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SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1939–1946

HITLER'S EUROPE

EDITED BY

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(Both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)

AND

VERONICA M. TOYNBEE

'... Man, proud man,
Dress'd in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most asur'd,
. . . . . . . . . like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As make the angels weep.'

Measure for Measure

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EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE THREE WORLD MAPS
The object of these maps is to visualize the change in the shape of the arena of international affairs during and since the Second World War.

Down to 1940 the arena of international affairs was still, for practical purposes, the flat oblong shape that it had been since the beginning of history. Admiral King’s achievement of conducting naval operations across the whole breadth of the Pacific transformed this oblong into a continuous belt by sewing together the two ends. The conquest, since then, of the air over the North Pole has expanded this circular belt round the globe, which still had a northern as well as a southern edge, into three-quarters of a sphere, with no edge left to it except one round a still untraversable South Polar circle.

As a result, each of the two surviving Power-groups is now threatened by the other surviving Power-group on three fronts, east, west, and north, whereas before 1940 no Power was ever threatened on more than two fronts, and even this only happened to a ‘central’ Power, such as France was in the sixteenth century and Germany from 1871 to 1945.

This change in the ‘geo-political’ map is a first-class revolution in international affairs. It is so revolutionary, and has come so suddenly, that it is not easily grasped or taken into account. The purpose of these maps is to make the new shape of the human race’s habitat visible to the eye.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE

Authorization has been obtained for all major quotations, and full reference to the book, the author, and the publisher has been given in a footnote in each case under the first mention of the work.
ABBREVIATIONS

USED IN THE TEXT AND FOOTNOTES

Bor


Ciano: Diario (1939-43)


Ciano: Europa, and Eng. version


CLN

Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale: clandestine Italian Committee of National Liberation.

Cmd. 6600


Cmd. 6662


DAF

Deutsche Arbeitsfront: German Labour Front.

DNB

Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro: German news agency owned by the Ministry of Propaganda.

DNSAP

Dansk National Socialistiske Arbejder Parti: pro-German organization in occupied Denmark.

Duguit, Monnier & Bonnard


EAM


Economic Controls in Nazi Germany

U.S.A., Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch: Civil Affairs Handbook: Germany: Section 2 T: Government and Administration: Economic Controls in Nazi Germany.

EDES

Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos: Greek Democratic National League, an association of republican politicians, founded in Athens in the autumn of 1941.

Effects of Strategic Bombing

U.S.A., Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Economic Effects Division: The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, October 31, 1945.

EKKA

Ethniki Koinoniki Apeleftherosis: National and Social Liberation [Greek], a resistance organization of intellectuals.

ELAS

Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos: National People's Liberation Army [Greek]; EAM guerrilla forces.
ABBREVIATIONS


F.I. Front de l’Indépendance: union of Belgian clandestine resistance groups, ultimately dominated by the Communists.


Four Fighting Years Czechoslovakia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Four Fighting Years (London, Hutchinson for the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1943).


Gestapo Geheime Staatspolizei: German secret state police.


I.L.O. International Labour Office, Geneva. (In 1940 the Office's principal working centre was transferred to Montreal, and in 1948 was reassembled at Geneva.)


KKE Kommunistikon Komma Ellados: Communist Party of Greece, founded in 1918.

Kleist Peter Kleist: Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 1939–1945 (Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1950).


Mein Kampf; tr. Murphy Adolf Hitler: Mein Kampf, 2 vols. in 1, 41st impression (Munich, NSDAP, 1933); Mein Kampf, trans. James Murphy, 2 vols. in 1 (London, Hurst & Blackett, 1939).


AABBREVIATIONS

NDZ Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger: News Service of German Newspaper Publishers—subsidiary of DNB.


NSB Nationaal Socialistische Beweging: pro-German organization in occupied Holland, led by Mussert.

NSDAP Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei: National Socialist German Workers’ Party—the Nazi Party.

NSKK Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer Korps: Nazi Party motor corps.


OKH Oberkommando des Heeres: High Command of the German army.

OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: High Command of the German armed forces.

PEEA Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftheroseos: Political Committee for National Liberation [Greek]; provisional government set up by EAM in March 1944.


P.P.F. Parti Populaire Français, a French party on fascist lines, founded by the ex-Communist Doriot in 1936.


REX Flemish nationalist organization in Belgium, headed by Léon Degrelle.

SA Sturmbteilung: Nazi Party storm-troopers.

SD Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service): the police organization of the Nazi Party.


Sipo Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police): a German state organization, which comprised the Gestapo (secret state police) and the Reichskriminalpolizei, or Kripo (the national criminal police).

SS Schutzstaffel (Defence Echelon): selected group from the SA. The Waffen-SS was a military contingent.


Transoscan German radio news agency, largely intended for foreign consumption.
ABBREVIATIONS

UNRRA
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

U.S. Manual 356–2L
United States of America, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch: Civil Affairs Handbook, Germany. Section 2L: German Military Government over Europe: The Protectorate of Bohemia–Moravia (Headquarters Army Service Forces, 14 April 1944).

U.S. Military Tribunals

This transcript is not published. A selective version in 15 volumes, which contains some of the material referred to in this volume, is in process of publication:


VDB
Volksdeutsche Bewegung: pro-Nazi organization in Luxembourg.

Verdinaso
Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen: Flemish fascist movement in Belgium.

Verfügungen
Germany, Partei-Kanzlei: Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben (Munich, Zentralverlag der NSDAP [no date]).

VNV
Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond: organization of Flemish nationalists in Belgium.

Weh
Albert Weh: Das Recht des Generalgouvernements, 3rd edition (Cracow, Verlag des Instituts für deutsche Ostarbeit, 1941).

Wuorinen

NOTE

British Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) are cited in footnotes in the form suggested in the bound volumes of the Official Reports, preceded by the date (if not given in the text) and followed by the column number, e.g.

(for the House of Commons)


(for the House of Lords)

INTRODUCTION

By ARNOLD TOYNBEE

The present volume of the History of the Second World War in the Survey series has been given the title of 'Hitler's Europe' advisedly, because the facts testify that Hitler's personality was the key both to the amazing establishment and to the still more amazing collapse of the Third German Reich's short-lived domination over the rest of the European peninsula of the continent of Asia. This temporary enslavement of Europe by Germany was Hitler's personal achievement; and Germany's swift loss of her conquests—which was even more extraordinary than her swift achievement of them—was due to Hitler's personal inability to reap for Germany a harvest that had been ripened by the magic of his personal gifts.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Germany was well placed and well equipped for dominating the rest of Europe. She now occupied the central position in Europe that France had occupied before the centre of European population and production had shifted eastwards in the second half of the nineteenth century. In continental Europe early-twentieth-century Germany was the most highly industrialized country, with the largest fund of technologically skilled man-power. Indeed, in this half century her industrial potential was greater than that of any other country in the world with the single exception of the United States; and Germany could possibly have raised herself up to, and perhaps even above, the level of the United States' industrial potency if, without prematurely falling into war with the United States, she had managed to reinforce her own massive national economy by integrating with it the economies of all the adjacent continental territories that were actually under her domination on the eve of the United States' entry into the Second World War.

On planes of economic action that were out of Hitler's sight—the financial plane, for instance—considerable progress towards an integration of Hitler's Europe was in fact duly achieved by German technical ability even within the short period 1940-5; and some progress was also made towards the integration of the employment of labour and industrial plant thanks to the abilities of a Sauckel and a Speer, though on these planes the efficiency of the German technicians was hamstrung by Hitler's resistance to their efforts. This resistance of Hitler's to the harvesting, by German technical prowess, of the opportunities of aggrandizement for Germany that Hitler's own gifts had brought within Germany's reach was undoubtedly one of the most effective causes of the collapse of Hitler's European edifice—and of Bismarck's German edifice along with it in the same grand catastrophe.
The measure of the extent to which Hitler thus sabotaged his predecessors' and his own handiwork may be gauged by imagining one of the historic master-empire-builders standing in Hitler's shoes on the morrow of the fall of France or, for that matter, on the morrow of the agreements made at Munich. If Hitler's cards had been in the hands, not of Hitler, but of Augustus or Han Liu Pang or Cyrus, what might the thoroughbred man of genius not have made of them? Assuredly he would have fashioned out of Hitler's Europe an oecumenical empire that would have lasted for at least four centuries after the founder's own day. Even Napoleon—who resembled Hitler in lacking Augustus's moderation, though he was, of course, poles apart from Hitler in the Caesarean height of his powers—might perhaps have steered his empire clear of the rocks of Moscow and Waterloo if he had held all the cards that Hitler held in October 1938 and in June 1940. For Napoleon, unlike Hitler, could reap some harvest from his conquests in virtue of knowing how to present himself to his non-French subjects not simply as a conqueror and an exploiter but also as a bringer of precious administrative and cultural gifts and therefore in some sense as a liberator. Napoleon's Polish lancers fought for him to the last, and he received his apotheosis in the German Jew Heine's Buch Le Grand.

It lay similarly within Hitler's power to win the devotion, not of the Poles, but of the Ukrainians, and to be glorified, not by the Jews, but by Russian Christians and bourgeois whom he might have brought up again out of the catacombs into the light of day in a beneficent harrowing of a Communist hell. But such large-minded Napoleonic deeds were quite beyond Hitler's moral and intellectual range.

Though Hitler and Napoleon were not native-born sons of the countries over which they made themselves dictators, each of them reflected his adopted country's traditional attitude in his policy towards subject peoples. Napoleon took over an un-Corsican eighteenth-century and seventeenth-century French tradition of being a culture-bearer as well as a conqueror; Hitler took over an un-Austrian Prussian tradition of finding no pleasure in the acquisition of power without savouring this by tasting blood. It gave Hitler no satisfaction to establish his ascendancy over foreign peoples unless he could make them rue it by knocking them on the head; and, rather than forgo this tincine pleasure, he would forfeit all chance of winning their good will and securing their co-operation. Hitler could never have brought himself to emulate Napoleon's stroke of trying to win the loyalty of his Italian subjects by crowning himself with the iron crown of Lombardy. In Hitler's Europe the Italians were, in theory, not conquered provincials, but equal partners with the Germans in a Rome–Berlin Axis; yet Hitler's only idea of how to deal with these nominal allies of his was to use Germany's overwhelmingly superior power and efficiency in order to reduce the Italians to the status, de facto, of Germany's subjects; and the Italians' resentment
INTRODUCTION

and alarm at German domination played its part, side by side with the Anglo-American invasion of Italy, in precipitating the half-successful Italian anti-Fascist revolution and break-away from the Axis in 1943. *A fortiori*, Hitler indulged in the Prussian pleasure of offensively asserting his domination over satellite states and conquered peoples. The only conquered country towards which he showed for a time some rudiments of consideration and forbearance was Vichy France; and his motive here was the obvious one of inducing the Vichy Government’s representatives in the French overseas empire, which was inaccessible to Hitler himself, to refrain from throwing in their lot with the Fighting French and their English-speaking allies. A military occupation of Vichy France was his immediate retort to the Allies’ landings in French North-West Africa.

Hitler’s ideal (founded on his persistent illusion that the war would be a short and a light one) was that ‘the German alone should bear arms’; and the combination of this ideal of a German ‘Herrenvolk’ with his demagogic reluctance (springing from the same fundamental misconception of the character of the war) to mobilize German man-power to the full, or to mobilize German woman-power at all, had depleted his fighting force by the time when his need for troops was becoming desperate. In the last stages of the war he did consent to eke out German military manpower on a considerable scale by impressing into the ranks prisoners of war belonging to the non-Great Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union and by accepting the military services of ‘collaborators’ in the conquered countries who were aware that, if the Nazis’ heads fell, their own heads would fall too. But Hitler never persuaded—and never sought to persuade—any one of the nominally allied or liberated peoples in his Europe that its own national interest was identical with the German people’s. No Ukrainian counterpart of Napoleon’s faithful Polish henchman Poniatowski ever came forward to preach bona fide to his people that, in fighting for the preservation of Hitler’s Europe, they would be fighting for their own national cause; and Rosenberg’s efforts to win the Ukrainians to this idea were defeated by Hitler’s determination to treat all non-Germans in his Europe as creatures existing merely to be exploited to serve German ends.

Hitler was, in fact, a commonplace mind and a vulgar character that had been endowed, by a *lusus Naturae*, with an inordinate measure of the narrowly circumscribed gifts of the demagogue and the trickster; and, when these gifts thrust an empire into his hands, they did not tell him what to do with it. His inspiration here seems to have been limited to two ideas that were both narrow-minded and narrow-hearted. He would annex to the German Reich the maximum amount of conquered territory that there was any prospect of his being able to assimilate. The rest of his Europe—

1 ‘Nur der Deutsche soll Waffen tragen’: see below, p. 79 and note 6.
INTRODUCTION

Allies, satellites, and conquered peoples alike—he would reduce to a servile, and in the lowest categories to a sub-human, status in a swollen German Reich’s European colonial empire.

Direct annexations were the only changes in the political conditions of Hitler’s Europe in which Hitler himself showed an interest. For example, in proposals outlined at a conference at Göring’s headquarters on 19 June 1940, on the morrow of the fall of France, it was announced to be ‘the Führer’s will’ that

Luxembourg shall be incorporated in the German Reich and that Norway shall come to Germany. Alsace-Lorraine will be morticed into the German Reich, and an independent Breton state shall be set up. Tentative plans are also on the stocks relating to Belgium, to the special treatment of the Flemings there, and to the setting up of a Burgundian state.¹

The new Franco-German frontier was to include in Germany, not merely Alsace-Lorraine, but also further slices of north-eastern and northern France.² There was a plan³ for ‘germanizing’ within ten years certain territories—Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, Styria, Bialystok—that were to be placed under a Chief of Civil Administration. According to a German Foreign Ministry memorandum of 3 October 1942,⁴ Hitler, on the eve of the turning of the tide against him in the war, was laying it down that Denmark must ‘become a German province’. Proposals for cutting up a still unslaughtered Russian bear’s skin had been put forward by Hitler at a conference held on 16 July 1941.⁵ Galicia was to become a Reichsgebiet; the Baltic republics were to become an integral part of Greater Germany; the Crimea, the Volga German district, and Baku were to become Reich territory.

This exclusive concern of Hitler’s with the territorial aggrandizement of his Reich worked for his defeat in the war by precluding all possibility of Germany’s national war efforts being reinforced by any voluntary support from any of the non-German peoples in Hitler’s Europe. A second cause of Hitler’s defeat was an administrative and organizational chaos which the triumph of National-Socialism had let loose in the Third Reich and which spread into Hitler’s Europe in the wake of the German conquests in the Second World War.

² Ibid. xxxvii. 222 (513–F).
³ See ibid. p. 220.
INTRODUCTION

In the Hitlerian Revolution the principal existing secular institutions in Germany—the Länder, the political parties, the trade unions, and the rest—had been ruthlessly liquidated on the pretext that these were intolerable impediments to the monolithic unity which it was the Führer’s mission to bestow upon the German people; but the more or less harmonious and fruitful variety of the old order that had been swept away had been replaced, in fact, not by national unity but partly by an anarchy and partly by a vacuum.

As in the western provinces of the Roman Empire in the fifth century of the Christian Era the complex structure of the Diocletianic imperial régime had been supplanted by an Ishmaelitish struggle between Goth, Sueve, Vandal, Burgundian, and Frankish war-bands that now roamed over a fallen civilization’s derelict domain, perpetually clashing with one another and incessantly exploiting their ex-Roman subjects, so, among the ruins of the Second Reich and of the adjoining European states which the Nazis liquidated one after another, the old articulation of society was replaced by a frantic competition between the SS and other upstart gangs of neo-barbarians whose feuds with one another were not the less fierce or the less poisonous on account of the uniform Nazi badge that was worn by all these rival heirs of the old Germany and the old Europe. This inter-Nazi struggle for power round the steps of the Führer’s throne was carried on shamelessly and recklessly down to the last moment of the Third Reich’s fight for existence against the overwhelming coalition that it had rallied against itself by successive flagrant acts of aggression. A reader of the present volume will be able to judge for himself the amazing extent to which this Nazi domestic discord contributed to the victory of Germany’s adversaries by breaking the edge of the German war effort. Throughout the war every prominent member of Hitler’s barbarian comitatus was waging with one hand a more vigorous war against his adversaries on the home front than he was leaving himself the energy to wage against the British, Russians, and Americans. And as for the Führer, under whose nose this fatal domestic warfare was being conducted, either he was unaware of what was going on or else he chose to ignore it—whether because he did not appreciate its baleful effect on his chances of winning his own war or because he had learnt by experience that the surest way for him to avoid being devoured himself by his pack of wolves was to connive at their devouring one another.

While chaos thus reigned in Hitler’s Germany and Hitler’s Europe on the political and administrative planes—and eventually on the military plane too, as Himmler’s power waxed and the professional soldiers’ power waned—the organization of Germany’s resources, and the planning of her policy, on the economic plane—on which Hitler had perforce to

1 See Survey for 1933, pp. 139–52.
give a freer hand to experts because economics were above his and his fellow-gangsters’ heads—were disastrously handicapped by Hitler’s demagogic reluctance to be convinced that he could not avoid losing the war if he would not impose a total mobilization on the German people.

Hitler’s obstinate refusal to sanction the mobilization of all the means at his command was perhaps the most extraordinary of all the self-inflicted causes of his defeat. In the summer of 1942, when Hitler’s Europe stood at its maximum extent, the area dominated by the armed forces of the Third Reich stretched from the continental European shore of the Atlantic to the north-western end of the Caucasus, and from the North Cape to the Libyan Desert. The aggregate potential resources of this vast area were very great; and if a statistician had been asked to estimate what Germany’s control of them would enable her to achieve in her struggle with her opponents—even at a date when these included the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the states members of the British Commonwealth—he might reasonably have reported, on a review of the material facts and figures, that a Power commanding so substantial a proportion of the total resources of the contemporary world could never be brought to the ground by any counter-coalition, even if the assets in its hand should prove insufficient to enable the holder of them to defeat and conquer the rest of the world now that it was united in arms against him.

Any such forecast was, of course, totally confuted by the historical event which, within three years of the date at which Hitler’s power stood at its zenith, saw the German armies expelled from all their conquests, Germany herself invaded and overrun by the armies of her adversaries, and the German Government compelled to dissolve itself in an unconditional surrender. This striking confutation of a statistical forecast that might have been not unreasonable if material facts had been the only relevant consideration was, of course, the work of political and psychological factors that could not be expressed in statistical terms.

The chapter on Labour in the Economic Part of the present volume brings out the amazing fact that Hitler’s Reich—which had been created for aggression, and which had repudiated every virtue and shrunken from no crime in its determination to make sure that its cold-blooded designs should succeed—nevertheless allowed itself to lose the war without ever having fully mobilized—if the test of full mobilization was the degree of mobilization achieved in Great Britain after the fall of France.

In the nineteen-thirties, when Hitler was making his preparations for launching an aggressive war, he could not be persuaded to arm ‘in depth’, though he was contemplating the possibility that his attacks on small countries might bring Great Powers into the field against him before he had achieved his war aims. This impolicy caused misgivings to his professional military advisers; for the clear lesson of the First World War for
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Germany was the improvidence of assuming that an intended war was bound to be a short one, just because Germany was going to choose the time and place for delivering her blow, and had accumulated in advance a sufficient stock of munitions and of first-line troops to give her, on paper, the means of making this first blow a decisive one. On the eve of Hitler’s launching of a Second World War there was nothing in the international situation to assure him that the history of the First World War would not repeat itself in this respect. Above all, he could not be sure that, before Germany had overcome the resistance of all her victims in Europe, German aggression would not provoke, once again, the intervention of the United States—whose war potential would certainly again ensure Germany’s defeat if and when it was once again mobilized against her. Yet Hitler could not or would not think of a Hitlerian war except in terms of a Hitlerian political coup carried out by military means; and the military equivalent of the political coups by which Hitler had reoccupied the Rhineland, annexed Austria, and broken and subjugated Czechoslovakia, would be a Blitzkrieg in which novel weapons and tactics, employed with audacity, would bring Germany’s victims to their knees before there could be time for the full war potential on either side to be brought into play in a war of attrition.

Hitler persisted in thinking of the Second World War in these ‘smash and grab’ terms of the burglar’s profession even after the war had been twice lengthened—first, against Hitler’s will, through his failure to win the Battle of Britain, and then through his deliberate assault upon the Soviet Union. On each of these two occasions he seems still to have expected to win a decisive victory as quickly and as cheaply as he had won it in the Battle of France. On 1 January 1941, in an Order of the Day to the Wehrmacht, he predicted ‘the completion of the greatest victory’ in German history; on 3 October 1941 he declared in a public speech in the Sportpalast in Berlin that Bolshevism was now crushed and that its final liquidation would be only a matter of time; and, even after the winter of 1941–2 had left the Soviet Union still in the field and had brought the United States into it, Hitler’s economic and political advisers failed to persuade him to set about fully mobilizing the resources of the Lebensraum which the German armies had occupied until a stage of the war had been reached at which the fullest possible mobilization could no longer avail to save Germany from defeat.

In particular, Hitler was very late in agreeing to anything like a general mobilization of man-power, and he never drew on the potential human resources of the female half of the population in the great area under his control. When, after the fall of France, Great Britain was at last mobilizing in earnest, there was a saying current among the military authorities in the United Kingdom that Britain would redress the disparity in numbers
between herself and Germany by mobilizing her women. The writer remembers the annoyance that he used to feel at the time when this recipe for winning the war was propounded to him. It seemed to him cold comfort, because he took it for granted that Germany had long since put in train the mobilization of her woman-power with all the thoroughness of the German temperament and all the ruthlessness of a totalitarian government that lived for making wars and winning them. As far as he could see, the mobilization of woman-power would leave the relative strengths of Great Britain and Germany as they were, while increasing the absolute superiority in numbers of the Power commanding the larger population. It never occurred to him that Great Britain would be the first of the two to mobilize her women, and still less that Germany would look on while Great Britain made this addition to her mobilized strength without attempting to do likewise. Indeed, it was not till he read the draft of Part II of the present volume that he realized that, in 1940, ‘the damned fools’ had been ‘right’ in their apparently fatuous assumption that they were going to redress the balance by mobilizing the British women without defeating their purpose by provoking Germany into following suit.

In the course of the three years ending in May 1942 the total civilian German labour force was actually allowed to decrease by nearly 4 million; and, in order to make good this deficit, the Hitlerian régime was content to import foreign male labour from countries now under Germany’s domination, instead of applying the radical remedies of drastically reallocating the employment of the German male labour that had not been drafted into the army, and putting in hand a large-scale mobilization of German women. There was an actual decrease during this period in the total number of women in the civilian labour force in Germany; there were only temporary and sectional increases in the length of the working week; and not only down to this date but throughout the war Germany’s industrial plant continued to be operated for the most part by single-shift working, instead of being kept running right round the clock for twenty-four hours in the day. In March 1942 Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary for Labour Allocation with almost unlimited power over the recruitment, utilization, and allocation of labour, but at this stage, when the war with Russia was falsifying Hitler’s expectations by dragging on, the German armed forces were requiring increased numbers of German men who were only procurable at the expense of German industry—and this at the very time when industrial production needed not only to be maintained but to be greatly increased in view of the Soviet Union’s continuance in the war and the United States’ entry into it.

This signal failure of the Hitlerian régime to mobilize either the woman-power or even the man-power that was at its disposal was reflected in the history of Germany’s war-time armaments production. This was actually
allowed to decrease after the invasion of the Soviet Union, in the expectation that the war with Russia would be a short one for which the stocks in hand would be sufficient. Between February and July 1942 the production of armaments was raised by 55 per cent. through an increase in the efficiency of the use of the resources in labour, materials, and plant already allocated to the armaments industries. The Stalingrad disaster at the close of 1942 made it impossible any longer to ignore the need for a fundamental change in Germany’s economic policy; but it was now too late. The opportunity to provide, after all, for ‘defence in depth’ by broadening the industrial basis of Germany’s war economy had now been lost. Labour and materials could no longer be spared for projects that would not give immediate returns, and, in her subsequent losing battle against an inexorably approaching defeat, Germany remained the prisoner of Hitler’s fortunately fatal conception of the war as a ‘stunt’ in which the fruits of an all-out effort were to be culled, without ever making the all-out effort, by the brilliant use of a trickster’s audacity and slight of hand.

In these adverse, and in fact really hopeless, circumstances, Speer, who was appointed Minister for Armaments and Munitions in February 1942, achieved notable results. Yet, even at this desperate stage of the war, Speer made little headway in his efforts to reduce the output of civilian consumers’ goods—and this largely owing to Hitler’s invincible unwillingness to endanger his demagogic hold upon his public by bringing home to them the seriousness of their plight through sanctioning measures for the curtailment of civilian expenditure. In producing his results, Speer therefore had to concentrate on making the fullest productive use of existing reserves of tools and equipment at the disposal of the German armaments industries, and on measures of rationalization; and by these means he managed, in spite of having one hand tied behind his back, to produce a constant rise in armaments production until the autumn of 1944, when the peak was reached. Considering how large a part of her temporarily acquired foreign resources Germany had already lost by that date, and how severely she was now being bombed at home, Speer’s feat must be considered remarkable; but, by the time it had been achieved, it was already clear that it was labour lost; for by then the shortage of raw materials—which had been hanging all the time, like a sword of Damocles, over Hitler’s neck—was making itself felt with a vengeance, and its effect was now being clinched by a catastrophic falling off in Germany’s manufacturing capacity. In fact, by the autumn of 1944 it was already clear that, on every account, Germany would find herself unable to carry on the war for many months longer.

Thus Hitler lost his Europe by the cumulative effect of three major failures to take patently necessary action. He would not mobilize his Europe’s war potential to anything approaching its full capacity; he would
not stamp out the domestic warfare between rival Nazi gangs; and he would not make a bid for winning the voluntary co-operation of any of his allies, satellites, or subjects by treating them as human beings who had a right to consideration for their own sake. The verdict of history on Hitler's downfall was *quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*. The lesson for the peoples who had endured the tribulations of a Second World War rather than resign themselves to being a Nazi Germany's slaves was that, in spite of Hitler's overthrow, some such hateful servitude was the price for political unification that they would nevertheless still have to pay to some other abominable dictator if they did not unite voluntarily in an atomic age in which mankind was bound in the last resort to purchase unity at any price as the only alternative to self-annihilation.
PART I

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF HITLER’S EUROPE

By Clifton J. Child

(i) Germany, 1939–45

(a) The Consolidation of Political Power in Preparation for War

By the time that Hitler launched his attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 the concentration of power in the hands of the National Socialist Party in Germany was virtually complete. Much of the ‘co-ordination’ (Gleichschaltung) of German political life had indeed been accomplished during the first twelve months of the National Socialist régime. By the Enabling Act—or so-called ‘Law for the Protection of People and State’—of 24 March 1933¹ the well-known Führerprinzip, by which the Nazi Party itself had from the beginning been governed, had been substituted for the principle of majority rule, and legislative power had been transferred (in the main) from the Reichstag to the Reich Cabinet, which now had authority, in making laws, to deviate from both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. By the ‘Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State’ of 1 December 1933² the Nazi Party had become the sole ‘bearer of the concept of the State’, inseparable from the state, while the Führer’s Deputy and the Chief of Staff of the Sturmabteilung (SA) had become members of the Reich Government ‘in order to secure the close co-operation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public authorities’. Finally, by the ‘Reconstruction Law’ of 30 January 1934³ the process of centralization (sometimes described by the Nazis as Verreichlichung), which neither Bismarck nor the framers of the Weimar Constitution had been able to press to its logical conclusion in view of the strong local feeling which still persisted in 1871 and in 1919, had been brought to the point at which the sovereign rights, elected assemblies, and executive power of the former States (Länder) had all been swept away and the State Governments completely subordinated to the Reich.⁴

¹ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933 part I, p. 141.
² Ibid. p. 1016.
³ Ibid. 1934 part I, p. 75.
⁴ The ‘Reconstruction Law’ was followed by an order (ibid. 1934 part I, p. 81) whereby no Land legislation could in future be promulgated without the permission of the ‘appropriate Reich Minister’. The actual process of ‘co-ordinating’ the Länder was carried out by the Reich Governors (Reichsstatthalter), who by the Reichsstatthaltergesetz of 30 January 1935 (ibid. 1935 part I, p. 65) became the ‘permanent representatives of the Reich Government’ in the areas for which they were responsible.
After the *Gleichschaltung* of the regional institutions had come the process of concentration at the top, for, as he began to look around for new fields of adventure abroad, Hitler had been determined to impart his plans only to the narrow circle of his most trusted advisers. He had, therefore, begun to exclude the Reich Cabinet as a whole from discussions of public policy (the Cabinet at this time containing a number of Ministers whose allegiance to Nazism was somewhat dubious);\(^1\) so that, after the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations in October 1933, he had never informed the Cabinet in advance of the steps which he proposed to take,\(^2\) while after 4 February 1938 he had not allowed it to meet at all.\(^3\) He had also slowly deprived the Reich Cabinet of its law-making power by allowing the individual Ministers to promulgate legislation after merely showing it to other Ministries which might be interested.\(^4\)

As the Reich Cabinet had receded from the picture so Hitler had begun (mainly on paper, it seems) to experiment with other constitutional forms more peculiarly suited to cope with a national or international emergency. Thus in 1938 a new Reich Defence Law had been drafted with the object of concentrating responsibility, in the event of war, in the hands of Frick as Plenipotentiary-General for the Reich Administration, Schacht (later Funk) as Plenipotentiary-General for Economy, and Keitel as Chief of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW). This was the so-called ‘Three Man College’, which apparently never met as such, although it issued some minor decrees.\(^5\) Two days before the attack on Poland Hitler had superseded it with the ‘Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich’, a ‘permanent Committee’ of the existing Reich Defence Council under the chairmanship of Göring. This body, which had the power to issue ‘orders having the force of law’, had been brought into being specifically to ensure the ‘unified direction of the administration and the economy’ for the ‘time of the present international tension’.\(^6\) Like the Reich Cabinet before it, however, the Ministerial Council ceased, in the early months of the war, to be a deliberative body. In fact it met rarely, if at all, after December 1939, after which date its members merely communicated with each other by correspondence when decrees had to be issued.\(^7\) The result was that in the end even the idea of governing by means of a ‘Defence Council’ was gradually abandoned, so that, during the war years, Germany had con-

\(^{1}\) Some, e.g. Schacht and von Neurath, were formally admitted to Party membership on 30 January 1937.

\(^{2}\) Testimony of Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xi. 39).


\(^{4}\) Article by Lammers in *Reichsverwaltungsblatt*, quoted by *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 3 February 1943.

\(^{5}\) Testimony of Lammers (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xi. 57).

\(^{6}\) *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939 part I, p. 1539.

\(^{7}\) Testimony of Lammers (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xi. 57).
siderably less of a government in the formal sense than was usually supposed.\(^1\) Indeed, from 1940 onwards the Reichsregierung degenerated into a sort of Byzantine court, where all real power, so far as Hitler did not choose to exercise it personally, was concentrated in the hands not of the Reich Ministers, but of a small group of technicians, bureaucrats, and Party ‘strong men’ of the stamp of Speer, Lammers, and Bormann respectively.

\((b)\) Hitler and the Generals\(^2\)

Theoretically the law of 1 August 1934, by which Hitler took over the combined offices of President and Chancellor upon the death of Hindenburg, gave him the supreme command of the German armed forces, which were immediately required to take an oath of loyalty and unconditional obedience to him. Much power, however, especially the power to give direct orders to the Wehrmacht, continued to reside in the Reich War Minister, von Blomberg, to whom, under Hitler, all branches of the armed forces (i.e. the navy and air force, as well as the army) were subordinated.\(^3\) At first it had suited Hitler to leave this authority in military matters in the hands of Blomberg and his Ministry. For one thing he was still conscious of his own inadequacies as a military leader. He had also been convinced, at the time of the Roehm affair of 30 June 1934, of the necessity of preserving the independence of the army (if only as an insurance against further revolt within the Party) and had therefore come down on the side of the Wehrmacht against the SA.\(^4\) He had therefore entered into a tacit understanding with the army—which was symbolized by the attendance (for the first time) of units of the armed forces at the 1934 Nuremberg Party Rally—whereby the Party would not interfere in military affairs provided that the army gave its unconditional support to rearmament and other Nazi measures. This understanding was marred only by the incessant intrigues of the Schutzstaffel (SS)\(^5\)—now gradually supplanting the SA—and by the bitter recollection in the minds of some members of the General Staff and some older commanders like Hammerstein\(^6\) of the fate which their brother officers, General Schleicher and Colonel von Bredow, had suffered in the ‘purge’ of 1934. It was to last for the next three and a half years, coming to an abrupt end at the beginning

\(^{1}\) e.g. by the prosecution at Nuremberg.


\(^{3}\) Hitler was officially described as ‘Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht’ and Blomberg as ‘Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht’ (NS Jahrbuch, 1938, p. 266).


\(^{5}\) Ibid. pp. 71–72.

\(^{6}\) The former C.-in-C. of the Army, who retired in 1934, but was recalled in September 1939 and was concerned in an abortive plot to arrest Hitler on the Western Front in that month.
of February 1938, when the Reich War Minister, Blomberg, was driven from office after having scandalized the army by marrying a woman of the Berlin streets.¹

The Blomberg scandal gave Hitler his chance to act against the army. For some time the SS had been waiting to strike at the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Fritsch, the ‘strong man’ of the General Staff, against whom it now trumped up a charge of homosexuality. On 4 February Hitler was consequently able to announce the resignation of both Fritsch and Blomberg. The former was replaced by Brauchitsch, but, instead of appointing a new War Minister, Hitler personally assumed the ‘immediate Befehlsgewalt’ over all the armed forces and created a High Command of the Wehrmacht—Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)—to carry out the routine duties hitherto performed by the War Ministry.² On Blomberg’s recommendation he made Keitel, the head of the Wehrmachtamt in the Ministry, Chief of the new OKW.³ Even at this stage, however, Hitler still found it necessary to camouflage his coup against the Wehrmacht with an all-round reshuffle of posts. In this von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, was replaced by Ribbentrop, and von Papen was recalled from Vienna.⁴ Göring, who had hoped to succeed Blomberg as War Minister, was made a Field Marshal. A ‘shake-up’ among the senior army commanders was announced, and about a dozen generals who had offended the Party were forced to retire.⁵

Thus ended the era of good feeling between Hitler and the Generals⁶—an era in which amicable relations had been sustained only by Hitler’s willingness to maintain the old Reichswehr tradition of a ‘non-political’ army and by his ability to gratify the desire of the military leaders for a strong foreign policy and for the restoration of German Wehrhoheit. Immediately after the Fritsch-Blomberg crisis the Generals began to draw closer to the civilian opposition, represented at this time by Schacht, Goerdeler, and a group in the German Foreign Ministry. The moving spirit among them, now as later, was the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, who felt that the Fritsch affair had produced a gulf

² Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938 part I, p. 111.
³ I.M.T. Nuremberg, iv. 414.
⁴ Neurath was made chairman of a ‘Secret Cabinet Council’ which never met.
⁵ Gisevius, op. cit. i. 415.
⁶ In order to avoid misunderstanding it should be pointed out that the term ‘the Generals’ is used here and in the succeeding pages to denote, not the senior army officers generally (i.e. including those who, having been advanced by Hitler, were loyal Nazis), but rather the small nucleus of old Reichswehr commanders with whom Hitler had to bargain for power after 1933 and whom, because of their experience, he had perforce to retain in service after he had taken over the Supreme Command.
between Hitler and the Officers' Corps which could never be bridged. Beck was particularly apprehensive about the current trend of Hitler's foreign policy and at this time repeatedly addressed memoranda to his superior, Brauchitsch, in which he endeavoured to show that Hitler's recklessness could only lead to war. In July and August 1938 he tried to win Brauchitsch over to the idea of a collective demarche—a sort of ultimatum from the Generals to Hitler—pointing out that a conflict with Czechoslovakia could not fail to bring in France and England and thereby become a world war which Germany could not hope to win. Finding the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army too weak-willed to give him the necessary support, and believing that only the removal of Hitler could now save the country from disaster, Beck finally resigned his post as Army Chief of Staff on 27 August 1938 and thereafter quietly dedicated himself to the task of overthrowing the régime.

The civilian opposition, greatly inspired by Beck's resignation, now likewise became convinced that every peaceful attempt at resistance must necessarily fail and that 'only violent means' could succeed. The stage was therefore set for the plot of September 1938, the object of which was to halt the drift towards war by removing Hitler by force. At first it seemed that the plot might have some chance of success, for the German people generally were beginning to show signs of uneasiness regarding Hitler's warlike preparations—as the inhabitants of Berlin, for example, demonstrated by standing by in icy silence when, at the height of his agitation against Czechoslovakia, Hitler paraded a new armoured division through the Reich capital. Key figures in the army were apparently ready to act—among them the new Chief of Staff, Halder, who shared Beck's misgivings about Hitler's policy, and the Commander of the Berlin Military District, von Witzleben, whose Divisional General, von Brockdorff-Ahlfeldt, was to carry out the details of the coup. Inside the German Foreign Ministry the plans of the opposition had reached an advanced stage, and discreet feelers had been put out abroad. Even Brauchitsch had by now become convinced that the moment for action had arrived. Suddenly, however,

2 Ibid. pp. 81, 90, 95, 98, and 109.
3 Ibid. pp. 108 seqq.
5 Testimony of Schacht (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xii. 453).
7 Testimony of Gisevius (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xii. 214).
9 Kordt, op. cit. p. 278; Schacht: Abrechnung mit Hitler, p. 23.
when everything was ready, there came news of Mussolini’s intervention in the Sudeten crisis and of Hitler’s decision to accept Chamberlain’s suggestion for a four-Power conference. This, according to Schacht, ‘completely frustrated’ the plans for a revolt, for ‘the intervention of foreign statesmen’ was something which the conspirators ‘could not possibly have taken into account’.¹ The Munich settlement thus seemed to spell the end of this—and to dash all hope of any other—plot, for there was small chance of rousing the German people against Hitler once he had obtained all his demands without war.

Within less than twelve months the international conflagration which Beck and his companions had sought to avert had become a reality. But the struggle between Hitler and the Generals had hardly begun, and by the beginning of November 1939 extensive preparations were again being made for a coup. This time the signal for action was Hitler’s decision to launch a winter offensive against France—a move which the General Staff opposed partly because it lacked confidence in German ability to break through the Maginot Line, and partly because it realized that an offensive would remove the last chance of a negotiated peace.² Substantially the circle of conspirators was the same as before, except that both Brauchitsch and Halder were more resolutely determined to participate. In fact, on the morning of 5 November both flew to the west, ostensibly on a tour of inspection, but actually to make arrangements whereby, if Hitler issued an order to launch an offensive, the military commanders on the Western Front would refuse to transmit this to their subordinates.³ Later the same day Brauchitsch returned to give Hitler his reasons for believing an offensive to be impossible.⁴ Meanwhile the Army High Command (OKH) at Zossen had become keyed-up for action, while the civilian group, headed by Goerdeler, was preparing to assume power and even drawing up a peace settlement for the new German Government to offer to the Allied Powers.⁵ Should the coup in the west fail, an attempt was to be made to kill Hitler at the Reich Chancellery. In the end, however, the plot came to nothing because, as so often, the Generals—especially Brauchitsch—allowed themselves to be browbeaten into submission by Hitler, who repeatedly postponed the order for a western offensive upon which so much depended. The plan of assassination likewise proved impracticable because the attempt of an obscure ‘Communist’ to blow up Hitler and the other Party leaders in the Munich Bürgerbräukeller on 8 November

¹ Schacht: Abrechnung mit Hitler, p. 23.
³ Gisevius: Bis zum bitteren Ende, ii. 156.
⁴ In the course of the interview he made the fatal mistake of suggesting that morale was bad, which caused Hitler to bellow like a madman and reduced him to a characteristic state of distraction (ibid. pp. 157–8).
⁵ Kordt, op. cit. pp. 359–66.
made it impossible to obtain the necessary explosives without arousing suspicion.¹

In the course of the next few months all hope of successful resistance gradually dwindled. In fact, relations between the Führer and the army improved for a time and after the fall of France, when Hitler announced the promotion of a number of the Generals,² they seemed almost cordial. Nevertheless the attack upon the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, which some of the army leaders regarded as both foolhardy and unnecessary, gave rise to new tensions and disagreements. Hitler, for his part, clearly resented the fact that, notwithstanding the changes brought about at the time of the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis in February 1938, the operational command of the army was still in the hands of its Commander-in-Chief, Brauchitsch, and that the Generals still had an important say in tactical matters. The next step, therefore, was to break up the existing leadership of the army and to make himself, in fact as well as in name, the 'supreme war lord'.³ Here the winter crisis of 1941 on the eastern front provided him with his long-awaited opportunity.

It is not possible to enter here into a discussion of the many differences between Hitler and the OKH on the conduct of operations in the east which eventually precipitated this latest crisis.⁴ Fundamentally those differences boiled down to the fact that, whereas the efforts of the Army High Command were directed to crushing the Russians militarily, Hitler hankered after a series of 'political' victories.⁵ Consequently, while Brauchitsch pressed for an attack on Moscow, where the strongest Soviet forces were then concentrated, Hitler demanded, first, the annihilation of Leningrad as one of the 'breeding grounds' of Bolshevism, and then, when this proved impracticable, an offensive by the Army Group South in the direction of the rich industrial areas of the eastern Ukraine. And only at the eleventh hour, when the Russian winter had already begun to draw on (this year at least a month earlier than usual) did he order an attack on the central front in the direction of the Soviet capital. Meanwhile he had as good as promised the German people that the war in the east would soon be over. In his Order of the Day to the Wehrmacht of 1 January 1941 he had predicted that 'the year 1941 would bring the completion of the greatest victory of our history' and in his Sportpalast speech of 3 October⁶ he had

¹ Ibid. pp. 370-4.
² Brauchitsch, Rundstedt, List, Kluge, Keitel, Witzleben, and Reichenau were made Field Marshals; Halder, Fromm, and a number of others were made Colonel-Generals. Cf. Hitler's Reichstag speech of 19 July 1940 (Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, 20 July 1940).
⁴ For a full account of the differences between Hitler and the OKH cf. ibid. pp. 38 seqq.; also Kurt Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre (Wiesbaden, Brockhaus, 1950), p. 257.
⁵ Hitler was, however, firmly convinced that it was more important to defeat the Russians in the field than to win the political support of the Eastern peoples by making concessions to them. Cf. below, p. 646.
⁶ Volkischer Beobachter, 5 October 1941.
gone so far as to claim that Bolshevism had already been crushed and that its final liquidation was only a matter of time. Having given these assurances he refused to allow the High Command to provide the troops with special winter clothing, arguing that, as there would only be garrison duties for them to perform, the normal winter issue would be adequate.\(^1\)

The military disaster which was to demonstrate how wide of the mark Hitler had been in his calculations came suddenly and unexpectedly. On 10 December the Russians, who at the end of the previous month had been able to hold the Wehrmacht in check on every sector and even to counter-attack at many points, took the offensive along the entire eastern front. A few hours later Hitler summoned the Reichstag and announced that the winter campaign against Moscow was over. By 16 December the German armies were everywhere in retreat. General von Bock, who commanded the German forces before Moscow, had already (on 12 December) been relieved of his command, which was given to General List. Brauchitsch, broken in health by the strain of recent weeks, and blamed by Goebbels (in one of the latter’s most insidious whispering campaigns) for the military setbacks and for the lack of adequate winter equipment, begged to be allowed to resign also.\(^2\) His wish was granted, and on 19 December Hitler personally assumed command of the army—a step which, as the subsequent official announcement readily conceded, was part of the process of consolidating the political and military leadership which had begun when the Führer took over in February 1938 the powers hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.\(^3\)

From this point onwards the ‘intuitions’ of the former corporal were law as far as the conduct of military operations was concerned.\(^4\) Having overcome the sense of inferiority which he had once felt towards the Generals, Hitler now believed that he could make up in political fanaticism what he lacked in formal military training. As he remarked to Halder in taking over the army command, ‘anybody could do a bit of operational leadership’, but the real task of the supreme commander was to ‘educate the army in National Socialism’. He knew of no general who could perform this task to his satisfaction, and that was why he had decided to take over the supreme command himself.\(^5\) Nothing, as he saw it, was more important to the successful prosecution of the war than morale,\(^6\) and the essence of good morale, as he was often at pains to emphasize at his war-time

\(^1\) Halder: *Hitler als Feldherr*, p. 39.
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 44.
\(^3\) Cf. Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German news agency owned by the Ministry of Propaganda: hereafter referred to as DNB).
\(^4\) The official announcement of 21 December 1941 referred to Hitler as ‘following his intuitions’ in the conduct of military operations.
\(^5\) Halder, op. cit. p. 45.
conferences and in his public speeches, was that the men at the front should be thoroughly imbued with the National Socialist spirit.

How important, in addition to good military training, we considered ideological training to be [he later told Mussolini] was demonstrated by the fact that now in the midst of a war we were proceeding to the completion of the National Socialist indoctrination in our own armed forces, and we required of every officer unconditional allegiance to National Socialism.¹

The nazification of the Wehrmacht was therefore to be completed first by the creation of a so-called ‘People’s Officers’ Corps’, and then later by the setting up of a ‘National Socialist Guidance Staff’ (Nationalsozialistischer Führungsstab) inside the High Command which could ‘coordinate’ the political training of the armed forces in close collaboration with the Party Chancellery.² As the first step towards the creation of the new People’s Officers’ Corps the educational requirements hitherto prescribed for the officer’s career were abolished, and ‘unconditional readiness for action for the Führer, the People, and the Fatherland’ was substituted for ‘family, education, and financial standing’ in the selection of prospective officers.³

Meanwhile the gulf between Hitler and the OKH had continued to widen. In January 1942 Hitler commissioned Goebbels to prepare, with the aid of the liaison officer between the Wehrmacht and the Propaganda Ministry, a written report on so-called ‘defeatist tendencies’ in the OKH and OKW with a view to instituting ‘proper measures’ against these.⁴ Three months later, in his speech to the Reichstag on 26 April 1942,⁵ Hitler vaguely imputed responsibility for the winter crisis to the army commanders by alleging that there had been cases in which ‘nerves were at breaking-point, obedience wavered, or where a sense of duty was lacking in mastering the task’. In the following September, after another of those outbursts of rage which, according to Jodl, made life at the Führerhauptquartier ‘in the long run a martyrdom’ for the Generals, he dismissed the Army Chief of Staff, Halder, who had apparently urged the abandonment of the already flagging drive against Stalingrad.⁶ After that Hitler

² United States of America, Military Tribunals . . . Official Transcript . . . (Nuremberg, 1946-9) (mimeographed) [referred to hereafter as U.S. Military Tribunals, q.v. in Abbreviations, p. xviii], Case 12, Judgment, p. 53. The NS-Führungsstab of the OKW was set up in December 1943.
³ Cf. article by Oberleutnant Dr. Pfundtner in Das Junge Deutschland, quoted by the Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger (a subsidiary news service of DNB, referred to hereafter as NDZ), 21 November 1942.
⁶ Gilbert, ed.: Hitler Directs his War, p. 21; and testimony of Jodl (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xv. 300). The news of Halder’s dismissal was not published in Germany until some months later.
POLITICAL STRUCTURE

withdrew from the officers’ club used jointly by his Operations Staff and the High Command,¹ and quarrelled violently with Jodl, his subservient Operations Chief.² By May 1943 he had, according to Goebbels, become so ‘absolutely sick’ of the Generals that he could not ‘imagine anything better than having nothing to do with them’. He could not, he apparently told his Propaganda Minister, ‘bear the sight of generals any longer. . . . All generals lie. . . . All generals are disloyal. All generals are opposed to National Socialism.’³ He therefore began to encourage the growth of the SS—especially the Waffen-SS—as a counterweight to the army. After the dismissal of Halder a SS officer was invited to be present at every daily conference at the Führerhauptquartier. SS generals were given commands at the front, and Himmler himself was allowed to take over a number of purely military functions, becoming responsible for the military intelligence service in place of the Abwehr⁴ in February 1944, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army in July (after the abortive Putsch), and head of the prisoner of war administration in the following September.

(c) The Changing Balance of Power inside the National Socialist Party, 1939-43

Hardly less disruptive of the unity of the German war effort than the struggle of Hitler to assert his supremacy over the army were the constant attempts of certain individuals in Hitler’s own immediate entourage to achieve an ascendancy within the National Socialist Party. This ‘War of the Diadochi’, as it has been called,⁵ among the Nazi élite was in no small measure due to Hitler’s own failure, in consolidating the authority of the Party in Germany before the war, to develop a sense of collective responsibility among the Nazi leaders. For although he had enabled the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) to achieve total power he had not taken steps to foster a real team spirit among the heads of the various Party offices and Verbände. He had, indeed, in a crude attempt to introduce a system of checks and balances, even encouraged a certain amount of rivalry among the various Party groupings— as the building up of the SS as a counterweight to the SA above all bears witness. The consequence was that, notwithstanding all that was said and written about the operation of the Führerprinzip, a spirit of faction persisted within the

¹ Testimony of Göring and Jodl (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 434 and xv. 300).
² According to his own account, Jodl had attempted to justify Halder against Hitler’s criticisms. As a result he was informed through Keitel that the Führer could no longer work with him and that he would be replaced by Paulus as soon as the latter had taken Stalingrad.
³ Goebbels Diaries, p. 289.
⁴ Intelligence Department of the OKW.
Party organization and co-ordinated leadership remained, even throughout the critical war years, little more than a pious aspiration of the propagandists.¹

At the time of the attack on Poland in September 1939, Göring, the 'paladin of the Führer',² who had rendered such outstanding service, first as Prussian Minister of the Interior (and founder of the Gestapo, the secret state police), and then as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Head of the Four-Year Plan,³ was at the height of his power; and Hitler had recognized his position on 1 September by making him his legally appointed successor.⁴ For the next two years Göring's word was law in the planning of the exploitation of the occupied territories. In the military sphere also his pre-eminence was recognized by his promotion after the fall of France to the historically unique rank of Reichsmarschall.⁵ His potential rivals were at this stage very few indeed. Among these Himmler was still content to exercise, in his dual role as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police, the responsibility for the internal security of the régime which he had inherited from Göring in 1936; while Goebbels, the Reich Propaganda Minister and Gauleiter of the Reich Capital, was for the present still prepared to respect and indeed, where necessary, to bolster up Göring's authority. Neither Himmler nor Goebbels could in any case hope to benefit directly from any dethronement of Göring, for after him the line of succession to Hitler went to Rudolf Hess, the Führer's Deputy. By the law of 1 December 1933 Hess had, as has been noted,⁶ become a member of the Reich Cabinet, and by a further, unpublished, decree of 27 July 1934 he had acquired the right to participate in the drafting of all laws relating to the Reich administration.⁷ He thereby became the main link between Party and state, with far-reaching powers; and if he did not use those powers to the same effect as did his successor, Bormann, this was because his own weakness of character and notorious mental instability prevented him from doing so.

² As the German press described him on his forty-ninth birthday, 12 January 1942.
³ For the Four-Year Plan see below, pp. 173-4.
⁴ Cf. Hitler's Reichstag speech of 1 September 1939 (Volkischer Beobachter, 2 September 1939; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, i. 510).
⁵ Cf. Hitler's Reichstag speech of 19 July 1940 (Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, 20 July 1940). As the German press (e.g. ibid.) pointed out, the rank of Reichsmarschall was created especially for Goring. Prince Eugene had been given the title of Reichsgeneralfeldmarschall and so had a number of Austrian generals who succeeded him. Some members of the German nobility had also borne the hereditary title of Reichszeitmarschall, but this was non-military. Goring was thus the only Reichsmarschall.
⁶ See above, p. 11.
⁷ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 17 (138-D); N.C.A. vi. 1055-6.
This somewhat uneasy equilibrium within the Party leadership was to be shattered with dramatic force by the sudden flight of Hess to Scotland in May 1941. For this remarkable escapade on the part of the Führer’s Deputy, which sent Ribbentrop hurrying to Rome, ‘discouraged and nervous’, to explain to Mussolini that Hess was not at heart a traitor but only a ‘victim of his pacifist hallucinations’,1 laid the way open for the rise of Bormann, Hess’s assistant and special liaison officer at the Führerhauptquartier. Unlike the weak and erratic Hess, Bormann was a solid, unemotional, and thoroughly ruthless schemer, who had already been intriguing to displace his chief in Hitler’s confidence, and who, as Göring testified, came to exercise upon Hitler the ‘most decisive influence’ from this time onwards.2

Within two days of Hess’s departure Hitler—who was so deeply affected by the conduct of his Deputy that he made up his mind to have him shot if he ever returned to Germany3—had appointed Bormann Head of the Party Chancellery (as the Office of the Führer’s Deputy was now called), and on 29 May 1941 he issued a decree conferring on him all the powers which Hess had hitherto exercised as a Reich Minister and as a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich.4 The detailed instructions for carrying out the decree were left to Bormann himself and to Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, who on 16 January 1942 issued a supplementary order confirming Bormann’s right to participate in the preparation of all legislation and forbidding any contact among the highest offices of Party and state except through him.5 Bormann was now in a position to make himself the principal link between the Party, the state, and the Führer, and in this he received the all-important backing of Hitler himself, who now began to insist that first the Reichsleiters and the Gauleiters and then the Reich Ministers should conduct their business with him through Bormann6 and who, by appointing the latter his official ‘Secretary’,7 made him an indispensable figure at the Führerhauptquartier.

Of that remarkable fraternity of opportunists and intriguers with which Hitler managed to surround himself Bormann was in many ways the

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2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 490.
3 ‘Memorandum of Interview between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Duce, with Count Ciano present, at the Palazzo Venezia on 13 May 1941’, Department of State Bulletin, 30 June 1946, pp. 1103 seqq.
4 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1941 part I, p. 295.
5 Ibid. 1942 part I, p. 35.
6 Germany, Partei-Kanzlei: Verfugungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben (Munich, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, n.d.) [referred to hereafter as Verfugungen], i. 2, and testimony of Lammers (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 92).
7 Verfugungen, iv. 1.
most successful; for his strength came to rest, not only upon the key position into which he manoeuvred himself at the Führerhauptquartier, but also upon the power which he was able to concentrate in the hands of his Party underlings throughout the Reich. The months which followed his appointment as Head of the Party Chancellery were, in fact, to see a radical adjustment in the balance of power in Germany and sweeping changes in the Reich administration. Hitherto the Nazis had accepted the principle that the state and Party must remain entirely separate, with the Party merely trying to 'lead' the state. Now the Party was given supervisory powers over, and sometimes executive functions within, the state administration. Thus by a decree of 26 March 1942 the Gauleiters—Bormann's immediate subordinates—were empowered to supervise all promotions in the civil service.¹ A month later they assumed responsibility for the direction, within the Gaue, of the labour recruitment programme. After that they took over, through the Gaewirtschaftskammer, the supervision of the regional economic organization.² And finally, by a decree of 16 November 1942, which adapted the Reich Defence Districts to the Gaue, they became responsible for the entire 'civilian defence organization' within the Gaue.

At the national level the advent of Bormann was followed by an attempt to transfer control to Party 'activists' and to eliminate those (whether old Party members or not) who were no longer acceptable to the Party Chancellery. Thus in January 1942 Gauleiter Joseph Wagner was removed from office as National Price Commissioner and his post given to Dr. Hans Fischböck, a protégé of Seyss-Inquart.³ (Wagner's namesake, Gauleiter Adolf Wagner of München-Oberbayern, was likewise sent on 'prolonged leave' six months later.) On 21 March the State Secretary Dr. Syrup was replaced as labour dictator within the framework of the Four-Year Plan by Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, a prominent member of the Party 'old guard'.⁴ And on 22 May Walter Darré, the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture and a bitter opponent of Bormann's,⁵ was compelled to hand over his duties to his State Secretary, SS-Obergruppenführer Herbert Backe. In this way the influence of the Party Chancellery became second only to that of the all-powerful organization of the Four-Year Plan in the vital economic fields of price control, labour, and food.

³ Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands, formerly Austrian Federal Chancellor. Wagner had apparently irritated Hitler by his opposition to the methods of the SS. He was eventually sent to prison (cf. Schacht: Abrechnung mit Hitler, p. 39).
⁵ Darré's attitude towards Bormann is reflected in the conversation with Rosenberg reported in Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck: Portrait eines Menschheitsschreckers — nach den hinterlassenen Memoiren des ehemaligen Reichsministers, Alfred Rosenberg (St. Gallen, Verlag Zollikofer, 1947), p. 301. Schacht (op. cit. p. 27) describes Darré as having been 'angrily removed from his ministerial post'. 
At first the rise of Bormann and his fellow triumviri at the Führerhauptquartier, Lammers and Keitel, was apparently resented by Goebbels, the Reich Propaganda Minister and (according to Schacht)\(^1\) the only real 'brain' in Hitler's government, who in March 1943 attempted to draw Göring into a plan to 'freeze out the Committee of Three' by persuading Hitler to transfer 'responsibility for the political leadership . . . to the Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich'.\(^2\) Göring, for his part, was ready enough to lend himself to such a plan, for he could not fail to see that he, too, was gradually being pushed into the background by the 'Three Wise Men from the East',\(^3\) who now dominated the Führerhauptquartier. He hated Lammers 'from the bottom of his soul', believing him to be a typical bureaucrat who was attempting to get control back into the hands of the civil servants. Keitel he recognized as 'an absolute zero', whom the other two manipulated 'to make it look as though the Wehrmacht had a hand in their measures'. But he was apparently 'not quite certain about Bormann' and his intentions. This uncertainty may well have caused Göring to hesitate when in the spring of 1943 Goebbels summoned him to action. In any event the Propaganda Minister came to the conclusion that Göring no longer had the stamina to go through with his plan,\(^4\) and consequently decided that his own interests could best be served by reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Head of the Party Chancellery, instead of opposing him.\(^5\) From May 1943 until the end of the war Goebbels and Bormann were thus able to work together in perfect harmony, maintaining a solid front against their common enemies within the Party (e.g. Frick, Ribbentrop, and Rosenberg).\(^6\) As far as Lammers was concerned, Goebbels no longer had cause to fear his influence, for Bormann himself gradually disposed of the Chief of the Reich Chancellery by using his position as Hitler's Secretary to oust him from the Führerhauptquartier.\(^7\)

The beginning of the Goebbels–Bormann *entente* (it was a working understanding, rather than a friendship, for Bormann never had a single friend in the whole of Hitler's entourage) in this way marked an important stage

\(^{1}\) Statement of 7 July 1945 (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxiii. 562 (3936–PS)).

\(^{2}\) *Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 201–3 and 236.

\(^{3}\) As Goring called the Bormann–Lammers Keitel triumvirate.

\(^{4}\) 'One can no longer really depend on Göring. He is tired and somewhat washed out' (ibid. p. 285).

\(^{5}\) On 9 May 1943 he wrote: 'When you think how many promises [Bormann] keeps compared with Göring, the latter is undoubtedly at a disadvantage' (ibid.).


in the decline of Göring, whose failure to cope with the growing Allied air offensive had already cost him much of his popularity in the country at large. So low indeed was his prestige to sink during the summer months of 1943 that in August a special press campaign had to be launched to convince the German people that he was not in permanent eclipse. But as long as Hitler himself had confidence in him his position was secure. And Hitler showed no signs of realizing that Göring’s usefulness was past. Indeed, when the fall of Mussolini presented him with a new crisis in July 1943 he took comfort in the thought that he had the ‘ice cold’ Göring to fall back upon, remarking that he could not ‘have a better adviser’ at ‘such a time’.1 Four months later, at the annual Munich rally of the Nazi ‘old guard’, he publicly poked fun at rumours that he had ‘deposed’ his ‘friend Göring’, and as late as September 1944 he reaffirmed his faith in him by renewing the latter’s appointment as Head of the Four-Year Plan. Bormann, however, remained always on the look-out for an opportunity to poison Hitler’s mind against this major obstacle to the realization of his ambitions, and it was, significantly enough, a trick on his part which brought about Göring’s final removal from office and his arrest on 23 April 1945.2

Like Göring, Himmler succeeded until the very last week of the régime in passing himself off as a tower of strength to Hitler. Indeed, the more Hitler’s ‘intuitions’ failed him at the front, the more he came to need a man of the calibre of the ‘treuer Heinrich’ to deal with possible resistance at home and in the occupied countries. During the last two years of the war he therefore allowed Himmler to accumulate an assortment of offices unique even in Nazi history. Already Chief of the German Police and Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality, the Reichsführer-SS became Reich Minister of the Interior,3 Chief of the Political and Military Intelligence Service, Commander of the Home Army, Supervisor of the Prisoner of War Administration, and, with Bormann, joint Controller of the Volkssturm (German People’s Levy).4 In addition he had a voice in the control of the German A.R.P. (air-raid precautions) system, which he acquired through the air-raid police, and in the administration of the Customs and Border Protection (Zollgrenzschutz), which he took over from the Reich Finance Ministry in the autumn of 1944. The fact that he was thus able to acquire so much authority was not

1 Gilbert, ed.: Hitler Directs his War, p. 44.
2 When, on 23 April 1945, Göring sent Hitler a telegram suggesting that, as the latter’s successor-designate, he should take over power (see also p. 46 n. 5), Bormann apparently caused Hitler to construe this as an act of treachery. Cf. Milton Shulman: Defeat in the West (London, Secker and Warburg, 1947), pp. 295–6; Trevor-Roper: Last Days of Hitler, pp. 145 and 154 seqq.; and Göring’s testimony at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 481).
3 See below, pp. 33–34.
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 375 seqq. (120–USSR); ibid. xxv. 114–16 (058–PS); N.C.A. iii. 103–4; and DNB, 18 October 1944.
without its effect upon his enemies both inside and outside the Party. To Bormann it was a source of some anxiety, causing him to try to build up the influence of Himmler’s ambitious subordinate, Kaltenbrunner, and to push him into the forefront with Hitler. To the opposition it presented a special problem in that ‘scarcely anyone could conceive a change in the system without the participation of Himmler’, which meant that it became difficult to dispose of Hitler without giving the Reichsführer-SS the credit and causing his ‘prestige’ to rise accordingly.

(d) The Crisis in German Justice

Just as there was a constant struggle for power among the Nazi leaders during the war years, so there was also occasionally a fundamental clash of principles. For there was always a certain amount of controversy within the Nazi movement as to how far the National Socialist ‘revolution’, if it were to be carried to its logical conclusion, demanded a complete break with the past and the repudiation of all the institutions and traditions upon which German political life had hitherto been founded. This controversy had simmered quietly in the background after the ‘revolt’ of 1934, but it came to a head again during the crisis in German justice of 1942, causing the latter, as Hans Frank, the legal expert of the Nazi movement, pointed out, to become not only a ‘crisis of the law, but a crisis of the State’.

To the Party radicals the war presented a golden opportunity to carry out a 100 per cent. ‘socialist’ programme. In the field of law this implied the complete subordination of justice to the ends of policy, so that the judge would become what Thirack (then President of the People’s Court) called ‘not the supervisor, but the immediate assistant of the State leadership’. Foremost among the advocates of such a Gleichschaltung of German justice were Goebbels, Thirack, Freisler (then State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice), and, above all, the SS organ, Das Schwarze Korps, whose attitude was reflected in Himmler’s dictum that he did not care whether his actions ‘broke some paragraph or other’ and in his suggestion to Hitler, on the death of Gürtnner, the Reich Minister of Justice, in January 1941, that the Reich Ministry of Justice should be liquidated altogether and the administration of civil law placed under the Ministry of the Interior and that of penal law under the police. Opposed to them was a less powerful group, led by Hans Frank, and supported by Huber


2 Gisevius: Bis zum bitteren Ende, ii. 327.

3 Frank’s ‘Abschließende Betrachtungen’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 555 (2233–PS)).

(Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of Justice), Bühler (Frank's State Secretary in the General Government) and a number of the Gaurechtsamtsleiter, who believed that, in so far as there could be no permanent security for any political system which had its roots in the legal insecurity of the ordinary citizen, even the Nazi State must be a Rechtstaat.

In their clamour for drastic changes in the administration of justice the Nazi radicals could rightly point out that, notwithstanding the attempts which had been made after 1933 to introduce reliable National Socialists as judges, the purge of the legal profession had not kept pace with that of other branches of German public life. In fact about two-thirds of the judges holding office in 1939 had been appointed before Hitler came to power, while Gürtner himself, the Reich Minister of Justice, was only nominally a Party member. Moreover the training of young lawyers in the universities had not been brought fully into line with Nazi principles. On the other hand, the political police and the new courts created after 1933 (i.e. the People's Court and the so-called 'Special Courts') were completely dominated by the Party, and the Public Prosecutors were for the most part ardent National Socialists. Friction between them and the judges, who tended to cling to their traditional independence, was therefore inevitable.

From the beginning the radicals had had an ally of decisive importance in Hitler himself who, having come to regard every lawyer as 'a disturbing element working against his power', now began to keep a close watch on the courts and to intervene personally in cases in which the sentence imposed appeared to be too lenient. Such intervention was apparently resented by Gürtner, who particularly disliked having to transfer to the Gestapo or to the police persons who had been sentenced by the courts. But after Gürtner's death in 1941 the Acting Minister of Justice, Schlegelberger, endeavoured to assuage Hitler by rebuking the courts and even removing the judges when they did not show sufficient severity in the performance of their duties. The radicals, however, continued to demand more drastic action. When the clamour was at its height Hitler, on 26 April 1942, suddenly summoned the Reichstag and, in the speech in which he accused the Generals of losing their nerve, threatened with dismissal,

2 Gürtner is described by Schacht (Abrechnung mit Hitler, p. 47) as a non-Nazi who had 'helped to whitewash all the violations of the law which were committed by the régime and the Nazi Party'. It may not be without significance that Gürtner's personal assistant, Reichsgerichtsrat von Dohnanyi, was one of the pillars of the German opposition.
3 Cf. Freiser's article in Deutsche Justiz, quoted by Kölnische Zeitung, 19 August 1941.
4 Frank's testimony at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xii. 14).
5 U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, p. 10691.
6 Ibid. p. 347.
regardless of ‘acquired rights’, any judge who showed by his conduct that he did not understand the needs of the hour. The Reichstag, in turn, formally asserted the Führer’s right, ‘without being tied to existing legal regulations’, to remove from office any public servant, high or low, who failed in his duty as Hitler understood it.¹

For the radicals Hitler’s action was the cue to intensify their campaign. On 11 May Rothenberger, the President of the Hanseatic Court of Appeal at Hamburg, wrote to Schlegelberger:

The Führer’s speech of 26 April 1942 did not surprise me. It confirmed to me the regrettable fact that the Führer has no confidence in German justice and in the German judges. A radical National Socialist reform of the legal system, which I have suggested for years in verbal and written reports, has therefore become urgent.²

During the next three months Goebbels and the Party press became more bitter than ever in their denunciation of the judges. ‘The idea of irremovable judges’, the Propaganda Minister warned members of the People’s Court in an address of 22 July, ‘... originated in an alien intellectual world, hostile to the German people.’ Under National Socialism the judge would be expected ‘to proceed less from the law than from the basic idea that the offender was to be eliminated from the community’.³

On the other hand, Frank, who was at the time in Poland of which he was Governor-General, decided that he must now make a firm stand against this latest assault upon the independence of the judiciary. He therefore proceeded to the Reich and in June and July delivered a series of remarkably outspoken addresses at the Universities of Berlin, Vienna, Munich, and Heidelberg in which he vigorously denounced the suppression of the ‘old Germanic respect for law’ in favour of ‘police state ideals’.⁴ He also tried to see Hitler personally to point out the dangers inherent in his present policy, but, despite repeated entreaties, he was refused an audience.⁵ By now Hitler had decided that he must come down unequivocally on the side of his more fanatical supporters. On 20 August 1942 he therefore appointed Thierack, the President of the People’s Court, Reich Minister of Justice and issued a decree commissioning him to ‘build up a National Socialist administration of justice’ in accordance with his ‘directives and instructions’ and in agreement with Bormann and

³ Ibid. pp. 204 seqq. Goebbels’s speech, which was delivered at the request of Thierack, then President of the Court, was submitted in advance to Hitler and approved by him.
⁴ The text of Frank’s addresses is given in I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 518 seqq. (2233–PS); extracts in N.C.A. iv. 908-918.
⁵ ‘Abschließende Betrachtungen’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 554).
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Lammers; and in so doing he authorized him to ‘depart from existing law’. At the same time he took steps to eradicate the influence of Frank in Reich and Party legal matters. For ‘reasons of foreign policy’ he felt that he could not dispense with Frank’s services as Governor-General in Poland. Nevertheless, after placing him under police surveillance for several days, he relieved him of all his Party offices, deprived him of his ministerial rank, and forbade him to make further speeches or to publish the text of those already made. At the same time he dissolved the Reich Legal Office of the NSDAP, of which Frank had been Reichsleiter, and wound up its offices throughout the Gaue and Kreise. The other posts which Frank had held as President of the Academy for German Law and Chief of the National Socialist Lawyers’ League he handed over to Thierack.

It did not, however, prove easy to silence the rumblings of protest, which were widespread. As Kaltenbrunner, the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo, the State Security Police) and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD, the Nazi Party Security Service), in reporting upon the effect of Hitler’s latest measures, was constrained to observe:

These measures have met with an extremely dissentient reception in juridical circles. The complete break with the hitherto prevailing conception of magisterial independence . . . is said to have been, to a certain extent, very unfavourably commented upon by the magistrature. In certain cases this is even said to have led to outspoken judgments against the National Socialist State.

Subdued echoes of Frank’s plea for Rechtssicherheit and Rechtsgefühl continued to be heard in non-Party newspapers and in the end his stand had the effect, according to him, of silencing the attacks of the Schwarze Korps upon the lawyers and of causing Goebbels to forbid the press to make further uncomplimentary remarks about the judges.

Nor, on the other hand, did Thierack, the new Minister of Justice, find it easy to build up the sort of ‘National Socialist administration of justice’ that Hitler wanted. In the course of the next few months he tried to nazify the judiciary by subordinating the judges more completely to the Reich Ministry of Justice. Under an agreement with Himmler of 18 September 1942, concluded after a five-and-a-half hour conference at Himmler’s Feldkommandostelle, he endeavoured to bring the dispensation

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1 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1942 part I, p. 535.
2 Testimony of Lammers at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 42); also Frank’s testimony (ibid. xii. 25), and U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, p. 290.
3 Frankfurter Zeitung, 25 August 1942.
4 DNB, 24 August 1942.
6 Cf., for example, the article on the ‘Necessity of Legal Security’ in the Kölnische Zeitung of 12 December 1942.
7 ‘Abschließende Betrachtungen’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 555–6 (2233–PS)).
of 'justice' more into line with the activities of the Security Police and SD.\(^1\) He also attempted to simplify criminal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, although he might claim, as he did in his Berlin speech of 29 September 1942,\(^2\) that he had already overcome 'the mistrust which the Party had shown towards jurisdiction', he bitterly disappointed his fellow radicals and he was not in the end, according to Goebbels, found to be 'an ideal Minister of Justice'.\(^3\) Although he managed to stay on in office until the final capitulation, his State Secretary and right-hand man in the Ministry of Justice, Rothenberger, was relieved of his post in January 1944 and was replaced by Ministerialdirektor Herbert Klemm who, as head of Group III-C of the Party Chancellery, had been dealing with Nazi complaints against 'unsatisfactory' court decisions.\(^4\) Thus in the end the crisis in German justice produced something of a stalemate, the consequences of which were satisfactory neither to the all-out revolutionaries, who wanted a complete break with the past, nor to their opponents who believed that, in this one aspect of German life at least, National Socialism must be prepared to compromise with tradition.

\(\text{(e) STALINGRAD AND THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI}\)

In his Sportpalast speech of 30 September 1942 Hitler endeavoured to assure the German people that 'nothing worse' than the winter crisis of 1941–2 'could or would ever happen' to them. This assurance was necessary because the progressive tightening of the belt, which was to remain characteristic of life on the German home front for the rest of the war, had already begun. Already the Germans had experienced the ban on the sending of Christmas greetings in 1941, the inauguration of the winter clothing collection, the beginning of the process of 'concentration' in industry (involving the closing down of many small businesses), Sauckel's comb-out of the factories, and the conscription of labour for agriculture. In addition they had begun to feel the effects of the growing Allied air offensive and of the Allied military successes in North Africa. Morale was sagging, and it began to look as though nothing short of a major victory on the eastern front would be able to revive their flagging spirits.

The assault upon Stalingrad—the other 'breeding ground' of Bolshevism which, with Leningrad, had all along been one of Hitler's major objectives\(^5\)—was now in progress, and Hitler was prepared to spare nothing in order to effect its capture. Although the outcome was still very much in doubt,

\(\text{\(^1\) U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, p. 259, and I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 200–3 (654–PS); N.C.A. iii. 467–70.}\)
\(\text{\(^2\) Deutsche Justiz, 16 October 1942.}\)
\(\text{\(^3\) Goebbels Diaries, p. 384. According to Goebbels, 'jurists will always be jurists. The Fuehrer has just found that out in the case of Thierack.'}\)
\(\text{\(^4\) DNB, 3 January 1944, and U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, Judgment, pp. 10796–7.}\)
\(\text{\(^5\) Halder: Hitler als Feldherr, p. 38.}\)
the official German news agencies were encouraged to throw caution to the winds and to make the most optimistic forecasts. The fall of Stalingrad, Transocean announced on 3 September 1942, was 'only a question of time', and the news of victory would 'soon be given out by the German radio'. To this Hitler added his own emphatic assurance, in his Sportpalast speech of 30 September, that the German troops would take the city. But it was becoming apparent even then that the assault upon Stalingrad was not going 'according to plan'. When, in the following month, Hitler's military advisers began to press for a withdrawal in the face of the Soviet pincer movement he ordered his forces to hold their ground against all odds. If he could not take the 'city of destiny', as Goebbels called it, he was determined that his troops should fight there to the last man, making the battle one of the great epics of German military history. Thus, the more hopeless the struggle became, the bigger was the 'build up' which Stalingrad received in German propaganda.

Hitler was confident that Paulus, the Commander of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, would play the game as he intended. On 30 November he promoted Paulus to the rank of Colonel-General, and then on 31 January to the rank of Field Marshal, feeling sure that he would shoot himself rather than surrender to the Russians. Paulus, however, was not ready to commit this last heroic act of hara-kiri, even in return for a Field Marshal's baton. On 31 January 1943 he surrendered with all the troops under his command and at least twenty generals went into captivity with him. When he heard of this 'betrayal' Hitler was beside himself with rage. Paulus, he decided, would be the last Field Marshal to be appointed in the present war; and never again would he 'count [his] chickens before they were hatched'. Within a week, he predicted, Paulus and his generals would be speaking over the Russian radio—a remarkable piece of prognostication which came true some months later when the Stalingrad generals did appeal, as Hitler suggested, to the other German troops to surrender. Hitler himself, however, was not prepared to take any of the blame for the disaster. Instead he ordered the Reichsgericht to try in

1 Statement by Stillfried, Transocean (German Radio News Agency, intended largely for foreign listeners), 4 September 1942.

2 Report of conference of 1 February 1943, in Gilbert, ed.: Hitler Directs his War, p. 19. Paulus was not, however, the last Field Marshal to be appointed, for only two weeks later Hitler promoted Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen to that rank.

3 Gilbert, op. cit. pp. 21 and 22. The appeal by the generals was made in July 1943, after the foundation in Russia of the 'Free Germany' National Committee. In September 1943 some of the Stalingrad commanders founded the 'Union of German Officers'. Paulus, in a statement of 8 August 1944, publicly expressed his agreement with the programme of the 'Free German' movement—a movement purporting to represent persons of all shades of political opinion, from former Communist Reichstag deputies to German officers and ordinary soldiers, united in a 'patriotic Front against National Socialism'. It took shape at a conference in Moscow on 12 July 1943 of prominent German political refugees and delegates from prisoner-of-war camps throughout the Soviet Union.
absentia for treason the military commanders whose only crime had been to carry out his orders.¹

Meanwhile, the propaganda farce of Paulus’s last-ditch stand had been maintained. First (on 1 February) there were denials that the new Field Marshal had been captured;² then came reports of how he had ‘fought with his soldiers to the last hour’, followed by an announcement from the Führerhauptquartier (3 February) to the effect that the battle for Stalingrad had ended and that, ‘true to their oath to fight to the last breath, the 6th Army under the exemplary leadership of Field Marshal von Paulus’ had been overcome by the ‘numerical superiority of the enemy’ and the ‘unfavourable circumstances’ confronting the Germans. Finally there were various elegiacs in the German press mourning Paulus’s ‘heroic death’.³

Now that the great gamble had failed there was nothing left but to put the country on a ‘total war’ footing, although this could hardly involve very drastic changes in view of the measures which had already been introduced in 1942. On 27 January 1943 Sauckel was called upon to initiate a new man-power comb-out with a decree compelling all German men and women employed for less than forty-eight hours per week to register for war work.⁴ This was followed, two days later, by another decree closing down or amalgamating large numbers of small businesses and factories.⁵ Simultaneously the Party was appointed the ‘representative of the total mobilization of the Fatherland’.⁶ The ‘force of the National Socialist idea’, Hitler asserted in a proclamation to the German people issued on the tenth anniversary of his accession to power,⁷ would ‘hold every one to the fulfilment of his duties and would annihilate everyone who tried to shrink from those duties’. The Party, he repeated in another proclamation on 24 February, would ‘ruthlessly destroy saboteurs’ and ‘break terror with tenfold terror’. Nor would it ‘scruple about foreign lives’ at a time when ‘such hard sacrifices were being exacted’ from the German people.⁸ This meant that the Party itself must be purged of ‘lukewarm elements’, and the wholesale expulsion of Party officials whose enthusiasm had begun to wane was in fact ordered.⁹ ‘General roll-calls of all members’

² Cf., e.g., DNB, 1 February 1943.
³ Cf., e.g., NSZ Westmark and Oldenburgische Staatszeitung, 4 February 1943.
⁴ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1943 part I, pp. 67–68; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 49. See also below, p. 231.
⁵ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1943 part I, p. 75. Another and more drastic decree was issued in March 1943 (see below, p. 232).
⁶ DNB and Transocean, 8 February 1943.
⁷ Frankfurter Zeitung, 31 January 1943. Hitler normally spoke in person on the anniversary of his Machtübernahme, but this year he merely issued a proclamation to be read on his behalf.
⁸ The Times, 25 February 1943; proclamation read at the Munich Hofbräuhaus on the anniversary of the founding of the Party.
⁹ Gauleiter Robert Wagner of Baden was chosen to announce this purge publicly at Mannheim at the end of May (Transocean, 25 May 1943).
(Generalmitgliederappelle) were to be held in every Ortsgruppe, and there were to be quarterly parades, in which ‘the whole Party’ was called upon to ‘march as in former times’. ¹

No sooner had the call to ‘total war’ been issued, however, than the régime suffered another setback with the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943.² Hitler reacted with characteristic violence to the news of this latest ‘betrayal’, which became the signal for a new shake-up in the German internal administration. Frick, the ageing and ineffectual Reich Minister of the Interior who had been retained in office because of his long and devoted years of service to the Nazi movement, was replaced by Himmler and sent as Reich Protector to Prague. His principal State Secretary in the Ministry, Haus Pfündtner, an old career bureaucrat not prominently identified with the Party, was succeeded by Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, an able and active SS official.³ Himmler, whose appointment was said to complete ‘the basis necessary for a further concentration of forces and a stronger consolidation of the home front’,⁴ then went about his task with all the ruthlessness expected of him. His first duty was to deal with the case of the fifty-two-year-old civil servant, Regierungsrat Theodor Korselt, who had appealed against a death sentence for defeatist talk imposed upon him by the People’s Court.⁵ Himmler rejected the appeal, and on 25 August Korselt was executed—his execution being reported in heavy type by the Volkischer Beobachter and other Party newspapers. Hundreds of others—some members of the aristocracy and of the professional classes⁶ and a few merely over-bold individuals who ventured to comment too frankly upon the recent course of events in Italy—were soon to share his fate. In fact, of the 5,336 death sentences imposed in Germany during the next twelve months, no less than 1,744 were for ‘high treason’.⁷

At the same time Himmler instituted energetic measures against the backsliders inside the Nazi Party. In September he ordered that all Party members who no longer wished to wear their badges must hand these over personally to the Gauleiters and accept the consequences.⁸ On 4 October, at a gathering of the SS generals at Posen, he made it clear that he

¹ Verpflichtungen, iv. 4–5 and 8–12.
² See below, pp. 313–15.
³ Stuckart had already played an important part in the organization of the occupied territories: see below, p. 107.
⁴ DNB and Transocean, 21 August 1943. The appointment also marked the beginning of the clash between Himmler and Bornmann (cf. Trevor-Roper: Last Days of Hitler, pp. 42–43).
⁵ DNB, 1 September 1943.
⁶ e.g. Arno Freiherr von Wedekind, executed 3 September 1943; Georg Miethe (bank director), executed October 1943; and Dr. Gaiger (general practitioner), executed December 1943.
⁷ Cf. Die Lage, 23 August 1944. Many death sentences for ‘high treason’ had already been imposed in Austria at the time of Stalingrad.
⁸ National Zeitung (Basle), 20 September 1943.
intended to 'proceed without mercy' in carrying out his new tasks, which he
defined as (1) the 'restoration of the much-impaired authority of the
Reich' (Reichsautorität), (2) the 'decentralization of all functions which
were not important to the Reich' (reichswichtig), and (3) the 'rooting out of
corruption and bad conduct' in the 'whole apparatus and in every case'.
Those who had proved themselves 'good-for-nothings' would now be
'thrown out'—and that applied equally to unsatisfactory elements 'inside
the SS'. Three days later he claimed at a conference of Reichsleiters and
Gauleiters at the Führerhauptquartier that there was 'no defeatism among
the German people', and said that individual cases of disloyalty were
being 'ruthlessly eliminated'. He was, however, speaking to some extent
with his tongue in his cheek in that he himself had meanwhile been
flirting with treason. For at the time when he instituted his new reign of
terror against the so-called 'defeatists and grumblers' he had been in con-
tact with Langbehn and Popitz, two members of the German opposition,
whom he knew to be involved in a conspiracy against Hitler.\(^\text{1}\)

\(\text{f) The German Opposition, 1941–4}^\)

In the speech which he delivered from his military headquarters on 10
September 1943, after the Italian armistice, Hitler asserted that any 'hope
of finding traitors [in Germany] as in Italy was based upon a misunder-
standing of the nature of the National Socialist State' and that it was
'childish' to expect any repetition of the events of 25 July in the Reich.
This was in some ways typical of the Nazi attitude towards the opposition,
for the Nazi leaders had long been so bemused by their own propaganda
about the strength of the régime—as, indeed, about the strength of Fascism
in Italy\(^\text{2}\)—that they had refused to take the possibility of organized
resistance very seriously. In fact Hitler had, in April 1942, assured
Mussolini that he no longer had 'any opposition in Germany' and that,
in a large city such as Berlin, there was only a small element, 'of perhaps
2,000', which was hostile to the régime.\(^\text{3}\) Goebbels likewise was inclined
to belittle the 'political importance' of the resistance groups in the Reich
capital and to regard as 'amateurish' and 'innocuous' the activities in
which he knew certain prominent individuals ('Halder and possibly
Popitz') to be involved.\(^\text{4}\) Ironically enough, this attitude was shared by

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\(^{1}\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 143 (1919–PS).

\(^{2}\) DNB, 8 October 1943.

\(^{3}\) Allen Welsh Dulles: Germany's Underground (New York, Macmillan, 1947), pp. 147 and 158.

\(^{4}\) 'All reports referring to a weakening ... on the part of Italy were absolutely false. The
Duce had his people firmly in hand': Ribbentrop to Oshima, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin,
18 April 1943 (Memorandum of conversation at Fuschl, translated in Department of State Bulletin,
1 September 1946, p. 401).

\(^{5}\) Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, 29 April 1942 (ibid. 14 July
1946, pp. 57–63).

\(^{6}\) Goebbels Diaries, pp. 315 and 408.
some in the Allied countries, who found it difficult to believe that there was any serious resistance to Hitler during the war years.

(1) The Churches

Hitler did not, of course, underestimate the opposition which emanated from the Churches, as the elaborate machinery set up in the Reichsicherheitshauptamt to deal with 'political Catholicism' and 'political Protestantism'\(^1\) bears witness. This he felt impotent to deal with as he would have liked during the war, although he apparently looked forward to a reckoning later.\(^2\) However, even the Church opposition did not become really vocal until the Party extremists, led by Bormann, finally made it clear that they were determined to take advantage of the exigencies of war (e.g. the need for hospitals, which was made an excuse for taking over monasteries and other Church property)\(^3\) to eliminate the Christian confessions as they had already eliminated the rival political parties. Indeed, at first the Churches were prepared, in the interests of national unity, to endure persecution in silence, and occasionally a religious leader even went so far as to identify himself with his persecutors—as when, after the fall of France, Mgr. Rarkowski, the Catholic Field Bishop to the German Army, issued a pastoral letter to the troops praising Hitler, or when the Evangelical General Superintendent, Tügel, described the Führer in the Hamburgische Kirchenzeitung as the instrument of God and said that the restoration of German power in Europe was the fulfilment of divine law.\(^4\)

The beginning of 1941, however, witnessed a decisive change in Nazi-Church relations, as a result of which the anti-Nazi pronouncements of the Catholic Bishops became more and more outspoken. In March Archbishop Gröber of Freiburg, one of the most fearless critics of the régime, issued a pastoral letter declaring that, in the face of the current Nazi campaign against the Churches, 'Catholics could not remain merely passive' and pointing out that in present circumstances it would be 'definitely sinful to stand with arms folded'.\(^5\) Three months later a joint pastoral letter, drawn up at Fulda and read in all the Catholic churches of the Reich, recalled the serious obstacles placed in the way of the Church in recent months (expropriation of monasteries, closing of schools, suppression of diocesan journals, &c.) and pointed out that their removal must be the condition for any wholehearted collaboration between Church and State.

\(^1\) Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 74–75 (219–L); N.C.A. vii. 1069.
\(^2\) Cf. memorandum on the discussion between Rosenberg and Hitler of 8 May 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 866–7 (1520–LPS); N.C.A. iv. 67–68); also Goebbels Diaries, pp. 101 and 301.
\(^3\) Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 120–33 (3274–PS, 3278–PS); N.C.A. v. 1067–77; I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 537–47 (3927–PS) and xxxviii. 410–11 (146–R); N.C.A. viii. 250–1.
\(^4\) Schweizerische Evangelische Pressedienst, 24 July 1940.
\(^5\) Vatican Radio, 31 March 1941.
Since this document was issued only four days after the attack on Russia it might have been taken as an overture from the bishops to bury the hatchet in the face of the common Bolshevik danger. (The Evangelical Church Council for Spiritual Affairs was, for its part, about to send a telegram to Hitler assuring him of the loyal co-operation of all Evangelical Christians in the struggle against the Soviet Union.) The Nazis were not, however, interested in national unity at the price of ideological compromise. On 6 June 1941 Bormann sent out a secret circular to all the Gauleiters, emphasizing the incompatibility of Christianity with National Socialism and insisting that 'all influences', such as the Churches, 'which could limit or impair the leadership of the people (Volksführung) exercised by the Führer with the help of the NSDAP must be eliminated'. In this no distinction must be made between the confessions because the Protestant was 'just as inimical' as the Catholic. Instead, therefore, of the so-called 'Crusade against Bolshevism' becoming the signal for religious peace, it marked the beginning of an all-out spiritual war. Concessions hitherto granted to the Catholic Church—such as the right to hold services for Polish workers (the largest non-German Catholic group in the Reich)—were summarily withdrawn, and the repeated protests which this elicited from the President of the Fulda Conference, Cardinal Bertram, were studiously ignored. Even a joint memorandum from the bishops to Hitler charging the Reich Government with violating the Concordat went unheeded. The bishops, therefore, decided to bring their protests to the notice of the German people through the medium of their pastoral letters and their sermons.

For some time the bishops had been severely critical of the Nazi doctrines of race hatred, as well as of the systematic corruption of youth and the killing of the sick and the insane. Now they began to direct their denunciations to more purely secular aspects of Party policy such as the interference with the independence of the judges and the racial experiments (e.g. the attempts to people the state with 'scientifically bred human beings') which came in for particularly strong condemnation at the 1942 Fulda Conference. They also began to express open doubts about the

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 7–13 (075–D); N.C.A. vi. 1035–9.
3 The contents of this joint memorandum, which was submitted by Cardinal Bertram on 10 December 1941, were revealed in a pastoral letter signed by the Bishop of Wurzburg and read in the churches on Passion Sunday, 22 March 1942. According to Cardinal Bertram, 'not a word by way of answer' was sent to the memorandum (ibid. pp. 106 and 1031 respectively). For text of the memorandum cf. B.B.C. German Catholic Programme Broadcast of 22 August 1943.
justice of the German cause in the war, pointing out (in their joint Fulda letter of 19 August 1943) that all purely temporal ideologies which had moved away from the Christian faith had revealed themselves as paths of error and had ended in bitter disappointment,¹ and condemning those who had ‘fashioned a special god manifested only in their own nation and race’. Finally, in a number of lenten pastoral letters issued in 1944 they openly questioned the moral right of the Nazis to pose as the champions of Christian civilization against Bolshevism. Depicting the horrors of war as a direct answer to man’s provocation of God,² they warned those who expected to ‘conquer Bolshevism solely by political and economic measures’ that ‘the godlessness which is inherent in Bolshevism can only be overcome by the inner forces of the spirit of Christ’;³ and they appealed to the German people not to be ‘led astray’ by those who had ‘outraged and bestialized their souls’ and reduced them ‘to the level of Marxist materialism, instead of overcoming it’.⁴

(2) The Political and Military Opposition⁵

Meanwhile the political and military opposition, which had lain dormant for a time after the plot of November 1939, was again becoming active, although so far it had no positive achievement to record. For although there had been some attempt, with the help or connivance of Paulus, to organize a Putsch at the time of Stalingrad the two most notable acts of defiance to date—the planting of the Communist bomb in the Bürgerbräukeller at Munich on 9 November 1939 and the leaflet demonstration which Hans and Sophie Scholl staged in the same city on 19 February 1943⁶—had been the work of individuals not connected with the main anti-Nazi groups.⁷ Moreover, the attempt which Fabian von Schlabrendorff had made to blow up Hitler’s plane on 13 March 1943 had ended in failure, although fortunately not in discovery.⁸ Added to this, the opposition (so its members later maintained) had been to some extent demoralized by the Allied insistence upon ‘unconditional surrender’ after

¹ Vatican Radio, 7 and 8 September 1943.
² Lenten pastoral of Count von Galen, Bishop of Münster, KIPA (Catholic Press Agency), 11 March 1944.
³ Lenten pastoral of Cardinal Bertram, Archbishop of Breslau, ibid. 24 February 1944.
⁴ Lenten pastoral of Archbishop Gröber of Freiburg, ibid. 13 March 1944.
⁵ See also Wheeler-Bennett: The Nemesis of Power, pp. 456 seqq.
⁶ Hans Scholl and his sister, Sophie, believing the time to be ripe for open agitation against Hitler, scattered hundreds of copies of an anti-Nazi leaflet from a balcony of Munich University. Betrayed by a building superintendent, they were tortured, tried (by no less a person than Freisler himself, the President of the People’s Court), and executed (see Dulles: Germany’s Underground, p. 121).
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid. p. 67; Fabian von Schlabrendorff and Gero von S. Gaevernitz: Offiziere gegen Hitler (Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1946), pp. 71 seqq.
the Casablanca Conference of January 1943. It was also divided among various factions, which tended to reflect either the professional or the social outlook of the group or class to which the members belonged or the creed or the political party with which they were identified.

On the military side there was a small nucleus of anti-Nazi generals, led by Beck (the former Chief of Staff), Witzleben (who had retired as Commander-in-Chief West in 1942), Hoeppner (an eastern front general court-martialed in 1942 for retreating against Hitler's orders), and Oster (Chief of the Abwehr Central Intelligence Bureau), who had been waiting for a chance for action ever since the collapse of the plot of November 1939. They had, in the course of the war, been joined by General Friedrich Olbricht (the Chief of the Allgemeine Heeresamt), Lieutenant-General von Hase (since 1940 commander of the troops stationed in Berlin), General von Treschkow (one of von Kluge's aides on the eastern front), and General Lindemann (an artillery officer attached to Supreme Army Headquarters). Closely linked to them through Oster was the so-called 'Canaris Circle' (Admiral Wilhelm Canaris being the Head of the Abwehr), which consisted almost exclusively of officers and civilian officials of the military counter-intelligence service. This group rendered valuable service to the opposition by providing 'cover' for its activities, but, while it supplied some good organizers like Oster, General Lahousen, and Colonel Hansen, the high-mindedness and hatred of violence of its leader, Canaris, made it an easy target for Himmler, who pounced on it late in 1943, relieving first Oster and then Canaris himself of their posts and arresting a number of their assistants. On the fringe of the Beck and Canaris circles stood another small group of generals, represented by von Kluge and eventually by Rommel, who saw the necessity of removing Hitler but who hesitated to give their unconditional support to the idea of a Putsch.

Of the civilians connected with the opposition some had been officials in the early years of the Nazi régime and a few were still in the public service. Dr. Karl Goerdeler, the leader, had been National Price Commissioner under Brüning and Oberbürgermeister of Leipzig from 1930 to 1936. Schacht had been Reich Minister of Economics until 1938, President of the Reichsbank until 1939, and Minister without Portfolio until January 1943. Popitz was still Prussian Minister of Finance. Gisevius


2 At this date Schacht was dismissed for writing a letter to Göring pointing out that the call-up of schoolboys for the anti-aircraft defences would 'impose a very great strain on the confidence of the German people in a German victory' (Schacht: Abrechnung mit Hitler, pp. 26–27).
had been in the Gestapo and then in the *Abwehr*. Nebe, the SS general who became one of the most assiduous of the plotters, was Chief of the Criminal Police. Count Wolf von Helldorf was *Polizeipräsident* of Berlin. Other prominent members of the group—Ulrich von Hassell, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, Otto Kiep, Hans Berndt von Haeften, Adam von Trott zu Solz, and the brothers Erich and Theo Kordt—had been in the Foreign Service.

More closely knit than this group of ex-officials, who were for the most part (but by no means exclusively) conservatives with close connexions with the industrialists, big business, and the aristocracy, were the Social Democrats and the so-called ‘Kreisau Circle’ to which some of the Social Democrats belonged. The former were led by Gustav Dahrendorf, Julius Leber (whom Freisler described at his trial in 1944 as ‘the Lenin of the German working class movement’),¹ Wilhelm Leuschner (a former trade union leader and Hessian Minister of the Interior, who was closely associated with the Catholic trade union leader, Jakob Kaiser),² Carlo Miren- dorf (one of the younger Social Democrats), and Theodor Haubach (a founder of the Reichsbanner). The moving spirit of the Kreisau Circle was Count Helmut von Moltke, a great-nephew of Bismarck’s Field Marshal and the international law expert of the *Abwehr Auslandsamt*, from whose estate in Silesia the group took its name; and its members included Peter Yorck von Wartenburg (a cousin of Stauffenberg), Eugen Gerstenmaier (the Lutheran Church leader), Adolf Reichswein (the Social Demo- crat), Trott zu Solz, and a number of other professional men, civil servants, and representatives of the pre-Nazi trade unions.³

Although the Kreisau Circle was generally opposed to violence (being more interested in promoting a spiritual regeneration) it did much to keep up the intellectual ferment of the opposition movement. More important still, being somewhat socialistically inclined, it served as a bridge between Right and Left, thereby helping to compose the ideological differences which divided the conspirators. Some of the ideological and many of the personal differences between the latter, however, persisted until the end. Beck, for example, disliked Popitz, who was also unpopular with the Social Democrats and (it seems) not always in agreement with Goerdeler.⁴ Severing, the Social Democrat, apparently refused to join any government in which Schacht was to serve.⁵ Stauffenberg, who finally planted the bomb at Hitler’s feet, was anxious for a *rapprochement* with Moscow. He

¹ Dulles: *Germany’s Underground*, p. 107.
⁴ Hassell: *Von anden Deutschland*, 27 December 1943.
⁵ Severing’s testimony at Nuremberg (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xiv. 274).
was completely out of sympathy with Beck and Goerdeler politically, and
even planned to install ‘military administrators’ with full powers alongside
Goerdeler’s Cabinet. Nevertheless, deep-seated as their differences were,
Goerdeler was able, by the summer of 1944, to bring the opposing factions
together on a common programme and to persuade them to agree upon
the composition of the future German Cabinet. According to the list of
Ministers which he drew up at this time Goerdeler himself was to be
Chancellor, under Beck as ‘Head of State’; Leuschner, the Social Demo-

crat, was to be Vice-Chancellor. The Foreign Ministry was to be given
either to von der Schulenburg or to Hassell (depending upon whether the
first peace negotiations were undertaken with the East or with the West),
while the Ministry of the Interior was to go to Leber, the Social Democrat,
and the Ministry of Justice to Wirmer, a Catholic. Witzleben was to
become Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Hoeppner Com-
mander of the Army.

The programme which the conspirators’ government was to follow had
already been drawn up by Goerdeler at the end of 1943. This emphasized
the desire of the new Reichregierung for peace. It also called for the com-
plete rejection of totalitarianism and the creation of a state based upon
the Christian traditions of the West. As was to be expected, concessions
were made to the socialist demand for public ownership of utilities and of
heavy industry. There was, however, little in the programme to attract
the Communists, although a last-minute attempt was made by Reichwein
to draw the Central Committee of the Communist Party into the plot.
The failure of this attempt, caused by the presence of a Gestapo agent on
the Communist Committee, resulted in the arrest of Reichwein and Leber
on 4 and 5 July and in the end helped to accelerate the attempt on Hitler’s
life, which was finally made by Stauffenberg just over two weeks later.

Space does not permit a detailed account here of the dramatic, but for
the most part highly confused, sequence of events which followed the ex-
plosion of Stauffenberg’s bomb at the Führerhauptquartier, at Rastenburg
in East Prussia, in the early afternoon of 20 July 1944. In the main the
Putsch misfired because Hitler was not killed but only in fact received
slight injuries which did not incapacitate him during the next crucial
twenty-four hours. Hardly less disastrous for the conspirators was the

1 Gisevius: Bis zum bittern Ende, ii. 347.
2 Schlabrendorff and Gaevertnitz: Offiziere gegen Hitler, pp. 106 seqq.
3 On 6 June General Eisenhower’s armies had landed in Normandy, and at the end of June
Beck had been told by Stulpnagel that the German front in the west could not last for another
six weeks. It had therefore been realized that the Putsch must be undertaken at once.
4 For a full account of this attempt on Hitler’s life see Wheeler-Bennett: The Nemesis of Power,
pp. 695–93; see also Gisevius, op. cit. pp. 371 seqq.
5 The bomb had been designed for use in a concrete underground shelter, but at the last
minute Hitler had changed the venue of his conference to a flimsy wooden barrack room where
the blast from the explosion was dispersed through the walls and roof.
failure of General Fellgiebel of the Signal Corps to blow up the communications centre at the Führerhauptquartier (thereby leaving the headquarters in contact with Berlin) and of their other key men to obtain control of the main wireless stations. Equally fatal was the indecision of the military leaders in Berlin, who sat about at the OKH headquarters in the Bendlerstrasse waiting for confirmation of Hitler's death and arguing endlessly as to what they should do next, while Goebbels, as Gauleiter of Berlin, was taking firm and decisive action to protect the Reich capital against the organizers of the Putsch. The result of this failure on the part of the conspirators to grasp their opportunity was that, by the evening of the same day, the attempt at a coup was virtually over. Just before 6.30 p.m. the Reich radio, announcing the news of the attempt on Hitler's life, was able to assure the German people that the Führer had received only 'slight burns and concussion but no injuries'. This and the repeated instructions from the Führerhauptquartier to ignore all orders from the Bendlerstrasse caused the waverers—among them Fromm, the Commander of the Home Army, who forced Beck to commit suicide and who had Olbricht, Stauffenberg, and Haeften shot—to withdraw and to make every effort to cover up their tracks.

The reaction of Hitler and of the Nazi propaganda machine to the Putsch was entirely characteristic. Every emphasis was given to the part played by the 'small clique' of Generals—those 'foolish and criminally stupid officers' against whom, as Hitler said in his broadcast of 21 July, accounts would 'this time' be settled in the manner to which National Socialists were accustomed. And practically nothing was said, until the relatively brief announcement of their trial and execution in September, about the civilians and above all about the high officials of the Party, like Helldorf and Nebe, who had been involved. The point that the plot was in the main simply another conspiracy of the Generals was also driven home by the proceedings of the military 'Court of Honour' which met on 4 August to expel Witzleben and the other surviving officers from the army and to hand them over to the People's Court.

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1 When Major Remer, the commander of the Großdeutschland guards battalion, reported that he had orders to arrest him, Goebbels insisted that this young officer should speak personally to Hitler on the telephone to prove that the Führer was still alive. This action resulted in Hitler's making Remer responsible for the protection of Berlin against those taking part in the Putsch.

2 B.B.C. Monitoring Digest for 21 July 1944; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 15. The phrase 'small clique of Generals' was first used by Dönitz and then repeated ad nauseam by the German press and radio.

3 The Nazi authorities may not, of course, have known at first how far the civilians were involved. Goerdeler's complicity, together with the offer of Rm. 1 million reward for his capture, was announced very briefly on 1 August.

4 On 8 August the People's Court sentenced them to death. For a verbatim account of the People's Court proceedings cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 299 seqq. (3881-PS).
(g) The Last Months of the National Socialist Regime

Hitler's only thought in the weeks which followed the failure of the Putsch was to wreak vengeance on all who had been involved—however remotely—in the attempt upon his life. Just as he had in 1934 seized upon the resistance of a small group within the NSDAP as the occasion for a purge of the whole movement, so now, as he remarked in his message to the Party of 13 November 1944, he proposed to make the new 'revolt' the occasion for a 'fundamental overhaul of the entire apparatus of the state' in which 'compromise and half-measures' would be a thing of the past. Thus, as one Nazi commentator put it, 20 July 1944 was to be 'the completion of 30 January 1933'.

In the course of the broadcast which he made after the Putsch Hitler announced that 'to create order at last' he had made Himmler Commander of the Home Army and that he had appointed Guderian to succeed Zeitzler (the somewhat colourless nonentity who had stepped into Halder's shoes) as Chief of the General Staff. This was the signal for a vigorous SS and Gestapo drive against the rest of the conspirators of 20 July, as well as against the weaker elements who had endeavoured to withdraw when it became clear that the plot was not going to succeed. In the course of this drive, which Hitler himself followed to the extent of demanding a daily report upon the proceedings, no fewer than 7,000 members of the opposition were taken into custody and about 700 officers were sentenced to death and executed, the measures against the army leaders being greatly facilitated by the curtailment of the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht courts in favour of the People's Court. Among the first to be arrested and tortured (although he was not actually executed until 19 March 1945) was Fromm, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, whose fratricidal activities at the Bendlerstrasse on 20 July had failed to wipe out all record of his connexion with the conspiracy. Kluge, the Commander-in-Chief West, only saved himself from a similar fate by committing suicide, but, before he did so, he addressed a long letter to Hitler in which he begged the latter to put an end to the 'hopeless struggle' in the west. In October Rommel, whose connexion with the plot had now become known, was given the alternative of taking his own life or standing trial before the People's Court. Knowing that the latter course would mean

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1 As he remarked at his conference of 31 August 1944, 'the fact that it [the plot] didn't succeed gives us the opportunity to free Germany of this cancer' (Gilbert, ed.: Hitler Directs his War, p. 104).
2 Volkischer Beobachter (South German edition), 14 November 1944.
3 Otmar Best in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 July 1944.
4 Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, p. 481.
5 Lüdde-Neurath: Regierung Dönitz, p. 38.
6 Shulman: Defeat in the West, p. 134.
certain conviction, and degradation for his family, the Field Marshal chose suicide on 14 October. By this time, however, it had become clear that the morale of the German army and people would be seriously shaken if it became known that these two distinguished soldiers were involved in the conspiracy. For this reason Hitler gave orders that Kluge should be buried without ceremony and that the other generals should not be told of his connexion with the plotters. In the case of Rommel he staged the nauseating spectacle of a state funeral in the hope that in this way the true facts about the Field Marshal’s death would not become known.

While Himmler busied himself with the task of keeping the army in line, Goebbels, who had played so conspicuous a part in quelling the revolt in Berlin, was given the responsibility of exacting new sacrifices from the home front. On 25 July, after a special meeting of the supreme Reich authorities under the chairmanship of Lammers, the Propaganda Minister was appointed ‘Reich Commissioner for the Total War Effort’, with authority to bring ‘all public projects’ into line with the needs of ‘total war’. Specifically he was to examine the ‘entire State organization, including the Reich Railways [and] the Reich Post Office’ to ensure that they were giving up ‘the maximum man-power for the armed forces and for armaments’; and for this purpose he was empowered to ‘demand information from the Supreme Reich authorities and... issue instructions to them’. Goebbels thus became, after Hitler, Himmler, and Bormann, the most powerful man in Germany, with authority to dictate to all government departments and to every branch of German social and cultural life what, in terms of man-power, their contribution to the ‘total war’ effort must be. This authority he exercised a month later with a decree abolishing almost every form of public entertainment in Germany. All theatres, music halls, and cabarets were to be closed. All orchestras not needed for the Reich radio were to be disbanded. The publication of all ‘fictional and similar literature’ (but not, of course, of the ‘standard political works’ of the Party) was to be suspended. The daily press was to be further curtailed (it had been subject to drastic restrictions since 1942). And many institutions of learning, ‘for instance, domestic and commercial colleges’, were to be closed.

On 18 October 1944, on the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig (1813), all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty were called upon to do service

2 Gilbert, ed.: Hitler Directs his War, pp. 101-2.
3 Young: Rommel, pp. 241-4 and DNB, 15, 17, and 19 October 1944.
5 Goebbels had already, in April 1944, been made Stadtrâûïer of the Reich capital ‘in order to concentrate all its forces... with regard to the war effort’ (DNB, 7 April 1944).
6 Ibid. 24 August 1944.
with the Volkssturm,¹ which, side by side with the army, was to carry on
the war on German soil against the invading Allied armies. (By this time
the United States First Army, having crossed the German frontier on 12
September, had entered Aachen, while, in the east, the Russians were
fighting on the borders of East Prussia.) Although the Volkssturm was
nominally 'an integral part of the armed forces’,² its control was, as
Bormann conceded, 'a purely Party affair’.³ Under Hitler’s decree of 18
October, to which the Volkssturm owed its existence, the Volkssturm
levies were to be raised and commanded by the Gauleiters. Schepmann,
the Chief of Staff of the SA, was its 'inspector of rifle training’; Himmler
was responsible for its over-all organization, training, and equipment; and
Bormann, who apparently refused to give the regular military authorities,
including Keitel, any information about the Volkssturm,⁴ was its leader in
political matters.⁵ This meant that, during the last six months of the war,
the control of military operations in the west was almost entirely in the
hands of the Party, for, as far as the army was concerned, Hitler himself
had now taken over responsibility for every operational detail.⁶

In his broadcast of 30 January 1945 Hitler spoke scathingly of 'those
numskull members of the middle class who refused to recognize that the
day of the bourgeois world had gone and would never return’, thereby
striking a note which was frequently to be heard in Nazi propaganda as
final defeat drew near. In this propaganda the last desperate struggle
was made to look as if it had some deeper revolutionary meaning, and
surrender or retreat was made tantamount to treason. Even the SS was
degraded when it failed to maintain the struggle against hopeless odds.⁷ As
Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army Himmler had already ordered
the shooting of families of deserters,⁸ and on 12 February Keitel imposed
the death penalty for officers who assisted their subordinates to leave the
combat zone illegally.⁹ For some time Hitler toyed with the idea of tearing
up the Geneva Convention, having been persuaded by Goebbels that the
shooting of prisoners which would probably ensue would discourage the
German soldiers from surrendering to the advancing Allied armies. Only

¹ See below, pp. 232–3 and note 1.
² Transocean, 18 October 1944.
220).
⁴ Testimony of Keitel (I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 597).
⁵ DNB, 18 October 1951.
⁶ Shulman: Defeat in the West, pp. 6–7. In January 1945 Hitler issued an order whereby no
army, corps, or divisional commander was to undertake any 'operational movement' without
prior reference to him.
⁷ All the SS divisions engaged in the fighting in Hungary, including the famous Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler, were in March 1945 stripped of their arm badges on Hitler’s orders because one of
their attacks had ended in retreat (cf. Boldt: In the Shelter with Hitler, p. 24).
⁸ Shulman, op. cit. p. 218.
⁹ Ibid. p. 280.
the firm opposition of his military advisers, in fact, seems to have prevented him from committing this new act of madness.¹

At the same time Hitler and Goebbels tried every propaganda trick in the book—the V-weapon campaign,² the fantasies woven round General Wenck’s march to relieve Berlin,³ the deception practised by Hitler personally on the subject of separate peace negotiations,⁴ the ‘Werewolf’ movement,⁵ and the promise of a last stand round the ‘Alpine Fortress’ at Berchtesgaden⁶—in their efforts to convince the German army and people that the war could still be fought to a stalemate if not to complete victory. Finally, in a last desperate attempt to stem the Allied advance, Hitler on 19 March 1945 ordered the institution of a scorched-earth policy.⁷ ‘All military installations, transport, communications, industrial and supply services, as well as all things of intrinsic value within the Reich which could be of immediate or future use to the enemy in the continuation of his struggle’ were to be destroyed. Even the great industrial cities of the Ruhr were to be demolished if they could not be held against the Allied forces.⁸ By now, however, many, both within the Party and without, had come to realize the senselessness of Hitler’s policy. Thus Gauleiter Kaufmann of Hamburg, for one, deliberately ignored Hitler’s orders and refused to dynamite that already much-damaged city.⁹ Similarly his close friend, the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production, Speer, made up his mind to save what he could for the benefit of the German people after the war, and in a speech at Hamburg on 16 April forbade all further destruction and called upon the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm to shoot all who disobeyed his orders.¹⁰ Others, in the army no less than in the Party, were now convinced that there was no sensible alternative to complete capitulation. In January, and again in March, Guderian had

¹ Dönitz and Jodl were apparently in the end able to convince Hitler that Germany stood to lose far more than she could gain by such an act (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xiii. 348, 469; also xxxiv. 641–4 (158 C); N.C.A. vi. 971–2; and I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 181–6 (606–11)).

² Vergeltungswaffe (reprisal-weapon) was the name given by the Germans to the pilotless flying bombs (V1), which they began sending over, chiefly to London, from sites across the Channel on 13 June 1944; and to the big explosive rockets (V2), the first of which fell in England on 8 September 1944.

³ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvii. 156.

⁴ According to Speer, Hitler at times pretended to be negotiating a separate peace with both Moscow and the West (ibid. xvi. 485).

⁵ Trevor-Roper: Last Days of Hitler, pp. 50 seqq.

⁶ Some deluded military commanders apparently fought hard to reach this ‘Alpine Fortress’ on the strength of Hitler’s promise that a last stand would be made there (cf. Halder: Hitler als Feldherr, p. 61).

⁷ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 430–1 (Speer–25); cf. N.C.A. Supplement B, 950–1 (Speer Document 027).

⁸ See Shulman: Defeat in the West, p. 283.

⁹ See Trevor-Roper, op. cit. p. 83.

¹⁰ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 437–42 (Speer–30); N.C.A. Supplement B, 942–3 (Speer Document 019).
gone to Ribbentrop and demanded an immediate armistice in the west. Himmler and Göring were apparently by now convinced of the necessity for such a step (the former was, in fact, about to try to initiate negotiations with the Western Powers through Count Bernadotte), but Ribbentrop (as so often in a crisis) showed himself incapable of action.¹

The story of how Hitler's dictatorship came to its inglorious end has already been told in great detail elsewhere,² and the main events can therefore be summarized very briefly here. In his last political testament, drawn up before he committed suicide in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery on 30 April 1945,³ Hitler appointed Grand Admiral Dönitz, on whom he had already conferred full military powers in the north, as his successor.⁴ Dönitz was to be both Reich President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, with Goebbels as Reich Chancellor, Bormann as Party Chancellor, and Seyss-Inquart as Foreign Minister. (Göring, hitherto designated as Hitler's successor but now suspected of disloyalty, was expelled from the Party,⁵ as was Himmler, who was to be succeeded as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police by Gauleiter Hanke.) At this time Dönitz himself was in Holstein and received the news of his appointment by wireless in the form of two messages—the first authorizing him to take all measures which he considered necessary and the second giving him details of the other appointments which Hitler had made.⁶ His immediate reaction was to act upon the first message and to ignore the second.

Dönitz's only thought was to provide Germany with some form of caretaker government until the details of the surrender could be arranged. In a speech to the German people over the radio on 1 May⁷ he defined his primary task as 'saving German men and women from being destroyed by the advancing Bolshevik enemy', and he made it clear that he was only interested in continuing the war against Great Britain and the United States as long as the latter prevented 'the achievement of this task'. Two

¹ Boldt: In the Shelter with Hitler, pp. 22–23.
³ As early as November 1939 Hitler had stated: 'Ich werde in diesem Kampf stehen oder fallen. Ich werde die Niederlage meines Volkes nicht überleben': speech to the generals of 23 November 1939 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 336 (789-PS); N.C.A. iii. 390).
⁴ Trevor-Roper, op. cit. p. 196; Lüdke-Neurath: Regierung Dönitz, p. 130.
⁵ Göring had left Berlin for southern Germany on 21 April. On 23 April he sent a telegram to Hitler announcing that, unless he received orders to the contrary, he would take control as the Führer's successor-designate (see also above, p. 25). On the same day he was arrested by the SS, but was afterwards released by the Luftwaffe.
⁶ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xiii. 306; Lüdke-Neurath, op. cit. pp. 45–49. In between the two messages there was a brief wireless signal from Bormann informing Dönitz that Hitler's testament had come into force.
days later he sent envoys, headed by General-Admiral von Friedeburg, to Field Marshal Montgomery’s headquarters on the Lüneburg Heath. On 4 May he ordered the termination of U-boat warfare and on the following day he banned the ‘Werewolves’—those miserable remnants of Hitler’s attempt to galvanize the German youth into a resistance movement behind the Allied lines.¹ The unconditional surrender of the German forces in Holland, north-west Germany, and Denmark had meanwhile become effective. On 6 May Dönitz sent letters to Himmler (who had begged in vain to be allowed to become ‘second man in the State’ in the new Reichsregierung),² Goebbels (the news of whose death with Hitler in the bunker had not yet reached the north-west), Rosenberg, and Thierack, dismissing them from office.³ A few hours later his Foreign Minister, Schwerin-Krosigk, informed the German people of the unconditional surrender of all the German armed forces to the Western Powers and Russia. On 23 May the Grand Admiral and all other members of his ‘Cabinet’ were taken into Allied custody as prisoners of war, and for the next four years and four months⁴ Germany was to remain under Allied military government.

(ii) The Concept of the New Order

(a) The New Order in German Propaganda

Although the German press and radio had discussed plans for the reorganization of Europe from time to time since the outbreak of war, the first reasoned and considered statement of how Germany proposed to bring the New Order into effect was made by the Reich Minister of Economics, Walther Funk—who was by nature a publicist, rather than a planner and administrator⁵—in an address delivered to German and foreign newspaper correspondents on 25 July 1940.⁶ Funk was, however, primarily interested in the commercial exploitation of Europe (for which much of the New Order propaganda served as a useful smoke-screen) and the burden of his proposals—presenting, as they did, a picture of Europe moving under German guidance from a system of bilateral to one of multilateral trade agreements—was largely economic. It was consequently not until after the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan—the ‘Magna Carta of the New Order’, as the Kölnische Zeitung

¹ Lüdde-Neurath: Regierung Dönitz, p. 72.
² Ibid. p. 95.
⁴ i.e. until the Occupation Statute for Western Germany became effective in September 1949.
⁵ Funk, who was a journalist by profession, had been Press Chief of the Reich Government before becoming Reich Minister for Economics.
⁶ Südost Echo, 26 July 1940; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 29. See also below, pp. 166–9.
called it—on 27 September 1940 that the political aspects of the picture began to be brought more clearly into focus. After that date Articles I and II of the Pact provided a favourite text for statements emphasizing the essential similarity of Axis aims in east and west. (By these two articles Japan recognized and respected ‘the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe’ and Germany and Italy made an identical declaration with regard to Japan’s ‘new order in Asia’.)¹ Much emphasis continued, however, to be given to the economic side of Axis collaboration. A ‘free exchange of trade’ should, according to Ribbentrop, take place ‘along generous lines’ between the ‘Euro-African hemisphere’ under the leadership of Germany and the East Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. This would be organized, not on a Raum to Raum, but on a country to country basis: ‘Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent States in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would conduct directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina &c.’² European countries (e.g. the Netherlands), whose colonies in the Far East lay within the Japanese living-space, would be compensated by a share in the exploitation of the European Großeräum. To Europe in general the New Order would bring such benefits as the abolition of unemployment and the assurance of a market for the agricultural surplus of the food-producing countries, which would remain unaffected by the fluctuation of world prices.³ At the same time the ‘German battle of production and Four-Year Plan’ would be put ‘through a European edition with the appropriate changes’, so that the Continent would become less dependent upon overseas supplies.⁴ Yet nothing more precise regarding the future European economic organization was vouched-at this stage. In fact the ‘formalist’ who demanded to know whether the new Europe would ‘resemble a cartel, pool, or concern’ was warned that he would ‘have to wait a long time until his juristic yearnings were satisfied in the New Order itself’.⁵

The basic propaganda concept of the New Order at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact was set out by Rosenberg in an article in the Völkischer Beobachter of 27 October 1940. Germany, this prolix Nazi theorist contended, stood for the delimitation of Lebensräume in place of the

² Minutes of discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima (Japanese Ambassador in Berlin), 23 February 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxviii. 552 seqq. (1834–PS); N.C.A. iv. 460–75).
³ Funk, in Mitteilungen der Deutschen Handelskammer in Kroatien, quoted by Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 14 March 1942.
⁴ Frankfurter Zeitung, 30 August 1941.
⁵ Ibid. 26 August 1941.
economic and financial imperialism of the nineteenth century, with the mutual safeguarding of the peoples who belonged to the ‘living-spaces’. As more and more nations became converted to this idea, a repetition of the events which had led to two world wars could be avoided. The ultimate aim was, therefore, a continent permanently at peace—a continent largely self-sufficient economically and completely self-contained politically—in which a Greater German Reich would serve as a ‘connecting link between the Baltic and the Mediterranean’. As Stuckart of the Reich Ministry of the Interior put it, the present war had broadened the concept of the German Volksgemeinschaft out into one of a European Völkergemeinschaft—a development which, according to another Nazi writer, would result in international law being superseded by the law of living-space. In this new ‘revolution’ the guiding principle would be, not national self-determination, but self-determination of the Lebensräume.\(^2\)

The emergence of Italy as a nominally equal partner under the Tripartite Pact caused interest to be directed towards the Mediterranean and Africa, where that country’s main ambitions were presumed to lie. ‘Euro-Africa’ came to be regarded as a single Großer Raum, while the Mediterranean assumed the role of a ‘bridge of water linking the European and the African spheres’.\(^1\) Italy was recognized as having the major interest in this region, while Germany’s African pretensions were said to be extremely modest. According to Ribbentrop, Germany would be ‘satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies’. Italy would be given the lion’s share of the African territories, while what remained of British possessions throughout the world would ‘probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States [sic], and Japan’.\(^4\)

At this stage the Nazi commentators were clearly at a loss to account for the existence of the Soviet Union as an interested observer, if not an active partner,\(^5\) in the Axis programme of aggression. Not that they apparently perceived any fundamental incongruity between the Tripartite Pact and the Nazi-Soviet Agreement of August 1939. On the contrary, they were at pains to emphasize that the Tripartite Pact (which Russia, in November 1940, came very near to joining)\(^6\) was not directed against

\(^1\) Wilhelm Stuckart: ‘Aufgaben und Ziele einer Verwaltungswissenschaft’, in Reich, Verwaltungsordnung, Lebensraum, ed. Wilhelm Stuckart, Werner Best, and others (Darmstadt, Wittich Verlag, 1942), ii. 53–74.

\(^2\) Goldel, in Der Mittag, Düsseldorf, 28 December 1942.

\(^3\) National Zeitung, Essen, 24 November 1942.


\(^6\) Ibid. pp. 226–60.
the Soviet Union\(^1\) and had, therefore, not affected German-Soviet relations. According to Dr. Jahrreis, writing in the *Kölner Zeitung* of 6 October 1940, the result of the present struggle would be to create a ‘political Europe’, which did not correspond to the so-called ‘geographical Europe’. This ‘political Europe’ ended at the frontier of Russia, which was itself a continent, and therefore an entirely different Großraum which presumably lay beyond the orbit of German-Italian interest.

Nevertheless, a German-Italian living-space cut short at the Narev, Vistula, and San did not fulfill the expectations of colonial expansion in the east raised by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, and it was consequently not until the attack upon Russia in 1941 that the exponents of Raumordnung were able to emphasize the advantages of turning the New Order in this direction. According to the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 21 March 1943 the living-space of Greater Europe could be safeguarded permanently ‘only if it extended to the steppes in the east and to the surrounding seas’. This would also enable the link with the Greater Asiatic Großraum to be established. As one writer saw it, the war against the Soviet Union and the occupation of the Eastern Territories served the purpose of restoring the balance in Europe by bringing the centre of gravity, which had shifted too far to the west, back to the very middle of the Continent. The incorporation of the Eastern areas was now a task for a united Europe, and opinion in all countries was beginning to realize the importance of this task, instead of merely regarding the war as a defence of Europe against Bolshevism. Each nation must, therefore, consider what its contribution to the common endeavour could be and ‘must be present as a co-worker on the great European building site’.\(^2\) Each nation must also, the exponents of the new Raumordnung insisted, ‘complete its own revolution’ (i.e. its political regeneration according to Nazi principles), as such national revolutions were to be part of a general European up-surge, which would create a ‘European community feeling’.

This was the spirit in which the German press and radio hailed the summoning of the Axis and satellite representatives to Berlin to renew the Anti-Comintern Pact in the much-publicized ‘State Act’ of 25 November 1941.\(^3\) This ‘first European Congress’, as the Wilhelmstrasse spokesman called it, was said to mark the identification of the New Order with the European ‘crusade’ in the east, and in commemoration of the occasion the German radio stations broadcast a new ‘Song of Europe’ urging the peoples of the Continent to fight for unity and the removal of international

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1 On 25 September 1940, the day before the Pact was signed, the German chargé d'affaires in Moscow had been directed by Ribbentrop to inform Molotov that it was ‘directed exclusively against American warmongers’ (*Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 195).

2 Megerle, in *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*, 26 October 1941.

discord,\(^1\) while the Berlin Post Office issued a special rubber stamp inscribed ‘European United Front against Bolshevism’ and showing a map of Europe decorated with sword and swastika. Catching the enthusiasm of the moment, the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 28 November 1941 wrote that ‘born out of discord, struggle, and misery the United States of Europe had at last become a reality’.

Fantastic projects for the colonization of the conquered areas of Russia with the cream of the Western European populations now began to be mooted; for these were the months when young people and the peasantry were constantly exhorted to take up the work of creating a *Bauernwall* against Bolshevism in the Eastern Territories, when the Party storm troops (i.e. the SA) were sent eastwards to promote schemes of settlement,\(^2\) and when chairs and institutes of ‘eastern research’ were established at a number of the German universities. Three million Dutchmen, it was stated after the establishment of the *Nederlandsche Oost-Compagnie* in June 1942, could take up a new and better life in the ‘modern colonics’ which were to be established in occupied Russia;\(^3\) while as far as Germany herself was concerned the opening up of the Eastern Territories was expected to permit the large-scale redistribution of peasant holdings in marginal areas which had long been one of the most cherished of Nazi projects.\(^4\)

Hardly less extravagant were the plans of the Nazi technicians and propagandists for developing the natural resources of the Großraum, and for bringing the member countries into closer physical contact with each other. In order to supplement the diminishing coal supplies of the area the ‘dormant water power resources’ of the Mediterranean and the Congo basin would be harnessed for European industry, and a gargantuan power dam, with turbines driven by the ‘inflow from the Atlantic’, would be constructed across the Straits of Gibraltar.\(^5\) At the same time the rich mineral resources of the east would be made more easily accessible to the west by the construction of a ‘Transcuropean railway’ linking the Donetz basin with the industrial area of Westphalia.\(^6\) Some day, when the whole of Russia was ‘thrown open to Europe’, there might be a four-metre gauge railway linking east and west, over which huge passenger cars, six metres wide and seventy metres long, would travel at speeds of anything up to 250 kilometres per hour.\(^7\) There would also be large-scale improvements in the

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\(^1\) The words of the song, it was stated, were by Christian Arensburg and the music was ‘written in modern revolutionary marching rhythm by Kurt Heuser’.


\(^3\) *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 June 1942.

\(^4\) Article by Herbert Backe of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, quoted by NDZ, 20 November 1942.

\(^5\) *Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung*, 8 March, and *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 8 August 1942.

\(^6\) Radio Paris, 22 April 1942.

\(^7\) Dr. Wiens, *Ministerialrat* in the Reich Ministry of Transport, quoted by *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2 March 1942.
European canal system—including the completion of the Oder–Danube Canal to link the Black Sea with the Baltic, and the construction of a ‘European Suez Canal’ linking the Upper Rhine and the Po by means of a cutting through the Alps.1 Telegraph and telephone facilities would likewise be improved out of all recognition by the Reich postal authorities, which were said already to be ‘working on a plan for an all-comprehensive European Postal Union’ in co-operation with ‘every European postal administration’.

Territorially the creation of the Großraum would necessitate the acceptance of a number of totally new concepts, as well as the revision of some existing ones. As far as Germany herself was concerned she must break through the narrow bounds imposed by ‘Bismarck’s Reich’, for the Reich of today was ‘taking its place as a super-national Ordnungsmacht’ and was ‘assuming a responsibility beyond that of the National State’.3 The ‘conception of the Reich’ thus no longer knew ‘any frontiers which could be marked on a map’.4 The Großraum itself, moreover, was ‘not a geophysical but a geopolitical conception’, being ‘the whole territory which can be made a unity over and above the national territory’ (Volksraum).5 The geographical limits of the Großraum were thus not necessarily fixed by any existing territorial frontiers. Werner Daitz, who produced his much-discussed study of ‘Real and Unreal Greater Living-Spaces’ at this time, defined the real Großraum as ‘the natural living-space of a family of nations’, receiving its character, extent, and form from the ‘biological substance’ of such ‘Völkerfamilien’; and he classified the Großlebensraum of the ‘European family of nations’ as one of the six major regions of the globe.6 The Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung (8 March 1942) spoke more vaguely of an ‘economic space Atlantropa’.

Administratively the problems created by the organization of the Großraum were apparently to be solved by marrying the Herrenvolk theory, which the Nazis had evolved in their external relations, with the Führerprinzip, upon which they insisted in the government of the Reich.7 The keystone of the Großraum administration was thus the ‘Fuhrungsvolk’ or ‘leading people’, which ‘welded the Großraum into one unity’ and

1 Signal, 1 July 1942. For other Nazi plans for revolutionizing the European canal system cf. Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 10 September 1941.

2 Friedrich Risch, Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Post Ministry, in Deutsche Post, quoted by NDZ, 7 September 1942.

3 Heinrich Scharp, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 1 March 1942.

4 Scharp, ibid. 15 July 1942.


6 W. Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 75 96. The six Großlebensräume, according to Daitz, were East Asia, Indo-Malaya, Europe, Africa, North America, and South America.

7 As the Kolnische Zeitung (15 September 1942) put it, ‘the leadership principle, which hitherto applied only in the state, has now also attained power in the life of the people of the Großraum’.
which ‘created the Großraum order’.\(^1\) The way in which the Führungs-
volk exercised its leadership must be ‘decided from a practical point of view’, and the Großraum administration might therefore take one of four forms: (1) The Bündnisverwaltung, in which the Führungsfolk would ‘outline and direct’ policy by diplomatic representation; (2) the Aufsichtsver-
waltung, in which the Führungsfolk would exercise close supervision; (3) the Regierungsverwaltung, in which ‘all the leading administrative activities would be undertaken by the administrative institutions of the Führungsfolk’; and (4) the Kolonialverwaltung, ‘under which the Groß-
raumfolk would not be allowed to participate in the administration at all’.\(^2\) Whichever of these alternatives was chosen, the whole pattern of relations between the individual states would radically change. International law would inevitably go by the board, for, as Werner Best pointed out, ‘Groß-
raumordnung and Großraumverwaltung constituted a new legal charter of co-existence to which the terms “international law” and “constitutional law” of the former liberalistic era no longer applied’. Nor could the prin-
ciple of neutrality be admitted. The ‘reorganization of the world’ would ‘probably result in the creation of great areas between which war would still be possible’, but it was inconceivable that any individual states which were members of these great areas should ‘take no part in such wars, particularly in Europe’.\(^3\) Or, as another Nazi commentator more bluntly phrased it,

what small state is there which is sufficiently independent to be neutral towards the Great Powers? The crisis of neutrality is in reality the crisis of the structure of our continent, of the collapse of old orders and empires, and of the birth of new dynasties. The small states have become the prey of an inexorable course of history, and the only question is whether they will give in without hope or full of hope.\(^4\)

The mood of German Großraum propaganda had always tended to vary with the military situation, and under the impact of the defeat at Stalingrad at the beginning of 1943 the theme changed completely. Not only was the colonial expansion motif now sedulously soft-pedalled, but de-
nunciation of Raumimperialismus became the order of the day.\(^5\) Germany, it was emphasized, was engaged in a war of defence for the entire continent of Europe, and the introduction of the New Order had become a matter


\(^2\) These are the forms of Großraum administration outlined by Best. They were said to re-
present ‘a first, though non-committal, systematic scheme’ (Kölnerische Zeitung, 15 September 1942).

\(^3\) Dr. Hans Ballreich, in Die Bewegung, 19 September 1942.

\(^4\) Cf. Dr. E. H. Bockhoff, in Brüsseler Zeitung, 6, 7, and 16 August 1942.

\(^5\) Even Werner Daitz joined in these denunciations, stressing that the German New Order was ‘anti-imperialistisch’; cf. article in Lubecker Zeitung, 14 March 1944.
for consideration only when the Bolshevik danger was past.\(^1\) The long
communiqué issued on 11 April 1943, after Hitler’s talks with Mussolini,
underlined this idea by stressing the determination of Germany and Italy
to remove the danger to the ‘Eurafrican’ region from East and West as
their common contribution to the defence of European civilization.\(^2\) In
the new propaganda directives which were issued by the information
section of the German Foreign Ministry on 3 February 1943 the German
missions abroad were instructed to take the line that ‘a victory of
the Anglo-Americans and the Bolsheviks would not be followed by peace,
security and prosperity, but only by a further bloody war’, and Europe
was to be depicted as having the choice ‘only between Bolshevist chaos and
the new European Order which is beneficial for all nations’.\(^3\) ‘European
co-operation’ within the military *Festung Europa* now became the favourite
German propaganda slogan, moving even Sauckel to end his proclama-
tions to foreign workers with the cry of ‘Long live the New Order’,\(^4\)
although, as Goebbels was constrained to admit, the Germans had hitherto
shunned such phrases ‘just as the devil shuns holy water’.\(^5\) For a time it was
even suggested that the Axis Powers might formalize their international
obligations in a European charter. The establishment of a joint *Programm
Europa* was actually announced at the end of February when Ribbentrop
returned from his visit to Rome, and the impression was given that a
‘Statute of Europe’ was due to be promulgated at any moment.\(^6\)

From the date of the German capitulation at Stalingrad until the end
of the war the New Order was seldom discussed except in relation to the
Russian danger. German propaganda was concerned, during this period,
on the one hand to minimize Germany’s own territorial aspirations and
ambitions, and on the other to magnify the aggressive designs of the
Soviet Union. In an attempt to inflate the Soviet bogey to its most terrify-
ing dimensions Goebbels ordered all his propaganda organs in November
1943 to embark upon what he called ‘a great, new anti-Bolshevik camp-
aign’, which, by exploiting the military successes of the Red Army, would
‘give Europe and our enemies the creeps’.\(^7\) At the same time propaganda
which hinted at the desirability of a German hegemony in Europe began

\(^1\) *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7 February 1943.
\(^2\) *Volkischer Beobachter*, 12 April 1943.
\(^3\) *Standardthesen und Richtlinien*, issued by the Chief of Propaganda on the Staff of the German
Minister of Foreign Affairs, translated in *Department of State Bulletin*, 3 March 1945, p. 312.
\(^4\) e.g. in his New Year Proclamation for 1944 (DNB, 31 December 1943).
\(^5\) *Goebbels Diaries*, p. 251.
\(^6\) Halfeld, in *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, 5 March 1943. According to the diplomatic correspon-
dent of Transocean (18 March 1943) there were ‘many indications that a future Statute of Europe
is at present the subject of lively discussion in the camp of the Tripartite Pact Powers*. In the
event, however, the New Order was never formalized in this way—possibly because of the
Italian collapse which followed soon afterwards.
\(^7\) *Goebbels Diaries*, p. 419.
to be used much more circumspectly, and emphasis was now given to the fact that Germany merely aspired to be *primus inter pares* among her neighbours.\footnote{Rehberg in *Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung*, 24 January 1944.} Germany, Goebbels stated at his press conference on 11 March 1943, aimed at a New Order ‘not held together by force and power, but based upon free will’. There were, it was argued, ‘no “Great Powers”, “medium states”, and “small states”, but only “concrete entities unique in history, whose relations to each other, and to the whole, cannot and need not be based upon an abstract theoretical formula’.\footnote{News Wiener Tagblatt, quoted by Nachrichten und Pressedienst, news agency of the German Foreign Ministry [referred to hereafter as NPD], 22 August 1944.} In order to give such arguments an air of credibility the Propaganda Ministry now found it necessary to eat some of the harsh words which it had said about the neutrals after the attack upon the Soviet Union.\footnote{Cf. e.g. articles by Goebbels in *Das Reich* of 11 January 1942 and 2 October 1942.} The tone, therefore, changed to one of pained regret that these countries had not been more alive to the common Bolshevik peril and to the real aims for which Germany was fighting. Germany, one newspaper even went so far as to assert in this connexion, had not gone to war in order to subjugate her neighbours, but in fulfilment of a mission to benefit all European peoples: ‘We did not cross our frontiers in order to subdue other peoples in blind madness for conquest . . . we came as the heralds of a New Order and a new justice.’\footnote{Pommersche Zeitung, 1 September 1944.} The ensuing sections of this survey will, it is hoped, provide a suitable commentary upon this assertion.

*(b) Hitler and the New Order*

No one reading Hitler’s speeches of the period 1939 to 1941 can fail to be struck by the contrast between his reticence regarding Germany’s plans for a New Order in Europe and the volubility of some of his subordinates on this subject. Indeed, despite the fact that by the beginning of 1941 the entire Nazi propaganda machine was geared to the idea of the New Order, and despite the wording of Articles I and II of the Tripartite Pact, Hitler himself never enlarged upon the theme, nor even attempted to define its meaning. It is true that he used the expression ‘New Order’ in his Reichstag speech of 6 October 1939,\footnote{Dokumente der deutschen Politik, vol. vii, part 1 (Berlin, Junker and Dümnnaupt, 1940), pp. 334–62.} but only in reference to two specific matters—the solution of the problems of Eastern Europe and the reorganization of international trade; that in his New Year message for 1940\footnote{Adolf Hitler: *Der großdeutsche Freiheitskampf: Reden [1 September 1939—16 March 1941]*, ed. Philipp Buhl, 2 vols. in 1 (Munich, NSDAP, Eher, 1943), p. 135.} he spoke of the Germans as ‘fighting for the construction of a New Europe’; and that, in his speech of 30 January 1941,\footnote{Deutschlandsernder (B.B.C. monitoring), 30 January 1941.} he referred to 1941
as the ‘year of a great European New Order’. But when Molotov, who seemed determined to find out during his visit to Berlin in November 1940 what was in fact meant by the ‘New Order in Europe and Asia’,¹ invited him to expound his views on the subject he merely responded by defining the objects of the Tripartite Pact in terms of ‘natural interests’ and apparently made no reference to the wider aims of the New Order as defined in Nazi propaganda.² In his New Year message for 1941 he bluntly admitted that the issue at stake in the war was not any political system or any particular international structure.³ Only in his speech of 30 January 1944,⁴ which he delivered at a time when the days of the New Order were clearly numbered, did he deign to refer to the tasks which the Nazis had allegedly undertaken on behalf of the ‘European family of nations (die europäische Völkerfamilie)’. Even then he spoke of the seizure of foreign territories, not as a move on behalf of Europe, but as the unification of countries which were inhabited by Germans, which once belonged to the German Reich, or which had become economically indispensable to Germany.

This general indifference on Hitler’s part towards the propaganda trimmings of the New Order was reflected not only in his public pronouncements on Germany’s war aims, but also in his unwillingness to entertain the proposals which were put to him by his advisers for a reorganization of the European continent along the more liberal lines occasionally suggested by the German publicists. Proposals of this nature were apparently presented to him at least twice by the German Foreign Ministry and on both occasions he rejected them out of hand; the first time being after the capitulation of Belgium, when von Steengracht (afterwards State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry) suggested the constitution of a United States of Europe, and the second, in the winter of 1942–3, when Ribbentrop apparently worked out a plan which would have restored to the occupied territories a measure of independence under German leadership.⁵

Whenever Hitler considered the rearrangement of the map of Europe he thought only in terms of conquest, followed, wherever possible, by direct annexation. His attitude in this respect was summed up by Goebbels, who bluntly stated in his Sportpalast speech of 11 February 1941 that Germany was fighting for her Lebensraum, ‘and what that is we can discuss

² Ibid. pp. 233 seqq.
³ Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 January 1941. Hitler apparently used the expression ‘New Order’ once in his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, on 27 March 1941 (Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 291). He had also used it once in his conversation with Suñer of 17 September 1940 (see below, p. 58, notes 5 and 6). This use of the term is not surprising in view of the part which Nazi propaganda clichés always tended to play in the Axis conversations.
⁴ Großdeutscher Rundfunk (B.B.C. monitoring), 30 January 1944.
⁵ Testimony of Adolf, Freiherr von Steengracht at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 112–13).
after the war'. How Hitler pursued this search for Lebensraum was revealed with particular clarity after the fall of France in 1940. His first reaction to the French defeat was to press for the detachment of large areas of France and for their incorporation in the Reich. Then, upon reflection, he decided that there might be bigger pickings at the expense of the British Empire, and he consequently deferred the dismemberment of the Third Republic in order to enable the latter to join him in his war against Great Britain. Finally, when the British Empire refused to fall, he turned his attention once more to the east, where an attack upon the Soviet Union seemed to offer him the prospect of effecting the sweeping territorial gains which he had failed to make in other areas.

Hitler’s first plans for the reorganization of Western Europe have survived in a report of a conference which was held at Göring’s headquarters on 19 June 1940. This indicates that, by the date in question, Hitler had decided that both Norway and Luxembourg were to be made an integral part of the Reich. The position of Belgium was still under consideration, as was the possibility of according ‘special treatment to the Flemish’ and of creating ‘a Burgundian State’. As far as France was concerned, Alsace and Lorraine were to be ‘reincorporated’ in the Reich, and an ‘autonomous Breton State’ was to be established. Nor was this to be the only price which France would have to pay, for Hitler apparently had in mind also the annexation of large areas in the north and east of the Republic ‘which, for so-called historical, or political, racial, geographical reasons, or any other reasons, could be considered as belonging, not to Western, but to Central Europe’; and he therefore commissioned Stuckart, of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to prepare a plan for the dismemberment of France along these lines.

Upon reflection, however, Hitler seems to have come to the conclusion that it would be more to his advantage to ‘work together’ with the French, ‘in the most effective manner possible for the future conduct of the war against England’. At this stage there appeared to be more to be gained by concentrating upon what he described to Molotov on 13 November 1940 as the ‘bankrupt estate’ of the British Empire. He consequently

1 Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, 12 February 1941. Hitler frequently spoke of Germany in his speeches as fighting for Lebensraum (cf. e.g. speeches of 23 November 1939 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 329 (789–PS); N.C.A. iii. 574) and 25 February 1940 (Volksicher Beobachter, 26 February 1940); also proclamation of 31 December 1941 (Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 1 January 1942). At the conference of 23 May 1939, reported in the ‘Little Schmundt Report’, he had stated: ‘Der Lebensraum der staatl. Größe angemessen, ist die Grundlage für jede Macht’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 548 (079–L); N.C.A. vii. 848).

2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 31 (1155 PS).

3 Interrogation of Dr. Globke (ibid. xivxvii. 222 (513–F)). It was Stuckart who, without consulting Ribbentrop, had participated in a similar dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Cf. U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, pp. 1112–13.

4 Directive No. 18 of 12 November 1940 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 41 (444–PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 403). This did not mean, however, that France was to be allowed to regain enough strength to make her a possible danger to the Axis (see below, pp. 289–90).
decided that he ‘did not want to annex France, as the Russians appeared to assume, but wanted rather to create a world coalition of interested Powers which would consist of Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Soviet Russia, and Japan’ and which would ‘to a certain degree represent a coalition’—extending from North Africa to Eastern Asia—of all those who wanted to be satisfied at the expense of Great Britain.¹ As Ribbentrop observed, Hitler had given long and thorough consideration to the question of allocating spheres of influence between Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan, and had come to feel that ‘a wise policy would normally direct the momentum of their Lebensraum expansion entirely southward’. Japan had already turned towards the south, and she would have to work for centuries in order to consolidate her territorial gains there. Similarly, Italian expansion would lie to the south, in North and East Africa.² As for Germany herself, she had ‘defined her spheres of influence with Russia’, and after the establishment of a New Order in Western Europe she would find her Lebensraum in a southerly direction, i.e. ‘in Central Africa in the region of the former German colonies’.³ As an earnest of this ‘southerly’ orientation of Germany’s interests, Hitler and Ribbentrop were apparently prepared to insert into the first ‘Secret Protocol’ to the draft agreement which was to bring the Soviet Union into partnership with the Tripartite Pact a declaration to the effect that, apart from the ‘territorial revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of peace’, Germany’s territorial aspirations would be directed to ‘the territories of Central Africa’.⁴

For a few months between the late summer of 1940 and the spring of 1941 Hitler’s true intentions were, therefore, for once faithfully mirrored by the propagandists in that he was apparently prepared to concede that Germany’s destiny (or at least her immediate future) lay to the south in Africa. As he told Suñer at their meeting on 17 September 1940,⁵ he did not contemplate ‘a great colonial area’ for Germany in Central Africa as an ‘area for settlement’—for she already ‘possessed enough’ territory of this description on the European continent—but purely as ‘a matter of raw material colonies’.⁶ This would mean making some concession to France and turning a blind eye to the shortcomings of the Vichy Government,⁷ if his plans were not to be doomed at the outset by a breach between

¹ Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 243.
² For Italy’s territorial claims, as formulated shortly after her entry into the war, see below, pp. 286–7. For Italy’s suspicions about Franco-German relations see also below, pp. 290–1.
³ Conversation with Molotov of 12 November 1940 (Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 221).
⁴ Ibid. p. 257.
⁵ Serrano Suñer was General Franco’s brother-in-law and held the office of Minister of the Interior in the Spanish Government.
⁷ Of which, as Hitler told Ciano in March 1941, he was, now as before, ‘very mistrustful’ (conversation between Hitler and Ciano in Vienna of 25 March 1941: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 103 (2765–PS)).
France and her territories in North Africa. France would, therefore, for the time being be assigned the role of a non-belligerent, which would mean that she would have 'to permit and, as far as necessary, support with everything at her disposal, the measures of the German war leadership in the territory under her control—particularly in the African colonies'.

The great African venture came to nought, however, because of the final unwillingness of Spain, upon whose co-operation the Drang nach Afrika depended, to throw in her lot with the New Order. From the beginning General Franco had set a high price upon Spanish collaboration. In a memorandum of June 1940, laying down his conditions for entering the war, he had insisted upon the fulfilment of Spanish 'national territorial' aspirations with regard to Gibraltar, French Morocco, Oran, the areas adjacent to Rio de Oro, and the colonies in the Gulf of Guinea. This had not deterred Hitler from trying to reconcile the Spanish and French points of view and to persuade both Madrid and Vichy to recognize 'the greater future possibilities' which might be open to them if the Axis enterprise in Africa were successful. Nevertheless, despite his repeated assurances that Spain had 'in every moment felt herself at one with the Axis' and his professed belief that 'the destiny of history' had united him, the Führer, and the Duce in 'an indissoluble way', Franco decided, when the date for the combined Axis attack upon Gibraltar and the advance into North Africa was fixed, that Spain was economically in no shape to enter the war. The so-called 'Operation Felix' (code-word for the occupation of the Canary Islands, North Africa, and Gibraltar) had, therefore, to be postponed indefinitely, and Hitler began to direct his ambitions once more towards the east where he had, at heart, always felt that the search for Lebensraum should lie.

Although the adventure upon which the Germans embarked in Russia in 1941 was remarkable for the elaborate political planning which preceded the military attack, this was, in the main, planning not for the

1 Directive No. 18 of 12 November 1940 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 41 (444-PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 493).
3 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 243.
4 Spanish-Axis documents, nos. 8 and 13 (Department of State Bulletin, 17 March 1946, pp. 419 and 425).
5 Ibid. pp. 421–2. The date fixed for the attack was 10 January 1941.
6 At the OKW conference of 3 February, 'Operation Felix' was described as 'no longer possible, as the mass of the army artillery is being sent elsewhere' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 395 (872–PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 690).
7 Cf. Adolf Hitler: Mein Kampf, 2 vols. in 1, 41st impression (Munich, NSDAP, 1938), p. 154; Mein Kampf (trans. James Murphy), 2 vols. in 1 (London, Hurst & Blackett, 1939), p. 128. [Hereafter the original and translation will be referred to as Mein Kampf and 'tr. Murphy']. Hitler had actually begun to plan the attack on Russia before 'Operation Felix' was called off (cf. N.C.A. i. 798–9).
purpose of fulfilling the professed aims of the New Order, but for ensuring the ruthless exploitation of the territories concerned. Rosenberg might conceivably have argued that the grand scheme for the reorganization of the east, which he formulated as Hitler’s ‘Delegate for the Central Study of Questions Relating to the Eastern European Region’ after 20 April 1941, was in harmony with the broad concept of the New Order which he had set out in the columns of the Völkischer Beobachter. But the emphasis of his scheme was upon the advantages to be gained by Germany, and not upon the general European interest. As he saw it, Germany must concentrate upon the foundation of ‘three gigantic state units, each according to a different law’ in the area conquered from the Soviet Union. The first—the Baltic area—was initially to become a ‘German Protectorate’, although eventually, ‘with the Germanization of racially suitable elements, the colonization of the country with German settlers, and the uprooting of undesirable elements’, it would be transformed into an integral part of the German Reich. To this area would be brought, not only Germans from the Volga settlement (‘after the undesirable elements have been eliminated’), but ‘Danes, Norwegians, Dutch and—after the victorious conclusion of the war—also Englishmen’. A distinction would, however, be made between the territory of the former Baltic States and their hinterland, White Russia, which, with its ‘completely different character’, could only be used as a ‘dumping ground’ for the racial refuse of the rest of the area and of the General Government and Wartheland. The second area—the Ukraine—was to become ‘an independent state allied to Germany’, while the third—Caucasia—was, ‘with the adjoining territories to the north of it’, to become ‘a federal state with a German Plenipotentiary’.

This was in any case not the sort of Großraum planning in which Hitler himself was interested, as he showed at the conference which was held to discuss the organization of the Eastern Territories at his headquarters on 16 July 1941. At this stage he was only interested in how much Germany could digest of the conquered areas. At the conference of 16 July he therefore proceeded to pick out the regions which could be incorporated in the Reich at once. The old Austrian province of Galicia should, he stated,

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 383–4 (865–PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 621.
2 Speech to meeting of those most closely concerned with the Eastern Problem, 20 June 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 624 (1058–PS)).
5 Speech of 20 June 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 618 (1058–PS)).
become 'Reichsgebiet'. 'The entire Baltic territory'—the area of Rosenberg's proposed 'German Protectorate'—should likewise be made an integral part of Greater Germany. To the north-east, Leningrad must be razed to the ground and then handed over to the Finns, who also 'wanted East Karelia'. In the extreme south, the Crimea, 'with the largest possible hinterland', must be cleared of all foreigners. Then, having been resettled with Germans, it must become Reich territory, as must the Volga German colony and the 'area around Baku'.

At this same conference Hitler made known his views on the idea that the war against the Soviet Union was a war on behalf of the whole of Europe, and that not only Germany, but every other country collaborating with her, should be allowed to benefit from it. This was a favourite theme with the propagandists, who suggested that the eastern campaign had enabled Germany to put the natural resources of the Soviet Union 'at the service of Europe', and that the launching of the common crusade against Bolshevism now meant that 'European Gemeinmutz should have precedence over nationalistic Eigennutz'. It was also a theme which Hitler himself was willing to exploit in his speeches when it suited him. But this was an occasion for frankness, and Hitler was not now making a propaganda speech. Apparently a statement emphasizing the common interest of all European countries in the anti-Soviet campaign had just appeared in a Vichy newspaper, and this prompted Hitler to give vent, at the very beginning of the conference, to his own feelings on the subject. The main thing, he insisted, was that the Germans themselves knew what they wanted. It was not necessary to proclaim German aims to the world, and the German path must not be made more difficult by such declarations. Declarations of this sort were, in fact, superfluous, 'for as far as our might extends we can do what we like, and what lies beyond our power we cannot do in any case'. Although Hitler later came to modify his tone in the light of the reverses which the Germans suffered on the eastern front, these remarks must be taken as indicating his real attitude and the true measure of his intentions when the attack on Russia was launched. Had Hitler found himself with a completely free hand, the Eastern Raum would undoubtedly have been organized as he suggested at the conference of 16 July 1941, and the proclaimed objectives of the New Order in that region would have been quietly forgotten.

1 Rosenberg, however, had already suggested transferring the Volga Germans to the Ostland (see above, p. 60).
3 Cf. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 November, Volkischer Beobachter, 30 November, and Das Reich, 7 December 1941.
4 This was a point frequently made by the Großraum theorist Werner Daitz; cf., for example, Lübecker Zeitung, 14 March 1944.
(c) The Diplomatic Framework of the New Order

In the great mass of explanation and comment which the Nazi propagandists devoted to the diplomatic framework of the New Order they were always at pains to emphasize the superiority of Axis collaboration over that which existed in the Allied camp. As they saw it, the identity of outlook between the totalitarian movements, no less than the ties of friendship between the Axis leaders, gave the Tripartite Pact a 'special character' nowhere else achieved in international relations, and endowed the Axis with a unity which its enemies could not hope to emulate. Thus while Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union each pursued selfish and often conflicting aims, Germany and her allies could direct their efforts to the one exclusive purpose of making the New Order a reality. In so far as the Axis—at its European end at any rate—was completely dominated by Hitler, there was an element of truth in this contention; but, in the light of what is now known about relations between Germany, Italy, and the satellites, the general picture painted by the Nazi propagandists of the satellites working spontaneously and harmoniously towards the attainment of a common goal does not stand up to serious examination.

As far as Germany and Italy were concerned the general assumption was that these two countries shared the leadership of the New Order on a completely equal basis. Thus, when the so-called 'European Youth Association'—a federation of the Axis and satellite youth movements—was founded at Vienna in September 1942, it was given an Italian as well as a German President, while for practical purposes the control of the organization was entrusted jointly to the Reichsjugendführer, Arthur Axmann, and the Commander General of the Fascist GIL (Gioventù Italiana del Littorio) Aldo V dussoni.¹ This proved, in the event, to be no more than a propaganda gesture, but it was typical of the illusion of German-Italian equality which the Germans sought to foster. Hitler himself was constantly at pains to stress the equality of status between the two major Axis partners, as well as the 'absolute identity' (absolute Identität) of aim between the Nazi and Fascist 'revolutions'.² He also always made a point of emphasizing the close ties which bound him to Mussolini personally, whose 'destiny', he claimed, had so much in common with his own.

