basileus should not mislead us into thinking that Papasynadinos was an uncritical panegyrist. He did not greet every measure taken by the central government in this way. Thus, for example, the reform of the coinage pushed through by the Grand Vezir Mustafa Pasha (Kemankeş, Kara) aroused his exasperation: “No mint (τοροπχονός; Ott. darphane) was working any

49 See the obituary, Σερραϊκὴ Χρονογραφία, fol. 55v: “In the same year [i.e. 1637], in the month of August, Bayram Pasha died during the Baghdad campaign (σφαρύμα), a very wise and capable man who ruled the Empire very well. Sultan Murad mourned his passing very much. His dead body was sent to Constantinople and buried in the imareti [Ott. imaret] which he had built there during his lifetime.” Bayram Pasha died in August, 1638. Cf. Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i osmani, vol. 2, p. 36. On the külliche in the Fatih neighbourhood, built 1044/1634–35, see the article “Bayram Paşa Külлиyesi” by M. Baha Tanman, Düden Büyük İstanbul Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1994), p. 101.

50 “. . . he took five children from the town and there were 220 aspers (Ott. akçe) of expenses. Thereupon Sultan Murad learned that he had taken additional aspers and had him beheaded. When he had sent him to the people, he had ordered him: ‘Beware of ever taking aspers’. And he was disobedient and was beheaded.” Σερραϊκὴ Χρονογραφία, fol. 53v. The Ottoman historian Naima describes the events as follows: “Derviş Ağa had been assigned for the boys’ levy in the sağa kol, i.e. the shores of the Danube until Belgrade and Buda, Mustafa Ağa in the orta kol, i.e. from Albania to Sarajevo up to the areas at its extremity. Afraid of the Sultan, they acted with perfect uprightness. Especially Mustafa Ağa took from every cadi arzes and mahzars showing his upright conduct [. . .] When Derviş Ağa, who had been assigned to the campaign, arrived at the Imperial camp in Mosul, the sultan heard through the grand-vezir and the silihdar pasa about his misconduct, some aghas of the ocak having said: ‘he has taken money and committed unjust acts’ (akçe aldı zulm eyledi).’ Thereupon the sultan had him arrested and beheaded in front of his tent. Cf. Na’ima, Tarih, vol. 3 (Istanbul, 1281 [1864]), p. 339: ‘Tafsıl-i ahval-i Derviş Ağa ve Mustafa Ağa’; and Uzumarslı, Kapakulu Ocaklam, I, p. 30; on the turnaçbaşı Derviş Ağa, see also Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i osmani, vol. 2, p. 390. It is not clear what the abuse in question consisted of. Recruiting officers occasionally levied more children than their warrants permitted, selling the surplus for their private profit, or they accepted bribes both from Christians who bought their children off and from non-Christians who smuggled their children in (article “dewshirme” Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed.).

51 “. . . Πρεπόν εἴαι καὶ ἡμᾶς ο ἀδελφό, να τόν κλαύσομεν τό πός τόν ἐχόσαμεν τιοῦτον βασιλέα καὶ να τόν ὁρνησόμεν καὶ να τόν λυπηθοῦμεν καὶ να ὑπούμεν: ‘Ω ὁλή εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀθλίους, τοὺς ἐπταχούς, τοὺς κακοεἰζίκους, τοὺς παντοφρανοὺς διότι
longer except the one in Constantinople. And he set a fixed price (vāʾrī < naḥī) on all things in the world, which were sold, large and small, with a lot of compulsion (zābt). The judges recorded everything in the sīcīl (sīntā zbīn), and it was not accepted that anybody should transgress it. And thus a great depression (kēsād) reigned in all things all over the world. Everybody suffered great misery and hardship and everybody, great and small, suffered injury. And the people became destitute and everybody cursed the vezir."

Intercommunal relations and conversion to Islam

As far as intercommunal relations are concerned, the basic antagonism between “Christians”, on the one hand, and “Turks”, on the other, runs through the whole chronicle. As a member of the clergy, Papasynadinos is naturally particularly concerned about the fidelity of the Orthodox believers towards their Church, so steadfastness is the prime virtue of his moral universe.

This brings us to a second controversial topic: conversion to Islam. This subject plays an important role in Greek chronicles of the Tourkokratia. It should be stressed, however, that in these texts...
conversion is seen mainly as a problem of faith, of apostasy, and not as a method of denationalization; in contemporary western Europe the issue was regarded in the same light. Furthermore, conversion to Islam was by no means the only kind of conversion known to the author, as Papasynadinos himself had been trained in the art of weaving by a convert. The latter was, however, a baptized Jew named Christodoulus ("the servant of Christ") who seems to have suffered a great deal from the harassment of his former coreligionists.56

In Papasynadinos' chronicle several cases are recorded of Christians "becoming Turks". The first case (1617) is unequivocally a forced conversion. The incident is reported as follows: The skreophylak Amarianos Temeroutoghi had offered to pay a Turkish market trader ten aspers per okka of cuttlefish (σουπιές) instead of the twelve the seller was asking, saying: "Don't sell these, you won't have any benefit from them, and cuttlefish is a Christian dish." Whereupon the Turks, offended by this remark, took him to the kadi, who however released him after having him chastized and flogged.57 The Turks were not satisfied with this decision. They took Amarianos to the central mosque at the market square and were about to kill him whereupon the cry was heard: "He has become a Turk, let him go!" Since he did not contradict this statement, he was circumcized (εσουνετηςευν). His wife and sons were equally forcibly converted, except his eldest son who was already seventeen years old.58

In the remaining two cases, the conversion took place voluntarily (αυτοθελήτως καὶ αυτοπροερέτως) as is stated unequivocally by Papasynadinos.59 What is still more interesting, in both cases the converts were clerics. Forty-eight year old Papaskarlatos from Prosyniki gave up his office in order to marry, as did the abbot of the famous Prodromos Monastery, Papagavril. Although he was not without merits, the latter is described as a drunkard (μπεκρής; Ott. bekri) who

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56 Cf. the obituary, Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 23v.
58 Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 20r. The conversion was followed, as the author observes with bitterness, by a domanma of the local Turks.
59 Cf. Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 26v, fol. 28v. The same terms are used, ibid., fol. 175r. Here the author assures that he wrote his chronicle himself "on his own accord and voluntarily."
got excited whenever he saw a female. In a stereotypical way, these conversions are condemned and commented with the saying: “It would have been better had he never been born.”

Relations between the two major communities, the Turks and the Christians, are mostly described as strained. As the examples above show, they were in fact characterized by mutual suspicion and aggressive outbursts. Yet temporary alliances did occur. The houses of the powerful local notable Mehmed Yazatzis (Yaţa), who had refused to sell flour to the bakeries despite the famine, were plundered by an exasperated mob consisting of Christians and Muslims alike. In other cases reported by Papasynadinos, Christians even connived with Turks to the detriment of their own coreligionists.

In the obituaries commemorating a number of prominent Muslim notables from Serres, who died during the great plague, Papasynadinos appreciates their positive aspects: Huseyin Ağa, the baltacı, for example, was “brave, strong, of imposing appearance, healthy, with a mustache”; Derviş Efendi was “of imposing appearance, pious, kind, modest”; the powerful and immensely wealthy Kara Ahmed, who died at the age of seventy, is described as a “handsome, elegant, pious and respected man”, though he was at the same time greedy and rapacious. Interestingly enough, he is also blamed by Papasynadinos for not having done anything for his spiritual welfare, having built neither a bridge nor an aqueduct.

On the other hand, the self-confidence of certain members of the Greek community is apparent from the long obituary the author wrote for his father, who died in July, 1635, at the age of sixty-three. Papasynadinos reports that the deceased in his lifetime had gone four or six times to Istanbul in order to obtain a reduction of

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60 “... ἐκεῖ ὅπου ἐκεῖταξεν γυναῖκα ἐδαιμονίζουνταν.” Σερραϊκῆ Χρονογραφία, fol. 28v.
61 Σερραϊκῆ Χρονογραφία, fol. 24v–25v.
62 Cf. the example of the unruly Alexandris Tatarchanis who was eventually hanged by the Turks according to evidence given by the protogerós Vassilis. Σερραϊκῆ Χρονογραφία, fol. 38v–39r.
63 The custom of attaching obituaries to historical narrative was also well established in Ottoman historiography (usually under the rubric vefeyat; see also the remarks on the tarajim of eighteenth-century Egyptian chronicles in Hathaway, “Sultans, Pashas, Taqwims”, p. 42). In fact obituaries contained in the “Chronicle of Serres” show some striking similarities, in terms of structure and phraseology, to their Ottoman counterparts. Kara Ahmed was said to have owned some 3,000 loads (φορτίο; one load, Ott. yik: 100,000 guruş).
64 Σερραϊκῆ Χρονογραφία, fol. 88r.
65 Σερραϊκῆ Χρονογραφία, fol. 48v–52v.
the *harâq*, the "*khanedâs*"*66* and the sheep-tax (Ott. *âdet-i aqnam*). Surprisingly enough, and although this was contrary to Islamic law, he was also able to build a new church without hindrance, because the old one was too far away from the village.*67* In Sklaitza, he laid the foundation stone for the local monastery. His son particularly praised the hospitality which the deceased had granted daily to "Christians and Turks, Kônarî and gypsies". He was on good terms with everybody—"with the kadis and aghas, with *zorbabâshîs* and *beys*." Newly arrived *sipahîs* treated him with great respect since they were unable to do anything without his consent. He supported the locals against the substitute judges (*parqartâcê*) and the cadis used to say: "Whatever the priest says, we accept it as reasonable (*muqayyâlî*)". Thus when he died, he was mourned, as Papasynadinos assures us, by Christians and Turks alike.*68*

The memoirs of Panayis Skouzes

The second local chronicle to be treated here was written almost two hundred years later. It deals with the events in Athens during the last third of the eighteenth century. In this case, it is "*Tourkokratría Remembered*, since the chronicle of Panayis Skouzes (1777–1847) was composed in 1841 in an independent Greece, a few years before the death of its author.

The memoirs of the veterans of 1821 occupy a special place in the history of modern Greek literature.*69* They are so numerous that a collection of these works runs to twenty-two volumes. Most of them deal with the experiences of the protagonists during and after the

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*66* *Khanedâs* < Ott. *awânz-hane*. The *awânz-i dîvanîye*, constituted a tax collected by the central government, originally to meet emergencies. In the seventeenth century, the *awânz-i dîvanîye* were increasingly converted into annual cash taxes imposed on the entire population. See Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700", *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), 283–337, especially 313 ff.

*67* "... *éroî̱s òçû̱s ékkleê̱sían vêç av òçû̱s eîc tîn ýrôrû̱n, òpòûò dèn òçû̱n poûsèç òû̱ûê têðêî̱iôîn.*" Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 50 r. According to the *yerad*, churches could be repaired or rebuilt, but only on the same sites as before and provided the 'original plans' (*heyêt-i ašîîîye*) were followed. Even the *Islahât fermanî* of 1856 was still somewhat evasive in this respect: explicit permission was only given for the repair of churches.

*68* Σερραϊκή Χρονογραφία, fol. 52v.

War of Independence. Only a few of them focus on the events of a previous period. One of these exceptions is the work usually referred to as the “Chronicle of Athens Enslaved” by Panayis Skouzes, a member of an old Athenian family. Though relatively well-known in Greece, it is overshadowed by the memoirs of the very popular national hero, General Makriyannis (1797–1864), which display quite a few similarities with Skouzes’ work. Together with other memoirs, we owe these to George Tertsetis (1800–1874), the librarian of the Greek Parliament, who indefatigably collected the testimonies of the veterans and, where necessary, even wrote them down himself from dictation. Two versions of Skouzes’ memoirs exist. He apparently wrote the second version because he thought the first had been lost. As has been stated above, they were published only at a very late date.

It is the personality of the author which makes for the interest and even fascination of this work. He was however barely literate. Whereas Papasynadinos was taught “grammar and writing, of the poets Cato, Pythagoras, Aristophanes, and the canon of Christmas and Epiphany” during his training at the metropolis of Serres, Skouzes attended school for only three years (1783–1786). He gives us a vivid description of the brutal teaching methods used at the time, notably the bastinado (φάλαγγας). The style and rhythm of his language are colloquial, including occasional hyperurbanisms and numerous words borrowed from Turkish (Skouzes himself remarks, not without pride, that he knew Turkish). We therefore find hardly any of the levelling influences of a formal education, but instead directness, realism and an eye for detail which testify to a remarkable

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70 According to the title of the edition by G. Valetas, Τὸ χρονικὸ τῆς Σκλαβομενής Ἀθήνας γραμμένο απὸ τὸν Παναγή Σκουζέ (Athens, 1948); a new edition was published by Thanasis Ch. Papadopoulos: Παναγή Σκουζέ. Α’πομνημονεύματα. Η τυραννία τοῦ Χατζή-Αλή Χασεκή στὴν τουρκοκρατούμενη Ἀθήνα (1772–1796) (Athens, 1975). For this paper, Valetas’ edition has been used. For the Skouzes family, see Dernetrios Sicilianos, Old and New Athens, translated by Robert Liddell (London, 1960), 214–217.

71 These memoirs also were only published a half a century after the death of their author. See the abridged English translation by H. A. Lidderdale, Makriyannis. The Memoirs of General Makriyannis (1797–1864) (London, 1966).

72 This occurred in the case of the illiterate revolutionary leader, Th. Kolokotronis, whom Tertsetis had rescued from execution.

73 The second part of Panayis Skouzes’ autobiography has been lost. On his chequered career—allegedly he had even been on Nelson’s flagship at Trafalgar—see Sicilianos, Old and New Athens, p. 216.

74 Σερενική Χρονουγραφία, fol. 21r.

75 Χρονικό τῆς Σκλαβομενής Ἀθήνας, 80–81.
The subject of the first part of the chronicle is in fact the tyrannical rule of the hasseki, Haci Ali, who had been voyvoda of Athens several times between 1774 and 1795.⁷⁷ As in the case of many other ill-famed local tyrants, we do not find any references in Ottoman chronicles to this person, who left such a lasting impression on the inhabitants of Athens. According to popular belief, he had been the lover of Esma Sultan (1726–1788).⁷⁸ In 1772, the hasseki purchased Athens at an auction as malikâne for the sum of 750,000 gurûş, thanks to the support of his lover.⁷⁹ After his arrival, he also assumed the function of zabît, responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

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⁷⁶ Χρονικό τῆς Σκληρομένης Ἀθηνᾶς, p. 17.
⁷⁷ On the different meanings of the title hasseki (perhaps derived from hass-eski), see Midhat Sertoğlu, Resimli Osmanlı tarihi ansiklopedisi, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1986), p. 141. The Ottoman term voyvoda applies here to a class of officials who performed administrative functions such as tax collection on certain lands, in particular hâss lands. They might also be responsible for certain kinds of tax-farm revenues derived from large hâss holdings, such as those assigned to provincial governors or to the sultans’ mothers. On the voyvodas of Athens in the eighteenth century, see in particular Benizelos’ chronicle, in Th. N. Philadelpheus, Ιστορία τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐπὶ Τουρκοκρατίας (1400–1800), vol. 2 (Athens, 1902), 277–313, and Sicilianos, Old and New Athens, 104–134.
⁷⁸ This princess was not, as Skouzes asserts (p. 46), the “daughter of Sultan Hamit [i.e. Abdüllahmîd I (1774–1789)] and sister of Sultan Selim [i.e., Selim II (1789–1807)].” Selim’s father was in fact Mustafa III (1757–1774), whereas Esma Sultan, the hasseki’s alleged lover, was one of the numerous daughters of Ahmed III (1703–1730). She had, according to Mehmed Süreyya, the reputation of having a firm grip on her worldly affairs (iματιν ἄνω ἐν τῇ χρήσει). She was also said to have accumulated a huge fortune. These rumors were, however, unfounded, insofar as no cash at all came to light after her death. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. 1, 18–19.
Initially, the hasseki Haci Ali made a positive impression, in particular during the defence of Athens against an invasion of rebellious Albanians led by a former head of the frontier guards (μειωτά-μπασης) of Attica. In 1778, he had city walls built, for which the people of Athens, however, had to pay the substantial contribution of 42,500 gurus. When his tyranny increased, hundreds of Athenians secretly left the city for Istanbul, where they submitted their complaints to the Sublime Porte (Πασώ-Καρπόι). Thereupon the order came to exile Haci Ali, who presumably had been recalled to the capital, to Cyprus. However, the kapucbasi was bribed and first took him to Athens where he made preparations for his later return. In particular, he managed to obtain false testimonies from the koçabaşis and sentences (ιλαμι; Ott. ɨlām) from the local kadi.

After the death, in 1787, of the kapudan paşa who had been well disposed towards the Athenians, the hasseki managed to get back to Athens to take his revenge. A number of people were tortured and executed. Twenty-four burgesses (νομοκυνοι) were imprisoned and blackmailed. The Athenians were required to pay the extraordinary sum of 400,000 guruf. It should be noted that Turks also fell victim to the hasseki. These were not only outsiders, such as Osman Bey Makfi (Mahfi?), an admiral whom Skouzes calls a ‘kerhaneci’ (κηρανα-ντζής), but also two Turks, Palitzikos and Bekir, who were, as Skouzes says, “on the side of the people and of justice”.

This is not the place to enumerate all the further misdeeds of Haci Ali which almost caused the complete ruin of the city and its inhabitants. After the death of his protectress Esma Sultan, the situation eventually changed and after a new complaint, the hasseki was exiled to Kos where he was executed. His head was displayed for

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80 Χρονικό, p. 29. According to Mehmed Zeki Pakalm, Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü vol. 2 (Istanbul, 1983), p. 526, the meydanbaşı (or meydan kethüdast) was an officer of the acemi ocagı whose duty it was to inflict punishments.
81 Χρονικό, p. 43.
82 Χρονικό, p. 44.
83 “Hasan Pasha Moustaka”, apparently Cezayirli Hasan Pasha whose second term of office was 1774–1789. In August, 1789, the Ottomans had declared war on Russia and Cezayirli Hasan Pasha was compelled to join the Ottoman armies in the Balkans. He died in March, 1790. These events seem to have passed by Skouzes, who does not mention any of them in his chronicle.
84 Χρονικό, p. 49; Ott. kärhaneci (pron. kerhaneci), ‘a keeper of a manufactory’ (vulg. ‘brothel-keeper’); this latter meaning does not seem to have been intended by the author): “... με το μέρος του λαού και της δικαιοσύνης.” Ibid., p. 51.
85 Cf. Sicilianos, Old and New Athens, 140–146.
three days at the Imperial Gate (Μπαβ-Ιουμέν; Ott. Bab-i hūmayun) of the Topkapi Sarayı (1795). At intervals his estates in Athens were sold by auction.\(^{\text{86}}\)

**The Athenian system of classes**

Athens was at that period, according to Skouzes’ very detailed description, a town consisting of 36 neighborhoods (μορφήδες), inhabited by 1,500 Christian and 350 “Ottoman” families. Furthermore, there were 25 families of Muslim gypsies (Τουρκόγραφτοι) and also about 330 families of Muslim blacks (Αιθιώπες).\(^{\text{87}}\) Half of the Turkish houses were segregated from those of the Christians, the other half were in a mixed area.\(^{\text{88}}\) The Turks, according to Skouzes, used to live peacefully together with the Christians.\(^{\text{89}}\)

A particularly interesting aspect of Skouzes’ chronicle is his description of Athenian society as being divided into different classes (τάξεις). Such a division is all the more remarkable since it is never referred to in Ottoman sources. Taxpayers were ranked by wealth in Ottoman registers, but otherwise, the only social division known to the Ottomans themselves was that between the havāss and the avām.\(^{\text{90}}\)

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\(^{\text{86}}\) In principle, malikāne holdings could not be inherited. However, male descendants had priority, provided during the auction (Ott. mużayede) they offered the same amount as the other candidates. Cf. Sučeska, “Mālikāna”, p. 269. The saray of the hasseki was bought by the community of Athens for 35 purses (σουγγία; Ott. kese; one kese: ca. 500 guruf) to be used for the voypoda, government agents (μεσομαστήρι); Ott. mihišir) or for other purposes. His gardens and other estates were purchased by the state treasury (ejiipi; Ott. mihišir) and became crown lands (”. . . eyvocv (3anov XiKa”). The auction was then interrupted due to a rebellion of the local Turks against the new zabt. When law and order had been reinstated (thanks to the intervention of two beys from Zituni [Lamia] with their troops), the auction was eventually completed: two thirds of Haci Ali’s remaining property were purchased by the vizier of the treasury, and one third by the mother of the sultan (Βαλιντέ; Vâlide). The money went into the treasury. Cf. Χρονικó, pp. 67 ff.

\(^{\text{87}}\) Χρονικó, p. 32: “. . . the Ethiopians were Turks, too.”

\(^{\text{88}}\) Χρονικó, p. 42.

\(^{\text{89}}\) Skouzes’ chronicle contains abundant statistical material which shall not be dealt with here.

\(^{\text{90}}\) The poll-tax (rizye) was divided into three grades, according to the wealth of the payers, called edna (“lowest”), evsat (“middle”) and a’lā (“highest”). See article “Djizya; ii-Ottoman”, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. by Halil Inalcık; cf. also Skouzes, p. 24: “The harajes were not very significant, the one called toneli amounted to five guruf; the second, called efsati [essat], to three guruf; and the third to 60 paras”. 
himself, however, was very conscious of the local pecking order. In his introduction, he remarks explicitly that his parents, Dimitrios and Samaltana, both belonged to the second class which consisted of 24 families. The first class, the notables (κοτζιωμπάσιδες), feared the latter since, albeit inferior in rank, they were well-off and had some formal education. Members of the first class, the kocabaşis, consisted of about a dozen families, who mainly lived off the income from their estates, which they partly rented out or left to the lower classes for exploitation. They distinguished themselves from the rest of the population not only by their traditions, but also by their dress.

During the eighteenth century the originally four-tier class system in Athens underwent certain changes. In particular, the kocabaşis found it increasingly difficult to maintain their position and political predominance against the second class, the noikokyraini, which was in ascendancy. The advent of Hacı Ali, therefore, provided the kocabaşis with a welcome opportunity to strengthen their position. Repeatedly, Skouzes observes with bitterness that the kocabaşis had allied themselves with the tyrannical voyvoda and had been preparing his return to Athens from the beginning. This support for Hacı Ali by the kocabaşis eventually led, after his first banishment to Cyprus, to a minor “revolution” in Athens. A temporary modification of the system may be described as a constitutional change: The rank of kocabaşi could no longer be passed on to descendants, but the holders of this title were to be freely chosen in annual elections.

Present-day historians will wonder what place the Muslim population of Athens occupied in this system. It turns out that the latter did not form part of it at all. Skouzes classifies more than one third of the Turkish population as poor: They were shoemakers (παποντζίδες), tobacco-sellers, barbers (μπαρέριδες) and tailors or else had no trade at all. The rich lived by the revenue of their landed properties.

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91 On this term see Vacalopoulos, The Greek Nation, p. 193. Skouzes also uses archontes and aristokrates synonymously.
92 In order of decreasing importance: 1—Notables (ἄρχόντες, kocabashis), 2—landowners and burgesses (νοικοκωρατοί), 3—market sellers (παζαρίτες) who were organised in guilds (ἐσωτήρ, πουρφέτια < Ott. hifet), and 4—immigrants (ξωμαρίδες) who used to live in the peripheral neighborhoods. The system is described in some detail in Th. Ch. Papadopoulos, Πανεγή Σκούζ, 20–21.
93 Originally, “landlord, proprietor, manager, ruler”.
94 Cf. Χρονικό, p. 52.
95 Χρονικό, p. 46.
Wealthy landholders used to sell their produce to Christian merchants, mostly “before the [goods] became cheap”, and they handed them over without difficulties and without asking for documents. These Muslim landholders resembled the Christian kocaba§is in many respects, and it is not surprising that the two groups were inclined to enter into alliances. Christian kocaba§is and Muslim notables (αγάνιδες; Ott. âyan) are also sometimes mentioned in the same breath.

These relationships need further study in the light of as yet underexploited sources. It is remarkable that Skouzes also observes a certain decline of the Turkish upper classes. Due to their indolence, or so he sees it, the âyan increasingly sold their property to Christians, so that these notables would have become destitute if the Revolution had not broken out. And this occurred, as Skouzes critically remarks, even though they did not have to pay the tax of the Christians, but only the established tithe.

A local chronicle from Cyprus and the reforms of the Tanzimat

Cyprus is the origin of the last chronicle to concern us here. It was discovered in a notebook containing miscellaneous texts in the style of an Ottoman mecmeua and published in 1931 by N. Kyriazis in the journal Kypriaka Chronika. The published section covers the years 1800–1878, i.e., the period ending with the occupation of the island by the British. As far as the origin of the chronicle is concerned, only conjectures are possible. It is presumably the copy and contin-

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96 Χρονικό, p. 42.
97 On the âyan and their role in the eighteenth century, especially in the Peloponese, see Yuzo Nagata, Muksin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve âyanlık müessesesi (Tokyo, 1982). On Muslim and Christian notables, see Χρονικό, p. 50: “οἱ ἀρχοντες καὶ αγάνιδες” and p. 62: “αγάνιδες καὶ κοτζαπάνιδες”.
98 The social history of Greece during the last decades of Ottoman rule has not yet been studied on the basis of Ottoman sources. A fairly original Marxist interpretation of the Greek Revolution can be found in Kerim Sadi [i.e. Ahmet Nevzat Cerrahoğlu], Osmanlı İmparatorlukunun dağılıma döer ve tarihî maddeçilik (İstanbul, 1941), 3–51.
99 Skouzes himself had made his fortune from the properties he had bought from Muslims who emigrated after 1821.
100 Χρονικό, p. 42; Ott. üşir tithe; tax collected, in kind, in a given proportion from agricultural produce. The rate demanded generally lay between 10 and 20 percent, but higher rates were by no means unknown.
uation of a chronicle originally made by a peasant from the village of Lysi near Larnaca.\(^{101}\) It is uncertain whether we are dealing with notes made at the end of every year.

Up to the year 1868 the style of the entries is fairly homogeneous and is characterized by a large number of Greek Cypriot dialect words including numerous Turkish elements. Later, we can detect the hand of a different writer. Unfortunately, the later sections of this chronicle have been omitted by the editor on the grounds that the events treated were sufficiently well-known. It should be noted that the value of this chronicle as a source for nineteenth-century Cypriot history is considerable, and it was used by George Hill in his history of the island.\(^{102}\)

Yet for our purposes, even the published text as it stands is most instructive. Once again, the unknown author(s) witnessed an epoch of great revolutions. On the international stage, this chronicle is contemporaneous to the Napoleonic Wars, the revolutions in western and central Europe, the Greek Revolution and military conflicts such as the Crimean War (1853–56) and the Franco-German War of 1870–71, to name but a few. As far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, this period was accompanied by changes scarcely less significant. It was the era of reforms, both abortive and successful. Conflicts between the central government and local rulers abounded, among which developments in Egypt were particularly ominous to members of the Ottoman ruling group. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78 heralded the end of Turkish rule in Europe and the inception of an increasingly authoritarian régime in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. As far as Cyprus itself is concerned, the period included several civil war-like conflicts, the loss of power of the locally influential dragomans after 1821, and the gradual introduction of the Tanzimat reforms.

However, it was not the *histoire événementielle* which lay at the heart of this chronicle. What concerned the author (or authors) were more immediate interests, i.e., in the first place, the biological and climatic conditions which in any given year determined the harvest. The basic structure of the chronicle revolves around a classification of years as “very good”, “good”, “average”, “bad” and “very bad”.

\(^{101}\) This may be concluded from the notice on the construction of the church of Lysi in 1851. Χρονογραφικών Σημείων, p. 90.

Occasionally more or less extensive digressions on political events of local or international significance are added to these basic entries.

Of the seventy-eight years covered by the published text, two are specifically described as “very good” (χρόνος πολλά καλός), thirty-three as “good” (καλός χρόνος), twelve as “average” (χρόνος μεσαίος), two as “bad” (άστοχια)\(^{103}\) and nine as “very bad” (μεγάλη άστοχία).\(^ {104}\) What is actually meant by a “good year”? To the author(s) of the chronicle, 1807, the year of the fall of the reform-minded sultan Selim III, was, for example, “a good year. Peace in the country.” Their classification depended, in the first place, on climatic conditions: in particular, sufficient rainfall to secure a good harvest, which meant low prices for the agricultural products of the island—wheat, barley, olive oil and cotton.\(^ {105}\) Despite a steady increase in prices, the price for one καφίς (κοφίζιν) of wheat fluctuated enormously, in good years between one γυρύς and thirty γυρύς.\(^ {106}\) Prices were also influenced by political events; during the Crimean War, for instance, in 1856 prices rose to 35 γυρύς for wheat and 22 γυρύς for barley, whereas in the following year, with the end of hostilities, they fell to 18 and 6 γυρύς, respectively. Famine (πείνα) is mentioned regularly (e.g., 1802, 1826, 1838, 1841). Just before the arrival of the British the locust plague, a perennial problem throughout the history of the island, was finally eradicated.\(^ {107}\)

But it was not only natural disasters which disrupted the lives of the country people. Serious disturbances were also brought about by the endemic rebellions, in which people referred to as zorbadhes played an important role. From the dry remarks of the chronicle, it is possible to reconstruct the course of events, but hardly the underlying reasons. Our author(s) convey the impression of a partly latent and partly overt civil war, which increased in intensity after the uprising in Greece and which the central government only managed to sup-

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\(^{103}\) In the Greek Cypriot dialect, the word (pronounced astojë) means “drought”, “bad harvest”, “failure in a commercial enterprise”. Cf. K. G. Giankoullia, Επίτομο ετυμολογικό και ερμηνευτικό λεξικό της κυπριακής διαλέκτου (Nicosia, 1992), p. 24.

\(^{104}\) As for those years which are not explicitly classified, the context indicates that they were “bad years”.

\(^{105}\) The text then reads “the earth was saturated” (ἐκχύττασεν ἡ γη).

\(^{106}\) One καφίς = 22 ὀκκα.

press by calling in troops (ἀσκέρια) from Anatolia or Egypt (Μισίρι). Peace was, therefore, highly valued. 1812, for example, was an ideal year for which we find the laconic entry: “Good weather and peace in the country” (Χρόνος καλός καὶ ηπυχία εἰς τὸν τόπον). By a sort of macabre irony, 1821, the year of the Greek Revolution, is classed as one of the two “very good” years our author(s) witnessed, although it resulted in ultimate catastrophe for the Christian Cypriots. As the chronicle also reports, several bishops and kocabağis fell victim to the massacres, which led to a mass emigration from the island.

Faced with a capricious climate, in particular the threat of drought, the peasants felt helpless. Their only solace was the icon of the Virgin Mary of the Kykko Monastery, which was considered particularly venerable and believed to be a bringer of rain. It was carried in a procession to another location, where it sometimes remained for years. Such events are regularly recorded in the chronicle.

**Ottoman administration**

The author(s) of the chronicle were not overly interested in the ever-changing higher authorities of the island. To him or them, the country seemed to be governed by anonymous pashas, although there were some outstanding figures deserving special mention, such as Kâmil Pasha (1832–1912) or Ziya Pasha (1825–1880). Events in the metropolis appear beyond the scope of the chronicle. Neither the destruction of the janissaries (1826), nor the reform decrees of 1839 (Hatt-i serif of Gülhane) and 1856 (İslâhât fermentı) rate even a brief note. This becomes understandable if we take a closer look: In 1826 a great famine ravaged the island and, in the following year, the population survived on millet (τάρη) and kutzúdhkia (some sort of

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108 The Monastery of Kykko is the largest and most famous monastery in Cyprus (also see P. Chidirogliou, Ὀθωμανικά εγγραφά τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Μονής Κύκκου (Nicosia, 1973). It is built on a mountain 3,800 feet above sea level, 56 miles due southwest of Nicosia. It was founded in about 1100 A.D. in the reign of the Byzantine Emperor, Alexios Komnenos, who gave it an icon of the Virgin Mary and Child (παναγία τοῦ Κύκκου) allegedly painted by St. Luke.

109 In days of drought, people used to go to the monastery and together with the monks and the monastery’s icon, they climbed the hill for special prayers beseeching the Virgin Mary to send them rain for their crops. During the Ottoman period, the sultan used to issue orders to the kadi of Lefka, in whose kadšlık the monastery was situated, not to interfere with such processions. See Hill, History, vol. 4, p. 68.
maize?), which had to be imported from Egypt. In 1839, the harvest was destroyed by locusts. For 1856–57, the chronicle only records "average weather" and earthquakes in Crete and Europe.

Nevertheless, certain innovations introduced by the Tanzimat reforms affected the population directly, and these are therefore recorded in the chronicle. In 1832, the author(s) tell(s) us, population registration (νοσούς δευτερη; Ott. niifus defteri) was introduced, which was to be repeated regularly. In 1840, the chronicle mentions a regulation that everybody must register his property (μύλη); in 1842, taxes (μυρία) are increased under a new pasha. Moreover, in 1845 the local people obtained passports for six gurus a piece and special documents linked to taxes (χαρακτήρατια). In 1855, the chronicle reports, the tax paid for exemption from military service (άσκεριτίς [i.e. bedel-i askeriyye]) was levied from the Christians. Conscription of the Muslim Cypriots (κουφά) is mentioned in 1863. In 1869, again according to the chronicle, the fields of the peasants were measured with a cord, and the value of houses and estates assessed.

Other administrative changes were not considered worth mentioning. This applies in particular to the Ottoman governors or, in the terms of the chronicle, "the pashas". Their comings and goings are recorded only occasionally, which is not surprising, since they changed almost annually.

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110 See Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimat’ın uygulanması ve sosyal tepkiler", Belleten 28 (1964), 623–690, esp. 672–678, where two Ottoman documents concerning the implementation of the reforms in Cyprus are reproduced.

111 On the Ottoman censuses see Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830–1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics (Madison, 1985). According to the niifus defteri of 1247/1831 the figures for Cyprus were 14,983 Muslims, 29,190 reaya and 43 gypsies. (p. 114).

112 Aziz Pasha (1842–43); see Hill, History, vol. 4, p. 237.

113 Ott. ciye tezkeresi (or senedi); on this document see Asparukh Velkov, Vidove osmanoturski dokumenti. Prinos kain osmanoturskata diplomatika (Sofia, 1986), 206–208 (a copy of a ciye senedi, dating from 1265 [1848], p. 115).

114 "Ελαθον ἀπὸ τοὺς χρυσιανοὺς ἄσκεριτίς". Χρονογραφικόν Σημείωμα, p. 91. The bedel-i askeriyye had supplanted the ciye after the Crimean War. It was taken only from the male population.

115 "Επισκαν καὶ τούς τούρκους εἰς τὸν κουφάν". Χρονογραφικόν Σημείωμα, p. 92. On the Ottoman conscription method, by casting or drawing lots (κυρία-ι σεξιγιγγα), see Pakaln, Osmanlı Tarih deyimleri, vol. 2, 323–324.


tion towards their religious leadership, on the other hand, is demonstrated by the fact that the appointment of a new archbishop is regularly recorded, including his name.

This restricted perspective should not, however, induce us to believe that events occurring outside of a Cypriot peasant’s immediate range of vision remained totally unnoticed. In the notes concerning 1813, we find, after entries on epidemics and the procession of the Holy Icon of Kykko Monastery, the surprising sentence: “The Muscovite made war with Bonaparte.” In 1831, the chronicle says, cholera broke out not only in Egypt, but also in France. Events in the Middle East are also recorded, for example, the siege of Beirut by the British and the retreat of Ibrahim Pasha (1843). In 1849—a “good year”—“a rebellion broke out in France”; in 1870, “the Prussian made war with the French and took him prisoner.”

However, this interest in, and knowledge of, events occurring in a wider world, which may have been conveyed through the foreign consulates at Larnaca cannot disguise the fact that we are still dealing with a mentality confined to an Ottoman context. This is apparent from the curious description of the Crimean War, whose repercussions were also felt in Cyprus: “The Muscovite Nicholas rose and requested the Christians from the Emperor and [demanded] that he also give him the churches. But the pope in Rome did not agree (δὲν ἐκατόλισε) he stirred up the rayadhes and induced them not to give their consent. So they levied their troops (άσκερια) and sent them to help the Turk and they began to fight at Sevastopol. This led to a great war, to a great catastrophe in the whole world, to great starvation, to cholera and to plague.”

Nothing is more characteristic of the reaya perspective than this apocalyptic vision.

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118 “Επολέμησεν ο Μόσκοβος τῶν Μποναπάρτην.” Χρονογραφικόν Σημείωμα, p. 84.
120 It should be noted that no local press, either Turkish or Greek, existed in Cyprus at that time.
121 “Εσηκώθην ο Νικόλαος Μόσκοβος καὶ έξήρησεν τοὺς χριστιανοὺς ἀπὸ τὸν βασιλέα νὰ τοῦ τῶν χαρίσῃ καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ δὲν ἐκατόλισεν ὁ παπάς τῆς Ῥώμης, καὶ εσήκωσεν τῶν ραγίδων καὶ ἐκκατάκαιναν νὰ μὴ εξαριστηθῶν, καὶ εσήκωσαν τὰ ἀσκήρια τους καὶ ἐστείλαν τὰ εἰς βοηθείαν τῶν τούρκων καὶ ἀρχήσασαν νὰ πολέμων εἰς τὴν Σεβαστούπολιν, καὶ ἔγινεν μέγας πόλεμος καὶ πεινα πολλὴ καὶ χολέρα καὶ θάνατος πολὺς”. Χρονογραφικὸν Σημείωμα, 90–91.
In conclusion

In their different ways, all three sources discussed here provide us with a view of Greek-speaking subjects, or former subjects, of the Ottoman sultans. The authors vary widely in educational background. Thus, in spite of the limited opportunities for training open to most provincial priests, apparently Papasynadinos had received a reasonably advanced education, a privilege not enjoyed by either Skouzes or the anonymous Cypriote villagers. Skouzes' rapid passage through the schools of Athens raises some intriguing questions. Was the author simply uninterested in formal schooling, or was his education typical even of relatively well-to-do boys in the later eighteenth century? As to the Cypriote writers of our village chronicle, as they remain anonymous, it is impossible to say much about their training. But since many Cypriote peasants of the later nineteenth century must have been illiterate, the sheer fact of these men's being able to write at all puts them in a privileged position. We may guess, though we do not know for certain, that they formed part of the village elite.

Our texts cover a lengthy timespan, from the early seventeenth to the later nineteenth century. At the beginning of this period, the Ottoman Empire, in spite of serious crises in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as yet had to reach its most remote frontiers, in Crete and Kamenietsk-Podolsk. By the end of the period covered, Ottoman power was in full retreat, and the occupation of Cyprus by the British was only a few weeks or months away.

Thus while Papasynadinos wrote at a time when the legitimacy of the Ottoman ruler remained unchallenged, Skouzes had been involved in the Greek war of independence. Doubtless he would have provided the precious testimony of an eye witness concerning those dramatic events, had not the later section of his work been lost. Where the Cypriote villagers were concerned, the Ottoman administration of the island seems to have remained marginal to their joys and worries. Pashas came and went, for the most part the chroniclers did not even consider them important enough to record their names. What counted were events which the government, any government, had limited power to influence, namely the presence or absence of epidemics, and above all, the blessing of bountiful harvests.

Last but not least, Papasynadinos and Skouzes were both townsmen. They wrote about the social networks of the urban Christian notables to whom they themselves belonged, and equally about the
tensions between these personages and local Ottoman powerholders. Skouzes, with his perceptions sharpened by the conflicts of the 1820s and 1830s, has written an especially detailed account of the attempts by lower-ranking Athenian notables to deal with the oppressive Hasseki Ali, protegé of an Ottoman princess. Our anonymous Cypriotes have provided the only testimony from the rural world, which makes their work particularly valuable in spite of its relative brevity and late date. Thus, the three texts, in their very diversity, provide a sampling—sampling of the differing conditions in which Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire might find themselves.