In reality the two dictators rarely, if ever, met upon equal terms, for as early as 1940 Hitler had—to quote one observer who was nearly always present at their conferences—'taken over the leadership and forced Mussolini into the role of junior partner'. Not only did Hitler completely dominate the famous Brenner meetings, speaking for 'eighty or ninety per

¹ DNB, 14 September 1942.
² Cf. speech of 24 February 1941 (Völkischer Beobachter, 26 February 1941).
cent. of the time' and allowing Mussolini only to 'get a few words in at the end', but he invariably concealed his intentions from his Italian colleague. Thus, at the first Brenner meeting of 18 March 1940 he studiously avoided giving the latter any information either about the impending offensive in the west, or about the planned attack on Norway and Denmark, which took place only three weeks after the meeting. In the following summer he refused to permit Mussolini to join in joint armistice negotiations with France, and when he launched his attack on Russia twelve months later he did not vouchsafe a word of warning to the Duce until the German troops were almost on the march.

Mussolini, for his part, bitterly resented this tendency to treat him as the junior partner. According to Ciano, he confessed as early as June 1941: 'Personally, I've had my fill of Hitler and the way he acts.' He apparently had no relish for the Axis conferences to which he found himself summoned 'by the ringing of a bell' as 'when people call their servants', and at which he had to listen for hours to 'quite fruitless and boring' monologues by the Führer. He could not, for one thing, overlook the way in which the Germans treated him in Croatia, and he was deeply offended by Hitler's cavalier omission to advise him in advance of the attack on Russia. Like the Japanese, he was also greatly exercised about German excesses in the occupied territories, which, as he saw it, 'made Europe as hot and treacherous as a volcano'. He therefore made up his mind to pay Hitler back in his own coin when, in the autumn of 1940, he launched his own attack on Greece. Nothing was communicated to Berlin until the Italian troops were ready to advance, with the result that Hitler, who was 'beside himself' with rage at Mussolini's action, found himself rushed into a new war for which he was totally unprepared and in which—as he tried lamely to explain to the Reichstag some months later—he felt compelled to intervene 'not to help Italy against Greece' but to prevent Great Britain from taking advantage of the Greek-Italian conflict to gain a foothold in the Balkans. 

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1 Schmidt: *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne*, p. 479. See also below, p. 286.
2 Schmidt, op. cit. p. 484. See also below, p. 288.
4 Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 10 June 1941; see also below, p. 301, note 5. Mussolini seems, however, not always to have been immune to Hitler's fascination when he was actually face to face with him: see Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 18–21 January 1943, cited on p. 297 below.
5 See below, p. 301, note 5.
6 Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 30 June 1941.
7 Ibid. 8 October 1942.
8 See Schmidt, op. cit. p. 505, and testimony of Keitel (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, x. 522–3). On 13 November 1940 Hitler told Molotov that he 'did not like Italy's war against Greece, as it diverted forces to the periphery, instead of concentrating them against England at one point' (*Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 242).
9 Speech of 4 May 1941 (supplement to *Wochenpost*, 13 May 1941).
Even in his speeches Hitler tended to draw a distinction between the Duce and the Italian people. Mussolini he praised as the 'genius' who stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries—'the greatest son of the Italian soil since the collapse of the ancient world', for whom, months after his fall, he continued to profess the deepest friendship, saying that he had 'decided once and for all to rely on the Duce and he had broken off all other relations with Italy'. For the Italian people, however, he had only the most profound contempt. In his conversations with the Japanese he made it clear that he was not prepared to share his secrets with them, and not even at his meetings with Mussolini did he conceal his attitude towards them. Thus, at their meeting at Feltre in northern Italy of 19 July 1943 (i.e. in the week before Mussolini's fall) he took the Duce severely to task for the way in which the 'unskilful and unsoldierly conduct' of the Italian ground forces had caused the Luftwaffe to lose many of its planes on the Italian airfields, while at the Klessheim meeting of 23 April 1944 he gave vent to his feelings on the whole 'shameful' conduct of the Italian forces in the war, particularly that of the Italian 'officers' corps' and of the Alpini and other regiments on the eastern front.

Hitler's attitude in this respect was shared by others in the Nazi Party. Officially the Party maintained that the German-Italian alliance could not be 'measured by normal standards' inasmuch as it rested upon the 'ties between the two revolutions, the Fascist and the National Socialist', and even after the armistice of September 1943 the line adopted was that the Italians should not be blamed as a nation for 'what had been done by a criminal group of plutocratic politicians in Rome'. Nevertheless Himmler, being personally less apprehensive than Bormann (who laid down Party policy in this respect) about the impact upon Party morale of the Fascist collapse in Italy, was inclined to take a far less tolerant view of the Italian shortcomings. Addressing the SS generals at Posen on 4 October 1943 he suggested that Mussolini alone among the Italians was the 'bearer of the

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1 Cf. Reichstag speech of 19 July 1940 (Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, 20 July 1940).
2 Speech from Führerhauptquartier, 10 September 1943 (Reichsprogramm—B.B.C. monitoring, 10 September 1943).
3 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, 23 April 1944 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 8 December 1946, p. 1061).
4 See also below, pp. 284–5, 296.
5 In his talks with Oshima of 3 January 1942 he twice begged the Japanese Ambassador not to breathe a word to the Italians of what he had said, as he could not trust them to keep it secret (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 96–97 (423-D)).
6 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini on 19 July 1943 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 6 October 1946, p. 610). For this meeting see also below, p. 313.
7 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, 23 April 1944 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 8 December 1946, pp. 1041–2).
8 Bormann's circular V.I. 79/1019 of 18 December 1942 (Verfugungen, i. 414–15).
9 Circular R. 172/43 of 15 December 1943 (ibid. v. 552–5). This circular was based upon an OKW Merkblatt on the handling of Italian internees.
great Roman tradition'. The Germans, he insisted, must 'get it clear in their heads' that the weakness of the Italian people lay 'in their blood and in their race'. Had Italy been a neighbour related 'body and soul' to Germany, 'then it would have been a happy state of affairs if she had remained strong'. However, the fact that she had proved 'permanently weak' made it 'better, considerably better, that conditions should be as they were today'.

Such sentiments as these were not inspired exclusively by the Italian collapse of September 1943, as the treatment accorded to the Italians living and working in the Reich and the occupied territories clearly indicated. In the Protectorate the Italians, as the Italian Consul-General had occasion to complain to Ciano in February 1942, were treated, 'if not worse than the Czechoslovaks', then 'certainly not much better'. Nor were they exempted from the wholesale expulsion of foreigners which accompanied the resettlement programme in the other occupied territories. Never, in fact, were the Italians regarded as the racial equals of the Herrenvolk. Inter-marriage between them and the Germans was generally forbidden, and only three months after the signing of the Tripartite Pact a confidential circular was issued to all Party offices in the Reich reminding them that this prohibition had been imposed.

Between the Germans and their other major ally, the Japanese, extensive collaboration was physically impossible and co-operation seems to have been confined in the main to an exchange of technical information under Hitler's 'Basic Order No. 24' of 5 March 1941. Even the agreement on economic co-operation, upon which Ribbentrop laid such emphasis after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, did not materialize until 20 January 1943, and was then mainly academic in view of the Allied control of the sea routes between the two Axis 'spheres'. German propaganda was not, however, slow in suggesting ways and means in which more positive collaboration could be effected. It gave considerable publicity to the military convention between Germany, Italy, and Japan which was signed in January 1942 and which it hailed as ensuring 'the proper and appropriate distribution of military forces for the preparation of operations of great striking power'. It also laid stress upon the Operationsverbundenheit between Japanese naval activity in the Indian Ocean and the German and

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1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 124-6 (1919-PS).
2 Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 22 February 1942.
3 In Alsace, for example, it was expressly stated that no exceptions to the deportation order were to be made in favour of the Italians, and the local Italian Consul was informed accordingly (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 336 (114-R); N.C.A. viii. 127).
4 Verfügung, ii. 64. For the treatment of Italian labourers see also below, pp. 322-31.
6 DNB, 20 January 1943.
7 Ibid. 19 January 1942.
Italian military campaigns in Africa,¹ and sought to suggest that Axis strategy was following an 'inner and an outer line', with Germany and Italy manning the 'inner line' on land and Japan exploiting the 'advantages of the outer line' at sea.² Nevertheless, even the most sanguine of German spokesmen were compelled to recognize that such collaboration would be, at best, fortuitous, and in an attempt to make up for the lack of substance in the German-Japanese alliance much emphasis was given to German-Japanese cultural collaboration, and branches of the German-Japanese Society, under the presidency of Admiral Förster, were set up in many of the larger German cities. Considerable publicity was also given to the activities of the German-Japanese Cultural Committee, which was constituted under the German-Japanese Cultural Agreement of 1938 and which was presided over by Professor Six, of the Foreign Ministry Department for Cultural Policy.³

Glowing as were the German press and propaganda tributes to the Heldenmut of the new oriental ally after the attack upon Pearl Harbour, there were apparently some who felt that, after all that had been said and written about Germany's 'Nordic' mission, it ill became her to have allied herself with the Japanese against her European sister nations. This uneasiness was brought to a head by the Diario de Barcelona, which on 1 January 1942 published a long article over the signature of Alvar Fanez accusing the Germans of 'betraying the whites' and of 'Aryan apostasy' by putting themselves 'at the service of the gravest danger which threatens the future of Europe... the 'yellow peril''. Coming from a country which had long been regarded as having thrown in its lot politically, if not militarily, with the New Order, this charge apparently proved particularly disconcerting to the Propaganda Ministry, which hastened to reply with a special article in its principal foreign propaganda organ, Signal, suggesting that the cause of 'European solidarity' had already been betrayed by the use of coloured troops against Germany in 1870 and 1914.⁴ It also evoked a strong reaction at the German Foreign Ministry, which in March 1942 sent Prince Urach, of the Foreign Minister's Press Bureau, to Rome to sound Ciano's secretary, d'Aieta, on the subject.⁵ Doubts about the propriety of the German-Japanese alliance also began to beset the German public generally, so that on 5 June 1942 Bormann was constrained to issue a special circular to the Party, calling upon the latter to take

¹ Cf. article by Rear-Admiral Gadow in Volk und Reich, June 1942.
² Cf. article by General von Metzsch in Die Koralette (Wochenschrift für Unterhaltung, Wissen, Lebensfreude), 8 November 1942.
³ Cf., for example, DNB, 7 July 1943.
⁴ Later the Propaganda Ministry apparently had second thoughts on the wisdom of replying in this way, and the issue of Signal containing the article on the 'yellow peril' was withdrawn.
⁵ Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 10 and 11 March 1942. According to Ciano, 'the Duce was indignant about Urach's declarations' and 'affirmed... his extreme pro-Japanese attitude'.
energetic measures in suppressing all further talk about the 'yellow peril', which he described as tantamount to 'treason'. Yet these doubts apparently persisted, even in the very highest quarters, and Hitler himself began to register uneasiness about the spectacular progress which the Japanese were making. According to Goebbels, he 'profoundly' regretted the 'heavy losses sustained by the white race in East Asia' and sometimes asked himself 'in a worried sort of way whether the white man is going to be able in the long run to maintain his supremacy over the tremendous reservoir of human beings in the East. Relations between Germany and the other Axis partners and satellites were even more completely dominated by the personality of Hitler than were those with Italy. As far as Spain was concerned—and she was, strictly speaking, neither an ally nor a satellite, despite Franco's early protestations of devotion to the Führer and the Duce—Hitler apparently wrote her off as a full and effective partner in the Axis enterprise after her withdrawal from 'Operation Felix' at the end of 1940. He came to the conclusion that she would 'take sides only when the outcome of the war is decided'. He recognized, however, that it was in Germany's interest 'at least to preserve the appearance of good relations' with her, and, realizing that 'the Spanish were in an extremely doubtful position', he shrank, even as late as January 1944, from any 'step which might drive them into the enemy's camp'. On the other hand, he did not prevent the German press from becoming more and more outspoken in its comments on the Spanish attitude, especially after the recall of the Blue Division from the eastern front at the end of 1943. This change in the attitude of the German press was all the more noticeable in that it was writers in the press rather than German official spokesmen who had always laid so much emphasis upon Spain's desire to collaborate in creating the New Order. Great prominence had originally been given to the arrival of each contingent of Spanish 'volunteers' on the eastern front and to the frequent propaganda visits which the volunteers paid to Germany; and even more sporting events, like the international football match between Spain and

1 Verfugungen, i. 407–8. The circular was apparently issued at the request of the Propaganda Ministry.
2 Goebbels Diaries, pp. 26 and 280. To some extent, however, Hitler appeared to find solace in the thought that there were 'no Japanese on the European continent' to be 'serious competitors in the future organization of Europe' (ibid. p. 279).
3 See above, p. 59.
4 Hitler told Ciano on 25 March 1941 that Franco had in practice denounced the Hendaye agreement (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 103 (2765–PS)).
6 Statement to Ciano, 25 March 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 103 (2765–PS)).
7 Memorandum on conversation between Hitler and Oshima, 22 January 1944 (Department of State Bulletin, 29 September 1946, p. 569).
8 Cf., for example, Otmar Best's articles in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 19 August and 18 September 1944.
Germany in April 1942, had been eagerly seized upon as evidence of Spanish 'solidarity' with the Axis.\(^1\) The German Foreign Ministry spokesmen, on the other hand, had been considerably more cautious in their allusions to Spain's relations with the Axis, merely describing her attitude as one of 'non-belligerency' or 'neutrality which laid the stress on particular sentiments' towards the Germans and Italians.\(^2\)

Of the satellites proper, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland were not in Hitler's view 'closely related' to the Reich in the same sense as Italy.\(^3\) Nevertheless, as far as Rumania was concerned, his personal relations with Marshal Ion Antonescu were in some respect closer than those with Mussolini.\(^4\) In fact, he admitted to the Duce that he 'had a great regard' for the Conducator, although he had 'no confidence in Mihai Antonescu'.\(^5\) Marshal Antonescu was the only foreigner from whom Hitler ever sought military advice in time of difficulty,\(^6\) and the only visitor to the Führerhauptquartier who ventured to speak his mind freely and unequivocally in his conversations with Hitler.\(^7\) He also received special favours, such as Hitler showered upon no other satellite leader. In June 1941 he was told in advance of Hitler's plans for attacking the Soviet Union.\(^8\) When he visited Hitler in February 1942 his visit was front-page news in the Nazi Party press, while Quisling, who was also in the Reich at the time, was only given a brief and less conspicuous mention. On the occasion of that visit Antonescu was decorated by Hitler personally with the Grand Cross of the Order of the Eagle in Gold, and in the following June he became the first foreign general to receive the Knight's Cross.\(^9\)

Politically this predilection for Antonescu had far-reaching consequences in that it greatly strengthened the latter in his antagonism towards the Hungarians. This apparently gave Hitler no cause for regret, for he, like the Conducator, 'despised the Magyars'.\(^10\) Nor were Hitler's feelings towards Horthy personally at any time very cordial. For one thing the Regent's failure to co-operate wholeheartedly in 'solving' the Jewish 'problem'\(^11\) was always a source of exasperation to him.\(^12\) He also resented

\(^1\) Cf. DNB, 9 April 1942.
\(^2\) Cf., for example, remarks of Schmidt at the Wilhelmstrasse, reported by NPD, 18 November 1942.
\(^3\) Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, 23 April 1944 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 8 December 1946, p. 1061). For further details of relations with the satellites see below, pp. 576–84, 604–31.
\(^4\) See below, p. 606.
\(^5\) Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini at Schloss Klessheim, 29 April 1942 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 14 July 1946, p. 59).
\(^6\) Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 511.
\(^7\) Ibid. pp. 548–50 and 574–5.
\(^8\) Ibid. p. 537; but see below, p. 607.
\(^9\) DNB, 13 June 1942. In the previous January Hitler had presented him with a Daimler-Benz car as a mark of his esteem.
\(^10\) Schmidt, op. cit. p. 512.
\(^11\) See below, pp. 72–73.
\(^12\) Goebbels Diaries, p. 279, and I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 203–4 and 409–12.
the reluctance of the Hungarians to throw their full weight behind the war in the east, and a trace of this resentment was even apparent in his public speeches, in which he at times used different terms to describe Hungarian and Rumanian collaboration,1 and in which he tended to lump the Hungarians together with the Slovaks and the Croats, while according separate mention to the Rumanians.2 Both Hungary and Rumania had, he felt, been handsomely rewarded territorially for their allegiance to the Axis—the first by receiving Transylvania under the Vienna Award and Prekomurje, the Bačka, and Baranja after the attack on Yugoslavia, and the second by being allowed to recover Bessarabia and to annex Transnistria after the attack on Russia. In Hitler’s conversation with Mussolini he took the line that ‘it would be the duty of the Foreign Ministers of the Axis to deal with both countries persuasively and calmly’ so as to prevent their mutual animosities from leading to ‘an open break’ between them; and he claimed that he himself had told the Hungarians and the Rumanians ‘that if, at all costs, they wanted to wage war between themselves, he would not hinder them, but they would both lose by it’.3 Secretly, however, he apparently went so far as to hint to the Conducator that he might later give him a free hand to deal with Hungary,4 and it was hardly a coincidence that Mihai Antonescu delivered his famous speech of 19 March 1942 against the Hungarians5—a speech which for a time threatened to precipitate a war within the Axis6—only a month after the Conducator’s first visit to the Führerhauptquartier in East Prussia.

As far as Bulgaria was concerned, Hitler seems to have become resigned to the fact that the pro-Russian sentiments of her people would not allow them to participate in the ‘crusade’ against the Soviet Union. His relations with King Boris, whose ‘unconstrained’ and ‘unassuming’ manner apparently made a good impression on him and his entourage,7 were always correct, if not exactly friendly.8 Having liberally rewarded Bulgaria for her part in the campaign against Yugoslavia—thereby, as he put it in his Reichstag speech of 4 May 1941, paying off Germany’s ‘historic debt’ to her faithful ally of the First World War—he would undoubtedly have given her more but for the fact that she maintained diplomatic relations

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1 For instance, in his Reichstag speech of 4 May 1941 he spoke of the ‘altogether loyal attitude of Rumania’ as distinct from the ‘understanding co-operation of Hungary’ (Supplement to Wochenpost, 13 May 1941).
2 Cf., for example, Reichstag speech of 26 April 1942 (DNB, 26 April 1942).
3 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, 29 April 1942 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 14 July 1946, p. 59).
4 Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 549.
6 But which, as neutral press correspondents pointed out at the time, could not have been delivered without German approval.
7 Schmidt, op. cit. p. 572.
8 See p. 623 below for the rumour that Hitler was responsible for Boris’s death in August 1943.
with Moscow. This meant that in German propaganda regarding Bulgaria's role in the New Order the emphasis had to be placed less upon possible territorial adjustments at the expense of the Soviet Union than upon German-Bulgarian economic and cultural co-operation\(^1\) and upon the role which pro-German figures\(^2\) were playing in Bulgarian political life.

In the case of Finland, Hitler had likewise to accept the fact that she maintained diplomatic relations with a leading Allied Power (i.e. the United States), and that between her and Germany, as neutral correspondents pointed out,\(^3\) there existed no formal agreement beyond the 'practical co-operation necessitated by the struggle against a common enemy'. Nevertheless, the evidence available at the time of writing (1953) suggested that Hitler thought highly of this northern ally, to whom he accorded pride of place in his praise of the satellites in his Reichstag speech of 11 December 1941,\(^4\) and whom he honoured with a special visit in June 1942.\(^5\)

The most revealing picture, as far as Germany's relations with her satellites were concerned, was perhaps provided, not so much by their military collaboration (which was sometimes very tenuous indeed), as by the steps which Hitler took, first to 'protect' the Volksdeutsche in the Axis countries, and secondly to ensure that those countries co-operated with Germany in her attempts to bring about a 'final solution' of the Jewish 'problem'. In the case of the Volksdeutsche it became German policy to insist that these ethnic Germans be allowed to enjoy their own corporate existence, with the right to set up their own local government, to enact laws for the preservation of their Deutschtum, to join the Waffen-SS and other German military formations, and generally to maintain such relations with the Reich German authorities as the latter might require of them.\(^6\) Thus in Slovakia—the first satellite to 'join the Germans, weapons in hand, when war broke out' in 1939\(^7\)—the leader of the German Volksgruppe, Franz Karmasin, who had played an important part in the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Republic\(^8\) and who never made

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\(^{1}\) And especially upon the work of the German Scientific Institute in Sofia, the German-Bulgarian Agricultural Institute, and the German Labour Commission.

\(^{2}\) e.g. Gancho Ganchev, the Secretary-General of the Bulgarian Ministry of Education.

\(^{3}\) e.g. the Helsinki correspondent of Stockholms Tidningen, 28 September 1942.

\(^{4}\) Volkscher Beobachter, 13 December 1941.

\(^{5}\) According to the Volkscher Beobachter (6 June 1942) Hitler went to Helsinki for the sole purpose of expressing to Field Marshal Mannerheim his 'unqualified appreciation' of Finland's military achievements. See also below, p. 583.

\(^{6}\) For the activities of the German minorities in the various satellite countries cf. Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 23 February 1942, and Donauzeitung, 7 January 1942.

\(^{7}\) Juraj Ohrwal, in Slovak, 29 November 1941.

\(^{8}\) Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 118 (2790–PS); N.C.A. v. 425. See also Survey for 1938, iii. 83, 122.
any secret of the fact that he was a German agent,\(^1\) remained in constant touch with Ribbentrop, by whom he was used as a sort of unofficial Reich Commissioner.\(^2\) Under the Slovak constitutional statute of 21 July 1940 the Germans in Slovakia were to be represented by a State Secretariat, and in May 1940 they were declared a public corporation with the right to collect their own taxes (Volkssteuer) in addition to the taxes collected by the Slovak State.\(^3\) In Croatia the German Volksgruppe was similarly granted the rights of a public corporation under the Croat State Law of 21 June 1941 and subsequent laws issued in October of the same year, with the result that (1) their leader, Dr. Branimir Altgayer, became a Staatsdirektor, with supreme authority in all internal Volksdeutsche affairs; (2) Volksdeutsche civil servants swore allegiance both to Hitler and to Pavič, the Poglavnik (i.e. the Head of German-occupied Croatia); and (3) Volksdeutsche were free to follow the Nazi ritual of hoisting German flags, singing German songs, wearing uniforms, and giving the Party salute.\(^4\) In Rumania the status of the Volksgruppe was fixed by a special protocol signed by Ribbentrop and the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Manoilescu, on the occasion of the Vienna Award on 30 August 1940.\(^5\) This was subsequently implemented by an agreement between Antonescu and Andreas Schmidt, the Volksgruppenführer, of 6 October 1940, and by a decree of 21 November, making the Volksgruppe a public corporation and authorizing it to issue its own by-laws. As in Croatia, members of the Volksgruppe were compelled to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler, as well as to the local government (the so-called 'Legionary State of Rumania').\(^6\) In Hungary also the status of the Volksgruppe was fixed by a special protocol signed on the occasion of the Vienna Award.\(^7\) This granted the local Germans the right to retain their Volksstum without hindrance and permitted the ‘National League of Germans in Hungary’ (Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn), under the leadership of Dr. Franz Basch, to decide which persons were to be recognized as members of the Volksgruppe. Volksdeutsche were to have their own German

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1. Cf. Karminas's speech of 30 June 1942, reported in Grenzbote (Bratislava). He was, in fact, generously subsidized through the League of Germans Abroad and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.
3. Cf. Deutsche Stimmen (Bratislava), 9 October 1943. In 1940 there were about 140,000 Volksdeutsche in Slovakia, forming about 5 per cent. of the total population.
4. German estimates of the number of Volksdeutsche in Croatia varied between 160,000 and 180,000. These Volksdeutsche were concentrated mainly in the regions of Eastern Slavonia and Srem and in the capital, Zagreb.
6. The Germans in Greater Rumania totalled 745,000 in 1930. About one-fifth of these were involved in the cessions of territory which Rumania had to make in 1940.
schools and were to have a proportionate share in the public administration. Nevertheless, the rights of the Volksdeutsche in Hungary remained narrowly circumscribed compared with those of the ethnic Germans in the other satellite countries. The Volksdeutsche did not receive corporate status, nor were they the powers of their leader comparable with those of the Volksgruppenführer in Slovakia, Croatia, and Rumania. Local authorities forbade the hoisting of the swastika flag beside the national colours; hostility to the leaders of the German minority was frequently manifested during the debates of the Hungarian parliament; and the majority of the ethnic Germans themselves refused to join the Nazi-dominated Volksgruppe.¹

Like the Volksdeutsche, the Jews were made an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of the satellite countries. How far the satellites were to be drawn into the German plans for a ‘final solution’ of the Jewish ‘problem’ was indicated by the draft memorandum which Luther, the Under State-Secretary in charge of the Department ‘Deutschland’ of the Foreign Ministry, prepared on the subject in December 1941. According to Luther, the Jewish ‘problem’ could only be finally solved by:

1. deporting to the east all Jews residing in the Reich as well as those in Croatia, Slovakia, and Rumania;
2. deporting all German Jews in the occupied territories who had lost their citizenship;
3. deporting all Serbian Jews;
4. deporting all Jews handed over to Germany by the Hungarian Government;
5. issuing to the Rumanian, Slovakian, Croatian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Governments a declaration of German readiness to deport to the east Jews living in those countries;
6. influencing the Bulgarian and Hungarian Governments to enact laws similar to the Nuremberg Decrees;
7. inducing the remaining European Governments to issue laws concerning Jews; and
8. executing these measures, as hitherto, in ‘voluntary co-operation’ with the Gestapo.²

At one time the Nazi authorities apparently toyed with the idea of making their plans for the ‘final solution’ binding upon the satellites by drawing up a collective treaty on the Jewish question to which all the signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact would be asked to subscribe. This, however,

¹ According to the figures published in Pestí Hírlap of 3 September 1942, the Vienna Award brought the number of Germans in Hungary up to 866,000, or 5.9 per cent. of the total population. The leaders of the Volksgruppe, however, claimed that there were in Hungary some 1,250,000 persons of German origin, including all those who had become magyarized during the last century.
seems to have met with the objection that Italy, Spain, and Hungary would not be willing to commit themselves to any such multilateral undertaking. Consequently it was in the end decided to bring pressure to bear upon the satellites one by one to enter into bilateral agreements permitting the Germans to deport their Jewish populations. Here again, however, Hungary refused to toe the German line. At the celebrated ‘Wannsee Conference’, which was summoned on 20 January 1942 to clear up a number of questions in connexion with the proposed ‘final solution’, Heydrich found it necessary to point out that, whereas ‘in Slovakia and Croatia the problem was no longer difficult’ and whereas ‘Rumania had likewise appointed a Commissioner for Jewish Affairs’, in Hungary ‘it would be necessary in the near future to force upon [the] Government acceptance of an adviser on Jewish problems’. Yet no amount of diplomatic bullying was in fact able to bring about a change in the Hungarian attitude—as Vecsenmayer, who was sent by Ribbentrop as a special envoy, was constrained to report after his two visits to Budapest in April and December 1943—and the deportation of the Hungarian Jews did not in fact begin until the Germans occupied the country in March 1944.

(iii) The SS and the New Order

This survey would not be complete without some reference to the role which the SS played in the planning and organization of the New Order, for the SS was undoubtedly the most important single influence which was brought to bear upon the shaping of that much-discussed, if somewhat shadowy, political concept. Indeed, it might even be said that Hitler’s Europe was in the main a SS empire—an empire upon which the Führer himself looked with special favour because it embodied so many of his own ideas and principles; and one against which, as will be seen later, the civil and military administrations in the occupied territories often strove in vain to assert themselves. For this reason it is in general difficult to separate the history of the German Großraum from the story of the SS and its policies and activities.

1 Cf. memorandum by Albrecht of the Legal Division of the German Foreign Ministry, dated 23 December 1941 (ibid. pp. 28301–2).
3 See below, pp. 614, 616.
4 U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, Judgment, p. 28305. At the conference Heydrich reported that he had been appointed by Goring to serve as ‘Commissioner for the Preparation of the Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem’. He added that the primary responsibility for putting the ‘final solution’ into effect rested with Himmler, the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), ‘regardless of geographical boundaries’.
5 Ibid. pp. 28537 and 28540 seqq. Vecsenmayer subsequently became German Plenipotentiary in Hungary; see below, p. 106, note 2.
6 U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, Judgment, p. 28333.
7 See below, pp. 113–18.
The SS entered upon the scene with many initial advantages, not the least being the specially privileged position which it had enjoyed in the state and Party structure. For the SS had been for many years a law unto itself—a *Staat im Staat*, as General Petzel, the Army District Commander in Posen, had reason to complain as early as November 1939.\(^1\) Not only had it, in recognition of its services ‘in connexion with the events of 30 June 1934’, been elevated by Hitler to the status of an ‘independent organization within the framework of the NSDAP’;\(^2\) but its officers came, like the agents of the Gestapo, to be for all practical purposes outside the normal scope of German jurisdiction.\(^3\) Wherever possible, the SS avoided working through the regular state and Party offices. From the very beginning it maintained its own intelligence system, which at an early stage had also come to be made the sole intelligence agency of the Party and its formations, and which eventually superseded the official military intelligence organization, the *Abwehr*. It also set up its own independent bodies for conducting political, ideological, and ‘sociological’ research—among them being that macabre institution, the ‘SS Research and Training Association’ (*Das Ahnenerbe*)\(^4\) of which Himmler was President.

In all its activities the SS had the advantage (which many of the other agencies concerned with Hitler’s Europe were denied) of having, within its own organization, a co-ordinated and effective leadership; so that if, as so frequently happened, it worked at cross purposes with the other state and Party bodies, it was at least clear as to what its own aims were supposed to be. In the main, and in so far as it deigned to proclaim its policies at all, it was more blunt than these other agencies in stating its objectives. Despising the ‘plan-makers’—whom its organ, the *Schwarze Korps*, delighted in holding up to ridicule—\(^5\) it had little use for a New Order constituted on the broad basis advocated by many of the propagandists, believing that considerations of ‘blood, soil, and race’—particularly race—and what one SS spokesman\(^6\) called ‘the conception of the sword almighty’ must be paramount in any Europe reorganized under German leadership. The emphasis of its activities in this connexion was thus upon the Germanic peoples and upon the Volksdeutsche, the ethnic Germans abroad whom Hitler was pledged to ‘bring back’ into the Reich.

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1 Report from the Wehrkreiskommando, Posen, 23 November 1939 (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxv. 87–91 (419–D)).
2 *Verfügungen*, i. 596.
3 Cf., for example, *Deutsche Justiz*, 19 March 1943, on the legal position of the SS; also decree of 17 October 1939 on special jurisdiction in penal matters for certain SS officials and SS men (*U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, Judgment*, p. 10667).
5 Cf., for example, the issue of 17 September 1942.
6 SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Schinke, of the Berlin Educational Office, quoted by *Danziger Vorposten*, 19 December 1941.
In the occupied countries, as in the Reich itself, the SS became the main instrument for carrying out the many special 'security tasks' which Himmler was required to undertake as Chief of the German Police. It also acquired far-reaching powers under Hitler's decree of 7 October 1939, appointing Himmler Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums). This (as will be seen) gave the Reichsführer-SS virtually unlimited authority to designate areas of 'settlement' in the conquered territories and thereby to adjust the map of Europe, ethnically and demographically, as he saw fit. The result was that not only did the SS (by virtue of its police powers) serve as the custodian of the New Order, but Himmler, its leader, also became in some respects its architect, as his own group of Großraum planners—Stuckart, Best, Höhn, and others—duly recognized in the special volume of essays on SS geopolitics which they dedicated to him on his fortieth birthday in 1940.

(a) The SS and the 'Germanic' Ideal

On 12 August 1942 Hitler greatly extended the authority of the SS in the international field by issuing a decree which gave Himmler, as Reichsführer-SS, exclusive responsibility for conducting Nazi ideological relations with the so-called 'Germanic-national groups' in Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At first this responsibility extended only to the relations which the Party maintained with the native pro-Nazi organizations in the Germanic countries. Later, however, it came to apply to the official agencies of the state also, inasmuch as the Reich representatives in the occupied territories were forbidden to take action in matters affecting the Germanic groups without first consulting Himmler. The result was that the SS came to regard itself as having an exclusive lien on the contribution which the Germanic peoples were to make to the New Order, and as being the sole authority concerned with the planning and supervision of the role assigned to them in the future development of the Großraum.

This new accretion of power to Himmler became the signal for the appearance of a spate of newspaper articles and speeches in the Reich and

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 255-7 (686-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 2; cf. N.C.A. iii. 496-8.
2 See below, pp. 80 seqq.
4 Festgabe zum 40. Geburtstage des Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (Darmstadt, Wittich-Verlag, 1940).
6 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 265 (705-PS); N.C.A. iii. 514.
in the occupied territories, emphasizing the ties between the Germans, Dutch, and Scandinavians and advocating a New Order based upon a solid ‘Germanic Union’ of these and other ‘Germanic Peoples’. The idea, which was now enthusiastically taken up by the Schwarze Korps, was not entirely new and had, in fact, to some extent originated in the Germanic countries themselves. Thus in February 1942 Quisling, who had become head of the pro-Nazi Government of Norway on 1 February, had presented Hitler with a plan for entrusting the leadership of Europe to a ‘Great Germanic League’ under German guidance.\(^1\) This League would be controlled by a ‘Germanic League Council’, meeting periodically in Berlin, and would be protected by a common League army, navy, and air force. In expectation of a favourable response from Hitler—which was not, however, in the end forthcoming\(^2\)—Quisling renamed his own Norwegian SS organization (i.e. the ‘SS Norge’) the ‘Germanske SS Norge’, claiming that this was ‘a section of the SS of Greater Germany’ which was to ‘contribute its share to showing the Germanic peoples the path to a new future and to creating the bases of a Germanic community’.\(^3\) He also encouraged the circulation in Norway of a special ideological treatise, *Germansk Samband*, by Knut Knutsson Fiane, which was designed as an official guide for the Germanic Union propaganda.\(^4\) Nor had Quisling been alone among the Germanic collaborators in advocating the idea of such a union. In the Netherlands the plea for a ‘Germanic League’ had been vigorously put forward by Mussert, the Dutch National Socialist leader, first at a ceremony for the swearing-in of the Dutch SS under the direct command of the German SS at The Hague on 17 May 1942,\(^5\) which Himmler himself attended, and then in a speech at Lunteren on 31 July.\(^6\) On both occasions Mussert expressed the hope that a Germanic army (of which a ‘new Dutch army’ would be part) would eventually be formed for the defence of a ‘Union of all the Germanic peoples’. Such a union should, he thought, be the first step in the construction of a New Order. It would not, however, be the closely-knit organization which some of the German press and radio commentators were advocating, so much as a broad confederation of relatively independent ‘Germanic States’.

On the German side, Nazi spokesmen made flattering references to the racial ties which linked Germanic countries with the Reich. In Norway Terboven (Reich Commissioner since April 1940) sought to emphasize

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3 Order of 21 July 1942 (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxviii. 694 (926–RF)).

4 *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 February 1942.

5 DNB, 18 May, *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 May 1942.

6 Radio Hilversum (B.B.C. monitoring), 22 August 1942.
that the Norwegians were ‘not Poles or Asiatic Bolsheviks’, but ‘a nation of high culture’ with a ‘common origin’ with the Germans; and he said that he therefore conceived it to be his mission to ‘bring together Germans and Norwegians as equal partners in a Germanic community’. In the Netherlands Seyss-Inquart endeavoured on various occasions to explain that the country had been placed under a Reich Commissioner, instead of being given a military administration, because it was inhabited by a Germanic people, which would (so he hoped) soon be ready and willing to play its part in the creation of the New Europe. Similarly, in Denmark, the leader of the Germans in Nord Slesvig, Pastor Schmidt, suggested that it was in recognition of the fact that the Scandinavians were of ‘equal birth’ that the Germans had decided to limit their area of conquest in the north, in contrast with the extensive campaigns which they had undertaken in the east. Others laid stress upon the opportunities which all Germanic nations would be afforded of participating in the great eastern adventure, and it was, indeed, perhaps more than a coincidence that the foundation of the Nederlandsche Oost-Compagnie for the development of Dutch interests in the Eastern Territories was announced at this juncture. It was, however, characteristic that Hitler himself was apparently unenthusiastic about creating large non-German colonies in Russia.

In the Reich itself considerable latitude, if not indeed encouragement, had for some time been given to the Germanic quisling groups to engage in propaganda among foreign workers of their own nationality, although a rigid ban was imposed upon the activities of other pro-German organizations. Thus, under orders issued by Heydrich (the then Chief of the Security Police and SD) on 3 September 1941 and 6 December 1941, representatives of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling, the Danish DNSAP (Dansk National Socialistiske Arbejder Parti), the Dutch NSB (Nederlandse Nationaal Socialistische Beweging), the Flemish Nationaal Verbond, and the Belgian Rexist movement were expressly exempted from the prohibition on activities by foreign political organizations in the Reich. Similarly, Swiss nationals belonging to the ‘Nationalsozialistischer Schweizer Bund’ and the ‘Bund der Schweizer in Großdeutschland’ were allowed to hold meetings. On the other hand, when the Slovak Legation in Berlin

1 Deutsche Zeitung in Norwegen, 28 September, 7 October 1942.
2 Speech at Cologne, 13 November 1941 (Svenska Dagbladet, 20 November 1941). See below, p. 494 and note 5.
3 Article in Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 30 August 1942.
4 See above, p. 51.
5 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 288 (1520–PS); N.C.A. iv. 70.
6 Degrelle claimed that his Walloon Rexists were a ‘Germanic people’ and that they must therefore play their part in the Great Germanic community (e.g. speech at Brussels, 17 January 1943, reported by Brussels Radio and Pays Riel, 18, 19, and 20 January 1943).
7 See Heydrich’s Confidential Instruction 18/224 of 4 March 1942 (Verfugungen, ii. 213–15; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, pp. 6–8).
8 Ibid. iii. 243–4 and p. 11 respectively.
requested the approval of the German authorities for the constitution of a foreign branch of the Hlinka Party to organize the 50,000 Slovak workers in the Reich, this was refused on the ground that the German Government did not consider that such a step could serve any useful purpose during the war.\(^1\) The same ban was imposed upon all the French collaborationist groups\(^2\) and all the Serbian groups, ‘including the Ljotić Group (Zbor Movement) at present represented in the Serbian Government’ and the followers of Stojadinović. The Croat Nazi Party, although admitted to be ‘particularly pro-German’, was likewise forbidden to organize, and political activity among the Croats in the Reich was only to be carried on under the supervision of the Ustaša movement.\(^3\)

Encouraged by the interest which the German Nazi Party as a whole was now showing in Germanic questions, Himmler designated the Gau Südhannover-Braunschweig as the Party unit which was to ‘use its influence to bring about a union of all Germanic peoples in the German Reich’—this being accompanied by the opening in May 1943 of a ‘Germanic House’ in the Gau capital, Hanover, at a ceremony attended by leading German SS officials and by representatives of all the quisling SS groups of Western Europe.\(^4\) Inside the SS itself he entrusted the study of questions relating to the Germanic ideal to a so-called ‘SS Committee of the Working Group for the Germanic Raum’, consisting of representatives of all the SS offices interested in Germanic affairs (Ahnenerbe, Amt VI, the Chief Staff Office of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanic Nationality, Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, &c.).\(^5\)

The SS was not, however, anxious to further the Germanic ideal as an academic, or even as an ideological, exercise, and it was, in fact, in the practical aspect of Germanic solidarity—the stimulation of recruitment for the Germanic units of the Waffen-SS—that it was mainly interested. The recruitment of these units—which swore an oath of allegiance to Hitler as the ‘Germanic Führer’\(^6\) and which were officially described as the ‘SS shock troops for the New Order’\(^7\)—was of inestimable importance to the SS politically, extending as it did its influence over the quisling groups in the occupied territories and giving the SS ‘Germanic Command’ (the so-called SS-Hauptamt ‘Germanische Leitstelle’) a voice in shaping Nazi

\(^1\) Verf"u\ssungen, iii. 245.

\(^2\) The ban was said to have been imposed because of the ‘real political insignificance’ of these groups and because of ‘their attitude towards the Vichy Government’.

\(^3\) Ibid. pp. 243–4.

\(^4\) Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, 21 May 1943.

\(^5\) Cf. report of meeting of this committee held on 12 January 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 261 seqq. (705–PS); N.C.A. iii. 511–15).

\(^6\) As did members of bodies like the Dutch Landwacht (cf. Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 1943, pp. 115–18).

\(^7\) U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 1986.
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occupation policy. Nevertheless, this recruitment had a still more important purpose to serve in filling the gaps in the German armed forces left by the reverses on the eastern front, and as such it reached its peak after the defeat at Stalingrad, when feverish attempts were made to expand the Germanic SS units into a regularly constituted Panzer Corps. And it was when this recruiting drive failed to come up to expectation that the large volume of propaganda in favour of the Germanic ideal began to subside. Increasing importance then came to be attached to the non-Germanic formations of the Waffen-SS which recruited their 'volunteers', not on a racial basis, but by exploiting the common fear of Bolshevism.

Although some of these formations had been constituted earlier in the war, they too, began to be raised in strength only after the defeat at Stalingrad. Thus in May 1943 the Walloon Legion, which had originally been composed of a small body of fanatical Rexists, was expanded into a SS Walloon Brigade and made the object of an intensive recruiting campaign. In Latvia and Estonia all eligible age-groups were compulsorily conscripted for the Latvian SS Legion and the Estonian Brigade respectively; and Hitler's original insistence that only the German should bear arms gave way to a policy of wholesale impressment in these and other Eastern Territories. Occasionally, as in the case of the Galician Division—which the German Foreign Ministry spokesman, Stumm, described as a formation of 'local ex-servicemen of the First World War who fought with the former Austrian army'—the forces mustered were numerically, if not militarily, quite formidable. But in the main, as Lieutenant-General Dittmar, the military commentator, found it necessary to point out at the end of 1943, the efforts to recruit these and other eastern 'volunteers' amounted to nothing more than 'a promising beginning'.

The real eclipse of the Germanic ideal, however, came, not so much with the recruitment of non-Germanic SS formations, as with Himmler's

1 The fact that the 'Germanic Command' was placed under SS-Gruppenführer Gottlieb Berger, the Head of the SS-Hauptamt, was an interesting indication of its importance in this respect.
2 The 3rd Panzer Corps, under the command of SS-Gruppenführer Steiner.
3 According to Himmler 'the majority of the peoples of the Germanic countries could only be won over in their heart of hearts when in the present struggle between the two Germanic empires—the German and the British—the die had been cast and it had been decided which was the stronger': speech at Posen, 4 October 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 127–8 (1919–PS)).
4 For the Rexists see below, pp. 483–4.
5 See also below, p. 574.
7 NPD, 31 May 1943.
8 NS. Erziehung und Führung im Heere (a periodical issued irregularly by the German Army High Command), Heft 1/2, 1944, p. 18. For Jodl's views avowed at the Nuremberg Trial see below, p. 228.
decision to use Russian ‘volunteers’ and to give the backing of the SS to the ‘Russian Liberation Army’ of General Andrei A. Vlasov. This, as the Reichsführer’s own speeches show, at first proved a bitter pill for him to swallow. As late as October 1943 he had expressed great indignation at Vlasov’s suggestion that ‘Russia could only be conquered by Russians’, and he had vehemently denounced the ‘Vlasov fuss’ (Vlassow-Rummel) of which so much was being heard in other German quarters. By November 1944, however, the turn of the tide on the eastern front had driven Himmler into the ranks of the ‘petty political vagabonds’ (to use his own earlier expression) who were sponsoring the Russian general. After that date his relations with Vlasov became, outwardly at least, most cordial. He frequently exchanged greetings with the ‘R.O.A.’ commander, and when, on 15 November 1944, the ‘Committee for the Liberation of Russia’ was inaugurated in Prague, it was a member of his own staff, Lorenz, who was chosen to wish it well on behalf of the Reich Government.

(b) The SS and the Resettlement Programme

In his Reichstag speech of 6 October 1939 Hitler spoke of the need for a ‘rearrangement of ethnographical relations, i.e. a resettlement of nationalities’ which would produce ‘sharper lines of demarcation’ between the races of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and thereby ‘remove one of the causes of European conflict’. On the following day he issued a decree appointing Himmler Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volksstums) with the dual responsibility of organizing the return to the Reich of Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche who were scattered over this region, and of eliminating ‘the harmful influence’ of foreign national splinter groups within the new frontiers of Greater Germany which might ‘constitute a danger to the Reich and to the German people’s community’. In carrying out these two tasks the Reichsführer-SS was to take charge of the formation and development (Gestaltung) of new German settlement areas ‘through resettlement and in particular by providing a home for the

1 Cf. speech at Posen, 4 October 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 117 (1919-PS)), and speech at Bad Schachen, 14 October 1943 (ibid. xxxvii. 514 (070-L)).
2 The official Russian designation (Russkaya Osvoeboditeinaya Armiya) of Vlasov’s army, which wore German uniforms with these initials, R.O.A., on its shoulder-tabs. For Vlasov’s army see also below, p. 575.
returning racial Germans’, and in doing so he was to draw upon the Reich Ministry of Finance for all the funds that he needed.\(^1\) This was the beginning of the celebrated *Umsiedlung* programme, the object of which was not only to bring all Germans back into the Reich as stated in Hitler’s decree of 7 October 1939, but also to use the Volksdeutsche of the Baltic States, Italy, Russia, and the Balkan States to consolidate politically and economically the areas which Germany had conquered and annexed from Poland.

Theoretically the Reich Commissionership for the Strengthening of German Nationality was a state and not a Party or SS appointment. According to the decree of 17 October 1939 Himmler was to avail himself of the existing ‘authorities’ and ‘public bodies’, and in an order of 17 October 1939, setting up an Office of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality, he therefore laid it down that the state and Party agencies were to co-operate in carrying out the resettlement programme on the following basis:

\((a)\) Germans and Volksdeutsche were to be returned to Reich territory by the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* and the *Auslandsorganisation*;

\((b)\) medical examinations of the resettlers were to be conducted by the Reich Health leaders and the *SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt*;

\((c)\) ‘foreign elements dangerous to German Volkstum’ were to be taken care of by the Security Police in co-operation with the Chiefs of Civil Administration;

\((d)\) the settlement of peasants was to be carried out by the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture; and

\((e)\) the building of apartment houses and of suburban settlements was to be entrusted to the Reich Labour Minister and the German Labour Front.\(^2\)

For a time at least this was the division of labour which was followed in practice. Nevertheless, although Himmler used the Reichsstatthalter, Regierungspräsidenten, and Landräte as his agents in the reception areas, he kept the actual direction of the programme firmly in SS hands by appointing the Higher SS and Police Leaders his ‘Regional Commissioners’.\(^3\) As the Higher SS and Police Leaders were virtually independent of the German civil authorities, this had far-reaching consequences in divorcing the resettlement programme from other aspects of the German administration.

Many of Himmler’s duties under the decree of 7 October 1939 were eventually entrusted to the ‘Main Staff Office’ (*Stabshauptamt*) of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality and to the

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1. Large sums were, in fact, placed at his disposal by the Reich Finance Ministry (cf. *U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11*, pp. 2824 and 2835).

2. Ibid. *Case 8*, pp. 36-37.

3. With, however, two exceptions—i.e. in Baden-Elsass and Silesia, where the Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter respectively served for a time as ‘Regional Commissioners’.
'SS Head Office Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle'. The Main Staff Office, which was formally constituted by Himmler on 11 June 1941, was placed under the supervision of his own deputy, SS-Obergruppenführer Ulrich Greifelt, who is said to have been, under the Reichsführer-SS himself, 'the main driving force of the entire Germanization programme'. This Office was officially described as having responsibility for 'the entire planning and carrying out of settlement and reconstruction, including all questions of administration and economic policy connected with these'. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, which dealt with 'questions of nationality, particularly those of German nationality', and saw that all 'national-political measures decided upon by the Reichsführer-SS' were put into effect, had been in existence some years before the outbreak of war, and was originally a state, rather than a Party, agency. At the beginning of 1937 it had come under the direction of Werner Lorenz, whom Himmler, after his own appointment as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality in 1939, made responsible for the registration of the settlers, for their evacuation from their former homes, and for their removal to collecting camps in German or German-occupied territory. On 11 June 1941 the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle became, in name as well as in fact, a 'SS Main Office', with Lorenz as its chief.

The other branches of the SS apparatus which played a prominent part in the resettlement programme were the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), or 'RSHA', and the Race and Settlement Head Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt), both of which had their own special departments for handling matters relating to the New Order. Discussions on the various aspects of the programme—especially on the negative side of arranging the deportation of 'undesirable' foreign elements—usually involved both these offices, as well as the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the Main Staff Office, but matters of fundamental importance bearing upon the granting of citizenship to the settlers could be decided by the RSHA ('Gruppe III B — Volkstum') alone.

The resettlement programme got under way immediately after Himmler's appointment as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality with the transfer of the Baltic Germans to the newly incorporated areas of Poland under the agreement with Estonia of 15 October 1939 and with Latvia of 30 October 1939, and with the attempted

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1 U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 8, p. 37.
2 Ibid. (Judgment no. 1), p. 5387.
3 Germany, NSDAP: Organisationsbuch der NSDAP (Munich, Eher, 1943), pp. 421–2.
5 Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 11 and 70–71 (185–L and 219–L); N.C.A. vii. 1005 and 1064; and U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 8, pp. 237 9 and 356.
7 Ibid. pp. 653–8 and 269–79 respectively.
transfer of the German-speaking population of the South Tyrol under the German-Italian agreements of 23 June 1939 and 21 October 1939. In the following month it was extended, under the German-Soviet agreement of 3 November 1939, to the Germans in the Russian-occupied area of Poland, who were to be exchanged for Ukrainians and White Russians in the German 'zone of interest'. Later, under the further German-Soviet agreement of 5 September 1940 it was made to embrace the 132,000 Volksdeutsche in the areas of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina annexed by the Soviet Union, and was then extended, under the German-Rumanian agreement of 22 October 1940, to the German Volksgruppen in Southern Bukovina and the Dobruja. After that the programme was confined to areas under Axis control, where it was largely a question of moving scattered German groups which might become engulfed by so-called 'foreign influences'—e.g. the 9,000 Germans of Warsaw, who were transferred to the Reich early in 1941, and the 14,000 Auslandsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche of the Province of Ljubljana—including the 10,000 Gottschee (Kočevec) Germans—who were evacuated under the German-Italian agreement of November of the same year. The Germans from some of the small enclaves in the Protectorate were also resettled at this stage.

In order to make room for these settlers Himmler took advantage of his powers under the decree of 7 October 1939 to remove all so-called 'foreign elements' from the reception areas whose presence might impede the process of germanization. The Umsiedlung of Volksdeutsche from abroad was thus accompanied by the ruthless expulsion of the non-German populations, not only from the incorporated areas of Poland, from which hundreds of thousands were deported to the Reich and to 'reservations' in the General Government, but also from western territories like Alsace, where some 105,000 persons were officially admitted to have been removed during the first wave of deportations between July and December 1940. In fact, by the summer of 1943, the term Umsiedlung had come to have such an essentially negative connotation that instructions had to be issued to the Party asking for it to be reserved for the more positive side of Himmler's activities and suggesting that only the expression Absiedlung should be used in connexion with the expulsions.

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1 Ibid. pp. 642-51 and 85-93 respectively.
5 Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 1 February 1941.
6 Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 8 November 1941.
7 Verfugungen, ii. 194.
8 Cf., for example, Frank's Diary (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 487-8 (2233-PS)).
9 Ibid. xxxviii. 531 (14-R); N.C.A. viii. 122; see also below, p. 368, note 5. Some 7,000 persons were also deported from Luxembourg (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 153 (v77-UK)).
10 Verfugungen, iv. 75.
Had the original time-table been adhered to, the resettlement programme should have been completed in the course of 1942.\(^1\) By that time, however, Himmler’s fertile brain was full of bold schemes to extend his *Umsiedlung* activities indefinitely. In fact, he had now decided that the golden age of resettlement was to come after the war when, under the ‘First Five-Year Plan of Resettlement’, the new Eastern Territories would be filled with German colonists,\(^2\) and when ‘roughly 225,000 peasant families’ would be moved from marginal areas in the *Altreich*.\(^3\) After that the object would be to provide the Crimea and the Baltic with ‘at least a German superstratum’. In the General Government there might be more German ‘island settlements’, and in any case there must be a strong settlement (*Ansiedlung*) of German colonists along the San and the Bug, so that the non-German areas of Poland would be completely ‘encircled’. These and other schemes were apparently to be worked out in detail by the ‘*Amtsgruppe C*’ of the Main Staff Office, whose Chief, *SS-Oberführer* Konrad Meyer-Hetling, in 1942 drew up a broad plan for the ethnic reconstruction of the whole of Eastern Europe. This was the so-called ‘General Plan East’ which proposed to convert the regions round Leningrad, the Crimea, and Kherson in Russia and round Memel and Narew in Lithuania into solid German colonies and to settle these with a large German population over the next quarter of a century. When the plan was presented to Himmler he gave it his whole-hearted approval and commissioned Meyer-Hetling to draft a further twenty-year programme to embrace the incorporated Polish territories, Bohemia-Moravia, Alsace-Lorraine, and Lower Styria and Upper Carniola.\(^4\)

The German reverses on the eastern front, however, soon spelled the end of any such long-term proposals, and from the early months of 1943 onwards the resettlement programme degenerated into a disorganized scramble to remove the Volksdeutsche from the area threatened by the Soviet advance. By July 1944 350,000 such Volksdeutsche were officially stated to have been brought back to the Reich under the supervision of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*. Nearly half of these were moved between February and July 1944 from the area between the Dniester and the Ukrainian Bug, the rest having been evacuated earlier from (1) the Leningrad and Ingermanland districts (3,800, evacuated January–March 1942); (2) the area of the ‘*Heeresgruppe Mitte*’ and of White Russia (10,500, evacuated January–

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\(^1\) The removal of the German-speaking population from the South Tyrol was, for example, originally to have been completed by 31 December 1942 (Dokumente der deutschen Politik, vol. vii, part 2, pp. 641–2; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, pp. 93–94). The time-limit was eventually extended to 31 December 1943 (Transocean, 21 August 1942).


\(^3\) Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 September 1941.

\(^4\) U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 8, p. 29.
July 1943); (3) the Northern Caucasus, the Kalmuck Steppe, and the Donbass (11,500, evacuated up to February 1943); (4) the Ukraine (72,000, evacuated October 1943—March 1944); (5) the Black Sea Regions and the Southern Ukraine (73,000, evacuated August 1943—May 1944); and (6) the Zhitomir region (44,600, evacuated October 1943—May 1944).1 Most of these Volksdeutsche were sent to the Wartheidland, which had been designated one of the principal 'areas of settlement'—the other such areas being Danzig-Westpreussen, Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Upper Carniola, and Lower Styria, where large numbers of ethnic German settlers were brought in to take the place of the non-Germans who had been expelled.

In the end, Himmler's activities in the field of resettlement contributed very little to the strengthening of Deutschtum which Hitler had hoped to accomplish when he inaugurated the programme. Indeed, they sometimes produced such chaos and unrest that the other German authorities apparently came to question the wisdom of allowing them to continue.2 More often than not the Umsiedler were uprooted before proper provision had been made for their accommodation in Reich territory, so that large numbers merely languished in camps in Germany and in the outlying districts throughout the war, and the 'temporary barracks of the camp' became, as Lorenz himself was constrained to admit, 'the habitation of tens of thousands of transferred families'.3 This was particularly true of the settlers from the South Tyrol, whose trek into the promised land was so mismanaged that by 1943 Bormann was forced to issue a circular to the Party offices to counteract rumours that the whole idea of an Umsiedlung from this area had been abandoned.4 Occasionally a complete reversal of policy would add to the misery of the Umsiedler, as in the case of the Volksdeutsche from Lithuania, who had no sooner settled in the Wartheidland than it was decided to send them home again (Germany having meanwhile launched her attack upon the Soviet Union); although it was actually not until the autumn of 1943 that some of them returned. Many Lithuanian Germans, however, neither reached new homes nor returned to their old ones, but were stated by Rosenberg in May 1942 to be 'going to rack and ruin' in the resettlement camps.5

Nothing is more eloquent of the type of SS mismanagement which

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1 Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 23 July 1944.
2 In the General Government, for instance, Frank found that the resettlements caused unrest among the population and led to a falling off of agricultural production (cf. I.M.T. Nurenberg, xii. 67; see also below, pp. 559-60).
3 NDZ, 6 August 1942.
4 Verfügungen, iv. 484-5. The settlers from the South Tyrol were supposed to go to Luxembourg and Lorraine (Transocean, 5 April 1943). Some were settled in Upper Carniola and Lower Styria (Kärntner Zeitung, 4 February and Grazener Tagespost, 11 April 1943).
5 I.M.T. Nurenberg, xxvii. 284 (1520-PS); N.C.A. iv. 66. According to Rosenberg about 30,000 Umsiedler were being allowed to suffer in this way.
occurred in this connexion than the official statistics which the Germans published from time to time to indicate the progress which the resettlement programme was making. According to these, some 50,000 Lithuanian Germans were originally transferred to the Reich, yet of these no more than 3,482 were in the end allowed to stay in Reich territory (all but 176 of them in East Prussia). In the course of the same operation some 80,000 Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia were also brought back to Greater Germany; yet by the end of 1941 apparently only 56,721 of these had actually been found new homes in the Wartheland, Danzig-Westpreussen, and Upper Silesia, and the rest had presumably proceeded no farther than the transit camps. In the case of the Volksdeutsche repatriated from the Soviet 'zone of interest' under the agreement of 3 November 1939 a similar picture is presented: 164,000 had, according to the report of the 'German Resettlement Trustee Company' for 1941, answered Hitler's call to return to the Reich; yet apparently only 103,858 had, by the end of 1941, found a settled place to live—92,960 of these in the Wartheland. Even these, however, were apparently more fortunate than the Volksdeutsche who had opted for resettlement from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and from Southern Bukovina and the Dobruja, under the German-Soviet agreement of 5 September 1940 and the German-Rumanian agreement of 22 October 1940, respectively. For although, according to the German Resettlement Trustee Company, these totalled some 164,000 in 1941, no more than 85,803 had by the end of the following year arrived at any permanent destination.\footnote{The above statistics are taken from the annual reports of the German Resettlement Trustee Company, as published in the German press, and from Karl C. von Loesch: 'Die Umsiedlungsbewegung in Europa', Jahrbuch der Weltpolitik, 1942. According to a statistical survey conducted by Greifelt's Main Staff Office at the beginning of 1942, over 507,000 Volksdeutsche had been taken by 15 January 1942 from a number of countries in the east. Approximately 289,000 had been brought to the Incorporated Territories and 9,480 had gone as labourers to the Reich. The rest were in the camps of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 8, p. 68).} In the case of the Umsiedler from the South Tyrol the position was apparently such that the authorities decided that it would be more prudent to draw a veil of secrecy round it. The published statistics merely disclosed that the numbers of persons involved rose from 220,000 in 1941 to 237,802 in 1942\footnote{Volkischer Beobachter, 4 April and Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 7 April 1943.}—a disclosure which is in itself somewhat surprising in view of the fact that the total opting for 'repatriation' in the plebiscite of 1939 was officially stated at the time to be only 185,365.\footnote{Dokumente der deutschen Politik, vol. vii, part 2, p. 652, note 1.} A little of the truth was, however, allowed to leak out in Bormann's circular to the Party offices of 21 May 1943, which revealed that, up to that date, only 'about 80,000' of those who had opted for Germany in the plebiscite had actually been resettled in the Reich.\footnote{Verfugungen, iv. 484–5.}
(c) Germanization

The responsibilities of Himmler and the SS in connexion with the 'strengthening of Deutschum' extended not only to the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche but to all matters relating to the readmission of racially desirable elements into the German national community. This process of retrieving the so-called 'lost blood' for the German Volksgemeinschaft was often referred to at the time as one of 'germanization' (Eindeutschung). To the SS, however, it was really one of 're-germanization' (Wiedereindeutschung), for the idea of trying to make Germans out of persons who were of completely foreign extraction was totally abhorrent to the SS racial experts. Indeed, Himmler himself insisted that it was not his task 'to germanize the east in the old sense, i.e. to teach the people there the German language and German law, but to see to it that only persons of German, that is Germanic, blood' lived in that area.1 This, according to the Schwarze Korps (20 August 1942), meant that 'the newly won living-space' must be built up with 'German blood and German life and not with verdeutschte persons', for 'one cannot make foreigners into Germans, any more than Germans can be made into foreigners'. Every effort must therefore be made to 'comb' the Incorporated Territories for every conceivable 'carrier of German blood',2 and children of mixed marriages and of so-called 'renegades' (e.g. Germans who had become 'polonized') were not to be rejected. Nor, indeed, were the offspring of illicit relationships between Germans and suitable foreign workers in the Reich (however much those relationships might be frowned upon in law) apparently to be excluded.3 Persons of Swedish descent in the Occupied Eastern Territories were also to be accepted as potential Germans,4 and even German-American prisoners of war might likewise be 're-germanized'.5

The essential difference between the theory and the practice of germanization had, however, already been demonstrated by the attempts which had been made to find a solution to the so-called 'Czech problem'. Here three alternatives had been suggested to Hitler by his advisers. These were: (1) the infiltration of Moravia by the Germans and the reduction of the Czech national area to a residual Bohemia; (2) the deportation of all Czechs (the 'most total solution'); and (3) the assimilation of the Czechs,

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1 Deutsche Arbeit, Berlin, June/July 1942, p. 157. Hitler himself had declared in his Bad Godesberg speech of 19 August 1939: 'I reject the idea of germanization by our people of foreign folk and peoples since this could never result in a reinforcement and strengthening, but at most only in a weakening of the racial core of our people.' He was, however, apparently quite willing to abandon this principle when it came to finding a solution to the Czech 'problem': see below, p. 88.


3 Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 638 (884-D).

4 U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 2860.

5 Ibid. p. 2838.
i.e. the absorption of about half of the Czech national group into the German. ‘After deliberation’ Hitler had apparently decided upon the third course, which meant that, ‘while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface’, the process of germanization would have to be ‘carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protectorate for years to come’. This made a complete mockery of the SS contention that germanization must be selective. For although Karl Hermann Frank might argue that the ‘thousand-year process’ of inter-marriage had produced a ‘far-reaching racial equalization’ between the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, by no stretch of the imagination could Hitler’s decision to use germanization as a means of overcoming resistance be reconciled with Himmler’s insistence that the programme must be rigidly restricted to the retrieval of ‘good German blood’.3

It was not, however, with the Protectorate so much as with the incorporated areas of Poland that the re-germanization programme was primarily concerned. Here—except in the case of the eastern half of the Wartheland, which had been part of Congress Poland, and which, although incorporated in Prussia for a time after 1793, had never been colonized by the Germans—it was, in the main, a question of ‘winning back’ persons of German or partly German descent who had, to varying degrees, come under Polish influence. The method by which Himmler proceeded to retrieve these lost Germans was simple, if not indeed in some respects even crude—the idea being to register them in various groups and to give each group the necessary injection of Nazi propaganda and other ‘treatment’ (including, in some cases, detention in concentration camps) until their consciousness of being German returned to them. For this purpose on 12 September 1940 he introduced the German ‘racial register’ or Volksliste, which divided the former Polish citizens of German or partly German origin in the Incorporated Territories into four categories and set out the principles which were to govern their admission to citizenship or state membership. Category I of the Volksliste was to comprise those Volksdeutsche who, by belonging to a German organization, &c., had been active in the ‘German national struggle’ during the years of Polish rule; Category II, those who had been merely passive, but who had never-


2 Memorandum of 28 August 1940 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 26 (3859–PS)). See also below, pp. 587–8.

3 In the event apparently little, if any, attempt was made to carry out Hitler’s decision: cf. Neurath’s testimony (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 672–3, xvii. 95–96).

4 Consequently the policy of ‘re-germanization’ was applied far less thoroughly in the Wartheland than in Danzig-Westpreussen and Polish Upper Silesia: cf. below, p. 90.

5 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 290 seqq. (2916–PS); N.C.A. v. 582–5. On 4 March 1941 the Volksliste was embodied in a formal decree issued by Himmler, Frick, and Hess (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1941 part I, p. 118; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 250).
theless preserved their *Deutschum*. Both these categories automatically acquired German citizenship and state membership. Category III was to comprise persons of German origin (*Deutschstämmige*) who had come under Polish influence, as well as persons of foreign blood who, having married Germans, had adopted German ways and customs; while Category IV was to comprise ‘renegades’ of German blood who ‘politically had become completely Polish’. Persons placed in Category III were to be made ‘German state members’ (but not Reich citizens) immediately, but those placed in Category IV could only acquire state membership ‘on probation’.

Theoretically registration was to be voluntary, but it was not long before Himmler insisted that those who failed to have their names entered on the Volksliste were to be sent to concentration camps.¹ ‘Local and personal considerations’ were to be taken into account in deciding the category into which the Volksdeutsche were to be placed, and language was not to be regarded as conclusive evidence of racial origin. (There were, it was pointed out, ‘entire Protestant parishes in the region of Łódź and Rawicz’ which spoke Polish, but which were German in outlook.) Religion was important in that the Poles, under the influence of their ‘national catholic clergy’, had for centuries insisted upon equating Germans with Protestantism and Poles with Catholicism. Circumspection was, therefore, called for in dealing with Catholics, especially as the ‘relatively limited body of German Catholic clergy’ had not been ‘entirely reliable’ in matters in which German and Polish interests had been in conflict. In general, however, the net was to be spread as wide as possible, the principle being that no drop of German blood must be lost or become useful to a foreign nation.²

In order to assist local authorities (mainly the Landräte and the Oberbürgermeister) in classifying the Volksdeutsche who entered their names on the Volksliste, the SS set up branch offices (*Zweigstellen*) whose duty it was to interrogate the applicants and to investigate their antecedents. Appeals against the decisions of these branch offices could be made to district offices (*Bezirksstellen*), which were set up in each Regierungsbezirk, and, if necessary, to a ‘supreme court of investigation’ (*Oberster Prüfungshof*) at Himmler’s headquarters as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality in Berlin. In this way the SS was able to supervise the general execution of the programme, although much discretion in applying the principles of germanization locally appears to have been left

² ‘A person’s knowledge of the German language gives no clue as to his German “quality”. Do not the Jews often speak and write the most perfect German of all?’ (Schwarze Korps, 13 August 1942).
to the Gauleiter in the territory concerned. Thus different policies tended to be applied in different Gaue, and the results obtained tended to vary accordingly. In Upper Silesia, where Gauleiter Bracht pressed Poles and ethnic Germans alike to register as Volksdeutsche, 135,000–145,000 were placed in Categories I and II, and 900,000–1 million in Category III.\(^1\) In Danzig-Westpreußen, which Hitler decided to make ‘entirely German’ within ten years\(^2\) and where Gauleiter Forster consequently had to pursue a vigorous policy of germanization, 200,000 Volksdeutsche had, by August 1942, been included in Categories I and II, while about 100,000 Cashubs and 700,000 Poles ‘of mixed race’ were later selected for inclusion in Category III. On the other hand, in the Wartheland, where Gauleiter Greiser used the Volksliste much more circumspectly, no more than about 70,000 persons had by February 1943 been placed in Categories III and IV, and probably not more than 250,000 (i.e. all the recognized Volksdeutsche) in Categories I and II.\(^3\)

None of these figures can, however, be taken as a reliable indication of the success or failure of the germanization programme. Nor is the other evidence which is now available much more conclusive on this point; for the fact seems to be that, thanks to the handicap of administrative confusion under which they laboured, the Germans were, in this as in so many of their undertakings in connexion with the New Order, never really sure what progress, if any, they were making. The admission by the SS authorities themselves that ‘only 3 per cent. of the Polish population’ had by June 1942 been found ‘capable of being germanized’\(^4\) does not, however, suggest that very spectacular progress was being made. Nor does the warning which had at that time to be issued to Party members against speaking Polish in their homes suggest that even those placed in the highest category of the Volksliste\(^5\) were proving very satisfactory Germans.\(^6\) The conclusion, therefore, seems to be that in this, as in other aspects of the New Order with which the SS was associated, that organization proved more of a liability than an asset to the realization of German aims and that its achievements were commensurate neither with the special confidence which Hitler reposed in its activities nor with the vast expenditure of man-power and material resources which these involved.

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\(^1\) *Wille und Macht*, May 1942, quoted by *Krakauer Zeitung*, 4 June 1942.

\(^2\) *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, 5 November 1941.

\(^3\) *Neues Bauertum*, February 1943. The Volksliste was also applied to Bialystok and the Ukraine, but no reliable figures are available to indicate the extent of its operation there.

\(^4\) *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxix. 361 (060(g)–USSR).

\(^5\) Normally only those placed in Category I were admitted to Party membership without further formality.

\(^6\) *Verfügungen*, iii. 194.
(iv) Administration

(a) Categories of Territories under German Occupation

Despite the emphasis which the Nazi publicists laid upon the need for planning in Hitler's Europe, the administration of the German Großraum was not, except possibly in the case of the territories conquered from the Soviet Union after 1941, evolved in a systematic manner, but was determined largely by a process of trial and error. The administrative pattern consequently came to vary considerably from one region to another. Broadly speaking there were, by the end of 1943, five different categories of territory under German occupation. These were:

1. The Incorporated Territories;
2. the Territories placed under a Chief of Civil Administration;
3. the Appended Territories;
4. the Occupied Territories;
5. the so-called 'Zones of Operations'.

(1) The Incorporated Territories

Most closely related to the Reich, both politically and constitutionally, were the so-called Incorporated Territories (Eingegliederete Gebiete), which were brought under direct German rule, either as new Reichsgaue, or as additions to Länder, Reichsgaue, or provinces already in existence. In the east these territories comprised (a) the Reichsgaue Danzig-Westpreußen and Wartheland, consisting of the Regierungsbezirke Danzig, Marienwerder, and Bromberg and of the Regierungsbezirke Hohensalza (Inowroclaw), Posen, and Kalisch (Kalisz) respectively; (b) the Regierungsbezirk Kattowitz (Katowice), which was added to the Province of Silesia; (c) the Regierungsbezirk Zichenau (Ciechanów), which was added to the Province of East Prussia; (d) the district of Sudauen (Suwalki), which was added to the Regierungsbezirk Gumbinnen in East Prussia; and (e) the area of Soldau (Dzialdowo), which was added to the Regierungsbezirk Allenstein in East Prussia. In the west they comprised the pre-1939

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1 For the planning which preceded the attack upon the Soviet Union see above, p. 60.
2 Sometimes necessitating a rearrangement of the existing territorial units. For instance, the incorporation of the Regierungsbezirk Kattowitz in the Province of Silesia was one of the reasons which led to the division of Silesia into two separate Provinces and Gaue—Upper and Lower Silesia—on 1 February 1941.
3 See also below, p. 550.
4 The Reichsgaue were originally called 'Danzig' and 'Posen', the names being changed in January 1940 (cf. Albert Weh: Das Recht des Generalgouvernements (Cracow, Verlag des Instituts für deutsche Ostarbeit, 1940) [referred to hereafter as Weh], A.100, note 3).
5 The Regierungsbezirk Marienwerder, with the towns of Elbing and Marienburg, was detached from East Prussia and incorporated in Danzig-Westpreußen (see also p. 550 below).
6 See also below, p. 550.
7 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, pp. 2042–3; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 239. See also below, p. 550.
Belgian Cantons of St. Vith, Eupen, and Malmédy (an area referred to in the German decree of incorporation as 'Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet'),¹ which were added for administrative purposes to the Rheinprovinz (Regierungsbezirk Aachen), and which were attached politically to the Gau Köln-Aachen.

(2) The Territories under a Chief of Civil Administration

In the south-east these comprised the former Yugoslav areas of Lower Styria and of Upper Carniola, the Miesstal, and the Commune of Seeland, which, under his 'provisional directives for the splitting up of Yugoslavia' of 12 April 1941,² Hitler decided to attach to the Reichsgaue Steiermark and Kärnten respectively. In the west they comprised: (a) the French departments of Moselle (Lorraine) and of Haut Rhin and Bas Rhin (Alsace), the first of these being added to Gau Saar-Pfalz, and the other two to Gau Baden, to form the new Gaue of Westmark³ and Baden-Elzaß respectively; and (b) Luxembourg, which in February 1941 was attached to the Gau Koblenz-Trier to form the new Gau Moselland.

Although the annexation of these territories was never proclaimed by law, the Germans made it clear that they had every intention of incorporating them in the Reich eventually. In Alsace, for example, the Chief of Civil Administration, Gauleiter Wagner, spoke of his task as being 'primarily political . . . the task of bringing Alsace back into the Greater German Reich'.⁴ Hitler himself is stated to have given the local Chiefs of Civil Administration ten years in which to complete the germanization of both Alsace and Lorraine.⁵ In Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg legislation was introduced both by the Chiefs of Civil Administration and by the Reich Ministries in Berlin for the purpose of bringing the pattern of government into conformity with that of the Reich.⁶ Compulsory military service was introduced in August 1942, and this was followed by a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior conferring German citizenship

¹ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, p. 777; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939 46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 193. Both Eupen and Moresnet formed part of the pre-war Belgian Canton of Eupen; see also p. 475, note 1 below.
² I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 60-62 (1195-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 329; cf. N.C.A. iii. 838 9. The Miesstal and Seeland had formed part of the old Austrian Duchy of Carinthia. All these areas had predominantly Slovene populations, the Germans themselves admitting that only 5 per cent. of the population was German in 1941.
³ Cf. Deutsches Recht, 1941, p. 35. By thus splitting up Alsace and Lorraine between two neighbouring Gaue the Nazis sought to avoid the administrative pitfalls which the pre-1918 'Reichsland Elsaß-Lotaringen' had created for Imperial Germany.
⁴ Frankfurter Zeitung, 20 March 1941. The ex-autonomist, Kreisleiter Paul Schall, writing in the Straßburger Neueste Nachrichten of 6 June 1942, claimed that Alsace had reverted to its Versailles status and that formal annexation would come at a later date when the Alsatians had developed a consciousness of their Deutschtum.
⁵ Interrogation of Dr. Globke (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 220 (513-F)).
⁶ See pp. 510-12 below for this process in Luxembourg.
upon persons serving in the Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS or otherwise proving themselves worthy to become Germans.\(^1\) In all three territories steps were taken to germanize place and even family names,\(^2\) and to compel the inhabitants to speak German, instead of the local dialect or French.\(^3\) As far as the administration of the customs, post and telegraphs, and railways was concerned, the territories were treated as an integral part of the Reich.\(^4\)

In August 1941, six weeks after the attack on Russia, the Gebiet Bialystok, a former Polish ‘voivodeship’ roughly the size of Belgium, was added to the category of territories under a Chief of Civil Administration.\(^5\) Gauleiter Koch of East Prussia was made Chief of the Civil Administration and the territory was attached to the Gau East Prussia.\(^6\) As in the case of Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg, the Germans insisted that Bialystok was destined eventually to be annexed to the Reich, notwithstanding the fact that it was not made subject in any way to the laws governing the Incorporated Eastern Territories.\(^7\) Since its Chief of Civil Administration, besides being Gauleiter of East Prussia, was also Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, the territory was sometimes described as serving as a bridge between East Prussia and the Ukraine in the general structure of the New Order in the east.

\(\text{(3) The Appended Territories}\)

The next category of territories likewise had an almost totally German administration. It consisted of the General Government in the ‘residual area’ of Poland, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the Generalbezirk White Russia of the Reichskommissariat Ostland.\(^8\) Although having a technically ‘autonomous’ native administration, as well as a German administrative superstructure, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia might also be regarded as falling within this category, especially as it was officially regarded as constituting part of the ‘Greater German Reich’. The relationship of the territories in this category to the Reich was never

\(^1\) For these measures in Luxembourg and the reaction to them see p. 515 below.
\(^2\) Cf. _Deutsches Recht_, 1941, p. 438.
\(^3\) For Luxembourg see p. 513 below.
\(^4\) Nevertheless, both Alsace and Lorraine continued even in 1942 to be economically dependent upon France (cf. _Kolnische Zeitung_, 7 July 1942). The economic integration of Luxembourg also seems to have presented difficulties: see below, p. 511, note 4.
\(^5\) For an account of the German administration of Bialystok cf. _Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, 7 November 1942.
\(^6\) See also below, p. 553.
\(^7\) The _Frankfurter Zeitung_, which on 6 November 1942 printed a map showing Bialystok within the Reich frontier, insisted that the Gebiet was not ‘foreign territory’, although its future status had still to be decided. On 4 March 1912 the area was virtually incorporated in East Prussia by being made a Regierungsbezirk of that province.
\(^8\) The other Generalbezirke of the Reichskommissariat Ostland—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were later given native ‘self-administrations’: see pp. 124-5 below.
very precisely defined. In the case of the General Government it was officially stated that the 'peculiar position' of the territory does not permit it to be classified according to the usual concepts of municipal and international law. It is a legal concept all of its own. It is a part neither of the German nor of the Greater German Reich, from which it is separated by a customs and monetary frontier. . . . But it is a sphere of interest of the Greater German Reich and an integral part of the Greater German power orbit.2

According to Frank, the Governor General, the General Government was 'no longer an occupied territory, and therefore foreign to the Reich, but an essential part of the Greater German Reich'.3 It was also 'not purely a colony' nor 'a dominion or protectorate', but an 'adjunct territory' (Nebenland) of the Greater German Reich.4

Both Frank and the German press were at pains to draw a sharp distinction between the position of the General Government and that of the Protectorate, and to point out that, although the two territories might equally be part of the Großdeutsches Reich, they were not necessarily comparable in status.5 This distinction was to some extent a valid one in that, constitutionally, the Protectorate had certain features in common, not only with the General Government, but with all the occupied territories. Like the General Government, the Ukraine, and the Ostland, it was deprived of all standing as an 'entity in international law' and was designated as an area of exploitation and possibly of germanization. Like the Incorporated Territories, it was made part of the 'customs area of the German Reich' and became subject to many of the laws of the Reich.6 On the other hand, like Denmark, it retained the right to diplomatic representation in Berlin7 and had a nominally 'autonomous' administration, with a head who was entitled 'to the full honours of the head of a sovereign government'.8

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1 For the origin of the General Government see pp. 552 below.
2 Welh, A.120, note 2.
3 Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, 17 August 1940.
4 Speech at Cracow, reported in Krakauer Zeitung, 24 October 1942. Apparently Frank asserted the independence of the General Government as a Nebenland so vigorously that the territory came to be known in administrative circles in Berlin as 'Frankreich' (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xii. 130). See also below, p. 100.
6 The decree of 16 March 1939 referred to the 'territories of the former Czechoslovak Republic' as being 'incorporated in the territory of the German Reich and placed under its protection as the 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia'' (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part 1, p. 495).
7 The Protectorate 'Minister' in Berlin was, however, accredited, not to the Führer, but simply to the Reich Government, which took charge of Protectorate interests in all negotiations with foreign Powers (cf. Dr. Maximilian Ronke: 'Fünf Jahre Rechtsentwicklung im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren', Deutsches Recht, 1944, pp. 258–66).
8 Decree of 16 March 1939. The pretence of preserving the 'autonomous' status of the Protectorate was taken to the point of according to the local German military commander the title of 'Wehrmacht Plenipotentiary' (Wehrmachtbevollmächtigter), instead of referring to him as a Wehrmachtbefehlshaber (Wehrmacht commanding officer), as in the other occupied territories.
The status of the Ostland and the Ukraine was left equally vague—no doubt because, as in the case of the General Government and the Protectorate, the Germans did not want to fix this in a way which might prejudice the absorption of the territories into the Reich at a later date. Rosenberg had (as has been noted)\(^1\) originally envisaged the Ostland as a vast colonial ‘protectorate’ to be settled and germanized by suitable immigrants from all the Germanic countries; but he had intended that the Ukraine should become an autonomous state closely allied to Germany. In the event, however, this position was reversed; so that, while some degree of self-government was accorded to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the Ostland, the Ukraine remained primarily an area of colonial exploitation under an almost totally German administration.\(^2\)

\(\text{(4) The Occupied Territories}\)

This group of territories comprised those in which the Germans were interested militarily and economically, but which were not, in the main, felt to lend themselves to immediate incorporation in the Reich. (Eventual annexation was, however, never ruled out, even in the case of Denmark.\(^3\)) As long as the war continued, these countries were of varying importance to Germany militarily and strategically, and the nature of their administration tended to be determined accordingly. Thus Belgium and Northern France, the Occupied Zone of France, Greece and the Serbian ‘rump’ area of Yugoslavia, which were of paramount strategic importance, were kept under military administration and were controlled directly by the Wehrmacht through Military Commanders; although, by a remarkable reversal of policy, Belgium and Northern France were, in July 1944, suddenly given a civilian Reich Commissioner, and the post of Military Commander was eventually combined with that of Higher SS and Police Leader.\(^5\) On the other hand, Norway and the Netherlands, where political considerations were as important as military, were placed almost from the beginning under civil administrations headed by Reich Commissioners.

In one outstanding case—that of the so-called ‘model protectorate’ of Denmark—the Germans endeavoured at first to combine military occupation with only limited interference in local affairs. Here the idea was to exercise control by diplomatic means—i.e. through the German Minister at Copenhagen. On the day of the invasion the German Government

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\(^1\) See above, p. 60.
\(^2\) See below, p. 124.
\(^3\) See below, p. 479.
\(^4\) See below, p. 479.
\(^5\) See below, p. 491. Gauleiter Josef Grohé, of the neighbouring Gau Köln-Aachen, was appointed to the post of Reich Commissioner. The appointment was officially described as ‘a measure of reorganization within the general conduct of the war’ (DNB, 19 July 1944). Its object was apparently to place the population under more complete German control than Falkenhausen, the Military Commander, had hitherto exercised (cf. letter from Lammers to Reich authorities, 14 July 1944 in \textit{U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 17}, p. 985).
had consequently declared that it had no intention of violating the integrity of Danish territory or of interfering with Denmark's political independence. The result was that, not only did the Danish parliamentary system continue to function, but even the Danish army was left intact, although it was confined to special areas. Nor, to the chagrin of the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung, was any attempt made to use the German minority, as in the other occupied territories. Important changes were, however, demanded in Danish foreign policy—especially after the attack on Russia in 1941. Denmark was then compelled to break off relations with the Soviet Union and to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. She was also made to permit the establishment of the Freikorps Danmark and to outlaw the Danish Communist Party. Later her whole constitutional relationship to Germany was radically changed.¹

(5) The 'Zones of Operations'

The collapse of Italy in September 1943 brought into existence yet another category of territory under German occupation—the so-called 'Zones of Operations' (Operationszonen), composed of areas hitherto belonging to Italy or under Italian administration which the Germans allegedly found themselves compelled to take over in the interests of military security. These 'Zones of Operations' comprised the 'Adriatic Littoral' (Adriatisches Küstenland) and the 'Alpine Foreland' (Alpenvorland). The Adriatic Littoral, which included the Italian provinces of Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, as well as the Italian-occupied province of Ljubljana, the districts of Sušak and Bakar, and the islands of Krk, Lussin, and Cherso, was placed under the administration of the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Gau Kärnten, Dr. Friedrich Rainer. The Alpine Foreland, consisting of the Italian provinces of Bolzano, Trento, and Belluno, was placed under the administration of the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Gau Tirol-Vorarlberg, Franz Hofer. Both Rainer and Hofer were given the title of 'Supreme Commissar' (Oberster Kommissar) of the 'Zone of Operations' for which they were responsible.

In the Adriatic Littoral Rainer spoke of his 'paramount task' as being to keep the enemy out and to see that 'no political vacuum' developed in the area; while in the Alpine Foreland Hofer stated that he had been given the responsibility of 'securing the proper attitude, peace, and order in the districts south of the Brenner'.² To some extent both these statements tallied with the explanation of the German action in setting up the 'Zones of Operations' which Hitler gave to Mussolini in April 1944: namely,

¹ See pp. 105-6 below, and, for a fuller account, pp. 519-34 below.
² Cf. Donauzeitung, 16 and 30 March, 24 and 28 April 1944; Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien, 16 May 1944; Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 27 September, 27 October, and 17 November 1943; also testimony of Rainer at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 130).
that if the Germans were to carry on the war in Italy they would have to have the rearward area 'completely free' and 'would have to dominate and make secure the Alpine passes so as to be sure that no partisans would be able to threaten those narrow supply routes'.

Although the Germans at first disavowed any intention of incorporating these areas in the Reich, they soon began to make it clear that both the Adriatic Littoral and the Alpine Foreland would eventually be assimilated politically to the neighbouring German Gaue. In the South Tyrol, especially, encouragement was given to the movement for 'reunion' with the Reich. The use of the Italian language was gradually prohibited, and Italian institutions were systematically suppressed. In Germany itself the Nazi press began to refer to the South Tyrol, along with Austria, the Sudetenland, the Incorporated Territories of the East, and Alsace-Lorraine, as one of the areas whose German population had been reclaimed for the Reich.

(b) The Internal Frontiers of German-occupied Europe

Although the type of German administration which was instituted varied from each of the foregoing categories of occupied territory to the other, the areas all, in the early stages at least, had one feature in common as far as relations with the Reich were concerned: they were separated from the Reich by 'internal frontiers' and German civilians were not allowed to travel to them unless they were in possession of a special permit issued under the authority of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. In the case of the Eastern Territories and the Protectorate the granting of such special permits was governed by a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, of 20 July 1940. This listed Bohemia and Moravia, the Incorporated Eastern Territories (with the exception of Danzig, the former Prussian area of Upper Silesia, and the former Austrian districts of Freistadt, Teschen, and Beilitz, as well as the town of Biala), the General Government and 'any other territories to be specified by the Reich Minister of the Interior' as the areas for which a special permit would be required. To the list were subsequently added the Ukraine and

1 Memorandum of conversation between Hitler and Mussolini at Schloss Klessheim, 23 April 1944 (trans. in Department of State Bulletin, 8 December 1946, p. 1044).

2 On 10 September 1943, Goebbels wrote: 'We cannot seize the Southern Tyrol now, because that would absolutely flabbergast the Italian people and condemn every neo-Fascist Government to political inactivity' (Goebbels Diaries, p. 345).

3 Since 1938 propaganda for the 'return' of South Tyrol to the Reich had been forbidden by the Party in Germany; cf. A.54/38 of 20.5.1938 and R.65/38 of 3.6.1938 (Verfugungen, i. 413–14). The official Nazi attitude had hitherto been that 'die deutsche-italienische Grenzziehung ist endgültig' (the German-Italian frontier delimitation is final).

4 Cf., for example, NSZ Westmark, 29/30 January 1944.

the Ostland. This made almost the whole eastern area of German occupation subject to entry permit, although in May 1942 Himmler lifted the so-called 'police frontier in the east', thus enabling German civilians to travel to the rest of the Reichsgaue Danzig-Westpreußen and Wartheland without further formality.\(^1\) Passes for the rest of the Eastern Territories would, it was stated, 'on principle only be issued if the reason for requiring them were important from the point of view of the war effort', and the Kreis police authorities, to whom application had to be made, were given orders to 'take a strict view in deciding individual cases'.\(^2\) Needless to say, severe penalties were imposed for persons caught crossing the 'internal frontiers' without the necessary authorization.

In the case of certain occupied countries of the west—notably Belgium and Northern France and the Occupied Zone of France—a special visa procedure (Sichtvermerksverfahren) was introduced by Himmler in April 1942 to take the place of military transit permits for civilians travelling to and from these territories.\(^3\) It was, however, pointed out that only the following types of journey would be permitted: (1) official journeys on behalf of state and Party, (2) business journeys, and (3) journeys of foreign workers from Belgium and France. All other journeys would be forbidden. The fact that Party journeys were excepted from the travel ban, although not surprising, is interesting in view of the prohibition placed upon the travel of Party officials to other areas. In these areas not even these normally privileged members of the community were allowed to cross an 'internal frontier' without express permission. For instance, an order issued by the Party Chancellery on 29 April 1941 forbade 'all members of Party offices and of its formations and affiliated bodies' to cross into the areas of Lower Styria, Upper Carniola, Seeland, and the Miestatal, which had been placed under Chiefs of Civil Administration. Journeys which were 'necessary for urgent official reasons' had first to be approved by the Party Chancellery, although this approval could also be given by the Chiefs of Civil Administration.\(^4\)

(c) The Position of the Supreme Reich Representatives in the Occupied Territories

The position of the supreme Reich representatives (i.e. the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, Chief of Civil Administration, Reich Protector, Reich Commissioner, Military Commanders, &c.) tended to vary from one category of territory to another, although the essential purpose for which these officials existed—i.e. the maintenance of the interests of the Reich—

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\(^1\) Cf. Himmler's decree of 12 May 1942 (Verfügungen, ii. 409).
\(^2\) DNB, 20 April 1943.
\(^3\) V.I. 30/40 of 24.4.1942 (Verfügungen, iii. 219 20).
\(^4\) A.22/41 of 29.4.1941 (ibid. p.218). Similar restrictions were later placed by Himmler on Party journeys to the Ukraine and Ostland (cf. ibid. p. 219).
was the same all over Hitler's Europe. In the case of the Incorporated Territories, supreme authority was exercised locally by the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter or, if the Gau to which they were attached formed part of Prussia, the Gauleiter and Oberpräsident.¹ Like all other Gauleiters and Reichsstatthalters he was the 'permanent official of the Reich Government', working under the general supervision (Dienstaufsicht) of the Reich Minister of the Interior, with responsibility for seeing that the lines of policy laid down by Hitler were observed. In Danzig-Westpreußen and the Wartheland, where 'all branches of the administration' were officially described as being placed at his disposal, the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter was also the chief of 'special administrations' (Sonderverwaltungen) for justice, finance, railways, and post and telegraphs. He therefore tended, as the German press pointed out, to be in an 'incomparably stronger position' than the Reichsstatthalter in the other provinces.² Unlike his opposite numbers in the Reich he was also unencumbered by any traditional type of German provincial administration—his territory being, in fact, one in which the 'National Socialist Ideengut could be carried out from fundamentals' and in which 'National Socialist theory could be put into practice 100 per cent'.³

In the territories of Bialystok, Lower Styria, Upper Carniola, Seeland, the Miessal, Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg the Chief of Civil Administration was the supreme Reich representative, with responsibilities analogous to those of the Reich Commissioners in Norway and the Netherlands. Yet, at the same time he was the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter (with the exception of Koch, who was Gauleiter and Oberpräsident of East Prussia) of the neighbouring Gau to which the territory was attached. But the mere fact that the territory was attached in this way to a Gau did not make its administration a Reichsverwaltung. 'Only in special fields—namely post and telegraph, railways and customs—did the Reich take over the direct administration.'⁴ In all other spheres the supreme authority was the Chief of Civil Administration, who exercised control through a number of administrative Abteilungen corresponding to the various Reich Ministries in Berlin.⁵ Even when a central Reich agency like the Reich Food Estate established branches in the territories these came under the supervision, not of Berlin, but of the Chief of Civil Administration.⁶ Except for the orders issued by those Reich authorities which were

¹ Such Gau were Upper Silesia, East Prussia, Moselland, and Koln-Aachen. In Gau Koln-Aachen, Grohé merely had the title of Gauleiter.
² Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 20 March 1942.
³ National Zeitung (Essen), 6 September 1942.
⁵ Cf., for example, Frankfurter Zeitung, of 5 May 1942, on the position in Lower Styria; also Tagespost (Graz), 11 April 1943. For the Reich Food Estate see p. 269 below.
expressly empowered to legislate for all the occupied territories,\(^1\) the Chiefs
of Civil Administration received instructions only from Hitler, through the
Head of the Reich Chancellery (i.e. Lammers). They were, however,
expected to consult the appropriate Reich Ministries before promulgating
new legislation, and in the case of some territories (e.g. Alsace, Lorraine,
and Luxembourg) the so-called ‘Zentralstellen’ which were set up in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior were empowered to settle any differences
which arose between the Chiefs of Civil Administration and the Reich
Ministries.\(^2\) But the Berlin authorities did not exercise any ‘power of the
purse’, for Hitler himself insisted that the Chiefs of Civil Administration
were ‘not to be hampered’ by any stringent supervision in financial matters.
They were therefore ‘to be allowed separate budgets with the widest
scope’.\(^3\)

In the General Government the Governor General, Hans Frank, was,
like the Chiefs of Civil Administration in the above-mentioned territories,
responsible directly to Hitler, although in other respects his position was a
somewhat more exalted one than theirs.\(^4\) In many ways Frank was the
most self-contained of all the Reich representatives, being head of an
administration which was not only almost totally German in its composi-
tion, but which was actually accorded the status of a ‘government’—the
so-called Regierung des Generalgouvernements.\(^5\) At the head of this ‘gov-
ernment’, under the Governor General, there stood a State Secretary, and
below him came an elaborate administrative machine consisting, at the
top, of twelve heads of ‘central departments’ forming a sort of Cabinet,
and, at the regional level, of five District Governors, each administering
territory corresponding to a German Regierungsbezirk. While some of this
ambitiously planned administrative structure was undoubtedly necessary
in view of the decision to keep all but the minor posts in German hands,
much was clearly the result of Frank’s own well-known desire for adminis-
trative autonomy—a desire which eventually caused him to be accused of
trying to convert the General Government into an independent state.\(^6\)

\(^{1}\) See below, p. 134.

\(^{2}\) Questions of particular importance were decided by Hitler personally after calling the Chiefs
of Civil Administration or Lammers to discuss the matter with him in the presence of representa-
tives of the Reich Ministry concerned (cf. interrogation of Globke (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii.
220 (513–F)).

\(^{3}\) Letter from Lammers to Schwerin-Krosigk (Reich Minister of Finance), 30 September 1940,
quoted in U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 2821.

\(^{4}\) Frank held the rank of Reich Minister, as did Seyss-Inquart, who served as his deputy in
1939 and 1940.

\(^{5}\) The other German administrations in the occupied territories were spoken of as being, not
Regierungen, but Verwaltungen.

\(^{6}\) Cf. memorandum of 12 April 1943, enclosed with Lammers’s letter to Himmler of 17 April
1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 339 (2220–PS)). According to the Frankfurter Zeitung (24 October
1942) the fact that the General Government had its own budget was also ‘an expression of its
relative independence’.
Not only did Frank maintain a large Dienststelle (which included a special propaganda office)\(^1\) to represent his interests in Berlin, but he had 'liaison officers' appointed by the Military Commander and by the Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, as well as the customary 'delegates' (Beauftragte) of the Foreign Ministry, Reich Chancellery, Ministry of Armaments and Munitions (Speer Ministry), Party Chancellery, and Reich Youth Leadership, attached to his office in Cracow.\(^2\) Nor was he averse to the idea of having representatives of foreign governments accredited to him—as he indicated by receiving the Fascist delegate Count Fossombrone 'as a sort of diplomatic representative of Italy'.\(^3\)

Although in the Ukraine and the Ostland the Reich Commissioners (Koch and Lohse respectively) bore the same title as the supreme heads of the civil administration in Norway and the Netherlands, they were technically not comparable in status with these other Reich representatives. For, under Hitler's decree of 17 July 1941,\(^4\) they were subordinated to Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, as well as to his permanent deputy, Alfred Meyer. Under the terms of this decree, it was the Reich Minister, rather than the Reich Commissioners, who exercised the supreme law-making authority in the territories.\(^5\) The powers of the Reich Minister tended, however, to be gradually limited as so-called 'special administrations' (Sonderverwaltungen) penetrated into his sphere of responsibility. Thus the Reich Minister of Transport took charge of the railway system in the Generalverkehrsdirektion Osten, and the Reich Post Minister assumed responsibility for the postal and telegraph services. In their respective spheres, Göring, Speer, and Himmler were also supreme,\(^6\) although it was specifically laid down that 'all these authorities' were to remain in close contact with the Reich Minister and with one another, so that 'a unified direction of affairs' would be assured. This limitation of Rosenberg's authority made it easier for the nominally subordinate Reich Commissioners to free themselves from his control; and in practice Koch, at least, came to acquire a considerable degree of independence of the Eastern Ministry.\(^7\) Rosenberg's position vis-à-vis

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2. Weh, A.120, note 10.
3. Memorandum enclosed with Lammers' letter to Himmler of 17 April 1943 (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxix. 339 (2220–PS)).
5. The Reich Minister could, and did, however, delegate the right to make laws to the Reich Commissioners and to the General Commissioners.
7. Lohse might likewise have attained a more independent position but for the fact that the administration of the Ostland was more decentralized than that of the Ukraine (cf. p. 124 below). This meant that the General Commissioners in the Ostland acquired more power than their opposite numbers in the Ukraine, and that Lohse's tasks were more of a supervisory nature than those of Koch.
these two officials was in any case weakened by the fact that they, like all the other German administrative heads in the occupied territories, were appointed by Hitler personally, and not by the Reich Minister.

In the case of Norway and the Netherlands the Reich Commissioners were identical in status, although Terboven continued to have the Party rank of Gauleiter, while Seyss-Inquart bore the somewhat more elevated title of Reich Minister.\(^1\) In fact Hitler’s decree of 18 May 1940, appointing Seyss-Inquart ‘Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories’,\(^2\) was apparently modelled on his decree of 24 April 1940, appointing Terboven ‘Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Norwegian Territories’.\(^3\) In both cases the Reich Commissioner was specifically designated as the ‘guardian of the Reich interests’, was directly responsible to Hitler, and received ‘instructions and orders’ from him personally; in both cases he was empowered to make laws by decrees; in both cases the ‘supreme military authority’ was to remain vested in the local Wehrmacht commander, whose orders in the ‘civil domain’ were to be enforced by the Reich Commissioner; and in both cases the Reich Commissioner might ‘call upon the services of German police organs’ for the carrying out of his orders, although these were also to be at the disposal of the Wehrmacht commander ‘as far as military needs required it and the tasks of the Reich Commissioner permitted it’. Indeed, the only essential difference between the position of Terboven in Norway and that of Seyss-Inquart in the Netherlands seems to have been that, whereas after February 1942 Terboven carried out many of his tasks through a native government under Quisling,\(^4\) Seyss-Inquart continued to administer the Netherlands through a so-called ‘headless government’, composed of the permanent Secretaries-General of the former Dutch Ministries.\(^5\)

In the case of the countries under military administration—i.e. Belgium and Northern France, the Occupied Zone of France, Serbia, and Greece—the German military command was technically a Vollzugsorgan der Wehrmacht. Many of the laws which the Military Commander had to enforce were promulgated by the OKW or OKH, although, like the civilian Reich Commissioners, he also had to carry out the orders of those central Reich agencies (Four-Year Plan, &c.) which were competent to legislate for German-occupied Europe as a whole. In the case of Serbia the position of the Military Commander as the representative of the Wehrmacht was

\(^1\) The rough Party equivalent of Reich Minister was Reichsleiter. In practice, however, this apparent difference in rank between Terboven and Seyss-Inquart meant very little, as the Reichskommissariat in Norway was officially accorded the status of a Reich Ministry.


\(^3\) Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, p. 677.

\(^4\) See below, pp. 120, 537-8.

\(^5\) See below, pp. 496-7.
emphasized by his subordination, along with the Military Commander for Salonika and the Aegean and the Military Commander for Southern Greece, to the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost in Athens. All the Military Commanders, however, had civilian specialists attached to their headquarters to assist them with the tasks of administration. In Serbia the ‘Chief of the Administrative Staff at the Headquarters of the Military Commander’ (Chef des Verwaltungsstubes beim Befehlshaber), Staatsrat Turner, had virtual control of the country, although local affairs were theoretically the responsibility of the ‘autonomous’ government which was set up under General Milan Nedić on 29 August 1941. In Belgium and Northern France, the head of the Militärverwaltung, SS-Obergruppenführer Eggert Reeder, exercised similar, albeit perhaps more limited, powers under General von Falkenhausen, the Military Commander—the German administrative machinery in this case being divided into a number of specialist departments (Economic General Staff, Transport, Justice, &c.) corresponding to various aspects of local affairs in which the Germans were particularly interested. In the Occupied Zone of France the position was modified to some extent by the fact that the Germans technically only controlled the French administrative system, which was run from Vichy. Yet here, as in the other territories under military administration, the supervision of civil affairs was carried out by a Verwaltungsstab attached to the headquarters of the Military Commander.

The peculiar position of the Protectorate in comparison with that of the other occupied territories has already been commented upon. That peculiarity was also reflected in the status and powers accorded to the

1 Greece was divided for occupation purposes among Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria, although a puppet government was supposed to govern the whole country except (1) the Bulgarian-occupied territory, (2) the Ionian Islands, and (3) the Aegean Islands. The area under German military occupation covered: (1) the eastern part of Western Thrace bordering on Turkey, (2) the greater part of Macedonia and the islands of Lemnos, Chios, and Mitylene, and (3) the so-called ‘Fortress’ of Crete.

2 Verfügung, iii. 216–17.

3 Later an attempt was made to co-ordinate the military administration of Serbia with that of other Balkan areas. A ‘Chief of Military Administration South-East’ (Chef der Militärverwaltung Südost) was appointed in the person of the former Director of the German Tourist Agency in Belgrade, Franz Neuhausen, while economic co-ordination was entrusted to Hermann Neubacher, who held the dual position of Bevollmächtiger of the Reich for Economic Questions in the South-East and Foreign Ministry Representative in the different Balkan States.

4 As Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France Falkenhausen had two distinct forms of military administration under his control: (1) the Kommandantur, which dealt with all questions directly affecting the German army, and (2) the Militärverwaltung, which supervised the government of the territory.

5 As in the case of Belgium and Northern France, the staff of the Militärbefehlshaber in the Occupied Zone was divided into two main branches, the Kommandostab, which controlled the Kommandanturen, and the Verwaltungsstab, which was purely administrative. In addition to these branches there was an entirely separate Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsstab, under the direct supervision of Speer, which planned the economic exploitation of France.

6 See above, p. 94.
supreme Reich representative in Bohemia and Moravia, the Reich Protector. Hitler’s decree of 16 March 1939,1 and supplementary order of 22 March 1939,2 relating to the establishment of the Protectorate had stipulated that Neurath (like Frank, Terboven, Seyss-Inquart, and all the Chiefs of Civil Administration who came to be appointed after him) was to be Hitler’s direct subordinate and ‘sole representative’ and was to ‘receive his directives’ from him. Like all the other Reich representatives, the Protector was described as the ‘guardian of the interests of the Reich’.

Yet, not only were certain branches of the administration, such as communications and postal, telegraphic, and telephone services removed from his control, but the Reich Government in Berlin had the right to establish administrative offices in Bohemia and Moravia outside his jurisdiction.3 This was particularly the case in the legal field, where the Reich Ministry of Justice, and not the Reich Protector, exercised supreme control.

Neurath’s authority was thus limited in the main to the supervision of the ‘autonomous’ Czech administration, and was narrowly circumscribed as far as the offices of the Reich Government in the Protectorate were concerned. Under the decree of 16 March 1939 he might ‘offer his counsel’ to the Czech administration, which held office subject to his approval, and he could protest against measures which in his opinion might be ‘harmful to the Reich’. He could not, however, set up his own supervisory machinery, as could his colleagues in the other territories, although he was eventually empowered, under a decree issued by Hitler on 7 May 1942, to undertake, ‘in consultation with the Reich Minister of the Interior’, such measures for simplifying the administration of Bohemia and Moravia as the needs of war might be considered to necessitate.4

In the case of Denmark the position of the German Plenipotentiary was unique and defies comparison with that of the supreme Reich representative in any other occupied territory. So unusual, indeed, was the arrangement adopted here that it at first apparently caused great confusion even in the state and Party offices in the Reich. These, it seems, found it difficult to desist from addressing communications direct to the German Plenipotentiary, as if he were a Reich Commissioner, and even to the Danish Government, and from sending them circulars which were intended only for the other occupied territories. In view of this unfortunate, but perhaps understandable, breach of diplomatic etiquette the Party Chanceller found it necessary, on 20 March 1941, to circulate a copy of a letter from Weizsäcker of the German Foreign Ministry, pointing out that the position of the Reich Plenipotentiary did not correspond to that of the Reich


2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 549.

3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xix. 290.

4 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1942 part I, p. 329.
Commissioners in Norway and the Netherlands, in that he ‘must carry out all his tasks vis-à-vis the Danish authorities by diplomatic means’. The letter insisted, therefore, that the German Foreign Ministry must remain the proper intermediary for ‘all instructions and requests’ to Denmark ‘on the part of the internal German authorities’.¹

It was, however, unlike Hitler to permit any such relatively enlightened arrangement to remain in force indefinitely. At the beginning of October 1942 he decided that the declaration of 9 April 1940, upon which the relationship between Denmark and the Reich had hitherto rested, was ‘obsolete’. It was, he contended, ‘impossible that in the New Europe established under German leadership there should exist a form of state with a democratic government and under a royal house which up to now had displayed nothing but ill-will’. Denmark must consequently ‘become a German province’. The aim of the administration must be ‘to establish as soon as possible a régime’ under the Danish National Socialists and ‘any resistance, even the slightest, must be suppressed by force’. As Plenipotentiary he would therefore send a ‘hard-fisted National Socialist’, while ‘the Military Commanding Officer as well as the armed forces would regard themselves as not in a friendly but in a hostile country’.² This was the prelude to the appointment as Military Commander of General von Hanneken, an ardent Nazi who had previously served with ‘Group W’ of the Economic Staff ‘Oldenburg’ in Russia, and to the replacement of the original German Plenipotentiary, von Renthe-Fink, by Werner Best.³

Nor was this the last change to be effected in the relations between the so-called ‘model protectorate’ and the Reich. After the ‘crisis’ of August 1943⁴ the powers of the Reich Plenipotentiary were modified considerably, in that the German police and SD, who now began to arrive in force, were subordinated not to him, but to the Higher SS and Police Leader, Pancke, who in turn was responsible to Himmler. Thus during the last two years of the occupation Denmark was controlled by three different German authorities, each quite independent of the others: (1) the Reich Plenipotentiary, Werner Best;⁵ (2) the Military Commander, General Hanneken (later General Lindemann); and (3) the German SS and police under Pancke.⁶ Denmark consequently reached the ironical position of continuing

¹ Verfugungen, iii. 208–9; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 213. It was also characteristic of German policy during this period that the German ‘Police Administration Denmark’, which was set up in February 1941, was only empowered to deal with German nationals, and that no German police force to deal with Danes was instituted until the ‘crisis’ of August 1943.
⁶ Official Memorandum of the Danish Government of 25 October 1945, and Supplement on Crimes Committed by the Germans (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 673 (901–RF)).
theoretically to retain her 'autonomy', with her Constitution still in force and her diplomatic representatives abroad still, in some cases, *en poste*,\(^1\) while in practice her affairs were probably subject to closer German SS and police scrutiny than those of any other Western European country.\(^2\)

\(d\) The Central Reich Authorities and the Administration of the Occupied Territories

\(1\) *The Reich Ministry of the Interior*

Notwithstanding the fact that certain Reich agencies were empowered to legislate for Hitler's Europe as a whole,\(^3\) the central Reich Government in Berlin was not in general encouraged to interest itself any more than was absolutely necessary in the affairs of the occupied territories. Theoretically the latter came under the 'Reich External Administration' (Reichsaufienverwaltung), an entirely 'new branch of German public administration' which, although only in its first beginnings at that time, was eventually expected to 'take its place side by side with the Internal Administration and the Administration of Foreign Affairs'.\(^4\) In practice, however, the Reichsaufienverwaltung remained little more than a generic term for the Reich representatives and their staffs. It had no central office which could co-ordinate its activities. Indeed, the very fact that all the Reich representatives in the occupied territories were appointed by Hitler personally, and (with the possible exception of Koch and Lohse)\(^5\) were answerable to him alone, had made the creation of such an office difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, in so far as it was felt necessary to have a link between the activities of the Reich representatives it was left to the 'Reich Internal Administration' to provide it. But so jealous was Hitler of any interference by the Reich authorities in the administration of the occupied territories that, except in a very few instances, this link remained little more than purely nominal. The Reich Chancellery, under the supervision of Lammers, could and did receive representations from the Reich Commissioners and Military Commanders on matters of both public and private import, and at one time it even took steps to see that they submitted

\(^1\) See below, p. 522.

\(^2\) Despite the failure of their experiment in Denmark the Germans were not deterred from again trying the idea of control by diplomatic means in the case of Hungary after the occupation of March 1944 (see p. 628 below). There the position of the German Plenipotentiary, Edmund Veessenmayer, came in many respects to resemble that of Best in Denmark (cf. testimony of Horthy, in U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, pp. 2704 seqq.).

\(^3\) See below, p. 134. They were, for the most part, the agencies interested in economic exploitation and the maintenance of security.

\(^4\) Article by Professor Ipsen in Der Deutsche Verwaltungsbeamte, quoted by NDZ, 8 April 1942.

\(^5\) See above, p. 101.
regular monthly reports on the territories under their jurisdiction. Its main function, however, appears to have been to act as an intermediary between them and Hitler, sifting their communications and forwarding these to the Fuhrer. Only in the legal field and in other purely technical matters did the ‘Reich Internal Administration’ come to have any appreciable influence upon the Reichsaußenverwaltung, and this was exercised through the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

The Reich Ministry of the Interior was usually brought into the picture at the very beginning of the occupation, when the details of the constitutional relationship of the territory to the Reich had still to be worked out. Thus, in the case of the Protectorate the Ministry was given the responsibility of issuing, in agreement with the other Reich Ministries concerned, ‘all rules and regulations, general and administrative, required for the enforcement and implementation’ of the decree of 16 March 1939. Under Hitler’s decree of 8 October 1939 it was designated as the ‘central office’ for the ‘reordering’ of the incorporated areas of Poland and given the responsibility of introducing German law, fixing the boundaries, and germanizing the place-names; while under his decrees of 18 and 23 May 1940 it was entrusted with the task of ‘reuniting’ Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet with the Reich. On paper there was an elaborate organization within the Ministry for dealing with the occupied territories, for a Zentralstelle was usually set up under its aegis for each area as it was incorporated in the Reich or brought under German occupation. Before the war such Zentralstellen had been established for Austria, the Sudetenland, and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. During the war the most important Zentralstellen were those for Norway, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxembourg, and the so-called Occupied South-Eastern Territories. Most, if not all, of these agencies were headed by Stuckart, who eventually became the State Secretary in the Ministry and who also supervised the Departments I and I R., dealing with ‘constitution, law-making, administration, and Incorporated Territories’ and with ‘civil defence of the Reich and the occupied territories’ respectively.

1 Reich Chancellery memorandum of 15 June 1940, in U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, pp. 960–1. It was typical of Hitler’s determination to exclude the central Reich authorities from the administration of the occupied territories that he took steps to prevent them from receiving copies of these reports.


4 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, pp. 777 and 803–4; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 193. The Ministry also promulgated legislation dealing with persons who had suffered in the Volksstumskampf in these areas and in Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg (cf. DNB, 11 May 1943).


7 Ibid. Document NG–3456.

As far as the Incorporated Territories were concerned the Ministry of the Interior was by far the most influential of the Reich Ministries, for its word was law in all matters relating to citizenship in those territories. Elsewhere, however, it seems that the only important service which the Ministry was able to render to the Reich representatives was in providing and looking after the Reich civil servants who were assigned to the latter and in affording technical assistance and advice in the promulgation of laws and decrees. Under Frick's control the Ministry lapsed into what Goebbels described as a state of 'bureaucratic hydrocephalus', which made it 'entirely unsuited to political leadership'. Its usefulness would undoubtedly have been further circumscribed but for the fact that Stuckart, an active, able, and ambitious SS officer with a strong geopolitical bent and keen interest in Großraumverwaltung, 'seized hold of the reins and to an increasing extent became the real Minister of the Interior'. When Himmler took charge in August 1943 he attempted to remedy the situation by holding periodic conferences of German administrative officials, which were attended by members of the administration in the occupied territories, as well as by representatives of the internal Reich Government. Yet it was less as Reich Minister of the Interior than as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police and Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality that Himmler exercised authority in the occupied territories. His main interest, after succeeding Frick, consequently continued to be in strengthening the power of the SS and police in those territories, rather than in building up the influence of the Ministry of the Interior as a whole.

(2) The German Foreign Ministry

Normally the German Foreign Ministry, having the largest staff of experts on the various European countries, might have been expected to become closely associated with the Reichsaußenverwaltung in the administration of the occupied territories. Hitler, however, felt that the Foreign Ministry represented 'the home of reaction and defeatism' and should therefore 'as far as possible disappear from the picture until the end of the war'. Thus, as von Steengracht has testified, 'the Foreign Office lost its competence towards the country concerned at the moment when the

1 The Reich Ministry of the Interior was consequently one of the principal bodies concerned with the administration of the Volksliste and the naturalization of Volksdeutsche in these territories. It was also 'deeply involved' in 'the so-called germanization programme' (cf. U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, Judgment, p. 28515).
2 Cf. testimony of Lammers at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 58).
3 Goebbels Diaries, p. 241.
4 Testimony of Bernard Loesner (U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 28525).
5 See above, pp. 75–90.
6 Testimony of Margarete Blank (I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 189).
German bayonet crossed the border,\(^1\) so that in the case of some occupied countries 'even the right to have a representative of the Foreign Office, whose post was for observation [purposes] only', was refused.\(^2\) There were, however, certain exceptions to this restriction upon the authority of the German Foreign Ministry—e.g. in the case of the Occupied Zone of France and Denmark.

In the Occupied Zone of France the post of Foreign Ministry Plenipotentiary, to which Otto Abetz was appointed on 3 August 1940,\(^3\) acquired considerable importance in view of the influence which its holder was able to exert upon the Unoccupied Zone and upon the Vichy Government. According to the letter from Ribbentrop to the OKW of 3 August 1940, notifying the latter of Abetz's appointment, Hitler himself, in making the appointment, had expressly ordered that 'only Ambassador Abetz' should 'be responsible for all political questions in Occupied and Unoccupied France', and should 'act only in agreement with the Military Command' there. His functions, as defined in the letter, were to include (1) the giving of advice to the military agencies in political matters; (2) the maintenance of permanent contact with the Vichy Government and its representatives in the Occupied Zone; (3) the bringing of the right influence to bear upon 'important political personalities' and upon 'responsive elements engaged in the moulding of public opinion'; and (4) the provision of the necessary political guidance for the press, radio, and propaganda organs in the Occupied Zone.\(^4\) This placed Abetz in one of the few key posts to which the German Foreign Ministry was able to lay claim in the administration of Hitler's Europe. The result was that he inevitably became the target of intrigue on the part of other German bodies (particularly the Gestapo)\(^5\) and that, thanks to such intrigue, Hitler also became 'somewhat suspicious' of him.\(^6\)

In Denmark the German Plenipotentiary, Werner Best, was not strictly speaking a Foreign Ministry official at all. His headquarters in Copenhagen were usually referred to, not as the German Legation, but as the 'agency of the Reich Plenipotentiary', and the Reich Chancellery even went so far as to speak of him in January 1943 as being 'no longer a diplomatic representative of the Reich accredited to the Danish Government, but a

\(^1\) Testimony of von Steengracht (ibid. p. 109). This was not, strictly speaking, true in the case of Yugoslavia, where the Foreign Ministry was in April 1941 involved in the handing over to Italy of the areas which were to come under Italian occupation (cf. Hitler's provisional directives for the splitting up of Yugoslavia (ibid. xxviii. 60–62 (1195 PS); Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe p. 329; cf. N.C.A. iii. 838–9).

\(^2\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 109.

\(^3\) He remained there until May 1945 (ibid. p. 127).


\(^5\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 127.

\(^6\) Goebbels Diaries, p. 4.
kind of Reich Commissar in Denmark. Apart from having been an expert on Großraum questions and from having served, in 1941 and 1942, on the administrative staff of the Military Commander in France, Best had been a SS lawyer, an authority on the German police, and (as Ribentrop was constrained to admit) a 'collaborator of Heydrich's'. Consequently, although the German Foreign Minister might boast that the Plenipotentiary's mission was part of an 'experiment' on his part to determine the efficacy of 'the gentle touch and compromise' in the handling of the Danes, it was Best's SS connexions, rather than his diplomatic experience, which commended him for the Danish post in 1942. During the two and a half years that he served in Denmark he continued to receive instructions from Hitler and Himmler, as well as from the Foreign Ministry, and he maintained 'his contacts with the Minister of the Interior, with Himmler, and with the circles of the SS'.

The only other Foreign Ministry representative in a position to exercise an important influence in German-occupied Europe was Hermann Neubacher, who was appointed 'special envoy' to the Balkans on 7 September 1943. Yet he, like Best, was not a professional diplomat but an official of the Nazi Party. In the other occupied territories the Foreign Ministry representative, where he existed at all, tended to play only a minor role in the German occupation. In the Netherlands, where the so-called Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bene, was apparently appointed by Seyss-Inquart and not by the Foreign Ministry itself, he was made 'immediately subordinate' to the Reich Commissioner and his main task was defined as 'the settlement of such foreign political questions as might still arise in the Netherlands'. As the other German authorities were continually at pains to see that such questions did not in fact arise, this

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1 Testimony of Paul Barandon (U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 11143) and Reich Chancellery memoranda of 5–8 January 1943 (ibid. p. 981).
2 Best was the author of the standard work, Die Deutsche Polizei, published at Darmstadt in 1940. He was also the author of the 'Boxheimer Document', a scheme for the drastic elimination of Communism in Hesse which brought him notoriety in the days of the Weimar Republic.
3 He had been departmental chief in the headquarters of the Gestapo in Berlin, and acted on occasion as Heydrich's deputy.
4 Discussion with Bastianini, 8 April 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 453 (740-D); cf. N.C.A. vii. 195).
5 He had only been in the Foreign Ministry (as Ministerialdirigent) for three months prior to his appointment (Transocean, 5 November 1942).
6 Testimony of Paul Barandon (U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, pp. 11143 and 11146).
7 Neubacher had been engaged in illegal Nazi activities in Austria before the Anschluss. In 1938 he was appointed First Deputy Burgermeister of Vienna. Three years later he became Gauamtsleiter für Kommunalpolitik in Gau Vienna. He held the rank of Obergruppenführer in the SA.
8 Cf. 'Bekanntmachung' naming Otto Bene as Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amtes, and making other appointments, in Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 1940, pp. 18–19.
10 Rudolf Kroiss, in Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 31.
meant that his influence upon the conduct of affairs would be very limited indeed.¹

One positive advantage, however, accrued from this policy of restricting the influence of the Foreign Ministry representatives. This was that, whereas there were frequent conflicts between Ribbentrop and the other Reich Ministers over their respective functions in the occupied territories,² relations between the Foreign Ministry and the German civil administrations were kept on a fairly amicable basis. The only serious clash which occurred was in the case of the Occupied Eastern Territories, where Ribbentrop antagonized the Reich Minister, Rosenberg, by claiming the right to take part in the internal organization of the conquered Russian areas.³ Although he was immediately overruled in this by Hitler, the Foreign Ministry apparently continued to interfere in Ostgebiete affairs by organizing an 'Eastern Committee' in the Foreign Ministry⁴ and by cultivating his own circle of Eastern European émigrés. In May 1942, therefore, Rosenberg had again to complain to Hitler,⁵ with the result that, on 28 July 1942, Hitler was prevailed upon to issue a decree defining the respective responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry and the Eastern Ministry as far as the Occupied Eastern Territories were concerned. This gave the Foreign Ministry authority to deal with all matters relating to the Occupied Eastern Territories which had to be taken up with foreign countries, although, in exercising this authority, the Reich Foreign Minister was to keep in close touch with the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Rosenberg, on the other hand, was given sole responsibility for 'preparatory measures required for political leadership and development' of those former Soviet territories 'which it is proposed to place under German civil administration or under German sovereignty'; although he was likewise to consult Ribbentrop, as well as the Chief of the OKW (Keitel), when taking action which was likely to affect the foreign or military policies of the Reich. As far as the peoples of the territories and their representatives (including the émigrés) were concerned, the Reich was to be represented by the Wehrmacht when the territories were still

¹ Except in such matters as the deportation of Dutch Jews, when the attitude of the protecting Power, Sweden, had to be taken into consideration and when Bene's advice could be particularly useful (cf. *U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11*, Judgment, pp. 283.35–7).
² Ribbentrop and Goebbels, for example, had acute differences over German propaganda in France (cf. *Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 417 and 449).
⁴ The German Foreign Ministry appears to have had a special 'Russian Committee' as early as May 1941—i.e. a month before the German attack upon the Soviet Union. After the attack was launched it also had a 'Special Detachment' in Russia (cf. *U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11*, pp. 830–1 and 845).
under military occupation, and by Rosenberg's Ministry when they were under civil administration.¹

(3) The National Socialist Party

Only in the Incorporated Territories and in the territories placed under a Chief of Civil Administration did the Nazi Party organization as such have a major role to play in furthering the aims of the German occupation. In these territories the Party's chief function was to 'bring the areas into the Reich' and to assist with the assimilation of the local populations. For this purpose the Party set up special local organizations—the so-called Auffangorganisationen—which could admit to their ranks a large section of the native community not normally eligible for ordinary Party membership. Such organizations were the Opferring in Alsace, the Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft in Lorraine, the Volksdeutsche Bewegung in Luxembourg,² the Steierische Heimatbund in Lower Styria, and the Kärntner Volksbund in Upper Carniola, Seeland, and the Miestal. The first three of these were admittedly created for the specific purpose of expediting 'the process of re-germanization',³ and participation in all these organizations was usually a prerequisite for the acquisition of German 'State membership' (Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit), while active work was a necessary qualification for full German citizenship, and for retention in the public service. Consequently in most of the territories the inhabitants were placed under strong pressure to join the organizations, with the result that the Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft in Lorraine and the Steierische Heimatbund in Lower Styria were eventually able to claim a membership of 98 per cent. and 95 per cent. respectively of the local adult population.⁴ The size of this membership did not, however, apparently influence the pace at which the regular Party organizations were constituted in the territories. Thus in Alsace, where the Opferring had only recruited about 15 per cent. of the population, the NSDAP was set up as early as 22 March 1941, whereas in Lorraine, where the Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft membership was more than six times as large in proportion to the total population, it was not until 30 July 1942 that the Party was formally constituted.⁵

¹ Verfugungen, iii. 206-7; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 291. As a result of the differences which arose in 1941, Ribbentrop apparently forbade the further transfer of Foreign Ministry officials to Rosenberg's service in the Eastern Territories (cf. testimony of Brautigam in U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 1018).

² See below, pp. 513-14.

³ Verfugungen, iv. 478-80; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, pp. 154-6. In Luxembourg the Volksdeutsche Bewegung was described as having 'die Eigenschaft einer Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts' (Deutsches Recht, 1942, p. 324).


⁵ In Upper Carniola, Seeland, and the Miestal the NSDAP was formally introduced on 15 December 1941, although the Kärntner Volksbund had only been founded in the previous July. An interesting insight into the methods which were used to recruit the local population into the
In the other occupied territories the operation of the Führerprinzip and the concomitant concentration of political authority in the hands of the supreme Reich representatives was felt to necessitate, not only the sub-ordination of the Party to the Reich Commissioners, but also the re-organization of the local Party units in order to make them completely self-contained within each particular area. Thus in the Netherlands and Norway the local Landesgruppen of the Party were removed from the control of the central Auslandsorganisation (Party organization for Germans abroad), to which they had hitherto been affiliated, and brought under the exclusive jurisdiction of Seys-Inquart and Terboven respectively.¹ In the General Government, the local Party unit—the Arbeitsbereich Generalgouvernement Polen der NSDAP—which was set up on 6 May 1940, was placed under Frank’s control from the very beginning,² although the Governor General appointed the ‘Representative of the Führer’s Deputy’ (after May 1941, the Representative of the Party Chancellery) as his ‘delegate’ in all Party matters.³ Similarly, when Hitler created the Arbeitsbereich Osten der NSDAP in the Occupied Eastern Territories on 1 April 1942, he made Rosenberg, the Reich Minister, its ‘Leader’ (Leiter),⁴ and the latter at once concentrated control of all Party matters in his own hands by forbidding the Party organizations to engage in any activity in the east without his express approval.⁵ In the Protectorate it was apparently considered sufficient merely to set up a ‘Party Liaison Office’ (Partieiverbindungsstelle), which was to bring the Party organization into closer touch with the Reich Protector and his staff. Here, however, the Party machinery was placed, not under Neurath, but under Jury, the Galeciter of the neighbouring Gau Niederdonau.⁶

(4) The SS

Reference has already been made to the role of the SS in the planning and shaping of Hitler’s Europe.⁷ It therefore only remains to consider here the relationship of the SS to the administrative agencies in the occupied territories and to indicate some of the consequences which ensued from Party once the latter had been constituted was provided by the drive which was launched in March 1942 in Alsace, where even ‘former members of pro-French or Marxist organizations’ could apparently join the Opferring and thereby qualify for eventual admission to the NSDAP (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 579 (732–RF)).

¹ The Landesgruppe Niederlande was transferred as early as October 1940; the Landesgruppe Norwegen was left under the Auslandsorganisation until March 1943 (cf. Verfü gungen, iii. 198, and v. 339). The Landesgruppe Niederlande became the Arbeitsbereich der NSDAP in den Niederlanden, and the Landesgruppe Norwegen became the Landesgruppe der NSDAP in Norwegen.
² Weh, A. 180.
³ Max Du Prel (ed.): Das Generalgouvernement (Würzburg, Triltsch, 1942), p. xvii.
⁴ Verfü gungen, iii. 200.
⁵ Ibid. p. 201.
⁶ Ibid. ii. 247.
⁷ See above, pp. 73–90.
Hitler's failure to subordinate the SS and police to the Reich representatives and Military Commanders.

Much of the authority which the SS exercised in the occupied territories was concentrated in the person of the Higher SS and Police Leader, who usually represented Himmler both as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality and as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police. The office of Higher SS and Police Leader was universal throughout the whole area of German occupation, a senior SS official being assigned in this capacity to every occupied territory from the moment when the civil or military administration was first constituted. Moreover, whereas the pattern of the civil or the military administration might change from one area to another, that of SS and police control never varied, not even between the occupied territories and the Reich proper. Whenever a Higher SS and Police Leader was appointed in an occupied territory he had the same SS and police agencies at his disposal and the same authority to assume command over the Ordnungspolizei (Orpo), the Sipo, and the SD, whenever it became necessary to employ these as a combined force, as his opposite numbers in Germany itself.\(^1\) He also retained the same status in relation to Himmler, his immediate superior.\(^2\) Thus, by making the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the occupied territories an integral part of the regular SS and police machinery and by keeping them under his own direct command Himmler ensured the same degree of absolute control over those territories as over Germany itself. He also, as Kaltenbrunner has testified,\(^3\) created a tremendous instrument of power which extended throughout the length and breadth of Hitler’s Europe.

The position of the Higher SS and Police Leader vis-à-vis the Reich representative was defined according to a variety of formulae but always in a way which gave him a loophole for avoiding complete subordination to the civil or military power. In the Protectorate, where the position was regulated by the ‘Order on the Reconstruction of the Administration and of the German Security Police’ of 1 September 1939,\(^4\) Neurath, as Reich Protector, was placed in charge of ‘all the authorities, offices and organs of the Reich’ in Bohemia and Moravia, and Karl Hermann Frank, the State Secretary, was made his ‘general deputy’. Under the second part

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1. The office of Higher SS and Police Leader was not created until the outbreak of war, when a SS officer of this rank was appointed to every German Wehrkreis, with which the various SS-Oberabschnitte were made identical.

2. The only difference between the position of the Higher SS Leaders in the occupied territories and those in the Reich appears to have been that the former were more directly controlled by the Befehlshaber and Kommandeure of the Sipo and SD, although they apparently had power to issue any orders which did not conflict with the over-all authority of the Sipo and SD commanders (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, iv. 238; also U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 12, Judgment, p. 59).

3. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 293.

of the order, however, the Security Police in the Protectorate were to remain administratively an integral part of the Security Police of the Reich and consequently under the exclusive control of Himmler. Yet as Frank was already Higher SS and Police Leader, and therefore Himmler's regional representative in SS and police matters, the somewhat remarkable position was reached in which he was nominally subordinate to Neurath as far as general administrative matters were concerned, but completely independent and answerable to the Reichsführer-SS alone in all questions relating to security. In practice, however, Frank forestalled any possibility of confusion by gradually assuming responsibility for both police and administration; and when Neurath was replaced by Frick in August 1943 the powers of the Reich Protector were modified in such a way as to transfer authority to Frank in name as well as in fact.

In the other occupied territories also the tendency was to aggrandize the authority of the Higher SS and Police Leader at the expense of that of the Reich representative. In the Netherlands, where the German police organs were merely placed at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner and of the Wehrmacht, the Higher SS and Police Leader was nominated by Himmler and appointed by Hitler. The result was that, whenever Seyss-Inquart gave the German police an order, they would apparently 'investigate as to whether [this] order was in line with the instructions which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader'. On the other hand, the Dutch police were from the beginning under the control of the Reich Commissioner. But, when Seyss-Inquart set up the four 'General Commissariats' for Administration and Justice, Security, Finance and Economics, and Special Purposes, he was apparently pressed by Himmler to give the 'General Commissariat' for Security, and with it the supervision of the Dutch police, to the Higher SS and Police Leader, Rauter. Thus again the confusing position was reached in which the Higher SS and Police Leader was nominally subordinated to the Reich Commissioner for the exercise of certain administrative functions, while remaining totally independent in his main capacity as head of the German SS and police formations.

In the Occupied Eastern Territories a slightly different procedure was adopted in regulating the position of the SS and police in relation to that of the Reich representative—with, however, the same ultimate result of

1 Testimony of Lammers at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 62). According to Lammers, the Reich Protector became merely the formal German representative in the Protectorate, with very little authority. He had the right of nominating civil servants and of granting pardons, and Frank was supposed to keep him informed regarding his activities. But Hitler received only Frank for political discussions. He did not want the Reich Protector to spend too much time in Bohemia and Moravia, and Lammers had 'several times' to remind Frick of this fact.

2 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart at Nuremberg (ibid. xv. 646).

3 See below, p. 119.

4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 206.
leaving Himmler in supreme control of all SS and police affairs. In this particular instance the Reichsführer-SS had started out with the advantage of having been brought into the picture before the civil authority was constituted; for, while the territories were still under military administration, he was given 'special tasks' in connexion with the preparation of the country for civil government—tasks which were said to result from the struggle between the 'two opposing political systems' of Nazism and Communism. Consequently, in issuing his decree on the administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories of 17 July 1941 Hitler expressly stated that the powers of the Reichsführer-SS were 'not to be affected' by the provisions of the present ordinance. Himmler's powers in this connexion were, in fact, regulated by an entirely separate *Führererlaß*, which made 'police security in the newly occupied Eastern Territories' specifically 'a matter for the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police'. The latter was also authorized, in 'certain circumstances', to 'issue instructions direct to the civilian Reich Commissioners', although he was supposed to 'transmit orders of fundamental political significance' through the Eastern Ministry unless it was 'a question of averting an imminent danger'. This meant that, in practice, Himmler could always exclude the Eastern Ministry from important police measures by claiming that there was an 'imminent danger' to avert. Nor did the two Higher SS and Police Leaders who were appointed for the territories have to consult the Ministry in police matters, for under the terms of the decree they were 'directly and personally subordinate', not to Rosenberg, but to the Reich Commissioners, Koch and Lohse.

It was, however, in the General Government that the conflict of jurisdictions between the Reich representative and the Higher SS and Police Leader had the most widespread repercussions. This was partly because it was in the General Government that much of Himmler's activity as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality was concentrated, and partly because both Frank, the Governor General, and Krüger, the Higher SS and Police Leader, were given to dogmatic notions as to the role which the civil authority and the SS respectively should play in the German occupation.

1 In the performance of these tasks Himmler was empowered to 'act independently and upon his own responsibility': cf. Keitel's 'Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21 (Fall Barbarossa)' of 13 March 1941 (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxvi. 53 (447–PS); *N.C.A*. iii. 410).


3 *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xi. 483–4; also *U.S. Military Tribunals*, *Case 11*, pp. 1927–8. Rosenberg had apparently all along opposed the idea of the police being made independent of his Ministry. Hence there was a 'rather heated' discussion at the Führerhauptquartier meeting of 16 July 1941, when he claims to have spoken against the proposed wording of Hitler's decrees, without, however, finding support from the others who were present.

4 As a 'fanatic for unity' (to quote his own description of himself), Frank believed that control
Unlike most of the other Reich representatives, Frank made a point, right from the very beginning, of emphasizing the subordinate position which the Higher SS and Police Leader held in relation to both the Governor General and his Deputy. Speaking to a group of officials on 8 March 1940 he stated that 'there was in the General Government no authority which was higher in rank, stronger in influence, or greater in power than the Governor General. Even the Wehrmacht had no governmental and administrative function ... and had no political power of any sort; and the same applied to the police and SS'. After a two years' struggle, however, he apparently came to realize that he was fighting a losing battle with Krüger, and he therefore endeavoured, early in 1942, to clear up his position vis-à-vis the Higher SS and Police Leader by entering into a formal agreement on the subject with Himmler. This agreement, which was drawn up on 14 March 1942, and which was eventually embodied in a Führer decree of 7 May 1942, endeavoured to effect a compromise by bringing the Higher SS and Police Leader into the formal machinery of government as State Secretary for Security. In this capacity the Higher SS and Police Leader was to be subordinate to the Governor General (very much as Rauter, as General Commissioner for Security in the Netherlands, was technically subordinate to Seyss-Inquart). Himmler, however, retained the right to give him 'direct instructions', although before carrying these out Krüger was to obtain Frank's approval, just as he was to obtain Himmler's approval in the case of any orders given to him by Frank. In an attempt to ensure that Krüger did not now arrogate to himself more powers than he possessed already, Frank followed the agreement with a decree prescribing down to the last detail the matters with which the State Secretary was to be competent to deal.

Although this somewhat cumbersome arrangement was publicly hailed as bringing the 'administrative reconstruction' of the General Government to its 'organizational conclusion' the agreement had only been in operation some 'four to six weeks' before the conflict between Frank and Krüger was raging again as fiercely as ever. The fact that Frank at this

in all matters, including those involving the police, should be kept in the hands of the Governor General and that the Higher SS and Police Leader 'could only act upon the orders of the Governor General and not upon those of the Reichsführer-SS' (cf. his Diary, I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 510 (2233–PS)). Krüger, on the other hand, contended that police action, having everywhere the same problem to deal with, should be co-ordinated throughout the whole area of German occupation (cf. ibid. xii. 65–67).

2 Frank's Diary (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 371–3 (2233–PS)).
3 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1942 part I, p. 293; also Frank's Diary (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 512–14 and 569–70 (2233–PS)); and ibid. xii. 117–18.
4 Ibid. xxxix. 582 seqq. (JN).
5 Deutsches Recht, 1942, p. 1012.
6 Testimony of Lammers (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 44).
time fell from grace as a result of his stand on Hitler’s attempt to nazify the German judiciary\(^1\) and was only retained in office as Governor General for ‘reasons of foreign policy’ meant that he now became an easy target, not only for the Higher SS and Police Leader, but for his other enemies also.\(^2\) By April 1943, therefore, Krüger was able to concert with Lammers a long memorandum on Frank’s shortcomings in the General Government which was apparently to be used for the purpose of bringing about his downfall.\(^3\) In this latter endeavour the Higher SS and Police Leader would undoubtedly have been successful but for the fact that, having meanwhile lost the confidence of his SS superiors in Berlin, he was himself at this time suddenly removed from office.\(^4\)

The examples which have been given above to illustrate the relations between the Reich representatives and the Higher SS and Police Leaders have been drawn entirely from the territories under civil administration. It would, however, be possible, if space permitted, to show how a similar state of affairs existed in the areas administered by Military Commanders.\(^5\) For the confusion caused by these conflicting jurisdictions was a phenomenon common to the whole area of German occupation. In part this was the result of the relentless and never-ending struggle for power which Himmler and the SS waged against the civil and military representatives. To an even greater extent, however, it was the result of Hitler’s own failure to define clearly and unequivocally the position of the Reich representatives in relation to the SS agencies and to insist upon a rational division of authority between them.

(e) **THE USE OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS AND THE COLLABORATION OF NATIVE PEOPLES**

In view of the emphasis which German propaganda gave to the need for a general political regeneration along Nazi lines in Europe\(^6\) it might

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\(^1\) See above, p. 29.

\(^2\) According to Buhler (State Secretary under Frank in the General Government), it became ‘a kind of sport’, after Frank lost his legal posts in the Party, to try to take over his powers in the General Government (cf. *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xii. 81).

\(^3\) Cf. Lammers’s letter to Himmler of 17 April 1943, enclosing the memorandum of 12 April 1943 (ibid. xxix. 337 seqq. (2220-PS)).

\(^4\) Apparently it was SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach, the influential commander of the SS anti-partisan forces, who helped to secure Krüger’s dismissal (cf. von dem Bach’s affidavit: ibid. x1. 115 (Frank-8)). Frank’s relations with Krüger’s successor, Koppe, seem to have been much more amicable (cf. Frank’s Diary: ibid. xxix. 717 (2233-PS), and testimony at Nuremberg, ibid. xii. 25).

\(^5\) In Belgium and Northern France, for example, there was a ‘long struggle’ between Falkenhausen and the SD, ‘which frequently worked against’ him (cf. interrogation of Falkenhausen: ibid. xxxviii 507 (015-RF)). In the Occupied Zone of France there were similar conflicts between the Gestapo on the one hand and Abetz and the military authorities on the other (ibid. vi. 559-60 and x. 126-7).

\(^6\) See above, pp. 50–51.
have been expected that the Germans would from the beginning have welcomed the growth of collaborationist movements in the occupied countries. Very often, however, this was not the case. In many instances such movements were at first treated with suspicion and reserve, if not with open hostility—presumably because any other policy must necessarily have alienated other sections of the population—and actual encouragement was only given to them after the Germans had found it difficult to persuade other native elements to assist in the administration of the country.

The working of German policy in this respect was perhaps best illustrated by the course which was followed in the Netherlands after May 1940. There Seyss-Inquart's initial concern was to devise some form of German supervisory machinery which could control the native civil service at the top and watch over the other Dutch agencies of government at the lower levels. He therefore set up four German 'General Commissariats' (for Administration and Justice, Security, Finance and Economics, and Special Purposes), with various Hauptabteilungen and Abteilungen, to direct the work of the Dutch Secretaries-General, who in turn were to be responsible to him 'for the orderly conduct of the business of their departments within the special field of their activity'. At the same time, he appointed German Beauftragte to supervise the Dutch administrations in the provinces, as well as the Dutch mayors of the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. These Beauftragte, he was careful to point out, must not be 'administrative officials, so much as persons with political experience'. Consequently he made arrangements with Bormann (then on the staff of Hess, Hitler's Deputy) to secure as Beauftragte men who came 'almost exclusively from the Party'.

At this time Seyss-Inquart was not interested in furthering the political fortunes of the Dutch NSB leader, Mussert, whose qualities he described as 'not coming up to those of an average Gauleiter in the Reich'. On the contrary he preferred as far as possible to use 'non-political men' or even Mussert's rivals like Rost van Tonningen, whom he regarded as meeting perfectly 'all the ideological requirements' and whom he appointed President of the Netherlands Bank and Secretary-General of the Treasury.

1 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 1940, no. 1, pp. 8–11 and 11–15; also Rudolf Kroiss: 'Die Verwaltung des Reichskommissars' (Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 29 and 50). Under Seyss-Inquart's decree of 29 May 1940, on the 'exercise of governmental authority', he himself assumed 'all powers ... heretofore vested in the King [sic] and the Government in accordance with the Constitution and the laws' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 594 (JN); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 202).

2 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 1940, no. 1, pp. 11–15 and Kroiss, op. cit. p. 31.


4 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 31).

5 Ibid. pp. 27–28, and Seyss-Inquart's first report (ibid. xxvi. 416 (997–PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 645); see also p. 497 below.
Nevertheless, with the stiffening of Dutch resistance after the opening of the campaign against Russia, Mussert's prospects brightened, and on 14 December 1941 his NSB was made the sole political party in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{1} Twelve months later Mussert himself was at last accorded the title of 'Führer of the Netherlands' and the NSB was given some measure of control over the Netherlands administration.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, Seyss-Inquart continued to reserve to himself the final decision in 'matters in which, under existing conditions, account must be taken of the point of view of the occupying Power', and even at this late hour he seems to have made no secret of the fact that he had built up Mussert only to drop him again if it suited his purpose.\textsuperscript{3} It was, therefore, perhaps not surprising that when, in March 1943, he created the Landwacht (later Landstorm)—a 'territorial defence force designed to provide protection against external and internal enemies'—he placed this under the control, not of Mussert, but of the German Higher SS and Police Leader, Rauter.\textsuperscript{4}

Even in Norway there appears to have been some initial reluctance on the part of the Germans to use the arch-collaborator, Quisling, particularly after their experience with his ill-starred government at the beginning of the occupation.\textsuperscript{5} As early as August 1940 the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling leader was consequently forced to complain to Hitler that the Reich Commissioner was 'not supporting him sufficiently in the political situation'.\textsuperscript{6} In working out the details of the German administration in 1940 Terboven was clearly anxious to keep as much control as possible in his own hands. He therefore extended the offices of the Reichskommissariat throughout the country, setting up Gebietskommissariate and regional branches in such widely scattered places as Kirkenes, Tromsø, Narvik, Trondheim, Lillehammer, Bergen, Stavanger, and Christiania.\textsuperscript{7} Although he recognized the Nasjonal Samling as the 'leading party of the state' in the autumn of 1940, it was not until 1 February 1942 that he was brought to countenance the formation of a 'National Nor-

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Kölnische Zeitung, 30 May 1942. For a fuller account of Mussert and the NSB see pp. 498–502 below.

\textsuperscript{2} See below, p. 499.

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. Notes on the Conference of the SS Committee of the Working Group for the Germanic Raum, 12 January 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 264 (705–PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 513). The idea of building up Mussert just to drop him again apparently displeased the SS, who felt that this must be rejected 'as far as a Germanic Reichspolitik in the sense of the SS' was concerned.

\textsuperscript{4} Order of 11 March 1943, in Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 1943, pp. 115–18. The title of the Landwacht was changed to Landstorm on 16 October 1943 (ibid. p. 346), and a new Landwacht was created within the NSB in order to give the latter the means of defending itself against its Dutch opponents. The Landstorm remained under German control.

\textsuperscript{5} See below, p. 535.

\textsuperscript{6} Meeting between Hitler and Quisling of 16 August 1940 (U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 978).

\textsuperscript{7} Herbert Schneider: 'Staatsrechtliche Entwicklung und Verwaltungsgebietung Norwegens seit dem 9. April 1940' (Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 379 405).
wegian Government’ with Quisling as Prime Minister, having meanwhile administered the country, first through the ‘Administrative Council’ (Administrasjonsråd) set up by the Norwegian Supreme Court and the German Minister on 15 April 1940, and then, from September 1940 onwards, through the thirteen ‘Provisional State Counsellors’ to whom, on 25 September 1941, he had accorded the formal rank of Ministers. Even then, however, his decision to appoint Quisling, whom he is accused of having ‘sabotaged’ and ‘discredited’ with the Norwegian population, appears to have been dictated, not by his own volition, but by representations which Admirals Raeder and Boehm, the Naval Commander in Norway, made behind his back to Hitler.

In Belgium, where, as in the Netherlands, the local administration remained largely in the hands of the Secretaries-General of the former Ministries working under German control, the Germans found themselves in the difficult position of having to choose between the rival aspirations of the Flemish nationalists and of the Walloon Belgicists, and between the competing claims, within the two racial groups, of the outright annexationists and the other collaborators who merely wanted an alliance with the Reich. It is consequently not surprising that they tended to vacillate, in the distribution of their favours, between one faction and another. In Flanders they at first showed a preference for the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (VNV), recognizing it as the sole party in the Flemish province in May 1941, after it had brought the Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen (Verdinaso) and the Flemish section of the Rexists under its control, and giving important posts, like the Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Interior and the Mayorality of Brussels to its members. By the end of 1942, however, the VNV had begun to lose favour, and the annexationist Devlag (Deutsch-Vlämische Arbeitsgemeinschaft) was preferred to it. In Wallonia, the Germans likewise vacillated between the Rexists and the more vociferously pro-German AGRA (Amis du Grand Reich Allemand), sometimes encouraging the Rexist leader, Degrelle, to the extent of appointing his followers to important posts, and at other times showing stern disapproval of his Belgicist policies. Other movements like the Walloon National Socialist

1 i.e. nine days before Terboven’s own appointment (Schneider, op. cit. pp. 382-3). See also below, p. 536.
2 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete, 1941, p. 23; see also below, p. 537.
3 See Raeder’s testimony at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xiv. 100–2). Raeder claims to have made repeated representations to Hitler about Terboven’s unsuitability for the Norwegian post, and suggests that it was as a result of these that Quisling was appointed Prime Minister. According to him, Terboven wanted to remain ‘Gauleiter of Norway’.
5 For a fuller account of the collaborationists in Belgium see below, pp. 482–4.
6 See below, p. 483, note 1.
Party which, although pro-German in outlook, were not of any practical value to the Reich authorities, were strongly discouraged, if not actually suppressed.  

In Denmark the efforts which the Germans made to draw the Danish National Socialist Party into the conduct of affairs ended in complete failure. The main attempt in this direction was made at the time of the 'diplomatic crisis' of October 1942, when Hitler decided that the aim of the German authorities 'must be to establish as soon as possible a régime under the leadership of the Danish National Socialists'. At that time Hitler apparently felt that the question 'whether the Party leader of the Danish National Socialists, Dr. Frits Clausen, was the right person or whether he had a large or small proportion of the Danish people behind him' was 'completely unimportant'. In the preceding months the German Legation at Copenhagen had given Clausen considerable financial assistance and had led him to expect that he might become a sort of Danish 'Führer' under German sponsorship; although at no time since the invasion had they accorded him any open recognition. One of Best's first demands after his arrival in Denmark was, therefore, for a change in the composition of the Danish Government and for the admission of the Danish National Socialists to ministerial posts. This demand was, however, firmly resisted by the Danish Government and, after protracted negotiations, the Germans eventually decided not to press it. German confidence in Clausen in any case slumped considerably after the elections of March 1943, in which the Danish National Socialists obtained only 2.5 per cent. of the votes cast; and after the crisis of the following August the Reich authorities made up their minds to control Danish affairs, not so much through the use of local collaborators (although the SS did use native terrorists) as by direct police action.

In the west the tendency in most cases was to keep the central government exclusively in German hands and to leave only minor administrative tasks to purely native bodies. This was in the main the result of the German decision to give the countries over to the most ruthless exploitation, although it was also due in part to the absence, in the former Soviet territories at least, of any suitable native organs of government. (The local government officials had perished in, or fled before, the German

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1 *Gazette de Charleroi*, 25/26 October 1940.
3 Official Memorandum of the Danish Government of 25 October 1945, on Crimes Committed by the Germans (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 639 (901-RF)).
4 They had, however, come to use Clausen's newspaper, *Fedrelandet*, more and more as a semi-official German organ. As early as June 1940 Renthe-Fink had also been interested in using the DNSAP (the Danish Nazi Party) to nazify the Danish Government (cf. U.S. Military Tribunals, *Case 11*, p. 1848).
5 For source reference see note 3 above.
6 See also below, pp. 527-8.
invasion; but the Russian system was, in any case, supposedly repugnant to the Germans.) In so far as the Reich authorities encouraged pro-German movements this was often done in an attempt to use the latter as a lever against other national groups, rather than to prepare them for participation in the task of government. Thus in September 1939 Ribbentrop apparently toyed with the idea of using the western Ukrainians against the Poles and Jews in Galicia, and later on Frank did in fact use them as a counterweight to the Poles in the General Government. After the attack upon the Soviet Union, Ukrainian émigrés were assiduously cultivated by Rosenberg’s Eastern Ministry, although in the Ukraine itself they were always anathema to the Reich Commissioner, Koch. As far as Russia proper was concerned, however, General Andrei Vlasov, the principal collaborator, was given little recognition until the end of 1944, when Russia itself was already in Soviet hands again; and even then the attention given to him was strongly resented by Rosenberg, who feared that his großrussisch (Russian expansionist) designs would only alienate the other eastern peoples.

As far as the actual administration of the Eastern Territories was concerned, the extent of native participation was usually so limited that there was, from this point of view at least, no advantage to the Germans in having large numbers of collaborators at their disposal. In the General Government, for example, only the towns and local communes were allowed to remain in the hands of Polish officials. These local administrative units were brought together in small ‘communal associations’ (Gemeindeverbände) and were placed under the provision of native ‘Wojts’, who, as the Germans were frequently at pains to point out, were based upon the ‘old Germanic institution of the Vögte’. The control of the ‘communal associations’ lay, however, not so much with the Polish ‘Woit’ as with the German Kreishauptmann, who took his orders from the department dealing with internal affairs in the office of each District Governor. Above this level the administration was entirely German, although Frank apparently found it to his advantage to set up at the top of the administrative structure both Polish and Ukrainian ‘Main Committees’ (Hauptausschüsse) representing the heads of the local native bodies, to keep him informed of the wishes of the population on various national matters. According to his own account, he made it obligatory for his

1 Testimony of General Lahousen (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ii. 448).
3 Cf. letter to Lammers and enclosure of 12 October 1944 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 185 seqq. (Rosenberg-14)).
4 Du Prel (ed.): Das Generalgouvernement, p. xvi.
5 Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 June 1943. In Galicia there were Ukrainian ‘Akademiker’ corresponding to the ‘Wojts’.
6 Count Ronikier was made head of the Polish Hauptausschuß and Professor Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch head of the Ukrainian.
German subordinates to consult these Hauptausschüsse on ‘all questions of a general nature’ and he himself was in ‘constant contact’ with them. At the time of the Warsaw rising in 1944 he even toyed with the idea of turning the Polish Hauptausschuß into a ‘Polish National Committee’, to be represented in the Kreise by the ‘Wojts’, who would, in turn, become ‘real administrative units’. The Ukrainian Committee, which had two branches (one in Cracow and the other in Lwów), as well as an ‘agency’ in Berlin, was already well on the way to acquiring a status of this sort, having been given sole responsibility for ‘co-ordinating’ Ukrainian national life in Galicia.

In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine the use of native organs of government was similarly circumscribed—despite Rosenberg’s grand scheme for creating an autonomous Ukrainian State—and native participation in the administration never extended beyond the Ukrainian ‘Rayonchefs’, who corresponded roughly to the Polish ‘Wojts’ in the General Government. In the Reichskommissariat Ostland the position varied from one Generalbezirk to another. In view of the fact that its eastern half had been under Soviet rule since 1917, the Generalbezirk of White Russia was considered to be politically the most backward; hence no attempt was made to form any central native administration, and the main burden of government fell upon the staff of the German General Commissioner in Minsk and upon the two subordinate Chief Commissioners in Minsk and Baranowicze; although, as in the General Government, a representative ‘committee’ was set up to advise the German authorities in matters in which it was felt necessary to take the wishes of the native population into consideration. On the other hand, in the Generalbezirke of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had only been under Soviet rule for a relatively short time, the German civil administration availed itself of the services of local Selbstverwaltungen almost from the very beginning. This use of native administrative bodies was in due course formally recognized by Rosenberg’s decree of 7 March 1942, which designated the National

1 *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xii. 11. Frank’s testimony is borne out by the letter of Kubijowytsh of 25 February 1943 (ibid. xxvii. 298 seqq. (1526–PS); *N.C.A.* iv. 79 80) and by the discussions with Ronikier reported in Frank’s Diary (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxix. 604–5 (2233–PS)).