Postscriptum

This paper was written nine years ago. Except for a few additions in the footnotes, the text has remained basically unchanged. In the case of Papasynadinos' chronicle, the new (bilingual) edition by Paolo Odorico, *Conseils et mémoires de Synadinos prêtre de Serrès en Macédoine* (XVIIe siècle), (Paris 1996) is indispensable. The reader will find in this excellent work not only a more reliable version of the text, but also copious notes and commentaries by Greek specialists in the field, as well as a comprehensive bibliography. Therefore, the system of quotation in this article has been changed: References to the chronicle indicate the folio number of the manuscript, so that both editions may be used. I should also mention a paper on the same subject which I presented in 1994 at the "IXe réunion des chercheurs sur le monde arabe et musulman" (Strasbourg, 1994) under the title "Papasynadinos de Serres ou l'homo ottomanicus du XVIIe siècle". It has now been published in a volume edited by Meropi Anastasiadou and Bernard Heyberger, *Figures anonymes, figures d'élite: pour une anatomie de l'Homo ottomanicus* (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 35–61.
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Islamization processes in the Balkans differ strongly from one region to the next, and so do the corresponding historiographies. However, paradoxically, the volume of writings and the intensity of controversy within the different national historiographies bear no necessary relationship to the number of Muslims resident, or formerly resident, in the states concerned. Thus the causes, consequences and dimensions of Islamization have not aroused a great deal of interest in Albania, although in this country, seventy percent of the population are Muslim. At the same time, Islamization has constituted a favorite topic for Bosnian historians, who ever since the 1950s, have published primary sources and also produced some solid secondary works. They have focused on Balkan history since the Ottoman conquest and, especially, on the ensuing demographic changes. In the course of their researches, they have developed a number of hypotheses concerning the timing of Bosnian Islamization and the number of people involved; much thought has been expended on the possible role of the dualist Bogomils in sparking off the movement of conversion.

Although the percentage of the Muslim population within Bulgaria is much lower than in Bosnia, Bulgarian authors have tended to approach this issue not in a spirit of scholarly detachment, but in a romantic-sentimental fashion. To a certain extent, this has been the outcome of Bulgarian state policy. Especially in recent decades, but not only then, official bodies have encouraged both professional historians and literary people to write on Balkan Islam and Bulgarian ethnogenesis in the sense of what happens to be the current government’s attitude. By contrast, quite a few Macedonian historians working in Skopje have approached this problématique in a more detached fashion, concentrating on local history. In the course of their
research, they have exploited Ottoman sources, particularly taxation surveys (tahrir defterleri), which allow a glimpse of the social structure of Macedonian villages.¹

However, some Macedonian and Albanian historians, to say nothing of their Serbian colleagues, have become entangled in the disputes between certain national states and ethnic groups, involving territories currently contested, such as the Kosovo. This has led to debates which, occasionally and to some extent, are relevant to our problematique of Balkan Islamization. Discussions concerning Albanian migrations, the ethno-religious composition of the Kosovo or Tetovsko populations, or the history of certain other regions shared by Albanians and Slavs, at times turn out to be relevant to the study of Balkan Islamization.

A similar focus on ethnicity is also typical of much of Greek historiography. There are some excellent studies concerning the last centuries of the Byzantine Empire, and now almost thirty years ago, the Greek-American historian Speros Vryonis published his still standard work on the Turkification and Islamization of vast territories of Asia Minor.² But otherwise, Islamization as a research topic has not greatly interested Greek scholars. More often they have sought to provide arguments for the autochthonous character of greco-phone populations living in presently disputed territories, or to prove that in conformity with the ideology of Panhellenism, these territories always have been controlled by Greeks.

Turkish historiography includes numerous studies on the methods by which the Ottoman rulers consolidated their power over the Balkans, while demographic and ethnic changes resulting from the conquest have been highlighted as well. However, the dissemination of Islam throughout the Balkans, which implied both immigration and the conversion of large numbers of local people, as well as the adaptation of the Muslim religion to local beliefs, have interested


² Speros Vryonis Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971).
only a few Turkish scholars. Moreover, when these topics are studied, it is often not because of their intrinsic interest, but because of their connection to socio-economic processes and political events. Religious history definitely is not the strongest point of Turkish historiography, especially not where the Balkans are concerned.

A study of the historiography concerning the process of Islamization throughout the Balkans cannot but reflect this diversity among national historiographies. In the present paper, the space devoted to individual Balkan countries varies according to the intensity with which Islamization has been treated by the historians of the state in question. Two specific problems have been accorded priority: On the one hand, I have highlighted the formation of Islamic communities, an issue which cannot be separated from the question of Ottoman colonization and intra-imperial migrations. Secondly, I have emphasized the reactions of the conquered populations: How did the presence of larger or smaller Islamic communities, whose link with the central Ottoman state might be more or less obvious, affect the self-image and identity of a given Balkan population?

The Ottoman presence in the Balkans: cultural and political implications

A product of conquest, the Ottoman Empire was governed by a group of people who by our modern standards contented themselves with a low level of empire-wide inter-regional integration. Formed within a relatively short period of time, the Empire incorporated dozens of ethnic groups and denominations within its borders. Even though for many centuries they cohabited within the boundaries of a Muslim state, at least in the Balkan provinces, they often retained many of their distinctive features. Frequently individual ethnic groups and denominations possessed specific moral value systems and other cultural traits, which they preserved throughout the period of Ottoman rule. It is possible, and indeed probable, that if the Ottoman conquest had not intervened, many of these ethnic groups and denominations would have taken socio-cultural paths quite different from those which they eventually adopted. But the historian limits him/herself to what took place in actuality.

From the cultural historian's viewpoint, the most significant consequence of the Ottoman conquest possibly was not the disappearance of the various independent Balkan kingdoms and principalities,
but rather the transformation of the civilizational structure of the Balkans. Christian courtly cultures survived, after a fashion, only in the Ottoman vassal principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. Otherwise, courtly culture now was identical with Islamic palace culture, which flourished in Edirne and Istanbul. In terms of religious culture, mosques and theological schools (medreses) were sponsored by the Ottoman state apparatus for use by the Muslim population. As to the Orthodox and Catholics, they could repair their churches, but only under exceptional conditions were they permitted to build new ones. Ecclesiastical culture was reduced to a few centers, especially on the Athos or in the patriarchal academy in Istanbul. Otherwise, Christian villagers and townsmen were reduced to what their local priests could provide, and these had not often enjoyed much formal education.

All this rather resembles the situation in Asia Minor after the Byzantine Empire had been destroyed and the Seljuk sultanate and the post-Seljuk emirates had implanted their own brand of Islamic culture. However, unlike Anatolia, where Christian cultures soon survived only in a few outlying regions and the inhabitants largely converted to Islam, most of the different ethnic groups and denominations inhabiting the Balkans did not change their faith. Yet in the course of time, however, there were quite a few who did, and this explains why the formation of Muslim communities in the Balkans has come to form a major topic for some of the historiographies of this area.

During the first centuries of their existence, the Ottoman ruling group and Ottoman society in general were open to foreign cultural influences and characterized by a broad religious tolerance. Similarly to what has been observed with respect to other medieval Muslim societies, including the Anatolian Seljuks and the post-Seljuk emirates, the Ottoman ruling groups included members of varying ethnicity. Adopting Islam and culturally affiliating with the Islamic community, the umma, often sufficed to open up appreciable chances to the new Muslims. From the late fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottoman ruling group and military establishment absorbed a variety of ‘outsiders’.

A few examples will make this clearer. Among the irregulars fighting at the Balkan frontiers of the Empire, akıncı, deli and the like, men of Balkan origins were so common that in certain units one heard predominantly Bulgarian, Serbian or Greek. In the navy, many seamen were Islamized Greeks or Lazis. Of course, the most famous
instance of recruiting and successfully assimilating ‘outsiders’ into the Ottoman ruling group is the ‘levy of boys’, the dev§irme. Young Christian villagers were recruited by force to serve the sultan, usually as janissaries, but occasionally and if they were lucky as pages in the palace school and later as high-level administrators. But in addition, the fifteenth-century Ottoman ruling group also absorbed individual representatives of the previous Balkan aristocracies, among whom Mehmed the Conqueror’s Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha, considered a saintly figure by many, constitutes but one very prominent case. Moreover, individual inhabitants of different Balkan territories, to say nothing of Italian corsairs or fishermen, might adopt Islam in order to begin a career in the sultans’ service. Varying — and at times quite exotic — ethnic origins in no way constituted an impediment to success in this sphere. On a less elevated level, conversion to Islam equally made sense to urban merchants and craftsmen; they were thus relieved of discriminative taxes and formed new networks which might be useful in the pursuit of their business activities.

All this explains why so many individuals and groups from among the autochthonous Balkan populations first adopted Islam and later, to varying extents, changed their ethnic identities. Islam, which had come to the Balkans as an alien and largely unknown religion, as a novel system of civilization, performed the function of levelling ethnic identities. To what extent the pre-nineteenth century Ottoman ruling group consciously was concerned with such a breaking-up of ethnic identities is a matter for dispute. But certainly the formation of a ruling class of varying ethnic backgrounds, unified by its Islamic religion, contributed to the stability of Ottoman rule.

Moreover, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, most servitors of the Ottoman state learned to function in Turkish, or if they reached more elevated positions, in the heavily Arabicized and Persianized version of Turkish known as Ottoman. This change of language further intensified the separation of Balkan Muslims from their previous milieu, where they were now regarded as ‘infidels’, and, as time passed, as ‘Osmanlis’ and even ‘Turks’.

The formation of a Muslim-Ottoman ethnicity, which by 1900 easily redefined itself as ‘Turkish’, did not happen in the same fashion.

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everywhere; thus the Bosnians form a special case, as they retained their Slavic language even though their 'high-cultural' activities typically were conducted in Ottoman Turkish. Given this diversity, different Balkan historical schools have discussed the appearance of Islam and Muslim culture in very different ways. Between extreme aggressiveness vis-à-vis an 'alien' culture, on the one hand, and a tranquil acceptance of historical realities, on the other, a large number of options have been tried.4

Both historians and politicians are familiar with the complicated reality of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empires and their populations, of which the Ottomans are but one example. To use modern terminology, from the late eighteenth century onwards, certain ethnic and religious groups joined hands in order to form 'political nations' of an ethnically and religiously composite character. In the framework of large polities, such a formation of 'political nations' has not been at all unusual, for these states allow groups of varying ethnicities, religions and ways of making a living to form economic and sometimes even cultural ties to one another. The development of 'political nations' does not depend on the prevalence of kin languages among the component groups, as the well-known example of Switzerland demonstrates. Nor is it necessary for all the members of a 'political nation' to belong to the same religious denomination. It would seem that the degree of integration prevailing in modern 'political nations' is much higher than that which was found in the great imperial polities of the past, including, to name but two recent examples, the British and the Soviet empires. Yet these older politics frequently provided the settings in which the more closely integrated 'political nations' of today were able to develop.

4 In the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, some Ottomanization also occurred, yet it did not result in ethnicity changes on a grand scale. Many Arabs considered themselves truer Muslims than their Ottoman overlords, who carried with them so many syncretistic practices from their recently Islamized homelands. Thus it is notable that dervish orders such as the Mevlevis and the Bektashis, when they established lodges in Cairo or Baghdad, catered for the needs of Turkish-speaking soldiers and officials, not for the local population. On the other hand, certain upper-class Ottomans felt that Arabs (and Iranians) constituted the 'real' repositories of Islamic culture, to which they themselves were but latecomers: Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mustafa 'Ali (1541–1600), (Princeton, 1986), 253–57.
As for Bulgarian authors concerned with the problématique of Balkan Islamization, they have come up with a number of rather inconsistent theses. Given their political inspiration, it is not surprising that these sets of claims keep on recurring in spite of obvious internal contradictions. On the one hand, we find references to a supposed Ottoman genocide of Bulgarians immediately after the conquest, followed by an intensive colonization from Anatolia. On the other hand, we encounter an emotional and absolute rejection of any possible colonization from Anatolia; everybody is supposed to have been of local origin, and even the terms ‘colonization’ and ‘colonists’ disappear from the texts when this latter assumption is really en vogue. In such a context, the existing Muslim community is described as resulting entirely from violent mass campaigns for the Islamization of the native population. This latter assumption has proven more popular than the ‘genocidal’ thesis, and it lies behind the vuzroditelen protses (‘revival process’) of the period between 1985 and 1989, when there was an attempt to assimilate the Turkish minority by means of a forcible change of names and subsequent mass expulsions.5

Both the assumption of genocide committed against the Bulgarians and its counterpart, a massive colonization from Anatolia, obviously are difficult to prove on the basis of either domestic and Byzantine sources or of Ottoman chroniclers. Dubious attempts have been made, particularly by Christo Gandev, to prove the mass slaughter of Bulgarians on the basis of surviving demographic data. Without discussing in detail the complex comparisons and computations made on the basis of Byzantine documents and Ottoman tax registers, we shall only quote this author’s conclusions:

The ratio of the population present as of 1490 (890,000 people) and the population lost in the period between the 1460s and 1493 (680,000 people) is approximately 100:75 . . . the Bulgarian nation suffered a demographic catastrophe . . . a biological shrinking of the nation which had a momentous effect on its development.6

Gandev’s claims are not an isolated case. Quite to the contrary, they fit in perfectly with the romantic-sentimental attitudes to the history

5 See the contributions in Stranitsi ot bulgarskata istoriya. Ocherki za islyamiziranite Bul-gari i natsionalno-vuzroditelnite protses, ed. by Christo Christov (Sofia, 1989).
of the ‘homeland’ which have prevailed in Bulgaria ever since the achievement of independent statehood in 1878 (in Bulgarian terminology: the Liberation). Already K. Jireček had claimed that the magnitude of the Turkish colonization had eliminated Bulgarians from certain districts, and M. Drinov agreed with him. In their wake, quite a few Bulgarian historians have claimed that Ottoman power had delivered a massive ethno-demographic blow to the Bulgarians and other Balkan peoples by killing off or ousting the native population in favor of the newly arriving Anatolian immigrants.

Ironically, these assumptions fit in very nicely with the claims of certain Turkish historians, who, as we will see, also tend to assume a massive state-directed immigration from Anatolia. Yet they are groundless, as apparent from the work of the Turkish scholar M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, firmly based on Ottoman sources. In Gökbilgin’s work, one can discern a certain tendency to represent this colonization as larger than it actually was. Yet even so, his detailed study of the yürükləs (Turkish-speaking nomads) and Tatars in the Balkans arrives at much more moderate figures than Gandev and other Bulgarian historians.

However, not all Bulgarian scholars assume a massive immigration from Anatolia. Quite to the contrary, some of them prefer to think that one of the principal difficulties confronting the Ottoman state in the Balkans was the limited number of conquerors involved, compared to the much more massive conquered population. This demographic difficulty supposedly was present from the start, but it became more serious with the expansion of the Empire, and continued down to the latter’s eventual demise. Furthermore, this assumption of the conquerors’ “demographic deficiency” is by no means limited to Bulgarian scholars; the Greek historian Th. Papadopoulos has also adopted an argument of this kind.

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7 Konstantin Jireček, Putuvaniya po Bulgariya (Sofia, 1974), 463–73; M. Drinov, Izbrani suchineniya, Vol. 2 (Sofia, 1971); Gandev, Bulgarskata narodnost.
9 Gökbilgin, Rumeli’de Yürüklər, and Gandev, Bulgarskata narodnost, 100–110.
10 Antonina Zhelyazkova, Razprostranenie na islyama v zapadnobalkanskite zemi pod Osmanska vlast, XV–XVIII vek (Sofia, 1990), 55–67.
In this context, some nineteenth-century figures may help us establish the proper proportions. The Macedonian historian Niyazi Limanoski is the author of a pioneering attempt to distinguish the colonization of the Balkans by Anatolian immigrants from Islamization per se. As far as possible, this undertaking involves a differentiation between Anatolian Turks, Tatars and Circassians. Moreover, all these Muslim immigrants are computed separately from the converts to Islam from among the ‘autochthonous’ Balkan inhabitants. Of course, this categorization begs a vexing question: For how many centuries must a given group of people live in a certain locality before they cease to be ‘immigrants’? Be that as it may, according to Limanoski’s estimate, just before Bulgarian statehood, there were 1,774,884 Muslims in European Turkey, that is, in the Bulgarian, Thracian and Macedonian provinces. Of these 975,584 were ethnic Turks, the others Islamized ‘natives’ of the Balkans. In the three regions under discussion, one third of the total population was Muslim.\(^\text{12}\)

\[\text{An all-powerful state— and recalcitrant realities ‘on the ground’}\]

On the Turkish side, the establishment of Ottoman domination in the Balkans also has been enveloped by nationalistic myths. Critics of Turkish nationalist historiography concerning the Ottoman Empire have dwelt on the extreme emphasis placed on ‘the state’ as an institution to which an almost religious value is sometimes ascribed.\(^\text{13}\)

Yet the attempts to prove a large-scale Turkish colonization from Anatolia, organized by a purposeful and successful Ottoman central power, have not been empirically convincing. Often uncritically, it has been assumed that the ambitions of the Ottoman state to control population movements necessarily corresponded to reality. This is especially obvious in Ömer Lütfi Barkan’s article on ‘forced settlement’ (sürgün).\(^\text{14}\) While Halil İnalçik has also been inclined at times

\(^{12}\) Niyazi Limanoski, *Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni vo Makedoniya* (Skopje, 1993), 182.


to this view, his detailed study of the settlement process of post-conquest Istanbul has demonstrated that even the powerful Sultan Mehmed II had a great deal of trouble inducing or obliging people to settle in his new capital.\footnote{Halil İnalcık, “The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City,” \textit{Dumbarton Oaks Papers}, 23–24 (1969–70), 231–49.} Since Ottoman historians of the early periods so often have to work from normative texts—tax regulations and the like—the sources themselves have a built-in tendency to confirm the ‘statist’ point of view.

Yet even if one assumes, as the present author does, that the migration of Turkish nomads and semi-nomads into the Balkan peninsula resulted from the complex political and social situation in Anatolia, and thus was largely spontaneous and not state-controlled, the Turkish primary sources and historiography have much to offer.\footnote{Zhelyazkova, \textit{Razprostranenie na islyama}, 55–75.} On the basis of Gökbilgin’s remarkable study it is possible to calculate that in 1543, when nomad immigration presumably was at its highest point, there were 1305 \textit{ocaks} (non-tribal, military units into which these people were organized) present on the Balkan peninsula.\footnote{Gökbilgin, \textit{Rumeli’de Yürükler}, 13–18. See further Strashimir Dimitrov, “Za yurushkata kolonizatsiya i rolyata i v etnoasimilatsionnite protsesi”, \textit{Večor}, 1982, No. 1–2, 36, and Antonina Zhelyazkova, “Yurutsite v rodopovedskata literatura”, \textit{Rodopi}, 1977, No. 10, 34.} This amounted to an estimated population of approximately 160,000 persons. For the seventeenth century, the Macedonian historian Niyazi Limanoski has suggested a somewhat higher figure. Relying on the Ottoman authors Ayni Ali and Ali Çavuş, who claim that there were 1264 or 1464 \textit{ocaks} of \textit{yürük}s, Limanoski estimates a population amounting to between 190,000 and 220,000 persons.\footnote{Limanoski, \textit{Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni}, 178.}

The numerous \textit{ocaks} of the \textit{yürük}s were organized into six corps, known as the Tanrıdağ, Vize, Selanik, Ovče pole, Kocacık and Naldöken. Some of these names were derived from tribal groupings into which the nomads originally had been organized. But for the most part, and this reflects the rapid dissolution of tribal bonds in the new environment, they were simply the names of the regions in which the nomads in question had established themselves. These places were mostly located in the Aegean coastlands, eastern Thrace and Macedonia.
As to the ethnic composition of the yörüük ocaks, it would seem that they included a number of Tatars. The Tatar presence in the Balkan peninsula in some cases antedated the Ottoman conquest, and we know of Tatars from the Kipchak steppe who established themselves in the Edirne and Plovdiv regions during the reign of Timur Lenk (1370-1405). Not infrequently, Tatars entered the yörüük organizations, and we find their names on the lists, compiled for military-administrative purposes, which document the existence of the yörüük. But in addition, the yörüiks also included Islamized native inhabitants of the Balkans, as well as manumitted former prisoners of war. In the regulations pertaining to the yörüiks promulgated in the time of Süleyman the Magnificent, we find the following statement:

and the freed slaves of the aforementioned people [i.e. the yörüiks], those persons who have arrived from other provinces and from Anatolia and have taken wives from among them [i.e. the yörüiks] while not recorded in anybody’s register and not disputed by anybody [i.e. not belonging to military tax assignments—timar—, crown lands or pious foundations], [in addition to] those who are not recorded in anybody’s registers and have taken wives in their households, and [also] those sons of Abdullah [i.e. converts] who while serving there have adopted Islam, [thus] establishing themselves, [all these] will be deemed to be yörüiks.  

Furthermore, some of the ocaks of Muslim gypsies had also obtained registration as yörüük. Thus in terms of ethnic background, the yörüiks represented a rather motley crowd. However, it must be stressed that the newcomers were rapidly Turkified and assimilated.

**Piecemeal Islamization: non-yörüük migrations**

Yet as we have seen, yörüük colonization, in the widest sense of the term, was not large enough to change the ethnic balance of the Balkan peninsula as a whole. A glance at the map appended to

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19 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *XV ve XVI asrarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ziraat ekonominin hukuki ve mallı esasları*, I: Kanunlar (İstanbul, 1943), 263.
20 This is apparent from an order dated 1566 and addressed to the subaşı (commanders) assigned to the Kocacık, Tekirdağ, Vidin, Debar, Vize, Kırklıise, Selanik and Ovçe pole yörüiks. This text has been published by Aleksandar Matkovski, “Yurutsite od Makedoniya vo neki turski dokumenti”, in *Etnogeneza na yurutsite i nivoto naseluvanye na Balkanot* (Skopje, 1986), 40.
Barkan’s article on ‘deportation as a means of colonization’ shows that around 1520 many Balkan regions almost exclusively were inhabited by Christians. However, in the course of the later sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries, the number of Balkan Muslims increased considerably, both by migration and by conversion of the local inhabitants.

We will begin with a brief glance at non-yüriik immigration. Some of the earliest migrants consisted of prominent Muslim families from Anatolia, whom the central government had displaced from the areas in which they wielded local influence. Not infrequently, these families had been granted quite extensive landholdings in the Ottoman-held Balkans (Rumeli); presumably they did not arrive alone, but brought along their servitors. In addition, there was an immigration of administrative personnel and military men. The latter might be granted rights of taxation (timar) in exchange for joining the sultans’ campaigns and taking charge of local administration. As officials and even timar-holders could be readily transferred from one area to the next, not all such immigrants necessarily stayed in the Balkans, but many doubtless did so. In addition, Muslim immigrants staffed the garrisons which secured numerous larger and smaller fortresses, thus providing the behind-the-front organization indispensable for further conquests. Moreover, we must not forget the numerous slaves, usually prisoners of war, who were sold by their captors on the slave markets of Istanbul or some Balkan town and who often became Muslims. If ultimately liberated and able to form families, these freedmen equally contributed to the Islamization of the Balkans. All these ‘official’ migrants certainly served the political and military-strategic plans of the Ottoman central power. It is, however, quite anachronistic to assume that the Ottoman state aimed at the ‘denationalization’ of the Balkan peninsula through a wholesale replacement of the autochthonous population with colonists from Asia Minor.

In addition to these migrants in the service of the Ottoman administration, there were also people who came on their own initiative. Migratory mobility from Anatolia involved socially heterogeneous elements. Our quote from the yüriik regulations already has introduced an important type of immigrant, namely those who were con-

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sidered ‘free’ because they had not been assigned to any *timar*, crown domain or pious foundation. Dervishes, who were often in this relatively privileged position, established at least partially Muslim villages during their lifetimes. After their deaths, their graves might be turned into shrines, attributed miraculous powers and therefore visited by the local population. More often than not, such visits might convince some of the local non-Muslims of the superior power of Islam.\textsuperscript{22}

*From immigration to emigration*

These processes were characteristic of the Empire’s expansion period, that is the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However, once the Ottoman Empire had begun to contract, the Muslim population of those Southeastern European regions which remained with the Empire longest also was increased by the immigration of Muslims, this time roughly from northwest to southeast. Both the present author and the Macedonian historian N. Limanoski have dwelt on this particular issue.\textsuperscript{23} Migrations to the Ottoman heartland began to occur at the end of the seventeenth century, when Ottoman Muslims for the most part abandoned Hungary, which had been conquered by the Habsburgs. In 1718, after the peace of Pojarevac/Pasarofça, there was another spate of emigration, when Muslims left the Serbian territories now acquired by Austria. These movements gathered further momentum with the Russo-Ottoman-Austrian war of 1788–1791, followed by the Serbian uprising of 1804–1813; the emigration of Muslims was especially massive after Serbian autonomy had been declared in 1830. Muslim Turks, Slavs and Albanians, all retreated to ‘Old Serbia’, i.e. the Kosovo, and also to Macedonia, in search of a new home in places where Islam and the Ottoman Empire were still dominant.\textsuperscript{24}

Neither did emigration from Balkan regions end there, nor did immigration into the easternmost parts of Rumeli, such as Macedonia.


\textsuperscript{23} Zhelyazkova, *Razprostranenie na islyama*, 112–20, 133.

or Thrace cease. During the Russo-Ottoman wars of the later nineteenth century, all Circassians, who but a few decades earlier had arrived in present-day Bulgaria from imperial Russia, left Bulgarian territory. The same applied to a large number of Turks and Tatars, and also some Pomaks, Muslims of Slavic speech. Particularly intensive were the various emigrations from northeastern Bulgaria, the lowlands of Upper Thrace and the sub-Balkan plains. In these regions, there often had been serious fighting, or the local Muslim population previously had compromised itself in the eyes of their Bulgarian neighbors by taking part in the suppression of anti-Ottoman revolts. Basing himself on both literary and statistical sources, the Bulgarian scholar At. Totev has estimated that between 1880 and 1945, Bulgaria received 808,000 immigrants, while 954,000 people left the country. Among the immigrants, the vast majority, nearly 700,000 people, were Bulgarians, the remainder consisting, among others, of 30,000 Russians and 20,000 Armenians. As to the emigrants, Turks formed the majority, 574,000 persons leaving Bulgaria for eastern Thrace, Anatolia, and, to a lesser extent, Macedonia. In addition, there was a sizeable emigration from Bosnia to Istanbul and further east, encompassing both Turks and Slavic speakers, once Austria-Hungary had occupied the territory after the Berlin Congress and especially, after the annexation of 1908.

Apart from migrations, military service and epidemics had an often noticeable impact on the size of the Balkan Muslim population. The empire’s campaigns demanded numerous recruits, most of them Muslims, and losses, due to battles and epidemics, were heavy. According to Avdo Sučeska, in the twenty-year period between 1711 and 1739, over 20,000 Muslim Bosnians, or Boshnaks, perished while in the field. In the second half of the eighteenth century, a five-year war period in this region took another 20,000 lives. Moreover, in the last century of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim peasants and craftsmen often joined the Ottoman armies in their retreats, and these flights took the lives of many non-combatants. In addition, plague

continued to be a menace in the Balkans down to the early nineteenth century. Muslims often were more threatened than their Christian neighbors because they rarely fled an affected area. Stefan Verkovic reported that a whole street in the town of Serres (Serrai), originally inhabited by Muslims, was laid waste by the plague and later repopulated by Christians. Plague epidemics destroyed a numerous yiürük colony near Demirhisar, while for the same reasons, the number of Muslims living in the town of Kesriye (Kastoria) was reduced by 50 percent.

Albanian migrations as a bone of nationalist contention

For decades Albanian colonization of various Balkan territories, more or less remote from the Adriatic coastlands where the members of this ethnic group predominantly live, has engaged the attention of Macedonian, Serbian and Albanian historians. Special importance has been attached to the colonization of the Kosovo, also known as Old Serbia. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this region was but slightly affected by Ottoman-Turkish colonization from Anatolia. Here Muslims constituted the garrison soldiers and holders of tax assignments (timar), as well as town-based administrative officials and a share of the townspeople. Moreover, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, a significant number of Albanian Catholic families, immigrants from the turbulent regions of northern Albania, were already registered in the Kosovo.

But a major Albanian influx into the region occurred only after 1690–91, when the Habsburg troops, which recently had conquered Belgrade and entered the Kosovo, were obliged to withdraw in the face of a renewed Ottoman advance. As there had been considerable support for the Habsburgs from among the local Christian population, the Ottomans undertook severe punitive measures for purposes of reprisal and pacification. In order to avoid the atrocities, many Christian households in northern Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohia, nearly 37,000 people in all, headed by the Patriarch of Peć, Arsenije

28 For details compare Daniel Panzac, La peste dans l’Empire ottoman, 1700–1850 (Louvain, 1985).
III Crnojević, left their homes, following the retreating Habsburg armies. Settled in what was then southern Hungary, they constitute the ancestors of the present-day Serbs of the Vojvodina. Further emigrations of Christians to Hungary followed in the first half of the eighteenth century, this time under the leadership of Patriarch Arsenije IV; this movement included numerous Christians from Novipazar, Niš and Užice. As to the now deserted Kosovo, it was appropriated by Albanian stockbreeders, who made the region their permanent home. In subsequent years the Albanians of the Kosovo, similarly to those who had remained behind in Albania, adopted Islam in large numbers. Thus the Kosovo mutated from a predominantly Serb and Orthodox to a largely Albanian and Muslim region.

Moreover, the Albanization of the Kosovo was furthered by the fact that not only the preexisting Christian population, but also the resident Muslims, significantly decreased in number as a result of the war of the Holy League against the Ottomans (1683–1699). Ottoman sources show that as a result of military operations only one third of the previously established urban Muslims remained in the towns of the region. A chronicle describing the 1689 seizure of Prizren by Austrian and Serbian volunteers states that the Muslim inhabitants of the town and its environs were put to the sword by the local Christians, and only 16 households survived the massacre. In the opinion of the Macedonian historian N. Limanoski, the previously stable ethnic boundary between the Serbs and the Albanians first was disturbed toward the end of the fifteenth century, but only in a sporadic fashion. However, significant violations of this borderline occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and unfortunately, the greatest and most fatal of them have happened in this century and in our days.

Ottoman state power and Albanian colonization

In the historiography, the role of the Ottoman state in directing the Albanian colonization of the Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia has been considerably exaggerated. Both Hasan Kaleshi and N. Limanoski have argued that the Ottoman state, in order to strengthen its con-


31 Limanoski, Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni, 189.
trol, assisted Albanian territorial expansion. In the perspective of these two authors, Albanian immigration was often associated with Islamization and a dramatic increase of Ottoman control. Supposedly, the Ottoman power wished to set the Albanian Muslims against the rebellious Christians of Old Serbia or Macedonia and

regarded the Albanian population as its main force in the struggle against the disobedient Serbs and the other Balkan Christians. That these theses are, however, rather far-fetched becomes clear when we consult Aleksandar Stojanovski’s study of pass-guards (derbendcis) in Macedonia and the enlistment of Albanians in this and other Ottoman guard services. Basing himself on an abundant documentation, Stojanovski has developed the thesis that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Sublime Porte was quite mistrustful of the Albanians it employed in Macedonia to guard passes, bridges, roads and sometimes even whole districts. In an order dated 7 September 1704 by the governor of the great Balkans province of Rumeli to the kadis of Ber, Doiran and other places, it was announced that

some Albanian haramis [rebels, robbers, haiduks] have managed to obtain martolos basî positions [commanders of irregular troupes]. They have each gathered 200–300 Albanian haramis around themselves and have committed murders, robberies and [other] outrages against the sultan’s subjects and against [other] travellers.

It was therefore commanded to dismiss all Albanian irregulars and replace them with local people. Later texts also indicate that the Ottoman administration placed no particular confidence in its Albanian mercenaries and irregulars, tried to limit the latters’ outrages against the local people, and was anxious to entrust resident Muslims with the protection of the population.

As we have seen, A. Stojanovski in no way denies the violence perpetrated by Albanian irregulars against the indigenous inhabitants, but simply questions the claim that these outrages were intended by the Ottoman administration. Yet his thesis has not been well received by Macedonian historians. According to N. Limanoski, Muslim Albanians were rather encouraged to settle in Christian Macedonian villages with the purpose of breaking up areas of compact Christian

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32 Limanoski, Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni, 191.
33 Limanoski, Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni, 204.
settlement.\textsuperscript{33} This author is also unwilling to believe the assertions of later Albanian inhabitants of the plain between Bitola and Prilep to the effect that their ancestors emigrated because of favorable conditions for animal breeding in their new area of settlement and to escape the blood feuds in which northern Albanian clans so frequently were involved.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Ottoman residents in the Albanian provinces}

As to the colonization of Albania by Muslims from Anatolia or Istanbul, the numbers involved were insignificant compared to the population movements occurring in Thrace, Macedonia and Bulgaria. An Ottoman tax register from the year 1432, one of the oldest of its kind to survive, contains data about the settlement of people from Anatolia in the newly conquered Ottoman province of Arranid, in modern Albania.\textsuperscript{37} Some of these were military men from the Anatolian sub-provinces of Saruhan (modern Manisa), Konya and Canik (modern Samsun), appointed to administer timars. Others were officers of fortress garrisons (\textit{müstahfiz}); thus the \textit{müstahfiz} of Iskarpë (today's Skrapari) came from Saruhan. Given the dangerously unstable situation in Albania at the time, these appointments probably constituted exile more than rewards for military merit or loyalty to the sultan. In all likelihood, we are not wrong in suspecting that some of these people were appointed to Albanian timars in order to remove them from the province in which they had a local following or from the Ottoman capital. Even so, these men were expected to found the first Muslim centers in Albania, which later would represent the sultan's power and defend the interests of the Ottoman state. Anatolian peasants as well as dervish missionaries sporadically established themselves as well, for instance in the sub-province of Dukagin.\textsuperscript{38} Albanian historiography has made public some documents concerning Ottoman colonization in this region, but rarely has dealt with the quantitative dimensions involved.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{33} Limanoski, \textit{Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni}, 206.
\textsuperscript{36} Limanoski, \textit{Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni}, 205.
\textsuperscript{38} Zhelyazkova, \textit{Razprostranenie na islyama}, 88–90; Selami Pulaha, “Të dhëna ekonomike dhe demografike për krahinën e Poljës në gjysmën e dytëtë shek. XVI”, \textit{Studime historike} 1975/3, 115.
\textsuperscript{39} K. Frasheri, \textit{Istoriya Albanii} (Tirana, 1964); S. Pollo and A. Puto, \textit{Histoire de l'Al-
Governing Albanian districts on behalf of the sultan must have been a daunting task. Certain Catholic clans of northern Albania sometimes refused to admit the officials who were to compile the tax registers, that mainstay of Ottoman provincial administration. It also was not unknown for certain clans to declare themselves Muslims while continuing to observe Catholic rituals. This inclination must have wreaked havoc with the registration process, which, after all, was based on the differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even in the Shkoder district, of special importance to the central administration on account of its strategic location on the Adriatic coast, Ottoman control of the mountain villages was shaky at best.

Given these difficulties, the Ottoman government attempted to institute a minimal control over, and communication with, the population of mountain settlements by integrating their leaders into its own administrative hierarchy. An Albanian elder when thus coopted, was entered into the tax registers as a timar-holder, and de jure shared the rights and responsibilities of these warrior-administrators. In practice, however, he often must have defended the interests of the closed peasant or herding community from which he came, while seeing to the timely payment of taxes and the recruitment of soldiers for the Ottoman armies. In this fashion, imperial power could be exercised in a mode acceptable in terms of the local laws and established social organization. However, it goes without saying that no senior government official would have assumed that seventeenth- or even eighteenth-century Albanians could really form the backbone of Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

Albanian Islamization

As might have become apparent by now, it is quite difficult to find in the Macedonian and Serbian historiographies a non-emotional and scientific assessment of the dimensions and timing of the Albanian migrations and Albanian relations with the central Ottoman state.

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banie des origines à nos jours (Roan, 1974); S. Islami and K. Frasheri, Historia e Shqipërise, Vol. 1 (Tirana, 1959); I. Zamputi, Perpjekjet e Shqiptarëve për bërë në dy shekuj të parë të sundimit otoman (Tirana, 1961); Selami Pulaha, Le cadastre de l’an 1485 du sandjak de Shkoder (Tirana, 1974); Selami Pulaha, Aspects de démographie historique des contrées albanaises pendant les XV°-XVI° siècles (Tirana, 1984).
Studies concerning Albanian Islamization are beset with similar problems; thus, even Albanian historians to date have made but few contributions to our understanding of the specific features, magnitude and chronology of the Islamization process. Presumably, the dogmatic atheism of the Albanian ruling group until the end of the 1980s has induced professional historians and experts in Ottoman studies, such as K. Frasheri, S. Pulaha, S. Islami or I. Zamputi, to concentrate on socio-economic relationships, as well as on late medieval Albanian resistance against the Ottomans. Mutatis mutandis, similar considerations have probably also applied to other Balkan historiographies.

Where there is little empirical research, preconceived notions happily will thrive. Such prejudices have, among other things, led to the misinterpretation of primary source data concerning the Christian and Slav populations on the territory of modern Albania itself. For example, Macedonian and Serbian scholars have assumed that large numbers of Albanians converted to Islam already in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which constitutes an egregious distortion of the most elementary chronology of events. Data from both Ottoman and western sources show that Islamization was a much later process.\(^{40}\) In 1610, the Catholic bishop of Antivari (Bar), Mario Bizzi, reported that merely ten percent of the Albanian North was Muslim. Only in the second half of the seventeenth century and during the hundred years which followed did Islam begin to spread on a larger scale. Especially affected were villagers and stockbreeders, who also constituted the most likely emigrants and colonizers of neighboring territories. Northern Albania, inhabited by the previously Catholic Gegues, adopted Islam most rapidly.\(^{41}\) As a result of these misconceptions, which telescope the Islamization process in an anachronistic fashion, the Albanian newcomers to the Serbian and Macedonian territories, even in quite early years are regarded as Muslims. To top it all off, it is assumed that from an equally early date, the Slavic

\(^{40}\) For a summary of Ottoman-Albanian history and Ottoman sources concerning the Albanian territories, see Machiel Kiel, *Ottoman Architecture in Albania, 1385–1912* (Istanbul, 1410/1990).

inhabitants of present-day Albania were Islamized, which in turn constituted a step toward their later Albanization.

Toward the end of the seventeenth century, a change in the Ottoman administration’s fiscal policies encouraged the rapid and massive Islamization of the Gegues of northern Albania. While until the war years of 1693–1699 the capitation tax due from non-Muslims had stood at a moderate level, and often had been levied from whole communities as a lump sum, now it was to be assessed on an individual basis.\(^{42}\) Moreover, the exemptions hitherto accorded to priests and monks were abolished. If one takes into account the effects of abusive registration, certainly not uncommon particularly in outlying areas, quite a few villagers found themselves assessed sums of money they could or would not pay. For certain categories of the population, in the eighteenth century the tax increased tenfold. In addition, even though assessment now was on an individual basis, the collectors might continue to hold entire communities responsible for the full and timely payment of this tax. These practices resulted in a mass adoption of Islam in the rural areas of modern Albania. As a Catholic missionary put it,

such wretched fellows... were abundant in number in the Ottoman provinces and most of all in Albania, where whole villages abandoned their faith in order to avoid the paying of taxes.\(^{43}\)

In the case of northern Albania political considerations may have led to a particularly brutal collection of the capitation tax. After all, where the Ottoman central power was concerned, there existed numerous factors of uncertainty with reference to the Albanian provinces. These included the insignificant number of Muslim-Anatolian colonists established in the area, the isolation of vast stretches of mountainland, and the existence of peasant communities with vigorous traditions, especially in the realm of customary law. In certain areas, Ottoman power on the local level must have been more or less a formality. Moreover, numerous emigrants from the Albanian provinces sought a living as mercenaries, and during


the Veneto-Ottoman war for Crete (1644–1669) not only the Catholic northerners, but also some of the Orthodox inhabitants of the South, supported the Republic of Venice. Therefore the Ottoman administration presumably was not at all unhappy if the novel and heavy tax load induced many Albanians to adopt Islam.