2 Ibid. p. 715.

3 *Krakowski Vierteljiahr*, 1 March 1942.

4 See below, pp. 634–5.

5 I.e. the area to the east of the former Polish voivodeships of Nowogrodek and Polesie and districts of Glebokie and Wileika.

6 As early as 3 July 1942 Kube, the General Commissioner, had announced that the Director of the White Russian ‘Self-Help’ Movement, Ernatschenko, would be attached to his staff as ‘Referent für weißrussische völkische Angelegenheiten’. In June 1943 he set up a White Russian *Vertrauensausschuß*, composed of the Kreisälteste of the ten Districts and six other prominent White Russians, under the chairmanship of Professor Wazlaw Iwanowski, the ‘Alderman’ of Minsk. In the following December this body was given the status of a ‘Central Council’ (Zentralrat). Its chief function appears to have been to recruit the local population for the White Russian ‘Home Guard’.
Directors, Directors-General, and Councillors-General as the ‘supreme national authority’ in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania respectively. All these bodies were, however, to be appointed by the local General Commissioner, with the approval of the Reich Commissioner, Lohse; for, as Rosenberg pointed out to Hitler shortly afterwards, he had, by inserting certain ‘security clauses’ into his decree, been careful to ensure that nothing could be done by the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Selbstverwaltungen without the consent of these German officials. The decision to give the present carefully circumscribed measure of responsibility to these native Selbstverwaltungen had in fact been dictated primarily by the fact that the Germans ‘were short of officials and had therefore to exercise a great economy in the use of man-power’. Nevertheless it had the advantage, as Rosenberg saw it, of creating ‘an historical alibi’ (ein geschichtliches Alibi) for the Germans (presumably by suggesting that their methods were more enlightened than they in fact were), and of showing the Baltic peoples that the Germans were prepared to go a long way to meet their wishes. And if the decision were not accepted in this spirit by the local population the Germans could still—‘rightly intervene with sharper measures’.2

The considerations which Rosenberg thus emphasized in his report to Hitler on the creation of the Baltic Selbstverwaltungen afford an interesting insight into the factors which influenced German administrative policy generally. In their more ingenuous moments the Germans were ready to concede this policy to be one of Zuckerbrot und Peitsche:3 its basic principle being to secure collaboration by alternating inducements with coercion. In so far as modifications of the policy were required from one area of occupation to another, this was achieved by varying the proportion between the two ingredients. In the west the ‘gingerbread’ was often (but by no means always) proffered first, and then the less palatable alternative produced when this had failed to achieve its purpose. In the Eastern Territories (i.e. Poland and occupied Russia), on the other hand, the tendency was to use the ‘whip’ throughout, and only to try persuasiveness at the very end when it was a question of mobilizing every ounce of anti-Bolshevik sentiment for the last stand against the Russians.


2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 285 (1520–PS); cf. N.C.A. iv. 67. In reporting to Hitler Rosenberg was at pains to emphasize that his decree merely represented a ‘confirmation of the existing state of affairs and the removal of an amount of uncertainty’ (ibid. pp. 284 and 66 respectively).

3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 269 (3859–PS) and xli. 195 (Rosenberg-19). Goebbels regarded Seyss-Inquart, with his ‘good Habsburg schooling’, as ‘master in the art of alternating gingerbread with whippings’ (Goebbels Diaries, p. 339).
(v) Legal Aspects

(a) The Legality of German Occupation Policy

Strange as it may seem in the light of the methods which they subsequently adopted, the Germans at first maintained some pretence, at least as far as the administration of the occupied territories in Western Europe was concerned, of following the principles laid down by the Hague Convention. Indeed, they even went so far as to suggest that, inasmuch as there was no formal peace treaty and usually no armistice between them and the country in question, 'inter-state relations' (zwischenstaatliche Verhältnisse) were 'regulated solely by general inter-state treaties', such as the Hague Convention. In particular they argued their right to govern from Article 43 of the Convention, which provided that, once the authority of the legitimate power had passed into the hands of the occupying Power, the latter was entitled to take all steps within its means to restore and ensure public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the occupied territory. This, the Germans contended, 'imposed no barriers to a reorganization of public life': 'the administration had only, in so far as no overriding obstacle interposed itself, to proceed in accordance with the laws of land warfare'.

Later, as their violations of the Hague Convention became plain for all to see, they began to take refuge in the argument that the Convention had been outmoded by the changes which had occurred in the nature of war since it was signed in 1907. According to one writer, while the authors of the Hague Convention considered that war was principally a matter for opposing armies and only occasionally touched the civilian population, 'war today affects the people as a whole and in every department of life'. The tasks of the civilian authorities in an occupied country had grown more complex. They had now to deal with all administrative problems and to intervene in every aspect of civilian life—'for this war is a total war'. Even the Germans, however, could see that this specious line of reasoning was not adequate to justify the wholesale incorporation of territories which had occurred since 1939. In order to cover this aspect of German policy it was therefore suggested that 'administrative practice had from the beginning not regarded these territories as "occupied territories" within the meaning of the Hague Convention', although the occupation régimes of the other (including the 'non-Western') regions had been based in the main on the principles of occupatio bellica according to the Convention.

1 Cf. e.g. the argument of Kroiss in the case of the Netherlands in Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 21 and 43.
2 Ibid. p. 48.
3 R. H. Koch: 'Der Aufbau der deutschen Verwaltung in Norwegen' (Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, iii. 40).
4 Jahrbuch der Weltpolitik, 1942, ed. F. A. Six (Berlin, Junker and Dunnhaupt, 1942), p. 94.
To suggest, as this argument seemed to do, that even the administrations in the east were in accordance with international law and usage was completely to ignore the aims which had been set for German occupation policy in that region. In the General Government, for instance, the objectives of the German occupation were officially described as being:

1. To increase and control agricultural production to the greatest possible extent in order to guarantee the German people’s food supplies. To allow the native populations engaged upon work of importance to the war effort adequate rations and to remove the rest of the food for the Wehrmacht and the home country;
2. to keep the labour force of the native population engaged exclusively upon important war work and to place labour not necessary for this purpose at the disposal of the Reich;
3. to strengthen the German element in the territory generally and in particular to reinforce the eastern frontier districts by redistributing the settlements and by bringing in Volksdeutsche from other parts;
4. to secure the General Government as a transit area for supplies going to the eastern front;
5. to recruit troops from the native population for the military struggle against Bolshevism.  

Clearly the principles of international law would have to go by the board when a programme such as this was instituted. Hence the pretence of trying to govern ‘legally’ was soon dropped when it came to exploiting the former Soviet territories. Here, it was stated, the provisions of the Hague Convention could have no relevance ‘as the U.S.S.R. has been dissolved and the Reich consequently has the duty of exercising all governmental and other sovereign rights in the interests of the local population’. Therefore ‘all measures’ would be permissible ‘which seem to the German administration to be necessary and suitable for the carrying out of this comprehensive task’.  

From what has been said about German administrative methods and policies in previous sections of this survey it will be seen that there was little in these that could be reconciled with either the letter or the spirit of the Hague Convention. The whole SS programme for Hitler’s Europe, with its mass shootings and wholesale uprooting of populations and confiscation of property under the resettlement schemes, was, for instance, in flagrant violation of the provisions of Article 46 of the Convention, requiring that family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property be respected. The incorporation flagrante bello of large areas into Greater Germany, the institution of purely political régimes under the

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1 Translated from Lammers’s memorandum of 12 April 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 338 sqq. (2200 PS)); cf. N.C.A. iv. 856.
2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 602 (1056–PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 710.
supervision of the German Nazi Party, and the imposition of oaths of allegiance to Germany and Hitler were also contrary to the principles laid down in the Convention—as were the introduction of German laws, courts, and citizenship, the changing of customs frontiers and the imposition of collective fines, and the holding and shooting of hostages for acts of resistance.¹

The accepted principle of international law that occupied territories should be held in trust until the conclusion of a formal peace treaty found no place in German policy. On the contrary, the overriding consideration was to bring about, by the speediest possible means, the absorption of the countries into the New Order. The idea that a peace treaty might eventually have to be concluded seems to have rarely entered into German calculations, the emphasis of Nazi propaganda being always upon the role which would ultimately be assigned to the countries in the New Order, rather than upon the terms which they could expect under a final peace settlement. As he indicated in his reply to the efforts of Quisling and Raeder to bring about a peace settlement for Norway in 1942,² Hitler himself had no desire to conclude formal peace treaties, even with countries which had puppet régimes completely subservient to German interests. As he saw it, eventual annexation must always be the German aim. This applied even to Denmark, which in the earlier stages experienced less direct German control than any other occupied country, but which was ultimately to become a ‘German province’.³

(b) The Concept of Law in the New Order

Speaking at the University of Vienna on 1 July 1942, on ‘Law and the Reconstruction of Europe’, Hans Frank, the Governor General of Poland and the chief legal expert of the Nazi movement, suggested that, when the Germans thought of the European New Order, they must also think of giving ‘the European cult of law its fitting and proper place in that New Order’. Law must mean ‘the protection of the small nation against the big, the protection of the small economic potentiality against the big, the protection of the weak powers against the strong, and above all the

¹ Many of these violations of the Hague Convention are set out, with reference to the relevant articles of the Convention, in the Official Luxembourg Report Concerning Crimes Committed by the Germans, in I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 137 seqq. (077–UK).

² Raeder apparently suggested to Hitler that the task of defending Norway would be made considerably easier if a formal peace treaty could be concluded with that country (cf. his testimony at Nuremberg: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xiv. 101). The question of a peace treaty for Norway was apparently raised again after the battle of Stalingrad, but even then Hitler does not seem to have been very enthusiastic. His attitude is stated to have been ‘that possibly next spring a treaty of peace might be concluded. However, the terms would be imposed upon Norway and the question would then be resolved whether Norway would enjoy the status of having a Reich Commissioner . . . or [of receiving] a Reich Plenipotentiary’ (cf. Woermann’s report on conversation with Lammers of 20 February 1943: U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, p. 660).

³ See above, p. 105.
protection of the small continent of Europe against the great areas (Räume) of the world.¹ Yet Frank was himself to demonstrate the essential contradiction between the theory and practice of German administration as far as the operation of any rule of law was concerned; for the details of his government in the rump area of Poland which were recorded in his diary, and the many repressive and completely arbitrary decrees which he issued as Governor General of that territory, represent the very antithesis of the Rechtskultur for which he pleaded at Vienna.² Nor was this leading Nazi jurist in any way consistent in his definition of the role which law should play in German occupation policy, for it was he who stated in November 1939 that 'law is that which is useful and necessary for the German nation; that is unlawful which harms the interests of the German nation. These principles guide us in these times.'³

This idea of basing law upon expediency was from the beginning the guiding principle of German legal and administrative practice. Frequently asserted in the celebrated Nazi dictum that the courts did not exist 'exclusively to protect the rights of the individual, but, first and foremost, to serve the interests of the people's community',⁴ it was the principle which led the Germans to admit that, for them, law was simply an adjunct—if not, indeed, a mere product—of administrative policy. As far as the tasks of administration were concerned, Stuckart contended in an address to the International Academy of Political Science and Public Administration in Berlin in May 1941, laws were merely indicative of the 'established boundaries' of the 'great field in which administrative action should follow its own free judgment in order to be able to do full justice to the manifold developments of national life'. Administration was the 'preservation and development of the community according to the directions laid down by the leadership', and this in turn was 'law in the most elevated sense of the term'. Administration was therefore not 'gesetzmäßig (i.e. according to law) in the sense of the legal state', but was 'rechtmäßig (i.e. according to right) in a higher sense'.⁵

The application of this principle to the occupied territories meant that the exigencies of German rule, and more especially of German exploitations, became a law unto themselves, overriding both international agreements and the laws of native and German origin in the territories concerned. This was clearly recognized by Hitler as early as March 1939

¹ The text of the speech is given in I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 522-9 (2233-PS). This was one of the four addresses which precipitated Frank's removal from his legal offices in the Nazi Party. See above, pp. 28-29.
² See below, pp. 149 and 557 seqq.
³ Address to Academy of German Law, in Juristische Wochenschrift, December 1939.
⁵ Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 64-65.
when, in the decree setting up the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, he stated that ‘in so far as the defence of the Reich requires it, the Führer and Reich Chancellor may issue, for specified areas of these territories, orders at variance with these articles’. With this decree Hitler established a precedent which was followed by the Reich representatives in the occupied territories whenever there was a crisis with which the normal law agencies seemed inadequate to cope. In these circumstances it became the invariable practice of the Reich representatives to give their subordinates explicit authority to ‘deviate from the laws in force’.

In a number of cases the existing law of the occupied countries was radically revised for the purpose of promoting Nazi political and ideological objectives. Thus in Norway the income and property tax laws were modified so as to accord special privileges to men who served in the Norwegian Legion, the Waffen-SS, and the German Wehrmacht. In Flanders a movement was started to replace ‘Franco-Roman law’ by a ‘Flemish-Germanic Volksrecht’, the idea being to ‘sever the link between Flanders and French law’ and to enable the ‘Flemish-Dutch people’ to create ‘its own national law within the framework of the New Europe’. At the same time the Germans made significant changes in the law of Belgium in order to give encouragement to the Flemish quislings. They also set up special political courts along familiar German lines—e.g. the Folkedomstol in Norway, the Tribunal d’État in France, and the Vredegerechtshof in the Netherlands, all of which were created in the image of the German Volksgerechtshof (People’s Court)—to deal with offences which they considered particularly serious from an ideological point of view.

Nowhere was the influence of the Nazi Weltanschauung upon legislative

2 For instance under Seyss-Inquart’s decree of 19 March 1941, setting up administrative courts martial (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, no. 11, 20 March 1941, p. 190), the Higher SS and Police Leader could ‘deviate from existing regulations’. The ‘Special Agent’ appointed for the areas where administrative courts martial were established was also not to ‘be bound by law’. Under Seyss-Inquart’s order of 5 January 1943 (ibid. 9 January 1943, pp. 1–39), the Higher SS and Police Leader could deviate ‘from the law in force’ when Polizeistandrecht was imposed. In the Protectorate similar deviations from the law in force were made possible when the state of civil emergency was proclaimed on 29 September 1941 (Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors, 1941, p. 527).
3 Norwegians serving in the Norwegian Legion, the Waffen-SS, and the Wehrmacht were also given preference in admission to schools and universities (Deutsches Recht, 1944, p. 16).
4 Cf. ibid. 1941, p. 34.
5 Cf. e.g. the orders of the Military Commander for Belgium and Northern France, providing for the restitution of the rights of Belgian nationals who had been ‘persecuted’ because of their collaboration with Germany in the First World War (Verordnungsblatt des Militarbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, no. 14, 10 September 1940, and Dokumente der deutschen Politik, vol. viii, part I, pp. 252–6).
7 Cf. ‘Neue Sonderstrafgerichtsbarkeit in Frankreich’, ibid. 1942, pp. 1217–18.
8 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 1941, pp. 664–71.
policy more clearly marked than in the attempts which were made to bring the laws of the occupied territories into line with those of the Reich on the so-called 'Jewish question'. Here the anti-Semitic programme was extended with all the malignity which had been exhibited in the campaign against the Jews in the Reich after 1933. Thus, in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, changes were made in the criminal code imposing particularly severe penalties upon Jews who committed acts of violence against German nationals or who disobeyed German instructions. At the same time Jews (like Poles) were forbidden to bring private actions in the courts. In these territories also the property of Jews of Polish origin was made liable to immediate confiscation, whereas that of other Polish nationals was in theory only to be confiscated if it was 'needed for public welfare' or if the owners had migrated to the Reich after 1918. In the General Government Jews were made liable to compulsory labour service under a decree issued by Frank on 26 October 1939. Those over ten years of age had to wear the Star of David and those having shops or businesses had to display special signs to indicate that these were of Jewish ownership. By a decree of 26 January 1940 the Jews in the General Government were forbidden to use the railways. After October 1940 they were compelled to live in ghettos, from which they were not allowed to move without permission and in which they were given a sort of *Selbstverwaltung* in the form of 'Jewish Councils' (Judenräte). In the Ostland, where similar restrictions were imposed, all Jewish property was confiscated by an order issued by the Reich Commissioner, Lohse, on 13 October 1941. Legislation confining the Jews to ghettos was introduced by the District Commissioners, and the principle of making local 'Councils of Elders' responsible for the Jews was applied. Nor was the position materially different in the west, as the measures which were instituted against the Jews in occupied France bear witness. There, by a decree of the Military Commander of 27 September 1940, Jews who had fled to the Unoccupied Zone were forbidden to return. All other Jews were required to register with the

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1 *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1941 part I, pp. 759 seqq.
2 Ibid. 1940 part I, pp. 1270 seqq.
3 Weh, A.425 and A.426.
4 Ibid. A.405.
5 *Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement Polen*, 1939, p. 61.
6 Ibid. 1940, p. 45.
7 Du Prel: *Das Generalgouvernement*, pp. xvii and 235. The Judenrate not only looked after the welfare of the Jewish population but were also responsible for seeing that the orders of the German authorities were carried out. For the rising in the Warsaw Ghetto in April 1943 see below, pp. 565-8.
8 Legislation confining the Jews to 'closed settlements' was also introduced by the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia (cf. *Deutsches Recht*, 1942, p. 562). Similarly the principle of making the Jews communally responsible for their own welfare was extended to Belgium, where an 'Association of Jews in Belgium' to encourage emigration and to provide Jewish schools was created by a decree of 25 November 1941 (ibid. p. 75).
local sub-prefect, and Jewish businesses had to be designated as such by signs in French and German.¹ Later, Jews were forbidden to change their place of residence and were made subject to a curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.² They were also compelled to wear the Star of David, as in the Eastern Territories.

(c) The Law-making Power

The main concern of law as the Germans administered it in the occupied countries was to serve the ends of occupation and, above all, to assert the primacy of German interests against the competing interests of the native populations.³ In the Incorporated Territories and in those under Chiefs of Civil Administration the process of subordinating the legal institutions to German political objectives was taken to the point of eliminating the original native law and judiciary almost entirely and of replacing these by the codes and Gerichtsverfassungen of the Reich. For this reason the supreme law-making authority in the Incorporated Territories was not so much the Reichsstatthalter as the various Reich agencies and ministerial offices in Berlin. In the case of the incorporated areas of Poland the pre-eminence of the Reich Government was asserted from the very beginning—i.e. in Hitler's decree of 8 October 1939 setting up the two new Reichsgaue of Westpreußen and Posen (later Danzig-Westpreußen and the Wartheland). While permitting existing law to remain in force in so far as it did not 'conflict with the incorporation in the... Reich', this decree expressly empowered the Reich Minister of the Interior, 'in consultation with the appropriate Reich Minister', to introduce Reich law and Prussian state law into the territories and to regulate the financial relationships with the rest of the Reich in collaboration with the Reich Minister of Finance. Nothing, however, was said about the law-making powers of the local Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, although the Reich Minister of the Interior did, in practice, delegate some of his authority to these officials.⁴

In the Incorporated Territories of the West—i.e. in Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet—Hitler himself introduced the entire Reichsrecht and the

¹ Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten französischen Gebiete, no. 9, 30 September 1940, p. 92.
² Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich, 1942, p. 340.
³ As Oberlandesgerichtspräsident Froboess put it, 'German law exists only for German people, therefore foreign people can never have equality before the law’ (Litzmannstädter Zeitung, 16 December 1941).
⁴ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, pp. 2042–3; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 238. The actual 'reconstruction of the administration' was to follow the law on the reconstruction of the administration in the Reichsgau Sudetenland of 14 April 1939. Under Section 4 (i) of the latter law the Reichsstatthalter was empowered to 'promulgate law by means of orders with the consent of the Reich Ministers concerned and the Reich Minister of the Interior' (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 780). It was not specifically stated in the decree of 8 October 1939 that this limited law-making power was extended to the Reichsstatthalter in Danzig-Westpreußen and the Wartheland.
state laws of Prussia by his decree of 23 May 1940. Under the terms of this decree these Reich laws were to come into effect at the beginning of the following September, although the Reich Ministers were given discretion, ‘in consultation with the Reich Minister of the Interior’, to postpone or modify the application of any particular statute if this was deemed to be advisable. On the other hand, in the territories under a Chief of Civil Administration much more initiative tended to be left to the regional authorities. The Chief of the Civil Administration was said to act ‘on behalf of the Führer’ and was subordinate to him alone. He was, therefore, the ‘holder of the law-making, law-enforcing and judicial power’ in the territory under his control. Only in special matters (posts, railways, and Customs) had the Reich taken over the ‘direct administration’, so that in all other fields the authority of the Chief of Civil Administration was decisive. Nevertheless, as in the Incorporated Territories, the fundamental object was to introduce the main body of Reich law as rapidly as possible, and the legislative policies of the Chiefs of Civil Administration had to be framed accordingly. Moreover, those policies followed a pattern which seemed to suggest a considerable degree of direction from Berlin. Thus when Wagner introduced the German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch), along with the law against ‘insidious attacks on Party and state’ of 1934 and the various laws to safeguard the German war effort, into Alsace in January 1942, similar steps were soon taken by Bürckel in Lorraine and by Simon in Luxembourg. Compulsory military service was subsequently introduced into the three territories by the same method. On the other hand, the complementary legislation conferring Reich citizenship upon the inhabitants of the three territories who served in the Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS or who were recognized as having otherwise ‘proved themselves’ German was introduced, not by the Chiefs of Civil Administration, but by the Reich Minister of the Interior in Berlin.

3 Decree of 30 January 1942, in Verordnungsblatt des Chefs der Zivilverwaltung im Elsäß, 1942, pp. 64 seqq.
4 Deutsches Recht, 1942, p. 214.
5 Ibid. p. 262. See also below, p. 510.
7 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1942 part I, pp. 533–4; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, pp. 141–3. The German tax law (Steuerrecht) was also introduced into Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg simultaneously in this way (Deutsches Recht, 1942, pp. 324–5). German commercial law (Handelsrecht) was introduced by the Chiefs of Civil Administration in Alsace and Lorraine independently, but again in a way which suggested co-ordinated action on the part of these authorities (cf. ibid. pp. 214 and 562).
To some extent the supremacy of the Reich authorities in the matter of law-making was admitted in the other occupied countries also. This was especially true as far as it concerned the law-making powers of Göring, both as Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich. It was also to a considerable extent true of the authority exercised by Sauckel (his nominal subordinate) as General Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labour, by Speer as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, and by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality. Yet such laws as would be issued by these Reich authorities would usually be of general application throughout German-occupied Europe, so that within the area of their jurisdiction the Reich representatives (i.e. Military Commanders, Reich Commissioners, &c.) were, both in name and in fact, the supreme law-makers, as well as the originators of all new organs of justice. According to one official commentary, the law-making power of the Reich representatives, which was ‘one of the most important attributes of governmental authority’, was ‘limited only by the will of the Führer and in the international field by the provisions of Articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Convention’. Legally the Reich representatives were in the highest sense the ‘guardians of the Reich interests’ (Wahrer der Reichsinteressen), and as such they exercised absolute control over the courts and other institutions (except the German police) which were responsible for protecting those interests.

The law-making authority of the Reich representatives was invariably defined in their decrees of appointment, although the actual formula adopted tended to vary from one decree to another. In the decree of 12 October 1939, appointing Frank Governor General in the occupied Polish territories, it was stated that the ‘Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan and the Governor General may make laws by means of decrees’, and that the superior Reich authorities, as well as these, could issue regulations for the planning of the German Lebensraum and economic sphere in the areas under the Governor General’s control. No such qualification was imposed in the case of Terboven in Norway or of Seyss-Inquart in the Netherlands. In both these cases it was merely stated that ‘the Reich Commissioner can make laws by means of decrees’.

1 Cf. article on labour mobilization in the occupied territories in Pariser Zeitung, 30 August 1942.
2 Kroiss, in Stuckart, ed.: Reich, Volksordnung, Lebensraum, ii. 32–33.
4 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete, no. 1, 6 May 1940, p. 1.
5 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part i, p. 778; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 201
Although it was expressly laid down that 'the law hitherto valid should remain in force' in the General Government as long as this was 'not contrary to the taking-over of the administration by the German Reich', and, in Norway and the Netherlands, as long as it was 'compatible with the occupation', the supremacy of the law introduced by the Reich representatives and the other German authorities was implicit in all three decrees. Similarly in the corresponding proclamation issued for the occupied zone of France it was expressly stated that 'the general orders and regulations issued by the German Military Commanders take precedence over the law of the land', although local laws not in conflict with these orders and regulations would remain in force 'unless incompatible with the purposes of the occupation'.

In the case of the Protectorate, on the other hand, the position was complicated by the fact that all German Ministries in Berlin had a clearly prescribed right to legislate for the territory under Hitler's decree of 16 March 1939, which reserved to the Reich Government the power to issue 'orders having the force of statutes'. Where this right to legislate was not exercised by the Reich authorities the 'laws and statutes currently in effect in Bohemia and Moravia' were to remain in force unless they were 'incompatible with the purposes of protection by the German Reich'.

Nothing was said about the law-making authority of the Reich Protector, apart from a vague reference to his being able, in cases of emergency, to 'take all steps necessary to the common welfare'. However, under a further decree of 7 June 1939, Hitler gave von Neurath limited legislative powers by authorizing him to order changes in the local law in so far as this was required by the 'common interest' of the Reich and the Protectorate, and by empowering him, in an emergency, to 'issue general orders of every kind having the force of laws'.

In the Occupied Eastern Territories Hitler's decree of 17 July 1941 gave Rosenberg law-making powers analogous to those of the Governor General in Poland and the Reich Commissioners in Norway and the Netherlands. At the same time the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories was authorized to delegate these powers to the Reich Commissioners in

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2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 405; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, i. 62-65.
3 In taking this decision to leave Czech laws in force the Germans were apparently influenced by the fact that the Czechoslovak Republic took over and left intact much of the old law of the Dual Monarchy (cf. Maximilian Ronke: 'FünfJahre Rechtsentwicklung im Protektorat Böhmen und Mahren', Deutsches Recht, 1944, pp. 258-66).
4 The Reich Protector could, however, 'protest against measures harmful to the Reich'. If he protested the publication of 'the statutes, orders and other general rules' was suspended.
5 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 1039.
the Ukraine and the Ostland\textsuperscript{1}—as he eventually did under an order of 21 February 1942.\textsuperscript{2} These officials could, in turn, delegate their authority in matters of minor importance to the General Commissioners. Legally, however, an important distinction was made between the Eastern Occupied Territories and the western countries and even the General Government, in that there was no provision in Hitler’s decree of 17 July 1941 for the existing laws of the country to remain in force. This was because Soviet law was considered to be incompatible with the general purposes of the German administration, and, as a result, a substantial part of the Occupied Eastern Territories—notably the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the General District of White Russia—was kept permanently under German law. In the rest of the area—i.e. in the Generalbezirke of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—German law was applied exclusively for a time, but provision was eventually made for local law in force before June 1940 to be brought back into operation. When this was done it was expressly stated that the laws in existence prior to that date were to regain their validity in so far as they did ‘not contradict the sense of the New Order introduced by the German Reich’; but legal relationships brought into force, and legal rights acquired, under Bolshevik rule would remain as before, unless specifically invalidated by new laws and decrees.\textsuperscript{3} As a corollary to this measure part of the law-making authority which the General Commission-ers and the Reich Commissioner had received from Rosenberg was in April 1942 delegated to the native administrations in these Generalbezirke.\textsuperscript{4} Theoretically this placed the native authorities on a par with the Dutch Secretaries-General in the Netherlands and with the Quisling Government in Norway as far as local law-making was concerned. In practice, however, the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian ‘self-administrations’ were more closely supervised than the corresponding bodies in the west. The law-making power was (like that of the Dutch Secretaries-General) limited to the promulgation of ‘regulations and executive instructions having the force of law’, but even these could not be issued without the prior approval of the German authorities.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{(d) The Administration of Justice}

The methods which the Germans employed to maintain their interests against the competing interests of the local populations may perhaps be most clearly illustrated by reference to their administration of justice in the General Government and the Occupied Eastern Territories. Here German policy was governed by three basic principles. First, all criminal

\textsuperscript{2} Meyer, ed., O.I.A4.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. A.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid. A7. The General Commissioners could also delegate this law-making authority to the German District Commissioners.
\textsuperscript{5} Cf. ibid. A7\textsuperscript{2}. 
cases and nearly all civil suits involving German citizens (Reichsdeutsche) or 'state members' (Staatsangehörige), ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche or Volkszugehörige), or persons of German descent (Deutschstämmige) could only be adjudicated by a German judge, in accordance with German law. Secondly, certain offences against the occupying authorities, against the laws enacted by them, against the National Socialist Party and its affiliated organizations, or against individual Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche were reserved for trial by German courts, regardless of the nationality of the offender. And, thirdly, the competence of the native judicial authorities was restricted to civil suits between non-Germans and to minor criminal cases, except when more serious criminal cases were specifically assigned to them by the German authorities. Even here, however, the decisions of the native courts were invariably subject to review by the German courts.

The principle of not entrusting cases involving German interests to the adjudication of native courts was also applied to the territories of the west, with, however, certain notable exceptions. In Denmark during the first three years of the occupation even cases of sabotage against the Wehrmacht could, under the law of 18 January 1941, be tried by Danish courts, while in the Occupied Zone of France the military courts could refer back to the French courts cases involving crimes against the German armed forces which were not felt to warrant prosecution by a military tribunal. Similarly, in the Netherlands, both the military authorities and the German courts could transfer the proceedings to a Netherlands court if the offence was of minor importance and the accused was not a German national or a national of the Protectorate.

In Denmark the Germans refrained from setting up the usual German courts and from introducing German jurisdiction, although the Wehrmacht

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1 The category of Deutschstämmige was invented in October 1941. Under a decree of January 1943 the Deutschstämmige were placed on the same legal footing as Germans and Volksdeutsche (Krakauer Zeitung, 5 January 1943).

2 This general principle of extraterritoriality was also applied to Czechs from the Protectorate (Protektoratsangehörige), who were not to be regarded as 'foreigners' and who could therefore only be dealt with by German courts: cf. introduction to 'Verordnung über die Errichtung und den Aufbau der deutschen Gerichtsbarkeit in den besetzten Ostgebieten vom 19. Dezember 1941' (Meyer, ed., O.II.A1). From March 1942 onwards the principle of exclusive German civil jurisdiction in suits between Germans and non-Germans was relaxed in Latvia. Germans could, if they wished, agree to adjudication by native courts.

3 The Danish Penal Code was amended after the occupation had begun to enable the Danish courts to impose sentences of imprisonment from one year to life for sabotage, espionage, and other acts likely to prejudice Denmark's relations with the occupying Power.

4 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten französischen Gebiete, no. 5, 29 July 1940, p. 59.

5 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, no. 12, 20 July 1940, p. 181; also no. 3, 14 June 1940, p. 26.
POLITICAL STRUCTURE
Part I

never renounced its right to try acts of resistance against the German armed forces by courts martial. For all practical purposes trial by German courts martial remained more of a threat than a reality during the first two and a half years of the occupation,¹ and it was not until the 'crisis' of August 1943 that the first death sentence by a Wehrmachtgericht was pronounced and carried out.² From that time onwards, however, cases involving sabotage were tried not only by the army courts martial, but also by the courts of the SS and police (SS- und Polizeigerichte).

In the Incorporated Territories of the West—i.e. in Eupen, Malmödy, and Moresnet—the original courts were abolished entirely by a decree of 28, July 1940, and the German Gerichtsverfassung substituted in their place.³ The newly instituted German courts were to render judgements 'in the name of the German people'—an interesting circumstance in view of the fact that the native courts in the other territories usually rendered judgements 'in the name of the law'; and the qualifications required of the judges who presided and of the attorneys who practised there were essentially the same as in the Altireich. In the territories under a Chief of Civil Administration the shortage of trained German personnel tended to delay the germanization of the local judicial system, so that, in the case of Alsace, for example, it was January 1942 before Wagner could introduce the German Penal Code.⁴ The Gleichschaltung of the legal institutions in these territories brought them for all practical purposes under the direct control of the Reich Minister of Justice in Berlin, although in the case of Lower Styria it was claimed, as late as 1944, that the Chief of the Civil Administration (i.e. the Gauliter of Steiermark) was still not only the 'supreme leader and law-giver' but 'also administratively in charge of the courts'.⁵ Measures for the germanization of the local judicial system,

¹ Sentences of imprisonment had from time to time been imposed by German courts martial, and towards the end of 1942 a number of deportation proceedings had also been ordered by such courts. Sentences passed by the Danish courts for offences against the Wehrmacht were usually mild in comparison with those imposed for similar offences in other occupied territories: for instance, a Danish agricultural labourer who shouted 'Schweinehund' after a German soldier received only twenty days' imprisonment (Folke (Randers), 7 August 1942). See also below, pp. 524, 526.
² Memorandum of the Danish Government, and Supplement, of 25 October 1945 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 631 (901–RF)). See also below, p. 529.
³ I.M.T. Nuremberg, vi. 435. At the same time the Oberlandesgericht of Cologne replaced the Belgian Court of Cassation for cases with which the latter would have been competent to deal.
⁴ Verordnungsblatt des Chefs der Zivilverwaltung im Elsäß, 1942, pp. 64 seqq. Even in the Incorporated Eastern Territories it was June 1940 before Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, and Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, could issue the necessary order for the reorganization of the courts (cf. Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, p. 907).
⁵ Gerhard Amlacher: 'Rechtspflege in der Untersteiermark', Deutsches Recht, 1944, pp. 271–8. Criminal law in Lower Styria was stated to have been 'from the beginning in the hands of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD'. After the German occupation 'special judicial offices' were set up to deal with criminal and civil cases, and it was not until April 1943 that ten regular courts of law were established to take over this jurisdiction (Tagespost (Graz), 11 April 1943).
including the setting up of Special Courts (Sondergerichts) on the German model, might be initiated either by the Reich Minister of Justice in collaboration with the Reich Minister of the Interior, or by the local Chief of Civil Administration. The latter was also responsible for seeing that persons engaged in the practice of law displayed the right ‘political attitude’. In Luxembourg the retention, during the initial period of the occupation at least, of a large part of the local civil code (which was merely translated from the French into an official German version) made it necessary to continue to employ native lawyers, and consequently special measures had to be introduced to ensure that only reliable members of the Luxembourg bar were admitted to practice. Under a decree of 6 December 1940\(^1\) it was laid down that admission to the bar would in future be subject to the consent of the Chief of Civil Administration, while in the following February a ‘Special Court of Honour’ for attorneys was set up along the lines of the professional Ehrengerichte in the Reich. This had the right to punish ‘acts which constituted a violation of the duties arising from the organization of a German administration in Luxembourg’\(^2\).

In the other occupied territories the setting up of German courts and the promulgation of orders relating to the jurisdiction of the native courts was left entirely to the supreme Reich representatives, except in the case of the Protectorate. In the Protectorate the courts were placed, as in the Incorporated Territories, under the direct supervision of the Reich Minister of Justice in Berlin, and the Reich Protector was concerned only with appeals from the German courts which were submitted to him by the President of the German Oberlandesgericht in Prague.\(^3\) Under the decree of 14 April 1939 on German jurisdiction in the Protectorate, both the Reichsgericht and the Volksgerichtshof were to exercise jurisdiction in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as in Germany proper. Apart from this the German judicial machinery consisted of a German Oberlandesgericht at Prague, two German Landgerichte at Brünn and Prague, and twelve German Amtsgerichte which were set up in the various German enclaves.\(^4\)

Elsewhere the form in which the German courts were constituted tended to vary from one territory to another—–the one feature which they had in common being that they all applied German law, sometimes by itself, but sometimes in addition to the law of the country in which they were set up.\(^5\)

\(^1\) *Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg*, no. 65, 9 December 1940, p. 373.

\(^2\) Ibid. no. 15, 21 February 1941, p. 104. See also below, p. 512.

\(^3\) Testimony of von Neurath (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xvi. 670–1). However, the Reich Protector could, under the decree of 16 March 1939 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939 part I, p. 485), file protests against the decisions of Czech courts. Under the subsequent decree on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of 14 April 1939 (ibid. p. 754) this had the effect of bringing the cases before a German court for retrial.

\(^4\) Amtsgerichte were set up at Bohmisch Budweis, Brünn, Deutsch Brod, Gitschin, Goding, Iglau, Mährisch Ostrau, Olmutz, Pardubitz, Pilzen, Prague, and Strakonitz (ibid. p. 752).

\(^5\) In the Netherlands the German courts applied both Reich and Dutch criminal law.
In Norway it was apparently deemed sufficient to have only one ordinary German court, although, under the terms of Terboven's decree of 27 August 1940, this might transact its business in 'any locality within the occupied Norwegian territories'.\(^1\) In the Netherlands, on the other hand, a German circuit court (Landgericht) and a superior court (Obergericht) were set up under Seyss-Inquart's decree of 17 July 1940,\(^2\) although these again were empowered to try cases in any locality under the Reich Commissioner's jurisdiction. The setting up of these German courts was stated in no way to prejudice the right of the Reich Commissioner to introduce summary courts or special courts to deal with exceptional outbreaks of resistance. Nor did it in any way affect the existing provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the courts of the German armed forces. In Belgium and Northern France and in the Occupied Zone of France these military courts assumed much the same responsibility for safeguarding the interests of the occupying Power as the German courts in Norway and the Netherlands, and they applied German law to the same extent as these courts.\(^3\) Their jurisdiction was in some cases supplemented by special judicial powers granted to the subordinate Military Commanders, for which there does not seem to have been any parallel in the territories under civil administration. Thus in the Occupied Zone of France the district commanders and field commanders were empowered, by a decree of 10 September 1940, to 'issue summary orders' for the punishment of persons not subject to the Military Penal Code, if the facts were 'sufficiently ascertained', and in so doing they might impose a fine of Rm. 30,000 or imprisonment for a period of up to six weeks.\(^4\)

Reference has already been made to the basic principles which governed the administration of justice in the General Government and Occupied Eastern Territories. In these territories three factors combined to give the German courts an even greater importance than they assumed in the occupied countries in Western Europe. These were (1) the existence of a considerably larger number of Reich German officials and of others (Volksdeutsche, &c.) entitled to extraterritorial jurisdiction; (2) the inadequacy (from the German point of view) of the native judicial systems, especially in the former Soviet territories; and (3) the tendency to regard

Norway the German court might decide individual points according to Norwegian law in consultation with the Legal Division of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police. In the Protectorate the German courts in civil matters decided 'according to the law in force'—i.e. both Czech and German.

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\(^1\) Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete, no. 3, 31 August 1940, p. 11.

\(^2\) Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, no. 12, 20 July 1940, p. 181.

\(^3\) Under an order issued by the Supreme Commander of the Army on 10 May 1940, 'any offence which was punishable by German law, and which was brought before Wehrmacht or special courts for trial, was to be tried according to German law' (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten französischen Gebiete, no. 1, 4 July 1940, p. 7).

\(^4\) Ibid. no. 8, 23 September 1940, p. 86.
the Occupied Eastern Territories not as areas under temporary occupation, but as a permanent field for exploitation and colonization.

In the General Government an elaborate German judicial system was set up under Frank’s decree on ‘German Jurisdiction in the General Government’ of 19 February 1940, with German courts at Cracow, Rzeszów, Lublin, Chelm, Radom, Petrikau (Piotrkow), Warsaw, and Zyjardów, and with German superior courts for each District at the seat of each District Governor. As in the other occupied territories, the German courts were to apply German law and, unless it was otherwise stated, they were to follow the rules of court procedure laid down in the Reich. Appeals against the judgements of the German courts were to be decided by the German superior courts, and the decisions of the latter were to be final. The principles already referred to of making the German courts alone competent to deal with criminal matters involving German citizens, persons of German origin, and others accused of acts against the occupying Power, and with civil suits involving German citizens, persons of German origin, and German interests generally were all carefully embodied in the decree, which also charged the German courts with the duty of keeping a commercial register (Handelsregister) of German firms established in accordance with German law. At the same time it was specifically stated that the provisions of the decree would in no way affect previous legislation relating to special courts in the General Government or the ‘jurisdiction of any court martial already provided for by law’. Nor was the setting up of the German courts to affect the competence of the Wehrmacht courts, which was carefully defined by Frank, in agreement with the Chief of the OKW, in a decree of 26 January 1940.

By a further order which Frank issued on 19 February 1940 the Polish judiciary was completely subordinated to the German courts. The Supreme Court of Poland and the Polish labour courts were abolished, and the jurisdiction of other Polish courts was limited to ‘local courts, district courts, and courts of appeal’. ‘Whenever the public interest so required’, the decisions of the Polish courts could be ‘re-examined’ by the German superior courts, which could confirm those decisions, ‘decide

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1 Weh, C. 120.
3 Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete, no. 13, 24 February 1940, p. 64.
4 The Polish judicial machinery functioning on 1 October 1942 consisted of 5 courts of appeal (one in each District), 22 lower courts (Bezirksgerichte), 239 Justices of the Peace (Burggerichte), and 22 public prosecutors (Krakauer Zeitung, 1 January 1943). In Eastern Galicia, which was not attached to the General Government until 1 August 1941, the legal status quo before the Soviet occupation was restored in theory (Weh, C. 100), but for some time the German courts exercised sole jurisdiction, and it was not until 30 October 1942 that provision was made for the establishment of non-German courts (Krakauer Zeitung, 3 November 1942).
the matter otherwise', or order a retrial before a German court. In
criminal matters involving Polish nationals the Polish courts, which sat
under the direct supervision of the local District Governor,¹ were not to
have jurisdiction unless the proceedings had first been referred 'by a
German prosecuting authority to a Polish authority'. Moreover, other
nationalities (e.g. Ukrainians) living in 'closed settlements' could demand
to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Polish courts and could ask for
courts of their own. The Polish courts were to apply Polish law unless the
Governor General ordered otherwise.²

Speaking at Cracow in October 1942 Frank made no secret of the fact
that the object of these measures was, first and foremost, to make the
administration of justice subservient to German interests. The setting up
of a German legal system had, he stated, provided the Germans with the
possibility of taking matters of concern to them in the General Government
to German judges and of placing their affairs in the hands of German
lawyers and notaries. The Germans in the General Government lived
according to German marriage and personal law. Commercial concerns
could be set up in accordance with German law. At the same time, howev-
er, it had been (Frank said) his aim 'from the beginning to build up a
system of jurisdiction for the German and the foreign-born alike according
to the well-tried principles of German jurisprudence, and above all to
ensure that ... the native administration of justice was given a safe lease
of life according to the principles which the Poles and Ukrainians had
developed by long tradition and usage'.³

Notwithstanding the greater burden which it had to bear in view of the
absence of any satisfactory native judiciary in all the former Soviet areas,
the system of German jurisdiction which Rosenberg provided for the
Occupied Eastern Territories was considerably less pretentious than that
introduced by Frank in the General Government. Its basic principles
were, however, much the same. By a decree of 19 December 1941⁴
Rosenberg set up a German superior court (Deutsches Obergericht) at the
seat of each Reich Commissioner (i.e. at Równe and Riga) and a German
court (Deutsches Gericht) at the seat of every General Commissioner (i.e.
at Łuck, Kiev, Zhitomir, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev, and Melitopol in the
Ukraine, and Kaunas, Riga, Reval, and Minsk in the Ostland). In civil
matters the German courts were competent to try cases of the type tried by
German courts in the other occupied territories. In criminal matters,

¹ The Head of the Department of Justice in the Regierung of the General Government
supervised the Polish judiciary as a whole, while the Departments of Justice in the Offices of
the District Governors supervised the local Polish courts.

² Germans could not be examined as witnesses by Polish courts, but in case of need and at the
request of the Polish courts they could be examined by the German courts in accordance with
German legal procedure (Weh, C. 121).

³ Krakauer Zeitung, 27 October 1942.

however, they could try 'all cases in so far as these were not specifically placed within the jurisdiction of another court'. This, as the official legal commentaries pointed out at the time, meant that there was no limit to the competence of the German courts in criminal matters—that is to say, they could try even minor offences involving only native offenders, as well as all other cases involving non-Germans which would elsewhere usually be reserved to the native courts. Nevertheless, in practice it soon became necessary, wherever circumstances rendered it at all possible, to delegate jurisdiction in criminal cases not involving Germans or German interests to native judiciaries. In the case of the three Baltic Generalbezirke this was done by a series of decrees issued in February and March 1942. As a result, the native judiciary in these territories came to resemble that of the General Government: i.e. each territory had its appellate court, lower courts, and justices of the peace. Later, however, with the restoration of the local 'self-administrations', the native authorities acquired certain penal powers—e.g. the power to punish civil disobedience, resistance to conscription, &c.—for which there was no parallel in the General Government. In the Generalbezirk White Russia, on the other hand, native participation in the administration of justice remained limited to the district courts (Bezirksgerichte) and the peace courts, which could only handle minor criminal cases. The district courts, which were apparently presided over by 'former Tsarist judges', applied the German Strafgesetzbuch with the necessary local modifications in criminal cases, but in civil cases they could also apparently apply 'the old laws of the pre-Bolshevik era'.

In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine there were no native courts properly speaking, although under an order issued by the Reich Commissioner, Koch, on 8 May 1942 minor offences committed by members of the non-German community could be tried by Ukrainian assessors (Schöffenen), applying German law. These assessors, who could impose imprisonment for periods of up to two years and fines up to 10,000 karbovantsi (silver roubles), were described as the 'delegates' of the District Commissioners and were appointed by the General Commissioners on their recommendation. They were the counterpart in criminal law of the arbitrators (Schlichter) who were appointed by Koch in March 1942 to adjudicate in civil cases involving former Polish and Soviet citizens which were not of sufficient importance to come before the German courts. However, all cases relating to marriage and divorce, guardianship, property, and

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1 Cf. ibid. A2, 3, and 4.
2 Ibid. A6.
3 Deutsche Zeitung im Osten, 1 September 1942.
5 Ibid. A2. There was apparently no objection to the same person's serving both as an assessor and as an arbitrator.
patent rights were reserved to the German courts, so that the competence of the Ukrainian arbitrators remained very limited indeed.¹

(e) POLICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS MARTIAL AND SPECIAL COURTS

A distinctive feature of the German administration of justice in the occupied territories was the use of the so-called ‘State of Civil Emergency’ (Ziviler Ausnahmezustand) to speed up and increase the deterrent effect of German criminal justice at times when resistance threatened to become too widespread to be dealt with by the ordinary courts. When such a State of Civil Emergency was proclaimed jurisdiction in criminal matters was for the most part immediately transferred to specially constituted Standgerichte.² These Standgerichte, which were set up by the Reich representative, were in many respects a civilian counterpart of the military courts set up by the Wehrmacht. They were presided over by officials of the SS and police or even by representatives of the German civil administration. Their procedure was a summary one, and was designed to lead to an immediate decision. The accused was not represented by counsel, and the usual punishment, apart from the death sentence, was to hand those found guilty straight over to the Gestapo. There was no appeal against a sentence passed by a Standgericht, although cases could be withdrawn and submitted to other courts. The State of Civil Emergency governing the activities of these courts was generally of very limited duration, although the number of cases dealt with was usually considerable, and the proportion of death sentences imposed was often quite high.³

In the occupied territories in Western Europe the proclamation of a State of Civil Emergency had, by the end of 1942, become a familiar device for dealing with organized resistance. In Norway Terboven used it to break the strikes which occurred at Oslo at the beginning of September 1941.⁴ In the Protectorate a State of Civil Emergency was proclaimed immediately after the arrival of Heydrich in September 1941,⁵ and again after his assassination in May 1942.⁶ In Luxembourg a similar proclamation was issued to deal with resistance to the introduction of conscription

² A rough translation of which is ‘police courts martial’.
³ 778 death sentences were imposed in the Protectorate, and more than 1,000 persons were handed over to the Gestapo, during the first State of Civil Emergency between 28 September 1941 and 19 January 1942. More than 1,450 death sentences were imposed during the second State of Civil Emergency between 27 May and 3 July 1942.
⁴ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 718 (1149–RF). See also below, p. 540.
⁵ See below, p. 590.
⁶ Official Czechoslovak Report on German Crimes against Czechoslovakia (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 504 seqq. (998–PS)). See also below, p. 593.
in August 1942.\(^1\) In the Netherlands provision had been made for the imposition of a state of emergency resembling the Ziviler Ausnahmezustand by the introduction in 1941 of a so-called ‘administrative martial law’ (Verwaltungs-Standrecht), and under a decree of 19 March of that year the German Superior Court at The Hague was empowered to act as a Standgericht ‘in accordance with the procedure for Special Courts established in the Altreich’\(^2\). In January 1943 the ‘administrative martial law’ was converted into ‘police martial law’ (Polizeistandrecht), which could be imposed in cases of rioting and disorder, and provision was made for ‘police courts martial’, consisting of one SS leader with legal training and two SS or police officers as associates, to act as Standgerichte.\(^3\) In the following May a state of ‘police martial law’, corresponding to the State of Civil Emergency imposed in the case of other territories, was brought into effect to deal with the Dutch strikes.\(^4\)

In the General Government and in the Eastern Territories Standgerichte were introduced without reference to the proclamation of any formal state of emergency. In his decree of 31 October 1939 Frank laid down the principle that all acts of violence and incitement to resistance against the Germans in the General Government should be tried by such courts, which were to be composed of a regimental or battalion commander of the Ordnungspolizei or a leader of an Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and of ‘two officials of the unit in question’\(^5\). This principle was extended to the Incorporated Eastern Territories, where Poles and Jews committing acts of violence against the German authorities were to be tried by Standgerichte,\(^6\) and to the Occupied Eastern Territories, where Standgerichte were set up under Rosenberg’s decree of 12 January 1942.\(^7\)

In both the General Government and the Occupied Eastern Territories authority was given to the officials in charge of the Standgerichte to pass on to the ‘Special Courts’ (Sondergerichte) cases with which they felt the latter to be more competent to deal. In most of the occupied territories these Special Courts were closely associated with the ordinary German Courts introduced after the occupation, to which they were usually ‘attached’.\(^8\) Their procedure followed that laid down for the corresponding

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\(^1\) Verordnungsblatt fur Luxemburg, nos. 50 and 51, 1942, p. 257. See also below, p. 515.

\(^2\) Verordnungsblatt fur die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, no. 11, 20 March 1941, p. 190.

\(^3\) Ibid., 9 January 1943, pp. 1–39.

\(^4\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 57 and 187–8.

\(^5\) Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs fur die besetzten polnischen Gebiete, no. 2, 1939, pp. 10–11.

\(^6\) Reichsgesetzblatt, 1941 part I, pp. 759 seqq.

\(^7\) Meyer, ed., O.I.F2.

\(^8\) The same individuals usually acted as public prosecutors for both courts.
institutions in the Reich itself.¹ Cases assigned to them were removed from ordinary criminal jurisdiction, and they were their own courts of appeal. Counsel for the defence was appointed ‘wherever practicable’. Besides dealing with the sort of crimes (e.g. offences against the war economy) which the Special Courts usually handled in the Reich, the Sondergerichte in the occupied territories were empowered to try cases for which they were expressly declared competent by the occupation authorities and any other criminal cases which the public prosecutor might assign to them on the ground of special gravity. So far as criminal jurisdiction over non-Germans was concerned, they tended to be by far the most important of the German courts. As one commentator noted with reference to the situation in the occupied areas of Poland in 1939, ‘at the very beginning of justice in the occupied Polish territories there was the “Special Court”; this Court was the alpha and omega of the German civil justice which existed at that time’.²

In Poland Special Courts were first constituted by the German Army Commander-in-Chief on 5 September 1939, but their functions were again set out in detail by Frank in a decree of 15 November 1939.³ By this decree Frank set up a Special Court at the seat of each Governor or District Chief. Each court was to consist of three judges, except in ‘simple cases’, when they were to consist of only one judge. They were to decide according to German criminal law. Similar courts were later attached by Rosenberg to each German Court in the Ostland and the Ukraine.⁴ In the Protectorate Special Courts were automatically constituted, on the same basis as in Germany proper, under the Reich decree on the ‘reconstruction and competence of Special Courts’ of 21 February 1940.⁵ In the west, also, Special Courts were often set up at an early stage of the occupation to deal with cases which were deemed to require a more expeditious handling than the procedure of the ordinary German courts would allow. Thus in Luxembourg a Special Court was set up by the Chief of the Civil Administration, Gauleiter Simon, on 20 August 1940, to try cases of unlawful assembly, illegal possession of arms, spreading information imical to Germany, and incitement to strikes and lock-outs.⁶ In Norway a similar institution was set up by Terboven in October 1940 to deal with persons trying to keep illegal political parties alive.⁷ In Belgium the Military

¹ e.g. in the decree of 21 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933 part I, p. 136) and in the decree of 21 February 1940 (ibid. 1940 part I, p. 405) and its supplementary order of 13 March 1940 (ibid. p. 489).
³ Weh, C. 105.
⁵ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, p. 405; also Official Czechoslovak Report on German War Crimes against Czechoslovakia (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 500 seqq. (998·PS)).
⁶ Verordnungsblatt fur Luxembourg, 1940, p. 2.
⁷ Verordnungsblatt fur die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete, 1940, p. 29.
Commander ordered the Kommandanturen to establish Special Courts to deal with crop thefts. However, it was pointed out that this did not necessarily mean that the Belgian courts would be ‘eliminated’, for the use of the German courts would ‘depend upon the way in which the Belgian courts showed their sense of responsibility towards the population’.

(f) The Abandonment of Legal Methods in the Face of Native Resistance

Notwithstanding the importance which they attached to bringing the laws and judicial systems of the occupied countries into line with Nazi political and ideological objectives, the Germans soon came to depend less upon legal means than upon the use of sheer terror to deal with the opponents of the New Order. Thus, in the case of Denmark, only 113 members of the Resistance Movement were executed in fulfilment of judgements of military tribunals, whereas no fewer than 797 were killed in ‘clearing’ or ‘compensatory’ murders and other acts of terrorism perpetrated by the German authorities. Various factors contributed to the gradual abandonment of the pretence of ‘legality’ on the part of the Germans. One was the inability of the courts—including both the regular German courts introduced after the occupation and the Standgerichte set up to deal with special emergencies—to cope with native resistance, particularly the Communist-inspired resistance which was organized after the attack on Russia in 1941. Another—and perhaps more important—factor was the aversion which Hitler himself felt from the use of courts to deal with resistance in the occupied territories.

Hitler, who apparently welcomed the existence of partisan warfare in the east because it gave him a chance to ‘wipe out’ all who ventured to oppose him, objected on principle to the idea of arraigning his opponents before a court. In the course of the discussions on the Czech ‘problem’ in September 1940 he expressed emphatic disapproval of a proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, Gurtner, to bring four Czech leaders before the People’s Court, and insisted that ‘firing squads were sufficient for Czech rebels and resisters’. It was, he suggested, ‘wrong to create martyrs through court verdicts, as the examples of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter demonstrated’. In 1942 he apparently felt that the best method of dealing with the assassins of Heydrich was not to bring possible suspects to trial,

1 Voruit (Ghent), 18 August 1942.
2 Memorandum of the Danish Government of 25 October 1945 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 623 (go1–RF)).
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 439 (739–D).
but to execute out of hand 30,000 to 40,000 Czechs who were 'suspected of political activities'. In the case of Denmark he was equally emphatic—again with the examples of Hofer and Schlageter in mind—that 'there could be absolutely no question of trying saboteurs before a court'. There was only one way to deal with saboteurs, 'namely, to kill them—preferably at the moment when the crime was committed, otherwise on arrest'. The result was that Best and the local German police chief, Günther Pancke, were in December 1943 given strict orders by Hitler personally to begin the notorious 'compensatory' or 'clearing' murders.

In the west the first and most flagrant repudiation of 'legality' came with the introduction of the principle of collective responsibility for acts of sabotage against the Wehrmacht. This principle was applied in the Occupied Zone of France as early as September 1940 under an order of the Chief of the Military Administration, Streccius, empowering the local German Bezirkschefs to demand sureties for the good behaviour of the French population and to take hostages whenever there was a 'possibility of serious crimes of violence being committed' and when 'other suitable means of maintaining public order' were not available. Armed with the authority given them by this order the German commanders carried out a number of mass executions as reprisals for 'crimes' against the Wehrmacht, and even sought to legalize this practice by promulgating so-called 'codes of hostages'. Little attempt was made to ensure that the persons executed were in fact identified with the Resistance Movement, especially after 30 September 1941, when Stülpnagel issued an order whereby all Frenchmen held by the French authorities as well as those in German custody were to be regarded as potential hostages. Even at that comparatively late stage, however, the German military authorities apparently had qualms about shooting hostages without some semblance of a trial. In a report of the Chief of the Administrative Staff of 7–14 December 1941 it was therefore suggested that, instead of shooting hostages out of hand, it might be preferable to allow courts martial to pronounce death sentences

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1 According to Karl Hermann Frank, the order to execute the Czechs was withdrawn as a result of an interview which he had with Hitler (cf. Official Czechoslovak Report on German War Crimes against Czechoslovakia: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 513 (998–PS)).

2 Memorandum of the Danish Government, and Appendices, of 25 October 1945, concerning Crimes Committed by the Germans (ibid. xxxviii. 659 (901–RF)); cf. also ibid. vii. 46–47. See also below, p. 152.

3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 213–17 (508–F).

4 See below, pp. 388–9.

5 For the Wehrmacht as a whole Keitel issued a decree instructing the military commanders always to have at their disposal a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely 'Nationalists, Democratic-Bourgeois and Communists', and to shoot hostages belonging to the same group as the culprit (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 374 (1590–PS); N.C.A. iv. 127).

6 I.M.T. Nuremberg, v. 399. Stülpnagel's order followed Keitel's 'directive' of 16 September 1941 (see below, p. 150). A similar order was issued for Belgium and Northern France by von Falkenhausen (cf. Le Soir, 20 and 21 September 1941).
on prisoners who would normally be sentenced only to imprisonment or who might even be pardoned.\(^1\)

Nor was the application of the principle of collective responsibility and the taking of hostages confined to the countries under military administration. At the very outbreak of the war some 8,000 prominent Czechs had been arrested by the Gestapo in the Protectorate as hostages for the good behaviour of the rest of the population.\(^2\) On 27 May 1942, immediately after the attack on the life of Heydrich, from which he died on 4 June, a decree was issued which stated that not only those sheltering or helping the perpetrators, but their families also, would be executed and that this would apply even when the families bore no responsibility.\(^3\) It was in the spirit of this decree that the Lidice massacre was carried out on 10 June 1942, six days after Heydrich had succumbed to his injuries.\(^4\)

In the other occupied countries also the Germans made it clear that they would hold the population as a whole responsible for individual acts of resistance. In the Netherlands, for example, Seyss-Inquart announced in May 1942 that he proposed to retain in custody ‘some 460 persons who were formerly prominent in public life’ to ‘answer with their lives’ if, as a result of the ‘machinations of the émigrés in London’, there were further disturbances of the public order.\(^5\) Similarly, in the following July, the Military Commander in the Netherlands announced that he, too, was taking ‘several hundred’ hostages in order to ‘safeguard the execution of [his] military tasks’.\(^6\) In the General Government, where by the summer of 1943 resistance had reached such dimensions that the German authorities were admittedly ‘no longer fully in control of the situation’, Frank ordered the shooting of 100 known members of the Polish underground movement for every German killed by the latter.\(^7\) This was followed on 28 June 1944 by a decree of the Higher SS and Police Leader ‘East’, issued on the instructions of Himmler ‘in agreement with the Governor General’, under which the assassination or attempted assassination of Germans or the sabotage of vital installations was to be punished, not only by the shooting of those responsible, but also by the execution of all their male relatives and the

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1. Such a policy would, it was felt, ‘take account of the French love of juridical form’ (cf. *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxix. 10 (1943-RP)).
2. Ibid. p. 341 (pp60 (1)-USSR).
5. Der Mittag (Dusseldorf), 19 May 1942.
7. Frank’s Diary (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxix. 598 (2233-PS)). See also below, pp. 559-60.
8. *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxix. 678 (2233-PS). The assassination of the German Police Chief in Warsaw, Major-General Fritz Kutschera, on 1 February 1944, was consequently avenged by the shooting of 100 Poles, as well as by the imposition of a collective fine of 100 million zloty on the Polish capital.
deportation of all their female relatives over sixteen years of age to concentration camps.\(^1\)

Hitler's impatience with the use of ordinary legal methods for dealing with resistance found expression both in Keitel's directive to the military commanders of 16 September 1941, and in Hitler's own infamous decree of 7 December 1941, popularly known as the Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) decree. The object of Keitel's 'directive' was ostensibly to enable the military authorities to deal more effectively with the 'Communist insurrection movements' which had broken out in the occupied territories after the attack on Russia. According to Keitel, 'the measures taken hitherto' to deal with Communist-inspired movements had proved 'inadequate'. The Führer had therefore ordered 'the most severe measures' to be applied with a view to suppressing all opposition 'in the shortest possible time'. Consequently, all acts of resistance must in future be treated as being of Communist origin; 'the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists must be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for the death of one German soldier'; and such sentences must be carried out in a 'manner calculated to enhance' their 'deterrent effect'. In so far as court martial proceedings were instituted as a purely 'exceptional measure' in connexion with Communist uprisings and other attacks upon the German occupation authorities, only the 'most severe penalties will be in order'.\(^2\)

These measures apparently failed to produce the results which Hitler required, and they were consequently superseded three months later by the Nacht und Nebel decree. According to the 'executive order' which Keitel issued in connexion with this decree, Hitler, after weighing the matter for a long time, had come to the conclusion that there must be a change in the system of punishing those committing acts of resistance in the occupied territories. In such cases he considered that life imprisonment—even life imprisonment with hard labour—would be regarded as a 'sign of weakness'. An 'effective and lasting deterrent' could therefore only be achieved by imposing the death penalty or by taking steps which would 'leave the family and the population uncertain as to the fate of the offender'. Deportation of the accused to Germany could 'serve this purpose'.\(^3\) In the decree itself it was therefore stated that, where there was no likelihood of the death penalty being imposed, the accused was to be taken to Germany and no information given regarding his fate.\(^4\)

Under the terms of Keitel's 'executive order' the military authorities were to decide where a trial involving acts of resistance was to take place.

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1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 434-5 (037-L); N.C.A. vii. 782-3.
2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 532 (389-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, pp. 188-9.
3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 246 (669-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) cit. p. 190.
If, after taking counsel with the offices of the German counter-intelligence, the military judge came to the conclusion that it was possible to pass sentence in the occupied territories, he was to call together a Feldkriegsgericht to try the case. Otherwise he must lay the papers before the superior commander, who would decide whether the accused was to be dealt with on the spot or removed to Germany by the secret field police. After that, there could still be a military trial in Germany if the Wehrmacht authorities saw the need for it. Alternatively, there might be a trial by one of the four Special Courts at Kiel, Cologne, Essen (or Dortmund), and Berlin, which were designated to handle Nacht und Nebel cases in Norway, France, and Belgium, and general cases respectively. Or there might even be a trial by the German People's Court, which after October 1942 was empowered to deal with persons deported under the Nacht und Nebel decree.

As the subsequent course of events was to show, the most outrageous feature of this altogether barbarous decree was the provision which was made for the persons transported to the Reich to be handed over to the Gestapo. Whenever the military authorities decided that trial could not take place in the occupied territory the Reich Security Main Office was to designate a Gestapo command post which would take charge of the prisoner. The Gestapo thus became an adjunct of German military justice—just as, for years, it had been an adjunct of German criminal justice in the Reich. Moreover, although the Nacht und Nebel decree was apparently intended in the first place solely as a military measure, it soon came to be used by the SS and SD as the means of carrying out mass deportations from the occupied territories which eventually filled the concentration camps in the Reich with hundreds of thousands of Allied nationals.

Although the Nacht und Nebel decree remained in operation until the end of the war it was apparently considered inadequate to deal with resistance in Western Europe after the Allied landings in the summer of 1944. Consequently, on 30 July 1944 Hitler issued an even more draconian decree which virtually suspended the jurisdiction of the regular courts in cases involving sabotage and other acts against the German authorities. Under this decree the Wehrmacht and the SS and police were ordered wherever possible to destroy 'terrorists and saboteurs' at the scene of the crime and to hand suspects caught afterwards straight over to the Security Police and SD. Under a supplementary order issued by Keitel on 18 August 1944 court proceedings which were already in progress were to be

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 247-8 (669-PS).
2 U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, pp. 94, 10722, and 10729.
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 576 (090-L).
5 Ibid. xxxv. 503 (762-D); N.C.A. vii. 221-2; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 191.
terminated and the accused transferred to Security Police and SD custody,\textsuperscript{1} while, under a further supplementary order issued by the Chief of the OKW in consultation with Himmler, Thierack, and Bormann on 24 September 1944, persons already ‘legally sentenced by a German court’ and serving prison sentences in the occupied territories or the Reich were likewise to be handed over.\textsuperscript{2} So utterly at variance even with German practice, however, was this latest measure felt to be that some of the Reich authorities apparently shrank from applying it. In the Netherlands, for example, both Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner, and Rauter, the Higher SS and Police Leader, are stated to have objected to the decree on the ground that it would only drive the Dutch all the more into the illegal organizations, although in the end Himmler himself seems to have intervened to ensure that the measure was enforced as Hitler intended.\textsuperscript{3}

Nor was the deportation and the handing over to the Gestapo and SD of political prisoners the only extrajudicial device which the Germans used for dealing with resistance in Western Europe. In the case of Denmark, which was expressly excluded from the operation of the \textit{Nacht und Nebel} decree,\textsuperscript{4} and where the taking of hostages was not generally practised, they instituted a deliberate and systematic ‘counter-terror’ against the local underground, involving the wanton destruction of property and the cold-blooded murder of prominent Danish patriots. This ‘counter-terror’ was carried out by the notorious \textit{Gruppe-`Peter’} of the SS Special Commando ‘Denmark’\textsuperscript{5}—a unit of the Reich Security Main Office sent from Germany after the ‘crisis’ of 1943 with explicit instructions from Hitler and Himmler to organize bomb outrages and ‘reprisal’ murders of the most revolting kind in order to bring the Danish population to heel.\textsuperscript{6} Similar methods were at one time apparently considered for Norway also, but were not in the end adopted, because Terboven felt that they would fail for lack of suitable objectives and because Himmler and Kaltenbrunner considered that they could only have ‘the most disadvantageous consequences’.\textsuperscript{7}

For the Nazis the struggle against resistance was dictated by ideological considerations rather than by the needs of military occupation. As they saw it, resistance was not an act of war, which could be dealt with according to the accepted rules of war, but treason against the New Order, which they must suppress with every severity, as they had suppressed their

\textsuperscript{1} I.\textit{M.\textit{T. Nuremberg}, xxxv. 506 (764--D); \textit{N.C.A.} vii. 223--4; \textit{Documents (R.I.I.A.)} for 1939--46, ii: \textit{Hitler’s Europe}, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{2} I.\textit{M.\textit{T.} and \textit{N.C.A.} cit. pp. 510 (766--D) and 226--7 respectively.

\textsuperscript{3} Testimony of Seyss-Inquart (I.\textit{M.\textit{T. Nuremberg}, xv. 651). For the use of terrorist methods in the Netherlands in 1944--5 see pp. 505--7 below.

\textsuperscript{4} Cf. I.\textit{M.\textit{T. Nuremberg}, xxvi. 248 (669--PS).

\textsuperscript{5} A unit under the command of one \textit{SS-Obersturmbannführer} Schwerdt, alias ‘Peter Schaffer’.

\textsuperscript{6} Official Memorandum of the Danish Government of 25 October 1945 (I.\textit{M.\textit{T. Nuremberg}, xxxviii. 644 seqq. (901--RF)). See also below, p. 530.

\textsuperscript{7} I.\textit{M.\textit{T. Nuremberg}, xxvi. 388 (870--PS); \textit{N.C.A.} iii. 623--5.
political opponents in the Reich after 1933. The struggle against resistance, in addition to engaging the constant attention of the Wehrmacht, came therefore to have the first call upon the resources of the SS in the occupied territories. Hitler himself demanded to be informed of 'each individual occurrence' involving sabotage and other acts of defiance, and was apparently 'very displeased if such matters were concealed from him in the reports of the military commanders'.¹ In the end it did not seem to matter what repercussions the measures adopted might have in the territories concerned or even in the world at large. All that mattered was to extirpate the so-called 'dissident elements' (the favourite Nazi phrase to describe the opposition both in the Reich and in the occupied territories) even if—as in the case of Lidice and Oradour-sur-Glane—this meant actually annihilating the population in the area from which resistance sprang.

(vi) The German Treatment of the Jews

By James Parkes

The ultimate responsibility for the tragedy which involved the deaths of nearly 6 million Jews during the years 1939 to 1945 must rest with Hitler himself. He had been, from the beginning, the mainspring of Nazi policy; and he was never so much occupied with more important matters that he would not turn aside to denounce the Jews and to superintend measures for their destruction. In his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939 he had stated:

Today I will again venture a prophecy: if international Jewish finance inside and outside Europe were to succeed in plunging the nations once again into world war, then the result would be, not the bolshevization of the world and with it the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.²

Three years later, on 30 January 1942, at the height of the winter crisis on the eastern front, he stated: 'We are clear in our minds about one thing—namely that the war can only end either with the Aryan peoples being exterminated, or with Jewry disappearing from Europe.'³

In November 1938 a German official, vom Rath, was murdered by a Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan.⁴ Hitler seized upon this act as a pretext to raise the persecution of German Jews to new heights of severity. They had already been entirely expelled from every position in the civil service, in cultural and professional life (save for such doctors, lawyers, or entertainers

¹ Testimony of Keitel (I.M.T. Nuremberg, x. 54†). Hitler apparently always suspected the military authorities of being too lenient in dealing with the Resistance Movement (cf. testimony of General Rudolf Lehmann, quoted in U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 3, Judgment, p. 10724).
² Translated from I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 65 (2663–PS).
³ Ibid. p. 66 (2664–PS).
⁴ See Survey for 1938, iii. 153 seqq.
as the Jewish community itself needed), and in industry;¹ and their civil equality had been destroyed by the Nuremburg Laws of 1935. On 12 November 1938 three further laws were designed to complete their ruin. A fine of a billion marks was imposed on the whole community, which amounted to 20 per cent. of the Nazi calculation of their total wealth, although it represented a much higher proportion of that of which they could freely dispose. They were ordered to pay for the restoration of all the damage done in the rioting which followed the murder, while the insurance money (particularly on the plate-glass windows destroyed) was withheld from them. Even more serious, they were finally eliminated from the economic life of the country by a law which forbade them, as from 1 January 1939, to own retail stores, mail order, or brokerage firms, to engage independently in any trade, or to offer for sale, advertise, or accept orders for goods or trade services at markets, fairs, or exhibitions. Moreover no Jew could be the head of an enterprise, or be employed in an executive position. He could be given six weeks’ notice, but he was not entitled to compensation. He was likewise expelled from all co-operative organizations.² Almost the only means left open to a Jew to earn his living lay in such meagre economic services as the Jewish community itself required.

While the Jews in Germany were thus faced with the alternatives of starvation or emigration, conditions in the rest of the world severely restricted their opportunities for leaving the country. The lean years of the 1930s had led everywhere to the closing of doors, especially to immigrants who would now have to enter penniless; and the British White Paper³ prevented more than a trickle to Palestine. The load of relief placed on the shoulders of the Jewish communities in the rest of the world was approaching breaking-point. Yet no government felt itself in a position to intervene on behalf of the victims, and Nazi fury showed no sign of intending to stop short of anything but the total destruction of the Jewry within its control. In Austria, where Nazi regulations had been in force since March 1938, and in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, as well as in the satellite state of Slovakia, identical conditions obtained, though it has to be said to the credit of the Czech people that the Germans found no willing cooperation from them for their antisemitic brutality.

The legislation of 12 November 1938 does not complete the pre-war story. Three further measures were introduced. Jewish control of property was severely restricted, and a modified ghetto system was brought in.⁴

¹ A complete table of Nazi legislation, together with photostatic reproductions of the more important laws, is to be found in The Black Book (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), published by the Jewish Book Committee.
² Ibid. pp. 496 seqq.
A central organization was set up to which all German Jews were compelled to belong, the *Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland*, so that the authorities could easily lay hands on the person or property of any Jew it desired; and this had become necessary because of an order by Göring, as Executive Head of the Four-Year Plan, that there should be conscription of Jews for forced labour in nationally useful projects.

The year before the outbreak of war had seen an almost comparable deterioration of the condition of Jews in other countries of Europe. In Poland 3 million Jews had been reduced by years of repression and restrictive legislation to economic misery and degradation; and a succession of authoritarian premiers in Rumania pursued a similar policy. Both Governments professed a great interest in Jewish emigration; but neither could suggest any territory in which Jews would be welcome. In Hungary Jews could no longer live a normal existence, but, by comparison with the countries already cited, their condition was almost tolerable; in spite of a considerable amount of antisemitism in the country neither the Church nor public opinion would have accepted the treating of Hungarian Jews at the Polish or Rumanian level. In Italy a comprehensive anti-Jewish law had been introduced on 7 October 1938; but the Fascist Government’s imitations of Nazi antisemitism were not enthusiastically endorsed by the mass of the population, and so were not effectively put into practice. Nevertheless, the outbreak of war in 1939 found all the major Jewries of Europe in a condition of more or less acute distress, their legal rights impaired or destroyed, their wealth confiscated or frozen, their possibilities of escape limited and hazardous.

The German attack on Poland placed Polish Jews in a difficult position. They had little reason to love the country which, ever since it had obtained its freedom after the First World War, had treated them as second-class citizens, and which for more than ten years had been actively persecuting them. Yet the alternative was worse; and, with the optimism which had so often characterized Jewish life, they threw themselves loyally into the struggle beside their fellow Poles, hoping that the promises of the Polish Government, made at the last minute, might this time be implemented. More than 30,000 perished on the battlefield during the three weeks’ campaign. With the complete defeat of Poland their worst fears were quickly realized. As the Germans entered city after city violence against the Jewish population was encouraged. By the German army and SS, by native antisemites, and by the criminal elements of the population, more than a quarter of a million Jews were murdered before the end of 1939. Meanwhile the German authorities set about more systematic destruction, while working on the idea of an ultimate total evacuation of any surviving Jews of Europe to Madagascar.

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1 Ibid. pp. 508 seqq.
Within six weeks 57,000 had been deported to Germany for forced labour. Ghettoes were set up in Polish cities—in Warsaw after over $2 million had been extracted from the Warsaw Jews as bribes not to establish one—and the inhabitants were set to labour in factories, on the roads, and wherever unskilled workers could serve the German war machine. The Nuremberg Laws were introduced; Jews were deprived of all civic rights; their ration cards were stamped, and their access to rations severely limited; those Jews who were not ‘economically useful’ were in some cases entirely deprived of any official rations at all; those of their synagogues and cultural institutions which had escaped destruction in the first excesses were confiscated and destroyed; their businesses were seized and ‘Aryanized’; and every effort was made to set the native Polish population against them, both by constantly spreading the statement that it was the Jews who had caused the war and Poland’s defeat, and by offering to Poles property, food, or clothing which had been stolen from the Jews.

At the end of October a reservation was established, fifty miles by sixty in dimension, in the Lublin area, and it was announced that all Jews would be sent there, and allowed to live an autonomous life within its boundaries. Over 30,000 from Poland, from Vienna, and from Czechoslovakia were dispatched thither, herded in cattle trucks without food or water. Those who survived the journey found that no preparations had been made for their reception, and that they had no means of earning a livelihood. They soon fell victims to epidemics, and the Germans, fearing infection, were compelled, temporarily, to abandon the experiment.

In place of the reservation the herding of Jews into ghettoes and into compulsory labour camps was intensified. At first Jews were simply seized on the street and set to work; then the Jewish authorities were compelled to provide so many each day for different forms of labour. Those who could not work were left to starve. During this early period the Nazis introduced the system—extraordinary in view of the needs of war—transport—of simply sending Jews, herded in cattle trucks, on long journeys without food or water with no other apparent motive than that they should perish on the way.

Naturally enough all Jews who lived near the frontiers sought to flee; but flight was not easy. The Russians had occupied the whole of eastern Poland, and with few exceptions kept that frontier closed. In all other directions flight was practically impossible and, in the end, useless. Most of those who escaped eastwards or northwards were retaken when the Nazis advanced into Russia and the Baltic States in 1941; and only a few Polish Jews managed to travel far enough eastwards to find safety in the new munition centres which the Soviet Union had established east of the Urals and in Siberia.¹

Between April and June 1940 the Jewries of Denmark and Norway, of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, including many thousands of refugees from Germany and Austria who had been able to escape no farther, fell into the hands of the Nazis. In Denmark, where the Germans had refrained from replacing the existing Danish régime by a direct administration of their own, they failed to force their anti-Judaic policy on the heroic King and people of the country. When they threatened to introduce the Jewish badge, the King announced that he and his court would all wear it. When they tried to drive a wedge between Jewish and other citizens of Denmark, the King, accompanied by his court, ceremonially attended the services of the Holy Days in the Jewish synagogue. In Norway they were able to establish Quisling in power, but he found it difficult to force legislation of the Nazi pattern on the Church and people of the country. In Holland and Belgium their minions, Mussert and Degrelle, were too weak to be put into power, and they had to establish their own governments. Ironically, in view of her past history of toleration, it was in France, under Marshal Pétain and Pierre Laval, that Germany was most successful in securing the establishment of an anti-Jewish régime substantially on the Nazi model.

In all these countries, in varying degrees, the familiar pattern was reproduced. Refugee Jews were first attacked, and many thousands of them were deported to the forced labour and concentration camps of Eastern Europe in the usual conditions of barbarity. Huge sums were extorted from the native communities under a variety of pretexts; religious and cultural institutions were looted; business properties were confiscated; and the Jewish population was put to forced labour, harried from place to place, and deprived of normal rations. All through Central and Western Europe a whole department had to be set up to organize the robbery of Jewish homes of their artistic and cultural treasures, their libraries and pictures, their furniture, tapestries, jewellery, and works of art.

In the summer of 1940 Rumania joined forces with Germany; and the U.S.S.R., repeating her conduct in Poland, proceeded to annex the northern provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina without fighting a blow. Some 300,000 Jews thus became temporarily Soviet citizens, and were subjected to the Soviet attack on Zionist and ‘bourgeois’ elements. The same fate also befell the Jewries of the Baltic States. But in both cases far worse was to follow after the German declaration of war on the U.S.S.R. in June 1941.

In Germany itself the first year of war had brought an intensification of Jewish miseries. Many of the smaller cities expelled their Jewish population completely, and proudly proclaimed themselves judenrein (clean of Jews), and this was particularly the case in the territories annexed from Poland along the eastern frontier. Rations were often refused, or made impossible to obtain.
Nevertheless the war introduced, at first at any rate, one modification of Nazi policy. It became necessary to restore a number of doctors and dentists to general practice, especially with the army, because of the shortage of trained men. Apart from that, forced labour, senseless deportations, deprivation of rations, expulsion from dwellings, and perpetual vilification were the lot of the Jewish population.

In June 1941 Hitler invaded Russia, and even before the invasion opened it was realized that it would offer opportunities for a brutality and violence which, even under conditions of Nazi occupation, were impracticable in Western and Central Europe. The decision to complete the work of the annihilation of Eastern European Jews was taken, under Hitler's order, by Himmler in the middle of June. Special squads were created within the SS to whom the task was to be entrusted, and these squads were attached to all the different armies. In addition steps were taken to extend the equipment for mass extermination, already in existence at Treblinka, Belzec, and Wolzec, to the larger camp of Auschwitz (Oświęcim).

The implementation of this policy followed various models. In the Baltic States the SS sought at the beginning to associate with their work local antisemitic elements. Thousands of Jews were murdered during this phase. But the Nazis soon found this inadequate and unsatisfactory. It resulted in too slow and unsystematic a destruction, and at times provoked sympathy among the local population. It is one of the significant factors in this story that the antisemitic parties of Europe themselves, in spite of the violence of their denunciation of the Jews as parasites and murderers, and in spite of the thousands of murders they committed, could not be made partners in the cold-blooded and 'scientific' horrors of the final phase of the Nazi crime. The one exception is Rumania, where the atrocities committed after the Rumanians had joined the Germans in the invasion of the U.S.S.R. equalled those of the SS themselves. In the western republics of the Soviet Union the antisemitism of the Germans met with but little response among the general population.

Even among the Germans themselves discrimination was necessary, and the men chosen for their abominable role had to be most carefully 'screened'. Documents exist giving instructions that murders and executions were not to be committed in public, that soldiers must be kept away, and that, where necessary, explanations must be given them of the necessity for exterminating the Jews, even when it deprived them of skilled or slave labour. Yet, even so, there were occasions where the German authorities responsible for carrying out the extermination were themselves revolted at the behaviour of those whom they had trained to carry out their policy. A series of documents from White Ruthenia reflects all these different elements of the tragedy—the disgust of the local population, the anger of 'decent' Germans, the evil effect on the reputation of Germany,
the dislocation of the occupying government when it was thus deprived of most of its skilled craftsmen without warning. The incident in question took place at Sluzk in the neighbourhood of Minsk. The Jews had been rounded up and massacred with no more than the customary brutality; but this is the comment of Kube, the German Commissioner-General for White Ruthenia:¹

... The police battalion no. 11 from Kauen has, as a unit, directly subordinate to the armed forces, taken independent action without informing me, the SS Brigadier-General or any other office of the Commissariat General, thereby impairing most seriously the prestige of the German nation. ... To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their graves again, is such a base and filthy act that this incident as such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reich Marshal. The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes very strenuous efforts to win the population over to Germany in accordance with instructions of the Fuehrer. These efforts cannot be brought into harmony with the methods described.

In the long account which the local official, Carl, gave to Kube the single atrocity quoted by the latter was but one of many. But, needless to say, neither it nor any other information produced any change in the policy of Hitler or of Göring, to whom Kube appealed.

All through Eastern Europe, and especially in the Russian provinces invaded by the German armies, the Jews, together with many elements of the local population, were massacred on the spot by the special squads attached to the German forces. They were machine-gunned, gassed, starved, or otherwise annihilated in every city and town which the invaders entered, a procedure which could not be concealed from tens of thousands of the soldiers or from the civil administration, and which evoked singularly few protests comparable to that of the Commissioner-General for White Ruthenia. In the south, in the Ukrainian and Bessarabian provinces entered by the Rumanians, the massacres were almost equally bloody and indiscriminate. In all, the death-roll in these campaigns amounted to over 2 million. In many cities where there had been large and prosperous Jewish communities only a few individuals were found when the Soviet armies returned westwards. Others had been more fortunate, especially in the eastern sections of the area, for there they had more time to escape; in this part of Soviet territory some Jews were deliberately evacuated by the Soviet authorities; and though the number of these is impossible to estimate, it is probably smaller than was at one time believed.²

While it had not been found prudent by the Nazis to be as open in their

¹ *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxvii. 3 (1104–PS); *N.C.A*. iii. 784–5.
² See Schwarz: *Jews in the Soviet Union*. He estimates the total Jewish population of the area affected as 2,150,000 within the frontiers of 1939, and 1,900,000 in the areas annexed in 1939 and 1940. Of this total he calculates that about half survived.
policy of extermination in the more civilized portions of Western and Central Europe, their intentions remained the same for the millions of Jews still to be found in these countries. We possess the minutes of an important conference\(^1\) of Nazi officials, held under the orders of Göring in January 1942 at Wannsee, in which it was decided, in the expectation of victory, to complete the annihilation of the 11 million Jews whom the Nazis calculated that they would be able to reach. Even half-Jews were to be given the choice between death and sterilization. In the meantime the policy of extermination was extended, under the command of Heydrich, to all Jews already within the Nazis' clutches. It was for them that the additional death camps in Poland were devised; and all through 1942 and 1943 transports were being sent eastwards and northwards from France, Belgium, and Holland, from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, from Hungary and the Balkans. At Auschwitz it was possible to kill 2,000 people in a single operation lasting but a quarter of an hour, and to repeat this three or four times a day. And it must be remembered that only a proportion of those who set out on these terrible journeys, sometimes lasting weeks, arrived alive. How summary was the dispatch with which arrivals were treated is revealed by the story of a train-load of Germans evacuated from Hamburg who had been sent to Lwów to make their homes there. They were seized, stripped of their possessions, and gassed by the Gestapo, before it was discovered that they were not Jews.\(^2\)

In the camp of Auschwitz alone it is reported by the Nazi commandant himself that 2½ million persons, most of whom were Jews, were gassed, and that another half million died of starvation and disease.\(^3\) The last great consignment was 400,000 Jews from Hungary in the summer of 1944. About the beginning of October, when the defeat of Germany was already certain, Himmler finally gave the order for the massacres to stop, though there is ample evidence that local SS squads ignored it right up to the end.\(^4\)

By the time that the Allied armies gained control of the whole of Europe approximately 6 million Jews had perished.

For the Jewish people as a whole no resistance to this appalling fate was possible. It was inflicted on civilian populations already reduced to misery and impotence by years of unremitting persecution; and the situation was such that no concerted resistance could be organized, or, if organized, could have been effective. Nevertheless, wherever resistance was possible, it was offered. Among all the forces organized from those who managed to escape from occupied Europe, either to England or elsewhere, and who

\(^1\) U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, Judgment, pp. 28301 seqq. Cf. testimony of Lammers (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 50–51).


\(^3\) Affidavit of R.F.P. Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz from 1 May 1940 to 1 December 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 276 (3868–PS); N.C.A. vi. 787).

\(^4\) Testimony of Kurt Becher (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 68–69 (3762–PS); N.C.A. vi. 645).
there formed nuclei of Polish, French, or other resistance, Jews were to be found. Even where a considerable measure of endemic antisemitism still existed, as among the exiled Poles, this did not put a stop to Jewish enlistment. Wherever Jewish refugees were admitted to national forces they were to be found, and they served on every front. They were among the Palestinians who fought in Africa and Ethiopia; they formed a fifth of the heroic force of the French Foreign Legion which defended to the last the fort of Bir Hakeim in June 1942; they were dropped into occupied Europe where their knowledge of languages made them especially valuable—but where also they knew what fate awaited them if they were caught. In addition, they took part in all the guerrilla warfare in cast and west which was organized by underground movements behind the lines and within the occupied countries. In all these operations they were fighting side by side with half a million Jews in the armies of America, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the Dominions. But, like them, they fought anonymously so far as the general public either in Allied or enemy countries realized. It was only as the Allied armies advanced through Europe that these lonely fighters, as well as the survivors of work camps and concentration camps, were able to see for themselves that they had formed part of a universal Jewish resistance to the barbarity of the Nazis.

Only in the ‘battles of the ghettos’ were they able to fight in Europe as Jews. The policy of herding them into selected ghettos in Eastern Europe had been adopted by the Nazis after the abandonment of the plan to create a Jewish reservation in the Lublin area. It had the advantage from their point of view of providing them with an easily controlled labour force, while it also enabled them to get rid by starvation of elements whom they considered useless, for they could control the number of rations that they allowed to enter a quarter which was exclusively Jewish. Łódź and Warsaw were the two largest of such ghettos. That of Łódź, in spite of the casualties from continual resistance, and a hideous rate of mortality, was preserved to the end by replenishment from elsewhere, in order to supply workers to its vital textile factories. That of Warsaw, after being maintained during 1942 at a figure of approximately half a million, was allowed in 1943 to drop to a tenth of that number. The Jews there were of no further use, and it was decided to liquidate them. But they organized a desperate resistance, and it required a forty-two days’ battle, raging through April and May, and costing over a thousand German casualties, before the 40,000 or more inhabitants of the ghetto were finally destroyed, save for a few hundred who managed to escape to join the Polish underground, there to continue their struggle.²

If some Jews were able to save themselves by joining the resistance

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1 See below, p. 469.
2 For a fuller account of the fight in the Warsaw ghetto see pp. 565-8 below.
movements, others were saved by non-Jewish friends, or by escape from Nazi-occupied Europe, even after the only European neutrals had been reduced to Sweden, Switzerland, and the Iberian peninsula. Even in Germany itself a certain number of Jews owed their lives to the devotion of non-Jewish friends, who hid them, provided them with rations, or, especially in the case of half-Jews, helped them to conceal their identity. Among these friends the religious orders and clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, occupied an honoured place. Although the numbers who could be saved by personal intervention were but a drop in the ocean compared with the numbers of those destroyed, yet in all parts of occupied Europe individual Jews were saved, often at great risk, by non-Jewish friends. In the crowded tenements of cities, as well as in the fastnesses of mountain and forest, Jews were hidden. Jewish children were taken into Christian families and institutions—often to create a problem of restoration after their deliverance—and Jewish families were sheltered in convents and institutions. From Greece to Norway, and from Poland to France, the hideous record of destruction is redeemed by this story of rescue, and many of the rescuers paid with their lives for their sympathy and courage.

Especially before the full occupation of the Balkan States a certain number of Jews managed to escape eastwards towards Turkey, hoping to cross the narrow passage of the Bosporus. But Turkey was a poor country and found difficulty in feeding her own population; so that it was natural for her to accept only those who had the possibility of passing on. The British fear of a flood of refugees still further embittering their relations in Palestine and the Arab world kept this escape route to a trickle, for they would grant no visas for entry into Palestine. In consequence there were a number of tragic incidents, of which the sinking of the S.S. Struma, an unseaworthy Danube tug, was the most lamentable. It was in February 1942 that nearly 800 refugees set out in this ship to Turkey; but the Turks would not allow them to land without the certainty—which the British refused—that they would be able to cross the Turkish frontier again into Syria. The ship sank as the result of an explosion off the Turkish coast, with only one survivor, in a vain effort to reach Palestine by sea. Nevertheless, later in 1942, the British opened the frontier, and some 6,000 Jews managed to escape from Europe by this route.

Switzerland received some 25,000 refugees, and allowed them to seek work, in spite of the many difficulties confronting a country which was now an enclave entirely surrounded by Nazi-occupied territory. In addition to allowing them to work, she provided relief and help amounting to millions of Swiss francs. At the end of the war there were just over 2,000 Jewish refugees in Spain, and 1,000 in Portugal, mostly from among the more prosperous, since they received no help from the Governments concerned.
The most remarkable section of this aspect of the story concerns Sweden. There both Government and people were tireless in their efforts to succour the victims of persecution. When, in the autumn of 1943, the Nazis placed the King of Denmark under house-arrest, and introduced their own government into his country, the Swedes managed to ferry 5,000 out of the 6,000 Danish Jews to safety across the Baltic. Fewer could be saved in Norway, where Quisling had had them in control since the beginning of his rule. But even here the Swedes managed to smuggle half the Norwegian Jews across the frontier. In the same year they offered to send Swedish ships right round by the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the Black Sea to evacuate 40,000 Rumanian Jews, especially children, if the Rumanian Government would allow them to go. But the Nazi overlords forbade the proposal, and only the relatively small number of 160 children was finally saved, in the summer of 1944, and transported to Palestine.

An attempt of even greater magnitude to save the Jews of Hungary occurred in the same year. The Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, made an offer to the International Red Cross to allow the departure of all Hungarian Jews ('foreign' Jews had already been deported to Auschwitz and murdered) for whom visas for Palestine or elsewhere could be produced. But again the Nazi overlords intervened, not, this time, to refuse the offer, but to insist on an enormous quid pro quo in war material. In spite of the treacherous, and obviously blackmailing, nature of this proposal, negotiations continued for some time, conducted mainly through the Swiss and the Americans. In the end nothing came of it directly except the release of a certain number of Hungarian Jews from the Belsen concentration camp, who were allowed to be carried by the Red Cross to Switzerland. But at least the negotiations delayed the destruction of Hungarian Jewry, with the result that nearly half survived the war.

To estimate in terms either of human suffering, or of destruction of spiritual, historical, cultural, and economic values, the full consequences of Nazi antisemitism during these war years will for ever remain impossible. It is still difficult for ordinary people to realize that all the skills of a scientific and technical civilization were cold-bloodedly and deliberately applied to the murder of nearly 6 million Jews—and these were not the only victims of the death-camps. It was a catastrophe unique in both its magnitude and its futility; for it served no purpose, and the Jews who died could not feel that in their death they were serving any cause, save that of the insane hatred of madmen and criminals. What it meant in the cold terms of statistics is revealed in the following table, showing the estimated Jewish population of Nazi-occupied countries in Europe in 1939 and in 1946:

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1 See the American Jewish Year Book, 1946–7, vol. 48, p. 606.
## POLITICAL STRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1946</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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Part I
PART II
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF HITLER’S EUROPE

(i) The Planning of the New Order in 1940
By Patricia Harvey

The summer of 1940 saw not only the occupation by German troops of the major part of the European continent, from the Atlantic Coast to the borders of the U.S.S.R., but also the publication of German plans for the economic reorganization of Europe after the conclusion of hostilities. Up to that time German writers and speakers had been concerned mainly with protests, first against the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and then against the withholding from their people of adequate Lebensraum. But by the end of the campaign in Western Europe the long-cherished dream of a German-controlled Europe had become a reality, and with this a new phase in German propaganda began.

Germany’s conquests were but the necessary first step in the building up of a ‘New Order’ for Europe, a New Order which was to initiate another golden age. The complete bankruptcy of economic liberalism had been demonstrated in the inter-war period, and the Fascist states alone had succeeded in finding a way to prosperity. This solution Germany was prepared to share with other states, but to achieve success Europe must be united under German leadership. Europe was too limited in size to be divided into a large number of small artificial states, and, despite any sentimental reasons that the small states might have for wishing to retain their complete independence, they should realize that their destiny lay with that of the Greater German Reich.

It may be comprehensible [said Rosenberg], it may even be right that a small nation does not wish to be ruled by another nation of the same size. We are, however, convinced that a small nation does not demean its honour by putting itself under the protection of a very large nation and of a great Reich. . . . To recognize the greatness of a Reich like the German one, which after a thousand years of the greatest tribulation now stands once more in its own strength before all eyes, is not a sign of weak will or of dishonourable attitude, but is the recognition of a vital law, of the demands made by the destiny of European existence.1

Provided that the nations of Europe were prepared to accept their destiny ‘there would be no economic crises to destroy prosperity, bringing in their turn unemployment and terrible social and moral diseases’.2

1 Deutschlandsender (B.B.C. monitoring), 9 July 1940.
2 Ibid. 14 July 1940.
No complete and comprehensive plan for the setting up of the New Order was ever published. A series of statements was made by different people, and to suit different occasions, with the result that many gaps were left and many contradictions remained unchallenged. The nearest approach to an official and comprehensive statement of German intentions was given by Walther Funk, Reich Minister of Economics and the Minister entrusted by Göring with the formation of plans for the New Order, on 25 July 1940, but even Funk denied the existence of a hard and fast plan. Nevertheless, from the various sources available, it has been possible to build up some picture of the Europe which the Nazis planned to create after they had brought the war to a successful conclusion.

The basis of the new economic order was to be the formation in Europe of a single economic community working under German direction. Centralized planning was to take the place of unorganized liberalism, and throughout Europe a high level of employment would be assured by means of adequate credit creation.

International division of labour was to be encouraged as far as possible. The benefits to be gained from such a policy had already been shown by the relationships built up between Germany and the countries of South-Eastern Europe between the wars, and they would be even greater in the increased area of the New Europe. It was economic lunacy, said Funk at the Vienna State Fair in September 1940, for each country to produce everything from buttons to locomotives if for that purpose it had to establish at high cost a heavy industry which could be maintained only by tariffs, subsidies, and restrictions on imports; in place of this, specialization should be developed among European states for the benefit of all. None of the German writers or speakers made clear, however, the means by which this specialization was to be achieved. Government control over industry on the lines of that established in the Reich was obviously envisaged, and a suggestion was made that international cartels, already responsible for much valuable preparatory work, might be enlarged and strengthened, at the same time being brought under the supervision of some central authority. It was recognized that the problems of division of labour for a whole continent differed from those for a single country, and it was stated that it might be necessary to scrap nationally profitable industries in the interest of the whole. The inference was, although this was not openly stated, that, where a conflict of interests was likely to arise between the Reich and one of the other European countries, the former's wishes would receive favourable treatment.

As far as can be seen, the tendency envisaged throughout non-German Europe was towards at any rate partial de-industrialization. Europe, when

1 Südost-Echo, 26 July 1940; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 29.
2 Volksicher Beobachter, 3 September 1940.
viewed as a whole, was deficient in foodstuffs and fodder; increased agricultural production was desirable, and, in view of the fact that European agriculture was on the whole less profitable than industry, the Germans were likely to prefer that the change-over to agriculture should take place in countries other than the Reich. The policy of increased agricultural production in South-Eastern Europe was to be continued, but this area would not retain the armament and auxiliary industries (such as machinery and locomotives) for whose products there was no demand; the Yugoslav textile industry was also described by one writer as ‘irrational from a European point of view’. Even in Western Europe, although complete de-industrialization was, of course, out of the question, certain changes were envisaged. Denmark in future was to reduce her cattle and dairy production and to increase her output of corn and fodder; Norway was to aim at agricultural self-sufficiency; and even France was in future to be regarded primarily as an agricultural economy and the exporter of valuable foodstuffs.

The reorganization of the European economy was to be assisted by the conclusion of long-term agreements between Germany and the member countries guaranteeing to the latter a safe export outlet for years to come. On the basis of these agreements it would be possible to adjust the export structures of the countries concerned to the requirements of Greater Germany and of other European countries, and such agreements would be of particular importance to agricultural countries because of the need for long-term planning in this sphere. As economic relations widened in scope, so would the advantages to be gained by the participating countries increase.

Trade between the member states of the New Europe was also to be assisted by abolishing the evils of exchange fluctuations which, if left in existence, would detract from the value of the long-term agreements mentioned in the previous paragraph. European currencies were no longer to be linked with gold as they had been in the past; their value would be fixed by the state-controlled economic system. ‘We shall never pursue a currency policy which makes us in any way dependent on gold, because we cannot tie ourselves to a medium of exchange the value of which we are not in a position to determine.’

After a preliminary period of adjustment, transactions between the member countries were to be carried

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1 ‘Industry is (in Europe) more productive than agriculture. Net outputs per person engaged in manufacture (measured at the world price of the product so that the effects of protection do not enter in) appear to have been between 60 and 100 per cent. higher than outputs per male worker in agriculture and mining, similarly measured, in European countries in recent years’ (‘The German New Order in Europe’, Bulletin of International News, 25 January 1941, xviii. 70).

2 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 April 1941.

3 Ibid. 24 May 1941.

4 Funk’s speech of 25 July 1940 (Südost-Echo, 26 July 1940; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 33).
out on the basis of fixed exchange rates. The maintenance of these rates would, of course, depend upon the institution in the member countries of rigid price control and supervision, on the lines of those adopted in Germany before the war. As regards the settlement of trading accounts, the system of bilateral agreements built up by Germany since 1933 would in time give place to a system of multilateral trading by which all the European countries would settle their trading accounts in Reichsmarks through a central clearing house in Berlin. Germany, said Landfried (State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics) at the opening of the Cologne Trade Fair in September 1940, was working towards the return of the old system of multilateral clearing, with Berlin as the financial centre of Europe, and trade barriers reduced to a minimum. ‘International restrictions on exports and foreign trade which today still separate European nations from one another must speedily be abolished.’

The relationship between the New Europe and the rest of the world was a subject for constant discussion. International division of labour, combined with the development of agriculture and of mineral production, was to free Europe from dependence upon the supply of essential products from the rest of the world. The actual amount of trade carried on with the outside world would depend upon a number of factors, notably the exact territorial extent of the New Europe and the standard of living required within it. No clear picture was ever given of the area to be covered by the New Europe, but on the whole it seems to have been envisaged in 1940 as including the whole of continental Europe, from the Atlantic coast to the borders of the U.S.S.R., with the probable inclusion of the Mediterranean area and even of the African continent as a whole. According to one writer it was increasingly recognized that the Europe which was to be reformed by Germany and Italy included the whole of Africa; Europe, with a strong German centre and a resurrected Mediterranean area, had to be united with Africa into one political continent. Some suggestions were also made for the ultimate formation of a partnership between Germany and Italy, Russia, and Japan for the control of the whole land-mass stretching between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Within the smaller area complete autarky would mean certain restrictions on the standard of living. Continental Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., could exist without supplies from other countries, but this would mean certain deprivations; coffee, tea, and cocoa would have to be forgone, and tobacco would satisfy only 50 per cent. of normal requirements; shortage of fats would prove a serious problem in the short run, but in time it should prove possible to meet the deficit through increased cultivation of oil-producing plants; shortage of fodder was likely to decrease the

1 New York Times, 16 September 1940.
2 See above, pp. 48-49.
3 Kölnische Zeitung, 6 October 1940.
number of livestock which could be kept; the consumption of cotton would have to be reduced by two-thirds, and that of silk by one-half, while jute would be unobtainable; the most serious problem of all in the long run was likely to be the lack of such metals as copper, lead, tin, nickel, and zinc.

Germany did not propose, however, to change over to a perfectly self-sufficient economy. Funk summed up the position as follows:

It is not a question of autarky or export, but of autarky and export, which requires a proper understanding of the term. We shall consider it important to trade our high-quality industrial products in exchange for raw materials in the world markets. But here we make a reservation. We must take care that there is a sufficient supply in the European economic area of all those commodities which make this area economically independent of other areas. We must therefore guarantee its economic freedom. That is largely a question of living standards. For instance, in future we should not need to import a single ton of oil from overseas markets if we were to limit our consumption of petroleum products by rationing. But if everyone is to be free to drive a car as much as he likes and if as many cars as possible are to be produced, then there is nothing to stand in the way of our importing this extra oil from world markets, because in case of need consumption can be reduced to the amount we ourselves can produce. This is even more true of consumption of goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa, &c. We shall have to be careful lest in time of need the economic area of Greater Germany should become dependent, as regards what it can produce itself, upon forces and powers over which it has no control.¹

At first sight the German plans for the economic reorganization of Europe appeared to have certain advantages even from a non-German point of view. The benefits promised to those European nations co-operating in the New Order sounded impressive. Economic liberalism had failed during the inter-war period to provide a means of combating the depression and of securing a reasonable level of employment, and the introduction of some form of state control and planning was one of the possible solutions. Interest in the possibilities of co-operation between European states had increased after the First World War; and the years between the foundation by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi of the Pan-European Union in 1923 and the outbreak of the Second World War were marked by a series of conferences and plans designed to promote European economic collaboration, including the so-called Briand and Van Zeeland Plans and the setting-up of a Commission of Inquiry for European Union to work within the framework of the League of Nations. At first sight the New Order might seem to be yet another attempt, this time sponsored by Germany and Italy, to achieve international co-operation within the European continent.

On closer consideration, however, the situation seemed rather different. A united Europe might gain benefits from co-operation between the

¹ Funk’s speech of 25 July 1940.
member states, but the main benefits were earmarked for Germany herself. 'The coming peace-time economy', said Funk, 'must guarantee for Greater Germany a maximum of economic security and for the German nation a maximum consumption of goods to raise the level of the nation's well-being. The European economy must be adapted to achieve this aim.' The prospect for the more industrialized states and for those relying to a considerable degree upon overseas trade was gloomy, since it was explicitly stated by the Germans that these countries would have to make radical alterations in their economic structures. Those countries relying purely upon agriculture and mining were in a different position. The provision of a large German market, secure over a period through the promised long-term agreements, would remove the anxieties felt as a result of more efficient overseas competition. But, judging from the course of events in South-Eastern Europe in the years preceding the Second World War, the position would not be wholly favourable, despite German accounts of the success of Germany's trading policy in that area. Germany certainly paid high prices for her agricultural imports from South-Eastern Europe, but the countries concerned were in their turn forced to pay high prices for their imports from Germany and were prevented, by the working of the clearing agreements negotiated with the Reich, from switching their purchases elsewhere. Another problem to be faced in the long run, and one for which the New Order offered no solution, was that of over-population in the agricultural areas of South-Eastern Europe.

Outside Europe, too, the New Order was likely to have unfavourable effects upon Germany's former trading partners. According to Funk, and to other German writers and speakers, the New Europe would be perfectly prepared to trade with other areas, but only on certain terms. The monopoly of Britain and the United States in world trade would have to be broken, the New Europe refusing any longer to 'submit to political and economic terms dictated to it by any extra-European body'. Europe would be willing to trade with individual nations, but would refuse to enter into negotiations with any combination of nations. 'We do not need North America as an intermediary in trading with South American countries', said Funk. 'Either Germany trades with South America on the basis of free agreements with sovereign states, or she does not trade with South America at all.' German Europe, on the other hand, would refuse to trade with other nations except as a single unit; the New Europe would be capable of existing, if need be, without external trade relations, but other countries would be forced, by their need for industrial goods, to seek trade relations with Europe.

1 Funk's speech of 25 July 1940.
3 Funk's speech of 25 July 1940.
4 Ibid.
The clearest indication of the true nature of the proposed New Order was provided, however, by the actions taken by Germany in the countries already under her control before the publication of plans for the reorganization of Europe. Overseas countries and those of Western Europe might, in the summer of 1940, be prepared to listen to the grandiose German plans for the introduction of a new golden age; the Austrians, Czechs, and Poles were already enduring German rule.

(ii) The Structure of Economic Controls in Europe

By Patricia Harvey

(a) Economic Controls in the Reich

The importance of Germany in the war-time economic structure of Europe was supreme. Not only was she, with the areas which she incorporated within her own borders, by far the strongest economic unit, but it was her decisions alone which, at least after 1940, determined the distribution of the factors of production throughout the whole of Axis-dominated Europe. The methods chosen for implementing these decisions varied considerably both with the areas in which they were applied and with the military situation at the time, but the final objective was at all times the same, namely, to extort the greatest benefits for Germany and for the German war effort.

In view of Germany's position both as the keystone of the New Order and as the central policy-maker for the whole area under her control, and of the fact that the methods chosen for enforcing her will in the rest of Europe were for the most part extensions or adaptations of those employed in the Reich itself, some account of these methods must be given before dealing with the techniques adopted in the attempt to mould production in the countries which came under her control.

1. Corporative Organization of Economic Life

Ever since their accession to power, and especially after 1936, the Nazi Party had consistently pursued a policy designed to prepare their country's economy for war. Such a policy demanded complete control by the state of all branches of economic life, and the Nazis proceeded to secure this by the organization of the working population along occupational lines into four huge governing Stände or estates, each of which, through the 'leadership' principle, was subjected to strict government control. These four estates were the National Food Estate (Reichsnährstand), which included all farmers, farm families, farm labourers, and first processors and handlers of farm produce; the Estate of Industry and Commerce (Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft), in which were grouped all business men and
those engaged in handicrafts; the Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront), formed of employees in all activities; and the National Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer) to which belonged all authors, artists, &c., as well as newspapers, theatres, and other such organizations. Since the structure of all these estates was very similar, a description of one, the Estate of Industry and Commerce, will suffice.\(^1\)

The Nazis, during their campaign for and subsequent consolidation of power, had continually sought the co-operation of business men and had laid stress on the advantages to be gained by the latter from such co-operation. The advantages were, however, by no means on one side only, for the willingness of business leaders to work with the Government considerably simplified the task of economic control, as well as increasing the efficiency of the productive system by reason of the knowledge, initiative, and enterprise of these leaders which was placed at the Government’s disposal. It was on this basis of co-operation between business men and the Government that the whole foundation of industrial control was built.

Industrial self-organization in Germany had its origins in the early part of the nineteenth century, and had become increasingly complex since the First World War. By 1933 the economic life of the country was organized both on a territorial and on a functional basis. The territorial units were the Chambers of Industry and Commerce and the Chambers of Handicrafts, whose functions were to represent the common interests of all the industrial and commercial enterprises within a given area. More important, however, were the functional organizations in which were associated all those engaged in any specific branch of economic activity. At the head of the system were seven National Groups representing industry, trade, banking, insurance, public utilities, the tourist trade, and handicrafts; these national groups were split up into economic groups, and these were further divided into trade and sub-trade groups. By far the most influential of the National Groups was the National Union of German Industry which was formed in 1919 by the fusion of two national bodies representing light and heavy industry. All individual functional associations in mining and manufacturing were members of the National Union, which provided a number of services for its members, dealing with questions of economic policy, tariffs, and imports and exports, and providing advice on the formation and functioning of cartels.

There existed in 1933, therefore, a highly complex system of economic organization, and one which it was possible, with little difficulty, to bring under effective state control. Much of the old structure of both territorial and functional organizations was maintained, but certain modifications were introduced. The first of these was the ‘leadership’ principle; up to that time the officials of the business organizations had been elected by the

\(^1\) For a description of the activities of the Reich Food Estate see below, pp. 209 seqq.
normal methods of voting, but under the new system the chairmen of the National Groups and Chambers were appointed and removed by the Minister of Economics, while the chairmen of the smaller organizations were, in their turn, appointed by the chairmen of either the Groups or the Chambers. The introduction of another regulation, making membership of both functional and territorial organizations compulsory for all entrepreneurs, assured the direction of the economic life of the country 'in accordance with the principles of the National Socialist State'. In theory the Government had only to issue orders which were then executed by the self-governing organizations of industry. In practice, however, the hierarchy of economic controls did not work so smoothly, since the self-interest of the cartels often proved to be in conflict with the communal interests as upheld by the Groups and Chambers.

(2) Government Agencies

The main government agencies interested in the regulation of production in the years immediately preceding and following the outbreak of war were the Reich Ministry of Economics, the Office of the Four-Year Plan Organization, the War Economy and Armament Office of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Munitions.

The Ministry of Economics, created in 1919 and given increased powers in 1933, was a relic of the Weimar Republic. Its functions included the supervision of commercial policy and international trade, money, banking, and foreign exchange control, and it acted as adviser to the Reich Government in all problems of an economic nature. As has already been mentioned, the Minister of Economics was also responsible for the appointment, and if necessary the dismissal, of the chairmen of the National Groups and Chambers. The Minister, appointed in August 1934, was Hjalmar Schacht, who combined with this post the presidency of the Reichsbank, to which he had been recalled in March 1933, and the position of Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy, to which he was appointed in May 1935.

The idea of the creation of a Four-Year Plan Organization originated during the German food crisis in the autumn of 1935, but was not implemented until 18 October 1936, when Hitler issued a decree appointing Göring as Delegate for the Four-Year Plan. Although at the time the objectives of the Organization were not made public, it subsequently emerged that its main aims were to make the German economy proof against crises and to provide an economic high command, similar to the

1 Testimony of Körner, 12 March 1946 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 152–4 and 160–1).
2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1936 part 1, p. 887; N.C.A. iv. 499.
3 See, for example, Göring's statement during his examination on 14 March 1946 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 282).
supreme command of the armed forces, which should be capable of giving a unified direction to the economic life of the country and preparing it for war. In view of the enormous scope of this task the Organization was bound to come into conflict with existing institutions, notably with the Ministry of Economics. Soon after Göring’s appointment difficulties began to arise between himself and Schacht over the general line of economic policy which should be pursued, and these difficulties culminated, in November 1937, in the resignation of Schacht from his positions as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy. After Schacht’s resignation an attempt was made to iron out some of the difficulties inherent in the existence side by side of two agencies with functions which to a considerable extent overlapped. Göring himself took over the Ministry of Economics for two months, with the object of integrating within it much of the Four-Year Plan Organization, which subsequently retained only a small staff. The purpose of the reorganization, according to Funk, the new Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary for Economy appointed in February 1938, was that ‘the Reich Marshal reserved for himself the direction and control of economic policy in the most important decisive matters and gave me [Funk] corresponding directives, but the execution of these was naturally in the hands of the Ministry and its organizations’. There seems some doubt, however, despite Göring’s reference during his trial to the ‘irreproachable attitude’ of Funk towards himself as compared with his relations with Funk’s predecessor Schacht, as to whether the division of responsibility for economic planning was quite so clear cut.

The main responsibility for the supervision of armaments production during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war lay with the military authorities. The decree of 4 February 1939 transformed the Reich War Ministry into the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), so that the former ceased to exist. Within the OKW an Office for War Economy

1 For evidence of the disputes see I.M.T. Nuremberg, v. 143-6 and Schacht: Abrechnung mit Hitler, pp. 18 20, A proposal for settlement of the dispute was made on 7 July 1937 but did not lead to anything. ‘Both of us, I [Goring], as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, and Herr Schacht, as Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, were able to exercise very great influence on German economy. As Herr Schacht also had a very strong personality and felt his position keenly, and I likewise was not inclined to hide my light under a bushel, whether we were friends or not we could not help getting in each other’s way because of this question of authority, and one of us had finally to give in to the other’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 448).

2 Examination of Goring, 14 March 1946 (ibid. pp. 282–3).

3 According to Funk, while Schacht had been Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy, he, Funk, was only Plenipotentiary-General for Economy (ibid. xiii. 105).


5 Ibid. ix. 382–3.

6 See, for example, the interrogation of Posse, referred to in ibid. xiii. 158.

7 U.S.A., Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch: Civil Affairs Handbook: Germany: Section 2T, Government and Administration: Economic Controls in Nazi Germany, p. 31. [This will be referred to hereafter as Economic Controls in Nazi Germany.]
Staff (Amtsgruppe Wehrwirtschaftsstab) was established, and this was later transformed, on 22 November 1939, into the Office for War Economy and Armaments (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt) under General Thomas. The functions of this office grew considerably until it became virtually responsible for the war sector of the economy in the period just before the administrative reorganization in 1942. In 1942 it was split into a War Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt), which remained under the control of the OKW, and an Armaments Office (Rüstungsamt), which was transferred to the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions. General Thomas continued to preside over both branches of the former Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt and thus remained subordinate to the OKW for some of his functions while becoming subordinate to Speer in respect of the rest. The most important organs of the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt were the Armament Inspectorates, transferred to the control of the Speer Ministry in 1942, which were regionally organized to cover the whole of German territory and later that of occupied Europe as well. They were in charge of the production of combat material, of scheduling, and of contract letting.

Another authority which had certain powers over the production of armaments in the early period was the Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy. His functions were to co-ordinate the civil economic departments in preparing for war. Under Schacht an office existed and a working committee was set up consisting of representatives of the various economic departments, as well as the Ministry of the Interior, the Plenipotentiary for Administration, the OKW, and subsequently, and most important, of the Office of the Four-Year Plan. After the resignation of Schacht and the appointment of Funk, however, the functions of the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy continued to exist only on paper, the real control lying with the Delegate for the Four-Year Plan Organization; the power was formally transferred by a directive of Hitler's issued in December 1939.

The outbreak of war caused very little reorganization in the machinery of administration, since this had been built up with the aim of providing an instrument for the direction of the economy in case of such a war. Not until the winter of 1941–2 were any important changes made. By then, the first questions had been raised as to the ultimate success of blitz warfare, and it was thought that some more centralized and efficient organization was required in order to provide in sufficient quantity the means for

1 Ibid. p. 32.

2 Ibid.

3 See the examination of Funk, 6 May 1946 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xiii. 106).

4 There seems to be a slight doubt as to whether Funk's powers as Plenipotentiary-General for Economy were non-existent: see, for example, the letter from the OKW to its department L, dated 27 April 1938 (ibid. xxxvi. 275 B (270-EC)).

5 See the examination of Funk, 6 May 1946 (ibid. xiii. 105).
carrying on a long-term war. Two new personalities emerged in the spring of 1942. One of these was Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia, who became Plenipotentiary-General for Labour Allocation within the framework of the Four-Year Plan Organization,¹ and the other was Albert Speer, who, on the death of Fritz Todt, was appointed to the post of Minister of Armaments and Munitions² and to the various other positions which had been held by Todt.³ The powers wielded by Speer were far greater than those exercised by his predecessor, owing to the fact that the whole conception of the appointment was different. 'Until that time,' said Speer, 'Hitler considered the main activity of Todt to be in the building sphere, and that is why he called me to be his successor . . . Immediately upon my assuming office, it could be seen that not building but the intensification of armaments was to be my main task.'⁴ The powers given to Speer were, however, still insufficient to enable him to carry out a full-scale reorganization of the war sections of the economy. For one thing, only the armament department of the army was placed under his control, those of the navy and the air force remaining under separate administrations for the time being,⁵ and, for another, the Minister of Economics continued to supervise the production of basic materials such as leather and textiles, which were of vital importance to the armed forces.

The increasing demands made by the military situation throughout 1942 and 1943 led in the autumn of 1943 to further administrative changes, this time of a more drastic nature. A firm distinction could no longer be drawn between the military section of the economy under Speer and the civilian section under Funk. One or the other had to be given precedence.

The contingencies of the war necessitate the further concentration and unification of the control and organization of the war economy, in order to utilize even more effectively than hitherto the economic strength of the German people for war purposes. Total productive capacity and man-power in the future must be used to an even greater extent and more extensively to achieve an increase in armament production. To this end, German war production must be directed from one place, according to uniform direction.⁶

To further this policy a decree conferring new powers on Speer was published on 2 September 1943. Under this decree the Reich Minister for Economics was made responsible for general economic policy, for questions relating to foreign trade, for supplying the population with consumer goods, and for financing the economy; but all power over production was given

¹ For further details see below, pp. 227-30.
² For details of the measures taken by Speer see below, pp. 190-3.
³ See below, p. 237, note 1.
⁴ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 432.
⁵ Speer assumed responsibility for naval armament in the spring of 1943, and for air armament only in August 1944.
⁶ Hitler's directive of 21 September 1943 (Economic Controls in Nazi Germany, p. 1).
to Speer, who from that time became the dominating personality in German economic life.¹

The functions of the Reich Minister of Economy in the field of raw materials and of production in industry and trade shall be transferred to the Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions. The Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions will have the title ‘Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production’ in view of his enlarged sphere of activity.²

(b) Reich Agencies Responsible for the Co-ordination of Economic Policy in the Occupied Countries

Decisions as to the broad lines of economic policy to be followed in the occupied countries were made by the same agencies as were responsible for similar decisions within the Reich itself, that is to say, the Office of the Four-Year Plan, the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, the Ministry of Economics, the War Economy Office of the German High Command, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The day-to-day implementation of these policies was left mainly in the hands of the territorial authorities, either military or civilian.³ Laws passed in the Reich were not usually applicable to the occupied countries, the territorial authorities where necessary issuing decrees of analogous content in order to bring regulations into line with those in force in the Reich.

Co-ordination on a lower level was achieved by the fact that many departments or sections of the central Reich agencies and of corporative business organizations were concerned with the economic problems of the occupied countries. In addition, many special agencies were set up under the central Reich authorities to deal exclusively with the occupied countries.⁴ The most important organs for the co-ordination of industrial policy throughout Germany and the occupied countries were the Armament Inspectorates and Commands, the control of which was handed over from the War Economy Office of the Supreme Command to the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions in 1942.⁵ Armament Inspectorates were set up in all the occupied countries which had important industrial facilities. Their functions were to exploit the industrial capabilities of the occupied countries.

¹ Göring’s position had by that time become much weaker. In his own words: “The chief influence on the Fuhrer, if I may mention influence on the Fuhrer at all, was up to the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, and that influence was I. Then my influence gradually decreased until 1943, and from 1943 on it decreased speedily” (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 614).
³ See below, pp. 177 seqq.
⁴ These included such bodies as the Main Trust Office East and the Central Office for Generators (under the Four-Year Plan), and the German Clearing Office (under the Ministry of Economics).
⁵ See above, p. 175.
countries, to supervise the storage of war material, to control firms working on German account, and, in the event of a German retreat, to supervise the removal of important materials and machinery. Before the setting up of Armament Inspectorates, the preliminary measures were taken by the economic detachments and commandos of the Office for War Economy and Armaments.1 These consisted of troops who were specially trained in various economic duties and who were attached to the high command of the army, moving into the newly conquered areas alongside the fighting troops. Their principal duties were to identify and safeguard supplies of important goods and machinery, and to start or restart the production of plants whose products were of importance to the German war effort. In the occupied, as opposed to the incorporated, areas a further task was to make ready for transport to the Reich any goods or machinery needed there. The scope of these duties is shown by the instructions issued at the end of May 1940 to ‘economic detachment J’ then stationed at Antwerp:

It is their task to gain information quickly and completely in their districts of the scarce and rationed goods (raw materials, semi-finished products, mineral oil, &c.) and machines of most vital importance for the purposes of national defense and to make a correct return of these stocks. . . . Furthermore, the economic detachments have the duty of preparing and, upon order of the Army Group, of carrying out the removal of scarce and rationed goods, mineral oils, and the most important machines. These tasks are the exclusive responsibility of the economic detachments.2

Other agencies which assisted the co-ordination of economic policy in the occupied countries were the Central Order Offices (Zentralauftragstelen) established in the Western occupied countries to co-ordinate German purchases, and the German chambers of commerce abroad, which were established to act as information centres for German business firms wishing to extend their activities to the occupied countries.

(c) Administration of German Economic Control in the Occupied Countries

No consistent machinery of control was adopted in all the countries occupied by Germany. The particular type of controls applied depended primarily upon the ultimate political status which each of the occupied countries was to hold in the New Order. Broadly speaking, three main types may be distinguished: those applied in the areas which were either legally incorporated within the Reich or were probably destined for eventual

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1 Such troops were first used during the entry into the Sudetenland: see General Thomas: Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armaments Economy, quoted in N.C.A. iv. 1072–3 (2353–PS).
2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 536–48 (183–R.F); translation, ibid. vi. 11–12.
incorporation, those which were employed in the areas designated as 'colonial' territories, and finally those which were put into force in the occupied countries of Western Europe. The latter two categories are dealt with below; of the first it need only be said that they were fully incorporated within the administrative machinery of the Reich.

(1) Occupied Countries under Direct German Economic Control

The German long-term plan for the organization of Europe provided not only for the incorporation of certain territories within the borders of the Reich, but also for the permanent occupation of other areas either as appended territories (Nebenländler) or as areas for colonial expansion. In these areas—the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R., and the so-called General Government of Poland—the Germans assumed direct control of economic life in order to bring their economies into line with that of the Reich, and to ensure, from the German point of view, that the best possible use was made of the factors of production. In the occupied parts of South-Eastern Europe, too, even though these areas were not envisaged as under permanent occupation, the economic systems were placed under the direct control of the Reich.

Although all these countries were alike in having their economic life governed directly by Germany, the differences in the administration of control were very great. In the Protectorate, for instance, a certain amount of executive authority was left in the hands of the native administration, while in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. the whole governmental structure was virtually replaced and even the minor positions filled by Germans.

(a) The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia

A dual form of administration was set up in the Protectorate; the Czechs were allowed to handle the bulk of detailed economic controls and were responsible, with few exceptions, for the enforcement of economic measures, but all this was accomplished under the direct supervision, and sometimes under the direct control, of Germans. Under the terms of the decree of 16 March 1939 the Protectorate was to be autonomous and self-administering, and was to 'exercise its sovereign rights within the scope of the Protectorate in consonance with the political, military, and economic

1 Those territories legally incorporated (the so-called eingegliederte Gebiete) were Danzig-Westpreußen, the Wartheland, Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet. Those probably destined for eventual incorporation (i.e. those placed under a Chef der Zivilverwaltung) were Luxembourg, Alsace, Lorraine, Upper Carniola, Lower Styria, and Bialystok. For a discussion of their constitutional position see pp. 92–93 above.

2 See above, pp. 93–95.

importance of the Reich’; the Reich Protector could, nevertheless, ‘object to measures calculated to harm the Reich, and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest’. The power of Germany was further strengthened by the assumption of control over the transport, post, and telegraph systems, and over the external economic relations of the country, and by the inclusion of the Protectorate within the customs area of the Reich.

The main organs of German economic control in the Protectorate were the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munitions (working through the Armament Inspectorates), which exercised control over armaments production and from 1944 over industrial production of consumer goods, and the German Ministry of State, the most important local agency. This latter was divided into departments, several of which dealt with economic matters and supervised the autonomous economic administration. In addition there were several special delegates, responsible directly to the Minister of State and concerned with such items as coal, petroleum, motor vehicles, and machinery production. Subordinate to the German administration were the autonomous Czech agencies, the Ministries of Economics and Labour, of Agriculture and Forestry, and of Finance, and the Supreme Price Control Office. All of these were either headed by Germans or were under German direction and supervision by the Minister of State.

Large sections of Czech industry were under the control of Germany through the activities of the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, and through the formation of super cartels for the glass and shoe industries. German domination of the rest of the economy was assured by the formation of compulsory corporative organizations on the German pattern, and headed as a rule by German nationals domiciled in the Protectorate.

(β) The General Government

The economic administration of the General Government was almost wholly German, Poles being employed only for technical assignments and for tasks which were purely local in scope. The main lines of the policy to be followed were laid down by Göring in his capacity as head of the Four-Year Plan Organization,¹ and for the carrying out of this policy he appointed as his deputy the Governor General, Hans Frank. Frank, in January 1940, set up an office for the Four-Year Plan in the General Government which was entirely separate from the ordinary administration. When, however, the main lines of economic policy had been settled this office was abolished and its functions transferred to the departments of the central administration which dealt with economics, food and agriculture, forestry, and finance.

¹ For Göring’s directive of 19 October 1939 see pp. 195-6 and 552 below.
Powers of supervision of the production of armaments were vested in the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production, through its Armaments Inspectorates, while offices were set up to regulate the production and allocation of all the major raw materials and industrial products. All former Polish economic chambers and trade associations were either dissolved or brought under German control, and in March 1941 a Central Chamber for the Entire Economy (Zentralkammer für die Gesamtwirtschaft) was set up to act as the sole medium through which business cooperated with the German administration in the regulation and planning of production and distribution of goods and services.¹

(γ) The Occupied Eastern Territories²

The evacuation of administrative staff from the area and the decision of the Germans that the local population was unreliable were both used as justification for the denial of any form of self-government to the inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories and for the complete replacement, with certain minor exceptions, in the former Baltic States, of local officials by Germans. The Occupied Eastern Territories were in fact administered so far as was possible as an integral part of the Reich economy, and the pattern of organization that emerged was very much like that in force in the Reich itself.

The main lines of policy for the economic exploitation of the Occupied Eastern Territories were formulated by the principal Reich central agencies, notably the Four-Year Plan Organization, the Reich Ministry of Economics, and the Speer Ministry, in conjunction with the corporative organizations of German enterprise which from the very beginning played an important role. In the Occupied Eastern Territories themselves, economic exploitation was organized jointly by these central authorities and by the territorial administrations. In the case of the areas under military administration, these were the military commanders, the chiefs of whose economic departments reported to, and received orders from, the economic branch of the OKW, which in its turn maintained close contact with the Four-Year Plan Organization and with other civilian Reich agencies. In 1942 the OKW established in Berlin an Economic Staff East to deal with economic matters in all the areas under military control in the Occupied Eastern Territories. In the areas under civilian control, the administration of economic policy was the responsibility of the Economic Planning Staff East of the Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories, the head of which was at the same time the leader of the Department of Economic Affairs in the Occupied East in the Ministry

² These were: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine (see above, p. 95).
of Economics. The closest co-operation between military and civilian authorities was established by the fact that the Economic Staff East and the Economic Planning Staff East were staffed to a large extent by the same officials.

The day-to-day execution of economic plans in both the civilian and the military areas of the Occupied Eastern Territories was entrusted to a series of official monopoly companies (Ostgesellschaften), which united the authority of the central Reich agencies, the Reich corporative organizations, and the territorial administrations. The private element was further increased through the introduction into the Occupied East of individual German firms which worked under the supervision of the monopoly companies, so that, although the economic system was formally operated by the Reich Government, the dominant position on the spot was held by German big business.¹

(8) The Balkans

The method of economic control adopted by Germany in the parts of the Balkans occupied by her was somewhat similar to that employed in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia; puppet régimes were established soon after the occupation, but these were in each case closely supervised by the German military administrations. In Greece, authority over the puppet government was theoretically shared with Italy, but from the beginning all major decisions were taken by Germany; in Serbia, Germany was in sole control from the start. After the Italian armistice in 1943 those areas in the Balkans which had formerly been under Italian control were also taken over by the German military authorities.

Balkan agricultural and mineral products were of very great importance to the German war economy and, as a result, economic experts were chosen for the most important posts throughout the area. Hermann Neubacher, a former I.G. Farben financial expert, was appointed special envoy to Greece in 1941–2 and special envoy of the German Foreign Ministry in the Balkans in 1943,² while the control of economic matters in Serbia was entrusted to Franz Neuhausen, the Plenipotentiary-General for Economics, who in addition held many important positions, such as the chairmanship of the boards of directors of the Bankverein für Serbien and of the Mines de Bor.³ The administration in Serbia was typical of the

¹ See below, pp. 570–2, for a short account of the application of Germany’s economic policy in the Ostland.

² Neubacher, when giving evidence at Nuremberg, described himself as ‘one of the foremost economic leaders in Austria’. He had been, among other things, an executive of the Austrian National Bank, a member of the Austrian Customs Auxiliary Council, and director of a large combine in the building trade and building materials industry (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 428).

³ Franz Neuhausen had been resident in Yugoslavia since the early 1930s, first as chief of the Deutsche Verkehrsburo and subsequently as official representative of the Nazi Party and Consul-General. He had been actively engaged in the economic penetration of the Balkans carried out
technique of German economic control in the Balkans. Under Neuhausen, Germans were employed to supervise the native administration, to represent German interests with all important firms, and even directly to run certain branches of the economy, notably important mining concerns and the collection of agricultural produce. In fact, Germans were in control of every Serbian economic activity that was of the slightest importance to the German war economy.

(2) Occupied Countries under Indirect German Economic Control

In the areas which were not scheduled by Germany either for permanent incorporation in the Reich or for areas of colonization,\(^1\) the tendency was, as far as possible, to leave the day-to-day administration of economic life in the hands of the native administrations, while at the same time ensuring German control over the main lines of economic policy to be pursued and over those sections of the economy which were of vital interest to the German war effort.

The advantages to Germany of such a system of indirect control were considerable. With the enormous increase in the area under German domination, the reserve of men skilled in administrative duties and in the conduct of economic activities had suffered a severe depletion, a drain which was intensified by the calling up of recruits to the armed forces. In addition to the saving of German personnel, the employment of native administrators and business men had other advantages. The co-operation of local officials with knowledge of local conditions and methods made for increased efficiency and eased the task of those Germans who were employed in supervisory positions, while the fact that administrative and entrepreneurial functions continued to be exercised by citizens of the states concerned lessened the friction which would have occurred between victors and vanquished, had the former been in obvious everyday control. The possibilities of securing co-operation, too, were very great. Apart from the minority who had been members of the Nazi parties or of similar organizations in their native countries, and who were prepared, for various reasons, to throw in their lot with their German conquerors, there were far more who, for compelling economic reasons, felt that at least some small degree of co-operation was the best course open to them.\(^2\)

In most cases, the local administrations were not entirely suited for use

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\(^1\) These were Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, France (wholly occupied from November 1942), and, after September 1943, Northern Italy.

\(^2\) See below, p. 200.
as instruments of German policy. Many changes had to be made in personnel, and in this there was considerable scope for manoeuvring between parties and individuals. But changes had also to be made in the form of the administrations. 'To ensure efficient operation of the German machine for the exploitation of Europe the existing powers of control had to be strengthened and brought more into line with those in force in the Reich. To this end the powers of native administrations over native businesses were enlarged and centralized. The general principles of this reorganization were everywhere the same, but the resulting pattern differed from one country to another. The principal method chosen for creating a more efficient machinery of control was the formation or development of corporate organizations of business in the occupied countries on the lines of the self-governing organizations in the Reich itself, only with functions which were purely advisory. The success of this policy varied considerably, the best results being achieved in the Netherlands, where the basis for this development already existed,¹ and in Vichy France.²

Superimposed on the reorganized native organs of control were the German administrators, whose responsibility in economic matters differed little in the areas under military and under civilian government. As a rule, the German administration was organized so as to duplicate the higher branches of the native administration. The closest contact was maintained between the two, both offices often being housed in the same building. In addition to this duplication of the higher branches of the administration, the Germans held direct control of certain agencies with strategic positions in economic life, for example those concerned with the distribution of raw materials, and of semi-official agencies, such as the National Banks, to which German advisers or commissioners were appointed. There were also examples of direct control of business enterprises where Germans had taken over control of the property of Jews, enemy aliens, and black-listed nationals, and, in some cases, of enterprises which were working on German account.

Besides the central German administration in the areas under indirect German control, there were also some Reich agencies which exercised economic controls and were represented directly through field offices, some of them being subordinate to, and others independent of, the territorial authorities. Most important of the latter were the Armament Inspectorates and Commands and in Vichy France the German Armistice Commission. The subordinate agencies included the representatives of the Four-Year Plan Organization and the Reichskreditkassen.

(d) German Influence over Other European Countries

Germany’s influence over the economic life of other countries was by no means limited to those in which she maintained formal agencies of control. The ever present threat of military action, combined with the blockade of the Continent and the control by Germany of the major sources of raw materials within Europe, enabled her to a certain extent to dictate her wishes throughout the Continent. In some cases this influence was strengthened by participation in, or ownership of, concerns in countries which were at least nominally independent of the Reich.

Control over the economies of the countries of South-Eastern Europe had been one of the major aims of German foreign economic policy for several years before the outbreak of war, and by 1939 Germany had, by means of bilateral trade agreements, the setting up of a clearing system, and various other measures, succeeded not only in assuming the dominant role in the foreign trade of these nations, but also in bringing about a shift in production to those commodities, textile fibres and oil seeds for example, which were likely to be of most use to the Reich in the event of war.1 The outbreak of war and the blockade of the continent of Europe by Germany’s enemies after the summer of 1940 enormously increased Germany’s bargaining position in relation to that of her neighbours, not only the countries of South-Eastern Europe, but also the remaining neutrals. Of certain vital raw materials and manufactured products Germany, together with the countries under her control, emerged as the sole supplier. Probably the most important instance of this was coal. After the cutting off of overseas supplies Germany, with the addition of those countries which she had incorporated into the Reich, was the only country which possessed reserves of coal far in excess of her needs. In contrast with this, such countries as Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland were wholly or mainly dependent upon imports, and to obtain the coal necessary for the carrying on of economic life they were forced, in varying degrees, to provide in exchange the products which Germany needed for the maintenance of her war effort.2

In the satellite countries and in the so-called ‘independent’ states of Slovakia and Croatia which were set up by the Nazis, control through the manipulation of trading relationships was strengthened by active German participation in local enterprises. In Slovakia, for example, many of the more important industrial, commercial, and financial concerns were in German ownership, while the glass and cement industries were controlled by the corresponding German cartels. In Rumania and Bulgaria, too,

1 For further details see Royal Institute of International Affairs: South-Eastern Europe: a Brief Survey, Information Department Papers, no. 26 (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940), pp. 114–22.
2 Cf. the account of Italo-German economic relations on pp. 317–24 below.
German capital penetration was considerable. The degree of German control over the satellite and ‘independent’ states was, indeed, almost complete some time before military considerations required the occupation by Axis troops of large parts of South-Eastern Europe.

(iii) Industry and Raw Materials

By Patricia Harvey

(a) General Survey of Industrial Developments in the Reich 1939-45

(1) Position at the Outbreak of War

Preparedness for war had been the aim of German industrial policy for several years before the outbreak of hostilities. But the measures taken to achieve this aim, and the state of preparedness reached, were both governed to a large extent by the concept of future war held by Hitler and his associates. Hitler believed that his objectives could be gained either by diplomatic offensives or, failing that, by isolated ‘police’ actions undertaken against opponents who would be unable to resist German military might, yet whose conquest would strengthen Germany’s economic position. He did not believe that there was any real danger, at any rate in the near future, of Germany’s coming into conflict with any combination of the major world Powers, and thus of being forced to take part in a long war. Even if, in the long run, Germany was opposed by such a combination, she would by that time be in an impregnable position as a result of her previous conquests. To this end, future production was to be heavily discounted in favour of present output, and any expenditure of labour and materials on projects which would not produce an immediate yield was to be discouraged. Despite the opposition of many of Hitler’s advisers, prominent among whom were the members of the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (War Economy Division) of the OKW under General Thomas, who believed that Germany should prepare herself for a prolonged war, this view was accepted as the basis for German policy.¹

As a result of this decision, German rearmament took the form of building up stocks of finished arms and munitions to the extent considered necessary for the supply of her armed forces in the short campaigns which were all that were envisaged; seeming justification for this policy was provided by the successful attacks made upon Austria and Czechoslovakia which were achieved at negligible cost and which resulted in substantial additions to Germany’s economic potential.

¹ See U.S.A., Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Economic Effects Division: The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, 31 October 1945 [referred to hereafter as Effects of Strategic Bombing], pp. 20–21.
This form of rearmament was well within the capacity of the German economy. By the use of resources previously unemployed the Nazis achieved an increase in total production which, in the absence of large-scale expenditure on new capital projects, was sufficient to maintain civilian consumption more or less unchanged despite the expansion in armaments production. Factory space and machine tools were available in plenty, and even during the war single-shift working was almost everywhere the rule.

This apparent abundance of equipment, and even of materials, was accompanied by a system of detailed measures of control which, although complex, was by no means wholly efficient in operation. The day-to-day administration of industry was in the hands of the Groups and Chambers, loosely supervised by the Ministry of Economics. Measures were, on the whole, introduced to deal with specific problems as they arose, but there was no co-ordinating authority whose responsibility it was to put the economy of the country on a war footing. As regards steel, for example, the belief in a short-term war, combined with the political undesirability of restricting civilian consumption, ‘resulted in 1939 in the seemingly peculiar situation in which steel was available for a variety of purposes which had little or no connection with the war effort, and yet was denied to undertakings which would, although only after several years, enlarge Germany’s war potential’.¹

In view of the long contest which ensued, the weak spot in the German industrial economy at the outbreak of war was the shortage of basic materials. With the exception of coal, Germany was deficient in all the most important strategic raw materials needed for the maintenance of a high level of armaments production. Her position was made worse by the fact that in the 1930s the major sources of supply for these materials, with the exception of iron ore and bauxite, lay outside the European continent. Germany tried to improve this situation by building up stocks of imported raw materials, by increasing her domestic sources of supply, and by the development of substitute products. During the late 1930s Germany managed substantially to increase her imports of strategic materials,² but much of this increase was necessarily taken up by the intensified production of armaments; as a whole, too, the increase in imports was appreciably less than was desirable because of a shortage of foreign currency. Considerable progress was made in the development of domestic sources of supply, the most notable example of which was the construction of the Hermann Göring Works at Salzgitter for the exploitation of the low-grade iron ores in that area, and in the production of synthetic materials, principally oil and rubber. But the development of these activities was hindered

¹ Effects of Strategic Bombing, p. 192.
by the unwillingness of Hitler to expend materials and labour on projects which would not bring an immediate return.

The measures described above were expected only to tide Germany over a short period of difficulty. Other plans had been made to ensure Germany's long-term supplies of vital materials, and these plans were for the conquest of those territories which could supply at any rate a large part of her needs. Germany was prepared to use up the reserves under her immediate control on the assumption that these reserves could then be made good either from stocks looted from the occupied countries or from their domestic production. Germany could expect that most of her requirements would be made good from the areas likely to come under her future control. Continental Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., might be expected to cover her needs in respect of lead and zinc (Yugoslavia), bauxite (Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Norway), iron ore (Sweden and Lorraine), antimony (Yugoslavia), sulphur and pyrites (Italy and Norway), mercury (Italy), flax (the Baltic States and Poland), hemp (Yugoslavia and Italy), and timber (Poland, Scandinavia, and South-Eastern Europe); in addition, Rumania was likely to be able to provide extremely useful, if not ample, supplies of oil. The conquest of the Ukraine and the Caucasus would be of vital importance to the German economy by assuring it of oil in abundance, as well as of substantial quantities of nickel and manganese. The only real shortages then remaining would be copper, for which in many cases other minerals could be substituted and of which there were large stocks in the Western European countries, and tin and rubber, the supply of which would still be dependent upon keeping open the trade routes with the Far East.¹

(2) The Early War Years

The first two years of the war witnessed an enormous increase in German economic strength. Blitzkrieg tactics were uniformly successful not only against Poland, the first country to be attacked, but also, and in these cases more surprisingly, against Norway, France, and the Low Countries. The conquest of Poland gave Germany control over the whole industrial district of Upper Silesia. The successful campaign in Norway, by reducing Sweden's contacts with the Western Allies, assured the continuance of supplies of Swedish iron ore, valuable because of its high metal content, besides giving Germany access to important sources of strategic raw

¹ An order issued by Hitler on 5 March 1941 stressing the need for active participation in the war by Japan said: 'The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiv. 304 (075–C); N.C.I. vi. 907; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 83).
materials within Norway itself. The occupation of Western Europe and the subjugation of Vichy France not only put at the disposal of Germany the vast industrial capacity of those countries, but also brought with it vitally important stocks of raw materials, notably of copper, to augment Germany's inadequate reserves. To the east, too, the area under German control was rapidly expanding; the conquest of Yugoslavia and its subsequent dismemberment brought under German domination further resources of strategic materials, the most important example of which was the Bor copper mines; and the subservience of the satellite countries to Germany was increased. Most important of all, the initial successes in Russia led Germany to believe that her anxiety over raw materials might be at an end; Nikopol, with its rich deposits of manganese, was securely in German possession, while the German armies at Rostov were within striking distance of the Caucasus.

Germany was everywhere on the advance, and although at this stage it would still have been possible to widen the base of the economy and so to rearm 'in depth', the existing industrial capacity was in German eyes quite sufficient for the demands likely to be made upon it. Indeed, the period between the fall of France and the attack on Russia was a time of 'peace-like war economy' during which civilian production was maintained almost unchanged. Even after the invasion of Russia, armament production was allowed to decrease in the belief that the stocks of arms and munitions already laid up would be enough to meet the requirements of the armed forces in the war against the U.S.S.R., which the Germans firmly believed would be successfully concluded in the near future.¹

(3) The End of the Blitzkrieg Period

The first indication that the policy of blitz warfare might not prove universally successful came with the setback in Russia in the winter of 1941–2. German estimates as to the amount of equipment needed by the armed forces had hastily to be revised, and the declining trend of armaments production reversed. But the Germans had by no means given up their faith in the ultimate success of blitz warfare. The Russian counter-attack in the early months of 1942 had been followed by the German summer offensive which had resulted in the occupation by German troops of large areas in the Caucasus, notably of the Maikop oil-fields. At last Germany was in possession of much of the Russian oil area, and all that was needed was time to repair the destruction caused by the retreating Russians.² Some measures had to be taken at home to ensure increased

¹ In the autumn of 1941 Hitler ordered the reduction of war production and the beginning of reconversion in the belief that the war was virtually over (Effects of Strategic Bombing, p. 23).
production of war materials, but the administration considered it unnecessary to make any far-reaching alterations in the economic structure of the Reich.

Responsibility for bringing about the increase in armaments production was given to Albert Speer, appointed Minister of Armaments and Munitions in February 1942 upon the death of Fritz Todt. But that no thorough-going reorganization of the economy on a war footing was intended is shown by the fact that Speer's task was limited to supervision of armaments production as such, and that even here he was not put in complete charge. The general and somewhat inefficient administration of industry by the industrial and trade groups, under the Ministry of Economics, remained, and the allocation of raw materials was still principally the responsibility of Funk, the Minister of Economics, and his subordinate agencies.

Against this background Speer managed to raise the production of armaments by about 55 per cent. between February and July 1942. In the absence of any plans for the reorganization of the economy, the only method of achieving this increase was by raising the level of efficiency in the industry itself. This Speer attempted to do by substituting for closely integrated over-all controls smaller authorities with more narrowly defined responsibilities. These new authorities were the so-called Main Committees (Hauptausschüsse) and Industrial Rings (Industrieringe). Main Committees were set up for all the more important mass-produced war materials, such as ammunition, aero-engines, and motor vehicles, and were concerned only with finished products. Industrial Rings on the other hand were responsible for those raw materials, semi-finished goods, and accessories which entered into the production of more than one finished type of armament, and were individually concerned with such things as electro-technical products, non-ferrous metals, and industrial glass and ceramics. Both Committees and Rings were subdivided into a number of smaller organizations which were even more specialized in their responsibility. The Main Committee for motor vehicles, for example, was split into sixteen Special Committees dealing with such things as motor cycles, light and heavy lorries, tractors, and automobile repairs; these Special Committees were themselves split into smaller Working Committees. Industrial Rings were divided into Special Rings and further into Working Rings. All these organizations were staffed exclusively by technical experts, engineers, and construction men, and the closest liaison was achieved by the fact that many of these experts were members of both Committees and Rings. The responsibility of these bodies was to ensure the employment of the most efficient production methods throughout

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1 See above, pp. 176-7.
2 See above, p. 176.
3 Effects of Strategic Bombing, p. 7.
the whole of the armaments industry, to simplify product designs, to increase the degree of specialization of separate factories, and generally to lower material and labour costs.

Throughout 1942 armaments production continued to rise sharply and civilian consumption, which had remained more or less stable throughout 1940 and 1941, was considerably reduced. The course of the war was, however, still favourable to Germany. With the temporary exception of Russia, she was everywhere on the offensive; she had at her disposal the enormous resources, both human and material, of the greater part of continental Europe; and she continued to derive benefit from the stocks of valuable raw materials which she had seized in the occupied countries.

(4) The Turning-point of German Industrial Policy—Stalingrad

Whereas the first doubts as to the infallibility of blitzkrieg tactics had been felt during the winter of 1941-2, the defeat at Stalingrad showed once and for all that these tactics could not win the war. The long and costly war of attrition, in which Hitler had not believed and for which the German High Command had wished to prepare, had become a reality. Germany’s position was made worse by the fact that she could no longer count on a series of easy and rich gains such as she had won during the early war years and which had done so much to strengthen her war effort. Perhaps worst of all, she had lost all hope of capturing within the near future the oil-wells of the Caucasus.

Some fundamental change had to be made in German economic policy. The demand for armaments was higher than it had yet been at any time during the war, and there was every likelihood that this demand would be maintained for a considerable period, if not increased. But the opportunity to widen the industrial base of the economy had by that time been lost; the need for armaments was an urgent and pressing one, and neither the labour nor the materials could now be spared for projects which would not yield an immediate return. Germany was now compelled by necessity, and not merely led by choice, to continue to follow the course of raising the output of war materials out of existing capacity. At last the need for a single authority to direct the whole of the German war economy was realized, and in September 1943 Speer was appointed Minister of Armaments and War Production with powers not only over the military but also over the civilian sectors of the economy.

1 The index of consumer expenditures at 1939 prices throughout the war was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: U.S.A., Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Economic Effects Division: The Gross National Product of Germany, Figure 2, Special Paper no. 1, 1945, mimeographed.)
In view of the impossibility of expending scarce resources upon capital projects which might in time increase the productive capacity of the economy, the only methods of raising armaments production were the reduction of the output of civilian goods and the intensification of the use made of the available factors of production. In the first direction Speer made little headway; in fact, the index of civilian expenditure dropped only from 81.5 in 1942 to 80.2 in 1943 \( (1939 = 100) \). One reason for this was the unpopularity of measures for reducing civilian expenditure; Hitler and his Gauleiters, out of fear of unpopularity, failed to support these measures, which were ineffective even in the period following the disaster at Stalingrad. A more important reason, however, for Speer’s failure in this direction was the increasingly heavy air attacks made by the Western Allies on targets within the Reich, which resulted in the destruction of enormous quantities of consumer goods which had, at least in some part, to be replaced. The major part of the increase in armaments production had, therefore, to be brought about through measures of rationalization and the use of available capacity, and it was on this that Speer concentrated his efforts. By drawing into full productive use the reserves of tools and equipment which still remained in the Reich, by the ruthless closing down of many factories not engaged on vital war production, by the increasing use of specialization, and by the initiation at long last of some overall system of planning, Speer managed to achieve remarkable results. Despite the increasing weight of bombs dropped on Germany the production of armaments during 1943 was on average 56 per cent. higher than in 1942 and more than twice as high as in 1941.\(^2\)

\[(5) \text{The Final Phase}\]

The expansion in armaments production was maintained well into 1944. Speer, during his trial at Nuremberg, gave the following description of the position:

I succeeded up to that time [autumn 1944], in spite of bombing attacks, in maintaining a constant rise in production. If I may express it in figures, this was so great that in the year 1944 I could completely re-equip 130 infantry divisions and 40 armored divisions. That involved new equipment for 2 million men. This figure would have been 30 per cent. higher had it not been for the bombing attacks. We reached our production peak for the entire war in August 1944 for munitions; in September 1944 for aircraft; and in December 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats.\(^3\)

But long before the peak of German armaments production had been reached there were indications of the ultimate collapse of the economy.

\(^1\) See p. 191, note 1.
\(^3\) *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xvi. 484.
Sect. iii

INDUSTRY AND RAW MATERIALS

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Speer’s efforts had proved highly successful since his appointment as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, but shortage of raw materials was by then preventing further effective mobilization of labour and equipment. The area under German control was steadily decreasing, and this meant not only the loss of manufacturing capacity, but also, and even more important, the loss of vital sources of raw materials. Air attacks, too, began to play an increasingly important part in hampering the German war effort; from May 1944 onward heavy and sustained attacks were made by Allied aircraft on German oil resources, and the amount of fuel available was cut by 90 per cent., thus making useless the new tanks and jet planes which were being produced. By the autumn of 1944 it was obvious to all concerned that from an economic point of view the war could not be carried on much longer. In a memorandum dated 11 November 1944 Speer wrote:

According to the whole structure of the Reich economy it is obvious that a failure of the territory of the Rhenish Westphalian Industry in the long run will be unbearable for the whole German economy and the successful continuation of the war. In fact at the present the Ruhr territory, with the exception of the products manufactured within the sector, is a total loss for the German economy.²

In the early spring of 1945 the situation had become desperate.

Within 4–8 weeks [wrote Speer to Hitler on 15 March] one must therefore count with certainty on the final collapse of German economy. Neither an armaments output can then be guaranteed, nor will railway and sea navigation then be in a position to take care of the transportation assigned to them, with the possible exception of the operating transports. After this collapse the war can also in a military sense no longer be carried on.³

The unconditional surrender of Germany to the Western Allies and to Russia followed on 7 May.

(b) German Policy towards Industry in the Rest of Europe

Germany’s long-term plans for the economic reorganization of Europe, according to which she was to become the industrial heart of the Continent, surrounded by a ring of states so organized as to supply her deficiencies in agricultural and mineral products, have already been described.⁴ The requirements of war, however, necessitated certain modifications of these plans. The all-important short-term objective was to bring the war to a successful conclusion, and to the achievement of this objective were subordinated many of the ideological considerations implied in the New

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1 Testimony of Speer (ibid).
2 N.C.A., Supplement B, p. 911 (Speer—017).
3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 421 (Speer—23); N.C.A., Supplement B, p. 948 (Speer—026).
4 See above, pp. 165–70.
Order; where industrial capacity in the occupied and dominated countries could usefully be employed to further Germany's war aims, production was maintained and at times even increased. But industrial production in German-dominated Europe was regarded as wholly subsidiary and supplementary to production in the Reich. In view of the industrialized nature of many of the occupied countries, the shortages of raw materials, the limited concept of German war requirements at any rate during the early war years, and the German indifference to maintaining the standard of living of the occupied countries, surpluses of capacity were bound to appear, and Germany was determined that the necessary cuts should be made in the economics of the occupied and dominated countries rather than in that of the Reich. Any deficiencies felt by the Reich of labour, raw materials, and machinery were to be made good as far as possible by transferring these factors of production from other countries to Germany. The branches of production which were permitted to continue in the occupied countries were determined almost entirely by German war requirements. Thus, the output of armaments and of those raw materials needed by Germany was increased wherever possible, while that of textiles, glassware, and raw materials of which Germany had a sufficiency was allowed to decline. In Belgium, for example, out of a total number of 2,164 textile enterprises, 1,360 were closed down during the German occupation.2

Although the German long-term plan for the concentration of industry within the Reich had temporarily to be set aside during the war, ideological considerations were not wholly disregarded in the formulation of Germany's policy towards industry in the different parts of Europe which fell under her control. In each of the countries which successively came under her domination the initial measures taken were very similar. The economic commandos attached to the fighting troops3 were everywhere responsible for the restarting of vital production and of public utilities, and for the safeguarding of stocks of important raw materials and semi-finished and finished goods. But there in many cases the similarity ended. In the subsequent treatment of industry in the occupied countries three broad categories may be distinguished; first, the areas either incorporated or scheduled for incorporation within the Reich—Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Polish Upper Silesia, and Austria; second, the areas which were regarded as 'colonial' territories—the General Government of Poland, the Baltic States, and the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R.; and third, the occupied countries of Western Europe, with the addition of Vichy France.

1 See above, pp. 186-7.
2 Final Report of Chief of Military Administration, part II, section 2, subsection 9, p. 23 (N.C.A. vii. 636 (19-ECH)).
3 See above, p. 178.
The districts incorporated, or scheduled for incorporation, in the Reich were mainly areas of heavy industry whose output was of immediate importance to the German war effort, and whose inclusion within the borders of the Reich was necessary for the fulfilment of the long-term plan to make Germany the industrial heart of Europe. German policy with regard to these areas was to absorb them completely into the industrial system of the Reich, and they escaped much of the wholesale plunder to which the other occupied countries were subjected. An account of German policy in the incorporated areas was given by Göring during his trial at Nuremberg on 14 March 1946, when he outlined the steps taken after the entry into Czechoslovakia:

Before the war no confiscation took place in Czechoslovakia, that is to say, no economic goods were taken away. On the contrary, Czechoslovakia’s large and vigorous economic capacity was aligned in its full extent with the economic capacity of Germany. That is to say, we attached importance above all to the fact that, now we had declared the Protectorate and thus concluded an action, the Skoda Works and the Brünn Armaments Works, that is important armament works, would naturally be included in the armament potential of Germany. That means that orders were sent there for the time being to a considerable extent. Over and above that we even created new industries there and gave our support in respect to this. . . . After the creation of the Protectorate, the total economic capacity of the Protectorate was of course amalgamated with Germany’s total economic capacity.1

Another area which was the subject of intense industrial development during the war was Upper Silesia, both the German and the former Polish parts, which enjoyed relative immunity from air attack. Its coal production was vastly expanded, synthetic oil plants were built, and its heavy engineering and armament capacity fully exploited so that by the time of its conquest by the Russians it had become a most valuable centre for the whole of eastern Germany and for the Russian front.2

German policy towards industry in the ‘colonial’ areas was very different. This is clearly shown by a directive issued by Göring on 19 October 1939 concerning the policy to be adopted in the various parts of Poland.

The objectives of the economic treatment of the various administrative areas differ according to whether the region in question is one which is to be incorporated politically in the German Reich or whether it is the General Government, which will probably not be incorporated. In the first-mentioned areas the reconstruction and expansion of their economy and the safeguarding of their

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 305-6.
2 The importance of Upper Silesia towards the end of the war is shown in a memorandum from Speer to Hitler, dated 15 December 1944, in which it was stated that the loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting impossible after only a few weeks owing to the importance of the armament production in that area (ibid. xvi. 491).
production and supplies must be pushed forward, with a view to complete absorption as soon as possible in the German economic system. In the General Government, on the other hand, all raw materials, scrap, machinery and so forth which can be used in the German war economy must be removed from the territory. Enterprises which are not absolutely essential for the maintenance at a low level of the bare existence of the inhabitants must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would take a disproportionately long time and therefore it would be more practical to carry out German orders in the factories where they now stand.\(^1\)

Throughout the whole period of German occupation, industry in the occupied countries to the east of Germany was limited to the acquisition, processing, and transportation of raw materials, to the production of those goods necessary for the maintenance of the administration and the supply of the armed forces, to the production of armaments, and to the provision of the barest necessities for the indigenous populations. Evidence of this is given in a number of documents, among which is a report of the Liaison Staff of Supreme Headquarters, Armaments Procurement Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt), dated 25 November 1941, on the general principles of economic policy to be adopted in the Occupied Eastern Territories:

Manufacturing in the occupied Eastern territories will be considered only if absolutely necessary:

(a) to decrease the volume of transportation (i.e. manufacturing processes up to steel or aluminum blocks),
(b) to take care of urgent repair needs inside the country,
(c) to take advantage of all facilities in the armament sector during war-time.

It remains to be decided to what extent a resumption of the production of trucks and tractors can be considered during the war (in view of the overburdened European industrial capacity).

The development of a considerable consumer goods and finished products industry in the occupied Eastern territories is not permitted. It is rather the task of European and especially German industry to process the raw materials and semi-finished products produced in the occupied Eastern areas and to take care of the most urgent requirements for industrial consumer goods, and production means of these Eastern areas which are to be exploited like a colony.\(^2\)

German policy towards industry in the occupied countries of Western Europe lay somewhere between those policies adopted in the incorporated and in the ‘colonial’ areas. The countries of Western Europe were much more highly industrialized than those which lay to the east of Germany, but on the other hand it was not proposed, so far as is known, to incor-


\(^2\) *N.C.A.* vii. 243 (3-EC).
porate the whole of them in the Reich.1 The successful German attack in the west was followed by a period of widespread looting of stocks of goods and equipment, but this lasted only through the summer and early autumn of 1940. The objective during this period is shown in the following passage relating to France: ‘The task is primarily to collect booty. In this phase the legal concepts of the Hague regulations regarding land warfare are not yet strictly observed. The main purpose is to get out of France, through seizure or purchase at infinitesimal prices, the materials of use for the German armament.’

As early as September 1940, however, the advantages of using at least some part of the vast industrial resources of Western Europe became apparent to the Germans, and the phase of stripping was replaced by one of exploitation through the employment of existing capacity. On 14 September the following instruction was sent out by the Army Ordnance Branch to its subordinate formations:

I attach the greatest importance to the proposition that the factories in the occupied western territories, Holland, Belgium, and France, be utilized as much as possible to ease the strain on the German armament production and to increase the war potential. Enterprises located in Denmark are also to be employed to an increasing extent for subcontracts.3

Industrial production was, however, permitted only within the limits imposed by the German demands. Where the products of an industry were not of importance to the German war effort, or where there were shortages of raw materials, production was drastically cut, if not completely stopped; the machinery, if a use could be found for it, was shipped to Germany; and the labour was transferred to war industries in the occupied countries, to work for the Organisation Todt, or to the Reich itself. In the industries which were allowed to continue production a very high percentage of their output was reserved for Germany. The following official French figures show the scope of German levies in that country:

The percentage of levies of raw materials in relation to French production: Coal, 29 per cent.; electric power, 22 per cent.; petroleum and motor fuel, 80 per cent.; iron ore, 74 per cent.; steel products, crude and half finished, 51 per cent.; copper, 75 per cent.; lead, 43 per cent.; zinc, 38 per cent.; tin, 67 per cent.; nickel, 64 per cent.; mercury, 50 per cent.; platinum, 76 per cent.; bauxtite, 40 per cent.; aluminium, 75 per cent.; magnesium, 100 per cent.; sulphur carbonate, 80 per cent.; industrial soap, 67 per cent.; vegetable oil, 40 per cent.; carbosol, 100 per cent.; rubber, 38 per cent.; paper and

1 See above, pp. 91–92, for the areas in Western Europe which were incorporated or intended for incorporation in the Reich.
2 History of the War Economy and Armament Staff in France from October 1, 1940 to December 31, 1941, vol. ii (introduction), quoted in N.C.A. vii. 482 (422–EC)
3 Excerpt from a report by Lieut. Colonel Hedler, entitled Change in Economic Direction (J.M.T. Nuremberg, vi. 2).
cardboard, 16 per cent.; wool, 59 per cent.; cotton, 53 per cent.; flax, 65 per cent.; leather, 67 per cent.; cement, 55 per cent.; lime, 20 per cent.; acetone, 21 per cent.\(^1\)

Levies of manufactured goods and the products of mining industry were as high as those of raw materials:

Automobile construction, 70 per cent.; electrical and radio construction, 45 per cent.; industrial precision parts, 100 per cent.; heavy castings, 100 per cent.; foundries, 46 per cent.; chemical industries, 34 per cent.; rubber industry, 60 per cent.; paint and varnish, 60 per cent.; perfume, 33 per cent.; wool industry, 28 per cent.; cotton weaving, 15 per cent.; flax and cotton weaving, 12 per cent.; industrial hides, 20 per cent.; buildings and public works, 75 per cent.; wood work and furniture, 50 per cent.; lime and cement, 68 per cent.; naval construction, 79 per cent.; aeronautic construction, 90 per cent.\(^2\)

As the intensity of the war increased and industrial centres within the Reich were subjected to heavy attacks from the air, the Germans attempted to shift more and more orders to factories in the occupied countries, both in the relatively safe areas of the Protectorate and Silesia and in Western Europe. Whereas in the early war years the emphasis had been placed mainly on the production of raw materials and armaments, on ship-building and on repair work, the intensification of purely war production within the Reich from the end of 1943 meant that a wider range of goods was scheduled for production in the occupied countries. Speer, commenting on this development during his trial at Nuremberg on 20 June 1946, said:

At that time [summer 1943], I had already worked out the following plan. A large part of the industry in Germany produced so-called consumer goods. Consumer goods were, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other necessary articles for the Armed Forces and for the civilian requirements. In the occupied western territories, however, the industries which supplied these products were kept idle, as the raw materials were lacking. But they nevertheless had a great potential. In carrying through this plan I deprived German industries of the raw materials which were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, and sent them to the West. Thereby, in the long run, a million more workers could be supplied with work in the country itself; and thus I obtained 1 million German workers for armament. . . . Through this plan I could close down whole factories in Germany for armament; and in that way I freed not only workers, but also factory space and administrative personnel. I also saved on electricity and transportation.\(^3\)

(c) German Methods of Controlling Industry Throughout Europe

By a variety of methods Germany was able to direct industrial production not only in the countries which lay under her immediate control

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2. Ibid. p. 39.
3. I.M.T. Nurenberg, xvi. 460-1.
but also in those which were allied to her; to a lesser extent she was able to influence production even in neutral countries. The choice of methods to be applied in each case depended upon a number of factors, important among which were the position which each country was designed to hold in the New Order, the possibilities of securing efficient collaboration from native industrialists, and the importance of particular branches of industry to the German war economy. Roughly speaking, German methods of directing industrial production may be divided into three groups: first, control over the factors of production; second, the employment of native businesses under native management for work on German account; and third, direct control by Germany, either financial or managerial, of industry in the allied and occupied countries. Whatever the method employed the result was the same, namely, the complete domination by Germany of industry in the occupied and allied states.

German control over the distribution of raw materials and fuel in the occupied countries was complete. The immediate confiscation or blocking of stocks of strategic materials was followed by the introduction of a rigid system of control, analogous to that in force in the Reich itself. Special licences were required for the sale, purchase, and processing of vital raw materials, and special agencies were set up to direct distribution. These mainly took the form of commodity control offices, which were established by the military authorities for each important material. A description of their functions is given in a ‘Decree regarding the Government Control of Industrial Goods (Government Control Decree)’ of 1940.

The Commodity Offices have the task of regulating production within the framework of the instructions given by the Army Group, by means of general rules [or] separate decrees to the undertakings producing, dealing in or utilizing the controlled goods, as well as providing for just distribution and reasonable utilization, with the greatest possible security of the places of work.

The Army Groups and the Commodity Offices can, within the framework of the instructions issued to them, make decisions regarding procuring, distribution, storage, sale, utilization, and notification. In particular they can:

(a) Control the selling of goods to certain customers or obtaining them from certain suppliers by management.

(b) Forbid or require the manufacture of raw materials or semi-manufactured goods into certain semi- or finished manufactured goods.

(c) Make the sale or the purchase of goods in general or in detail dependent on their consent.

In the occupied countries of Western Europe the functions of these offices were transferred to native agencies as soon as a satisfactory form of collaboration could be worked out. These worked under close German

1 For a discussion of German control over European labour as a means of influencing production see below, pp. 233–41.

2 V.C.I. vii. 312 (155-EC).
supervision and direction and were responsible for the distribution of raw materials according to plans drawn up for them by the German agencies operating in the area, which in their turn were responsible for the integration of these plans in those of the Reich. For some commodities, for example iron and steel, the machinery of control itself was integrated in the Reich system of allocations, being distributed in the occupied countries on the basis of iron certificates similar to those issued in the Reich.

The existence of a rigid system of controls within the occupied countries, combined with complete German control over international trade, made it possible for Germany to ensure that scarce raw materials were available only to those plants which were engaged in the production of goods important to the German war effort. Supervision of the international trade of German-controlled Europe also made Germany's influence hardly less powerful over the raw material supplies of the allied and neutral countries, since all of them were dependent upon imports of at least some necessary raw materials.¹

Germany's ability to control the distribution of raw materials was one of the reasons which compelled many of the factories of Western Europe, although remaining under the control of their pre-war owners, to concentrate entirely upon the production of goods on German account. This form of control had many advantages from the German point of view since, while it enabled a saving in German personnel, the threats and incentives which could be offered to industrialists in the occupied countries made it completely effective. The possibilities of exerting pressure on native business men were, indeed, very great. On the positive side, the Germans, by making use of the vast sums levied from the occupied countries by way of occupation costs, unsettled clearing debts, &c., were able to offer most attractive prices for goods supplied to them since, ultimately, the cost was borne not by the Reich but by the country concerned. They were also in a position to supply the raw materials without which it would have been impossible to maintain production and with it the livelihood of the entrepreneurs and their employees. On the negative side, the Germans could threaten dismantling of factories, the confiscation of unused machinery, and the transfer of workers to the Reich. Thus many industrialists, whatever their political sympathies, felt themselves compelled to comply with the German demands.

The Germans then proceeded to co-ordinate and make more efficient the whole business of sub-contracting. To prevent competition between the various Reich agencies in placing orders with factories in the occupied countries, and to give private German firms more chance to participate, Central Order Offices (Zentralauftragstellen) were set up to co-ordinate purchasing activities in Western Europe. To these Offices had to be re-

¹ For Italy's dependence on German coal see below, p. 320.
ported all contracts with a value of over Rm. 5,000, and failure to report meant that no allocation of raw materials could be made to the firm concerned. Although these Offices had no powers of control, they achieved considerable importance through their central position. During the latter part of the war their functions were largely taken over by the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production, which gave its orders direct to the factories concerned. Further steps taken to make the system more efficient were the delegation of specialists from the Reich to advise on the organization of production in the occupied, and even the allied countries, and the setting up of bureaux to superintend the production of parts and accessories for armaments manufactured within the Reich.

In many cases, however, the Germans were not content to exert only indirect control. Indeed, it was one of Germany's openly stated war aims that the Reich should increase its hold upon industry in foreign countries. Even before the war, German firms had been engaged upon the penetration of European industry, especially in the south-east, and the outbreak of war and the subsequent extension of German territorial control greatly facilitated the fulfilment of this programme.

One of the goals of the German economic policy is the increase of the German influence with foreign enterprises. It cannot be seen yet if and in which way the Peace Treaty will deal with the transfer of shares and so on, but it is now that every opportunity should be taken to make it possible for the German Economy to obtain access even during the war to material of interest in the occupied countries and to prevent any measures which could make it harder to reach the above-mentioned goal.

An enormous expansion in German industrial participations was initiated. Throughout Europe, Reich Government agencies, German banks, and private firms worked together to secure control over an ever-increasing number of foreign firms, using methods which varied from open confiscation of property without payment or compensation to so-called 'normal' financial practices. The extent of direct penetration varied considerably from one country to another, being much more complete in the incorporated areas and the occupied countries of Eastern Europe, and even in some of the satellite countries of South-Eastern Europe, than in the occupied western territories.

The most straightforward method of assuming control over foreign

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1 See also above, p. 178.

2 A report from a worker in Turin stated that 'my factory, like every other, has German technicians who decide all important matters... German technicians give the orders' (Inter-Allied Information Committee, London: The Penetration of German Capital into Europe (Conditions in Occupied Territories, 5. London, H.M.S.O., 1942), p. 31).

3 Goring's letter of 2 August 1940 to the Reich Commissioners of the Netherlands and Norway and to the German military commander in Belgium (N.C.A. vii. 310 11 (137–EC); emended version in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 35-36).
concerns was either to confiscate them outright or to sequester them for the duration of the war. Sequestration for the duration, although theoretically only restricting the right of the owner to dispose of his goods and not cancelling ownership, amounted to confiscation, since the owners were not usually allowed to participate either in the administration or in the profits of the company, and their only hope of possession lay in the defeat of the occupying Power.\(^1\)

The area in which the most widespread confiscations were carried out was the U.S.S.R. There the Reich Government declared itself to be the successor to the Soviet State and therefore to be the owner of all state property. The initial decrees by which the Reich Commissioners assumed civil administrative control in their respective areas declared that ‘the German civil administration takes over . . . all the moveable and im-moveable property of the U.S.S.R., its member states, public corporations, associations, and dependencies (Zusammenschlusse) with all claims, shares, rights, and interests, according to their conditions of 20 June 1941’.\(^2\) The property taken over included not only that of the Soviet State but also that of the Communist Party and all other political associations. Once taken over, this property was placed under trustees who were appointed, and if necessary dismissed, by the Reich Commissioners. The general direction of the economy was entrusted to a series of official monopoly companies (Ostgesellschaften), which were created by joint action of the central Reich planning authorities, and the corporate organizations of German enterprise, which worked as the agents of the central Reich authorities. Into this structure were drawn individual German firms to carry out officially determined tasks in industry and trade. The position of these firms was fully recognized in September 1942 with the introduction of the privilege of \textit{Patenfirmen}. These were German industrial enterprises to which firms in the occupied eastern territories were to be turned over on the basis of trusteeship. The German firms were to put in managers, technical staffs, machines, tools, and materials; at first they worked for ‘adequate compensation’, but the more efficient were later allowed to lease the factories over which they held the power of trustees, with the intimation that after the war they might be allowed to purchase them outright. Prominent among the \textit{Patenfirmen} were such important German concerns as the Hermann Göring Works, Mannesmann, and Siemens.

In the Baltic States the Germans followed much the same procedure, although there were two exceptions to the taking over of property. These were first, handicrafts, small industrial enterprises, and retail shops, which


were allowed to remain in native ownership provided that their owners were personally and professionally reliable, and second, agricultural and forestry enterprises. The reasons for this decision were that the U.S.S.R. had not carried nationalization far enough to make it possible to use trustee devices, and that none of these branches of the economy was profitable enough to attract private German enterprise. With these minor exceptions, however, little attempt was made to carry out the much publicized programme of returning to its former owners property nationalized by the Russians.¹

Widespread confiscations and sequestrations were also carried out in the General Government, in Yugoslavia, and in the incorporated parts of Poland, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in Luxembourg. In the General Government, for example, a decree of 15 November 1939 ordered the confiscation of the property of the former Polish State,² while in the incorporated part of Poland a German company, the Haupttreuhandstelle-Ost G.m.b.H., was specially formed to deprive Poles of their property, for which no compensation was paid, and then to 'sell' this property to Germans at nominal prices.³

The property of Jews, enemy nationals, and those whose continued ownership was considered prejudicial to the fulfilment of German aims was subjected to German management in all the areas which came under the control of the Reich. Owing to the wide interpretation given to these terms the expansion of German ownership was considerable. For example, an enterprise was considered Jewish if the owners or lessees were:

(a) Jewish, or
(b) A partnership with one Jewish partner,
(c) A limited partnership in which more than one-third of the partners are Jewish or in which more than one-third of the board of trustees are Jewish partners, or in which the manager is a Jew or more than one-third of the board of directors are Jews, or
(d) Corporations in which the president of the board of directors or managing officer is a Jew or in which more than one-third of the board of directors are Jews.⁴

The grounds for action against the property of enemies of the Reich were

¹ See also below, pp. 570–2.
² 'All movable and stationary property of the former Polish State with accessories, including all demands, participation, rights and other interests inside the General Gouvernement, will be sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 293–8 (1773–PS); N.C.A. iv. 346).
³ 'Decree concerning the treatment of property of citizens of the former Polish State, September 17, 1940' (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, p. 1270, quoted in Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 511).
⁴ 'Second order concerning Measures against Jews, October 18, 1940' (Verordnungsblat für die besetzten französischen Gebiete, no. 12, 20 October 1940, p. 112, quoted in Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 400).
equally wide. For instance, a decree issued by Seyss-Inquart on 4 July 1940 for the occupied Dutch territories contained the following passage: 'The property of persons or associations that have assisted or are assisting, or of whom it is assumed that they will assist, anti-German or anti-Reich efforts can be confiscated in whole or in part.'

After gaining control of industrial enterprises the Germans proceeded to install managers upon whom they could rely implicitly to carry out their instructions. But supervisors were also appointed to concerns which had not been seized. These concerns were those which the Germans considered to be without proper management, where the management was considered ineligible, or which were held to be of vital importance to the German war effort. The commissioners (Betriebsbevollmächtigte) were either Germans resident in the occupied countries, natives with Nazi affiliations, or Germans from the Reich. They were usually concerned with the general supervision of industrial enterprises and were not responsible for the day-to-day management; they were, however, in a position to acquire knowledge of business and trade secrets, production schemes, &c. An illustration of the placing and powers of such commissioners is given in a decree issued by the Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France on 1 February 1940:

Sec. 1

1. To safeguard the industrial production, the Military Commander or the agency authorised by him can appoint commissars [Betriebsbevollmaechtigte] for industrial plants. These Commissars can only be individuals. They can be recalled at any time.

2. The Commissars receive a certificate of appointment from the agency which appoints them, as well as directives for their task and are bound to conscientious execution of their duties and to secrecy.

Sec. 2

1. The Commissar has to take care of starting or operating of the plant administered by him, for the execution of orders according to plan, as well as for all measures to increase the capacity of the plant.

2. The Commissar has to decide also regarding visits of outside persons.

Sec. 3

1. The activity of the Commissar does not affect the responsible management and right of representation of the business management. The business management, however, is obliged to allow the Commissar examination of the plant and business activities and of the business records, to give all required information, and to follow his directions within the scope of his duties. The Commissar is entitled to attend all conferences of the business and plant managers.

2. The Commissar is not authorized to act as representative of the firm.

Sec. 4

All expenses caused by the appointment of the Commissar are borne by the firm, unless otherwise decided by the appointing authority. The compensation to be paid to the Commissar is determined by the appointing authority.¹

German control over European industry was further extended by what might be called more 'normal' methods, that is to say, by the acquisition of shares in foreign concerns in return for payment, by the skilful use of minority holdings, by the creation of mixed companies, and by the setting up of branch factories and agencies. But, although the methods employed might bear a superficial resemblance to those used in normal commercial practice, the results were far from normal, since Germany made full use of her dominant position to achieve her ambitions without fulfilling her obligations. These 'normal' methods were employed mainly in the western occupied territories and in the allied countries of South-Eastern Europe, where the Germans on the whole preferred to use methods other than confiscation and sequestration in acquiring ownership of industrial concerns.

The extent to which German capital was invested in foreign countries, either in the purchase of existing shares or in the expansion of capital so as to obtain control, varied enormously from one country to another. In Denmark, for example, little German capital was placed, whereas in the Netherlands, possibly owing to the removal of exchange barriers, the penetration was considerable. An important extension of German foreign assets was accomplished in South-Eastern Europe. A considerable amount of French, Belgian, and Dutch capital was invested in this area, and the Germans considered the occupation of Western Europe an opportunity for them to assume the position formerly held by the other Western Powers, and to consolidate their hold upon an area in which they had always been interested.² Throughout the occupied countries decrees were passed forbidding the unauthorized sale of foreign securities, thus leaving the Germans a clear field to take over these shares when they wished. The strength of the German position may be realized from the fact that the alternatives put before the owners of securities in enterprises coveted by Germany were either purchase, at prices determined by the purchaser, or open expropriation without compensation. The outstanding example of a

² See, for example, the report of a discussion held at the Ministry of Economics on 16 August 1940. 'A private economical penetration of the South-East area by German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of French and English investments in that territory. The economic consequence of such a policy will be that England and France cannot disturb any more the German policy in the Balkans, and Germany, on the other hand, obtains influence which makes it possible to develop the economy of the countries of the Balkans and so serve the German economy' (N.C.A. vii. 258 (43-EC)).
concern taken over in this way by Germany was the Société des Mines de Bor in Yugoslavia; these mines, formerly under the control of the Banque Mirabeau of Paris, were subsequently taken over by the Preusische Staatsbank.¹

Other methods used to increase German control over industry took the form of forced extensions of capital by firms, this extra capital being subscribed by Germans who were then able to influence the management; of the creation of mixed companies, such as Francolor (French dyestuffs industry) the capital of which was subscribed by I.G. Farben (51 per cent.) and French firms (49 per cent.); of the setting up of branches and agencies in the occupied and dominated countries; and of the compulsory unification with German cartels, as in the case of the Bohemian glass industry, which was forced to work under the control of the German glass cartel.

Payment for the interests thus acquired presented no difficulties and did not even cause a drain upon German resources, for ample funds were available. Many of the purchases were made with the money secured by Germany through the levying of occupation charges, and others were made against the clearing accounts which Germany held with all the European countries.² In addition, political pressure could be applied to local banks to grant large credits to German firms for the purchase of interests in national businesses.

One important method by which Germany increased her hold upon European industry has not yet been mentioned; that was the acquisition of foreign banking establishments with wide industrial interests. This was mainly accomplished through the big German banks, and in particular the two ‘D’ banks, the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank. These banks, through devices such as interlocking directorates, stock ownership, proxy voting, and management of new financing, had come to fulfil an important role in German industry, and during the territorial expansion of the Third Reich they participated in the economic exploitation of the territories which came under German control. Their chief object was to gain control of the leading commercial banks in the countries concerned, which in turn gave them control over the industrial participations of these banks, participations which, at any rate in Central and South-Eastern Europe, were very considerable. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the taking over of the Böhmische Union-Bank and the Böhmische Escompte

¹ ‘Germany wishes to acquire the shares of the company without consideration for the juridical objections made by the French. Germany obeys, in fact, the imperative consideration of the economic order. She suspects that the Bor mines are still delivering copper to England and she has definitely decided to take possession of these mines’ (extract from declaration by Hemmen, chief of the German economic delegation to the (French) Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, 27 September 1940 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, vi. 41)). See also below, p. 370.

² For further details see below, pp. 274–5.
Bank by the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks respectively gave Germany control over the Poldinar Foundry, the Kralodvorov Cement Works, the First Brno Machine Factory (Prvni Brenska Strojirna), the Bohemian Copper Works, the Solo match monopoly, the Carborundum Works, and a number of other industrial enterprises.\(^1\) How widespread were the interests of the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks may be seen from the fact that between them they acquired subsidiaries or affiliates in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.\(^2\)

In addition to activities on their own account the banks often acted as intermediaries for the large German firms such as the Hermann Göring Works, I.G. Farben, and Mannesmann in the penetration of European industry. In fact, the combination of the two ‘D’ Banks and the large German industrial concerns was one of the major instruments in the subjugation of European industry.

An idea of the major role played by the large German industrial concerns in the exploitation of European industry may be obtained from a brief survey of some of the activities of the most important, the Hermann Göring Works. The Hermann Göring concern for mining and smelting was founded in 1937, with a nominal capital of Rm. 5 million, with the aim of increasing Germany’s iron ore production through the exploitation of the low-grade ores of the Salzgitter region. By the following year, however, its capital had been increased to Rm. 400 million and its interests had spread far beyond the production of iron and included the production of oil and magnesite, shipping, and building.\(^3\) The first chance to expand its interests beyond the borders of the Reich came with Germany’s entry into Austria in 1938, when the Göring concern took over many Austrian enterprises, most important of which was the Alpine Montangesellschaft, the largest producer of iron ore in the country. From that time, every successful German territorial advance meant an increase in power for the Hermann Göring Works; in Czechoslovakia the Škoda Works and the Brno Arms factory were seized; in Poland the Göring concern acted as trustee of all the Silesian heavy industry; in Rumania it obtained control over the Resitza Works, accounting for four-fifths of the country’s steel output; in the west, the conquest of Lorraine and Luxembourg led to the setting up of a Lorraine department to control the iron works in that area; while in the occupied eastern territories the Hermann Göring Works was foremost among the German concerns which took control.

\(^1\) Inter-Allied Information Committee, London: Penetration of German Capital into Europe, p. 10.
(iv) Food and Agriculture

By W. Klatt

(a) Introduction

At the outbreak of war European agricultural production provided, in terms of calories, about 90 per cent. of the food requirements of the Continent. This overall figure covered, however, wide variations as between different types of foodstuffs. While the Continent was almost self-sufficient in bread grains, potatoes, sugar, and milk, it was dependent upon outside supplies for a proportion of its meat and for nearly half of its requirements of oils and fats, as well as for some 10 per cent. of its feeding stuffs. There were also wide regional variations in agricultural self-sufficiency, ranging from a deficit of more than 50 per cent. in the case of Norway to a surplus of over 20 per cent. in the case of Hungary. The dependence upon outside supplies of food was highest in Northern and Western Europe, while Eastern and South-Eastern Europe produced a surplus.

During the war, the amount of food available in continental Europe decreased considerably. Imports declined steadily owing to the growing effectiveness of Allied blockade, and home production declined owing to shortages of labour, farm equipment, and fertilizers. The production of animal foodstuffs was particularly affected, and European consumers were forced to rely more and more upon a vegetable diet. Hunger, and in some areas even starvation, appeared, but until 1945 this was confined to the non-German population of Europe. Regardless of shortages in the occupied countries, large quantities of food were requisitioned by Germany either for transfer to the Reich or for the feeding of the occupation forces. The German attitude towards the problem of distributing the food supplies available in Europe was made plain by Göring in a speech delivered on 4 October 1942 on the occasion of a harvest festival:

It is my desire [he said] that the population of the territories which have been conquered by us and taken under our protection shall not suffer from hunger. If, however, through enemy measures difficulties of food supply should arise, then all must know that if there is to be hunger anywhere it shall in no case be in Germany.

(b) Food and Farming in Germany

(1) Position at the Outbreak of War

German preparations for war in the sphere of agriculture were thorough. The lesson of the disastrous results caused by blockade during the First

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1 J. H. Richter: 'Continental Europe's Pre-War Food Balance', Foreign Agriculture, August 1942, vi. 299-312.
3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 521 (111-RF).
World War had been learnt.¹ The six years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War were spent in reducing Germany’s dependence upon overseas agricultural supplies. To achieve this, home production was raised, foreign trade was diverted as far as possible to those countries with which Germany expected to be able to retain contact, stocks were increased, and the machinery of agricultural control strengthened. The effect of these measures was to decrease the dependence upon outside supplies from 25 to about 15 per cent. By the autumn of 1939 Germany was virtually self-sufficient in bread, potatoes, sugar, milk, meat, and coarse vegetables, although she was still deficient in certain types of food-stuffs, the most important of which were fats and oils. Some 10 per cent. of Germany’s requirements of protein fodder also had to be imported. Almost one-half of all German food imports came from countries outside continental Europe.²

During the years 1933 to 1939 domestic agricultural production was raised by almost 15 per cent.; given the short time in which this was achieved, the gain was impressive. Part of this gain was the result of genuine measures of rationalization, such as the increased use of farm machinery and fertilizers, but decreased dependence upon outside supplies was achieved at a price. Subsidies and inducements of various kinds had to be given to the farming community; less economical farming practices, such as the increased production of oilseeds to take the place of cheap imported concentrates, were introduced; and consumption had to be diverted to some extent from animal fats and animal proteins to plant produce. Only 30 per cent. of the total German food consumption was derived from animal food, compared with 40 per cent. in other industrialized countries, and the greater part of the protein consumption was derived from vegetable food, while in other industrialized countries the bulk of the protein was derived from animal foods.

For the rest, increased domestic production and decreased reliance upon foreign sources of supply were achieved by an efficient and comprehensive system of controls which had been set up long before the outbreak of war. At the centre of this system was the Reich Food Estate, one of the four major agencies set up by the Nazi administration.³ It was responsible for controlling all political and economic activities concerned with agriculture. All persons engaged in agriculture, gardening, fishing, and forestry, as well as manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of farm produce and farm requisites, were obliged to become members of this organization.

Marketing associations, consisting of producers, manufacturers, and

¹ W. Hahn: Der Ernährungskrieg (Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939).
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Distributors, were created and charged with regulating the flow of domestic farm products. Foreign trade was controlled by the Reich offices dealing with grain and feeding stuffs, livestock and livestock products, fats and oils, eggs, and wine. The farmers were organized through the Reich Food Estate into local, district, and regional associations, which were directed by peasant leaders who were appointed and dismissed by the head of the Reich Food Estate. Control was effected through a system of written records, i.e. the farm record and the trade certificate, which gave an up-to-date account of all farm stock and showed the movement of agricultural produce.

(2) Food Controls and Food Administration

So comprehensive were the preparations made in the years preceding the war that little remained to be done at the outbreak of hostilities to put Germany's food administration on a war footing. Such steps as were necessary were taken almost immediately, after which the administrative structure remained almost unchanged throughout the war.1

The old machinery of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture was retained, but its functions were severely curtailed, amounting to little more than technical advice and formal control over the budget of the Reich Food Estate. Friction between the two bodies seldom arose since the Minister of Food and Agriculture was at the same time head of the Reich Food Estate. To avoid duplication, the Reich Food Estate was placed formally under the control of the Ministry, continuing to function as the executive body of the official state administration.

In order to guarantee adequate food supplies for the civilian population and the armed forces, public control over all agricultural products was introduced. In principle, all products under public control were subject to confiscation in favour of the administration, and it was the task of the Minister to regulate their further disposal, in particular the distribution to farmers and town-dwellers. To carry out the official policy regional and local food offices were set up throughout Germany and the incorporated territories, and in each food office there were two sections, one concerned with the production, collection, and supply of foodstuffs and farm requisites, and the other with the distribution of foodstuffs by the retailer.

The tightening of controls provoked irritation on the part of the farmers, but on the whole the system worked satisfactorily. The administration never forgot the lesson of the First World War—that food controls cannot be operated without the tacit consent, if not the active co-operation, of the producer. A system of production and delivery orders combined with inducements in money and kind was designed to meet the requirements of

1 W. Klatt: Food and Farm Administration in Germany. Combined Working Party on European Food Supplies (London, 1944, mimeographed). See also above, p. 171.
both parties, and throughout the war the half-truth was maintained that, contrary to the system in force in Soviet Russia, the administration never interfered with the initiative of the farmer and with his cropping plans, but only regulated the delivery and use of his crop. Indeed, although in the case of bread grains and some other important food crops acreage targets were set and practically the whole crop had to be put at the disposal of the administration, the control of fodder crops was never very strict and was enforced rigidly only when poor crops of bread grains made necessary the addition of barley and potato flour to the national loaf. Least effective of all was the control of animal produce, but even in this sphere there was relatively little evasion.

Closely connected with the administrative supervision of food production and delivery was the control of farm requisites. Farm labour, like all other forms of labour was, from 1942, under the control of Sauckel. The supply of farm machinery and fertilizers presented greater difficulties. Farm machinery was readily available up to the time of the attack on Russia but subsequently became increasingly scarce, and buying permits were introduced which were granted only in cases of urgent need and of satisfactory delivery of crops. Fertilizers were under strict control from the outbreak of war, and allocations were steadily reduced on the basis of a quota system; special allocations were, however, made in certain circumstances, notably in order to increase the production of oilseeds and vegetables.

The control of food production and delivery would not have been successful, however, without an effective rationing system. The first provisional rationing of food was introduced on 27 August 1939 by an executive order of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and was replaced four weeks later by a permanent scheme. Practically all foodstuffs were rationed either on a national basis or by control of local distribution. Bread, flour, and similar products, meats, fats and dairy produce, sugar, jam, and coffee substitutes were rationed on a nation-wide scheme, while locally rationed foodstuffs included potatoes, vegetables, fruit, fish, game, and poultry. Shopkeepers obtained their allocations according to the number of coupons surrendered to the food office for the previous ration period, and registration with retailers by consumers was required only in the case of some commodities, the consumer otherwise being at liberty to choose and change his shops as often as he liked. Limited quantities of sugar, jam, eggs, and coffee substitutes were supplied to hotels and restaurants, but otherwise no rationed foodstuffs could be obtained without the surrender of coupons.

1 See below, pp. 227–30.
As all vital foodstuffs, including bread and potatoes, were included in the rationing scheme, a system of differential rationing had to be introduced by which the requirements of the different categories of consumers could be met. Heavy industrial workers, including miners, and soldiers were granted increased rations, mainly in the form of supplements of bread, potatoes, meat, and fats, while whole milk (with a reduced fat content of 2.5 per cent.) was reserved for children, nursing mothers, and workers in unhealthy occupations. There was, however, discrimination not only according to need, but also on racial and national grounds. Ration cards were used as a means of tying foreign labourers to their working place, and the rations given to certain classes of foreign labourers were made dependent upon the work done by them. On the whole, foreign labourers and prisoners of war were denied foodstuffs of high nutritional value; they were given food of lower quality, and the supplementary rations to which their occupations or their condition entitled them were often withheld altogether or granted in much smaller quantities. The ration cards issued to Russian prisoners of war and so-called 'Eastern workers' provided greater quantities of starchy foods and smaller quantities of protective foods than those given to non-Russian prisoners and to civilian workers from Western and South-Eastern Europe. The supplementary rations to which prisoners of war and civilian workers of foreign nationality were entitled for doing heavy work were smaller than those granted to German workers in those occupations.

The most severe discrimination was practised against the Jews. After September 1942 Jews were not permitted to receive any meat, meat products, eggs, cake, white bread, whole milk, skim milk, or any foods distributed against special permits. Bread cards issued to Jews entitled them to rye bread only. Jewish children and adolescents received the bread ration of normal consumers only, no artificial honey, no cocoa powder, and no special allocations of jam, and they were not entitled to receive whole milk. All other supplementary rations were also withheld from Jews whose German counterparts were entitled to receive them.

On the whole the German rationing system achieved what it set out to do, namely, to distribute a none too adequate supply of food in such a way that the genuine special requirements of different consumer groups were met with the exception of those against whom discrimination was employed as a deliberate policy.

(3) Farming and Food Supplies

At the outbreak of war, German agriculture was in a healthy condition, and little had to be done in the autumn of 1939 to adapt farming to war-

1 H. Donner: Kriegernahrungswirtschaft (Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1944).
2 Order of the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture dated 18 September 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 181-5 (1947-PS); N.C.A. iii. 914-15).
time requirements. The main adjustments took place in the production of fats and vegetables, which were increased largely at the expense of fodder crops. The output of vegetable oil increased from 40,000 tons in 1939 to 240,000 tons in 1944.\(^1\) At the same time great economies were introduced in the use of milk. As the consumption of whole milk was restricted to children, mothers, and workers in unhealthy occupations, the bulk of the milk output was available for butter production. While this did not alter the total amount of milk fat available, it did increase the supply of visible fats and thus secure a fairly satisfactory ration of fats throughout the war.

The increase in arable crops, such as oilseeds, potatoes, and vegetables, affected Germany’s livestock population, all the more so since overseas supplies of concentrates were cut off by the blockade and domestic supplies of bran were reduced by a high milling rate, which was raised in five years of war from 77 to 90 per cent. and more. Dairy cattle were kept mainly on domestic feeding stuffs, and milk supplies were thus maintained at a high level, but the pig population had to be reduced. At the end of the war it had fallen to about 60 per cent. of the pre-war level. Output of pork and pig fat fell even more than pig numbers, since the slaughter weight and fat content of the carcass were reduced by lack of fodder grains and potatoes.\(^2\)

As in other countries at war, farmers did not keep accurate records of the acreage, yield, and production of crops; allowing for underestimates, total production fell by about 15 per cent. below the pre-war figure during the last two years before Germany’s collapse. However, considerable economies were achieved in the utilization of crops, so that the total output of domestic foodstuffs available for human consumption fell by only 10 per cent. below the pre-war level. The decline would have been greater but for the maintenance at a high level of supplies of farm labour and farm requisites. Farmers and farm workers drafted into the army were largely replaced by foreign labour, which, though not quite as effective as native labour, helped to maintain domestic production. Draft power, farm equipment, nitrogen, and potash were also available in sufficient quantities, at least up to the time of the attack on Russia. The lack of phosphate fertilizers, which became acute after the Allied landing in North Africa, did not make itself felt until 1943–4.

While food supplies did not fall as drastically as they did during the First World War, demands increased continuously. When war broke out Germany had to cater for approximately 80 million people. In the course of the war more than 12 million men were mobilized, and, although they

\(^1\) Germany, Reichsnährstand: Übersichten über die Entwicklung der deutschen Ernährungswirtschaft (Berlin, Reichsnährstands Verlag, 1944).

did not contribute to industrial or agricultural production, they had to be given rations ranging from 2,750 to 3,550 calories. Seven million of those called up were replaced by foreign workers and prisoners of war who, although kept for the most part on a low and monotonous diet, had to be given adequate rations of starchy foods if they were to do heavy work in industrial plants and on farms. Thus, in the course of the war, total food requirements for the civilian population and the armed forces increased by at least 20 per cent. above the pre-war level. The deficit between domestic supplies and total requirements was met through substantial requisitioning in occupied territories.

It will probably never be possible to state with complete accuracy the total amount taken by the German army and administration in occupied Europe. The official trade returns give a completely false picture, but the records of the Four-Year Plan Bureau and of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture seem fairly accurate. From these sources it appears that during five years of warfare and occupation approximately 25 million tons (in terms of flour equivalent) were taken from territories in continental Europe and Russia. Part of this was imported under normal trade agreements and paid for with exports of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and other industrial goods, but—particularly in Russia and Poland—large quantities were requisitioned and consumed by the armed forces or shipped to Germany without compensation. During the first two years after the invasion of Russia foreign supplies provided one-fifth to one-quarter of Germany's total food consumption. In this way a high level of consumption was maintained in Germany throughout the war.

During a large part of the war the main source of supply for agricultural products was occupied Soviet territory. The importance of these areas was obvious, and the possibilities of securing food there had been fully discussed before the German armies attacked. Proposals dated 23 May 1941, by the Economic Staff East, Group Agriculture, on the economic policy to be adopted in such parts of Russia as should come under German control summed up the position as follows:

Germany's food situation in the third year of war demands it imperatively that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning, must not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. The minimum aim, the provisioning of the Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception be provisioned from the Eastern space. . . . About 1 million tons of bread cereals, 1·2 million tons of fodder cereals, 2·4 million tons

1 H. Backe: Zahlen zur deutschen Kriegernährungsweise (Berlin, 1945).
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The contribution which food supplies from the occupied territories made to the German diet was acknowledged by Dr. Backe, the Minister of Food and Agriculture, when in his speech on 13 May 1944 he stated:

The achievements in the east during the first two years of occupation have compensated us for the relatively bad German harvests and have thus given us the necessary freedom of movement. The fact that these territories are not at our disposal at present has forced us to abandon the contemplated increase in some food rations.\(^2\)

The \textit{N.S. Landpost}, the official organ of the Reich Food Estate, said at the end of December 1943: 'We gained two months' grain rations for the armed forces and the Reich, more than one month's meat ration, and almost a whole month's fat ration. It would be erroneous to say that the areas which we have now given up in the east were of no importance to us.'\(^3\)

Before evacuating the occupied territories, the German armed forces and civilian occupation authorities frequently removed considerable quantities of foodstuffs. On 21 December 1943 a war correspondent reported from the eastern front: 'In one single sector on the southern front eighty evacuation trains were run every day while the retreat went on. 198,000 cattle, 200,000 sheep, and 128,000 horses were driven away. To a large extent these were not military operations in the narrow sense.'\(^4\)

Until the last phases of the war the German consumers were more sheltered from hardship than the people in occupied territories, but they were by no means entirely unaffected by fluctuations in the flow of food supplies. At first rations were reasonably generous, but minor reductions in 1940 and 1941 were followed by a severe cut in the bread ration in the spring of 1942. After the rich food-producing areas in the east had been overrun, food rations were increased.\(^5\) In 1944 and 1945, after these territories had been abandoned, rations were reduced several times by increasing amounts. Up to 1944 food supplies had declined by less than 10 per cent., but in the last year before Germany's collapse the decline was much steeper.\(^5\)

In spite of the changes in rations, the distribution system can be said to have succeeded in dividing a not too adequate supply of food reasonably satisfactorily. With few exceptions the rations were fully honoured, and

\(^1\) \textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xxxvi. 148-9 (126-EC); \textit{N.C.A} vii. 301-2.
\(^3\) \textit{N.S. Landpost}, 29 December 1943.
\(^4\) \textit{Berliner Borsen-Zeitung}, 21 December 1943.
\(^5\) W. Klatt: \textit{The Food Situation in Germany in 1943-44. Combined Working Party on European Food Supplies} (London, 1944, mimeographed).
consequently there were fewer offences against rationing regulations in Germany than in any other continental country. The estimates of total supplies made by various authors are somewhat conflicting. If allowance is made for the consumption of non-rationed foodstuffs, the average calorie intake of the total civilian population fell from 2,700 calories a day in 1939–40 to 2,450 calories in 1944–5. During the early months of 1945 it fell to 2,100 calories; the consumption of the non-farm population declined for the first time to 2,000 calories and less, and the ration of the normal consumer, i.e. every third member of the community, fell substantially below this level until eventually, before Germany’s surrender, it was down to 1,600 calories.

Throughout the first five years of war the German diet was monotonous and not very palatable, overladen with bulky energy-producing food and deficient in high-grade proteins and minerals, but not seriously short of any vital nutrients. In the last year of the war animal proteins in the German diet fell to three-quarters of the pre-war level and visible and invisible fats to two-thirds. The supply to the normal consumer was never quite adequate, but for families as a whole the diet usually provided at least the essential minimum.

The health of the German people was not impaired by lack of foodstuffs. The incidence of sickness and absenteeism in factories was not unduly high; where they did occur they were the result rather of overwork and the general deterioration of living conditions under heavy air attacks than of undernourishment. In the winter of 1943–4 an epidemic of influenza swept Germany and at the end of the war some mild skin troubles were observed. Otherwise the state of health and nutrition of the German people was maintained remarkably well throughout the war. Even during the ordeal of the eventual collapse of the German army a minimum supply of foodstuffs was secured, thanks to local emergency distribution, and riots were avoided.

(c) Food and Farming in the Rest of Europe

(1) Position at the Outbreak of War

In most European countries agriculture was in a healthy state at the outbreak of war. Throughout the Continent the economic depression of the late 1920s led to government assistance for agriculture, and the decade preceding the outbreak of war was a period of steadily rising food production. Most of the increase was due to intensification of production rather than to increases in acreage; fertilizers were applied more widely, farm machines used more liberally, crop rotations improved, and the quantity of animal produce raised. As a result, continental Europe as a whole provided almost 90 per cent. of its foodstuffs in terms of calories, with a
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deficit of 10 per cent. in feeding stuffs, and as much as 45 per cent. in fats and oils. Like Germany, it was almost self-sufficient in bread grains, potatoes, sugar, and milk, but dependent on overseas supplies for 15 per cent. of its meat. In view of the expected emergency, stocks were increased in most countries, legislation for food control was prepared, and a skeleton staff was held in readiness. In September 1939 relatively small changes were thought necessary, but in the event these preparations proved insufficient in more than one country on the European continent.

(2) Food Controls and Food Administration

Outside the Reich only limited preparations were made before the outbreak of war for the control of production, collection, prices, and distribution of foodstuffs, and in most countries the system of food controls was introduced or completed only after their occupation by Germany. The general principle of German policy at the start was to vest controls in existing organs of administration and in established farmers’ and traders’ associations. In many cases, however, these were later dissolved or re-organized, and in the course of time the German system was usually copied to the last detail. This was intended primarily to facilitate control of the collection and distribution of foodstuffs, but attempts were made everywhere to impose also the ideological pattern of the German model.

Throughout continental Europe production and delivery quotas were introduced, seeding and feeding rates were fixed, and prices and subsidies were regulated. The main instruments of control over production and distribution were the farm record and the trade certificate, but in the last phases of the war, as in Germany, these records were frequently found to be unreliable. To remedy this, it was proposed to set up ‘village triangles’, local control bodies consisting of the village mayor, the peasant representative, and the leader of the collaborating political party.1 There is little evidence, however, that these ever operated effectively.

In the incorporated territories the German system was enforced in its entirety, and all responsible posts were given either to Reich Germans or to Volksdeutsche. In the other countries under German domination the system varied in respect to agriculture as it did in other fields, but everywhere German influence was evident. All over Western Europe (with the exception of Denmark, which was the only country permitted to retain unchanged its existing administration) corporate organizations, based on the Reich Food Estate, were established, and the powers of those Ministries concerned with agriculture strengthened. The final determination of policy was reserved to the Germans, but otherwise the administration was left in native hands.

Little was done in Italy to introduce and enforce controls before the end of 1940, when distribution was taken out of the hands of the Minister of Corporations and brought under the direction of the Minister of Agriculture. As the situation remained confused on the lower administrative level further steps had to be taken to reduce bureaucratic inefficiency. In 1941 controls were tightened and commodities not previously controlled were made subject to compulsory delivery. Early in 1942 an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Supply, Distribution, and Prices was charged with simplifying the administration and amplifying the system of controls. In spite of certain improvements the Italian peasants found ways and means of withholding considerable quantities of produce from official control.

The same can be said of France, where the administration never quite succeeded in tackling the problem. Only after the occupation of the whole of France was the setting up of an effective food administration attempted. As no organization existed on the lower administrative level, 'syndicats communaux' were founded in more than 30,000 villages and grouped into regional peasant unions. As in Germany, the head of the Corporation Paysanne was at the same time Minister of Agriculture. The Ministry was in direct charge of the provisioning of the big towns and industrial areas, while in the rural areas the prefects were responsible for matters of supply. The internal flow of grain was regulated by the Office National des Céréales, the successor of the Office de Blé, while animal products were supervised by the Comité Central de Lait and the Comité National des Viandes.

In occupied Belgium the two Ministries concerned with food supplies were merged into the Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Ravitaillement, and a national corporation on the German model was established to take over all existing agricultural organizations. In the Netherlands the war-time food administration set up in 1939 was first accepted by the German occupation authorities, but later superseded by the familiar national food estate. As, however, the foundations of state control had been laid long before the German invasion, the Dutch system continued to function without much interference, with the result that, until the last stages of the war, when fighting interrupted communications and controls, the distribution of food remained reasonably satisfactory.

After the German invasion of Norway the National Farmers' Union was suppressed and the 'Bondesamband' created, but it was given no executive powers, and control over production and distribution was exercised by the respective Ministries. Denmark, as has been noted, was the only occupied country where the German authorities did not interfere with the existing administration.

In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, as a result of dismemberment, the system of controls varied from region to region and, in some cases,
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owing to partisan warfare, even from locality to locality. As the rural areas were self-supporting, the main task of the food administration was to provide supplies for the towns and for the military and civilian occupation authorities.

Besides fixing production and delivery quotas, and seeding and feeding rates, the attempt was everywhere made to introduce German practices of price control. In no case, however, did these function as effectively as in the Reich, and the result was that throughout Europe food prices rose steeply. These increases were on the whole smallest in the incorporated and annexed areas, slightly greater in Scandinavia, still greater in Western and Southern Europe, and greatest of all in South-Eastern Europe.¹

In rationing, as in food controls, little was done in most European countries before the outbreak of war. In some countries certain preliminary preparations were made, but usually only sugar, coffee, and tea were rationed immediately before the outbreak of war. The controlled distribution of all major foodstuffs was organized only after the intervention of German occupation authorities, with the result that throughout the Continent rationing controls were modelled fairly uniformly on the German pattern. One of the main features was the complete rationing of virtually all foodstuffs, including bread, flour, and cereals, and ultimately also of potatoes. Only fruit, vegetables, fish, and game remained unrationed in most countries. The basic foodstuffs were usually controlled through rationing on a national level, but some foodstuffs were rationed on a regional basis, or left to local distribution schemes. Regional and local rationing were practised extensively in France and Italy, and differentiation between urban and rural areas was common in many parts of South-Eastern Europe.²

As all major foodstuffs were rationed, differential scales had to be introduced. All adults were granted a basic 'normal consumers' ration, while all priority consumers, such as manual workers, nursing and pregnant women, and hospital inmates, were entitled to supplementary allocations of foodstuffs. Whole milk and standard milk (with 2.5 per cent. fat content) were reserved for workers in unhealthy industries, mothers, and young children; other consumers were entitled to skim milk only.

The strictness of the rationing system varied from one country to another. In Denmark, where no serious shortages were felt, rationing was never very severe. Elsewhere the rationing system was most effective in North-Western and Northern Europe, less so in France and Italy, and least of all in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where it was enforced in urban areas only and much food passed through illegal channels.

¹ W. Klatt: Food Prices and Food Price Control in German Europe in the Fifth Year of the War. Combined Working Party on European Food Supplies (London, 1944, mimeographed).
² Mary Egle: 'Wesen und Formen der Verbrauchsrationierung in Europa', Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, September 1943, Iviii. 305-34.
With the exception of Denmark the basic ration in most occupied countries and the supplementary rations were lower than in Germany. This, however, did not necessarily reflect consumption levels, since the composition of the consuming population varied widely from country to country. Where controls were not fully effective, rations were less representative of total consumption than they were in countries where controls were tight and all vital foodstuffs rationed.

(3) Farming and Food Supplies

The state of farming and food supplies was less satisfactory in the rest of Europe than inside the Reich, but the deterioration was less drastic in some parts than observers had expected. This was partly because the importance of healthy farm industries and adequate food supplies had been realized since the First World War, and steps had been taken before the outbreak of the second to secure high domestic production and equal distribution of foodstuffs. The improvements in the application of scientific methods to farming and of planning techniques to marketing also played their part. Most outstanding in the period between the two wars was the steady increase in the use of artificial fertilizers on arable and grassland, resulting in reduced dependence on imported concentrates.

At the outbreak of war, farming was in a healthy condition in most European countries with the soils well stocked with nutrients and the farms well provided with animals. The large livestock population was the greatest asset in the first years of war, when the slaughtering of animals made vegetable crops available which had previously been required for feeding purposes. Simultaneously considerable quantities of animal proteins were provided, until livestock numbers had fallen so low that the annual reproduction rate was not large enough to meet the animal food requirements of the consumers.

Some observers interpreted the systematic slaughter of livestock as evidence of major food-supply difficulties. In fact, as has been seen, it saved many people from starvation as it made available the bread and flour admixtures which at times made up to 20 per cent. and more of total requirements. As flour extraction rates were raised to 90 per cent. and more, the bread became heavy and unpalatable; yet it provided a fairly stable and sufficient supply of carbohydrates and vegetable proteins for the bulk of the consumers and thus kept malnutrition within bounds.¹

The diet became increasingly vegetarian when the production of potatoes, vegetables, and oilseeds was raised at the expense of fodder grains and fodder roots. In some countries a certain amount of grass and uncultivated land was brought under the plough, but nowhere on the

CONTINENT was this possible to such an extent as it was in Britain. While livestock farming suffered a serious setback throughout Europe, arable farming was affected relatively little and was in fact intensified in some countries. On the whole the supply of agricultural labour was reasonably satisfactory in most parts of Europe, although in France and in Eastern Europe farming suffered from the forced mobilization of labour for the Reich. Until the German attack on Russia the supply of farm machinery was also fairly satisfactory; and it was not until the Allied landing in North Africa that the shortage of fertilizers became acute. In some of the territories under German domination the provision of tractors and nitrogen fertilizers was at times better than before the war.

However, the longer the war lasted, the more the drain on reserves of all kinds was felt, and as a result farm output declined steadily. The weather played its part in the annual fluctuations of crops, but, looking over the war period as a whole, the decline of domestic food production amounted to 10 per cent. during the first half of the war, reaching 20–25 per cent. at the end of the war. There was a slightly smaller fall in crops, particularly in bread grains, and a larger reduction in animal products, particularly in meat. In some countries there was a slight improvement in farm production from 1943 onwards when the full impact of the war began to be felt in the centre rather than on the fringes of the Continent. The first really disastrous crop was harvested only after the end of the war, in the autumn of 1945.

By the end of the war the decline in food production was approximately of the same magnitude as during the First World War, but the reduced resources were husbanded better than between 1914 and 1918. Substantial economics in utilization, such as high milling and low feeding rates, kept total supplies of foodstuffs from domestic sources approximately to 90 per cent. of the pre-war level. Allowing for loss of imported foodstuffs, the calorie value of food supplies on the average amounted to four-fifths, but fell at times by as much as one-quarter, of the pre-war level. In terms of calories this meant a decline from almost 2,900 calories to 2,200 calories per head per day.

The average figures are likely to be misleading in several respects. The composition of the diet deteriorated and thus affected the well-being and working capacity of the consumer. More important was the deviation from the average which was the fate of a large part of the consuming population. On the whole farmers and farm labourers continued to eat as well as before the war, and the burden of any decline had to be borne

by the non-farm population. As workers in war industries were entitled to supplementary rations, the reduction in food supplies fell mainly if not exclusively on the non-manual urban dwellers, employees and housewives, the adolescents and the aged. Thus millions of consumers had to subsist on less than 2,000 calories a day over much of the war period. Every second consumer in continental Europe had only two-thirds to three-quarters of his pre-war food throughout most of the war years. The reductions were greatest in fats and animal protein, smallest in carbohydrates and vegetable protein.

There were considerable variations from country to country, but in all countries except Denmark rations and total supplies of food were smaller than in Germany. In large parts of Finland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France, and most of all in the cities of Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the population had to live considerably below minimum requirements for a long time. Those who could afford to buy in the black market suffered little physical privation, but the bulk of the urban population was not in a position to supplement the rations regularly through illegal channels.

In Poland in the last year of the war the low-income consumers in the cities obtained not much more than half the quantities of foodstuffs that the corresponding categories of consumers received in Germany. In the Athens–Piraeus region, the daily food intake of the majority of the population was estimated at 600–800 calories in 1941 and 1942. Many died of starvation before a relief scheme was introduced in the autumn of 1942 under the supervision of the Red Cross. The position would have been less disastrous had it not been for the food requisitioned by the German armed forces and the civilian administration.

All over Europe the health of the population was to some extent impaired. Loss of weight was common among adults and delay in growth was recorded among children. Rickets and gastro-intestinal troubles increased and cases of hunger oedema appeared in the worst areas. Infant mortality rates rose, and morbidity and mortality from tuberculosis increased substantially in the territories in which food consumption was particularly low. But improvement in medical attention and treatment brought most people through the war in better condition than the previous generation had come out of the First World War. Less lasting harm was done in most cases than had been expected at the time by those who had to undergo the ordeal.

1 U.S.A., Department of Agriculture: The Food Situation and Outlook in Continental Europe and the Soviet Union (1945, mimeographed).
2 League of Nations: Food Rationing and Supply 1943–44 (Geneva, 1944), (1943 II A3).
(v) Labour

By Patricia Harvey

Shortage of labour was one of the main problems which faced Germany at the outbreak of war. Economic mobilization had by 1936 caused the absorption of the large numbers of unemployed which had existed in Germany in 1933, and the call-up of men for the armed forces would obviously bring about a further straining of resources. The leaders of the Reich had, however, made plans for dealing with this situation. German labour might be scarce, but it could be replaced to a very considerable extent by foreign labour. As early as 23 May 1939 Hitler, discussing the proposed attack on Poland, said: 'If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of more space in the East will be advantageous. . . . The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.' Almost immediately after the attack on Poland the Germans initiated a policy of transferring labour to the Reich, and this policy was developed during the war to such an extent that by 1944 over 7 million foreigners were employed in the Reich as compared with a German civilian labour force of about 28½ million. German employment of foreigners was, however, by no means limited to those serving in the Reich itself. Although no figures are available, it is safe to say that the numbers of those working for Germany in non-German countries far exceeded the number of those working in the Reich. The significance of this to the German war effort is obvious.

(a) Labour Developments in the German Reich

(1) Position at the Outbreak of War

As has been said in the previous paragraph, the large-scale unemployment which had faced Hitler on his accession to power had given place to labour scarcity some time before the outbreak of war. The need for schemes which would create work such as the building of Party offices and the construction of Autobahnen had passed, and instead the German authorities had to intensify the measures of control which were an integral part of Nazi economic policy from the beginning of the régime. Labour, like the other factors of production, was destined to play its part in the building up of the Nazi war machine, and by the date of the outbreak of war it had been subjected to a series of controls which made it completely subservient to the demands of the Government. The normal structure of relations between employers and workers had been destroyed by the dissolution of

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 549 (079-L); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, i. 272.
2 See Table I, p. 234 below.
trade unions, and by the measures designed to make the hiring of workers dependent upon specific government permits. Wage restrictions, too, made it more difficult for employers to bid against each other in their attempts to meet their increasing labour requirements.

Despite the introduction of controls and of measures designed to increase the total domestic labour force, the shortage of labour persisted, and by the end of 1938 had begun to assume serious proportions. By the end of the year the deficiencies in the labour supply were estimated at about 2 million,\(^1\) and although certain reserves of labour, particularly of women, did exist, any substantial increase in the civilian labour force, drawn from domestic reserves, would have necessitated considerable, and therefore painful, readjustments in the structure of employment. In view of German preparations for war, alternative sources of labour, outside the borders of the Reich, had to be found to increase the total labour supply.

The German Government, realizing the transition which was taking place from a state of under-employment to one of scarcity of labour, had decided as early as 1937 to reopen the frontiers to foreign workers.\(^2\) Labour began to flow into the Reich, principally from Poland and Italy, and subsequent territorial expansion facilitated this migration. By the summer of 1939 over 300,000\(^3\) foreigners, excluding Austrians and Sudeten Germans, were employed in the Old Reich, as compared with a total civilian labour force of some 34,269,000.\(^4\) These additional workers were, however, but a small increase in the face of German requirements, and, immediately after the attack on Poland, voluntary migration of workers was supplemented by forced enlistment.

(2) Effects of the Polish Campaign

The outbreak of war caused an immediate strain on the labour resources within Germany, a strain which was felt particularly in agriculture. No time was lost, however, in putting into action the plans for exploiting foreign labour. Recruiting agents followed closely behind the German troops who were advancing into Poland; thousands of civilian Poles, in particular agricultural workers, were deported to the Reich,\(^5\) and, in

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\(^1\) Dr. Friedrich Syrup: 'Die Etappen des Arbeitseinsatzes', Soziale Praxis, 1939, p. 141.

\(^2\) The employment of foreign labour, in particular of seasonal agricultural labour, had been a traditional policy in Germany, but had been discontinued in the early 1930s owing to the large numbers unemployed in the Reich.

\(^3\) Figures given for the total number of foreign workers in the Reich can only be approximate owing to certain inconsistencies in German statistical practice. For a further explanation of this see International Labour Office: Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany (Studies and reports, Series C, no. 25: Montreal, 1945), pp. 54–64.

\(^4\) The corresponding figure for the Greater Germany of 1939 (including the Saar, Austria, and the Sudetenland) was 39,416,000. Subsequent figures for the civilian labour force will refer to this area.

\(^5\) According to the Volkischer Beobachter of 17 February 1940, about 70,000 were recruited for agricultural work in the Reich between mid-September 1939 and February 1940.
addition, between 200,000 and 300,000 prisoners of war were retained for work in Germany.¹ Early in 1940 it was decided that the number of civilian Poles to be transported for work in Germany was to be increased to at least 1 million, 750,000 for employment in agriculture.²

The lull in hostilities which followed the conclusion of the war in Poland made possible a consolidation of the labour position in Germany. The urgent need for agricultural labour had been met by the importation of Poles. Mobilization for the armed forces had meant the withdrawal of men from the civilian labour force, but after the immediate reorganization caused by the outbreak of hostilities the position had been stabilized; by the end of 1939 many of the restrictions placed on holidays and the granting of pay for overtime which had been imposed by an order of 1 September 1939³ had been withdrawn.

(3) Further German Territorial Expansion

The campaign in Western Europe added enormously to the resources of labour under German control. Military losses were slight,⁴ and were far more than offset by the gains of labour from the occupied countries. Nearly 2 million prisoners of war were taken, and many of these were put to work in the Reich, mainly on the land.⁵ In addition, the material destruction and the consequent economic dislocation caused widespread unemployment in Western Europe,⁶ and this provided a further pool of labour which could be drawn upon by Germany. Little pressure had to be exerted to secure the number of civilian recruits needed to maintain German industrial and agricultural production.⁷ Indeed, during the autumn months of 1940, the amount of labour under German control was more than enough to supply Germany's needs. She could afford to pick and choose; recruiting was temporarily suspended in certain areas; and no attempt was made to mobilize civilian labour in France, despite the prevailing unemployment in that country.⁸

Recruitment of foreign labour continued steadily throughout the winter and spring of 1940–1, the number of foreign workers employed in Germany increasing from about 2,200,000 in October 1940⁹ to 3,033,000 on 31 May 1941.¹⁰ Preparation for the attack on Russia and the calling up of more men for the armed forces increased the demand for foreign labour,

¹ The Times, 23 January 1940, quoting reports from Berlin to Danish papers, gave the somewhat higher figure of 340,000.
² Letter from Frank to Goring dated 25 January 1940 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 200-6 (1375-PS); N.C.A. iii. 925-9).
³ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 1683.
⁴ Total losses of the armed forces from the outbreak of war to 1 September 1940 were 112,000 (Effects of Strategic Bombing, Appendix, table 6, note 2, p. 207).
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ See below, p. 244.
⁸ Kulischer, op. cit. p. 124.
⁹ Ibid. p. 160.
¹⁰ See Table 1 on p. 234 below.
but sufficient numbers were still available for recruitment. More labour was drawn from Western Europe, and, in addition, the strengthening of German control, either by direct military action or by political pressure, facilitated recruitment from South-Eastern Europe. From Italy, too, more workers were being brought into Germany, and a new agreement was signed between the German and Italian authorities at the beginning of February 1941 providing for the increased employment of Italians in German industry.\(^1\) By 25 September 1941 the number of foreigners, both civilians and prisoners of war, who were employed in the Reich had risen to about 3,700,000.\(^2\)

During the period from the outbreak of war until the spring of 1942 considerable changes occurred in the structure of employment within Germany. By 31 May 1941 about 5,808,000 men had been drafted into the armed services from the civilian labour force, and a year later this figure had risen to 7,805,000.\(^3\) As against this, however, the number of foreign workers employed had increased from 301,000 in 1939 to 3,033,000 in May 1941 and to 4,224,000 in May 1942;\(^4\) from being a negligible quantity in the German labour force in 1939, foreigners accounted for about 8·4 per cent. of the total number of persons employed in May 1941 and 11·7 per cent. in May 1942.\(^5\) The contraction of just under 4 million in the total labour force during the three years ending 31 May 1942 was due to a decrease in the numbers engaged in the distributive trades and in handwork (1·4 million and 1·8 million persons respectively).\(^6\) The inclusion of so many foreigners made unnecessary any widespread redistribution of the German working population and the large-scale mobilization of women; in fact, the total number of women in the civilian labour force decreased by 249,000, while the number of domestic servants was cut by only 165,000.\(^7\) The adequacy of the labour supply also made unnecessary more than temporary and sectional increases in the length of the working week.\(^8\)

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1 Kulischer: *Displacement of Population in Europe*, p. 156. See also below, p. 323.
2 *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 December 1941, no. 34, part V, p. 610.
3 *Effects of Strategic Bombing*, p. 204.
4 See Table I on p. 234 below.
5 See Table II on pp. 235–6 below.
6 Ibid.
7 The total number of employed women declined from 14,626,000 on 31 May 1939 to 14,437,000 on 31 May 1942. The number of Germans employed in domestic service on 31 May 1942 was 1,414,000 as compared with 1,575,000 three years earlier (see Tables I and II on pp. 234–6 below).
8 The average length of the working week for employees in all industries increased from 47·8 hours in September 1939 to 48·7 hours in March 1942. There were, however, wide variations from this average. The average weekly hours worked by women tended to decrease, owing to the greater number of part-time employees, while those of skilled male workers in the production goods industries increased from 50·7 in 1939 to 52·4 in 1942. These latter figures probably do not, however, reflect the increases which occurred in key munitions industries, since they are based on a survey of weekly earnings of wage earners (excluding prisoners of war) made by the Social Statistics Division of the Statistisches Reichsamt in which the munitions industries were not adequately covered (*Effects of Strategic Bombing*, pp. 199 and 215).
(4) The Reorganization of Labour Administration

A significant change occurred in the labour situation early in 1942. The success of the Russian counter-attack not only destroyed any hope of a period of retrenchment, such as had been possible in previous winters, but called for an immediate increase in the total number of men in the armed services. Losses of the Wehrmacht, too, for the first time assumed serious proportions.

The growing seriousness of the situation was reflected in changes in administrative control. The first change came with the appointment of Werner Mansfeld, formerly head of one of the Groups in the Reich Ministry of Labour, to the control of the Department of Labour Allocation under the Four-Year Plan Organization in place of Friedrich Syrup, who was declared to be seriously ill. Mansfeld was given considerable powers over the direction of labour, and a start was made in tightening up the machinery of labour control. But after a period of six weeks he was superseded by Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia and one of Hitler's staunchest Party supporters. Drastic measures had to be taken, and the responsibility for carrying out this policy was entrusted not to officials of the Ministry of Labour, but to a man whose Party record was of the first order, but who nevertheless lacked previous labour experience.

Under the terms of his appointment1 Sauckel was given almost unlimited power over the recruitment, utilization, and distribution of labour, his only superior being Göring, as Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan. The scope of Sauckel's task was outlined as follows:

In order to ensure the labour forces required for the whole war economy, especially for armaments, it is necessary to set up a uniform system for directing the allocation of all available labour resources, including foreigners who have been brought in to work and prisoners of war, and for mobilizing all labour forces which have not yet been fully utilized in the Greater German Reich, including the Protectorate, and in the General Government and the Occupied Territories.2

One of the factors influencing Sauckel's task was the increased demand for men to serve in the armed forces. Germany attempted to persuade her allies to increase the number of troops made available by them for service on the eastern front,3 but such reinforcements could only be small in

3 See below, pp. 300-1, for the part played by Italian forces on the eastern front and pp. 604-11 for the part played by the Eastern European satellites.
relation to Germany's needs. Nor could Germany rely to any extent upon conscript labour from the occupied territories for her armed forces.\(^1\) As Jodl said later:

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and skepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East FRONT with the slogan 'Russia can be conquered by Russians'. Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense Vlasov army. At the time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat.\(^2\)

The bulk of new recruits had, therefore, to be found from the German labour force.\(^3\)

Since reserves of German labour, at any rate of men, had virtually been exhausted, the provision of increased numbers for the armed forces could be achieved only at the expense of industry. Yet industrial production, at least in the war sector, had somehow to be maintained and even raised to meet the increased demand for armaments. Various measures were introduced in an attempt to remedy this situation. Industrial production was further concentrated on those firms considered to be of importance to the war effort, and others were partially or wholly closed down. A propaganda campaign, featuring the slogan 'zieh hier drei', urged the necessity for intensifying industrial effort and the duty of workers on the home front to play their part in support of the armed forces who were faced by the 'hardest and most gigantic commitment of German soldiery in all history'.\(^4\)

Training schemes were expanded to assist in the replacement of skilled workers called up for service in the armed forces, and attempts were made to drain off the last reserves of German labour. Yet, whatever their degree of success, these measures could not be expected to make available all the labour needed to meet German commitments. A full exploitation of foreign labour remained the only way in which the labour force could substantially be increased.

This was Sauckel's main objective.

The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw materials as well as the fertility

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\(^1\) For the recruitment of 'Germanic' units of the Waffen-SS see p. 78 above, and for the Vlasov Army p. 80 above.

\(^2\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 662–3 (172–L); N.C.A. vii. 961.

\(^3\) Germans living abroad were also summoned home to serve in the armed forces (cf. Associated Press Report, quoted in New York Herald Tribune, 31 October 1942).

\(^4\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 56 (016–PS); N.C.A. iii. 46.
of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and [her] allies.\footnote{1}

Opportunities for recruitment were no longer, however, quite so plentiful as they had been during the earlier part of the war. In Poland, where a ruthless labour policy had been pursued since the beginning of the German occupation, further transfers, on the scale of previous ones, were impossible; in South-Eastern Europe, owing to the importance of that area as a producer of agricultural goods for Germany, most of the remaining labour had to be retained; and in Western Europe the widespread unemployment which had been prevalent after the occupation had, in most cases, ceased to exist.\footnote{2} This latter change was due to a variety of causes, among which were the migration to Germany of all those who could be persuaded by more or less peaceful methods, the farming out of German orders to firms in the occupied countries,\footnote{3} and the action taken by many of the Governments to spread what work there was among all those seeking employment. Only in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. were there still relatively untapped sources of labour, and even there the transfer of labour to Germany was limited by certain considerations, the most important of which were the withdrawal by Russia of skilled labour along with her fighting troops, and the desire to maintain production in the areas under German control.\footnote{4}

The importance of the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. as a source of labour was stressed by Sauckel in his Labour Mobilization Programme: 'It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous quantity of foreign labor has been found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose are [sic] the occupied territories of the East. Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent.' Mobilization in the west was not, however, to be disregarded: 'On the other hand, one-quarter of the total need of foreign labor can be procured in Europe's occupied territories west of Germany, according to existing possibilities.' Nevertheless, 'the procurement of labor from friendly and also neutral countries can only cover a small part of the total need. Practically only skilled workers and specialists can be considered in this case.'\footnote{5}

\footnote{1} Ibid. pp. 57 and 47 respectively.
\footnote{2} In France the number of unemployed receiving assistance decreased from 805,409 in November 1940 to 88,707 in April 1942. By May 1943 this figure had been reduced to 20,429, by which time unemployment may be said to have disappeared, since most of the 20,429 were unemployable (cf. France, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques: Mouvement économique en France de 1938 à 1948, pp. 63 and 307).
\footnote{3} See above, pp. 197-8.
\footnote{4} This subsequently became one of the major issues in the disagreement between Speer and Sauckel over the location of production and thus the distribution of labour in German-controlled Europe; see below, pp. 238-40.
\footnote{5} I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 62 63 (016-PS); N.C.A. iii. 52.
The more ruthless policy of recruitment initiated by Sauckel achieved a considerable degree of success, at any rate in the period immediately following his appointment. By methods varying from cajolament to open compulsion¹ an increasing number of foreigners was transferred to Germany. In a letter dated 23 June 1943 Sauckel claimed that, during the first twelve months of his administration, 3,638,056 foreigners were put to work in the German economy,² and although this did not represent an equivalent gain in the total number of foreigners employed in the Reich (since many were lost to the labour force through their return home, through sickness, or as a result of other causes) the number of employed foreigners did rise from 4,224,000 at the end of May 1942 to 6,260,000 a year later.³ The steady advance of German troops into the territory of the U.S.S.R. throughout the spring and summer of 1942 facilitated the recruitment of Russian labour, so that, whereas in the spring of 1942 only a negligible number⁴ was employed in the Reich, by the beginning of 1943 it was estimated that some 1½ million were working there.⁵ The over-all success of Sauckel’s policy may be seen from the figures given in Table II (on pp. 235–6 below); the total civilian labour force, which had decreased by over 500,000 in the year ending 31 May 1942, increased by roughly 1 million in the subsequent twelve months, despite further mobilization for the armed forces.

(5) Deterioration in the German Labour Position

By the beginning of 1943 the German labour force had reached its peak. It is true that from the winter of 1941–2 the demand for labour was tending to exceed the supply, but nevertheless, owing to the widespread use of foreign workers, the total labour force, in both its civilian and its military sectors, was increasing. But from 1943 onwards the total number of civilians employed in the Reich steadily decreased. The Germans were thus faced with the problem of meeting their ever-increasing commitments with reduced resources. Various factors further complicated this problem, the most important of these being the loss of military initiative and the growth in the number of firms in the occupied countries which were working on German account. The closing months of 1942 marked the farthest expansion of German military power;⁶ up to that time new territory was constantly coming under German control and conse-

¹ See below, pp. 242–7.
² I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 5: 8 (407 (VI)–PS); N.C.A. iii. 391 (407 (V) and (VI)–PS).
³ See Table I on p. 234 below.
⁴ An estimate of 8,000 was given in a press report from London, quoted in the New York Times, 3 May 1942.
⁶ The battle of Alamein, the Allied landings in North Africa, the Stalingrad counter-offensive, and the raising of the siege of Leningrad all occurred in the period between 23 October 1942 and 18 January 1943.
sequently new areas were becoming available for recruiting purposes; after that date, however, the reverse was the case; German-controlled territory was shrinking, and the first areas to be lost were those parts of Russia which had proved such an abundant source of labour in 1942. The growth of manufacturing on German account in the occupied countries presented a somewhat different problem by reducing the numbers of workers who, without detriment to German interests, could be moved from their own countries to the Reich itself. Recruitment of foreign labour for work in Germany continued, but on a considerably smaller scale than in the previous year. During the twelve months ending 31 May 1944 the number of foreigners employed in the Reich increased by only 866,000 as compared with over 2 million a year earlier.

The increased demand for labour, combined with the difficulties encountered in maintaining a large-scale recruitment of foreign workers, had meanwhile made it impossible any longer to postpone a thorough reorganization of the domestic labour force. Labour legislation, which had remained virtually unchanged since the outbreak of war, was tightened up, with the object of drawing out the last reserves and of securing the optimum distribution of those already employed. Effective control over labour mobility was introduced by a decree, issued by Göring on 13 June 1942, prohibiting all changes of employment except on the order of the Labour Offices, and conscription of labour, previously carried out under a decree of 13 February 1939, was drastically strengthened by a decree of 27 January 1943, under which all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, and all women with the exception of certain categories of married women, between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, were called on to register for work of national importance. The results of this measure were, however, disappointing; some 3½ million additional persons registered, but the overwhelming proportion of these were women, many of whom were either reserved or unable to work a full forty-eight-hour week.

1 See below, pp. 238-40.
2 See Table I on p. 234 below.
3 Up to that time workers had been free, even in the war industries, to leave their employment if there was mutual agreement between them and their employers. In all cases, however, except in agriculture and mining, the consent of the Labour Offices was necessary for the taking on of new labour (Decree Restricting Changes of Employment, 1 September 1939: Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 1685, and subsequent amendments).
5 Ibid. 1943 part I, p. 67; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 49.
6 Under the decree of February 1939 there was no general system of registration by age-groups. Open conscription of labour could only be imposed in favour of war industries, and firms applying for conscript labour were supposed to satisfy the Labour Offices that they had done everything they could, by internal reorganization and other means, to satisfy their needs. Conscription of labour was, in the first instance, on a local and regional basis, with inter-regional conscription only where necessary.
7 According to a report made by Sauckel to Hitler dated 15 April 1943, the results of the
In view, on the one hand, of the difficulties in substantially increasing the total labour force, and on the other of the need for more men both for the armed forces and for the munitions industries, the only policy open was a further concentration of the available civilian labour in the war sector. To this end, a decree issued in March 1943 required that all those firms not directly concerned with the war effort should either be closed down completely or be drastically concentrated. For some time the labour employed in the war industries was exempted from service with the armed forces, but by the autumn of 1943 the demands of the Wehrmacht were such that even the younger skilled workers were called up.

On the whole, however, until the middle of 1944, sufficient man-power was available to the war industries to enable these to maintain and even increase their production. But the landings made by Germany’s enemies in Normandy in the summer of 1944 marked the opening of a new phase in German labour mobilization. From that time on it was clear that Germany was faced with a state of siege warfare. The appointment of Goebbels as Plenipotentiary for Total War in July 1944 was followed by the proclamation of a series of orders. Last-minute attempts were made to mobilize all possible reserves, for the armed forces, for war production, or for the building of fortifications. The draft age, which had already been lowered from eighteen to seventeen years in the summer of 1942, was further lowered to sixteen; the age-limit for the conscription of women was raised from forty-five to fifty; and the length of the standard working week was increased from forty-eight to sixty hours. In addition, many measures were introduced which were designed to close down all activities which did not directly and immediately contribute to the prosecution of the war. All forms of entertainment, such as theatres, were banned; the number of newspapers published was drastically reduced; postal services were cut by as much as one-half; and railway services were decreased. By the autumn of 1944, however, the dislocation caused by bombing, and the consequent loss of mobility of both supplies and labour, proved more of a check on production than actual shortage of labour, although the formation in October of the Volkssturm (People’s Army), with its almost

1 See above, p. 192.
2 See above, p. 43.
3 The average length of the working week for employees in all industries actually decreased during the period March 1942 to March 1944 from 48.7 to 48.3 hours (see also above, p. 226, note 8). But this latter figure probably again hid wide variations. ‘It is probable that at least in production goods and armament industries full-time men workers put in average hours in excess of 50 per week, with 60 hours worked in key armament industries as the war moved into its final stage’ (Effects of Strategic Bombing, p. 35).
universal obligation to serve, caused further difficulties.\(^1\) Throughout Germany as a whole, any careful reallocation of labour had become impossible, and pockets of unemployment began to appear.

(b) German Employment of Labour in the Rest of Europe

German employment and exploitation of European labour was by no means confined to those persons who were transferred for work in the Reich itself. Hitler, in a speech delivered on 9 November 1941, said: 'As far as German territory is concerned, the territory occupied by us and that which we have taken under our administration, there is no doubt that we shall succeed in harnessing every man for this work.'\(^2\) All other considerations were subordinated to German requirements, and whether an individual was employed in his home area, in another part of his own country, in the Reich, or in a different part of occupied Europe depended ultimately upon his relative usefulness, in each of these areas, to the furtherance of the German war effort. Even the allied and satellite countries were forced, by German control over raw materials and by various financial devices, to employ a considerable part of their labour forces in accordance with German requirements without receiving adequate financial recompense.\(^3\)

Employment in his own country did not mean that a worker was producing goods for distribution within that country, or, indeed, that his labour was in any way benefiting his native land. This is clearly shown by an order issued by Sauckel on 22 August 1942 in which the following instructions were given:

The labour available in the occupied territories must be used in the first place to satisfy the primary war needs of Germany herself.

This labour must be used in the occupied territories in the following order:

(a) For the essential work of the army, the occupation offices, and the civilian agencies;

(b) for the German armament programme;

(c) for tasks concerned with food supplies and agriculture;

(d) for industrial tasks in the German nation's interest, other than the armament industry;

(e) for industrial tasks in the interest of the population of the territory in question.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Service with the Volkssturm was compulsory for all those men fit to bear arms between the ages of 16 and 60. There were neither medical examinations nor reserved occupations, although account was taken of the degree of indispensability of the civilian occupation when training and service duties were drawn up. In theory, service was on a part-time basis, members continuing in their ordinary civilian occupations unless called on for duty, but in practice this was out of the question for many men.

\(^2\) Volkscher Beobachter, 10 November 1941, quoted in I.M.T. Nuremberg, v. 440.

\(^3\) See above, p. 200.

# Table I

Civilian Labour Force, by Nationality and Sex, and Armed Forces, Active Strength and Losses

[in thousands]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Labour Force</th>
<th>Civilian Labour Force</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939, May 31</td>
<td>40,781</td>
<td>39,415</td>
<td>39,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940, May 31</td>
<td>41,583</td>
<td>35,983</td>
<td>34,829*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941, May 31</td>
<td>43,377</td>
<td>36,177</td>
<td>33,144*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942, May 31</td>
<td>44,160</td>
<td>35,525</td>
<td>31,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943, May 31</td>
<td>46,084</td>
<td>36,527</td>
<td>30,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944, May 31</td>
<td>45,210</td>
<td>36,110</td>
<td>28,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944, Sept 30</td>
<td>45,044</td>
<td>35,920</td>
<td>28,432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 See Effects of Strategic Bombing, p. 207.

2 Civilian labour force data for 1940-2 are adjusted on the basis of revisions indicated by the 1944 edition of the Kriegswirtschaftliche Kraeftebilanz.

3 Active strength figures for 1939-41 are given in OKW: Zusammenstellung über die personelle und materielle Rüstungsbestände der Wehrmacht (April 1941 with data added through October 1941); those for 1942-4 are derived from the total mobilized by deducting losses. Losses of the armed forces, comprising deaths, personnel taken prisoners of war and missing, discharge and net desertions, are reported by the Heerespersonalamt as follows for the years ending 1 September: 112,000 in 1939-40, 217,000 in 1940-1, 626,000 in 1941-2, 976,000 in 1942-3, and 1,819,000 in 1943-4. Losses from 1 September to following 31 May are assumed to have been 75 per cent. of the foregoing losses for the current period, except in 1940-1 when they are assumed to have been one-third of losses in the 12 months ended 1 September 1941. Losses in September 1944 are estimated at approximately 136,000. To obtain the total number mobilized after 1941, the numbers drafted as reported by the Kraftebilanz have been increased by approximately 50,000 annually, representing persons not in the labour force at the time they were drafted into the armed forces.

4 Not equal to sum of male and female data because of slight discrepancies in the Kraftebilanz figures from which they were taken.

Sources: Civilian labour force data for 1939, 1943, and 1944, Kriegswirtschaftliche Kraeftebilanz for 1944; data for 1940 and 1941, ibid. for 1942; data for 1942, ibid. for 1943. Armed forces data, OKW: Zusammenstellung über die personelle und materielle Rüstungsbestände der Wehrmacht (April 1941 with data added through October 1941) and statistics of the Heerespersonalamt.
### Table II

Civilian Labour Force by Nationality and Industry Division, May 31, 1939–44¹

[in thousands]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Division</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent.³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Agriculture</td>
<td>11,103</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1·1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Industry and Transport</td>
<td>18,482</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Industry</td>
<td>10,876</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Handwork</td>
<td>5,307</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Transport</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Power</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Trade, banking, and insurance</td>
<td>4,595</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1·0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Administration and services⁵</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Armed Forces administration⁶</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Domestic service²</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Home work</td>
<td>(ⅸ)</td>
<td>(ⅸ)</td>
<td>(ⅸ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,114</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ See next page for footnotes.
### Table II (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Division</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent.³</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent.³</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent.³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Agriculture</td>
<td>9,252</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>9,008</td>
<td>2,933</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>8,708</td>
<td>2,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Industry and Transport</td>
<td>13,386</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13,324</td>
<td>3,566</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>12,489</td>
<td>4,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Industry</td>
<td>8,369</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8,170</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>7,640</td>
<td>3,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Handwork</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2,745</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Transport</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Power</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Trade, banking and insurance</td>
<td>3,124</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2,933</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2,679</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Administration and services⁵</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Armed Forces administration⁶</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Domestic service⁷</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Home work</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total⁹</td>
<td>31,179</td>
<td>4,115</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>30,269</td>
<td>6,260</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>28,984</td>
<td>7,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 See *Effects of Strategic Bombing*, p. 206.
2 Including Jews, both German and foreign, and prisoners of war.
3 Foreigners as percentage of total civilian labour force in each industry division.
4 Including forestry and fishing.
5 Government administration excepting police and the Armaments Ministry, and public and private services, arts, and sports.
6 Including police and Armaments Ministry.
7 Data incorporate the following additions to the *Kräftebilanz* figures to make the series comparable for all years: 440,000 in 1940, 420,000 in 1941, and 400,000 in 1942.
8 Not available.
9 Figures in parentheses are adjusted on basis of revisions indicated by the 1944 edition of the *Kräftebilanz*.

Thus it was only after all possible German requirements had been satisfied that any of the demands of the occupied countries for industrial goods for themselves were met.

(1) Employment on the Construction of Defence Works

Besides employment on the land, there were two main ways in which the populations of the occupied countries could be used to further the German war effort. The first of these was on the construction of fortifications and other defence works, and the second was on the production of goods needed either by the armed forces or by the German war economy in general.

In control of most of the work done on fortifications was the Organisation Todt. This was founded on 28 May 1938 by Fritz Todt,¹ with the primary objective of hastening the completion of the West Wall. With the outbreak of war and the subsequent German territorial advance, the work of the Organisation Todt expanded considerably. It became responsible for the building of roads, railways, bridges, and pillboxes, for the digging of trenches, and for the construction of such large-scale works as the Atlantic Wall, which stretched from the north of Norway to the Spanish border, and the Ligurian Wall, a system of coastal defence begun in September 1943 with the object of covering the line between Toulon and Spezia. Apart from its strictly military functions the Organisation Todt also became responsible for the construction of harbours and armaments factories, and in some cases even assumed responsibility for developing and working mines.

The personnel of the Organisation Todt consisted of both Germans and foreigners. As elsewhere, the Germans received preferential treatment, notably in the way of special uniforms, and of payments and benefits in recognition of the dangerous nature of fortification and construction jobs which were often carried out only a short distance behind the front line. As the number of foreign workers increased, Germans were employed more and more only as foremen. Recruitment of foreigners was carried out on much the same lines as recruitment of workers who were to be transported to Germany, persuasion being supplemented where necessary with open compulsion.² Few statistics are available as to the numbers of workers,

¹ Fritz Todt was a Major General of the Air Force and a high-ranking officer in the SA. From June 1933 he was Inspector-General of the German Highway System; from 9 December 1938 Commissioner-General for the Construction Industry. He was Director of the Organisation Todt, and among his other posts was that of Inspector-General of water power and power plants. Just before the opening of the German offensive in the west he was appointed Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions. After his death in an air accident in February 1942 his functions were taken over by Albert Speer. The Organisation Todt continued to bear his name.

² See Hitler's order dated 8 September 1942. "The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers be assigned and given the fullest extent of their productive
both Germans and foreigners, who were employed in the Organisation Todt; according to a report made by Sauckel to Hitler on 17 May 1943 the total number of employees had increased from 270,969 at the end of March 1942 to 696,003 twelve months later; recruitment continued, however, well into 1945 in order to meet German demands in the last desperate stages of the struggle, so that the final figure was in all probability considerably in excess of that for March 1943.

(2) Production on German Account

The original German idea had been to concentrate a large part of industrial production, and particularly that of armaments and munitions, within the borders of the Reich. But as the intensity of the war increased, the advantages to be gained from farming out orders to factories in the occupied countries became more apparent. Large numbers of workers were recruited for labour in these factories, and production in the occupied countries assumed considerable importance to the German war effort.

Difficulties began to arise, however, over recruitment. By the end of 1942 the reserves of labour were no longer sufficient to meet all the demands made upon them; recruitment of workers for factories in the occupied countries began to conflict with recruitment of workers for transfer to the Reich. This conflict assumed a personal aspect owing to the fact that whereas Sauckel, as Plenipotentiary-General for Labour Allocation, was responsible for the provision of workers for Germany, the factories in the occupied countries lay outside his control, and, instead, came under the direction of Speer in his capacity of Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions. The disagreement over recruitment became increasingly acute from the autumn of 1942. More and more labour was diverted into the factories working on German account in the occupied countries, and complaints were made by Sauckel of the deleterious effects which this had upon his own recruitment programme. Recruitment of labour for capacities to this task. The previous allotment of workers originating from these countries is insufficient. In order to increase it I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore, the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as leaving the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 150 (556 (2)–PS)); translation given in J.M.T. Nuremberg, iii. 455). For a fuller treatment of German methods of recruiting foreign labour see below, pp. 242–7.

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 10 (407 (VIII)–PS); N.C.A. iii. 394.
3 See below, pp. 280–1.
4 See above, p. 230.
5 At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1943 Sauckel claimed that his recruitment programme had been seriously handicapped in the previous autumn by the increased employment of labour in the factories which were working on German orders (N.C.A. viii. 182 (R–124)).
factories in the occupied countries continued, however, and in the autumn of 1943 the concept of 'blocked enterprises' was created. This was designed to safeguard the labour supplies of concerns which were considered essential for armament and war production, and laid down that workers in the armament and war production industries were not to be transferred by Sauckel unless previous consent had been given by Speer. Sauckel's complaints became stronger. At a meeting of the Central Planning Board, held on 1 March 1944, Sauckel, describing his recruitment efforts in the previous autumn, said:

The program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium, and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from those countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these countries themselves. For months—sometimes I visited these countries twice within a month—I have been called a fool who against all reason travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled over whether or not Sauckel was a fool.

Later in the same speech he added:

I want to state clearly and fearlessly: The exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program described to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies to Italy.

The dispute was then referred to Hitler. In a memorandum, dated 17 March 1944, Sauckel reiterated his complaints and claimed that his whole recruitment programme for 1944 was jeopardized by the widespread reservation of workers in the occupied countries. 'The appointment of protection concerns [Schutzbetriebe—S-concerns] for the purpose of safeguarding armament assignments and transferring civilian quotas occurred in the occupied western territories to such an extent and in such a form that it made a fluent and systematic commitment of labor impossible.' The opposite side of the question was given in an answering

1 See letter from Speer to Hitler, dated 5 April 1944 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 183–6 (3819–PS); N.C.A. vi. 763–5).

2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 349–52 (124 R); N.C.A. viii. 147–51.

3 Sauckel claimed that, in France alone, some 5,150,000 persons of working age were protected from recruitment for Germany. Of these, 890,000 were employees of armament concerns and 550,000 of civilian firms coming under the heading of 'Schutzbetriebe'. In addition to these, and included in the total, were 2,750,000 employed in agriculture, 450,000 on railroads and transportation, 150,000 in the Organisation Todt, and others engaged on Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine construction, forestry, and in the gendarmerie (cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 181 (3819–PS); N.C.A. vi. 760–1).
memorandum submitted by Speer on 5 April. Production in the occupied countries was, he said, essential for the German war effort, the consequent demands made on labour reserves were not excessive, and, he thought, could well be met. That the dispute was settled in favour of Speer seems likely in view of a statement made by him at a conference held on 11 July.

Reichsminister Speer stated that he had an interest both in spurring on an increased labor recruiting for the Reich and also in the maintaining of the production in the extra-German territories. Up to the present 25 to 30 per cent. of the German war production had been furnished by the occupied western territories and Italy, by Italy alone 12½ per cent. The Fuehrer recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation.

Soon after this, the advancing troops of the Western Allies rendered this controversy void since production had thenceforward to be carried out wherever possible on an ad hoc basis.

(3) The Extent of German Employment of Labour outside the Reich

No over-all estimate has been made of the number of persons who were engaged on work for the German war effort, other than those employed in the Reich. Throughout the war there was a continual shifting of populations, and 'however great the number of persons transported to Germany, probably still more were deported not to Germany, but to other parts of their own countries or to other occupied territories'.

Some idea of the scale of German employment of foreign workers in their own countries may, however, be gathered from the figures given in an official report by the French Government on the employment of French labour by Germany. French workers in Germany, including employed prisoners of war, represented a loss of 7,748,568,000 man-hours to France; those employed directly by Germany in France contributed 5,136,346,000 man-hours to the German war effort; and indirect employment by

1 Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 183-6; N.C.A. vi. 763-5. Speer claimed that the total number of protected workers in the blocked enterprises of armament and war production in the occupied western territories at that time was only 2,700,000 (to be increased to 3 million), which represented only 1·21 of the population as compared with a corresponding figure of 1·8 in the Reich.

2 Minutes of a conference of department chiefs at the Reich Chancellery, 11 July 1944 (ibid. pp. 190 and 769-70 respectively).

3 I.L.O.: Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany, p. 56.


5 Ibid. p. 154.

6 These included those whose labour was requisitioned under Article 52 of the Hague Convention, and those employed by the Organisation Todt and the Wehrmacht.

7 Ibid. p. 45.
Germany in France accounted for an additional 9,917,640,000 man-hours. The Germans may, therefore, be said to have gained 15,053,989,000 man-hours from French workers in France, as compared with only 7,748,568,000 man-hours from Frenchmen working in Germany.

(c) German Treatment of Foreign Labour

(1) Underlying Principles

The basic principle underlying German treatment of foreign labour was the doctrine of the racial superiority of the German nation. This theory of the 'master race' was expressed by Erich Koch, Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, in the following terms: 'We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here.' The practical application of this policy entailed the complete subordination of the rights and interests of the non-German population of Europe to those of their German masters.

What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death [verrecken—to die—used of cattle] interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We shall never be rough and heartless where it is not necessary, that is clear.... But it is a crime against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them.

The policy of racial discrimination affected almost every aspect of German treatment of foreign labour—methods of recruitment, living conditions, and conditions of employment alike. Apart from this general discrimination there was further discrimination as between different groups of foreign workers. Roughly speaking, foreigners in this respect were divided into three groups. At the bottom of the scale came the Jews whom, as a general policy, it was considered advisable to exterminate regardless of the contribution which their labour could have made to the German war economy. Next came the so-called 'Eastern' workers, a

1 Ibid. p. 56.
2 Speech given by Koch at a meeting of the National Socialist Party on 5 March 1943 in Kiev (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 9–11 (1130–PS); N.C.A. iii. 798).
3 Speech given by Himmler at a meeting of SS Major-Generals at Posen, 4 October 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 122–3 (1919–PS); N.C.A. iv. 559).
4 See, for example, a letter from the Ministry of the East to the Reich Commissioner for the East dated 18 December 1941: 'Economic considerations should fundamentally remain unconsidered in the settlement of the problem' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 437 (3666–PS); N.C.A. vi. 402–3). On the treatment of the Jews see also pp. 153–64 above.
group which included those from Poland, the former Baltic States, and the occupied parts of Russia. Within this group there were certain differentiations, the Russians being regarded as least worthy of consideration, followed by the Poles, with the nationals of the former Baltic States receiving certain privileges. There were also differences as between members of the third group, which included those persons coming from the allied and neutral states and from the occupied countries of Western Europe. In this case, however, there was as much discrimination on the ground of skill as on that of nationality, so that, on the whole, Hungarians, Swiss, Danes, and Flemings as skilled workers received the most favourable treatment, and even the French and the Dutch, who were considered politically unreliable, fared better than the less highly skilled Italians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Spaniards.

Another factor contributing to the harsh treatment of foreign labour by Germany was the contradiction between the employment of large numbers of foreign workers in the Reich and the expressed long-term aim of 'creating clearer racial boundaries'. The existence of this contradiction had two main results. The first of these was the continued emphasis placed by the Nazi leaders throughout the war on the temporary nature of such employment, and the subsequent failure to provide the facilities necessary for the adequate housing and feeding of these workers. The second was the constant necessity felt by the administration to demonstrate to the German people the inferior position of the foreigner. The effect of this latter was to preclude the granting of any form of civil rights to foreigners working in Germany and to emphasize the necessity of segregating foreigners from Germans in order to satisfy National Socialist racial doctrines.

(2) Civilian Labour

The dependence of Germany on securing additional supplies of labour for the maintenance of her war effort has already been shown. Within the area under her control there were three main groups of persons upon which she could draw in order to supplement her own failing domestic labour resources. These were prisoners of war, inmates of concentration camps (some of whom were Germans), and, most important of all, foreign civilian workers.

(a) Recruitment

No one consistent or uniform policy of recruitment was followed by Germany with regard to foreign civilian labour during the course of the

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1 Cf. below, p. 322.
2 Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, 6 October 1939 (Volkischer Beobachter, 7 October 1939).
4 See above, pp. 223-32.
war. The particular method employed in any country at a given moment was governed by a variety of factors, the most important of which were the type of political relationship between Germany and the country of origin of the workers, the urgency of the demand for labour at the time, and the application of the concept of racial inferiority.¹ Methods varied from voluntary enlistment to forcible deportation, and the picture is further complicated by the fact that various methods of recruitment were sometimes employed simultaneously in one area. The general trend, however, was roughly as follows: in the countries to the east of Germany, compulsory recruitment was introduced immediately after the occupying forces had gained control, but in the west its introduction was delayed until after the deterioration of the labour situation, that is to say until 1942. The absence of direct compulsion in some areas before 1942 did not mean, however, that the majority of workers went to Germany entirely as a matter of voluntary choice; according to a statement made by Sauckel to the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 ‘out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily’.²

Wherever possible, responsibility for providing the desired number of recruits for transfer to Germany was left with the administrations of the countries of origin of the workers concerned, thus lessening the strain on the German labour organization. The extent to which this was possible depended, however, on the willingness of these administrations to cooperate. In some of the allied and neutral countries German requests for labour were favourably received, at any rate during the early war years; migration of their labour to Germany was, for some, a traditional policy, and one which proved more desirable in view of the decrease in employment caused by the cessation of normal economic activities after the outbreak of war. With these countries a new series of bilateral agreements was signed, providing for the transfer of both seasonal and permanent workers to the Reich.³ Under most of these agreements, Germany’s partners undertook to make a preliminary selection of recruits, the final choice being determined by the local representatives of the German labour administration.⁴

In most countries, however, Germany could not count on much active

¹ See above, pp. 241–2.
² I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 355 (124–R); N.C.A. viii. 160. This was substantiated by Speer in his interrogation during his trial at Nuremberg, 13 December 1945: ‘Q: That means then, that the great majority of the workers that came from the western countries—the western occupied countries—came against their will to Germany? A: Yes’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, iii. 488–9).
³ Bilateral agreements were signed during the war with the following countries: Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain, Slovakia, Vichy France, Rumania, and the Netherlands.
⁴ See, for example, the chief provisions of the German-Spanish agreement of 2 August 1941, quoted in I.L.O.: Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany, pp. 82–83.
support for her recruitment policy from the local population, and she was forced to set up her own agencies for recruiting labour; in some cases these worked parallel with the existing agencies, and in others supplanted them completely. In the incorporated areas labour organizations were absorbed into the German labour system and recruitment followed roughly the same pattern as in the Old Reich.

During the later stages of the war German recruitment methods all over occupied Europe were very similar; compulsory enlistment, often carried out by violence, had become the rule. In the western occupied territories, however, the introduction of compulsory recruitment was prefaced by the employment of various other less harsh measures, and it was only after the labour situation had become desperate that brutal methods, up to that time considered advisable only for the 'inferior' eastern races, were widely employed in the west.

The easiest method of recruitment, and the one which was first employed in Western Europe, was the persuasion of workers to migrate voluntarily to the Reich. An intensive propaganda campaign was initiated, stressing the benefits to be gained, not only by the worker himself but also by his dependants, from taking up work in the Reich. Through the media of the press and of the wireless, by the distribution of attractive brochures, and by the holding of mass meetings, the Germans attempted to inveigle men and women into volunteering for work in the Reich. To those who should volunteer, promises were made of high wages, of facilities for transferring substantial amounts of these wages home to their dependants, of good living conditions, of regular home leave on full pay, and of participation in German social insurance schemes which were in advance of those in existence elsewhere.

Prevailing conditions at first made for the success of this policy. In Western Europe the military campaign, short as it was, had caused large-scale destruction of productive resources and general economic dislocation, and this situation was aggravated by the immediate policy of looting carried out by the German invaders; unemployment was widespread, and German offers of high wages and favourable conditions sounded attractive.

It became clear almost immediately, however, that voluntary enlistment was unlikely to provide either the number or the type of workers required in the Reich. The increased need for labour, coupled with the spread of information regarding the true state of conditions in Germany, made necessary the introduction of other methods of recruitment into Western Europe. Various measures of indirect compulsion were employed, the most common of which were the abolition of unemployment relief for those who were declared physically fit but who refused to volunteer for

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1 Recruiting was carried out either by Sauckel's representatives or, at his request, by the military commanders of the various areas.
work in the Reich, the withholding of food ration cards, and the forced
dismissal of certain categories or age-groups of workers who were then
detailed for transfer to Germany. The German policy of closing down
factories and lengthening working hours in the occupied countries, by
increasing the number of unemployed, also increased the number of those
who could be forced, by these methods, to go to Germany.

In occupied Eastern Europe, meanwhile, compulsory enlistment had
from the beginning been the rule. On the first day of the establishment of
a civil administration in the General Government labour duty was intro-
duced for Poles and forced labour for Jews, while a further decree of
February 1940 provided that those conscribed under the first decree might
be deported to Germany for agricultural and other work. A similar
decree, issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
on 19 December 1941, introduced compulsory labour in the former Baltic
States and in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R.

So great were the demands made by Germany first for Polish and then
for 'Eastern' labour that the introduction of forcible methods of recruit-
ment was inevitable. As early as 10 May 1940 the following entry appears
in Frank's diary: 'Upon the demands from the Reich it has now been
decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient
manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the German
Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female
Poles.' Throughout the occupied territories to the east of Germany terror,
vigilance, and arson were all employed in the attempt to supply the Reich
with an ever-increasing number of workers; the estates of those who
resisted recruitment were burned, their relatives were arrested and taken
to forced labour camps, and raids were carried out not only in the streets

1 Other methods included the release of civil offenders on condition that they volunteered for
work in Germany, and the agreement reached in June 1942 between the Vichy Government
and Sauckel's office by which one prisoner of war was to be released on the arrival of every three
skilled French workers in Germany. This agreement was the so-called *relève* (see also below,
p. 409).

2 Verordnung über die Einführung der Arbeitspflicht für die polnische Bevölkerung des
Generalgouvernements, 26. Oktober 1939; Verordnung über die Erstreckung der Arbeitspflicht
für die polnische Bevölkerung des Generalgouvernements, 14. Dezember 1939 (Weh, A 330,
A 331).

3 Verordnung über die Einführung des Arbeitszwangs für die jüdische Bevölkerung des


5 Verordnung über die Einführung der Arbeitspflicht in den besetzten Ostgebieten, 19.
Dezember 1941 (Meycr, ed. I. III. Ba5 Wirtschaft).

6 *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxx. 376 (2233-PS); *N.C.* I. iv. 884. See also below, p. 557.

7 'Estates of those who refuse to work are to be burned, their relatives are to be arrested as
hostages and to be brought to forced labour camps' (Directive of the Commissioner-General in
Luzk (Luck) of 21 September 1944, quoted in a secret letter from the Reich Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories to Operations Staff on the Political Side, 12 November 1943
but also in houses and churches.\footnote{1} A memorandum, dated 25 October 1942, gives the following general description of recruitment methods in occupied Russia:

In the prevailing limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, ‘recruiting’ methods were used which probably have their origin only in the blackest periods of the slave trade. A regular manhunt was inaugurated; without consideration of health or age the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately that far more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious illness and other incapacities for work.\footnote{2}

So long as Germany retained control of the areas to the east of the Reich, recruitment continued at this pace; indeed, the Russian advance stimulated the Germans to attempt a round-up of the last reserves of labour before they were finally lost to the enemy.\footnote{3}

The sharp deterioration in the German labour position, dating from the winter of 1941–2, led to the introduction of compulsory labour service in the whole of Western Europe and not as hitherto mainly in Eastern Europe.\footnote{4} In Belgium, for example, an order issued by the Military Commander on 6 October 1942 specified that all men between the ages of 18 and 50, and all unmarried women from 21 to 25 years of age, were liable for compulsory labour and could be transferred to Germany.\footnote{5} In the Netherlands, too, all inhabitants were liable from March 1942 onwards for labour service either in their own country or abroad.\footnote{6} By the autumn of 1942 compulsory labour service had become the rule in most of the occupied and dominated countries, although in the dominated countries it was directed mainly towards the provision of labour for building and for other work for the German authorities, for the maintenance of transport facilities, and for agriculture, and only secondarily for transfer to the Reich. The exception was Denmark which, until the revolt in August 1943, received preferential treatment as Germany’s ‘model’ protectorate.\footnote{7} From that time onwards,

\footnote{1} ‘The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants’ (Letter from the Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee to Frank, February 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 300 (1526–PS); N.C.A. iv. 80)). For labour recruitment in the Ukraine see also p. 639 below.

\footnote{2} Secret note by Brautigum, a high official in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 25 October 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 339 (294–PS); N.C.A. iii. 248).

\footnote{3} The final stages of the campain in the east witnessed a new development, namely, the large-scale transportation to the Reich of juveniles, including boys from the age of ten. See, for example, a teleprint from Rosenberg to Lammers, dated 20 July 1944 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 362–5 (345–PS)).

\footnote{4} Labour conscription had already been introduced in Norway and the Netherlands.

\footnote{5} Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabens in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, no. 87, 7 October 1942. See also below, p. 485.

\footnote{6} Kulischer: Displacement of Population in Europe, p. 141. See also below, p. 503.

\footnote{7} See below, pp. 519–28.
the loss of territory in the east was followed by the intensification of recruitment elsewhere, especially in France and that part of Italy which remained under German control, where there were considered to be substantial reserves of labour.\(^1\) The landings made by the Western Allies in Normandy in the summer of 1944 ushered in a new and more desperate stage of recruitment, culminating in the rounding up of all the able-bodied men who could be found.\(^2\)

\((\beta)\) *Living Conditions*

The treatment of foreigners after their arrival in Germany equalled in harshness the methods by which many of them were recruited. With the exception of a small minority, consisting mainly of skilled workers from the Western European countries, 'slave labourers were subjected to almost unbelievable brutality and degradation by their captors'.\(^3\) The vast majority were ill-housed, underfed, and were allowed little or no freedom of movement. The official line of policy adopted towards foreign labour is illustrated by a quotation from Sauckel’s Labour Mobilization Programme of 20 April 1942: ‘All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way that they produce to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.’\(^4\) Yet even this standard was not maintained. Many foreign workers, particularly those from the Occupied Eastern Territories, were forced to live under conditions which seriously impaired their capacity for work and which, despite the extremely severe punishments meted out to so-called slackers, resulted in a considerable decrease in output.

While most agricultural workers\(^5\) were, for the sake of convenience, housed by their employers, the majority of industrial workers lived in

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\(^1\) In France, the position had, up to that time, been anomalous. German demands for skilled labour had been insistent, and Laval had agreed from time to time to provide workmen, while laying stress on the advantages of voluntary as opposed to compulsory recruitment. The principle of voluntary enlistment was not abandoned until November 1942, and even then recruitment was carried out on the basis of an act promulgated by the Vichy Government on 4 September 1942, and not on Sauckel’s order of 22 August 1942. For further details see p. 409 below and *International Labour Review*, January 1944 and March 1945. In Italy, after the abdication of Mussolini in the summer of 1943, labour recruitment in the areas under German control followed much the same pattern as in the other occupied territories. For further details see pp. 322-4 below and I.L.O.: *Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany*, pp. 39-41.

\(^2\) In the Netherlands, for example, in November 1944 ‘the Germans started a ruthless campaign for manpower, passing by the Labour Offices. Without warning they lined off whole quarters of the towns, seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them’ (Statement of the Netherlands Government on the prosecution and punishment of German major war criminals: *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxvii. 543 (1726-PS))

\(^3\) Speech for the prosecution at Nuremberg by Thomas J. Dodd (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, iii. 440).

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Responsibility for the care of foreign workers employed in Germany was divided between the Reich Food Administration, which looked after agricultural workers, and the German Labour Front, which dealt with non-farm labour.
barracks, with separate camps, or at least separate huts, for different nationalities. From the German point of view this arrangement had definite advantages; not only was it cheaper, but it also lessened the problems of supervision and of segregating foreign from German workers.\(^1\) Although in theory\(^2\) these barracks were designed to provide satisfactory accommodation for the foreign workers, in actual fact they were deficient in many respects. The great majority were badly and hastily constructed; there was no adequate supply of furniture, even of the essentials such as chairs and tables, or of toilet facilities; they were overcrowded; and, in winter, they were extremely cold owing to totally inadequate allocations of fuel.\(^3\) During the latter part of the war, conditions deteriorated further: not only were an increasing number of foreigners brought into the Reich, but the shortage of all kinds of materials also meant that essential repairs were often not carried out.\(^4\)

The food situation was equally unsatisfactory. Although foreigners, with the exception of those from the Occupied Eastern Territories, were entitled to receive rations corresponding to those allowed to their German counterparts,\(^5\) they in fact suffered under severe relative disadvantages. Whereas German workers could exchange their ration cards where they chose, foreigners were forced to hand theirs in to the commandants of the camps, and then to take their meals in the communal canteens; 'the quantities distributed in the camp canteens, where the workers were obliged to take their meals, were very much less than those to which their ration cards entitled them'.\(^6\) Foreigners were also handicapped as regards their ability to purchase unrationed foodstuffs; 'the German authorities restricted the sale of foods which were temporarily or permanently free of

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1. See above, p. 242. Serious attempts were made to prevent all but the bare minimum of contact between German and foreign workers, and particularly between German and eastern workers. 'The billeting [of eastern workers] did not follow the policies according to which the other foreigners are governed, but just as for civilian prisoners in camps which were fenced in with barbed wire and were heavily guarded, from which no exit was permitted' (Report of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 September 1942: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 163 (084-PS); N.C.A. iii. 132).

2. See Regulation no. 4 of the Plenipotentiary-General for Labour Mobilization on the recruiting, care, lodging, feeding, and treatment of foreign workers of both sexes, 7 May 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 209-12 (3352-PS); N.C.A. v. 762-4 (3044-PS)).

3. See, for example, the Official Report by the French Government (Ministry for Prisoners of War and Deportees) concerning the deportation to Germany of French workers (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 195 (078 (3)-UK)).

4. Ibid.

5. 'The foreign workers receive provisions fixed by the Reichsminister for Food and Agriculture; it is fundamentally the normal provision for German civilians. During sheltering in camps, community feeding throughout will be guaranteed. Here consideration must be given to the native customs of the foreign workers insofar as war conditions allow' (Regulation no. 4 of the Plenipotentiary-General for Labour Allocation: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 211 12 (3352-PS); N.C.A. v. 763 (3044-PS)).

6. Official Report by the French Government (Ministry for Prisoners of War and Deportees) concerning the deportation to Germany of French workers (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 195 (078 (3)-UK)).
rationing by other control measures, such as customers' identification cards, records of customers, housekeeping permits (Kundenausweise, Kundenlisten, Haushaltsausweise), &c. Shopkeepers were forbidden under penalty to sell ration-free goods to customers not officially listed in these records or not provided with these documents.\(^1\) Since few foreigners were actually in possession of their ration cards, they were obviously not able to supplement their rations in this way.

Particularly ill-served as regards food supplies were the foreign workers who had come from the occupied eastern areas, notably the Russians, and to a lesser extent the Ukrainians, Balts, and Poles. Other foreigners were at least entitled to the same rations as German civilians, but eastern workers were specifically excluded from these provisions. "The Russian is easily satisfied. Therefore he should be fed lightly and without serious infractions upon our food balance. He should not be spoiled or accustomed to the German food, but he should be satisfied and kept in the productive capacity which corresponds to his assignment."\(^2\) The food supplied was both poor in quality and insufficient in quantity, consisting often of small quantities of the so-called 'Russian bread', made from rye husks, sugar beet chips, and straw dust,\(^3\) or a watery soup with a few cabbage leaves and some pieces of turnip.\(^4\) Such a diet caused an appalling increase in the rate of sickness, and a series of protests was made by those who were responsible for the care of eastern workers.\(^5\) Despite these protests, and the admission by the National Socialist authorities that they were justified,\(^6\) however, the supply of food to eastern workers was not noticeably increased.\(^7\)

\(^1\) I.L.O.: Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany, p. 98.
\(^2\) Goring's directive of 7 November 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 58 (1193–PS); N.C.A. iii. 836).
\(^3\) Memorandum on a discussion in the Reich Food Ministry, 24 November 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 446 7 (177–USSR)).
\(^4\) Report from Thiele, in charge of the Russians working in the boiler construction shop of the Krupp factory at Essen, 26 March 1942 (N.C.A. vii. 10 (291–D)).
\(^5\) An example of these protests is given in a letter from August Grollius, in charge of the feeding of foreign workers in the Krupps armoured car repair shop, 17 January 1942, to oversee Kolsch: '[We] cannot continue having people perish here at work' (N.C.A. vii. 16 (310–D)).
\(^6\) See, for example, a note on a meeting held in the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on 10 March 1943 on the subject of directives for treatment of foreign workers employed in the Reich (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 346–50 (315 PS); N.C.A. iii. 251 5).
\(^7\) See the statement of Dr. Wilhelm Jager regarding the conditions in the Krupps workers' camps after October 1942: 'The diet prescribed for the eastern workers was altogether insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the minimum prescribed for any German.... The eastern workers were given only 2 meals a day and their bread ration. One of these consisted of a thin, watery soup. I had no assurance that the eastern workers, in fact, received the minimum which was prescribed' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 58 (288–D); N.C.A. vii. 2).
volunteered for work in the Reich. These promises were not honoured, and those who had been offered equality of treatment with German workers found their position very different. Even had their material position been the same, which it was not, there were certain disadvantages under which all foreign workers in the Reich laboured, namely, those of working in a strange country, or conducting their business in a strange language, and of feeling that they were being forced to contribute to a war which was often directed against their own countrymen. Unsatisfactory though the conditions were for voluntary workers from Western Europe, they were far worse for workers coming from Eastern Europe who were explicitly denied equality of treatment with Germans.

All foreigners, except those specifically excluded, were entitled to receive the same wages as their German counterparts. But the payment of equal wages for the same type of work was by no means a guarantee that a skilled foreign worker received the same remuneration as an equally skilled German worker. Foreigners were, for example, not infrequently employed on a lower grade of work than that to which they had been accustomed at home, and they were paid according to the rates applied to this less skilled type of labour. The great majority of workers from Western and Central Europe1 were also subject to German rates of taxation and to contributions to the social insurance schemes, from which by the nature of things they could never hope to derive full benefits. Another cause of discontent which developed during the war concerned the transfer of money to dependants at home; considerable degrees of inflation developed in most of the occupied countries, but the rates of exchange at which the transfers were made were not substantially altered, with the result that their purchasing power decreased sharply.

Eastern workers and Jews were treated on a different footing. It was officially stated that the German labour code and the labour protection provisions were to apply to Russians, Poles, and all Jews only in so far as was specifically stated.2 Not only were specially low wages fixed for them, but in addition they were subject to much higher rates of taxation. Russian workers were subject to the greatest discrimination, having to pay a special ‘Eastern Tax’ (Ostarbeiterabgabe) which created a situation in which a worker earning a wage anywhere between Rm. 10 and Rm. 70 per week received only a part, the rest being deducted at source as Reich taxation. The rate of taxation was such that no worker, whatever his wage, could receive more than Rm. 17 per week, of which Rm. 10-50 were deducted by the employer for food and shelter. So bad were conditions for Eastern

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1 A small minority were exempt from German taxation on proof that their legal residence was outside the Reich (I.L.O.: Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany, pp. 110–19).

workers that some attempt was made from the summer of 1942 to improve matters; the upper limit of Rm. 17 per week was abolished, wage scales were somewhat increased and the Ostarbeiterabgabe correspondingly lowered, and finally, under an order of 25 March 1944, the special system of wages for Eastern workers was abolished. On the whole, however, it does not appear that the Eastern workers in actual fact received any considerable benefit from these changes.

All foreign workers, except those from the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. and the former Baltic States, were promised regular home leave. In the case of Poles, only industrial workers were legally entitled to this, but the claims of even these were suspended throughout most of the war. Numbers of workers from Western Europe were given leave during the early part of the war, but difficulties over the granting of the necessary papers and over transport, combined with the disinclination of the German authorities to lose any labour, even for a short period, meant that the granting of leave to foreigners became more and more unusual.

In the factories and on the land foreign workers in the Reich were expected to work long hours, seldom less than sixty per week, despite the fact that as the war went on the connexion between the length of the working day and the productivity per man-hour became closer. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the German authorities had recourse to a number of measures, varying from open coercion to promises of better conditions and of increased pay. Towards the end of the war, coercion became increasingly employed and working hours were lengthened, so that by the autumn of 1944 foreigners were expected to work for at least twelve hours a day with only one hour's break.²

(3) Prisoners of War

Some time before the outbreak of war the potential importance of prisoners of war as a source of labour had been realized in Germany. Directives were issued for the employment of prisoners as workers in the event of war, and the necessity of close co-ordination with the civilian recruitment authorities was stressed.³

Under the terms of the Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention of 27 July 1929⁴ the employment of prisoners was permitted, but strict regulations

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¹ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1944 part 1, p. 68
² See, for example, a memorandum dated 17 October 1944 from the Chief of the Krupps Camp Catering Department: 'It is to be considered that foreigners must work 12 hours on principle out of which one hour counts as a break and consequently will not be paid' (N.C.A. vi. 1945 (233-D)).
³ Letter from the Plenipotentiary-General for Economy to the OKW dated 28 January 1939 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 545-9 (488-EC); trans. in Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, Hitler's Europe, pp. 19-21).
were laid down as to both the type of prisoners who might be employed and to the kind of work which they might be called upon to perform. Belligerents may employ as workmen prisoners of war who are physically fit, other than officers and persons of equivalent status, according to their rank and their ability. Nevertheless, if officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, this shall be found for them as far as possible. Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war may be compelled to undertake only supervisory work, unless they expressly request remunerative occupation.

The type of work to be done was defined as follows:

Work done by prisoners of war shall have no connexion with the operations of the war. In particular, it is forbidden to employ prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms or munitions of any kind, or on the transport of material destined for combatant units.¹

These regulations were consistently disregarded by the Germans in their attempt to obtain the maximum benefit from the prisoners under their control. Russian prisoners suffered particularly brutal treatment on the ground that, as the U.S.S.R. had not adhered to the Geneva Convention, the German authorities were in no way bound by its provisions in their treatment of Russian nationals. Non-commissioned officers of many nations and, in the case of Russians, commissioned officers, too, were forced to work. The employment of Russian officers was, indeed, specifically directed, as for example in an OKW order dated 24 March 1942, which said: ‘As a result of the general labour situation, the employment of the Soviet prisoners of war, including officers, derives decisive importance. In principle it is permitted everywhere, unless there are objections for reasons of defence in individual cases.’² Prisoners of all nationalities were forced to work in munition factories; they were used to load bombs on to planes, to repair airfields, and to construct fortifications.³

The importance of prisoners of war as a source of labour is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>348,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,489,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,623,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,831,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² According to a statement made by Speer during his interrogation at Nuremberg on 18 October 1945, 40 per cent. of all prisoners of war were employed in the year 1944 in the production of weapons and munitions and in subsidiary industries (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxii. 505 (3720-PS); *N.C.A. vi. 456*).
⁴ U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany, Economics Division: *Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland*: Part I, *Bevölkerung und Beschäftigung* (Fürstenhagen, Ministerial Collecting Center, 1946, mimeographed): Table B. II.
The regulations relating to the living conditions of prisoners were disregarded in the same way as those relating to employment, the Russians again being the most ill-used.

It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps. Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, while complaints about the treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and English, have not become loud.

Prisoners of war of other nationalities, however, in many cases, received treatment which by no means conformed to the minimum standards laid down in the Geneva Convention.

(4) Concentration Camp Labour

The existence of a large group of unemployed persons, albeit under strict confinement, was obviously against the German interest in view of the acute shortage of labour which developed in the Reich during the war. The decision was, therefore, taken by Himmler in the spring of 1942 to mobilize, to the maximum possible extent, the labour available in concentration camps.

The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are fit for work for purposes of the war, now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, come to the foreground more and more. From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the aim to transform the concentration camps into organizations more suitable for the economic tasks, while formerly they were merely politically interested.

In the employment of concentration camp labour, all considerations other than that of extorting the maximum amount of work from the prisoners were disregarded.

This employment must be, in the true meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance. . . . There is no limit to

1 Note by Brautigam dated 25 October 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 338-9 (294-PS); N.C.A. iii. 247).

2 See, for example, the Official Report by the French Government concerning Violations of International Law and Customs committed by the Germans against Prisoners of War of French Nationality, in I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 162-71 (078 (2)-UK). Also the statement of Dr. Wilhelm Jager (senior camp doctor to the Krupps workers’ camps from 1 October 1942) made on 15 October 1945 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 61 62 (288-D); N.C.A. vii. 5-6).

3 See below, p. 254.

4 Report by the Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, Pohl, to Himmler, 30 April 1942, describing the main purpose of the camps following Himmler’s order of 3 March (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 363-5 (129-R); N.C.A. viii. 200).
working hours. Their duration depends on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp-commanders alone. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of work hours (e.g. meals, roll-calls) have therefore to be restricted to the minimum which cannot be condensed any more. It is forbidden to allow long walks to the place of working and noon intervals only for eating purposes.1

No attempt was made to maintain the prisoners in a state of health which would enable them to go on working for any long period. Indeed, the extermination of so-called ‘anti-social’ elements was part of the stated programme, as is shown in a memorandum of an agreement reached on 18 September 1942 between Himmler and the Minister of Justice, Thierack:

Anti-social persons, instead of carrying out their sentences, will be handed over to the Reichsführer-SS to be worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, gipsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with longer than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with longer than 8-year sentences, will all be handed over in accordance with decisions taken by the Reich Minister for Justice.2

The effect of abnormally long working hours was enhanced by the appalling conditions under which prisoners were forced to live. Camps were overcrowded, little or no furniture or bedding was provided, and sanitary arrangements were in most cases non-existent. At Camp Humboldstrasse, attached to the Krupp factories at Essen, Jewish women had ‘no shoes and went about in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with holes for their arms and head.’3 Food supplies were wholly inadequate. At Buchenwald the ration allowance was 600–700 calories per day, consisting generally of very weak soup made from cabbage and other vegetables, and a small piece of bread in the mornings, and another in the evenings.4

Responsibility for the employment of concentration camp inmates was at first assumed by Himmler, in his capacity as Reichsführer-SS, but in the autumn of 1942 Speer arranged to bring this source of labour under his control.5 The object of this move was to increase production by employing prisoners in factories under Speer’s direction where the supply of tools and equipment could be assured. To compensate for this loss, it was agreed that Himmler should receive a share of armaments output for the SS.6

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1 Instructions sent by Pohl to all concentration camp authorities, 30 April 1942 (I.M.T Nuremberg, xxxviii. 365–7 (129 R); N.C.A. viii. 201).
3 Statement on 15 October 1945 by Dr. Wilhelm Jäger (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 62–6 (288–D); N.C.A. vii. 6).
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 617 (159–L).
6 Ibid.
These agreements opened up a full-scale exploitation of concentration camp labour; the supply of victims was assured by Himmler, who supplemented general measures where necessary with special drives for persons who would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps,\(^1\) while production was raised by the construction of small camps in the vicinity of important factories.\(^2\)

(vi) Transport

By Patricia Harvey

An efficient transport system was an urgent necessity for Germany during the war, and European transport, like Europe’s other resources, was made to serve German needs. To this end, all national transport systems, not only of the occupied countries but also of Germany’s allies, were subjected to a system of control which, although sometimes only indirectly operated, was in all cases virtually complete. Germany’s transport task was enormous. The blockade by her enemies and the hostility of a growing number of overseas countries considerably reduced her overseas trade, and with it her shipping problem, but on the other hand the demand for transport within Europe increased steadily. In the first part of the war the territory under her control was expanding, as were her military commitments; shortages of vital materials hampered any large-scale measures of re-equipment; and later on the increasing weight of bombs dropped on German-controlled territory caused severe dislocation, culminating in the almost complete disruption of transport services in the autumn of 1944. That Germany was able, up to that date, to meet her most vital transport requirements is an indication both of the ruthlessness and of the efficiency of the German transport organization.

(a) Position of German Transport at the Outbreak of War

The demands made upon the German transport system had begun to increase seriously even before the outbreak of war. By 1937 a state of full employment, with a consequently high transport demand, had been reached, and on this had been superimposed the demands caused by military projects such as the construction of the Siegfried Line and by the

\(^1\) See, for example, an order signed by Muller dated 17 December 1942 (*I.M.T. Nuremburg*, xxvi. 701 (1063 (d)—PS); *N.C.A. iii. 778–9*).

\(^2\) ‘The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps near the factories in order to use the manpower that was available there was a general fact’ (Testimony of Speer, taken at Nuremberg, 18 October 1945: *I.M.T. Nuremburg*, xxxii. 507 (3720—PS); *N.C.A. vi. 438*).
increased production of synthetic materials. The Anschluss with Austria and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia increased the number of vehicles and the amount of equipment under German control, but on the whole the gains were not really sufficient to offset the increased commitments in these countries.

The bulk of the traffic within the Reich was carried by the Reichsbahn which, in 1937, accounted for some two-thirds of the tonnage of goods moved within Germany; about one-fifth was transported by inland waterways, both rivers and canals, and the remainder was carried by roads or by private railways. ¹ Germany's coastal traffic was of secondary importance, but even in normal times was used to supplement the other means of transport.² Most means of transport had been adversely affected by the depression of the early 1930s which had led to a reduction in the demand for transport, an increase in competition, and a consequent curtailment of development. The number of vehicles owned by the Reichsbahn decreased during the years between 1929 and 1937, but this decrease was to a considerable extent compensated for by the increased efficiency of the new vehicles. Inland shipping had to some extent been increased and improved, but an embargo on new construction, imposed as a result of the shipping crisis in the depression, was not lifted until 1937, by which time it proved impossible to initiate any large-scale building programme. The German network of roads had been greatly improved as a result of Hitler's drive against unemployment, but this increase did not apply to lorries and trucks, since the carriage of goods by road was subject to a strict system of licensing to prevent its becoming a serious competitor of the Reichsbahn. Merchant shipping was in a somewhat different position, because the whole inter-war period was spent by Germany in rebuilding her fleet after its confiscation at the end of the First World War, and by 1939 Germany possessed an efficient and up-to-date merchant fleet.³

(b) Effects of the Changing Military Situation on the German Transport Position

Apart from the demands caused by the military attack on Poland, the outbreak of war brought immediate changes in the German transport position. The most striking change was in the relative functions of the overseas and of the inland transport systems. After September 1939 the whole function of the merchant marine changed radically; all long-run foreign

³ In 1939 the German merchant fleet was fairly new; only 19.3 per cent. of the tonnage was over twenty years old, and 19.9 per cent. was less than five years old (ibid. p. 14).
Sailings were abandoned except for a few ships capable of running the blockade imposed by Germany’s enemies in the attempt to bring in vital supplies to the Reich. Merchant shipping during the rest of the war was more or less limited to the supply of certain critical materials from Spain and Sweden, to the carrying of military supplies, and to the maintenance where possible of coastal trade in order to limit the burdens imposed upon the inland transport systems. For these tasks the merchant shipping fleet, strengthened by the vessels seized in the occupied countries, was sufficiently strong.

**Tonnage seized by Germany during the war**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Passenger Cargo</th>
<th>Tankers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Europe:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>701,180</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>439,477</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>371,925</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>73,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>261,856</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>1,852,848</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Mediterranean and Black Sea:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>158,255</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>40,103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>646,253</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,568</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>73,991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34,439</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,853</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29,280</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,645</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,001,291</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>3,079</td>
<td>2,854,139</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The position of inland transport was very different. Growing military activity automatically increased the demands made upon the transport system, and yet further demands were made upon it by the need to find alternative overland routes for much of the merchandise which had formerly been carried by sea to or from the ports in North Germany. Coal exports to Italy, for example, of which a very large proportion had

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1 Ibid. p. 9.

2 See following table.
previously been carried by sea, had during certain stages of the war to be conveyed over the already congested rail routes through Switzerland. German imports from South-Eastern Europe, too, had to be transported over inland routes, some by river and canal but most by rail. These increased demands had to be met against a background of difficulties over supplies, for the blockade had caused an immediate shortage of certain raw materials, most important of which were fuel oil and rubber. Shortages of these were most felt in the sphere of road transport and resulted in the introduction of restrictions upon the civilian use of motor vehicles, which reductions still further added to the burdens which had to be shouldered by the Reichsbahn.

During the first part of the war German transport commitments were steadily increasing, but on the whole were accompanied by equivalent, or more than equivalent, increases in resources. Although neither the occupation of Poland nor that of parts of South-Eastern Europe added much to German resources, owing to the widespread destruction and to the relatively backward state of transport facilities in those areas, the campaign in Western Europe brought rich gains. In these countries, and notably in France and Belgium, the transport systems were highly developed and efficient, and were made to yield to the Germans large numbers of vehicles and, in the later stages of the war, equipment as well. An example of the scope of German requisitioning is given by the official figures provided by the Netherlands Government at the Nuremberg trials:

Railways—of 890 locomotives, 490 were requisitioned; of 30,000 freight cars, 28,950 were requisitioned; of 1,750 passenger cars, 1,446 were requisitioned; of 300 electric trains, 215 were requisitioned; of 37 Diesel-engine trains, 36 were requisitioned. In general, the little material left by the Germans was badly damaged either by wear and tear, by military operations, or by sabotage. In addition to rolling stock, the Germans sent to the Reich considerable quantities of rails, signals, cranes, turntables, repair cars, &c.

German requisitioning of foreign means of transport was by no means confined to railway vehicles and equipment. Barges, motor vehicles, coastal and ocean shipping, and even trams were all used by the Germans to eke out their own domestic resources.

The German attack on and penetration into the U.S.S.R. marked the beginning of a new phase. Whereas in Western Europe a large proportion of the existing transport facilities had fallen untouched into German hands, and had enabled Germany considerably to increase her reserves of vehicles of all kinds, the occupation of large parts of the Soviet Union provoked

1 Apart from the relative slowness of transport by water there were other disadvantages, notably the freezing of the Danube for part of every winter.

2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, v. 562.
an immediate and very severe strain upon German transport. The Russian scorched earth policy was drastically applied to transport; not only were all railway engines and carriages, motor vehicles, and barges removed farther into Russia, but in addition large stretches of railway track were torn up and either removed or rendered completely unusable. A further complication was that the Russians did not use the normal European gauge, but a considerably broader one,\(^1\) thus making it impossible for the Germans to use their own engines and wagons, or those seized from the occupied countries, without substantial alterations. These difficulties were particularly serious in view of the enormous amount of material which had to be transported over long distances in order to wage a campaign of the scale of the German attack on Russia, and also of the fact that any large-scale policy of rebuilding or replacement of vehicles or equipment was now no longer possible.\(^2\)

To a certain extent the German transport problem from 1943 onwards was eased as a result of the gradual withdrawal of Germany’s armed forces towards the Reich borders, thus decreasing the average length of haul. But other difficulties arose. The worsening military position meant, among other things, the cutting off of sea-borne trade in and through the Mediterranean, while the increasing naval power of Germany’s enemies further reduced the safety of trade through the Atlantic. The neutrals, too, began to become restive, and one result of this was that Sweden cancelled in August 1943 the agreement allowing the passage of unarmed soldiers and of war material across her territory.\(^3\)

The most serious problem which had to be met by the German transport system during the later part of the war was, however, the increasing weight of bombs dropped on the Reich by her enemies. The intensive bombing of industrial areas made necessary the transfer to safer areas of some factories and of large numbers of persons, while the transport system was also directly affected by the bombing of bridges and tracks, of marshalling yards, and of centres manufacturing and repairing railroad equipment. Throughout the war an appreciable tonnage of bombs was dropped on transport targets in Germany and German-held territory, but this form of attack was intensified in the months preceding D-Day and carried even farther during the last part of 1944, resulting in an almost complete dislocation of all means of transport.\(^4\)

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1 The standard European gauge is 4 ft. 8 in., or so nearly as to permit the through running of locomotives and rolling-stock. The Russian railways, on the other hand, have a gauge of 5 ft. To complicate the problem from the German point of view, the Russians had converted many of the railroads in those parts of Poland occupied by them to the broad gauge.

2 See above, pp. 191–2.

3 *Railway Gazette*, 13 August 1943, p. 166.

4 *Effects of Strategic Bombing*, pp. 5–6.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE Part II

(e) German Methods of Controlling Transport throughout Europe

Germany's control over transport in Europe was effective not only throughout territory occupied by her but also in the territory of her allies, and even to a certain extent in neutral countries. But the methods by which this control was achieved varied as much as the methods used to control the other spheres of the European economy. Once again, wherever possible, the day-to-day administration was left in the hands of the local authorities, German personnel being employed only in supervisory capacities.

In certain areas, however, the Germans considered it advisable to bring transport facilities under direct Reich control. These areas fell roughly into two categories; those which were incorporated in the Reich or were scheduled for incorporation, and those which were important from a strategic point of view. Among the first of these were Austria and Luxembourg, together with parts of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, and Lithuania, while the second included such areas as the Atlantic coast of France and Belgium, and much of occupied Russia. All railways in the first were absorbed into the Reichsbahn, while in the second they were run either by the army or by the Reichsbahn. The railways of the former Baltic States, too, were for a short period run by the army, but were transferred to the control of the native administrations in the spring of 1942.

Several new administrative transport units were set up by the Germans as a result of territorial changes and all of these, although nominally independent, were in fact closely controlled by Germany. The most obviously controlled of these was the Ostbahn, which was set up in the General Government of Poland to take over the functions in that area of the former Polish State Railways. Both the administration and the finances of the Ostbahn were specifically separated from those of the Reichsbahn, but all senior officials were Germans, many of them seconded from the staff of the Reichsbahn. Elsewhere, the former Czech railways, excluding those parts annexed to the Reich, were divided into two, managed respectively by the administrations of Bohemia-Moravia and of Slovakia, while in Yugoslavia much the same policy was followed, control being divided between the Governments of Slovenia and Croatia. In all these areas the administration of the railways was theoretically in the hands of the state, but in each case was closely supervised by German officials.

In Western and Northern Europe, excluding the areas mentioned above, the Germans preferred to leave the administrative structure more or less unchanged. But Germans were everywhere given supervisory powers in
order to make sure that German traffic requirements were fully met and were given priority over non-German traffic. In France, for example, while the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer continued in operation, the ultimate control over the railways was exercised by the German Wehrmachtverkehrsdircktionen (later renamed the Hauptverkehrs- direktionen), of which there was one in Brussels, controlling the railways in Belgium and parts of northern and eastern France, and another in Paris controlling railways in the remainder of occupied France. Both these had sub-offices which were responsible for a particular section within the main area. Whatever the precise titles of these offices, however, their functions were the same, namely, to issue directives to the administrations concerned in order to ensure that German traffic requirements had absolute priority.

Even Germany's allies did not escape a certain degree of control over their transport systems. As early as 1941 there were reports that Reichsbahn officials were in control of the main railway stations in Italy, while the importance of South-Eastern Europe, both as a supplier of vital food and raw materials and later as a base for operations against the Soviet Union, meant that Germany early in the war established her position as the arbiter of transport questions in that area. The neutrals, too, although not subject to detailed German transport direction, were forced, through dependence upon German supplies, to meet most of that country's transport demands during the greater part of the war.

(d) German Organization of European Transport

Control over the transport systems of most of the European countries gave Germany the power to impose her wishes throughout the Continent. Owing to the fact that this control was in most cases indirectly operated, the Germans were able to achieve their objectives for the most part by the simultaneous publication of orders in the different countries rather than by decrees from the Reich. In fact, with the exception of certain freight direction offices, no supra-national transport authorities were set up in German-controlled Europe.

The objective of German control over European means of transport was to secure as far as possible all German transport requirements, if necessary at the expense of other nations. To achieve this it was necessary to see that vehicles and equipment were made available wherever the need for them was greatest, irrespective of whether this was in the country to which they belonged or not, and that the best possible use was made of those vehicles which were available.

1 Railway Gazette, 25 July 1941, p. 95.
2 In 1942, for example, a German demand for 75 steam locomotives from Switzerland was reported. It was stated that failure to deliver these would result in the cessation of German coal exports to Switzerland (ibid., 15 May 1942, p. 578).
Something has already been said about the extent of German requisitioning of foreign means of transport. Throughout the war there was a continual shifting from one part to another, and this shifting was increased after the German attack on Russia. As German vehicles were moved towards the eastern front, so others were brought in from Western Europe, and particularly from France and Belgium, to fill their place in Germany.

Various measures were introduced to ensure the best possible use of the available transport. A strict system of priorities was everywhere introduced by which non-essential transport, particularly passenger services, was drastically reduced, and civilian transport needs subordinated to those of essential war goods. Where possible, shipments were transferred from the more crowded to the less used means of transport, that is to say from the railways to the inland waterways, although the scope of these transfers was limited by the length of time taken by water transport. Throughout Europe, regulations were issued to ensure the full loading of trucks and the maximum use of locomotive power, and attempts were made to speed the circulation of rolling-stock by the raising of demurrage charges. Another attempt to limit the demands made upon the transport system was made by the introduction of measures designed to reduce the length of haul by requiring firms to buy only from the nearest supplier.

(vii) Finance

By Patricia Harvey

(a) German Internal War Finance

In any country, under conditions of modern warfare, finance becomes a secondary consideration. Production is limited solely by the availability of resources, both human and material, and the need to raise additional funds for the purchase by the state of an increasing proportion of the national output is never permitted to be a limiting factor. The normal price mechanism ceases to regulate the economic life of the country and is replaced by a system of direct controls upon production and consumption. The actual technique of war financing from internal resources in Nazi Germany differed very little from that adopted in any of the major belligerent countries, and Germany was a special case only in that measures which in the democracies were introduced after the outbreak of war had in Germany already been in force for several years. These pre-war preparations have been fully described elsewhere, and only a short account of the more important need be given here.

1 See above, p. 258.

(1) Pre-war Financial Preparations

The financial policy adopted by the Nazi Government after 1933 was well suited not only to its immediate purpose, that of countering the depression, but also to the preparations necessary for war. The country’s financial system was completely subjugated to the political aims of the Party, and to achieve this there were certain requirements. Government demands for credit had to be met in full, while on the other hand private demands for capital had to be carefully screened to ensure that their purpose was wholly in accordance with the over-all government programme. A stable economy had to be maintained, so that the public need feel no anxiety over inflation, the recent disastrous effects of which were still fresh in their minds, and so that the price of materials and goods required by the Government should not rise. Finally, private consumption had to be prevented from increasing and thereby diverting labour and materials which were needed by the Government for the production of war goods.

The provision of adequate credit and its direction into the desired channels were achieved through the extension of state control to the banks and to the capital market. By a series of acts, beginning in 1933, the Government took complete control of the Reichsbank, introducing the ‘leadership’ principle by which the President of the Bank and the members of the board of directors were appointed by the President of the Reich. After government control was assured, the powers of the Reichsbank were widened so as to enable it to supply public credit up to any amount determined by Hitler and his advisers. By 1939 there were no legal limits to the powers of creating credit on the part of the Reichsbank: ‘It could go so far as to issue currency for the purchase of commercial and Treasury bills and securities, and then treat the bills and securities as cover against the notes with which they had been bought; and there was no limit to its doing so.’

At the same time as they gained control of the central bank, the Government were widening their powers over the commercial banks. The German Credit Act of 5 December 1934 enabled the Government to supervise every phase of banking activity, while the Preparatory Law for the Reconstruction of the German Economy of 27 February 1934 and its first Administrative Regulation of 27 November 1934 introduced the ‘leadership’ principle. Under the Credit Act the Government were able not only to demand full details of all banking procedures, but also to exercise strict control over the provision of loans of any large amount to clients of the banks.

To secure complete control over the financial life of the country the

2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934 part 1, p. 1203.
3 Ibid. pp. 185 and 194.
Government had also to bring the capital market under their influence and fit it for the purpose of absorbing an ever-increasing amount of government bonds. The measures taken included the limitation of dividends, the reduction of rates of interest on stocks which might otherwise have tempted capital away from government bonds, and, most important, drastic limitation on the flotation of new capital issues. For this latter purpose, a special committee was formed to examine each prospective capital issue and was given complete authority to decide whether or not a particular issue was likely to be in the interest of the nation.

The complementary problem to that of regulating the flow of investment was to limit the amount of money left in the hands of individuals for expenditure on items not considered necessary from the Government's point of view, and to prevent the general rise in prices which would have been caused had an increased supply of money been left unchecked to purchase an unchanged amount of consumer goods. In view of the enormous increase in government expenditure on armaments and other projects during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, this was a very real problem. The most obvious and important way of dealing with these problems was by taxation. The Nazi Party were fortunate in finding in existence in Germany at the time of their accession to power a highly efficient and comprehensive tax system. This system, based on the so-called Erzberger Tax Reform of 1919–20, had been inaugurated at a time when Germany was faced with large reparation demands and it was designed to levy a considerable proportion of the national income to meet these demands; with few alterations it was adopted by the Nazi Party.

Supplementing the high rate of taxation and the control of dividend payments as means of reducing the purchase of consumption goods and preventing inflation were the various regulations on prices and wages. Price control as a major weapon of economic policy had been introduced into Germany as part of the Brüning Government's deflationary policy during the depression, but under the Nazis its functions were both amended and expanded. The problem changed from one of reducing existing price levels to one of preventing increases wherever possible, while the functions of the price-control authorities, from being mainly supervisory, changed to active fixing and formation of prices. With the increasing prosperity of the 1930s, combined, especially after 1936, with large-scale rearmament, demand was exceeding supply in almost every sphere of the economy. Fear for the rearmament programme led the German Government in the autumn of 1936 to tighten up the whole machinery of price control. By a decree of 29 October 1936 a new office of Price Commissioner was created directly under the authority of the Four-Year Plan Organization.¹ To the Price Commissioner was transferred all authority previously granted to

¹ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1936 part I, p. 927.
any government department over the supervision, approval, or formation of prices, and he was given authority over commodities and services of any and every kind, with the exception of wages and salaries. He was responsible not only for fixing the prices of such goods as reached the final consumer, but also for supervising prices during the intermediate stages of production.

The basis of German price policy from 1936 onwards was the Price Stop Decree of 26 November 1936, by which the Price Commissioner prohibited all increases above the level of 17 October 1936 except with his express permission. Since the price stop froze not only individual prices but also the relationship between various prices, the number of exceptions necessarily proved very great in the following years and by the middle of 1940 amounted to some 7,000. But in general the price level was kept relatively stable, the index of wholesale prices (1913 = 100) rising from 104.1 in 1936 to 166.9 in 1939.

The necessity for wage controls became apparent much later than that for price controls, owing to the widespread unemployment which had resulted from the depression. Long before they were exercised, indeed, the necessary powers were in the hands of the Government. The Labour Regulation Act of 20 January 1934 had the effect of placing the organization of industrial relations directly in the hands of the Government: labour trustees were introduced who were empowered to issue ‘collective rules’ for wages and conditions of employment to take the place of the former collective agreements between employers and workers. When the labour shortage became acute in the early part of 1938 and the tendency of wages to rise became general, the labour trustees were empowered, by a Decree of 25 June 1938, to fix maximum rates of wages in industries specified by the Ministry of Labour, and employers were required to obtain the consent of the labour trustee before granting better conditions of employment. Despite the fact that the urgent demand for labour led to attempts at circumvention of this order by the payment of housing allowances, the increase of family allowances, and by other methods, wages during the period from 1933 to 1939 remained practically stable.

(2) War-time Measures

As has been shown in the preceding section, the whole machinery of war financing was in existence long before the attack on Poland. The

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2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1936 part I, p. 955.
5 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934 part I, p. 45.
6 Ibid. 1938 part I, p. 691.
7 P. Waeldbroeck and I. Besling: Labour Policy in Germany under the Nazi Regime (Montreal, I.I.O., 1941).
outbreak of war brought about no radical changes in financial policy but only a tightening of restrictions and the further replacement of financial controls by direct controls on production and consumption.

Few additional methods of taxation were developed during the course of the war, and the proportion of Reich expenditure covered by taxation decreased steadily.\(^1\) The first changes in tax legislation came with the War Economy Decree of 4 September 1939\(^2\) which introduced three measures—a surtax on all incomes over Rm. 2,400; a special war surcharge of 20 per cent. on the sale of tobacco and alcoholic beverages; and a war contribution to be paid by the states, local authorities, and other public and semi-public bodies. No further changes were made until the summer of 1941 when the surcharge on tobacco and alcohol was raised to 50 per cent., a tax on dividends was introduced, and a war surcharge of 25 per cent. was added to the corporation tax. The only other change of importance was the compounding of the 1924 tax which house owners had been compelled to pay to compensate for the devaluation, by inflation, of the mortgage on their houses; under the new regulation, house owners were to pay a sum equal to ten times the annual amount in final settlement.

Since the increase in taxation failed to keep pace with the increase in government expenditure, alternative methods of finance had to be found. Part of the deficit was made good by levies from the occupied countries,\(^3\) but the main source of funds was borrowing within the Reich. The method chiefly relied upon by the Reich Government was so-called 'silent financing', i.e. state borrowing straight from the credit institutions and banks. There was no general appeal to the public to subscribe to war loans: in fact, no attempt was made to draw upon individual incomes until the third year of the war, when a scheme of 'iron savings' was introduced. This project, however, was very limited in its scope since participation was voluntary and the monthly savings were restricted first to Rm. 26 and subsequently to Rm. 39.

In a normal economy 'silent financing' would probably have had disastrous inflationary effects, but in Germany these inflationary tendencies were kept strongly in check. The levies made on foreign countries considerably lessened inflationary tendencies within the Reich itself by increasing the amount of goods available without in any way increasing the amount of money in circulation. Price and wage controls also on the whole remained effective throughout the war. The Price Stop Decree of 1936


\(^{2}\) See below, pp. 267-78.

\(^{3}\) See below, pp. 267-78.
remained the basis for price policy, but certain new features were introduced: failure to reduce prices to the greatest possible extent was made a punishable offence, and the War Economy Decree of 4 September 1939 forbade the passing on, by means of higher prices, of any increases in cost due to war risks or even to war losses.\(^1\) New methods of price fixing were also developed with regard to cartel prices and to those paid for government contracts.\(^2\) Despite considerable pressure from financial circles, price increases were kept within narrow limits, the index number for wholesale prices \((1936 = 100)\) rising from 102.7 in 1939 to 109.9 in 1942 and 113.0 in 1944.\(^3\) Wages, too, on the whole remained relatively stable; nominal wages increased slightly, but on the other hand real wages tended to decline.\(^4\)

Financial controls during the war were increasingly reinforced and even replaced by direct controls over every sector of the economy. For the individual, the widespread system of controls meant that money alone no longer gave its possessor the right to the purchase of goods; if unsupported by permits of one sort or another, money could only be saved, and was thus automatically made available to the state through the credit institutions or banks.

\(\text{{\textit{(b) German Exploitation of Foreign Countries}}}
\)

Germany, unlike most of her enemies, entered the Second World War without any substantial foreign assets of her own upon which she could draw to supplement her domestic war effort. Yet she did succeed, by various devices, in drawing heavily upon the resources of other countries. Even before the war, by means of the introduction of blocked mark arrangements and clearing agreements, she had laid the foundation of a system of exploitation, but the outbreak of hostilities and the subsequent expansion of German territorial control in Europe enormously increased her opportunities. In the occupied countries, financial techniques were only one of the ways open to Germany of acquiring what she wanted; it would have been perfectly possible in most cases to remove by force everything which could be of use to the German war effort. But financial methods had certain very definite advantages. They made the process of

\(\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service: World Economic Survey 1939-41 (Geneva, League of Nations, 1941), p. 122.}}\)

\(\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2} For details see Economic Controls in Nazi Germany, pp. 150-62.}}\)

\(\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3} Based on Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 460.}}\)

\(\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{4} The index numbers (1936 \(=\) 100) of average gross hourly earnings were as follows:}}\)

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Year} & \text{Nominal} & \text{Real} \\
1939 & 108.6 & 107.2 \\
1942 & 118.2 & 108.6 \text{ including Sudetenland and the Incorporated} \\
1944 & 118.9 & 104.7 \text{ Eastern Territories.} \\
\end{array}
\]

\(\text{(Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 472.)}\)
exploitation easier, throwing a veil of legality over the proceedings, at least in the earlier stages before German intentions had been fully realized; they assured the closest possible control and supervision of detail and provided a means by which the industrial and banking systems of Europe could be remodelled to the requirements of the Reich; and at the same time these measures cost Germany nothing, since the control was in all cases financed with the money of conquered, satellite, and neutral states.

The methods of financial exploitation employed by the Germans were many and varied, ranging from the seizure and forced sale of gold and foreign assets held in the occupied countries to the piling up of large debts on clearing account in occupied, neutral, and allied countries alike. Besides those mentioned above the most important measures were the interference with the domestic currencies in the occupied countries, the fixing of artificially low rates of exchange for those currencies in terms of the German Reichsmark, the imposition of occupation charges, the levying of fines, and the remodelling and detailed control of the banking systems of the occupied countries.