*Crypto-Christianity, in Albania and elsewhere*

One of the more intriguing phenomena revealed by the study of Islamization is that of crypto-Christianity, among other peoples also practiced by certain Albanians. The earliest examples of crypto-Christianity have been observed among the Greeks of Asia Minor. In the rural areas, Byzantine Christianity had by no means entirely eradicated the remnants of the different heresies which had emerged during the early centuries of Christianity. At the same time the immigrant Turkic nomads, but superficially Islamized, still practiced some of their pagan rituals. For a long time, the world view of many illiterate peasants doubtless represented an unsystematic mixture of Islamic and Christian elements, and this allowed the two sides to come closer to one another. As the border between Christianity and Islam became indistinct, in V. Gordlevskii’s expression “in Asia Minor a bridge was thrown over the chasm dividing Islam and Christianity”. In the fifteenth century, after the conquest of Trabzon by Sultan Mehmed II, large numbers of Greeks adopted Islam to protect themselves from reprisals. Some of these people, known as Stavriots, fled from Trabzon to the mountainous district of Gümüşhane, where they outwardly acted as Muslims but continued to practice Christianity in the privacy of their homes. This double identity was maintained until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when most Stavriots overtly returned to Christianity.

A similar practice has been observed with respect to northern Albania. Former Catholics who had adopted Islam claimed to have

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44 For a study, undertaken for the most part before World War I, see F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, ed. by Margaret Hasluck (Oxford, 1929), Vol. 2, 469–474. See also Peter Bartl, “Krypto-Christentum und Formen des religiösen Synkretismus in Albanien”, in *Grazer und Münchner Balkanologische Studien* (Munich, 1967), 117–27.

done so but outwardly, in order to escape the capitation tax. They secretly continued to observe their old customs and, especially in outlying areas, were allowed by local parish priests to take part in religious services. These men took communion in secret and married Christian girls, declaring that they did not wish the name of Christ to leave their homes for good. With the support of their priests, these Crypto-Christians refused to observe the bull of Pope Benedict XIV of 1744, who insisted that the Crypto-Christians should return to the Catholic faith in public. In the districts of Ispat, Berat, Skopje and Montenegro, similar practices were also current among the formerly Orthodox.46

The formation of the Bosnian Muslim community

As for the beginnings of Islam in Bosnia, they once again must be sought in colonization and intra-imperial migrations. Due to its geographical location and its place in the Empire’s military and political strategy, Bosnia was organized as a border province, or serhad in Ottoman parlance. Garrison towns with their merchants and artisans servicing soldiers and officers were numerous; often medieval fortresses conquered from the Bosnian rulers simply had been rebuilt and provided with new garrisons. Border conflicts were so frequent that small-scale fighting became a way of life, even at times when the sultans were not at war with the Hungarian kings or later with the Habsburgs. Life in this border region thus was very different from that experienced in the interior of the sultan’s memalik-i mahruse, his ‘well-protected domains’.47

The earliest Muslim presence in Bosnia was military. Miloko M. Filipović has recorded a folk tale from the neighborhood of Visoko, according to which Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror left 12,000 soldiers in Bosnia.48 I. Zviijh is of the opinion that the Ottoman soldiers, officials and tradesmen who settled in Bosnia were quite

47 Zhelyazkova, Razprostranenie na islyama, 124.
numerous. According to Ottoman sources and modern ethnological research, in the areas of Fojnica and Visoko, to the west and northwest of Sarajevo, retired soldiers established themselves, whose descendants long retained memories of their—often remote—regions of origin. About 71 clans living in the neighborhood of Visoko probably came from Rumeli and Asia Minor, but also from territories further afield such as the Arab provinces. In addition, a certain number of religious scholars and functionaries from Anatolia migrated to Bosnia, and after the conquest of Egypt and Syria by Selim I, these latter regions also provided a contingent of scholarly immigrants. These religious specialists taught Islamic theology and law, preached in mosques and administered pious foundations.

However, by the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, non-official Anatolian emigration to the newly gained border provinces had been reduced to no more than a trickle. In consequence, few peasants and nomads of the kind we have encountered in Thrace or Macedonia arrived in Bosnia. Most Muslim Ottoman settlers came from closer by, namely from the regions which today form Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria. This has been confirmed by Ottoman sources concerning the sub-provinces of Hercegovina (1477) and Zvornik (1519) published by Nedim Filipović. Among the Muslim timar-holders in these two areas, there were people from Küstendil, Nikopol, Vidin, Plovdiv, Shoumen, Niš and from different towns and villages in modern Albania. Islamized Croats and Slovians also settled in Bosnia. Yet altogether, historians agree that Muslim colonizers of non-Slavic origin did not exceed 2 to 5 per cent of the total Bosnian Muslim community.

Up to this point we have discussed migrants who came to Bosnia more or less voluntarily. Yet servile immigrants also were numerous.

49 As cited in S. Kulešić, Razmatranja o porijeklu muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo, 1953), 145–148.
50 See Kulešić, Razmatranja o porijeklu muslimana, 146, and N. Filipović, “Neki podaci iz ranije istorije Sarajeva pod Turcima”, Pregled, 1953, No. 5.
51 Nedim Filipović, “A Contribution to the Problem of Islamization in the Balkans under the Ottoman Rule”, in Ottoman Rule in Middle Europe and Balkan in the 16th and 17th Centuries (Prague, 1978), 305–58; Hazim Sabanović, Bosanski pašalik. Postanak i upravna podjela (Sarajevo, 1959); idem, Krajiste Isa-bega Ishakovica. Zbirka katastarskih popisa iz 1453. godine (Sarajevo, 1964).
52 Ahmed S. Aličić, Pomenjeni popisi Sadžaka Vilajeta Hercegovina (Sarajevo, 1985); Adem Handžić, Dva prva popisa Zvorničkog sanđaka iz 1519. i 1533. godine (Sarajevo, 1986).
53 I. F. Jukić, Putopisi i istoriko-etnografski radovi (Sarajevo, 1953), 294.
Given the region’s military role, prisoners of war of various backgrounds, more or less profoundly islamized, provided a non-negligible share of the local inhabitants. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, prisoners of war reduced to slavery could be found all over the Empire. As to the western Anatolian city of Bursa around 1500, in a single year over 500 slaves in one context or another left traces in the kadi’s records. 

According to the fortunes of war, Greeks, Bulgarians, Lazis, Albanians, Saxons, Georgians, Russians and Ukrainians, Magyars and others were captured and enslaved. Even in peacetime, soldiers in pursuit of illegitimate gains often enough raided and plundered neighboring territories, and their booty supplied the slave markets.

Those slaves whose owners were established in Bosnia obviously settled this frontier province; among them we find people from Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Slovenia and Hungary. In the sixteenth century, slaves and—by then Islamized—freedmen made up a significant share of the Bosnian urban population. Thus, in 1528, 42 out of 616 Muslim households in Novipazar belonged to freedmen. By 1570 130 households, or 4 per cent of the Muslim population of Sarajevo, had been established by former slaves. Even more than the free migrants, the slaves constituted a motley crew; yet both these groups were easily absorbed by the local population, whose members, by the sixteenth century increasingly adopted Islam.

However, Bosnian Islamization is even more complex than a mere discussion of the factors deriving from the region’s status as an Ottoman frontier province would lead one to believe. For before the Ottomans arrived, a state had existed in Bosnia, with a king and an ecclesiastical organization. This encourages the historian to ask himself/herself questions concerning possible continuities and discontinuities between pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Bosnia. One question concerns the role of the political class: Did the groups of people who dominated the Bosnian medieval state, i.e. the local aristocracy, disappear from the political stage entirely? Or did at least some elements of the Bosnian ruling group ‘recycle’ themselves as members of the provincial elite of Ottoman times? This question requires further study. As problematic is the situation of the Bosnian church; historians have asked themselves whether the latter’s organization

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was dominated by the Bogumils, adherents of a dualist creed considered heretic both by both Orthodox and Catholics.

Particularly the role of the Bogumils in the Islamization of Bosnia has formed, and still forms, a subject of sometimes acrimonious debate. Given the deficiency of the available primary documentation, which is limited in quantity and also extremely partisan, much is left to the modern historian's interpretation. Particularly Serbian and Croatian scholars, but by no means they alone, have engaged in this debate, which revolves around the interpretation of a few key sources. To date, there is no consensus concerning the time at which the Bogumils became extinct. Did they exist long enough for their teachings and the history of their repression to have an impact on the decisions of Bosnians converting to Islam? Claims emanating from either Catholic or Orthodox churchmen concerning the disappearance of the 'heretics' must be taken with a grain of salt. For such writers had an interest in showing their own church as successful, sometimes rather more so than it was in actuality. Moreover, it is not impossible that even people who had not themselves had any direct contact with the Bogumils had heard from their elders about the campaigns against these people, sometimes probably the narrators' grandparents or great-grandparents. And this information, even if distorted by multiple retellings, may well have engendered enough hostility for people to prefer a non-Christian alternative.

What is remarkable about the Bosnian case is the fact that, while normally conservative peasant communities were little inclined to change their religious allegiance, in Bosnia the peasantry accepted Islam as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. There is debate about the rapidity of the process, but the ultimate results are not in doubt. It is likely that in addition to the—mostly unwelcome—mis-

55 Compare the contribution by Fikret Adanir to the present volume.
sionary efforts of the Franciscans, the climate of total insecurity which prevailed in the fifteenth century had a significant role to play. After all, the Bosnian rulers were unable to defend their subjects against the invading Ottomans, and this may well have caused the peasantry to become estranged from these rulers, who strongly identified with Christianity. As King Stjepan Tomasević declared in a letter to Pope Pius II, the Ottomans had built several fortresses in his kingdom and treated the peasants very well, promising freedom to whoever would join them. Deserted by their peasants, the magnates were not able to hold out for long in their castles. In this climate of disillusion with Christianity, mystical brotherhoods such as the Nakşbendi, Halvetis and Mevlevis, who began their activities shortly after the Ottoman conquest, soon gained numerous adherents.

In no other Balkan country did the spread of Islam lead to such profound changes in the cultural makeup of a major section of the population. This, rather than the actual numbers involved, constitutes the particular characteristic of Bosnian Islam. For Bosnian Muslims are often identified as a forepost at the border between the Muslim and the Catholic worlds. This applied especially between the sixteenth and eighteenth century, when Bosnian participation in the sultans' campaigns was very high — many of the soldiers who garrisoned Hungary on behalf of the Ottoman Empire were themselves native Bosnians. Some of the more highly placed among the Bosnian military men succeeded in making impressive careers in the sultan's service. However, this process resulted in the isolation of the Muslim Bosnians from their Christian neighbors, who tended to view the Muslims as religious fanatics.

58 At the end of the eighteenth century, Muslims numbered 265,000 people and thus formed a plurality of the local population, with members of the Orthodox church totalling 253,000 and Catholics, 80,000 men and women. Zhelyazkova, Razprostranenie na islama, 139.
Islam in Montenegro

Contrary to what happened in neighboring Bosnia, Islamization in Montenegro, which the Ottomans called Karadağ, was of limited effectiveness. The *zhupa* of Zeta constituted a specific kind of tribal alliance in which the local Orthodox church played an extremely important role. Relations with the outside world consisted essentially of fighting both the Ottomans and the Venetians and negotiating with them when fighting became inexpedient. Throughout the fifteenth century, the rivalry between these two states helped the Montenegrins to retain their independence. In order to protect its territory, the locally dominant Crnojević family acknowledged its vassalage to both Venice and the Ottoman rulers. But by the end of the fifteenth century, the latter conquered the fertile lowland parts of the Montenegrin polity and annexed them to the Empire as the sub-province of Skutari.60 The Montenegrins retired to the more inaccessible mountain regions, where they remained largely undisturbed. Now a kind of theocratic polity was formed, with an Orthodox metropolitan holding supreme political authority in addition to his religious role. The Orthodox church became the largest landholder, and the fusion of clerical and secular authority, far from engendering disaffection, helped the highlanders maintain their tribal-patriarchal traditions and encouraged their self-image as irreconciliable opponents of the Ottomans and Islam.

Even so, however, Islam won adherents among Montenegrins as well: usually landlords who adopted Islam in order to consolidate their positions under Ottoman overlordship. Conversion of the lords often was followed by that of their peasants. Throughout the eighteenth century, Orthodox Montenegrins, for a while commanded by their metropolitan Danilo Petrović, conducted a series of raids against their Muslim neighbors, in which a sizeable number of the latter either were killed or driven away from their lands and homes. Orthodoxy thus remained supreme in Montenegro.61

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60 Branislav Djurdjev, *Turska vlast u Crnoj Gori u XVI i XVII veku. Prilog jednog nerešenot pitanju iz naše istorije* (Sarajevo, 1953).

Islamization in continental Greece was especially intensive in western Thrace, where similarly to the Macedonian and Bulgarian territories, there was a massive immigration of Turkish speakers. This latter process occurred well before 1470, when the southern parts of modern Greece fell under Ottoman rule and the territory was organized in six sub-provinces, subordinate to the provincial governors of Rumeli and Cezayir. On the local level, the Ottomans frequently relied on Greek dignitaries, known as archons, who were responsible for taxation, good order in their respective communities, and public functions in general.\(^\text{62}\)

It is noteworthy that the Ottoman ruling group accorded its Greek subjects a comparatively privileged position. Greeks were not only granted considerable autonomy in the territories they themselves inhabited, but also were employed in administrative functions in other parts of the sultans’ extensive Balkan provinces. Thus, in the eighteenth century, Ottoman Greeks were appointed as governors of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the chief translator to the Sultan’s Council, who had considerable responsibilities in foreign affairs until the Greek uprising of 1821, was also chosen from among this group. As we have seen, Greeks were affected by the ‘levy of boys’ and, after Islamization, some of them entered the Ottoman military and administrative services. Islamized Greeks frequently served in the navy, known as deniz levendleri. From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, there also existed Greek Orthodox naval recruits who wore a special eye-catching uniform.\(^\text{63}\)

In this process of incorporating selected Greeks into the Ottoman administration, the Orthodox hierarchy had a key role to play. By empowering the Greek patriarchs and supporting their hold over the Orthodox on Ottoman territories, the sultans secured their rear in

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times of war against Catholic princes. For under the circumstances, the Orthodox hierarchy had no interest in pursuing otherwise possible alliances with the Catholic Church of the Counter Reformation. For the Orthodox hierarchy, this arrangement with the Ottoman administration implied a confirmation of its material possessions, while the Sublime Porte quite successfully used the Orthodox ecclesiastical organization for the consolidation of the Ottoman order. Of course, this claim, namely that in the Ottoman realm as in many other polities, state and church worked out a mutually beneficial agreement, sounds quite heretical to most Balkan historians. Apart from a few rather cryptic allusions, we do not find much reference to this arrangement in the historiographies of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia.

In the Greek historiography, there have been few serious attempts to analyze colonization and Islamization; most researchers have concentrated on demographic and territorial losses occasioned by the long process of Ottoman conquest. Indirectly, these losses include an appreciable amount of emigration, at first to Venice and other Italian principalities where Greek mercenaries were in demand. Quite a few families from Epirus came to settle on the Calabrian coast. Later, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Greek mariners and merchants also moved to southern Russia. Outside of Thrace and Greek Macedonia, Muslim colonization on present-day Greek territory was undertaken less by Turkish speakers than by Muslim Albanians, although the former frequently filled administrative and military positions.

Simultaneously, local people living in Greek-speaking territories accepted Islam. This process is reflected in the Ottoman tax registers, which give us some idea of the composition of the tax-paying population. It is only quite recently that Greek Ottomanists have

64 However, the recent studies of Paraskevas Konotas have pointed out that the Istanbul patriarch became head of the entire Orthodox church only in the second half of the eighteenth century, when previously autocephalous sees had been eliminated or else subordinated to his authority: “From Ta’lîe to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community” in Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism, ed. by Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, 1999), 169–79.

begun to analyze the data from Ottoman registers, not only from the viewpoint of the socio-economic historian, but also from that of the specialist on religious change. A brilliant example is the study by Evangelia Balta of the sub-province of Egriboz (Euboea), in which she particularly focuses on the island's heterogeneous ethnic and confessional structure. For the first time a Greek historian working on the Ottoman period has used the personal names recorded in the Ottoman registers to trace the process of Islamization. Furthermore, consecutive registers have been compared in order to establish the growth or decrease of the Muslim, Orthodox and Jewish populations.

Social scientists have, moreover, studied the Muslim—and Slav—minorities resident in present-day Greece. However, these studies have been hampered by the fact that officially the Turkish speaking minority in western Thrace is accepted solely as a religious minority not as a linguistic or ethnic one. Absurdities abound: A doctoral dissertation defended at the University of Thessaloniki claims to have 'proven' the Thraco-Greek origin of the Pomaks, Muslims of Slavic speech. What the author has in fact demonstrated is much more mundane. In the villages of Ehinos, Satrai, Oreon, Milivia and Kotili, blood tests have shown that in 50–70 percent of all cases, blood relationships must have existed between Greeks and Pomaks. This could have come about for a variety of reasons; yet the author blithely concludes that “archeological, historical, cultural, linguistic and hematological data prove that the pomaks are autochthonous Thracians, that is, ancient inhabitants of a wider Hellenic area”.

But it must not be assumed that Greek authors are the sole producers of such mythologies. The Turkish writer N. Memişoğlu has imagined a Turko-Kumanian origin for the Pomaks, who are supposed to have settled in western Thrace after a rather mysterious ‘Turkish-Kumanian-Pecheneg union’, which supposedly had dominated the western Balkans, had disintegrated in the eleventh century.

67 P. Hidiroglou, Οι Ελληνες Πομάκοι και η σχετική τους στη Τουρκία (Athens, 1984), p. 4; N. Y. Xirotiris, Надеждення върху разпределение на крвните групи сред помаките, doctoral dissertation, Thessaloniki, 1971 (I have used the manuscript of the Bulgarian translation of this dissertation.)
This sounds as absurd as the attempts by Bulgarian authors between 1985 and 1989 to find 'historical' arguments for the government’s vuzroditelen protses ('revival process') by 'proving' the Old Bulgarian origin of all Turkish settlers from Anatolia. To make it clear how myths can be dressed up in scientific garb, it is worth quoting a sample:

The Bulgarian origin and identification of the Islamized population in our lands has been confirmed by data from historical science, archeology, linguistics, ethnography, folklore and anthropology, i.e. data from sciences using comparative analysis which bases the study of the ethno genesis of nations on strictly scientific data.69

Such myth-making unfortunately tends to submerge the few serious studies of Balkan Islamization, including both the adaptation of Islam to the local context and the emergence of Muslim communities in individual Balkan countries. As our colleague Milan Vasić rightly puts it, these processes are much more complex than usually has been implied in the term ‘turning Turk’, so often used in the Serbian sources.70 These problems also have been discussed by a few Greek scholars, such as Theodore Papadopoullos and Y. Theoharidis; among the Bulgarians Petar Petrov’s contribution has been noteworthy.71

Conversion to Islam from among Balkan Jews

The history of Balkan Jewish communities differs significantly from that of the Christians. There do not seem to have been many Romanite, i.e. Grecophone Jewish communities, present in the Balkan territories conquered by the Ottomans, although there were a few in early Ottoman Istanbul.72 Most Ottoman Jews were immigrants from

71 Th. Papadopoullos and Y. Theoharidis, “Cases of Islamization—Turning Mohammedan or Turning Turk”. (I have used their unpublished manuscript.) Petur Petrov, Sudbonsni vekove za bulgarska narodnost (Sofia, 1975); idem, Po sledite na nasilieto (Sofia, 1987).
Spain, Portugal and Italy. They were well received by the Ottoman administration and permitted to settle in many important Balkan cities and towns, including Istanbul, Edirne, Salonica, Skopje, Bitola, Sofia, Sarajevo and others. Some of these communities led an active life, both in commerce and in the cultural realm. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, certain Ottoman Jews, thanks to their culture and experience, obtained high positions at the Ottoman court as physicians, financiers and commercial advisors.

Jewish communities were rather effective in countering proselytism by keeping a vigilant eye on their members’ conformity to communal norms. The sanction for non-observance was ostracism, a severe punishment in a setting where people’s place in society was determined by their religious adherence. However, even these Jewish communities were not monolithic. Especially in the sixteenth century, when the immigrants were still finding their places in Ottoman society, there were considerable disagreements between Jewish communities of different origins and variant traditions, at least in the larger centers such as Istanbul and Salonica. But in spite of such conflicts, the pressure to conform to the norms of the local community was effective. Ottoman documents do record former Jews who had converted to Islam, but such cases were quite exceptional. Most Jewish communities in the Balkans tended to isolate themselves from their environment and thus safeguarded their particular culture.

Islamization of Ottoman Jews on a larger scale was linked to the movement of Sabbatianism, named after Sabatai Zevi (1626–1676). Claiming to be the Messiah, he attracted thousands of Jewish followers, even though many rabbis adamantly were opposed to his teaching. Considered dangerous by the Ottoman administration as well, he was presented with the alternative of execution or conversion to Islam, and chose the latter (1666). Many of his adherents followed him into Islam, creating a self-contained sect of dönme (converts) who justified their conversion as part of the chain of events destined ultimately to lead to religious salvation. According to the

73 See the forthcoming study by Minna Rozen on the Jews of sixteenth-century Istanbul. In a recent article this author also has pointed to the tendency of at least certain communities to split along the dividing line between “comfortably off” and “poor”: “Public Space and Private Space among the Jews of Istanbul in the Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries”, Turcica 30 (1998), 331–346, here 340.

Greek historian Apostolos Vacalopoulos, the dönme of Salonika only outwardly practiced Islam, in secret they were adepts of Jewish mysticism.75 Throughout its history, the Jewish milieu proved extremely difficult to control from the outside, and this tendency has motivated the Macedonian historian A. Matkovski to devote several chapters of his five-volume work on the resistance against Ottoman domination in Macedonia to the Balkan Jews.76

Searching for the 'origins' of Islam among Balkan populations: religious syncretism

Up to this point, we have discussed the historiography of 'conversion to Islam' among several ethnic and religious communities of the Balkans. Now the time has come to study the historiographical treatment accorded to certain social and political dynamics which operated in more than one ethnic or cultural context, or perhaps even in several environments which might differ considerably from one another. In the present section, we will focus on the historiography of religious syncretism, which we already have encountered in the Pontic-Greek and Albanian instances. Of course, religious syncretism did not begin with the interaction of Christianity and Islam in the minds of Balkan peasants and herdsmen. Quite to the contrary, the Christianization of many Balkan peoples had already led to an appreciable degree of interaction between pagan beliefs and Christian dogmas, ideas and cults. On the other hand, in areas where Turkish-speaking nomads had immigrated in large numbers, one had to reckon with notions derived from nature cults or shamanism, and the prowess attributed to holy men in this particular context later might be transferred to certain dervish saints. Thus, in such rural areas, we are confronted with a degree of syncretism between shamanism or nature cults, on the one hand, and Islam, on the other. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in certain areas of the Balkans, beliefs marginal to Christianity have survived in people's minds, beliefs considered heretical by the dominant churches.

76 Matkovski, Otporot vo Makedoniya.
These had been repressed with considerable brutality by rulers adhering to both the Catholic and Orthodox creeds, yet had not been totally eradicated. Such more or less conscious adherents of persecuted ‘heresies’ were at least profoundly opposed to the official teachings of whatever church was established in their locality. In this way they contributed their share to the prevailing inclination toward religious syncretism.\(^77\)

In the Balkans, Sunnism was represented largely by administrative officials and religious personnel and gained currency mainly in towns. More important for the spread of Islam, especially among the rural majority, were certain dervish orders, particularly the Bektashis.\(^78\) In Albania alone, at one time more than forty lodges of this order existed, which was also widespread in present-day northeastern Bulgaria and in Macedonia. By contrast, the Bosnians seem to have preferred the Mevlevis, dervishes who extensively employed music and dance in their rituals.\(^79\) Many dervishes placed special emphasis on the veneration of saints, and this linked them to the indigenous Christian population, for whom the cult of saints also was central.\(^80\)

St George’s day, celebrated on May 6th, might function as a spring festival; St Dimitri’s day, on the other hand, was regarded as the onset of winter. In some places, both dates were observed by certain Muslims by the sacrifice of an animal, usually a sheep \(\textit{kurban}\).\(^81\) Pomaks and Turks in Bulgaria honored the Blessed Virgin. Moreover, the Forty Martyrs venerated by Christians found their place in esoteric Islamic teachings, where they could be identified with the holy figures known as the \textit{kirklar}. Given this devotion to

\(^77\) Compare the Bosnian instance discussed above.

\(^78\) However, we also find dervishes whose practices were perfectly consonant with strict Sunni Islam, and who were regarded as representatives of the Ottoman régime. On the role of one such dervish order, namely the Halvetis, in the struggle against “heretic” Muslims, see Nathalie Clayer, \textit{Mystiques, état et société. Les Halbetis dans l’aire balkanique de la fin du XVI\textsuperscript{e} siècle à nos jours} (Leiden, 1994).

\(^79\) Zhelyazkova, \textit{Razprostranenie na islama}, 143.


saints honored in common, many dervish lodges (tekke) formed centers of cultural contact between Christians and Muslims, and in the tekke milieu many Balkan Christians found it easy to convert to Islam.

There even existed cult sites which originally had been dedicated to some Christian saint and later were recuperated by dervishes as memorials to one of their own holy men. Here both Muslims and Christians offered sacrifices and oblations to the saint, and as we have seen, these practices brought the believers of the two hostile religions more closely together. In some places, the use of certain cult sites by both Muslims and Christians persists to the present day and has engaged the attentions of both Bulgarian and Greek anthropologists and ethnologists. Thus the Greek scholar Eustratios Zenginis has described cases of this kind in western Thrace, where in Ottoman times certain Christian chapels and other sanctuaries were taken over by dervishes, those dedicated to St George apparently exercising a special attraction. We also encounter the Islamization of sanctuaries dedicated to the Prophet Elias/Ilyas. Or in other cases, the ruins of even older religious buildings, such as temples, still considered sacred by the local population, were 'recycled' in this manner.82

The impact of the central government: ethnic divisions among Muslims

Quite a few debates in the Balkan historiographies concern the aims pursued, and the methods adopted, by the Ottoman central government with respect to the Islamization of its Balkan subjects. In principle, the Ottoman authorities did not regard the ethnic background of their Muslim subjects as a matter of major concern; religion, not ethnicity, was the major criterion for the classification of Ottoman subjects. All Muslims were, after all, members of the ʾummet-i Muhammed, the Islamic community overarching all earthly divisions. Thus, Ottoman tax registers, when recording the population of a village or town, typically listed Muslims first.

However, administrative practice often made it expedient to differentiate between Muslims of varying ethnic backgrounds. Thus, Muslim gypsies—Kibtiyan or Çingene—were not, as were other

82 Eustratios Zenginis, O Μπεκτσισμός στη Α. Θράκη, Συμβολή στην ιστορία της διαδόσεως του μουσουλμανισμού στον Ελλαδικό χώρο (Thessaloniki, 1988).
Muslims, exonerated from the capitation tax; therefore the tax registers will inform us of the Kibtiyan background of certain Muslim subjects. In the same fashion, the Islamization of many Albanians in Ottoman eyes never quite obliterated the ethnic identity of these people. Muslims or Christians, to the educated Istanbulı they were known as the Arnavut, who so often arrived in the capital as migrant workmen, guards and mercenaries. In records pertaining to the Ottoman army, information about the ethnic origin of certain soldiers is not uncommon either, as members of the Ottoman ruling class appreciated certain qualities which they ascribed to the different ethnic groups among their fighting men. Moreover, some people, such as the yüriük, were assigned specific responsibilities, such as serving as auxiliaries or transporting war material.\footnote{Gökbel, \textit{Rumeli'de Yüriükler}, 52.} Last but not least, as early as the sixteenth century, there existed among the sultans’ servitors, their \textit{kul}, factions based upon the regional or ethnic origins of the people concerned.\footnote{I. Metin Kunt, “Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment,” \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 5 (1974), 233–39.} It is therefore an error to assume that in Ottoman governmental practice, ethnic divisions among Muslims were irrelevant under any and all circumstances.

\textit{The impact of the central government: conversion to Islam}

More contentious among Balkan historians is the question whether there was at any time an official policy aiming at the forced Islamization of Christian and Jewish Ottoman subjects. In the course of our study, we already have encountered certain categories of people who assumed Islam without having much of a choice in the matter. This applied particularly to slaves, who might be prisoners of war, but also to the victims of soldiers who illegally, on the borders but sometimes even in the Empire’s heartlands, kidnapped people for sale in the slave markets. In addition, there were the boys drafted for service to the sultans, who also were expected to convert to Islam as a matter of course.

Yet even within these categories, brute force was only sometimes, not always, the decisive factor. Slaves might adopt Islam because
their owner would then be more inclined to manumit them after a period of faithful service, and even might remember them in his/her will. In a register of Istanbul's pious foundations, dating from 1546, we find quite a few cases of well-to-do people who left their freedmen/women an income by making the latter administrators of a pious foundation. Or else a former owner might make a house of his/hers into a foundation, so that an elderly ex-slave would have a place to stay.\textsuperscript{85} In the seventeenth century particularly, Balkan Muslim communities grew appreciably due to an influx of freedmen.\textsuperscript{86} In the same vein, by the late sixteenth century, the status of a Janissary might be an enviable one, and a devşirme recruit, however involuntary, in the course of life might encounter numerous people who solicited entry into the Janissary corps as a privilege. Nor was, by this later period, entry into the Janissary corps reserved for new converts from among the Albanians, Armenians, Bosnians, Bulgarians and Greeks. Albanians and Bosnians who were Muslims by birth also solicited entry into the corps for their sons.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, depending upon circumstances, certain devşirme recruits and their families even might view the drafting of their offspring into the sultan’s service as a chance to rise on the social ladder.

More controversial even than these social processes is the question whether entire Balkan regions ever were subjected to campaigns of forced Islamization. This is an issue of debate mainly among Bulgarian historians. However, the primary sources which make such claims are of dubious authenticity, dating only from the nineteenth century. Certain Bulgarian historians and linguists have criticized the use of these sources when constructing a narrative of Islamization in the Bulgarian lands, but their objections have been violently rejected by most of their colleagues, and also by the general public.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{85} Ömer Lutfi Barkan and Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi (eds.), \textit{Istanbul vakıfları tahır defteri, 953 (1546) tarihli} (Istanbul, 1970), XXVI–XXVII.

\textsuperscript{86} Zhelyazkova, \textit{Razprostranenie na islyama}, 153.

\textsuperscript{87} In a regulation from 1666, it is specified that Bosnian and Albanian Muslims recruited through the devşirme were to be between fifteen and twenty years of age, and should not be drafted without their consent. These \textit{sunnetli oğlan} (circumcised boys) or \textit{potur oğullan} were to be sent to Istanbul separately from the boys of Christian background. See Aleksandar Matkovski, “Prilog pitanju devširme”, \textit{Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju} 14–15 (1969), 276–77.

During the years of Ottoman expansion, the sultans' administration did not make any efforts to Islamize and acculturate its 'ordinary' subjects, that is, non-slave peasants and townsmen who had not been drafted through the devşirme. Quite to the contrary, as we have seen, the Orthodox church, including the Athos monasteries, received grants of privileges from Sultans Bayezid I (1389-1402), Mehmed I (1413-1421) and Murad II (1421-1444, 1446-1451). In this atmosphere, some Balkan lords did not hesitate to join the Ottomans, and non-Islamized Balkan Christians even served in the army. When Selim I conquered Syria and Egypt, some of the local people supposedly blamed him for leading, against a Muslim country, an army in which there were numerous Christian soldiers; these critics also found fault with the fact that the most widely used language in Selim I's army was Slavonic.  

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, only a few Balkan campaigns are known to have resulted in forced conversions. Thus the notables of Tarnovo, who refused to adopt Islam after their town had been conquered in 1394, were massacred, and others changed their religion to avoid such a fate. The bishop of Vidin Joasaph, who visited the town that same year, mentioned that apart from fear, some of these conversions also were motivated by flattery (presumably on the part of the conquerors) and hope of gain. Similar events occurred in Bosnia in 1463, when many feudal lords were slaughtered and those who survived accepted Islam.

But these were events which took place in the weeks and months following the Ottoman conquest. As the reader of the present study already will have concluded, once the sultans' rule had been firmly established, it was easier, by and large, to live as an 'infidel' in the Ottoman Empire than as a Protestant in a Catholic country of the Counter Reformation, or even as a Catholic under a Protestant king. To be a Jew, Muslim or even a New Christian in Catholic Spain during the early modern period obviously was yet a worse hardship. However, this relative tranquillity did not exclude some rather upsetting interludes. In the early sixteenth century, Selim I, the nemesis

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89 Strashimir Dimitrov, "Demografski otnosheniya i pronikvane na Islyama v Zapadnite Rodopi", in Rodopski Sbornik 1 (Sofia, 1965), 81; V. Bartold, Sochineniya, Vol. 6 (Moscow, 1966), 427.
of Shi'i Iranians now conceptualized as 'heretics', planned to convert all Christians of his Empire by force. Protests came, unsurprisingly, from the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople/Istanbul, but negative reactions from both the *ulema* and the janissaries must have been even more effective in dissuading the sultan. Neither Ottoman nor Italian sources do in fact record such a campaign of forced Islamization, and Steven Runciman, in his authoritative history of the Orthodox church, refers merely to an abortive attempt.\(^91\) Yet Balkan historiography, with its tendency to overrely on local sources of questionable authenticity, continues to claim that some of the most extensive campaigns of Islamization in the Balkans were undertaken in the time of Selim I.\(^92\) Another project of Balkan Islamization on a large scale apparently was conceived by Sultan Murad IV. After having conquered Erivan, Tabriz and Baghdad, this ruler threatened to force Islam on all Christians in his Empire. But once again he was dissuaded by the *ulema*. Quite apart from the fact that such a move ran counter to Islamic religious law (*şeriat*), the large foundation of Mehmed the Conqueror in Istanbul, with its numerous *ulema* employees, had been assigned the capitation tax of Istanbul and Galata non-Muslims. Material interests thus were involved as well.\(^93\)

In the seventeenth century, a series of long campaigns, in addition to economic difficulties, encouraged the holders of state power to seek alliances with 'revivalist' low-level *ulema*, particularly mosque preachers, and thus consolidate their hold over the Muslim urban population. This is what Halil İnalçık, in a very influential volume, has termed "the triumph of fanaticism".\(^94\) Reports of the large-scale, forced Islamization of the Rhodopes area have been assigned to the same period and would seem to fit into some such context. Three sources report the story, namely the chronicle of the priest Metodi Draginov, an anonymous chronicle linked to the village of Golyamo Belovo and the so-called Batkunino account. All three nar-

\(^{91}\) Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity. A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (Cambridge, 1968), 199.

\(^{92}\) Limanoski, *Islamizatsiyata i etnichkite promeni*, 85; Petrov, *Sudbonosni vekove*; idem, *Posledite na nasilieto*.

\(^{93}\) Runciman, *The Great Church*, does not refer to this story at all. For the assignment of the capitation tax to Mehmed II's foundation, see the article "İstanbul" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Vol. 4, p. 229, by Halil İnalçık.

rate the same events and obviously are based upon a common source text.

These chronicles of Rhodopes Islamization have been used by several historians, mainly of Bulgarian background, ever since they were made known to the scholarly world over a century ago. St. Zahariev, Hr. Popkonstantinov, G. Dimitrov, St. Shishkov and most recently P. Petrov have all accepted the information provided by these three chronicles as a basis for their accounts of 'the ruin of the Rhodopes'; the events in question supposedly took place in 1666–1669, during the last phase of the Veneto-Ottoman war for Crete.\(^5\)

Yet in a comprehensive study published in 1984, the Bulgarian linguist I. Todorov has demolished the credibility of this material. Todorov argues that Metodi Draginov’s account is nothing but a literary fiction, concocted by St. Zahariev on the basis of the Belovo chronicle, itself written not earlier than the nineteenth century.\(^6\) I. Todorov assumes that this is but one of several mystifications which St. Zahariev, driven by patriotic impulses and romantic ‘national revival’ ideals, concocted in the course of his life. Another such ‘mythohistory’ incidentally was produced by Rada Kazalieva and her son Hristak Pop Pandeliev, both active in the Bulgarian national revival movement. In their “Historical Notebook” these two authors claimed to have reconstructed an original and recently lost chronicle, all from memory.

Why were such mystifications considered necessary by Bulgarian intellectuals of the late nineteenth century? To begin with, as the collection edited by E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger has demonstrated, inventions of texts and rituals for ‘patriotic’ purposes were common enough in this period.\(^7\) In addition, the Bulgarian intelligentsia, in its struggle first for a church independent of the patriarch in Istanbul, and soon for independent statehood, was confronted with a number of questions concerning the near and more remote

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5 S. Zakhariev, Geografiko-istoriko-statistichesko opisanie na Tatarpazardzhiskata kaaza (Sofia, 1973); Chr. Popkonstantinov, “Chepino. Edno bulgarsko kraishte v severozapadnite razkloveniya na rodopskite planini”, Sbornik narodni umotvoreniya 15 (1898); G. Dimitrov, Knyazhestvo Bulgariya v istorichesko, geografichesko i etnogrichesko otnoshenie (Plovdiv, 1894); P. Cholakov, “Pop Metodieviy letopisen razkaz za poturchvaneto na chepinski bulgari”, Dukhova kultura 24–25 (1925); Petrov, Po sledeite na nashioto, and idem, Sadbonosni vekov.


7 E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).
past, which in the view of nationalist intellectuals demanded immediate responses. Why did Islam spread in the Bulgarian lands? Were the Muslims living in the provinces soon to become Bulgaria to be considered renegades, traitors and apostates, or were they rather victims of religious fanaticism, and maybe even martyrs? Who bore the immediate responsibility for what was seen as the sufferings of the Bulgarians? Was it only the Ottoman sultans, or were high-ranking Greek ecclesiastics just as guilty? By proposing answers to these questions on the basis of ‘ancient’ texts, the nationalist intelligentsia planned to mobilize Bulgarian speakers and weld them into a nation. Such a body of people, it was hoped, would resist an ‘infidel’ ruler, demanding autonomy and ultimately statehood. Given this commitment, the ‘inventors’ of pseudo-ancient chronicles assumed they were fulfilling a patriotic duty.

However, all these matters are by now a century old, and the time has come for dispassionate historical criticism. In 1988 the present author, addressing an audience of young historians in Primorsko, has presented a detailed analysis of the historical mystifications which cloud our understanding of the events in the Rhodopes. If ‘mytho-history’ is discounted, one arrives at the following chronology: Some isolated cases of conversion to Islam already are on record for the sixteenth century. The process of Rhodopes Islamization gathered momentum during the seventeenth century, especially after 1650, when the number of Muslim households increased significantly. Conversion continued during the eighteenth century as well. Throughout, the process was gradual and, above all, voluntary, an aggregate of decisions made by individuals, families or whole villages. The latter case particularly involved settlements on lands belonging to pious foundations, whose inhabitants solicited the permission and imperial grace of the sultan in this matter.

In conclusion

The present paper has focused on the debates and unresolved issues encountered among Balkan historians. I have refrained from dis-

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98 Zhelyazkova, “The Problem of the Authenticity”.
cussing the historiographic achievements of different schools of national history writing, which, while often important, would have rendered the present article unduly long and difficult to read. For the same reason, I have for the most part avoided comparisons with the work of western/central European and American historians. Of course, it would be interesting to see how the studies of such ‘outsiders’ were received in the Greek, Bulgarian or Bosnian context, how certain sections of works by non-Balkan scholars, beginning with Konstantin Jireček, became part and parcel of a given ‘national’ historiography. But that is for a different occasion, hopefully.

Most Balkan historians have been unable to accept calmly and analyze objectively the spread of Islam in the Balkans, both by immigration and by the conversion of a segment of the local population. With regard to Balkan Muslim communities, negative stereotypes have been formed, and through textbooks but also through scholarly works, these simplistic notions have been passed on from generation to generation. Furthermore, as these stereotypes are so widespread, they have facilitated the mobilization of wide sectors of the Christian or post-Christian Balkan populations for actions against their Muslim neighbors. In the Bulgarian context, the infamous ‘revival process’ of 1985 to 1989 first comes to mind, and, more recently, there were the horrors of the war in Bosnia.