(1) Reichskreditkassen

The first financial requirement of the Germans after their occupation of successive European countries was the provision of a means of payment to meet the demands of the occupying troops and administrative units. Occupying forces in previous wars had tended to rely upon the use either of their own domestic currency or of local currency, but there were objections to be raised against both these policies, and the Germans decided instead to issue a new and temporary medium of exchange, the notes of the Reichskreditkassen, to meet their needs until such time as a more permanent system could be devised. These Reichskreditkassen notes (Reichskreditkassenscheine) circulated in the occupied countries alongside the native currency at a fixed rate of exchange, usually corresponding roughly to the pre-invasion rate; they were not freely exchangeable with notes of the Reichsbank, a provision necessary to prevent the inflationary effects of the issue of large amounts of Reichskreditkassen notes from spreading to the Reich itself.

Reichskreditkassen were set up first in Poland, by a decree of 23 September 1939,1 and subsequently in the other occupied, and even allied, countries by further decrees. The various regional Kassen were subject to a central administrative board in Berlin which consisted of members designated by the President of the Reichsbank, the Ministries of Finance and Economics, the High Command of the Armed Forces, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but were granted considerable local autonomy. By the decree of 23 September 1939 the Kassen were em-

powered to make advances to the Reich of up to Rm. 1 milliard\(^1\) for its use in occupied territories, to make short-term advances against securities, to discount bills and receive non-interest-bearing transfers and deposits, and to issue notes in denominations from Rpf. 50 to Rm. 50. The coverage of the notes was said to include the assets of the Reichskreditkassen due to advances and bills discounted, reserves of German currency, credit balances at the Reichsbank and the Clearing Offices, reserves of Reich Treasury bills, and the loan to the Reich.

In operation the Reichskreditkassen notes were largely temporary, except in the Russian territory under German occupation. As soon as it was possible for arrangements to be made with the local governments for the supply of adequate amounts of local currency, the notes were gradually withdrawn. Whether or not the Kassen themselves were liquidated depended upon the area in which they were. In the incorporated areas they were converted into branches of the Reichsbank and their notes exchanged for Reichsmarks; in the occupied western territories, Greece, Serbia, and Croatia, the banks were liquidated; in the General Government, the Ukraine, and the Ostland, where the normal banking structure was completely dislocated and new banks of issue established, the Kassen were transformed into branches of these banks; while in Rumania and Bulgaria, where the requirements of German troops for currency were immediately met by agreements with the Governments, no Reichskreditkassen notes were issued and the Kassen confined their activities to acting as clearing and exchange offices and as a means of liaison between the German and local Governments. In Hungary Reichskreditkassen notes were used for a short time in the spring of 1944.

The number of Reichskreditkassen in existence at any one time varied considerably. At the end of 1942 there were fifty-two, but during the following year twenty were closed, and sixteen taken over as branches of the Ostland Central Bank, while twenty-three new Kassen were opened in Italy, Dalmatia, Albania, and Montenegro.\(^2\)

\(2\) Seizure of Gold and Foreign Assets

Another step taken by the Germans immediately after their occupation of any country was to confiscate the gold and foreign assets held by the

\(^1\) This sum was increased to Rm. 3 milliard by a decree dated 15 May 1940, and the limit was removed entirely by a decree of 6 August 1941 under which 'the Central Administration of the Reichskreditkassen will grant the Reich . . . a loan the amount of which will be fixed by the Reich Minister of Finance' (Clifford J. Hyming: Germany: Preliminary Report on Selected Financial Laws, Decrees and Regulations (U.S. Treasury Department, Office of the General Counsel, May 1944, mimeographed) vol. ii, pp. B 35-42).

central bank in that country and to curtail or abolish the right to dispose of such gold and foreign assets as were held by other banks or by private individuals. These assets were then used by Germany to finance purchases in allied and neutral countries which demanded, and could insist on, payment in negotiable currencies.

The amounts seized from the central banks depended very largely upon whether the banks concerned had been able to transfer any of their deposits to a place of safety before the occupying German forces entered the country. In Austria the gold and foreign exchange seized amounted to about 450 million schillings, and proved a very useful contribution towards the payment for essential imports during the summer of 1938. The Germans were later able to take over part of the gold reserves of Czechoslovakia,1 France, and Belgium. The story of the Belgian gold seized by the Germans is somewhat complicated. After the invasion of Belgium, some of the gold reserve was entrusted to the National Bank of France;2 when the fall of France was imminent, Belgium requested that the Belgian gold held in France should be sent to the United States. The gold was, however, only sent as far as Dakar, whence the Germans—after the occupation of France—requested and finally achieved its transfer first to Marseilles and then to Berlin.3

With privately held gold and foreign assets the German procedure immediately after occupation was to prohibit all dealings in foreign exchange, to order the registration of all gold and foreign exchange holdings and the blocking of enemy accounts, and finally to require individuals to present upon request all gold and foreign exchange and to sell these at the official rate of exchange to the central bank or to whatever authority was specified. An example of this is given in the regulation issued in Belgium on 2 August 1940:

The residents of Belgium... must offer and upon demand sell and transfer the following assets, at the time this law goes into effect, to a local branch of the Bank of Issue in Brussels, on or before August 31, 1940:

(a) U.S.A. dollar notes; Swedish kroner notes;
   Swiss franc notes;
   French franc notes.
(b) Gold coins, fine gold, and impure gold alloys, unfinished or half-finished.4

Similar decrees were passed in most of the occupied countries.

1 See Survey for 1938, iii. 243.
2 The gold stock of the National Bank of Belgium and of third parties who had gold deposits with it amounted to 24½ milliard Belgian francs, of which 8 milliard had been entrusted to the Bank of France (Annual Report of the Commissar at the National Bank of Belgium for period May 1940/ May 1941: N.C.A. I. vii. 636 (24–EGR)). See also p. 370 below.
3 Annual Report of the Commissar at the National Bank of Belgium for the period May 1940/May 1941 (N.C.A. vii. 646–7 (24–EGR)). A final settlement was reached between the National Banks of France and of Belgium on 19 October 1944 when an equivalent amount of gold was transferred from France to Belgium. In 1947 France was compensated by gold from Germany.
Not only gold and foreign exchange but at times other valuable metals were removed from the occupied countries where they had formed part of the domestic currency. In Yugoslavia, for example, the coinage 'which contained a certain percent of silver and brass, was withdrawn, and replaced by coins of very poor metal alloy. Naturally, the Germans carried to Germany a large quantity of the most valuable Yugoslav coins.'

(3) Occupation Costs and other Levies

The Germans, as soon as they were able, began to organize financial contributions from the occupied countries on a regular basis. The form which these contributions took depended very much upon the area from which they were received, but their purpose was everywhere the same, namely, the provision for the German conquerors of the funds necessary not only for the maintenance of the armies of occupation but also for other purchases.

The most important sources of contributions were the so-called occupation charges levied on France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Greece, and Yugoslavia, and the similar although differently named charges levied on the Protectorate, the General Government, and Denmark. Denmark, being technically unoccupied, could not pay occupation costs as such, but instead had to place the required funds at the disposal of the head of the administration of the Reichskreditkassen; in the Protectorate the contribution came under the heading of 'Matrikularbeitrag' (tribute), and in the General Government was called 'Wehrbeitrag' (defence contribution).

The rate at which occupation charges were to be levied depended theoretically upon the cost to Germany of maintaining an army of occupation in the country concerned. In fact, however, the amount was determined rather by the level of German requirements and the capacity of the individual country to pay. In this respect the Germans went far beyond the limits laid down in the Hague Convention of 1907, the relevant provisions of which were as follows:

1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, viii. 13.
2 ‘Denmark is not considered as occupied territory, and therefore does not pay occupation expenses. The means necessary for the German troops are placed at the disposal of the central administration of the Reichskreditkasse by the Central Danish Bank, through the channels of ordinary credit. In any case, for the duration of the war uniform payment by Denmark is assured’ (Secret report of the Arbeitsstab Ausland, dated 10 October 1944, quoted in I.M.T. Nuremberg, v. 538; cf. N.C.A. vii. 274).
Article 48

If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls payable to the State, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in accordance with the legal basis and assessment in force at the time, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the national Government had been so bound.

Article 49

If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above Article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, they shall only be applied to the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.\(^1\)

That these levies were not used solely for the maintenance of the occupation forces has been clearly proved. In Belgium the Military Commander openly stated in a letter to the Minister of Finance, dated 2 March 1942, that 'during the period between 1–31 January 1942, Belgian occupation costs have furnished expenses totalling Rm. 25,803,899.99 which served from the beginning to cover the requirements of the armed forces outside Belgium (non-occupation costs)'\(^2\). Detailed evidence concerning France is given in a report by Walter W. Ostrow, dated 29 September 1945, based on the records of the Reichskreditkassen and on an interrogation of Anton Wilz, one of the two directors of the Reichsbank who managed the Reichskreditkassen in Berlin:

Contributions made by defeated France to cover the costs of occupation were used to pay for raw materials, foodstuffs, and other goods which were diverted from France to Germany. Special Government procurement agencies were created for such purposes.

Funds from this source were used also for the acquisition of securities, paintings, and other objects of art; for the purchase of radio equipment for Germany, of gold seized by the Germans in France, of Rumanian currency for the use of the Wehrmacht in Rumania, and books for libraries in the Reich destroyed in air raids. Occupation funds were used also to defray the cost of war risk insurance for exports to Germany, for the payment of support to dependents of laborers recruited in France for work in Germany, to finance the operations of the SS and the German customs and internal revenue service in France, and for propaganda purposes by the Foreign Office.\(^3\)

The sums received by Germany in the way of occupation costs were enormous. The Reich Minister of Finance, Schwerin von Krosigk, in a report dated 15 April 1944 estimated that up to the end of February 1944 Germany had received occupation payments up to the amount of

\(^1\) Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Cd. 4175, p. 59).
\(^2\) N.C.I. vii. 693 (89-ECR).
\(^3\) N.C.I. vi. 323 (3615-PS). Attached to the report are details of German misuse of French occupation charges, taken from German sources (ibid. pp. 331–88).
Rm. 47,663,100,000. The distribution of these payments is shown in the following table taken from the report.¹

**Occupation Payments up to the end of February 1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Occupation Payments (in Rm. million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France: Count A</td>
<td>2,287.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count B</td>
<td>23,561.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current payments in florins</td>
<td>5,666.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special contribution</td>
<td>500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to the fight against Bolshevism</td>
<td>1,550.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>560.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4,517.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (budgetary payments only)</td>
<td>1,278.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>118.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece²</td>
<td>3,758.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,432.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>126.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichskommissariat Ukraine</td>
<td>1,246.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichskommissariat Ukraine (payments in roubles)</td>
<td>107.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain¹</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichskommissariat Ostland</td>
<td>753.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>291.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,663.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Occupation payments after this date were on a reduced scale owing to German loss of territory, and it has been estimated that for the whole war the amount received by Germany was something over Rm. 60 milliard.⁴ This sum does not, however, include the contribution, amounting to between Rm. 6 and 8 milliard, levied from the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia under the name of ‘Matrikularbeitrag’, nor does it include charges made for quartering troops or by requisitioning. In some parts of Poland, the Balkans, and occupied Russia no system of clearing or of occupation costs was created, and German troops were instead ordered to take what they needed direct from the area in which they were stationed.

In addition to the regular payments described above, further funds were

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² Greek occupation payments after March 1943 were known as *Wehreinsatzüberzüge* and the amounts paid altered with the depreciation of the drachma.
³ It is not clear why Spain agreed to pay occupation costs to the Reich.
⁴ Cf. Davin, op. cit. p. 291.
acquired by the Germans from time to time through fines which were imposed for real or imaginary reasons in the occupied countries. Thus, for example, cash fines to the value of 48,818,068 dinars were imposed by the Feldkommandantur in Belgrade in 1943 alone;\(^1\) in Norway a series of fines was imposed including those to the value of 60,000, 50,000, and 100,000 kroner on Trondheim, Stavanger, and Vest-Opland respectively in January 1941, while in September of that year Stavanger municipality was forced to pay an additional 2 million kroner for alleged sabotage to telegraph lines;\(^2\) in the Netherlands the fines imposed on only sixty-two municipalities totalled at least 20,243,924 guilders;\(^3\) and in France the amount of collective fines was at least 412,636,550 francs.\(^4\)

(4) *Clearing Agreements*

The negotiation and subsequent manipulation of clearing agreements provided Germany with a method by which she was able to extort financial contributions not only from the occupied countries but also from her allies and even from some neutral countries. Under normal circumstances, the trade between partners in a clearing agreement must roughly balance over a period unless the creditor is willing to lend consistently to the debtor. After May 1940, however, Germany, owing to her overwhelming military, political, and economic power, was able to compel the granting of credit far in excess of the amount wished by the lender. Europe as a whole was forced to continue supplying Germany with whatever goods the latter required and to accept in return credits on clearing accounts to Germany which were to be repayable only after the end of the war. German debts on clearing accounts were incurred not only for merchandise, but also for transport and transit services, the execution of German orders placed abroad, and the transfer of savings made by foreign workers in the Reich.\(^5\)

The system of clearing agreements built up by Germany was extremely wide in its scope. By the end of 1941 clearing agreements had been negotiated by Germany with every other continental European country\(^6\) and by many of these with each other. Some of these latter were settled through the central clearing office in Berlin, and Germany did not hesitate to manipulate these to her advantage, freezing credits entered in favour of one party to an agreement and using such credits to offset her own transactions.\(^7\)

The amounts received by Germany by way of debts on her clearing

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\(^1\) *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, viii. 13.

\(^2\) Report of the Norwegian Government on Germany’s crimes against Norway, quoted ibid. v. 517.

\(^3\) Affidavit of a representative of the Netherlands concerning the amount of collective fines, cited ibid. p. 554.

\(^4\) Ibid. vi. 33.

\(^5\) See also above, p. 250.


\(^7\) Lemkin: *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, pp. 61 62.
account were very considerable, reaching a total of some Rm. 36 milliard by September 1944. Efforts were made, particularly by the satellite countries of South-Eastern Europe, to reduce their Reichsmark claims by such methods as the purchase of gold, the repatriation of securities in German hands, and even by placing orders for delivery after the war, but with the exception of Norway and Turkey every country with whom Germany had a clearing agreement owned appreciable claims on the Reich at the conclusion of hostilities.

The system of clearing agreements built up by Germany during the war was notable as being the only real step taken towards the setting up of the New Order in Europe. As has already been mentioned, the German plan envisaged the extension of the pre-war system of bilateral clearing agreements between Germany and her trading partners into a multilateral system in which the foreign trade of Europe would be conducted through a central clearing house in Berlin. It is significant, however, that no country outside the German sphere of influence chose to conduct its financial transactions through Berlin.

(5) Manipulation of Exchange Rates

German financial exploitation of other European countries, at least during the early part of the war, was made much more far-reaching by her ability to fix rates of exchange which were highly favourable to the Reichsmark. In certain areas which were incorporated, or were scheduled for incorporation, in the Reich the new rates represented an appreciation of local currency, the step being taken in order to bring the price and wage levels of those areas into line with those prevailing in the Reich, but everywhere else the new rates meant a very considerable depreciation of local currency in terms of the Reichsmark.

By increasing the value of the Reichsmark in terms of the currencies of her trading partners Germany increased her purchasing power in those countries, her ability to maintain this advantage being dependent upon the unchallengeable position she held in Europe at that time. In normal circumstances the fixing of a high rate of exchange for any currency means the automatic decrease of exports and increase of imports and subsequent exchange difficulties for the country concerned. The maintenance of such a rate is only possible if the trading partners of the country whose currency is overvalued are prepared to lend to that country the amounts by which its imports exceed its exports, a situation which is unlikely to last very long. In Europe during the Second World War Germany's trading

2 See above, p. 168.
partners, although unwilling to grant her credit, were forced to do so because of their relative weakness in the face of German demands, and Germany's deficits were covered either by occupation levies or by the running up of clearing debts.

In the later stages of the war, the advantages gained by Germany from the overvaluation of the Reichsmark were considerably reduced owing to the widespread inflation in Europe which enormously increased the price of German imports.

(6) German Control over European Banking

The smooth working of the German financial exploitation of Europe was achieved through the assumption by Germany of control over the banking systems of the occupied countries, and their reconstruction or adaptation to make them serve as instruments for the administration of German directives in the areas which they served.

The first step taken by the Germans was to assume control of the note-issuing banks of the countries which came under their domination or, where such banks were no longer in existence, to create new ones. New banks were set up in the General Government, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, the Ostland and the Ukraine, and Belgium, but elsewhere the Germans found it possible to make use of existing institutions. Belgium was a special case, because during the occupation two central banks existed side by side. This was due to the fact that shortly before the fall of the country the directors of the National Bank fled, only to return soon after the occupation had begun; meanwhile, however, a new Belgian bank of issue had been set up by the Germans under the name of the Emissionsbank in Brüssel. Both banks were allowed to function, the National Bank undertaking to issue notes and grant credits to government bodies, while the Emissionsbank concentrated on clearing and foreign exchange operations. Despite the division of responsibility, unanimity of banking policy was assured by the personal union of the bank management and of all bank officials of the National Bank and the Emissionsbank.1

The general policy was to leave the day-to-day administration of the banks in the hands of nationals of the country concerned and to have one or more German or German-sponsored individuals acting as supervisors. These latter in most cases were called bank commissioners (Bankdirigenten), although in the nominally independent puppet states of Croatia and Slovakia they were referred to only as advisers. In Denmark, also nominally an independent state, control was exercised not through a bank commissioner but by officials in the chancery of the German Legation and by visiting advisers from the Reich. In the Netherlands, the task of the bank

1 Annual Report of the Commissar at the National Bank of Belgium for period May 1940/May 194 (N.C.A. vii. 643-6 (24-ECR)).
commissioners was considerably simplified by the appointment of Rost van Tonningen, the Dutch Nazi, as President of the Netherlands Bank. Whether or not the banks were newly created, and whatever the nominal relationship between these banks and the representatives of the Reich, German demands were equally compelling. In all cases the German representatives were authorized to demand whatever information they desired about the working of the banks, their orders had to be carried out, and they had the power of veto over any actions of which they did not approve. The following regulations were, for example, issued for the National Bank of Belgium:

(1) The Commissar at the National Bank is to be currently informed of all measures of the Bank. He can obtain information on all business of the Bank. . .

(3) All important measures of the President, the Managing Directors and the Managing Board, particularly the granting of credits as well as the setting of the interest rates applying to business with the Bank, require the agreement of the Commissar at the National Bank of Belgium. The Commissar can give his general permission for individual groups of transactions; he can revoke this agreement at any time.

(4) The Commissar is entitled to give orders [Weisungen] which serve the fulfilment of the tasks of the Bank.

Under German control the powers of the central banks were then adjusted to fit them for the needs of the German war effort. Restrictions on note issue and upon the granting of credit were removed, and the banks were then able to finance the payments of occupation costs and of direct German military expenditure in the occupied countries. Another step was to reduce the rates of interest payable on credits, thereby fostering production, most of which was directed towards German ends.

German control over the banking systems of the occupied countries was not confined to the central banks but was extended to cover the commercial and other private banks as well. In many countries, the most notable exceptions being France and the Netherlands, banking supervision of a kind was already in existence, and the Germans were in most cases content to work through these native agencies. In other countries German offices for banking control were set up, often headed by the bank commissioner. Belgium again was a special case in that the autonomous

1 The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost van Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership, penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude in itself gives him the correct position of financial and monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the greater German economic space. Furthermore it makes easier cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into office of the new President' (Report of the Commissar of the Netherlands Bank, dated 9 May 1941: N.C.A. vii. 748 (196-ECR)).

2 Charter of the Emissionsbank in Brussel (N.C.A. vii. 667 (24-ECR)).
Belgian Commission Bancaire was retained while at the same time a German office was created.

The control of private banking had many objectives. Besides enforcing the central banks’ financial policy it made considerably easier the task of exploiting the countries concerned, especially in the sphere of production on German account, and assisted the creation of opportunities for German participation in local enterprises. Purely governmental action in this respect was backed up by the participation of German private banks which were active in securing key positions in the banking of occupied and even of allied countries.¹

(c) The Effects of German Policies on the Rest of Europe

The effects of German financial policies on the occupied and, to a much lesser extent, on the dominated countries were disastrous. On the one hand, Germany throughout the war assigned to herself an ever-increasing proportion of the total output of the countries concerned, while on the other her actions vastly increased the available means of payment, thereby creating a highly inflationary situation.

Some German measures, notably the issue of Reichskreditkassen notes, were directly inflationary in their effects, representing an immediate addition to the amount of money in circulation. Even their subsequent withdrawal did not remove this pressure since they were merely replaced by an equivalent amount of domestic currency. The piling up of credits with the German clearing office in Berlin also had serious inflationary effects. In the first place it represented a one-sided removal of goods, and, in the second, although the Germans made no payment for the goods they received, the native governments, in order to prevent the bankruptcy of their exporters, were forced themselves to advance money against the clearing claims. Internally, too, the alterations of bank charters so as to make possible the granting of unlimited credit meant the removal of another guard against inflation.

The large increase in the circulation of money, accompanied by a decrease in the supply of goods, led to a flight from money and to the growth of widespread black-market operations throughout Europe. This situation was exploited by the Germans who, with unlimited supplies of money, were able and willing to use this as a further means of obtaining the goods which they needed. German black-market purchases were officially controlled and centralized, especially in Western Europe, and were an important source of supply at any rate until 15 March 1943 when they were officially suspended.

¹ For a description of the penetration of European industry through the activities of German private banks see pp. 206-7 above.
CONCLUSIONS
(viii) Conclusions
By Patricia Harvey

Germany's attempts to set up a new economic order in Europe ended in failure. Great changes certainly were brought about as a result of German intervention, but on the whole these were due rather to the exigencies of war than to specific measures designed to create a New Order. Lack of precise thought upon the subject and lack of time prevented the implementation of the grandiose proposals made during the summer of 1940. Certain features of the New Order became clear as a result of German actions, but a full implementation of the policy was postponed by the Germans until such time as they should become the undisputed masters of Europe. That time never came.

One of the features of the New Order which did become more or less clear through German actions was the future administrative structure of the region. As each successive country came under German domination it was allotted a form of administration suited to its final place in the New Order. Thus the central industrial core of Europe was brought under a unified control through the incorporation in the German Reich of such areas as Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, and Polish Upper Silesia. Other less highly industrialized areas, including the rest of Western Europe, were subjected only to indirect control, but those regions designated 'colony' territories, notably the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. and the General Government of Poland, although kept apart from the Reich itself, were directly controlled from Germany and were allowed no hand in their own administration.

Apart from determining the structure of the New Order, the only real move taken by the Germans towards implementing their plans for the new Europe were in the sphere of finance. There it is true to say that Berlin became for a time the financial centre of the European continent. The Reichsmark became the dominant currency, and many countries began to settle all their commercial dealings through Berlin in Reichsmarks; but it is notable that the countries concerned were all under direct German domination. Any nation which retained any degree of individual choice remained at any rate partially outside the multilateral clearing system centred on Berlin.

It is symptomatic that German propaganda, which during 1940 had laid so much stress on the advantages of the New Order, had, some two years later, become almost silent on the subject and was concentrating instead on the need for all European nations to band together in the fight against Bolshevism. The German conception of the war, and hence of the possibilities of setting up the New Order, had been based on the belief that hostilities would at no time be protracted. By means of a few
short campaigns Germany would be able to secure the physical basis of the New Order, and from there she would consolidate her position and determine her attitude towards the areas remaining outside it. The attack on Russia and the subsequent realization that that country could not, like Germany's previous opponents, be crushed by a blow, completely altered the situation. Germany was by then faced by a prolonged war for which she had not prepared. She could not waste time or energy on furthering the New Order merely to carry out a theory. She was faced by a bitter struggle for survival, and to maintain it at all she had to abandon long-term planning and secure the means to carry on the fight as best she could. For a time this appeared to be within her powers and German troops remained on the offensive. But from the beginning of 1943 this situation was reversed. Germany's enemies were now on the offensive, and the Reich was faced by increasing commitments, while at the same time her resources were steadily diminishing. It is a proof of German efficiency both at home and in the exploitation of the occupied countries that war production was on the increase until well on in 1944. This increase was, however, a last supreme effort, since by that time Germany's outside sources of supply had dwindled almost to nothing and a prolonged effort would have been impossible.

However small Germany's success was in establishing a new economic order in Europe, there is no doubt that she did succeed in drawing enormous material benefits from the rest of Europe during the war. Although in the long run Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., could not have provided Germany with all the materials she needed, in the short run the production of, and the stocks held in, the occupied and dominated countries proved to be of immense value and, with the exception of oil, were enough to postpone any serious shortage until such time as other factors intervened. The industrial capacity of the occupied countries, too, proved to be of great importance, at any rate during the middle part of the war. Thus Speer, at a conference held on 11 July 1944, said: 'Up to the present 25 to 30 per cent. of the German war production had been furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, by Italy alone 12 1/2 per cent.'

Perhaps most useful to Germany, however, was the supply of additional labour from non-German countries. Before the outbreak of war the labour shortage in the Reich was acute, and the position was likely to deteriorate rapidly after the beginning of large-scale mobilization for the armed forces. But through the unscrupulous exploitation of foreign labour, both in the Reich itself and throughout occupied and dominated Europe, Germany secured for herself ample supplies of labour during the greater part of the war. The scale of these operations was so great that in Germany alone over 7 million foreigners were employed in the spring of 1944,

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1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 190 (3819 PS); N.C.A. vi. 769-70.
and these accounted for nearly 20 per cent. of the total civilian labour force.

It is impossible to reach any accurate total, in monetary terms, of the gains made by Germany from the occupied and dominated countries during the war. Some items, such as the consumption of goods and services by German troops and officials stationed outside the Reich, and the materials removed directly to the Reich without payment, cannot be computed. It is also impossible to assess with any degree of precision the value of the work done by foreigners in the Reich or on service with the German armed forces. An attempt has, however, been made by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey\(^1\) to evaluate the contribution which other countries made to the German war effort, taking into consideration only those items which can reasonably be estimated. Under this heading come occupational charges levied against France, the Netherlands, Norway, Bohemia-Moravia, and Poland, the net deficit in Germany’s foreign trade balance, purchases made by means of invasion currency, and the net product of the annexed areas, after the deduction of consumption and capital formation within those areas. According to these calculations, foreign contributions for the five years 1940 to 1944 inclusive, estimated at 1939 prices, amounted to some Rm. 10.4 milliard or nearly 14 per cent. of the gross national product of Germany during that period.\(^2\) The importance of these contributions is more fully shown by the fact that they raised the amount available for government purchase of arms and equipment—that is to say, the amount left after meeting requirements for civilian consumption, administrative costs, payment of the armed forces, interest on the national debt, and necessary capital outlays—by 57 per cent. during the same period.

The levying of contributions on such a scale obviously had serious consequences in the occupied and dominated countries. In many countries the devastation caused by military operations was followed by the wholesale removal of goods which might be of use in the Reich. Raw materials, foodstuffs, livestock, plant and machinery, and transport equipment were all seized in varying degrees. Production was drastically curtailed and such factories as were allowed to continue in production could concentrate only on goods that the Germans required for their own purposes. The extent of German levies varied considerably from one country to another within Europe, but it is true to say that everywhere the standard of living was appreciably reduced and widespread shortages of all kinds appeared. The situation was aggravated by the financial policies pursued by Germany. Purchases made with occupation currency and the piling up of vast debts against clearing accounts were strongly inflationary in their effects on

\(^1\) U.S.A., Strategic Bombing Survey, \&c.: Gross National Product of Germany, 1936–1944.

\(^2\) Ibid. figures 2 and 3.
non-German countries, and decreasing supplies of goods were accompanied by increasing volumes of money in circulation. Although inflation caused a complete breakdown in the financial life of the country concerned only in certain areas, notably in Greece, its ill effects were felt throughout the European continent.

The main objective of German economic policy in Europe throughout the war remained the same—to extract the maximum benefits for Germany without consideration of the interests of other countries.

It is clear that the economic power of the protectorate, and of other territories possibly to be acquired, must of course be completely exhausted for the purposes of the conduct of the war. It is, however, just as clear that these territories cannot obtain any compensation from the economy of Greater Germany for the products which they will have to give us during the war, because their power must be used fully for the war and for supplying the civilian home population.¹

This statement of policy was made as a result of a conference held in May 1939 and remained the guiding principle for German actions throughout the following five years.

¹ *I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 395-6 (3562-PS); N.C.A. vi. 250.*
PART III

ITALY

(i) Italy from June 1940 to July 1943

By Katharine Duff

(a) From the Fall of France to the Invasion of Greece

(1) Italy's Rank in Hitler's Europe in the Summer of 1940

In theory a co-equal partner in the Axis, Italy was in reality already no more than Germany's chief satellite.¹ She entered the war, it is true, not entirely without assets as an ally. However precarious her claim to be a Great Power, she was the only state even approaching that rank to be supporting Germany. Her armed forces were larger than those of all Germany's other possible allies except Japan, and her navy was larger than Germany's own. Her position in the centre of the Mediterranean and her African empire gave the Axis opportunities of cutting the most direct route between Great Britain and the East, and of attacking Egypt, the Sudan, and East Africa. On the other hand, though the Italian armed forces had had some recent experience of fighting in Ethiopia and Spain, they had not stood the test of a general war since the advent of Fascism, and Italy's economic weakness was all too obvious. The events of 1939–40 had increased and emphasized the disparity of strength between Italy and Germany; by June 1940 the latter had reached the summit of her military prestige, and had expanded her resources of food and industrial capacity by conquering one European country after another till she dominated Europe from Biarritz to Brest-Litovsk.

Italy's entry into the war was not marked by any noteworthy changes in the administrative machinery of the Axis other than the setting up of numerous organizations devised to strengthen Italian economic links with the Third Reich. Political and military affairs were at first handled in much the same informal and discontinuous manner as before. The liaison staffs which were set up in Berlin and Rome took no part in planning operations,² and though later on intricate arrangements were made to link the German and Italian commands in the Mediterranean, at a higher level nothing at all comparable with the Anglo-American organizations for joint planning ever existed. At first, of course, both the Axis dictators

¹ For a full account of Italo-German relations before and during this period see Elizabeth Wiskemann: The Rome–Berlin Axis (London, Oxford University Press, 1949).
² See Kurt Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, p. 332; on German strategy as regards the Mediterranean see ibid. pp. 327–71.
believed that the war was all but won; and, moreover, even after they realized that this was not so, Hitler was at great pains to emphasize his fidelity to the principle of separate German and Italian spheres of influence north and south of the Alps.\(^1\)

It was one of the stock Italian grievances against the Germans that they were incapable of understanding the importance of the Mediterranean. A Mediterranean empire was not, it is true, one of the things that Hitler happened at the moment to be coveting. Looking eastwards as he did for Germany's open frontier, he showed no sign of grudging Italy her opportunities of expanding towards the south.\(^2\) Nevertheless, his other ambitions inevitably led Germany to encroach on Italy's Lebensraum. As before the war,\(^3\) South-Eastern Europe was a debatable land between the two Powers, and new causes of friction arose out of the German desire for bases in Morocco, and out of Fascist jealousy of German lenience towards Vichy France. Nor had the Italians (not excepting Mussolini) ceased to fear that the Germans might some day claim the South Tyrol\(^4\) and Trieste, in spite of all their vows to respect the Alpine frontier. It was not only the desire to share in the spoils, or the fascination and gravitational pull of German power that influenced Mussolini's decision to declare war, but fear of German expansion, and of German revenge for another Italian 'betrayal'; the fear, in short (as a veteran Fascist\(^5\) who was not at all pro-German put it), that, had Italy not declared war, she would have gone down Germany's throat like a raw egg. Within a few days of war being declared, however, Mussolini realized that his last-minute intervention had earned him no share in Hitler's triumphs, and that Italy's position in the Axis was too weak for her to count on a favourable hearing for her claims, though he still hoped that the achievements of the Italian forces might restore her to a more equal footing with Germany.

The Germans, for their part, despised the Italians as soldiers,\(^6\) fully realizing their lack of enthusiasm for the Axis, and continued to believe them capable of deserting it as soon as they felt this would be to their advantage. Hitler trusted no Italian but Mussolini, and was convinced

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1 German military writers have alleged that Hitler carried respect for Mussolini's feelings so far as to forbid his High Command to press advice or criticism on their opposite numbers in Italy (Siegfried Westphal: *Heer in Fesseln* (Bonn, Athenäum Verlag, 1950), pp. 152-4; cf. Assmann, op. cit. p. 331; 'Notes for Wehrmacht Discussions with Italy' of 26 November 1938 (Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, publ. jointly by the British Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., and London, H.M.S.O., 1951), series D, iv. 530).

2 For a few months in 1940 Hitler dreamed of a *Drang nach Afrika* with the aid of Spain which would secure an empire for Germany in Central Africa, but even then he thought that North and East Africa would remain in Italy's sphere of influence (see above, pp. 48, 49, 58-59).


4 An account of this will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: *The Eve of War, 1939*.

5 Leandro Arpinati, quoted by Giano: *Diario* (1939-43), 16 October 1941.

6 See below, p. 296, note 9, and p. 309, note 3.
that King Victor Emmanuel, the Italian army, and, of course, Ciano, would betray the Axis in the end, just as, in his opinion, they were responsible for the German-Polish conflict's becoming a general war, because at the critical moment they had told Great Britain that Italy did not mean to fight. And though it pleased him to see Mussolini in the role of Pollux to his Castor, this did not prevent him from imposing his will on his comrade by playing on his fears of Allied bombing, or from sowing suspicion in his mind against other Governments in the Axis system with which he might perhaps intrigue.1

Like so much of Germany's war equipment, Italy was a substitute, an ersatz ally. As he explained in Mein Kampf,2 Hitler would have preferred the help of Great Britain in defeating France for the hegemony of Europe. But, as Italy was the best ally to be had, Hitler must make what he could of her, and when once she had entered the war it would be a serious reverse for Germany if she were forced out of it by the blows of her enemies or by lack of consideration on the part of her ally. In practice, however, German policy towards Italy was self-defeating. Nazi greed and the relative strength of the two states being what they were, German 'friendship' was apt to stop short at fair words, and German help, if it was to be of any use at all, had often to take forms that the Italians could not but find intensely humiliating.

During the first phase of Italy's war, from June to October 1940, Axis diplomacy if reckoned in miles and in words was more active than ever before. Mussolini and Ciano spent:3 18-19 June in Munich;4 Ciano was in Berlin on 7 July, and again on 19-20 July to attend Hitler's peace-offer speech in the Reichstag;5 and he met Ribbentrop and Hitler in Vienna on 28-30 August to give Italy's assent to the partition of Transylvania.6 Ribbentrop visited Rome on 19-22 September bringing the draft of the Tripartite Pact7 (having said nothing whatever till then about renewing negotiations with Japan); and Ciano spent 28-30 September in Berlin for the ceremony of its signature.8 Finally Hitler and Mussolini met on the

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1 See below, pp. 292, 295.
2 See Hitler: Mein Kampf, pp. 698, 720, 755; tr. Murphy, pp. 595, 518, 511.
5 Minutes of Hitler-Ciano meeting of 29 August in Ciano: Europa, pp. 581-3; Eng. version, pp. 386 7. An account of the Transylvania award will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
7 Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 27-28 September 1940.
Brenner on 4 October and in Florence on the 28th. These were not, however, occasions for working out an agreed policy. After a five-hour display of Hitler’s military omniscience, Mussolini or Ciano might venture to put forward some questions or requests, but if, as often happened, these were unfavourably received, the argument was seldom pressed any farther.

The Nazi leaders were as unwilling as in the days of non-belligerency to take the Italian Government into their confidence, one of the most striking instances of this being the prohibition in Hitler’s Directive No. 19 of 10 December (operation ‘Attila’, or the total occupation of France) of any mention of the scheme to the Italians. Hitler did, in fact, firmly believe that any operational secret entrusted to the Italian High Command or Foreign Ministry would forthwith find its way to London, probably through the House of Savoy. For the most part the Italians got no more than a key-hole view of German plans, and were compelled to eke out the unsatisfactory information obtained from Axis meetings and through the regular diplomatic channels by conjectures from the German leaders’ looks and actions, by hints from the non-Nazis in the German Foreign Ministry, by intercepting telephone conversations between Rome and Berlin, and by other surreptitious means, almost as if they had been dealing with an enemy rather than an ally. Their task was made no easier by Ribbentrop’s extreme jealousy of any contact between the Italian Embassy and any German organizations but the Foreign Ministry. Nor had the Italians any doubt that the Germans were perpetually spying on them. Ribbentrop once complained to Dino Alfieri, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, about the contents of a telegram transmitted by the Embassy to Rome in the most secret code.

(2) Conflicting Interests, June to October 1940

(a) Italian Territorial Demands

One of the earliest questions on which German and Italian interests...
came into conflict was that of Italy's territorial claims against France and Great Britain. As outlined by Ciano to Ribbentrop on 19 June 1940 these included: first, as an absolute minimum, Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and French Somaliland, but also part of Algeria, or at least a revision of the Tunisian frontier giving Italy the iron and phosphate deposits. Ciano also mentioned Morocco and Italy's need to have access to the Atlantic. As for Great Britain, she would be expected to cede Malta, to let Italy succeed to her treaty relationship with Egypt and to the Sudan condominium, and to restore Gibraltar to Spain. Ribbentrop answered that Hitler was in agreement with most of these demands, but he made reservations about Algeria and Morocco, and reminded Ciano that Germany had historic ambitions with regard to the latter, and moreover that the satisfaction of Spain's claims in North Africa would be an incentive to her to join in maintaining the post-war settlement. He referred, but only in general terms, to Germany's own colonial demands, and said nothing about war aims in Europe, except that Germany wished to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.

Neither Morocco nor Gibraltar appeared in the second list of Italian demands, drawn up for Ciano's visit to Hitler on 7 July; and this also expressly recommended a protectorate for Tunisia and part of Algeria, whereas the June list did not distinguish between protectorate and annexation. Otherwise it was nothing if not comprehensive. It called for the annexation not only of Nice, Corsica, Malta, and French Somaliland, but of British Somaliland and French Equatorial Africa up to Lake Chad; and for a military occupation of Aden, Perim, and Socotra. Furthermore, Italy, in addition to controlling Egypt and the Sudan, proposed to conclude alliances with, and occupy strategic points in, the 'independent' states of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, and to acquire shares in the Middle Eastern oil companies and liquidate the Suez Canal Company. She also proposed that Greece should relinquish Corfu and Tasmuria (Northern Epirus) to her and receive Cyprus as compensation. Ciano reported to Mussolini that Hitler approved this programme, but, according to Schmidt, Hitler immediately plunged into one of his usual monologues, without committing himself either way. Mussolini brought up the question of Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and Jibuti—but not of the other demands—when he met Hitler on 4 and 28 October, and Hitler promised him on both occasions that he would not make peace with France unless these claims were met. On the 28th he even said that the French were surprised that Mussolini had not laid claim to Savoy.

2 Simoni: _Berlino, 7 July 1940_; Schmidt: _Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne_ , p. 492.
3 Ciano: _Europa_ , pp. 598, 603, 604; Eng. version, pp. 397–8, 401, 403.
(β) Policy towards France

The main purpose of the Hitler–Mussolini talks at Munich on 19 June, 1 at which Italian war aims were first stated to Germany, was to decide what armistice terms should be imposed on France. Mussolini was all for severity, proposing that they should occupy the whole country and gain possession of the fleet; but Hitler insisted that it was vital not to press the French too hard, or they might in desperation break off negotiations and transfer their Government to North Africa, and their warships (which in his opinion could not be taken by force if they resisted) to Great Britain or the United States. Nor would he agree to Italy’s taking part in joint negotiations with France; the reason for this, afterwards given by him to Ribbentrop, was that Franco-Italian animosity would waste so much time. 2 At Munich Hitler made no objection to Italy’s occupying the whole of south-eastern France east of the Rhône, and Corsica, Tunisia, and Jibuti as well, and it was Mussolini himself who spontaneously renounced all these claims after his return to Rome. 3 According to Ciano, the moderation of Hitler’s armistice terms had so deeply impressed him that he dared not make demands that might break up the negotiations with France and cause trouble between Rome and Berlin. 4

When the French plenipotentiaries reached Rome on 23 June, 5 Badoglio assured them that Italy would endeavour to make the terms as easy as possible. The Fascist Government did, in fact, make concessions over the demobilization of French forces overseas, and (unlike the Germans) they withdrew their demand for the handing over of political refugees. More-

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2 Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 484.
3 See Hitler e Mussolini, no. 28; cf. Mussolini to Hitler, 22 June 1940 (quoted by Mario Toscano in Rivista Storica Italiana, 1951, i. 130).
4 Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 21 June 1940; Simoni: Berlino, 22 June 1940. It would be interesting to know both the exact nature of the German communication of 21 June giving the final version of the armistice terms, and how soon on that day it was sent off. At Compiègne, that evening, General Huntziger declared that the Italians, never having defeated the French, had no right to impose the same sort of terms as Germany, and, moreover, that if they put their terms too high France would resume freedom of action against both Italy and Germany. Keitel merely took note of this objection, and disclaimed any knowledge of Italy’s intentions. Similarly, when the French Government were discussing the German terms on the morning of the 22nd, President Lebrun spoke of the probability of Italy’s presenting unacceptable terms and of both sets of negotiations breaking down, very much as if he hoped that this would occur (Paul Baudouin: Neuf mois au gouvernement: avril–décembre 1940 (Paris, Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1948), p. 199; F. Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques aux Affaires Étrangères (Paris, Plon, 1949), pp. 78, 79, 90, 102; Albert Kammerer: La Vérité sur l’armistice, 2nd edition (Paris, Éditions Médicis, 1945), pp. 294, 424, 438; General Maxime Weygand: Mémoires, vol. iii: Rappelé au service (Paris, Flammarion, 1950), pp. 243–4, 249, 251, 257, 262–3).
over, the Italo-French armistice agreement, as signed at the Villa Incisa near Rome at 7.15 p.m. on 24 June, only entitled the Italians to occupy the ground actually held by their army at the moment that the armistice came into effect, which proved to be merely the environs of Mentone. The agreement also demilitarized a 50-kilometre zone west of the occupied area, zones 200 km. wide in Algeria and in the French African territories bordering on Libya, the whole of the fortified area in southern Tunisia, and the coast of Somaliland. It granted Italy full use of the port of Jibuti and of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa Railway, but contained no other economic clauses or any financial clauses at all.

No official celebrations were arranged in Italy in honour of the armistice. It brought the first touch of disillusionment to Italians, who had been expecting easy conquests; and there were special reasons why it should leave Mussolini with a bitter taste in his mouth. Ever since the Axis had been formed he had suspected that Italy might some day be jilted for either of her more powerful rivals, Great Britain and France. He had not enjoyed an allusion of Hitler's at their recent meeting to the importance of preserving the British Empire, and he now became convinced that Vichy France was insinuating herself into the anti-British camp in the hope of escaping the penalty for her past errors. His deep sense of Italy's inferiority to France in terms of power politics led him to expect that, thanks in part to what he called the half-baked provincial servility of the Germans towards French culture, France, even though defeated, might become a dangerous rival in the New Order, and that Hitler might bribe her by withdrawing his support from Italy's territorial claims.

From now onwards Mussolini and Ciano neglected no opportunity of warning Hitler and Ribbentrop that France was playing a double game. The usual German rejoinder was to praise Mussolini's moderation with regard to the armistice terms, to admit readily enough that France was the irreconcilable and pernicious enemy of both the Axis Powers, and must not on any account be allowed to escape retribution; but at the same time to insist on the vital importance of controlling the French coast and the overland routes to Spain. Explanations to this effect seem to have been more than a mere camouflage to deceive the Italians. One of the series of

4 Filippo Anfuso: Roma, Berlino, Salò, 1936-45 (Milan, Garzanti, 1950), p. 161. For Hitler's later idea of carving up the 'bankrupt estate' of the British Empire with the aid of other interested Powers (including France and Spain as well as Italy) see pp. 57-38 above.
decisions by Hitler which Jodl communicated to the Chief of Operations of the Naval Staff on 4 November 1940 announced the definite intention of keeping France too weak ever to form a threat to the Axis, and of compelling her to satisfy the territorial demands of Germany and Italy.1 However genuine German reassurances may have been, they failed to satisfy Mussolini, and German behaviour during the summer kept his suspicions alive. For instance, Hitler, on 7 July, rejected Ciano’s suggestion of concluding forthwith a separate peace with France.2 Italians found it hard to get permits to enter the occupied zone where, even in September, Italian Consulates had not yet received permission to reopen.3

The working of the Italian Armistice Commissions4 which were set up in North Africa, Syria, Lebanon, and French Somaliland also contributed to Italo-German friction: the Germans complained on the one hand that the Italians were too easily outwitted by the French, and on the other that their policy of pinpricks and unnecessary disarmament would drive the French into Gaullism or make it impossible for them to resist a Gaullist or Allied invasion;5 and in the spring of 1941 German commissioners were sent to North Africa to take control over the heads of their Italian opposite numbers.

Mussolini and Ciano had been in no mood to respond to the various tentative approaches made from Vichy in the third quarter of 1940,6 and they regarded the Montoire conversations of 24 October7 with the greatest suspicion. Hitler is alleged to have said at the time that, expressly out of consideration for Mussolini, he had refrained from taking any definite steps towards Franco-German collaboration;8 and it was evidently in order to persuade Mussolini of this that he arranged a meeting at Florence on the 28th.9 Here he promised once again that all Italy’s claims would be

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1 Führer Conferences, 1940, p. 117; cf. conferences of 9 and 25 July 1941 (ibid. 1911, pp. 92, 94).
3 Simon: Berlino, 7 September 1940.
5 For all that, the Germans were more exacting than were the Italians in their demands for privileges and facilities in North Africa, for, whereas the Italians tried to secure the demilitarization of Oran and Bizerta and the use of Oran as an air base (Baudouin: Neuf Mois au gouvernement, pp. 237 8, 241 2; Führer Conferences, 1940, p. 128; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii. Hitler’s Europe, p. 102), the Germans (equally unsuccessfully) demanded no fewer than eight air bases in Morocco, with transit facilities from France right across North-West Africa.
7 See below, pp. 365–6.
9 Ciano: Diario (1929–43), 20, 24, 25, 28 October 1940; Ciano: Europa, pp. 601–7; Eng. version, pp. 999–101; Führer Conferences, 1940, p. 117; see also Anfuso: Roma, Berlino, Salò, p. 167. For the meeting on 28 October see also Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii. Hitler’s Europe, p. 99.
met, and he accepted Mussolini’s suggestion that France might in the end be compensated from territory forfeited by Great Britain, assuring him that, if the war ended in a compromise, France would still be expected to pay up. But he did not recommend settling Italy’s claims without more delay, considering it wiser to assure the French how moderate Axis terms would in the end prove to be, and to offer them a three-Power agreement on provisional relations; and he invited Mussolini to be present when Laval came to Berlin to conclude this agreement. Mussolini and Ciano were considerably mollified by Hitler’s gesture, or, more probably, by their success in surprising him with the news of their attack on Greece. Mussolini had written to Hitler telling him that the attack was imminent, but without revealing the actual date, and Hitler, though already in France when the letter reached Berlin, had been informed of its contents by the evening of the 24th, when Ribbentrop rang Ciano up to propose the Florence meeting.  

(γ) The Axis, the U.S.S.R., and South-Eastern Europe

While Italy was still non-belligerent Mussolini had planned to start a war of his own in South-Eastern Europe, ‘parallel’ to Hitler’s war, to forestall the Germans as well as the Allies; and he now had the additional motive of compensating Italy for the shelving of her claims against France. At intervals during the summer he drew down upon himself reminders from Germany that the Axis must at all costs refrain from disturbing the status quo in the south-east, for fear of playing into the hands of the U.S.S.R. even more than of having to divert forces from the campaigns against Great Britain and Egypt.  

For similar reasons, the Germans consistently discouraged any move to improve Italo-Soviet relations independently of Germany. They did not invite the Italians to take part in the German-Soviet meetings and negotiations of the autumn of 1940, though they were not uncommunicative (for them) about what was happening, with the exception that they were silent about their own aggressive intentions; and they even spoke, rather vaguely, of a pact between the Axis, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. But Ribbentrop warned Italy, on 17 August, 19 September, and 4 November that an Italo-Soviet rapprochement might have dangerous consequences in the Balkans, and Germany vetoed both the rather amateurish attempts made by the Italians, in June and December 1940, to achieve one.

The Italians hoped to persuade the U.S.S.R. to resume exports of oil to them, and at one moment it occurred to Mussolini that a rapprochement might be of use if he attacked Yugoslavia. Reinsurance against Germany

1 Wiskemann: Rome–Berlin Axis, pp. 231–2. For Hitler’s reactions see p. 63 above.
2 e.g. Ciano: Europa, p. 565; Eng. version, p. 374.
3 Ibid. pp. 587–8, 590, 611 and 390–1, 392, 407 respectively; Simoni: Berlin, 17 August 1940.
4 Ciano: Diano (1939–43), 4, 5 August 1940.
may have been another motive. Molotov responded immediately to a somewhat vague approach from Mussolini himself in June 1940 by pressing for conversations on Balkan and Turkish questions, and by offering recognition of Italy’s pre-eminence in the Mediterranean in return for a corresponding pledge with regard to Soviet interests in the Black Sea. In July it was made clear that a comprehensive political agreement must precede any economic one. Thereafter, however, yielding apparently without much regret to German pressure, the Fascist Government let the negotiations drop till the end of December, when new approaches were made in Rome and Moscow. Molotov still wished to begin political discussions without delay.

Ribbentrop again intervened. When Alfieri had sounded him on 16 December he had represented Italy’s aims as primarily economic; and when, on 6 January 1941, he revealed the purport of the December conversations Ribbentrop expressed strong disapproval, accusing Molotov of seeking concessions denied him in Berlin. Having advised Ciano, on 19 January, to play for time, and to be careful to keep in step with Germany in his dealings with the U.S.S.R., he thereafter compelled the Fascist Government to adopt such an attitude—especially towards Molotov’s inquiries into the probable policy of the Axis with regard to the Black Sea Straits if Turkey entered the war—that the Italo-Soviet political conversations were broken off on 24 February, though the commercial negotiations were to continue till June.1

Hitler may still have been a little anxious lest Mussolini might intrigue against him with the Governments of Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria. In November 1940 he seems, for instance, to have gone out of his way to tell Ciano that the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, had sounded him about Fiume just before the German visit to Italy in May 1938.2 But though in 1939 Mussolini, and still more, perhaps, Ciano, had seriously considered reinsuring against Germany by promoting an Italo-Danubian bloc inside the Axis,3 they would by this time seem to have realized that there was nothing to be done but leave Hungary and Rumania to the tender mercies of their greater neighbours. They advised the Rumanian Government to submit with a good grace to the loss to Russia of Bessarabia and to come to terms without delay with Hungary and Bulgaria;4 and

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1 On this episode see Mario Toscano: *Una Manata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941* (Florence, Sansoni, 1953); Alfieri: *Due dittatori*, pp. 230–1; Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 23 October, 7 November 1940, 1 January 1941; Ciano: *Europa*, pp. 617, 627–8; Eng. version, pp. 411, 418–19; Mario Donosti, pseud.: *Mussolini e l’Europa* (Rome, Edizioni Leonarda, 1943), p. 246; Augusto Rosso: ‘La questione degli Stretti e la Russia nel Mediterraneo’, *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, April–June 1950, pp. 177–8; Simoni: *Berlino, 17 August 1940*, 5, 6, 10, 16, 21 January 1941.

2 Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 18–19 November 1940.


although Italy took part in directing the partition of Transylvania\(^1\) there was no recurrence of the Italo-German rivalry that had marked the Czechoslovak-Hungarian award at Vienna in 1938.\(^2\) Italian relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were henceforth almost devoid of incident. An unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade King Boris to support the Italian attack on Greece,\(^3\) Italy protested against Hungary’s seizure of the Slovene and Croat districts of Prekomurje and Medjumurje,\(^4\) and difficulties arose with Bulgaria over the division of Yugoslav Macedonia.\(^5\) Otherwise there was nothing to record.

It was farther to the south that Mussolini was planning aggression in the early autumn of 1940. Operations against Croatia, which he had planned even before entering the general war, were not countermanded till 1 October,\(^6\) and at the same time he had been making ready to attack Greece. Hitler, when he met Ciano on 7 July, did not object to the Italians occupying the Ionian Islands, but advised them to do nothing against Yugoslavia until the problem of Great Britain was approaching solution, unless, of course, trouble broke out elsewhere in the Balkans.\(^7\) When Ribbentrop, on 17 August, vetoed Italian plans against Greece,\(^8\) he was equally firm about Yugoslavia; and he returned to the subject when in Rome on 19 September, though, on this later occasion, he mitigated the warning with assurances that Yugoslavia, like Greece, was an exclusively Italian interest, and that Germany only reserved a right to the Maribor district of Croatia.\(^9\)

(3) The Operations of the Italian Forces against Great Britain and France, June to October 1940

For years Mussolini had longed to convince the world that the Italians were a martial nation.\(^10\) Now, however, that he found himself in the long-desired position of Supreme Commander, he vacillated as usual between aggressiveness and caution. According to Badoglio he declared on 26 May that Italy needed a few thousand dead to earn a place at the peace conference,\(^11\) and in the past he had day-dreamed of obliterating Malta

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\(^1\) Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 10, 15 July, 26 to 30 August 1940; Ciano: Europa, pp. 581–3; Eng. version, pp. 386–7.
\(^2\) Survey for 1938, iii. 93–105.
\(^3\) Ibid.; 10 July 1941.
\(^4\) Ibid. 10, 19, 21 July, 13, 23 August 1941; for Ciano–Ribbentrop meeting of 21, 22 April 1941 see Ciano: Europa, pp. 653, 654, 656; Eng. version, pp. 437, 438.
\(^7\) Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 17 August 1940. An account of the Italian attack on Greece and its antecedents will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
\(^8\) Ciano: Europa, pp. 588, 590; Eng. version, pp. 391, 392.
\(^10\) Badoglio: L’Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale, p. 44.
without warning from the air,¹ but it was caution that prevailed in his directives on the eve of war.² Not until after his trial of strength with Hitler over the French armistice did he start that inglorious campaign of 21–24 June in the Alps and on the Riviera, which began four days after the French had asked Germany for terms. The French defended themselves with spirit, and the Italians might have found themselves in an unpleasant position had the armistice been delayed any longer.³ Thereafter, Mussolini had not been unwilling to join battle with the British, but his General Staff and his commanders in the field and at sea had neglected their opportunities of clearing the Mediterranean and over-running Egypt and the Sudan. Kassala and Gallabat in the Sudan were occupied in the first week of July, and British Somaliland in the middle of August, but Graziani’s Libyan army did not take the offensive until 13 September, when it advanced fifty miles into Egypt and settled down at Sidi Barrānī. No attempt was made to take Malta.

From the moment that he had committed Italy to declaring war, Mussolini began to pester Hitler with suggestions that Italian forces should take part in Germany’s campaigns.⁴ Italian airmen were sent into the Battle of Britain, where they were hopelessly outclassed by the Royal Air Force, and Italian submarines operated in the Atlantic from a base at Bordeaux under German operational control;⁵ but, in general, Hitler and the OKW remained convinced that the Italians ought rather to concentrate their efforts on their own operations in the Mediterranean.⁶ Hitler offered to send long-range bombers against the Suez Canal,⁷ and at a Führer conference on 31 July Brauchitsch recommended sending two armoured divisions to Libya.⁸ But when, at the Brenner on 4 October, Hitler offered Mussolini one armoured division the latter refused any help other than dive-bombers, trucks, and a few heavy tanks for the final advance into Egypt. And while Mussolini and the Italian High Command begged to be given the tools and left free to do the job by themselves—but seemed more and more incapable of doing it—Hitler’s generals were:

¹ Bottai: Ven’tanni, 31 October 1936; Ciano: Diario (1937–8), 21 December 1937.
² Badoglio, loc. cit.
³ Bottai, op. cit. 17 June, 1 July 1940; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 20 June, 2 July 1940; Marshal Rodolfo Graziani: Ha difeso la patria (Milan, Garzanti, 1947), pp. 209–11, 212; Weygand: Mémoires, iii. 267, 269, 70. Badoglio (op. cit. pp. 45–47) alleges that Mussolini on 16 June ordered that the attack should begin on the 18th, but Badoglio’s dates are not always accurate, and the attack certainly did not begin until the 21st.
⁴ See Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 2, 16 July 1940; Ciano: Europa, p. 568; Eng. version, p. 377; Mussolini to Hitler, 2, 12, 26 June, 17 July 1940 (Hitler e Mussolini, nos. 26, 27, 29, and 30).
⁵ Führer Conferences, 1940, 4 June, 25 July, 6 September (pp. 56, 74, 92); ibid. 1943, 8 February (p. 7); Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 7 September 1940.
⁶ See, for instance, Jodl’s memorandum of 30 June 1940 (N.C.A., Supplement A, p. 1405 (1776–PS)).
⁸ Führer Conferences, 1940, p. 81; Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, pp. 340–1.
turning their attention to preparing war against Russia, and Halder’s view that the Mediterranean was a sideshow where German troops would be sacrificed to no useful end prevailed correspondingly at OKW and OKH;¹ and it was the Naval General Staff who did most to persuade Hitler of the importance of this area, while even they were primarily interested in Gibraltar and Morocco.²

(b) Hitler’s First Attempts to Retrieve Mussolini’s Blunders in Greece and Libya

From the early days of the Italian invasion of Greece, and certainly from the moment when the British occupied Crete and Lemnos, Hitler expected Mussolini’s rashness to have serious consequences, both military and political, for the Axis,³ among them one of the blows he feared most of all—the bombing of the Rumanian oilfields. By 4 November he had decided to retrieve the situation by invading Greece himself.⁴ Keitel hinted at this when he saw Badoglio at Innsbruck on 11 November,⁵ and fuller explanations followed during Ciano’s visit to Salzburg on the 18th–20th. The Greeks, by now, were driving back their invaders, and the British Fleet Air Arm had just sunk one Italian battleship and damaged two others in Taranto harbour on the night of the 11th. In his talks with Ciano and in a letter of 20 November to Mussolini⁶ Hitler acted the part of True-hearted Comrade passionately; tears glistened in his eyes when he spoke of Mussolini’s support at the time of the Anschluss; but he also expatiated relentlessly on the mistakes that had been made, and was at pains to remind Mussolini how easily bombers could reach Southern Italy from Greece. Finally, when reassured that Yugoslavia was not to be attacked as well, he threw himself wholeheartedly into planning the next moves in the game.

His new plans, besides a Balkan campaign and the capture of Gibraltar,⁷ called for a fresh effort to expel the British from the eastern Mediterranean. The Italians must reach Mersa Matruh as soon as possible, in order to have a base whence they might fly to drive the British fleet from Alexandria and mine the Suez Canal; and—as the war had now (he considered) already demonstrated the uselessness of bombing non-military targets⁸—the Axis air forces should agree, apart from support to the troops in Albania, to

² C.f. Fuhrer Conferences, 1940, pp. 125–9; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939, 16, ii: Hitler’s Europe, pp. 100–3. ³ See also above, p. 63. ⁴ Fuhrer Conferences, 1940, p. 113.
⁵ Ciano: Berlino, 16 November 1940.
⁷ For ‘Operation Felix’ see also p. 59 above.
⁸ See Hitler to Mussolini, 20 November 1940 (Hitler e Mussolini, no. 33, p. 76).
concentrate on British warships and merchant vessels. He could transfer air forces at once for this purpose. Mussolini accepted this offer on 22 November, with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm, and General Milch arrived in Rome early in December to discuss the transfer of a German air corps, which was to form a separate command, and return to Germany as soon as it had completed its task, if possible early in February.

December only brought new humiliations to Mussolini. His first reaction to the news, received on 4 December, that the Greeks had taken the Albanian town of Pogradets, was to think of suing through Hitler for a truce; his next was to send Alfieri post-haste from sick-leave in Italy to beg that the Germans would create a diversion by moving troops in the Balkans, or by compelling Bulgaria to mobilize, or at the very least that they would provide military and technical help. Hitler told Alfieri that Italy must at all costs hold out in Albania, and proposed a Brenner meeting, which Mussolini did his best to evade.

Wavell's offensive in the Western Desert on the night of 9 December soon brought the Fascist Government back as suppliants before Hitler, imploring him for war material to replace Graziani's losses. Moreover, Italy's political stability seemed for a while to be in danger. Marshal Badoglio, Chief of the General Staff, had not stood firm in his objections to Mussolini's adventures, but had said enough to bring himself into disfavour, and the situation called for a scapegoat. A series of attacks in Farinacci's ultra-Fascist Regime Fascista forced Badoglio to resign on 26 November, and for a few days it seemed that this might bring all Italy's discontent and defeatism to a head. As it turned out, Badoglio chose not to rebel, the new Chief of Staff, General Ugo Cavallero (appointed on 6 December) proved notoriously subservient to the Germans, and Churchill's broadcast of 23 December on the evils which 'one man alone' had brought upon Italy had no immediate effect.

Hitler and those around him had not failed to notice these threats of an Italian collapse. They continued to harp on Mussolini's folly in attacking Greece, they did not conceal their opinion of the Italian forces, and for

1 Hitler e Mussolini, no. 34.
2 Ibid. no. 36; Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 6 December 1940; see also Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, p. 5. German dive-bombers began attacking British warships from bases in South Italy on 10 January 1941.
3 Alfieri: Due dittatori, p. 102; Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 4 December 1940.
4 Alfieri, op. cit. pp. 102 seqq.; Simoni: Berlino, 7, 8, 9, 23 December 1940. On the morrow of this interview, Ciano rang up the Berlin Embassy to say that the news was better, and Alfieri must on no account ask for help.
5 On questions of supply see below, pp. 317-19.
7 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, p. 128; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-45, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 102; Simoni: Berlino, 9 January 1941.
8 Ibid. 12 December 1940.
9 A German naval memorandum of 14 November had submitted to OKH that Italian leader-
some weeks they gave Italy only such help as did not involve sending German troops where they might be trapped by another Italian defeat.\(^1\) Whereas, in spite of the discouraging attitude of the Italians and of OKH, preparations had after all been made to send an armoured division to North Africa,\(^2\) Jodl now told an Italian purchasing commission that this plan was shelved owing to 'the crisis of confidence' that had arisen.\(^3\) The Italian diplomats in Berlin not unnaturally began to imagine that their country was simply being left to her fate.\(^4\)

By the New Year Hitler had decided that it would be worth while doing rather more to keep the Italians in the war, but that he must avoid asserting German leadership too strongly for fear of alienating Mussolini.\(^5\) He made up his mind to hold Libya, for the sake of Axis prestige and in order to deny the British the opportunity of linking up their forces through North Africa. For a time he also contemplated sending an expeditionary force to Albania to enable the Italians to hold their positions and to engage the main body of the Greek and 'Anglo-Greek' forces; but he had changed his mind on this point by the third week of January, when he and Mussolini met in conference at Berchtesgaden.\(^6\) Hitler had insisted on Mussolini coming to Germany for the conference; and, though the latter had told Ciano as they were arriving how much he dreaded meeting Hitler just then, he seems to have left Berchtesgaden, as on previous occasions, quite intoxicated by the experience.\(^7\)

The reason which Hitler gave for not sending troops to Albania was that this would draw too much attention to his own plans against Greece.\(^8\) Mussolini nagged his unwilling commanders into attacking the Greeks on 9-21 March, but his hopes were frustrated, and he had perforce to wait for the German invasion—in considerable trepidation, meanwhile, ship was wretched, and that the German army and air force would have to intervene in the eastern Mediterranean, as the Italian forces were incapable of the quick and decisive action needed to restore the balance in favour of the Axis; in short, that no substantial support at all could be expected from Italy in future (Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, pp. 125-9; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, pp. 100-3).

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\(^1\) See Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 1 December 1940; Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 5 December 1940; Simoni, op. cit. 27 November 1940; Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, p. 5.

\(^2\) Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, pp. 2, 3.

\(^3\) Simoni, op. cit. 30 December 1940.

\(^4\) Ibid. 17 December 1940.

\(^5\) Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 8-9 January (p. 8). Hitler really seems to have suspected at this time that Mussolini's attitude towards him had changed (see Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 3 January 1941).

\(^6\) On the development of Hitler's plans see Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 27 December (p. 136); ibid. 1941, 8-9 January (pp. 8-10); Fuhrer Directive no 22, 11 January 1941 (ibid. pp. 13-15, and I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 58-61 (448-PS)); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 107; Hitler to Mussolini, 31 December 1940 (Hitler e Mussolini, no. 37).

\(^7\) For the Berchtesgaden Conference see Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 10, 16, 18 21 January 1941; Ciano: Europa, pp. 625-9; Eng. version, pp. 417-20; I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiv. 462-71 (134 C); N.C.A. vi. 939-46; see also Allieri: Due dittatori, pp. 110-20.

\(^8\) Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 18-21 January 1941. Mussolini was no doubt gratified at being asked to try, where Hitler himself had just failed, to entice France into the war.

\(^9\) I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiv. 460 (134-C); N.C.A. vi. 943.
lest the Yugoslavs should attack Fiume, Zara, or Scutari. An account of the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Axis will be found elsewhere in this Survey. Here it need only be said that the Italian forces tried unsuccessfully to beat their allies in the race into Greece; that it was to the Germans that the Greeks surrendered; that the armistice terms were settled with the merest 'by your leave' to Italy; and that Germany rigged the partition of Yugoslavia and the occupation régime for Greece in such a way as to give Italy a full share of the kicks and herself most of the half-pence.

Meanwhile German reinforcements had already arrived in North Africa. At the beginning of the year Hitler had meant to send only an anti-tank regiment, in view of the lack of harbour facilities in Libya and the danger of a larger force being cut off; but on 3 February he announced at a military conference that he had decided to send an armoured force there after all, on the ground that if the British conquered the whole of Libya they could hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her to make peace and also that they would have a dozen divisions free for use in Syria, in support of Turkey. On 14 February, the Afrika Korps, commanded by Lieut.-General (afterwards Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel, began to disembark at Tripoli. Rommel counter-attacked on 24 March, reoccupied Benghazi on 4 April, and crossed the Egyptian frontier on the 10th, though the British continued to hold Tobruk. This was done entirely on his own initiative and his boldness led to an angry scene with the Italian commander in North Africa, General Gariboldi, from which he emerged triumphant, thanks to the arrival of a telegram from OKW giving him a completely free hand as regards the Italians.

This was not the only occasion on which Rommel received orders direct from OKW, by-passing the Italian Supreme Command and headquarters in North Africa, under whose operational command he was supposed to be. (In August 1942 he was placed directly under the Italian Supreme Command.) He became deservedly popular with the Italian soldiers who served under him, but his relations with the Italian headquarters staff were never good. A more serious handicap to the Afrika Korps, even than friction with the Italians, was the lack of interest shown by Hitler and OKH in the possibilities of the North African front.

1 Anfuso: Roma, Berlino, Salò, p. 184; Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 2 April 1941.
3 Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, p. 9.
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 396-9 (872 -PS); N.C.A. iii. 630-3; Documents (R.I.L.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 108.
6 Ibid. pp. 25-26; Young: Rommel, p. 93.
7 Brigadier G. Clifton: The Happy Hunted (London, Cassell, 1952), p. 223. For Rommel's opinion of the Italian forces see Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 2 August and 14 December 1941; Rommel, op. cit. p. 60; Westphal: Heer in Fesseln, pp. 157 8; Young: Rommel, pp. 141 seqq.
Brauchitsch on 3 February had advised against transferring armoured units from the operations against Greece and Russia. Halder told Rommel that his force was expendable and was only meant to delay the Italian collapse in Libya as long as might be, and also, that, because of supply difficulties, more than two or three German divisions could not be maintained in Africa; and Rommel frequently complained in his memoirs that the Afrika Korps was starved of men and material.

The arrival of Rommel's forces in Libya drew Italy more deeply into the Nazi machine. The Germans set up their own supply and signal services in Italy, as well as in Africa, and, collectively and individually, they put a new strain on that country's bankrupt economy, while the Italians not unnaturally feared that they had brought with them a hidden army of spies, Gestapo agents, and fifth columnists. It came to be believed, for instance, that thousands of Nazi terrorists would go into action in Rome and other cities at the first sign of Italy's deserting the Axis; and though no trace of such a scheme appears in the records of Hitler's naval and military conferences in July-August 1943, the fear of it had a most demoralizing effect on the Badoglio Government. It would have been well worth the Germans' while to foster such rumours themselves.

(c) From the German Invasion of Russia to the Fall of Tunis

(1) Italy's Part in the Russian Campaign, 1941-3

The Fascist Government were not, of course, told anything beforehand about 'Operation Barbarossa'. From time to time Hitler or Ribbentrop would comment unfavourably on the state of German-Soviet relations, but, even at the Brenner meeting of 2 June 1941, Ribbentrop assured Ciano that rumours of imminent hostilities were premature. Having drawn their own conclusions from developments during the past year, the Italians were not, however, surprised when Ribbentrop, at Venice on 15 June, announced that Germany was about to present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government, and, undeterred by Ribbentrop's assertion that Germany was prepared to tackle the U.S.S.R. singlehanded, Mussolini promptly offered Hitler an Italian army corps for the eastern front.

At 3 a.m. on 22 June Prince Otto von Bismarck, German Minister in Rome, handed Ciano a long message for Mussolini in which Hitler excused himself for giving such short notice by saying that the final decision to attack had not been taken until 7 p.m. on the 21st. He argued at great

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1 Rommel: Krieg ohne Hass, p. 388; cf. p. 20.
2 See below, p. 319, and Rossi: Come arrivammo all'armistizio, pp. 18-19, 209-10.
4 Ibid. pp. 660-1 and 422 respectively; Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 2 June 1941.
6 See Hitler e Mussolini, no. 44, p. 102.
7 Ibid. no. 44.
length on the necessity of eliminating the U.S.S.R. before settling accounts with Great Britain, and he spoke of sharing the wealth of the Ukraine. He accepted Mussolini’s offer of troops, but declared that he was in no hurry for them and that Italy could best help Germany by strengthening the North African army, by showing a more combative spirit at sea and in the air, and by making ready to invade France or Tunisia if France should ever break her treaty obligations.

In spite of this ungracious reception of his offer Mussolini declared war on the U.S.S.R. as early as he could on 22 June, and replied next day to Hitler’s message, assuring him of the enthusiasm of the old guard of the Party for the war, and the excellent morale of the Italian people. Determined to raise Italy’s prestige by showing the flag on the front where Hitler expected the war to be won, and by contributing more soldiers and fewer non-combatant workers to the Axis war-effort, he hurried off a corps of three divisions to the eastern front, and planned to send another as soon as possible. Hitler, though for some time unwilling to accept more Italian troops, agreed to do so in the autumn of 1941, and suggested that they should take part in the conquest of the Caucasus, as Transcaucasia was destined to form part of Italy’s Lebensraum. At the end of December 1941 he even asked Mussolini to make sure that Italian reinforcements would be in position by spring.

It was not until July 1942, however, that the ‘Corpo Italiano di Spedizione in Russia’ was expanded into the Italian Eighth Army, ‘Armata Italiana in Russia’ or ‘Armir’, consisting of ten divisions and 220,000 men. It had not been easy for Italy to equip a force of this size, and the usual Italo-German friction arose over supplying it when it had reached the front. The Italian forces had come through the winter of 1941-2 without disaster, but the Soviet offensive of December 1942—January 1943 set them a task beyond their strength. Relations between the Axis partners were not improved by mutual recriminations after the Stalingrad disaster, and when the Soviet forces broke through in January 1943 the Germans

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1 Cf. Hitler e Mussolini, no. 45. For Mussolini’s resentment at not having been told earlier of Hitler’s plans see Ciano: _Diario_ (1939-43), 30 June 1941.
2 Mussolini’s report to Comando Supremo (Hitler e Mussolini, no. 49); see also Bottai: _Vent’anni_, 5 July 1911.
4 Cavallero: _Comando Supremo_, 1 January 1942; Simoni: _Berlino_, 8, 21 January 1912.
6 E.g. Cavallero, op. cit. 9 September 1941, 27 January, 16 August 1942; Ciano: _Diario_ (1939-43), 13, 20 February 1942.
7 See Alfieri: _Due dittatori_, pp. 282-3; Cavallero, op. cit. 18 December 1942; Liddell Hart: _The Other Side of the Hill_, citing Blumentritt; Mussolini to Hitler, 8 March 1913 (Hitler e Mussolini, no. 57); Simoni: _Berlino_, 18 December 1942, 13, 14, 15 January 1943; Alfieri—Ribbentrop meeting, 21 February 1943 (I.M.T. _Nuremberg_, xxv. 458 9).
refused to give the Italians any motor transport, and the ‘Armir’ therefore
had to make its way back from the Don to Kiev as best it could. The
remnant which survived was withdrawn from the front.¹

(2) Mussolini Faces a Second Year of War

Not long after Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. Mussolini had expressed
the hope that the Germans would ‘lose a lot of feathers’, because a total
German victory would reduce Italy to vassalage.² Yet even when Ribben-
trop paid a hurried visit to Rome on 13-14 May 1941 to explain away
Hess’s flight to Great Britain, Mussolini does not seem to have realized how
alarmed the Germans were at the possible effects of this flight on Italy,³
or to have made any effort to take advantage of the situation. Instead, as
he so often did, he took refuge in words, and celebrated the completion of
a year of war that had destroyed both the military reputation of the
Fascist régime and its East African empire⁴ by reluctantly complimenting
the Germans in an anniversary oration in the Fascist Chamber, and by
angrily pouring out his grievances against them in private.⁵

Nevertheless, he readily accepted an invitation from Hitler to visit the
eastern front,⁶ and the only reason for the meeting⁷ being delayed till
25-28 August 1941 seems to have been that operations had gone more
slowly than had been expected. It was quite fruitless as far as Italy was
concerned, and Mussolini could only console himself with the hope that
the Germans, having failed to defeat the Russians in the expected eight
weeks, would realize that they could not hope to win the war singlehanded,
and would seek the support of other nations by promising to respect their
national and social ideals.⁸ Mussolini, shortly after his return, found it
desirable to allay suspicions that his visit had left him in a hostile mood,

¹ Rossi, op. cit. pp. 15-16, 70, note.
² Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 1 July 1941.
³ Goebbels: Diaries, 20 March 1942, 23 September 1913; Rudolf Semmler: Goebbels—the Man
⁴ On the Duce’s regrets for his Empire see Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 30 May, 7 July 1941.
⁵ They rang for him, he told Ciano, as if he were a servant. They summoned him by telephone
to meetings without any agenda, where Hitler did all the talking, and no decisions were taken.
In Greece they had made an armistice behind his back, and a Romagnol division had been
ignominiously turned back by a German sentry at the bridge at Perato. In Croatia, they pretended
to recognize Italian rights, but left Italy nothing but a heap of bones picked clean of every
morsel of meat. In the face of all this, he meant to go on strengthening the Alpine Wall. It might
come in useful some day, but, at present, one must ‘howl with the wolves’ (ibid. 10 June 1941,
cf. 31 May, 8, 9 June 1941). At times his mind turned to the crisis which the Fascist regime would
face at home if the Germans forbade him to annex Corsica, Tunisia, and Nice, or, worse still,
if they were to demand the South Tyrol; or he even imagined himself defending Italy against
German armies (ibid. 1 June, 6, 20 July 1941).
⁶ See Hitler to Mussolini, 30 June 1941 (Hitler e Mussolini, no. 46); Mussolini to Hitler, 2 July
1941 (Alfieri: Due dattilovri, pp. 359-60).
⁷ Minutes of meeting in Ciano: Europa, pp. 669-75; Eng. version pp. 447-52; see also Alfieri,
op. cit. pp. 210-23; Anfuso: Roma, Berlino, Salsi, pp. 229-79; Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 25-29
August 1941.
⁸ Alfieri, op. cit. p. 221; Anfuso, op. cit. pp. 235, 238, 263.
and that he was hastening the completion of the Alpine Wall,¹ but, in fact, as Ciano reported in his Diary for 13 October, he recognized that the most Italy could expect was to become a province in Germany's Europe, while, if she resisted any German demands, however outrageous, she might share the fate of the vanquished countries, and become a mere German colony.

Suddenly, in the middle of October 1941, the Germans changed their tune. Ciano was invited to visit Germany and the eastern front on 25–29 October.² He was received with unusual attentions and with compliments on the achievements of the Italian army and on the important part Italy would play in establishing the new Europe as a barrier against American imperialism. Cordiality towards Italy was still the order of the day when Ciano visited Berlin on 24–27 November for the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact.³ He reported to Mussolini that the Nazi leaders' behaviour on this occasion clearly showed that Italy, though not on an equal footing with Germany, was more nearly so than any other state, not excepting Japan.⁴ The Germans, he noted in his Diary, were the masters of Europe, and let this be felt. One simply had to accept that, but what really mattered was to sit, as Italy was sitting, at the master's right hand.

This display of cordiality could not alter the fact that Mussolini was being compelled to 'swallow a toad' (to use an Italian phrase) which no amount of sugared words could make palatable. Italy's dependence on Germany was being emphasized, at this very time, by the arrival of Kesselring with wide powers as Commander-in-Chief, South,⁵ and by the German veto on Italian negotiations with France about transit through Bizerta.⁶ It was not surprising that Mussolini should watch the German reverses of the winter of 1941–2 in Russia with a certain malicious relish. While he did not want Germany to 'lose' too many 'feathers', he felt that the great spaces of Russia were an enemy not easily to be overcome, and that the Axis would be well advised to make a separate peace with the U.S.S.R.⁷

By this time, also (though Mussolini himself does not appear to have admitted as much), the balance of power had been altered to the disadvantage of the Axis by the entry of the United States into the war; a portent which not even the succession of Allied defeats in the Far East could disguise in a country where peasants in the remotest villages hung

⁵ See below, p. 305.
⁶ See below, pp. 303–4.
⁷ See below, p. 310.
Roosevelt’s picture side by side with that of the local wonder-working Madonna.\(^1\) Mussolini’s speech announcing Italy’s declaration of war on the United States on 11 December was neither given nor received with enthusiasm. For a time he affected great admiration for Japan,\(^2\) but actual co-operation between the two countries continued to be negligible.\(^3\) Doubts as to the outcome of the war, added to his persistent suspicions of Germany, moved him in the spring of 1942 to speak of building up an army in Northern Italy in readiness for whatever surprises 1943 might bring,\(^4\) but instead of doing anything of the kind he sent the Alpini to the Ukrainian steppes.

(3) Franco-Italian Relations

The vexed question of Axis relations with France took a new turn in 1941 with the growing need of the Axis Powers to shorten the Mediterranean crossing by inducing the Vichy Government to let them land war supplies at Tunisian ports. The Germans actually secured this privilege in the second of the abortive Paris protocols of 28 May 1941,\(^5\) but, when Mussolini asked that Italy might be placed on an equal footing with Germany as regards transit through Bizerta, the Germans told him that French permission only applied to Germany and to non-military supplies,\(^6\) though, in fact, the protocol expressly mentioned war material. Ribbentrop advised Ciano on 2 June that such important negotiations had far better be left in German hands, as the French were so much more apt to take offence when dealing with Italians, and that what he described as the Vichy Government’s refusal to let Italians make use of Tunis need cause no anxiety at Rome, seeing that the Axis understandings on Tunisia were still valid, and would be carried out after the war.\(^7\)

Hitler shortly afterwards (on 25 July) told Raeder, one of those most in favour of conciliating France, that relations with Italy must on no account be allowed to deteriorate,\(^8\) but the emphasis was apt to be the other way round when Nazi spokesmen were addressing Italians. Keitel told Cavallero, at the Brenner meeting on 2 June, that Hitler had forbidden

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3 For instances of such co-operation see Cavallero: *Comando Supremo*, 24 February, 11 September 1942; and for the text of the Italo-Japanese economic agreement of 20 January 1943 see *Giornale d’Italia*, 22 January 1943.
4 Ciano: *Diario* (1939-43), 24 March, 1 April 1943. Ciano for his part felt that it might not be so long before a small but effective army might decide the fate of Europe.
5 William L. Langer: *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York, Knopf, 1947), pp. 147 seqq., 404-5; see also pp. 382-3 below.
6 Cavallero: op. cit. 26, 29, 31 May, 2 June 1941.
8 *Fuehrer Conferences, 1941*, p. 94. Hitler told his naval adjutant on 10 August 1941 that the reason why he had not accepted the offer of collaboration made by Pétain in July was that he must continue to support Italy’s demands, and he knew that France would never agree to them (Assmann: *Deutsche Schicksalsjahre*, p. 325).
him to discuss Italy’s claims, and both Keitel and Ribbentrop at Venice on 15 June dwelt on the danger of putting pressure on France. In August Mussolini thought of sounding the French with a view to an immediate settlement in Western Europe, leaving the fate of the colonies to be settled after the war, and offering France the Walloon part of Belgium in return for Nice and Corsica, while, later in the month, at Rastenburg, he told Hitler that relations should be put on a new basis as the Armistice Conventions were a dead letter; but Hitler preferred to postpone negotiations till the defeat of Russia should have deprived the French of their last illusions.

Ciano, when he visited Berlin in November, proposed a meeting between himself and Darlan. Ribbentrop approved, but strictly on condition that political questions should be eschewed. The Italian High Command were now particularly anxious to have the use of Bizerta, as the British were once more invading Cyrenaica, but Hitler expressly forbade any negotiations on this point; and the only result of the Darlan–Ciano meeting, which took place on 10 December in Turin, was the appointment of an Italian Ambassador at Vichy. (Afterwards, on German advice, Italy sent an Ambassador to Paris as well.) Cavallero, with unusual pertinacity, even took the step of drafting a letter for Mussolini to send to Hitler insisting that the Tunisian ports must be secured, either by agreement (even at the price of military concessions to France) or by force. Some new approach seems, indeed, to have been made to France, for Ciano on 20 January 1942 reported that the French terms were very stiff, and Hitler would not consider them. Meanwhile, both Axis Powers had been making arrangements with the French for clandestine facilities, the Germans as usual being much the more successful in doing so.

(4) The Axis in the Mediterranean

By the end of 1941 the German navy as well as the army was making its pressure felt on Italy’s Mediterranean realm. German pressure had forced

1 Cavallero, op. cit. 2 June 1941.
3 Cavallero, op. cit. 15 August 1941; cf. Hitler’s similar offer of 11/12 May to Darlan (Langer: Our Vicky Gamble, p. 150).
4 Ciano: Europa, p. 675; Eng. version, p. 450.
5 Ibid. p. 689; omitted from Eng. version.
6 Cavallero, op. cit. 3, 10 December 1941; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 7 December 1941.
7 Ibid. 10 December 1941; Ciano: Europa, pp. 668–702; Eng. version, pp. 468–71; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europa, p. 112. The English version of Europa is misleading. At the meeting, Darlan did mention the Tunisian ports, and hinted that it might be possible, though dangerous, to consider allowing the transit of war material (though not, under any circumstances, of troops). At the Saint-Florentin meeting of 1 December, however, Darlan and General Juin had told Goring that France could not make Bizerta available to Germany without grave danger of a conflict with the United States (Langer, op. cit. pp. 198–200).
8 See Hitler’s Mussolini, no. 50; Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 29 December 1941, 1 January 1942; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europa, p. 115; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 29 December 1941, 1 January 1942.
the Italians to undertake that cruise against British convoys in the eastern Mediterranean that ended on 28 March 1941 in the Battle of Matapan, and the German, as well as the Italian, air force bore its share of responsibility for the lack of air support on that occasion. After the fall of Greece, Italian naval forces in the Aegean came under the operational control of the newly appointed German ‘Admiral South-East’, and German submarines were sent to the Mediterranean, though the total German naval force there was never large.

The Italian navy had no aircraft carriers, had suffered heavy losses at Matapan, and was in constant difficulties as regards fuel; and it attempted very little beyond the protection of convoys. Even in the performance of this duty the Italians failed to satisfy the Germans, who suspected their allies of trying to preserve their warships and merchant shipping as trump cards for the future, and, with this end in view, of deliberately slowing down the transport of supplies.

Two-thirds of the Axis shipping bound for Libya during the last quarter of 1941 is reported to have been sunk on the way. To break this air and sea blockade Hitler transferred Luftflotte II from the eastern front to the Mediterranean, and appointed its commander, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief South, with authority over the whole of the Luftwaffe in Italy, Greece, and North Africa, and afterwards over German naval forces in the Mediterranean as well. Early in 1943 German land forces in the Mediterranean also came under his control. Kesselring was nominally subordinate to the Italian Comando Supremo, but Göring had the right to make direct contact with him in all matters affecting the Luftwaffe. The Italians thwarted Hitler’s plan that Kesselring should

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1 Record of meeting between Raeder and Admiral Riccardi, 13 14 February 1941 (Angelo Jachino: Gaudio e Matapan (Milan, Mondadori, 1947), pp. 265–7); see also ibid. passim, and Admiral Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope: A Sailor’s Odyssey (London, Hutchinson, 1951), pp. 325 seqq.

2 Fiehler Conferences, 1941, 22 May (pp. 49, 58).

3 Ibid, 17 September, 13 November, 12 December (pp. 113, 121, 130); Cunningham, op. cit. p. 122.

4 Cavallero, op. cit. 2 September 1941, 2 June 1942; Fiehler Conferences, 1941, 18 March (p. 34).

5 Ibid 6 June, 25 July, 13 November (pp. 87, 97, 122–3); Anthony Martiensen: Hitler and his Admirals (London, Secker and Warburg, 1948), pp. 126, 130; Rommel: Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 111 seqq., 117, 202 seqq., 227 seqq. The Germans were critical of the discipline of the crews of Italian freighters on dangerous voyages. For a more favourable view see Cunningham, op. cit. p. 525.

6 Italy lost 1,705,297 tons of merchant shipping up to 8 September 1943, and 836,139 more tons before the end of the war (Istituto per gli Studi di Economia: Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana (Florence, Vallecchi, 1919), pp. 382–3). German suspicions of Italian unwillingness to risk warships were not without foundation. For Mussolini’s order that warships should not go beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft see Cavallero, op. cit. 25 July 1941.

7 Cunningham, op. cit. p. 420; cf. Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, pp. 349–50, 355, 362; Martiensen, op. cit. p. 125. Aircraft, submarines, and even hospital ships (Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 19 May, 2 September 1942) were now being used to carry Axis troops and supplies.
control the Italian air force and part of the navy, but, even as it was, the new arrangement brought them more closely under German domination.\(^1\)

The lack of harmony between the Axis leaders and the inability of the Italians to influence policy or to take any independent action became even more marked during 1942 than it had been in 1941. Rommel’s counter-attack of 21 January 1942 carried the Afrika Korps across the bulge of Cyrenaica to Gazala. More important still, the Axis Powers had the most favourable opportunity since the summer of 1940 of silencing Malta, and began to take advantage of it. From January onwards they kept up an air offensive on the island and on all convoys approaching it, and in February the Comando Supremo, assisted by German and Japanese staff officers, began to make plans for landing an Italo-German expeditionary force there.\(^2\) Even now, however, Hitler did not realize the importance of taking Malta by assault. He considered the operation extremely hazardous, had little confidence in Italian troops, and was loath to spare any of his own from the eastern front during the campaigning season.\(^3\) The Italian High Command, for their part, were fully conscious of the danger from Malta, but lacking in resolution as regards either undertaking their share of the assault or even putting their case to the Germans. Nor was it one of the matters about which Mussolini was continually appealing to Hitler. The difference of opinion was not clear-cut as between Germans and Italians, for Raeder, Kesselring, and, for a time, Rommel were all in favour of the assault.\(^4\)

At the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini on 29–30 April 1942 it was decided to invade Malta in July, after Rommel’s desert offensive, planned for the end of May, had had time to develop.\(^5\) In mid-June, however, Hitler, without consulting Mussolini, decided to postpone the landing until after his summer offensive in Russia or, at the earliest, the end of August.\(^6\) The Axis continued to blockade Malta, but a large convoy got through in August, and Malta became able not only to defend itself

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2 See Cavallero, op. cit. 27 January, February and March, passim, and 12, 21 April 1942; Fuhrer Conferences, 1942, 12 March (pp. 19–20); Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 243.

3 Hitler was less interested in Malta than in Gibraltar, and contrary to the advice of OKW had decided to attack Crete rather than Malta in 1941 (cf. ibid. p. 238).

4 Fuhrer Conferences, 1941, 18 March, 22 August (pp. 34–35, 100, 102); I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiv. 669 (167–C); Westpfal: Heer in Fesseln, p. 176.

5 Fuhrer Conferences, 1942, p. 37.

6 As late as 20 June Mussolini signed a letter reminding Hitler of the importance of Malta and asking for supplies for the invasion (Cavallero, op. cit. 20 June 1942; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 22, 23 June 1942). For Hitler’s reply see Cavallero, op. cit. 24 June 1942; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 116; Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, p. 358; Fuhrer Conference, 1942, p. 47.
against invasion, but to turn the tables on its besiegers by once more harrying their convoys to Libya.\(^1\)

Meanwhile Rommel’s new offensive, launched on 26 May, had led to the fall of Tobruk on 21 June and raised German hopes that the Axis forces would be able to pursue the Eighth Army into the Nile Valley and destroy it there.\(^2\) Mussolini, also, was intoxicated by Rommel’s victory; the Foreign Ministry in Rome drafted a declaration of independence for Egypt, and Mussolini himself flew to Libya on 29 June, expecting to make a triumphal entry into Egypt within a fortnight and to be on the spot in time to prevent the Germans from cheating Italy over Egypt as they had cheated her over Greece.\(^3\)

The hopes of the two dictators, however, were frustrated by the British stand at Alamein, and Mussolini returned to Italy on 20 July, professing confidence that the advance would be resumed in two or three weeks’ time.\(^4\) But Rommel’s successive attempts, ending on 30 August, to break through the British lines failed to achieve success. The desert war was at a standstill until the night of 23–24 October, when Montgomery launched the offensive which carried his forces as far as Tripoli before the end of January 1943.\(^5\) Before the Axis army began to retreat, the Italian divisions suffered heavily, and there were again accusations that the Germans had left them in the lurch, and had even taken their motor-transport for the Afrika Korps.\(^6\) During this period also, the Italians were taking punishment at home; for a series of heavy Allied air-raids on Genoa, Turin, and Milan began at the end of October 1942.

While Montgomery was pursuing Rommel across the desert, the Allies made landings in Algeria and Morocco.\(^7\) Hardly a single Axis meeting from June 1940 onwards can have passed without some mention of the danger of an Allied landing in French North-West or West Africa, and at the meeting of 29–30 April 1942 it had been arranged that, if the Allies landed either in France or in North Africa, Italy should be ready to march into France.\(^8\) Operations had not, however, been worked out jointly in detail, nor had any agreement been reached as to how Germany and Italy were to share the new zone of occupation. For months, too, Hitler and Musso-

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\(^1\) Several tankers carrying petrol for the Afrika Korps were sunk at the time of Rommel’s last attempt to break through at Alamein.

\(^2\) See also Survey for 1939-46: America, Britain, and Russia, p. 187.

\(^3\) German experts were already reported to be amassing Egyptian currency and preparing to requisition cotton, and Hitler was proposing joint control of civilian administration (Donosti: Mussolini e l’Europa, pp. 281–2).

\(^4\) Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 21 July 1942.


\(^6\) Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 8, 10, 11 November 1942; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 12 November 1942, 22 January 1943.

\(^7\) See Survey for 1939–46: America, Britain, and Russia, pp. 201–9, 218–19, 245 seqq.

\(^8\) Cavallero, op. cit. 30 April 1942.
lina had been considering precautions against landings elsewhere in the Mediterranean, and by October 1942 they were expecting that such a landing might be made any day, very possibly in the eastern Mediterranean.\(^1\) But when Axis intelligence reported the massing of a great convoy at Gibraltar at the beginning of November, many different guesses were expressed as to its destination,\(^2\) and preparations were actually made to deal with an invasion fleet making for Tunis or Tripolitania, and the news of the events during the night of 7–8 November took the Axis leaders by surprise. On the evening of 8 November Hitler convened a meeting at Munich, to settle Axis policy towards France and to announce the decision to Laval. Mussolini sent Ciano, instructing him to say that Italy would offer the French every assistance if they collaborated with the Axis, but would occupy the unoccupied zone of France and Corsica if collaboration was refused. At about midnight Hitler, who had been marking off the distance between Rome and Tunis on a map torn out of a railway guide and had then fallen into a kind of trance, suddenly announced his decision to occupy France and Corsica at once;\(^3\) and then or later he also decided to hold a bridgehead in Tunisia.\(^4\) Italian troops began to advance in France on 10 November and to land in Corsica on the night of 10–11 November, making every effort to keep pace with the Germans.\(^5\) At Munich on the 10th Hitler had ostentatiously cut short an attempt by Laval to offer the use of Tunisian ports in return for an Italian renunciation of territorial claims; but once the Axis troops had begun to move the Germans acted with their usual disregard for any interests but their own. For instance at Toulon, which was jointly occupied, the Germans kept the arsenal in their own hands, and offered Italy only 100,000 tons out of the 500,000 tons of French shipping which they took over.\(^6\) They allowed the Italians to salvage the scuttled warships, but no vessel larger than a destroyer was captured in working order, and, at Hitler’s request, five French torpedo-boats and one gun-boat were even-

\(^1\) e.g. Mussolini’s memorandum to the Comando Supremo, 24 July 1941 (Hitler e Mussolini, no. 49); cf. Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 1 November 1941: summary of letter from Hitler to Mussolini, received 1 November.

\(^2\) See Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, pp. 305, 314–15, 316–18; Cavallero, op. cit. 6 November 1942 (cf. 21 October); Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, pp. 345–6. According to Assmann (p. 307) the Comando Supremo wanted to occupy Tunisia before the Allies landed, but the Germans would not agree.

\(^3\) Simoni: Berlino, 9 November 1942.

\(^4\) Cavallero, op. cit. 11 November 1942; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 9, 10–11 November 1942. On 28 November Hitler told Rommel, who wished to evacuate the Afrika Korps for service on other fronts, that for political reasons a large bridgehead must be maintained in Africa (Rommel: Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 313–15).

\(^5\) Cavallero, op. cit. 11, 12 November 1942. The Italian zone of occupation eventually consisted of the Department of the Alpes Maritimes, and part of that of Savoie, between Modane and Chambéry. The rest of Savoie, Haute Savoie, and the Toulon district were jointly occupied (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16 November 1942).

\(^6\) Cavallero, op. cit. 3, 8 December 1942.
tually handed over to the German navy in order that it might organize convoys of its own in the Mediterranean.\(^1\)

In Tunisia the Italians had hoped to secure political control, but their advanced guard, which reached Tunis on 13 November, was two days behind the Germans, and they soon found themselves in the usual position of inferiority.\(^2\) Hitler’s method of sharing power with the Italians in Tunisia seems to have been to avoid entering into definite arrangements and to build up German strength regardless of the Italians, whom he looked upon as useless for the counter-attack that he still hoped to make.\(^3\)

In the event, the Germans were just able to check the Allied offensive on Tunis in November but were unable to counter-attack.

During the winter of 1942–3 the Germans put even more pressure than before on the Italians to improve the handling of supplies for the Axis forces in North Africa. Hitler told Rommel on 28 November that the supply problem could and must be solved;\(^4\) and at the end of November Göring visited Italy to discuss the problem. He behaved (according to Ciano) very much as if he had appointed himself ‘Reichsprotektor of Italy’.\(^5\) He rated the Italian military leaders for their mistakes, and appointed additional transport controllers, thereby adding to the already great friction and overlapping between the Luftwaffe, the German naval command in Italy, the Comando Supremo, and other Italian bodies—a trouble which was inter-departmental as well as international.

A week or two after Göring’s visit Ciano and Cavallero (Mussolini excused himself on the ground of ill-health) were summoned to Hitler’s

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\(^1\) Ibid. 26 November 1942; Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, p. 15.

\(^2\) For the story that Hitler had agreed to allow Tunisia to be treated as an Italian theatre of war, and that Mussolini had been persuaded by Kesselring to yield precedence to Germany, see Rahn: Ruhelos Leben, pp. 204–5, 210–11.

\(^3\) Gilbert, ed.: Hitler Directs his War, pp. 4–5. The Italians’ war record was, in fact, better than was implied by the jokes about their lack of valour which circulated as readily among the Germans as among the Allies. It was true that the Italian forces in general showed no great enthusiasm for the war and that Fascist zealots were relatively few in number and found mostly in the Blackshirt Brigades. But Rommel, for one, was of opinion that the Italians, though not natural fighters, would have acquitted themselves much better if properly led, and he criticized the Italian officers for not taking a fair share of dangers and privations with their men (Krieg ohne Hass, p. 198). The navy, the most efficient of the services, was to a large extent paralysed by lack of fuel, and its general lack of enterprise was in contrast to the performance of some feats which demanded great individual courage, especially the exploits of the men of the Decima Flottiglia Mas, whose explosive motor-boats and human torpedoes raided Malta, Gibraltar, Suda Bay, and other ports, and who put the Queen Elizabeth and Valiant out of action at Alexandria in December 1941 (Cunningham: A Sailor’s Odyssey, pp. 323, 433–5, 507, 512, 524). The Italian air force also earned commendation from Admiral Cunningham for its reconnaissance flights, torpedo bombing, and accurate and resolute bombing from high levels (ibid. pp. 258–9); cf. Assmann: Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, pp. 333–4.


headquarters. The meeting took place on 18–19 December,\(^1\) just in time for the two Italians to feel the brunt of Nazi wrath at an Italian collapse on the eastern front,\(^2\) where the Russians had recently opened a new offensive. One of the main topics\(^3\) was sea transport, the extreme importance of which was impressed upon the Italians once again. Hitler assured them that if that one problem could be solved the Axis would send its best divisions to North Africa and advance to Algiers and Melilla, thereby compelling the Spaniards to change their attitude. In mid-March Hitler was still declaring that Tunisia must be held,\(^4\) and large reinforcements were in fact sent right up to the middle of April. The result was that after the Allied capture of Tunis and Bizerta early in May some 125,000 Germans and 115,000 Italians were taken prisoner.\(^5\)

\[(d)\] **The Collapse of Italy**

\[(1)\] **Italian Hopes of Peace or of an Escape from the Axis**

Long before defeat was staring them in the face the Fascist leaders had envisaged other possible outcomes of the war than a total Axis victory. Mussolini, in the summer of 1941, would have welcomed a compromise peace as the best chance of retaining the spoils already acquired by Italy, and of preserving her independence against German domination.\(^6\) After Pearl Harbour the Tripartite Alliance began to consider the possibility of dividing their enemies by inducing either Russia or the Western Powers to conclude a separate peace, but could not themselves agree which course to pursue. A suggestion from the Japanese Premier about approaching Russia reached Rome on 28 December and found favour with Mussolini,\(^7\) but not long afterwards various German spokesmen were hinting to the Italians (and Ciano, for one, was inclined to agree with them) that Japanese victories boded ill for all the white races.\(^8\) On 24 February and again on 9 April 1942, shortly after Canaris had been visiting Italy, Bismarck, the German Minister in Rome, went so far as to say that the Fascist Government should take the lead in a peace move, both by approaching the Western Powers and by exercising influence inside the Axis. Bismarck expected Great Britain to be ripe for negotiations by October, especially if the Germans offered to help reconquer Asia for the white

\(^1\) See Cavallero: *Comando Supremo*, 18 December 1942; Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 18, 19 December 1942; Simoni: *Berlino*, 17–20 December 1942.

\(^2\) See also above, pp. 300–1.

\(^3\) Another topic was the need for Italy to fight the Četnici in Yugoslavia instead of alleting them (see below, p. 662). For the question, also raised by Ciano, of peace with Russia see below, p. 311.

\(^4\) He said it would be worth 4 or 5 million tons of shipping to the Allies (*Fuehrer Conferences*, 1943, p. 14).


\(^6\) See Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 6 May, 2 June, 20 July 1941.

\(^7\) Ibid. 28 December 1941.

\(^8\) Ibid. 10, 11 March, 5 April 1942. See also above, pp. 66–67.
races. Mussolini did not respond to any of these suggestions, and Hitler’s speech of 26 April dispelled for the time any hope of an official peace move. When, in May, the Papal Nuncio in Berne consulted Ciano on the prospects of a compromise peace that autumn he declared that Germany would long remain intransigent, that he could as yet see no basis for conciliation, and that the Holy See would be well advised to abstain from action. Nevertheless, Italian fears of a secret German approach to the British were not so easily eradicated, and Ciano was at once on the alert at what he himself admitted was a fantastic report of Anglo-German talks at Lugano.

Mussolini sent Ciano to the Axis meeting of 18–19 December with instructions to advise Hitler to make peace with Russia, or at least to seal off the eastern front, so that as many divisions as possible might be spared for other fronts, especially the Mediterranean. He was also instructed to suggest that Japan might induce the Soviet Government to transfer their ambitions to Central Asia. Hitler, however, refused to entertain any of these suggestions.

By this time nearly every Italian except Mussolini was longing that Italy should escape from the Axis, approach the Allies, and save what still might be saved for herself. Similar ideas were spreading among Germany’s other satellites, and on 19 January 1943 the news reached Rome from Bucharest that Antonescu considered it essential for Italy and Rumania to make contact with the Allies, in the hope of saving Europe from Bolshevism. Mussolini rejected Antonescu’s proposal, but in his messages of 8 and 26 March he urged Hitler to make peace with the U.S.S.R., or at least to stabilize the eastern front. From 7 to 10 April Mussolini and other Italians were at Salzburg for an Axis conference, and on this occasion Giuseppe Bastianini, whom Mussolini had appointed Under-Secretary on taking over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from Ciano in the previous February, recommended peace with Russia, just as Antonescu, on the 12th, was to recommend an approach to the West. Ribbentrop, who was already making efforts to prevent Italy from joining Hungary and Rumania in a drift towards peace with the Allies, still firmly opposed any peace

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1 Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 24 February, 9 April 1942.
3 Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 5 May 1942.
4 Ibid. 20 July 1942.
5 For the arguments with which he supported his refusal see Ciano: Europa, p. 716; Eng. version, p. 482.
6 See below, pp. 327–31 for a description of the Italian state of mind during the war.
8 Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 20 January 1943; see also Bottai, op. cit. 12 March 1943.
9 Hitler e Mussolini, nos. 57, 59; Alfieri to Mussolini, 8 April 1943 (Alfieri: Due dittatori, pp. 305–90).
11 See below, p. 622.
move, but other Germans were beginning to sound the Italian Embassy in Berlin about approaches to the Allies and even to the U.S.S.R.¹

Even before Roosevelt’s demand for unconditional surrender² there was a pathetic flavour of unreality about the various schemes evolved by Italian diplomats and politicians in the hope of persuading Hitler to rescue, or release, his ally, or to open peace negotiations. Bastianini’s attempt in the spring of 1943 to induce the German Government to proclaim a ‘European Charter’ safeguarding the smaller and occupied countries found no favour among the Nazis, and Ribbentrop, when Alfieri discussed European collaboration with him on 11 June, asserted that the Axis must first of all be successful in war, after which it could organize Europe with a stroke of the pen, and that a declaration similar to the Atlantic Charter would only be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Europe, said Ribbentrop, could not be held save by force.³

Even before the fall of Mussolini approaches to the Allies are alleged to have been at least in preparation. Bastianini is reported to have sent two separate agents to Lisbon in July 1943; a banker called Fummi, who might, he hoped, be received in the United States or Great Britain, and Francesco Fransoni, who had not long quitted the post of Minister to Portugal.⁴ Mussolini is alleged to have sanctioned the dispatch of Fummi, on the understanding that he himself should be in no way associated with it. About this time, too, he even began to take a half-hearted interest in Antonescu’s peace scheme, to the length of inviting him to Rome, and telling him, when they met on 1 July, that he might, in certain circumstances, take action for peace independently of Hitler.⁵ His suggestions were, of course, far from practicable, and, as usual, Mussolini vacillated despairingly between these dangerous alternatives.

(2) The Breakdown of the Axis

Hitler, after the loss of Tunisia, waited for the Allies’ next landing, fully conscious that the Italian forces were in no state to resist invaders and that the whole nation was utterly war-weary. Dönitz, reporting on a visit to Italy on 12–15 May, even hesitated when Hitler asked him whether Mussolini would carry on to the end.⁶ Hitler himself had more confidence in Mussolini’s will to resist, but he knew him to be a sick man, and feared that the King might at any moment overthrow him and that the German troops in Sicily might be cut off.⁷ To protect these, and to strengthen the

¹ Simoni: Berlin, 10, 17, 22 February, 11 June, 25, 31 August 1943.
³ Simoni, op. cit. 29 April, 14 May, 11 June 1943; Bottai: Vent’anni, 23 May 1943.
⁵ Ibid. pp. 86, 370.
⁶ Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, 14 May (p. 38).
outer defences of his European Fortress, he now began to move more troops into Italy. Mussolini and his new Chief of Staff, General Ambrosio, who had succeeded Cavallero on 30 January, would much rather have brought back Italian divisions from France and the Balkans, but this the Germans would not allow.¹

After the Axis meeting of 7–10 April Hitler had prided himself on his success in restoring Mussolini, who had arrived at Salzburg 'a broken old man', 'to his old form'.² The Allied landing in Sicily on 10 July³ was followed by fresh German attempts to galvanize Mussolini into taking ruthless action against cowardice and inefficiency.⁴ On 17 July⁵ Hitler told his advisers that nothing short of 'barbaric measures', comparable with Stalin's ruthlessness in 1941, would serve to check demoralization in the Italian army, and to save the nation. What he had in mind was a sort of directorate or court-martial to 'remove undesirable elements'. He considered that, unless something drastic were done, it would be useless to send more German troops to Italy, and that the German army, if it had to fight alone, could not defend the whole peninsula and must shorten its line.

Hitler forthwith proposed an Axis meeting at Feltre on 19 July. For two hours, interrupted only by the news of the first heavy raid on Rome, Mussolini had to listen to a tirade from Hitler;⁶ who told him in detail what ought to be done at the front and on the home front, and held out the hope that, if the Italians resisted in earnest, Sicily could be held until the new German submarines came into operation, when the British in their turn would meet their 'Stalingrad'.⁷ Mussolini hardly opened his mouth in reply to all this, though Ambrosio had warned him that his armies could not hold out more than a month longer, and even Alfieri had suggested that the time had come for Italy to end the Axis. He returned to Rome to face a revolt among his henchmen, and a wider conspiracy, as yet still kept secret, that was to bring about his downfall.

(3) The Fall of Mussolini

The Fascist régime was by now thoroughly discredited by its mismanagement of the war, its corruption, and its squalid personal intrigues. Fascist 'hierarchs' themselves felt that they had lost all contact with the

¹ Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, 13 May (p. 30); Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, pp. 318–51; Westphal: Heer in Fesseln, pp. 216–18, 221–2.
² Goebbels Diaries, 7 May 1943.
⁴ Simoni: Berlino, 16 July 1943.
⁵ Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, pp. 59–64.⁶ See also above, p. 64.
⁷ Cf. minutes of meeting in Hitler e Mussolini, nos. 65 and 66, of which the second is the fuller account; and in Department of State Bulletin, 6 October 1946, pp. 607–14, 639; see also Alfieri: Due dittatori, pp. 304–20; Rossi: Come arrivammo all'armistizio, pp. 40–44, 324–39; Westphal: Heer in Fesseln, pp. 221–2.
nation, and that the whole political machine was running down. The ordinary public, having been so often assured that Mussolini was always right, were all the more ready to believe him always in the wrong; and they longed above all for peace. The more active opponents of the régime, meanwhile, had been preparing to fight it since the early months of 1942, long before either Alamein or the North African landings.\footnote{See below, pp. 328-9.}

During the second half of the year Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, the small Left Centre group afterwards known as Labour Democrats, and the Mazzinian Left-wingers who were about to found the Party of Action, formed an alliance to overthrow Mussolini and bring Italy out of the war.\footnote{Ivanoe Bonomi: \textit{Diario di un anno} (Milan, Garzanti, 1947), pp. xxi-xl, and 2 June to 26 July. On the organization of the conspiracy see Giuseppe Castellano: \textit{Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile} (Milan, Mondadori, 1945), pp. 32-70; G. Senise: \textit{Quando ero Capo della Polizia} (Rome, Ruffolo, 1946), pp. 193-220.} The more idealistic anti-Fascists longed to raise a people's revolt against Fascism, Monarchy, Church, and Axis alike, but the counsel which prevailed was to plan a \textit{coup d'état} at the centre of power, in which the King, and his authority over the armed forces, would play an essential part. The anti-Fascists, the Court, and the malcontents among the Fascist 'hierarchy' all made contact with the army, and though General Ambrosio, the Chief of Staff, did not entirely give up hope until after the Feltre meeting that Mussolini himself might break with Germany, his assistant, General Castellano, drew up plans for a coup as early as April.

Ciano, meanwhile, after his dismissal from the Foreign Ministry on 5 February, had accepted the post of Ambassador to the Holy See, hoping to take advantage of his new freedom of action. He and Grandi approached the British Minister to the Holy See, Mr. (later Sir Francis) D'Arcy Osborne, and were not rebuffed. They were not the only inquirers; one of the anti-Fascist leaders, Professor Gonella, also made contact with Osborne about this time, and received the impression that Great Britain would prefer a monarchical solution of the problem, and that if Italy acted quickly she might expect favourable treatment from the Allies.\footnote{Bonomi: \textit{Diario di un anno}, pp. xxvii-xxix.} Feeling that no time was to be lost, and, moreover, that Ciano, Grandi, and others might follow the example of Darlan and offer the Allies a liberalized Fascism without Mussolini, the anti-Fascist parties made a definite approach to King Victor Emmanuel, who, however, hesitated until 19 or 20 July before finally committing himself to take action against Mussolini.\footnote{Castellano, op. cit. p. 57; Senise, op. cit. pp. 193-9.}

Meanwhile, since the Allied landing in Sicily on 10 July, a number of disaffected Fascist 'hierarchs' had compelled Mussolini to summon the Grand Council on 24 July. Grandi, Bottai, and a rather hesitant Ciano put forward a motion calling for the restoration of all the constitutional
functions of the Crown, Grand Council, Cabinet, Parliament, and Corporations, and proposing that the King should assume full command of the armed forces; and this was carried by nineteen votes to eight with one abstention, in the small hours of the 25th.¹ None of the Fascist rebels seems to have been in the secret of the other plot, but Grandi immediately called on the Minister for the Royal Household, and asked that the King should intervene.² Mussolini went about his business next day as if nothing had happened, and seemed dumbfounded when, having been summoned to Villa Savoia, he received his dismissal from the King, and was driven off in an ambulance and detained in one of the police barracks. From there he was moved to the island of Ponza, then to that of La Maddalena off Sardinia, then inland to a mountain hotel on the Gran Sasso.³

The King appointed Marshal Badoglio (who had taken no part in carrying out the plot) head of the new Government, and the change of régime was achieved without any opposition even from the Fascist Party and Militia. Public rejoicings at Mussolini’s fall⁴ were, however, somewhat dashed by a proclamation announcing that the war would continue, and that all disorder would be severely punished.⁵ Badoglio’s Cabinet consisted of generals and civil servants, as the King would not let him appoint any representative of the anti-Fascist parties; and though the new Government did away with some of the evils of Fascism, for instance by abolishing the Party and releasing many political prisoners, they refused to restore full freedom to the press, or to legalize the formation of political parties.

(4) Hitler Prepares to Take Charge in Italy

The fall of Mussolini caused great bewilderment and alarm among the ordinary public in Germany,⁶ coinciding as it did with the first of a series


³ Admiral Franco Maugeri, who escorted Mussolini to Ponza and Maddalena, gives his impressions of him in his From the Ashes of Disgrace (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1948).


⁵ Bonomi: *Diario di un anno, 26 July 1943.

⁶ Goebbels, who thought that subversive elements might be encouraged to follow Badoglio’s example, reports that Hitler, though refusing to admit that any such danger existed, nevertheless ordered Himmler to be ready to cope with it if it arose. On Hitler’s reactions see Goebbels *Diaries, 25 to 29 July 1943; Gilbert, ed.: *Hitler Directs his War, 25, 26 July 1943; *Fuehrer Conferences, 1943, 26–28 July, 1 to 11 August 1943 (pp. 65–70, 71–87).
of devastating air-raids on Hamburg and other cities, and with a Russian
offensive. With regard to the situation in Italy, Hitler’s first thoughts were
to save the German troops in Sicily, to secure control of the Alpine passes
(a point on which Keitel and Jodl strongly agreed with him), and to send
parachutists to rescue Mussolini. He proposed to move a German armoured
division into Rome, to arrest the King, the Prince of Piedmont, and the
Badoglio Government, and to bring them by air to Germany. He would
gladly have sent troops into the Vatican, but both Goebbels and Ribben-
trop advised against it.¹ His military advisers opposed the whole scheme
of seizing Rome at once, and in the end it was decided to move as many
troops as possible into Italy while the Badoglio Government still pretended
to be an ally, and to be ready to occupy the country and seize the fleet at a
moment’s notice. German reinforcements began to cross the Brenner on
30 July, and a force of sixteen or seventeen divisions was built up.² Hitler
refused an invitation to meet King Victor Emmanuel in Northern Italy,
suspecting that he himself might be kidnapped,³ and at a meeting between
the German and Italian Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of Staff at Tarvisio
on 6 August⁴ each side tried unsuccessfully to deceive the other.

The Badoglio Government survived for another month. Again and
again their spokesmen solemnly assured the Germans that Italy had no
intention of deserting the alliance, yet from the beginning of August they
had been in contact with the enemy,⁵ and they were offering to change
sides with an unabashed alacrity which made an unpleasant impression on
the Allied representatives in Lisbon.⁶ They dared not prepare to resist a
German attack lest they should provoke it, but they cherished hopes that
the Allies would rescue them from their predicament by sending large
fleets of aircraft, or making landings north of Rome. It was also believed
(and by Allied military intelligence as well as by some at least of those
responsible for the defence of Italy at this time) that the Germans, if
attacked in force, might make no stand south of Rome but withdraw to the
‘Pisa–Rimini line’.⁷

Nevertheless, Badoglio and his colleagues were quite unready to take
any action even if the Germans had meant to withdraw northwards at
once. They waited for the Allies to work a miracle for them and when the
armistice was announced on 8 September 1943,⁸ unaccompanied by

² Rossi: Come arrivammo all’armistizio, pp. 176 7.
³ Simoni: Berlino, 30 July 1943; Westphal: Ileer in Fesseln, p. 224.
⁴ Cf. minutes in Hitler e Mussolini, no. 67; see also Bonomi: Diario di un anno, 10 August 1943;
Simoni, op. cit. 6 August 1943; Westphal, op. cit. p. 225.
⁶ Butcher: My Three Years with Eisenhower, 21 August 1943.
⁷ A fuller account of this will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
⁸ The armistice had been signed on 3 September (see Survey for 1939 46: America, Britain, and
Anglo-American miracles, all was confusion in Rome. The King and Badoglio fled that very night to Pescara and thence by sea to Brindisi. The Germans gained control of the whole country from Naples to the Brenner in a few days, and rounded off their victory by rescuing Mussolini like a second Andromeda by air from the Gran Sasso on 12 September.

(ii) Economic Relations between Germany and Italy, 1940–3

By Katharine Duff

(a) German-Italian Economic Relations, 1940–1

Without German coal, steel, chemicals, and machinery, Italy's industries and transport would soon have been at a standstill. Most of her requirements of oil could only be supplied either from German synthetic production, or from Germany's satellite, Rumania; and Rumanian oil, if brought overland, had to pass through Germany. All those countries where Italy might have found other sources of supply were dominated by Germany, or cut off by the blockade; and Greater Germany was now almost the sole market for Italian exports. Though the Danish-Italian trade agreement was still functioning, trade with Norway, the Low Countries, and France was carried on through the German-Italian clearing. An economic delegation attached to the Italo-French Armistice Commission handled business with Unoccupied France and found itself at a perpetual disadvantage vis-à-vis the Germans. These were also using their control of Western European firms to push their own interests in South-Eastern Europe, where the Italians already found it hard enough to compete with them.

Nazi panegyrics representing the Axis Powers as joint patrons of the New Order, or acclaiming Italy's right to an economic empire linking three continents across the Mediterranean, could not disguise the fact that the Third Reich aimed at a monopoly of military and industrial power, and that Italy was of no great importance to her from an economic point of view. The Germans were ready to take strategic materials and large quantities of agricultural produce from Italy, but they could either do without these things if necessary or procure them elsewhere. This did not, of course, deter them from settling down with their usual ruthlessness to

Russia, p. 300). For the circumstances in which the situation was made public, and for the Allied landing at Salerno, see ibid. pp. 301–3.

1 See also below, pp. 330–1.


3 See e.g. Reich Economics Ministry regulations of 14 June 1940, and a conference at that Ministry on 20 August 1940 (N.C.A. iv. 20–21 (1445–PS); vii. 258–9 (43–EC)).

4 On German trade methods in Rumania see Amedeo Gianinni: 'Il Convegno italo-germanico di Assisi (20 agosto 8 settembre 1943)', Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, January–March 1950, pp. 3–18; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 6 January 1942.

5 See above, pp. 49, 58, 62.
extract what they could from Italy and to eliminate her competition in trade with third countries. When they were the sellers they demanded high prices and often failed to deliver what they had promised. Often it was genuinely impossible for them to do so, but the Italians invariably suspected ill will on their part. It was to be expected that the Germans should grudge supplying a régime which they considered incompetent, dilatory in imposing war-time controls,¹ and lagging far behind Germany in the use of substitutes and other technical economies;² they also suspected the Italians of deliberately holding back resources in the hope of seizing an unfair advantage after the war. Such criticisms were not unjustified. Some officials were certainly being deliberately obstructive under a pretence of inability to fulfil German requests,³ and where there was not hostility there was often incompetence. After a year of war, for instance, the Italian air force and navy were reported to be making separate requests to Germany for oil, which, if both had been granted in full, would have left nothing over for the army or for civilian use.⁴

A commercial agreement,⁵ announced on 5 December 1940, provided for the export of Italian agricultural produce over a number of years at fixed prices, but, by this time, the Italians were far more interested in buying arms and the means of making them than in selling lemons and tomatoes. Hardly any of the arms captured in France were passed on to them.⁶ Meanwhile the defeat of Graziani's army in December 1940 made it imperative to obtain new supplies from Germany, and the Italian military attaché in Berlin, General Efisio Marras, was hurriedly instructed to buy up all the tanks and guns he could, regardless of expense. As no master agreement for war supplies existed, this was no easy task.⁷ On 17 December Mussolini personally appealed to Hitler for raw materials and fuel,⁸ referring back more than was perhaps tactful to the purposely exaggerated list of needs he had submitted on 26 August 1939.⁹ Hitler agreed to grant supplies, but let it be known that he would prefer to send finished goods,

¹ Italy was, in fact, slow in introducing controls. Decrees published on 31 December 1940 and 15 February 1941 gave wider powers respectively to the Minister of Agriculture and to the Ministers of Corporations and Foreign Trade to allocate commodities to the consumer and to industry, and to control imports and exports; but the Germans continued to the last to complain of Italian slackness.

² Goring offered them expert advice on the economical use of scarce materials (Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 3 February 1942).

³ Christian Science Monitor, 1 October 1941.

⁴ Simoni: Berlin, 17 June 1941.

⁵ See Volksischer Beobachter, 6 December 1940, 20 July 1941.

⁶ Simoni, op. cit. 18 October, 3 November 1940; Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 11 August 1940, 6 June 1941.

⁷ Simoni, op. cit. 16 December 1940.


⁹ A fuller account of this will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Eve of War, 1939; cf. Hitler e Mussolini, no. 4.
chosen on the advice of German experts, rather than raw materials, and he asked for many more Italian workers for Germany in return.\(^1\)

The agreements regulating Italo-German trade for 1941,\(^2\) concluded on 26 February, did in fact provide for larger Italian imports of finished goods, and it was not long before much of the raw material supplied was reserved for factories chartered to work for Germany. These February agreements were presented to the public as an important step towards economic unity. Trade would no longer depend on what one country could spare and the other might need, but on where raw materials could most profitably be used; and the European war effort must have absolute priority over private interests and luxury consumption. To ensure an uninterrupted flow of essential supplies, temporary inequalities in the clearing account would in future stand over for settlement at some later time. From June 1941, indeed, payments for any transaction connected with the armed forces were not transferred, but credited to the state within whose frontiers the payments were to be made.\(^3\)

By a reciprocal arrangement the Italian Quartermaster-General's Department maintained the German forces in Italy; while the Italian Government also provided funds month by month for other needs of these troops, acting on recommendations from the General Staff, checked by an inter-departmental committee.\(^4\) Besides this, the German military authorities dealt direct with Italian firms without any official sanction and often entered into most questionable arrangements with them on purpose to outwit the Italian Government.\(^5\) Germany acquired a large stock of lire cheaply by buying up in Switzerland the Italian notes that the British had captured in Ethiopia;\(^6\) German 'tourists' in and out of uniform ransacked Italy like a stream of ants; and the restrictions on the sale or export of precious metals, and on dealings in foreign currencies which were imposed in the autumn of 1941,\(^7\) quite failed to check German spending.

\(b\) The Economic Breakdown of the Axis

It was from the autumn of 1941 that the Italians began to feel the pinch in their daily life. Fuel allowances were cut by a third, and the rationing of bread and clothes began. From 15 March 1942, indeed, the bread ration was cut from 200 to 150 grammes (about 5 oz.) a day, little more than half the German ration. Mussolini was most unwilling to let the

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\(^1\) Simoni, op. cit. 19, 20, 26, 30 December 1940; 7 January 1941; see also below, pp. 322–4.

\(^2\) Giornale d'Italia, 28 February, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1 March 1941; Wirtschaftsdienst, 7 March (p. 192) and 21 March 1941 (p. 231).

\(^3\) Giornale d'Italia, and Volkischer Beobachter, 21 June 1941.


\(^5\) Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 31 December 1941, 1 January 1942.

\(^6\) Donostia: Mussolini è l'Europa, p. 96.

\(^7\) Decrees of 3 September and 5 and 20 November 1941.
Germans know of the food shortage, but it was eventually arranged that Germany should supply wheat (some of it from the Ukraine) and potatoes in 1942, and more wheat in 1943; but this did not fill the gap left by three successive bad harvests. Official measures to check the rising cost of living and the black market had the usual lack of success. Profiteers were continually being arrested, but profiteering flourished unabated; and, though Italy might be little better fed than an occupied country, Fascist ‘hierarchs’ could still be seen eating lavishly in the expensive restaurants.

The Allied blockade was not the only cause of this growing scarcity. Shortly before invading Russia the German Government announced a cut in deliveries of coal and oil to Italy, and thereafter matters went from bad to worse. Writing to Hitler on 6 November 1941, Mussolini complained that industry was working at 40 to 60 per cent. of capacity. In February 1942, to take another example, only 540,000 tons of coal, out of a monthly quota of over a million, were expected to reach Italy: this would have disastrous effects on war industry. Imports from Germany never recovered their former level; the Italian import balance of 1940 became an export balance in 1941 and 1942. The annual trade agreement for 1943 prescribed no reduction in exports of Italian agricultural produce; and by the early spring of 1943 the balance of payments in Italy’s favour amounted to over Rm. 8,000 million, 2,850 million for normal business, and 6,000 million due to the Italian Government under the guarantee scheme for war supplies. To reduce this balance the Italian Government proposed to withdraw workers from Germany. After weeks of acrimonious negotiations the Germans agreed to send back 12,000 men every month from April onwards and to make certain other concessions. They refused, on the other hand, to let the clearing be used to finance Italian purchases in third countries such as Hungary and Rumania. (Four-fifths of Italy’s foreign trade was now carried on with Germany.)

Italian industry had been slowed down by the shortage of raw materials and fuel long before the Allies began seriously to attack it from the air. Added to this, dry weather cut down supplies of hydro-electric power in

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1 Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 13, 22 November 1941.
2 Ibid. 6 June 1941; Ciano: *Europa*, pp. 662–3; Eng. version, p. 443.
3 Alcieri: *Due dittatori*, p. 361.
4 Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 22 February 1942; Cavallero: *Comando Supremo*, 4 March 1912.
5 See a report by the Minister for War Production on the state of supplies on 1 July 1913 (Rossi: *Come arrivammo all’armistizio*, pp. 364–77).
7 *Stampa*, 24 December 1942.
8 Simoni: *Berlino*, 13 January 1943. On Italian financial claims against Germany see also *Italy: Memorandum sulle questioni economico-finanziarie connesse col trattato di pace* (1946), pp. 41, 43.
9 According to one source (‘The Mobilisation of Foreign Labour by Germany’, *International Labour Review*, October 1944, vol. I, pp. 147–8) the withdrawal of men from non-essential industry was to be balanced by the engagement of others for war industry and agriculture.
10 Simoni: *Berlino*, 13 January, 17, 26 February, 3 March 1943.
the winters both of 1942 and 1943. The output of some war factories was almost halved, and the Government decided, about midsummer 1942, on a drastic policy of concentrating industry and transferring redundant workers to munitions or agriculture. This meant the merging of many small firms with giant concerns like Montecatini and the closing down of many factories altogether. A number of textile mills closed down from December 1942 till the end of February 1943, while others worked short time. The clothing, paper, glass, pottery, and leather industries were also 'concentrated'. Firms working for the armed forces, or for export (which almost always meant for Germany), might claim exemption, and it was alleged that the concentration policy had in fact been imposed under pressure from the Germans, who had just given their own economy another turn of the screw.

(c) Economic Effects of the German Occupation

In some ways, the north of Italy fared better than the south under foreign occupation. It was a more productive part of the country, and it had more roads and railways, so that there was rather more to eat. Prices did not rise as high as in the south, and the rate of exchange, though altered from 7.6 to 10 lire to the Reichsmark, was more favourable to Italy than the Allied military lira rate in the south. The Germans issued occupation currency at first, but ceased to do so under an agreement of 25 October 1943 binding the Neo-Fascist Government to pay 6,000 million lire a month (increased to 10,000 million in the summer of 1944) to cover all payments, including war contracts for Italian industry. German economic control was chiefly exercised through the local agency of Speer's Ministry of Armaments and War Production, which carried off to the Reich great quantities of food, livestock, manufactured goods, and even of machinery and rolling-stock. Whole factories were transferred to the Reich, or to other parts of Italy, and 400,000 tons of shipping were promptly snapped up, as was the gold reserve of the Bank of Italy. Some of the gold was recovered in the South Tyrol after the war and part of the rest of the loss was made up by the Allies in 1948 from German gold.

The worst of the deprivations were committed in central and southern

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1 Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 4 March, 12 July, 30 December 1942.
2 See speeches of 2 June by Giuseppe Lombrassa, and of 26 August by Renato Ricci, Under-Secretary and Minister respectively for Corporations (Giornale d'Italia, 4 June 1942, and Messaggero, 27 August 1942).
3 Frankfurter Zeitung, 4 May 1943.
4 Ibid.
5 Stampa, 24 December 1942.
6 See above, pp. 32, 191-2, 231.
7 Volkischer Beobachter, 7 December 1943; Kolnische Zeitung, 10 March 1944.
9 Goebbels Diaries, 18 September 1943, p. 367.
10 Istituto per gli Studi di Economia: Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana, 1938 47, pp. 47, 44.
Italy, where the Germans when retreating also caused much damage by deliberately wrecking public utilities as well as roads and factories. It was feared that they would treat the highly industrialized North in the same way when driven out of that, but, in the event, the German army, on the brink of capitulation, gave no general order for demolitions, and prompt action by the Partisans prevented most of those which were attempted by local German commanders.¹

(d) Italian Labour in Germany

An official scheme of recruiting Italian labour for Germany already existed when Italy went to war,² with the result that in the winter of 1940–41 about 47,000 Italians were employed in German agriculture and about 70,000 in industry. In February 1941 the Italian Government agreed to recruit a further 200,000, about a quarter of these to be metal workers. A German official source gave a total of 271,000 (including 21,700 women) for September 1941.³ Italians worked in mines, metallurgical plants and munition factories, shipyards, the building industry, and the Organisation Todt; even in miscellaneous commercial posts. Thousands of them left the coalfields of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg for the Reich, and German firms recruited them quite independently of the official scheme.

Italians were at first willing to go to Germany, as the pay and conditions offered compared favourably with those open to them at home. But though men skilled in certain trades were much in demand, Italian workers as a class were treated as one of the inferior races, ranking about on a level with Rumanians, and well below Hungarians, Swiss, Flemings, and even Frenchmen and Dutchmen.⁴ They were not allowed to associate with German women. When, as not infrequently happened, they offended against Nazi discipline they were severely punished, many being sent to concentration camps, with the result that official protests were made by Italy against their treatment.⁵ The Germans retorted by complaining what bad workmen the Italians were, but, for all that, they continued to ask for more skilled men and especially for more coal miners, as a condition of coal being sent to Italy.⁶ Mussolini, however, soon wished to bring men back from Germany rather than send them there, if only because he feared


³ Ibid. p. 470.⁴ See above, p. 242.

⁵ Ciano: Diario (1939 43), 24, 25, 26 September 1941; 29 April, 18 May 1942; see also Alfieri: Due dittatori, pp. 251–2.

⁶ Cavallero: Comando Supremo, 17 September 1941.
the *Herrenvolk* would become too well accustomed to the sight of an unarmed *Sklavenvolk* of Italian labourers.\(^1\) Besides, even over-populated Italy was short of skilled agricultural and industrial workers.\(^2\) Working hours were lengthened in Italian factories and workshops after the conclusion of the Italo-German agreements of February 1941, and many more women were soon being employed.\(^3\)

Hitler promised Ciano on 25 October 1941 that all those workers who could not settle down in Germany should be sent home, and, though the total number of Italian workers in Germany rose to 300,000 early in June 1942, it had fallen to 230,000 in May 1943.\(^4\) The agreement of March 1943 for the repatriation of 12,000 workers a month has already been mentioned\(^5\) and a considerable number would seem to have left before repatriation was suspended after the fall of Mussolini.\(^6\)

The Italian collapse occurred just when Germany was more than ever before in need of foreign workers. Immediately the Germans gained control of Italy, out came their press gangs, and by the end of the war some 130,000 men and women had been ‘rastrellati’ (angliciz. rake up) and carried off to Germany.\(^7\) Sauckel looked to Italy to supply 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) million workers in 1944 as compared with 1 million from France, and 600,000 from the east, and declared it to be ‘a European scandal’ that no more than 7,000 had been raised by the end of February.\(^8\) He visited Italy himself in May and compelled Mussolini at last to agree to call men up for labour service. Hardly any more were recruited in this way than under the previous military system, and, even after Kesselring had forbidden the ‘rastrellamenti’, SS troops continued them on Himmler’s orders.\(^9\) Besides these indiscriminate slave raids, factories would be called upon to give up a proportion of their men, or their whole staff might be transferred in a body; but here Sauckel came into conflict with the unwillingness of the Rukstab (*Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion*) to lose men from factories on its protected list.\(^10\) Besides this, the *Organisation Todt*\(^11\) was

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\(^1\) Ciano: *Diario* (1939–43), 7 June, 14 July 1941.
\(^2\) Cavallero’s diary, for instance, often refers to difficulties in sharing labour among the war industries (Cavallero: *Comando Supremo*, 2, 6, September 1941; 5 August, 2 October 1942).
\(^3\) Kulischer: *Displacement of Population*, p. 156.
\(^5\) See above, p. 320.
\(^6\) Simoni: *Berlino*, 26 June 1943. German and Italian figures for the autumn of 1943 give respectively 117,000, including 14,000 women, and 170,000 (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxv. 150 (524–D)); Anfuso: *Roma, Berlino, Salo*, p. 505.
\(^10\) *N.C.A.* vii. 156–7; *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xli. 415–16 (Speier, 10).
\(^11\) *Popolo e Libertà*, 28 November 1943; see also I.L.O.: *Exploitation of Foreign Labour in Germany*, pp. 74–75.
employing Italians (200,000 it was alleged in November 1943) on all kinds of construction work in their own country; the SS deported men for forced labour; and Junkers and Krupps advertised enticingly in the Italian press. The 600,000 to 700,000 Italian soldiers interned in Germany and elsewhere were also put to work, and after July 1944 were gradually reclassified as 'free' workers.

(iii) The German Occupation of Italy, and the Neo-Fascist Régime

By Katharine Duff

Hitler, broadcasting on 10 September 1943 for the first time since Mussolini's fall, gloriéd in his friendship with 'that great and loyal man', only to be deeply disillusioned when his friend visited him at Rastenburg on 13-14 September. Instead of thirsting to fight his way back to power, Mussolini, dazed and weary, desired only to retire into private life, and Hitler is said to have bullied him into continuing the struggle by threatening reprisals against him personally, as well as against the Italian people. The massacre of the garrisons of Corfù and Cephalonia at the end of September shows to what extremes the Germans were prepared to go in crushing Italian resistance. So long, however, as the Italians did not commit the crime of defending themselves, Hitler displayed no active animosity against them; and he told Goebbels at the time that he needed their co-operation in maintaining his lines of communication, and could not spare police enough of his own to rule them by force. A quisling régime was therefore necessary. A 'National Fascist Government', consisting at first of a few extremists who had fled to Germany after 25 July, had already been proclaimed by the German radio early on 9 September, and Mussolini was now installed as its nominal head. Suitable collaborators in Italy were approached, a full list of Ministers, including Marshal Graziani as Minister of Defence, was announced on 27 September, and Mussolini was flown down to Italy in time to preside over a Cabinet that others had appointed for him.

After the war collaborators often pleaded in extenuation that they had been unable to refuse German pressure backed by threats that otherwise Italy would become a second Poland. Nevertheless, their compliance did not save her from being treated in practice as an occupied country or from suffering virtual annexations of territory. Hitler had avoided reveal-
ing German territorial designs immediately after the armistice, but on 5 October Germany assumed full military and administrative control over the ‘defence zones’ of the Alpine Foreland and Adriatic Littoral. One zone covered the South Tyrol, including the Province of Belluno; the other covered Trieste, the whole of Venetia east of the River Livenza, Istria, and the newly annexed part of Slovenia. The Gauleiters of Tyrol and Carinthia were appointed to administer the two zones.\(^1\) Goebbels, who longed for Germany to annex any Italian territory that had ever belonged to Austria, reports Hitler as having said that Venetia itself ought to be federated with the Reich.\(^2\)

Mussolini had hoped to build up a new army from the 600,000 to 800,000 men of the Italian forces in northern Italy, the Balkans, and France, who had been ‘interned’ after the armistice, mostly in Germany, but some also in the Balkans; but the Germans would not allow the rank and file to enlist. Four divisions were raised by conscription in Italy, and used by the Germans to guard their supply lines against the Partisans. Neo-Fascist troops only came in contact with the Allies for a short while in the Carfagnana valley. In addition some remnants of the former army continued to fight beside the Germans, a number of Italians enlisted directly in the Wehrmacht and the SS, and a number of irregular anti-Partisan forces were raised.\(^3\)

The Neo-Fascist Government were not much more substantial than the Neo-Fascist army. The men who held office in what from December 1943 onwards was known as the ‘Italian Social Republic’ were an ill-assorted team of extremists, party bosses, and moderates who cherished hopes of ‘building a bridge’ to the democratic parties. The Government even had their Left Wing and produced some definitely socialistic legislation, to the disapproval of the German military and economic authorities. Neither Mussolini’s return to the revolutionary ideas of his youth nor anything else could breathe life into the ‘Little Republic of Salò’, as the anti-Fascists nicknamed it after the small town on Lake Garda where some of its Ministries had taken refuge. The Republic’s control over the municipal and provincial authorities on its territory, who were often German nominees, was precarious. Rival Ministers built up rival forces and militias, and from the beginning ‘squadristi’, carrying on the evil tradition of the ‘action squads’ who had cleared the way for Fascism, took the law into their own hands: some were merely roving gunmen, while some held official positions.\(^4\) The Germans insisted on action being taken against

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\(^1\) See above, pp. 96–97.

\(^2\) Goebbels Diaries, 23 September 1943, p. 383.

\(^3\) For details of the Italian forces under German control see Allied Forces, Supreme Command Mediterranean: Report by Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis . . . on the Italian campaign 12th December 1944 to 2nd May 1945 (London, H.M.S.O., 1951), pp. 16–18, 52–53.

\(^4\) Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 October 1943; on ‘squadristi’ in Trieste see Bruno Coccani: Mussolini, Hitler, Tito, alle porte orientali d’Italia (Bologna, Cappelli, 1948), pp. 23–27.
some of these Fascist thugs, as for instance the Pollastrini gang who terrorized Rome throughout the autumn of 1943; but they themselves encouraged some of the worst criminals, including the Koch and Carità gangs who specialized in torturing prisoners and were protected by the SS.

After the war attempts were made to excuse Neo-Fascist crimes against the Resistance Movement as self-defence against Communist terrorism.\(^1\) It is, therefore, worth while pointing out that extremists like Pavolini, Secretary of the ‘Republican Fascist Party’, combated anti-Fascism with true ‘squadrista’ ferocity, that arrests of anti-Fascists began immediately after the armistice, and that Mussolini’s Government were collectively responsible for instituting the death penalty for those who helped prisoners of war to escape. They also revived the discriminatory laws against the Jews, who were declared to be enemy aliens. Before July 1943 the Fascist Government had never carried their anti-Semitism to Nazi extremes, and Himmler and Ribbentrop had even rebuked them for their slackness in the occupied countries,\(^2\) where individual Italians had done what they could to help the Jews against the Germans; and now that Italy too had become an occupied country, it was the Germans who committed the worst crimes against the 45,000 Jews living there. 10,000 of these were deported, and only 605 returned alive.\(^3\)

To satisfy his wrath at the betrayal of the Axis, Hitler insisted that Ciano and the other Grand Council rebels should be brought to trial. The special tribunal set up at Verona\(^4\) pronounced eighteen sentences of death and one of life imprisonment, and, of the six accused who were in custody, Ciano, Marshal De Bono, and three lesser Fascists, Marinelli, Gottardi, and Pareschi, were shot on 11 January 1944. Mussolini was powerless to protect his son-in-law, for he himself was virtually a prisoner of the Germans, who installed him at Gargnano on Lake Garda, under the protection of a SS bodyguard. Here he lived in such retirement that the public hardly knew whether he was alive or dead. Twice again he visited Hitler, once at Klessheim in April 1944,\(^5\) and again at Rastenburg on 20 July, just after the bomb explosion.\(^6\) He long believed that the secret weapons might save the day for Germany, or that, in any case, at the end of the war a new coalition would be formed against the U.S.S.R. and that the Allies would find him indispensable as an intermediary.\(^7\)

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1. e.g. Silvestri: Mussolini, Graziani, e l’antifascismo.
4. Detailed report of trial in Mayer: La Verità sul processo di Verona.
Unlike Hitler, Mussolini was never possessed with the desire to bring his whole world down in ruins with him. During the last few months of Neo-Fascism he made a futile attempt at a rapprochement with non-Fascists and anti-Fascists, and, as the time for the Allied attack on the Gothic Line drew on, he wavered between the alternatives of leading a Garibaldian retreat into the Valtellina, which adjoined Hitler's Alpine Redoubt, and of achieving an anti-Communist deal with the Allies, or even with the non-Communist resistance groups. Meanwhile the Germans had forecasted him in suing for peace. SS General Karl Wolff had been in contact with the Allies in Switzerland since February, and the Allied break-through in mid-April, which resulted in the total collapse of the Third Reich, at last put an end to the hesitations of the German Commander-in-Chief. (General von Vietinghoff succeeded Kesselring on 23 March.) The unconditional surrender of all forces under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief South-West was signed on 29 April. This included the Neo-Fascist forces as well. Hostilities ended on 2 May.

Mussolini had spent the last few days before the Liberation in Milan. On 25 April he met representatives of the National Liberation Committee through the good offices of the Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Schuster, but broke off the talks abruptly on learning that the Germans were negotiating with the Partisans as well as with the Allies. He fled that night towards Lake Como, accompanied by his mistress Clarettia Petacci. The Partisans captured them both a few days later, shot them on 29 April, and brought back their bodies to Milan, together with those of a number of Fascist leaders, to hang by the heels in the Piazzale Loreto.

(iv) The Italian Resistance Movement

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

(a) The Italian State of Mind, June 1940 to September 1943

There is every reason to suppose that in June 1940 the Italians embarked upon Mussolini's adventure in a thoroughly uneasy state of mind. Among the Fascist leaders two or three, like Farinacci and Alfieri, were genuinely pro-German. The rest were more or less embarrassed by stabbing France

1 Amicucci: I 600 giorni, pp. 257-8; Silvestri: Mussolini, Graziani e l'antifascismo, pp. 322-34.
2 For details see Allied Forces: Supreme Command Mediterranean: Report by Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis ... on the Italian Campaign, 12th December 1944 to 2nd May 1945, pp. 62-66.
in the back, while technical experts were aware of Italy's incapacity to fight with success unless the war were ended within a week or so. In declaring war Mussolini threw away the popularity he had gained by apparently saving peace at Munich; indeed his subservience to Hitler since the Anschluss, which involved his attempted persecution of the Jews, was condemned not only in anti-Fascist circles, but by a high proportion of the Fascists themselves, including Ciano in some of his moods.

By now, despite their noisy bellicosity, Mussolini and his movement had grown corpulent and tired; what little keen feeling there was in Italy went rather into hoping for their downfall than fighting for their victory. Then came the campaigns in the Balkans, North Africa, Russia. The Italian soldiers had generally to fight with inadequate equipment. There were times when they fought quite well, but except for the Blackshirt brigades they were without any real enthusiasm.\(^1\) Many of them felt they had no right to be in the Ukraine or in Greece or Yugoslavia. In Croatia—especially in Dalmatia—and in Montenegro the Italian Second Army of 1942 accepted the activities of Yugoslav Partisans in the mountainous regions without opposing them; on the contrary, it soon became all but the regular thing for the Italians to supply Mihailović's Četnici with arms in order to let them rather than the Italians fight against Tito's Partisans.\(^2\)

At home rationing and air-raids were disagreeable, and in addition they showed up the incompetence and corruption of the régime. From early in 1942, that is well before the decisive winter of 1942–3, while the ordinary public regretted the war passively, active oppositional groups began to organize themselves. There were the usual two categories, working-class and the other. Communist cells had survived in Turin and Milan throughout the Fascist period; Italian failures and Russian resistance enabled them to blossom out, and old Socialist links were picked up again, especially in Milan and Genoa. The centre of Communist resistance remained, as it had been in the days of Gramsci, the founder of the Italian Communist Party, the Fiat motor-works in Turin. It is significant that the secretary of the Fascist labour unions in Turin called a meeting of factory officials in September 1942 and used the following words: 'When one is part of a victorious army, when one forms an integral part of a revolution, one has no right to be weak or sentimental, one has no right to treat the country's enemies otherwise than as enemies.'\(^3\)

Non-working class opposition was strongly pro-British and was successfully nurtured by the B.B.C. There was much pacifist feeling among a number of the Catholic clergy, but it was perhaps in university circles among both professors and students that there was most enthusiasm for

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\(^1\) See also above, p. 309, note 3.  
\(^2\) See also below, p. 659.  
\(^3\) See Wiskemann: Rome–Berlin Axis, p. 288. This was part of a great deal of information smuggled out of Italy at the time by Socialist friends to Silone who was living in Switzerland.
real anti-régime activity. This enthusiasm was vaguely but strongly 'leftist' and often not unwilling to be misnamed Communist; it was stimulated by the increasingly successful resistance of the U.S.S.R. to Germany during the winter of 1941–2, but also by the backward and unjust condition of Italian society. Its most typical manifestation was found perhaps in Florence, where the ideas of Carlo Rosselli were revived and disseminated with his old watchword of *Giustizia e Libertà*. But there were similar groups in all the major towns, especially in Turin, where another victim of the Fascists, Gobetti, had left a similar heritage. During 1942 contact was established between many groups of this kind which merged into a national party; it revived the Mazzinian name of *Partito d'Azione* (Party of Action) and in January 1943 brought out the first number of its clandestine newspaper, *L'Italia Libera*.1 By this time there was a clandestine press of various kinds which began to exert some influence, and Communists and non-Communists drew together in opposition to Fascism.

The most important events to be recorded in the history of anti-Fascism between June 1940 and Mussolini's fall were the strikes which occurred in the spring of 1943. Communist directives were handed out on 20 February2 and on 5 March demonstrations began at the big Mirafiori factory of the Fiat works in Turin; the men demanded that promises of compensation to bombed-out workmen should be kept. The local authorities were obviously afraid to seem stern and a week later the Mirafiori workers came out on strike with the encouragement of some of the directors, and leaflets were circulated demanding bread, peace, and liberty; thereupon on 13 March 300 lire was paid to all workmen who would 'maintain discipline'. After this the Turin strike died down and some of the leaders were then arrested and hanged. On 19 March strikes began to spread from the Caproni works in Milan to the Breda and Pirelli factories,3 and again some concessions were made. When Mussolini and Bastianini went to Salzburg in April, Bastianini spoke to Ribbentrop of the Turin and Milan strikes as one of the reasons why Italy could not continue the war.4 It was the first time that Axis Europe had witnessed a formidable labour demonstration directed against its rulers.

From the fall of Tunis on 7 May 1943 until the fall of Mussolini on 25 July the history of the Italian state of mind is inseparable from the political history of Italy.5 It was characteristic of the period that in Rome the former Socialist Bonomi, now recognized as Leader of the Opposition, was received by the King on 2 June, while General Cadorna in command

1 The Party of Action early received valuable financial help through Raffaele Mattioli, a director of the Banca Commerciale Italiana.
3 See also Scinese: *Quando ero Capo della Polizia*, pp. 171–2.
4 See Schmidt's minute of this meeting: *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxv. 452 (740–D); *N.C.A.* vii. 194.
5 See pp. 312–15 above.
at Ferrara was visited by the Communist Marchesi, Professor of Latin in the University of Padua, soon afterwards.\(^1\) There then followed those extraordinary forty-five days until the announcement of the Italian armistice during which everything which could possibly contribute to the demoralization of an already demoralized nation took place. The Italians thought that Mussolini had been removed in order that peace might be made with the Allies, yet they were subjected to the worst Allied air-raids that they had yet experienced; at the same time German troops poured into their country, which was clearly to become a major battlefield.\(^2\) They thought Mussolini was to make way for a democratic régime, but found the democrats pushed aside by the King and Badoglio and the press censored as severely as before. Finally the fact that an armistice had been signed was announced (but its terms were not) at 8 p.m. on 8 September and the next morning the royal family, which had been losing popularity since 1940 only less rapidly than Mussolini, fled southwards to Brindisi in territory already conquered by the Allies.

At first the confusion was hideous, particularly in Rome. It was hoped by all kinds of anti-Fascists that the Germans would be resisted here, and the political groups offered really considerable numbers of volunteers to Carboni, the general in charge. Carboni himself claimed later that he was eager for co-operation,\(^3\) but he was generally accused of preventing it.\(^4\) Some Italian soldiers, notably the Ariete division commanded by General Cadorna,\(^5\) fought the Germans who advanced upon the capital on 9 September and the next day their survivors and a few civilian groups held up the invaders near the Porta San Paolo and the Pyramid of Cestius, but the army leaders and officers were mostly defeatist, and through old Marshal Caviglia a capitulation was arranged on favourable terms which the Germans then ignored. For three-quarters of a year Rome became part of German-occupied Italy, and the anti-Fascist committee which now almost certainly represented the majority of its citizens became, as elsewhere, a clandestine Committee of National Liberation (C.L.N.).\(^6\) The only positively good news to trickle through the cordon of the German occupation during that autumn was that of the Quattro Giornate (27–30 September) when the Neapolitans, at the Allies' approach, rose up and drove

\(^1\) See Cadorna: *La Riscossa*, pp. 18–19; Longo: *Un Popolo alla macchia*, p. 43.

\(^2\) The Allies themselves had expected at once to occupy the airfields around Rome, but found them to be in German control; the Italians, further, hoped to see the Allies land in the north on the Ligurian coast.

\(^3\) G. Carboni: *L'Armistizio e la difesa di Roma* (Rome, Universale De Luigi, 1945), p. 14. Carboni was the chief of the S.I.M. or Italian Intelligence Service.

\(^4\) See among others G. Castellano's *Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile*. Longo (*Un Popolo alla macchia*, p. 56) says that Carboni at first decided to allow civilians to arm, but changed his mind later.

\(^5\) See Cadorna: *La Riscossa*.

\(^6\) It consisted of Bonomi, Casati, De Gasperi, Ruini, Nenni, Scoccimarro, Lussu (see Longo, op. cit. p. 56).
the Germans out. On this, as on every later occasion of the kind, the
Italians claimed that their revolt had expelled Hitler's troops while the
Allies retorted that only their own advance had softened the Germans to
the point of defeat.1

(b) The Italian Resistance, September 1943 to April 1945

It was only after the war that the fact was discovered that the Italian
resistance to Hitler2 was in some ways the most remarkable movement of
its kind in the Second World War. The Germans were enraged by the
desertion of their former ally, while the Allies regarded their former
enemy with suspicion; both sides accused the Italians of confusion and
cowardice. The fact was that the Italians were now at their best; their
anarchistic ingenuity was an excellent weapon for clandestine political
resistance and guerrilla warfare. After the despair of mid-September
1943 a wave of enthusiasm for justice and liberty welled up and brought
with it an exaltation reminiscent of the days of Garibaldi, an exaltation
which inspired astonishing bravery, especially among the many and
diverse victims of the Gestapo. The historic Risorgimento had scarcely
affected the working class, but the Resistance Movement, which was
sometimes called the Second Risorgimento, was based upon the industrial
workers of the north, and increasingly enlisted the peasantry, especially
that of Venetia. It was noted, too, that women became politically en-
thusiastic for the first time. For a brief period the nation was genuinely
united.

It is almost impossible to describe a movement of such local diversity;
the regional traditions of the country served resistance well, and the
Germans with their neo-Fascist allies were embarrassed by this ubiquitous
rebellion. Each manifestation seemed insignificant, yet proved itself the
head of a Lernian hydra. The most important military efforts in the early
stages were made in Piedmont where the Italian Fourth Army had been
stationed. Many of its members joined with new volunteers and thus the
Partisans were able to seize a considerable store of arms.3 As early as
12 September 1943 a dozen men met at Cunco to found the first Alpine
division of the Cuneo Partisans. The leader was Galimberti, a young
lawyer and member of the Party of Action, who, addressing the crowds
at Turin and Cunco on 26 July, had expressed the ardent resolution that
the whole people must wage war against Hitler to cleanse itself of the Fascist
stain.4 Partisans gathered along the fringes of Switzerland: the Alpini

1 See below, p. 337.
2 Only Hitler's strength maintained Mussolini's Republic of Salò. See above, pp. 325-6.
3 See Cadorna: La Riscossa, p. 99.
4 Elizabeth Wiskemann: Italy (London, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 110. Also Igor
Markevitch: Made in Italy (London, Harvill Press, 1949), p. 171: 'How often have I heard the
words "No sacrifice is too great for us: we have to rehabilitate ourselves".'
near Lecco refused to be disarmed, a group of twelve boys who joined Filippo Beltrami on Lake Orta\textsuperscript{1} was later to become famous. The Communist leader, Moscatelli, was soon the master of the Val Sesia, where his authority was scarcely interrupted until the end of the war. Partisans gathered in certain positions in the Ligurian Apennines; here especially, but in other places too, escaped British officers made excellent chiefs.\textsuperscript{2} The situation in Venetia was always tense: here were the crossroads essential for German communications, but also the road between Tito and the Italian Partisans. (Some of the Italian soldiers in Yugoslavia joined Tito after the Italian armistice and in those days there were some genuinely fraternal feelings.)\textsuperscript{3} In any case Venetia was hotly anti-German by tradition.