Muslim communities were formed in each Balkan country in the course of many centuries and under the influence of specific local factors. Muslims thus have every reason to consider themselves as native to the regions they have inhabited for generations. It is useless and dangerous to ‘otherize’ Muslims living in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and, last but not least, the Kosovo. Historically these lands belong to the civilization of Christian Europe, and either they continue to do so, or at least they retain strong ties with Christian—and post-Christian—European civilization. But Balkan environments were never monolithic; quite to the contrary, Orthodox and Catholics continue to live in predominantly Muslim Albania, while Catholic congregations exist in Bulgaria, to say nothing of a Turkish-speaking Muslim minority. Examples could be multiplied. While preserving their original features and traditions, the different ethnic and cultural/religious communities inhabiting the Balkans for a long time have established and entertained numerous contacts, both in the economic and cultural spheres. In spite of historical and
political vicissitudes, many of these contacts continue down to the present day. If we wish to enable a new generation to live without prejudice and hatred, this human experience should occupy the foreground of present-day Balkan historiographies.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FORMATION OF A 'MUSLIM'
NATION IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA:
A HISTORIOGRAPHIC DISCUSSION

Fikret Adanir

Introduction: Bosnian Muslims and South Slav nationalism

The presence of Muslim populations in the Balkans is a salient aspect of the Ottoman legacy. That some of the indigenous Christians had embraced the belief of the conquerors has often enough aroused scholarly curiosity. But particularly intriguing has been the question of how it was possible that these converts clung to their new creed even after the national emancipations of the nineteenth century. Should not the “descendants of those who did not convert” rightly “regard those who did, and their descendants, as opportunistic traitors to their nation or race”? In a time in which important segments of public opinion even in the West view Islam as an obstruction to democracy and prosperity, it is understandable that many people in the Balkans deem the Ottoman-Islamic domination of the past as the principal cause of their countries’ present plight. Dealing with Islam in a Balkan context implies, therefore, dealing with an explosive matter—an issue that has plunged southeastern Europe into violent conflicts at the end of the twentieth century.

This chapter is devoted to Bosnia-Hercegovina. It aims at tracing the multilayered historical process through which the question of a Bosnian Muslim identity has attained political significance; as a primary source, I will use the historiography concerning the region’s Ottoman and pre-Ottoman past. Especially the official recognition

2 See Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans”, in Imperial Legacy, 45–77, especially 70 f.
of a Bosnian Muslim nation (narod) as a constituent element of the Yugoslav Federation in 1968 has generated much controversy in historiography, bringing into focus various periods of the Ottoman past. Not least this is linked to the fact that the general pattern of nation-state formation in this part of Europe has traditionally been perceived as a process appropriate only to autochthonous ethnic groups whose members achieved their goals by prolonged liberation movements against Ottoman imperial rule. But the conditions under which a new type of historiography focusing on nations came into being also contributed to the triumph of the ethnocentric approach: Inspired by the romanticism of the nineteenth century, historians showed a pronounced inclination to conceive of nations in terms of ethnicity, whereby ethnicity itself was understood as an organic community of common descent and shared destiny. Such a group (ethnos, nation) articulated itself through the medium of its own language. This might explain the remarkable interest in philological research in southeastern Europe since the early nineteenth century, as well as the preoccupation with historical linguistics, in other words, with phenomena connected with ethnogenesis. Thus the Illyrian movement launched by Ljudevit Gaj in the early nineteenth century aimed at incorporating all Slavic peoples of southeastern Europe, by reason of their common ethnic roots and similar languages, in an autonomous state preferably under the aegis of the Habsburgs, an idea that anticipated the more recent Yugoslavism. Equally comprehensive was the concept of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić who succeeded in having a Herzegovinian dialect accepted as the basis for a future standard

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Serbo-Croatian. In a pamphlet entitled “Serbs All and Everywhere” (Srbi svi i svuda), Karadžić reclaimed Slavic populations of Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina expressly for the Serbian nationality. His cultural notion of Serbianism was soon echoed in Ilija Garašanin’s nationalist program, the so-called Načertanije (1844), which pinpointed Bosnia-Hercegovina as one of the territories to be redeemed by, and annexed to, the future Greater Serbia.

Neither the Ilyrian movement of Ljudevit Gaj and his followers nor Vuk Karadžić’s all-embracing Serbianism left room for a Bosnian Muslim identity. The consequences were felt in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin (1878) which had deemed it necessary to put Bosnia-Hercegovina under Austro-Hungarian administration. That decision was a profound shock to the self-perception of the Bosnian Muslim elites. Their protests in Istanbul and Berlin having proved ineffectual, the Bosnians put up a dogged resistance to the Austrian army of occupation, although in military terms the chances of success were nil. Nonetheless, it was this defiant spirit which compelled Austria-Hungary to make concessions to Muslim opinion: the Novi Pazar Convention of 1879 recognized the sultan’s suzerainty over the province and granted the Muslims the right to maintain contact

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with religious authorities of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it allowed them to display the Ottoman flag on special occasions and to recite the reigning sultan’s name in the _hutbe_, the sermon delivered after the Friday prayer in the mosque.\(^9\) Despite this arrangement, however, the wind continued to blow in their faces.

The problems confronting them were basically twofold. _First_, they were deeply concerned about their status as a religious community, for the Muslim community’s integrity was impaired, on the one hand, by proselytizing efforts of rival religious communities, now that the Ottoman protection for Islam had waned.\(^10\) On the other hand, barely disguised attempts at appropriation in the name of Croatian or Serbian ethnicity, neither of which was able to achieve a dominant influence over the province without securing the compliance of the Muslims, represented a serious threat.\(^11\) Austrian policies, geared since 1881 toward loosening Bosnia’s ties with the Ottoman Empire in total disregard of the rights of the sultan, were equally disquieting. Thus Benjamin Kállay, the Joint Imperial Minister of Finance charged with the administration of the new crown possession, pushed ahead the establishment of a Muslim religious authority comprising a head of the hierarchy (_reisülelemə_ and a committee of four religious scholars (_meclis-ı ulyema_), both being solely responsible to Vienna and no longer to the _şeyhülislam_ in Istanbul.\(^12\) Especially the introduction of general conscription in 1881/82 aroused stiff Muslim opposition,

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\(^10\) For various petitions by Muslim leaders regarding the danger to Bosnian Islam under Austrian rule, see _Bosna-Hercek ile ilgili arşiv belgeleri_, 138–47, 171–75 and 176–82. However, these fears particularly with respect to conversion appear rather exaggerated, if one considers the very low number of such incidents taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1878 and 1915. See Čupić-Amrein, _Die Opposition_, 97.


\(^12\) See Alexandre Popovic, _L’Islam balkanique. Les musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-ottomane_ (Berlin/Wiesbaden, 1986), 273; Čupić-Amrein, _Die Opposition_, 88; Pinson, “The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, 95. According to Aydın Babuna, _Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime_ (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 93, it was the Muslim leadership which demanded a stronger orientation towards Vienna.
even driving them into joining Serbian rebels during the 1882 uprising against the Austrian authorities.¹³

Secondly, various initiatives by the Austro-Hungarian administration with a view towards solving the chronic agrarian question in Bosnia-Hercegovina and persistent demands for reform in this field, especially by Serbian organizations, bode ill for the interests of Muslim landowners. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 had given the latter the chance of registering some of their holdings originally on state land \( (mir) \) as private property \( (chiftlik) \). In addition, the Decree of 12 September 1859 had codified the most salient stipulations of common law regarding land tenure, improving thereby the legal position of the peasant tenants \( (kmeš) \). The resulting agrarian regime protected the peasantry inasmuch as it was not possible to expropriate the tenants. At the same time, however, it secured for Bosnian aghas the status of a privileged gentry. They had the right to demand under the title of \( hak \) about a third \( (tretina) \), sometimes a fourth \( (četrťina) \), but in exceptional cases even one half \( (polovina) \) of the gross produce.¹⁴ The Austro-Hungarian administration adopted this system practically unchanged. Kallay was careful not to alienate Muslim landowning interests lest emigration increase, but also because landowning classes especially in Hungary would oppose any radical change in Bosnia-Hercegovina.¹⁵ Still, the new administration was also eager to improve productivity, introducing to that end settlers from other provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; this move was bound to affect the interests of Bosnian landowners.¹⁶ Another

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issue equally perturbing to these landowners was the intention of the
government to replace the proportional rent-in-kind such as *hak*
preferably by a lump sum, but at least by a fixed amount of pro-
duce. Finally, cautious attempts at establishing an agrarian credit sys-
tem, which would permit tenants to redeem the lands they cultivated,
deserve to be mentioned in this context. Under these conditions,
the Muslim gentry seemed to be losing ground, also because it was
apparently unable to espouse modern bourgeois values. Statistical
data stemming from 1910 indicate that the number of non-Muslim
*chiftlik* owners was on the rise, even though about 90 percent of those
owners were still Muslims. One author has pointed out that “most
Bosnian landlords (61.38 percent) owned less than 125.55 acres of
land” each and that “only seventeen landlords (not necessarily, though
probably, Muslims), or 0.18 percent of all Bosnian landlords, had
more than 2,473 acres of land” each.

It was thus a feeling of insecurity regarding both their commu-
nity’s religious concerns and their own socioeconomic interests that
induced more and more Muslim leaders to adopt an oppositional
posture vis-à-vis the Austrian administration. At first, some conserv-
ative *ulema* even went so far as to advocate outright emigration, since
it was, so they argued, incompatible with Islamic tenets to live under
non-Muslim rule. However, emigration to the Ottoman Empire was
mostly seen as a form of political protest, intended to attract the
attention of both Europe and the Porte to the untenable situation
of the Muslims in the occupied province. The introduction of gen-
eral conscription in 1881/82 set off the first rash of emigration.
Another upsurge was observed at the turn of the century when the
Muslim movement for autonomy gathered momentum, about 13,000
people emigrating in 1900/01 alone. A third wave came in the wake

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17 For an overview of Austrian reform initiatives, see Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung*, 74–83.
18 For an interpretation that emphasizes the rentier mentality of the Bosnian
landowning class as an obstacle to modernity, see Ferdinand Hauptmann, “Bosan-
skohercegovački aga u procijemu između privredne aktivnosti i rentijerstva na početku
19 Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung*, 84.
21 See Hans-Jürgen Kornrumpf, “Scheriat und christlicher Staat: Die Muslime in
Bosnien und in den europäischen Nachfolgestaaten des Osmanischen Reiches”, *Saecu-
of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908.\textsuperscript{22} It has been variously calculated that about 150,000 Muslims left Bosnia-Hercegovina for the Ottoman realm between 1878 and 1918.\textsuperscript{23}

Abdülhamid II’s attitude towards this influx of new Muslim subjects was ambivalent. On the one hand, he and his government actively encouraged Muslim immigration from Bosnia-Hercegovina because it contributed to the Islamization of Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, the Ottoman government already in 1879 drew attention to the detrimental effects a mass emigration of Muslims from Bosnia would have on Ottoman imperial interests, a most obvious one being that it would be increasingly difficult to uphold Ottoman sovereign rights with respect to Bosnia-Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{25} A quarter of a century later, the Porte still pleaded for discouraging immigration from Bosnia, among others with the argument that as long as there was a large Muslim population under Austrian rule, that power’s attitude towards the sultan’s government would continue to be friendly. However, once the Baghdad Railway project was completed, the Porte might reconsider and perhaps revise its policies in this regard, particularly if the need to settle Muslim populations along that line should emerge.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{22} Čupić-Amrein, \textit{Die Opposition}, 89–90.


\textsuperscript{25} See the Council of Minister’s memorandum of 27 April 1879, in \textit{Bosna-Hersek ile iğili arşiv belgeleri}, 82–85.

\textsuperscript{26} Protocol of a special session of the Council of Ministers of 14 August 1902, in \textit{Bosna-Hersek ile iğili arşiv belgeleri}, 205–08.
Bosnian Muslim opinion, too, was divided over the issue. Some ulema publicly declared themselves against emigration. For example, Muhamed Hadžijahić published a series of articles urging the readers not to forsake the common Bosnian homeland, and the Mufti Mehmed Tevfik Azab Agazade-Azapagić, who supported the Austrian policy of weakening the links between the Bosnian Muslim community and Istanbul, published a formal treatise against emigration. Nonetheless, the Muslims' share in the general population of Bosnia-Hercegovina under Austrian administration fell continuously, while especially the Roman Catholics experienced a perceptible growth.

By the turn of the century, this development began to alarm the Austro-Hungarian administration as well. Serbian claims to Bosnia-Hercegovina became increasingly vociferous, while the typically loyal Catholics were attracted to Croat nationalism. To Benjámin Kállay, himself of Magyar descent and an adherent of Habsburg dualism, neither the Serb nor the Croat element appeared reliable enough. His ingenious solution for this situation was the idea of promoting bosnjaštvo (Bosnianhood) as a new political concept conducive to generating loyalty towards the Dual Monarchy. Already in 1883, the expression “Bosnian nation” was being utilized as a neutral term that would not offend Serbian or Croat susceptibilities. By the beginning of the next century, bosnjaštvo had become the official ideology competing with Croat and Serb nationalisms. In practice, however, the chief addressees in this campaign were Muslim landowning groups who stood to lose most should the Croatian and/or Serbian aspirations ever come true. Therefore, Kállay expected them to respond positively to his Bosnianism. Indeed, the Bosnjak (Bosnian), the main organ of the movement, was founded and edited by Mehmed-

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28 Population in Bosnia-Hercegovina according to confessional affiliation, 1879–1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1879</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1910</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>496,761(42.86%)</td>
<td>571,250(42.76%)</td>
<td>673,246(42.94%)</td>
<td>825,918(43.49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>448,613(38.72%)</td>
<td>492,710(36.88%)</td>
<td>548,632(34.99%)</td>
<td>612,137(32.25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>209,391(18.07%)</td>
<td>265,788(19.88%)</td>
<td>334,142(21.31%)</td>
<td>434,061(22.87%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, a member of the Muslim landowning elite.\footnote{See Banac, \textit{The National Question in Yugoslavia}, 360–62. According to Smail Balić, Källay also pursued the goal of converting Bosnian Muslims to Catholicism, see \textit{Das unbekannte Bosnien. Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt} (Cologne - Weimar - Vienna, 1992), 43.}

The idea of Bosnianhood did not, however, catch on the Muslim imagination; the uneducated masses continued to view themselves as members of the Islamic \textit{umma}. Only the emerging Muslim intelligentsia, most of whom were employed by the Austro-Hungarian administration, showed some inclination to support the official line in the national question, namely, Bosnianism.\footnote{Čupić-Amrein, \textit{Die Opposition}, 229–38.} Some educated people also opted for Serbian or Croat national identity. Thus the organization \textit{Gajret} (Effort), founded in 1903 by an educated urban Muslim group as a cultural society, espoused a pro-Serbian stance.\footnote{Ibrahim Kemura, \textit{Uloga “Gajreta” u društvenom životu Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine (1903–1941)} (Sarajevo, 1986), 13–140. On pro-Serbian Muslim intellectuals see also Babuna, \textit{Die nationale Entwicklung}, 238–45.} A parallel movement that had its beginnings in Zagreb of 1902 viewed Islam as a hindrance to modern civilization.\footnote{Nusret Šehić, \textit{Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austrougarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini} (Sarajevo, 1980), 233–48.} Designating themselves as “progressive” Muslims, this group warned against the “reactionary” Muslim autonomy movement, accusing it of preparing the ground for a future Serbian take-over in Bosnia-Hercegovina. They themselves appeared convinced that the Bosnian Muslim community were descendants of the Bogomil Croats of the medieval period and consequently agitated in favor of inculcating a Croat national consciousness in the Muslims.\footnote{On the institution of Islamic charitable foundation (\textit{vakaf}) from Turkish \textit{vakif}) and Islamic education, see also Babuna, \textit{Die nationale Entwicklung}, 245–50.}

Given these circumstances, the most significant Muslim oppositional platform against the Austro-Hungarian regime was formulated by traditional religious leaders. It crystallized around the issues of religious foundations (\textit{vakuf} from Turkish \textit{vakif}) and Islamic education.\footnote{On the institution of Islamic charitable foundation (\textit{vakaf}), see Ömer L. Barkan, “Osmansı İmparatorluğu
unun toprak vakıflarının idari mali muhtarîyeti meselesi”, \textit{Türk Hukuk Tarihi Dergisi} 1 (1941–42), 11–25; M. Fuad Köprülü, \textit{İslâm ve Türk hukuk tarihi araştırmaları ve vakıf müessesesi} (İstanbul, 1983); Vera Mutafchieva, \textit{Le vakif}—un
into a country-wide protest movement. Led by the mufti of Mostar, Ali Fehmi Džabić, and Mujaga Komadina, the founder of the Kiraathane, a kind of reading society in the same city, the protesters demanded from the authorities not only prompt reparation of the wrong done in that individual conversion case, but also a closer and more sympathetic attention to the social and cultural needs of the Muslim community at large. Subsequently, matters of financing and administering Muslim confessional schools and particularly the clarification of complicated legal procedures related to vakuf property, rents and salaries became hotly debated issues. When Džabić went to Istanbul to secure support in 1902, the Austrian government reacted by banning his re-entry into Bosnia-Hercegovina. This deprived the Muslim movement of its leadership for several years, until an agricultural reform bill affecting the interests of the gentry stimulated a new oppositional spirit, thereby bringing Alibeg Firdus, a large landowner, to the forefront. The process of reorganization culminated in 1906 in the foundation of the first political party in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Muslim National Organization (Muslimanska narodna organizacija). Henceforth, the movement articulated in the name of the Muslim community demands more economic than religious in character. Alibeg Firdus was successful in persuading the Austro-Hungarian authorities to renew the negotiations with the Muslim political leadership, now conducted in a more conciliatory spirit. Also under the impression of the Young Turk revolution of 1908, which seemed to open new perspectives of closer links with the emerging Ottoman constitutional monarchy, the Austrian regime felt obliged to work for a compromise. Thus, just before the final annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the Dual Monarchy on 5 October

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aspect de la structure socio-économique de l’Empire ottoman (XVe-XVIIe s.) (Sofia, 1981); Ahmed Akgündüz, İslam hukukunda ve Osmanlı tarihinde vakıf müessesesi (Ankara, 1988).


39 See the text of the memorandum presented to the Austro-Hungarian parliament in 1906: Memorandum bosansko-hercegovačkog muslimanskog naroda upućen državnim odborima ugarskog i austrijskog sabora u Budimpešti godine 1906 (Zagreb, 1906).

The diplomatic crisis that followed the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina reflected also upon the internal situation in the province. For decades exposed to intense nationalist agitation, the Serbian Orthodox population perceived the change in the international status of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a setback for Serbian national aspirations. The years after 1908 saw the gradual radicalization of the Serbian youth movement, culminating in the spectacular assassination of 28 June 1914.\footnote{On the South Slav student movement and the appearance of secret societies after 1908 see Čupić-Amrein, \textit{Die Opposition}, 368–406. See also Jovan Cvijić, \textit{L'Annexion de la Bosnie et la Question serbe} (Paris, 1909); K. V. Vinogradov, \textit{Bosniyskiy kriis 1908–1909 gg. Prolog Perek mirovoy voypp} (Leningrad, 1964); Karl Kaser, “Die Annexion Bosniens und der Hercegovina im Jahre 1908 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Politik der bosnisch-hercegovinischen Serben”, \textit{Glasnik arhiva i društva arhivskih radnika Bosne i Hercegovine} 22 (1982), 195–208; idem, “Die serbische burgerliche Politik in Bosnien und der Hercegovina vom Ende der Annexionskrise bis zum Ende der ersten Saborssession (1909–1911)”, \textit{Prilozi za orientalnu filologiju} 22 (1986), 63–90.} In such a heated atmosphere, Bosnian Muslim opinion sought a reorientation. Once the Porte struck a bargain with Vienna, agreeing in 1909—over the heads of the Bosnian Muslim leaders—to recognize the Austrian \textit{fait accompli} in return for material compensation, a turning point in the process of Bosnian Muslim national assertion was reached.\footnote{The text of the Austro-Ottoman protocol of 26 February 1909, documenting formal recognition of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in \textit{Bosna-Hercek ile ilgili arşiv belgeleri}, 287–91.} Henceforth, Muslim parties moved closer towards a pro-Austrian position or sought a coalition with the Croats. The provincial constitution granted by the Emperor in early 1910 alleviated the former harsh conditions of political life for the Muslims, who were now allowed the second largest representation (after the Serbs) in the Landtag.\footnote{Čupić-Amrein, \textit{Die Opposition}, 47–59.}

During World War I, the Serbian Orthodox population in Bosnia-Hercegovina was subjected to very oppressive measures by the military regime under General Sarković, a Croat notorious for his anti-Serb feelings. Against Serb guerillas operating in border areas the regime
employed a defense force that was recruited from Croats as well as Muslims. Many Serb peasants were thus forced from their homes, while intellectual cadres were interned.  

But after 1918, it was the Croats and Bosnian Muslims’ turn to suffer. Especially the latter found themselves under great economic and political pressures. Agrarian reform was something that Serbian politicians had repeatedly promised since decades. Therefore, the sharecropping system in Bosnia-Hercegovina was abrogated by the interim decree of February 1919, which transformed more than 93,000 kmet families, without any compensation to the (mostly) Muslim landowners, into free proprietors of the land which they had cultivated previously. Meanwhile, Muslims were being attacked as parasitic elements in society, fit to be expelled. Under these conditions, a new wave of emigration to the Ottoman Empire set in; still worse, about 2000 Muslims fell victim to Serb retaliatory actions between 1918 and 1920.

Hardships of this sort heightened the feelings of solidarity between various segments of Muslim society. Former cleavages between rich and poor, traditionalist and progressive, urban and rural began to lose their significance. Under a new leadership of bourgeois background a more complex and sophisticated struggle against oppression began when the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO, Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija) was founded in early 1919. The Austrian-sponsored concept of bosnjak was naturally frowned upon in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The JMO therefore avoided using the term “Bosniak”. It stressed instead Yugoslavism, or declared the Muslims to be a synthesis of the Serbs and

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46 Salim Čerić, Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika (Sarajevo, 1968), 184–192; Atif Purivatra, Jugoslavenska Muslimansko Organizacija u političkom životu kraljevine Srba, Hrva i Slovenaca, 2nd ed. (Sarajevo, 1977), 34–47.

Croats, and adamantly refused to identify with one or the other side.48 Ably led by Mehmed Spaho, a lawyer of urban background with an academic degree obtained in Vienna, the JMO participated in coalition governments of this period. Due to the party’s initiative, it was widely, albeit grudgingly, recognized that the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina comprised three different groups of people with different traditions, cultures and world views.49 At the same time, the JMO sponsored an ideological campaign with a view towards instilling in its members a sense of pride in belonging to the Bosnian Muslim community. In many essays with a polemical undertone, it was stressed that Muslims alone “were autochthonous to Bosnia-Hercegovina. They were pure descendants of Bosnian ‘Patarins’ and King Tvrtko, the purest part of [the] Croat and Serb people”.50 Nonetheless, the JMO was obliged to behave as the organization of a religious community, even though in reality it represented a secular bourgeois movement, at a time when Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina were fully organized along national lines.51

The Southern Slav state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed in 1929 to become the Yugoslav Kingdom. This entailed the loss of administrative unity for Bosnia-Hercegovina, as the country now was divided into several provinces with such topographic designations as Vrbaska (around Banja Luka), Drinska (around Sarajevo), Primorska (parts of Hercegovina with the center in Split), and Zetska (parts of Hercegovina and Montenegro).52 However, the worst was yet to come: the Serbian-Croat Agreement (sporazum) of February 1939 constituted a territorial division of Yugoslavia which totally disregarded Bosnian Muslims’ interests: the western districts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, including the city of Mostar, became integral parts of the autonomous banovina Croatia; the Serbs considered the rest as their portion. Muslim hopes for having Bosnia-Hercegovina recognized as the “fourth unit” of Yugoslavia along with Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia were finally shattered.53

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48 For the line of argumentation the JMO followed in the early 1920s and its program, see Purivatra, Jugoslavenska Muslimansko Organizacija, 391–393 and 418–420.
49 Purivatra, Jugoslavenska Muslimansko Organizacija, 395.
51 Purivatra, Jugoslavenska Muslimansko Organizacija, 408–410.
52 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 164 and 167–168.
During World War II, all districts of Bosnia-Hercegovina were annexed by the Independent State of Croatia. The Ustaša ideology held the Bosnian Muslims to be Croats of Islamic religious affiliation. Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Ustaša movement and head of the new state, asserted that “Croat national consciousness never was extinguished in the Muslim element of Bosnia, and after the departure of the Turks[,] has resurfaced.” Pavelić seems also to have avoided hurting Muslim susceptibilities, yet only a few Muslim political leaders were ready to declare themselves as Croats; the majority simply temporized, while an oppositional fraction of the JMO leadership tried to secure German protection over Bosnia-Hercegovina as a guarantee against Croat aspirations. For example, in November 1942, the Muslim National Committee (Narodni Odbor) of Mostar sent a memorandum to Adolf Hitler complaining about the Ustasa regime and offering at the same time collaboration in return for German support for Bosnian autonomy. Authors closer to a Serbian standpoint interpret these events to mean that most Moslems became loyal citizens of the puppet Croat state and accepted the government's anti-Serb policy. The fact that the Moslems identified themselves with the Ustaši and became active participants in the slaughter of the Serbs provoked a bloody revenge on the part of the Četnici. Indeed, irrespective of whether they sympathized with the Ustaša regime or actively opposed it, Bosnian Muslims became a target of Serbian chetnik attacks in these years, with the result that by the end of the war the number of their dead reached 86,000, about 6.8 percent of the Muslim population. According to some authors the death rate even climbed to 8.1 percent, and thus constituted “a higher

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55 See Banac, “Bosnian Muslims”, 142 f.
56 Enver Redžić, Muslimansko autonomastvo i 13. SS Divizija. Autonomija Bosne i Hercegovine i Hitlerov Treći Rajh (Sarajevo, 1987), 71–79.
proportion than that suffered by the Serbs (7.3 per cent), or by any other people except the Jews and the Gypsies.\textsuperscript{58}

Tito’s partisans were ready to recognize at least the territorial unity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, although in terms of ethnicity they, too, considered the Muslims primarily as a confessional and not a national group. Until the Fifth Regional Conference of the CPY in Zagreb in October 1940 the national question had not been dealt with at any length. However, at this meeting, when Milovan Djilas argued that in Bosnia-Hercegovina there were only two ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Croats, a Bosnian delegate contradicted him sharply by pointing out that only the Muslim upper classes had the chance of opting either for the Serb or the Croat identity, whereas the mass of the people referred to themselves simply as Bosanac (Bosnian). This delegate admitted that Bosnian Muslims had not as yet reached the level of a proper nation, nevertheless, they were already an ethnic group.\textsuperscript{59} At the same meeting Tito clarified this question further by pointing out that “Bosnia is one, because of centuries-old common life, irrespective of confession.”\textsuperscript{60} Thereupon it was decided that the Party should pursue the goal of reestablishing the territorial unity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with Serbs and Croats each representing a nationality, whereas the Muslims were viewed as a special group beyond the concept of ethnicity. By 1942/43, the situation had evolved still further. In an article on the national question Tito enumerated problems that awaited their solution within the framework of the future Yugoslav federation, among them the question of Bosnia-Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{61}

Thus after the Second World War Bosnia-Hercegovina re-emerged as a member republic of the socialist Yugoslav Federation. However, the Constitution of 1946 recognized only five nationalities: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. There was to be no Bosnian nationality, the official party line still holding that the


\textsuperscript{60} “Bosna je jedno, zbog vekovnog zajedničkog života, bez obzira na veru”. See Suljević, \textit{Nacionalnost Muslimana}, 204.

\textsuperscript{61} “Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svjetlosti narodnooslobodilačke borbe”, \textit{Proleter}, no. 16 (September 1942), 4, as cited in Suljević, \textit{Nacionalnost Muslimana}, 206.
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was composed only of Serbs and Croats. Bosnian Muslims were individually free to decide which of the two nationalities they would opt for. Consequently, in the first post-war census in 1948 they were allowed to declare themselves as Serbs, as Croats, or as “Muslims nationally undetermined” (muslimani nacionalno neopredeljeni). The results were sobering for the CPY: Only 72,000 declared themselves as Serbs and 25,000 as Croats, but 778,000 as “undetermined”.\(^{62}\) In the census of 1953, they had the option of declaring themselves as “Yugoslavs undetermined” (Jugosloveni neopredeljeni). In 1961, they were offered yet another category by the regime: “Muslims (ethnic adherence)” (Muslimani etnička pripadnost). Finally, in the census of 1971, the Muslims were entitled to call themselves “Muslims in the sense of nationality” (Muslimani u smislu narodnosti).\(^{63}\)

By establishing a new nationality, the Yugoslav communists were actually recognizing a de facto situation, for Bosnian Muslims had asserted their separate identity already during the Austrian administration. Nonetheless, in the 1960s and 70s anti-Muslim feelings were running high, especially among Serbs but also among Croats, as Tito increasingly used the Muslim element in order to balance the two rival national entities. Moreover, during those decades, the Muslims for the first time since the end of Ottoman rule emerged as the dominant ethnic community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, both numerically and by socio-political influence.\(^{64}\) This development coincided with the resurgence of resentful national feeling between Serbs and Croats also on the federal level. Finally, the 1980s saw a revival of Serbian Orthodoxy, fanned by ethnic tension in Kosovo and the Vojvodina. This led to the 1986 “Memorandum” of the Serbian Academy of Sciences which complained that Serb people within the Yugoslav Federation were being assimilated in a sinister fashion by


\(^{64}\) Banac, “Bosnian Muslims”, 145; Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 330.
non-Serb nationalities. Inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979, Muslim intellectuals, too, began to seek new channels of articulation. But the regime, growing daily weaker and weaker, resorted to harsh methods in 1983, when a number of Muslim activists, among them Dr. Alija Izetbegović, were sentenced to ten and more years' imprisonment for having propagated the establishment of a Bosnian Muslim state.

The 1990s ushered in not only the dissolution of Yugoslavia but also an effervescence of ethnic nationalism that was especially acute in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Public discussion focused on the issue of Bosnian national identity in general and Bosnian Muslim identity in particular. Faced with the threat of national separatism, Muslim intellectuals brought up the old concept of *bosnjastvo* in a last attempt to preserve the territorial unity of the republic. Since Serbs and Croats refused to be called *Bosnjak*, the term came to be associated with Muslim Bosnians exclusively. After all, they had since decades yearned to call themselves “Bosniak”. They always had believed that the bizarre invention according to which Muslims with a capital ‘M’ were ethnic Muslims and those with a small ‘m’ belonged to a religious community,

was owing to the fear of a reaction from the Croats and Serbs. It was out of fear of them, and particularly the Serb nationalists, that the Party passed an unprincipled and inadequate resolution, needlessly complicating matters by inventing a national name for the Bosniaks, as a Bosnian Muslim intellectual-politician, Adil Zulfikarpasić, has put it. Even Serbs such as the historian Branislav Djurdjev, who had been invited to speak on this issue at a Communist Party conference, had

said that the Muslims should not have another name forced upon them since they had their own name that dated from the Middle Ages—they had always been called Bosniaks.

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Against this background of Muslim national affirmation in the post-World War II era and the opposition it aroused in various quarters, the fundamental issue the Bosnian Muslim historiography has to tackle with remains the question of historical continuity from the medieval period to modern nationhood. Muslim historians seem to be well aware that religion alone was of little use in the formation of national consciousness without a sense of a national past. Most nations which demanded recognition of their existence had some past state which, to them, legitimized their claim to a separate identity.  

Nevertheless, it was religion more than anything else that had helped preserve a Bosnian Muslim distinctiveness in the face of the rival Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic identities in a linguistically Slavic province, and it is in this connection that the centuries of Ottoman rule gain special significance. For through Islamization, Ottoman rule allowed the Bosniaks to develop a cultural individuality, apart from serving as a historical link between the era of nation states and the medieval Bosnian statehood. 

However, not all Muslims of Bosnia stem from the autochthonous population, some of them may well be the offspring of immigrants who entered the province during the period of Ottoman rule. Clearly the share of immigrants is not totally irrelevant to the question whether the existence of Islam in Bosnia can serve as an argument in favor of continuity or discontinuity. Serb and Croat historians have maintained that Islam stands for discontinuity, while claiming at the same time that their own communities represent the true medieval tradition. Thus historiographic attention focuses on three fundamental questions. Historians have attempted to elucidate the motivation behind Bosnian mass conversions to Islam, and especially the role the “Bosnian Church” may have played therein. In addi-

tion they have tried to clarify the ethnic origins of the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Lastly, inquiry has focused on the social and political conditions which allowed the Bosnian Muslims to preserve their cultural specificity during the Ottoman centuries.

**Bosniaks—why did they embrace Islam?**

The early post-war period witnessed an increase in scholarly concern with socio-religious movements in history. A number of remarkable monographs appeared, which tried to establish the origins and geographic diffusion of the dualist heresy from its roots in the Gnosis of late antiquity through various Neo-Manichaean heterodoxies between the seventh and tenth centuries, up to the medieval movements of Balkan Bogomilism and the Catharism of western and southern Europe. Since the second half of the nineteenth century it was believed that the Bosnian Patarin Church had been dualist in its doctrines and as such had served "as a connecting link between the Bogomils and the Cathars". And as Ivo Andric emphasized in his doctoral dissertation of 1924, the Patarin movement had struck deep roots in Bosnia, leaving its mark upon the land and the people. Along with historians of religion, who not only edited the central texts of Bogomilism but also offered conflicting interpretations, it was the Marxist tendency to see in heresy an expression of antifeudal struggle that further stimulated scholarly debates.

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74 Obolensky, *The Bogomils*, 244. Obolensky, as many other adherents of the "Bogomil thesis", relied heavily on Franjo Rački’s pioneering study, "Bogomili i Patareni", *Rad Jugoslovenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti* 7 (1869), 126–179; 8 (1870), 121–175, usually quoted from his collected works: *Borba Južnih slovena za neodvisnost* (Belgrade, 1931), 335–599.


76 Of crucial importance was the publication by Henri-Charles Puech and André Vaillant, *Le traité contre les bogomiles de Cosmas le Prêtre. Traduction et étude* (Paris, 1945). For a Marxist conception of Bogomilism as a social movement rather than a religious phenomenon, see Dimitar Angelov, *Bogomilstvoto v Bulgariya* (Sofia, 1947). On research in Yugoslavia see Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Yugoslav Lands in the Ottoman
In the late 1940s the publications of Aleksandar Solovjev provided significant support for the Bosnian Muslim cause. Analyzing the available primary sources in the tradition of Franjo Rački, Solovjev could prove that the Bosnian Church of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries was Bogomil in character and therefore heretical as far as both Catholic and Orthodox theology was concerned. Particularly welcome was the explanation Solovjev offered for the disappearance of Bogomilism, which he believed had resulted from the mass Islamization of the members of the Bosnian Church. Conversion, setting in immediately after the Ottoman conquest of 1463, was voluntary, and the chief motive behind it the affinity between Bogomilism and Islam. Consequently, already by the early seventeenth century the Muslims made up three quarters of the Bosnian population.

On the one hand Solevjev tried to substantiate his reading of Bosnian history by an exhaustive examination of the domestic—Byzantine and Slavic—sources pertaining to Bogomilism. On the other hand, he attempted to decode the religious symbolism of the mysterious tombstones (stećci) of medieval Bosnia. That these spectacular monuments, which are still seen as “the most striking legacy of a mythical past”, should be viewed in connection with Bogomilism had already been pointed out in 1876. However, archeolo-

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81 Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 17. For an early description of the tombstones of medieval Bosnia see Arthur J. Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August and September 1875. With an Historical Review of Bosnia and a Glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the Ancient Republic of Ragusa (London, 1876).
gists and art historians tended to interpret various figures on the decorated sarcophagi, such as the moon, stars or certain flowers such as the lily, in terms of heraldic symbolism. It was Georg Wilke who already in 1924 associated especially the lunar imagery with death and resurrection. Following a similar line of argument, Solovjev investigated the Bosnian stećci against the background of Neo-Manichaeist heterodoxy. His conclusions seemed to be the final corroboration of the Bogomil character of the Crkva Bosne (Bosnian Church) and underlined the cultural uniqueness of Bosnia within the medieval Balkan setting.

Present-day Muslims are very much aware of the heterodoxy of medieval Bosnians, and this feature evidently forms an important aspect of contemporary Muslim identity. Similarly, Muslims take pride in the monumental tombstones apparently unique to their country. Particularly since the mid-twentieth century, however, historians are no longer so sure of the Bogomil character of these stećci. Thus Maja Miletić, approaching the question from an archeological angle, has argued against Solovjev by pointing out that the ornaments she has investigated on the Bosnian stele can hardly be interpreted in terms of Neo-Manichaean symbolism. Instead, she has suggested that Crkva Bosne was a monastic institution which had come under the influence of the Gnostic tradition. Marian Wenzel has been more categorical in his dismissal of the ‘Bogomil thesis’. Conceding that “stećci began to be erected just after the arrival of Bogomils in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and ceased to be erected with the arrival of the Turks”, he nevertheless associates them with those

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84 Cf. Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 17.
86 A series of systematic descriptions of the more important necropoles has been published under the title: Srednjovjekovni nadgrobn spomenici Bosne i Hercegovine, vol. 1–9 (Sarajevo, 1950–1967). The most authoritative manual on the topic is by Marian Wenzel, Ukrasni motivi na stećcima. Ornamental Motifs on Tombstones from Medieval Bosnia and Surrounding Regions (Sarajevo, 1965).
87 Maja Miletić, I “Kristjani” di Bosnia alla luce di loro monumenti di pietra (Rome, 1957). For a review of this work, see Ernst Werner, Byzantinoslavica 21, no. 1 (Prague, 1960), 119–124.
“horsebreeding inhabitants known as Vlachs” who had immigrated into the mountainous hinterland of Dubrovnik, soon getting engaged in the caravan trade and thus attaining relative prosperity.\textsuperscript{88} In another article, Wenzel has expressed his conviction that “the Bosnian Church—whatever its nature—had nothing to do with the evolution or style of these chest-shaped tombstones”.\textsuperscript{89} Equally Milan Loos, while agreeing that there was in medieval Bosnia a dualist state church supported by the nobility, has rejected the idea that \textit{steći} ever had anything to do with that church.\textsuperscript{90} Finally, after a meticulous analysis of all available sources, John V. A. Fine, Jr., has concluded that “only by a stretch of the imagination and insistence on symbolic interpretations” could some motifs on Bosnian gravestones be associated with dualist beliefs. Moreover, most \textit{steći} were erected “in regions beyond the borders of Bosnia” and most of them seemed “to fall into the period from the mid to second half of the fourteenth century”.\textsuperscript{91} Fine, Jr., therefore, has suggested that “the \textit{steći} were set up by everyone rich enough to afford them” and that it would be wrong to tie them to any specific religion.\textsuperscript{92} Yet this does not mean that there were no gravestone inscriptions containing information about the Bosnian Church—such inscriptions existed, dated mostly to the fifteenth century, and they have strengthened the general impression that between the 1440s and 1460s, dualist influence in Bosnia was in ascendancy.\textsuperscript{93}

The position outlined may be taken as representing the current basis of scholarly consensus. Though more radical interpretations continue to persist, the general tendency is clearly towards moderation. A good example for convergence in this regard is the dimin-

\textsuperscript{88} Marian Wenzel “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Tombstones—who made them and why”, \textit{Südost-Forschungen} 21 (1962), 102–143, here 108, 114.


\textsuperscript{90} Milan Loos, \textit{Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages} (Prague, 1974), 309. For a review article on the occasion of this publication, see Ernst Werner, “Geschichte des mittelalterlichen Dualismus: neue Fakten und alte Konzepte”, \textit{Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft} 23 (1975), 538–551.

\textsuperscript{91} John V. A. Fine Jr., \textit{The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and Its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries} (New York and London, 1975), 89.

\textsuperscript{92} Fine, \textit{The Bosnian Church}, 90.

\textsuperscript{93} For an analysis of tombstone inscriptions with reference to dualism, see Fine, \textit{The Bosnian Church}, 260–264. For an overview of developments in Bosnia from 1443 to 1463, see \textit{ibid.}, 295–354.
ishing importance of the so-called “Orthodox” theory. Already in 1867 an author of Serbian origin had maintained that the medieval Bosnian Church had always been Serbian Orthodox and the Bogomils an outgrowth of Serbian Orthodoxy. In a book entitled “The Truth about the Bogomils”, another Serbian author went so far as to deny the historicity of the Bogomil heresy in the Balkans altogether. Furthermore, Jaroslav Šidak, a historian of Croatian origin, argued in a similar vein, asserting that the Bosnian Church was not heretical when viewed from a Christian perspective. He reasoned at the same time, however, that it could not have been Orthodox either, since Serbian Orthodox sources themselves denounced the Bosnian Church as heretical. Thus Šidak suggested that the medieval Bosnian Church, even though conforming to established Christian doctrines, was independent of both Rome and Constantinople, which explains why it had been defamed by both sides. Yet after World War II, Šidak reconsidered his position, accepting finally that the Bosnian Church had been basically Bogomil.

With respect to Islamization, a similar convergence can be observed. For a long time it was believed that the Ottoman occupation of Bosnia was facilitated by Bogomil cooperation with the enemy, because the former had suffered persecution and hence preferred Muslim domination to Roman Catholic oppression. After the conquest, the majority of these Bogomils converted to Islam and constituted henceforth the gentry of the province. A revision of this view was largely made possible thanks to an upswing in Ottoman studies after 1945, when the utilization of new types of source materials such as poll-tax registers, cadastral surveys or court records began. Especially an article by Tayyib Okić dealing with the question of Islamization attracted great attention. The author studied the Ottoman registers

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94 The first proponent of this view was Božidar Petranović, Bogomili. Crkva bosanska i krstjani (Zadar, 1867); Vaso Glišac succeeded in popularizing it. See idem, “Srednjevekovna ‘crkva bosanska’”, Prilozi za književnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor 4 (Belgrade, 1924), 1–55; idem, “Problem bogomilstva”, Godišnjak Istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine 5 (1953), 105–138.
95 Vaso Glišac, Istina o bogomilima (Beograd, 1945).
related to Bosnia, especially the first one dated 1469, that is to say, only a few years after the incorporation of the new province into the Empire. Okić came upon the term *Kristiyan*, apparently a new population category for the Ottomans, apart from the terms Gebr and Kāfir which they traditionally reserved for the Christians. Consequently, it was established beyond any doubt that a part of the population of Bosnia belonged to a specific church, sect or ‘heretical’ order outside of both Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

On the other hand this investigation of Ottoman sources also has had a sobering effect upon the proponents of a major role of dualism in the Islamization of Bosnia. The number of registered *Kristiyan* was after all not very high; actually, it was far lower than might have been expected. Evidently, King Tomoš’s harsh measures against the dualists (1459) had weakened the Bosnian Church considerably. Here was a warning against sweeping judgments. Islamization was after all a long and complex process, more or less intensive according to region, demanding a much more sophisticated approach. Therefore, authors such as John Fine, Srečko Džaja or Noel Malcolm, who express doubts about the continuity thesis, believe they have found substantial support in the Ottoman sources which “show that conversions to Islam occurred but that the rate of conversion varied from place to place and that in many places the rate of accepting Islam was slow.” Moreover, it was mainly former Catholics and Orthodox who converted, the motivation being material and social advantages rather than theological affinity with, or psychological sympathy for, the new creed. Research conducted by Muslim historians themselves reveals that peasants who showed some inclination towards Islam did so chiefly because they suffered under outrageously heavy labor services owed to their Christian lords; religious motivation seldom played a decisive role in this process.

Questions of ethnic origin—Muslim Slavs or ‘Turks’?

Evidence gained from Ottoman sources led some authors to question whether any of the great Muslim families really descended from

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100 Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 57.
101 See Nedim Filipović, “Osvrt na položaj bosansko seljaštva u prvoj deceniji
a pre-Ottoman nobility. Indeed, on the basis of a recent genealogical study one might argue that only a small percentage could boast of such venerable lineage. Relying on these genealogical data, Noel Malcolm concludes that there “was no pact between ‘great lords’ and Turks to exchange Christianity for a life of careful ‘evil dealing’.”

In a similar vein, Srečko Đžaja chose the Ottoman roll call of the Bosnian military men who participated in the battle of Mohács in 1526 as his point of departure. He argued that since even in the third generation following the Ottoman conquest about 30 percent of the registered men were still non-Bosnians, the share of the Bosnian element must have been even lower during the first and second generations. Consequently, it would be hardly warranted to presume that the medieval Bosnian nobility had somehow been transformed into an Ottoman-Bosnian military elite.

Some historians have serious reservations about such a reasoning and continue to suppose that “after 1463, when the Ottomans gained political and military control of Bosnia, the nobility started to convert to Islam, followed by their kinsmen and dependent peasantry.” Thus Muhamed Hadžijahić lays great emphasis on the fact that a high percentage of the Bosnian noble families of Ottoman times stemmed from the old-established population of the country. There are, however, also scholars who avoid associating themselves with either one of these extreme positions. Antonina Zhelyazkova, for example, pleads for a multi-perspectival approach which allows a more
balanced assessment. Especially studies with a regional focus seem, indeed, more conducive to an understanding of the complexities involved. The Islamization of autochthonous elements already differed according to regions and social groups, but in addition, there were newcomers who introduced further complications. For example, Milan Vasić, in a study of the “Bosnian Frontier” (Bosanska krajina), has come to the conclusion that in districts such as Uskoplje, Jajce, Glamoč and Livno it was mostly the old-established population who converted to Islam, a process which was very intense already during the first decades of Ottoman rule. But in this region the Ottomans had encountered a rather mixed population. Apart from Croats and Serbs, Catholics and Orthodox, there were also adherents of the “Bosnian Church”. The sixteenth century saw a profound change in the structure of this population, and in consequence Islamization took place within different parameters. While the Catholic element diminished noticeably, Orthodoxy profited due to the immigration of Vlachs. Not least due to Muslim soldiers and administrators arriving from outside the province, the number of Muslims increased. In another study with a regional focus, it is stated that in the early Ottoman period religious differences did not count for much. Embracing Islam had only a declaratory character, exhausting itself in adopting Muslim names. Converts were mostly younger people who continued to live with their parents, whereas the wives of some new Muslims kept their Christian faith. Only in the course of rapid urbanization during the sixteenth century did ethno-confessional divides begin to take shape.

Moreover, when we study religious syncretism as it prevailed during this early period, references to a pre-Ottoman phase of Bosnian acquaintance with Islam should not be discounted. Some Bosnian


112 On syncretistic elements in Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina see Muhamed
authors point out that, whereas the Ottomans entered the Balkan scene in the mid-fourteenth century, Islam had been present already for half a millennium. Certainly, nowhere in the Balkans was the Muslim faith formally recognized, but at the time the Ottomans established their "Bosnian March" (the mid-fifteenth century) it was no longer an alien element to the Balkan cultural mélange either. Relations with Muslim Spain can be traced back to the eighth century, and, later on, there were contacts with the Arabs in southern Italy as well as with the Levantine world. Within the medieval kingdom of Hungary, which exercised overlordship over Bosnia, Muslims were present both in economic and military life, until in 1341 a royal decree confronted them with the alternative of conversion or emigration. Apparently these Muslims were mostly followers of Shia Islam, probably of its Ismaelian branch. Thus their creed may have contained elements borrowed from old Oriental Gnostic traditions such as Manichaeism. If this assumption is at all realistic, there should have existed a line of tradition linking the Bogomils to Middle Eastern dualistic beliefs by way of an acquaintance with a branch of Islam considered 'heretical' by all Sunnis and by many Shiis as well.

Although such assumptions mostly remain on the level of speculation, more substantial evidence is available as regards the role of the dervish orders in the process of Islamization. Nedim Filipovic, commenting on the humanism of Sheikh Bedreddin, argues that Islamic mysticism challenged the established demarcation lines between


113 On the establishment of the Bosnian March, see Hazim Sabanovic, Krašće Isa-bege Ishakovića. Zbirni katastarski popis iz 1455. godine (Sarajevo, 1964), 60-66.

114 Dal, Das unbekannte Bosnien, 83-85; Besim Korkut, Arapski dokumenti u državnom arhivu u Dubrovniku, vol. 1, parts 1-2 (Sarajevo, 1960); Bariša Krekić, Dubrovnik i Levant (1280-1460) (Belgrade, 1956); idem, Dubrovnik et le Levant au Moyen-Age (Paris - The Hague, 1961).

various creeds and churches, propagating the equality of all reli-
gions.\textsuperscript{116} The proselytizing successes of mystic brotherhoods already
had been emphasized by F. W. Hasluck.\textsuperscript{117} That dervishes played
an important role in the process of internal colonization during the
Ottoman period has also been verified.\textsuperscript{118} In early Ottoman Bosnia
it was the heterodoxy of the brotherhoods that appealed to popular
imagination, and in this context the Bektashis seem to have out-
ranked their rivals, especially the Hurufis and the Hamzavis.\textsuperscript{119} The
latter are known publicly to have “venerated Jesus Christ”.\textsuperscript{120} Slo-
bodan Ilić has stressed that at the end of the sixteenth century Bosnia
had become the center of the Hamavwi and the Hurufi heresies, the
members of which were persecuted by the Ottoman government,
since they were considered to represent a danger for public order.\textsuperscript{121}

Such developments in the socio-religious sphere supposedly con-
tributed to the emergence of a Bosnian distinctiveness under Ottoman
rule. But even stronger arguments in this line have come from his-
torians who have focused on socio-economic structures. Their analy-
ses have delivered the model of a very specific Bosnian society, setting
this province clearly apart from any other region in the Ottoman

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Nedim Filipović, \textit{Princ Musa i Şejh Bedreddin} (Sarajevo, 1971), 730-732.
\item \textsuperscript{117} F. W. Hasluck, \textit{Christianity and Islam under the Sultans}, ed. by Margaret M.
    Hasluck (Oxford, 1929).
\item \textsuperscript{118} Omer Lutfi Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda bir iskan ve kolonizasyon
    metodu olarak vakıflar ve temlikler. I. İstilâ devri diniinin kolonizator Türk dervişleri ve
    zâviyeler, II. Vakıflann bir iskan ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak kullanımının diğer
    şekilleri”, \textit{Vakıflar Dergisi} 2 (1942), 279-386. Cf. also Nathalie Clayer, “Des
    agents du pouvoir ottoman dans les Balkans—les Halvetis”, in \textit{Les Balkans à l’époque
    ottomane}, ed. by Daniel Panzac (= \textit{Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Mediterranée},
    no. 66, 1992/4), 21–29; eadem, \textit{Mystiques, état et société: les Halvetis dans l’aire
    balkanique de la fin du XV\textsuperscript{e} siècle à nos jours} (Leiden, 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Balic, \textit{Das unbekannte Bosnien}, 92–94. Cf. also Suraiya Faroqhi, \textit{Der Bektaschi-
    Orden in Anatolien (vom späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert bis 1826)} (Vienna, 1981); Bek-
    tachiyya. \textit{Etudes sur l’ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach},
    ed. by Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein (Istanbul, 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{120} Lopasic, “Islamization of the Balkans”, 169. Cf. also Colin Imber, “A Note
    on ‘Christian’ Preachers in the Ottoman Empire”, \textit{Osmanlı araştırmaları} 10 (1990),
    59–67, and Ahmed Refik [Altnay], \textit{XVI. asırdı Raflzılık ve Bektazılık} (İstanbul, 1932),
    passim.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Slobodan Ilić, “Hamzawi and Hurufi Heresy in Bosnia as Reaction to the
    Political Crisis of the Ottoman Empire in the Second Half of the 16th Century”,
    \textit{Bulgarian Historical Review} 28 (2000), 34–40; also eadem, “Hurufijski pjesnik Vahdeti
    Bosnevi i njegov divan”, \textit{Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju} 38 (1988), 63–95, and “Mul-
    Morgenländischen Gesellschaft} (forthcoming).
\end{itemize}
Balkans. As Avdo Sučeska emphasized, it was the Muslim society’s class structure which justified the Bosnian claim to being considered a nation. The Bosnian Muslims represented a specific ethnic community which had developed into a nation (narod) with specific interests and aspirations. In contrast to the non-Muslim populations Bosnian Muslim society was complete, that is, it possessed all social classes and groups: the sipahis as the feudal elite, a clergy, an urban layer, a free peasantry, and serfs.\textsuperscript{122}

According to this concept, Bosnian specificities were to a large extent due to the privileged position Bosnia had acquired already in the sixteenth century as the crucial frontier province of Ottoman Europe. The Ottoman timar system was quickly transformed into a system of feudal estates held by local landowners. One reason for this development was that “the timars and ziamets granted to a great many of the Bosnian feudal families were formed of land that had originally been part of their old tribal heritages.”\textsuperscript{123} Halil İnalcık had touched upon this same aspect of the question when discussing the Christian sipahis and their origins in the Ottoman Balkans. İnalcık thought that the Slavic term bastina, that is, a hereditary title to land granted in compensation for an important service, would be best translated by the Ottoman term temlik, namely, a transfer of property enacted by a sultan in favor of his relatives, friends or slaves. Considering that temliks were rarely granted by Ottoman rulers, the existence of a large number of bastinas in Bosnia should be interpreted as a sign of special Ottoman appreciation for the existing institutions of the province.\textsuperscript{124} Moreover, Ottoman registers clearly indicate that the bastinas of the Christian sipahis were the strips of land these men had held in the pre-Ottoman period. Once such


sipahis converted to Islam, their baštinas became çiftliks. Thus İnalçık seemed to be supporting the Bosnian Muslim thesis of continuity. He did however also point out that the Ottomans had recognized similar inherited rights in the case of Anatolian landlords in previously independent Muslim principalities. Even so, the situation in Bosnia differed significantly, for example, from that in pre-Ottoman Serbia. In Serbia, the lords used to control the land usually in form of prononia, and this was a conditional ownership of land, similar to an Ottoman timar holding, and therefore not to be compared with a baština.

Equally important from a Bosnian Muslim standpoint appears the practice, established in the early sixteenth century, of awarding timars and ziamets to local landowners only. But the introduction of ocaklık timar, namely the conversion of feudal fiefs into hereditary holdings, and the establishment of the kapudanlık institution (kapetanija, captnancy) are generally seen as the ultimate steps towards a de facto autonomous Bosnia under Ottoman domination. These developments opened the way for the emergence of a new landed aristocracy. Especially the “kapetanija formed a unique feudal institution only known in Bosnia because of its position as a frontier province of the empire.”

On the other hand, in recent research some doubt is expressed as to whether the Ottoman term ocaklık has been understood and utilized correctly in Bosnian historiography. Thus Michael Robert Hickok has pointed out that Ottoman registers pertaining to Bosnia, even from a period as late as the eighteenth century, do not men-

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126 İnalçık, “Stefan Dušan’dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu”, 97-98.
129 Lopasic, “Islamization of the Balkans”, 174. Cf. also Džaja, Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens, 36-40; Malcolm, Bosnia, 90.
tion the names of the owners of sipahi holdings; neither do they indicate any modus of transferring land between different owners. It seems that so far “no examples of documents related to land holdings in Bosnia that specifically used the term ocakhk timar have appeared for the eighteenth century.” Hickok also has shown that in the frontier zones of Anatolia and the Pontic steppes, ocakhk was “a cash fund for wages and provisions for Ottoman garrison troops.” It related to state policy “designed to create and finance border fortresses and stockades, using both the local personnel and the regional tax base.” The facts of the case were similar in Bosnia, as Hickok demonstrates on the basis of an ocakhk register of 1773. This document not only enumerates all such units in the province but also supplies an exact definition of the term as it was understood in contemporary Bosnia: ocakhk was the “year’s salary, made annually, of the local troops in fortresses and other defensive works...[taken] from the revenues of tax-farming, levies, and head taxes.” Consequently, Hickok has come to the conclusion that “Yugoslav historiography which sees ocakhks as hereditary land holdings is no longer tenable.

Another institution of the Ottoman landholding system which has received considerable attention in Bosnian historiography is the çiftlik. In the general Ottoman context, çiftlik of the eighteenth

130 Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia (Leiden, 1997), 44.
131 Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration, 46–47.
132 Rhoads Murphey, Regional Structure in the Ottoman Economy: A Sultanic Memorandum of 1636 A.D. Concerning the Sources and Uses of the Tax-Farm Revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern Portions of Syria (Wiesbaden, 1987), 252, quoted in Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration, 48.
134 Document in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Kamil Kepeci Tanshı, 6722, 1, as quoted in Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration, 50.
135 Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration, 53. As for Bosnian captains, who were according to some authors quasi autonomous “princes”, Donia and Fine point out that “throughout the eighteenth century, records show the vizier appointing and removing kapetans, and sometimes transferring them from one fortress to another. In some cases their tenure at a particular post was quite short.” Robert Donia and John V.A. Fine Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York, 1994), 34.
136 For literature related to the çiftlik question in general, see Gilles Veinstein, “On the Çiftlik Debate”, in Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, ed. by Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, 1991), 35–53.
century are supposed to have been sizeable farms devoted to production for distant markets. The peasants who cultivated the land, usually in a sharecropping arrangement, could not claim any rights over the arable, nor was the sipahi who formerly had controlled the land in a position to do so. The de facto owner of the land was a new type of entrepreneur, generally referred to as çiftlik sahibi. It seems that çiftlik formation in Bosnia took place along rather different lines. The process was triggered by the profound financial crisis during the Cretan War (1645–1666), when peasants began to lose their traditional holdings due to indebtedness caused by soaring extraordinary taxation. Uncultivated lands were practically expropriated by members of the Muslim feudal elite—sipahis, ulema, janissaries, and perhaps some merchants—, whose economic as well as socio-political position was hence further consolidated. In short, the majority of Bosnian çiftlik resulted from the conversion of former timar fiefs into private property. The economic dimensions of this transformation remain, however, rather underexposed. Thus Yuzo Nagata has suggested that due to the geographical and ecological conditions of the region, an average Bosnian çiftlik was rather too small to be viable as a commercial enterprise, a view which also has been corroborated by Bruce McGowan. Yet in addition, the process had far-reaching implications for the relations between the administrative center of the Empire and a peripheral region such as Bosnia. The ascent of local notables (ayan) to political prominence in the course of the eighteenth century was intimately connected with these


changes. This brings us back to Bosnian distinctiveness within the Ottoman context, as "local Bosnian notables (ayans) came to play a greater role in local administration than did the indigenous population in areas where conversions were rarer."

Urban unrest and even revolts against the representatives of the Ottoman government during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries lend themselves equally well as arguments for the thesis that Bosnian Muslim society, while remaining basically loyal to the Ottoman state, nevertheless was bent on achieving and/or preserving a certain degree of autonomy. Thus Muhamed Hadžijahić has suggested that Mostar should be considered, on account of the inveterate opposition of its burghers to the central government during the eighteenth-century, as a via facti privileged city. Much attention has been devoted to a non-extant "charter" of Sarajevo, actually a letter of Mehmed II dated 1464, declaring the city exempt from extraordinary taxation. It has been interpreted in terms of a major immunity that served later on as a basis for the articulation of autonomy claims by the notables, so much so that the governing vizier felt obliged to move his residence to Travnik in 1698. But this "triumph of the local Bosnian Muslims (particularly those of Sarajevo) over the vizier and central administration" had followed a major Austrian raid in 1697 that burned down much of Sarajevo, as Robert Donia and John Fine Jr. have pointed out. These two authors also have suggested that it would be more "appropriate to regard cooperation between the vizier and the Sarajevo ayans, rather than rivalry and conflict, as the norm for the eighteenth century."

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142 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 55.


145 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 57–58, 59. On state-sponsored urbanization in Ottoman Bosnia, see Adem Handžić, "O formiranju nekih gradskih naselja u Bosni u XVI stoljeću", Prilozi za orientalni filologiju 25 (1975), 133–169. The role
Given the significant role the written word plays in most cases of nation formation, Bosnian historians have examined the contribution of authors with a Bosnian background to the corpus of imperial Ottoman literature, on both the qualitative and quantitative levels. Apparently the culture of the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia had asserted itself already in the sixteenth century, when, for the first time, we hear of a specific Bosnian alphabet called *bosancica*.

In addition, Bosnian members of the Ottoman elite produced a respectable amount of work—poetry as well as prose—in Ottoman-Turkish, Arabic and Persian. More interestingly, there was also a Bosnian *aljamiado* literature—works in the Bosniak language but in the Arabic script—consisting mainly of poetry. Already Safvetbeg Bašagić thought that Ottoman classical poetry was influenced by Bosnian *sevdalinka* songs; and Džemal Čehašić ascribed a similar role to the mystical thinking inherent in the works of Bosnian dervishes.

This rather romantic concept of literary Bosnian-hood was subjected to a thorough criticism especially by those Ottomanists who were of Yugoslav but non-Muslim origin. Vančo Boškov and Alexandre Popovic disparage the assumption that the term *bosnevi* denoted ethnic descent. In their view this sobriquet signifies merely a regional identity. They point out that literary personages with a “Bosnevii” attached to their names easily might have been Turks, particularly since they mostly wrote in Turkish. The literature produced by Bos-

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nians during the Ottoman period should properly be considered as an organic and integral part of Ottoman literature, as "Ottoman literature written in Bosnia-Hercegovina" and not as Bosnian literature.\footnote{Boškov, "Neka razmišljanja o književnosti", 57–60; Alexandre Popovic, "Représentation du passé et transmission de l'identité chez les Musulmans des Balkans. Mythes et réalités", in Les Balkans à l'époque ottomane, ed. by Daniel Panzac (Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée, no. 66, 1992/4), 139–144.}

The Bosnian position on this issue typically can be summarized as follows: (i) Turkish colonization in Bosnia did not take place. Bosnian Muslims are not Turks, but islamized Slavs. (ii) Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. (iii) Islamic-Middle Eastern culture is of a synthetic nature. Bosnians had their part in it. (iv) Bosnian poets wrote in Middle Eastern languages, but what they expressed had to do with Bosnia, with the spirit of the Bosnian people. (v) Ottoman-Turkish literature was not the work of Turks exclusively. Therefore, it should be allowed to speak of "Muslim literature of Bosnia-Hercegovina in oriental languages".\footnote{This is, more or less, the answer Džemal Čehajić formulated against the criticism expressed by Vančo Boškov, in Književnost Bosne i Hercegovine u svjetlu dosadašnjih istraživanja, 227–229.}

Bosnian historiography on the Ottoman period stresses also the importance of various forms of armed resistance against Ottoman rule during the eighteenth and especially in the nineteenth century. According to Avdo Sučeska, rural uprisings of the eighteenth century reflected only the discontent of the Muslim peasantry which felt threatened by an imminent social leveling.\footnote{Avdo Sučeska, "Seljačke bune u Bosni u XVII i XVIII stoljeću", Godišnjak Država istorišća Bosne i Hercegovine 17 (1966–67), 163–207; idem, "Bune seljaka muslimana u Bosni u XVII i XVIII stoljeću", in Oslabodilački pokreti Jugoslovenskih naroda od XVI veka do početka Prvog svetskog rata, (Belgrade, 1976), 69–100.}

In the nineteenth century, the situation changed rather radically. On the Muslim side, it was the opposition of an elite to the egalitarian as well as centralist policies of the Tanzimat bureaucracy. The Ottoman government could master the situation only by way of full-fledged military campaigns during the 1830s, and then again just on the eve of the Crimean War.\footnote{Dragutin Pavlović, Pokret u Bosni i Albaniji protiv reforma Mahmuda II (Belgrade, 1923); Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. zamanında Bosna-Hersek (İstanbul, 1963); Vladimir Stojančević, Južnoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom carstvu od jedenskog mira 1829. do Pariskog kongresa 1856. godine (Belgrade, 1971), 179–228 and 257–284; Galib Šiljivo, Omer-Paša Latas u Bosni i Hercegovini 1850–1852 (Sarajevo, 1977).} During these decades, the typically Bosnian agrarian question likewise entered the agenda, involving now primarily the
non-Muslim peasantry. Tanzimat reformism had gone a long way toward solving the agrarian question in the interest of non-Muslim peasants. But as Milorad Ekmecic pointed out, the Treaty of Berlin (1878) undid those achievements and therefore possessed a counter-revolutionary character with respect to the future development of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Conclusion: historiography and national politics

By furnishing themselves with a "national history" of these dimensions, the Bosnian Muslims obviously aimed at presenting themselves "as descendants of the membership of an authentically and peculiarly Bosnian Church; and their turning to Islam could be described not as an act of weakness, but as a final gesture of defiance against their Christian persecutors". These persecutors were, for the most part, Croats and Serbs, who depicted the Muslim Bosnians often "as mere renegades from Catholicism and Orthodoxy" hinting at the same time that they should return to their original beliefs. Here Noel Malcolm is voicing the opinion of modern Western scholarship. The general tenor is that the Bogomil theory is since long obsolete, corresponding in no way to historical reality. Another author in a similar vein warns that "scholars of the medieval Balkans and the Ottoman period are likely to be frustrated by many of the dated assertions concerning the Bogomil church and the Ottomans’ conquest and subsequent rule in Bosnia." But almost condescendingly it is added that this literature "should not be dismissed as a Bosnian apologetic. It should instead be cherished as a window into a historiographical tradition largely unknown outside the former Yugoslavia."

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157 Ibid.
The nation-state is a secular idea, and the nation, as we have learned from Benedict Anderson, is an “imagined community”. Why then bother about medieval myths regarding ethnic descent, linguistic affiliation, and geographic autochthonism? The reason should be sought in the history of Balkan nationalism. It is true that the risorgimento type of national awakening in the Balkans was based on the European romantic idea that viewed people as an organic community of shared destiny, assuming that the collective soul of this community articulated itself through the medium of language. However, the dominance of ethnic nationalism should not lead us to under-rate the importance of religion. More often than not, religion dominated all other elements within Balkan nationalism. The wars of liberation during the nineteenth century were at the same time wars of religion. Consequently, the establishment of the Balkan national states was in each case accompanied by a mass exodus of parts of the autochthonous Muslim populations. And it is obvious by now that the current projects of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Balkans seek legitimation in an argument of the following type: We have been living here since a millennium but the Muslims only for five hundred years. But “how many years of residence does one need to be considered indigenous?”

It is against this setting that Ottomanists should view the history of the Balkans since the medieval period. We are aware that the conquering Ottomans did not invent new ethnonyms but simply adopted the existing ones, and that they were conscious of ethnic descent. Although they reestablished the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, they had a sense that some Orthodox were ethnically Greeks and others were not. For example, the Greek Orthodox Albanians were named “Arvanid” and not Greek. Similarly, the Ottomans normally differentiated between a Bulgar, a Serb, and a Croat. It is remarkable, therefore, that from the beginning they utilized the term “Boşnak” for the inhabitants of that country. No doubt, considerable mixing—through intermarriage etc.—must have taken place between Muslim Slavs and ethnic Turks under Ottoman rule. But as William G. Lockwood has rightly stressed,
the social organization of the Bosnian Moslems—and by extension, Bosnian Moslem society and culture as a whole—is not Turkish, nor South Slav Christian, not even some intermediate form. Elements from both contributing sources were integrated, in line with the unique history of the Moslems in Bosnia-Hercegovina, to create something new and distinctive.\(^{161}\)

Thus, it is understandable that Alija Izetbegović, who even today is being attacked as a "Turk", felt obliged in 1990 to declare publicly that Bosnian Muslims were not Turks.\(^{162}\) For by this time, it was generally acknowledged that if Bosnia-Hercegovina was to survive as a state its subjects had to be identified as a nation directly associated with its territory.\(^{163}\)

Students of Ottoman history are perhaps obliged to observe articulations of ethnic, religious or regional awareness more carefully.

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163 Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*, 35.
To discuss Hungarian studies which deal with the Ottoman period in the country’s history is doubtless of interest for those wishing to analyze perceptions of past empires in the national states of the present day. Such a concern has become popular during the last few years, now that, at least within the European context, supra-national organizations are gaining in importance. In that sense, studying Hungarian historiography parallels the analysis of Turkish, Bosnian or Bulgarian historiographical production on the Ottoman Empire.

However, for the specialist in Ottoman history Hungarian historical research, too often neglected because of the language barrier, has features of particular interest to offer. For at the time of the Ottoman conquest in the mid-sixteenth century, the kingdom of Hungary constituted an early modern state with its own system of record-keeping. Moreover, from the time of Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490) onwards, the kings of Hungary maintained close links to Italy, with quite a few humanists producing works in the new, post-medieval mode. Unlike the Bulgarian or Serbian territories, where in the years immediately preceding the Ottoman conquest centralized bureaucratic government was less in evidence, in the Hungarian case we can check Ottoman accounts against an appreciable number of locally produced sources. Furthermore, this situation did not change even after the integration of central Hungary into the Ottoman Empire. A princely court and schools teaching Latin remained active in Transylvania, while the Habsburg-controlled section of Hungary equally possessed its share of officials and chronicle writers. In consequence, a study of Ottoman Hungary involves the constant juxtaposition of sources written in the Ottoman, German, Hungarian and Latin languages. The details of border warfare are reflected not only in Ottoman chronicles or in lists of soldiers entitled to receive their pay in
money or tax assignments (timar), but also in letters to the Habsburg king of Hungary and his responsible commanders-in-chief.1

In addition, the social and economic historian of the Ottoman Empire will welcome the opportunity to confront tax lists prepared under Habsburg auspices with the Ottoman registers known as ‘detailed’ (mufassal). For such a comparison can shed some light on the day-to-day routine of preparing these crucial documents, fundamental for our notions of Ottoman demography and agricultural production. Yet for many Ottoman provinces we have only a rather sketchy notion concerning the production of bureaucratically relevant knowledge, and thus information gained from Hungarian evidence may prove of value to historians dealing with other Ottoman provinces as well.2

‘Ideological’ preliminaries

Scholarly studies of the Hungarian past first appeared in the second half of the eighteenth century, building on the work of sixteenth and seventeenth-century humanists, and more remotely, on medieval ecclesiastical annals.3 Until the first half of the nineteenth century, scholars to a large extent were concerned with the publication of primary sources. Most of the authors in question were either clergymen or members of the nobility, both Catholic and Calvinist, who wrote in Latin.4 While the preference for this latter language was shared by members of both denominations, a divergence between Catholics and Calvinists ensued as soon as historians passed from mere source publication to the interpretation of events. It is generally claimed that Catholics followed a pro-Habsburg line, while Calvinists sympathized with the anti-Habsburg rebellions punctuating early modern Hungarian history. As we shall see, this generalization, similarly to oth-

1 For a recent voluminous edition of letters of this sort see: 500 magyar levél a XVI. századból. Csányi Ákos levelei Nádasdy Tamáshoz, 1549–1562, vol. 1–2, ed. by Sándor Öze (Budapest, 1996).
2 Several town monographs by Ferenc Szakály show the satisfying results of such a comparative approach. Géza Dávid equally has attempted the parallel evaluation of data derived from Habsburg and Ottoman tax registers.
3 An excellent overview of this latter period is offered by Emma Bartoniek, Fejezetek a XVI–XVII. századi magyarországi történettörténelemből (Budapest, 1975).
4 For a rich bibliography cf. Emma Bartoniek, Magyar történeti források (Budapest, 1929).
ers of its type, is not valid in each and every instance. But it contains more than a kernel of truth, and remarkably enough, the divergence between ‘Catholic’ and ‘Calvinist’ interpretations of Hungarian history is noticeable even for the post-1948 era, when Marxism was the official ideology.

During the 1820s and culminating in 1848, Habsburg-dominated Hungary was the scene of reform movements of a strongly nationalist character. In this context, the Ottoman period of Hungarian history was ‘discovered’, as the struggle against the Ottomans could serve as an exemplar of the ‘fight for Hungarian liberty’. This attitude was particularly visible where the fine arts and drama were concerned. Numerous paintings, novels and operas composed during this period featured various heroes of the Ottoman period. Their derring-do in battling the sultan’s armies was meant as a call to the struggle for political and economic autonomy directed against the Habsburgs. This being the era of romanticism, a subjective and emotional world view for the most part informed historiography, Ottomanist studies not excluded. The defeat of the Hungarian revolution in 1849 by Czarist troops called in by the Habsburg government only served to prolong this tendency.

On the other hand, during and after the Crimean war some intellectuals began to feel a degree of sympathy towards the Ottomans. After all, one of the conflicts at the origins of this war had been the refusal of the Ottoman government to extradite Hungarian refugees of 1849. On the side of England and France, the Ottoman Empire now figured among the victors and in consequence was viewed in some Hungarian circles as a potential ally against the Habsburgs. Friendly relations reached their apogee in 1877, when the recently enthroned Sultan Abdülhamid II returned a number of precious manuscripts, some of them taken from the famed Corvina library of King Matthias (1458–1490) after the Ottoman conquest of Hungary following 1526.3 This situation gave rise to what has been termed the ‘Turcophile’ movement in Hungarian historiography. However, cordial relations on the political level did not imply a full ‘victory of the Turcophiles’, and some historians continued to express their hostility towards the Ottoman occupation.

Ottomanist studies proved relatively impervious to the changes in the political atmosphere after 1918. In 1920, the treaty of Paris-Trianon established a Hungarian state which contained no more than one third of the lands of the former kingdom of Hungary, as it had existed in Habsburg times. The population of the new state, 7.6 million, likewise formed no more than 40% of the inhabitants of pre-1914 Hungary. In acquiring Transylvania, Rumania gained an important Magyar minority; and in this context of nationality conflicts, refuting the Rumanian thesis of Daco-Roman continuity came to form an important concern of Hungarian historiography during the inter-war period. This debate involved a concentration upon antiquity and the early middle ages. Moreover, certain scholars sought to legitimize Hungarian national demands by searching for 'noble ancestors', such as the Huns, and this concern equally encouraged studies dealing with the early medieval period. Ottomanist research, however, by virtue of focusing on the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, was rather remote from the major interests of inter-war nationalists or state-builders. A lack of political 'relevance' thus permitted this discipline to develop according to its own internal dynamics.

After 1945 and notably after 1948, vulgar-Marxist simplifications came to prevail throughout the social sciences as practiced in Hungary. The clichés typical of this trend also affected overall accounts of the Ottoman period, particularly if written by non-specialists, but also by authors whose main concern was with local history. Even worse, the tendency to think in terms of 'black and white' permeated schoolbooks and popular literature, and the negative consequences remain with us down to the present day.

The 'grand old man' of Ottomanist studies in Hungary

Once again, however, Ottomanist studies were protected by their relative marginality in the eyes of the new régime. That considerable language skills and paleographic knowledge together constitute a

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6 In this connection, valuable works were produced, particularly with respect to archeology and the history of rural settlement. Quite a few of the results obtained at the time are still valid, in spite of the occasionally rather outdated terminology employed.

7 These remarks apply to the work of Erik Molnár, Aladár Mód, Emma Léderer and other influential figures of the 1950s historical establishment.
conditio sine qua non for work in Ottoman history equally discouraged interventions by would-be ideologues. On the understanding that everybody was ‘in principle’ a Marxist, political supervision of our field remained relatively light and did not preclude serious work.

But a good deal of credit for this development also must be given to the principled attitude of the discipline’s major representatives during this difficult period, namely Lajos Fekete (1891–1969) and the latter’s former student and later colleague Gyula Káldy-Nagy (b. 1927), who began his career in the 1950s. Important works by late nineteenth and early twentieth-century scholars notwithstanding, Fekete can be regarded as the real founder of Ottomanist studies in Hungary. An archivist by training, he had, similarly to his contemporary Paul Wittek, begun to learn Turkish in a prisoner-of-war camp during World War I. He gained proficiency in deciphering Ottoman records so rapidly that by 1926, he was able to publish his first work on ‘Turkish’ diplomatics, of which both a Hungarian and a German edition appeared.

During the decades that were to follow, Fekete attempted to collect all surviving archival records pertaining to the Ottoman financial registry (defterhane) of Buda, in the hope of being one day able to reconstruct its functioning in detail. From his study tours abroad, which included a period of work in the Istanbul archives, where he introduced modern principles of cataloguing, Fekete brought back precious microfilms and wrote a series of articles usually accompanied by editions of Ottoman documents. After 1945, he assembled the material for what is indisputably his greatest paleographic work. This two-volume study was dedicated to the financial registers written in the siyakat script, whose very difficulty probably had been intended to protect the arcana imperii from outsiders. Not only is the introduction exemplary, the transcription of the often extraordinarily difficult originals is almost devoid of mistakes. Moreover, Fekete’s explanatory notes clearly demonstrate his unusual

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8 Lajos Fekete’s only captatio benevolentiae was an article on the presents sent by Abdülhamid I to Catherine II; he also published some of his impeccable studies in Russian, among others in Vostochnye istochniki.

9 Lajos Fekete, Bevezetes a hodoltsadg tank diplomatikdjdba/Einführung in die osmanisch-türkische Diplomatik der türkischen Botmassigkeit in Ungarn (Budapest, 1926).

erudition. In the systematic discussion of different historiographical
genres which will be attempted in the present chapter, we will more
than once have occasion to discuss Fekete's pioneering role.

Outlining our project

Our paper will begin by introducing the—hitherto very small—num-
ber of Hungarian scholars who have attempted to write compre-
hensive studies of Ottoman history. A second section, fairly large,
will introduce the reader to Ottoman rule in Hungary properly speak-
ing. Here we will focus on the thorny problem of assessing the
Ottoman role in a broader context, especially difficult because in
this field ideological pre-suppositions often impinge on conclusions
derived from a close study of the relevant primary sources. Such
general assessments are not always easy to separate from the polit-
ical history which constitutes the topic of the third section of our
discussion. The administrative history of Ottoman Hungary, a rather
neglected but important field, will be discussed in a separate, fourth
section. Moreover, the fifth sub-chapter will be devoted to biogra-
phies of significant political figures; for, rather differently from the
histriography of most Ottoman provinces, studies of provincial com-
manders and administrators do constitute a significant part of Hun-
garian historiographical output.

The sixth section—a substantial part of our overview—is devoted
to economic history which reflects, by its relatively high level of devel-
opment, the preoccupation of historians during the 1960s and 1970s
with the material conditions of everyday life in society. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of demographic history, also a favorite topic
of those decades. However, in our particular context, demographic
history mainly covers the work of scholars who have attempted to

11 Among his other works, two text editions should be singled out here. The first
is the pioneering publication of an Ottoman tax register of the kind known as
'detailed' (mufassal): Lajos Fekete, Az Esztergomi szandzsák 1570. évi adóösszeírása (Budapest,
1943). While addressed to a Hungarian audience, this work became renowned inter-
nationally due to the methodology followed, and also because of the careful iden-
tification of placenames. His method was further developed by Gyula Káldy-Nagy in
his numerous tahrir defteri editions. The second work produced by Fekete, along with
Káldy-Nagy, is a faithful translation of the Buda treasury registers: Lajos Fekete
and Gyula Káldy-Nagy, Rechnungsbücher türkischer Finanzstellen in Buda (Öfen) 1550–1580.
Türkischer Text (Budapest, 1962). Lajos Fekete/Gyula Káldy-Nagy, Budai török szá-
madás könyvek, 1550–1580 (Budapest, 1962).
determine whether, and if applicable, to what extent, Hungary lost population during the one hundred and fifty years of its existence as an Ottoman border province. This seventh section of our study also includes a discussion of the fate of Hungarian towns. After a short detour concerning military events (section 8), a brief overview over research in ecclesiastical history (section 9) follows, which will be completed by what may be termed a glimpse of Ottoman Muslim culture in Hungary. Studies of mosques, theological schools and dervishes have not attracted much interest in the past, but as this tenth and final section will demonstrate, they are now engaging a growing number of researchers, especially among the younger generation.

**General issues**

Although the Hungarians of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries possessed much first-hand information concerning the Ottoman Empire, rather surprisingly, they made no attempts to elaborate or summarize this knowledge. The first systematic description of Ottoman civilization—over and above events in the military and diplomatic fields—appeared in a three-volume monograph published at the end of the eighteenth century, when most information on Ottoman customs not previously consigned to writing had already perished. The author, Sámuel Decsy, wished to make up for these omissions of earlier Hungarian scholarship. In the first two volumes, he presented in detail the “natural, moral, religious, civil, and military condition of the Ottoman Empire”, while in the third volume he examined the history of Ottoman-Hungarian conflict right up to his own day (1789).