Milan became the political headquarters of Upper Italy; it was there that the C.I.N.A.I.\textsuperscript{4} used to meet. As in Rome and then in all the lesser places where dependent Committees of National Liberation were formed, the North Italian C.L.N. contained representatives of at least five political parties. Of these the Communists and the Party of Action were almost always the most forceful; this was most true of the Milan committee where their respective leaders were Luigi Longo and Ferruccio Parri.\textsuperscript{5} The other three parties were the Liberals, the Socialists, who all along showed signs of division and indecision, and the at first passive and little-defined Christian Democrats, who were strongest in Brescia. The Partisan groups, incidentally, tended rather vaguely to sort themselves by political colour, the most common being either the Communist Garibaldini or the Party of Action Giustizia e Libertà divisions; even the Liberal Party, which had no real popular support, provided the Franchi and later the Risorgimento division.\textsuperscript{6}

The chief political tasks of the C.L.N. were to find money and supplies for the Partisans, to sabotage industrial production, and to develop the clandestine press. At first the heritage of the Fourth Army in Piedmont was the main source of both money and arms, the former also coming from friends in Switzerland. Certain industrialists helped the Partisans with supplies of food and of footwear.\textsuperscript{7} Enrico Falck, of the big Falck steel works in Milan and elsewhere, which were supplied and strictly controlled by the Germans, conspired with his work-people to reduce production to a minimum;\textsuperscript{8} there were other employers who did the same. The workmen themselves, in all the larger factories of Milan and Turin, excelled in short

\begin{itemize}
\item[2] Italian sources tend to ignore this fact.
\item[3] See also below, p. 663.
\item[4] \textit{Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale All'Italia}, the co-ordinating Committee of National Liberation for all Upper Italy.
\item[7] Of course, the Partisans sometimes requisitioned supplies on their own account, but they usually gave receipts which were as a rule honoured later on.
\end{itemize}
sit-down strikes on some plausible economic pretext. Since the German High Command depended to a great and increasing extent upon the industrial production of northern Italy, this sort of sabotage was of importance. There were longer strikes, too, at Milan in December 1943 and March 1944, and at Turin in June 1944, when the Fiat employees thus succeeded in preventing the removal of the Fiat plant to Germany. Strikes were, of course, strictly forbidden, and strikers liable to the severest penalties, but these north Italian workmen stood so solidly together that the German military authorities were afraid to take action for fear of decimating their own ends; they deported as much labour as they could to Germany where coercion was easier.

In order to express the aspirations of the Resistance, the Italians very rapidly developed a luxuriant clandestine press to which certain eminent writers and journalists contributed. The printing-presses and the personnel were often actually or nearly discovered, but quick moves would be arranged, and here, as in all the other Resistance services, when one man was arrested another at once took his place. All the political parties now circulated their newspapers as regularly as they could and certain Partisan centres produced papers of their own. The clandestine press also circulated information which the Germans and Neo-Fascists tried to suppress. In the north Enzo Boeri was one of those who collected and distributed information. At the beginning of November 1943 a group was formed in Naples, the Organizzazione per la Resistenza Italiana, which developed into an important intelligence service, contriving gradually to establish more and more lines of communication between the Allied armies in southern Italy and the resistance in the north; the central figure here was Raimondo Craveri.

In May 1944 Mussolini's neo-Fascist régime made a 'last offer' of surrender and forgiveness to the Partisans; after this those found with arms, it was threatened, would be shot in the back. The result of this 'offer' was negligible. Thus the stage was set, but the battle in the centre and north was scarcely joined when the Allies entered Rome on 4 June 1944. In the outside world this event was immediately eclipsed by the invasion of France, but in Italy the psychological effect of the expulsion of the Germans from Rome was profound. In an order dated 17 June Kesselring em-

1 The Resistance Movement specially organized people who stayed in the cities in order to carry out sabotage, &c. They were called Gruppi d'Azione Patriottica (G.A.P.). In the villages the Squadre d'Azione Patriottica, or S.A.P., had much the same functions.
2 See above, p. 323.
5 'After the fall of Rome a greater depression of a spiritual character ... and a big increase in the number of Partisans must be noted' (Minute of meeting of Neo-Fascist Generals, 15 June 1944, quoted in Wiskemann: Rome–Berlin Axis, p. 332).
phasized the deterioration 'in the Italian theatre, particularly Central Italy',¹ and the gulf between German-occupied and liberated Italy ceased to yawn like an abyss. The C.L.N.A.I. was able to feel more confidence in the new Bonomi Government than in that of Badoglio. The Milan leaders asked² that General Cadorna should be sent to co-ordinate the C.L.N. military effort. The general had already secretly visited the C.L.N.A.I. people in Milan between December 1943 and January 1944; in August he was parachuted back to them and took over the extremely complicated task of the co-ordination of the fighting Partisans who were henceforth called the Corpo Volontari della Libertà.³ Already the Allies were supplying arms upon a considerable scale—'arms rained from the sky', wrote Parri later⁴—while desertions from the Neo-Fascist ranks and successful small-scale actions here and there were bringing in enough to make a notable difference. It is interesting that the University of Padua, which had become the centre of C.L.N. activities in Venetia, contributed explosives produced in its Istituto di Chimica.⁵

As the Allies pushed north from Rome the atmosphere in Florence became daily more tense. The Resistance groups, again chiefly Party of Action and Communists, were strong, and the SS and their Neo-Fascist jackals, reinforced by colleagues who had been driven out of Rome, pursued the patriots more and more remorselessly.⁶ On 30 July the Germans ordered the evacuation of the houses along the Arno and in the night of 3–4 August they blew up its bridges.⁷ But Partisans from outside had begun to penetrate into the city and desperate street fighting began as the Allies drew near. A week later, on 11 August, Florence was liberated. Not long after this, however, the Allied armies were halted for many weary months along the Spezia–Rimini, or Gothic, line.

Early in the autumn a Partisan epic was played out in the Val d'Ossola in north-western Piedmont on the frontier of Switzerland. The area was strategically important, partly because all Milan's water-power was generated here, so that it held the key to Milanese industrial production. The Partisans were strong in the mountains around, and early in September 1944 several groups of them, including Garibaldini led by Moscatelli and the Val Toce division which was Christian Democrat and led

¹ Quoted at Nuremberg Trial (I.M.T. Nuremberg, ix. 221).
³ The Communist guerrilla leaders never fully accepted Cadorna's authority, but it is interesting to find how well he thought of Moscatelli and even of Longo (see Cadorna: La Riscossa, pp. 170–2 and 132–3).
⁴ Mercurio, December 1945, p. 16. Craveri (ibid. p. 110) speaks of 'il bel crescendo del maggio e del giugno'.
⁵ Meneghetti (Rector of Padua University): 'Cronaca dell' Università di Padova', Mercurio, December 1945, p. 171.
⁶ See Markevitch: Made in Italy, pp. 180 seqq.
by Di Dio, swept down into Domodossola, drove out the Germans and Neo-Fascists, and set up a miniature republic in the Ossola valley for six weeks. Although the Allies had at one time considered an operation of this kind neither they nor Cadorna were in favour of it now. It was the expression of a romantic Italian idealism. Those who carried it out wished to follow the Mazzinian example of 1849 and to establish a symbolic, if temporary, régime to represent their own national aspiration independently of Allied policy. The Ossola patriots were sadly short of arms and, if they were not reinforced, the enemy was sure to return to drive them out; he did so, in fact, in the second half of October.

The fact was that, while Allied supplies of arms had been generous in the early summer, from the beginning of August all the efforts of the Royal Air Force were devoted to supplying weapons to the Warsaw patriots, and the Ossola action paid for this. On 13 November the bitter disappointment of the Italian Partisans was deepened by General Alexander's directive suggesting that they should melt away to their homes till the spring since they could not be usefully employed. Cadorna, whose attitude all along was remarkably objective, pointed out later that, while the winter automatically encouraged the men who could do so to follow Alexander's instructions, the indignation felt by the parties of the Left was both strong and justifiable. Not only the Communists, but the Partisans as a whole, felt that the Allied Command distrusted them, which was not altogether untrue. Cadorna agreed with Longo that the attitude of military leaders must always be positive, never as negative as this.

Owing to the interruption of financial supplies from Switzerland the question of Partisan funds had become acute early in the summer of 1944. From the beginning Alfredo Pizzoni had been chosen to preside over the C.L.N.A.I. because he had no party affiliations. It was he who was able to arrange in June that two big banks, the Banca Commerciale Italiana and the Credito Italiano, should advance credits to patriotic firms in Milan, such as Falck, Edison, and Pirelli; these then passed the money to Pizzoni. But needs grew all the time. After the liberation of France in August it was easier for the C.L.N.A.I. to move, and on 14 November Parri, Pizzoni, and two other of its representatives arrived at Monopoli outside Bari to consult the Allied authorities, then continued their journey to Rome to visit members of the Italian provisional Government. Thus at a moment of great popular depression it was possible, nevertheless, to

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2 See Cadorna: La Riscossa, pp. 200–1; Longo: Un Popolo alla macchia, pp. 332–3. It is interesting to see how generously Cadorna writes of the Communists, but how Longo does his best to ignore all but the Communist effort. But it is also interesting to have Cadorna's account of how Longo restrained the perhaps comprehensible ferocity of the Communist-dominated C.L.N. in Piedmont.

take several important decisions. The Allies undertook to finance the C.L.N.A.I., evidently preferring to exercise this control than to leave it to Bonomi and his colleagues. At the same time, on 7 December 1944, General Maitland Wilson agreed to the corollary of financial support, that is to say the recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. as the authority responsible for the struggle against the enemy in northern Italy and responsible, too, for all administration until the Allied forces should arrive. The Bonomi Cabinet confirmed this recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. as a provisional government until Italy should be able ‘freely to decide her own destiny’ (20 December 1944).

The military stagnation in Italy through the long winter of 1944–5 was difficult to bear. At last on 10 April the Allied armies began to move. Later, on 19 April, the people of Bologna turned on the Germans and there were grim street fights: on 21 April the Allies occupied this key position. Meanwhile a famous Partisan hero, Boldrini,1 and his men had liberated Forli and Ravenna. From this time on it was simply a matter of sauve-qui-peut on the Nazi-Fascist side, for both Germans and Neo-Fascists did their best to go behind the others’ backs. Mussolini’s attempted flight on 25 April and its sequel have already been recorded.2

Meanwhile northern Italy was in ferment. Partisan plans had been worked out for the taking over of each of the big towns and the prevention of the destruction of communications (as had happened in Florence) and of factories by the Germans. Strikes increased in Milan during March 1945, and at the beginning of April the Partisans were in control of the Milan-Turin autostrada (main motor road). On 10 April the final directive—No. 16—of the Communist Party went out to prepare ‘popular insurrection’. On 23 April the C.L.N. forces in Genoa turned on the Germans, who were forced to surrender on 25 April. On 23 April, also, the Milan railwaymen went on strike, and very early on 24 April an ‘insurrectional committee’ of Communists, Party of Action, and Socialists (in Milan the Socialists were strong) gave the word for open resistance in the streets and factories; there was fighting at the Breda and Pirell works on 25 April at the time of the attempted parley with Mussolini. During the night of 25–26 April the wireless station was taken by the Partisans. Longo reported the state of affairs to Cadorna and early on 27 April the C.L.N.A.I. officially took over authority.3 In Turin the workmen began to occupy the factories on 25 April; there was heavy fighting with the Germans, who mostly fought their way out of the city

1 Boldrini’s nom de guerre was ‘Bulow’; it was as such that his fame had spread.
2 See above, p. 327.
3 Cadorna: La Riscossa, pp. 254 and 257. Mussolini was captured by Partisans on Lake Con on the same day.
4 The Allied authorities requested the Piedmontese C.L.N. to wait another ten days, but C.L.N. representative successfully lost the request.
The C.L.N. took over on 28 April. Thus all the important north Italian towns were essentially in patriot hands—sometimes as in Turin at the cost of serious casualties—before the arrival of the Allied armies. The Allied authorities then proceeded to take over all authority with a haste which was not always tactfully concealed; indeed their distrust of the Partisans clouded the atmosphere of the liberation of Italy.

There was, in addition to the general atmosphere of distrust, a clash between the Italians and French with regard to the traditionally French-speaking Val d’Aosta. Resistance to the Nazis and Fascists had been led there since the end of 1943 by Émile Chanoux, who was tortured to death by the Neo-Fascists in May 1944. In the following winter propaganda for secession to France began to come from some of the Val d’Aosta clergy. On 28 April 1945 the local Partisans drove out the enemy, but during the following night French patrols crossed the frontier. Feeling now ran very high between Italians, French, and Aostans, among whom the latter perhaps desired autonomy before all other things. On 5 May the Val d’Aosta was taken over by the Allied Military Government and American troops.

It should be recorded in conclusion that, apart from the Italian soldiers who fell fighting regularly with the Allied forces, the resistance cost at least 20,000 killed (or tortured to death) and 40,000 wounded and missing. There were the usual incidents of villages destroyed, beginning with Boves in Piedmont on 18 September 1943, and of deportations and SS torture. There are many records of how the German authorities left corpses hanging on the trees all along some street in order to advertise their reign of terror. The most notorious, perhaps, of the mass executions took place in Rome at the Fosse Ardeatine in March 1944—330 victims chosen at random from those under arrest because a bomb had been thrown in the via Rasella and thirty-two German soldiers killed. Perhaps the most costly part of the national sacrifice was paid in the lives of able—indeed brilliant—young leaders like Galimberti, Beltrami, Leopoldo Gasparotto, Curiel, and countless others, the loss of whom was to be acutely felt in the following years.

1 Isolated Special Forces officers were, of course, on the spot long before the main armies marched in.

2 This was mainly a reaction against Fascist over-centralization.


4 Cf. Longo (Un Popolo alla macchia, p. 471), who gives very high figures. His tables show the relatively heaviest losses as in Lombardy. On pp. 421 and 422 he gives interesting figures of the available patriot forces in Milan and the province on the eve of the insurrection.
PART IV
FRANCE
A. VICHY FRANCE

By Alfred Cobban

(i) The Vichy Régime in 1940–1

(a) The Establishment of the Vichy Régime

The defeat of the French armies in May and June 1940 was followed by the conclusion of an Armistice with Germany on 22 June and another with Italy on the 24th. France was in a state of chaos, and the French people, in the words of Léon Blum, 'comme stupide et abasourdi sous le coup . . . atterré, immobile, et en effet se laissant tomber à terre dans sa stupeur et dans son désespoir'. Further resistance was patently impossible inside France. The authority of the Government formed by Marshal Pétain on 16 June was recognized everywhere, and the Armistice was accepted as a bitter but ineluctable fact.

In the French overseas possessions, on the other hand, the first reaction was refusal to accept defeat. General Noguès in Morocco, General Mittelhauser, Commander-in-Chief in the Levant, Puaux, High Commissioner for Syria, Legentilhomme in Jibuti, General Catroux and Admiral Decoux in Indochina, among others, expressed in various ways their determination to continue the struggle. 'What has happened in France', asked the Dépêche d'Indochine, 'to cause the Government presided over by Marshal Pétain to demand a separate peace, when we had taken a solemn engagement never to conclude a peace of that nature?' 'Will we accept this peace? There cannot be any question of it. To-day the Empire can save France.' This, however, was an unofficial reaction; the official classes, with their sense of hierarchic subordination and tradition of obedience to the de facto Government, after a period of brief hesitation, threw in their lot with Pétain in all the major colonies. Similarly, to officers of the French forces refusal to accept the Armistice seemed a breach of the oath of loyalty to the state. Thus, with trifling opposition, the Bordeaux Government was able to carry the whole French Empire out of the war along with metropolitan France. The few recalcitrants, like Catroux and Legentilhomme, lost their posts, and subsequently joined the

1 An account of the fall of France, the Armistice agreement, and the formation of the Pétain administration will be found in the Survey for 1939-45: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
2 Procès Pétain, i. 243 (evidence of Blum).
3 Dépêche d'Indochine, 24 June 1940.
4 Ibid. 25 June 1940.
Free French Movement. The French Government made the necessary changes of personnel and could feel confident that the loyalty of the colonies was secure under the rule of proconsuls who had unequivocally accepted its authority—General Noguès in Morocco, General Mittelhauser in the Near East, General Fougère in Syria, General Germain in Jibuti, Admiral Estéva in Tunisia, Admiral Abrial in Algeria, Boisson in West and Equatorial Africa, Cayla in Madagascar, Admiral Decoux in Indochina, and Admiral Robert in the French West Indies.

De Gaulle, who had raised the standard of continued resistance in England, might possibly have obtained a foothold in some of the French colonies with British military aid. The British Government, however, were anxious not to allow their relations with Vichy to deteriorate to the point of war, and in a statement of British policy made it clear that Britain was willing to support dissident movements in the French colonies only with naval forces. An Anglo-Free French attack on Dakar at the end of September was repulsed. The Free French Movement only succeeded in winning over some of the smaller colonies in Africa, Oceania, and India, gains which were insignificant compared with the vast extent of French metropolitan and overseas territory which had accepted Pétain’s authority.

In the Unoccupied Zone of France the new administration took over control unresisted. On 28 June it moved to Clermont-Ferrand, but this town lacked suitable accommodation for the Ministries, which had to be scattered in the neighbouring spas. Twenty-four hours’ experience was enough to show that this situation was intolerable. Another possibility was Lyons, but the Government were unwilling to establish themselves where they would be exposed to pressure from a large urban population, and one, moreover, devoted to Herriot. Vichy, with ample hotel accommodation for the housing of government offices, offered a solution of the biggest practical difficulty, and on 1 July Pétain and his Ministers moved to the town which was to be their capital for much longer than they expected, and the symbol of far more than they had ever hoped or feared. The Government had undergone one important modification since its formation on 16 June. Laval then refused to accept office because he was not given the post which he desired—that of Minister for Foreign Affairs; but he soon repented of his fit of pique and joined the Government as Vice-President of the Council and Minister of State. Laval’s ally Marquet, the Mayor of Bordeaux, at the same time became Minister of the Interior.

1 See below, pp. 442, 444.
2 See below, pp. 436 seqq.
4 See below, pp. 444, 448.
5 See below, pp. 441-4.
7 The original holder of this office, Pomaret, was moved to the Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour. Baudouin retained the office of Foreign Minister, and Chautemps that of Vice-Premier.
The new Government, though it still included some parliamentarians in spite of Pétain’s well-known dislike for the breed, contained many enemies of the Third Republic. Hostility to the existing régime had in some cases reached such a point that the fall of France was even welcomed because it meant the end of the democratic Republic, though not many went quite as far as the author of Les Décombres, who openly rejoiced that defeat had paid better than victory, since it had brought about the destruction of an ‘ignoble parliamentarism’.\(^1\) A more moderate reaction was expressed in a French officer’s diary:

Naturally, the idea of a dictatorship in France, for the moment at least, is in the minds of both officers and men. Literally I have never met a single one of my poilus who has not expressed his disgust for the parliamentary régime and has not insisted on the Deputies and their policy as being solely responsible for the disaster.\(^2\)

This state of mind was undoubtedly widespread, and it explains why it was possible for the Third Republic to be brought to an end, not by a coup d’état, but with as much regard for constitutionality as circumstances permitted. The ordinary session of the Parliament for 1940 was formally closed on 6 July, and the next day the Chambers were convoked in extraordinary session at Vichy and presented with a proposition for the revision of the constitutional laws. On 9 July the Senate by 229 votes out of 230 (the Marquis de Chambrun, 75-year-old descendant of Lafayette, being the one dissentient), and the Chamber of Deputies by 395 out of 398, voted in favour of the revision of the constitutional laws. In an attempt to stave off the immediate abolition of the Third Republic, a group of senators, including Paul-Boncour, produced the contre-projet Taurines,\(^3\) which suspended the constitutional laws of 1875 until the conclusion of peace, gave Pétain full power to take all necessary measures for the maintenance of order and the life of the country, and authorized him to prepare with the aid of a commission a draft of a new Constitution to be submitted to the vote of the nation. Mention should also be made of the curious episode of Flandin’s attempt to persuade President Lebrun to resign office before the meeting of the Assembly. According to Flandin this was an attempt to save the Republic.\(^4\) It is permissible to wonder whether personal ambition and the desire to forestall Laval may not have had something to do with the manoeuvre. In any case it came to nothing,

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for Pétain was relying on Laval, whose political activity at this time was inexhaustible, to secure the consent of the Chamber to the abolition of the existing constitutional laws. ‘Il sait prendre les gens!’ commented Lebrun on Laval, and Léon Blum: ‘C’est lui qui a mené tout le jeu.’¹ Laval’s influence had already been shown in the vigorous steps he had taken at Bordeaux to prevent the move to North Africa.² Despite considerable personal antipathy, Pétain never altogether forgot that it was Laval who did most to secure his position for him. ‘Laval’, he said, ‘a été inouï.’³

The Chamber and Senate, or at least those members who were present at Vichy, assembled in a private meeting on the morning of 10 July to hear the views of the Government. Laval was the spokesman for a proposal to give full powers to Pétain to draw up a new Constitution. He endeavoured with some success to win support for this, as against the Taurines counter-project, by offering the assurance, in the name of Pétain, that the two Chambers should continue to exist, and their members therefore continue to draw their salaries, until new Assemblies had been instituted. He also insisted that the new Constitution would have to be ratified by the nation, though it should be observed that no time-limit was imposed for this ratification, that its form was not specified, and that the Constitution would become effective immediately on promulgation. In the debate that followed Bergery produced a declaration, signed by some hundred members, stating that the only path France could follow was that of collaboration with the other Latin countries, and even with Germany, in the establishment of a new continental order, national and social in character. Flandin now supported Laval’s constitutional proposals in an effective speech.⁴ The same afternoon, in accordance with the provisions of 1875 for constitutional revision, the two Chambers, sitting as a National Assembly, held a formal session. Out of 850 possible votes (not counting the 72 Communists excluded in 1939), 569 voted for the Pétain proposal and 80 against.⁵

(b) Political Institutions of Vichy

Pétain put his new constitutional powers to immediate use. His chief adviser was Alibert, an Action Française lawyer of extreme views and

¹ Procès Pétain, i. 163, 245 (evidence of Lebrun, Blum); cf. J. Montigny: Toute la vérité sur un mois dramatique de notre histoire (Clermont-Ferrand, Éditions Mont-Louis, 1940), p. 50; Garonne, 12 July 1940; Lebrun, op. cit. p. 104.
² Details will be found in the Surrey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
⁴ Montigny: Toute la vérité sur un mois dramatique, pp. 147, 153; Garonne, 12 July 1940.
⁵ In addition, 17 abstained, 30 excused themselves, 4 were not able to participate, and 149 more for one reason or another were non-participants. There was some doubt whether the constitutional law of 1875 required an absolute majority of the whole membership of the two Chambers or not, but in any case this also was secured with an ample margin.
excitable disposition. The first constitutional act, of 11 July, markedly avoided the word Republic, and declared that Pétain had assumed the position of Chef de l'État français. As such he decreed the abrogation of Article 2 of the constitutional law of 25 February 1875, the famous amendement Wallon, which by providing for the election of a President had in effect founded the Republic.1 Perhaps the most significant feature of the act was the phrase with which it opened—‘Nous, Philippe Pétain’—by which the personal character of Pétain's authority was clearly indicated. By the second constitutional act, also of 11 July, Pétain attributed to himself the legislative power until the formation of new Assemblies, the right of nominating to all civil and military posts not otherwise provided for, and all the appropriate powers of the Head of a State: he was to combine, in fact, the position of Head of the State with that of Head of the Government. The executive power thus obtained complete autonomy and its decrees were laws. By the third constitutional act the existing Senate and Chamber of Deputies were adjourned until further notice.2 France in the space of two days had passed from a parliamentary to what might be described as a presidential régime, a transformation recalling in some ways that effected by Louis Napoleon between 1850 and 1852, when fear of the collapse of the social order had thrown France into the arms of an earlier saviour of society.

The point of departure of the new Government was the attribution of personal authority to Pétain; its whole strength lay in the widespread sense of loyalty to the Marshal. In the logic of the régime the only effective constitutional development to be expected was the strengthening of the personal element by such acts as the imposition of an oath of loyalty.3 Because it was a personal government, the question of the succession to Pétain naturally arose. Laval was the first successor to be nominated, by Constitutional Act No. 4 of 12 July 1940, a decision which was far from popular.4 His fall on 13 December5 involved the deletion of his name. On 10 February 1941 the rise of Darlan was manifested by his appointment

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1 A constitutional law of 14 August 1884 had stated that in no case could the republican form of government be made the subject of any project of revision. This, of course, was what no law could do. However, the Republic was never abolished by Vichy, though the word ‘État’ was steadily substituted for ‘République’. From 4 January 1940 the Journal Officiel de la République became the Journal Officiel de l'État.

2 For the three acts see Les Constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789, ed. Léon Duguit and Henry Monnier and continued by Roger Bonnard, 6th edition (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1943), pp. 544–5 [this work will be referred to hereafter as Duguit, Monnier, & Bonnard]; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 120.

3 For higher officials (27 January 1941), the army and magistrature (14 August 1941), and lower officials (4 October 1941).


5 See below, p. 371.
as the new Dauphin, and the name of Laval did not return until November 1942.

Under Pétain as *Chef de l'État* there were from September 1940 to July 1941 two Councils, a Council of Ministers which he presided over himself, and a Cabinet Council, in which much of the real work was done, presided over by the Vice-President of the Council. Decrees of 6 September 1940 and 23 February 1941 established fifteen Secretaries of State, to whom two more, attached personally to the Vice-President of the Council, were added on 9 June 1941. Certain of the Secretaries held the office of Minister and a rank superior to the others. The Senate and Chamber still continued to exist, but they could only be summoned by the Head of the State, who had no intention of calling them. While Flandin was in office, in January 1941, he was responsible for an attempt to create a substitute for them in the form of a National Council, nominated by the Head of the State and functioning, in a consultative capacity, only on his motion. The *Temps* described it, in appropriate eighteenth-century terminology, as an assembly of notables. Of its original 185 members some 90 were parliamentarians, a fact which so seriously annoyed Pétain that he refused to allow them any salary, or even the right to hold an inaugural session. The Council never met as a whole but operated through commissions, appointed and convoked by the Head of the State. In June 1941 a Constitutional Commission was formed, presided over by Joseph Barthélemy, at the first meeting of which Pétain read a speech announcing that the electoral, representative, majoritarian régime, long discredited, was to be replaced by an authoritarian and hierarchic state, but no results of the labours of the Commission ever materialized.

Constitutional plans were indeed of little significance. The real government, from beginning to end of the Vichy episode, was the bureaucracy. ‘We put all our faith’, said one of the leading Ministers, Bouthillier, ‘in administration.’ The most important body after the Council of Ministers was the *Conseil d'État*, to which the legislative section, suppressed in 1934, had been restored. The Ministers themselves were, by Pétain’s choice, for the most part not politicians but officials, many of them drawn from the powerful and closely-knit corporation of the *Inspecteurs des Finances*. They had to cope with enormous difficulties, not least the existence of the two zones and the division of the administrative services between Vichy and

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1 The system of two councils was said to have arisen because Pétain could not follow the discussion in a large meeting and therefore preferred a council at which only the more important Ministers were present. It was found inconvenient and was abandoned in February 1941. Bouthillier denies that the Secretaries were subordinate to the Ministers (see Yves Bouthillier: *Le Drame de Vichy*, ii: *Finances sous la contrainte* (Paris, Plon, 1951), pp. 259-60.

2 *Temps*, 27 January 1941.


4 *Temps*, 10 July 1941.

5 Bouthillier: *Drame de Vichy*, ii. 18.
Paris, although during 1941 most of the Ministries gradually drifted back to Paris. Du Moulin de Labarthète, Pétain’s first Chef de Cabinet, has written in high praise of the courage and technical ability of the *hauts fonctionnaires* who occupied the seats of power at Vichy, ‘et dont on ne dira jamais assez à quel point ils ont sauvé la France’. This verdict may contain much truth, though the material is hardly available yet for a balanced judgement. It is certainly correct, however, as he also observed, that their administrative qualities were counterbalanced by a notable lack of political sense.\(^1\) On a lower level, to provide the new staff required for the expanding bureaucracy, there came in what du Moulin described as ‘cadres de complément improvisés, braillards, agités: un curieux mélange d’hommes de main, de ratés du P.P.F. [Parti Populaire Français] ou de la Cagoule,\(^2\) de jeunes gens du monde, d’ “évadés de château”’.\(^3\) And at the centre, in the words of the American Ambassador, was ‘a feeble, frightened old man, surrounded by self-seeking conspirators’.\(^4\)

Vichy never achieved political coherence. Weygand has denied that it can be referred to as an entity at all. ‘Vichy’, he said, ‘n’existe pas’; its Government always consisted of divided and opposed groups.\(^5\) Its history is not the history of a government by Pétain, or by anyone else, but of the intrigues and struggles of conflicting factions, fighting for power in what was left to them of France, but confined and constrained on all sides by the conditions of a world at war and the dictates of the Germans. The impression its history gives is that of some ramshackle copy of an eighteenth-century court, with Pétain as an aged and puritanical Louis XV, appointing his courtiers to office, or dismissing them, with a singular detachment from personal affections, allowing one group to cancel out another, and giving his full confidence to nobody, or if to anyone then to his personal medical attendant, Dr. Ménétrel. Even in foreign affairs the parallel holds, not least in the autumn of 1940, when Pétain, in addition to the attempts of the Foreign Ministry to negotiate with Britain and of Laval to do a deal with Germany, had his own pathetic and ineffective little *secret du roi*.\(^6\) All this formed the makeshift political reality to which the idealism of what was termed the National Revolution provided an imposing but detached façade.

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\(^1\) Du Moulin de Labarthète: *Temps des illusions*, pp. 124, 146–7, 368.

\(^2\) See below, p. 372, note 2.

\(^3\) Du Moulin de Labarthète, op. cit. p. 124.


\(^6\) See below, pp. 359–60.
The Economic Difficulties of France

There is, as has been suggested, another side to the medal. The Vichy Government had to face appalling economic difficulties, and it was only by remarkable efforts on the part of the administration that order was restored to a country which had been in chaos. Towards the end of July 1940 repatriation of refugees to their homes in the Occupied Zone began. Disarmament (in the course of which the French military authorities did their best to retain secret stores of armaments unknown to the Germans) and demobilization had also to be dealt with. By November unemployment figures amounted to a million. Various devices were adopted to deal with this problem—dismissal of female labour and foreigners, prohibition of the employment of agricultural labour in any trades or industries working under government contract, and above all the institution of compulsory short time.\(^1\) Unemployment was, however, only a temporary problem. A more lasting difficulty was to be shortage of labour, for the prisoners of war in Germany amounted at the outset to nearly 2 million, and as late as December 1941 there were still over a million and a quarter in captivity.

To the inevitable difficulties arising out of war and defeat were added those resulting from the systematic economic exploitation of France by her conquerors. Road and rail transport in the Occupied Zone was rapidly reconstructed for strategic reasons. Raw materials, machinery, and vehicles were confiscated for transmission to Germany; supplies for the German forces were requisitioned in the countryside and payment made the responsibility of the French authorities. The fixing of the exchange rate at one Reichsmark to twenty francs, in place of the pre-war rate of one to eleven, or the ratio indicated by price levels of about one to fourteen,\(^2\) encouraged the occupying troops to buy goods on a large scale to send back to Germany. France had agreed to pay the cost of the army of occupation. In spite of French protests this was assessed at 400 million francs a day, a colossal sum, which practically doubled the pre-war French budget. The Germans, in fact, charged France with the budget not merely of a normal army of occupation, but of all the huge forces assembled in the country for operational purposes.\(^3\)

Apart from German exactions the dominating fact in the economic life of France after the Armistice was the division between the Occupied and the Unoccupied Zones. The dividing line began at the Swiss frontier near

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\(^1\) Bouthillier: *Drame de Vichy*, ii. 360–1.


Geneva, went north-west to Dôle, west to a point just east of Tours, and then swung south to the Pyrenees near Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port. Within the Occupied Zone the industrial regions of the north and east were placed under a special régime, and at the beginning of September the civil population was evacuated from the Channel coast to a depth of thirty kilometres. Occupied France was divided into five regions with strict control of movement between them. There were stringent limitations on movements between the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones. Even postal communication was severely restricted. In October 1940 correspondence between the two zones, which had up to this time been banned, was permitted, but only in the form of post-cards with printed phrases on them.¹ The French authorities continued to function in the Occupied Zone, but under the control of the German military commander and his subordinate officers.

The isolation of the Unoccupied Zone from the rest of France meant its separation from the richer half of France, and the loss of 66 per cent. of the cultivated land, 65 per cent. of the industrial workers, 74 per cent. of the wheat production, 70 per cent. of the milk, and so on. In addition, the severe winter of 1939–40 had been bad for the crops, and the fighting in the summer of 1940 had interfered with the harvest.

The British blockade, which had been extended to France on 25 June 1940, cut off traffic to and from the Atlantic and Channel ports. In the Mediterranean there were not the warships to make the blockade effective. Traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar might have been controlled, but no attempt was made to restrict it in 1940, in order not to exacerbate relations with Vichy. However, a large proportion of the supplies which entered France through the Mediterranean ports passed into German hands.² Baudouin, broadcasting on 22 August,³ protested that the British blockade was reducing France to starvation, and gave publicity to a German offer that foodstuffs allowed to come in from overseas would be reserved for the civil population. On the following day, as it happened, the Germans demanded from the Unoccupied Zone the immediate delivery of half a million head of cattle, 1½ million pigs, and other supplies,⁴ and this from an area which even in normal times could not support itself in foodstuffs and was now choked with refugees. During the winter of 1940–1 the situation in Paris was so serious that train-loads of food and coal were sent from Unoccupied France. Subsequently conditions became worse in the Unoccupied Zone.

¹ In May 1941 correspondence was authorized between the zones by means of post-cards with seven blank lines for writing on family matters only, in place of printed cards.
⁴ Ibid. p. 312.
The problem of food supply was the most urgent one for Vichy. To cope with the shortage of agricultural labour resulting from the absence of a huge army of prisoners, decrees allowing the requisitioning of labour for the land were introduced in the spring of 1941, and measures were taken to encourage suitable families to return to the land, and to give the urban unemployed work on the farms. 'Back to the land' became one of the themes of Vichy propaganda, encouraged by the Germans, who, before they felt their need for the products of French industry, cherished the idea of turning France into a satellite peasant community. The idea was not welcomed in all quarters in France. Plans for increasing agricultural production were notably unsuccessful. The attempt to organize a corporative system, which was pushed farther in agriculture than in any other sphere, encountered indifference and hostility from the peasants, and membership of the corporative agricultural union had to be made optional. By a decree of 18 August 1941 the state assumed control over all its activities and the corporation became a mere agency of the central Government for the execution of decisions taken by the Minister of Agriculture. From Vichy there emerged continual complaints of the egoism of the peasants which condemned the towns to famine, interspersed with appeals to peasant patriotism.

Industry also was in grave difficulties. By the blockade France lost 90 per cent. of her imports of raw material for textiles, 60 per cent. of the supplies of pulp for paper, and all her imports of coal, which in 1938 had amounted to 23 million tons out of 68 million tons used. One result of this loss, and the consequent employment of wasteful and inefficient substitutes, was a fall in production, taking the productivity of labour in 1938 as 100, to 71 in 1941 and 57 in 1942, over the whole industrial field.

In these circumstances the introduction of economic controls, such as France had not known since the days of the Committee of Public Safety, was not surprising. Without drastic measures it is doubtful if French industries could have avoided a complete breakdown. A complicated system of committees for purchasing, allocating, and distributing stocks was set up, despite considerable opposition. The weaknesses in the func-

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1 'Ce n’est pas douloureusement, ni par la force des traités', wrote the Jour, 'qui nous intégreraient à je ne sais quelle Europe idyllique qui nous transformeraient en vachers et pêcheurs pacifiques et résignés, que la France nouvelle naîtra' (Jour, 2 August 1941).
2 'Je sais bien, paysan, que les taxes et contrôles s’apparaisent vexatoires par leurs innombrables complications. Tu as parfois tendance à ne point aller au marché, à restreindre les cultures essentielles suivant la stricte mesure de tes besoins personnels' (De la Rocque in the Petit Journal, 29 November 1941). Caziot, the hard-working Minister of Agriculture, had to complain in December 1941 of the many gaps through which corn was lost to the rationing system, such as its clandestine sale and feeding to cattle and chickens (Ibid. 1 January 1942).
4 Ibid. p. 203.
5 That their operation was far from satisfactory is shown by a comment such as that of André Siegfried: 'Il y a actuellement une telle prolifération de bureaucratie et l’économie dirigée a
tioning of this system were revealed in a speech by Pétain on 12 August 1941, explaining the reason for the dismissal of the Minister of Supplies, Achard, and condemning the national distribution centres, which, he said, had given the great commercial agents a monopolistic control of supplies to the detriment of both producer and consumer.

Though economic conditions in France became increasingly severe, it is to the credit of the bureaucratic technicians who formed the real government of France that there was no catastrophic collapse. This was particularly due to the work of the Ministry of Finance, which created a nearly closed monetary circuit, with a coefficient of efficiency estimated at 76 per cent. for 1940, 80 per cent. for 1941, and 67 per cent. for 1942.\(^1\) Sound finances were, of course, out of the question in a situation in which occupation costs and other expenses arising out of the Armistice constituted over half the French budget.\(^2\) In 1940 expenditure was over 365 billion francs and income 82 billion; and in the following year the corresponding figures were 302 and 91.\(^3\) The proportion of expenditure covered by income was thus a quarter in 1940, and under a third in 1941.

A policy of freezing wages was followed, although exceptions in the form of payments for overtime, subsidies to the lowest-paid workers, and increased family allowances modified its effect. The Germans put a ban on any general increase in wages because the low level enabled them to attract workers to the Organisation Todt and to Germany by offering higher wages.\(^4\) Regulations controlling prices, codified as early as October 1940, helped to keep down the cost of living, which rose only slowly. Taking 100 as the figure for 1938, the index of retail prices was 136 in December 1940, and 160 in December 1941.\(^5\) Wages meanwhile had risen from an index of 103 in October 1939 to 121 in October 1941.\(^6\) These figures do not represent the situation quite fairly, however, because agricultural prices, being more difficult to control, had risen more rapidly than industrial prices, so that the urban population was much worse off than the agricultural.\(^7\) The corollary of this control of wages and prices in a period of acute shortages was, of course, a general system of rationing, beginning in September 1940 with food and extended to petrol, soap, and many other commodities. That ambitions for the future of France could flourish, even in such a hard climate, was shown by the plans for irrigation, the drainage of marshes, and electrification which were drawn up and in

tellement envahi notre système de production et d'échanges que les gens ne savent plus, en toute bonne foi, s'ils sont ou non fonctionnaires' (Temps, 19 June 1941).


\(^3\) Dieterlen and Rist: *Monetary Problem of France*, p. 7.

\(^4\) Baudin, op. cit. p. 208.

\(^5\) Dieterlen and Rist, op. cit. p. 9; Bettelheim, op. cit. p. 227.

\(^6\) Dieterlen and Rist, op. cit. p. 9.

\(^7\) Bettelheim, op. cit. p. 228.
some cases even put into operation. Economic conditions, however, were gradually deteriorating during 1941 and only palliatives lay in the power of Vichy, but they had a long way to go before they reached their worst.¹

(d) Pétain and the National Revolution

Economic policies were largely dictated to Vichy by force of circumstances. Its politics were its own, so far as it had any, for Vichy was not so much a polity as a state of mind or, rather, a collection of often mutually incompatible states of mind. The parties of the Republic having been submerged in the waters of Vichy and their organizations suppressed, the politics of the new régime inevitably took the form of faction and intrigue, centring on the austere little court of Pétain and his confidents, huddled in confusion in the semi-converted salons and bedrooms and gaming-rooms of the hotels of a nineteenth-century spa. At the outset, a world of fashionable hangers-on and political aspirants gathered there.

Vichy bourdonnait [wrote the author of Les Décombres] comme un Deauville des plus heureux jours. De la gare à l’Allier, c’était un flot de robes pimpantes, de négligés savamment balnéaires, de vestons des grands tailleurs, Hollywood, Juan-les-Pins, les Champs Élysées, tout Auteuil, tout Passy, toutes les grandes ‘premieres’ de Bernstein et de Jean Cocteau, la haute couture, la banque, la Comédie-Française, le cinéma, avec les grues les plus huppées du boulevard de la Madeleine, juchées sur leurs talons Louis XV.²

It did not last, of course: the fashionable world tired of Vichy, especially in the winter, and went back where the money was, to the Germans in Paris, the author of Les Décombres one of the first.

Its departure left Vichy more isolated from political reality, but freer to pursue its own ideals. The men of Vichy dwelt with almost masochistic pleasure on the sins of France and the punishment that they had brought in their train. For the upper bourgeoisie, professional officers, and higher officials, defeat, ugly and venomous, bore yet the precious jewel of a new political and social order in its head. Regeneration through suffering was the keynote which Pétain struck in his broadcast of 25 June 1940, and it became a dominant element in the psychology of Vichy. ‘Une rage d’examen de conscience, une manie de mea culpa, s’étaient emparées d’une poignée de nos compatriotes’, writes Charles-Roux.³ It would be a mistake to underestimate the idealism of Vichy, and the desire of the little group round Pétain for a great moral reform. Their ideal, of course, was conceived in terms of the campaign against the Third Republic so long pursued by the Action Française and the Fascist and semi-Fascist groups. Weygand, in a memorandum of 28 June 1940, read among others by Pétain and Baudouin, called for an end to be put to the old order of

¹ See below, pp. 406-11.
² Rebacte: Les Décombres, p. 481.
masonic, capitalistic, cosmopolitan compromises, to class war, demagogic auctioning of votes, and love of ease and pleasure; and a return to the ideas of God, the patrie, and the family.\(^1\) An article signed by Pétain in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for 15 September 1940 put forward similar ideas—a strong state, family, youth, hierarchy, corporativism—and denounced liberalism, capitalism, and collectivism. Against the egoism, the individualism, and the class conflicts of the past, Pétain and his supporters appealed to the spirit of order and obedience, of social hierarchy, controlled economy and corporative professional organization, against parliamentarism to the principle of leadership.

In what its adherents described as the ‘National Revolution’ a rather nebulous version of the Action Française doctrines seemed to have come at last, after nearly half a century of agitation, into its own. Anglophobe, Jew-baiting, anti-democratic, the Action Française was unfortunately, from the German point of view, also anti-German and hostile to totalitarianism. The conditions under which the Action Française sympathizers had come into power at Vichy were to face them, sooner or later, with the alternative either of adopting a pro-German and totalitarian policy, or of abdicating; but the dilemma to begin with went unappreciated, and the partisans of the extreme Right, triumphant in defeat, set to work on the National Revolution they had dreamed of for so long.

Their greatest asset was the name of Pétain. The extraordinary appeal that the personality of the Marshal had for the defeated French people is capable of no simple, rational explanation. The fact cannot be denied. It was demonstrated repeatedly in the enthusiastic and affectionate welcome with which he was received in large towns and smaller centres of population, down to the smallest villages, during his tours of Unoccupied France in the autumn and winter of 1940–1. The cult of the Marshal was, of course, promoted by all the usual devices. His photograph, on all scales, was to be seen everywhere: its sale was organized to raise funds for the *Secours National*. Bands of youths and girls chanted the *Marseillaise* of the National Revolution—*Maréchal, nous voilà*—all over the country. Pétain’s prestige was exploited by such methods, but it was not created by them. The country welcomed him, wrote the *Temps* (3 December 1940), as a saviour, and it went on to explain one of the reasons. ‘No one will deny to-day that the disaster undergone in June might have been accompanied by a worse disaster: we have been spared social disorder. ... We have avoided the madness of brutal revolution and sacrilegious rioting.’ It was partly for this reason that, although Pétain was not a practising Catholic, the Church surrounded him with a religious aura. Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons, declaring ‘Pétain is France, and France is

Pétain’, called him the incarnation of suffering France.\textsuperscript{1} Cardinal Suhard and Cardinal Baudrillart used similar language in Paris. On behalf of the French Protestants, Pastor Boegner, President of the Reformed Church of France, proclaimed that there was only one duty, to follow the Marshal.\textsuperscript{2}

What kind of man was Pétain? What had he done to centre on himself the hopes of a crushed and defeated nation? Much has been written to eulogize or denounce him which brings us no nearer to an answer to this question. If we attempt to answer it in terms of the actual individual we shall find no satisfactory explanation. Pétain, the hero of Verdun, had been associated with victory in the First World War; he had a reputation for humanity and for disinterested patriotism. The Fascist and semi-Fascist parties had hoped to make use of him during the troubles of the nineteen-thirties, and Right-wing propaganda had within a limited circle achieved some success in building up his reputation as a potential leader, though he had done little himself to foster this reputation. He was old, in a country which has a traditional bias towards gerontocracy. He was honest, unpretentious in his way of life, dignified, calm, fatalistic, with an almost regal capacity for impassivity and for being remote without seeming unsympathetic. Yet no personal qualities really explain the veneration that surrounded him in 1940. The truth is that the average Frenchman needed someone to believe in, to cling to in the hour of total defeat, while the individuals and groups who hoped to capitalize the defeat to the advantage of their ideas or their personal ambitions needed a figure-head. Pétain supplied both needs, and if he was not the saviour that the French people saw in him, neither was he to be quite the mere figure-head that the politicians hoped they had found. What he really was, what his motives were, who can say? ‘I do not understand the Marshal’, said Blum at his trial. ‘There is a mystery in him which I cannot penetrate.’\textsuperscript{3} He was naturally secretive—‘Le mystère était dans ses habitudes’, declares Charles-Roux, ‘le secret dans sa nature.’\textsuperscript{4} Weygand, in evidence before the Parliamentary Commission on the war, described him as ‘extrêmement secret’.\textsuperscript{5}

This secretiveness, which led him continually to conceal from one Minister the policy he was pursuing with another, might seem to his enemies like duplicity, or be presented by his admirers as an astute double-jeu. This is to read too much into what seems to have been mainly just secretiveness for its own sake. The American Ambassador, Admiral Leahy, who saw Pétain frequently, believed that his real concern was for the welfare and protection of the people of France.\textsuperscript{6} But it took a very individual form. The idea of the spiritual virtue of suffering and sacrifice

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Figaro}, 20 November, \textit{Petit Journal}, 14 November 1940.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Temps}, 29 January 1941.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Procès Pétain}, i. 245 (evidence of Blum).


\textsuperscript{5} Serre: \textit{Événements}, vi. 1617.

\textsuperscript{6} Langer: \textit{Our Vichy Gamble}, p. 284.
was strong in his mind. ‘Je fais à la France le don de ma personne pour atténuer son mal’, Pétain declared in his first broadcast, sincerely enough, yet exhibiting already the vanity which was no small element in his character and which fed on popular adulation; a vanity which was all the stronger, perhaps, because it was exhibited in none of the ordinary forms of outward show. Another weakness, more dangerous still in the long run, was that Pétain’s ideas were those of any ordinary man of his training and position; he was not intelligent enough to have a firm grasp of basic principles, though he clung to a small set of fixed ideas. Apart from these, his policies and speeches were those of the group or individual under whose influence he happened to be at the time. Above all, Pétain’s age must not be forgotten. For all his remarkable health, he had not the physical capacity, even if he had had the mental power, to control his Cabinet effectively. The meetings over which he presided were too big for him to manage and his attention wandered; after twenty minutes, said a witness before the Parliamentary Commission on the war, one ‘had’ Pétain always. He wasted his time over details, writes his Chef de Cabinet, while the essential clauses were ‘administered’ to him in the greatest confusion.

Pétain could provide the disoriented French people with the illusion of unity. He could not integrate the policy of Vichy. Indeed, it was in part the absence of agreement on a policy which made the men of Vichy seek a substitute by agreeing on a man. Under his name the work at least of pulling down the remains of the Third Republic could go ahead. The abolition of parliamentary government had been the first step. It was followed by an attack on local government. By a series of laws all elections were abolished in communes of over 2,000 inhabitants. These measures, which were particularly the work of Peyrouton and Bouthillier, satisfied the bureaucratic spirit of the great functionaries, but they dangerously increased the moral and political isolation of Vichy.

The trade unions also came under the axe early. The Confédération Générale du Travail (C.G.T.) attempted to save itself by repudiating the doctrine of class war. Its secretary, Léon Jouhaux, resigned, and its assistant secretary, René Belin, joined the Vichy Government. Despite this the C.G.T. was dissolved, along with the association of Catholic Unions, the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (C.F.T.C.), and the employers’ associations. The attempt which followed to create a corporative system for industry and the professions must be adjudged a failure, as was the loi Caziot of December 1940, which attempted to organize agriculture on a corporative basis. Corporative autonomy could not be

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1 On 16 June 1940.
2 Du Moulin de Labarthète (Temps des illusions, p. 159) names the authors of many of his speeches, but adds that Pétain always revised them personally. Cf. Serre: Événements, v. 14.15-6.
3 Ibid. p. 1415.
4 Du Moulin de Labarthète, op. cit. pp. 120, 145.
reconciled with the need for increasingly stringent government control of industry, and the corporations, in so far as they functioned at all, became little more than a thin camouflage for bureaucracy.

Yet there was a genuine desire for social reform, even if it was inspired by a spirit of paternal despotism; it was manifested in the Labour Charter of October 1941 and in a series of social laws. The long-promised old-age pensions were introduced. Youth and the Family were prime interests in the national revolution. Laws were passed providing for the training of youth in civic duty and the development of physical education, for the suppression of alcoholism, the limitation of divorce, and the encouragement of larger families.

An attempt to bring back religion into the schools reached its height at the end of 1940, when Chevalier, a prominent Catholic, became Minister of Education. 'L'école sans Dieu', he proclaimed on 7 December 1940, 'a donc vécu.' The most important step against secular education had been the abolition, in September 1940, of the écoles normales for the training of teachers. The law of 1904 prohibiting the religious teaching orders was abrogated on 3 September 1940, and a series of laws and decrees led up to the law of 8 April 1942, which restored legal personality and juridical rights to religious congregations. But anti-clerical sentiment was still easily aroused in France, and there were important anti-clerical elements among the supporters of Vichy. In early 1941 Chevalier was replaced by the more moderate Carcopino, who rescinded the more strongly criticized features of Chevalier's policy, despite the protests of the Church.

While Vichy was not purely clerical in its policy, so the Catholic Church was not undivided in its support of Vichy, and still less of collaboration. Cardinal Baudrillart, the eighty-one-year-old director of the Catholic Institute of Paris, was the only prominent leader of the Church openly to advocate collaboration. The most widely circulated Catholic paper, La Croix, edited by the Assumptionist Order, confined itself to religious questions and avoided politics as far as possible. The address of the bishops of the Occupied Zone to the Pope in February 1941 declared: 'Firmly decided to remain on the ground of religion, our intention is to avoid any political or partisan action', but in the face of a totalitarian creed such a policy of political neutrality was to prove difficult to maintain. German suspicions of the Church were manifested at the very beginning of the occupation by searches and seizures of documents in the offices of bishops and religious communities. In the east the local clergy could hardly be expected to abstain from sympathizing with the expelled Lorrainers. The Bishop of Quimper issued a protest against the Nazi campaign for Breton separatism. German attempts to suppress the activities of the organiza-

1 Much of this Vichy legislation was only applied in the Unoccupied Zone, and even there only partially.

2 Temps, 20 February 1941.
tions of *Action Catholique* were stubbornly resisted. Whatever support as a political movement the Action Française had obtained from Catholics, the Church as such could not applaud the teaching of racial hatred, though apart from individual protests it refrained from taking a stand on the issue of anti-Semitism up to the summer of 1942. François Mauriac in *Figaro*, and the Dominican Fathers in *La Revue des Jeunes*, wrote articles of considerable independence; and the influence of the Christian Democrats, uncompromised by concessions to German authority and free from close relations with the Vichy Government, steadily increased. In July 1941 *Le Jour* described them as the cleverest and most insidious enemies of the National Revolution, and by April 1942 the collaborationist press could declare that the youth of France was given up to the Christian Democrats, 'irreconcilable opponents of any Franco-German entente.' This development only came slowly, however; in 1940 the Church provided one of the pillars of Pétain's régime and most Catholics looked forward to the embodiment of their social and political ideals in the new France.

In studying the history of the 'National Revolution' the constructive achievements are bound to seem slight, compared with the inflated but not necessarily insincere language in which its ideals found expression, compared also with the work of destruction on which the heart of Vichy was set. Besides changing institutions it was equally anxious to change the men who ran them. All revolutions have their purges, and the National Revolution began with a purge of officials directed particularly against three groups—those of non-French parentage, freemasons, and Jews. The crusade against freemasonry was taken over as a personal speciality by the historian Bernard Faÿ, who filled the columns of the *Journal Officiel* with long lists of persons denounced as masonic dignitaries, and whose activities produced havoc in the lower ranks of the administration.

Anti-Semitism, long nursed by the propaganda of the Action Française, had been one of the stock themes of the parties of the Right under the Third Republic. In Paris anti-Semitic demonstrations by the Parti Populaire Français (P.P.F.) began almost immediately after the Armistice. The collaborationist press was in full cry against the Jews from the beginning, while increasingly severe measures were taken by the Germans. In Unoccupied France, the anti-Semitic impulse, like practically every other aspect of the 'National Revolution', came from above, and was accepted passively by the people. The first ominous sign was the abrogation, on 27 August 1940, of the decree law of April 1939 against race defamation. In October came a law defining the racial concept, excluding Jews from

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5. See above, pp. 160-1.
all official positions, teaching, subsidized industries, managerial functions in the press, radio, and cinema, and fixing a percentage for entry into the liberal professions. This was the first of a long series of anti-Jewish laws. At the same time the loi Crémieux granting rights of French citizenship to Algerian Jews was abrogated. The really virulent anti-Semites were not yet in charge, however, and many exemptions were allowed from this legislation; pension rights of Jews dismissed from the public service were maintained and temporary allowances granted to them. Apart from the Action Française the subject was generally shunned in the Vichy press.

On 29 March 1941 one of the chief anti-Semites at Vichy, Xavier Vallat, was put in charge of a newly created Commissariat-General for Jewish Affairs. In June the October laws were replaced by severer restrictions, excluding Jews from a large number of professions, including banking, stock-broking, advertising, and journalism, as well as from the managerial positions already enumerated. In the professions, such as the law, architecture, and medicine, a quota of 2 per cent. was laid down for Jews, and in institutions of higher education they were limited to 3 per cent. Most ominous of all, in June the registration of all Jews by the local authorities was decreed. In spite of these measures the anti-Semitism of the Unoccupied Zone still lagged far behind the standard set by the Germans.¹

The Government of Vichy, of course, continued the campaign against the Communist Party. The property of the Party and its subsidiary organizations was confiscated, and there were widespread arrests of alleged Communists in the autumn of 1940 and spring of 1941. In spite of this repression the clandestine edition of L'Humanité continued to have a considerable circulation. Economic conditions, low pay, shortage of food, and unemployment favoured the spread of underground Communist propaganda in the winter of 1940-1. By May 1941 it was reported that some 30,000 Communists were imprisoned, 18,000 in the Occupied Zone and 12,000 in the Unoccupied Zone, though the unreliability of such figures is shown by the fact that some of those arrested were accused of 'disseminating Gaullist propaganda', a thing which no Communist following the party line could conceivably have been doing at this time.

The bitterest hatred of Vichy was reserved for General de Gaulle and his supporters, perhaps partly because their very existence and continuance in the war against the Nazis was an implied reproach. The Gaullists were regarded not as mere political opponents but as traitors. Those who left France or French possessions 'to avoid national duties'—in other words to avoid the acceptance of the Armistice—or who engaged in propaganda against national recovery—in other words against the policy of Vichy—were condemned to the deprivation of French nationality and the con-

¹ For later anti-Semitic measures see pp. 420-1 below.
fiscation of their property. The stream of condemnations which followed included the military leaders de Gaulle, de Larminat, Legentilhomme, and Catroux. All who took service with foreign forces were declared liable to the death penalty. This was in fact only pronounced against those whose absence made it impossible for it to be carried out. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt of the intense bitterness of Pétain and many of his supporters against de Gaulle and the Free French Movement. To Pétain the dissidence of de Gaulle, who had once been a member of his personal staff—‘ce serpent que j’ai réchauffé dans mon sein’—was not merely an injury to his amour-propre but a personal betrayal. Among the general public, on the other hand, there was a tendency to regard the anti-Gaullist actions of the Government as a mere trick to deceive the Germans and conceal a secret understanding between the leaders of Vichy and the Free French.

Finally, there was one small group on whom the wrath of Vichy was particularly concentrated. Among the strongest sentiments on the morrow of the Armistice was the desire to find scapegoats for the defeat. Union, wrote Joseph Barthélémy, does not mean forgetfulness and amnesty. The initial reaction to the Armistice, says du Moulin de Labarthète, was: ‘Nous avons été trahis . . . Il faut punir les traitres!’ Accordingly, Constitutional Act No. 5 of 30 July 1940 set up a supreme Court of Justice at Riom to try former Ministers and high officials for actions connected with the passage from peace to war in September 1939 and for actions which had subsequently aggravated the situation. Thus in effect Vichy was proposing to try its own citizens for the crime of war guilt. As a preliminary measure a number of the accused, including Daladier, Blum, Vincent Auriol, Jules Moch, Grumbach, Pomaret, Marx Dormoy, Guy La Chambre, Reynaud, Mandel, and General Gamelin, were submitted to administrative internment. Their trial presented more difficulties than Vichy had at first realized. A special court, appointed by Pétain, found Reynaud and Mandel guilty by four votes out of seven and Pétain sentenced them to detention in a fortified place. The trial of the other accused, after repeated postponements, only opened at Riom in February 1942.

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1 Pétain considered de Gaulle ‘a viper that bit the breast that nursed him’ (Leahy: I Was There, p. 56).
2 See below, pp. 434–5.
3 Ferret: Aux côtés du Maréchal Pétain, p. 29.
4 Temps, 20 August 1940.
5 Du Moulin de Labarthète: Temps des illusions, p. 374.
6 Duguit, Monnier, & Bonnard, p. 547; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 121.
7 Jean Zay, who had been the object of a peculiarly vicious attack, as a former Popular Front Minister of Education, as one of the ‘fuyards’ of the Massilia [details of this voyage of the Massilia will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis], and as a Jew (though in fact he did not come within the definition of the racial law), was tried by a military tribunal for desertion and sentenced to deportation and military degradation. Apart from Zay, however, the trial of the accused was subject to interminable delays.
8 See below, pp. 394–5.
Vichy could not even take revenge efficiently on those whom it regarded as its enemies. But indeed it is only by a simplification that we can speak of Vichy as a political entity at all, or as anything but a congeries of conflicting interests. In its weakness, its high-flown phraseology and mediocre realization, its constant veering with the wind, its feverish struggle for jobs, and dizzy changes of personnel, it continued and exaggerated all the faults of the Third Republic. Down to the end of 1941 the achievements of the National Revolution had been slight, except perhaps on paper. And meanwhile the problems of foreign and domestic politics, which the generals and admirals and high functionaries of Pétain’s court understood so little, were pressing upon them from all sides and demanding ever increasing attention.

(ii) Vichy between Germany and the Western Powers, 1940–1

(a) Relations with Great Britain and the United States

Of all the illusions which flourished at Vichy the greatest was the belief that France would be left alone to pursue its new domestic policies peacefully while the rest of the world continued to fight. What it hoped to turn into an oasis of peace proved to be simply a no man’s land in the battle-front. The escape into neutrality was to prove an impossibility. A realist like Laval saw it as much and openly wished for a German victory over Britain. For the collaborationists, opposition to the defeated régime in France and opposition to the British were the same.

England victorious [wrote Philippe Henriot] would be the Masonic Lodges saved, the Jews reinstated in the seats of power, the ‘democrats’ and the ‘anti-fascists’ rehabilitated, and the Massilia, flag-ship of a misunderstood crusade, promoted to the rank of the Victory.2

The blockade produced the charge that Britain was trying to starve France. The adherence of some of the colonies to the Free French Movement led to the belief that Britain was taking advantage of French weakness to steal her overseas possessions. As a whole the upper classes, in which there had always been a current of Anglophobia, were prepared to react to such propaganda favourably. On the other hand, the masses of the people were traditionally less hostile to Britain and even the events of the

1 From 15 June 1940 to July 1941 there were five Ministers of the Interior, four Ministers of Foreign Affairs, five Ministers of Education, and six of Industrial Production. A balance sheet of changes in the local administration in the first fifteen months of Vichy gives 40 prefects and 29 sub-prefects dismissed; 35 prefects and 41 sub-prefects retired on pension; 9 prefects and 41 sub-prefects transferred to other posts; 321 maire and adjoints dismissed; and 1,208 municipal councils dissolved in those communes of under 2,000 in which alone they were allowed to survive (Gringoire, 3 October 1941).

2 Ibid. 29 August 1940.
summer of 1940 had not entirely changed their sentiments. The violent anti-British propaganda emitted by the Vichy radio under the control of Laval overshot its mark and served to increase Anglophile sentiment, particularly in the Occupied Zone. The influence of the British wireless was shown by the indignant protests of Maurras—aged but still violent protagonist of Action Française doctrines: 'On est intoxiqué par la radio anglaise'; 'Par notre Midi, la radio anglaise fait rage'; while Henriot was already in August 1940 denouncing the 'whispered propaganda which is beginning to run through town and country, all the threads of which can be traced to London'.

The conflict at Vichy between those who, like Laval, expecting the rapid defeat of Britain, wanted France to enter the German camp at once, and envisaged her future as Germany's favourite Gau, and those, including most of the adherents of the Action Française, who believed a genuine neutrality to be possible, was intense. Anglophobia reached its climax towards the end of August, when Laval in the Council of Ministers returned to his idea of declaring war against Great Britain. A questionnaire sent on 1 September to Admiral Auphan, Chief of Naval Staff, for the time being put an end to this agitation. His reply showed that France was quite without the naval, military, and aerial resources to engage in offensive war against Great Britain. The sentiments of the people, moreover, were beginning to become clearer. When Huntziger left his post in the Armistice Commission on 12 September 1940 he warned his German colleagues that relations between their troops and the French population were deteriorating, and that even if the people were not yet Anglophile they were at any rate showing increasing signs of being hostile to the German occupation.

Meanwhile, for the first few months of the Vichy régime the star of Laval was apparently in the ascendant, and under Laval and his assistant, Montigny, Vichy propaganda, especially by radio, was violently anti-British and as far as possible pro-German. In the governmental reorganization of 6 September Laval, besides retaining his post as Vice-Premier, had acquired the key position of Minister of Information. On the other hand the neo-Socialist opportunist, Marquet, Laval's close ally, who had been one of the first to call for collaboration with the Germans in building up a new order in Europe, was dismissed by Pétain, who distrusted him as a politician and replaced him as Minister of the Interior by Peyrouton. The opposition between Weygand and Laval produced violent disputes

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1 Baudouin: Neuf mois au gouvernement, pp. 288, 301, 322 (11, 19, and 29 August 1940).
2 Action Française, 4 November 1940.
3 Gingoire, 29 August 1940.
4 See The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, Macmillan, 1948), i. 799, referring to a report to Hull from the U.S. Ambassador to France, 1 July 1940.
5 Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, pp. 303-4.
6 La Délégation française auprès de la commission allemande d'armistice (Paris, A. Costes, 1947), pp. 267-8.
in the Government and led to the former’s removal from his post as Minister of National Defence, although, since he was too influential to be shelved with impunity, he was given the important position of Delegate-General in North Africa.1

The British Government hardly discriminated between the factions at Vichy. They were sympathetic to the efforts of de Gaulle to rally the French Empire to the cause of the Free French,2 but they did not wish to provoke whoever ruled at Vichy to the point of war. This caution was evidenced by an aide mémoire presented to Catroux on 18 September 1940, pointing out that the British Government did not desire a complete rupture, which might bring Vichy into the war on the side of Germany. British policy, therefore, was to exercise economic pressure on the French colonies which maintained their allegiance to Pétain; British assistance was promised in defending the colonies which rallied to the Free French, but only against naval attack.3 Despite the outburst of Anglophobia in France after the Armistice, which was intensified by the attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir (the military port of Oran) on 3 July 1940, and the subsequent breach of diplomatic relations,4 all links were not entirely severed between London and Vichy. A Canadian representative was sent to the French Government, with British approval, and contacts were established through the British and French Ambassadors at Madrid, M. de la Baume and Sir Samuel Hoare (later Lord Templewood).5 Charles-Roux states that the basis of an agreement had been reached between the Foreign Offices of London and Vichy by the end of October.6

Meanwhile another negotiation had been started by Pétain through the agency of a French professor, Louis Rougier. With characteristic secrecy Pétain kept his Foreign Ministry completely in the dark about this.7 Rougier, in an interview with Pétain on 29 September, obtained his approval for a plan to go to London to endeavour to reach an agreement for the amelioration of the blockade. In London he met the Prime Minister and other members of the British Government,8 and it was suggested that he should endeavour to open negotiations with Weygand.9 He subsequently alleged that he had concluded a ‘Gentleman’s agreement’

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1 Serre: Événements, vi. 1536.  
2 See below, p. 441.  
4 A fuller account will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.  
7 Ibid. p. 356.  
9 Cmd. 6662, p. 17.
with the British Government.\textsuperscript{1} Certainly Churchill was not opposed to the idea of negotiation, and on 10 November he warned de Gaulle that the British Government wished to try to achieve a \textit{modus vivendi} with Vichy.\textsuperscript{2} A telegram of 21 November 1940 from the British Government to their Consul at Geneva provided an answer to Rougier’s overtures. It acknowledged assurances from the Vichy Government that there would be no unjustified attack on Britain and recognized Vichy’s determination to retain control of the French colonies and fleet. The British Government asked only that Vichy should refrain from active operations against the Free French colonies and resist German attempts to attack or make use of the colonies under its own control. Britain affirmed her desire for the restoration after victory of the greatness and independence of France and her Empire. On this basis she was prepared to open economic discussions through the channel of Madrid.\textsuperscript{3} Rougier evidently thought that the British Government were prepared to go farther than this. But in view of their commitments to de Gaulle and their profound suspicion of the men of Vichy, the British were only prepared to move very slowly and cautiously; and when Laval, from whom the Rougier negotiation had been carefully kept secret, replaced Baudouin as Foreign Minister at the end of October,\textsuperscript{4} it was dropped. For the same reason the more official negotiations at Madrid came to nothing, and Charles-Roux himself, after the meeting between Pétain and Hitler at Montoire in October, resigned his office as Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs.

After Laval’s fall in December\textsuperscript{5} further negotiations were undertaken, this time between Jacques Chevalier, Secretary-General to the Ministry of Education and a personal friend of Lord Halifax, and the Canadian envoy at Vichy, Pierre Dupuy. Chevalier and Prince Xavier de Bourbon, who assisted him in the negotiations, asserted, like Rougier, that an agreement was concluded between London and Vichy, but there is again no evidence that anything more than an exchange of views took place.\textsuperscript{6}

Approaches were also made by the British Government to Weygand, but he refrained from replying to them. Holding that the British were incapable of affording effective military aid to French North Africa, he regarded the invitation to secede from Vichy as one to engage in a hopeless gamble. His hostility to such proposals was all the stronger because the British were supporting de Gaulle, whom he regarded as little better than

\textsuperscript{1} Rougier, op. cit. chapters iv–vi.
\textsuperscript{2} Winston Churchill: \textit{The Second World War} (London, Cassell, 1949), ii. 457; (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1949), ii. 516–17. [This work will be referred to hereafter as Churchill, i, ii, &c., and the pagination of both English and U.S. editions will be given.]
\textsuperscript{3} Cmd. 6662, p. 28; \textit{Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46}, ii: \textit{Hitler’s Europe}, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{4} See below, p. 366.
\textsuperscript{5} See below, p. 371.
\textsuperscript{6} Chevalier’s account of these negotiations is given in \textit{Procès Pétain}, ii. 694–703 (evidence of Chevalier). See also Prince Xavier de Bourbon: \textit{Les Accords secrets franco-anglais de décembre 1940} (Paris, Plon, 1949), and Baudouin: \textit{Neuf mois au gouvernement}, p. 403 (6 December 1940).
a political adventurer, who had taken advantage of the patriotism and
gallantry of those Frenchmen who felt the need for continued resistance
to the Germans to set himself up as a rival to the legitimate Government of
France.¹

The series of tentative approaches continued in the new year. Flandin
claimed at his trial that he had opened negotiations with the British
through Madrid in January 1941,² and early in 1941 Colonel Groussard
was sent on a mission to England from Vichy.³ The United States also
acted as a channel of communications between Vichy and the British,
who through them offered military aid if the Vichy Government would
transfer itself to North Africa and re-enter the war.⁴ The belief that this
was a possibility was undoubtedly an illusion, but it was not one that had
any serious consequences, and although the various negotiations proved
abortive, at least they produced a certain détente in the relations between
Loudon and Vichy.

The United States had more modest aims in its relations with the French
and better chances of achieving them. Cordell Hull limited his policy to
certain specific objects—to see that the French fleet and the French bases
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere did not fall into German hands, to
check the French Government from progressing in the direction of collab-
oration with Germany farther than the terms of the Armistice dictated,
and to prevent any further deterioration in Anglo-French relations.⁵ The
United States Government had at the time of the Armistice expressed their
views on the future of the fleet clearly. On 25 October 1940 rumours of
decisions taken at the Montoire interview⁶ produced a strong message of
protest from Roosevelt to Pétain and a warning that agreement with
Germany on the lines indicated in reports 'would constitute a flagrant
and deliberate breach of faith with the United States'.⁷

The pursuit of American aims involved the maintenance of friendly
relations with the Vichy Government and these were not compatible with
the recognition of the Free French Movement. Moreover, the intense
pressure brought to bear on the American Government by Free French
sympathizers and propagandists in the United States, and their bitter
attacks on American policy, confirmed Roosevelt and Hull in their
prejudice against de Gaulle and determination to have as little to do with
his movement as possible. The more influential American reports from
France rated de Gaulle's following there very low.⁸ These reports were
doubtless produced by the naturally closer contacts of American diplomats
with the world of officialdom and high society than with the great body of

¹ Weygand: Mémoires, iii. 457–8, 473, 475–8.
² Procès Flandin, p. 174.
³ Procès Pétain, ii. 628–9 (evidence of General Lacaille).
⁴ Hull: Memoirs, ii. 948; Langer: Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 120–1.
⁵ Hull: Memoirs, i. 804.
⁶ See below, pp. 365–6.
⁷ Hull: Memoirs, i. 850.
⁸ Cf. Leahy: I Was There, p. 56.
the people; but even if it was based on a false premiss, the conclusion that Vichy represented the only effective French power in France and North Africa was correct.

In December 1940 the American Counsellor at the Paris Embassy, Robert Murphy, was sent on a mission to French North Africa, and in January 1941 Admiral Leahy, a new Ambassador especially chosen by President Roosevelt, reached Vichy. Leahy's mission was to cultivate closer relations with Pétain, to endeavour to keep him from giving any active support to the Germans, and particularly to emphasize that consent to the use of the French fleet or naval bases by the Germans would forfeit the goodwill of the United States. Meanwhile Murphy in North Africa was to explore the possibilities of agreement with Weygand. Both Leahy and Murphy relied mainly on the economic argument. Leahy urged the dispatch of food and clothing to the Unoccupied Zone, in spite of strong British opposition, so that Germany should not be able to use the misery of the people as a means of pushing Pétain into collaboration. A number of shipments of medical supplies and food for children were sent to France under the auspices of the Red Cross. The more extensive Hoover plan for sending supplies to Europe on a large enough scale to break the blockade failed to materialize, partly because at a critical stage the Germans tactlessly announced, on 26 March 1941, an arrangement for bartering a great quantity of cereal for livestock and oil from the Unoccupied Zone. Among the by-products of American contacts with Vichy was the information which the Deuxième Bureau supplied in 1941 through the French Embassy at Washington. The Ambassador himself, Henry-Haye, who was not trusted by the Americans and was disliked by Hull, was kept in ignorance of this.

A more positive result was achieved by the American negotiators in North Africa. On 7 February 1941 Britain agreed in principle to a plan for a limited quantity of supplies to be allowed through the blockade to North Africa. On the basis of this understanding Murphy concluded an agreement with Weygand, on 26 February, by which the United States was to send supplies to North Africa on condition that no excessive stores were accumulated, and that they should not be allowed to leave the country. As a safeguard against breach of these conditions American consular agents were to be appointed to superintend the carrying out of the agreement. The same agents, who included military officers in civilian guise as 'technical assistants', were in due course to prepare the ground for the Allied landings of November 1942.

After the dismissal of Weygand in November 1941 Leahy began to despair of Vichy, but Murphy urged that American policy should not be changed. The price paid was certainly a cheap one: up to Weygand's dismissal in November 1941 the United States had dispatched to North Africa three tankers and four cargo vessels.\(^1\) Disappointment with Vichy might, however, have brought about a *rapprochement* between the United States Government and de Gaulle, but for the incident of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which were suddenly and without warning occupied by a small Free French naval force commanded by Admiral Muselier, on 24 December 1941.\(^2\) The American Secretary of State, as soon as the news arrived, issued a statement condemning the action as an arbitrary breach of an understanding. The British Foreign Minister, Eden, informed the United States Government that the news of the occupation of the islands was a complete surprise to the British Government and contrary to an assurance given by de Gaulle;\(^3\) but Churchill could not afford to abandon the Free French before the wrath of the American Secretary of State, who himself was being violently attacked in the United States for a reference to the 'so-called Free French'. In a speech of 30 December\(^4\) at Ottawa the British premier defended de Gaulle and strongly attacked Vichy. This provoked Hull into sending a memorandum to the President in which he declared his belief that the British were behind the St. Pierre incident, defended his French policy with the argument that over 95 per cent. of the French in France were against de Gaulle, and demanded that the United States insist on the maintenance of her views.\(^5\) He even contemplated resignation over the issue.\(^6\) For a time inter-Allied tension ran high, but finally a solution was found which was accepted by both the United States and British Governments, though de Gaulle never assented to it. The islands were to be neutralized and demilitarized, Canada and the United States were to have joint control of the wireless station, and, with Britain, to exercise joint supervision over them. The Vichy Governor was replaced by a consultative council and the Free French forces were withdrawn.\(^7\) The whole affair was a storm in a tea-cup, but it had produced an open clash between Britain and the United States, and by confirming American officials in their hostility to de Gaulle it was to exercise an influence on subsequent developments disproportionate to its inherent importance.\(^8\)

2. For an account of the St. Pierre incident see pp. 463–5 below.
7. Ibid. p. 1136.
Meanwhile, on 11 December 1941, Darlan and Pétain had given assurances that French North African policy would not be changed. To claim that American policy was responsible for keeping Vichy out of the war on the German side is undoubtedly to claim too much. But it is true that American friendship prevented Vichy from feeling entirely isolated, and to some extent counteracted the effects of German pressure.

(b) Relations with the Germans to February 1941

The relations of Pétain’s Government with the British and Americans consisted in manoeuvres at a distance, and reactions to tentative approaches and to indirect pressure. Relations with the Germans, on the other hand, offered a series of immediate problems and decisions which could not be postponed. Internal pressure, too, was greater here. There was no section within the ranks of the supporters of Vichy which contemplated the possibility of a return to the alliance with Great Britain. On the other hand, there was a powerful faction, with Laval at its head, which desired closer relations with the Germans. Lacking principles, Laval’s actions were determined by a combination of prejudices with calculations of self-interest. His personal position was founded on a hatred of Britain and a firm conviction that German victory was and had been inevitable. ‘Do you believe’, he asked at the trial of Pétain, ‘that any man with common sense could have expected anything but the victory of Germany?’ The interest of France, he concluded, was to find some grounds for an agreement with Germany which would enable her to escape from, or at least to mitigate, the consequences of defeat.3

The idea of a limited collaboration with the Germans had already grown up in the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden. Of the leading French delegate, General Huntziger, one of his colleagues, Saint-Har-douin, said that his work on the Commission ‘n’était pas brillante’,4 and Léon Noël, more positively, that it exhibited ‘une incroyable faiblesse’.5 Huntziger assured the Germans that France was ready for a collaboration that was compatible with her dignity.6 Bouthillier, as Minister of Finance, also gave a firm assurance of the French ‘volonté de collaboration’.7 It has been suggested that the French representatives were so much oppressed by their own powerlessness that they behaved as though it were impossible on principle to reject the demands of the Germans, and in particular that Vichy, to the surprise of the Germans, proceeded to accept without discussion the monstrous estimate of occupation costs, which had been put

1 Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1044.
3 Procès Pétain, i. 539-40 (evidence of Laval).
4 Serre: Événements, vi. 1536.
5 Ibid. iv. 1147.
6 La Délégation française auprès de la commission allemande d’armistice, i. 165, 268.
7 Ibid. p. 185.
forward in the first place for bargaining. This may or may not be true. Certainly the Germans, for their part, were a little less confident than the French imagined. Their greatest fear was of the secession of French North Africa to the British. For this reason they were anxious not to push the French to the point of resistance. In a letter of 15 July the German commander in France, von Stülpnagel, had demanded from the French extensive military concessions in North Africa. It was a sacrifice that they could not bring themselves to make. The demand was rejected and to their astonishment nothing more was heard of it. A directive of Hitler to his Commander-in-Chief on 12 November 1940 declared that the duty expected of France was the defence of her African possessions against England and de Gaulle. For that reason the German Government were prepared to encourage France to defend her colonies and allow her to retain the means of doing so, despite the demands of the Italians for the disarmament of French North Africa.

The real development of collaboration was only to come, however, as a result of the labours of Laval. From the beginning a personal laissez-passer enabled him to travel freely between Vichy and Paris. As early as 20 July, through the agency of de Brinon, he had established contact with the German propagandist Abetz, and the three of them formed a kind of triple alliance for the furtherance of their views, and not less of their careers. Abetz's connexion with Laval presumably helped him to secure appointment as Ambassador to France despite his poor relations with the German military authorities. Léon Noël, appointed Delegate-General of the French Government to the German military authorities in Paris, alleged that his efforts to secure concessions were sabotaged by de Brinon and Abetz, with the connivance of Laval. As, moreover, all important matters were treated in the Armistice Commission, Noël resigned. He was replaced by General de la Laurencie on 15 August.

Laval's plans for what might be described as a reversal of alliances culminated in the famous interview on 24 October between Hitler and Pétain, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Laval, in a railway carriage at

1 This was the view of Léon Noël: cf. Serre: Événements, iv. 1149.
2 Charles-Roux: Cinque mois tragiques, pp. 172, 178.
3 Führer Conferences, 1941, p. 2; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 127. Cf. report of Raeder to Hitler, 6 September 1940 (Führer Conferences, 1940, p. 95). For Hitler's intentions regarding Africa at this time see pp. 58-59 above.
4 Führer Conferences, 1940, pp. 116-17, 128.
5 Procès Pétain, ii. 607 (evidence of Peyrouton).
7 For the functions assigned to Abetz see p. 109 above and Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 123.
8 Serre, loc. cit.
10 Ibid. pp. 1147, 1151.
Montoire-sur-Loir. A protocol\(^1\) was drawn up in which was expressed Hitler's desire for France to have her proper place in Europe. The common interest of France and the Axis Powers in the speedy defeat of the British was recognized. On condition of positive collaboration by France in this aim, she was to be allowed to maintain military forces in North Africa in excess of those laid down in the terms of the Armistice, and, in a new partition of Africa after the defeat of Britain, would be guaranteed the possession of territories equivalent to those she held at the beginning of the war. The agreement was to be kept secret, and practical measures for its implementation were to be settled by a subsequent convention. It was intended that Ribbentrop should proceed to Paris to examine further steps with Laval, but a communication arrived at this point from Mussolini announcing his decision to invade Greece, and Ribbentrop instead went direct to Florence to discuss the new situation with the Italian Government.\(^2\)

Chance had thus stopped the negotiations at a critical moment, but Pétain did not draw back in the path on which Laval had set him.

At a Council of Ministers held at Vichy on 26 October Laval argued forcibly in favour of active collaboration with the Germans.

Il faut se rendre compte de cette chose formidable [he said, according to the note taken by Vice-Admiral Fernet], le vainqueur venant offrir la collaboration au vaincu. Les conditions atmosphériques n'ont pas permis jusqu'ici l'opération du débarquement. Mais la victoire sur l'Angleterre est acquise. Les Allemands font un effort gigantesque. La course de vitesse est très nettement en leur faveur. ... Nous ne voulons pas d'une paix de vengeance, a dit le Chancelier [Hitler]. La destruction de la Grande-Bretagne offre d'autres possibilités. J'ai déjà cherché une paix avec la France, a-t-il ajouté. Les relations franco-allemandes vont donc dépendre de la fin de la guerre. C'est de l'attitude de la France que tout va dépendre: une attitude positive et non une attitude d'attente. Il y a concernant l'organisation de l'Afrique une conception plus européenne. La France en Afrique sera bien traitée: c'est déclarer que l'Afrique est un prolongement de l'Europe. L'option est donc à saisir.\(^3\)

Whether these views were fully accepted or not, on 28 October the apparent triumph of Laval's policy was marked by his appointment as Foreign Minister, Baudouin stepping down to become Secretary of State to the President of the Council. In a broadcast on 30 October the Marshal announced that the meeting with Hitler had been of his own free will, and that he had accepted the principle of a sincere collaboration and looked forward to such a policy to improve the lot of the prisoners, lower the

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\(^2\) Mémorandum d'Abetz, p. 28; see also above, pp. 290–1.

\(^3\) Fernet: Aux côtés du Maréchal Pétain, pp. 63–64.
burden of occupation costs, render the line of demarcation between the zones less rigid, and facilitate the provisioning of France. ‘Until now’, he concluded, ‘I have spoken to you as a father—today I speak to you as the leader.’

What Pétain really meant by all this it is difficult to say. He had an extraordinary capacity for following contradictory policies at the same time. On the morrow of the Monitore interview he was writing to Weygand that he was determined to defend Africa, that he would never ally himself with the foreigner, and that he was determined not to make war on England. Attempts have been made to interpret the Monitore policy as a subtle Machiavellian device for bringing about the defeat of Germany. Only by such pretences at collaboration, it is argued, was Hitler prevented from seizing French North Africa, either buying Franco’s support with French Morocco, or overriding Spanish opposition by force. The presence of a German army in French North Africa in 1940, it is concluded, would have completely changed the military situation and brought about the conclusive defeat of the British. Vichy, therefore, in effect won the war for Britain. It is fortunately not necessary to discuss these hypothetical arguments. There is no contemporary evidence that such calculations entered into the minds of any French politicians at the time. They did their best to retain French North Africa in their own hands for the quite adequate reason that it was part of the French Empire and they did not want to lose it, not because they believed it could be of any value in winning a war which they were convinced was quite conclusively lost. Even after the German air attack on England had waned, doubts about ultimate German victory hardly existed at Vichy. Collaboration was no deep-laid scheme for bringing France back into the war on the British side: it was a realistic acceptance of facts. It was what it called itself—collaboration.

Laval at his trial defended the Monitore policy on the ground that collaboration was laid down in the terms of the Armistice, to which the new agreement was merely the logical sequel. It is true that Baudouin, in his statement of 17 July, had looked forward to the replacement of the old idea of balance of power in Europe by one of co-operation, but there was a difference between the co-operation of which Baudouin had spoken, ‘free from ideology’, and that which Laval envisaged. The belief that such a co-operation as Baudouin described was possible with the Nazis was doubtless an illusion, but Monitore represented a long step beyond it. However, the step had been taken, and even the cautious Temps hailed

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2 Serre: Événements, vi. 1617.
collaboration between the victors and vanquished as the basis of a new entente. It was hardly to be that.

Hitler did not trust the French, even with Laval in office. He wrote to Mussolini on 5 December 1940: ‘We are not absolutely sure of the attitude of the Government of Vichy... The slightest false move may bring about a rupture between North and West Africa and Vichy, which would offer Great Britain an operation base extremely dangerous for us.’ Even before the fall of Laval Hitler had issued, on 10 December 1940, his secret directive for the planning of ‘Operation Attila’: ‘In case a movement of revolt should arise in parts of the French Colonial Empire now under the command of General Weygand, preparation must be made for the speedy occupation of the territories of the French Motherland which are still unoccupied up to the present.’ Hitler’s profound suspicion of Weygand, and of the clique at Vichy which he believed to be supporting the North African commander, even led him to attribute the subsequent fall of Laval to his influence.

German suspicions of the genuineness of collaboration doubtless increased their unwillingness to pay any material price, or make any substantial alteration in their policy, for the purpose of buying a commodity of the value of which they were so sceptical. The fatal blow to the Montoire policy was in fact dealt by the Germans themselves in their treatment of Alsace and Lorraine. Early in August 1940 a decree had placed the two provinces under German civil instead of military authority. Robert Wagner, Gauleiter of Baden, became the head of the administration of Alsace, and Burckel, Gauleiter of the Saar, extended his control to Lorraine. There was a steadily increasing pressure for the elimination of all signs of French influence in Alsace. In September German was made the only official language and all personal names were ordered to be germanized. French opinion might possibly have reconciled itself reluctantly to the loss of Alsace. But it soon became evident that the Germans were preparing not only to annex Alsace but also to germanize Lorraine. This was brought home to the French acutely when, after a patriotic demonstration at Metz on 15 August, the expulsion of the Lorrainers began. With a nice contempt for French reactions, the expulsions reached their climax about

1 *Temps*, 30 October 1940.
5 Between July and December some 105,000 persons were expelled from Alsace, or prevented from returning to their homes there. The classes against whom the measure was directed were the Jews, gypsies and other foreign racial elements, criminals, asocial and insane persons, Frenchmen and Francophiles, and some of the patois-speaking population (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxviii. 331 (114–R); *N.C.A.* viii. 122.)
the time of the Montoire conversations. De Brinon later called them ‘un véritable sabotage de Montoire’, and Laval and Abetz both confirmed the view that they were a deadly blow to their policy. Though Vichy protested to the Armistice Commission in private at the ‘disguised annexation’ of Alsace and Lorraine, the Government at Vichy avoided official mention of the expulsion of the Lorrainers as long as possible. News of it, as of German policy in Alsace, was kept out of the papers. There were, however, frequent reports of the arrival of refugees from Lorraine, published without comment or explanation, and appeals for assistance in housing, clothing, and feeding them, and finding them employment. Ultimately Vichy had to admit the facts in self-defence. On 14 November the Minister of Justice, Alibert, read a communiqué to the press denying that the expulsion was by agreement between the Germans and Vichy, and on 1 December Pétain announced the reception of 70,000 expelled Lorrainers in the Unoccupied Zone.

The treatment of Alsace and Lorraine by the Germans was a major political blunder. In the summer of 1940 a Franco-German reconciliation had seemed not impossible. Ideological affinities cut across national hatreds. The fighting had been too short for intense bitterness to be engendered, and the crushing victory of the Germans was a fact which it seemed only reasonable to accept. The victorious German troops were impressive in appearance and at first correct in behaviour. Such was the state of French disillusionment that the vigorous German propaganda campaign for friendship between the two nations might have achieved some degree of success if the Germans could have restrained from picking prematurely the fruits of victory by bringing in the secret police, squeezing France dry economically, introducing Nazi ideas into the government of Occupied France, and above all virtually annexing Alsace and Lorraine.

Laval could offer no advantage from the conversation which he had engineered between Hitler and Pétain strong enough to outweigh the effect of the deportations. Moreover, American influence, to which Vichy was very sensitive, was thrown into the scales against the policy of collaboration. Soon after the Montoire interview, then, the wind at Vichy was veering in the opposite direction. Most of Pétain’s Ministers were hostile to Laval and suspicious of his ambitions, but they could only act through the Marshal, in whose attitude towards Laval there was a curious ambi-

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1 Abetz suggests that the expulsion of the Lorrainers was precipitated by Bürckel in order to create a fait accompli in view of the Montoire negotiations (Otto Abetz: D’une prison, précédé du Procès Abetz par Jean Bernard-Dervieu (Paris, Amiot-Dumont, 1949), pp. 89-90).
2 Procès Pétain, ii. 786 (evidence of de Brinon).
3 Ibid. i. 537 (evidence of Laval); Mémorandum d’Abetz, pp. 33, 37.
4 e.g. Huntziger to Stulpnagel, 3 September 1940 (La Délégation française auprès de la commission allemande d’armistice, pp. 239 ff).
5 Temps, 15 November 1940.
valence. There is much testimony to the personal dislike which Pétain felt for Laval.\(^1\) Yet he could never forget that the dark Auvergnat was the real author of his own personal power, and obviously found it difficult to oppose him face to face. The German Ambassador, Abetz, thought that it was the fear that Laval was driving France into a state of war with England which finally stimulated his enemies into action;\(^2\) but the belief that Laval, under cover of the negotiations with the Germans, was dangerously extending his own power was perhaps an equally important motive. He seems, indeed, to have been aiming at proving to the Germans at all costs that he was indispensable and could produce better results for them in France than anyone else. On his own personal responsibility he ceded to Göring the ownership of the Bor mines,\(^3\) and promised the Germans the gold which had been deposited by the National Bank of Belgium under French care and which was at this time in West Africa.\(^4\)

In the end Laval overplayed his hand. A plan, suggested it is said by the Germanophile historian, Benoist-Méchin, was concocted for the remains of Napoleon's son, the Duc de Reichstadt, to be returned to France for burial at the Invalides; it was proposed that Pétain should go to Paris for the ceremony. The Marshal's personal reaction was favourable: from the beginning one of his dearest hopes had been to get back to Paris or Versailles.\(^5\) The other Ministers were less naïve. They saw in the proposal a plot to remove Pétain from their influence, install him under German control in Paris, and set up a French Government there in which power would be in the hands of Laval and the Germanophiles, such as de Brinon, Déat, Doriot, and Lucaire. Their suspicions were increased by the fact that the Paris press and radio had been for some time past conducting a violent campaign against the Vichy Government, in which only the adherents of Laval and the person of Pétain himself had been spared. There is no doubt what the intentions of the Germans were. They were evacuating buildings at Versailles, and preparing an official residence for

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1 Cf. Langer: *Our Vichy Gamble*, p. 124; Rougier: *Mission secrète à Londres*, p. 64; *Procès Pétain*, ii. 668 (evidence of Peyrouton); Leahy: *I Was There*, p. 521.


3 Copper-mines in Yugoslavia financed by French capital.

4 The cession of the Bor mines was negotiated by Laval and Abetz, acting for Göring. The German compensation came, of course, from the occupation payments (Arnoult: *Les Finances de la France et l'occupation allemande*, pp. 276-89). The gold reserve of the Bank of Belgium had been deposited with the Bank of France in 1939 and in the following year sent for safety to Dakar. In claiming its return the Germans made use of a fraudulent document alleged to have been signed by the Governor of the Bank of Belgium. On the order of Laval, the French Minister of Finances yielded to the German demand and by a protocol of 11 December 1940 agreed to give up the Belgian gold. Its transport by air to Germany was completed by December 1942 (ibid. pp. 295-99). After the Liberation the Bank of France had to make good the ceded gold to the Bank of Belgium (ibid. p. 267). See also Bouthillier: *Drame de Vichy*, i. 231 seqq., and Annex no. 4, pp. 296-7; ii. 121; Abetz: *D'une prison*, pp. 204 seq. See also above, p. 270.

5 Message from Huntziger to Stulpnagel, 7 August 1940 (*La Délégation française auprès de la commission allemande d'armistice*, p. 168; cf. p. 283).
Pétain and a small reserved zone for the installation of a French Government there.¹

In the face of this danger practically the whole Ministry joined in a démarche to Pétain. As a substitute for Laval they had picked out another astute politician, his personal enemy, Flandin, whose record of working for Franco-German understanding would, it was hoped, reconcile the Germans to the change. Pétain was persuaded that Laval had been negotiating with the Germans behind his back, but even now he would not face him singly: on 13 December he called his Cabinet together, asked for their resignations, and accepted only those of Laval and one other Minister. Laval seems to have been taken completely by surprise. He returned to his office and was there arrested along with Brinon, Déat, and others by the political police, acting under the orders of Alibert (according to du Moulin de Labarthète and Peyrouton) or of Peyrouton (according to Abetz).²

The Montoire policy was thus liquidated. It was the failure of the first rough attempt at collaboration, and was to initiate the first trial of strength between Vichy and the Germans. On 16 December Abetz travelled to Vichy, accompanied by ten SS leaders, armed to the teeth. The French insisted that the recall of Laval would necessitate the resignation of Pétain, but Abetz was at least able to free the fallen Minister from the control of the Vichy police and provide him with SS guards instead. Abetz also insisted that Pétain should have a personal interview with Laval, which the Marshal had been anxious to avoid, and that de Brinon should replace General de la Laurencie as representative of Vichy in Paris.³ Further measures had to wait until Ribbentrop had decided on the line to be followed.

Meanwhile, at Vichy, the men who had brought about the fall of Laval did not step into his shoes. Unexpectedly, a triumvirate composed of Darlan, Flandin, and Huntziger emerged, and it was Darlan, not Flandin, who was to make the next bid for power. Realizing that the Germans were still the real masters of the situation, Darlan made a great effort to gain their confidence. He obtained an interview with Hitler in a train near Beauvais on 25 December, at which he presented himself as a partisan of Franco-German collaboration; but the Germans were in no hurry to commit themselves, and preferred to leave Vichy in suspense.⁴ They had


² Procès Pétain, ii. 671 (evidence of Peyrouton); Du Moulin de Labarthète: Temps des illusions, p. 86; Memorandum d’Abetz, p. 46.

³ Ibid. pp. 47, 48, 51. The last point had, in fact, been decided on 28 October; the Temps of 4 November reported that, on the proposal of Laval, de Brinon had been entrusted with a mission with the rank of Ambassador. It did not say what the mission was. Presumably the idea of a French Ambassador to Paris was a little difficult to stomach. De Brinon, in fact, only replaced General de la Laurencie as delegate-general of the French Government in the Occupied Zone on 16 December 1940 (Fernand de Brinon: Mémoires (Paris, Chaix, 1944), p. 18).

⁴ Memorandum d’Abetz, pp. 58, 61.
another card to play in the existence of the varied assortment of violent Germanophiles, who controlled the Paris press and radio, which were, of course, entirely pro-Nazi in their views.¹

The line of division between the political tendencies expressed at Vichy and in Paris was a clear one. The main trends of opinion represented at Vichy were those of the conservative and Catholic pre-war Right. The Left was represented only by L'Effort, a paper started after the Armistice with the support of a group of Socialist deputies and edited by Spinasse, formerly of the Populaire. It was a neo-Socialist paper, advocated collaboration with Germany in the creation of a new European economic order, and had little influence at Vichy. On the other hand the pre-war Right, so strong at Vichy, was little represented among the collaborationists of Paris, except for a small group of zealots of the Cagoule.² The former Cagoulards had split into two groups, the Right-wing U.C.A.D. (Union des comités d'auto-défense), supporting the reactionary elements in Vichy, while the more revolutionary C.S.A.R. (Comités secrets d'action révolutionnaire), under Deloncle, joined the Paris collaborationists. There was, as Rebatet put it from his point of view, ‘une cagoule parisienne saine, et une autre "anglaise", déplorablement et follement vichyssante’.³ Apart from a few such wild men of the Right, the leaders of the Paris collaborationists came mostly from the pacifists, neo-Socialists, and ex-Communists of the pre-war Left. Among their journals were Aujourd'hui, edited by the pacifist and anti-militarist Georges Suarez. A pseudo-socialist paper intended to appeal to the working classes, La France au Travail, run by the Germans, proved a failure and was replaced in November 1941 by France Socialiste, which made a point of its purely French management and advocated an authoritarian people’s republic and a European revolution based on Franco-German collaboration. A group of trade unionists belonging to the former syndicalist and pacifist factions of the C.G.T., and headed by George Dumoulin, secretary-general of the Northern Trade Union Federation,

¹ The first paper to reappear in Paris after the defeat was the Matin, produced, to begin with, by a largely German staff. Subsequently it followed a thorough pro-German policy under the editorship of Jean Luchaire. The next to appear was the semi-fascist La Victoire. Another revival was that of the Petit Parisien, backed by Marquet. In addition, a host of virulent news-sheets sprang up—‘d’étanges feuilles nées de la défaite et de l’occupation’, as the Action Française described them, complaining that Gaulisson was produced by the disgust they inspired, though in fact they seem to have been following in the true tradition of Maurras and Léon Daudet. Among the more notorious were Au Pilon, a French Der Stürmer; La Gerbe, edited by A. de Chatcaubriant, boosting German culture and expressing the racial ideas of the perverted Serpelle di Gobineau; Je Suis Partout, suppressed before the Armistice for its pro-German policy, and revived under Robert Brasillach in January 1941; the Nouveaux Temps, another agency for the expression of the pro-German policy of Luchaire; and the Nouvelle Revue Française, edited by Drieu la Rochelle, the organ of the Germanophiles of the literary world. The provincial press in the Occupied Zone printed local news and the German war reports.

² Cagoulards (hooded men) was the name given to an underground Fascist organization which became notorious in 1937.

³ Rebatet: Les Décombres, p. 503.
founded the *Atelier*. Jacques Doriot, once the rising hope of the Communists, who had broken with them in 1934 and had founded the Parti Populaire Français in 1936, was the director of *Le Cri du Peuple*.

In so far as the collaborationists of the Left had a leader it was Marcel Déat, whose organ was the former Radical Socialist *Œuvre*. At the National Assembly in July 1940 he had put forward a plan for a *parti unique*, but Pétain and his Right-wing advisers, who were profoundly suspicious of Déat, succeeded in side-tracking this proposal. In September he took back the *Œuvre* to the more propitious environment of Paris, whence he carried on a bitter controversy with the Vichy press, especially the *Action Française*. He joined in the general denunciation of the British and Americans, of Jewish high finance, Wall Street, freemasons, and monarchists, and advocated collaboration with Germany in a Europe united on a totalitarian and non-Marxist Socialist basis. His support for the National Revolution did not impress Vichy; for the *Action Française* he was a 'faux converti' whose intrigues were more dangerous than the underground conspiracies of the Communists.¹

Vichy was not wrong in suspecting Déat; he was one of the chief of the Paris collaborationists to whom the Germans turned as a weapon against Vichy after the fall of Laval. The *mot d'ordre*, given by Abetz, was that Vichy had betrayed the interests of France on 13 December, and that the Pétain Government was dominated by clerical and reactionary forces. As a counter-stroke the Rassemblement National Populaire was founded in Paris on 24 January 1941, by a group including Déat, Doriot, Luchaire, Deloncle, Suarez, Marquet, Cathala, Jean Fontenoy. The programme of the new movement included the participation of France in European affairs in free co-operation with Germany, the defence of the Empire, the creation of a strong national state, the strengthening of authority, the restoration of morality and family life, spiritual regeneration, the protection of the race; a planned economy, a higher standard of living and the abolition of unemployment, the organization of trade unions under the protection of the state, and the elimination of cosmopolitan cultural influences. The Paris collaborationists now had a weapon to direct against Vichy and encouragement from the Germans to use it. Since they were merely a party of opposition and could devote all their effort to denunciation, little practical importance need be attached to their internal conflicts, which led in October 1941 to a split between Déat, who became the sole director of the Rassemblement, and Deloncle. In the Occupied Zone similar ideas were advocated only by *L'Effort*, which continued to denounce 'British duplicity and treason', to advocate European unity in a new Socialist order, and to regret the failure of the Monotire colloquy.²

Vichy at first had no means of defending itself against the danger

¹ *Action Française*, 23 October 1940.
² *Effort*, 11 June 1941.
presented by the Rassemblement. The National Revolution, in so far as it existed, had been imposed on a passive people from above. As Abetz in October 1940 correctly reported, the weak point of Vichy lay in the absence of any organized relations with the masses.1 An attempt was made to fill this gap, and to reply to the Paris Rassemblement, by the formation in January 1941 of a Comité de Rassemblement pour la Révolution Nationale. This committee was very short-lived and achieved nothing. The development of the Légion des Combattants proved a more successful move. A decree of 24 August had merged all existing ex-service men’s associations, with a few unimportant exceptions, into a single Légion Française des Anciens Combattants. Its organization was hierarchical, all officers being appointed from above. Its head, under Pétain, until March 1941, was Xavier Vallat, later to take charge of the campaign against the Jews. In its earlier stages the Légion did useful social work, such as caring for released prisoners and refugees and aiding the families of prisoners of war. In the spring of 1941 General Laure was appointed by Pétain as his personal representative to the Légion, and its role was extended. It was called on to collaborate with the representatives of the Government in the départements and communes, and given the duty of informing officials of any signs of opposition to the doctrines and institutions of the state, a task which cannot have been uncongenial, for the Légion was strongly nationalist; both the Action Française and de la Rocque’s Progrès Social Français2 were well represented in its ranks. On 31 August 1941 it was turned into a single party, declared open to all who shared its beliefs, and given the new title of Légion française des vétérans et des volontaires de la Révolution nationale. Branches were founded in the Empire, and subsidiary organizations, the Amis de la Légion and the Légion des Jeunes, were created. Members of the Légion had valuable privileges, such as extra rations of food and clothing, special cheap meals in restaurants, and medical aid. There was a compulsory column for the Légion in all daily papers, and it had its own journal, Le Légionnaire, with a sale of over 1 million copies by June 1941. At the end of August 1941 the membership of the Légion was said to be 1,200,000, and that of the Amis de la Légion 400,000. It was hoped that this organization would prove the needed link between the Government and the people, and that it would serve as ‘the interpreter of popular sentiment to the rulers, and of the will of the rulers to the people’.3 It was later to be accused of trying to establish a White Terror, but up to the end of 1941 its organizations had committed no notorious excesses, except perhaps verbal. That the Légion was not unsuccessful in providing some kind of party backing for Pétain was shown

1 Mémorandum d’Abetz, p. 17.
2 From its foundation in 1936 until the fall of France this was known as the Parti Social Français.
3 Figaro, 6 September 1941.
by its prohibition in the Occupied Zone, and the vehement denunciation of it by Marcel Déat.

In January 1941, however, such strength as the Légion was to provide lay in the future. The threat from Paris was immediate. Vichy saw in the Rassemblement the nucleus of an alternative government of France and began to weaken. To add to the pressure the Germans closed the frontier between the Zones to French officials, and subsequently to all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Pétain was persuaded to meet Laval on 19 January, in an interview the object of which, as of the communiqué issued afterwards, was to attempt to rehabilitate the fallen Minister's reputation. But while Abetz was working for the return of Laval, Ribbentrop had different ideas. The German Foreign Minister, with characteristic over-cleverness, had concluded that more might be gained by the maintenance of a situation in which Laval was held as a threat over the head of the Vichy Government, and Paris and Vichy played off against one another. Accordingly, Ribbentrop instructed Abetz that Laval was not to be allowed to leave the Occupied Zone, and that the affair was to be dealt with in such a way as to prevent any danger of an entente between Laval and Vichy.¹

This did not mean, however, that the triumvirate was to be allowed to survive. Alibert and Peyrouton, who had been responsible for the more violent measures against Laval in December, had to leave the Government. Alibert's natural excitability, it is true, had been making him an impossible colleague. The Germans then demanded the removal of Flandin, who believed that Darlan and Huntziger were also intriguing for his dismissal.² Pétain himself, who resented the large number of parliamentarians introduced by Flandin into the newly created National Council,³ was not sorry to see him go. With Flandin eliminated, and Huntziger lacking in political strength, the Ministry rapidly became a Darlan Government. On 9 February the Admiral succeeded Flandin as Foreign Minister and Vice-Premier; he was designated by Pétain as his successor on the next day,⁴ and a few days later replaced Peyrouton at the Ministry of the Interior. The bureaucrats who filled so many of the Ministries at Vichy were above all anxious to get their administrative services, if not the Government as a whole, back to Paris, and were prepared to support anyone who seemed to be capable of reaching a settlement with the Germans.

A new phase in the history of relations with the Germans had begun. Abetz, when he reported to Berlin in April,⁵ could draw up a balance-sheet of the test of strength initiated by the events of 13 December with

¹ Mémoire d'Abetz, p. 79.
² Procès Flandin, p. 193.
⁴ Journal Officiel : Lois et décrets, 14 February 1941, p. 674; Duguit, Monnier, & Bonnard, p. 554; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 130.
⁵ Mémoire d'Abetz, pp. 91-92.
some satisfaction. The men who had offered the strongest resistance to German pressure had been eliminated from the Government; Darlan, who had promised loyal collaboration, was in control, with Laval held in reserve as a guarantee of the Admiral’s good behaviour; the Germanophiles Benoist-Méchin and Paul Marion were put in key positions as Under-Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Information; the Anglophilic Minister of Education, Chevalier, and a number of Anglophilic prefects and police officers had been dismissed; a Commissioner for Jewish Affairs was appointed; and the Ministries dealing with economic affairs were now entrusted to men who were ready to co-operate with the Germans.¹

(c) Darlan and the Colonies, 1941

Few can have suspected, least of all Laval, that the competition for power at Vichy would be won by Darlan, and that for practically the whole of 1941 he would remain the chief influence there, in spite of personal unpopularity which was not diminished by an increasing taste for ‘les installations opulentes’.² One observer thought that his sudden rise to power had gone to his head,³ but it did not rob him of his customary shrewdness. An able naval administrator, a man of much force of character and ambition, Darlan resorted in politics to a crude but not ineffective Machiavellianism. Leahy describes him as ‘a complete opportunist’.⁴ Having decided on any line of action, however inconsistent it might be with his previous policy, he was determined and ruthless in carrying it through. From the time of the Armistice onwards he favoured an entente with the Germans as the best policy, possibly for France, and certainly for his own personal ambitions. He is reported as saying, in December 1940, that a German would be better than a British victory for France.⁵ He was conscious of holding in his hand one of the few cards left to Vichy, in the form of the French navy. Undefeated, and subject to no radical reduction or reorganization as the army had been, the navy had increased its prestige by its exploits before and since the Armistice—the bombing of the Sirocco at Dunkirk; the escape of the Jean Bart to Casablanca and of the Strasbourg to Oran, the defence of Dakar by the Richelieu; to be added to later by

¹ See below, p. 391.
² Fernet: Aux rêves du Maréchal Pétain, pp. 152, 194.
³ Ibid. p. 194.
⁴ Leahy: I Was There, p. 94.
⁵ Langer: Our Vichy Gamble, p. 117. On Darlan’s contempt for the British cf. Leahy, op. cit. p. 23. In a memorandum on collaboration with Germany which he presented to Pétain on 8 November 1940, Darlan wrote: ‘Economically, we should be a party to collaboration with the Axis because in the future we shall be led compulsorily to collaborate and because in the present it is the only possibility we have of enabling the country to survive.

‘Politically, we should collaborate with the Axis because we are Europeans and in the future there will be a European bloc (including Africa) against an American bloc, because whatever may be the result of the war the British Empire will be dislocated to the profit of either America or Germany’ (Bouthillier: Drame de Vichy, i. 309).
the escape of the destroyers from Syria, and the repair and return of the
Dunkerque, and of smaller ships from Dakar, Madagascar, and Jibuti. The
spirit of the navy was intensely anti-British, and its morale, partly as a result
of increased pay and amenities, was good. Admirals were in charge of
many of the colonies—Abrial and Fénérd at Algiers, Estéva in Tunis,
Decoux in Indochina, Robert in Martinique. At home there was Platon
at the Ministry of Colonies, Bord was prefect of police at Paris; the head of
the new training-school for police was an admiral, as were the prefects of
some seven départements.

Darlan’s main interest, as the head, under Pétain, of the Government,
was naturally with the major issue of Vichy policy, that of relations with
Germany. Hitler was inclined to regard the admiral as trustworthy,
though in his anxiety about French North Africa he issued on 20 April
1941 instructions for Operation ‘Attila’ to be kept in readiness.¹ Darlan
was to all appearance hoping to revive the spirit of collaboration, but the
general atmosphere at Vichy—after the initial expectation of a rapid
German victory had proved to be mistaken—was now dominated by the
spirit of atténtisme. The lack of political experience of Darlan and his
subordinates was of vital importance in this phase of the history of Vichy,
because the most serious crises with which the Government were faced were
in fact political ones. They arose in connexion with the colonies. Ques-
tions requiring decisions poured in from one colony after another during
the early months of 1941. For the sake of clarity it will be necessary to
discuss them separately, though they developed concurrently and from the
point of view of Vichy formed to some extent a single problem.

The French West Indies were ruled by Admiral Robert, French High
Commissioner in the Antilles, who also had under his control the aircraft
carrier Béarn, a cruiser, and a few smaller ships, a considerable number of
aircraft delivered by the United States before the fall of France, and part
of the gold stock of the Bank of France. The United States was naturally
concerned for the fate of these islands, with their valuable contents. After
some negotiation an agreement to maintain the status quo was reached
between Admiral Robert and the United States in the autumn of 1940.
Robert was anti-British in sentiment and gave the Vichy laws full effect
in the islands. The local population was on the whole opposed to his policy,
but was held back, in part, by fear of racial discrimination if the United
States were to take over the islands, and Robert maintained his position
successfully throughout 1941. In another small colony, Jibuti, which was
also left in an isolated position after the Italian defeat in Abyssinia, the
French military authorities refused to accept British or Free French control.
The consequent British blockade inflicted considerable hardship on the

¹ Hitler to Raeder, 20 April 1941 (Fuehner Conferences, 1941, p. 48); cf. ibid. pp. 40,
92.
French garrison and the population, and was bitterly denounced in Vichy propaganda.¹

More important developments were taking place in Indochina. Already at the time of the Armistice Japan had been presenting demands to the French authorities. General Catroux began negotiations, but in his cables to France he made it clear that he believed it necessary to keep Indochina in the cadre of the Franco-English alliance in the Far East.² He was therefore recalled, and the commander of the naval forces in the Far East, Admiral Decoux, appointed as his successor. Faced with a Japanese ultimatum on 2 August, Decoux had to agree to the provision of facilities for a limited use of air-bases and transport in Indochina by the Japanese, and a military convention was signed in Tokyo on 30 August between the French Government and Japan.³

The neighbouring state of Siam seized the opportunity offered by the defeat of France to attack the colony in the autumn of 1940. Japan intervened with an offer to mediate, which France perforce had to accept on 23 February 1941. In the face of delaying tactics by the French at the Peace Conference in Tokyo, Japan threatened to impose peace by force, and sent a naval squadron to the Gulf of Siam. The French Government yielded and signed an agreement on 20 March, by which frontier districts of some 70,000 square kilometres in area were ceded to Siam. Japan guaranteed the settlement and in return obtained an assurance that neither Indochina nor Siam would conclude any agreement with a third Power involving political, military, or economic co-operation against Japan. Japanese pressure, which Vichy was in no position to resist, continued. An agreement for close economic co-operation between Indochina and Japan was signed in Tokyo on 6 May. On 26 July France accepted a temporary occupation by Japan of strategic points in Indochina, for the alleged purpose of defending the country against Free French, British, or Chinese aggression, and a Japanese fleet, transporting an army of 40,000 troops, arrived two days later. Japanese control was steadily extended over trade, transport, and the press. Vichy was driven, in September, to protest officially to Japan, but short of American aid, which was not forthcoming, there was no hope of resistance, except by guerilla warfare, which was not contemplated. For effective purposes the colony had become a Japanese base, though the force of some 25,000 men which the Japanese kept there permanently can hardly be described as an army of occupation.⁴

Nearer home, in Syria, the Darlan Government had more choice, and its policy was to lead to the loss of another colony in circumstances which

² Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, pp. 70–71.
⁴ Ibid. p. 116.
might have been avoided. The High Commissioner, Gabriel Puaux, being judged of doubtful loyalty by Vichy, was dismissed in December 1940 and the former Paris police chief, Chiappe, whose affiliations with the Right were unimpeachable, was sent out to replace him. Chiappe was killed by the shooting down of his plane, and General Dentz was then appointed to the combined post of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in the Levant. Although the defeat of France had encouraged the Arab nationalists in Syria, Dentz succeeded in maintaining French authority in a state of increasing tension.¹

The crisis came when the war spread to the Near East as a result of the Rashid 'Ali coup d'etat in 'Iraq in April 1941.² The Germans, to bring aid to 'Iraq by air, needed the use of airfields in Syria, and to obtain these put pressure on Darlan. He began to make concessions in Syria three weeks before concluding the definite agreement with the Germans known as the 'May Protocols'.³ Vichy instructed Dentz on 4 May that if German planes arrived in Syria he should remember that France was a neutral Power in relation to Germany, but that any intervention by the British should be opposed by force.⁴ On 6 May Darlan telegraphed to Dentz that he was engaged on important negotiations with the Germans and hoped for substantial concessions in return for granting facilities in Syria.⁵ He was undeterred by a warning from Admiral Leahy that French aid to the Germans in Syria went beyond the requirements of the Armistice and was not consistent with the terms of former assurances by Pétain.⁶ German agents arrived in Syria on 9 May, and informed Dentz that transit facilities were required for German planes, bearing 'Iraqi colours, on their way to Mosul and Baghdad.⁷ German aircraft duly arrived in Syria, and on 15 May were bombed by British planes at Palmyra, Damascus, and Rayak. The Free French under Catroux pressed for an immediate invasion of Syria,⁸ but the British Commander, Wavell, was compelled, because of his limited forces, to deal with the situation in 'Iraq first. The 'Iraq revolt having been defeated, there was no further occasion for the Germans to make use of Syria and the last German planes left by 30 May. On 6 June Dentz invited the American Consul-General at Beirut to satisfy himself that there were no German military personnel or planes in Syria. But it was too late to arrest the development that had been started by Darlan’s concessions to the Germans. On 8 June, preceding their move with a

¹ For a fuller account see Survey for 1939–46: The Middle East in the War, pp. 83–91.
² The coup d’état in 'Iraq is dealt with ibid. pp. 56–78. A more detailed account of the situation in the Levant States, the military campaign of 8 June–12 July, and the Levant armistice will be found ibid. pp. 92–104. For the Free French share in the campaign and its effect on the relations of de Gaulle with the British see below, pp. 451–6. ³ See below, p. 382.
⁵ Ibid. p. 206.
⁶ Ibid. p. 254.
⁸ For the account by Catroux of his policy before the invasion of Syria see Catroux: Dans la bataille de Méditerranée, pp. 104–29.
declaration guaranteeing the independence of Syria, with which General Catroux on behalf of the Free French associated himself, British and Free French troops invaded Syria.

This was the occasion for a fresh outburst of anti-British feeling in France. The origin of the struggle in Syria had, of course, never been explained to the French public. Given the inability of France to send reinforcements to Syria, the issue of the fighting could not be in doubt, but so far as resistance to the British and Free French invasion was possible it was regarded as a question of honour. On 20 June Dentz asked the British commander for armistice terms, but he could not obtain consent from Darlan to a suspension of hostilities. After a campaign which lasted a month, in which a stubborn opposition had been put up against the British advance, and for the first time, apart from the skirmish at Dakar, Frenchmen had been in action against Frenchmen, authorization was received from Vichy to treat with the British. The cease-fire was announced on 12 July and the terms of the Levant armistice were signed at Acre on 14 July.¹

Darlan's policy had resulted in the loss of Syria and the Lebanon, but Vichy put the best face it could on the consequences of its mistakes. Dentz and the troops repatriated from Syria were given an enthusiastic welcome at Marseilles, and the general was made a grand officer of the Legion of Honour. 'We welcome you as a victorious general', declared General Laure, 'for you have saved honour.' Anti-Free French and anti-British propaganda exploited the situation to the full. The Havas Agency sent to all French papers the headline: 'The Gaullists are seeking to steal Syria from France in order to give it to England.' Catroux was denounced as a British mercenary and a traitor. Dentz, in a speech to his officers, proclaimed: 'As for the British, you have found again in them our traditional enemies, whose only idea is to leave France at the peace without a navy, without colonies, and without a military tradition.'²

Events in Syria affected French opinion much more than those in remoter colonies like Indochina. But far and away the most important of French overseas territories, both for the policy of the French Government and for its strategic significance, was French North Africa. Here, since October 1940, though his power was limited by the opposition of the collaborationist Admiral Abrial and the rivalry of Noguès, Weygand had seemed to be building up a little kingdom for himself, which the Germans regarded with the greatest suspicion, and Darlan with considerable jealousy.³ Weygand set himself, within the narrow limits of what was


² Figaro, 12, 15, and 19 September, Dépêche de Marseille, 19 September 1941.

possible, to strengthen the French forces under him. He encouraged the establishment of secret depots of oil and arms, and blocked the export of strategic materials such as cobalt and copper to Germany. His lack of co-operation brought him into continual conflict with the Armistice Commission, but he was not prepared to risk an open breach with Germany. To approaches from Catroux he returned a non-committal answer; he manifested his personal hostility to de Gaulle, and made no reply to British advances, though he was more susceptible to American influence.

The policy of Vichy, seconding that of Weygand, was successful in keeping North Africa out of the war for over two years. Speculation on the advantages or disadvantages of this policy from the military point of view, or on the possible results of a different policy, as has been said above, necessarily reflect after-thoughts rather than considerations and motives which were operative at the time. It must not be forgotten that the initial object of Pétain and Weygand had been to get France out of the storm. Their next anxiety was to save what they could from the wreck, and to run no risk of being drawn back into the waters that had so nearly swallowed them up. The danger of a German invasion of North Africa, possibly with Spanish assistance bought with the offer of French Morocco to Spain, weighed heavily on the minds of the Vichy Government. The means at their disposal in North Africa were too limited for them to contemplate any prolonged resistance to such a move. Passivity, and —when necessary —concessions to persuade the Germans that they could get more by peace than by the use of force, seemed the only practicable policy. By the time when action was perhaps possible, inactivity had become habitual.

Germany and Italy were, of course, anxious to derive as much assistance as they could from the French colonies. It was impossible to prevent the Axis from drawing some foodstuffs and other supplies from French North Africa for their troops in Libya. Equally the British could not effectively cut off trade between North Africa and metropolitan France; and it has been estimated that between 60 and 80 per cent. of the imports from North Africa found their way into German hands.

With the Italian campaign in North Africa going badly, the Axis became increasingly anxious to obtain supplies and facilities for transport in the French territories, and Darlan saw the possibility of profiting from this desire to reach a more positive understanding with Germany. On 11–12 May 1941, along with Benoist-Méchin, he was received by Hitler at

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1 Serre: Événements, vi. 1572–3.
3 Catroux: Dans la bataille de Méditerrané, pp. 70–79; Serre: Événements, vi. 1529, 1623.
4 Weygand claimed, after the war, that he had done his best to prevent supplies from going to Rommel (Serre: Événements, vi. 1620–1).
6 Benoist-Méchin had been Professor of German History at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques and a member of the Comité France-Allemagne. Taken prisoner in 1940, he was
Berchtesgaden, and declared himself ready to opt immediately for Germany, all the more because he was firmly persuaded of the ultimate victory of Germany.  

This interview was followed by further discussions with the Germans at Paris, out of which emerged the famous 'May Protocols'.

By the terms of these Darlan agreed, as has been indicated above, to cede stocks of war material in Syria to 'Irāq, to authorize German and Italian planes to land and to refuel in Syria, and to allow the Germans to forward materials by road and rail across Syria in transit to 'Irāq. In respect of North Africa it was agreed that the Germans should have the use of the port of Bizerta and the Bizerta-Gabès railway for the supply of their troops; that France would provide the Germans with transport and other supplies from French North Africa; and that the French Government would declare themselves ready in principle to allow German naval and merchant shipping the use of the port of Dakar. In return for these important concessions the French were to be permitted a certain measure of rearmament in Syria and North and West Africa, to enable them to protect their colonies more effectively against a possible British attack. This was a very one-sided bargain, which is only explicable on the supposition that Darlan was feeling it necessary to strengthen his personal position by showing the Germans that he could produce results for them. He had also to try to show the French that his policy of collaboration would ameliorate their lot, and therefore asked for the liberation of more prisoners of war, for a reduction in occupation costs, and the suppression of the special régime in north-east France.

In return the Germans agreed to a reduction of the occupation costs to 300 million francs a day (a concession which cost them nothing, as they had been piling up a huge paper credit in the Banque de France), some relaxation of the restrictions on communication released by the Germans after a short period and given an appointment to assist in organizing the demobilization of the French army (see Jacques Benoist-Méchin: La Moisson de Quarante (Paris, Albin Michel, 1941). In June 1941 he was appointed Secretary of State attached to Darlan as Vice-President of the Council.

1 Cf. Mémoirandum d'Abetz, p. 101. In a communication to Weygand Darlan made his point of view quite clear. He said: 'C'est la dernière chance qui se présente à nous d'un rapprochement avec l'Allemagne. . . . Si nous collaborons avec l'Allemagne . . . nous pouvons sauver la nation française, réduire au minimum nos pertes territoriales, métropolitaines et coloniales, jouer un rôle honorable sinon important, dans l'Europe future. . . . Mon choix est fait et je ne m'en laisserai pas détourner par l'offre sous conditions d'un bateau de blé et d'un bateau de pétrole' (Weygand: Mémoires, iii. 422).


3 Mémoirandum d'Abetz, pp. 104-5.

4 Bouthillier treats this reduction as a triumph of his skilful financial negotiations; one would have to be very unsuspicious not to see it as a part of the payment for Darlan's concessions in the colonies (cf. Bouthillier: Le Drame de Vichy, ii. 67-70). Even as it was, the Germans tried to link the reductions promised in the French payments with a proposal that one-fifth of the new payment should be in the form of merchandise, stocks and shares, or gold. French delaying tactics prevented this demand from effective enforcement (Arnoult: Les Finances de la France et l'occupation allemande, pp. 46-74).
cation between the Zones in France, and the right to rearm some torpedo-boats, altogether a pitiable return for Darlan’s very material services.¹

He defended his negotiations with Hitler in a broadcast of 23 May, beginning with the assurance that he had not been asked to hand over the fleet. ‘Every one knows’, he said, and this at least was true, ‘that I will hand it over to nobody.’ Nor was there any question of giving up colonial territory to Germany, or of declaring war on Great Britain. But France had to pay for her errors, for the indolence and legalized disorder of the past, the irresponsible declaration of war, the faults of former allies, and of a Government ‘which wanted to continue fighting after we were unable to do so, and which then only thought of flight’. These things had been said so many times before that they may have been beginning to lose their efficacy by now. The future of France, Darlan concluded, rested on the negotiations with Hitler. ‘France had to choose between life and death. The Marshal and the Government have chosen life.’ The choice, whatever it was, had not in fact been made: Darlan was speaking a little too soon.

The Government of the United States, alarmed by reports of Darlan’s negotiations with the Germans, brought their influence to bear on Vichy as they had in the crisis of October 1940. On 15 May 1941 guards were put on French ships in United States ports. President Roosevelt issued a statement recalling the assurances of the French Government that they would not agree to any collaboration with Germany going beyond the conditions of the Armistice. ‘The people of the United States’, he declared, ‘can hardly believe that the present Government of France could be brought to lend itself to a plan of voluntary alliance implied or otherwise which would apparently deliver up France and its Colonial Empire, including French African colonies and their Atlantic coasts, with the menace which that involves to the peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere.’² At Vichy Leahy was warning Pétain of the dangers implicit in granting concessions to the Germans.³ His influence is attested by the bitterness of the comments of the Germanophile faction. L’Illustration in July accused the American Ambassador of being ‘a new kind of foreign dictator’, and on 30 December the Nouveaux Temps attributed the policy of attentisme that had marked 1941 to the ‘deplorable influence’ of the ‘war-inciter, Leahy’.

Other members of the Vichy Government were almost equally alarmed at Darlan’s apparent willingness to commit France to the German side. They summoned Weygand and Boisson from Africa to Vichy. At a meeting

¹ N.C.A. iv. 236, 503. French payment up to 12 March 1941 amounted to 108 milliard francs, of which the Germans had only drawn half (ibid. p. 234).
³ Langer: Our Vichy Gamble, p. 151.
of the Council of Ministers on 3 June Weygand threw his influence forcefully into the scales, 'pulverizing' the May Protocols, and was supported by Boisson. Under this pressure Pétain was persuaded to decline to ratify them and to put forward counter-proposals, linking the concessions which the Germans wanted with the question of the line of demarcation between the Zones in France. The Germans, who were now preparing for the attack on Russia, were not ready to use stronger pressure at this point and so the Protocols became a dead letter.¹

French attentisme, which had prevented the success of this negotiation, was curiously reflected in a similar unwillingness on the part of the Germans to commit themselves to any material concessions to Vichy. Even when they wanted something from France, and were not prepared to take it by force, they could not bring themselves to buy it. Perhaps the trouble was partly their inability to decide what policy it would be best to follow in their dealings with Vichy, for we find Ribbentrop in August 1941 instructing Abetz to follow a dilatory and delaying policy in his negotiations.² On one point, however, they were positive and consistent. They continued to press for the removal of Weygand from North Africa, which Abetz had been demanding as early as December 1940. To the Germans he was a potential danger, while Darlan regarded Weygand as a rival and a stumbling-block in the way of his policy.³ The resistance at Vichy was overcome, and in November 1941 Weygand was dismissed, though General Juin, who replaced him in his military command, continued his policy.⁴ In spite of the failure of the May Protocols, the Germans were able to draw supplies of food from French North Africa for their troops, as well as trucks and munitions, without making any concessions to France in return for these advantages.

On the whole it must be concluded that Darlan's colonial policy had everywhere proved an unqualified failure. It had brought Vichy nothing but loss; it had injured his own prestige; and it had even, in the long run, done very little good to the Germans. In the autumn and winter of 1941–2 the invasion of Russia monopolized most of the energies of the German Government, but when there was time for a new decision on France to be taken at a high level it was hardly likely to be favourable to Darlan.

(d) France after the Outbreak of the Russo-German War

The first six months of 1941 saw surprisingly little alteration in the general balance of French politics. The politicians and the press of Paris

¹ Du Moulin de Labarthète: Temps des illusions, p. 221; Procès Pétain, ii. 701, 714, 731 (evidence of Chevalier, General Bergeret, Berthelot); Weygand: Mémoires, iii. 430–7.
² Mémorandum d'Abetz, p. 116.
⁴ According to Leahy, Pétain said that the Germans had threatened to occupy all France and requisition all its foodstuffs for the army of occupation if Weygand were not removed (cf. Leahy: I Was There, p. 76).
and Vichy, along with the Rassemblement and the Légion, fought one another from a distance; but since each side was confined to its own Zone they could not get to close grips. Darlan from Vichy had been bidding for German favour by his colonial policy, Déat and the Paris collaborationists trying to outbid him by the violence of their pro-Nazi propaganda, while the Germans themselves were keeping Laval in cold storage. Pétain and his clique of confidants at Vichy were the still centre round which the cyclone raged, their hearts set on building, even in such a season of storms, the new social order for which the National Revolution had drawn up the plans. As for the attitude of the French people to the war, Ciano was perhaps not so very far wrong when he said, characteristically, that the only difference between Vichy and Paris was that in Paris people were saying: 'Let us hope the British win', while at Vichy they were saying: 'Let us hope those British swine win.'\(^1\) Leahy reported to Roosevelt in March 1941 that 95 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Unoccupied Zone and 99 per cent. of the Occupied Zone hoped for a British victory.\(^2\) Such sentiments, naturally, could for the time exercise no effective influence on the course of events. What changed the situation in France, rendered it fluid once again and presented new problems to Vichy, the Paris collaborationists, and the occupying authorities, was the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941.

Vichy broke off diplomatic relations with Russia on 30 June and recalled the French Ambassador, Gaston Bergery, taking care to distinguish its motives from those of the Germans by giving as its reason the alleged activities of Soviet diplomatic agents and consuls in France. In general, Vichy press and opinion continued to cling to the policy of *attentisme*. Frossard’s *Mot d’Ordre* (20 June 1941), admitting that the situation had its *imponderabilia*, declared: ‘We are at the beginning of a harsh, fierce struggle.’ For the *Garonne* (24 June 1941) France was necessarily outside the drama and must adopt an attitude of reserve. Similarly de la Rocque said that France ‘se trouve hors du jeu’.\(^3\) Even Maurras proclaimed that France must put the battle for the *patrie* before either the revolutionary or the counter-revolutionary crusade.\(^4\) This attitude did not, of course, imply any sympathy for Communism, and its expression was usually combined with violent denunciations of Bolshevism. Pétain committed himself rather farther than the general trend at Vichy warranted to sympathy with the Germans in their war against Russia. In a broadcast of 12 August 1941 he described the Nazis as engaged in ‘the defence of civilization in the East’.

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\(^1\) Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Mussolini in the presence of Ciano, 13 May 1941 (*J.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxix. 36 (1946-PS); *N.C.L*. iv. 504).
\(^2\) Cf. Leahy: *I Was There*, p. 527.
\(^3\) *Petit Journal*, 27 September 1941.
\(^4\) *Action Française*, 3 July 1941.
The most energetic demands that France should unreservedly stand beside Germany naturally came from the Paris collaborationists. A group representing the Rassemblement National Populaire of Déat, the Parti Populaire Français of Doriot, the Ligue Française of the bonapartist Constantinini, the Francisme of Bucard, and including also Deloncle of the Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire, Pierret of Au Pilori, Fontenoy, Jean Goy, Sabiani, and others, began the organization of an Anti-Bolshevik Legion (Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme). It is significant that the first news of the new Legion appeared, before any of the French papers gave it, in the Pariser Zeitung of 6 July. Déat and Doriot themselves volunteered for the Anti-Bolshevik Legion. Recruiting agencies were set up in Paris and elsewhere and much publicity was given to the alleged host of volunteers that were pouring in. Reliable figures are difficult to discover, but recruitment seems to have been much slower than had been hoped.¹ However, by the end of August a group was ready to leave for further training in the east. At the review held before its departure one of the volunteers, named Colette, who had joined for the purpose, shot at and injured Laval and Déat. This cast some doubts on the reliability of the Legion and possibly for this reason its departure was postponed. There was a wave of sympathy for Colette in France; Laval and Déat petitioned for his pardon, and the sentence of death which had been passed on him was commuted to life imprisonment. The first contingent of the Legion left quietly from Versailles on 4 September, under the command of Colonel Labonne.

Public opinion, outside collaborationist circles, remained lukewarm. To many supporters of Vichy the struggle in Syria seemed closer to French interests. Maurras wrote that Frenchmen would do better to die for France in Syria than, he implied, for Germany in Russia. The course of the eastern war was, of course, followed with interest and not always well-concealed hopes. The initial expectation, encouraged by German communiqués reporting colossal successes, was of a rapid and complete German victory. As the war continued more varied opinions developed. Even the military commentator of the Action Française expressed a belief in the Russian capacity for continued resistance. The vast extent of Russia and the size of the Russian army impressed French opinion, which could not forget the fate of Napoleon's Russian adventure. La Rocque wrote of a Russia 'décevante pour ses alliés, pleine d'embûches pour ses envahisseurs'.² In an article of January 1942, headed 'The Russian Mystery', which aroused much indignation among the pro-German factions, Figaro analysed the power of the Russian armies and stressed the return to Tsarist traditions—'l'esclavage sous le fûreau d'un autocrate, la foi mystique dans la terre des

¹ De Brinon says that there were not more than 3,000 members of the Légion des Volontaires Français and those of mediocre quality (de Brinon: Mémoires, p. 78).
² Petit Journal, 18 October 1941.
ancêtres’. By the end of 1941 it was clear that the continuance of the Russian war, Italian reverses in Africa, and the beginning of serious doubts about ultimate German victory were putting a strain on the unity of Vichy. There were also signs on which side Pétain would come down when the split came: for example, a message of 6 November (in reply to an address from Colonel Labonne), in which the Marshal congratulated the volunteers on participating in the crusade of Germany against the Bolshevik peril.

The most important consequence inside France of the German attack on Russia was that it brought the Communist Party into the war. It is necessary, in order to appreciate the significance of this change, to recall the position of the French Communists at the time of the Armistice. In the critical days of May and June 1940, L’Humanité, already a clandestine publication, had joined in the cry for peace which was raised from all points of the political horizon, but with unanimity only from the extreme Left and Right. ‘Il faut constituer un gouvernement de paix en s’appuyant sur les masses populaires’, declared L’Humanité on 26 May. The French Communists regarded the defeat of France as equivalent to a Communist victory over French imperialism, and envisaged the peace in terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. They believed that in the general dissolution of authority it would be possible for them to seize power by heading a popular campaign directed against the ‘responsables de la guerre’. Following the party line of friendship with the Nazis, they approached the German authorities for the official ban on L’Humanité to be lifted. They encouraged fraternization between French workers and German soldiers, called for a renewal of normal production in the factories, denounced economic sabotage by ‘a certain number of employers’, and proclaimed their readiness to collaborate with the Germans on the basis of the German-Soviet alliance. The Germans did not receive these advances in a very encouraging way, and the Communist press and organization had to remain underground. An appeal to the people of France, signed by Thorez and Duclos

1 *Figaro*, 6 January 1942. The issue of *Figaro* was confiscated and the paper suspended because of this article.
2 *Garonne*, 7 November 1941.
3 An account of the Communist opposition to the war in 1939–40 and the action taken by the Government against the Communist deputies will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: *Initial Triumph of the Axis*.
and dated 10 July 1940, though probably composed in August, avoided direct reference to the Nazis; but it denounced the intrigues of the British, and advocated European pacification and the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet treaty of friendship.1 ‘We seek the security of France through a policy of friendship with the great land of the Soviets’, declared L’Humanité, adding that the ‘absolute neutrality’ of the U.S.S.R. was a guarantee against being involved in any new warlike adventures.2 The U.S.S.R., it declared, was the only country in which there were no ration cards, no restrictions, no queues, no unemployment; its supplies of food were inexhaustible and no blockade would prevent their reaching France.3 Bread and peace, the programme on which the Communist Party had won power in Russia, defeated in the First World War, were the cries which were relied on to gain France, defeated in the Second. The attack on the imperialist war of course continued, and de Gaulle was denounced as the agent of British finance.4 In 1941 Communist propaganda against the Pétain Government was intensified, though Britain still remained the chief enemy. On 20 June 1941, two days before the German invasion of Russia, L’Humanité was adding an underground voice to the Anglophobe chorus from Vichy by proclaiming: ‘De Gaulle et Catroux font tuer des Français pour l’Angleterre.’5

The outbreak of war between Germany and Russia altered the whole situation overnight. The Communists, though launched into hostility to the occupying Power so suddenly and unexpectedly, started with the great advantage that they were already an underground party, with all the organization for active resistance ready to operate. Hence they were able to form the first effective group of partisans, which became in due course the nucleus of the body known as the Francs Tireurs et Partisans Français.

The partisan struggle, however, was a thing of the future. Resistance began with isolated acts of sabotage, the first attack on a member of the German army occurring on 21 August 1941 in the Paris métro. The Germans arrested suspects, especially Jews, on a large scale. On 23 August they announced that if acts of sabotage and attacks on members of the occupying forces continued, reprisals would be taken on hostages,6 and on 31 August for the first time the Paris papers were ordered to print prominently on the front page a report of the shooting of eight prisoners. In September Pétain broadcast an appeal to the French of the Occupied Zone to stop the attacks on Germans for the sake of the hostages. On

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1 Ceyrat: La Trahison permanente, pp. 97–100.
3 Ibid. 27 October 1940 (citing Rossi, p. 116).
4 Ibid. 1 July 1940, 26 September 1940 (citing Rossi, p. 86; Ceyrat: La Trahison permanente, pp. 117–18).
5 Ibid. 20 June 1941 (citing Ceyrat, p. 120).
6 Local German authorities had been authorized in September 1940 to take hostages when they considered this necessary for the maintenance of order (see p. 148 above).
5 October the Germans announced the seventy-fifth execution, and the figure mounted steadily. On 20 October the first high German officer, Lieut.-Colonel Holtz, commander of the troops at Nantes, was killed. A heavy fine and a curfew were imposed on the city and fifty hostages were executed. A few days later a German major was killed at Bordeaux. Pétain and Darlan made radio appeals, and de Gaulle broadcast from London an appeal against the assassination of Germans, but fifty more hostages were shot. It was intended that 100 more executions should follow, but energetic representations made by Vichy had some effect. Cardinal Gerlier declared that the shooting of the hostages shook the conscience of the world, and Pucheu informed the Germans that reprisals on this scale were producing a feeling of solidarity between the Communists and the rest of the population.

However, attacks on German soldiers, followed by the imposition of curfew, fines, and the shooting of hostages, did not stop. Vichy put forward the view that the attacks were the work of foreigners, Jews, and Communists; Maurras in the Action Française wrote: 'These bombs and these shots came from others. Our fellow countrymen could not be guilty of anything of this nature.' It seems very probable that at this stage they were mostly the work of Communists, but they were used as an excuse for further anti-Semitic measures. On 16 December 1941 the German commander, von Stülpnagel, announced the imposition of a fine of a million francs on Jews in the Occupied Zone, the deportation of 'criminal judeo-bolshevik elements' to forced labour in the east, and the execution of 100 Jews, Communists, and anarchists.2 Contrary to its usual practice Vichy published its protest, which spoke of a 'deep uneasiness among all the French people'. Public opinion, which might otherwise have been unfavourable to the attacks on isolated members of the occupation troops, was undoubtedly aroused and its sympathies were to some extent changed by the German hostage policy. Moreover, by announcing all the scattered movements of resistance as the work of Communists, the Germans were restoring to the Communist Party the patriarchic reputation which it had lost during the period of the German-Soviet alliance.

Apart from the activities just described, resistance in 1941 is difficult to assess. Undoubtedly many small resistance groups were growing up. The Action Française complained of the growth of Gaullism in the country-side,3 but it is not easy to tell how widespread Free French sympathies were, and how far they led to action at this stage. A British intelligence service was being built up in France, and the Deuxième Bureau of the Free French organization in London under Dewavrin (Colonel Passy) was sending agents to France to establish connexions with the scattered and

1 Cited in the Temps, 11 December 1941.
2 Ibid. 16 December 1941.
3 Action Française, 9 September 1941.
small resistance networks that were springing up spontaneously.1 By the end of 1941 the three chief movements of the Unoccupied Zone, Combat, Libération, and Franc-Tireur, were linked with the Free French National Committee in London. There were also many, often ephemeral, local groups. In the Occupied Zone the situation was much more difficult and little was achieved before 1942.2 Despite individual acts of heroism and devotion the Resistance Movement was only in its initial stages and it was still not clear how much support it had in the population at large. De Gaulle’s call for five minutes’ silence on 11 November 1941 is said to have met with little response. Yet there were signs that opinion was shifting in France during 1941. Admiral Leahy reported in July that the popularity of Pétain was declining.3 The Marshal’s message of 12 August reflects a pathetic feeling of disillusionment: ‘From several regions of France I have felt for some weeks an evil breeze springing up. Uneasiness is creeping over men’s minds. . . . The authority of my Government is disputed. . . . The forces of recovery are losing heart. . . . France can only be governed with the consent of public opinion. . . . That public opinion is today divided.’4 When the Marshal visited the chief metropolis of Unoccupied France, Lyons, in September, his reception was lukewarm.5 As for the French of the Occupied Zone, Léon Bailby, writing in L’Alerte of Nice in December 1941, was shocked at the ignorance of Parisian friends who came to the Riviera: ‘They have no trust in their own press or wireless, but they listen to foreign broadcasts, and, knowing nothing of the great work of Pétain, they misinterpret every act of the Government.’6

Faced with increasing resistance to its own authority, as well as to the Germans, Vichy resorted to severe measures of repression. New tribunals were erected, amalgamated, and transformed at a dizzy pace. The court martial of Gannat (created by a law of 24 September 1941) and the Special Courts against black-market offences (created 21 March 1941, and sitting in two sections at Paris and Gannat) had their powers transferred in November to the Tribunal d’État (created by laws of 14 August 1941 and 6 September 1941, and sitting at Paris and Lyons). Special courts were set up to deal with offences committed at night (21 August 1941), and with those committed under Communist or anarchist inspiration (14 and 25 August 1941). The military tribunals continued to function. Alarm at the trend of opinion was shown by the suppression of all public meetings by a decree of 12 August, and of the more independent journals, Jour, Candide,

3 Cf. Leahy: I Was There, p. 61.
4 Pétain: Quatre années au pouvoir, pp. 105, 6, 112.
5 Cf. du Moulin de Labarthète: Temps des illusions, p. 393.
6 Alerte, 13 December 1941.
and *Temps Nouveaux* in September. After Pucheu became Minister of the Interior in July administrative action against the opposition became more ruthless, though not undiscriminating.¹

While external events dominated the history of France throughout 1941, internally the balance of power at Vichy was shifting. The impracticability, as well as the nationalistic and non-collaborationist tendencies of Maurras and the Action Française, reduced their influence. Darlan had won the struggle for power in February 1941, but at the same time a potentially rival faction had entered the Government. There were strong Germanophile elements in French banking and heavy industry, and of these the Banque Worms was a particular focus. One of the partners of this powerful bank, Barnaud, had founded in 1937 the *Nouveaux Cahiers*, inspired by Gabriel Leroy-Ladurie, for the purpose of advocating a kind of fascism of great industrialists.² Bouthillier, the Minister of Finance, had connexions with this group, which in 1941 obtained control of practically all the Secretaryships of State concerned with economic affairs. Barnaud himself became Delegate-General for Franco-German economic relations, with control of all the economic questions formerly handled by the Armistice delegation under Huntziger. Other leading members of the group were Le Hideux (related by marriage to the industrialist Renault), who was Delegate-General for National Equipment; Benoist-Méchin, who as Secretary-General to the Vice-President of the Council was, along with Darlan, to conduct the negotiations of May with the Germans; Paul Marion, the other joint Secretary-General, a former Communist and later a follower of Doriot; Pucheu, a director of metallurgical companies, who was put in charge of industrial production, and subsequently became Minister of the Interior; the Minister of Labour, the trade unionist Bélin, who had pre-war contacts with the big industrialists and whose Chef de Cabinet was a director of the Banque Worms; and Berthelot, Minister of Communications. The influence of the Worms group grew as the scope of economic collaboration between French and German industrial and commercial interests increased. The arrangement by which the Germans supplied raw materials to French industries and took a large proportion of their manufactured articles provided an opportunity for large profits, which were also made by the interests concerned in transmitting supplies from North Africa to the Germans.

This very loosely knit group—if it can even be called such—is sometimes described as the Synarchie. It was given this name, and wrapped in the melodramatic trappings of a secret society, in the first place by the Left-

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¹ 'Il faut agir', Pucheu declared, 'de manière à ne pas heurter la sensibilité ouvrière. ... Il faut discerner entre le communiste militant faisant partie de l'appareil politique de Moscou et le syndicaliste' (*Figaro*, 29 July 1941); and in the autumn of 1941 he liberated a number of the interned trade unionists.

wing collaborationists of Paris. For example, L’Appel declared that the Montoire agreement had been sabotaged by the ‘synarchie’, and Déat conducted a campaign against it in L’Œuvre. From this angle it was a secret instrument of the ‘Judéo-Anglo-Saxons’. Another version of the ‘synarchie’, which appeared in a police report of January 1942, linked it with the Fascist C.S.A.R. (Comités Secrets d’Action Révolutionnaire) and M.S.R. (Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire). There seem to be no valid grounds for accepting this secret society theory, but there is no reason for rejecting along with this fact the existence of strong and intimately associated financial interests within the Vichy régime.

Pétain had little sympathy with the ideas of this group and he was supported by Barthélemy (Justice), Caziot (Agriculture), and the two Ministers of State, Lucien Romier and Henri Moysset. Huntziger (Defence) and Bergeret (Air) were of uncertain affiliations. Darlan, who was a somewhat isolated figure, continued to occupy the dominant position as Vice-President of the Council, Minister of the Interior, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, apart from his personal hold on the navy. But in July he had to give up the Ministry of the Interior to Pucheu, who proved a vigorous administrator, ruthless in the repression of opposition in the country and in purging the government services. With the influence of the Worms clique behind him, Pucheu steadily increased his power at the expense of Darlan. Both factions could regard it as a gain when in November Pétain gave way to repeated German demands, and Weygand was removed from his position in North Africa; but Darlan’s star was evidently beginning to decline in the autumn of 1941. He had taken over the Ministry of Defence in August from Huntziger, but this did not make up for the abandonment of the Ministry of the Interior to Pucheu. Outside his naval clientele he was an unpopular figure: in Pétain’s speech of 12 August 1941 there was an open reference to Darlan as a Minister ‘towards whom opinion has not been always favourable nor always fair’. His colonial policy had brought nothing but disaster; his attempt to reach an agreement with the Germans in May had proved abortive. Leahy reported in November 1941 that Darlan was himself becoming doubtful of the ultimate victory of Germany and disposed to wait to see how the Russian war went before committing himself farther; but though such doubts may well have existed in Darlan’s mind, they did not prevent him from continuing his efforts to keep the favour of the Germans, for example by the offer of information on the movements of the British fleet. At a

3 Procès Pétain, ii. 859 (evidence of Lavagne).
4 Pétain: Quatre années au pouvoir, p. 112.
5 Hull: Mémoires, ii. 1042; cf. de Brinon: Mémoires, p. 151.
6 Raeder to Hitler, 12 December 1941, Führer Conferences, 1941, p. 131. See also a letter of
meeting in Turin with Ciano on 10 December he made a great show of bitter anti-British sentiments.¹

The normal manoeuvres between the Germans, trying to get something for nothing, and Vichy, only willing to sell its aid at a price, were continued in an interview of 1 December at Saint-Florentin between Pétain and Göring. Göring demanded that more energetic steps be taken by the French for the defence of their colonies against the British. Pétain retaliated with the French need for increased forces and military material. No agreement was reached and the interview concluded with Pétain in an undignified manner stuffing his memorandum, which Göring refused to accept, into the Nazi’s pocket.² The Nouveaux Temps could complain, with some truth, that Franco-German relations were better before what it called ‘the crime of 13 December 1940’ than at the end of 1941.³

The great illusion of Vichy was to believe that it was an independent government, capable of determining its own policy for itself. It was in fact increasingly at the mercy of circumstances, and capable of putting up at best only a delaying action against German pressure. German interest in the maintenance of order in France, and in governing the country through Frenchmen, was, of course, great, but in the last resort the question was whether the Government at Vichy would oppose the Germans to the point of being replaced by Laval; as Abetz insists, the existence of Laval was the real guarantee of the subservience—he says loyalty—of Vichy to Germany. The Germans had won the game when they discovered that Pétain’s single trump card, resignation and refusal to continue as the nominal head of the Government, was one that he was not prepared to play. The only problem for them after this was to prevent anyone else from becoming strong enough at Vichy to play it for him, and to decide who would make the most useful tool as the effective head of the French Government under him. The half-heartedness of collaboration, the growing opposition and unrest in France, and the inefficacy of the repression, suggested that neither Darlan nor the Worms clique was the best possible instrument of German policy. There was still to be three months’ delay, but by the end of 1941 the stage was set for the negotiations which were to lead to the return of Laval in April 1942.

(iii) The Vichy Régime, 1942–4

(a) The Return of Laval

The increase in the spirit of attentisme which had been making itself felt in France during 1941 was reflected in Pétain’s message of 1 January 1942,

Admiral Schultze to Raeder, 4 December 1941, describing a dinner party at which Darlan was obviously making a strong bid for German favour (ibid. pp. 137–8).

¹ Ciano: Diario (1939–43), 10 December 1941. See also above, p. 304 and note 7.
² Mémorandum d’Abetz, p. 121.
³ Nouveaux Temps, 30 December 1941.
which seemed to balance Franco-German collaboration against the policy of the partisans of de Gaulle, ventured to refer to France as a European Power, and indicated that the existing situation should suggest to Germany the need for a modification of the Armistice settlement.\(^1\) The Paris press and radio denounced the message, and the German Ambassador, Abetz, evidently fearing reactions from Berlin at the failure of his policy to evoke more material evidence of collaboration from Vichy, countered it by producing an alleged offer from Darlan, supposedly speaking in agreement with Pétain and the leading members of his Government, to enter the war against England and the United States on the side of Germany.\(^2\) The offer was to be kept secret until the declaration of war could be made in such a form as would gain the support of public opinion.\(^3\) Both Benoist-Méchin and Darlan's friend, Admiral Docteur, specifically denied after the war that any such offer was made,\(^4\) and even if Darlan took this step it is impossible to believe that Pétain and the other Ministers could have agreed to a proposal which ran counter to the whole trend of their policy, which was to keep France out of the war at almost any cost.\(^5\)

The Germans in fact had more limited aims in their relations with France at this moment. In view of the difficulties of the Axis armies in North Africa, General Juin had been summoned to Berlin in December 1941 and presented by Göring with a demand for French assistance in supplying them. He temporized, and when he returned to North Africa issued orders for the measures to be taken in the event of a possible German attack. Darlan, on the other hand, accepted the German demands in principle, subject to some slight modifications. His attitude, expressed in a letter of 2 January 1942 to Estéva, was that the chief aim was to prevent French North Africa from becoming a battlefield; hence it was to the interest of France to assist the Axis forces with supplies, in order to enable them to stop the British before they reached the frontier of Tunis.\(^6\)

Despite Darlan's manoeuvres, the Vichy Government was not prepared as a whole to commit itself to the German cause. Its one positive act in the early months of 1942 was to open, at long last, the trial of the war criminals

\(^1\) Pétain: \textit{Quatre années au pouvoir}, p. 120.
\(^2\) \textit{Mémorandum d'Abetz}, p. 138.
\(^5\) Abetz, in his evidence at the post-war trials, persisted in his assertion that Darlan favoured military collaboration between France and Germany, whereas Laval, he admitted, was opposed to it (\textit{Les Procès de collaboration: Fernand de Brinon, Joseph Darnand, Jean Luchaire} (Paris, Albin Michel, 1948), p. 164). It seems almost certain, in spite of this, that Abetz's account of a French Council of Ministers on 11 January 1942, at which the policy of military collaboration was accepted, is an invention (cf. A. Kammerer: \textit{La Passion de la flotte française} (Paris, A. Fayard, 1951), pp. 366–9).
\(^6\) Ibid. p. 355.
at Riom. Four of these—Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, and Guy la Chambre (who returned from America to answer the charges against him)—had been administratively interned since September 1940. Jacomet, Secretary-General of the Ministry of National Defence and War from 1936, was added to the list in April 1941. Reynaud and Mandel, who had already been condemned by a special court,\(^1\) were not included in the new trial, but the others were brought before the court at Riom on 19 February 1942. The proceedings did not go exactly as had been expected. The defendants, and particularly Léon Blum, took full advantage of the opportunities the court offered them to speak in their own defence. They brought forward evidence which cast the responsibility for French unpreparedness on the General Staff, and refused to accept the time-limit, designed to prevent any reference to the period when Pétain himself had been the dominant influence over the planning of French defences. It was soon evident that the trial was doing far more harm to the reputation of Pétain and the General Staff than to that of the accused Ministers of the Third Republic. From the German point of view it was equally unsatisfactory. Instead of pinning war guilt on the French Ministers it was turning into a public debate over the reasons for the defeat of France. After some two months of this, both Vichy and the Germans were heartily sick of it, and on 11 April 1942 proceedings were summarily suspended. The accused returned to prison with enhanced reputations, and Vichy took care never to bring them to trial again.\(^2\)

The German authorities, in spite of the efforts of Abetz to put the best face on the situation, had reason to be dissatisfied with the results of their French policy, and at the end of March an interview between Göring and Laval initiated negotiations for a change of government at Vichy. For some time past the position of Darlan had visibly been weakening. Many of the Ministers, especially the so-called ‘synarchic’, were hostile to him. ‘L’equipe Worms’, in the opinion of Fernand de Brinon, was coming closer to the ‘clan Lavalliste’.\(^3\) This seems a misinterpretation of their position. The great French industrialists, who up to the end of 1941 had put their money on a German victory, began to change their views when America, whose economic power they understood better than any other group in France, came into the war. But, though not for the purpose of committing themselves to Laval, they were certainly moving away from Darlan. Pétain’s doctor, Ménétrel, used his influence against Darlan, and Pétain himself had become jealous of the admiral’s prominence.\(^4\) The ground was

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\(^1\) See above, p. 356.

\(^2\) The evidence given during the trial threw a great deal of light on the French lack of preparedness for war at the time of the Munich Conference (see Survey for 1938, iii, Part V passim and especially pp. 472–6, 510–21, 597–8).