Decsy based his monograph on the works of well-known western experts (such as Francesco Sansovino, Luigi Fernando Marsigli and numerous French authors), on several Turkish and many Hungarian chronicles, as well as on Hungarian archival sources available in

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12 Sámuel Decsy, *Osmanografa, az az: a’ török birodalom’ természeté, erkélyei, egy-házi, polgári, ’s hadi állapotjának, és a’ Magyar Királyok ellen viselt nevezetesebb hadakozásainak summás leírása*, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1788–1789). We have used the second revised edition of 1789. Nicolai Schmitth’s Turkish history (*Imperatores ottomanici a capta Constantinopolii cum epitome principum turcarum*, 2 vols. (Tyrnavia, 1747–1752; 2nd ed. 1760–1761), covering the period from 1453 until 1719, was published before Decsy’s work, but may be considered as part of the chronicle tradition of the late medieval and early modern periods.

13 Preface, without page numbers.

14 Decsy, *Osmanografa*. 
print. His synthesis reflected contemporary standards. He entitled his work *Osmanografa* because he considered the Ottoman Empire to be a dynastic state—a view which does not contradict present-day conceptions. For Decsy the basis of the empire primarily consisted of the moral and political system of Islam; ethnic groups, including the Turks, had only a secondary role to play. No work published in Hungarian since then has incorporated as much subject matter and detail as Decsy’s monograph.

However, Decsy’s promising initiative found few imitators. Hungarian Turcologists and Orientalists were primarily interested in discovering and publishing Turkish sources and even throughout the twentieth century usually limited themselves to Ottoman Hungary. Therefore, nearly a century had to pass before a further history of the Ottoman Empire was published. This work, in two volumes, had been authored by Gyula Lázár, whose far from original text was based primarily on well-known general Ottoman histories and various national histories of the era. Among the secondary sources used, we find Joseph von Hammer, Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Demetrius Cantemir, Johann Christian von Engel, Leopold von Ranke and George Finlay. Lázár examined the history, especially the political history, of the Ottomans from its very beginnings down to his own time.

A further one hundred years passed before the next general Ottoman history was published in Hungary, tracing the history of the Ottoman state from its inception to its disintegration. The author was Jozef Matuz, a Hungarian scholar who worked in Germany after 1956. Five years after the original work had appeared in German, Matuz produced a Hungarian version. The author was primarily interested in political and institutional history and thus concentrated on the Ottoman state rather than on Ottoman society. Subscribing to the ‘traditional’ view of Ottoman history, Matuz referred to a ‘golden age’ of the Ottoman Empire lasting until the later sixteenth century, followed by a period of ‘decline’ and ‘female rule’. Influenced presumably by the vulgar-Marxist theories he had imbibed as a student, Matuz regarded the Ottoman system as a form of feudalism, considering the presence of ‘feudal rent’ to be sufficient proof.  

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13 Gyula Lázár, Az oszmán uralom története Európában, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1877).
16 Jozef Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich. Grundlinien seiner Geschichte (Darmstadt, 1985), 113–114: “A high level of centralisation and feudalism are not mutually exclusive.”
Despite this rather doubtful concept, the book is well written and based on a thorough knowledge of primary sources.

Almost concurrently, there appeared a study by Klára Hegyi and Vera Zimányi, which we may perhaps describe as an “illustrated Ottoman history”. The text was written by Klára Hegyi, while the book’s many illustrations were selected by Vera Zimányi from among a large number of mostly unpublished manuscripts, which the latter author had tracked down in the larger European libraries. These illustrations are clearly one of the book’s greatest assets, but the text is also of a high standard: it provides a brief but brilliant account of the history of the Ottoman state and society from the thirteenth through the seventeenth century. Klára Hegyi describes the expansion of the empire only in a few brief chapters. By contrast, in addition to the ‘obligatory’ institutional and military history, she gives a balanced overview of economy, science and art in the Ottoman realm, the positions of Muslims and Christians, as well as everyday customs. Even through the title refers merely to Ottoman Europe, the author’s conclusions for the most part apply to the Empire in its entirety.

During the last three decades, Hungarian Ottomanists have started to show increasing interest in themes not directly connected with Hungary. This fortunate change is apparent not only in general histories, but equally in a whole range of special studies dealing with various aspects of military, economic and social history. We will refer to some of these works in due course.

The common feature of the European and Ottoman versions of feudalism is that in both cases the feudal lords were entitled to a part of the land yield. The cultivators of the land were each given a piece of land; in return, they were required to submit a part of the harvest, the so-called feudal rent, to the feudal lords. When answering the question of whether or not feudalism rules in a land, the feudal rent is the decisive factor.”

Klára Hegyi and Vera Zimányi, Az Oszmán Birodalom Európában (Budapest, 1986). The book was also published in German and English: Muslime und Christen. Das Osmanische Reich in Europa (Budapest, 1988); The Ottoman Empire in Europe (Budapest, 1989).

Compare the works of Gyula Káldy-Nagy (for a bibliography of his earlier writings, see idem, “Bibliographie des travaux turcologiques en Hongrie,” Tureca, 13 (1981), 203–205), in addition to studies by Géza Dávid, Mária Ivanics, Gábor Ágoston, Ibolya Gerelyes and Pál Fodor. A collection of articles by the latter author has recently been published: In Quest of the Golden Apple. Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul, 2000).
Ottoman rule in Hungary

The first academic account of the Ottoman occupation of Hungary was written by the leading Hungarian historian of the later nineteenth century, namely Ferenc Salamon. Revised several times, the first part of his monograph examined the Ottoman conquests in Europe, the Ottoman-Hungarian wars before 1526, and the relationship between the Ottomans and Christendom. Salamon then provided thorough descriptions of Ottoman and Hungarian border defence systems and Ottoman urban policy, taxation, and justice. His monograph also offered detailed accounts of taxation and justice throughout the Turkish-occupied areas, in which both the Habsburg-ruled Hungarian state and also its counties and landowners continued to play a significant role. This latter historical phenomenon, known as the *condominium*, which affected quite a few Ottoman-occupied territories, constituted Salamon's greatest discovery. He considered it to be a “curiosity” of world history that the institutions and subjects of a defeated (but not obliterated) country were able to oblige their conqueror to consent to a degree of power-sharing. Salamon also realized that the primary factor enabling Hungarians in the occupied territories to preserve their ethnic and religious identity was the penetration and gradual implantation of the institutions of Royal or Habsburg Hungary alongside their Ottoman competitors.

Although positively evaluated by his fellow Hungarian historians, Salamon’s brilliant findings were quickly forgotten. Subsequent ideas concerning the one hundred and fifty years of Ottoman rule were often less subtle and sometimes tended towards extremist positions.

As we have seen, the first Hungarian historians of the nineteenth century took up positions on the Turkish era according to their views of the Habsburgs, who long had been governing Hungary. Opinions significantly were influenced by the great political events of the century. After the Crimean war, as a consequence of Pan-Slavism and the Russian threat, cordial relationships developed, at least for a while, between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires and

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19 In book-form it was first published in 1864. We have used its second, final edition: Ferenc Salamon, *Magyarország a török hódítás korában* (Budapest, 1886). It was also published in German: *Ungarn im Zeitalter der Türkenherrschaft* (Leipzig, 1887).

between some Ottoman and Hungarian intellectuals. In this environment, Turcophile views easily could be projected on to past events. Thus for many scholars the principality of Transylvania became the symbol of Hungarian independence and national unity, the Ottoman Empire the supporter of the Hungarian national idea, while the Habsburg Empire figured as the oppressor. Such views permeated the historical writings of Sándor Takáts, but were also promoted by Ármin Vámbéry and the historian-architect Károly Kós. In an otherwise excellent book on the architecture of Istanbul, Kós wrote the following:

For us, Hungarians [Sultan Süleyman] represents the beginning of Ottoman rule in Hungary, of sufferings beyond words and uninterrupted struggle for survival; the most tragic pages of our history begin with his name. However, he equally marks the beginning of a Hungarian age of chivalry, the formation of our national self-respect, the birth of our racial consciousness, and the beginning of our wars of independence against the Habsburgs; he marks the birth of the Hungarian language and national culture, and the period when freedom of conscience was being codified. He inaugurates the creation of Transylvania as a separate Hungarian world which took refuge with his power from the western enemy.

Turcophile views culminated in the numerous works of Sándor Takáts. In several respects, this author was ahead of his time. Thus he was especially interested in the relationship between the peoples coexisting in sixteenth and seventeenth century Hungary. Focusing on the areas of contact and interaction between Turks, Hungarians, Germans and Serbs, he also pioneered research into the everyday lives of these peoples. Moreover, although almost all his works were based on archival sources, he considered history-writing to be a form of literature, and his talents as a writer were such as to lend credibility to his claim. In addition Takáts, in a rather spectacular fashion, dissociated himself from the pronounced anti-Turkish sentiment which had characterized most previous historical works, both Hungarian and non-Hungarian.


22 Károly Kós, Szövetség és architektura (Budapest-Constantinople, 1918), 9. The book was recently translated into Turkish: Istanbul, Şehir tarhi ve mimarisi, transl. by Naciye Gungormuş (Ankara, 1995), 76. Vámbéry’s formulation was very similar; cf. A magyarság keletkezése és gyarapodása (Budapest, 1895), 345 ff.
Takáts' political attitudes informed his work as a historian. Although he accepted the inevitability of Habsburg sovereignty for his own period, with regard to the past he became an unshakeable supporter of Hungarian independence. For this very reason, he showed a great dislike for the Habsburgs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and especially for their mercenaries. Meanwhile, he portrayed both the conquering Ottomans and their Hungarian opponents in a highly favorable light, bordering on partiality. In his accounts, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became the age of romanticism and heroism: Turks and Hungarians equally were presented as chivalrous, courageous, and honest adversaries. Although his work is still considered required reading—because of its accuracy of detail and broad, almost post-modern scope—Takáts ended up giving a rather one-sided and false impression, for he created a world that never really had existed. However, it is also true that his writings continue to exert a positive effect on Hungarian historiography by raising questions and providing both ideas and otherwise inaccessible information.

The opposite extreme is represented by Gyula Szekfű, the most respected figure of Hungarian historiography during the interwar period. Admittedly, one of his works, published in 1918, did identify certain features of the Ottoman system which the author considered advantageous to the Hungarian nation. Yet his multi-volume Hungarian history, which ran to many editions, painted a desolate picture of the consequences of the Ottoman conquest. Szekfű considered the Hungarian wars to have been a struggle between two civilizations, "the West and the East" in which the "Turkish slave state seized victory while the traces of Hungarian European civilization were wiped out". The wars and existential insecurity that accom-

23 Takáts wrote almost 600 articles and 30 books (some of the latter were collections of his articles). His most important studies of Turkish-Hungarian relationships were published in four volumes entitled Rajzok a török világból, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1915–1917) and A török hódolság korából (Rajzók a török világból, IV. [Budapest, 1928]). On Takáts' scholarship, see further Steven Bela Vardy, The Ottoman Empire in Historiography: a Re-Evaluation by Sándor Takáts (Pittsburgh, 1977); idem, Clio's Art in Hungary and Hungarian-America (New York, 1985), 148–149.

24 Such features, in Szekfű's perspective, included the emergence of the market towns of the Hungarian Plain, or, on quite a different level, the fact that the conquerors did not mix with the local population; see A magyar állam életrajza (Budapest, 1918), 92–93.


26 Magyar Történet V, 3.
panied the Turkish conquest gave rise to the "anti-culture of the 
puszta" on the Hungarian plain and to marshland and bog elsewhere.
Even worse, the climate, and soil of Hungary were irreparably dam-
aged. Moreover, the ancient lands of the Hungarian nation came to
be settled by immigrants from the Balkans, who arrived in the wake
of the Turkish invasion, as military campaigns, in addition to the
tyranny and indifference of the Turkish state towards the needs of
its subjects, plunged the Hungarians into a demographic disaster.27

We may search in vain for the positive effects of Turkish rule. We
are talking about two opposing cultures, whose natural relationship is
one of conflict.28

Gyula Szekfű's strong anti-Turkish sentiments were primarily due to
his ideas concerning the relationship between state and nation. He
regarded the state as the guarantor of national survival and inde-
pendence and believed that the Ottomans had severely weakened
this vital element. This was not just because they had swallowed up
a part of the sovereign state of Hungary, in which, moreover, the
largest numbers of Hungarians happened to be living. Another dis-
advantage of Ottoman expansion was that the residual Hungarian
state had entered Habsburg-dominated central Europe, which then
was being organized by the latter dynasty in order to balance the
Turkish-French concentration of power, with a just small part of its
original strength. Certainly the foundation of the principality of Tran-
sylvania did lead to a moderate improvement in the situation, given
the local princes' attempts to re-establish national unity. But due to
the opposition of the two great powers, such attempts were bound
to fail. As a result, the Hungarian nation split into two parts not only
territorially but also spiritually. There were western (Catholic) Hun-
garians and eastern (Protestant) Transylvanians, and the former were

not satisfied with the Transylvanian Hungarian state organization but
sought instead the complete unification of national forces under the
direction of the legitimate ruler, the Habsburg king.

Nevertheless, such unification was impossible as long as the eastern
conquerors remained in the center of the country.29 In the final

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27 Magyar Történet V, 35.
28 Magyar Történet V, 65.
29 Szekfű, A magyar állam életrajza, 116–117.
analysis it was the three hundred years of conflict with the Turks which diverted the Hungarian nation and state from their main course of development. For this reason “Turkish rule was the greatest and perhaps the only disaster of Hungarian history” and the cause of all subsequent misery.

A common peculiarity of the above-named authors is that they all evaluated the Ottoman system on the basis of Hungarian and Habsburg sources. As we have already mentioned, the first great generation of Hungarian Turcologists (Antal Gévay, József Thúry, Imre Karácson and others) devoted their time and energy to the study of Ottoman sources and their publication in Hungarian. Thus, Hungarian Ottomanists for a long time did not participate in historiographical debate, and the first monograph written by a Turcologist and based mainly on Ottoman sources appeared only in 1944. This epoch-making book was entitled Budapest a törökkorban (Budapest under Turkish rule).³⁰ We have already encountered its author, namely, Lajos Fekete, who over the years had collected a great amount of source material from European and Turkish archives. Although the book was published as part of a series on the history of Budapest and thus concentrated on Buda and Pest in the Ottoman period, in reality it was much more than a mere study of urban history. For Fekete provided a comprehensive survey of essential aspects of the Ottoman political, military, and social systems, including Muslim education, family life, cuisine and many other matters.³¹ Similarly to Szekfű, Fekete considered the relationship between Turks (Muslims) and Hungarians (Christians) to have been a struggle between “two world views”. However, in Fekete’s case this opinion was not based purely on ideological considerations or the ‘spirit of his own times’. Having studied everyday living conditions in the Ottoman period, he concluded that the society of the conquerors was diametrically opposed to the society of the defeated Hungarians. Indeed, in Fekete’s view they represented two separate entities with little mutual contact.³² Thus—supporting the conclusions of Salamon with

³⁰ Lajos Fekete, Budapest a törökkorban (Budapest, 1944). Some parts of this study were also published in English: Buda and Pest under Turkish Rule (Budapest, 1976).
³¹ The work is supplemented by an appendix in which the leading experts István Genthon, Magda Bárányné Oberschall, and Sándor Garády give short accounts of architecture, industrial art, and pottery in Ottoman Hungary (Fekete, Budapest a törökkorban, 313–401).
³² “During the one hundred and fifty years of Ottoman occupation in Hungary,
additional information from Ottoman sources—Fekete demonstrated one of the important characteristics of Ottoman rule in Hungary: here the Ottomans were far less successful at integrating the local population than had been the case in the Balkans. This finding is still accepted by scholars today.

Since the 1970s an increasing number of monographs on a variety of subjects have further developed the results of Salamon and Fekete. The success of many of these new studies is linked to the fact that researchers no longer connect anti-Ottoman and anti-Habsburg struggles in the manner typical of the older nationalist historiography. They have placed their investigations of the Ottoman period on a broader base and have employed many new archival sources. The first book to epitomize this new type of ‘objective’ history-writing is *Harács-szedők és ráják* (Head tax collectors and tax-paying subjects) by Gyula Káldy-Nagy. Apart from information about the population, commerce and economy of some of the more important settlements located in the occupied territories, this work includes a precise description of sixteenth-century Ottoman administration and taxation.33 In a work entitled *Egy világháborúban végvicékén* (On the borders of a world-empire), Klára Hegyi has concluded, on the basis of both Ottoman and Hungarian documentation concerning the Hungarian towns under Turkish rule, that in this region the Ottomans never were able to introduce the ‘classical’ set of institutions, of the kind established throughout the Balkans.34 Thus their rule never amounted to more than a military occupation, and they always lacked the strength to control civilian life. From the Ottoman perspective, Hungary remained an “unsatisfactorily conquered and administered province”.35 On the other hand, it was precisely this Ottoman weakness, along with the continued existence of the Hungarian state and its increasing judicial and administrative role in the occupied areas, that enabled the Hungarians to achieve a peculiar autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence they were never completely excluded from European history. In a further monograph, Klára

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Hegyi went on to provide precise data on the composition, numerical strength, and ethnic/religious background of the Ottoman armies of occupation, the fortress system, and changes in taxation during the seventeenth century (e.g. collection of the avanz taxes).\(^{36}\) Such data showed that one-third of the Ottoman provincial forces had to be used in the defence of the Hungarian base, and that, by the seventeenth century, this force of at least 25,000 men was mainly financed out of the Balkan tax revenues. At the same time, Hegyi clarified the phases and chronological order of the establishment of the Hungarian judicial system in the occupied territories. She also succeeded in elucidating several important problems relating to Ottoman and Hungarian dual ownership, as well as the various forms of co-operation between the conquerors and the southern Slavs living in Hungary.

Hungarian taxation and justice in the occupied areas, which intermittently had been on the agenda ever since the publication of Salamon’s work, were most thoroughly studied by Ferenc Szakály. In his first book on this subject, Szakály demonstrated that Hungarian influence in the Ottoman-occupied territories had been even stronger than had been supposed by Salamon.\(^{37}\) Apart from one or two areas in the extreme south, by the seventeenth century the Hungarians were levying taxes throughout the Ottoman domain and attempted to collect an entire panoply of dues. Of the three tax-levying bodies, i.e. the Hungarian state, the Catholic church, and Hungarian landowners, the latter were the most effective, but even they were dependent upon the assistance of the garrisons of the Habsburg border-fortresses. According to Szakály the amounts paid to the Ottomans however by far exceeded the total of taxes collected by the Hungarians. Nevertheless, the significance of double taxation was enormous: it contributed to the maintenance of Habsburg-Hungarian border defences and to the reconstruction of the Hungarian institutions which had collapsed at the time of the original Ottoman occupation. All these measures increased the sense of cohesion among the divided parts of the country. Hungarian institutions in the occupied territories were the subject of a separate monograph by Ferenc Szakály.\(^{38}\) He presented the organizations, officials and apparatuses

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\(^{38}\) Ferenc Szakály, *Magyar intézmények a török hódoltságban* (Budapest, 1997).
which, after an increase in their operational efficiency in the course of the seventeenth century, effectively impeded the Ottoman authorities in exercising powers of justice and administration in many parts of their territory.

In a work entitled *A hódolt Magyarország* (Subjugated Hungary), Gábor Ágoston introduced various modifications to the established views concerning the consequences of Ottoman conquest. He pointed out that the Ottoman administration and soldiers were not the only agents responsible for the changes occurring in the Hungarian landscape during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Szekfű had once claimed. Deforestation, increasing areas of marshland and bog also resulted from changing patterns of farming which included increasing livestock numbers on the Hungarian plain and the spread of millponds secured by dikes. Moreover, some of these changes had begun even before the arrival of the Ottomans. In Ágoston’s perspective, increasing demand for wood on the part of all armies operating on Hungarian territory constituted the primary reason for deforestation. The Christian side also played a part in this process, as fortresses and bridges everywhere were built of timber, to say nothing of the immense consumption of firewood, both for heating and the manufacture of gunpowder. Citing western examples, Ágoston proved that the destruction brought about by the Ottoman and Tatar armies was far from exceptional at the time, and that the main reasons for declining population levels were starvation and the epidemics accompanying the wars.

Today Hungarian scholars researching the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have a more balanced understanding of conditions prevailing in Hungary and of the conquerors themselves, than did their predecessors working in the first half of the twentieth century. They also attempt to move beyond the emotional and politically-motivated approaches that have divided Hungarian historians for so long.

Nevertheless, they consider the consequences of the Ottoman wars and occupation to have been extremely grave. Of course, this was not just due to the non-European political traditions of the conquerors and their different culture, but above all to the fact that, if the fifteenth century is included, the Ottoman conquest turned the

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country into a battlefield for about three hundred years. Hungarian historians consider the timespan between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth century, when the defence systems of the two adversaries were located right in the middle of the country, to have been particularly disastrous. Ferenc Szakály, who has authored the most comprehensive survey of the period, thinks that the misfortunes affecting the Hungarian nation can be summarized under the following headings: first of all, there was a demographic disaster, accompanied by a notable increase in the number of non-Magyar inhabitants in the Hungarian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This immigration, in Szakály’s perspective, lay at the root of Hungary’s dismemberment in the twentieth century. In addition, he refers to the dissolution of the medieval settlement pattern and the decline of the former economic centers; this disruption involved much destruction of productive capacity and a concomitant stagnation of commerce. Last but not least, political independence came to an end.40 Although Szakály regrets the loss of the latter, he nevertheless agrees that without the financial and military support of the Habsburgs, the Ottoman conquest would have swallowed up the remaining parts of Hungary as well.41

At the same time, Hungarian researchers are quite aware that the processes which caused Hungary to fall behind the developed countries of the West had begun well before the arrival of the Ottomans. After all, the country formed part of the East-Central European region which had become a periphery of the Atlantic economy.

We may be quite certain—wrote Klára Hegyi—that even without the Ottoman conquest the country would not have entered the mainstream of bourgeois development. But Ottoman rule did result in the lag being even greater than it would otherwise have been.42


41 This has been stated and supported with data by Géza Pálfy, the best expert on border defence: “The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)” in Géza David and Pál Fodor eds., Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest (Leiden, Boston, Cologne, 2000), 3–69.

42 Hegyi, Egy világhirodalom, 276.
Although a consensus has been established concerning the main issues, many aspects of the Ottoman occupation are still heatedly debated with pro-Habsburg or pro-Ottoman biases reemerging from time to time. This political bias became very obvious from a stormy dispute among historians in the 1970s and 1980s concerning the political aims of the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Revising and supplementing some of the arguments of nineteenth-century scholars, Géza Perjés advanced the view that Sultan Süleyman had not originally planned a conquest of Hungary. In Perjés’ opinion, Süleyman recognized that his economic interests were linked to the Mediterranean, Hungary lay beyond the boundaries within which his army could operate effectively, and, furthermore, a permanent occupation of Hungary would be extremely expensive. For these reasons, Sultan Süleyman supposedly offered the Hungarians autonomy, subject to payment of taxes and a sustained anti-Habsburg policy. When his offer was refused, Süleyman had no choice but to occupy the central part of the country: this was the only way to prevent the whole of Hungary from falling into the hands of the Habsburgs.\footnote{Géza Perjés, Az országút szélére vetett ország (Budapest, 1975), p. 112; idem, Mohács (Budapest, 1979), 465. For an English version, see The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526–Buda 1541 (Boulder, 1989).}

Reasoning on the basis of the Transylvanian example, Perjés suggested that if the status of a Turkish vassal had been accepted, Hungary might have avoided the complete loss of its independence, the destruction of the following one hundred and fifty years, and therefore the great tragedy of the twentieth-century dismemberment of the country.

Perjés’ theories were not well received by his fellow historians. It was shown, for example, that he had underestimated the action radius of Ottoman troops, and that Hungary lay well within the zone where the Ottoman army was able to fight effectively.\footnote{Ferenc Szakály, “Oktalan oknyomozás. Perjés Géza Mohács-könyvérül”, Kritika (1979) No. 10, 21–23. For a survey of the first phase in the debate and the relevant literature, see Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Policy towards Hungary,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45, 2–3 (1991), 274–78.} With respect to the costs of occupation, it was demonstrated that in border zones such costs were always immense. Similar resources were needed to
occupy the northern Serbian border zone, and apparently the Ottoman leadership accepted these expenditures as normal. A close study of Ottoman accounts from the second half of the sixteenth century demonstrated that, although the Hungarian province was loss-making, the deficit incurred was far smaller than scholars previously had thought. Attention moreover was drawn to the fact that Ottoman opinion at the time had considered the cost of defending the vassal state of Hungary higher than that of occupying the country. After all, the structural features of the Ottoman state and the relationship between the great powers of the time would have required the empire to make further conquests sooner or later. During the critical period from 1520 to 1532, Süleyman and his Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha had planned not just the conquest of Hungary but the occupation of the Habsburg Empire, or at least that of Austria. Given these circumstances, Hungary had no choice but to accept Habsburg rule. Without the resources of the latter empire, the country's complete fall to the Ottomans would have been inevitable.

Participants in the dispute were fully aware that the debate was only partly related to the historical events and personalities under discussion. In actual fact the exchange of ideas revolved around Hungary's historical alternatives. Historians disagreed on whether or not the country might have avoided the concatenation of events which reduced it from a medium power in the medieval period to a small nation-state in the twentieth century. In order to appreciate the above-mentioned trauma, we must have an understanding of the Ottoman period. For this reason, Ottoman studies will always retain their special status and relevance within Hungarian scholarship. It is the responsibility of Ottomanists to avoid undue politicization and to promote, as far as humanly possible, an impartial approach to this complicated issue.

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Ottoman administration

The functioning of the Ottoman administration in general and in Hungary in particular has been a rather neglected domain until very recent times. For many years, almost nothing was known about the nomination of provincial and district governors, their social backgrounds, or the manner of rotation in office. The governors’ duties, and the manner and extent of their cooperation with other local office-holders such as the kadi, equally had remained unexplored. As a first step, one of the present authors has attempted to characterize the tasks of the district governors and subordinates, establishing a more or less complete list of district governors.\textsuperscript{48} Another study has surveyed the organizational transformations implemented in the province of Temesvár.\textsuperscript{49} Additionally, Ottoman administrative strategies in western Hungary also have been investigated.\textsuperscript{50}

As far as prosopography is concerned, interest arose much earlier. Already in the mid-nineteenth century, Antal Gévay, a chief archivist in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, put together short biographies of the pashas of Buda, using the dispatches of Habsburg envoys in Istanbul and reliable Ottoman chronicles for periods, such as the seventeenth century, for which documents are scarce.\textsuperscript{51} Compared with Ottoman records, Gévay’s sixteenth-century data often turn out to be correct down to the very days of appointment, or at least, the difference is insignificant. Recently, names, nomination dates, revenue-producing estates, and previously held offices of district governors in some Hungarian sub-provinces have been assembled.\textsuperscript{52} It has also been possible to reconstruct the life stories of certain persons active principally in the Hungarian border areas.\textsuperscript{53}


\textsuperscript{51} German version: “Versuch eines chronologischen Verzeichnisses der türkischen Statthalter von Ofen”, \textit{Der österreichische Geschichtsforscher} 2 (1841), 56–90. Hungarian version: \textit{A budai pasák} (Vienna, 1841).


\textsuperscript{53} Géza Dávid, “Kászim vojvoda, bég és pasa. I–II. rész”, \textit{Kölektatés} (Fall 1995),
Hungarian researchers have tended to concentrate their attention on the Ottoman statesmen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who were closely connected to events taking place in Hungary. As in the case of so many other subject-matters and genres concerning the period of Ottoman occupation, the initiator was Sándor Takáts. A whole series of useful biographies of the pashas of Buda (including Arslan, Sokollu Mustafa, Kara Üveys, Kalaylıkoz Ali, Sinan Frenk Yusuf, Ferhat, Sofi Sinan, Sinan Paşazade Mehmed, Mehmed Paşazade Hasan, Kadızade Ali, and İbrahim) were written by this scholar. Takáts based his work primarily on Habsburg-Hungarian archival sources including the reports of the Istanbul ambassadors, while focusing on the pashas’ activities in Hungary. He was very partial towards his Turkish ‘heroes’, an inclination which, as we have had occasion to note, may be explained by his romantic view of history.

Among the governors-general of Buda, special attention always has been given to Sokollu Mustafa Paşa, who among all his colleagues, held the position of governor (beylerbeysi) of Buda for the greatest length of time. Gyula Káldy-Nagy, for instance, wrote two studies on Sokollu Mustafa. Employing Ottoman sources, he substantially supplemented the picture that had been drawn by Takáts. He provided a detailed account of the governor’s pious foundations, and also discussed the duties of these commanders and high-level administrators in general. Basing his work on a wide range of sources, Géza Dávid equally has examined the official activities and biographies of the pashas and beyens active in Hungary.

Two lengthy biographies, in addition to a third and rather shorter one, have been written about Sultan Süleyman I, the conqueror of Hungary. Once again, the first of these works has been authored by Lajos Fekete. While recognizing the achievements of Süleyman, Fekete did not fail to mention the less favourable aspects of his rule and

54 Sándor Takáts, A török hódoltság korából [Budapest, 1929], 57–293, 501–542.
56 For information concerning the results of his research, see below.
character. The most comprehensive and extensive biography of Süleyman to date, however, has been produced by Gyula Káldy-Nagy. This account includes a detailed study of Ottoman politics and society, as well as an examination of the achievements of Süleyman both as an individual and as a politician. Employing numerous unpublished archival sources, Káldy-Nagy draws a clearly negative picture of the ruler. Thus, although Süleyman is usually considered to have been a great man, a reader of Káldy-Nagy’s monograph is confronted with an indecisive and unimaginative individual whose apparent success was linked to a fortunate combination of circumstances.

Pál Fodor, the author of the third, and much briefer biography, also considers the Hungarian policy of the sultan to have been erroneous. Nevertheless, Fodor arrives at a more favorable judgement with regard to the ruler’s abilities and historical role. This “tolerant” appraisal also characterizes the other seven biographies, concerning four sultans and three grand-viziers, which have appeared in the same volume as the Süleyman biography, written by either Klára Hegyi or Pál Fodor himself.

57 Lajos Fekete, Szülejmán szultán (Budapest, 1967), 116: “It is difficult to characterize this man. He ruled for forty-six years, and a lot of both good and bad can fit into forty-six years. Respect for the forefathers, and having nine sons and a grandson killed; fighting wars without being a real commander; the title of Kanuni, because excellent doctors of law lived in Süleyman’s time and he could employ famous experts such as Kemalpaşazade or Ebussuud. Süleyman was able to build wonderful religious buildings because it was in his time that Koca Sinan, the great architect of the century, was active, and he did not shy away from driving the workers hard or spending money, if something great was being built. The Sultan was able to turn equestrian peoples of the steppes into lords of the seas, because he had excellent admirals, and he secured their services. His age saw the flourishing of science and literature, because his age had excellent scientists and poets, including even his humble self using the pseudonym of Muhibbi. In spiritual and material terms, his era was the golden age of the Ottoman Empire... The facts support this.”

58 Gyula Káldy-Nagy, Szülejmán (Budapest, 1974).

59 In the words of the author: “In the course of the centuries, there sometimes have been men of exceptional capabilities who were strong enough to shape history; Süleyman was not one of these. Nevertheless, he did become a well-known historical figure, if not because of his capabilities, then due to the conditions prevailing at the time. His greatest victory at Mohács almost fell into his lap just when the European balance of power had collapsed. Thus it was the circumstances or era into which he was born that made Süleyman great” (Káldy-Nagy, Szülejmán, 215).


61 Fodor/Hegyi/Ivanics, Török és tatár hódítók, 5–42, 52–56.
Economic history

When characterizing economic life in Ottoman Hungary, most authors have produced no more than a few commonplaces. A lack of reliable sources can be made responsible for this unfortunate situation, but in addition it must be conceded that available materials have not been used with the appropriate methods either. The easiest approach has been to list the various Ottoman taxes and comment that they must have been unbearable, without realizing that, in the Ottoman state, dues paid to the church were unknown. As a result, considerable resources remained in peasant hands. This was the legal situation in any Islamic polity. However, it is more difficult to judge to what extent the timariots and their soldiers collected more than was theoretically allowed.

Yet our greatest problem is that actual harvest data are available in only a few cases, almost no data having survived from the seventeenth century. Tithe registers of settlements reserved for the Ottoman treasury, the so called hāsī estates, constitute one of the rare sources recording agricultural produce effectively collected as taxes. Fortunately, two lists of this type have come down to us from the very same region, reflecting tax yields both from the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. In the places concerned, which belonged to the sub-province (sancak) of Szeged (Segedin), a clear decline in agricultural production could be detected. In the absence of more broadly based data, it is, however, quite difficult to establish whether this decline was typical of Ottoman-controlled Hungary in its entirety. For a different development can be observed in the nearby town of Nagykőrös, where a stratum of wealthy people existed in the seventeenth century. Less reliable conclusions can be drawn from late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century statements of peasant serfs in answer to questions of incoming Hungarian landlords concerning the peasants’ former liabilities to the Ottoman timariots. Not only

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were the territories covered quite limited, the newly enserfed villagers were likely to distort reality for their own purposes.\textsuperscript{64}

For the sixteenth century, but unfortunately not for the seventeenth, the detailed (\textit{mufassal}) tax registers contain fairly rich material on economic history, since taxes were assessed as fixed proportions of the total harvest. However, even in principle, these dues were based on the the average of three years’ production, which means that estimates and declarations on the part of the peasants concerned must have played a significant role. Yet in spite of these weaknesses, such data permit us to estimate sixteenth-century agricultural production for entire sub-provinces (\textit{sancaks}); in favorable cases such estimates are possible for three to six different dates.

When analyzing such data, we cannot be satisfied with simple enumerations of taxes and probable harvests on a village or \textit{per capita} basis. Rather it is our aim to arrive at a coherent interpretation, taking into account contemporary living standards and consumption habits.\textsuperscript{65} Meat and grain ingestion varied from one Hungarian region to another.\textsuperscript{66} Along the Danube and other rivers, but also south of Mohács, fish ponds were numerous at this time. But in most cases a full picture of peasant consumption continues to escape us. At least it appears that in the \textit{sancak} of Simontornya, after an initial setback in (or underregistration of) agricultural production, from the 1560s onwards grain and other harvests increased. Peasants became self-sufficient and had enough surplus to pay their levies in cash.\textsuperscript{67}

What we know about handicrafts and manufacturing concerns mainly the towns on the Great Plain and is relevant primarily for the seventeenth century. In addition, certain economic enterprises, often of some military relevance, have been recorded in the sixteenth century.


This issue was first raised in Hungarian historiography by Géza Perjés, Mezőgazdasági termelés, népesség, hadseregélméz és stratégia a XVII. század második felében (Budapest, 1963), 45–46.


century tax registers. Mills can be documented countrywide, and salt-peter beds occasionally are referred to as well. Slaughterhouses, candle-dippers’ workshops (jemhanes), and similar enterprises satisfying everyday needs equally are indicated. Unfortunately, these scattered references to economic activities have not as yet been systematically collected and analyzed.

However, the tax registers of Hungary are mute on urban guilds and also on domestic industry in villages. It can be inferred from municipal documents that some guilds functioned in the towns of the Great Plain. Jewellers, furriers, and tailors are recorded for Kecskemét. Butchers were active in Szeged. Boot-makers, tailors, furriers, felt-makers, butchers, barbers, millers and carpenters had formed guilds in Gyöngyös. Furriers’ and merchants’ guilds existed in Tolna. Similar modest corporations were formed in Mezőtúr, Nagykőrös, Pásztó, Ráckeve, and probably in some other places as well.

Great attention has been paid to the role of Ottoman Hungary in international trade. On the one hand, scholars have been intrigued by the fact that in the Ottoman period the cattle trade to Austria, Germany, and Italy reached extraordinary dimensions. On the other

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74 Szakály, Tolna mezévsor monográfija, 167, footnote 114.

75 An essential publication of Ottoman source material concerning cattle passing through the customs station Vác is due to Gyula Káldy-Nagy, “Statistische Angaben über den Warenverkehr des türkischen Eroberungsgebiets in Ungarn mit dem Westen in den Jahren 1560–1564”, Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae, Sectio Historica XI (1970), 269–341. For evaluations and other doc-
hand, trade routes, where imported textiles and spices circulated, also have interested economic historians. Commercial florescence in the sixteenth century has so much impressed one of our leading historians that he labelled this period the “first epoch of entrepreneurship” in Hungarian history.

However, the expansion of trade did not result in an overall improvement of material conditions. As probate inventories show, both among Muslims and Christians men of very modest means dominated the picture. Persons such as Ali Çelebi, a high-ranking financial administrator in Buda and a well-to-do ziamet-holder, who even possessed a small library, definitely belonged to a tiny minority.

Recent research has revealed that coins circulating in Ottoman Hungary differed fundamentally from those used in other parts of the empire. Archeological evidence shows that the akçe was not much favored in the Hungarian borderlands. Only in three cases

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76 See P. Zs. Pach, The Role of East-Central Europe in International Trade. 16th and 17th Centuries (Budapest, 1970); idem, Levantine Trade and Hungary in the Middle Ages (Thesis, Controversies, Arguments) (Budapest, 1975).

77 Ferenc Szakály, Gazdasági és társadalmi változások a török hódítás árnyékában, 12. The second expansion of entrepreneurship took place after the 1867 ‘Ausgleich’ with Austria.


79 L. Fekete, Das Heim eines türkischen Herrn in der Provinz im XVI. Jahrhundert (Budapest, 1960).

did excavated coin boards contain more than five akçe apiece. This can be explained only by the better reputation of the Hungarian denarius (called penz in Ottoman), but also by the relative popularity of French and Polish coins.

**Demographic history**

Perhaps the most heatedly debated topic in the history of Ottoman Hungary concerns population size and migratory movements. In this field, often erroneous generalizations abound. Many authors dealing with these questions have based their arguments merely on observations of contemporary travellers or have limited themselves to data derived from Habsburg tax-lists. The resulting picture has been uniformly negative. Hundreds of burned and depopulated villages, a seriously decreasing population, and hundreds of thousands of captives driven out of the country form typical elements of this depressing picture, mostly encountered in papers and books concerning local history.

Population losses have seemed so high because estimates for the late fifteenth century have been fairly optimistic. Moreover, since they were the work of a very careful historian of excellent reputation, they have not been disputed for decades. According to István Szabó around 1494–1495 Hungary had some 3.5–4 million inhabitants. Recent research, however, has revealed that his equation of one taxation unit with two families is open to doubt. Therefore, at least with respect to a number of counties, his figures are too high. More realistic is an estimate of 3.2 million, and the maximum should not have exceeded 3.5 million souls.

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If this is at all realistic, estimates concerning the Ottoman period appear in quite a different light. It recently has been suggested that 3.5 million people lived in Hungary at the end of the sixteenth century; thus, far from showing great losses, population seems to have increased in northern Hungary and Transylvania, while the Ottoman-controlled territories stagnated. In spite of setbacks and even long-term losses in certain regions, population grew somewhat in the course of the seventeenth century, reaching an approximate 4 million at the end of the Ottoman period.

Earlier it had been supposed that 77% of the late fifteenth-century population of the Hungarian kingdom consisted of Hungarians properly speaking. It is quite likely that this estimate equally is too high, and the actual ratio must have been between 60 and 70%. However, a significant change occurred within the following two hundred years, and around 1700 only about one half of the 4 million inhabitants consisted of ethnic Hungarians. This clearly indicates that the Magyar element suffered the most, especially in the troubled times before the full Ottoman occupation of the southern regions, from which the Magyars disappeared altogether. Let us postulate that the Magyar population of 1700, that is two million persons, was roughly equivalent to the Hungarian population of 1494–95, and that these two millions constituted two thirds of the population of the Hungarian kingdom inherited by Matthias Corvinus’ successor. Given these premises, the total population of that time should have amounted to three million. If we posit the counterfactual hypothesis that between 1495–96 and 1700 the Magyar population retained its original share of the total population of the Hungarian kingdom, namely two thirds, an increase of over 600,000 persons would have been necessary.