\(^3\) De Brinon: Mémoires, p. 99.

thus prepared on both the French and the German sides for Darlan’s removal from office, while Laval’s negotiations with the Germans had opened the door for his own return. On 18 April 1942 Darlan moved down to the position of Commander-in-Chief and Laval took his place at the head of the Government. At the same time, by Constitutional Act No. 11, the offices of Head of the State and Head of the Government were separated, and effective responsibility for both internal and external policy was attributed to the latter. Laval had come back on his own terms—terms which ruled out the possibility of any repetition of the events of December 1940. In the new Government Lucien Romier (former leader-writer for Le Figaro), though suffering from ill health, became Pétain’s most trusted associate and was kept in office by his support until the Germans finally insisted on his resignation in November 1943. Laval’s Cabinet contained many who were to remain by his side till the Vichy régime was no more, including Cathala (in charge of Finance), Abel Bonnard (Education), Dr. Grasset (Health), and Paul Marion (Information). Of the others, Leroy-Ladurie (Agriculture and Food), Barnaud (Franco-German economic relations), and Joseph Barthélemy (Justice) left earlier. Benoist-Méchin was dismissed, because of his intrigues with Doriot and the wild men of Paris, in September 1942, and his fellow secretary, Admiral Platon, followed in March 1943.

Laval’s fifteen months out of office had made no alteration in his judgement of the situation.

My policy [he told Leahy] is based on reconciliation with Germany, and without such reconciliation I see no possibility of peace, either for Europe or for France or for the world. I am certain that Germany will be victorious. But even if she were defeated, my policy toward Germany would be the same, for it is the only one that is in the interest of definitive peace.1

He had the intellectual limitations and the inability to see beyond certain fixed ideas that are apt to go with a capacity for successful intrigue. Laval had made up his mind long before the Armistice that the fate of France was bound up indissolubly with that of Germany, and that collaboration between them, even on Nazi terms, was necessary to the salvation of Europe, including France. He was obsessed with the invincibility of German military might, and, priding himself on his realism, was determined that if the international case came to trial by battle it should not find a Laval on the losing side. His plan, after the Armistice, for convincing the Germans that he was indispensable to them was to make it plain that no one else could serve their purposes better. By offering as much as possible, as freely and as openly as possible, he aimed at demonstrating

2 Langer: Our Vichy Gamble, p. 250.
that he was fully committed and had left himself no line of retreat from full collaboration. He had gone too far for Vichy in December 1940, but now that he was back in office again, and more convinced of his own astuteness than ever, he picked up the threads of his policy where he had dropped them at the end of 1940. In a broadcast of 22 June 1942 he even included the notorious words: ‘Je souhaite la victoire de l’Allemagne.’ At the trial of Pétain after the war he explained his use of these words by the need to create a climate of confidence in the Germans towards France.\(^1\) They might perhaps more correctly have been attributed to his need to create a climate of confidence in them towards himself; but the phrase with which the sentence concluded should also not be forgotten—‘car sans elle, le communisme s’installera partout en Europe’. He saw the future of the world as determined either by Nazi-Fascism or by Communism, and of the two preferred the former.

The return of Laval to power, and to closer collaboration with Germany, involved a cooling off in French relations with the United States. After a final approach to Weygand in January 1942, to which he replied with a refusal to take any action except under instructions from Pétain, the American Government abandoned their hopes of him.\(^2\) Leahy reported that no co-operation was to be expected from Vichy in any effort to exclude the Germans from North Africa if they were to move in that direction.\(^3\) Early in February, having information that French vessels were transporting material for the Axis forces from Marseilles to North Africa, the United States warned Vichy that this would lead to a change in American policy, but the threat was ineffective. In March the United States discontinued sending supplies of food to North Africa, and on 17 April Admiral Leahy was recalled and American representation left in the hands of a chargé d’affaires.\(^4\)

\(b\) Development in the French Empire, 1942

During the course of 1942 the greater part of the French Empire was to pass out of the control of Vichy. French North Africa came back into the war on the side of the Allies. In Indochina, effectively controlled by Japan, the mere shadow of French authority continued to subsist under Admiral Decoux. The remaining possessions witnessed an involved conflict between those who still clung to their allegiance to Pétain, those who accepted the new régime in North Africa, and the adherents of General de Gaulle, with the Americans and the British taking a hand from outside.

Free French hopes that the French Empire would be led back into the

\(^1\) Procès Pétain, i. 559; Laval parle, p. 122.

\(^2\) Langer: Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 210–11; Leahy: I Was There, p. 95.

\(^3\) Langer, op. cit. p. 211.

\(^4\) Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941–1942, pp. 630–2; Leahy, op. cit. p. 97.
war under the leadership of de Gaulle were doomed to disappointment. For this the hostility of the American Government was partly responsible. As has already been mentioned, the tiny islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland had become in the closing days of 1941 the source of a serious conflict between the Free French Movement and the United States,¹ but the prime cause of the profound American distrust of de Gaulle was that he seemed to them either a tool of British imperialism or else a mere political adventurer. The State Department's informants in France assured them that he had no effective backing there, and that to commit the Allies to his support would be to sacrifice the hope of eventually bringing France back into the war against Germany.² Information from North Africa seemed to confirm the view that the Pétainist authorities, if they could be won over, would provide military support far greater than any that de Gaulle could rally. The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, believed also that his policy was responsible for keeping Vichy from entering the war on the side of Germany,³ though, in fact, the danger of such a development was as exaggerated as were the hopes of Vichy's re-entering the war against Germany. American policy, however, based on these assumptions, sought to avoid unnecessary provocation of Vichy and in general to neutralize French overseas territory; whereas de Gaulle was striving to bring the colonies back into the war under his own leadership.

There was also a considerable strain in the relations between the British Government and the Free French.⁴ As with the United States, the crux of the matter lay in the attitude towards the French colonies. British policy was mainly concerned with the French colonies as actual or potential military, naval, or air bases, and was not unduly worried about the reactions of either Vichy or de Gaulle to attacks on them. Both French parties, on the other hand, looked with the utmost suspicion on British overseas policy. The general French attitude was well expressed by Admiral Auphan in a post-war work: the English, he said, not knowing too well how the war would turn out, were seeking to get hold of pledges in view of a possible compromise, or to collect the spoils of the French Empire in the eventuality of a complete foundering of France.⁵ At the same time the supporters of Vichy, not knowing the continual struggle that was going on between de Gaulle and the British Government, saw him as an accomplice of Britain in the nefarious design of liquidating the French Empire. It is in the light of these general considerations that developments in the French overseas empire during 1942 may be outlined.

¹ See above, p. 363, and below, pp. 483–5.
² See above, p. 361.
⁴ See below, pp. 451 seqq.
An account is given elsewhere of the British initiative in Madagascar in May 1942, which resulted in a British occupation of the whole island by the late autumn and its transfer in December 1942 to the control of the Free French, who had already peacefully obtained possession of the neighbouring Île de la Réunion.

Negotiations between the United States Government and Admiral Robert, a convinced supporter of Pétain, secured the disarming of the French ships at Martinique in May 1942. A year later the United States denounced the agreement, and in June 1943 Martinique rallied to the Free French. In French Guiana the rivalry between the Free French and the Algiers committee led to a race to obtain control of the colony. Both factions sent governors to take over its administration in March 1943, but American pressure, and the need of the colony for food which only America could supply, led to the acceptance of the nominee from Algiers.

The crucial struggle for the leadership of overseas France took place in North Africa and was the sequel to the Allied landings on 8 November 1942. Under Weygand North Africa had remained strongly pro-Vichy in sentiment and hostile to the Free French Movement and to the British. General Juin, who had succeeded Weygand in his military command in November 1941, continued the policy of attempting, so far as circumstances allowed, to build up the defences of North Africa, but exclusively for action within the sphere of Vichy policy. The military and naval officers in North Africa exhibited their customary loyalty to Pétain, the Légion was well supported and influential, and the Muslim population had welcomed with enthusiasm the abrogation of Vichy of the loi Crémieux, by which the Jews of Algiers had obtained rights of French citizenship which were not extended to the mass of the Muslims. In Morocco and Tunisia, under the control of Noguès and Estéva respectively, there was practically no dissident movement, and in Algiers only a small group of potential resisters. Even the monarchists—the claimant to the French Throne, the comte de Paris, was himself living at Rabat—were a stronger political force than the sympathizers with Free France.

This was the local background to the plans for the invasion of North Africa which were worked out by the Americans, in consultation with the British, during 1942. The Allied landings in North Africa on 8 November 1942, and the negotiations between the Americans and the French authorities which preceded and followed the landings, are recorded in another volume, and in this place it is proposed only to discuss the complicated political manoeuvres by which the French authorities in North Africa solved their problems of conscience and came back into the war.

In view of the strongly pro-Vichy character of the French administration

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1 See below, pp. 466–9.
2 Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, ii. 218.
in North Africa, the Americans had approached General Henri Giraud, whose romantic escape from prison in Germany had brought him to public notice, in the hope that they would find in him a leader whose name would provide a rallying point for opposition to Vichy. Unfortunately there was a fundamental misunderstanding involved in the discussions from the beginning. The American Government were planning a landing in North Africa, whereas Giraud was thinking of the invasion and liberation of France. The French general was under the impression that the terms on which he had offered to co-operate with the Americans—one of his conditions being that he should himself be Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces wherever they included French troops—had been accepted by Roosevelt, but the American military authorities on the spot were not aware of this. This misunderstanding led to difficulties when Giraud, having escaped from France, met Eisenhower at Gibraltar on 7 November, with the result that agreement was not reached until after the Allied landings had begun, and Giraud did not arrive in Africa until 9 November.

Meanwhile, plans for a French rising in North Africa had been worked out between the Americans and a small resistance group headed by General Mast; but, although this group succeeded in gaining control of Algiers for a few hours on 7 November, the Pétainists had restored the position before the Allies landed on the 8th. The situation was complicated by the fact that Darlan, because of the serious illness of his son, happened to be visiting Algiers at the moment, and since he was the senior French officer on the spot his authority overrode that of Juin, with whom the Americans had been in touch and who was at least sympathetic to the idea of the French army's re-entering the war. Impressed with the magnitude of the Allied armada, Darlan on 8 November authorized Juin to conclude an armistice for the town of Algiers only; but Noguès in Morocco resisted the Allied attack and arrested the few dissidents there. The name of Giraud, when he reached the scene, did not exercise the influence which had been hoped for; it was evident that the French authorities and forces in North Africa were still loyal to Pétain and would only cease their opposition on orders from him, or from Darlan acting as his agent.

Darlan himself was apparently waiting on Pétain. Official telegrams from Vichy instructed him to oppose the invasion with all available forces; at 2.30 on 10 November he received the order from Pétain: 'J'avais donné l'ordre de défendre l'Afrique. Je maintiens cet ordre.' But in the situation

3 It was agreed that Giraud should command all French troops, and Allied forces in which the French outnumbered the Americans.
of France no official, not even the highest, could ever be sure that any order meant what it said. The last message from Pétain before the Germans moved into Unoccupied France had been: ‘Vous avez toute ma confiance. Agissez pour le mieux.’ This was to have a sequel: at the critical moment le secret du roi was to be the decisive factor. A cypher, known only to one or two individuals, had been preserved by Darlan when the French telegraphic codes were handed over to the Germans at the Armistice. Revealed to Admiral Auphan, the Secretary for Marine at Vichy, who himself had not hitherto known of its existence, it provided a means of conveying, at 4.35 on the same day (10 November) a different message from Vichy: ‘Ne tenez pas compte de messages officiels envoyés sous contrainte. Vous avez tous pouvoirs.’ Darlan replied: ‘J'ai compris et je suis heureux.’ It must be admitted that, the originals having been destroyed, this text is doubtful; there is not even positive proof that Pétain himself was responsible for the telegram; but it seems unquestionable that some such message reached Darlan from Vichy and that it resolved his doubts. 1 On the same day, he agreed to a general cease-fire, and assumed control in North Africa in the name of Pétain, with Juin in military command under him.

The tragedy of honour rooted in dishonour and faith unfaithful had not yet been played out. At Casablanca Noguès presented an obstinate resistance to the invaders and an American bombardment caused serious French losses. On Juin’s orders he declared a cease-fire on 11 November, but on the same day an official message arrived from Pétain appointing Noguès his sole representative in North Africa. Vichy, fortunately, could not leave ill alone. Another secret telegram to Darlan—the last full message from Pétain—followed, it is alleged, saying: ‘Comprenez bien que c'est parce qu'on vous suppose prisonnier que le général Noguès a été désigné comme représentant du Maréchal.’ 2 Noguès, who arrived at Algiers on 12 November, was patently suspicious of the secret telegrams and proposed that the French forces in North Africa should remain neutral. The almost inextricable tangle in which the French and Americans at Algiers now found themselves was cut by a general who was primarily a general. On the evening of 12 November Juin sent the order to General Barré at Tunis to turn his guns on the Germans. 3 Algiers and Morocco had re-entered the war.

Tunisia was now the danger-point, for here a counter-invasion was taking place. Estéva, the Resident-General, Barré in command of land forces, and Derrien of the fleet at Bizerta, were faced not with Allied ships and landing forces but with German planes. During a week of confusion

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2 Ibid. p. 133.

3 Ibid. p. 149.
Barré managed to withdraw substantial quantities of military material to the hills, where a military defence was possible. Estéva and Derrien, on the other hand, as sailors, regarded the naval base at Bizerta as the one thing worth fighting for; but while they hesitated the Germans acted. The fate of Tunisia was decided on 17 November when the zealously collaborationist Admiral Platon arrived from Vichy with orders to resist the Anglo-Saxon aggressors. Derrien, whose views had oscillated wildly during this week, had already determined to do so. Estéva cast himself for the role of the Pétain of Tunisia. On the other hand, Barré, with a thin curtain of troops, took up his position on the hills, and on 19 November the army of North Africa was in battle against the Germans.¹

The presence of Darlan and his interpretation of the secret telegrams had averted a major conflict between the invading forces and the French army, but the situation that resulted was entirely different from anything the Allies had envisaged. The information gathered by the American representative, Robert D. Murphy, and his agents about French North Africa had misled the American Government to such an extent that Eisenhower could write to Roosevelt, in a message of 14 November, that local sentiment did not remotely resemble prior calculations.² Darlan, in the judgement of Admiral Cunningham, was the only man who could have stopped the fighting;³ while Eisenhower wrote to Churchill that he was 'the source of every bit of practical help we have received'.⁴ However much distrusted and undesired, therefore, the Admiral had to be accepted as a political necessity and the government of French North Africa based primarily upon his authority. His first important action was to issue on 15 November a proclamation relieving the armed forces, the administration, and the Légion of their oath of allegiance to Pétain. It was an essential step and it was one that only Darlan could effectively have taken.

After some confused negotiation it was agreed that Giraud should be Commander-in-Chief, Darlan High Commissioner for French Africa, Juin Commander of French land forces, and Noguès and Châtel Resident-General in Morocco and Governor-General of Algiers respectively. Boisson, who brought the adherence of French West Africa to the new régime, was confirmed in his post; and an Imperial Council was set up, composed of Darlan, Giraud, Noguès, Boisson, and Bergeret, the former Secretary for Air at Vichy, who had left for Africa on 6 November, having received information that there was to be an invasion after 15 November.⁵

These were nearly all men of the Armistice, and this deal with the Pétainist administrators of North Africa, and the recognition of Darlan,

¹ Chamine: La Querelle des généraux, chapter iv.
⁵ Procès Pétain, ii. 719–20 (evidence of Bergeret).
aroused bitter feelings among the Free French. It was strongly criticized
in Britain and America. It was defended on the ground of military neces-
sity, and, indeed, without Darlan and against the opposition of the French
forces there the invasion would have proved a long and difficult operation.

(c) VICHY AFTER THE LANDINGS IN NORTH AFRICA

We must turn back now to the story of developments inside France after
November 1942. The invasion of North Africa seems to have taken Vichy
completely by surprise. To a letter of invitation from Roosevelt, calling
on him to join in the liberation of North Africa, Pétain replied: 'We are
attacked, we will defend ourselves. This is the order I give'; and his
official telegrams to North Africa instructed the authorities on the spot to
repress all attempts at dissidence. He appears, on the other hand (as has
been shown), tacitly to have sanctioned Darlan's disobedience to these
orders by the secret telegram of 10 November; yet he transferred authority
in North Africa to Noguès on 11 November and on the 12th signed a
telegram presented to him by a general from the Ministry of War, detach-
ing the forces in Tunis from their allegiance to Darlan and Noguès and
ordering them to defend Tunisia against the Anglo-Saxon aggression.
The only plausible explanation of Pétain's contradictory actions at this
time is to be found in the different influences to which he was exposed.
The one point on which he never hesitated—it had become an idée fixe
with him—was his determination not to quit France. Advised, by General
Georges and Weygand among others, to leave for North Africa, Pétain
answered almost in the words he had used in 1940: 'My duty is to remain
with the French people.' Therefore, whatever he might do, or allow to
be done, secretly, he could not openly break with the Germans.

Metropolitan France was certainly in no position to second the events
across the Mediterranean. The only two acts of open resistance were an
attempt at rebellion by General de Lattre de Tassigny, who was arrested
and condemned to ten years' imprisonment, and the sending of the planes
of Air-France to North Africa by the president of the company. Laval,
panic-stricken lest the uneasy modus vivendi with the Germans on which his

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1 On grounds of secrecy, de Gaulle was not told anything about the invasion until it was
actually under way, when Churchill gave him the news personally. Despite his natural resen-
tment he accepted the situation and broadcast a message to the French in North Africa urging
them to join in the struggle. He also publicly denied rumours that the British and Americans
intended to take possession of the French Empire for themselves.

2 Department of State Bulletin, 14 November 1942, pp. 904–5; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939
46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 146.

3 Ibid. pp. 905 and 148 respectively; Kammerer: Du débarquement africain au meurtre de Darlan,
P. 293.


5 Sec above, p. 400.


7 Procès Pétain, i, 461–2, 482, ii. 743; Prince Xavier de Bourbon: Les Accords secrets franco-
anglais de décembre 1940, p. 92; Serre: Événements, vi. 1667.

government was based should collapse, tried to save the situation by repeating his earlier policy and offering the Germans all he had to offer. Unfortunately it was not enough. On the night of 7 November, having received the report of the entry of the Allied convoy into the Mediterranean, the Germans had proposed to come to the aid of French North Africa with their air forces based on Sicily and Sardinia.1 On the following morning Laval persuaded the Vichy Government to appeal for such assistance. This was followed by the acceptance of a German demand for the use of aerodromes in Tunisia. But on 8 November Hitler demanded a French declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States. This was the one move which would have appeased the Germans, and it was the one above all which Pétain would never take. Laval could only convey a refusal to Munich when he was summoned there to meet Hitler.2 He may still have hoped to gain something by negotiation, but the Germans had no intention of negotiating. On 11 November their forces invaded the Unoccupied Zone, while the Italians moved into the départements of the south-east.

The general effect of the invasion of North Africa was to strengthen the hands of those in France who favoured a fuller collaboration with Germany. For the Paris collaborationists Luchaire proclaimed: 'La France est maintenant unie à l'Europe.' He called upon France to take her place in the European front against the Jewish, Bolshevist, capitalist, and Anglo-Saxon coalition.3 Laval did not go as far as this, but when he returned from Germany he told the Council of Ministers that if they did not resist the invasion of North Africa to the limit of their capacity the Germans would revenge themselves on metropolitan France. 'On refait un empire,' he added, 'mais on ne refait pas la France,' and with or without French aid the Germans would reconquer Africa within a few weeks.4 It is true that German threats offered Vichy the alternative of a military alliance or the fate of Poland,5 but the German Government had no serious expectation, or perhaps even desire, that France would stand by their side 'in shining armour', as was shown by the order of 27 November disbanding the army of the Armistice, the last surviving French force on the soil of France.6

2 See above, p. 308, for the conference between Hitler and Mussolini at Munich on 9–10 November, at which Laval was present.
5 This was in a message from Krug von Nidda, German Minister at Vichy, on 8 November, according to Laval (*Procès Pétain*, i. 561), supported by Lavagne (ibid. ii. 861). Kammerer gives the same threat in a telegram from Ribbentrop brought to Vichy by de Brinon on 14 November (Kammerer, op. cit. p. 502).
6 The subsequent formation, announced by Laval in June 1943, of a First Regiment of France, to number some 3,000 men, can hardly be taken seriously. That it was a mere attempt to bolster up Laval's prestige was indicated by the fact that the regiment was given the Auvergne coat of arms. It was sometimes called the *Phalange d'Auvergne*. 
The crisis produced a fresh split in the Vichy Government. Among the changes that followed the invasion of North Africa the most important was the replacement of Auphan by Admiral Abrial at the Ministry of Marine. Weygand, who was still, rather unnecessarily, regarded as a potential leader of resistance by the Germans, was sent to imprisonment in Germany. By convincing the Nazis of his loyalty Laval managed to ride out the storm. Indeed, the result of the crisis was to strengthen his position, a fact which was embodied in Constitutional Act No. 12 of 17 November, by which Pétain delegated to him the promulgation of all laws and decrees, except constitutional laws.1

The crucial question now, as in the summer of 1940, was the fate of the fleet, gathered at Toulon. Auphan, while he remained at the Ministry of Marine, had urged Pétain to give the command for the fleet to sail for North Africa in order to prevent it from falling into German hands, but the Marshal feared reprisals in France and thought of the prisoners of war.2 Darlan, on the insistence of the Americans, had himself invited the Toulon fleet to sail to North Africa, but it does not seem likely that he took the invitation very seriously or expected any result from it.3 Technically it would have been possible for the Toulon fleet to escape, perhaps as late as 18 November,4 but its commander at Toulon, Admiral Laborde, was dominated by violent anti-English sentiments, and if he had put to sea, as indeed he wanted to, it would have been to launch an attack on the British fleet, not to join the Allies against the Axis.5

As in 1940, one of Hitler’s chief anxieties was that the French fleet should not pass under British control. Hence he attempted to reassure the Vichy Government by a promise that Toulon would not be occupied if the French pledged themselves to take no action against the Axis Powers and to defend Toulon against the Anglo-Saxons and French dissidents.6 This was merely to lull the admirals into a sense of security. On 27 November the German forces pounced on Toulon. According to de Brinon, reporting information obtained from Abetz, the reason for this move lay in an urgent report from Ciano to Hitler that the French fleet was on the point of sailing for North Africa,7 a characteristic piece of Machiavellianism devised to get the Toulon fleet out of French hands and so rob Vichy of the last card it could play in any attempt to rival Italy in the favour of the Germans. If this were the calculation it was successful.

3 Ibid. p. 436.
5 Ibid., p. 443.
7 De Brinon: Mémoires, p. 147.
Keitel, according to Abetz, made representations to Hitler, and the attack on Toulon was ordered.¹

Though the story is circumstantial no such involved explanation is really necessary to account for an action which was the logical conclusion of a long-cherished hope of Hitler's, and which was carefully prepared in the weeks before it was put into operation.² The initial concession of a small free zone round Toulon had been followed by an insistence that it should be garrisoned only by the navy, which meant some 4,000–5,000 men, a force quite incapable of ensuring its defence. At 4.30 a.m. on the morning of 27 November a letter from Hitler was presented to Laval announcing the occupation of Toulon. Laval convoked the admirals present at Vichy and within a short while had sent out the order to Toulon: 'Évitez tout incident: ceci modifie intégralement tous les ordres antérieurs.'³ This order went off so soon that Laval and the admirals could not have assumed that the instructions for sabotage would already have been applied. It suggests a knowledge of these instructions and a willingness to cancel them and let the fleet fall into the hands of the Germans. But it was already too late. The German rush on the port was swift, but not swift enough. For over two years Darlan's orders for the sabotage of the fleet had rested in inviolate secrecy. They had been renewed by Auphan as recently as 8 November.⁴ Now they came into effect, and—quicker even than the German mechanized units could speed through Toulon—explosion after explosion sounded the death-knell of the pride of the French navy as its last great fleet sank beneath the waters.

(iv) Resistance and Repression, 1942–4

(a) Economic Conditions in France

November 1942 was the real end of Vichy—'ce Vichy débonnaire et machiavélique, libéral et vétilléux, humble et assuré...le Vichy de la Révolution nationale'.⁵ While the Vichy Government was losing its overseas territories, its influence had been becoming more and more attenuated inside France, as it came to depend increasingly, and in the end almost entirely, on the occupying Power. This does not mean that the Germans wished to administer France directly. If Vichy regarded the survival of the traditional administrative network of French officials as a means of interposing a buffer between the French people and the occupying forces, as undoubtedly it was, the Germans also had much to gain from the maintenance of the working administrative machine in French hands. French officials continued throughout the war to administer the whole of

⁴ Ibid. p. 473.
⁵ Chaminé: La Querelle des généraux, p. 68.
France apart from Alsace and Lorraine—not only the Unoccupied Zone, but also the Occupied Zone, and even the two départements of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, which for military purposes were included in the Belgian command of von Falkenhausen. The German occupation authorities did not replace but ran parallel to the French administration. At their head was the military commander, General von Stulpnagel, to whom his more ruthless kinsman, Heinrich, succeeded in February 1942 for the purpose of intensifying the repressive measures which were proving increasingly inadequate. There were German Kommandaturen in each département and arrondissement and in the more important towns. All Vichy laws and decrees had to be submitted to the Germans for approval. The difference between the Zones from this point of view up to November 1942 was that in the Occupied Zone the German military authority itself issued decrees directly to the French administration. Obstruction, up to a point, was widely practised by French officials, but this could only have been avoided by replacing them all with Germans, which was obviously impossible, and in the end, within the limits of what was possible, German orders prevailed.

Throughout the occupation the primary interest of the Germans was in the economic exploitation of the country. This took many forms. In the first place there was the exaction of occupation costs, which were raised after the invasion of North Africa from 300 to 500 million francs a day.¹ In the earlier period a large surplus had been accumulated in the German account,² and by June 1941 a balance of 60 milliard francs to the German credit was held at the Bank of France. This represented a great potential menace to the French economy,³ but after November 1942 there was a great increase in German expenditure on the army of occupation and defence works in France, which was met by the enhanced sums exacted. The Italian capitulation in September 1943 enabled the Germans to claim the payments Vichy had formerly made to Italy; and on 31 July 1944, as a last turn of the screw before the thread finally broke, the tribute was increased from 500 to 700 million francs a day.⁴ The occupation payments in millions of francs, according to a calculation of the German Research Office for Military Economy, were, in 1940, 35,180; in 1941, 101,740; in 1942, 157,440; in 1943, 195,960; and in the first quarter of 1944, 45,500, making a total of 535,820 million francs.⁵

This vast amount of credit was employed for varied purposes, many of

which went far beyond the actual expenses of occupation. Thus it was used to pay for raw materials, foodstuffs, and other products diverted from France to Germany; for the acquisition of French securities; for the purchase of paintings and other works of art; for payments to dependants of workers recruited for labour in Germany; to finance the SS and German customs and revenue services; and for expenditure on German propaganda in France.¹ Similarly the vast Organisation Todt which worked on the Atlantic wall was lodged at the expense of France.²

To prevent the French from following a precedent set earlier by the Germans and thereby employing inflation as a weapon of economic defence the occupation authority insisted on the fixing of wages and prices, with the aid of heavy subventions from the French authorities.³ The natural accompaniment of this system was an extensive black market, for purchases on which the Germans themselves had special organizations, the best known being the bureau Otto, under the control of Otto Brandle, the agent of Canaris in charge of the counter-espionage service.⁴ Because of the extreme corruption in the Wehrmacht this bureau was closed down in April 1943.⁵ The black market continued to flourish, under French as well as German patronage, and the prevalence of its inflated prices makes the success with which official prices were kept down rather less impressive. For what the figures are worth, the official increase in prices was 32 per cent. in 1939–40, 23 per cent. in 1940–1, 18 per cent. in 1941–2, 16 per cent. in 1942–3, and 13 per cent. in 1943 ⁴⁶.

Wages rose rather more slowly than the official prices, from an index figure of 103 in October 1939, compared with a figure for retail prices of 109 in September, to 248 in September 1944, as against a retail price index of 290.⁷ Hardship was very unevenly spread, being severe in those

¹ Report on the examination of the records of the Reichskreditkasse on 29 September 1945 (N.C.A. vi. 322–3 (3615–PS)).
² Arnoult: 'Comment, pour acheter notre économe, les Allemands prirent nos finances', loc. cit. p. 22.
³ P. Aube: 'Une méthode, un bilan', Cahiers d'Histoire de la Guerre, no. 4, May 1950. The French Government might have been expected to follow this policy in their own interests, but Bouthillier, who was Minister of Finances up to 1942, insists that the system of subsidies was forced on the French Government by the Germans (Bouthillier: Le Drame de Vichy, ii. 328).
⁵ Ibid. p. 64.
⁷ Cf. Dieterlen and Rist: The Monetary Problem of France. The detailed figures are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retail prices</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1939</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1940</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1940</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
areas which did not produce sufficient food for their own consumption, and in the towns. It was alleviated, though unevenly, by an extensive system of private collection of food from the country-side as well as by the existence of the black market in food, which was winked at by the authorities. The courts never treated breaches of the rationing law as serious offences and only inflicted trivial fines on offenders.\(^1\) State control of the distribution of food, with a host of small producers scattered over the whole of France, had little chance of more than a very partial success. The peasantry could always evade the laws; in many cases they could even regard such evasion as their particular duty. So long as their own interests were protected the occupying authorities did not really mind how the French dealt with economic problems.

The extent of the exploitation of France during the war is revealed by the statistics of Franco-German trade.\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports from France (in millions of francs)</th>
<th>Imports from Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>6,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>17,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>29,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>20,388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures do not include either stocks requisitioned by the German army, or private purchases, which were encouraged by the low rate at which the French franc had been fixed in relation to the German mark.

In addition to making very heavy levies on French raw materials and industrial products,\(^3\) the Germans demanded a supply of French workers for both agriculture and industry. Up to June 1942 the official figure for the number of French workers transferred to Germany was 150,000, the real figure being probably about 70,000,\(^4\) but this was only the beginning. More energetic efforts to recruit labour for Germany, including broadcast appeals by Pétain and Laval, were made in the summer of 1942. A decree by Sauckel enforcing compulsory labour in the Occupied Zone met with difficulties in its application and was revised in September, in return for Laval’s promise of 150,000 volunteer workers for Germany. By a further agreement between Laval and the German authorities on 2 October the release of 50,000 prisoners of war was promised in exchange for these volunteers.\(^5\) This was the famous relève. Its application produced widespread disturbances, including labour troubles in Lyons and elsewhere.

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2. Ibid. p. 618. Another estimate of the excess of exports from France to Germany over those from Germany to France gives for 1941 Rm. 437 million, for 1942 Rm. 858 million, for 1943 (first three quarters) Rm. 657 million (*N.C.A., Supplement A*, p. 879 (524–11)).
3. See p. 197 above for figures illustrating the extent of these levies.
By a decree of 16 February 1943 compulsory labour, including service in Germany, was imposed on certain age-groups, partly because of the French shortage of man-power, and partly because of what it admitted was the 'shocking inequality' inflicted by the relève on workers. These efforts did not produce enough labour to satisfy the insatiable demands of the Germans, and Sauckel promised Hitler 450,000 more workers from the western areas. He did not produce this number, but by the autumn of 1943 it was estimated that French labour formed one-quarter of all the foreign male labour in Germany, and included 605,000 male civilians and some 44,000 women.

German demands for more and more labour did not relax until there were no more Germans left in France to make the demands. In January 1944 Sauckel called on France for a million more workers, to be dispatched to Germany at the rate of 90,000 a month. This was fantastic. The effect on French economy would have been such that the German officials in charge of armament and agriculture themselves opposed it, as involving far more loss than gain for Germany. Laval was able to play the German departments off against one another, and in the end only a few thousand were added in 1944 to the total of French workers in Germany. The machinery necessary for this colossal conscription of labour met, of course, with much opposition and evasion, and in the last stages of the war the flight of workers to avoid compulsory transfer to Germany was the chief source of recruitment for the maquis. By March 1944 Sauckel was declaring that further mobilization of labour for Germany would only be possible with the aid of energetic military measures.

The whole story of the German requisitioning of man-power in France during the course of the war can be summed up better in figures than in words. A German report of April 1944 gave the following estimate of the distribution of French male labour:

(1) Working for Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In Germany and France together</th>
<th>In France only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directly</td>
<td>2,578,000 (37%)</td>
<td>1,378,000 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>1,387,000 (20%)</td>
<td>1,387,000 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,965,000 (57%)</td>
<td>2,765,000 (48%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 5 (407 (VI)-PS); N.C.A. iii. 391.
3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 150 (524 D); N.C.A., Supplement A, p. 874.
4 Abel: D’une poisson, p. 225.
6 Comprehensive term for active participants in French clandestine resistance: see below, p. 423.
7 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 183 (3819-PS); N.C.A. vi. 762.
(2) Working for France

(a) In Germany and France together

(b) In France only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Official figures</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1940-June 1942</td>
<td>3,008,000 (43%)</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-December 1942</td>
<td>3,008,000 (52%)</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-October 1943</td>
<td></td>
<td>420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-March 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A post-war French estimate of workers going to Germany is:

In addition there were some 1,835,000 prisoners in Germany in the summer of 1940. The figure sank very slowly. It was 1½ million at the end of the year, 1,225,000 in December 1941, 1,135,000 in December 1942, 1,010,000 in December 1943, and 960,000 in 1944. Excluding Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken into the Reich, there were also some 95,000 Frenchmen who had been deported for political reasons, and 100,000 Jews, a quarter of whom were French and about a third women and children. From Alsace and Lorraine it has been estimated that some 200,000 were compulsorily enrolled in the German army or in paramilitary formations, or otherwise moved by force into Germany or other occupied countries. In all these categories there were many who never returned, and the ultimate loss of population to France between 1939 and 1945 has been estimated at 1½ million.

(b) The Struggle of Giraud and de Gaulle in North Africa

While Vichy was becoming more and more helpless in the clutches of the German economic and military machine, the French in North Africa were painfully struggling towards unity and independence. After the Allied landings in North Africa de Gaulle and the French National Committee dissociated themselves from the negotiations with Darlan. In spite of Churchill’s request that their disagreement should not be made public, a declaration to this effect was broadcast from London; in retaliation de Gaulle was prevented by the British from speaking over the air and for a time the Free French in protest withdrew their radio programme. Gaullist indignation at the recognition of Darlan was inevitably intense, though the admiral himself, presumably with the idea of rallying the different parties to him, had appointed leaders of the dissident movement

1 La France économique de 1939 à 1946, p. 30.
4 Compulsory military service was introduced in August 1942 (see p. 92 above).
5 La France économique de 1939 à 1946, p. 30.
6 Ibid. p. 59.
7 Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, ii. 18–19, 23, 31.
in Algiers to his administration, along with former adherents of Vichy. As has been said, the Free French Movement was not very strong in North Africa, and the elimination of Darlan was to come, unexpectedly, by action from another quarter.

The existence of a current of royalist opinion in French North Africa has already been mentioned, and the collapse of the Third Republic had stimulated the hopes of the royalist claimant, the comte de Paris. He met Pétain secretly in April 1942, but the Marshal was not a monarchist, and had no intention of sacrificing his own position for a speculative restoration of the monarchy. After the invasion of North Africa the comte de Paris made a tentative approach to the American commander Eisenhower, but met with no encouragement. His supporters did not abandon their hopes, though the extent of their implication in what followed is not clear. However, it is not necessary here to go into the still mysterious and obscure intrigue which led up to the shooting of Darlan on 24 December 1942 by a young French law student, Bonnier de la Chapelle, who had been in contact with the royalist Henri d’Astier de la Vigerie. His hurried execution prevented any effective inquiry into the instigation of the assassination, but it seems probable that at least in the mind of Henri d’Astier there was a plan for setting up a régime in the name of the comte de Paris and based on a combination of Giraud and de Gaulle. The inclusion of both generals, is, of course, fairly good evidence that neither was privy to such a plan, if indeed it existed.

Whatever the motive, the elimination of Darlan removed one stumbling-block to the future union of French forces. Co-operation between the Free French and a Darlan administration was inconceivable; yet despite the moral objections of many in Britain and America the Allied Governments had become committed to Darlan and could hardly have denied their obligation to him, while at the same time his vigorous personality and prestige inevitably kept him in the centre of the picture at Algiers. His disappearance threw the government of North Africa into the melting-pot.

On 26 December the comte de Paris, who had approached Giraud with a plea for mercy for the young assassin, already executed that morning, invited the support of Giraud for the monarchist cause and put himself at the disposition of the Imperial Council at Algiers, but his offer was not accepted. Noguès, as the senior in office of the French governors in Africa, should have succeeded to Darlan’s title and functions, but his former devotion to Vichy was too notorious and his transference of loyalty after the invasion had been too tardy for him to be acceptable to the

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1 Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, ii. 79; Kammerer: Du débarquement africain au meurtre de Darlan, pp. 608, 609, 614, 615 seqq.

2 Chamine: La Querelle des généraux, p. 530.

3 Serre: Événements, vi. 1542.
Allies. From London on 25 December 1942 de Gaulle sent a telegram to Giraud asking for a meeting with the object of setting up a single, provisional authority to control the French forces fighting for liberation inside and outside France. Giraud replied that the moment was unfavourable. On 27 December he was himself appointed military and civil Commander-in-Chief in succession to Darlan. The breach between London and Algiers apparently remained as complete as ever.

The British and Americans, however, were determined to make an effort to bring Giraud and de Gaulle together. This was one of the objects of the conference held at Casablanca between Roosevelt and Churchill in January 1943. To their message inviting him to come to Casablanca to meet Giraud, de Gaulle sent a blunt refusal. In a further message the British Prime Minister said that he had done all he could to settle de Gaulle’s differences with the United States; if he did not come to Casablanca his removal from the leadership of the Free French Movement would be a condition of continued support of the movement by the British Government, a threat which brought him to Casablanca. On 24 January 1943 a photograph was taken of de Gaulle and Giraud shaking hands in the presence of Roosevelt and Churchill. De Gaulle had made a gesture, under strong American and British pressure, but he did not intend to go any farther. The leader of Free France returned to London and stayed there with most of his principal lieutenants, while after the death of Darlan the former Pétainists in North Africa accepted Giraud as their leader.

The hostility of the Free French to the Algiers Government was intensified when the former Vichy Minister, Marcel Peyrouton, at this time Ambassador to Argentina, was brought to North Africa at the suggestion of Robert D. Murphy and the American State Department, and appointed Governor-General of Algiers in January 1943. Another event during January which widened the breach between Giraud and de Gaulle was Giraud’s imprisonment of some of de Gaulle’s adherents, including Henri d’Astier. The dislike which had been manifested among the French North African authorities for the group which had taken part in the preparations for the Allied landings provided a useful point for Free French propaganda, and they made the most of it.

On 27 February 1943 the French National Committee in London put

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1 Kammerer, op. cit. p. 630.
forward a memorandum setting out a basis for reconciliation with Giraud. The conditions which they laid down were the restoration of civil liberties, a return to republican institutions and laws, and the establishment of a new National Committee composed of representatives of both de Gaulle and Giraud.¹

Meanwhile Giraud had slowly been moving from his initial position. His political convictions were those of a man of the Right, but his economic adviser, Jean Monnet, who had come to Algiers from America, where he had managed to keep on friendly terms with the Gaullists without committing himself to them, urged the need of some democratic gesture to reassure American public opinion. He persuaded Giraud to deliver on 14 March what he subsequently described as the first democratic speech of his life,² in which he announced that Vichy legislation since 22 June 1940 was no longer valid and that the local government bodies would be revived. The racial laws were abolished, though Giraud was not prepared to go as far as the restoration of the loi Crémieux.³ General Catroux, meanwhile, had been endeavouring to mediate between de Gaulle and Giraud, and the latter now issued an invitation to de Gaulle to come to Algiers, though it was evident that any attempt by the two generals to share the driving seat was likely to prove a risky experiment. For those who had remained loyal to Pétain between 1940 and 1942 de Gaulle was no better than a traitor; while the bitterness of feeling in the ranks of the Gaullists against the men of Algiers was shown by the refusal of the Free French contingents from the troops of Koenig⁴ and Leclerc to march in the victory parade in Tunis along with the representatives of the army of French North Africa. The recruiting of men for the small Free French units from the much larger North African forces also caused bitter resentment.

The suggestion at the end of March that de Gaulle should visit North Africa was opposed by Eisenhower on grounds of military security, but after the Allied victory in Tunisia in mid-May this opposition was withdrawn and de Gaulle eventually arrived in Algiers on 30 May 1943. His purpose was not so much to co-operate with Giraud as to bring the struggle to a head. The crisis came soon after his arrival. Peyrouton, who fell under the Gaullist ban on all the men of Vichy, except for those who in one way or another managed to work their passage back, resigned at the beginning of June. He sent his letter of resignation to de Gaulle, who, without consulting Giraud, accepted it personally. For Giraud this was the last straw. He appointed Admiral Muselier, who since his break with de Gaulle⁵ had become one of his bitterest critics, to his staff, and with

³ Giraud, op. cit. p. 122. For the loi Crémieux see above, p. 355.
⁴ For Koenig’s exploit at Bir Hacheim see below, p. 469.
⁵ See below, p. 464.
littl sense of proportion took preliminary steps towards declaring a state of siege. The more reasonable men at Algiers could not contemplate the outbreak of a private war between the two generals, and after considerable efforts a committee of seven was formed, which brought de Gaulle’s France Combattante to an end as a separate organization. A Committee of National Liberation (C.F.L.N.) was constituted, under the joint presidency of Giraud and de Gaulle, and including Generals Georges and Catroux as Commissioners of State.

Each of the co-presidents still looked on himself as the sole legitimate leader of the campaign for the liberation of France; and although de Gaulle had obtained a majority on the Committee, Giraud, with armed forces of 300,000 or 400,000 men behind him, could regard himself as easily capable of withstanding the competition of the Free French with some 15,000 men under Koenig and Leclerc. At the same time the administration of North Africa was still mainly in the hands of men who hated de Gaulle. At the end of the Tunisian campaign the fleet which had lain so long disarmed at Alexandria, where inaction seemed to have become second nature to Admiral Godefroy, at last rallied to Giraud. The navy and the higher officers in the army looked to him as their legitimate leader. Giraud thus had many strong cards in his hand if he had been capable of using them, but he exhibited throughout the North African adventure a singular lack of political capacity, and in the struggle between the two co-presidents de Gaulle won hands down. He placed his own adherents in all the key positions. Catroux replaced Peyrouton as Governor-General of Algiers, Puaux became Resident-General in Morocco in place of Noguès, General Mast was confirmed as Resident-General in Tunis, and Boisson was obliged to resign his governorship of French West Africa.

The methods by which the supporters of de Gaulle obtained the key positions aroused intense American and some British resentment, and Giraud for a time was able to cling to his control of the army. His greatest and last triumph was the reconquest of Corsica. When in September 1943 the news of the Italian capitulation reached the island, Ajaccio rose in revolt. Using the town as a bridgehead a rapidly assembled force from North Africa landed in Corsica. It met with no resistance from the 80,000 Italian troops in the island; indeed, the Italian general put his material at their disposal in the struggle against the 12,000 Germans who alone offered opposition. The operation of reconquest was carried through successfully and had been kept entirely in the hands of Giraud and his

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1 In the summer of 1942 de Gaulle had changed the title of his movement from ‘La France Libre’ to ‘La France Combattante’ (see below, p. 470).

2 Other members were—Massigli (Foreign Affairs), André Philip (Interior), Monnet (Arms- ments), Couve de Murville (Finance), Pfeven (Colonies), Mayer (Communications), Diethelm (Production), Tixier (Labour).

supporters. The relations between the co-presidents of the Algiers Committee were such that de Gaulle, the Committee, and the Gaullist Intelligence Service (Bureau Central des Renseignements et d’Action Militaire: B.C.R.A.) had been left in complete ignorance of the preparations.\(^1\) Giraud was delighted that for once he had outmanoeuvred de Gaulle, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. His position had steadily been weakening, and now de Gaulle was able to force a reorganization of the National Committee. General Georges resigned and Giraud ceased to be co-president. He continued to be Commander-in-Chief, though with increasing resentment against de Gaulle’s policy, especially his acceptance of the necessity for an intimate co-operation with the Communists in the task of liberation, as well as against the Committee’s views on the future of the French Empire, which were utterly distasteful to him.\(^2\)

The prestige that still remained to Giraud was to suffer a severe blow in March 1944 from the Pucheu affair. Pétain’s former Minister of the Interior had come to North Africa in May 1943 on the strength of a letter from Giraud, on the sole condition that he should engage in no political activities and should enter a fighting unit.\(^3\) It was a sign of singular absence of political sense that neither Pucheu nor Giraud appears to have realized the bitterness of the feeling that the former had aroused by his actions when he was a member of the Vichy Government. He was looked on with peculiar enmity by the Communists, who were strongly represented at Algiers, where some twenty-seven of their leaders had been interned early in the war and were now at liberty. They regarded Pucheu as responsible personally for the choice of Communists as hostages to be executed by the Germans, who themselves would not have been sufficiently well acquainted with the personnel of the party in France to have known whom to select for execution. Pucheu at his trial suggested that the information could easily have been provided by former Communists who had attached themselves to the Nazis.\(^4\) There was some plausibility in both views, and neither was capable of proof. It was true, however, that Pucheu, while he had held office, had been identified with the use of the strong hand against the Communists. He was certainly a dangerous man for them. A report he had written for Pétain in October 1942, which had fallen into the hands of France Combattante, sufficiently showed this. France, it declared, could in no way desire a defeat of Germany in the east, for this would remove the only defence against the Russian menace. He added that France equally would not wish for a defeat of the Germans by the Anglo-Saxons, which would merely mean a repetition of the errors of 1918. France’s aim should therefore be a compromise peace between

\(^1\) Giraud: \textit{Un Seul But, la victoire}, pp. 254, 261.

\(^2\) Ibid. pp. 282, 283.


\(^4\) Ibid. p. 309.
Germany and the Anglo-Saxon Powers. Unfortunately for Pucheu his death would also be useful to de Gaulle as a means of cementing his alliance with the Communists. Moreover, it would be a sign that there was to be no compromise with the men of Vichy. After some months of violent agitation by the Communist Party in Algiers Pucheu was brought to trial in March 1944, condemned to death and shot, without any effective opposition from Giraud.²

The final break between de Gaulle and Giraud came over the control of the Secret Service, in which the rival organizations, the B.C.R.A., transferred from London to Algiers, under Soustelle, and the Services Spéciaux of the North African Army under General Ronin, came into conflict. It was through these organizations that relations were maintained with the Resistance Movement in France, where the Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée, formed after the dissolution of the Army of the Armistice in November 1942, was favourable to Giraud, though most of the other organizations had links with de Gaulle. The allegiance of the Resistance Movement in France was clearly destined to be the decisive fact at the moment of liberation, and de Gaulle could least of all tolerate rivalry in this sphere.³ To check Giraud's efforts to assert his influence over the clandestine movement in France, the Algiers Committee, now dominated by Gaullists, called on him to give up his position as Commander-in-Chief, and offered him the nominal post of Inspector-General. Rather than accept this and see his influence reduced to a negligible quantity, Giraud retired in April 1944.⁴

Along with the decline in the influence of Giraud had gone an increase in that of the Communists. Within the ranks of the Resistance, both inside and outside France, there was a veiled struggle by the Communists to gain control of the general movement, while at the same time preserving the separate identity of their own forces.⁵ Grenier, the Communist deputy for Saint-Denis, arrived in Algiers from France early in 1943, bringing with him the formal adherence of the Communist Party inside France to France Combattante.⁶ De Gaulle saw the possibility of playing the Russian card against the American, and in fact Russia, in August 1943 (before any of the other Allies), recognized the Algiers Committee as representing the French Republic.

Washington was still deeply suspicious of de Gaulle's ambitions. In June 1943 Roosevelt cabled to Eisenhower that the United States Government 'will not tolerate the control of the French Army by any

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¹ Ibid. pp. 331-8.
² Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, ii. 342-5; Giraud: op. cit. pp. 265 80.
⁴ Soustelle, op. cit. ii. 348-9.
agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander’s direction’. Military considerations may be held to justify this insistence on unified command. The President’s further comment: ‘We are not interested moreover in the formation of any Government or Committee which presumes in any way to indicate that, until such time as the French people select a Government for themselves, it will govern in France’ reflects the persistence not only of the personal antagonism which de Gaulle had aroused in Washington, but also of an interpretation of the situation in France which had been truer in the days of Leahy and Murphy than it was in the summer of 1943. Churchill also was annoyed at what he called the ‘preposterous conduct’ of de Gaulle, but was hoping that by merging his personality and powers in those of the Committee of National Liberation the stumbling-block to American recognition of the Committee might be overcome. While he was prepared to go much farther than Roosevelt in treating the Committee as a de facto authority, he was determined not to go to the point of estranging Washington. Those of his colleagues and subordinates who had to deal with the French Committee were steadily urging on Churchill the necessity of regularizing the situation by some kind of recognition, and he in turn was passing the pressure on to Roosevelt. Finally at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 a compromise was reached. Roosevelt did not change his view. He said, according to Cordell Hull, that ‘he did not want to give de Gaulle a white horse on which he could ride into France and make himself the master of a government there’. But he agreed that Great Britain and the United States should each issue a statement giving the National Committee some measure of recognition, in qualified terms.

After a long period of struggle and intrigue, overseas France was at last clearly back in the war and united under the leadership of de Gaulle. He had become also the acknowledged leader outside France of the Resistance Movement that was steadily increasing inside France. If the varying and opposed tendencies in the steadily growing opposition to Vichy and the Germans gradually came together in a single great movement, this was due more to the determination and the forceful and unbending personality of General de Gaulle than to any other factor. Reservations there undoubtedly were in many quarters amongst those who aligned themselves with him; but as the invasion of France came nearer, the need for unity kept differences of ultimate aim in the background. De Gaulle’s name provided a rallying-point for factions whose divergent aims were to reappear only after liberation.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. pp. 157–9 (memorandum of 13 July 1943) and 177–9 respectively.
4 Ibid. pp. 159–162 and 179–83 respectively.
5 Hull: Memoir, ii. 1241.
(c) Resistance in France

The fact which dominated the situation in France during the last two years of the war was the growth of resistance to the Germans. On the beginnings of the Resistance Movement little historical material exists.\(^1\) Out of a proliferation of little isolated resistance groups in the Unoccupied Zone, three larger movements gradually emerged: Combat, in which Henri Fresnay and other army officers combined with Christian Democrats including Georges Bidault; Libération, of which the central figure was Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, primarily an anti-Fascist movement with trade-union connexions; and Franc-Tireur, whose members included the historian Marc Bloch. In the Occupied Zone there was less opportunity for the many small movements to develop into larger ones. There were two para-military organizations, Ceux de la Résistance and Ceux de la Libération,\(^2\) but the most widespread of the movements in the Occupied Zone were the socialist Libération-Nord, and the Organisation Civile et Militaire, originating from the army and in contact with London through the Gaullist agent Rémy. The Communist Front National appeared in the Occupied Zone only towards the end of 1941; it developed even later in the south. One of the earliest activities in all these movements was the development of a clandestine press. It was reported as early as February 1942 that at least three of the clandestine journals had circulations reaching 10,000 each.\(^3\)

In January 1942 the Free French sent the former prefect, Jean Moulin, whose ability and courage were to make him one of the heroes of the Resistance, into France by parachute to co-ordinate the Resistance Movements.\(^4\) In October 1942 General Delestraint (Vidal) was given command of the secret army.\(^5\) On 27 November a committee of five—Moulin, Delestraint, Fresnay (Combat), d'Astier (Libération), and Lenoir (Franc-Tireur) met for the first time at Lyons.\(^6\) A Service des opérations aériennes et maritimes was created, and regional leaders and committees were appointed. The Mouvements unis de résistance, with its centre at Lyons, was formed in March 1943, and subsequently took the title Mouvement de libération nationale.\(^7\) Only at the end of 1942 and early in 1943 were the Free French able to establish significant contacts with the resistance groups in the Occupied Zone,\(^8\) but after the entry of the Germans into the Unoccupied Zone in November 1942 there was no reason for the organization

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\(^1\) Cahiers d'Histoire de la Guerre, no. 2, October 1949, p. 45. A short survey of the Resistance is provided by H. Michel: Histoire de la résistance 1940–44.

\(^2\) Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, i. 388–9.

\(^3\) National Zeitung, Basle, 4 February 1942.

\(^4\) Soustelle, op. cit. i. 382; Passy: Souvenirs, ii. 103.

\(^5\) Soustelle, op. cit. ii. 137.

\(^6\) Ibid. p. 142.


\(^8\) Passy: Souvenirs, ii. 136–9.
of resistance to remain in the south, and the advantages of Paris for concealment led to an increasing concentration there. In May 1943 the Conseil National de la Résistance met in Paris. Its first president was Moulin, who was succeeded, after his arrest in June, by Bidault. The full Council never met again until the liberation, but its bureau drew up a programme for united action and began the co-ordination of resistance activities.

German repressive measures kept pace with the Resistance Movement, although throughout they were partly misdirected because of the insane Nazi preoccupation with anti-Semitism. Jews were singled out for execution as hostages regardless of whether they were implicated in resistance activities or not. German support also gave the French anti-Semites their chance. Bomb attacks were made on synagogues at Marseilles, Vichy, Nice, Paris, and elsewhere in the course of 1941 and 1942. Apart from the restrictive measures against Jews in professions and the civil service, however, the French authorities showed reluctance to introduce the extreme anti-Semitic measures desired by the Germans, in spite of the establishment of a Commissariat Général for Jewish questions in March 1941, under Xavier Vallat, and the creation by Pucheu of a Police des Questions Juives. The anti-Semitic movement was laxly supported by the Government, and in January 1942 Darlan wrote to the German military commander that it was not possible to go farther without profoundly shocking public opinion. Mgr Saliège, Archbishop of Toulouse, and other religious leaders protested against the more vicious developments of anti-Semitism. By October 1942, however, some 10,000 foreign Jews had been handed over from the Unoccupied Zone for deportation to the east out of 50,000 demanded by the Germans. Laval, under German pressure, agreed in June 1943 to the passing of a law depriving of French nationality all Jews who had acquired it since 1927, but Pétain never signed the law, which was not published in the Journal Officiel.

In the Occupied Zone the German authorities were freer to introduce their measures of persecution. The wearing of the yellow star was enforced from May 1942. The first of the great round-ups of Jews occurred in Paris in July 1942, when about 9,000 were concentrated in the Vélodrome d'Hiver under appalling conditions. A chair in the history of Judaism was established at the University of Paris in August 1942 under the auspices of the Vichy Minister of Education, Abel Bonnard. From the end of 1943 the Germans began to enforce anti-Semitic measures without regard for French laws. Many Jews, of course, were sheltered by French families, and in the Italian zone they were protected against the Germans and,

1 Soustelle, op. cit. ii. 171.
3 See above, pp. 354–5.
4 See above p. 355.
6 Ibid. p. 86.
7 Ibid. pp. 88, 91.
8 Ibid. p. 24.
9 Ibid. p. 93.
when necessary, against the French police until the withdrawal of Italy from the war, when the Germans occupied the départements of the southwest and rounded up the Jews who had taken refuge there. In the later stages of the occupation the French Militia and the extremist parties in France enthusiastically joined in the persecution of the Jews. In February 1944 the French authorities had to produce a list of all remaining Jews, foreign or French; and finally the police of Paris were ordered to arrest the Jews still hidden in Paris, but took so long to apply the order that it never came into effect.¹

From any reasonable point of view the whole tragic history of the persecution of the Jews in France was an absurd irrelevance, which merely served the purpose of wasting German efforts which might have been directed to the more effective repression of the French Resistance. Fernand de Brinon, indeed, claimed credit for diverting the German choice of hostages from Frenchmen to foreign Jews.² In the task of repression the Germans were assisted, up to a point, by the Vichy authorities. The machinery of police and courts created by Vichy,³ at first in its own defence, was increasingly turned to the service of the occupying Power. According to one very active French agent the efficiency of the German secret services was much exaggerated, and without French collaboration they could not have effected such ravages in the ranks of the Resistance.⁴ Moreover it was not only the collaborators properly speaking who urged on the repression. Maurras, in the pages of the Action Française, was still conducting his own private war against the Gaullists–armed partisans whom, he said, the French forces had the right to shoot on capture. If the death penalty did not prove sufficient to bring them to heel, he urged, hostages should be taken among members of their families and executed.⁵

To hunt down the Resistance ‘Special Brigades’ were created, among which that of the police commissaire David became particularly notorious. For its part, the German High Command had its Abwehr, Geheime Feldpolizei, and Feldgendarmerie. More feared were the security services of the Nazi Party under the orders of Kaltenbrunner,⁶ and as the war continued imprisonment, deportation, tortures, and the shooting of hostages went on at an increasing pace.

The most effective French aid in the task of repression came from Joseph Darnand, who had founded in the Alpes-Maritimes in 1942 the Service

¹ Ibid. pp. 93, 94.
² De Brinon: Mémoires, p. 78.
³ See above, p. 390.
⁶ It was the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) and not the Gestapo which operated in the occupied territories.
d'Ordre Légionnaire, a para-military formation of the Légion des Combattants. In January 1943 it was separated from the Légion and became the Milice française, with Darnand as its Secretary-General. The effect of this change was to transfer it from dependence on Pétain to dependence on the Head of the Government, Laval.1 In the summer of 1943 Darnand was appointed to lead a small French unit of the Waffen-SS for service on the eastern front,2 but he was of more use to the Germans in France, where the Militia, its leaders having joined the Waffen-SS, became an integral part of the German machinery of repression. As Secretary-General for the Maintenance of Order, the post to which Darnand was appointed in January 1944, he participated in meetings of the Council of Ministers,3 and despite his intellectual limitations his power rapidly increased, though he was hardly equal to the position he finally achieved.4 In January 1944 a decree also authorized the institution of courts martial controlled by the police for the administration of summary justice.5 The explanation that Darnand offered at his trial for the increasing atrocities perpetrated by the Militia, which he made no attempt to deny, was that in his new position he was overburdened with duties and unable to exercise effective control of its actions. It was, however, merely continuing on the lines which he had laid down. In the Militia he had created an instrument of repression more feared and hated than the SS troops themselves.

In spite of its losses, the Resistance increased in strength and intensified its measures of sabotage, partly for the purpose of persuading the Allies that action inside France would be more effective than strategic bombing, as well as costing the lives of fewer Frenchmen.6 Air attacks on French trains were consequently relaxed and the Resistance undertook a widespread sabotage of railways.7 Resistance organizations also provided false identity and ration cards for those evading compulsory labour in Germany and arranged for the escape of Allied soldiers and airmen from France. The country was gradually covered with a network of intelligence services, working often in independence of one another, furnishing information both to the Free French Bureau Central des Renseignements et d'Action Militaire (B.C.R.A.), formerly the deuxième bureau of the Gaullist movement at London, and to the British Intelligence Service.

The clandestine press took on amazing proportions during the last two years of the occupation, and as the Resistance grew stronger, and possibilities for discussion in print became greater, so party politics revived. The Communist Party, while working for a national movement which should

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1 Proces Pétain, ii. 800-1 (evidence of Darnand).
2 Les Proces de collaboration: de Brinon, Darnand, Luchaire, p. 246.
3 Proces Pétain, ii. 801 (evidence of Darnand).
4 Ibid. pp. 824 (evidence of Tracou), 858 (evidence of Lavagne).
5 Tracou: Le Maréchal aux liens, p. 101.
6 Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, ii. 311.
7 Ibid. pp. 319-20.
encompass all shades of opinion and struggling to obtain control of this
movement, was determined at the same time that its own organization,
the Front National, should preserve its separate identity. The Communists
were successful in obtaining a strong position in the National Council of
Resistance. Besides their influence in the militant resistance, they obtained
control in May 1943 of the unified and secretly reorganized trade-union
organization, the C.G.T., under Saillant. To consolidate the intellectual
and moral basis of their position they took steps to rewrite the history of
1939–40. A Communist pamphlet of November 1943, expounding the
new version of the fall of France, declared:

In 1940 France, isolated and betrayed, was submerged. . . . What did the
Communists do in those forty tragic days? As a party, by an act which might
have changed the course of a war, the technical conditions of which are such
that the defence of the great cities is of primary importance, they proposed a
levée en masse for the defence of Paris. . . . In the course of the battle of France
the Communists were the heart of the resistance in the army.

This imaginative document was provided with an improved chronology and
republished after the Allied landing under the title, 6 juin 1940–18 juin 1940,
with the obvious intention of proving that the Communist call for resistance
to the Germans preceded that of de Gaulle by some twelve days, instead of
following it by about the same number of months. However, in spite of
their fundamental rivalry, the Gaullist and Communist organizations
gradually came to recognize each other as the strongest of the various
sections of the Resistance, inside and outside France. They formed a tacit
alliance for the purpose of defeating the Germans, but neither party
intended to bind itself hand and foot to the other.

The first great triumph of the Resistance was the liberation of Corsica
in September 1943, and from Corsica came the name of a new form of
resistance, by small armed groups, in the maquis. The greatest recruiting
agency for the maquis was the German compulsory labour service. In parts
of France where the wildness of the country permitted it, and particularly
in the Massif Central, the French Alps, and the Jura, bands of men fleeing
from labour conscription took to the woods or mountains. Thus was born
the maquis. Its composition was naturally very mixed, and what it could
not gain from the sympathy of the population it sometimes took by force.
The first fighting, as distinct from local raids, occurred in July 1943

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1 H. W. Ehrmann: French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation (New York, Oxford University
3 See above, p. 415.
4 The term maquis (It. macchia), literally 'thicket', was originally applied to the Corsican
undergrowth used as cover by brigands and by those carrying on a vendetta; extended to mean
those carrying on clandestine resistance in France against the Germans.
5 See above, p. 409.
between the maquis and Italian forces in the Haute-Savoie. Sporadic actions took place during the winter of 1943–4, notably on the plateau of Glières in February–March 1944, when a body of some 500 maquisards was practically exterminated by a force of over 12,000 German troops. After the Allied landing in 1944 insurrections broke out prematurely in the centre and south, the most important being one at Vercors where the maquis was destroyed by German troops in a pitched battle. With the aid of parachuted arms, and at considerable loss to itself, the maquis kept large occupying forces away from the battle-front and aided in their demoralization. This was a struggle without mercy, the Germans often resorting to the shooting of hostages and sometimes to indiscriminate massacre, as when the SS division Das Reich burnt some six hundred women and children in the church of Oradour-sur-Glane on 10 June 1944. By the time of the Allied invasion the Resistance was becoming an organized military force. On 1 February 1944 its previous military formations were united in the French Forces of the Interior (F.F.I.), and General Koenig was appointed as military delegate to co-ordinate their activities with those of the Allies.1 Plans for sabotage and for the cutting of communications in a great arc round the invasion beaches were drawn up,2 and teams of French, British, and American officers, with military supplies, were dropped to the F.F.I. by parachute.

In spite of these measures of co-operation, on the eve of the landing the Allied Supreme Command still had little belief in the military value of the French Resistance Movement, and equally little in the capacity of the Free French for providing a provisional government for France. It was assumed by the Americans that as each area of France was liberated it would pass under the control of Allied officials, who would be responsible for the preservation of order and the government of the country until such time as total liberation enabled a free consultation of the whole French people to take place. United States officers were instructed in their future duties as administrators in liberated France, and invasion money for use in France was printed without reference to the French National Committee.3 Even the appointment of General Koenig as commander of the French Forces of the Interior had not yet been recognized. It was difficult, however, to prevent de Gaulle from paying a visit to the battle-front, and on 14 June he went to Bayeux. When he returned he left behind him two representatives to administer the liberated territory. This was only a beginning. To its surprise the Allied Supreme Command found a new French administration springing up under its feet. The strength of Gaullist sentiment was at last revealed to the Americans now that they were in personal contact with the French in France. The country had for so long associated libera-

1 Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, ii. 390.
2 Ibid. p. 395.
3 Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1242; Soustelle, op. cit. ii. 389.
tion with the name of de Gaulle that any other régime than one established in his name was inconceivable. The Allied Supreme Command bowed to the facts, recognized the position of General Koenig, and accepted the appointment by the Committee of National Liberation of delegates to take over the administration of the country.1

Where the advance of the Allied armies and the appointment of representatives of the French National Committee followed immediately on the retreat of the Germans, the transfer of authority was comparatively peaceful. In some parts of France, however, particularly in the south-west, there was a considerable interval between the withdrawal of the German armies and the arrival of representatives of de Gaulle, and during this interval the F.F.I., and more particularly the Communist Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, were able to seize power locally and institute a temporary reign of terror.

Meanwhile the F.F.I., swelling to the size of a real army by a continual flow of volunteers, was beginning to take effective military action. In Brittany some 80,000 men undertook the clearing of the province after the American break-through at Avranches. As the fighting drew nearer to Paris, Eisenhower’s plan of campaign envisaged an advance round the city rather than a frontal attack. The commander of the German forces in Paris, General von Choltitz, was equally anxious to avoid a battle in the streets and the needless destruction that it would involve. According to the collaborationist President of the Municipal Council, to whom Laval had bequeathed his authority when he left Paris, von Choltitz made a tacit engagement to withdraw his troops progressively, not to shoot hostages, and not to carry out needless destructions.2 Meanwhile the railway workers had gone on strike on 10 August, and in the following week enthusiasm for throwing out the Germans spread through Paris. The Resistance leaders inside and outside the city were anxious to forestall an Allied administration and to restore French prestige by liberating it themselves. On 18 August Paris was called to arms by Communist placards, a move in which political considerations were far from absent: the plan for a Communist seizure of power, which had proved abortive in 1940 when it was founded on defeat, might have a better chance of success in 1944 when its aim was to forestall victory. The few thousands in Paris who sacrificed themselves suffered heavy losses: the one really organized force, the Paris police, played a leading part in the struggle. The Germans could still, in the little time left to them, have crushed the rising and destroyed the town. Paris was saved from this fate by the disobedience of von Choltitz (who had received orders from Hitler to destroy everything) with the connivance of Abetz.3 Through the mediation

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1 Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1433; Soustelle, op. cit. ii. 398
of the Swedish Consul, Nordling, a truce was concluded. French and German loud-speaker cars toured the city announcing the cessation of hostilities within its bounds, and the fighting, which had only been sporadic and localized, died down. But von Choltitz, whose family in Germany would have suffered from open disobedience on his part, was only prepared to give up Paris to regular forces. Fortunately the Allied Supreme Command now authorized the Leclerc division to advance on Paris, and von Choltitz signed the capitulation of the German garrison on 25 August. The next day de Gaulle entered the city, traversed on foot the Champs Élysées amid scenes of indescribable enthusiasm, and joined at last the National Council of Resistance which had fought so long inside France. Admiral Auphan, producing a document signed by Pétain much earlier, hoped for the establishment of a compromise government,¹ but de Gaulle, who was never a man of compromises, made no reply to this overture.² He had an engagement in France which prohibited any understanding with Vichy. The resistance from inside and outside had come together, and France had a government from the moment of liberation.

(d) The Last Year of Vichy

Meanwhile the Vichy régime, caught between the pressure of the occupying Power and the blows of the Resistance inside and of the Allies outside France, had gradually been hammered into shreds. Under the appearance of continuity provided by the name of Pétain, the régime had been in a process of almost continuous change from 1940 to 1944. One group after another retired from the unequal struggle or was driven out by German hostility. Pétain's own attitude had been settled in 1940, and remained unchanged in essentials to the end. As a witness at his trial declared, his unvarying thesis was that it was his task 'to attenuate, as far as possible, the rigours of the occupation, to constitute himself into a kind of shield between the occupier and the French'.³ He was blackmailed, throughout the whole period, by German threats against the French prisoners. His position became increasingly isolated as his collaborators left him one by one under pressure from the Germans or in consequence of their own change of heart or loss of hope. The only adviser who stayed with him from the beginning to the end was his medical attendant, Dr. Ménétrel, who held no official position but by common testimony exercised considerable influence over Pétain, especially in the later stages of the occupation.

Side by side with the Marshal, linked by an unnatural alliance in a common bondage with him, was Pierre Laval. Was Pétain, perhaps, not unwilling to have his bête noire at the head of the Government, so that the

¹ Serre: Événements, iv. 1153.  
² Tracou: Le Maréchal aux liens, pp. 402-4.  
³ Procès Pétain, i. 495-6 (evidence of Trochu).
brunt of the inevitable unpopularity might fall on his head rather than on that of the chef de l'État? Was he sorry that he could take his daily walk in Vichy quietly, without protection, while Laval had to go about heavily guarded?1 Discredited in public opinion, Laval remained in office only because the Germans could find no one more serviceable to put in his place, and also perhaps because, with so many enemies on all sides, out of office he could have no hope left.2 He was committed to collaboration up to the hilt, and there could be no drawing back for him. Moreover, he was less flexible and more obstinate than his reputation as an intriguer would suggest. Up to an extraordinarily late date he appears to have clung almost pathetically to a belief in the invincibility of the Germans in Europe.3 He had courage, too, and an almost unconquerable faith in his ability to get himself out of any tight corner at the last moment by his own cleverness. After it was no longer possible to believe in the certainty of German victory, for a time Laval played with the illusion that he might act as an intermediary between the contending forces. Abetz says that he saw himself as a new Talleyrand. In the spring of 1944 he was offering himself to the Germans as an 'honest broker' between them and the Allies; in June he had a plan for establishing contact through Madrid. He even attempted to initiate diplomatic conversations between Germany and the Soviet Union. None of the belligerents wanted his mediation and nothing came of these manœuvres.4

Events in 1944 had passed by Laval and Pétain and left them struggling helplessly in the cul de sac of Vichy, where the so-called government was visibly coming to mean less and less. The Vichy administration had been too long at the mercy of the occupying Power to be capable of any opposition to it now. All through, though more obviously at the end, the Germans had been able to get all that was practicably possible out of Vichy if they were sufficiently violent and persistent. While the Germans took their fill, the jackals of Paris had been hanging round with increasing impatience, waiting to pounce on the rapidly diminishing remains of the carcass. Their challenge to Vichy was weakened by their feuds among themselves, and by the awareness of the Germans both that the majority of the French people hated the Paris collaborationists even more than they did Laval, and that to force them into the Government might possibly prove the last straw on Pétain's back. They would have formed just the right prop for a pro-German administration in France if they had not been so rotten, for they were completely committed to the Nazi ideology. As it was, their existence

2 Cf. Tracou, op. cit. p. 43.
3 Cf. Stucki, op. cit. p. 33.
to some extent strengthened the position of Laval, who at least could be represented as standing between France and their rule.

Even this justification did not hold true to the end. The resentment of the Paris collaborationists that they had not been able to gain the official positions for the sake of which they had risked such high stakes found expression in a report that de Brinon sent to Goebbels in May 1943. The men of the Third Republic or their creatures, he protested, still hung on to their jobs in the prefectures, the mairies, and the great administrative organizations; this was the reason why the reality of the German victory had been so little recognized. Confidence, he urged, must be given to those leaders who had openly proclaimed their allegiance to the German ideal, even before the war.  

In September 1943 Décat, Darnand, Luchaire, and other collaborationists produced a plan de redressement national, which called for a government based on a parti unique after the National Socialist model, and on alliance with Germany. Their agitation alarmed Pétain’s advisers, who persuaded him to take a precautionary measure which was to lead to another crisis in his relations with the Germans. In November 1943, on the advice of Lucien Romier, in whom Pétain placed as much confidence as he did in anyone, he drew up a constitutional amendment transferring his power, in the event of his death before the coming into force of a new Constitution, to the National Assembly; and at the same time he prepared a message for broadcasting to the French people, in which he was to declare: ‘I incarnate to-day the legitimate government of France. I intend to preserve it as a sacred trust, to be returned after my death to the National Assembly from which I received it.’ These measures, which had been planned in secret, were communicated to Laval, who did not contemplate being put on one side so easily. He informed the Germans, and they took immediate action to occupy Radio-Vichy and the official printing establishment and to ban both constitutional act and message. All that Pétain could do was to have several thousand copies printed and distributed clandestinely.

After some delay the fuller German reaction was manifested. On 4 December Abetz brought a letter (dated 29 November) from Ribbentrop to Vichy. It contained a severe indictment of Pétain for lack of good faith in his collaboration with Germany, and demanded that henceforth all legislative proposals be submitted first to the German Government for approval; Laval was to be entrusted with the reorganization of the French Government ‘in a sense which would guarantee collaboration’; if the

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1 Les Procès de collaboration: de Brinon, Darnand, Luchaire, pp. 30-41. De Brinon denied the actual drafting of this report, but he did not repudiate its general tenor.
2 Tracou: Le Maréchal aux liens, pp. 10-11.
5 Tracou, op. cit. pp. 16-23.
French Government could not preserve order and justice in France, the letter concluded, with a vague menace, the Government of the Reich would have to take its own measures to safeguard its interests. Once more Pétain yielded. Romier resigned his office, and Abetz demanded the admission of Déat, Henriot, and Darnand to the Cabinet. Of these Henriot was the great star of Radio-Paris and the most brilliant orator of the anti-Bolshevik crusade. To Darnand, a courageous soldier with many decorations for bravery and devoted to the war against Marxism, the Marshal was not entirely unsympathetic. Laval, who feared and detested Doriot and Déat, had less suspicion of Darnand, who might, he thought, prove a useful tool. So he did, indeed, but of the Germans, not of Laval. Marcel Déat, former parliamentarian and journalist, who had conducted in the Œuvre a violent and able campaign for a French National Socialist Party, in the course of which he had continually attacked Vichy, was anti-pathetic to Pétain, and on this point at least Laval was in sympathy, for Déat was the one possible alternative Head of the Government. Laval, therefore, aided the Marshal to keep Déat out, but the other changes imposed by the Germans were accepted. To ensure that the Marshal should not again attempt to put into practice any ideas of which the occupying Power did not approve, a new watch-dog was appointed to maintain constant supervision over his words and deeds in the person of von Renthe-Fink.

The new Cabinet which emerged in January 1944 represented the definite conquest of Vichy by the Paris collaborationists. Laval was still at its head—like Pétain, and possibly not for entirely different motives, he never envisaged the idea of voluntary resignation. A full collaborationist policy without any reserves seemed guaranteed from a Government which included Cathala in charge of Finances, de Brinon (Ambassador and Delegate of the Government at Paris), Henriot (Information), Darnand (Maintenance of Order), Abel Bonnard (Education), Bichelonne (Industry and Transport), Marion (Secretary of State to the Head of the Government), Grasset (Health), Admiral Bléhaut (Marine), General Bidoux (War), and Lemoine (Interior). From now on Pétain ceased to attend the Council of Ministers.

Even Déat was not kept out permanently. In February von Renthe-Fink renewed the demand for his admission to the Cabinet and on 16 March he was appointed Minister for Labour and National Solidarity. Whereas Henriot and Darnand were in different ways of great service to

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2 De Brinon: Mémoires, pp. 165-6.  
5 One other name should be mentioned in connexion with the reorganization of the Government. Jean Tracou, former naval officer and since 1941 a prefect, became director of the Marshal's civil Cabinet, a position which was one of influence if not of power, and incidentally afforded an admirable observation post.  
6 Procès Pétain, ii. 818 (evidence of Tracou).
the German Government, Déat proved a disappointment. His febrile activity had little effect in office, though he did not cease to agitate for increased power and to work against Laval.¹ He gathered the ultra-collaborationists behind him and was able to make use of Admiral Platon, now completely sunk in collaborationist politics. But Platon has been described as ‘lacking political sense to the point of genius’, and Laval easily outmanoeuvred him and Déat.²

The conviction of the Germans that Pétain was now completely under their control was shown when they allowed him to pay a visit to Paris in April 1944, to attend a memorial service for the victims of Allied bombing. Though no public announcement of the visit was made, the warmth of the reception given to the Marshal alarmed the Germans. They insisted on his broadcasting, on 28 April, a long-delayed message associating France with Germany in the struggle against Bolshevism. The essential phrase, agreed on after much discussion, declared: ‘When the present tragedy has come to an end, and, thanks to the defence of our continent by Germany and the united efforts of Europe, our civilization is definitely safeguarded from the danger of Bolshevism, the hour will come when France will rediscover and confirm her place.’³ The message had a disastrous effect in France; the Germans were apparently incapable of realizing that the more they compelled Pétain and the French Cabinet to come out into the open as their supporters, the more they robbed them of influence in France, and the less useful they were likely to be.⁴ But the coherence of German policy in France, never unqualified, was beginning to vanish altogether under the stress of circumstances. Wavering from one opinion to another, the Germans became alarmed that Pétain, at Vichy, might fall into the hands of the maquis, and therefore transferred him to the château of Voisins, near Rambouillet. He was then allowed to make another journey, this time to Rouen to celebrate the fête of Jeanne d’Arc, which, like the Paris visit, seemed to his German masters a brilliant stroke of anti-English propaganda. The warmth of his reception at Rouen, as at Paris, reawoke German alarms and it was decided to send him back to Vichy. On the journey he was still well received and made little impromptu speeches, which were much applauded, at Nancy, Épinal, and Dijon.

The history of Vichy seems to have undergone a period of suspended animation in the months before the long-expected invasion, though the struggle between resistance and repression did not slacken. In May 1944

¹ Tracou, op. cit. pp. 187-92. De Brinon bears witness to the inadequacy of Déat and the weakness of his influence even with the Germans. ‘Celle de Laval’, he writes, ‘peut paraître faible, elle l’est sans doute, mais elle n’a pas toujours abouti à rien, ce qui est le cas de celle de Déat’ (de Brinon: Mémoires, p. 219).
³ Martin du Gard, op. cit. pp. 470-1.
⁴ Tracou, op. cit. pp. 205-30; Martin du Gard, loc. cit.
the existence of 'Supernap', an organization of high officials with contacts with the Resistance, was discovered, and fourteen prefects, four regional prefects, and the Secretary of State for the Interior, Lemoine, were arrested. In spite of this shock the Germans rightly believed that they could still count on Vichy. When the Allied armies began their landings on 6 June a message which Pétain had recorded on 17 March, under pressure from von Renthe-Fink, was broadcast. It called on all officials to remain at their posts and on the French population to obey the Government, to preserve order and discipline, and to accept any German instruction given in the battle-areas. Laval also broadcast a message in which he proclaimed: 'La France n’est pas dans la guerre', and urged the French to preserve their neutrality and not aggravate the foreign struggle by adding the horrors of civil war to it. The response of the Resistance Movement to this plea has been mentioned above.

When the invasion came France was indeed virtually in a state of civil war. From 1943 onwards attacks on individuals in France are alleged to have amounted to something like 100 every day. The responsibility for these attacks, and indeed the motive for them, were not always easy to discern. The Germans, the Militia, the Communists, the non-Communist maquis, all had their enemies, and opportunities for private banditry were not lacking. The growing tension found less commonplace expression in the assassination by the Militia of two of the more notable political prisoners—Jean Zay, the Socialist politician, who had been interned since 1940, and Mandel—and on the other side by the assassination of Philippe Henriot. The Germans, aided by the Militia, intensified the terror, though by now it had patently ceased to pay as a method of government. As Abetz pointed out: 'The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, is of no use; it will only drive the population the more quickly into the Maquis.'

The assassination of Henriot, to which the Militia replied with fresh excesses, provoked the ultra-collaborationists into issuing a manifesto on 3 July 1944 in which they urged the need for rallying public opinion, shaken by the strength of the Allied landings and the progress of the Russian offensive. In the period which must elapse before the Germans defeated the Anglo-Saxons in a decisive battle, the manifesto declared, France was threatened with a complete breakdown of government, the Head of the State and the Head of the Government (that is Pétain and Laval) had neither of them exhibited the firmness demanded by the situation. Faced with the menace of total anarchy, France must take sides

2 Tracou: Le Maréchal aux liens, pp. 147-8, 284; Stucki: La Fin du régime de Vichy, p. 39; Procès Pétain, i. 618, ii. 817 (evidence of Tracou); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 161.
3 Tracou, op. cit. p. 285.
4 I.M.T. Nuremburg, xxxiii. 191 (3819-PS); N.C.A. vi. 770 (conference of 11 July 1944).
clearly in the world struggle. To make her action effective, the ultra-
collaborationists called for the return of the Government to Paris, the
introduction of 'unquestionable elements' into it—whom this could mean,
except from themselves, is not clear—and the imposition of vigorous
penalties, including death, on any who stirred up civil war or compromised
the position of France in Europe. The declaration was signed by the
Ministers Abel Bonnard, Bichelonne, de Brinon, and Déat, and the names
of Platon, Benoist-Méchin, Luchaire, Doriot, Generals Duchêne and
Bineau, and a galaxy of collaborationist journalists followed.\(^1\) These were
the men who knew that they had staked all on a German victory.

Laval, who clung to his faith in German military power even in the
early stages of the invasion,\(^2\) still believed that he had something to lose,
and was not prepared to be pushed out of office, even at the last minute,
by the Paris collaborationists. He summoned the Cabinet for 12 July at
Vichy. Déat stayed away but the other rebels were there; in a pencilled
note passed to Laval by de Brinon a few minutes before the meeting, and
signed by Bonnard, Déat, Benoist-Méchin, and Luchaire, they called for
a reorganization of the Government.\(^3\) Laval proceeded to tear them and
their note to pieces. His personal superiority to his colleagues was perhaps
never more clearly manifested than in his treatment of this absurd mutiny
by a group of cabin-boys attempting to take control of a sinking ship.\(^4\) On
24 June Darnand, who had not joined the plot against Laval and who was
the one really effective ally that the Germans had found, was promoted to
the position of Minister of the Interior.

Even Laval's obstinacy was not proof to the end against the continued
evidence of German defeat. The ultra-collaborationists were right in
suspecting that his thoughts were turning to the possibility of transferring
his allegiance at the last moment, and buying his way back by taking
France with him. France, of course, was not his to take, but he had never
had any respect for public opinion. The chosen instrument of his last and
greatest manoeuvre was to be Édouard Herriot, living in custody near
Nancy. In agreement with Abetz, Laval went on 12 August to Herriot,
informed him that he was free, and brought him to Paris. There he
invited him to summon the National Assembly to take over responsibility
for the future of France, alleging that the step he was taking was with
the assent of Berlin and on the advice of Washington. Herriot replied
that it was the function of the President of the Senate to summon the
Assembly. The pre-war politician de Monzie, claiming to speak for some
255 parliamentarians, intervened with a declaration that they would

\(^1\) Pierre Nicolle: Cinquante mois d'armistice, ii. 520-3 (Annexe III); Documents (R.I.I.A.) for
\(^2\) Stucki: La Fin du régime de Vichy, p. 39.
\(^3\) Les Procès de collaboration: de Brinon, Darnand, Luchaire, pp. 413-14.
\(^4\) Tracou, op. cit. pp. 329-38; Martin du Gard: La Chronique de Vichy, 1940-1944, p. 509.
attend a session of the National Assembly called in the name of the Marshal but not one convoked by Laval. It is difficult to believe that this complicated intrigue ever had the slightest chance of succeeding. In any case the ultra-collaborationists, who were determined that it should not succeed, gave information of what was going on to the German secret police, who proceeded to put an end to it by rearresting Herriot and transporting him to Germany.¹

The Germans knew by now that they would not be able to hold either Paris or Vichy much longer, but they were determined that those who had served them so well in France should not escape from their grasp. On 17 August Laval was ordered to transfer the French Government to Belfort. There was no wriggling out of this, and no possibility of finding a compromise: for the first time, presented with a German ultimatum, he answered with a refusal to accept it. He declared in writing that he ceased to exercise his governmental functions, and transferred his powers to the President of the Municipal Council of Paris, Taittinger. Laval’s last official act was to order the Secretaries-General, or in default of them the highest available official, to take charge of the Ministries. Then, with the remnant of his Government, he set out for Belfort to offer his resignation to the Marshal, who, according to the Germans, was already there. In fact this statement was untrue. A German note had also been presented to Pétain on 17 August demanding that he should transfer his residence and that of any members of the Government with him at Vichy to an unspecified town in the north of France.² It was only on 20 August that, yielding to a show of force, Pétain in turn departed for Belfort. The Swiss Ambassador, who witnessed the scene, writes: ‘Le Maréchal était d’un calme véritablement impressionnant. Je crois qu’il n’a pas très bien compris ce qui se passait.’³ He left behind him a protest addressed to Hitler, declaring that this act of violence made it impossible for him to continue to exercise his prerogatives as head of the French state, and an appeal to the French people.⁴

There was now a saure-qui-peut in the ranks of the collaborationists.⁵ Some went into hiding, while others hurriedly inserted themselves into the ranks of the Resistance, where under a different flag they were not without opportunities for continuing their accustomed activities. Darnand succeeded in gathering in the east of France a body of some 6,000 militia with their wives and children. He seized funds from the Banque de France, and as the Allies advanced withdrew with his supporters into Germany. There he was allowed to constitute a ‘Franc Garde’ of some 2,000 men.

² Ibid: La Fin du régime de Vichy, pp. 89–90.
³ Ibid. p. 123.
⁴ Ibid. pp. 121, 246, 248.
⁵ Nicolle: Cinquante mois d’armistice, ii. 524 9; Procès Pétain, i. 615–16.
Another third of his troops was formed into the Brigade Charlemagne and sent to the Russian front, while the remainder were swallowed up in various German services.¹

For the men of Vichy, Belfort was only a brief resting-place. As the German armies were driven back it became no longer a safe refuge, and the French Ministers were bundled off to the castle of Sigmaringen in Germany. There the last scene of the tragedy was enacted. As Pétain and Laval, and a number of other Ministers, refused to fulfil any further governmental duties, Ribbentrop invited de Brinon to form a ‘national and revolutionary’ government with Doriot and the other extreme collaborationists. According to himself, de Brinon refused.² However, a governmental commission for French interests in Germany, inspired by Déat and presided over by de Brinon,³ was set up in the name of Pétain, despite his repudiation of it. The collaborationists thus achieved, in a foreign land and under a régime that was writhing in its death agonies, the simulacrum of what had been the object of their ambition for four years of intrigue and strife.

Not that the intrigues and strife came to an end even now. The struggle between Doriot, who had established himself with a force of members of the P.P.F. some 200 miles from Sigmaringen, and the other collaborationists, still continued. Luchaire was producing a journal called *La France* and had charge of a radio station, *Ici, la France*, in rivalry with which Doriot broadcast from his own station, *Radio-Patrie*. Abetz supported Luchaire, but the majority of the Germans looked with greater favour on Doriot.⁴ The conflict came to an end when Doriot was killed, allegedly by the machine-gunning of his car from the air, on a journey to meet Déat to attempt a compromise between their two camps. His opponents remained in possession of the conquered field. At Sigmaringen they awaited the end of the war and their respective fates.

**B. THE FREE FRENCH MOVEMENT, 1940–1942**

_by Sir Desmond Morton_

_(i) The Origin and Growth of the Movement_

_(a) THE CAREER OF GENERAL DE GAULLE_

In 1934 a French colonel, unknown save to a small circle of his brother officers, wrote a book summing up his own theories on the future of

³ *Procès Pétain*, ii. 735 (evidence of Admiral Bléhaut); *Les Procès de collaboration*, p. 45.
⁴ Ibid. pp. 420, 505.
mechanized warfare, already preached by him for some years past at the École Supérieure and wherever else opportunity had offered. Marshal Pétain, on whose staff this officer had served, read the manuscript and promised his support, but later withdrew it in face of expected opposition by other military and political leaders, refusing to discuss his change of attitude with the author. From this moment relations between Colonel Charles de Gaulle and the Marshal, previously of a friendly character, suffered a marked change. Nevertheless, undeterred by the rebuff, de Gaulle published Vers l'armée de métier on his own responsibility. It was greeted either by frigid silence or with patronizing disparagement by the majority of French experts. The opinions of professional soldiers might have been different had they realized that the book impressed the German General Staff enough to make them quote from it textually in their confidential handbook on mechanized warfare, and embody its principles in their secret plans for a future attack upon France.

Almost alone among French politicians Paul Reynaud studied the book with care, expressed general agreement with the theories adduced, and assured de Gaulle of his patronage, should it ever be in his power to afford it. Nevertheless, when de Gaulle tried to pursue his ideas a year later in a series of lectures at the Sorbonne, pacifists and anti-militarists stirred up so much opposition that de Gaulle was given official orders to stop lecturing. Reynaud tried, both in the Chamber and by writings, to put the French army into armour. He failed. De Gaulle was discouraged and most of his contemporaries deemed his military career over.

Soon after the outbreak of war in 1939 de Gaulle was promoted général de brigade and later to the command of an armoured division, which he led with great courage and military insight during the early days of the German break-through on the Meuse in 1940. A bare fortnight before the fall of his Government Reynaud sent for de Gaulle from the battlefield to offer him the position of Under-Secretary for War, retaining the Portfolio in his own hands. In accepting this appointment de Gaulle took his first step in French politics, and at once adopted an uncompromising stand against surrender and for the continuation of French resistance somehow, somewhere. Even in the last desperate hours of armed resistance in France he begged for the chance of collecting such armour as was left, and using it, under his own command and in his own way, in a final effort to disrupt the enemy’s advance. It was possibly too late; anyway, permission was refused.

If the attitude thereafter adopted by de Gaulle and if his relations as Head of the ‘Free French’ with the Governments of other allied countries are to be understood, it is essential to bear in mind this brief legal tenure of the political post of Under-Secretary for War. From then on it was as a politician rather than a soldier that he saw himself. In the early days of resistance after the Franco-German armistice, it is doubtful if this
psychological point was sufficiently realized by those British statesmen and soldiers with whom he had to deal. Their prime object was doubtless to use de Gaulle as a military rallying-point for any elements of the French army and air force who might elect to fight on and so swell the number of fighting men available to the Allies. This difference of outlook, perhaps of little importance at the time, may well have been the origin of much misunderstanding later.

On 15 June 1940 Weygand reported to the French Cabinet that organized resistance to the enemy had ceased. On the same day de Gaulle flew to England as French Under-Secretary for War to discuss the situation with the British Government. He declared militarily impossible the suggestion that the French should hold a bridgehead on the Continent in Brittany, but was firmly of opinion that France should continue the fight from North Africa, evacuating thereto, with British help, the greatest possible number of fighting men with their arms. He suggested that some striking act or pronouncement by the British Government was needed to stimulate French resistance, and therefore warmly supported the idea, already under discussion, of a proposal for some sort of federation between the French and British peoples and empires.\(^1\)

On the evening of 16 June, after reading on the telephone to Reynaud the text of the offer of federation which the British Government were about to make to France, de Gaulle flew back to Bordeaux, only to find that Reynaud’s Cabinet had fallen and was being replaced by one headed by Pétain. In de Gaulle’s opinion such a government must necessarily be opposed to all idea of continuing the war; while it included several members, apart from Pétain himself, who regarded the person of de Gaulle with open hostility. Consequently, on 17 June, saying nothing of his intentions to anyone, de Gaulle accompanied to the airfield General Spears, who had previously acted as Churchill’s personal liaison officer with Reynaud. After publicly bidding farewell to Spears, de Gaulle suddenly stepped into the plane as it began to move off and was carried to London; this time without permission or authority. With the fall of the Reynaud Government, de Gaulle had ceased to be Under-Secretary for War and was therefore merely a French général de division without a command, but on the active list. France was still nominally in a state of active war against Germany. By all normal standards, de Gaulle’s action was therefore open to attack by those who disagreed with his motives. Pétain’s Government did not fail to observe and make full use of this valuable point of propaganda.

\((b)\) The Genesis of the Free French Movement

During the afternoon and evening of 17 June de Gaulle discussed with certain prominent Frenchmen in England, such as Jean Monnet, head of

\(^1\) An account of this will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
the French Supply Mission in London, and the Ambassador, Corbin, ways and means for setting up a French centre of resistance outside France. Except from René Pleven, Monnet’s deputy, de Gaulle received little support from his compatriots. However, on 18 June he obtained permission from the British Government to broadcast to the French people, which he did that evening. Although the Free French Movement dated its birth officially from that moment, this first broadcast by de Gaulle confined itself to a profession of his own faith in the future of France and the eventual defeat of Germany. While it urged every Frenchman who wished to continue the fight to get into touch with him in England, it did not announce the establishment of any co-ordinated movement headed by himself nor, though eloquent and rousing as an appeal against defeatism, did it include the famous phrase which appeared a few days later on recruiting posters throughout England: ‘La France a perdu une bataille! mais la France n’a pas perdu la guerre.’

It was not until 23 June that the British Government, on receipt of a letter from de Gaulle, agreed not to oppose his request for permission to set up in England a French ‘Centre of Resistance’, though reserving the right to examine closely, before recognizing it, anything which might look like a Government of French émigrés, a French ‘National Committee’, or even a ‘Council of Liberation’. Nevertheless, in a further broadcast de Gaulle let it be understood that he had set up a provisional ‘French National Committee’, which the British Government had recognized. This broadcast elicited a violent protest from Bordeaux, but the announcement was not publicly repudiated. On the contrary, de Gaulle was given every facility to communicate with generals commanding in the French colonies and dependencies, among whom Mittelhauser in Syria and Noguès in North Africa had both rejected the Armistice, the former in a public declaration. In spite of this, de Gaulle got neither support nor satisfaction from his brother officers in high command, who subsequently changed their tone and gave their allegiance to Vichy.

On 28 June de Gaulle was again informed that, for the time being, the British Government could recognize no ‘French National Committee’, nor even a ‘Council of Resistance’, which did not in fact exist. This implied a possible change of outlook should a sufficient number of well-known figures, representative of French political life, elect later either to join de Gaulle or, alternatively, invite him to join them. While refusing to recognize a non-existent French National Committee, the British Government did agree to regard de Gaulle as ‘the Leader of all Free Frenchmen,

wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause, and an official announcement to that effect was broadcast on the evening of 28 June.

Meanwhile de Gaulle was authorized to try to obtain the allegiance of French soldiers, sailors, airmen, and merchant seamen and—as an afterthought—civilian technicians who might be useful in war industry. More than 100,000 Frenchmen had come to England from Dunkirk, but a large number of these had already been returned to France. On the other hand, the French Expeditionary Force from Norway under General Bédouard was in England, numbering about 10,000; while some 9,000 French naval personnel were in camp at Aintree—chiefly the crews of warships which had taken refuge in British ports and had been seized by the British after the Armistice. The great majority of these Frenchmen elected to return to France. Those who, as units or individuals, chose to rally to de Gaulle, comprised at first only one battalion of the Foreign Legion under Colonel Magrin Vernérét, who, like many of the more senior officers preferring to fight on, changed his name, using thereafter that of Montclar; one complete battalion of Chasseurs Alpins, and one company of Fusiliers Marins. These, together with a few hundred others, represented the total strength of which de Gaulle could dispose. In fact, by the end of June 1940, the Free French Forces in England numbered little more than 3,000, including some 450 sailors and marines, and 350 members of the air force. They were practically unarmed.

On 30 June there arrived in England by air from Gibraltar Vice-Admiral Émile Henry Muselier, who had been in charge of French contraband control in the Mediterranean, with his headquarters at Marseilles. As soon as he realized that the Armistice was complete and final, the admiral had loaded up some merchant ships with the most valuable stores he could find on the quayside and, accompanied by two or three small French warships, had set sail for Gibraltar in order to place his little fleet, his wares, and his services at the disposal of the British navy. Until his arrival in England he had had no acquaintance with de Gaulle, or knowledge of the position de Gaulle had assumed. As an admiral of three stars, he was technically a good deal senior to de Gaulle in the French hierarchy, but, on appreciating the situation, he came to an arrangement with de Gaulle, though he signed no promise of personal allegiance to the general, feeling that he had the right, at need, to represent the French navy while de Gaulle represented the army. Nevertheless, until grave political differences arose later between them Muselier continued to act as though he regarded de Gaulle as his chief, though claiming to retain in his own hand command and jurisdiction over the Free French naval forces.

1 The Times, 29 June 1940.
The British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July, of which de Gaulle was informed only just before the event, was a severe test. He took the news well, and thereby notably increased his personal status in the eyes of the British authorities. He made no secret of his profound sorrow. At best this action would handicap his own; at worst, should Bordeaux make it an occasion for declaring war against Britain, the position of de Gaulle and all his adherents would be terrible. He preferred not to judge the merits of the case, but required it to be made clear that he had not been consulted beforehand and had no lot or part in the action. Actually there is no evidence that the event had any immediate effect either way on the development of the Free French Movement. About 1,000 sailors from the French warships seized by the British at Portsmouth joined Admiral Muselier, and by the end of July the Free French fleet amounted to twenty-eight warships; small, except for one depot battleship, but fully manned by Free French crews. Sufficient air personnel had trickled in to form one bomber and one fighter flight, with enough land troops for one complete brigade group of all arms with ancillary services. Together with general and administrative headquarters and recruits undergoing training in England, the total Free French forces perhaps amounted to 6,000 men by 1 August 1940.

(c) The Agreement of 7 August 1940 Between the British Government and General de Gaulle

By the end of July, the short-term outlook for de Gaulle had become sufficiently clear to require a restatement of relations between the Free French Movement and the British Government. This was done by a memorandum sent by Churchill, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, to de Gaulle, with a covering letter dated 7 August 1940 stating that this memorandum would have the force of an agreement should de Gaulle accept it, and that the agreement would be regarded as having been in operation since 1 July. De Gaulle replied in writing on the same day, accepting the memorandum in his capacity as Leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever they might be, who rallied to him to defend the Allied cause.

This document, hereafter referred to as the agreement of 7 August 1940, was of high importance and served as the basic instrument governing mutual relations until the formation of the French National Committee in September 1941. Even then its provisions were not cancelled but con-

continued in so far as they were not automatically cancelled by the new situation. By this agreement, which was co-ordinated where applicable with agreements made with foreign Allied Governments who had taken refuge in England and were controlling armed forces, the British Government noted that de Gaulle was recruiting volunteers as sailors, soldiers, airmen, and technical and scientific workers to be organized and used against the common enemy. These forces would as far as possible bear an entirely French character, particularly as regarded language, discipline, promotion, and administration in general. They would have a prior right to dispose of any armaments of French types captured or otherwise obtained from French sources, the British supplying deficiencies. These forces would not be used against France. They would be under the command of de Gaulle who, however, agreed to accept the general directions of the British High Command and in agreement with the latter would, at need, put units of these forces at the disposal of British commanders in the field, so long as they were not required to fight against Frenchmen.¹

The agreement of 7 August also made provision for the pay and pensions of Free French volunteers; all costs of the Movement were to be borne by the British, who would have a right to examine and check expenditure. The British Government also undertook to consider favourably applications by Free French volunteers for British nationality. This provision, the object of which in certain events was obvious, was not invoked save in a few cases where peculiar difficulties were encountered.

Finally the agreement laid down certain conditions for a Free French navy and mercantile marine. It is noteworthy that it was with de Gaulle and not with Admiral Muselier that the British Admiralty agreed to concert arrangements. The admiral’s acceptance of this provision appeared to show that he regarded de Gaulle as the supreme commander of the Free French navy as well as of the army;² this weakened his position if, as indeed occurred later, he should wish to assert his original claim to independence.

¹ This understandable embargo against the Free French forces waging civil war was in fact observed, though not without some straining of language. As things turned out, the Free French did not fight at Dakar (see pp. 448–51 below). Had they been compelled to do so, de Gaulle would possibly have justified it as he did later when the Gaboon was rallied, by calling it a police operation. In Syria, still later, the Free French division was used chiefly against native troops and local levies (see p. 453 below). It is noteworthy that the agreement, as phrased, forbade their use against France, which might be read to imply French metropolitan territory only, if convenient, though no such subtlety might have been in the minds of either party when the agreement was originally signed.

² Muselier himself wrote later (De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 71): ‘Nous considérons tous que le général de Gaulle . . . avait, vis-à-vis des forces de terre, de mer et de l’air de la France libre, les mêmes attributions que le président de la République française, c’est à dire était le chef suprême des trois armées.’ Muselier states that he was consulted about naval questions during the negotiations preceding the signature of the agreement, but that his point of view did not prevail (ibid. p. 67).
The essence of the naval proposals was that French ships, whether armed or merchantmen, which could be manned by Free French crews became part of the Free French Marine: surplus French ships could be manned and used by the British direct. Some international difficulties were later encountered owing to the fact that the Free French Movement, not being recognized as a sovereign Power, could not enjoy corresponding privileges either on the high seas from the ships, or in the ports, of neutral countries. This embarrassment was, however, overcome by the use of various ingenious devices and the exercise of great care in the routeing of ships wearing the Free French flag.

Though kept secret at the time, it was later revealed that, coincident with the acceptance of this agreement, de Gaulle received the British Government’s approval in principle for his plan to set up in due course a Council of Defence of French Overseas Possessions, with which the British Government would discuss economic and defence questions involving collaboration with the British Empire. It was, however, understood at the time that this council would not in effect be created until suitable councillors became available and, presumably, only after further discussion with the British.

A number of subsidiary departmental agreements were negotiated to give effect to the main agreement of 7 August, and no special mention of them need be made; but it is worthy of record that if the main agreement had a weakness it was that, while laying definite obligations upon the British Government, it did not set out with equal clarity corresponding obligations falling upon de Gaulle; while it inevitably invested him with greater authority than heretofore, both within his own organization and in the eyes of the world. He could punish his adherents in accordance with French military and civil law as it stood at the date of the Armistice, and could discharge any man from the Movement at any time without giving reasons. The agreement was made with him personally, so long as he remained the Leader of the Free French.

(d) The Winning over of certain French Colonies to the Free French Movement

From the outset, de Gaulle and the British Government were in agreement in recognizing the importance of acquiring, if possible, French colonial territory on which the Free French Movement could plant its flag of libration. Grand strategy pointed to North Africa, but, failing an internal coup, this was too hard a nut for de Gaulle’s little force, even with the restricted aid which England could then afford. Strung along the coast from Algiers to Bizerta were the equivalent of some ten French divisions, with an air force estimated at 100 first line. Several French warships had been lost or damaged at Mers-el-Kebir or were isolated in
distant waters, but the main French fleet was concentrated at this time at Toulon. It now became clear that Morocco, Tunis, and Algiers would not join the Free French Movement. Of these, Algiers was the most important, being, under the French Constitution, an integral part of metropolitan France. Towards the end of June 1940 the British Government had sent Duff Cooper and Lord Gort to Rabat, in the hope of persuading local authorities, by direct contact with men who were obviously entitled to speak for the British Government, that England would fight on and was far from being defeated. They were also authorized to make certain pledges on behalf of the British Government should Morocco or North Africa secede from Bordeaux. General Noguès had refused to see them. General Mittelhauser had clearly made up his mind to hold Syria for Pétain. His Chief of Staff, Colonel de Larminat, had escaped into Palestine to join the Free French; but the bulk of the army in Syria preferred to stand behind its general on the opposite course. General Legentilhomme, a popular ex-Governor of Somaliland, agreed with Colonel de Larminat and thought that he could at least rally Jibuti to continue resistance, but the new Governor-General, Germain, was too strong for him.1 Legentilhomme therefore came to de Gaulle alone. Neither in Madagascar, nor French Guiana, nor the Antilles, nor St. Pierre was there any overt demand to join the new Movement; and in any case these other French colonies, together with French Indian possessions and the French islands in the Pacific, were all too far from the scene to be of first concern in the war effort. There remained the other two great French possessions of West Africa and Equatorial Africa; and these became the first objective of plans and propaganda. The choice for action fell upon Dakar, though actually the first French colonial territory to declare for the Free French was the New Hebrides, an Anglo-French Condominium, whose French Commissioner, Sautot, made his choice on 9 August 1940, with the approval of practically the whole colony.

The Anglo-Free French expedition to Dakar left England during the night of 29/30 August 1940. Before this, however, both the French Commander in the Chad Province of Equatorial Africa, Colonel Leclerc, and the Governor of the Province, Eboué, a French citizen of African race, had decided to join de Gaulle. The Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, Boisson, who was not popular, had begun by sitting on the fence, but a well-timed offer from Vichy to appoint him Governor-General of French West Africa at Dakar, a higher post, had tipped the scale, and on 15 July he had left Brazzaville by air, handing over his authority in Equatorial Africa to General Husson. This was a bad appointment, since Husson was apparently even more unpopular than Boisson. The opportunity was not missed. De Larminat arrived in Brazzaville and started

1 See also below, p. 466, note 3.
to canvass support without serious molestation. As a result, by agreement with the Free French and British authorities, Éboué openly declared on 26 August that the Province of Chad would acknowledge the orders of de Gaulle.\(^1\) Two days later de Larminat was acclaimed temporary Governor of the Middle Congo, and at the same time the adherence of Ubangi Shari to Free France was announced. Almost at the same time, the Cameroons were won over by a courageous but bloodless coup d'état. Brunot, the Governor, who was directly responsible to France, had early shown much the same spirit as Éboué, and had been warned by Vichy that he would be replaced by Annet.\(^2\) Leclerc, who had been joined by Pleven from England, in order to conduct the political campaign on behalf of de Gaulle in Western Africa, was informed that a show of force at Duala would clinch the matter. With some thirty other Frenchmen Leclerc and Pleven left Nigeria secretly by canoe and arrived before dawn at Duala. When the local inhabitants awoke, they saw on all sides proclamations announcing their change of allegiance. There was some shouting, but no serious opposition. From Duala, accompanied this time by local forces who had changed sides with alacrity, the party proceeded to the capital at Yaundi, where Brunot was unaware of events. Yaundi was soon completely reconciled to the situation, in which a British declaration, recognizing that the Mandate for the Cameroons was still held in the name of France, played no small part.

On 3 September a plebiscite was held in Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands where de Gaulle, by a majority of 5,564 votes to 18 for the Pétain Government, gained the adherence of these territories to his Movement. On 9 September Louis Bonvin, Governor-General of the French Establishments in India, joined Free France. Finally, on 19 September, the locally important island of New Caledonia was won over by Sautot, French Commissioner of the New Hebrides, practically single-handed. With the exception of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which were won over in special circumstances in December 1941,\(^3\) New Caledonia was the last colony to join the Free French. To complete the winning over of French Equatorial Africa, Gaboon was invaded in November 1940 by Free French troops from the Cameroons under Legentilhomme. Libreville was brought over on 5 November and Port Gentil on 12 November without serious fighting.

The winning over of French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons was a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort. Not only did these territories possess economic resources of great importance in timber, vegetable oils, cotton, coffee, cocoa, and other colonial products; but they also pro-

\(^1\) De Gaulle himself broadcast this news on 27 August from London. For text of Éboué's proclamation see Muselier: *De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme*, p. 112.

\(^2\) Annet in fact never arrived in the territory, but later became notorious as the Vichy Governor of Madagascar at the time of the British occupation of the island (see p. 466 below).

\(^3\) See below, p. 463.
vided a means of communication right across Africa, by air and road, over Allied territory, with Cairo and the Middle East via the Sudan; and their adherence to the Free French Movement greatly eased anxiety regarding the security of Nigeria on the one hand and, on the other, of the Belgian Congo, which had already decided to continue in the war, despite the defeat of the mother country.

The first indications that part of the French Empire might be about to join his cause became known to de Gaulle either just before he left with his forces for Dakar, or while he was on the high seas, and must have provided considerable encouragement—of which he stood in need after his attack on Dakar on 23–25 September had been repulsed with loss.¹

After the failure of the Dakar expedition the forces engaged withdrew to Freetown. De Gaulle did not at once return to England, but took the opportunity of touring the provinces of the French African Empire which had come over to his cause. He remained in Africa for about two months. Indeed, it was believed that he meditated transferring his headquarters permanently to Brazzaville, leaving in London only a liaison mission with limited powers. For political and administrative reasons this idea met with no encouragement from the British, but, in spite of any loss of prestige which might have been expected to accrue as a result of the Dakar incident, de Gaulle was received with marks of the highest respect and enthusiasm during his African tour.

(e) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE FREE FRENCH EMPIRE

On 27 October 1940 de Gaulle proclaimed from Brazzaville the formation of a ‘Council for the Defence of the French Empire’,² consisting of himself, General Catroux, Vice-Admiral Muselier, General de Larminat, Governor Félix Éboué, Governor René Cassin, General Sicé of the Medical Services, and, from January 1941, the Rev. Father d’Argenlieu. Of these, Catroux had been Governor-General of French Indochina at the time of the fall of France, but his lack of sympathy with the Armistice caused the Vichy Government to replace him, and he and his wife escaped and sailed for England with British help. He arrived in London after the departure of de Gaulle on the Dakar expedition, and there was some feeling of embarrassment within the Free French Movement owing to his seniority in the French army, which far surpassed that of de Gaulle, regarding whom Catroux had known nothing beforehand and had learned but little during his necessarily long sea voyage from Indochina. Doubts, however, were laid at rest when Catroux met de Gaulle for the first time in the Chad

¹ An account of the expedition to Dakar, with some discussion of the reasons for its failure, is annexed to the present chapter, on pp. 448–51 below.
² France, 6 January 1941; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 171.
Province, for he showed by his attitude and actions then that he regarded de Gaulle as his chief in the enterprise.

Professor Cassin had joined de Gaulle soon after the Armistice. He was President of the Union des Anciens Combattants in France and a Doctor of Law. He had been an expert attached to the International Labour Office at Geneva and had escaped from France in June 1940 to join the Free French. General Sicé was the Chief of Medical Services in French Equatorial Africa at the time. Father d’Argenlieu, after a distinguished career as a young officer in the French navy, had become a Carmelite in 1920, being elected Provincial in 1939. He was recalled to the navy with the consent of his religious superiors on the outbreak of war and made prisoner at Cherbourg, but he escaped and made his way to England. He joined de Gaulle, at first as Chaplain to the Forces, but later as a sailor again, and he was wounded at Dakar.¹

De Gaulle’s order establishing the Council was accompanied by a manifesto which did not spare the Vichy Government, or, by implication, its head, Marshal Pétain. The manifesto² began by claiming that millions of Frenchmen were awaiting ‘leaders worthy of that name’, who had not suffered from the ‘inexcusable panic’ which had led their present so-called Government to conclude the armistice with Germany. It asserted that a ‘true French Government no longer exists’: that the organization installed at Vichy and which pretends to bear this name is unconstitutional and controlled by the invader. In its condition of servitude, this organization can be nothing but, and in fact is, an instrument used by the enemies of France against the honour and interest of the country. Hence a new power must assume the duty of directing the French war effort.

The text of the act setting up the Council of Defence of the Empire,³ couched in the customary phraseology of a French Ordonnance, was less open to criticism. It declared that ‘all parts of the Empire freed from control by the enemy’ would be administered ‘on the basis of French legislation enacted before 23 June 1940’ (that is, before the signature of the Armistice with Germany) ‘for so long as it shall remain impossible to form a French Government and a representation of the French people of a normal character, independent of the enemy’. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Ordonnance also laid down that ‘decisions are taken by the Chief of the Free French, after consultation, if occasion offers, with the Council of Defence’.

The possibility of setting up a Council for the Defence of the Empire had been discussed when the formal agreement was signed on 7 August

¹ See below, p. 450.
² For text see France, 6 January 1941; Muselier: De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, pp. 124-5.
between de Gaulle and the British Government, and the latter had provisionally agreed to the suggestion, on the condition that suitable persons should be available to compose it, and that the moment for its institution should be otherwise favourable. However, de Gaulle’s announcement from Brazzaville on 27 October was made without prior notice to the British Government, and consequently occasioned some surprise, while the accompanying manifesto created troublesome political reactions. For some time it had become increasingly obvious that de Gaulle’s not unnatural ambition for a greater measure of recognition and power to be accorded to his Movement ran ahead of the willingness of the British Government to accord them. The legality of the Vichy Government might remain dubious when debated on fine points by constitutional lawyers, but there was no doubt that the great majority of Frenchmen, willingly or unwillingly, acted as though accepting its jurisdiction. By no stretch of the imagination could de Gaulle be regarded as the Government of France. In addition, there was the ever present danger of the French fleet at Toulon which, despite doubtful assurances given by Admiral Darlan at the time of the Armistice, would certainly have obeyed the orders of the Vichy Government in the event of that Government’s declaring war on England. Finally, although diplomatic relations had been severed between Vichy and the United Kingdom, they remained intact, not only between Vichy and the United States, but between Vichy and Canada. It was, for obvious reasons, of great war value to the British Government that United States and Canadian representatives should remain at Vichy; while a further complication had arisen from the general attitude which the State Department in Washington felt obliged to adopt towards the Free French Movement.¹

In spite of these difficulties de Gaulle was officially informed on 24 December 1940 that the British Government were ready to treat with the Council of Defence, of which he had announced the establishment in the previous October, on all questions concerning collaboration with French overseas territories placing themselves under de Gaulle’s authority, both in matters affecting the association of the Free French forces with British forces in prosecuting the war against the common enemies, and in those affecting the political and economic interests of the French territories concerned.² At the same time it was made clear to de Gaulle that the British Government were not to be regarded as expressing any views on the various constitutional and juridical considerations raised by de Gaulle in any of his manifestoes or speeches.

The British Government had repeatedly and publicly given their assur-

¹ See below, pp. 460 seqq.
² The text of the British Government’s declaration was not issued until 5 January 1941; cf. France, 6 January 1941; Muselier: De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 127.
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ance that any French territory which rallied to de Gaulle as Leader of all Free Frenchmen in support of the Allied cause would, subject to the needs of the British war effort, receive economic assistance on a scale similar to that which the British Government would supply in comparable circumstances to the colonial territories of the British Empire.¹ This pledge was kept to the full. Detailed negotiations were undertaken at once with all the French colonies and provinces concerned, and were signed as soon as they could be worked out. Long before precise instruments had been signed, practical help to the Free French Empire was in full swing. On the British side the necessary work was effected through the appointment of consular and other officials, and through the expansion of the general Mission to the Free French Movement, headed by General, afterwards, Sir Edward Spears, which had been established with its headquarters in London in June 1940, and by the end of the year had branches at Brazzaville, Duala, and Fort Lamy, with a large centre in Cairo. On the French side some understandable difficulties were encountered owing to a shortage of trained officials and experts.

(f) The Part played by the Free French Movement in the Military Operations in North Africa, 1940–1

When de Gaulle returned to London at the end of November 1940, after his tour of Free French African territory (during which he made time to fly to Cairo for interviews with Wavell and appointed Catroux as his deputy there for all Middle East affairs), he found it necessary to spend some time reorganizing his headquarters. At the same time he pressed the British Government to undertake schemes for bringing over other French possessions to his cause, particularly Jibuti, St. Pierre, the Antilles, and French Guiana, in all of which he claimed that a majority of the people was on his side. However, political and military considerations compelled the British Government, for the time being, to confine their operation against these territories to as effective an economic blockade as naval strength allowed. Meanwhile Wavell’s successful drive against the Italians in Libya tended to overshadow Anglo-Free French affairs. Nevertheless a Free French military contingent played so distinguished a part in African operations against an enemy force superior in numbers that special mention was made of the gallant action of ‘our Free French Allies’, in a congratulatory message sent to Wavell by the King. In co-ordination with Wavell’s strategic plan for further operations in North Africa, a detachment of Free Frenchmen, including camel corps and mechanized troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Colonna d’Ornano, attacked Murzuq, a desert outpost in the Fezzân Oasis. This and the subsequent capture in March 1941 of Kufarâ in the Southern Desert, were entirely Free French

¹ Cf. above, p. 359.
operations. Both actions reflected the highest credit on the Free French officers and men who planned and carried them out. To reach Murzuq from Fort Lamy in Chad Territory, from which the former expedition started, it was necessary to cover 900 miles of scrub and desert, and thereafter to surprise a garrison, armed and entrenched, with food and ammunition enough to stand a long siege. The Free French task force was completely successful, though its commander was killed when leading his men into action with the most conspicuous gallantry. By the destruction of Italian aircraft and aerodromes at Murzuq, and by the capture of the garrison, a potential threat to Wavell's left flank was removed.

In the further advance to Kufarā the Free French column had to march 600 more miles over the most difficult country. The Italians were expecting them and could not be overwhelmed by a surprise rush at dawn. For over a month the Free French besieged Kufarā. Though husbanding their resources with great administrative skill, this enterprise almost failed; a withdrawal was contemplated. At the last moment a tactical advantage was gained, a breach effected in the defences and, in a frontal attack, Kufarā fell. The Italian lines of communication between Libya and Ethiopia were broken. In Ethiopia, too, a small Free French force operated under the British command of General Platt. Units of the Foreign Legion, colonial troops, Spahis and artillery, with a flight of French bombers, joined the British in Eritrea in the attack on Keren, and fought later at Masāwa, where de Gaulle himself was present. Telegraphing to the Prime Minister after the victory, de Gaulle declared anew that 'the Free French Forces will take part in the fight against our common enemy until the victory is complete'. In reply Churchill expressed the gratitude of the British Government for the help the Free French had given, declaring:

You, who have never faltered or failed in serving the common cause, possess the fullest confidence of His Majesty's Government, and you embody the hopes of millions of French men and French women who do not despair of the future of France and of the French Empire.

These military successes of Free French troops did much to steady the somewhat irregular pulse of relations between the Free French Movement and the British Government. Unfortunately Wavell's retreat from Benghazi and the overwhelming of Greece produced their inevitable psychological reactions, and, in their disappointment, Free French officers criticized unguardedly British generalship and even courage.

**Annex: The Anglo-Free French Expedition to Dakar, September 1940**

The full causes of the failure of the Anglo-Free French expedition to Dakar must remain to some extent a matter of opinion and controversy.
It seems clear that, whether or not Vichy became aware of the project, and if they did, whether their foreknowledge was due to indiscretions in public on the part of Gaullist officers, one of the chief roots of failure was inaccurate information. Free French Headquarters claimed to know that a high proportion of the military and air personnel at Dakar was favourable to de Gaulle, together with many senior officials, though it was recognized that the newly appointed Governor, Boisson, held firmly to Vichy. The defence of Dakar included more and heavier guns than either the British or French Intelligence suspected; the garrison was nearly double that estimated: while it was learned afterwards that it was content to obey the orders of its existing commanders who, if not unanimously and wholeheartedly supporters of Pétain, were in the majority dubious about that, to them, unknown factor, General Charles de Gaulle. There was, indeed, some support for de Gaulle among the merchants and civil population, but these were neither ardent nor organized.

Even so, the ill-fated expedition was further handicapped through a chapter of errors, whereby a Vichy convoy of three cruisers and three destroyers reached Dakar with reinforcements and stores before the Anglo-French expedition arrived. Apart from the strength added to the defence by these ships and a submarine or two from Casablanca, French marines and naval ratings, bitter with recent memories of Mers-el-Kebir, were landed to man the guns of the permanent defences in place of the normal personnel of coloured troops. Stocks of ammunition and torpedoes were increased. The morale of the garrison was correspondingly strengthened. Responsibility for this particular misfortune cannot be laid at the door of the Free French. The reinforcements left Toulon on 9 September, while the Allied expedition was on the high seas. The news of the squadron’s departure was cabled to London, but, owing to an administrative lapse, this highly important information was not brought to the notice of high authority for several days. Thereafter every possible measure was taken, but it was then too late. The cruisers and destroyers had long passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and there were no British warships in the neighbourhood strong enough to intercept them. They reached Dakar on the night of 14–15 September, a week before the expedition did.

Other misfortunes occurred. As originally conceived, the descent upon Dakar was to have taken place in the last few days of August; and this would have had the incidental result that the Allies would have arrived there before the Vichy reinforcements. Constant delays, some of which are difficult to excuse, postponed the date to 22 September. Certain British merchant ships accompanying the expedition were found, just before departure, to have been loaded for routine convoy and not for an operational landing, and had to be emptied and reloaded. Certain Free French merchant crews at first refused to sail because they had not been paid for
weeks. The speed of some of the merchant ships had been miscalculated, so that the convoy had to slow down. Late in the preparations it was realized that the warships would have to be refuelled before the operation, and therefore they had to proceed to Freetown and return to Dakar, instead of making the direct approach.

The arrangement was that the British navy should convoy de Gaulle and his troops to Dakar, and that de Gaulle should obey the orders of the British commanders until he and his forces had been established on land. In the event, they were never so established. De Gaulle adhered strictly to his agreement, and increased his reputation after the event by making no recriminations.

In its simplest terms the plan of operations was first to allow de Gaulle to bring the town over by peaceful means. Leaflets were to be dropped from the air. The general was to address the populace by radio from apparatus specially installed on shipboard. Flying French officers were to land on the aerodrome, and parlementaires, bearing a white flag, were to enter the harbour and seek speech with the Governor. The leaflets were swept up before they did any good. Few people appear to have heard de Gaulle’s broadcast, which was first delivered at an hour when the population was not accustomed to listen in. The Free French flying officers who landed on the aerodrome were overpowered and arrested. The parlementaires entering Dakar harbour were fired upon after an attempt had been made to arrest them also. D’Argenlieu, the chief envoy, was wounded. The guns of the defences opened fire.

The next stage of the operation, assuming the failure of the first, was for the British fleet to show itself. Unfortunately visibility had grown so poor that the fleet was forced to approach within two miles of the shore, and for half an hour underwent a bombardment in which ships were hit. In accordance with the prearranged plan, the fleet did not reply, though it engaged two submarines which made a motion to attack. It was now clear that the second stage of the plan had not succeeded. The sight of the British navy had been insufficient to overawe the French defenders.

In the afternoon the third stage of the plan began to be put into operation. This was for de Gaulle’s little force to be landed at the small port of Rufisque, some fifteen miles east of Dakar, whence it could take the town in the rear. For this operation the misty weather was as favourable as it had previously been a hindrance. The Free French force, however, had not landed by 5.30 p.m. (the hour appointed), and de Gaulle obeyed the order he then received from the British commander to return to the ships. Some Englishmen who accompanied the expedition believed that if de Gaulle had landed at this time the operation would have been successful. This must remain a matter of opinion.

On the morning of 24 September the British fleet bombarded Dakar for
some two and a half hours, and again in the afternoon. Ships suffered
damage from the return fire, which in no way slackened. On the 25th
the bombardment was renewed, but when H.M.S. Resolution was torpedoed
amidships the British High Command in London suggested abandoning
the operation. This was agreed to by the local commanders, and the force
withdrew, reaching Freetown without further loss on 27–28 September.

(ii) Stresses and Strains between the Free French and the
English-speaking Powers

(a) The Free French and Syria, June to September 1941

The revolt in 'Irāq and other events in the Middle East which preceded
the Allied advance into Syria are described elsewhere.\(^1\) In planning the
military operations the British authorities had agreed with de Gaulle that
a Free French Brigade, previously operating in Libya, should participate.
The complete subservience to German demands shown by the French
High Commissioner, General Dentz, was reported to be having consider-
able effect among his own troops who, however determined they might be
to cling to Pétain and to immediate personal security, viewed with growing
disfavour the increase of German influence over the French authorities.
Towards the end of May 1941 Colonel Collet crossed the frontier with
about 500 of the Circassian levies of which he was the commander, and
placed himself under the orders of Catroux who, as already mentioned,
was at that time de Gaulle's avowed deputy and representative in the
Middle East. The Free French division was moved from Egypt into
Palestine and on 8 June Allied troops advanced into Syria.

Since March de Gaulle himself had spent most of his time in Western
Africa. He was fully aware of the intention to use the Free French troops
in Syria, but his whereabouts prevented the British from consulting him
daily upon detailed plans for co-operation in the field; these were, there-
fore, worked out on the spot between General Wilson, C.-in-C. Allied
Forces in Syria, and Generals Catroux and de Larminat.\(^2\)

A proclamation was made in the name of the Free French by Catroux
on 8 June 1941 at the moment of the move into Syria.\(^3\) This proclamation,

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\(^1\) See p. 379 above, and, for a full account, Survey for 1939-46: The Middle East in the War, pp. 56–98.

\(^2\) De Gaulle subsequently complained that he had been kept insufficiently informed, but any
blame for this attached to his own deputy and brigade commander, who could have com-
uncinated freely with him since all Free French forces had been provided by the British with
ciphers and other facilities for secret correspondence.

\(^3\) Great Britain, Foreign Office: Statements of Policy by the United Kingdom in respect of Syria and
the Lebanon, 8th June–9th September 1941, Cmd. 6600 [referred to hereafter as Cmd. 6600] (London,
H.M.S.O., 1943), pp. 2–3; Catroux: Dans la bataille de Méditerranée, pp. 137–8; Documents
worked out in detail between Catroux and the appropriate British authorities, and approved by the British Government, was of high political significance, stating, as it did, that the Free French were entering Syria and Lebanon to free these territories, to put an end to the Mandate system, and to give them the independence which they had long demanded. It promised the Syrians and Lebanese a new treaty defining their relations with France. This declaration was endorsed by the British Government in a separate statement made on the same day by Sir Miles Lampson, then the British Ambassador in Cairo.1 Later this proclamation and its endorsement by the British Government gave rise to serious trouble. The immediate intention was to encourage the local inhabitants and troops recruited from among them to throw off the yoke of Dentz and to support the Allies. Contrary to Free French intelligence reports and expectations it had no such effect. All local levies went into action against the Free French troops with at least as much alacrity as they displayed in engaging the British. Civilians took up a somewhat analogous attitude. While few were ready to support the Free French and the average civilian inhabitant betrayed no marked enthusiasm for the British, Syrian and Lebanese politicians wanted self-government. A number of these last warmly welcomed the British endorsement of the Catroux Declaration and thereby revived all the old jealousy and suspicions of the French that Britain was plotting to oust France from her position in the Levant. These suspicions were not dispelled, even by a letter from Lyttelton to de Gaulle, dated 7 August 1941, in which the British Minister said:

I am happy to repeat to you the assurance that Great Britain has no interest in Syria or the Lebanon, except to win the war. We have no desire to encroach in any way upon the position of France. Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. When this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the predominant position in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power.2

In the days following Dunkirk and the first British retreat from Benghazi in the spring of 1941 the political leaders in the Levant, who desired above all to free themselves from French tutelage, had turned to the Germans as being their most likely saviours in the situation as they saw it. With the collapse of the 'Irāqi revolt and the British entry into Syria, together with the British guarantee of the Free French promise to give Syria independence, the hopes of many persons in the Levant turned towards Britain. There were several other political leaders who felt that English and

1 Cmd. 6600, p. 2; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 173.

2 The text of the letter and of de Gaulle’s reply is printed in Cmd. 6600, pp. 3-4; Catroux: Dans la bataille de Méditerranée, pp. 182-3; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 176.
French, of no matter what brand or vintage, were incurable exploiters of Middle East peoples. Such persons preferred to see which way the cat was going to jump before committing themselves.

Further difficulties arose through the expressed unwillingness of the Free French Foreign Legion to fire upon French white troops, and more especially upon units of the Legion adhering to Vichy. Their objection had substance. It was bad enough for Frenchmen to fire on Frenchmen. This horrid notion had rightly perturbed de Gaulle from the very beginning of his enterprise. While ready, in the face of the provocation he had received, to order his troops to fire if attacked by Frenchmen, and to interpret thus liberally the relevant clause in the agreement of 7 August 1940,¹ he had made clear his ardent desire to avoid this as far as possible. The situation of a légionnaire was rendered even more delicate by reason of his oath of service to the Head of the French Republic, and of the conditions under which he had been accepted as a member of his famous corps. For a time the Free French Brigade had to be withdrawn from the line. In cold blood it is easier to see both sides of a question; but, in the middle of a considerable battle, the unexpected disappearance of an important part of his force is disconcerting to a commanding general.

It seems likely that this and other troublesome incidents, arising through the difference of language and accustomed procedure, helped to foster bad feeling between the Free French and British on the spot, and were largely responsible for some of the otherwise inexplicable events connected with the armistice in Syria on 14 July. It is, however, only fair to state that, whatever may have been the doubts about the value of the Free French Brigade in the earlier moves of this short campaign, Free French troops under Legentilhomme covered themselves with every distinction in the later stages of the fighting on the Damascus front. Unfortunately, during this last phase of the operations, it was found necessary to undertake the bombardment of thickly populated centres, and this in no way tended to warm the hearts of the local inhabitants towards Frenchmen, free or other.

The terms of the Levant Armistice² were worked out between the generals concerned, and it seems doubtful if London would have agreed to all of them, as phrased and subsequently interpreted, had the British Government been consulted at every stage. Vichy troops were to receive the honours of war, and any who preferred not to join de Gaulle were guaranteed repatriation to France. This was perhaps not open to objection, but an additional protocol contained a provision that no personal contact was to be allowed between Vichy troops and Allied emissaries. Since the

¹ See above, p. 439.
² For text see The Times, 16 July 1941; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 137.
majority of the Vichy officers markedly preferred repatriation to continuing the war in the Free French Movement, and since their troops were confined to barracks by their orders, it is difficult to understand how it was possible in practice for any of the latter to rally to de Gaulle. Moreover, the Anglo-Vichy Commission elected to interpret the armistice in a manner extremely favourable to the Vichy French, and appeared to go out of their way to do honour to the officers and men who had recently fought against the Allies, while treating the Free French Brigade much less favourably. The latter were, for example, compelled to camp and billet themselves in out of the way places with no comforts or facilities, while Vichy troops enjoyed the amenities of comfortable hotels and barracks. Restaurants were reserved for Vichy personnel and forbidden to admit Free Frenchmen. These measures for preventing contact between the two sorts of Frenchmen were most galling to the Free French and were hardly in the spirit of the agreement, interpretative of the Levant Armistice, which had been signed on 24 July. In this agreement reference was made to the freedom of choice to join de Gaulle or not which was to be allowed to Vichy French officers and men, and the following sentence appeared in Article II:

The liberty of choice can only mean that the Free French authorities will be allowed to explain their point of view to the personnel concerned with the same fullness and freedom granted to the Vichy authorities by the fact of the presence of Vichy officers and non-commissioned officers with their men.

Whatever this clause was supposed to mean it had no effect in practice. Conditions established under the Vichy interpretation of the armistice of 14 July continued, with the result that out of the 38,000 Vichy officers and men in Syria at the opening of the campaign more than 35,000 were repatriated to France during the autumn of 1941. These figures, even if only approximate, speak for themselves, though it must be said on the other side that at this period of the war there was evidence of very bitter antagonism between those Frenchmen who had chosen to adhere to Vichy and the followers of de Gaulle. Each side called the other traitor and forsworn. Such an attitude did not facilitate conversion. So strong was this feeling, which arose on both sides out of the peculiar psychological effects of the bitterness of defeat, that even the underground Resistance Movement in metropolitan France, which was already growing and conducting itself with the utmost gallantry and self-sacrifice, was inclined to regard itself as indigenous and autonomous rather than as part of the Free French Movement, though it collaborated enthusiastically with the British.

1 For text see Catroux: *Dans la bataille de Méditerranée*, pp. 166-8.

2 See above, pp. 419 seqq.
The terms of the Levant Armistice not unnaturally aroused much discontent among the Free French. Before he learned of the additional Protocol, de Gaulle had broadcast from Brazzaville on 16 July, formally reserving judgement 'on the Armistice concluded by our British Allies with Vichy'. When the full terms became known, the London headquarters of the Movement protested against them,¹ and de Gaulle went post haste from Brazzaville to Cairo to see the Resident British Minister of State, Oliver Lyttelton.

De Gaulle certainly had a case and one which the British Government were ready to consider. Unfortunately, overwrought as he was by events and by reports from his own officers in Syria that the British were apparently doing everything in their power to humiliate their Free French allies, he permitted himself to make statements in public which alienated sympathy. Amongst other things de Gaulle announced that, as from 24 July at noon, he intended to reassume full and entire freedom to dispose of all French armed forces in the Middle East in whatever way he thought best, without consultation with the British. This would have been a clear breach of his basic agreement of 7 August 1940 with the British Government.

For a short time it looked as though the Free French Movement in its existing form might disintegrate, but the rifts were patched up. De Gaulle withdrew his previous declaration and recognized once more that the Free French forces in the Levant must be under British command; while the British Government agreed that, as soon as the independence of Syria and Lebanon had been secured, France should enjoy a predominant position in those territories over any other European Power.

These decisions were embodied in two agreements drawn up between de Gaulle and Lyttelton on 25 July.² De Gaulle conceded that the Middle East constituted a single theatre of operations in which a co-ordinated policy was necessary for defensive and offensive military operations, and also that the British High Command in the Levant must be free to take all necessary measures of defence against the common enemy. The British and French commands would jointly draw up any plan of operations entailing the employment of French with British forces, but, in view of the existing preponderance of British forces in the Middle East, the British command in the field would determine the role to be played by French forces by delegation from de Gaulle. If, however, any defence measures or offensive plans were considered by de Gaulle's officers to be contrary to

¹ According to Soustelle (Envers et contre tout, i. 251), de Gaulle telegraphed his disapproval of the Armistice to Cassin, Secretary of the Free French Council in London, and the Council, on 17 July, informed the Foreign Office of their attitude; cf. Catroux: Dans la bataille de Méditerranée, pp. 160-1.

the interests of France, the question would be put to the British Government and to de Gaulle to be settled between them. Public services, general security, and local resources should appertain to the French authority in Syria and Lebanon, but de Gaulle accepted the attachment of a section of the British Military Security Service to the Sûreté Générale of the Levant States. Certain other details such as the raising and employment of local levies were also agreed.

In view of the attitude taken by de Gaulle at this time, some doubts existed whether he really intended to implement the public promise of independence made to the Levant States in his name by Catroux. On 9 August Catroux did, however, settle with General Wilson details of all military problems in the Levant on the basis of the Lyttelton–de Gaulle Agreement. Catroux thus acquired powers of civilian government, having been previously appointed by de Gaulle Délégué Général and thus the highest military authority in the area. Nominally the ordering of Syria and Lebanon, apart from questions affecting military security, was the province of the Free French, but Catroux’s administration could hardly have lasted a week had British military control been withdrawn. As it was, open unrest was only curbed by the Syrian and Lebanese expectation that the promises of independence made to them by Catroux himself would soon be carried out in a practical manner. The British looked for this as well. Some of Catroux’s lieutenants, particularly Collet and others with special experience of local politics, endorsed it, but for some reason, which may not have been unconnected with de Gaulle’s attitude, events moved slowly. It was not until many negotiations had taken place that Catroux published, on 27 September, a declaration of Syrian independence, but retained to himself the powers of Commander-in-Chief of all military, including Syrian National, forces; he also reserved the right to declare French martial law at will, thereby virtually abrogating the independence that he was nominally recognizing, and he maintained French control over the censorship. Not unnaturally the declaration was received without enthusiasm. Neither Turkey nor ‘Irāq would recognize the new Constitution, the Turks maintaining that their relations with Vichy prevented their recognizing a Government set up under Free French auspices; the ‘Irāqīs declaring that, while they would always recognize true Syrian independence, they could not regard the Government set up by Catroux as constitutional. Even the United States maintained an attitude of reserve. In this atmosphere of doubt and frustration Catroux opened negotiations with Lebanese notables with a view to setting up a government in Lebanon analogous to that in Syria. An uneasy peace was maintained in the Levant States for a year.

1 Cf. Catroux: Dans la bataille de Méditerranée, p. 184.
(b) The Formation of the Free French National Committee,
24 September 1941

Thus, fears of disruption of the Free French Movement through friction between de Gaulle and the British Government seemed temporarily to have been allayed, but it was thought desirable for de Gaulle to return to London as soon as possible for a comprehensive discussion of all outstanding differences. He did not respond with alacrity to the resultant invitation, but went back to Equatorial Africa; and there a new crisis arose. De Gaulle received at Brazzaville a representative of the United States press, who promptly published his talk with the general as an official ‘interview’ in a number of American newspapers. Apart from certain references to the British which purported to be an exact translation of statements made by de Gaulle, and were far from complimentary to his ally, the interview contained what seemed to be a public offer to the United States, at that time still a neutral country, of military facilities and bases in territories which had come over to Free France. The United States Government were no less embarrassed by this unsolicited offer of assistance than were the British Government by the tone and nature of the whole alleged interview. To his credit, de Gaulle issued a public repudiation before being requested through diplomatic channels for an explanation. However, although he claimed that the published story was unauthorized and incorrect, this was felt in London hardly to wipe out the whole affair, since it was common report that the general had been indulging somewhat freely in anti-British talk on several previous occasions.

In consequence, de Gaulle’s reception by the British Government was decidedly cold when he eventually returned to London in September. All this unpleasantness brought into the open political deficiencies in the relations between the Free French Movement and the British Government—not to say the rest of the world. There existed no means whereby the policies of de Gaulle could gain the approval of any sort of free popular vote. His whole juridical position differed fundamentally from that of refugee Governments in England, all of which had at one time or another been elected by the peoples whom they claimed to represent and which, therefore, had good titles to exercise constitutional rights under international law. Even the Czechoslovak National Committee, headed by Beneš, which more closely resembled the Free French Movement, differed from it in the two points that it did not claim to govern any territory, and that its President was an outstanding figure in Czech affairs whose hold on the affection of a majority of his countrymen could be denied by no one. De Gaulle now claimed to rule some millions of French colonials and large tracts of the French Empire, and to command armed forces on sea, land,

1 c.g. Chicago Daily News, 27 August 1941.
2 See below, p. 592.
and in the air, but he had never been elected to any political position by the French people at any time, and there was also no evidence that the electorate of metropolitan France would select him as their constitutional head, had they freedom of choice.

The British Government consequently informed de Gaulle of their anxieties and suggested to him that the time had come for the formation of a committee of Frenchmen who had made themselves prominent in the Movement. De Gaulle would doubtless be chairman or president of this committee, and would have the right in consultation with his colleagues to nominate its members and allocate their duties; but that measure of recognition and support, both material and psychological, hitherto accorded to the Movement through the person of de Gaulle would only continue if transferred to some such committee as a whole.

De Gaulle readily fell in with this suggestion. By a series of decrees, published in London on 24 September 1941, he created a 'National Committee' to be composed of 'Commissioners' nominated by himself. The Commissioners were to 'exercise all the functions, individual or collective, normally falling to the lot of a French Cabinet Minister'. The first nominations were to be:

President:
National Commissioner for Economics, Finance, and Colonies:
National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs:
National Commissioner for War:
National Commissioner for the Navy and Merchant Marine:
National Commissioner for Justice and Education:
National Commissioner for Home Affairs; Labour and Information:
National Commissioner for Air:
National Commissioner (without Portfolio):

General de Gaulle
René Pleven
Maurice Dejean
General Legentilhomme
Vice-Admiral Muselier
Professor René Cassin
André Diethelm
General Valin
Captain Thierry d'Argenlieu

Pleven was also charged with the special duty of co-ordinating departments concerned with civil administration, but during his absence from London these duties, as well as those of the National Commissioner for Economics, Finance, and Colonies, were to be undertaken by Diethelm. During the absence of Legentilhomme the duties of the National Commissioner for War were to be undertaken by General Petit, Chief of the Staff.

On the same day, 24 September, de Gaulle took the opportunity of republishing the list of members of the Council for the Defence of the

1 France, 26 September 1941; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 178.
French Empire, formed on 27 October 1940.\(^1\) Cassin's name was omitted. The posts held at this date by the other members were described as:

- **General Catroux**: Délégué Général and plenipotentiary, Commander-in-Chief in the Levant
- **Vice-Admiral Muselier**: National Commissioner for the Navy and Merchant Marine
- **General of the Medical Service Sicé**: High Commissioner of Free French Africa
- **Governor-General Éboué**: Governor General of French Equatorial Africa
- **General de Larminat**: Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief in the Levant
- **Governor Sautot**: Governor of New Caledonia and High Commissioner of France for the New Hebrides
- **Captain Thierry d'Argenlieu**: National Commissioner without portfolio
- **General Leclerc de Haute-cloque**: Commander of the Chad Forces

De Gaulle was officially informed in writing on 26 September 1941\(^2\) that 'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared to regard the Free French National Committee as representing all Free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to the Free French Movement in support of the Allied cause'. At the same time he was told that the British Government were ready to treat with the National Committee on all questions involving the collaboration of Fighting France and of French Overseas Territories placing themselves under the authority of the Committee.

For the time being this step greatly improved mutual relations. It was recognized that most members of the new National Committee, being nominated by de Gaulle, would be unlikely to withstand his demands beyond a certain point, but it was felt that the increase in prestige and authority thus accorded to a Commissioner, whoever he might be, together with the fact that it was proposed to treat with individual Commissioners departmentally, in accordance with their duties, would tend to modify any reality as well as semblance of a dictatorship which had previously rendered the Free French Movement open to criticism, particularly in the United States.

The new arrangement seemed also to be pleasing to de Gaulle, who doubtless was himself not wholly unaware of the dangerous and difficult personal position which he had attained, and which consorted ill with his claim to be the representative of Republican France. His public references to Anglo-French relations were happy and even generous, and for the time

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\(^1\) See above, pp. 444-7.

being tension on both sides relaxed; while he busied himself in organizing
and reorganizing the new machine, which was considerably strengthened
during the next few months by the arrival in England of several French-
men with previous experience of politics or administration.

(c) The Free French and the United States, 1940–1

The Japanese attack on the American fleet in Pearl Harbour on 7
December 1941 did not immediately affect the fortunes of the Free
French. The National Committee hastened to offer any facilities which
the United States might require in Free French possessions in the Far East,
and hopes were entertained at the London headquarters of the Movement
that the United States might thenceforward display a more forthcoming
attitude towards the Movement.

De Gaulle’s bold defiance in 1940 had not really caught and held the
imagination of the American people. As in many other countries of the
American continent, de Gaulle’s defiance had found support among local
Frenchmen. Free French Committees had been set up in twenty-four
sovereign states of North, Central, and South America, including the
United States itself, but the persons at the head of these committees were
usually less eminent than the regular diplomatic representatives of the
Vichy Government, and even than other publicly known Frenchmen
living in those countries. Many Frenchmen, opposed to the Armistice but
not yet willing to commit themselves to the Free French Movement, had
taken refuge in the Americas. The resultant quarrels and encounters
between local Frenchmen embarrassed and disgusted the Americans, who
were perhaps too ready to assume the real leaders of the Movement in
England to be but little better balanced than their self-appointed followers.
Over and above all this, there was an understanding between the British
and American Governments that the United States should, for the time
being, maintain diplomatic relations with Vichy, buttressing and shep-
herding that admittedly deplorable régime and persuading it by bribes or
threats to offer, wherever possible, tacit resistance to further German
demands, while England would support de Gaulle in so far as that should
prove possible without precipitating a state of war with the Pétain Govern-
ment.

The United States Government were particularly anxious to avoid
complications arising in French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.
By the Act of Havana of 30 July 1940 the United States had undertaken
not to recognize any changes of status due to the war in foreign possessions
in the Western Hemisphere. This act was intended to forestall any future

1 Hull: Memoirs, i. 805–6. On the American attitude see also Survey for 1939–46: America,
Britain, and Russia, p. 45 and note 2.
2 Details of this act will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
German attempt to encroach on these territories or their rights, but it also made it difficult for the United States to approve, and still less to assist in, the replacement of Vichy by Gaullist control of French colonial territory in or bordering the Western Atlantic, so long as the United States continued to act as though they regarded Pétain’s Government as the legitimate Government of France and the French Empire.

As time went on the State Department displayed an increasing irritation with the activities of the various bodies which were struggling among themselves for recognition as the only official representative of de Gaulle in the United States. Their irritation was not allayed by the interpretations placed by certain sections of the United States press on public utterances made by de Gaulle or his supporters. Policy demanded the maintenance of relations with Vichy, but few American citizens, and certainly not Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, either liked or admired the Pétain régime. Moreover, the State Department strongly suspected that de Gaulle was right in claiming that a significant majority in French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Pierre, and Miquelon would be willing to throw off allegiance to Pétain if given due encouragement.

A statement that the United States was supporting neither Pétain nor de Gaulle, in the early part of 1941, could be accepted as broadly accurate. At the same time it was difficult to deny that the very fact of the recognition of Vichy by the United States militated against de Gaulle, while the fruits of that recognition gave practical support to Vichy which was denied to Free France. For example, in August 1940, French Guiana showed unmistakable signs of wishing to rally to de Gaulle. Vichy announced the forthcoming dispatch from France of Carde as Governor of the Colony to restore order and tie more tightly the bond with Pétain. De Gaulle wished to anticipate Carde’s arrival by appointing his own nominee who was immediately available, and who would, of course, have at once won over French Guiana to Free France. The United States Government would not permit this, whereas they did allow the French admiral, Robert (who, with a small fleet including the aircraft carrier Béarn, was at Martinique and had personally opted for Vichy), to send reinforcements to French Guiana, which quelled the indigenous rising. A similar opportunity of rallying Martinique and Guadeloupe in the autumn of 1940 was missed owing to the refusal of the State Department to agree. Moreover, the United States permitted normal trade with the French West Indies in order to prevent riots in the islands and to keep life there normal. This in fact meant keeping de Gaulle out, since there was reason to suppose that

1 Great annoyance had been caused, for instance, by de Gaulle’s manifesto of 27 October 1940 on the occasion of the formation of the Council for the Defence of the French Empire (see p. 441 above), since this appeared to call in question the validity of the United States Government’s recognition of the Vichy Government.
the British policy of exerting economic pressure upon French colonies might act as a final weight in turning the scales in favour of de Gaulle.

British policy, as publicly announced, was to take all practical steps to close down the import and export trade of all French possessions adhering to Vichy in conformity with the economic pressure exercised against metropolitan France, while declaring that any French colony rallying to de Gaulle would be treated economically as well as the United Kingdom could afford to treat her own possessions. Proof of the reality of this promise was accorded by the cases of French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons. At the same time it could not be denied that economic pressure had failed to rally Jibuti. In April 1941 the United States Government, who were inclined to favour trying a different policy, decided to dispatch to French North Africa special observers in a consular capacity with authority to afford economic help and thus relax the existing blockade. The State Department had always hoped that some third person would arise with a better claim to represent France than either Pétain or de Gaulle. Their hopes had become concentrated upon General Weygand, who might, they believed, set up the standard of revolt in North Africa, whither he had been sent as Pétain’s deputy. This misplaced confidence in Weygand never faded until he was dismissed by Pétain, with no resistance on his part, on 19 November 1941.

A few weeks before this, in September 1941, Pleven had been received in Washington by the Secretary of State, who indicated that he was not prepared to grant to the Free French National Committee any greater measure of recognition than had already been extended by the United States to de Gaulle. At the same time Hull appeared to be somewhat more impressed than heretofore with the Free French case, and showed marked interest in detailed information about Vichy persons and policies which Pleven was able to give him at first hand.

Up to this time the United States had firmly refused to grant Free France benefits under the Lend-Lease Act. Even American trade with Free French colonies was discouraged, though it continued with the French West Indies and North Africa up to the fall of Weygand. In the autumn of 1941, however, the United States sent a military mission under Colonel Cunningham to French Equatorial Africa to reconnoitre the situation. Presumably its reports were not wholly unfavourable. One result at least was to improve commercial relations between the United States and Free French Africa. On 11 November 1941 the President suddenly took the step of informing the Lend-Lease Administrator that the defence of the territories under the control of ‘The French Volunteer Forces’ was vital for the defence of the United States.\footnote{Inter-Allied Review, no. 11, 15 December 1941, p. 13; cf. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941–1942, p. 178, note 1; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 183.} The National Committee
was accordingly made eligible for re-transfers of British deliveries of Lend-Lease equipment, but would receive this 'as a military unit' and not in any sense as a sovereign government.

The relations between the Free French Movement and Canada ran along somewhat similar lines. If on the one hand Canada, a belligerent, was less careful than the United States in her relations with Vichy, the existence of the French Canadians, who were at first inclined to regard de Gaulle as an ambitious upstart, complicated the situation. D'Argenlieu was sent on a mission to Canada in March 1941 and took firm measures to reorganize the Free French Movement there. After successful interviews with Cardinal Villeneuve and other French Canadian leaders he returned to England in May 1941, having done much to influence Canadian political thought in favour of the Free French.

(d) The St. Pierre and Miquelon Incident, December 1941

The prospect for future relations between the Free French National Committee and the states of the North American continent was thus brighter when on Christmas eve, 1941, Admiral Muselier with a small Free French squadron landed on St. Pierre and raised the flag of Free France in that island and in Miquelon, without the foreknowledge or consent of the British, United States, or Canadian Governments. These little islands had become of an importance on the great stage of the war quite out of relation to their size, owing to the existence in St. Pierre of a powerful transatlantic wireless station, which, under prevailing conditions, was controlled by Vichy. This station served not only as a distributing centre for Vichy and pro-Axis propaganda, but was one of the chief means whereby the Vichy and German Governments were able rapidly to communicate instructions in cipher to their agents and supporters in the Western Hemisphere, and to receive secret information in return. The British were in favour of removing this thorn from their flesh and, for their part, were willing that this should be achieved by the rallying of the islands to Fighting France. However, recognizing that the United States, though now a belligerent, might still be embarrassed by this procedure, the views of the United States Government were sought and de Gaulle, who for some time had been pressing for permission to undertake the requisite operation, was informed that consent could not be given pending a reply from Washington.

On 16 December the State Department referred the matter to the President, who at once said that he was strongly opposed to any action by the Free French in connexion with St. Pierre. In their turn, the Canadian Government, recognizing the military desirability of removing the wireless station from Axis control, proposed to effect this by a landing of

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1 Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1129.
Canadian forces, who would take over the station while leaving other administration in the islands in Vichy hands. The French National Committee was at once informed officially of these developments, and told that the British Government could consequently not consent to action at St. Pierre by Free France. Thereupon Dejean, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, while expressing deep regret at this decision, gave an assurance in the name of the National Committee that no Free French action would take place.

Meanwhile Muselier was in Canada, having left England on 25 November to visit his ships in Iceland and Newfoundland, with the consent of all concerned. He also took occasion to visit Ottawa in the hope of cementing the good will built up in the Dominion by d'Argenlieu during the preceding spring. It was known to have been de Gaulle's plan, had the operation received the approval of the British Government, that Muselier, on leaving Canada, should put in at St. Pierre and secure the island for Free France. The assurance given by Dejean—that the National Committee would take no action—specifically referred to action which might otherwise be taken by Muselier who, on 17 December, had interviews with the Canadian Department of External Affairs and with the United States Minister at Ottawa, giving the latter an assurance, according to the State Department, that he would not proceed to St. Pierre on his own initiative and without instructions or permission. The astonishment and embarrassment in London was, therefore, all the greater at receiving information on Christmas day from Muselier himself that, on the preceding day, acting on an order quite recently received from de Gaulle and at the request of the inhabitants, he had landed at St. Pierre, and had without bloodshed conducted a plebiscite of the islanders, who gave a nearly unanimous vote to join Free France. He had therefore taken over the administration and the wireless station in the name of the National Committee.1

It is hard to judge precisely what occurred. Subsequent inquiries strongly supported the view that the National Committee was as much surprised as were the British Government. Assertions made during the unfortunate quarrel which arose between Muselier and de Gaulle upon the former's return to England lent additional colour to a story that, on or about 20 December, de Gaulle in person, without consulting the National Committee, had elected to disregard the assurances given by Dejean to the British Government, and had telegraphed a formal order to Muselier to occupy the islands. It was not easy to convince the United States or Canada that, even if not privy to some such plot, the British Government were not in some way to blame for the event. However, the **fait accompli**

was accepted, albeit grudgingly. By good fortune a representative of the United States press was present in St. Pierre during the incident and accepted a cordial invitation from Muselier to be present and observe the working of the plebiscite. He commented publicly and favourably on the impartiality of the procedure adopted, which showed that an overwhelming majority of the islanders had voted, without compulsion, to join Free France. Nevertheless, the prestige of de Gaulle and Free France suffered a severe setback for the time being; and it is probably true to say that Roosevelt and Cordell Hull never forgave de Gaulle completely, and thereafter were inclined to regard him as a man whose word could not be trusted.