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88 Géza Dávid, “Magyarország népessége a 16–17. században”, in József Kovacsics
In research published after 1945, trends of urban and semi-urban development frequently have been discussed. Some scholars have claimed that progress was uninterrupted until the Ottoman occupation, and only Ottoman intervention struck a blow at flourishing towns. Others have argued that stagnation began rather earlier, namely at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The testimony of the Ottoman tax registers seems to corroborate the second view. Since the Ottoman scribes compiling the first post-conquest surveys faithfully followed their local informants in recording the settlements’ legal status, a decrease in the number of towns and market-towns can be accepted as proof that the setback in urbanization had started well before the Ottomans made their first surveys. Earlier calculations had arrived at 750 oppida in Hungary during the second half of the fifteenth century, not counting Transylvania and Slavonia. Half of the territory concerned came into Ottoman possession after 1526. Some 230 settlements were regularly designated as towns in the Ottoman surveys throughout the sixteenth century. Moreover in Habsburg Hungary some 125 places were entered as market-towns in the registration of houses undertaken in 1598. This must be a minimum value, but it clearly shows an enormous decrease in the number of market towns in the northern regions, for which the Ottomans can by no means be made responsible. This result allows us to conclude that the above-cited value for the late middle ages must be unacceptable. In all probability, it was gained by adding up all relevant data from the fifteenth century without making sure that these oppida all were really contemporary. For many sixteenth-
century inhabitants of market settlements, it no longer made sense to insist on the *oppidum*-status of the places they inhabited, and this is exactly what we wished to demonstrate.\(^\text{93}\)

Attempts also have been made to establish the proportion of the inhabitants of urban and semi-urban settlements within the total population. Assuming that the kingdom of Hungary contained 750 *oppida*, a ratio between 16 and 20% has been calculated.\(^\text{94}\) Ottoman registers show that around 1568–1580, the proportion was even greater: out of 67,000 Christian heads of families living in the provinces of Buda and Temesvár, some 15,000 (22.4%) inhabited towns and market towns. If Muslims were added, this value would be even higher, since the latter almost exclusively resided in castles, which typically formed part of towns or market towns. By and large the same high ratio can be obtained for 1598 Habsburg Hungary. Given the decrease in the number of urban settlements, we thus can conclude that the average size of towns grew in the course of the sixteenth century. However, almost no urban settlements in the Ottoman zone experienced uninterrupted development, quite to the contrary: after promising rises sudden drops were not unusual.\(^\text{95}\)

The most persistent generalizations in the field of demography, many of them rather remote from reality, concern depopulation. As we have noted, especially local historians when dealing with this issue are apt to accept even the least reliable data. Anti-Ottoman sentiments, and the stereotyped thinking so frequently encountered in 1950’s historiography, must account for this regrettable state of affairs. Once again, the Ottoman sources shed light on certain aspects of this important question. After a short period of non-negligible losses, when approximately 20% of all villages disappeared, an almost undisturbed epoch followed, with damages to the settlement pattern quite insignificant.\(^\text{96}\) However, this observation is valid only for territories


\(^{94}\) István Szabó, “La répartition de la population de Hongrie entre les bourgades et les villages dans les années 1449–1526”, in *Études historiques, publiées par la Commission nationale des historiens hongrois*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1960), 383.


in present-day Hungary, while other regions, chiefly those south of the Danube-Drava line, suffered a much more serious decline in the number of inhabited places, amounting to 70–75%.97

With respect to migration, similarly unfounded opinions are equally widespread. Unwary readers of the secondary literature are likely to come away with the impression that sixteenth-century Hungary was a stirred-up bee-hive, with everybody wandering hither and thither. If we were to believe the claims of many authors working on local history, the Ottoman menace constituted a sufficient reason for Hungarian subjects to frequently change their residences. Investigations based on the Ottoman tax registers have helped to correct this erroneous impression. Where the inhabitants of the district of Buda between 1546 and 1559 are concerned, just a very few are known to have left the territory of Ottoman Hungary. Data on Buda are of special interest, since, after all, they concern the former Hungarian capital now turned into an Ottoman border fortress. Moreover, between 1546 and 1590, the dimensions of migration were no greater in the sub-province of Simontornya than in those parts of Habsburg Hungary where reliable analogous research has been conducted.98 Nevertheless, we do not know whether these relatively positive tendencies can be extrapolated for other provinces as well.

Even worse, our possibilities for tracing seventeenth-century population movements are much more limited. Consequently, there remains much more room for speculation and prejudice. After decades of misunderstandings and misinterpretations, by now it seems undisputable that after the 1590s, primary data neither from Ottoman nor from Habsburg sources permit conclusions of demographic relevance.99 Notably, after 1608, one “porta” was legally equal to 4 serfs with land or 12 villeins without land.100 At the same time, seventeenth-century head-tax units on Ottoman territories were composed of several families, ranging from 3 to 20 households. This resulted in a serious decrease in the total number of units recorded,

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97 Engel, “A török dúlások hatása”, passim.
100 István Bakács, “A dicalis összeírások”, in *A történeti statisztika forrásai*, 73.
both on the settlement and on the district level. However, these figures should not necessarily be taken at face value, and declining totals may accompany indicators of economic strength.¹⁰¹

**Military history**

Military clashes between the Ottomans and Hungarians have always been a focus of attention in Hungarian scholarship. Already in the second half of the nineteenth century a large number of studies were published concerning the various battles, wars and peace treaties of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This vast literature may be considered under five headings:

1. The first period of Ottoman incursions. Due to lack of sources, both the chronology and the course of events remain very difficult to reconstruct. Recently the studies of Pál Engel have shed some new light on the first encounters, the author having demonstrated that the unbroken series of Ottoman-Hungarian wars began after the battle of Kosovo in 1389.¹⁰²

2. The fifteenth century. Despite all efforts, the Hungarian state during this period was unable to construct and maintain an effective defense system along the southern borders, the Ottomans gaining the upper hand. This gradual shift in the balance of forces was best described by Ferenc Szakály who examined, phase by phase, the struggle between the two powers from the beginnings to the decisive battle of Mohács in 1526.¹⁰³ Within this long period, the mysterious ‘Peace Treaty of Szeged’ (1444) has long presented an enigma to historians. Pál Engel could convincingly demonstrate that the conclusion of the treaty served first of all the personal interests of John Hunyadi and that it was actually signed in Nagyvárad.¹⁰⁴ Lajos Tardy has comprehensively treated the diplomatic efforts of the Hungarian

state which aimed at organizing concerted attacks against the Ottomans on the part of several European states. 105

3. The Ottoman occupation of central Hungary. The major events of the first half of the sixteenth century, including the loss of Belgrade (1521), the decisive battle on the field of Mohács (1526), and the capture of the Hungarian capital Buda (1541) have been the subject of innumerable works. As regards the battle of Mohács and the preceding events, three works stand out: the monographs by Ferenc Szakály and Géza Perjés cited above, and a commemorative volume published on the occasion of the 450th anniversary of the battle. 106 As we have shown in one of the earliest sections, Hungarian scholars are concerned not so much with the military encounters themselves as with the question of whether or not direct Ottoman conquest could have been avoided. 107

4. The Habsburg-Hungarian and Ottoman border defence systems in Hungary. By the second half of the sixteenth century two large competitive military frontiers came into being in the central part of the country. While the Habsburg-Hungarian defence has long been studied, recent research, however, has brought about 'revolutionary' changes in this field. Due to the works of a younger generation, the leading personality of which is Géza Pálffy, we have a much deeper understanding of the physical structure, the finances and manpower of the central European defences. József Kelenik has elucidated the diffusion of elements of the so-called 'military revolution' in Habsburg Hungary. 108

105 Lajos Tardy, Beyond the Ottoman Empire. 14th–16th Century Hungarian Diplomacy in the East (Szeged, 1978).


107 Concerning this issue, see also Gábor Barta, "An' d'illusions (Notes sur la double élection de rois après la défaite de Mohács)”, Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 24 (1978), 1–40; idem, La route qui mène à Istanbul 1526–1528 (Budapest, 1994); Ferenc Szakály, Lodovico Gritti in Hungary 1529–1534. A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry (Budapest, 1995).

Research into the Ottoman frontier (serhad) is similarly flourishing. On the basis of Ottoman pay and timar registers, Klára Hegyi has reconstructed the network of fortresses, including a comprehensive discussion of the strength, composition, and replacement methods of castle garrisons.\textsuperscript{109} We owe pioneering studies to Gábor Ágoston concerning the costs of the Ottoman military machine, its technical development, as well as the supply of raw materials and gunpowder.\textsuperscript{110} Pál Fodor has studied Ottoman manpower policies and fortress maintenance.\textsuperscript{111}

5. The period from the “Long War” (1593–1606) to the Habsburg conquest of Hungary (1683–1718). The two great wars at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively always have belonged to the favorite topics of Hungarian historiography. As a result, even a cursory overview of these studies is impossible here, and we will confine ourselves to some recent and important contributions. Sándor László Tóth’s voluminous monograph on the “Long War” (called the “Fifteen Years’ War” in Hungary) encompasses not only military actions, but also a wide range of underlying political, technical, and social factors.\textsuperscript{112} From among the works dealing with the wars following the second siege of Vienna (1683), a book by Ferenc Szakály is especially noteworthy, which traces the


\textsuperscript{112} Sándor László Tóth, \textit{A mezővészeti csata és a tizenöt éves háború} (Szeged, 2000).
political and military events up to the peace of Požarevac/Pasarofça (1718).\textsuperscript{113} Papers read at an international conference (Budapest, 1986) also help us to understand why the Ottomans lost the war in Hungary.\textsuperscript{114}

Throughout, the military history of the Ottoman period in Hungary has been studied on the basis of Hungarian and, more generally, European sources. It is one of the most urgent tasks of Hungarian Ottomanists to uncover new Ottoman archival material and construct a new synthesis reflecting the perspectives of both sides.

\textit{Ecclesiastical history}

Similarly to their policies in the Balkans, among all the Christian denominations present on Hungarian territory, the Ottomans established the most harmonious relations with the Eastern Orthodox church. Because many Orthodox believers—mainly of Serbian and Vlach origin—were in the service of the Ottomans, they were given various privileges including the possibility of building monasteries; after 1557, they became subordinated to the restored Serbian Patriarchate of Ipek/Pec.\textsuperscript{115}

On the other hand, the establishment of the Ottoman administration in Hungary coincided with the rapid spread of the Reformation in these territories. Since the ensuing social unrest endangered the consolidation of the conquest, at the outset the Ottoman administration had to intervene in the inter-confessional quarrels following the Reformation, and then to gradually clarify its position vis-à-vis the various denominations.

What is more—at least according to some scholars—the Ottoman administration even assisted the emergent Protestant groups. Data which can be interpreted in this way, mainly from the first two decades of the Ottoman period, has been gathered by Ferenc Szakály.\textsuperscript{116} Such manifestations of concern, however, ceased after 1575; by

\textsuperscript{113} Ferenc Szakály, \textit{Hungaria eliberata (Die Rückeroberung von Buda im Jahr 1686 und Ungarns Befreiung von der Osmanenherrschaft)} (Budapest, 1987).
\textsuperscript{114} "Conférence internationale tenue à l'occasion du 300\textsuperscript{e} anniversaire de la reconquête de Buda. Budapest de 1\textsuperscript{er} au 4\textsuperscript{e} septembre 1986", \textit{Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae} 33–34 (1987–1988).
\textsuperscript{115} The best survey of the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Ottoman state was written by László Hadrovics: \textit{L'eglise serbe sous la domination turque} (Paris, 1947).
\textsuperscript{116} Ferenc Szakály, "Türkenherrschaft und Reformation in Ungarn um die Mitte
this time the different Protestant churches had consolidated, and on the part of the conquerors, they now were treated with the same indifference as the Catholics. We possess a vast literature on the Protestants living under Ottoman rule.\footnote{117}

The Catholic Church suffered most from the Ottoman conquest: Its ecclesiastical hierarchy was destroyed, its landed properties confiscated, while bishops were forced to live far from their sees, in Habsburg (Royal) Hungary.\footnote{118} For this reason, the papal court in Rome declared the Ottoman-ruled Balkans and Hungary missionary territories and from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards began organizing Catholic missions. These mainly were undertaken by the Bosnian Franciscans and the network of the Ragusan trading communities. From 1622 onwards, their activity was supervised by the \textit{Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide} (The Holy Congregation for Spreading the Faith). The archives of this office constitute a real mine of information for Catholic ecclesiastical history, the relationship between the Ottomans and their Christian subjects, but also for everyday life in the empire.

The first scholar to publish some reports from this extremely important collection of documents was Tihamér Vanyó.\footnote{119} During the last decade, István György Tóth\footnote{120} and Antal Molnár\footnote{121} have made an

\footnote{117}Jenő Zoványi, \textit{A reformáció Magyarországon 1565-ig} (Budapest, 1922; new ed. 1986); \textit{idem}, \textit{A magyarországi protestantizmus 1565-től 1600-ig} (Budapest, 1977); Antal Foldváry, \textit{A magyar református egyház és a török uralom} (Budapest, 1940); Géza Kathona, \textit{Főjezetek a török hódoltsági reformáció történetéből} (Budapest, 1974); Mihály Bucsay, \textit{Der Protestantismus in Ungarn 1521–1978} (Vienna, Cologne, Graz, 1977–1979); Katalin Péter, \textit{Papok és nemesek. Magyar művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok a reformációval kezdődő másfél évszázadból} (Budapest, 1995); Ferenc Szakály, \textit{Mezővárás és reformáció. Tanulmányok a korai magyar polgárosodás kérdéséhez} (Budapest, 1995); Mihály Balázs, \textit{Teológia és irodalom. Az Erdélyen közédi antitrinitarizmus kezdetei} (Budapest, 1998).


\footnote{120}István György Tóth, \textit{Relationes missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania} (1627–1707) (Rome, Budapest, 1994); for the rest of his relevant publications, see the bibliography in \textit{Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs}, 312–13.

immense amount of material available in their numerous publications, thus much advancing the study of churches in Ottoman Hungary. Analyzing materials from the Ragusan and Roman archives, they have been able to shed new light on the early history of the missions, reveal the struggles among the different ecclesiastical organizations linked to various ethnic groups and bring to light the underlying commercial interests. These achievements are spectacular and promising, as compared to the derelict condition of this field under the Communist government, when research into ecclesiastical history was consciously impeded.

**Ottoman-Muslim culture in Hungary**

Numerous aspects of Muslim cultural history long have been rather neglected. Only the somewhat mysterious and legendary personality of Gül Baba, a Bektashi şeyh whose türbe stands on a hill on the Buda side of the Danube, has attracted some attention. However, in the 1980s systematic research in this field has begun. Gábor Ágoston has established the locations of the most important cultural centers in Ottoman Hungary and identified some outstanding scholars active in the local medreses and tekkes.

Recently, Balázs Sudár has taken up the same line with a larger emphasis on sixteenth-century literary life in Ottoman Hungary. It has been known for quite some time that certain Hungarian poets and writers were influenced by Ottoman literature. Bálint Balassi, the most outstanding sixteenth-century Hungarian poet, was undoubtedly inspired by aşık of the frontier zone. He even indicated the Turkish melodies according to which two of his poems were to be sung. “A Turkish poem” was composed to the tune of “Ben seyrane gider iken”, and “When he found Julia, this is how he greeted her” was sung to the tune of “Gerek mez dünya sensüz”. It is also worth noting that the first line of this latter poem is a translation of the

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122 For the best article about him, see L. Fekete, “Gül-Baba et le bektashi derkâh de Buda”, *Acta Orientalia Hungarica* 4 (1954), 1–18.
relevant Turkish verse. Bálint Balassi rendered nine Turkish poems into Hungarian ("Some Turkish beyts translated into Hungarian"), the originals of which have not so far been found. He even could imitate divan poems. This example shows that there was a—probably small—group of minstrels on both sides of the frontier familiar with both Ottoman and Hungarian poetry.

Surviving monuments of Ottoman art long have been, and continue to be, subjects of considerable interest. Not many mosques, mausolea, and baths from the Ottoman period have survived the vicissitudes of the last three centuries. But from the 1890s onwards they were considered a part of Hungary’s historical heritage, worthy of being preserved. Particularly during the socialist period, the conservation of old buildings was accorded high priority and included Ottoman monuments. The major figure in this field long has been Gyöző Gerő, an expert on Ottoman architecture who is a highly trained archaeologist. Moreover, he is the author of many shorter and longer studies, concentrating sometimes on a single edifice, sometimes on a special type of building, sometimes on the Ottoman monuments in a given town or even in the whole country. It should be noted that Gerő has discovered hitherto completely unknown sites such as the Malkoc bey mosque in Siklós. József Molnár, an architect, also has dedicated a series of articles to the same monuments and published a book about them in Turkey. One could easily that the topic is by now exhausted but that is far from being the case; Gerő has recently identified an Ottoman bastion belonging to the former castle of Szászvár. Moreover, Ibolya Gerelyes has studied a gate and tower complex belonging to the fortification system of Gyula.

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126 For a general evaluation of archeological activities concerning Ottoman Hungary see Dávid and Gerelyes, "Ottoman Social and Economic Life Unearthed", 43–79.
127 He has summarized his earlier results in a book: Gyöző Gerő, *Az oszmán török építészet Magyarországon. (Dzsámik, türbék, fiúdők)* (Budapest, 1980).
128 Siklós. Malkoc bey-dzsámá (Budapest, 1994).
131 Oral information kindly imparted by Ibolya Gerelyes.
Turkish rugs gained popularity in the seventeenth century, especially in Transylvania and among the local Lutherans. They constitute a special genre known as Transylvanian carpets in international literature. Usually they were hung on the upper walls of churches and some can still be seen in their original locations. Other valuable Gördes, Uşak, and Ladik rugs entered the collection of the Museum of Applied Arts, Budapest, which is one of the largest of its kind in the world. Ferenc Batári, a real connoisseur of the field, has been dealing with the collection over a long time, and finally has published a catalogue, both in English and Hungarian, with a detailed description of every single item.¹³²

Some fine examples of Ottoman applied arts have found their way into the "Esterházy Treasury", preserved in the Budapest Museum of Applied Arts. This collection consisted of tents, horse caparisons, saddles, and textiles with embroideries of a very high standard. Some of these objects had come into the possession of the Esterházy family as war booty, others as gifts or purchases. Unfortunately, the collection was severely damaged during World War II and could only partly be restored.¹³³

However, it is the Hungarian National Museum which houses perhaps the largest number of works of Ottoman origin, some of which postdate the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Jewellery, decorated guns, silver bowls, copper utensils, different kinds of pottery and leatherwork, all are represented here. For a long time, Géza Feher was the curator of the Turkish artifacts and wrote a number of careful studies on the subject.¹³⁴ He was succeeded by Ibolya Gerelyes, an expert of wide interests, who frequently combines archaeological data with information taken from Ottoman historical sources.¹³⁵

¹³² Ferenc Batári, Oszmán-török szőnyegek. Ottoman-Turkish Carpets (Budapest, Keszthely, 1994).
¹³⁴ See, for example, Géza Fehér, L’Artisanat sous la domination ottomane en Hongrie (Budapest, 1975).
How far did Muslim culture affect sixteenth and seventeenth-century Hungarians, and was there an influence in the opposite direction? When attempting to answer these questions, we must keep in mind that a very significant proportion of Muslims living in Hungary were not Turks at all, but Bosnians. Thus, connections with Ottoman culture as it existed in the central provinces must have been rather tenuous. Moreover, as Muslims living in Hungary were typically garrison soldiers, their everyday contacts with the local population were rather limited. However, there was a lengthy period of cohabitation of some sort or another, which did leave traces in Hungarian everyday culture. Dress, mainly footwear, and the techniques of leather manufacture show the impact of Ottoman models. Among other things boots (gizme), so typical of Hungarian folk-dress, were borrowed from the Ottomans. Slippers (Ottoman pabuç, modern Turkish terlik) likewise became popular; slippers manufactured in Szeged are purchased as souvenirs even today. Certain types of clothing (dolaman, zibrn) and headgear made of fur (kalpak) were also adopted by Hungarians. By contrast, Hungarian cooking was only superficially influenced by Ottoman cuisine, while the latter's impact was much greater in the Balkan countries. Out of the Ottoman loan-words which can be documented in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Hungarian texts, merely a dozen or so have survived in everyday common usage. A small number has been reduced to dialect level, while most of these terms have become obsolete or even totally forgotten.

As to the Hungarian impact on Ottoman culture, it was almost negligible. In official Ottoman documents, such as kanunnames, tapu-tahrir registers and others, we find some Hungarian terms, but they did not turn into integral elements of the Ottoman language.


139 For a list of such words see Fekete, Die Siyaqat-Schrift, vol. 1, 57–65.
modern Turkish, we encounter only *varoş* 'settlement outside the town walls', from Hungarian *város* 'town', and *kadana* 'artillery horse, and figuratively, a huge woman' derived from Hungarian *katona* 'soldier'.

**Conclusion**

During the post-war decades, Hungarian historians often had to struggle in order to retain contact with novel developments in European and American historiography. This was especially true until about 1965, when access to non-Marxist literature was meagre indeed; moreover, even the works of Marxists not part of the 'official canon' were hard to find in Hungarian libraries. In addition, the competence of many scholars in foreign languages was weak, and there was no authority to guide the newer generations in other directions than the 'official line'. International connections were quite limited and mostly restricted to a small circle of reliable 'party comrades'. Fellowships to foreign countries were even harder to come by, and if available at all, usually the privilege of those who worked on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Given these impediments, only a smallish group of relatively independent minds could follow western publications and apply the relevant findings to their own work.\[140\] A research group concerned with historical statistics and demography was founded by Zoltán Dávid, and pertinent studies appeared quite early.\[141\] During the 1970s and 1980s, important historians such as László Makkai, Vera Zimányi, Gyula Káldy-Nagy and György Granasztói absorbed the teachings of Fernand Braudel and the French *Annales* school. Hungarian historians also followed the main trends of quantitative history as developed in the United States, although they rarely produced research of their own in this field. Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of a European-dominated capitalist world economy, incorporating food- and raw-material-producing countries as 'semi-peripheries' and 'peripheries', had a considerable impact on younger scholars. In this con-

\[140\] In sociology, the acceptance of up-to-date, mostly American methodology began rather earlier. However even in this field, scholars had to carefully reinterpret findings considered as 'negative' by the powers that be, so as to make them 'acceptable'.

\[141\] For a positive evaluation of Hungarian results in historical demography see T. S. Hollingworth, *Historical Demography* (Ithaca NY, 1969), 53.
text, it is worth noting that the first volume of Wallerstein’s monumental work was translated into Hungarian already in 1983. By contrast, Fernand Braudel’s landmark study of the Mediterranean only appeared in 1996, well after the fall of the ‘ancien régime’.\textsuperscript{142} In the 1990s, an interest in historical ecology, the study of mentalities and post-modernism also manifested itself.

However, the teachings of these schools, and the debates between them, were not really assimilated by Hungarian scholars in any detail. Even historians working within one or more of the ‘great trends’ in international historiography perhaps would have been hard put if asked to describe their methodological assumptions. Generally speaking, present-day Hungarian historiography is characterized by a search for broad perspectives deemed capable of guiding historical research. Even more obvious is the disenchantment with anything that might be termed ‘ideology’. Needless to say, in this respect, Hungarian historians are not unique, as ‘chaos’ and ‘lack of universally accepted guidelines’ are typical of pluralist societies the world over.

Where the organization of research is concerned, Hungarian scholars are passing through a difficult period of transition. Before 1989–90, the situation was not on the whole favorable to team work, as the régime was happy to deal with atomized specialists. However, many historians themselves also preferred to work alone, as this made it possible to avoid controls and gain a degree of freedom to choose one’s own way. Remarkably enough, the preference for working as individuals has continued throughout the 1990s as well. This is, at least partly, due to the fact that the financing of scholarly activities, which had been more or less calculable in the 1980s, came to be rather unpredictable and insecure. As new forms of sponsoring research and initiating or supporting long-term projects were often implemented in a haphazard manner, historians continued to favor projects they could manage more or less on their own. Nevertheless, in the field of research funding, there have been some encouraging developments in the very recent past.

All this is valid, more or less, for the Hungarian historical community as a whole. Ottomanists are no exception to the general rule,

with perhaps the added proviso that they understand themselves very much as practitioners of Hungarian national history—globalization has not been a prominent aspect even in the most recent work. Researchers continue to focus on topics related to the Hungarian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time it has become ever more obvious that Buda or Gyula were part of a wider Ottoman context and that, moreover, the Ottoman Empire as a whole was not immune to developments affecting the entire Euro-Asiatic land mass. All this requires extra attention not only to Ottomanist literature, but also to work done on India, China or western Europe.

Here Hungarian Ottomanists are well served by the traditions established by Lajos Fekete and particularly Gyula Káldy-Nagy, whose wide knowledge of the scholarly literature continues to form an example to their successors in the field. Fekete and Káldy-Nagy incessantly have urged their students to follow not only the Turkish and Hungarian secondary literature, but to acquire a sense of world history, and more particularly, of European and American studies concerning the Ottoman world. Especially where research tendencies and historiographical results concerning the period before 1700 are involved, Hungarian Ottomanists generally are well informed and up-to-date.

However, this does not of course mean that Hungarian Ottomanists have been truly and fully integrated into international scholarship. In many ways, the after-effects of the division of Europe into 'west' and 'east' are still very much with us. As a small example of the continuing ‘western’ orientation of much of Ottoman studies, we might point out that there is only a single Balkan scholar on the advisory board of the series ‘The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage . . .’, in which the present volume appears. Yet scholars from the Balkan countries and Hungary have always been especially concerned with the Ottoman presence in southeastern Europe. Fortunately, there are encouraging signs as well. Thus, fellowships are being made available for applicants from the former ‘Eastern block’ countries wishing to do research in Turkey. Invitations to participate in symposia, complete with financial support, are also no longer a rarity. Hungarian Ottomanists gain appointments to major American universities, and publications on Hungaro-Ottoman history appear in western Europe.143 Last, but in the view of the present authors,

143 See footnotes 41 and 81.
perhaps not least, one might mention that this survey on Hungarian historiography has, after all, been commissioned from two Hungarian authors. Thus, a slow reintegration of Hungarian Ottomanists into the international scholarly community can be anticipated in the not so distant future.

But in the end, scholars are judged by the work they produce. We have accumulated a considerable amount of historical information, that is, both knowledge concerning the available primary sources and an understanding of international historiographical trends. Now the time has come to harvest the results. New and exciting syntheses can be expected at the beginning of the next millennium.
CHAPTER NINE

COPING WITH THE CENTRAL STATE, COPING WITH LOCAL POWER: OTTOMAN REGIONS AND NOTABLES FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Suraiya Faroqhi

Now the time has come to discuss once more a topic which has already been touched upon in the Introduction, namely, the status of local powerholders within the imperial framework. This is an issue which by far transcends Ottoman history and which has exercised many of the best minds among Indianists, Chinese historians and Europeanists. Given the limited means of communication in pre-railway times, any large empire, no matter how centralized, to a degree had to rely on 'the men on the spot'. However, central governments somehow needed to control their local agent, lest the latter gained too much independent power. In the Ottoman case, the perennial problem, at least from the later seventeenth century onwards, was to ensure that whoever held local power sent a significant share of the taxes he collected on to Istanbul. This generally was more difficult than to make tax farmers and financial agents of assorted governors acknowledge the Ottoman sultans' authority. Moreover, sultanic legitimacy required that abuses on the part of the government's local agents were at least partially checked.

Most obviously, such a policy implied controlling the governors and their henchmen, the much feared ehl-i örf. Appointing kadis centrally and training them in Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne, in institutions often founded by members of the Ottoman dynasty, was an

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1 In the present chapter, we will concentrate upon center-province relationships within the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen, the 'peripheralization' of the Empire as a whole has constituted a major topic of Ottomanist historiography. But that question is not at issue here.

2 This chapter develops certain points more briefly treated in the Introduction, within the section subitled 'Integration and Decentralization'.

important means of constructing an alternative chain of command and thus keeping the *ehl-i ḍarf* under control. But in addition to judges and military men, urban and rural notables also belonged to the intermediate layer between the central government and its taxpaying subjects. In the ‘Far West’ of Algiers, Tunis and Tripolis, the janissaries manning urban citadels were joined in the local governing councils by corsair captains. Such people did not necessarily fit into the simple dichotomy of privileged state servitors and ordinary taxpayers, whose complete separation long had been regarded as the foundation of the Ottoman political system. Therefore, these provincial upstarts might be regarded with a degree of mistrust by the authorities in Istanbul. Yet the Empire could not possibly be governed without them.

In the present concluding chapter, we will attempt a synthesis of the center-province relationship in the Ottoman world. In the first section, we will focus on territorial divisions, highlighting the economic and political factors which governed the formation of regions. As for the second part, it will be reserved for a discussion of locally prominent figures, those intermediaries between the central government and its taxpaying subjects whom we have already had occasion to invoke. We will concentrate on recent research, ‘recent’ mainly meaning those studies which have appeared during the last twenty years, a period during which the links between center and provinces have attracted a good deal of scholarly attention among Ottomanists. But, of course, older works which have made contributions to current debates or to the present scholarly consensus will not be neglected either.

**Ottoman methods of securing conquered territories**

In the sixteenth century, for a period which now is recognized to have been comparatively brief, a high level of centralization prevailed in the Ottoman Empire. But even at the height of the cen-

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3 I. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants. The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550–1650* (New York, 1983) gives a good idea of the level of centralization achieved, but also of its limits.
ter's power, there were border territories where the sultans' writ was only fitfully obeyed. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Mustafa Ali, who had seen service as a military commander in the borderland (serhad) of Bosnia, complained that the sultans' ordinances (kanun-i osmani) could not be properly enforced in the remote Bosnian marches. Something similar applied to the eastern margins. Around 1600, Aziz Efendi, an Ottoman official experienced in dealing with the Kurdish princes of eastern Anatolia, advised the central administration to treat these personages with forbearance. They were after all Sunnis, and as such, their loyalty to the Sultan and their opposition to the Shah of Iran should be strengthened.

Such situations can in part be explained by means of a model which Halil İnalcık has proposed, in an article now almost fifty years old. According to the sequence of central government measures identified by İnalcık, in newly conquered territories members of the old elites who had switched their allegiances to the Ottomans were often retained as governors. But in the next generation their sons, if indeed the latter possessed the prerequisites for high office, normally were posted to localities remote from their fathers' former domains. At the same time, the territory which the new administrators' fathers once had governed now became an ordinary Ottoman province. İnalcık has demonstrated that such a sequence can be observed even in Hungary between 1524 and 1541. Moreover, the Lebanese scholar Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn has pointed out that local lords ran much of greater Syria (the Ottoman provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Tripolis and later Beirut) until about 1630. Thus, the process which İnalcık has discerned could continue for a century and more, and in the case of the Kurdish beys of eastern Anatolia, it was not completed until the early nineteenth century.

Moreover, we have to distinguish between the period during which the continental Ottoman frontiers were constantly advancing and the years after about 1550. For while after the middle of the century, there was a good deal of fighting both on the Habsburg and Safavid

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6 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 66, note 64.
fronts, long-term conquests were quite limited. After 1550, territories such as Hungary were organized as more or less permanent frontier provinces. In these places, much money was spent on defenses but less on sultanic foundations, one of the major means by which the Ottoman government left its imprint on the cityscapes of its more central territories. In many years, defense expenditures were so high that provincial revenues were insufficient, and only in 'good years' did Hungarian revenues cover all the expenditures of this territory's many Ottoman fortresses.

In the Hungarian border provinces, defense needs thus reinforced links to the Ottoman central government. However, the borderlands also included a territory such as Transylvania, which continued to be governed by a tribute-paying prince, who was not even a Muslim. In the case of Ottoman Iraq or parts of eastern Anatolia, strong reliance also was placed on local potentates, often with a tribal base. These personages were granted significant autonomy, provided they permitted easy access to the Safavid front in times of war. Powerful fortresses controlled by governors appointed directly from the center, such as Erzurum, Kars, Van and Diyarbekir, served not only to repel possible Safavid attacks, but also to ensure the loyalty of the frontier beys. Central control and reliance on local potentates thus existed side by side, even after most borders had come to be more or less stable. Thus, recent studies of Ottoman warfare, mainly but by no means exclusively concerning Hungary, also teach us something about the perennial tension between centralization and decentralization within the Ottoman Empire of the 'classical age'.

William McNeill in his work on 'Europe's steppe frontier' has suggested a somewhat different sequence of stages in the relationship between center and periphery on the western and northern Ottoman borders. At an early stage of imperial expansion, according to McNeill's model, the center suffers less than the outlying provinces, for during these years, the central provinces merely contribute taxes and soldiers to the imperial enterprise, while being spared the destruction of war.

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10 Only against less powerful states, such as Venice and Poland, did the Ottoman sultans make major conquests after this date.
If, however, we carry McNeill’s ideas a step further, we may assume that at a later stage, outlying provinces can become the recipients of superior protection at relatively low cost, underwritten by the central provinces. Provided that small-scale frontier warfare can be kept within limits, the border provinces should then prosper at the expense of the center. Such situations are known to have occurred, for instance in the Spanish world empire, where, around 1600, the central province of Castile was vastly overtaxed in comparison to Aragon or Portugal. But in eastern Anatolia, Iraq or Hungary, we do not at any time observe rising prosperity at the expense of Istanbul or Aleppo. Presumably in the Hungarian instance, continuous border fighting prevented recovery in large sections of the country. In eastern Anatolia, the rough terrain and long cold winters put the area at a disadvantage impossible to compensate for, conditions which continue to characterize Turkey even today. As for Iraq, after the long neglect which followed the demise of the Baghdad caliphate, large-scale investment would have been needed to once more enhance the productivity of agriculture. Here, however, the distance from the Ottoman center probably discouraged such expenditure. Thus it would appear that the Ottoman ruling establishment largely viewed border areas as serving defense first and foremost, while borderland prosperity rarely if ever materialized.

Other models of centrality: Von Thünen and his followers

Yet another fashion of looking at center-province relationships, which mainly has been applied to Ottoman regions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is linked to Johann von Thünen’s by now classical concern with transportation costs as a function of distance to a central city. Basing himself on conditions obtaining just before the dawn of the railway age, Von Thünen postulates that if transportation costs
are not augmented due to dangerous mountain passes, unfordable rivers or other impediments, these costs constitute a mere function of distance. Moreover, according to Von Thünen's model, the central city may be located by a navigable river, which significantly cheapens transportation. Given Istanbul's location at the confluence of two seas, a model of this type seems peculiarly appropriate to the Ottoman central city.

Different goods are more or less difficult to transport, and this affects the price of moving them. Therefore, the relevant places of production must be selected with care. Goods such as fresh milk or butter, eggs, fruit, vegetables or flowers cannot be transported at all in a world without fast trains or airplanes. As a result, dairy and poultry farms as well as market gardeners will be located close to the central city. There follows a belt producing timber and firewood, costly to transport but indispensable for a metropolis such as Ottoman Istanbul, where, after all, private residences were built of wood. A third belt will contain the grain-producing regions, while the raising of animals for meat consumption, as well as for cheese or leather, will take place in the fourth and most remote belt. If the city in question is located near a waterway, which applied to most major cities in western Europe but less so to the more arid eastern Mediterranean, the normally circular belts surrounding the central city will be distorted to an elliptic shape. This phenomenon is, of course, very marked in the case of Istanbul. Once railways and paved roads have become established, they will produce the same effect.

As to the supply problems of Ottoman Istanbul, they are relatively well documented. In consequence Von Thünen's model has been employed largely to make sense of the geographical distribution of the 'agricultural enterprises' working for Istanbul. Where the seventeenth century is concerned, much of the relevant material has been made accessible by Robert Mantran. Thus this scholar has opened the way for İlhan Tekeli, İlber Ortaylı and the present

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16 Animals brought to the city's slaughterhouses from the fourth belt may have to be fattened up on meadows close to the city before they become, once again, desirable for consumption.

17 However these were not the capitalist farms which Von Thünen had in mind, but largely peasant homesteads and the establishments of migratory sheep breeders.

author, who have concerned themselves with various ‘side effects’ implicit in Von Thünen’s model. İlhan Tekeli has studied the impact of transportation conditions upon marketing patterns along Ottoman trade routes. Tekeli also discusses the effects which such arrangements may have had on the distribution of settlements. İlber Ortaylı has elucidated the role of one of Istanbul’s service ports, namely Rodostocuk/Tekirdağ, in channeling supplies to Istanbul. As to the present author, she has shown how closely the Von Thünen model fitted conditions ‘on the ground’ in the region of Istanbul, provided the distorting effects of the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean are taken into account. A study of eighteenth century Eyüp, with its market gardens, has further demonstrated the pertinence of Von Thünen’s model to the Istanbul case.

In addition Von Thünen’s model has undergone significant amplification in the 1960s and 1970s, thus facilitating the study of regions and their central places all over the world. Especially noteworthy are the studies of William Skinner and Gilbert Rozman on marketing patterns, both rural and urban, in China, Russia and Japan. While Skinner focuses on the twentieth-century situation, Rozman works historically, attempting to establish a sequence of stages through which the relevant societies passed in the course of their marketing histories. This ‘evolutionary’ stance, which today is thoroughly out of fashion, may explain why Rozman’s work currently is less often cited than Skinner’s synchronic study.

Ottomanists took up the challenges, as usual, somewhat belatedly, in the later 1970s and early 1980s. Leila Erder and the present author demonstrated how a system of towns came into being in Anatolia in the course of the sixteenth century. In the early 1500s, the

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towns of this region were on the whole very small and scattered, so that it is difficult to speak of a coherent system at all. But the population growth of the sixteenth century led not only to an expansion of rural marketing, but also to the emergence of towns where none had existed before and to the development of large cities as well.24 As a result, by the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire already possessed the 'primate' distribution often encountered in today's industrializing countries. Istanbul as the capital absolutely dominated the scene, for it contained many times the population of the next largest cities of the Ottoman core area, such as Bursa or Edirne.

With the information presently available, however, Leila Erder and myself might have been less certain of our conclusions. In the mid-1970s the numerous studies on the cities of the Arab provinces available today, with new ones regularly appearing, for the most part still lay in the future. Or at the very least, they were not accessible to us at the time of writing.25 On the other hand, the much lower estimates for Istanbul's population which now have gained currency had not yet been published either.26 Much against our inclination, we urban historians have been forced to admit that we have no clear idea concerning the sixteenth-century population of Istanbul. But given the large number of pious foundations and the size of the capital’s built-up area, an estimate of ‘a few hundred thousand’ still


26 Stéphane Yerasimos, “La communauté juive d’Istanbul à la fin du XVIe siècle”, *Turcica* 27 (1995), footnote 19, has shown that the high estimates for Istanbul’s early sixteenth-century population, often found in the secondary literature, are due to a technical error. On the basis of a taxpayer count from the year 1478, the total population of that year has been estimated at about 80,000. This figure then erroneously was assumed to denote households and not persons, and was once more multiplied by 5 to arrive at an estimate of 400,000.
appears to make sense. In consequence, we can continue to claim that Rumelia and Anatolia taken together showed a primate distribution. Istanbul was at least double the size of the next largest towns, such as Bursa, Edirne or Salonica, none of which seems to have numbered 100,000 inhabitants during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Regional autonomy in the economic sphere: significance and limits

But when we include the Arab provinces, the picture turns out rather differently. In terms of population, both Ottoman Cairo and Aleppo reached and even surpassed the one-hundred thousand mark. Regarding Cairo this had happened long before the Ottoman conquest, and Aleppo followed suit in the course of the seventeenth century. This 'competition' with Istanbul in terms of size may mean that the Egyptian and Syrian regions were linked to the Ottoman capital politically and economically, but that the domination of Istanbul over these commercial metropolises was less than absolute. A similar result can be arrived at if we examine the trade routes which came together in these two Arab cities. Commerce with Istanbul was significant, but by no means dominant. Cairo controlled the Empire's trade with India and Yemen, the latter ceasing to form part of the Ottoman territory after the 1630s. Aleppo also had access to Indian trade through the Basra route, and of course the importation of Iranian silks was only in part directed at the Istanbul market. Moreover, Damascus, a close runner-up to Cairo and Aleppo in terms of economic activity, controlled the trans-desert trade to Mecca and Medina. Thus in economic terms, even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottoman center probably was less dominant over the Arab provinces than one might have assumed on the basis of the information available in the 1960s or early 1970s.

27 André Raymond, Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane (Paris, 1985), 57.
28 It is still within the realm of the possible that a primate distribution existed even for the Empire as a whole. Thus, for instance, we may assume 300,000 inhabitants for Istanbul and 150,000 for Cairo. But we can no longer make such claims with any degree of confidence.
29 Raymond, Artisans et commerçants, vol. 1, passim.
30 Masters, The Origins, passim.
If Cairo, Aleppo and Damascus were thus centers in their own right, one would expect them to have controlled their respective hinterlands. That this was in fact the case has become obvious from two studies published in the 1980s. Both Abdul Karim Rafeq and Linda Schilcher have produced important work on the structure of Damascus’ hinterland.\textsuperscript{31} Basing his conclusions on material from the Damascus law courts and the French Foreign Ministry archives, Rafeq analyzes Damascus’ economic region and the changes which were brought about, among other things, by the opening of the Suez Canal. Pilgrims to Mecca, that mainstay of the Damascus commercial economy, now increasingly preferred to travel by sea; on the other hand, the canal facilitated trade with Egypt, to the greater advantage of a pre-existing Syrian commercial diaspora. Socially even more problematic was the competition from European fabrics, which caused some Damascene textile manufacturers to reduce wages, thus deepening the cleavages between rich and poor.\textsuperscript{32} In this manner Rafeq has shown that Damascus possessed a far-flung hinterland, whose structure, by the nineteenth century, was being changed and often deformed by European intervention.

Linda Schilcher by contrast has focused on the rural world, investigating relationships between Damascus and its grain-producing hinterland. Similarly to Abdul Karim Rafeq, she is concerned with the background to the anti-Christian riots of 1860, which resulted in numerous dead and much destruction of property. Schilcher differentiates between two groups of traders organized in rival factions and living in different parts of the city. One of these factions originally had been associated with the ‘Azm, a family, which in the eighteenth century, had furnished most of the city’s governors. But the opposing faction during the nineteenth century was able to enrich itself through the export of grain to Europe. Only after 1860, under serious pressure from the Ottoman central government, were the two factions willing to cooperate in order to ensure that the greatly expanded grain trade was routed through Damascus in preference

\textsuperscript{31} Abdul Karim Rafeq, “The Impact of Europe on a Traditional Economy, The Case of Damascus, 1840-1870”, in Economie et sociétés dans l’Empire ottoman (fin du XVIII\textsuperscript{e}—début du XX\textsuperscript{e} siècle (Paris, n.d.), 432; Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics. Damascene Factions and Estates in the 18th and 19th Centuries (Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, 1985).

to other urban centers. Schilcher’s study thus shows how strongly Damascene social structures affected the villages of southern Syria, and this impact once again proves the existence of a hinterland organized around the southern Syrian metropolis.

Even easier to demonstrate is the control of Aleppo over large sectors of the northern Syrian countryside. Before his untimely death in 1982, Antoine Abdel Nour found time to publish an important book on the hinterlands of Aleppo and Damascus in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Abdel Nour reacts against the older literature on Aleppo’s role in international trade, particularly the claims of Jean Sauvaget and Niels Steensgaard. Sauvaget had been convinced that the city’s prosperity was completely dependent on the international trade in silk, and therefore no more than a façade, which collapsed when in the early eighteenth century, Iranian silk ceased to be an important item in international trade. Not without a certain exaggeration, Abdel Nour set about minimizing the role of long-distance trade in the urban economy and stressed the role of the city’s hinterland with its numerous small towns and market villages in underwriting Aleppo’s commercial activities. While Abdel Nour does not as a whole invoke models developed outside of Ottoman history, motifs taken from central place theory are easily discernible in his work.

From Abdel Nour’s study it thus becomes clear that at least Aleppo possessed not merely a rural hinterland, but in addition was served by a number of smaller cities, such as Ayntab (Gaziantep), Kilis or ‘Azaz. This is an important finding as hitherto, the phenomenon of regional ‘urban pyramids’, though well enough known from European economic history, in the Ottoman instance had been studied only with respect to Istanbul. Lesser cities in the Ottoman realm,

33 Antoine Abdel Nour, Introduction à l’histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane (XVIe–XVIIe siècles) (Beirut, 1982).
35 Apart from Ortayh, “Tekirdağ”, compare also Suraiya Faroqhi, “İstanbul’un iâşesi ve Tekirdağ-Rodoscuk limanı”, Gelişme dergisi, ikitsat tarihi özel sayısı (1980),
even if important commercial centers, usually could claim the services of market villages only, or at best, of miniscule townlets. But obviously there were some exceptions. Now that we find Aleppo at the tip of an 'urban pyramid' encompassing today's northern Syria and southeastern Turkey, we possess good reasons for assigning this city the status of a 'regional capital' with a fair degree of autonomy. Similar claims could of course be made for Cairo. Both Cairo and Aleppo had been metropolises in pre-Ottoman times, and especially in the Cairene instance, the adjustments which imposed themselves, or else were imposed, once the city had become part of the Ottoman realm have been well investigated. A similar adjustment process occurred at a much later date, namely in the second half of the seventeenth century, after Crete had been taken

139—54. On Bursa, which in spite of its size, also functioned as Istanbul's 'industrial suburb', see Haim Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600—1700 (Jerusalem, 1988).


Given all the attention paid to the processes of region formation, the concrete analyses of large regions within the Ottoman Empire, that is those which encompassed not one but several towns, are surprisingly few in number. One of the more recent examples is due to the cooperative efforts of the historian Nejat Göyünc and the geographer Wolf Dieter Hütteroth. Basing their work on the evidence of the surviving sixteenth-century tax registers, the two authors have covered the lands adjacent to the Upper Euphrates: Land an der Grenze. Osmanische Verwaltung im heutigen türkisch-syrisch-irakischen Grenzgebiet im 16. Jahrhundert (Istanbul, 1997). Göyünc and Hütteroth have chosen a region not political or economic, but geographical in character, and their work might be classed as cultural geography with a historical slant. In dealing with the upper course of the Euphrates down to 'Ana, they have in fact consciously transcended Ottoman provincial borders, to say nothing of present-day state frontiers. Their concern is with the location of fields and villages and with the relative significance of different ways of making a living, nomadism included. A sizeable chapter deals with taxation, and they also have devoted a separate chapter to the region's towns. Unfortunately for historians concerned with the economic criteria of region formation, the Euphrates in this period did not form a trait d'union between different regions. This was due to the many shallows, which allowed only the most flat-bottomed craft to sail the river, but also to the tribal units living closely, whose members frequently disrupted traffic. But at the same time, Göyünc's and Hütteroth's study is unique on account of the detailed analysis to which it has subjected an otherwise little known Ottoman 'periphery'.

38 This matter already has been touched upon in the Introduction; see Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule Institutions. Waqf and Architecture in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries) (Leiden, 1994).
from the Venetians. Molly Greene’s work on the Veneto-Ottoman transition in Crete may be regarded as an original combination of two types of study current in the recent literature. On the one hand, she has produced a study with a regional focus, similar to that undertaken by Abdel Nour. On the other hand, she combines this regional study with the investigation of ‘adjustment to Ottoman rule’ as previously practised by Doris Behrens-Abouseif.\(^{39}\) Once again Greene does not explicitly refer to central place theories. Yet her findings concerning Crete’s olive economy during the Ottoman period, which replaced an earlier orientation toward the production of wine, can be well explained by the exigencies of Istanbul’s food market. Eighteenth-century Crete thus can conveniently be placed in the fourth belt of Von Thünen’s model, as similarly to hides and skins, olive oil can be transported over reasonably long distances. Moreover, the replacement of wine by oil makes sense if we take into account that olive oil was considered a more ‘legitimate’ food demand by the Ottoman administration than wine, even if wine consumption by non-Muslims was not prohibited.\(^{40}\) Also it is worth noting that in spite of Crete’s relative proximity to Egypt, the island developed more economic ties to Istanbul than to Cairo. When all is said and done, whatever the attractions of the Cairene market, political pressure was exercised mainly for the benefit of Istanbul.

\textit{The ‘primacy of politics’}

For the last few paragraphs we have pretended that regions were formed around major Ottoman cities for purely economic reasons; in fact, this assumption, not unreasonable for his own time and place, underlies Von Thünen’s model. Yet the annexation of newly Ottoman-ized Crete to the sultans’ capital, rather than to Cairo, shows the limitations of Von Thünen’s reasoning in the Ottoman instance. For the government in Istanbul, especially during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had fashioned itself a powerful instrumentarium in


\(^{40}\) However, we should not assume that vineyards generally were neglected during the Ottoman period, for there existed a large-scale consumption of raisins and grape syrup as sweeteners.
order to institute what has been termed a ‘command economy’. Wherever this ‘command economy’ was applied, it determined urban size and regional structuring according to non-economic criteria.\textsuperscript{41} Certainly today we are more aware of the limitations which weakly developed means of communication and a comparatively small bureaucratic apparatus placed upon the centralizing ambitions of Ottoman officials. But even so, the non-development of a major urban center on the Aegean coast of Anatolia was linked to the central administration’s will to reserve the produce of this fertile area for the navy and the Ottoman capital. Before the seventeenth century, any local competition for the region’s resources thus must have appeared undesirable. However, the demands of the Ottoman fleet probably became less insistent after confrontations with the Spaniards had come to a virtual close at the end of the sixteenth century, and the urgent need for revenue made customs-paying exports appear less of an evil than they had seemed in earlier times. Only at this juncture was Izmir able to develop into a major urban center, where exportation ruled more or less supreme.\textsuperscript{42}

One of the early scholars to point out the role of political factors in the formation of the Ottoman urban system was the sociologist and social anthropologist Mûbeccel Kiray.\textsuperscript{43} However, Kiray’s concern being the current situation in Turkey, she only touched upon, but did not elaborate, the concept of towns which developed due to the ruling group’s need for markets. In my view however, this factor is rather important in explaining the genesis of at least the smaller Anatolian and Rumelian towns. After all taxes collected in kind and not consumed locally by timar-holders would have to be exchanged for money before they could be transported to Istanbul. Due to the availability of foodstuffs for sale, there would have been an incentive for both craftsmen and traders to establish themselves even in

\textsuperscript{43} Mûbeccel Kiray, “Toplum yapısındaki temel değişimlerin tarihsel perspektifi: Bugünkü ve yarınki Türk toplum yapısı,” reprinted in \textit{eadem}, Toplumbilim Yazıları (Ankara, 1982), 126. The original article was published in 1969. Moreover, Mûbeccel Kiray was a most influential teacher, whose impact probably was due at least as much to her classroom persona as to her publications. Her account of Ottoman towns as centers of tax collection, among other things, has made a profound impact on the present author.
minor administrative centers. Town formation was the result, and in fact, Ottoman government officials always assumed that the seats of local administrators should be in towns, even though the latter might be minuscule indeed.

All this means that administrative districts came to constitute economic regions of a sort. Grain taxes collected in a given kaza, or area for which a kadi was responsible, came together in the markets of the central town, and this strengthened the links of villages to ‘their’ district centers. Moreover, the Ottoman administration assumed that even though exceptions might be authorized, a typical town should be fed by its own district. We equally must take into account that even in the sixteenth century, Ottoman peasants paid part of their taxes in cash. This should have implied that when they took the timar-holders’ grain to market, as they were obliged to do, they also sold other items, such as fruit or the products of rural crafts, in order to earn the money they would need for the tax collector’s next round. By establishing a new district center, the central government thus modified regional structure as well.\footnote{On regional trade and tax collection in north-central Anatolia, see Huri Islamoğlu-Inan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire. Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden, 1994).}

*The politics of region formation*

In a different fashion, the impact of political factors on the formation of regions, not of towns plus their hinterlands but of larger entities, has been explored by Klaus Kreiser.\footnote{Klaus Kreiser, “Über den Kernraum des Osmanischen Reiches,” in *Die Türkei in Europa . . .*, ed. by Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen, 1979), 53–63.} The latter had posed himself the question whether we can draw the limits of the Ottoman ‘core lands’ on a map. By ‘core lands’ he means the territory needed to support the central administration, the capital, and the army, at least under peacetime conditions. As a measure of a given province’s special significance to the Ottoman center, he has followed the example of Ömer Lütfi Barkan and studied the ultimate use to which provincial revenues were put.\footnote{Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “H. 933–934 (M. 1527–1528) mah yilına ait bir bütçe örneği”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi mecmuası* 15, 1–4 (1953–5), 251–57; see particularly p. 273.} For given the difficulties of transportation,
the Ottoman government attempted to secure the most indispensable supplies from places within reasonable distance from Istanbul. By contrast, the more outlying provinces either provided merely for their own defensive and administrative needs, or, in the case of Diyarbakır, for example, provincial revenues were used to pay garrisons in a yet more remote place such as Iraq. For the latter, as a border province, often must have cost more than could be supplied from local sources alone.

Another criterium which, in Kreiser’s perspective, may help us decide whether certain regions were in fact ‘indispensable’ to the Empire’s day-to-day functioning, is the location of those villages whose revenues had been assigned to Istanbul’s major sultanic foundations. Among the latter establishments, the complexes of Mehmed the Conqueror or Süleyman the Lawgiver figure most prominently. Kreiser has suggested that an analysis of the manner in which tax revenues were used by the Ottoman center on the one hand, and of the distribution of foundation lands on the other, allows us to arrive at more or less congruent results. The ‘core region’ of the Ottoman Empire included western as well as sections of central Anatolia in the east, and the Aegean seashore of Rumelia in the west. Important though Syria or Egypt might have been as sources of revenue, apparently they were not considered safe or conveniently located enough to finance the activities most crucial to the operation and legitimation of the Ottoman state.

Local powerholders

But from the late seventeenth century onwards, and especially in the fifty-year period from about 1775 to about 1825, the central administration presumably regarded its territory in a rather different light. An Ottoman official of that time probably did not view the Empire as divided into a stable set of regions, distinguished by the services they rendered to the central government. Rather, the Ottoman lands must have appeared as a congeries of domains controlled by different local powerholders. As long-term tax farmers, the latter were more or less legitimized by the Ottoman center. However, the territories these families controlled were not stable but rather shifted frequently, as families rose and fell and their places were taken by newcomers. These powerholders, known as ayan in Ottoman terminology, normally owed their positions to appointments on the part
of the central government, and the execution of all too powerful ayan was a frequent occurrence. Yet many magnate families for generations remained in the area where they once had become established. As a result, the region of Manisa and Izmir would have appeared, to an official of the eighteenth-century central administration, as the domain of the Karaosmanoğlu, or central Anatolia as a region where the Cebbarzade or Çapanoğulları were in control.

But in spite of the power and wealth of some of these families, which even permitted them to sponsor mosques and other public buildings, these men and women have left very few texts in which they speak in their own voices. In some cases, as in the chronicle of Panayos Skoutses, one of the more prominent people subjected to the domination of such an ayan has left his impressions. But even such cases are rare. We thus are obliged to refer to sources prepared by officials in the service of the central administration, many of which deal with conflictual situations. When a magnate had been killed, his goods and real estate were sold on behalf of the Ottoman treasury, and inventories prepared in the course of such proceedings constitute one of our most important sources. Yet such registers in all probability did not contain ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth’, as both the surviving family members and the recording officials had any number of reasons to produce only a truncated record. In addition, we possess appointment documents and correspondences with ayan expected to furnish soldiers or repair public buildings. As most magnates also held life-time tax farms—these revenue sources might indeed form the basis of their power—accounts of such tax farms will allow us a glimpse of the relevant family’s finances. In a few instances, the foundation deeds of mosques and other religious and charitable institutions also may survive. A few remarks in Ottoman chronicles may provide further clues and, if the kadi registers of the town in which the magnate in question resided have survived, there will be documents concerning one or the other court case. Apart from a few exceptions such as Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, who has left a wealth of documentation,

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47 For the recent literature on life-time tax farms’ integrative potential, compare the Introduction.
48 On the building activities of such a magnate family, see İnci Kuyulu, Kara Osman-oğlu ailesine ait mimari eserler (Ankara, 1992).
49 Compare the account by Johann Strauss in the present volume.
this is all that most historians of *ayan* power have at their disposal. Where *ayans* active in the Balkan peninsula are concerned, we may find reports by European consuls and/or travellers. These have to be used with a great deal of caution, to say the least, for the authors of these texts often saw themselves as championing the formation of a new state on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. A local magnate thus might be viewed as a potential king, with the author his putative advisor. Moreover, literary stereotypes current in much preromantic and romantic writing, such as that of 'the bloodthirsty oriental despot', further diminish the reliability of these sources. A recent attempt to interpret European texts of this kind using techniques of literary analysis, in my view only has demonstrated that, in spite of its limitations, the Ottoman material has more to offer to the historian.50 This relative lack of sources presumably explains why the number of monographs on individual notable or magnate families has remained so limited.51

Local powerholders became more prominent from the late seventeenth century onwards, yet today we are more aware of the survival of such families from earlier, sometimes even pre-Ottoman days, than was the case twenty or thirty years ago.52 While the rise of the *ayan* took place when Ottoman documentation was already quite substantial, the manner in which this process has been constructed by twentieth-century historians owes more to general historiographical currents than to the documents studied. In 1953 Traian Stoianovich, taking up ideas previously developed by Fernand Braudel, suggested that the rise of these notables, along with the concomitant deterioration of peasant status, was linked to grain exports to western Europe,

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50 Katherine E. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte. Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton, 1999). Even so however, European documents can be valuable, especially those concerning modest local figures. Above all, it is worth taking a closer look at texts which had not been written for publication. Such more private notes presumably contain fewer literary embellishments, and thus there is a better chance of encountering direct observations.

51 The documentation seems to be better for the Arab provinces than for the Balkans and Anatolia; at least that is the impression I have gained from Khoury, *Mosul* and similar works.

in other words, to what was later to be called the emerging European world economy. However, by the 1960s and 1970s, the thinking of eastern Europeanists on these issues changed substantially. Now it was assumed that Brandenburg, Russian and Bohemian nobilities were granted the right to enserf their respective peasantries not so much for economic reasons, but rather as a *quid pro quo* for the increasing taxes and services demanded by an ever growing state apparatus.

This line of thinking found favor among Ottomanist historians, who in the late 1970s and early 1980s dwelt upon the political origins of notable and magnate fortunes. Gilles Veinstein demonstrated that magnates could make a lot of money by interposing themselves between peasants and the market, while Halil İnalcık pointed out that control over the tax assessments of individual villages formed a significant source of many a notable's power. Moreover, Bruce McGowan argued that the dispossession of peasants by local power-holders could take place in regions without any contact to the European world economy. Notable and magnate fortunes thus were political in origin, and orientation towards the market, while common enough, was by no means essential.

But in addition to the genesis of the *ayan*, as a socio-political category, there are the institutional aspects of this phenomenon to be considered. These have been studied by Mustafa Cezar and Yücel Özkaya, but have not greatly interested scholars working on a broader synthesis of Ottoman eighteenth-century history. In my own perspective, this is rather a pity. For as a result, we have not to date really appreciated the importance of the institutional changes which the Ottoman ruling group initiated at the very end of the seventeenth century.

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54 However, the difficulty with this ‘political’ mode of explanation is that in Poland the peasantry was enserfed and the towns were largely emasculated, but no absolutism emerged: Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974), 195–220.
and the beginning of the eighteenth century. It has sometimes been claimed that the sultans and their advisors did not make use of the ‘breathing space’ which the Empire enjoyed between 1718 and 1768 for a thorough overhaul of its military structure.\(^{58}\) This may well be true in the military field; but in the realm of administration, the years between 1690 and 1725 saw a large number of new initiatives. Among the changes inaugurated during those years, we encounter a thorough reorganization of the passguards in charge of caravan security (derbendci) on the more dangerous roads, systematic attempts to settle nomads and the institution of life-time tax farms.\(^{59}\) In addition, the use, or maybe abuse, of the originally religious practice of the vow (nezir) in order to secure the submission of rebellious subjects, as well as the restructuring of cizye collection, fall into the same time period.\(^{60}\) Apparently the institution of one ayan for every district, selected by the powerful men of the locality but confirmed by the Ottoman administration, likewise formed part of this ‘package’ of administrative changes. Özkaya has pointed out that this official acceptance of local power was not a voluntary act, but forced upon the Ottoman central administration by circumstances; and about a century later, ayan power was in fact brutally reduced by Sultan Mahmud II.\(^{61}\) Yet for the time being, the centrally imposed apparatus of the governors and their henchmen on the one hand and that of the kadis on the other was balanced by a structure of local government based, in a fashion, upon provincial society.

Özkaya also has shown how the magnates and notables were able to take over the office of the şehir kethüdası, whose incumbents had, from the later sixteenth century if not earlier, represented the townsfolk in their negotiations with governors and tax collectors.\(^{62}\) Major

\(^{58}\) Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols., (Cambridge, 1977), vol. 1, 169, makes a similar remark, but referring to the seventeenth century: the respite provided by the victories of the Köprüli era had not been employed for a further restructuring of the Ottoman military.


advantages were in fact to be gained from recognition as a şehir kethüdası, mainly because the official ayan’s mediating role between government and taxpayers allowed him to accumulate both clients and cash. The importance of this factor becomes evident when we note how often local powerholders used force in order to gain public offices.⁶³

_Magnates of the Arab world_

Given the later formation of a national state in Anatolia which by far transcended the territory of any single magnate, however powerful, Turkish historiography never attempted to make such magnates into ‘national’ figures of heroic stature. Until very recently, Turkish historians normally identified with an abstract concept of ‘the state’ and to a lesser degree, with an equally abstract ‘people’. ‘State’ and ‘people’ typically were constructed as the victims, and in the case of the central state, also as the potential opponent of ‘usurping’ magnates. However, in the Arab world, it was for a while quite fashionable to see Ottoman provincial powerholders as the proto-rulers of certain national states, which were to form in this area only in the twentieth century.⁶⁴ Muhammad Ali, governor and later khedive of Egypt, was the personage who most easily lent himself to this interpretation. After all he briefly had formed a state which encompassed both Egypt and Syria, that is the traditional Mamluk territories. In addition, Muhammad Ali had organized an army superior to anything Sultan Mahmud II could muster and had tried to establish local industries in Egypt. And where the eighteenth century was concerned, the revival of Mamluk models in the building style of Cairo could be regarded as a resurgence of a hitherto dormant Egyptian ‘national identity’. As for the ‘Azm of Damascus, their role as governors, pilgrimage commanders and patrons of building also encouraged nationalist historians to regard them as

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⁶⁴ Due to my minimal knowledge of Arabic, this discussion of the Arab provinces is limited to the secondary literature in English and French, fortunately quite abundant. In spite of documentation available in the Istanbul archives, Turkish historians have been much less interested in the internal history of the Arab provinces.
proto-rulers of a Syrian national state. In the case of Lebanon, the originally Druze family known as the Shihab became Christian in the eighteenth century, and this change of religion in turn could be regarded as a gesture towards the ‘national unity’ of an as yet non-existent Lebanon.\(^{65}\)

As Rifa‘at Abou-El-Haj has demonstrated, this enterprise of discovering the ‘ancestors’ of twentieth-century national states in events and people of the past was only possible at the price of considerably distorting historical realities.\(^{66}\) Even more dangerously, such constructions often implied the notion that Arab civilization had remained static since the high middle ages, a strange congruence between the ideas of nationalists and those of old-fashioned Orientalists. For the most part however, eighteenth-century magnates were in the business of establishing or consolidating their hold over all territories within their reach. Usually they were indifferent to the language or religion of their subjects, and apart from a few, mainly Egyptian instances, these personages showed no evidence of having wanted to found states of their own. As to the political ties, largely mediated through tax farming, that continued to bind most ayan to the Ottoman center, we have already had occasion to discuss the relevant work of Ariel Salzmann and Dina Khoury.\(^{67}\)

*Localism but not proto-nationalism*

‘Localism’ implies that a given ruler originates from, or at least possesses strong ties to, the locality he administers, and that attempts by a remote center to control local politics be successfully resisted.\(^{68}\) In this limited sense, the ‘Azm in Damascus or the Jalili of Mosul certainly acted as ‘local powers’. On the other hand, the Ottoman

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\(^{67}\) Compare the Introduction.

\(^{68}\) Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 219, considers that a régime only can be regarded as localist if the interests of all members of the population are taken into consideration. This means that, in her understanding, localism is a political ideal, rather than something actually present in real life.
center was willing to tolerate such magnates as long as a minimum amount of taxes was paid, and major state concerns, such as the supplies and security of the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca, were taken care of. As for the degree to which these local powerholders really could withstand a determined attempt at interference on the part of the Ottoman center, this varied strongly according to the locality in question. Thus in the early nineteenth century, Mahmud II’s attempts at securing control over Anatolia or northern Iraq were quite effective, while Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt could only be prevented from seceding, and even from conquering Istanbul, by a massive British intervention.

However, apart from the ties between the Ottoman center and provincial magnates, there were other loyalties to be taken into consideration. No dynasty of whatever origin could hope to establish itself locally without gaining adherents among provincials possessing a degree of power, as well as financial resources and social capital. Such people might include ulema, garrison soldiers, nomad chieftains, or even churchmen in areas with substantial Christian populations. The means of cementing a family’s power, in an urban or regional context, included strategic marriage alliances, whose importance recently has been elucidated in Margaret Meriwether’s study of Aleppo.69 Providing employment in palaces and pious foundations might serve to tie at least some of the city’s poor to the notable family whose members had set up these establishments. Pious foundations, moreover, provided working spaces for craftsmen, who presumably could be counted upon to support their magnate landlords, provided the latter contented themselves with reasonable rents. A willingness to open one’s granaries and sell to the populace at affordable prices in times of scarcity must have cemented such loyalties even further, while the opposite behavior could lead to riots, which have been well studied in the case of Damascus.70

Moreover, whoever wished to exercise local power had to establish a working relationship with the Ottoman troops stationed in the major towns and fortresses. For the most part these were strongly entrenched. This applied not only to those units whose name (yer-liyya) already indicated such a local attachment, but also to those

regiments which supposedly were connected to the center.\footnote{Only in Algiers were Anatolian young men recruited for service in the local armed forces even in the eighteenth century.} In eighteenth century Egypt, these local troops competed for power with the political households set up by important men of varying backgrounds. Household members’ loyalty to their respective masters was cemented by the fact that the former were often manumitted slaves (Mamluks). According to the ethos of Egyptian upper class society, such Mamluks retained a life-long tie to the man who had established them in Egypt, having trained and later manumitted them.\footnote{Jane Hathaway, \textit{The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt. The Rise of the Qazdağlis} (Cambridge, 1997).}

It was possibly this special cohesion which, by the 1760s, permitted the ‘political households’ consisting of Mamluks to win out over the ‘ordinary’ troops (\textit{ocak}).\footnote{André Raymond, \textit{Le Caire des janissaires} (Paris, 1995).} From that time until the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt, this rich and productive province was governed by men of Mamluk background.

Magnates thus worked to manufacture local consensus and secure the loyalties of the key social groups of their respective regions. However, Schilcher’s study of Damascus, which we have already encountered in a different context, shows the limits of, in this particular instance, ‘Azm inclusiveness rather well.\footnote{Schilcher, \textit{Families in Politics}.} Not only did the governors issuing from this family neglect the interests of a whole group of traders, they also failed to accommodate the demands of some of the smaller tribal units displaced by the northward migration of the ‘Anayza. This turned out to be a costly failure, for it resulted in the catastrophic attack on the pilgrimage caravan of 1757. This latter event in turn led to the execution of a prominent representative of the ‘Azm family, and at least temporarily, greatly weakened the dynasty’s power.\footnote{Abdul-Karim Rafeq, \textit{The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783} (Beirut, 1970), 208–21; Karl Barbir, \textit{Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758} (Princeton, 1980), 97 ff.}

\textit{Cultural contacts, cultural identities}

Another issue which presents itself when we study ‘local consciousness’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century Arab world is the
manner in which individual Cairenes or Damascenes related to the
Ottoman center or neighboring provinces and how they viewed their
own status as Ottoman provincials. Given the scarcity of texts ema-
nating from even the most active magnates, these investigations con-
cern mainly Arabs with a medrese education. On the face of it, Arab
scholars should have had excellent career prospects in the Ottoman
judiciary; after all, they did not need to learn the basic rules of Ara-
bic which demanded so much time and effort from everyone else.
However, given the centrality of the Fatih and Suleymaniye medreses
for all those who hoped for a brilliant career in the Ottoman ilmiye,
this advantage was in reality nullified. Even the chief kadis of Cairo,
Damascus or Mecca came from the pool of jurists cum theologians
trained at the Ottoman center, so that only the judgeships of the
district courts officiating in the provincial towns and cities were avail-
able to local scholars. While this did not mean that the Azhar and
other centers of learning ceased to function, study at these institu-
tions did not give access to the highest positions in the Ottoman
ilmiye. Individual attempts to build a career in Istanbul could only
succeed if the candidate was able to develop strong patronage ties
at the outset of his active life. Such ties were, for instance, estab-
lished by Mustafa Naima, who arrived from Aleppo as a young man
to enter the baltaci corps of the Topkapi Palace and, probably, study
at the medrese of Sultan Bayezid II.76

Hala Fattah’s recent article on two eighteenth and nineteenth-
century travel accounts by Iraqi scholars has highlighted these issues.77
After having participated in a conference which was to respond to
Nadir Shah’s demand that the Shi’a be accepted as the fifth recog-
nized law school, the Baghdad scholar Abdullah al-Suwaidi (1692–
1761) went on the pilgrimage to Mecca and visited Damascus on
the way. He was hardly impressed by the local ulema, whom he con-
sidered to be immersed in worldly affairs. Moreover, while he was

77 Hala Fattah, “Representations of Self and the Other in two Iraqi Travelogues
I am much indebted to Werner Ende and Christoph Herzog, who have pointed
out this valuable article to me. Fattah’s study concentrates on the mid-nineteenth
century scholar al-Alusi, also from Baghdad, about whose life and circumstances
much more is known. His travelogue is pertinent to our purposes in so far as he
visited Istanbul, which al-Suwaidi did not do. However the Istanbul society he
describes is very much that of the Tanzimat, which is why I have attempted to
highlight his older contemporary.
himself a Sufi, al-Suwaidi professed to be repelled by the ‘exaggerated’ impact of Sufi shaykhs in the Syrian metropolis. All these negative impressions made al-Suwaidi inclined to view his home city, and the rectitude of his Baghdadi ulema colleagues, in the rosy light of nostalgia. In his latter-day colleague al-Alusi, who probably had become a victim of the Tanzimat government’s attempts to establish state control over pious foundations, this emphasis on a Baghdadi versus an Istanbul identity is even more pronounced. However, these strictures did not preclude a basic loyalty to the Ottoman sultan; presumably because such loyalty ‘went without saying’, neither al-Alusi nor al-Suwaidi is very explicit on this issue.

This relative mutual isolation of the Istanbul and Cairene or Damascene intellectual establishments may well have fostered strong local traditions of scholarship. Peter Gran has suggested that at the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a movement in Egypt of a kind which he has described as ‘enlightenment, Italian style’. By this he means an attempt to introduce rationalist tenets bit by bit, without openly challenging the religious framework unanimously accepted by the society in question. What lies behind these claims is an attempt to show that Mediterranean Europe and Egypt had not as yet seriously diverged even in the eighteenth century. This is a claim which I find inherently plausible; but its ramifications have not as yet been well investigated. We will have to know much more about the contacts between the scholarly worlds of Istanbul, Cairo and Damascus, as well as the disjunctures between these three centers, before we can move from hypotheses to valid generalizations.

A major desideratum: the history of Ottoman Anatolia

A bird’s eye overview of recent research, of the kind attempted here, somehow seems incomplete without a presentation of at least one of

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the major gaps in the literature. After all, this volume was put together in the hope that our readers may feel inclined to fill some of the lacunae in which our field still abounds. A real desideratum, in my view, is the history of Ottoman Anatolia. Even though this region has become the heartland of modern Turkey, the Ottoman period of Anatolia’s history has been much neglected. For a long time this important sub-field of Ottoman history remained the province of locally-based amateurs, although these sometimes were very gifted and energetic. Only in the 1960s with the work of Halil Inalcik, and also of Mustafa Akdağ, did university-based historians begin to concern themselves with Anatolian history, adopting a perspective which transcended purely local affairs.

This neglect of the Ottoman period in Anatolian history is all the more remarkable as Speros Vryonis’ book on the ‘decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor’ can be read as a general history of western and central Anatolia during the transition from Byzantine to Seljuk

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To a complete outsider just ‘looking in’ on the debate, there are several surprising features. First of all, the amount of emotion expended by Gran’s critics often appears disproportionate to the matter at issue; and as Adorno and Horkheimer have taught us, in such cases it is commendable to be suspicious. Secondly, the interview recently conducted by Ramadân al-Khulî and ‘Abd al-Râziq ‘İsa indicates that the ideas thrown out by Gran, now over twenty years ago, have not been tested since. In any case, neither the author himself nor his interlocutors refer to new studies which would either prove or disprove Gran’s claims—the author himself also seems unwilling to pursue this matter. In consequence, I would regard the issue as still open.


This is the place to pay tribute to the memories of two teachers active in the Aegean town of Manisa, namely Ibrahim Gökçen and especially Çağatay Uluçay. Between them, they not only saved the rich Manisa kadi registers from destruction, but also published a series of works on local history based on these sources, some scholarly and others directed at a more popular audience. Moreover Uluçay, probably in the context of a broadening interest in local history during the war years, sought and found people who could provide evidence on Istanbul buildings long since destroyed, thus recording much unique information which would otherwise have been lost. Compare M. Çağatay Uluçay, “İstanbul Sarayhanesi ve saraylarını dair bir araştırmâ”, Tarih dergisi 3, 5-6 (1951-52), 147-64.

or Ottoman rule. As the title indicates, Vryonis views this period from the standpoint of Byzantium and the Byzantinist community. In addition, Claude Cahen, a specialist in Seljuk and post-Seljuk history, has covered the same period of Anatolian history, namely, the eleventh to fifteenth centuries.\footnote{Speros Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971); Claude Cahen, *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, 2nd revised ed. (Istanbul, 1988).} We also possess a considerable number of studies covering individual sub-provinces, in addition to even more numerous works on individual towns and their respective hinterlands. There are also a few studies of broad topics such as nineteenth century manufacturing, which to a large extent, focus on Anatolia.\footnote{On towns: Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*. In addition, Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge, 1993), strongly emphasizes Anatolian developments. In part this is due to the fact that by the second half of the nineteenth century a large part of the Balkan peninsula was no longer in Ottoman hands.} It should thus be a challenge to future researchers to pull these different strands together in a comprehensive history.

However, there are serious problems of documentation, particularly regarding the eastern provinces. For as we have seen, western and to a degree central Anatolia formed part of the Ottoman ‘core lands’. On the other hand, large sections of eastern Anatolia until the early nineteenth century were controlled by princes who acknowledged the overlordship of the Ottoman sultans, but were permitted to run their territories without too much involvement on the part of the central government. As a result, less documentation was produced than in those provinces where the central power was regularly present. In addition, the wars with imperial Russia during the nineteenth century, to say nothing of the disturbances which accompanied and followed World War I, have led to the destruction of numerous sources. With the fortunate exception of Gaziantep, the kadi registers, the ‘provincial’ historian’s meat and drink, have survived for the pre-nineteenth century period only in scattered fragments and in a few places.

In consequence, it may be best to begin with a synthetic treatment merely of Anatolia’s western and central parts, that is, the Ottoman provinces of Anadolu, Karaman and Rum, for these provinces formed part of the Ottoman ‘core region’, and their taxes financed conquests on the European and Iranian frontiers. Taxes to the cen-
tral administration and dues to pious foundations established in the capital, but also deliveries of grain, honey, ropes and sailcloth demanded by Palace and Arsenal all needed to be recorded in files and registers. Therefore, Anadolu, Karaman and Rum occur frequently in tax documents of all kinds, but also in the financial accounts of pious foundations and of course in kadi registers and collections of sultanic rescripts. And once the groundwork has been laid, it will hopefully become feasible to enlarge the scope of such a study by including the provinces of Diyarbakır, Zülkadiye and Erzurum, even if it will not always be possible to treat these regions in as much detail as their western counterparts.

In conclusion: toward a history of provincial powerholders

Research concerning Ottoman provincial history has, as we have seen, moved along two more or less separate paths. Working with approaches originally developed by regional planners and economic geographers, one set of studies has discussed the formation of economic and political regions. In all likelihood, a flagging interest on the part of social scientists in the concept of the 'region' will discourage most Ottomanists from pursuing this line in the future. But from the 1970s to the early 1990s, our understanding of Ottoman political and economic structure has, in my view, been much advanced by this approach.

At the present date, we seem to have returned to a line of research which goes back far in time, namely ultimately to the comments of the nineteenth-century statesman and historian Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. For as Yücel Özkaya has reminded us, it was Ahmed Cevdet who almost a hundred and fifty years ago, already attempted to make generalizations about Ottoman ayan.83 To put it differently, we are looking at the means by which political power was built up in Ottoman provinces; as we have seen, official appointments as deputy tax collectors of one sort or another normally constituted the starting point of this process. Currently it seems that the study of the Arab provinces has progressed more rapidly than that of Rumelia and Anatolia. This is partly due to the greater abundance of locally

83 Özkaya, Ayantik, 109, 115.
produced sources both archival and narrative, especially in Syria and Egypt. But quite possibly the search for a ‘usable past’ in the various Arab states, in spite of all the distortions and anachronisms which will not be discussed here, has had the advantage of attracting a large number of scholars to the problems connected with seventeenth and eighteenth-century decentralization. In the end, it is both the synergy and the competition between a sizeable number of scholars which produces optimal results.

At the same time, we can now regard the institutionalization of eighteenth-century *ayan* as part and parcel of a broader set of changes. In the middle of the crisis precipitated by the Austrian war of 1683–1699, the Ottoman administration of course sought to maximize revenues, but also to strengthen control over provincial subjects. Yet the ‘classical’, sixteenth-century method of securing this aim, namely leaving behind low-income *timar*-holders to guard provincial revenue sources, was probably no longer of much use in the years around 1700. Thus new techniques of power were devised; nomads were to be induced to settle, not only because peasants were better taxpayers, but also because people on the move were more difficult to control. New fortified khans were constructed, and the privileged passguards responsible for closing the passes in times of unrest and rebellion were placed under a clear hierarchy of command.\(^84\) Moreover, the Ottoman administration also attempted to control more closely even those nomads who still were allowed to continue their former way of life. For as a study by Yusuf Halacoğlu has demonstrated, there were numerous attempts to make nomads follow prescribed routes, with severe penalties to be paid by those who contravened the central government’s rulings.\(^85\)

Yet at the same time, this eighteenth-century centralization also implied an element of negotiation with provincial powerholders. This phenomenon is particularly obvious in the case of nomads who were induced—at least temporarily—to settle down. Here bargaining with tribal leaders and the appointment of these men to official positions often preceded the settlement process. Sometimes the interests of the

\(^84\) It is apparent from Orhonlu, *Derbend, passim* that even though the institution of the passguards is well known from sixteenth-century tax registers, documents detailing the *derbend*’s organizational structure mainly date from the eighteenth-century.

ordinary tribesmen indeed must have been sacrificed to those of the dignitaries. But negotiation is also apparent when villagers, townsmen and nomads were to made to vow the payment of large sums of money if agreements concluded under the auspices of the central administration were not abided by. Kadís, tribal dignitaries and villagers all participated in this process. However, the most obvious example of such negotiations was surely the election and official acceptance of district ayan. By authorizing this procedure, the central government at least temporarily accepted that control over provincial society could only be maintained by seeking the cooperation of local tax farmers and dues collectors.

What is sorely missing to date is the story of ayan power and the magnates’ eventual fall as seen from the viewpoint of these provincial figures themselves. Possibly the writings of certain servitors and associates of these prominent men will shed light on these issues in the future. Although the interaction between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies is one of the oldest research topics in Ottomanist historiography, quite a few discoveries remain to be made.

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86 For an example of the preferential treatment reserved for the boy beyleri and their relatives, see Orhonlu, İskân tesebbüsü, 55.
87 However, this did not mean that the administration was attempting to integrate merchants into the political system. Given the expansion of trade in the first half of the eighteenth-century, this omission is worth noting. As we have seen, the more prominent ayan were not often of merchant background, and if they were, their commercial identities soon were submerged in their roles as tax farmers.
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