(e) Dissensions in the Free French Movement, 1942

Between January and March 1942 rumours leaked out from Free French headquarters of a crisis in the internal affairs of the National Committee. As early as September 1941, at the time of the formation and recognition of the National Committee, considerable disagreement was known to have existed between Muselier and de Gaulle. In broad outline the admiral complained that the general knew nothing about naval matters, but was interfering in the management of the Free French fleet; while the general complained in his turn that the admiral was intriguing against his authority as head of the Movement. Muselier had let it be known at the time that he would have wished to see upon the National Committee at least one Commissioner, other than himself, whose loyalty to the Movement exceeded, in the admiral’s opinion, his admiration for the person of de Gaulle: in fact, he accused the general of only nominating ‘yes-men’, and consequently of aiming at maintaining the somewhat dictatorial position which he had previously enjoyed by force of circumstance. These internal dissensions, which temporarily subsided during Muselier’s absence, came to the surface once more with renewed vigour upon the admiral’s return to England in January after the St. Pierre incident. Muselier was not entirely without support upon the National Committee, but undoubtedly in the eyes of the greater number of Commissioners de Gaulle could do little wrong. The quarrel was given publicity in the Free French, and even in the British, press, and strengthened the suspicions already rife in some quarters that de Gaulle’s autocratic outlook and methods had a decidedly Fascist tinge. In the end Muselier resigned his position as National Commissioner for the Navy and Merchant Marine on 4 March 1942, and was replaced by de Gaulle’s nominee, Admiral Auboyneau.

Some confusion still persisted, however, since Muselier claimed that he had only resigned the post of National Commissioner, not that of Com-

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1 See above, p. 363, for the friction between the British and the American Governments over the St. Pierre incident, and for the settlement finally reached on the status of the islands.
mander-in-Chief of the Free French navy, which, at that date, numbered forty-nine warships manned by Free French crews, in all about 4,300. Moreover, he began by insisting that the position of Commander-in-Chief was his as of right and could not be taken from him by de Gaulle, in view of the fact that in 1940 he had joined not de Gaulle or the Free French Movement—of which he had not then heard—but the Allies personified by the British. The deadlock was ultimately resolved, without trouble occurring among the sailors, with whom Muselier was popular, by the admiral's refraining from taking any further part in Free French affairs until the National Committee joined with General Giraud's forces in North Africa in 1943.¹

(f) The Madagascar Question

At the beginning of 1942 certain aspects of the situation in Madagascar had caused concern. It was suspected that Japanese submarines were using the main port of Diego Suarez for refuelling and as an overseas base for attacks on Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean. It was consequently decided to occupy this port. To that end a British expedition set sail from England in March. The whole affair was kept secret, and the Free French National Committee was not informed, though de Gaulle, incited by warnings in the South African press of the danger of the occupation of Madagascar by Japanese forces, was known to be preparing a plan of his own for winning over Madagascar, by force if necessary. The decision not to inform the Free French of the British intention was taken partly for reasons of security, and partly since it was believed, as a result of experience in Syria in 1941, that there would be less resistance to British occupation of the island if the Free French were not associated with the venture. The Governor of Madagascar at this time was Annet, who had been prevented from taking up an appointment as Governor of the Cameroons in 1940 in the interests of the Pétain Government by the earlier arrival of Colonel Leclerc, who had rallied the territory to de Gaulle.² A firm supporter of Vichy, his attitude towards the Free French was therefore further embittered on personal grounds. Moreover, he was known to hold views similar to those of Germain and Antoine, Governor-General and Secretary respectively of Jibuti, who were immovably opposed to any bargain with the Allies which would result in French Somaliland coming under Free French control.³

¹ Before this internal crisis in the Movement had been solved, the British Government had decided to place their relations with the National Committee on a new footing by accrediting a diplomatic mission to it in place of the military mission under General Spears through which liaison had hitherto been maintained. The diplomatic mission, whose head, Charles Peake, was received by de Gaulle on 12 February 1942, was accredited to the Free French National Committee as a whole, but not in a manner that could be interpreted as according any recognition of the Committee as a sovereign government.

² See above, p. 443.

³ This small French colony, although cut off by land as the result of successful Allied operations...
Diego Suarez was captured on 7 May 1942, but before that date knowledge of the arrival of the British expedition had inevitably become public property. The fact that the operation had been kept secret from the Free French caused consternation throughout the whole Movement. The National Committee protested formally against not having been consulted beforehand and not having been invited to participate. They urged, first, that Free French forces should take part in the occupation and defence of Madagascar as soon as possible and, in fact, should be dispatched at once in order to be present at further operations to occupy the capital, Antananarivo, and the rest of the island. Secondly, the National Committee demanded that the administration of the island should be handed over to them, so that French sovereignty should not be interrupted. Thirdly, doubtless having Jibuti in mind, the National Committee requested that the whole problem of French possessions in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea should be examined. Apart from any question of personal pride, de Gaulle was able to point out that the unilateral action taken by the British lent colour to Vichy propaganda to the effect that the British Government intended to absorb into the British Empire any French colonies which threw off their allegiance to Pétain, and that the action by the British in Madagascar had begun to persuade the people of the other French possessions administered by the Free French to believe this. He asked that, in order to allay these rumours, permission should at least be given for an accredited representative of the Free French Movement to leave at once for Diego Suarez.

The British Government were unable to agree immediately, even to de Gaulle’s minimum request for the dispatch forthwith of a Free French liaison officer to Diego Suarez, since negotiations were on foot with Governor Annet for the surrender of the whole island. These negotiations came to nothing, but it was decided not to advance for the time being beyond the Diego Suarez area, since the capture of that port had achieved the prime object of the operation—the denial of its use to the enemy. In consequence, on 13 May 1942 a communiqué was issued, in agreement with de Gaulle, to the effect that the British Government had undertaken the operation at Diego Suarez so as to prevent the territory being used by the Axis. The communiqué added:

It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that the Free French National Committee should play its due part in the administration of the liberated French

in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and blockaded by sea, remained a Vichy enclave until after the landings in Normandy in 1944. Negotiations for the surrender of Jibuti broke down more than once—if they can ever be said really to have started—owing to Germain’s demand that the terms should include a pledge that the British would not allow de Gaulle or the Free French Movement to play any part in the administration of the colony, and the British refusal to give such a pledge.

1 Cf. Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, i. 338.
territory, since the National Committee is co-operating with the United Nations as the representative of fighting France.¹

This communiqué, together with a broadcast by de Gaulle on 14 May,² allayed to a great extent the vague fears which had arisen in the Free French Empire, either that the British proposed eventually to seize French territory, or that the Free French Movement was about to break up, or both. Shortly afterwards de Gaulle agreed not to press for a share in the administration of Madagascar so long as only the fortress area at Diego Suarez was occupied, and in mid-July consent was given for Colonel Pechkoff, the representative of the National Committee in South Africa, to pay a short official visit to Diego Suarez as Free French liaison officer, largely in the hope that de Gaulle might realize from the eyewitness reports of his own representative the unwillingness of Vichy officers and administrators to rally to his Movement. Certain of the Senegalese troops expressed their readiness to join the Free French forces, but practically all their white officers preferred to be interned in South Africa.

Negotiations with Annet continued during the summer, but by the beginning of September it was clear that the island would not be surrendered without further resort to force, and on 9 September British troops began to advance from the Diego Suarez area. They occupied Tamatave on 13 September and Antananarivo, the capital, on 23 September, but it was not until 5 November that an armistice was signed with the Vichy forces. Meanwhile, at the end of October, negotiations had begun between the British and the Free French authorities on the question of the administration of Madagascar, and on 14 December an agreement was signed between Eden and de Gaulle. This agreement,³ which was to come into force on the day of the arrival of a High Commissioner, to be appointed by the French National Committee, and was to cover Madagascar and Réunion, announced as its objects the mutual desire to take all measures necessary to re-establish as soon as possible the exercise of French sovereignty over Madagascar and its dependencies, and to ensure the defence of these territories against attack by the Axis. It would remain in force until the end of the war. Whereas the High Commissioner would assume all powers, which, under French law, devolved on the Governor-General of Madagascar and Réunion, and would exercise the functions of Commander of the French forces in those islands, the territories concerned would form for military purposes part of the strategic command of the British military, naval, and air Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. Moreover, until such time as the High Commissioner possessed the means to ensure

¹ The Times, 14 May 1942; Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, i. 338; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 184.
² France, 15 May 1942.
the defence of the islands, this duty would fall on the General Officer Commanding British Troops in Madagascar. Questions of jurisdiction arising out of the presence of the British forces in Madagascar were dealt with in detail; special arrangements being reached concerning the administration and jurisdiction of the military area of Diego Suarez, where the French civil and military authorities would comply with all requests made by the British General Officer Commanding. This arrangement worked satisfactorily after the arrival of General Legentilhomme, whom de Gaulle appointed High Commissioner after the signature of the agreement.

(g) The Extent of the Support for 'Fighting France' in 1942

In the early summer of 1942 the prestige of the Free French Movement, which had suffered to a considerable extent from recent events, was largely restored in the eyes of the world by a brilliant and courageous feat of arms in North Africa, where Rommel succeeded at the end of May in rolling the Eighth Army back towards the Egyptian frontier. A small contingent of Free French troops under General Koenig not only held out for several days, against greatly superior mechanized forces, in the desert outpost of Bir Hacheim on the left flank of the British army, but eventually succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy and rejoining the Allied forces in the rear, suffering heavy casualties in the process.¹

This exploit had a notable effect on opinion in metropolitan France, as was shown by the fact that the Free French Movement received a number of adherents at this time who escaped from France in order to join de Gaulle in England. Among these was André Philip, an acknowledged leader of French Socialism, a Deputy and a leader of one of the Resistance Movements in metropolitan territory. Soon after his arrival, de Gaulle appointed him Commissioner of Home Affairs and Labour. At the same time he also named Jacques Soustelle, a French author and publicist, who had recently come to London from the United States, Commissioner for Information.²

¹ See also Soustelle: Envers et contre tout, i. 294-9.
² The reformed National Committee was thus composed as follows:

President: General de Gaulle
National Commissioner for Economics and the Colonies: René Pleven
National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs: Maurice Dejean
National Commissioner for War: General Legentilhomme
National Commissioner for the Navy: Admiral Auboyneau
National Commissioner for Air: General Valin
National Commissioner for Home Affairs and Labour: André Philip
National Commissioner for Finance: André Dietelmh
National Commissioner for Information: Jacques Soustelle
National Commissioner, Delegate Chief in the Levant: General Catroux
National Commissioner (without Portfolio) Seconded to the Pacific: Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu.
De Gaulle further decided at this time to change the name of the Movement from 'La France Libre' to 'La France Combattante', partly because the existence of various 'free' movements, particularly in the United States, had brought the term into disrepute, and partly because many Frenchmen looked upon the part of France which was governed directly by Vichy as 'Free France', in contrast to the part occupied by the Germans. By this change of title de Gaulle also wished to mark the fact that France was still at war. He believed that the new title would appeal to those Frenchmen in France who were resisting the Germans, whether as active members of the various Resistance Movements in the *maquis*,¹ or passively, as occasion offered. On 14 July the British Government agreed to take cognizance of this change of style, but took occasion to point out once more that while they recognized 'Fighting France' as the symbol of French resistance in general, this measure of recognition was accorded to the whole Movement, and the National Committee was regarded as the authoritative body representing the Movement—the implication being that official relations with de Gaulle arose solely by reason of his presidency of the National Committee.

During the latter half of 1941 and early in 1942 the National Committee had made every effort to obtain a greater measure of recognition, not only from the British but from other Governments. On 26 September 1941 an exchange of letters² had taken place between de Gaulle and the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Maisky, whereby the Soviet Government agreed to recognize de Gaulle in the same terms as those adopted by the British Government in 1940. This was followed by similar action on the part of other Allied Governments then resident in England (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, and Norway) and by the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1942, Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, Canada, Iran, Egypt, Sa'ūdi Arabia, and the Union of South Africa also recognized the National Committee. The United States Government contented themselves with instructing Anthony Biddle, who had been appointed Ambassador to the Refugee Governments in London, to keep in touch with de Gaulle and the National Committee.³

This diplomatic recognition of the Movement raised afresh the question of the extent of the support for de Gaulle and Fighting France amongst Frenchmen in the mother country.⁴ The Vichy press and radio naturally provided no indication, and, though de Gaulle had his own intelligence service, the B.C.R.A. (Bureau Central des Renseignements et d'Action

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¹ For this term see above, p. 423, note 4.
³ For the United States attitude towards the Free French Movement in 1942 see also above, pp. 361 seqq.
⁴ For relations between the Free French Movement and the Resistance organizations in France see also above, pp. 419–26.
Militaire), information from this source was not felt to be trustworthy in some quarters which were critical of what they believed to be Fascist tendencies in de Gaulle and which regarded the activities of the B.C.R.A. with a good deal of suspicion. By 1942, however, not only were copies of clandestine newspapers, printed and circulated secretly by French Resistance organizations, finding their way out of the country, but a number of Frenchmen of differing political views and background were succeeding in escaping to neutral countries, to the United States, and to England, where they talked freely about conditions in metropolitan France. From these sources of information, whose agreement on broad lines was noticeable, it seemed clear that support for de Gaulle and his Movement had grown, though not in a manner altogether helpful to the National Committee's aspirations. Practically the whole of the French people wanted to see the Germans chased out of France. In so far as Fighting France could help in accomplishing this end, it was popular. De Gaulle's picture was treasured secretly by all and sundry, but he and his Movement were regarded as a symbol of a hope to be fulfilled one day, rather than as a practical or governing centre of united French action; while no thought was given to possible post-war governments or political combinations. Frenchmen who had been prominent in pre-war political or social life, and who had not burnt their boats by publicly adhering to Vichy, were mostly unwilling to commit themselves to de Gaulle, fearing his inexperience and that of most of his colleagues in political affairs, and doubting whether, when France was liberated and peace restored, the French people would entrust their fate to him. In January 1942 a small delegation of French trade unionists were smuggled out of the country and visited de Gaulle in London. Their object appears to have been to sound him on his political views. Whether as a result of this visit or for other reasons, the Resistance Movement in France known as 'Libération', which was understood to be Left in its politics, declared itself openly as ready to accept de Gaulle's orders. This was, however, only one of several separate Resistance Movements which had grown up independently in various parts of the country. The majority of these, while in no way attacking 'Gaullism', found their inspiration elsewhere, taking pride in the idea that they were indigenous, and concentrating their efforts upon doing harm to the German enemy wherever they could and by whatever means came to hand. Their development as a force in the internal politics of France was not to come until later.1

1 In the early months of 1943, when de Gaulle and Giraud were competing for the leadership of the Resistance Movement outside metropolitan France, the Central Committee of Resistance, which controlled many, though not yet all, of the Resistance groups in France, sent a message to de Gaulle (which was published on 22 May 1943) recognizing him and not Giraud as the 'Leader of French Resistance'.

De Gaulle’s Visit to the Middle East, July to September 1942

At the end of July 1942 de Gaulle left London for the Middle East. He met Smuts in Cairo on 7 August and on 8 August had an interview with Casey, who had replaced Lyttelton as Resident Minister of State in the Middle East. Affairs in Syria had not gone well. The Syrians did not regard the limited Constitution permitted to them by Catroux as fulfilling the promises of liberty contained in Catroux’s own proclamation published on 8 June 1941 on the occasion of the Allied entry into their country. In consequence they had for some time been demanding free elections, which, it was averred, would by their result demonstrate the disapproval of the mass of Syrian and Lebanese voters both of the system and of the leaders who, they considered, had been imposed upon them. In order to see things for himself, de Gaulle went on to Syria, where serious disagreement immediately arose between him and the British Minister, Spears. De Gaulle demanded the recall of Spears, asserting that he was pursuing a policy of his own, hostile to France and calculated to replace French paramountcy in the Levant by British. Spears, however, received the full support of the British Government, whereupon de Gaulle embarked on a series of speeches and actions opposed to British policy and aims. This difficult situation came to a head after de Gaulle had made a speech at Beirut on 28 August, using phrases which appeared to modify the promise of Syrian and Lebanese independence previously given in his name. He observed that France had acquired her position in the country by reason of a Mandate which she had accepted from the League of Nations after the First World War. The eventual independence of Syria had always been France’s aim, and was indeed the object of the Mandate; but France alone could declare Syria independent. However much he might wish to further Syrian aspirations in this direction, he was unable to speak on such a matter with the authority of the French people, while they in turn could only declare their will after their country had been purged of the enemy and a democratic government had been elected by them. Such at least was the interpretation placed on de Gaulle’s words by the Syrians and Lebanese.

Unrest grew in the Levant accordingly; a situation wholly opposed to military needs in the Middle East. This led to a request from the British Government to the National Committee, which in the absence of de Gaulle continued to sit in London under Pleven’s temporary presidency, that de Gaulle should return at once for conversations on the Syrian question and also on Madagascar. After some delay de Gaulle agreed, and arrived in London once more on 25 September.

2 See above, p. 466.
If with the British Government de Gaulle’s relations were once more uneasy, his relations with the Government of the United States were more strained than ever. While in Syria de Gaulle had seen fit to supply the United States Consul at Beirut with two memoranda, comparing his own and British policy in the Levant to the detriment of the latter. The State Department did not approve, and the situation was in no way eased by an interview between de Gaulle and Wendell Willkie, whom he met in Syria. Garbled accounts of de Gaulle’s views were published in the American press, which went so far as to report that he had delivered an ultimatum to the British Government demanding the evacuation of all British troops from the Levant States, failing which he would resort to force to gain his ends. However untrue, and even ridiculous, such stories might be, they proved a godsend to Vichy and Axis propaganda, and a corresponding embarrassment to the Allies. It was in this atmosphere of tension that conversations took place in London between the Foreign Office and the National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Dejcan, with a view to drawing up a new settlement concerning Syria. It was proposed that a procedure should be established for mutual consultation on all Middle Eastern affairs, including Egypt, and that the National Committee should guarantee to hold free elections in the Levant in the spring of 1943. This idea came to nothing. Catroux, whose opinion was sought by the National Committee, criticized it adversely, and de Gaulle then refused to accept it. Thereupon Dejcan resigned his post as National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. He was succeeded by Pleven, who held the post until the arrival of Massigli to join de Gaulle a few weeks later.

(i) The Merging of the ‘Fighting France’ Movement in the French Committee of National Liberation

The abortive negotiations over Syria had only just broken down when events took place which transformed the whole war situation and had a profound effect, inter alia, on the ‘Fighting France’ movement. The story of the Allied landings in North Africa and of the measures taken by the American authorities to gain the collaboration of the French is told in another volume in this series;¹ while in an earlier section in this volume² an account is given of the rivalry between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle for the leadership of all those Frenchmen who wished to see the triumph of the Allied cause, and of the negotiations which finally resulted, early in June 1943, in the formation of a French Committee of National Liberation with its seat at Algiers and with the two generals as joint Presidents. All that need be said here is that the agreement for the establishment of the Committee of National Liberation also provided for the liquidation of Fighting

² See above, pp. 414–17.
France as an independent body. The British Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons on 8 June 1943\(^1\) that the formation of the new Committee, with its collective responsibility, superseded the situation created by the exchange of notes of 7 August 1940 between de Gaulle and himself. In other words, the Free French Movement, later known as Fighting France, had come to an end.

De Gaulle himself, with his leading collaborators, continued to play an important role after the transfer of their headquarters from London to Algiers; but de Gaulle's further activities, first in North Africa and later in metropolitan France, fall outside the scope of the present chapter.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) See above, pp. 411 seqq., for some account of de Gaulle's activities in North Africa before the liberation of metropolitan France. An account of the part which he played during and after the liberation will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
PART V
THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES IN WESTERN EUROPE
By Viscount Chilston
(i) Belgium

Among the states submerged in the welter of defeat and occupation in May 1940 Belgium’s plight presented certain features which entitled her to an extra measure of pity. In the first place the attitude of the King towards the disaster did not correspond with that of his Government, so that the Belgian people were filled with perplexity and bitterness and at first obtained no clear lead in shaping their own attitude. In the second place the Germans, in contrast with their policy in most other countries which they occupied, made little pretence from the very outset of respecting the integrity of the Belgian state or its institutions. Certain long-disputed parts of Belgium’s eastern territory were immediately annexed to the Reich, while the bulk of the country was lumped together with a part of northern France under a purely military administration. Thirdly, owing to the fall of France the young men whom the Government had ordered in the early stages of the German attack to escape to France so that they might form the basis of a resurgent Belgian army were unable to fulfil that hope, and were brought back ignominiously to Belgium to serve whatever purpose the Germans thought fit. The bitter humiliation felt by these young men as well as by other sections of the nation was cleverly exploited in the early days by German propaganda, and the majority of Belgians, though inwardly in despair and loathing the invader, nevertheless accepted the idea of a German victory and the consequent necessity of collaboration with the enemy. Only a minority maintained their faith in resistance and in the ultimate victory of those forces whose sole representative was at that time Great Britain.

When King Leopold, as Commander-in-Chief, offered the unconditional surrender of the Belgian army to the Germans during the night of 27–28 May 1940, he resolved, in accordance with earlier declarations on his part, to surrender his own person as well. The Government, on the other hand,

1 The districts of Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet, which had gone to Belgium by plebiscite after the First World War, were incorporated in the Reich by decree of 18 May 1940 (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940 part I, p. 777; Document (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 193). On 4 February 1941 the Reichsgesetzblatt (1941 part I, p. 73; Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 315–16) announced that they were to receive representation in the Reichstag through representatives who were to be chosen by the Führer (cf. Völkischer Beobachter, 12 February 1941). See also above, pp. 91–92.
had already decided to transfer themselves to France, and to continue the struggle from there with a new Belgian army formed from the young men whose evacuation had been specially ordered. It had been hoped that the King would likewise continue to exercise his functions as Head of the State from abroad and would take command of the new army; but this he stubbornly refused to do. He did, however, consult three leading jurists\(^1\) as to the constitutional position, and these formally declared that the capitulation was a military act, by the King in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, not a political one, and that since he was a prisoner of war it was the constitutional right of the Belgian Government to decide on the country's future policy.\(^2\) Though the declaration was much concerned to vindicate the King's conduct, its terms and their implications remained at first quite unknown to and unappreciated by the majority of the population, who were inclined to approve unreservedly the action of the King rather than that of the Government. This attitude prevailed even despite the denunciation of the King by the members of the Government when they met at Limoges in France on 31 May. Indeed, the collapse of France and the temporary nonplus of the Belgian Government (leading them to consider returning to Belgium and to condemn one of their number (Jasper) who went early to England on his own initiative) brought about a violent revulsion of feeling against all those who had criticized the King's conduct and yet failed to stem the Germans—that is to say, the French and the British as well as the Belgian Government. The King was regarded as having stayed at his post; all the Belgian authorities who had left the country were regarded as deserters.\(^1\)

This state of confusion in the public mind certainly rendered easier the disruptive plans of the Germans in the earlier stages, but gradually, aided by a series of significant events, the notoriously independent and critical spirit of the Belgian people began to reassert itself. The stock of both Britain and France rose again as a result of the Battle of Britain and the

\(^{1}\) These were the Procurer Général à la Cour de Cassation, Hayoit de Jermicourt; the Minister of State, Devèze; and the Catholic statesman and lawyer, Pholien.


\(^{3}\) The Manchester Guardian (17 July 1940) reported a Moscow broadcast to the effect that the Premier, Pierlot, intended bringing his government back to Belgium, though against the wishes of King Leopold. Two days later a German decree was issued forbidding the return of any members of the Government. Later, a Belgian correspondent of the Manchester Guardian (27 August 1940) wrote that Pierlot was said to have been persuaded by Baudouin, the French Foreign Minister, at Bordeaux immediately after the French capitulation, that Britain would also capitulate within three weeks and that this accounted for his hesitation in going to England, although transport had twice been put at his disposal. Two Ministers preceded the rest of the Cabinet to England: Jasper, Minister of Health, who came on his own initiative and was condemned by his colleagues; De Vleeschauwer, Minister of Colonies, who came later, with the approval of the Cabinet, to co-ordinate policy with the British Government regarding the Congo. Pierlot, Spaak, and the rest did not arrive until October.
creation of General de Gaulle's Free French Movement, as did that of the Belgian Government in Exile through their association with the British and French in London and their ability to reach Belgians in Belgium by means of the special radio service provided by the B.B.C. Moreover, collaboration with the Germans did not yield the promised results. A large number of prisoners of war remained in captivity. The food situation grew worse. The first repressive measures against patriots were put into force and the German soldiers who had at first acted with studied correctness and courtesy began to revert to type. Then, as early as September 1940, the Germans committed a major political blunder when they demanded the formal rehabilitation of the activistes of the First World War. This demand, and the appointment of avowed traitors to important posts in the administration and to the control of all organs of publicity, opened the eyes of the Belgians and made them realize that the very existence of their country was at stake.

As regards the position of the King, the tendency to approve his course of conduct and to disparage that of the Government has already been remarked. Even his journey to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden in the autumn of 1940, as well as the visits to him of his sister the Princess of Piedmont, were invested with the best possible interpretation, and, although important members of his entourage appeared to be collaborators and to be encouraging a like sentiment in others, it was not felt that they were necessarily interpreting the King's personal opinions. For a time so great was his popularity with the majority of the people that both collaborators and patriots made use of his name; indeed, it was the shameless use of it by the former which led to the turning of the tide of his popularity. Also, as hopes of an Allied victory grew stronger, the Belgian people became more critical of the King's extreme caution and began to feel after all he had made an error of judgement and would have done better to go abroad to lead the Resistance from outside the country. But the final factor which

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1 See above, p. 130, note 5.
2 The Manchester Guardian (11 December 1940) quoted the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (date unspecified) as saying: 'We had hoped that the youth of Belgium would have welcomed the possibility of collaborating in building a new Europe, but with the exception of some Flemish quarters they stay completely apart and uninterested. The fault lies not only with the young intellectuals but with the lack of Belgian leaders who are willing and capable of encouraging the Belgian nation to reach an understanding with Germany. Both the younger and older generations like only to dream of the past and to hope for a return of political independence. The unwillingness of the Belgians to recognize the new situation proves to us that the country must be partitioned, as it must return to its natural Nordic Germanic influence, especially as Belgium was never entitled to have political power.'
3 A 'clandestine' pamphlet entitled La Belgique Loyale defended the 'realist' attitude of the King, and in the same breath indulged in disparaging remarks against Great Britain and democracy in general. But perhaps equally damaging was the agitation begun by Henri de Man, the renegade Socialist leader, and believed to be inspired by the Germans in order to confuse the issue further, for the reassertion by the King of his royal powers under the aegis of the occupying Power (see New York Times, 18 May 1941; Sunday Times, 8 June 1941).
tipped the scales against the King was the news of his marriage to a commoner, Liliane Baels, the daughter of a Flemish Catholic politician who, rightly or wrongly, was suspected by public opinion of collaboration. The nature of this marriage, coupled with its concealment for three months (it took place on 9 September 1941 and was announced by the Primate on 7 December 1941), and the people’s strong attachment to the memory of the King’s first wife, Queen Astrid, all combined to create an atmosphere of disillusionment which rapidly dissipated the aura of glamour which had surrounded the Roi-prisonnier.

The gradual eclipse of the King as the focal point—or last refuge—of the nation’s hopes and self-esteem undoubtedly helped the Government in Exile to consolidate their position and in some measure to take the King’s place as a rallying point.¹ This role they were much better equipped to fulfil once they had eliminated all thought of appeasement from their minds and had frankly committed themselves to relentless opposition to the Germans in concert with the other Allies. On the other hand, in the worthy but elderly and prosaic figure of Hubert Pierlot there was no inspiring and energetic leader of the order of France’s de Gaulle, and, because of the memory of the Pierlot Government’s original haverings in their attitude towards both the King and the German occupation, that Government never enjoyed popularity or even complete authority in Belgium. As a result control of the Resistance at home by the Government abroad—so satisfactory a feature in the cases of the Netherlands and Norway—was at best a problematical matter during the occupation, and after the Liberation was so openly challenged as to provoke a serious domestic crisis.

The voluntary exile of the legitimate Government at least deprived the Germans of the opportunity—of which they availed themselves for instance in Denmark, where the legitimate Government remained in the country—of compelling it to be the instrument of their will and of thus investing their deeds with a semblance of legality. It is likely, in any case, that the situation suited the Germans, for it enabled them to install an entirely

¹ Nevertheless, in a speech in London on 2 October 1941 Pierlot felt moved to say that ‘by his uncompromising attitude and by the silence with which he met the enemy’s proposals King Leopold was the centre of his country’s resistance’ (Manchester Guardian, 3 October 1941). And in September 1941 the Belgian Government published The Official Account of what happened 1939-1940 (London, Evans Brothers for Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1941), in which the following tribute was paid to King Leopold: ‘By his dignified attitude, in the captivity to which he has condemned himself, by his refusal to recognize the accomplished fact, he has shown himself to be the incarnation of a people which will not accept servitude’ (p. 52). On the British side the Foreign Secretary, Eden, in a broadcast to Belgium in May 1943, said: ‘Your King, himself a prisoner of war, has steadfastly refused to co-operate with the enemy’ (Daily Express, 17 May 1943). The first public challenge to the King’s position came from Dr. Albert Marteaux, official delegate in London of the Belgian Resistance Forces, who asserted that by ‘his pro-Fascist attitude’ the King had forfeited the right to the throne (Chicago Herald Tribune, 11 January 1944).
military administration throughout the country without more ado. Since Belgium was a vital military base for the continuation of operations against Britain as well as a rich reservoir of economic resources capable of almost infinite exploitation for the benefit of the German war machine, a military régime was obviously the best proposition for the Germans.\(^1\) For the same reasons, doubtless, they did not try to follow their practice in certain other occupied countries and make use of any of the 'quisling' bodies as a puppet government. With so much at stake it was a risk which the Germans could ill afford, and they preferred instead to keep the rival 'traitor bodies' always guessing and to play them off one against the other. The decision to bring two departments of northern France under the same administration as Belgium was likewise influenced mainly by military considerations, though also by economic and political ones. It was convenient to place under a single command those coastal districts of Belgium and France which were closest to the shores of England. At the same time, from an economic point of view, it could be justifiably held that the Belgian industrial area of Hainaut and Flanders formed one whole with the French industrial area round Lille and Valenciennes; while, on the political side, the arrangement gave the Germans a lever which could be used on the Vichy Government, on the one hand, by playing on their fears of losing these valuable territories, and on the Flemish extremists, on the other hand, by playing on their hopes of retaining them for good as part of a Flemish state.

The administration of Belgium and northern France being therefore a purely military one, the highest authority in the land was the supreme military commander in this area, General Alexander von Falkenhhausen. But the administration which he controlled fell into two distinct categories: the Kommandantur, dealing with all questions directly affecting the German army; and the Militärverwaltung, which supervised the Belgian administration of the country and ensured the full exploitation of the Belgian economy for the benefit of the German war effort.\(^2\) The Kommandantur was subdivided into four Oberfeldkommandanturen, five Feldkommandanturen, and a number of Kreiskommandanturen and Ortskommandanturen. German military courts sat at the headquarters of the two first-named categories, while all Kommandantur officers had the power to punish offences against the Wehrmacht and minor breaches of the peace. The head of the Militärverwaltung was General Eggert Reeder, who as such acted as von Falkenhhausen's chief assistant for dealing with civil administrative, political, and economic questions. For this

1 See above, pp. 95, 102.
2 For a survey by the German Military Government for Belgium and Northern France of Belgium's contribution to German war industry, dated 1 March 1942, see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 125–33 (455–1).
purpose Reeder's organization was divided into a number of departments such as 'Economic General Staff', 'Production', 'Justice', 'Communes', &c., and it also had its own commissioners in all Belgian business concerns of any size and appointed delegates or liaison officers to all institutions whose activities it particularly wished to control. At the same time certain branches of the administration of the Reich—such as the Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, and the Gestapo—had extensions in Belgium under their own representatives. The Gestapo, under Himmler's delegate Jungclaus, had a complete organization in Belgium with orders to spy on Germans and Belgians alike.

Although at the highest level German control was complete and all-embracing, the actual administration of the country continued to be carried out by the old machinery of the Belgian State—that is, the civil service acting under the Secretaries-General of the various government departments. On the other hand, the Secretaries-General had now assumed powers which under the lawful Constitution they were never intended to exercise. From being the permanent heads of state departments responsible to a Minister of the Crown and without any executive authority on their own account, they had assumed the status and attributes of Ministers with wide powers which they exercised in the exclusive interest of the occupying Power. It is true that their position had been rendered somewhat equivocal by a law which had been passed on the very day of the German invasion (10 May 1940), confirming an earlier law (5 October 1935), which laid it down that certain officials should remain at their posts in the event of an enemy occupation, and delegating certain powers to these officials which would ordinarily have belonged to their superiors. But these powers were only to be exercised 'in case of urgency' and where the officials concerned were 'cut off from all communication with the higher authority to whom they are [normally] responsible'. Moreover, under the Hague Convention, such officials were still only obliged to assist

1 For the text of a decree authorizing the appointment of commissioners to supervise industrial enterprises see above, p. 204.


At the beginning of 1941 it was estimated that there were about 1 million Germans, military, para-military, and civilian in Belgium (see The Times, 31 January 1941). But reports circulated in the autumn of 1941 indicated that Germany's new commitment in the east against Russia had reduced the military garrisons in Belgium by more than half (New York Herald Tribune, 28 September, Manchester Guardian, 13 October 1941, &c.). In 1943, with the threat of Allied invasion, it was estimated that the army of occupation had increased again to about 60,000 (Sunday Times, 17 January 1943). The Frankfurter Zeitung (18 May 1942) boasted that 'only about 475 officers, officials, and specialists—including all assistants altogether 890 persons—under the leadership of the Chef der Militärverwaltung, District-Gouvernor Reeder, suffice to run the whole country, or, more accurately, to govern and guide it'. This estimate would, of course, exclude the military personnel, and presumably also the police personnel and SS men.
the occupying Power in so far as the latter respected the laws in force in the country, and Pierlot, in answer to a query from one of the Secretaries-General, wrote (15 May 1940) that 'while it was wrong to deviate from the law of the land and from specific decrees, it was no less impermissible to conform to their provisions . . . if this involved serving the plans of the enemy'. He added that such a decree as that of 10 May 1940, 'however defensible and even commendable when issued by the Belgian authorities, can assume quite another character when implemented by the enemy'.

In spite of these admonitions the majority of the original Secretaries-General were at first content to continue in office, though one or two immediately refused or else were forced to resign by the Germans. But within a year there had occurred a number of changes in their ranks, either through disillusionment and voluntary resignation or as a result of an astutely devised German ordinance (7 March 1941) fixing sixty as the retiring age for certain classes of officials and thus making it possible for certain unreliable or refractory individuals to be quietly removed. After this the Secretaries-General of certain key departments could be known for what they were—the willing tools of German policy. Principal among these was Romsée, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior, whose functions were greatly extended so as to enable him to control the Gendarmerie, Public Health, Price Control, &c., and to fill the Gendarmerie, the provincial and communal administrations, and even the communal schools (whose teachers were normally appointed by the communes themselves) with fellow collaborators. Similarly Schuind, the Secretary-General for Justice, filled the magistracy with partisans of the New Order, and Leemans, Secretary-General for Economic Affairs, appointed men of the same outlook to key economic posts. De Winter, Secretary-General for Agriculture, incorporated the former Ministry of Food in his Ministry, and through the CNAA (Corporation Nationale d’Agriculture et d’Alimentation)—a compulsory corporation for peasants—and the institutions of special courts to try cases of infringement of the food regulations he was able to canalize the whole of Belgian agricultural production for the benefit of the Germans.


2 Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, no. 34, 8 March 1941, p. 529; Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 320. A clause in the ordinance enabled exceptions to be made 'in exceptional cases'. It was also explained that 'this does not mean it is a disgrace to become 60, but that officials of that age are still under the influence of old ideas and are trying to revive the old régime'. The ordinance was defied by the Mayor of Brussels, Van de Meulebroeck, who issued a public proclamation declaring it to be illegal, for which he was arrested and imprisoned on 30 June 1941.

3 See also above, pp. 146-7.

4 German exploitation by the appropriation of food supplies, coupled with the effects of the Allied blockade, had reduced Belgium to the verge of famine by the middle of 1942. After considerable agitation by British as well as Belgian circles in London a slight relaxation of the blockade was introduced to enable milk and vitamins to be sent to the children and nursing or
Thus, between them the German Military Commander and the Belgian Secretaries-General introduced such a mass of new laws and regulations affecting every aspect of national and private life that they could not but end by stultifying the former law of the land and subverting the Constitution. The Military Commander was empowered to issue ordinances (Verordnungen) which, if need be, could override all the laws of the land. The most flagrant breaches of the Constitution were therefore generally introduced in this manner, while it was left to the Secretaries-General, by means of their decrees (arrêtés) to introduce the purely executive measures required for putting them into effect. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in the beginning, thanks to the personal character of von Falkenhhausen and the general German policy of trying to win Belgian co-operation by mild treatment, the régime was found less oppressive than the dual systems of German civil and military administration which were introduced into other occupied countries. But when realization grew of the underlying aims of this régime—which were nothing more nor less than the disruption of the former Belgian State and the ruthless exploitation of its material resources for the German war effort—then the hostility and resistance of the population were aroused. When this opposition manifested itself in the form of acts of sabotage and of defiance of the New Order, then repressive measures inevitably became more drastic, reprisals were taken, and any pretence of friendly co-operation—except with the quisling groups—had to be dropped.

Indeed, the quisling groups, from whose ranks the collaborating Secretaries-General and other administrative officials were drawn, would have been grateful for more and franker support from the Germans. First, they would have wished the Germans to allow the Secretaries-General to present themselves openly to the public as a government. Secondly, each movement ardently desired to play a leading part in the reshaping and reorientation of their country. But it suited the Germans far better to exploit the rivalries between the groups, to play off one against the other, and to make them do a large part of the work of exploiting and enslaving the country, by leading first one and then another to believe that it enjoyed the Germans' especial favour. Such a policy was peculiarly expectant mothers in Belgium, among whom tuberculosis and other deficiency diseases had become alarmingly widespread.

1 German press comments were as disingenuous as they were intended to be disarming. 'In the first two years of its activity the German Militärverwaltung in Belgium and northern France has succeeded not only in preserving the native administrative forms intact, but even to some extent in improving them ...' (Frankfurter Zeitung, 18 May 1942). 'If one wants to understand properly the situation in Belgium one must always bear in mind that the German Militärverwaltung has not set itself any political task—that is to say of reshaping the state (keine politische, das heißt staatsanernde, Aufgabe) (Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 August 1942).


Part V
easy to pursue in Belgium owing to the number and diversity of the quisling groups, which in turn were a reflection of the ethnological split in the country. Their respective aims and tenets ranged from outright acceptance of German domination and the desire for the absorption of Belgium into the Reich to the advocacy of separate, autonomous Flemish and Walloon States. In view of the undeniably closer kinship of the Flemings with the Germans in the matter of race and language it was not unnatural that the Nazi movement should have deeper roots in Flanders than in Wallonia and that the Germans should tend to favour the Flemish quislings—principally represented by the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (VNV)—rather more than the others. It should be remembered, moreover, that the Germans had successfully suborned a number of Flemings during their previous occupation of Belgium in the First World War, and that they had done this by exploiting the then not invalid grievances of the Flemings over their slightly inferior status within the Belgian State.

Until the middle of 1941 it appeared as though the VNV, which was the oldest of the Flemish Nazi parties and groups, might acquire a monopoly of political action in Flanders under the occupation. Indeed, in May 1941 the other two Flemish fascist movements which had existed before the invasion, Verdinaso (Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen) and Rex Vlaanderen (the Flemish branch of the Rexist movement; the latter being primarily Walloon), were amalgamated with and absorbed into the VNV. But almost immediately afterwards the Germans invaded Russia, and, perhaps for the sake of the welcome addition of moral support and man-power, made it clear that they were prepared to countenance other Flemish fascist groups whose policies were not necessarily in harmony, and, indeed, were often in conflict, with the VNV; and to allow them to conduct propaganda as well as to form para-military formations and contingents of their own for the Russian front.

1 The Leider of the movement until his death in October 1942 was Staf De Clercq; after him Hendrick Elias. Two of the foremost collaborating Secretaries-General, Romsée and Leemans, were members of the VNV, as was the Head of the Labour Bureau, Hendricks, and the Governors of East Flanders, West Flanders, and Limburg, and the Burgomasters of Bruges, Malines, and Hasselt. On the other hand, there was no Rexist Secretary-General and only two Rexist provincial governors; of the more important Rexist Burgomasters, two were assassinated (at the hands of Great Charleroi and Henault of Verviers), while a third, Willems of Greater Lüge, withdrew to a mental home, his nerve broken by continual threats from patriots.

For the origin of the Rexist movement, whose leader was Léon Degrelle, see Survey for 1936, pp. 36-37. The name Rexist bore no reference to the monarchy, but was derived from the name of a Catholic publishing firm, known as Christus Rex, in which Degrelle had acquired the controlling interest.

2 See also below, p. 498, note 2.

1 e.g. the Algemeen SS Vlaanderen and the anti-Semitic Volksverwering. The first-named is not to be confused with the SS Legion Vlaanderen which was the voluntary force recruited under the auspices of the VNV leader Staf de Clercq from among all Flemish Nazi sympathizers. Other Flemings joined the Standarte Westland, a regiment of the German Wallen-SS. The VNV's own particular militant body was known as the Dietsche Militsie-Zwarte Brigade (DM-ZB).
By the end of 1942 the Germans had begun to snub the VNV, comparing them unfavourably both with the NSB (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging—Nazis) in the Netherlands\(^1\) and with the Devlag (Deutsch-Vlämische Arbeitsgemeinschaft) in Belgium. The aims of the VNV—particularly its ‘Great Dietsch’ ideal\(^2\)—began to be criticized, whereas the leader of the annexationist Devlag, Van de Wiele, had in the German view repudiated the ‘imperialist and particularist’ tendencies of the VNV by pinning its faith exclusively to Hitler.\(^3\) In Wallonia, the Germans similarly gave a modicum of support to the fascist movement of Léon Degrelle (Rex) but sometimes showed more favour to a rival organization, the Amis du Grand Reich Allemand (AGRA). For all Degrelle’s fervent declarations of loyalty to Hitler, all that he obtained—instead of the hoped-for high office—was the permission to go to fight in Russia as a private soldier in the Légion Wallonie which he had himself raised in Wallonia. From having been quite an important political party before the war, with thirty representatives in Parliament, the Rexist movement was reduced to being little more than a recruiting agency for the German army and police forces, for the vast majority of Degrelle’s former supporters fell away as soon as he openly sided with the Germans. Indeed, when Degrelle made a speech in January 1943, after his return from Russia, wearing the uniform of a German lieutenant and in the presence of the German authorities, and declared that the Walloons were Germanics who should fight for the Germanic Community,\(^4\) several of his leading collaborators withdrew from the Rexist movement and ceased further collaboration with the Germans. In March of the same year the Rexist party even lost control of the recruiting for their own Walloon Legion, which a little later was given the status of a SS formation and renamed SS Brigade Wallonia.\(^5\)

One of the principal reasons for the failure of both the Flemish and the Walloon fascists to achieve a real hold on the country, and thereby to gain for themselves positions of real authority under the Germans, lay in their failure to win the Church over to their side. Originally both the VNV and the Rexist movement had advertised an extreme Catholicism and the closest association with the Church, and thanks to this they had been able to draw a fairly considerable number of priest into their movements—

\(^{1}\) See below, pp. 498–500.

\(^{2}\) The equivalent of Pan-germanism: the idea that on the basis of linguistic nationalism Flemish and Dutch speakers should be united with each other and with the Germans.

\(^{3}\) Cf. article by Heinrich Tötter in Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 6 September 1943. According to Tötter, the ‘Great Dietsch’ ideal was not necessarily anti-German, but was ‘imperialistically coloured’. ‘Devlag’ seems to have been dominated entirely by the German SS General Berger, the head of the SS-Hauptamt, acted as its President and used the organization, according to Falkenhausen ‘to unite all parties in a SS effort to partition Belgium into two Gaue’ (cf. U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11, pp. 1988–91.)

\(^{4}\) See Frankfurter Zeitung, 20 January 1943.

\(^{5}\) See Völkischer Beobachter, 28 May 1943. See also above, p. 79.
though they had never won the approval of the upper hierarchy. But as soon as it became clear that both groups were primarily intent upon subserving the purposes of the German Nazis, whose anti-Christian record was already notorious, churchmen, with a few insignificant exceptions, turned resolutely away from and against them. Thus, the religious authorities refused to admit to Communion Catholics who were wearing political uniforms or to allow the display of political flags in churches, and their refusal to celebrate requiems for quislings killed in Russia or ‘executed’ by patriots at home provoked threats from Germans and quislings alike.

As regards the Church’s attitude to the Germans, while not opposing them in the exercise of such authority as pertained to them under international law, it was ever ready to lead resistance to the many violations of this law perpetrated by them, as well as to come forward boldly in the defence of threatened Christian principles. Foremost in this resistance was the Primate of Belgium himself, Cardinal Van Roey. The bishops continually reminded the faithful that patriotism and loyalty to their country’s institutions were incumbent upon them, and, though the Germans for long tried to pursue a conciliatory policy with the Church, the latter’s patriotic attitude eventually aroused their displeasure and the consequences attendant thereon. The subjects of special protests by the Cardinal and bishops were compulsory labour (introduced by the Germans in March 1942), the deportation of Belgian workers to Germany,

1 A pastoral letter signed by the Cardinal and five other bishops and dated 7 October 1940 declared that ‘love for one’s country is a sacred duty’ and that ‘it is doubtless necessary to recognize the occupying power as a de facto power and to obey it within the limits of international conventions, but the Belgian fatherland continues to exist and all its children owe it fidelity and assistance’ (see New York Herald Tribune, 8 February 1941).

The quisling newspaper Hier Dinosa (7 June 1941) violently attacked the Cardinal for forbidding priests to read newspapers: ‘The Cardinal chooses England’s side against Germany. He is for the enemy against his own people. He has banned pro-German organizations from Holy Communion. If he hopes that this will prevent Belgians from joining such organizations he is making a mistake.’

2 The decree of 6 March 1942 (cf. I.M. I. Nuremberg, v. 497) enabling the occupying Power to conscribe for compulsory labour in Belgium people of all classes and ages not hitherto employed or to direct to more essential work those already employed was widened by a further decree of 6 October 1942 under which men between 18 and 50 years and unmarried women between 21 and 35 would be compelled to undertake work in Germany as well as in Belgium ‘according to their capabilities and physical fitness’ (Verordnungsblatt des Militarbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, no. 87, 7 October 1942).

3 On 4 March 1943 Totter, the editor of the German-sponsored Brüsseler Zeitung, announced in his paper that to date 436,000 Belgian workers had been sent to Germany. The King had sent a protest on the subject to Hitler on 3 November 1942 (see Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: Recueil de documents établi par le Secrétariat du Roi concernant la période 1936-1949, p. 434, Annexe 184; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 199), and had informed the President of the Belgian Red Cross of this action on 17 December (see Recueil de documents . . . 1936-1949, pp. 437-8, Annexe 187).

On 14 June 1943 the Belgian Government in Exile announced that the Germans had removed nearly all the 52,000 Belgian Jews to concentration camps in Germany, Poland, and occupied Russia, beginning these deportations in the previous summer (New York Times, 15 June 1943).
the obligation imposed on miners to work on Sundays, and the confiscation of church bells. Although these protests met with no response from the Germans, owing to the great power and influence of the Church in Belgium they were of immense value in sustaining the country’s morale and will to resist.

Another highly influential quarter in which the spirit of resistance was fostered and brought to effective expression was the universities. In the state universities of Liège and Ghent it was easier for the Germans to enforce their will—through the medium of the quisling Secretary-General for Education—than it was either in the Free University of Brussels or in the Catholic University of Louvain. After a long struggle with the Germans against the appointment of quisling professors Brussels University was closed (December 1941)¹ and its students were welcomed by the other universities—above all by Louvain, which generously exempted them from signing the usual compulsory declaration of adherence to the Catholic faith. In March 1943 the Germans introduced a new ordinance compelling all first year male and female university students to report for six months’ compulsory manual labour. Moreover, in future, no one was to be admitted to a university without having first completed at least one year’s labour service.² Strikes broke out in the universities of Ghent and Liège; the Rectors refused to co-operate, and even after several months only 20 per cent. of the students had reported. The Rector of Louvain University, Mgr. Van Waeyenbergh, flatly refused to comply with the German demand to supply lists of students, and was accordingly sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, his courageous defiance evoking the highest admiration and enthusiasm among the population.³

Yet another influential body which set a fine example of resistance in the beginning of the occupation was the Belgian judiciary, but the later compromises which they made with the Germans, albeit under duress, caused considerable disappointment and dimmed the earlier lustre of their resistance. Indeed, during the first two years of the occupation the Germans and their collaborators found in the judiciary the chief obstacle to the realization of their schemes. In the first place the decision, mentioned above,⁴ of the three jurists consulted by the King on the day of the capitulation made the Pierlot Government in London the sole legal Government of Belgium and rendered impossible the setting up of any kind of quisling régime with any semblance of legality. Secondly, as early as the autumn of 1940, another body of jurists, the Comité de Législation, declared

¹ This was the date of the voluntary closure by the university authorities; the Germans officially closed it only in August 1942. ² See New York Times, 8 March 1943. ³ See Manchester Guardian, 24 August 1943, quoting La Libre Belgique; cf. Letter from the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines, Van Roeij, to General von Falkenhausen, 4 June 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg vi. 531–3; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 200). ⁴ See above, p. 476 and note 1.
formally that the right of the Secretaries-General to legislate was definitely limited. This resulted in numerous litigants impugning decisions of the Secretaries-General before the courts and culminated in the Cour de Cassation delivering a judgement (7 April 1941) which had the effect of declaring a great part of these decisions illegal. Here von Falkenhausen stepped in with an ordinance (14 May 1942) forbidding the right to question the legality of the decrees of the Secretaries-General, and a number of barristers who had participated in these cases were arrested. An agreement was reached on 4 July 1942 between the Cour de Cassation and the Secretaries-General whereby the latter could meet and legislate as a 'College', but, when Romée introduced an important decree in the following December on his own sole initiative, the conflict broke out again. On the submission of a case arising out of this decree the judges of the Brussels Court of Appeal declared the decree illegal; the Germans then arrested them and the judges of the Cour de Cassation went on strike in protest. Reeder, the German Administrative Chief, parried with an ordinance making the stoppage of the essential machinery of the judiciary an offence punishable, in the last resort, with death. The strike then stopped, the Germans released the arrested judges, and a compromise was patched up on the question of the powers of the Secretaries-General.

Perhaps the most effective, because the most constantly wielded, weapon of resistance was the clandestine press, which would have been truly formidable by reason alone of the number (about 200) and diversity of the newspapers and journals which it comprised. The Germans had taken control of the open press, put it in the hands of quislings, and thereby entirely reoriented it to serve their propaganda purposes. There was therefore a crying need for a new, clandestine press to offset the German-sponsored press, to rebuild the morale of the country, and to provide it, not so much with general news, for which it could look to the London broadcasts, as with domestic information and indications as to where and how resistance could most usefully be applied. A great source of strength

1 Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, vi. 528.
2 In virtue of the law of 7 September 1939, investing the Executive Power, i.e. the King and his Council of Ministers, with the task of introducing urgent legislative measures in the absence of the legislature. The argument was that, as the Ministers had left the country and the King was a prisoner, their mantle had fallen upon the Secretaries-General.
3 La Libre Belgique, representing moderate Catholic opinion, was the first Belgian underground newspaper to be published (August 1940). It had separate editions in Brussels, Liège, and Antwerp, and by 1944 was said to have reached a circulation of 40,000 copies. Le Peuple, the official paper of the Socialist underground, claimed a circulation of 20,000 copies. Le Drapeau Rouge, the official paper of the Communist underground, which, unlike the other party-political resistance movements, was a wholly militant group, naturally adopted a more violent attitude than the rest of the clandestine press, continually inciting to spontaneous acts of violence and sabotage and focusing attention on the achievements of the Red Army rather than on those of the other Allies.
to the clandestine press was the fact that it was not centralized—hardly a town in the country was without its own paper—but in view of the obvious difficulties of large-scale distribution this was as much the outcome of necessity as of choice. Another source of strength, which was more simply a reflection of the Belgian national character, was the diversity of the clandestine press. Almost every sectional interest was catered for, almost every political nuance was to be found. Polemics over pure politics were frequent between papers; yet one and all recognized and fought the common foe and co-operated over the practical problems of clandestine production.¹

As for the resistance of the man in the street in Belgium, it was not so slow to develop as it was to become organized. Even in its early, individualistic form—as expressed in deliberately inefficient administration and police work, in 'go-slow' tactics in industry, and in general hostility towards the Germans—it was effective in straining the Germans' machinery of control, depriving them of the full benefit of their exploitations, and promoting uneasiness and doubt about their final victory. Moreover, many individual acts of overt resistance—the killing of hated quislings, the sabotage of industry or communications—were spontaneously perpetrated long before bodies had been formed for organized resistance of this kind. From the mass of contemporary press reports and other available material on the subject it is difficult to give any concise idea of the actual growth, quality, quantity, and frequency of acts of resistance in Belgium and of the reprisals exacted for them by the occupying Power. As early as 8 July 1940 the Germans admitted for the first time, in a broadcast via Brussels radio, that acts of sabotage had been committed against telegraph and telephone communications and threatened general reprisals. From that date there was a constant stream of similar reports and pronouncements relating to sabotage of communications, crops, petrol stores, factories, &c. Reprisals first of all took the form of taking back into captivity a certain number of returned prisoners of war, of forcing Belgians to guard factories or military installations, or of imposing collective fines; but they gradually increased in severity till the shooting of hostages began. Until about February 1941 the execution of patriots or saboteurs or hostages was usually kept as secret as possible, but a German decree of 19 September 1941 declared that all political internees in Belgium (of whom there were believed to be some 400 at this time) were to be considered as hostages. When the guilty persons could not be found in cases of an attack on a member of the Ger-

¹ Louis de Brouckère: 'Le Nouvel Esclavage en Belgique', France, 10 November 1942: 'Let us note in passing that many of our clandestine newspapers are organs of opinion. All oppose a common front to the Occupying Power—an intransigent opposition. But each retains its originality as to its thinking and aspirations. Sometimes there are arguments between paper and paper—but almost always in a brotherly spirit. And it is thanks to this necessary and beneficent diversity that political thinking remains alive and healthy.'
man army or police, parties of these hostages were to be shot: at least five were to die in the event of such an attack proving fatal.\(^1\)

Towards the close of 1942 the rate of acts of sabotage and reprisal rose steeply and continued to rise until the very end of the occupation. Certain contemporary summaries from the German side are helpful in arriving at an impartial estimate of these developments. On 24 April 1943 the German occupation authorities announced that since the beginning of the year they had seized ‘310 terrorists’ and ‘522 Communist functionaries (Funktionäre)’, and that those who had not been ‘shot immediately’ had been ‘handed over to courts martial and must expect the death penalty’. At the same time they listed ‘188 attacks on the lives or property of members of the collaborating parties’.\(^2\) A B.B.C. broadcast on 20 July 1943, to commemorate Belgian Independence Day, stated that already more than 3,000 Belgians had been ‘executed or simply murdered’ by the Germans since the beginning of the occupation.\(^3\)

The system of recruiting men and women for work in factories in Germany which was applied ruthlessly to Belgium and other West European occupied countries in 1942 and 1943\(^4\) aroused strong resistance among Belgian workers. Between February and May 1943 the threatened deportation of a large number of Belgians to Germany gave rise to strikes in the great industrial centres in and around Liège, Charleroi, La Louvière, Mons, and Verviers. The strike of 60,000 workers at Liège in February caused the Germans temporarily to postpone the deportations which they had planned,\(^5\) and a strike in the electrical works at Charleroi in March against the transfer of 1,200 workers to Germany led to the reduction of the number taken to 400.\(^6\) The Germans retaliated against the resistance by the issue of an ordinance whereby all those breaking labour contracts, refusing to submit to compulsory labour regulations, or otherwise giving proof of ill will could be deprived of their ration cards.\(^7\)

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2. See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 April 1943.
4. See above, pp. 227–55, for the recruitment of foreign workers by the Germans and the conflict of interests between the authorities responsible for it and those concerned with increasing production for Germany in factories in the occupied countries.
5. Cf. Hitler’s decree of 8 September 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 150 (556(2)PS); Documents (R.I.I.A.) 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 48), put into force in Belgium by order of 5 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, v. 500). It may here be noted that the original Belgian trade unions had been ‘sold down the river’ to the Germans by Henri de Man, the Labour leader turned quisling. De Man was largely responsible for the creation of the single union which was set up in November 1940 and known as UTMI (Union des Travailleurs Manuels et Intellectuels). At the outset UTMI claimed 250,000 members, but the number of workers paying their subscriptions steadily fell off as it became increasingly obvious that UTMI was in the German service and that it had no power to fulfil the primary duty of a union—the maintenance and
For three-quarters of the following year, 1944, the Belgians continued to suffer the miseries of Nazi oppression—forced labour, deportations, shooting of hostages, mass arrests, and executions—confirmation of which is again to be found on the German as well as on the Belgian side. At the end of February 'Inbel', the Belgian News Agency, reported that some 20,000 inhabitants of Liége had 'taken to the woods' to escape forced labour or deportation.\(^1\) At the beginning of March orders were given to evacuate a large part of the Belgian coast, including Ostend, in preparation for the flooding of these districts, together with the adjoining ones in Holland. At the same time a new 'accelerated judicial procedure' (Schnittgerichtsverfahren) was introduced to deal with the rising tide of resistance. Under this scheme special courts martial were sent to deal out summary justice on the scene of the deed; death sentences were pronounced and carried out on the same day and in the same place against any persons found in possession of weapons, ammunition, or explosives.\(^2\) This was immediately followed by the execution of some seventy or more hostages—the Germans themselves officially admitting to the execution of sixty-two between 6 and 11 March.\(^3\) They also made the revealing disclosure that between 1 March 1943 and 15 February 1944 they had arrested 'around 4,700 Communists, terrorists, and bandits', and that 'thereby 963 cases of murder, dynamiting and other sabotage have been cleared up beyond all doubt (einwandfrei geklärt)—a pretty clear indication, in view of the known penalty for such deeds, that roughly that number of persons, at least, had been executed. According to the evidence submitted by the Belgian Ministry of Justice in 1945 to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,\(^4\) some 200 of the Belgians executed during the occupation fell definitely into the category of hostages and about fifty more were already under arrest when the crimes for which they were put to death were committed. The Belgian Ministry of Justice also estimated that at least 650 Belgians—who were similarly known to be innocent of the acts for which reprisals were being taken—had been deported to concentration camps in Germany, where many of them died.

Despite this terrorism, resistance and sabotage continued to increase, especially after the Allied landings in Normandy in June, when Belgian Resistance groups joined with French Resistance groups in systematically destroying the means of communication, thereby greatly embarrassing the withdrawal of the German troops. 'D-day' also brought strong reactions on the German side. On the day following (7 June) King Leopold was removed from Belgium to Germany; on 6 June he had sent a message to

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his people telling them that he had strongly protested against his coming removal and calling on them to remain courageous and united. \(^1\) In July, on the very eve of the abortive attempt on Hitler's life, came sweeping changes in the form and personnel of German control. By a decree of 13 July 1944 General Grase was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Belgium and Northern France in succession to General von Falkenhausen, and the German military government in Belgium was changed into a civilian administration under Josef Grohè, the Gaulciter of Köln-Aachen (which post he continued to occupy as well), as Reich Commissioner.\(^2\) Thus it was intended that the relatively clement military régime should give way to a more complete and all-embracing control of the lives, activities, and resources of the Belgians.\(^3\) But the rapidly deteriorating position of the Germans required even this step to be overtaken by other yet more drastic and revolutionary measures within less than a month. Himmler already had his personal representative in Belgium and Northern France in the person of SS-General Richard Jungclaus. Early in August it was announced that this officer had been appointed to be SS and Police Chief in these territories,\(^4\) and then only a few days later that he had been given command of the army in them as well.\(^5\) But, despite a few last acts of reprisal and terror,\(^6\) Jungclaus was not granted the time in which to consolidate his régime, for within a fortnight of his appointment the Allies had entered Belgium, taking Brussels on 3 September 1944.

A final word needs to be said about the nature, aims, and organization of the Resistance Movement in Belgium. It is important to observe that even after it had become organized it remained distinctly divided into two forms—active and passive. The passive Resistance groups were organized mainly by the leaders of the pre-war political parties along party lines with the aim of building up the morale of the population against the German

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1. Belgium, Secrétariat du Roi: Recueil de documents établi par le Secrétariat du Roi concernant la période 1936-1949, p. 514. Annexe 227. In announcing the King's removal to the Belgian people Pierlot reiterated that the King had 'consistently refused to exercise his high function under enemy domination' and that on the deliverance of Belgium 'the King will recover, by the very fact of his liberation, the exercise of his prerogatives' (see Manchester Guardian, 14 June 1944).

2. The hand-over of authority took place on 18 July 1944 (see Kölnische Zeitung, 20 July 1944). See also above, p. 95.

3. In an address to the Belgian Secretaries-General Grohè said: 'If Germany has for years been making the greatest sacrifice in blood for the sake of the survival of all, then it can scarcely be felt to be asking too much that others should at least pledge all their economic resources to the struggle...Certainly the military exigencies of the moment require the concentration of all the outward and inward strength which we can muster, but over and above this stands the necessity for absolute political leadership' (Kölnische Zeitung, 20 July 1944).

4. Ibid. 13 August 1944.

5. Ibid. 17 August 1944.

6. On 29 August 1944, according to the Belgian Press Bureau in London, the Germans executed 202 Belgians in the border region between France and Belgium—probably part of a large Belgian underground force (New York Times, 2 September 1944). At the same time they were alleged to have taken 1,000 hostages from the town of Ath and to have arrested 2,000 young men in the Louvain district and deported them to Germany (The Times, 31 August 1944).
attempts at nazification and, at the same time, of preserving and fostering their own particular political, economic, and social programmes against the day of liberation. The active Resistance groups, on the other hand, did not follow distinct party lines and organized sabotage and paramilitary formations with the aim of obstructing German administration and undermining the German war effort. Although the two types of Resistance were separate and distinct, membership in one did not preclude simultaneous membership in the other; but the Communists provide the only instance of the two aspects of Resistance being really linked and coordinated under the exclusive aegis of one party. Indeed, one of the chief reasons for the sensational increase in the size and prestige of the Communist Party during the later war years lay in the fact of its well organized and active ‘underground’, which attracted those Belgians who, though not necessarily inclined to Communism as such, found among the Communists a fuller scope for active resistance than in the other groups. The prestige of the Communists was further enhanced and even exaggerated by the German practice of attributing all acts of sabotage to them in an effort to focus hatred against Russia and ‘Bolshevism’ in general.

Ultimately the Communists came to dominate the largest group of active resisters, the Front de l’Indépendance (F.I.), which had been founded with the object of uniting under common direction various small underground groups specializing in sabotage. The F.I. had by the end of the war visibly succeeded in amalgamating these multitudinous groups, and the Communists thereby came into a mighty legacy of man-power. Certain important groups, however, remained outside the F.I. for the very reason of its strongly Leftist complexion. Such were the Légion Belge, La Garde Blanche, Les Mousquetaires, and the Front National de la Liberté. The Légion Belge was probably the most important single paramilitary group, being very highly organized throughout the country, officered largely by ex-army officers, and well equipped with arms and ammunition. It was the aim of the Légion to offer valuable co-operation to the Allies on the day of invasion, but it was also their aim to provide a strong police organization for the maintenance of public order and to prevent a coup d’état by Left-wing underground extremists in the dangerous period between the collapse of German control and the re-establishment of Belgium’s legal government. The latter aim, however, inevitably aroused the suspicion in Left-wing circles that the Légion contemplated a coup d’état on their own account.1 Similar suspicions of authoritarian tendencies were entertained about the other movements which remained outside the F.I.—partly perhaps on account of the reactionary flavour of some of their

1 Yet the Légion’s genuinely anti-German and patriotic character was put beyond doubt when, in June 1943, it was declared by the Germans to be a ‘terrorist organization’ and two of its members were put to death.
names, e.g. 'White Guard' and Mousquetaires, and partly on account of the composition of their membership, i.e. largely Catholic and ex-army. The White Guard was highly organized and operated chiefly in the Flemish regions, while the Mousquetaires were active in the Walloon districts. The Front National de la Liberté was also composed of war veterans, but drawn from the three main traditional political parties—Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal—and therefore excluding the Communists.

In spite of their potential power in men, discipline, arms, and other resources, these non-Marxist Resistance groups, which came to be referred to under the general label of L'Armée Secrète, could not hope to be a match for the F.I. in enjoying popular support and favour at and after the Liberation; the tide of public opinion, not only at home, but all over Europe, was running too strongly towards the Left. Nevertheless, the Right in Belgium enjoyed one great advantage denied to the Left in that its powerful political instrument, the Catholic Party, could advertise its opposition openly through the activities of the defiant clergy, led by the Primate himself, while the other political parties were obliged to operate exclusively through underground channels in their efforts to keep themselves and their programmes in the public eye. At the same time the influence of the Catholic passive Resistance Movements, such as the Pro Deo Movement and the Glaive de l'Esprit, was evidenced by the severity with which the Germans tried to extirpate them. On the other hand the Socialists, who were the next largest party in the state, suffered several heavy blows during the occupation period. First, most of the party's leading representatives left the country in May 1940; then it was officially dissolved by the Germans; and, thirdly, it suffered a severe loss of prestige when Henri de Man, its pre-war president, joined the ranks of the quislings in June 1940. Later, however, these initial setbacks were to a large extent offset by the fine Resistance record of individual Socialists of the younger generation. Indeed, both the Socialist and Liberal parties made more contributions to Resistance through individual members than through organized movements of their own. Thus they left the field clear for the

1 The White Guard was actually so-called in contrast to the quisling 'Black Brigade', rather than in any historical allusion. Moreover, it was said to have members of all classes, including miners who stole the explosives needed for their coal-mining in order to do sabotage (see France, 1 September 1942). When seven members of the White Guard were executed at Ghent on 17 April 1942 for committing acts of sabotage, the German authorities referred to 'Communist' activities (see The Times, 25 April 1942).

2 The veteran Socialist leader, Camille Huysmans, wrote on the eve of the Liberation: 'I have never belonged to the extremist elements of the Belgian Labour movement, but I think that in periods of war the labour class must use its chance. Resistance in itself is something revolutionary because it defies authority. . . . The common understanding in the labour classes about their future, their experience of the authoritarian regime, and the common fate in all these years of oppression have all created an atmosphere with a definite Leftward tendency. That action will move in the same direction is beyond question' (Manchester Guardian, 8 August 1944).

3 See above, p. 489, note 7.
strongly contrasting claims of the Catholics on the extreme Right and of the Communists on the extreme Left. The effect of this development was to have all-important repercussions upon the post-Liberation political scene.

(ii) The Netherlands

Though the Germans never explicitly defined their ultimate aims in the Netherlands there were distinct signs that a reversion of the country to its independent status was not one of them. One fact, however, was clear from the outset, namely that the country was of immediate and tremendous military importance to Germany, first as a jumping-off place for a German invasion of Britain,1 and later as a possible landing-place for an Allied invasion of the Continent. These considerations caused the Germans to desire to keep a strong hold on the country and at the same time to alienate the population as little as possible.2 Thus Ribbentrop’s assurance, given on the day of invasion (10 May 1940), that ‘Germany does not intend . . . to attack the integrity of . . . the kingdom of the Netherlands . . . either now or in the future’,3 was followed up by another from Seyss-Inquart,4 in his first proclamation as Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands (25 May) that he intended to maintain in force the existing law of the Netherlands, to employ Dutch officials in administration, and to preserve the independence of the judicature. The proclamation stressed, on the one hand, the necessity for Holland, in view of her geographical position, to submit to the fullest control of her territory by the Germans, and, on the other, the mitigating feature that out of all the occupied countries she alone had been favoured with a civil, instead of a military, administration—in recognition of the ‘kinship’ of the Dutch and German peoples.5

1 In 1932, just before Hitler’s coming to power, a sensational German book by Ewald Banse (Raum und Volk im Weltkriege (Oldenburg, Stalling, 1932)) had indicated with the aid of detailed maps the value of the Netherlands for this purpose.

2 It was not, however, so easy to obliterate one of the worst German crimes of the whole war, committed on the very first day of invasion, viz. the bombing of the defenceless city of Rotterdam, which began twenty minutes after the delivery of an ultimatum demanding the capitulation of the city within three hours (see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 618 (224-F)). In this attack the centre of the city and a large part of the residential area were completely destroyed. At the time it was estimated that some 50,000 persons lost their lives, but later investigations proved that this figure was much too high and that not more than 814 people were killed, while about 78,500 were left homeless (ibid. p. 656).


4 See below, p. 555, note 2.

5 See The Times, 30 May 1940. Even at the end of the first year, after completely subverting the Dutch law and Constitution, Seyss-Inquart had the temerity to say during a tour through Holland: ‘I would not dream of making political propaganda. You must work out your own salvation. We only want to give you the benefit of our example. We feel a special responsibility for the peoples of Germanic blood and we don’t want to keep our experiences for ourselves. We want you to share in the great conceptions which we have acquired, and we want to spare you the bitter struggle through which we have attained these new ideals’ (Sunday Times, 15 December 1940). Only a few months later, however (soon after the Amsterdam riots: see below, p. 497), he said in a broadcast to the Dutch people: ‘Holland must be brought to such a state of obedience
After these perfunctory gestures of conciliation Seyss-Inquart proceeded immediately towards the Gleichschaltung of the Netherlands with the Nazi Reich. Hitler's enabling decree appointing him Reich Commissioner (18 May 1940) had authorized him to promulgate laws and had ordered that the Dutch law 'shall remain operative in so far as it is compatible with the purposes of the occupation'. Deriving his mandate from this decree, Seyss-Inquart, in his first proclamation, assumed 'supreme governmental authority within the civil domain', and armed therewith proceeded to disrupt entirely the Dutch law and Constitution. As a first step, on 21 June 1940, he suspended the States-General (the Dutch Parliament) and the Council of State, and formed the Secretaries-General (the administrative heads of Government departments) into a kind of sub-Cabinet strictly subordinated to his own authority. In August he took power to appoint and dismiss personally all high Dutch officials, administrative, legal, or otherwise. In November the Department of Education was divided in two so as to allow of more control over the minds of the Dutch: a Department of Education, Science, and Culture, which controlled all public and private schools, universities, youth movements, &c., and a Department of Popular Enlightenment and Art controlling the press, films, theatres, non-scientific publications, &c. In the following year the process was carried farther when the political parties (with the exception of the Dutch Nazis) were dissolved on 4 July 1941, and when in the following month the municipal and Provincial Councils were suspended. The first serious attack on the
day that even if the German army were to leave Holland the Dutch would still ask them to return. They would ask them to return because there would be no one left in the country to oppose German rule' (Daily Mail, 14 March 1941). Yet in a speech at Cologne on 13 November 1941, Seyss-Inquart again expressed the hope that the 'Germanic' Dutch people would soon be willing to co-operate in the creation of the new Europe.


2 Verordnungsblatt fur die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, no. 1, 5 June 1940, Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 July 1940.

3 Verordnungsblatt, no. 5, 22 June 1940, p. 54. The Council of State (Raad van Staate) was an advisory body appointed by the Sovereign, who also appointed the Vice-President, its effective officer. It was consulted by the Sovereign as a matter of obligation in a variety of cases and on all general measures affecting the kingdom and the overseas territories. The Council would also suggest to the Sovereign matters on which legislation appeared to it to be desirable.

4 Ibid. no. 22, 21 August 1940.

5 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xvi. 29 30. 'By German decree the famous university of Leyden and the Technical High School at Delft have been closed owing to the "generally anti-German attitude of the undergraduates, and sabotage of the anti-Jewish measures". All professors of the Faculty of Laws of the University of Utrecht have been sent to concentration camps in Germany, while several professors of the Catholic University of Nijmegen, and of the Commercial High School at Rotterdam have been arrested because of their loyalty to the House of Orange and openly admitted preference for a democratic system of government. A number of students at all these institutions have been arrested, tried, or sent to concentration camps' (The Times, 29 November 1940).

6 Verordnungsblatt, no. 27, 5 July 1941, p. 513.

7 Ibid. no. 33, 12 August 1941, p. 627.
law was also made in August 1941 by the establishment of the so-called Peace Court (Vredegerechtschöf) and Peace Judges (Vrederechter). These judges were appointed for each district by the Dutch Nazi Secretary-General of Justice to try any misdemeanours and offences held to threaten the political peace of the community or its ‘highest political interests’. Arrests could be made on suspicion and defendants kept in custody for eight days without trial. Appeals could be made only to the Central Peace Court at The Hague, but from the latter no further appeals could be made. But perhaps the most sinister feature of the institution was that cases already closed elsewhere could be reopened by the Peace Court and judgement revised where political motives were suspected, thus violating a cardinal principle of Dutch law which forbade a second trial of anyone on the same charge.

On paper the system of administration in Occupied Holland appeared absurdly complex, for the machinery was triple: German civil, German military, and Dutch. But, because of the preferential treatment allegedly accorded to the Dutch, the Civil Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, had overall authority, and, except when direct military intervention was unavoidable, carried out through his own organization the requirements of the German Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, the authority given to Seyss-Inquart to employ so far as he thought fit the Dutch administrative machinery undoubtedly added a complication, however much he might twist—as he did—that machinery to his own desired pattern of subordination. For his Reichskommissariat with himself at the head was supreme. Under him he had four General Commissariats: ‘Administration and Justice’ under Dr. Wimmer; ‘Public Security’ under Hans Rauter, Chief of Police, controlling SS, German police, and Dutch police; ‘Finance and Economic Affairs’ under Dr. Fischboeck; ‘Special Purposes’, first under Fritz Schmidt, then under Ritterbusch, dealing with the Dutch Labour Service and with relations between the German and Dutch Nazi Parties. The Military Administration was under General Christiansen of the German air force, to whom were ascribed ‘sovereign military rights’ and who could order any measures necessary for military security, but who was expected to secure the fulfilment of any requirements touching civil affairs through the Reich Commissioner and his organization. The object was

1 See above, p. 140, for Seyss-Inquart’s decree of 17 July 1940 setting up a German circuit court and superior court; and p. 145, for the introduction of ‘administrative martial law’ early in 1941.


3 See also above, p. 119.

4 See above, p. 115.

to make the government of the occupied country appear more civilian than military and to try to render the position of the Wehrmacht easier vis-à-vis the population.

When Seyss-Inquart suspended the States-General and the Council of State, he extended the sphere of authority of the Secretaries-General in so far that they became puppet ‘Ministers’ of their respective departments. At first these officials had thought that they could continue to hold their posts within the terms of the so-called Landoorlogreglement (National Regulations for War-time), which directed them to carry on and help to maintain order, even under orders from the occupying Power, so long as they did not co-operate in changing the law or the Constitution. But they soon realized that the latter was precisely the role which they were expected to play. Seyss-Inquart had assumed all the rights formerly vested in the Crown, its Ministers, and Parliament; and thus regarded the Secretaries-General as instruments of his will. When the Secretaries-General demurred, as most of them did, he replaced them by Dutch Nazis. Some of these latter were given dangerously wide powers; for instance, the new Secretary-General for Justice, Professor Schrieke, was empowered to issue ‘orders’ having the force of law. Likewise the bizarre adventurer Rost van Tonningen,1 Secretary-General for Finance and President of the Netherlands Bank (whose experience had ranged from being a League of Nations official to being the confidant of Dollfuss), was empowered to sell state property at his own discretion, to issue Exchequer Bills and Treasury Bonds, and to float state loans. He was also made responsible for drawing up the national budget. As for the Secretary-General for Home Affairs, he was freed from the restraints of the ancient Communal Law (Gemeente- tevel) and authorized to alter the time-honoured boundaries of the communes.2

Already by February 1941 it must have become clear to the Germans that they could not count on a submissive attitude on the part of the Dutch population,3 for in that month strikes and disturbances began in Amsterdam and then spread to other cities. Moreover, the fact that these dis-

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1 See also above, p. 277.
3 A writer in the German Nazi organ Das Reich admits the antipathy of the Dutch in the following words: ‘Holland waits. It waits impatiently and unwillingly. For what? Has Holland’s lot not yet been decided? One would think so, but the slow, critical Dutch refuse to realize what has happened. They want to know the decision about England. Only the capitulation of London would make the Dutch defeat plausible to them. That is why those stubborn Dutch say: “We have not been defeated. We have been overwhelmed, but if England . . .” ’ “If” . . . that little word has always been the wisdom of the defeated, and the waiting Dutch spend their rudderless days with it’ (Sunday Times, 10 November 1940). A broadcast of the German-controlled Dutch radio also complained: ‘It is strange that even those . . . who have nothing they can call their own take a hostile attitude to the new order. . . . Why do we withdraw within ourselves? Why are we so angry? Why do we refuse to listen to the wireless?’ (The Times, 23 July 1940).
turbances had been occasioned by a provocative demonstration on the part of Dutch Nazis in Amsterdam naturally cast doubts on the usefulness of these indigenous traitors.¹ But here the Germans were on the horns of a dilemma for, their own Beamtenstum being already stretched to the limit by heavy commitments in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, it was difficult to see who else could take over the functions of dispossessed Dutch authorities, central and local. On the other hand, the Dutch Nazis, even when politically reliable, were usually incompetent and always unpopular. Anton Mussert, the leader of the most favoured Nazi group, the NSB (Nationale Socialistische Beweging), pursued a roundabout policy of deception in order to earn the good opinion of the Germans, and hence his own advancement. To achieve these ultimate aims he had to increase his following and this he cunningly thought he might do by posing as an opponent of the outright absorption of the Netherlands by Germany, in contrast to the rival Nazi groups. But the manoeuvre was detected and revulsion from the movement increased rather than lessened.

As already indicated, the National Socialist movement in the Netherlands was not limited to one party only, but, following the characteristic Dutch tendency to divisions, included a number of individual groups.² Nevertheless, the NSB was always the strongest of these groups, and by December 1941 had absorbed all the others and become the only political party allowed by the Germans to exist openly in the Netherlands. On paper it could boast a complete party government with departmental and

¹ As a result of the disturbances the city of Amsterdam was fined 15 million guilders (£2 million) and the province of North Holland was placed temporarily under martial law. Warnings were given that striking or provocating to strike would be punishable by imprisonment up to fifteen years; interference with military enterprise or vital industries might incur the death penalty. (See proclamation of 26 February 1941 by the German Commander-in-Chief, General Christiansen, in F.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 705-6 (222-F.).) A decree of 14 January 1941 had already introduced for the whole of Holland the principle of reprisals ‘personal, financial or corporate’ for hostile acts against the occupying Power. The first mass death sentence was pronounced on 5 March 1941 at The Hague on eighteen Dutchmen accused of sabotage and espionage.

² Principal among these were, first, Het Nationale Front, a predominantly Catholic association developed from the former Zwarte Front (Black Front). It opposed both the NSNAP (Nationale Socialistische Nederlandsche Arbeiderspartij) and the NSB because of their attitude towards the German Reich; nevertheless, it ultimately, though unsuccessfully, attempted to co-operate with the NSB. It was dissolved early in 1941. Secondly, Verdinao (Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen)—an organization which was more active in Belgium, but which had a small branch in the Netherlands (see above, p. 483). In 1940 the Dutch section was merged in the NSB. Thirdly, the NSNAP, which was a complete copy of the German NSDAP, and which advocated the merging of the Dutch national socialist movement in the German Nazi Party and the incorporation of the Netherlands in the Reich. Later the NSNAP split in two—one half under Major Kruyt immediately merging with the NSB (June 1941), while the other under Dr. van Rappard ultimately dissolved itself with the recommendation to members to join the NSB. Before this happened Mussert, the NSB Leader, had blatantly advertised his differences with Rappard over the question of fusion with the Reich in hopes of himself posing as the champion of Dutch sovereignty and independence and thus enhancing his position in the country. In these manoeuvres he was assisted by obtaining the tacit approval of the Germans for his policy as against van Rappard’s. (See P.I.D.: Handbook: Netherlands, part II, pp. 23 seqq.)
regional divisions, and with central and local authorities. Corresponding to ‘governmental’ departments were the Hoofdafdeelingen (Head Sections) of the NSB, of which there were no fewer than seventeen, covering every aspect of national life. Mussert’s object in having all this organization ready to hand was inspired by the hope that, impressed by it, the Germans would be more likely to call upon him to collaborate in, if not to take over entirely, the administration of the country. ¹ The nearest approach to the achievement of this ambition came with Mussert’s recognition in December 1942 as ‘Führer’ of the Dutch people and with the formation on 1 February 1943 of a ‘consultative Cabinet’ (Staatspolitieck Sekretariaat) of which he was made the head. ² It was only a last attempt by the Germans to bolster up his authority, so that he might become a more useful instrument of their policy, and all real initiative still remained emphatically in their hands, as was made clear by Seyss-Inquart in his declaration of 14 December 1942. ³ Hitler’s professed wish, expressed in this declaration, for the Dutch people to be associated with their own administration could in any case never have been genuinely carried out through the medium of the NSB, as he proposed.

The NSB had certainly spread its tentacles throughout the Dutch administration, but it could never have been considered even remotely representative; for the highest estimate ever made of its membership was

¹ There were also numerous para-military formations founded or sponsored by Mussert and his associates. The oldest was the Weerding, founded in 1932 and a sort of counterpart of the German SA; from having been voluntary it became compulsory in 1942 for every able-bodied member of the NSB, though always remaining a part-time service like its German prototype. In September 1940 the Nederlandsche SS was founded, whose name, on its being placed under German corps command, was changed to Germaansche SS en Nederland (see also above, p. 76). About the same time the Standarte Westland was created as a regiment of the Waffen-SS. With the invasion of Russia the Nederlandsche Legioen was created (July 1941) for service on the eastern front; it was composed of volunteers and did not form part of the Waffen-SS. Early in 1943 the Landwacht (later renamed Landstorm) was set up as a sort of ‘home guard’, not to quell internal disturbances, but as a reserve force in the event of invasion. It was drawn from second-class volunteers not good enough for the SS and other formations. Finally, a Stad-en-Landwacht was created in November 1943 expressly for maintaining order and quelling disturbances at home (see P.I.D.: Handbook: Netherlands, part II, pp. 277 seqq.).

² Under a decree issued by Seyss-Inquart on 30 January 1943 (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, no. 3, 30 January 1943; I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 623 (J.N): Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 207) the Rijks-Sekretariaat of the NSB was incorporated in the public administration, and all departments of the Reichskommissariat were to consult Mussert ‘in the execution of all important measures, and particularly in questions affecting personnel’.

³ ‘It accords with the task confided to me by the Fuhrer that the Dutch people shall be associated in a responsible manner with the administration of this country. The NSB is the representative of Dutch political ideas. I command accordingly that, in order to ensure the harmony of the administration with the tasks of the NSB movement, all services subordinated to me shall promote agreement with Herr Mussert . . . in the carrying out of all important administrative measures, and especially in matters of personnel. I reserve to myself the final decision in all such questions of the kind as concern primarily the maintenance of the position of the occupying Power’ (P.I.D.: Handbook: Netherlands, part II, p. 24). See also above, p. 120.
about 110,000 out of a population of 9 millions, and a substantial proportion of these were opportunists who wished to enjoy the fleeting privileges of collaboration and avoid labour service and other désagrément. In any case the ‘consultative Cabinet’ proved so ineffectual for whatever purpose it was created, whether administrative or psychological, that it was abolished in July 1944, when the growing threat to Hitler’s empire no longer permitted of such luxuries.

Moreover, by this time, the resistance of the mass of the Dutch people to the oppression and encroachments of the Germans and their Dutch Nazi hirelings had become a really serious factor in the situation. It was scarcely surprising if, at the beginning of the occupation, after over 100 years of peace, the Dutch were stunned by the suddenness of the blow, coming from a quarter, moreover, towards which they had always hitherto entertained the most amicable feelings. Yet the steadfastness of their Queen, coupled with that of the British people among whom she had perficely taken up her abode and with whose immediate aims and policies she had completely identified herself, soon had a reviving effect upon them. One indication of this development was to be seen in the formation of a new party, the Unie, which represented an attempt to superecede the old party divisions and to weld Dutchmen into a ‘new Netherland solidarity in accordance with our own Netherland character’.

Although outwardly of a distinctly fascist character, the Unie obviously made its principal appeal to the purely patriotic instincts of the Dutch, as is proved by its meteoric rise (it is estimated to have achieved at its peak a membership of about a million) and by its eventual suppression through the combined efforts of

1 Almost the entire Royal Dutch Navy escaped the clutches of the Germans and thenceforward was in active collaboration with the British Royal Navy. No less than 3 million tons of merchant shipping, including some 180 seagoing ships and more than 200 coastal vessels also escaped and later helped to bring food and raw materials to England. A Dutch Legion was formed in England from men of the Dutch army who escaped from Holland and Dutch residents in Britain. Later this Legion was sent for training in Canada, where it was swelled by Dutch residents in Canada and the United States. Dutch fighter squadrons were formed within the R.A.F.

2 From the new party’s manifesto as reported in the New York Times (25 July 1940). It also contained the phrase: ‘We wish to keep contact between the Netherlands and the occupying authorities.’ In so far it appeared to some people to be trying to outbid the Dutch Nazis for the favour of the Germans. Yet later in the year the Daily Telegraph (16 November 1940) reported that a sensation had been caused by the publication in the Dutch Nazi paper Het Nationale Dagblad of an interview with an official of the Unie, which ran thus: ‘Q. “Should Britain win the war and the Dutch governm in England return, what is the attitude of the Union?” A. “We know only one government, and that is in London, and we expect it to return.” Q. “What is the attitude if Germany wins?” A. “Not a single Dutchman hopes that will happen. But should such a situation arise the consequences are not to be imagined.”’ A German newspaper later confirmed this view of the Unie: ‘The more than 30 parties, paralysed by discord and indecision, were dissolved and replaced by a Unity Party, the Nederlandsche Unie, which wanted to collaborate with the German administration. Later, however, this instrument proved itself to be untrustworthy. The Unie did not become a rally of all those who intended to work for the New Order, but, on the contrary, became an organization of Germany’s opponents, and thereby brought upon itself its own dissolution’ (Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 May 1944).
the Germans and the Dutch Nazis. Indeed, its fascist garb has been explained as a camouflaging device to enable it better to counter the insidious efforts of Mussert and the Dutch Nazis to obtain power. The provocations of the Dutch Nazis produced the first spontaneous outburst of popular anger in February 1941, as already mentioned.\(^1\) Indignation against the Germans also began to rise, first, with their mounting persecution of the Jews;\(^2\) and later as the exigencies of the war brought about an ever more drastic exploitation of Dutch man-power and resources. Compulsory labour service was gradually introduced for ever-widening categories of men and women from the beginning of 1941, skilled workers were inveigled into going to work in the Reich, and with the opening of the eastern front in July 1941 Dutchmen were recruited to fight Germany’s enemies or transplanted to exploit with their farming ability the newly conquered steppes of the Ukraine.

Towards the end of 1941 the Unie disappeared, as did also the NSNAP, the principal rival among the Nazi groups to Mussert’s NSB. Though the Unie may have played its part in consolidating and rallying the Dutch in the first phase of occupation, its character and aims were obviously rather too equivocal for it to provide the necessary nucleus and inspiration for future Dutch resistance.\(^3\) This need was to be filled by the appearance of a new movement which was more in keeping with current trends of thought — the Netherlands People’s Movement, founded by Professor Schermerhorn in the Christian-Social tradition, which now became the most important of the underground organizations.\(^4\) The disappearance of the NSNAP, while it left the way clear to Mussert for the pursuit of his ambitions, also focused the limelight on him as the arch-traitor and primary object of the people’s wrath, which formerly had dissipated itself in several directions. Therefore both these developments had, in different ways, the effect of concentrating Dutch resistance and rendering it more formidable and effective. Moreover, the fact that Dutch resistance was beginning to make itself felt was seen in 1942 in the abandonment by the Germans of their hopes of cajoling or cowing the Dutch and in the introduction of

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1 See above, p. 497.
2 Beginning from July 1940 one restriction after another was placed upon the appointments, professions, economic situation, personal property, and even movements and domicile of the Jews, ending with the wholesale deportation of almost the entire Jewish population, regardless of age, sex, or health (see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 641-8 (221-F)); see also below, p. 504, note 1.
3 Dr. Colijn, former Premier and one of the founders of the Unie, himself said in a speech towards the end of 1940: ‘A new Government can be established only after the complete restoration of our independence. Many people are not prepared to admit that and believe that action is necessary against threatening dangers. They consider the Netherlands Union to be a shelter against Mussert’s Nazi group. On the other hand 90 per cent. of the Netherlands people could not agree with the programme of the Union because it demanded the disappearance of our democratic system’ (Sunday Times, 3 November 1940).
4 Further details of this movement will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
strong counter-measures. During the spring both Himmler and Heydrich, his chief lieutenant, visited the Netherlands and personally briefed their representative there, the Police Chief Rauter. In May Dutch officers of the armed forces were reinterred and 460 hostages were taken from among leading Dutchmen. Their number was later increased to about 1,000 and the first case of the shooting of hostages took place on 15 August 1942, when five were put to death in reprisal for an act of sabotage at Rotterdam. In the autumn, with the growing fear of Allied invasion, began the compulsory evacuation of the Dutch coastal districts, including part of The Hague, a process involving added hardship for the Dutch people, who were already suffering from the rapidly worsening food and fuel shortages. At the same time new decrees increased the German control over Dutch labour and man-power, so that many thousands of Dutch workmen could be deported to work in Germany—no fewer than 46,000 in May and June 1942 alone.

The bitterness caused by all this oppression began to burst out with the coming of the new year 1943. Hatred of the NSB (now raised to a semblance of governmental power) manifested itself in the assassination of some of its leading members in January. Active resistance to the occupying Power, also, began to take the form of sabotage of factories working for the Germans, and the destruction of registers relating to the deportation of workers. Railways were also attacked with the double object of impeding the German war effort and of preventing or slowing down the deportation of workers. In retaliation the Germans executed a number of hostages and then, at the end of March, launched an attack upon the universities, arresting thousands of students and interning them as hostages. A decree was issued on 16 March 1943 limiting the number of students to be received by the universities and making their acceptance conditional upon the giving of an oath of loyalty, failing which they were to be deported for work in Germany. About 85 per cent. of the students are said to have refused to sign. During April the state of tension in Holland increased, and on 29 April a new crisis was precipitated by the announcement of a decree issued by the German Commander-in-Chief, General Christiansen,

1 An article in the Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden (quoted in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 April 1942) complained that German 'magnanimity' towards the Dutch had met with no proper response from the latter in the form of co-operation and that therefore now 'German patience and magnanimity' were at an end. In the following month the German-controlled Hilversum radio (reported in The Times, 5 May 1942) announced the execution of seventy-two Dutchmen for 'anti-German activities'. A few days later twenty-four more were shot.

2 See also above, p. 149.

3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xv, 655; xvi. 47 seqq.; xxxvi. 623 (224-F).

4 From March 1942 all Dutch men and women were liable for labour service at home or abroad.

5 I.M.T. Nuremberg. iii. 433-4; v. 394, 402, 492. 506; xxii. 595-6; xxxvi. 651 (224-F).


7 See The Times, 28 April and 1 May 1943.
ordering all former non-commissioned members of the Netherlands armed forces to report for internment in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany (it will be recalled that the officers had already been reinterned a year earlier). The next day the Dutch Government broadcast an appeal from London urging those affected to resist the decree: 'Don't register... disregard summonses. Try to make yourselves unfindable!' In view of the dangerous mood of the population martial law was proclaimed throughout Holland on 30 April, and a curfew and many other restrictions on liberty of action were imposed, contravention of which was made punishable by death. Nevertheless, in the course of the next few days violent demonstrations took place, crowds were fired on, strikes broke out all over the country, farmers refused to deliver up their cattle or milk, railways and docks were damaged, and fires broke out in factories and farms. Between 2 and 6 May at least twenty-one Dutchmen were sentenced to death for taking part in strikes or for other offences. When the Germans had regained control of the situation they took the opportunity to enforce the total mobilization of Dutch labour which had been adumbrated by Seyss-Inquart in February. Under a decree of 6 May 1943 all men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were required to register for compulsory labour service, as were also all students who had not signed the declaration of loyalty. On 13 May Rauter, the German Police Chief, announced the confiscation of all radio sets, accessories, and parts, whether in homes or in stock in shops. On 15 May martial law was withdrawn, though without affecting the regulations concerning compulsory labour and the confiscation of radio sets. On the same day, moreover, Seyss-Inquart issued a decree designed to deal with passive resistance in government services, making serious cases of administrative sabotage punishable by hard labour for life or execution. This measure testified to the success of an appeal which the Dutch Premier, Professor Gerbrandy, had issued from London in the preceding February, urging all loyal Dutch officials to oppose by every means in their power the working of decrees clearly intended to assist the German war effort.

At about this time the rising tide of Resistance was swelled from two highly important quarters. First the Catholic and Protestant Churches sent a combined protest to Seyss-Inquart, which was read from the pulpits of all Dutch churches on 21 February 1943. The protest referred in the

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1 See New York Times, 1 May 1943.
2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 707–10 (224-F).
3 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 May 1943.
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 710–12 (224-F).
5 See ibid. v. 498–9; Daily Telegraph, 13 May, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18 May 1943.
6 The Roman Catholic bishops had already issued a pastoral letter, which had been read from the pulpits of all churches on 25 January 1941, denouncing the Dutch Nazi Party and warning Dutch Catholics against joining it. This had been followed by a refusal of the Sacraments to all Dutch Nazis. Another similar pastoral letter was read on 3 August 1941, protesting at the suppression of the Catholic trade unions. In September 1941 the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church issued a pastoral letter counselling defiance of the authorities when their
strongest terms of indignation to the violation of justice and of Christian principles, the persecution of Jews,\(^1\) the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany and compulsory labour service in Holland, and the execution of hostages. The second protest came in June 1943 from the Dutch medical profession and drew attention in equally strong terms to the physical and psychological effects of oppression, the under-nourishment of the Dutch population and the consequent spread of tuberculosis, and the injustice of exporting Dutch food to Germany where rations were higher. It also referred to the psychological torture involved in forcing Dutchmen to forge weapons which would be used against their compatriots fighting against Germany beside the Allies. But the rapidly worsening war situation of the Germans was scarcely likely to incline them to listen to humanitarian appeals; on the contrary, it was already compelling them towards acts of even greater ruthlessness.\(^2\) After the compulsory evacuation of the coastal districts came hints of even more drastic defence measures. On New Year’s Day 1944 Mussert made a speech in which he painted an awful picture of the horrors which might attend an Allied invasion and pointed out in particular that, since a great part of Holland was below the sea level, invasion might lead to the flooding of the polders (drained marshes). The theme was then developed by the German-controlled Dutch press with the idea of intimidating the Dutch population into subservience and frightening them off resistance and collaboration with the Allies.\(^3\) Later this aspect of the matter was toned down and emphasis laid upon the ‘proud’ role of Holland as a bulwark against the ‘bolshevization’ of Europe and the value of the flooding as a defensive weapon. Indeed, while this propaganda was appearing in the spring of 1944, the edicts were contrary to the law of God, and, in particular, denouncing the persecution of the Jews. Even a year earlier, in October 1943, the anti-Semitic legislation had been the subject of a Protestant pastoral letter of protest. Another joint protest on the part of the Catholic and Protestant Churches was read from the pulpits on 19 April 1942, referring especially to the compulsory labour service and German encroachments in the spheres of education and nursing.

\(^1\) A further vehement joint protest of all the Dutch Churches was sent to Seyss-Inquart early in June 1943 when it was reported that he had ordered the compulsory sterilization of Jewish husbands of mixed marriages and that a number of such operations had already been carried out (see The Times, 12 June 1943). In an address at Haarlem to celebrate Hitler’s birthday Seyss-Inquart promised that by the end of the year 1943 Jews would have disappeared from Dutch national life (Manchester Guardian, 22 April 1943). In fact, between the summer of 1942 and the autumn of 1943, 117,000 Jews who were Dutch citizens (nearly 85 per cent. of the Jewish community in the Netherlands as estimated in January 1941) were deported, all but 2,000 of them being taken to Poland for use as forced labour (I.M.T. Nuremberg, iii. 565; xxxvi. 646 (224-F)).

\(^2\) Press reports from Allied and neutral sources indicated that 101 persons were executed in the Netherlands between the beginning of the May crisis and the end of the year. But the underground paper Het Parool (as quoted by the New York Times, 26 January 1944) claimed that 640 persons had been executed in October 1943 alone—and 20,000 since the beginning of the occupation.

\(^3\) See The Times and New York Times (28 February 1944) quoting the German-controlled Haagsche Post.
Germans were actually proceeding with the flooding of certain areas—a fact which, despite their attempt to minimize it and to shed the best possible light on it, was soon being circulated by the underground press and causing the direst forebodings.

But in the main the Germans were no longer inclined to mince matters where their own interests and safety were concerned. On 13 May 1944 Seyss-Inquart issued a new decree providing for the immediate introduction of martial law should the situation (i.e. an Allied landing) require it and for the subjection of the Dutch to the most stringent control to prevent them from impeding the Germans in any way; practically speaking, all Dutchmen were to carry out German orders under pain of death.\(^1\) In July, soon after the Allied invasion of Normandy, the pretence of Dutch co-responsibility was put an end to by the abolition of Mussert's 'consultative Cabinet' and for the remainder of the occupation the Dutch were subjected to a naked German military despotism. Yet, as they watched the apparent irresistibility of the Allied drive across Europe in the late summer of 1944 the Dutch not unnaturally imagined the hour of liberation to be very close at hand. It was in this expectation and in hopes of accelerating the end, that the Government in Exile, in accord with the Supreme Allied Command and the Resistance Movement inside the country, ordered a general railway strike on 17 September 1944. The order met with instant universal compliance. Within forty-eight hours trains ceased to run anywhere in Holland, with the exception of a few run by the Germans themselves. The Germans failed to break the strike either by terror\(^2\) or by the offer of double pay and double rations. But then the Allied drive suffered a severe setback at Arnhem; the Germans tightened their grip on those parts of the country which they still held, and the strike began to recoil, not only on the strikers, but on the whole population. The Germans, considering the Dutch to have now forfeited all right to consideration, began a systematic and ruthless destruction and pillage of the country's assets. A terrible winter, enhanced by natural rigours, began

\(^1\) *Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden* (quoted by the *Manchester Guardian*, 24 May 1944) gave this extract from the regulations: 'All people who co-operate with Germany's enemies or impair Germany's defensive strength to be executed. The death penalty for creating disturbances or resisting measures taken by the occupation authorities. Judges, civil servants, workers, physicians, chemists, and midwives, must go on working. Those who stop work will be liable to the death penalty. All Dutch authorities will be under direct German military orders immediately a landing takes place.'

\(^2\) The case of the village of Putten was subsequently submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as an example of German terrorism at this time. On 30 September 1944 a German vehicle was attacked in the neighbourhood of the village, and a German officer was wounded. Thereupon the entire male population was deported and the women were warned to leave the village because it was to be burnt—a threat which was carried into effect. Eight of the villagers were shot while trying to escape (I.M.T. *Nuremberg*, xxxvi. 671 (224-F)). For the view taken by Seyss-Inquart and Rauter that severity only provoked the Dutch to stronger resistance see above, p. 152.
for the Netherlands, with desperate shortages of food, fuel, and power, as well as continual Allied bombing attacks. Food stocks in the western coastal districts, in which the largest cities of the Netherlands were situated, had been reduced in the summer of 1944, by order of the German civil authorities, to a reserve sufficient for only two or three weeks; and in reprisal for the railway strike an embargo was placed on the supply of food to the large towns from the agricultural districts farther east. The embargo was not raised until 8 November and by that date the winter frosts had set in, making it impossible to build up stocks again. Apart from the German retaliatory measures, the strike prevented the transport of supplies to the towns, so that stocks of coal as well as of food were soon exhausted. Moreover, 30,000 railwaymen were on strike—with their families this involved altogether 100,000 people—and all these had to be hidden and fed. In November the Germans began to round up Dutchmen in the streets and houses and deport them to Germany. As a result of the hardships that were endured the death-rate in January and February 1945 in six cities with a total population of rather more than 2 millions was nearly double what it had been in the same two months of 1944. According to press reports, deaths from starvation in Rotterdam alone averaged 400 a day.

The Germans built their defence lines along the broad river mouths of the southern half of the country; at the beginning of the new year 1945 they still occupied the greater part of the country with a population of about 6 millions. Near-starvation reigned in the Allied occupied part and outright starvation in the German occupied part. The spirit of the Dutch, however, was still not broken and anti-German activities did not cease. An attempt on the life of Rauter, the head of the German police and Commissioner-General for Public Security, at the beginning of March, called forth particularly savage reprisals. On 7 March some 400 people were put to death for the crime, many of them being shot on the dunes at Scheveningen. It was not until the beginning of April that the Allied

1 See I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 648-9 (234-F).
2 See The Times, Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, New York Times, 7 October 1944. The Manchester Guardian wrote: 'From what has been stated by the Dutch Ministers—and from facts which for reasons of military security cannot yet be released—it has become clear that the Germans in Holland have two main objectives: (1) destruction for military security; (2) destruction for the sake of weakening Holland for years to come. As regards the latter objective, the Germans are but executing a general political principle decided by the régime a long time ago. The idea behind this dreadful design is to make sure that Germany will emerge from the war in a relatively stronger position than her neighbours.' See above, p. 247, note 2.
3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 649. The six cities were Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Delft, and Gouda. The actual number of deaths were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1945</td>
<td>3,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1945</td>
<td>5,203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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6 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 624 and 689-95 (224-F).
armies began to move into the country from Germany, and liberation was not completed until 6 May 1945. By that time the Dutch people were at the end of their physical endurance. During the last phase of the war the Germans had inflicted further heavy blows on the country. In the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam they had carried out demolitions which served no strategic purpose and appeared to have been undertaken purely in the spirit of vengeance; and by the destruction of dikes they had caused the flooding with sea water of further large areas of fertile land.1

From the moment when Queen Wilhelmina arrived in England and throughout the duration of the war she lost no opportunity of stressing her position as the legitimate symbol of the nation’s unity in the face of the enemy’s usurpation of power. Indeed, in explaining her flight to England the Queen stressed the necessity of continuing ‘to exercise freely the authority of the state’, her ‘firm intention of returning’, and the continuity of the kingdom as ‘a sovereign state’.2 This doctrine of legal continuity, accepted and unquestioned by the Dutch people and their allies, was a thorn in the side of the Germans, who made every attempt to destroy the Queen’s authority by prohibiting displays of pictures of the royal family, coercing the press, purging text-books, and penalizing all reference to the House of Orange. But these attempts belied the Germans’ professed intentions towards the country too obviously and therefore merely produced renewed declarations of Dutch allegiance. A form of attack which was more insidious, because it was masked as a ‘constitutional question’, was the use of Article 21 of the Constitution to ‘prove’ that the Queen and her family had virtually abdicated by leaving the Netherlands and that the Government in Exile had by the same token no right to give orders to the Netherlands. The clause was exploited by Mussert and his propaganda chief, Blokzijl, in an attempt to persuade Dutch officers and officials that they were absolved from their oaths of allegiance, but, coming from such a source, suggestions of this kind, when they were not rejected outright, were bound to be treated with considerable reserve.3

1 Ibid. pp. 625 and 657. It was estimated that the total area affected was about 500,000 acres (ibid. p. 657). About one-tenth of this area was the Wieringermeer, one of the new polders formed by the reclamation of part of the Zuider Zee. Here the Germans had begun to undermine the dike towards the end of February and on 17 April an explosion occurred which broke the dike in two places. Within forty hours the whole of the polder was under water. The inhabitants of the three villages in the area escaped with their lives, but great material damage was caused (ibid. pp. 659–63).


3 Article 21 declared: ‘The King can wear no foreign crown. In no case can the seat of government be removed out of the country.’ However, the hollowness of Mussert’s pseudo-constitutional argument was exposed by the clandestine Dutch newspaper Trouw (Loyalty) on 23 June 1943. The newspaper pointed out that the clause dated from 1815, at which time, owing to the union with Belgium, there was a reasonable fear of the Sovereign taking up residence in a foreign capital and governing the Netherlands from there. The contingency which arose in 1940 had, moreover, been foreseen in similar circumstances in 1917, when it had been decided
Indeed, as a result of the war, the monarchy achieved a hitherto unparalleled degree of prestige and influence in the Netherlands. The most important aspect of this development in its effects upon the course of future events lay in the unswerving loyalty of the Resistance Movement and underground press1 throughout the occupation. The entire Resistance Movement loyally accepted the directives of the London Government in Exile transmitted to them via 'Radio Orange' and never doubted the ultimate return of the Queen. The political parties, too, in an early attempt to work out some kind of *modus vivendi* with the Germans, had firmly insisted upon the unassailable continuity of the dynasty; the Germans' refusal of this condition led first to the voluntary disbandment of most of the parties and later to their official suppression by the Germans. In August 1944 a joint manifesto published by Conservative and Socialist newspapers, though urging the necessity for sweeping social and economic reforms, even went so far as to advocate an increase in the powers of the Crown after the war.2 But the most conclusive evidence of the fidelity of the Dutch to their Sovereign and of their recognition of the legality of her Government was to be found in the response of the railway workers and of the Resistance generally to the order of the Queen's Government for the general railway strike in September 1944. Even the tragic outcome of this order did not affect these feelings.

Not content only to be a symbol, the Queen gave positive, strong leadership through constant consultation with her advisers and Ministers and through intermittent radio appeals to her subjects. More important still, she identified herself with the Resistance by appointing such of its leaders as were forced to flee from Holland to responsible positions in and around her Government. Meanwhile a scrupulous regard for constitutional forms was shown during the period of exile. An 'Extraordinary Advisory Council' of fourteen members was set up in March 1942 to assist the Government and as a substitute for a parliament. As the day approached for the Allied invasion of the Continent, however, the Queen broadcast plans for the forming of the new, legitimate Parliament and dissolved the Advisory Council. A 'Council of Trustees' was organized by the Resistance Movement to represent all their interests and to advise the returning Government in the transition period. In May 1945 this Council, made up of Catholics, Social Democrats, and Protestants (but, be it noted, not Com-

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1 From the earliest days of the occupation a great number of clandestine newspapers were produced, ranging from simple stencilled sheets to handsomely printed journals, and catering for various sections of the community. *Vrij Nederland* had a dual existence as a secret paper in Holland and an open one in England, *Het Parool* had a circulation of approximately 20,000 copies—though probably five times as many readers; *Ons Volk* circulated almost entirely in the mining districts; there were also *Oranje Krant*, *Uit de Woestijn*, and *De Gurs*.

2 See *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 August 1944.
munists), assumed its functions, working especially with the Civil Affairs Administration. Early in February 1945 Resistance representation in the London Government had been wisely strengthened by the co-optation of five more Resistance leaders from the partially liberated homeland, and, when the Germans had finally surrendered, the Queen fulfilled earlier promises by accepting the resignation of the Gerbrandy Cabinet and entrusting the formation of an interim government to two of the foremost Resistance leaders—Willem Schermerhorn, the leader of the Netherlands People’s Movement, and Willem Drees, a former Socialist member of the Lower House.

(iii) Luxembourg

The German invasion of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg took place during the night of 9–10 May 1940, simultaneously with that of Belgium and Holland, and in view of the planned attack on France was an obvious strategic move. But, apart from the lure of Luxembourg’s immensely valuable iron and steel, the invasion was also part of the general Nazi scheme of territorial aggrandizement. Therefore the customary pledge given by the German envoy that his country had ‘no intention of violating the territorial integrity and political independence of the Grand Duchy by her measures either now or in the future’ was as hollow as the by now equally familiar story, also recounted by him, that German action was necessary to forestall the imminent Allied invasion of the country. Within two months the Germans had not only begun to impose the Reich system of administration upon Luxembourg, but had made it plain that she was to be actually incorporated in the Reich. The line taken was that the Luxemburgers were really Germans, who, when duly enlightened, would welcome such incorporation. Such a view was a travesty of the truth, for, from the first, the Luxemburgers manifested great hostility to the Germans.

1 Despite German assurances (in 1940) to the contrary, there were also definite signs that similar designs were entertained in regard to the adjoining Belgian Province of Luxembourg. For a decree of the Belgian Secretary-General for Education (under German pressure) of 10 October 1941 made German the standard language in all communal schools of the Province because ‘the majority of the inhabitants are German-speaking’. Also a German-language newspaper, German libraries, and a branch of the Deutsche Akademie were all founded at Arlon, the capital of the Province. By a further decree of October 1943 only German-speaking officials were to be appointed to public and administrative offices in Arlon (see Kolnische Zeitung, 21 October 1943).

2 Gauleiter Simon (see below, p. 510) later argued (in a speech reported in the Frankfurter Zeitung of 30 September 1940) that Germany could not have violated Luxembourg’s neutrality since Luxembourg was not strictly neutral, having allowed her press and radio to be exploited by other countries for several years preceding the war. He also asserted that it was ‘not for nothing’ that her principal streets were named after Clemenceau and Foch.

3 ‘Above all else it behoves us to strengthen and bring to fruition the essentially German character of the country which has in the past been stifled by every available means—for Luxembourg is German, through its history, its language, and the blood of its people!’ (Volkscher Beobachter, 22 September 1940).
and never abated their loyalty to their Grand Duchess and their independence.1 On the day of the invasion the Government appealed to Britain and France for help. Though assistance was promised, this could not prevent the complete overrunning of the country, and the Grand Duchess and the Government thereupon escaped to England, being possessed of all legal powers necessary to enable them to associate the Grand Duchy with Britain and the other nations at war with Germany.2 On the following day, 11 May 1940, the Luxembourg Parliament met and registered a protest against the invasion of their country and also affirmed their loyalty to the Grand Duchess.

For the first few weeks the Grand Duchy was under German military administration—first as a Feldkommandantur under General Gullman and then later as an Oberfeldkommandantur under General Schumacher. Meanwhile, a number of Luxembourg administrative officials, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wehrer), formed an 'Administrative Commission' to serve as an organ for carrying out routine administration tasks. Since, however, it tried to act in the interests of the Luxembourgers rather than in that of the Germans it was unable to co-operate to any effective extent with the military administration and was, therefore, gradually squeezed out of existence by the latter. Indeed, already by the end of July the Germans had decided to place Luxembourg under civil, instead of military, control, and it was announced that Gustav Simon, Gauleiter of Koblenz-Trier, had been appointed Head of the Civil Administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung) of Luxembourg; as such he was to be directly responsible to Hitler. On 2 August 1940 Simon took over his duties with the order from Hitler to 'recover the former German Reichsland Luxembourg for the German

1 The feeling is summed up in the national motto: 'Mir wölle bleiwe wat mir sein' (We want to remain what we are). Even the Volkischer Beobachter (1 October 1940), describing the first great National Socialist rally in Luxembourg City, was forced to admit that beside the enthusiastic Volksdeutsch contingent there were 'thousands of Luxemburgers who even today treat the victorious Reich with reserve and mistrust—hatred of Germany and National Socialism having been whipped up here with special intensity'. Another article, in the Frankfurter Zeitung (2 October 1940), admitted that feeling against Nazi Germany was particularly strong owing to the stories spread by 'emigrants' (i.e. Jews and political dissenters who had fled from the Reich and taken refuge in Luxembourg). A correspondent of the Warschauer Zeitung (23 July 1940) wrote: 'The population of Luxembourg is afflicted with a strange variety of individualism... Although they are almost entirely Germanic, during their hundred years of independence they have withdrawn from the spiritual circle of German people, and have been assimilated spiritually by the French. Luxembourg is more French than German... francophilism and pacifism lead them to believe that the present war is Germany's fault.'

2 A law of 1936 had given them full powers to take 'any steps required to preserve the safety of the State and its inhabitants', and another of 29 August 1939 gave them full executive and legislative powers for the duration of the hostilities, which then seemed inevitable, by a unanimous vote of Parliament.

The Government, appointed in November 1937, was a coalition of the 'Right' and Socialist Parties, under the premiership of Pierre Dupong (Right), with Joseph Bech as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Simon lost no time in carrying out his instructions, and within the same month declared that the Grand Duchess and her Government, by their flight from the country, had forfeited their authority; that all political parties except the Volksdeutsch Movement had been dissolved; that the Luxembourg Constitution was no longer in force; and that the expressions 'Grand Duchy' and 'country' of Luxembourg were no longer to be used.  

On 23 October the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of State were dissolved, and even the aforementioned Administrative Commission was abolished and its chairman imprisoned, after daring to address a declaration to Hitler asserting the country's will to retain its independence and its dynasty.

Thereafter the Gleichschaltung of Luxembourg with the Reich proceeded apace throughout the rest of the year, with the introduction of the Nazi racial laws, the Reichsmark, the German prices and wages level, the German social insurance system, and finally, early in 1941, the German compulsory labour system (Reichsarbeitsdienst). Already by February 1941 the stage was set for a major step towards complete incorporation in the Reich, for on the 9th of that month the Grand Duchy was united with Koblenz-Trier in a single Gau, which was renamed Gau Moselland, and the NSDAP (German Nazi Party) henceforth conducted its activities in Luxembourg as though the latter were a part of the Reich. Luxembourg, however, retained its separate Civil Administration and Simon therefore now enjoyed a dual role and authority as Head of the Civil Administration and at the same time as Gauleiter of Moselland. In fact the new system

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1 Even before this, on 13 July 1940, Simon had told a meeting of Luxembourg quislings, headed by their leader Krattenberg, that Luxembourg was again to become part of the Reich. On this occasion, for the first time, some quislings took the oath to Hitler (see P.I.D.: Handbook: Belgium and Luxembourg, part A, p. 34).

2 On 15 August 1940 Luxembourg was incorporated within the Reich's customs borders and her customs union with Belgium (dating from 1919) was dissolved. On the same day a German-Luxembourg 'agreement' on iron and steel was announced, whereby the industry was 'centralized' and placed under a 'supervisory authority', which was to decide on the allocation of production in such a way as to ensure complete satisfaction of German needs and to prevent any supply to Allied or pro-Allied countries (see Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 and 21 August 1940). Although Luxembourg was part of the German customs area, exports to Germany usually required licences.

3 Text of decree of dissolution (dated 22 October 1940) in Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1940, no. 52; I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 597 (801-RF); trans. in Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 419; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii.: Hitler's Europe, pp. 208-9.

4 Mixed marriages were forbidden by a decree of 5 September 1940 (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1940, no. 2). Subsequently Jewish physicians, dentists, veterinaries, and chemists were forbidden to practise their professions, and Jewish lawyers were forbidden to represent anyone except Jews. Jews were forbidden to frequent public places and so on (see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 151 (077-UK)). On 20 February 1941 the New York Times reported that Luxembourg Jews were being transported to unoccupied France, and on 22 October 1941 quoted a report by the Kölnische Zeitung that 'all Jews in the former Grand Duchy had been transported eastward'—apparently into Poland.

5 Order of 23 May 1941 (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1941, no. 36; I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 140 (077-UK)).
imposed by Germany was extremely confusing to the outside observer, since there existed side by side two sets of officials—the German state officials proper and the Nazi Party hierarchy put in to ensure that the interests of the Party were duly observed by the civil administration. On the other hand, very often the two authorities were identical—as in the case of Simon himself.

Meanwhile, every effort was made to germanize the country by systematically introducing German—or rather Nazi—administrative law, methods, and officials, and—when Germans were not actually substituted for Luxembourg officials—by providing courses of instruction for the latter in German law and methods. Local government, too, was thoroughly reorganized on the German pattern; the country was divided up for administrative purposes into Landkreise, at the head of each of which stood a Landrat—a political official, appointed or dismissed from above, and assisted by nominated councillors (Kreisräte). The Burgomaster now became a petty local dictator instead of the head of an elected local body; elected Councils were dissolved and eventually replaced by nominated Councillors whose functions were purely advisory.\(^1\) Germanization was just as complete in the sphere of justice, for the German criminal code in its entirety was brought into force in Luxembourg by a series of decrees issued between March 1941 and April 1942,\(^2\) and the German civil code—in part—by a decree of 15 March 1942.\(^3\) Also the German ‘special court’ (Sondergericht) was introduced, in which German law was applied, without appeal, for so-called ‘political offences’.\(^4\) The Luxembourg judicial system was abolished and many native judges and magistrates were dismissed or deported, their places being mostly taken by Germans. In February 1941 a so-called ‘Court of Honour’ for all lawyers was established to apply the Nazi-concocted lawyer’s code;\(^5\) as a result the majority of the Luxembourg barristers refused to co-operate and were deported to Germany to do hard labour.\(^6\) Police control in the Grand Duchy was exercised by the Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer of the Wiesbaden area (Berckelmann). The native police were mostly deported and replaced by German police and SS men.\(^7\)

2. See I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 148 (077-UK).
4. Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 21 February 1941, no. 15.
5. Out of 125 barristers registered in Luxembourg only five were still exercising their profession at the end of 1942. Eighty were either in concentration camps or doing forced labour on the roads (see New York Times and New York Herald Tribune, 7 March 1943, and P.I.D.: Handbook: Belgium and Luxembourg, part A, p. 38).
6. The German Secret State police had been at work in Luxembourg since Simon’s appointment as head of the civil administration, though the decree authorizing their use, with effect from 2 August 1940, was not issued until 2 June 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 599 (812-RF)). An order of 2 June 1941 introduced the Gestapo, and another of 2 April 1942 the Kripo (Kriminalpolizei) (ibid. xxxix. 152 (077-UK)).
It was characteristic of the Germans, and of the Nazis in particular, to devote much effort to the external aspect of their attempted germanization of this little country. Although the man in the street in Luxembourg spoke a Low German dialect, French was the language of the educated classes, and, until the occupation, was also the official administrative, legislative, and judicial language. The Constitution put French and German on an equal footing and both were accordingly taught in all schools. However, one of Simon's first decrees after taking control in August 1940 provided that German should in future be the sole official language and the sole language to be taught in the schools. The publication of French newspapers was forbidden, and, subsequently, the use of the French language in public.

Meanwhile, local authorities and business firms had to comply with an order for the germanization of all inscriptions, street-names, &c., and this was followed in March by orders for the germanization of all surnames.

In embarking on this all-embracing scheme of integration the Germans were not without a certain amount of assistance from inside the country. There had long been a fairly large German community, and among these residents was a nucleus of reliable Nazis large enough to form a useful fifth column and to act as an instrument of German policy by the provision of administrators, magistrates, teachers, &c. There was also Professor Damian Kratzenberg, who was of German origin, and for some years before the occupation had been known as a pro-German and a pro-Nazi, favouring the integration of the Grand Duchy in the Reich. As soon as the occupation had taken place he founded a Volksdeutsche Gruppe, which on 20 June 1940 was renamed the Volksdeutsche Bewegung (VDB). The VDB at once began to collaborate to the full with the Germans and to work for the incorporation of Luxembourg in the Reich, and, since it

1 Decree of 6 August 1940 (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1940, no. 1; Lemkin, Avis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 440; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 207). Nazi text-books were soon substituted for those hitherto in use. In the course of time many teachers were dismissed and replaced by German nationals or by local traitors. Religious teaching was also banned in schools and the clergy were forbidden to enter them. Indeed, the whole Church was virtually outlawed, the bishops and clergy being unable to exercise their ministry and many being thrown into prison or concentration camps without trial. The religious houses, including the famous Abbey of Clervaux, were pillaged, and monks and nuns driven out. In February 1941 the Bishop of Luxembourg was arrested by the Gestapo for not preaching in German and for not exhorting his flock to collaborate.

2 Decree of 31 January 1941 (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1941, no. 21); see also I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 151 (477-UK). Cf. Deutsches Reich, 1941, p. 488. By a decree of 28 February 1941 even the wearing of that popular headgear the bêté basque was forbidden on pain of fine as being 'un-German'. In point of fact the wearing of the bêté had since the invasion become a symbol of resistance and national independence.

3 On 31 August 1940 the VDB published in all newspapers a proclamation with Kratzenberg's motto Heim ins Reich ('Back to the Reich'). In an interview given to the Volkischer Beobachter (29 September 1940) Kratzenberg declared: 'There is no such thing as a Luxembourg national, just as there is no such thing as an Austrian national: the Luxemburger is German—German by language, culture, blood, and historical background.'
also professed the complete Nazi creed, it received the full blessing and support of the Gauleiter, who, after dissolving all other parties, commissioned the VDB to undertake the ‘political education’ of the Luxembourgers.¹

From time to time impressive figures were given out by the VDB and the Germans regarding the alleged widespread adherence of the Luxembourg population to this movement, as well as to real German Nazi bodies such as the Hitlerjugend (HJ), Bund Deutscher Mädels (BDM—Nazi girls’ youth movement), Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), SA, SS, NSKK, &c. Indeed, it was announced in September 1941 that 500 members of the VDB had been admitted to the NSDAP (German Nazi Party) as a reward for their devotion to the cause of Deutschtum.² These were presumably willing candidates: otherwise recruitment to the VDB itself was more in the nature of regimentation, as when Simon ‘declared’ the entire Luxembourg police force to have joined the movement. Moreover, a series of measures made it almost impossible for Luxembourgers to earn a living in industry or in a profession unless they joined the VDB.³ Since the Luxembourg trade unions and benefit societies had been dissolved in January 1941, all industrial workers were enrolled in the DAF, and at the same time the according of this indispensable ‘privilege’ (of membership of the DAF) was made strictly dependent on membership of the VDB.

Though sheer necessity might in this way swell the ranks of the VDB, events were soon to prove that this was the only motive in the vast majority of cases and that the ordinary Luxemburger remained true to his old allegiances and was ready, if need were, to demonstrate it. In October 1941⁴ Simon ordered a census of the population, in the course of which he attempted to crown his work of germanization by forbidding anyone to give ‘Luxembourg’ or Letzeburgisch as his nationality or language, on the ground that no such nationality or language had ever existed. Yet, in spite of this, 96 per cent. of the town-dwellers and 99 per cent. of the country-dwellers gave Luxembourg as their nationality and Letzeburgisch

¹ It was not, however, till 4 January 1942 that the VDB was given official status as a public corporation and declared by Simon to be the representative in Luxembourg of ‘Germanic Nationalism’.

² Simon, in a speech reported in the Frankfurter Zeitung (27 September 1941). He declared that out of the 300,000 inhabitants of Luxembourg 69,045 had joined the VDB, 9,547 the Hitlerjugend, 7,133 the BDM, 12,117 the NS-Frauenschaft, and 57,666 the DAF. An order of 25 August 1942 made it compulsory for young Luxembourgers to join the Hitlerjugend (Verordnungblatt für Luxembourg, 1942, no. 54; see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 140 (077-UK)).

³ ‘L’adhésion à la V.d.B. . . . fut la condition sine qua non du maintien des fonctionnaires à leur poste, des employés privés à leurs places, des carrières libérales dans l’exercice de leurs professions (avocats, médecins, etc.), des industriels dans leurs entreprises, des commerçants dans leurs fonds, de tout le monde en son gagne-pain’ (Official Luxembourg Report concerning Crimes committed by the Germans in Luxembourg: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 150 (077-UK)).

⁴ Decree of 10 October 1941 (Verordnungblatt für Luxembourg, 1941, no. 67); see also I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 150 (077-UK).
as their language. In reprisal several thousand Luxembourgers were imprisoned or sent to concentration camps, the census was declared invalid, and later (May 1942) Simon simply declared that 'Luxembourg will never have a plebiscite to decide whether her people want to join the Reich. That decision was taken on 10 May 1940.'

Further resistance grew out of the fact, already recorded, of the abolition of the trade unions and the confiscation of their funds, and the introduction of the German Labour Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst) and of the German compulsorily subscribed relief scheme known as Winterhilfe (Winter Aid). The feelings of resentment thus aroused led to sabotage and 'go-slow' tactics in industrial plants taken over by the Germans or forced to work for them, and this in turn led to severe reprisals, ranging from deportation to execution. By the end of 1942 these deportations had become wholesale. Meanwhile, various attempts were made by both deed and word to convince the Luxembourgers and the world at large that they had been won over to Germany in every sense. Much capital was made out of an alleged amnesty for minor political offenders, out of the so-called 'volunteers' for the German services, and out of the competition that there was said to be for the honour of Reich citizenship or even of being inscribed on a Volkstum register as Volksdeutsch. In fact, on 30 August 1942, Simon issued a decree according German citizenship to all 'trusted (bewährte) Volksdeutsche', members of the VDB, and members of German civil and military organizations and their wives and children. In view of the fact that so many thousands of persons had already been 'declared' either Volksdeutsch or members of German-sponsored bodies, such as the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, this meant that virtually the whole population was affected and that the final step had been taken in the process of annexation. Having built up the mighty implications of Reich citizenship the Germans passed with ineffable subtlety, via the argument of noblesse oblige, to the delicate matter of military conscription: the Luxembourgers must accept the duties as well as the privileges of being German. Accordingly, another decree was issued simultaneously calling up all Luxembourgers of the 1920-4 classes for military service with the Wehrmacht.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1 These activities were described in an 'Underground Report from Luxemburg', issued by the London Office of the International Transport Workers' Federation and quoted in the New York Times (9 August 1942).

\footnote{2 Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1942, no. 49; see also I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 150 (077-UK).

\footnote{3 Ibid. p. 139; Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, loc. cit. It was estimated that about 15,000 Luxembourgers were forced to serve against their country's allies. Under a later decree men who refused to serve were liable to severe penalties, including the death sentence, deportation of the conscripts' families, and the confiscation of their goods (ibid. 1943, no. 30); see also I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 139 (077-UK). An earlier decree (21 July 1942, Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1942, no. 43) had made it compulsory for part of the population to join the Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst, and some of the Luxembourg members of this para-military formation were later deported to Germany for dangerous work (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 141 (077-UK)).}
The reaction of the Luxemburgers to the Gauleiter’s pronouncement was prompt and emphatic. On the very next day, 31 August 1942, strikes broke out all over the country. Simon ordered the strikers back to work by the end of the day and announced that their leaders would be tried by summary court martial (Standgericht)¹ and shot. Nevertheless, by the next day, 1 September, the strike had become general—the first general strike to have occurred so far in an occupied country. On the following day, 2 September, a state of emergency was proclaimed for the whole of the Grand Duchy, and several of the alleged strike leaders were summarily condemned and shot in various parts of the country. During the next few days other executions took place under the Standgericht procedure,² until, on 6 September, Kratzenberg, heading a deputation which he claimed to be representative of all classes of the community, intervened with Simon to plead for leniency, to reaffirm the ‘loyalty’ of the great majority of Luxemburgers, and to deplore the conduct of the rebels.

Since the violence of his reprisals had succeeded in breaking the strike Simon agreed to bring the state of emergency to an end by stages. But, at the same time, he announced (17 September 1942) that drastic measures would be taken to purge Luxembourg of ‘unreliable and traitorous elements’, partly by the removal from responsible positions of certain officials and business men, and partly by the wholesale deportation to Germany of the politically suspect together with their families.³ The Reich, he argued, could not afford the risk of harbouring such elements in a vital frontier area, but, safely installed in the interior, they could be re-educated as good German citizens. On the other hand, those suspected of being directly implicated in the strike and other subversive activities, if they escaped execution, would undergo their ‘re-education’ in the less congenial atmosphere of the concentration camps.⁴ Meanwhile, to refute rumours that the military conscription had been dropped as a result of the strike, the lists of the age-groups affected were quickly compiled and the call-up put into execution.⁵ Most of the Luxemburgers thus forced into the Wehrmacht were dispatched at the earliest opportunity to the Russian front, though some were sent to North Africa.

¹ Decree of 31 August (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1942, nos. 50 and 51); see also I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 152 (077-UK).
² Altogether twenty-one death sentences were pronounced by the special tribunal and about fifty Luxemburgers were sent to concentration camps, where many of them died (ibid. pp. 152–3).
³ The decree providing for deportations was issued on 13 September 1942 (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1942, no. 55) and came into effect on 18 October 1942. The Luxembourg Government estimated that some 7,000 persons were deported to eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, or Poland (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 153 (077-UK)).
⁴ It was estimated at the Liberation that one-tenth of the whole population had spent some period in a concentration camp (Daily Telegraph, 22 September 1944).
⁵ The lists were issued between 14 and 18 September 1942 (The Times, 1 May 1943).
The 1942 crisis, therefore, while confirming and strengthening the Luxemburgers' will to resist, also resulted in intensifying the conquerors' previous policy of germanization and nazification. More and more control in every sphere was given to Reich Germans imported into the country since the occupation, but at the same time the prestige and authority of the local quisling movement, the VDB, was increasingly bolstered up in an attempt to maintain the illusion that the process of integration with Germany came as much from inside as from outside the country. Similarly, in regard to the deportations, emphasis was continually laid on the theory that in this instance they were not so much deportations of foreigners to work for Germany in Germany as part of a scheme of 're-settlement' (Umsiedlung) of less reliable Germans from one particularly vulnerable part of the Reich to another less vulnerable part of it. The success of the scheme from this point of view was claimed by Simon at a meeting, over which he presided on 12 May 1943, of Kreisleiter and Gestapo representatives, but the meeting was none the less unanimous in thinking that the deportations must continue. Those deported were replaced by Reichsdeutsche and by Volksdeutsche from the South Tyrol, Transylvania, and the Bukovina. During the summer of 1943 a number of Italians were also imported to work in the mining areas to replace deported Luxemburgers in this vital branch of Reich economy. Finally, as the Allied bombing offensive became increasingly violent many bombed-out Reich Germans sought refuge in the Grand Duchy—by permit if they were influential party members, or surreptitiously if without influence.

In spite of so much concentrated effort to swamp the individuality of Luxembourg and to force it into the Nazi mould, and in spite of the difficulties in such a diminutive territory of organizing and keeping Resistance bodies in being, the flag of resistance was nevertheless kept flying. At any given time during the occupation there were always some clandestine newspapers, though the number of these varied in accordance with their success in avoiding discovery. There was also a nation-wide underground Resistance organization called the L.P.L. (Luxembourg Patriotic League), which the Germans persistently tried to destroy. Moreover, despite loud

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1 Further evidence of the German pretence of making a 'special case' of Luxembourg among occupied countries appeared in the German claim that many of these imported Volksdeutsche were descendants of persons who had originally come from Luxembourg.

2 Probably the most important was De Freie Letzeburger which boasted in its heading of 'Direct wireless connexions with London, New York, and Moscow'.

3 One of its leaders, Jean Vercel, who travelled frequently back and forth to keep in touch with the Government in Exile, said of it in an interview with a Daily Telegraph correspondent (8 September 1942): 'The Patriotic League is a true State within the State. The Nazis are relentlessly pursuing the task of exterminating the movement, which they brazenly call "separatist".' He claimed both the census fiasco of 1941 and the general strike of 1942 as the work of the L.P.L.

According to P.I.D.: Handbook: Belgium and Luxembourg (part A, p. 44) there was also another Resistance organization called the Lion Rouge Luxembourgeois (L.R.L.).
and numerous boasts about the complete germanization of the Grand Duchy, the Germans could not, and often did not, conceal the fact that their efforts were not meeting with success.\(^1\) There were frequent complaints about disobedience and lack of co-operation, culminating in a speech by Simon early in August 1943 which was a curious mixture of threats and entreaties, blandishments and reproaches, and which, taken in conjunction with the recent German military reverses, can scarcely have inculcated in the Luxembourgers the desired feelings of awe and respect for the conquerors. It was furthermore clear from a decree issued in July 1943, establishing severe penalties for persons in public or semi-public posts guilty of corruption or breach of security rules, that many of those to whose services the Germans had had recourse were not dependable from the German point of view.

Again, in spite of appeals to workers in industry and agriculture to increase output, and in spite of German claims regarding the success of these appeals, it proved necessary for controls to be progressively tightened. Thus a decree of 21 September 1943 provided that in most branches of industry labour contracts could not be annulled, even with the consent of both parties, without the approval of the labour exchange, and in the following February another decree increased the disciplinary powers of the staff managers. The peasants, for their part, were incorporated in the Reichsnährstand in October 1943, which obliged them to deliver a fixed quota of their produce to the occupying Power. That there was considerable resistance to this control is proved by the large number of peasants fined or imprisoned—and, in one instance, executed—for black market offences.

In October 1943 there was another census taken, which revealed a decline in the population of some 14,000 since 1938. Foremost among the various reasons which may account for this decline must be reckoned the relatively heavy number of fatal casualties among Luxembourgers conscripted into the German army,\(^2\) as well as of deserters among both army conscripts and labour deportees. For conscription for both military and industrial service continued to be applied and to be bitterly resented, and desertions were frequent in spite of the severe penalties which were imposed not only upon the deserters themselves, if captured, and upon those proved to have assisted them, but also upon the deserters' relatives, who were liable to deportation.\(^3\) The extent of desertion was apparent from the

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\(^1\) 'The inhabitants of the little country of Luxembourg still give proof of an astonishing lack of comprehension of geopolitics. The bourgeoisie has been deceived by an effective French propaganda' (Das Reich, 2 May 1943).

\(^2\) In September 1944 it was estimated that the number of Luxembourgers serving with the German forces who had been killed or were missing had reached 2,500 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 139 (077-UK)).

\(^3\) In March 1944 the German authorities announced twenty-two executions for 'helping men
frequent and lengthy references to the problem in most of Simon’s latter-day speeches. Indeed, in every way these speeches revealed either directly or indirectly the total failure of the germanization policy—as when, after ‘D-Day’, he threatened pro-Allied *activistes* and deserters from the Wehrmacht with instant death, deplored the prevalence of anglophile sentiment and of the listening to broadcasts from the exiled Government in London, and in the same breath expressed confidence in the ultimate loyalty of the Luxemburgers.

At the liberation it was estimated that some 5,000 of the young Luxemburgers conscribed by the Germans had escaped by desertion, and that 1,100 to 1,200 families—or about 5,000 persons—had been deported to the Polish border lands because their sons had ‘taken to the maquis’ rather than serve in the German army. Indeed, in these last months the Germans became increasingly, and justifiably, alarmed by the existence of large bodies of guerrillas in the mountains and forests of the Ardennes, made up of those who had escaped from the call-up, ‘deserters’, and patriots with a price on their heads, who effectively harried their communications and hastened their total withdrawal from the Grand Duchy in September 1944. Yet, even at this eleventh hour, they still exhibited an amazing psychological inability to fathom the feelings of the people whom they had so ignobly subjected, by appealing to the maquis to ‘repair their errors and rejoin the ranks of the army of true patriots fighting for the New Order’. Magnanimously they added: ‘We shall understand you and not blame you. You will be pardoned though we disapprove of what you did. No questions will be asked.’

(iv) Denmark

When the Germans, without any warning, overran Denmark in the small hours of 9 April 1940 there was sporadic resistance, but there was no time to organize it effectively, and the King, on the advice of his Ministers, accordingly ordered the commanders of the armed forces to desert from the army, giving assistance to the enemy or committing treason’ (Sunday Times, 12 March 1944). H. R. Madol (*Evening Standard*, 1 April 1944) quoted the following excerpt from new German orders: ‘If the deserter has to be shot, the person inciting to desert, who is often more guilty than the deserter himself, must also suffer the same fate, ... Those who are persuaded to desert might have been courageous soldiers, like so many of their comrades, had they not come under the influence of people acting out of hatred for Germany.’

1 In this respect an immense influence was wielded by Pierre Krier, Minister of Labour in the Government in Exile, for more than forty years president of the Luxembourg Metal Workers’ Union and Socialist deputy for the Ech district. His directives over the air from London for ‘go-slow’ and other subtle methods of sabotage were eagerly awaited and scrupulously executed by thousands of Luxembourg metal workers.

2 See *Daily Telegraph*, 22 September 1944.

3 H. R. Madol, quoting a German broadcast in the *Daily Telegraph*, 6 September 1944.

4 A non-aggression pact between Germany and Denmark had been signed in Berlin on 31 May 1939 (*Reichsgezetblatt*, 1939 part II, p. 857; *Documents (R.I.I.A.*) for 1939 46, i. 256 7).
desist from it. On the same day the German Minister handed a memorandum to the Danish Government declaring that '. . . Germany does not intend now or in the future to interfere with Denmark’s territorial integrity or political independence'. This was followed up by leaflets and broadcasts to the population containing the familiar story that the Germans were only occupying the country to protect it from being invaded by other Powers. In view of the German undertaking of non-interference the King and the Prime Minister issued, also on 9 April, a proclamation recognizing the fact of occupation ‘under protest’, ordering the population to refrain from any opposition to it, and appealing for order and restraint. It was argued later that this measure of recognition of the German occupation was invalidated by the subsequent behaviour of the Germans; but the Germans might conceivably have argued too that if there were such a desire to disclaim any responsibility towards them it was belied by the many concessions later made by the Danes.

In the beginning Germans and Danes theoretically enjoyed equal sovereignty. This gave great importance to the attitude of the King, for not only was he immensely popular but in the exercise of his duties as head of the Danish State he was in a position, if he so wished, by following an astute policy of covert resistance and delaying tactics, to be a symbol and rallying point to the more overt resistance in the country at large. In carrying out this policy the King showed, in general, evidence of greater resolve and consequently greater success at the beginning of the occupation than later in the middle phase—that is to say, before German action in completely alienating the population and taking over entire control had simplified the situation. In this connexion it must be appreciated, therefore, that with the rise of German power to its zenith on the fall of France

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1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 201-5 (628-D).
2 Ibid. pp. 207-8; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 212. Hitler’s directive for the occupation of Denmark and Norway, signed on 1 March 1940, had ordered that efforts should be made to give the operation the character of a friendly occupation designed to protect the neutrality of the two states (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiv. 729 32 (174-C); N.C.A. vi. 1005-5; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 209). The same reasons were also given, together with the text of the German Minister’s memorandum, in the announcement of the invasion to the German public by the German press (see Frankfurter Zeitung, 10 April 1940).
3 The full text of the proclamation was reproduced in the New York Times, 10 April 1940; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1939-1940, pp. 406-7; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, pp. 212-13.
4 In a press interview reported by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (12 April 1940), General Kaupisch, the German commander in Denmark, declared that Denmark ‘would remain a sovereign state under German military protection’. The Danish army and police would be permitted to retain their weapons, ‘for we are convinced that they will play fair’ (daß sie sich fair verhalten werden).
5 E.g. the King is reported to have sent telegrams of sympathy to the police injured in a clash with Danish Nazis in December 1940; also to have received in audience the historian La Cour immediately before the latter’s arrest for anti-German propaganda in February 1942, and to have threatened to abdicate rather than sanction anti-Jewish legislation which the Germans tried to force on his Government in January 1942. Soon afterwards he suffered from a series of illnesses, and a fall from his horse which incapacitated him for many months.
it became increasingly difficult for the King to resist the even greater pressure which the Germans were thereafter able to exert upon him. Understandably, if misguidedly, he gave in to certain of their demands in hopes of preventing the Germans from playing one of their trump cards—direct military rule, or, almost worse, of putting the Danish Nazis in power.\(^1\) It was thus that in July 1940, under cover of reshuffling the Government coalition in order to make it more representative of all shades of opinion, the notoriously pro-German Scavenius was made Foreign Minister in succession to Munch. Scavenius's first act was to issue immediately (8 July 1940) a 'declaration' in favour of Danish-German collaboration, apparently with the approval of the Prime Minister and his other colleagues—a gesture which made later attempts to deny the validity of German claims very much more difficult.

It was not surprising that this should provide the prelude to a series of concessions, which, whether major or minor, were none the less damaging to Danish self-esteem. These ranged from the surrender of ten torpedo-boats to Germany (January 1941), the introduction of anti-Jewish measures (March 1942), and the withdrawal of Danish garrisons from Jutland (November 1942) to the impudent 'clearing agreement' (December 1940) under which Germany robbed Denmark of billions of kroner.\(^2\) The only proposal put forward by the Germans which was successfully refused was that for a German-Danish currency and customs union. The concession which evoked most protest, however, was the acceptance by Scavenius of the German invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact (25 November 1941). Though two-thirds of the Cabinet were against the step, it was supported by the Prime Minister, Stauning (who in his declining days tended to be ever more subservient to the wishes of his Foreign Minister),\(^3\) by Scavenius himself and his ally Gunnar Larsen, and by the Minister of

\(^1\) In the latter part of 1940 several attempts were made by the Danish Nazis to stir up trouble, with the aim of providing the Germans with an excuse for setting up a 'quising' régime. Considerable hostility was shown by the mass of the population towards Nazi demonstrations, culminating in a three-hour fight on 9 December 1940 at Haderslev in South Jutland, when the police arrested 350 Danish Nazis for contravening the law against demonstrating in uniform without a permit.

\(^2\) 'Denmark's entire economy, which was based upon world trade, has been undergoing reorientation under the new order of the Axis. Her exports have increased; within four months of the Occupation they have reached the highest monthly level in recent years. But the principal factor in this was large exports of bacon, fatted hogs and beef to Germany in return for which Denmark has received a large, unusable balance of credits in German marks' (\textit{New York Times}, 20 March 1941). In a budget speech in the Folketing Scavenius tried to calm public anxiety on this score: 'The value of this asset would of course increase considerably if we could make use of it for purchases in other countries, but the possibilities have been rather limited... After the war Denmark could make good use of her assets in Germany' (\textit{The Times}, 14 January 1941).

\(^3\) In May 1942 Stauning died and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Buhl. Shortly afterwards Buhl made a speech in which he declared that it was 'the historic task of Denmark to ensure and cement a close and peaceful collaboration with Germany' (\textit{Neue Zürcher Zeitung}, 22 June 1942).
Justice, Jacobsen. Moreover, great pressure was exerted from two sides: the above-mentioned Ministers threatening resignation and the consequent overthrow of the Government, and the German Minister, von Renthe-Fink, \(^1\) letting it be known that, failing submission, Germany would revoke her promises of 9 April 1940. The surrender, thus rendered almost inevitable, induced a deep sense of humiliation in the Danish people and caused demonstrations in Copenhagen for several days. Another important result was the declaration (2 December 1941) by the Danish Minister in London, Count Reventlow, that he could no longer consider himself the representative of the Copenhagen Government, but only of the Free Danish Movement. At the same time he sent a personal telegram to the King expressing the belief that Denmark's adherence to the pact was 'apt highly to harm Denmark's good name in Great Britain and to endanger the time-honoured relations between Denmark and the British Empire'. \(^2\)

Reventlow's remarks referred to the fact that as early as September 1940 Danes resident in Great Britain had formed a 'Danish Council' of resistance to represent Free Danish interests with the British Government. The adherence to this body of the erstwhile accredited Minister to London of the Copenhagen Government naturally added great weight to its authority. Moreover, Reventlow's gesture had been preceded by an even more remarkable and significant one on the part of his colleague, Henrik Kauffmann, Danish Minister to the United States. In April 1941 Kauffmann had not only dissociated himself from the Copenhagen Government and declared himself the representative in the United States of Free Denmark, \(^3\) but had gone so far as to conclude a treaty with the United States on his own initiative, to enable the latter to use bases in the Danish island of Greenland. \(^4\) The Danish Government felt compelled to dismiss him and to repudiate the agreement \(^5\) (though they tacitly agreed to it later on); but the United States Government continued to regard him as the legitimate representative of Denmark, and his example was soon followed by most of the other Danish representatives in free countries, including Reventlow. Another Danish link with the free world were the 5,000–6,000 Danish merchant sailors who had escaped the clutches of the invader and who now operated some 800,000 tons of Danish shipping for the cause of the Allies. \(^6\)

\(^1\) See below, pp. 525, note 2, 526.


\(^3\) Department of State Bulletin, 19 April 1941, pp. 470–1; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1940–1941, pp. 237–9.


\(^5\) Department of State Bulletin, 19 April 1941, p. 471; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1940–1941, p. 238.

\(^6\) Immediately after the invasion of Denmark the British Government announced that all
But by far the greatest acquisition of the Free Danish movement was in the person of Christmas Moeller, the Conservative leader, who escaped to London from Denmark in May 1942. When the Socialist Government of Denmark was widened into a coalition immediately after the invasion, Moeller was given a seat in the Cabinet; but he soon proved to be a source of embarrassment owing to his intransigent opposition to the occupying Power and by his open incitement of others to follow his example; and within six months he had been obliged to leave both Parliament and the Government and had been debarred from all political activity. Once in England it was natural, therefore, that Moeller should take the lead in the Danish Council; he became its president and at once began a vigorous campaign on the radio exhorting his compatriots at home to resist and to sabotage the German war machine. Yet, despite such determined leadership, it was singularly difficult for the Danish Resistance Movement abroad to exert its influence, because the legitimate Government was inside the country—not outside it as in the cases of Norway and Holland—and therefore any decided lead which they might give was liable to be formally denounced in the name of the King. This difficulty was clearly exemplified in the question of sabotage.

In the first two years of the occupation sabotage was sporadic and on a small scale, consisting mostly of the cutting of telephone wires and the theft of small-arms, &c., but in the summer of 1942, with the ebbing of the tide of German military successes and the vigorous direction of Moeller from London, it took on a more serious aspect. Principal targets were now those industries which were working for the Germans, Wehrmacht property, and railways and power stations on which the Germans depended. Moreover the operations were obviously now conducted by experts and leaders who had been dropped into Denmark by air for the purpose, although the industrial workers themselves also gave their willing aid and support. Till then German policy had been to damp down sabotage by

Danish shipping must be considered enemy property and therefore seized and only allowed to continue to operate under an Allied flag. At the same time protection and compensation were offered to Danish merchant ships and their crews if they came voluntarily into Allied ports—which a great many eventually did, although at first considerable opposition was offered by both Danish and American shipping interests in the United States (The Times, 13 and 29 April 1940; New York Times, 5, 10, 25 May and 7 June 1940).

1 An article in the Volkscher Beobachter (18 February 1941) complained that after Hitler had taken Denmark under the ‘protection’ of the Reich the Danes began to display an ‘artificial and exaggerated patriotism’, and that even at the date of writing they evidently ‘have not got a clear perspective of the German plans and the Nazi fight for freedom’. Enlightened Danes who attempted to explain the truth to their fellow countrymen were called traitors and, it was alleged, even maltreated. Even the Government were accused of failing to interest themselves in the task of changing the outlook of the people. In fact, during January and February 1941 King Christian was under very heavy pressure from the Germans to reconstruct his Government according to German requirements. The King stood firm, however, and the most the Germans obtained was the resignation of Christmas Moeller from the Cabinet.
depriving it of publicity, but in September 1942 a formal appeal for its cessation was made by the Prime Minister, Buhl, followed within a few days by another from the trade-union leader Laurits Hansen. Afterwards several further appeals were made, culminating in a special broadcast by the King immediately after his resumption of the royal powers on 15 May 1943. By many this was taken as a sign that his powers of resistance had been weakened by his severe illness during the preceding winter, but it would probably be a fairer diagnosis to say that, rightly or wrongly, he still believed it to be his duty to restrain his people from provocations of the occupying Power which might lead to an even greater measure of bondage being imposed upon them. But by this time these attempts at appeasement were futile and misguided, because the Germans had already shown that they had decided to take the conduct of Danish affairs and the suppression of resistance more into their own hands by appointing a Reichsbevollmächtigter, Dr. Werner Best, to safeguard their interests and quell opposition, and by compelling the King to replace Buhl as Prime Minister by their tried instrument Scavenius (November 1942).1

Up to now no part of the Danish Constitution had been formally abrogated as a result of the German occupation; but gradual and insidious restrictions on the liberty of the individual as guaranteed under the Constitution had the cumulative effect of undermining it. Various additions and amendments were made to the criminal law in order to restrict public meetings and comment on the occupying Power, to prevent Danes from giving aid to the enemies of the occupying Power, and even to prevent them from demonstrating sympathy with the Allies. The next and more serious problem for the Danes was to deal with German attempts to obtain and exercise jurisdiction over Danish subjects.2 The cause célèbre on this issue was the case of Vilhelm La Cour, the Danish historian, who was charged with ‘endangering Danish relations with a foreign Power’ (i.e. Germany). Here an ultimate compromise could not obscure the fact that the Germans had established a dangerous precedent. For the Danish authorities who had arrested La Cour, in order to forestall the Gestapo, were compelled to hand him over to the Germans (24 February 1942), who conducted a preliminary inquiry into his case; he was then handed back again to the Danish courts, who sentenced him to seven months’

1 The Times diplomatic correspondent wrote: ‘The Danish Government have had to give way to the strongest German threats: evidently they had to choose between Scavenius and a Reich Commissar. They chose Scavenius, but it has to be seen whether they have profited much in their choice. Scavenius is only too likely to lead Danish policy into much more active collaboration with Germany’ (The Times, 10 November 1942).

2 A hasty addition to the Danish penal code, passed by the Rigsdag in January 1941, saved a Danish officer, Lieutenant Commander Oerum, from being sentenced to death by a German military court. Under the new Danish law he was sentenced to the maximum penalty—imprisonment for life—and two other officers to varying terms of imprisonment for anti-German sabotage (Sunday Times, 2 February 1941).
imprisonment, again to forestall the Gestapo. With the appointment of the Scavenius Government in November 1942 immediate steps were taken to provide against any ambiguities arising in any future contingency of this kind. A 'Power of Attorney Bill' was introduced and passed (11 November 1942) under which the Rigsdag was induced to sign away its most vital constitutional powers, and the Government obtained almost unrestricted powers to deprive any citizen whatever of his liberty. In point of fact the new law was never used, but was kept in the cupboard as a most effective 'big stick' wherewith to induce the Rigsdag to be amenable and to give their parliamentary sanction to unconstitutional measures required in the interests of the occupying Power.1

All concessions and distortions of the Constitution were made on the pretext, honest or not, of saving Denmark from even greater humiliations or from complete subjection to the Germans. On the face of things the Danish central and local administrations had hitherto been allowed to carry on as usual and German control had been mostly of an indirect kind and had operated mainly behind the scenes. The favourite procedure for the exercise of this control was to have representations made by the German Legation to the Danish Foreign Ministry. The staff of the German Legation was greatly enlarged and the status of the German Minister was a special and powerful one.2 Yet the German press attaché, Meissner, whose ostensible job it was to exercise supervision over the Danish press and to act as a link with the Danish Nazis, was higher in the Nazi Party hierarchy than the Minister, as well as higher in the confidence of Ribbentrop, with whom he was constantly in direct touch. Another member of the mission, Kästner, police expert and friend of Himmler, controlled the covert work of the Gestapo, which had no overt authority in Denmark, but nevertheless collected information and supervised the operations of the Danish police.

At the beginning of the occupation press censorship was one of the principal means of German control, but great care was taken to disguise the fact. Direct interference with the press was very rare; control was exercised mainly by directives on the handling of foreign political items, and

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1 Thus shortly afterwards, on 18 November 1942, it was officially announced that two Danish citizens had been sentenced to ten and five years' hard labour respectively by a German court martial. The sentences were to be served in a German prison. The offence was that of spreading leaflets exhorting members of the Wehrmacht to mutiny. The announcement contained a warning that severe punishment, including death, awaited perpetrators of similar crimes against the Wehrmacht and those guilty of sabotage (The Times, 26 November 1942).

2 See the German Foreign Ministry letter of 20 December 1940 (Verfügungen, iii. 208-9); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 213. Up to the end of September 1942 the holder of this post was von Renthe-Fink; he was succeeded by Dr. Werner Best, who received the higher-sounding title of Reichsbevollmächtiger, partly in view of the important posts which he had already held and partly as an earnest of a new and firmer attitude on the part of the Germans towards the Danes (see above, pp. 109-10).
occasionally also of domestic affairs. There was a ban on the mention of certain subjects: no comment was allowed on the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact; no adverse comment on the position of Danish workers in the Reich; no critical discussion of the occupying Power.

All Norwegian news was severely curtailed. As for the Gestapo, in comparison with its activities in other occupied countries, it lay very low. Arrests of Danish subjects were generally effected by Danish policemen, who were, however, often accompanied by German police to ensure that they did their duty. At first too, though rather reluctantly, the Germans allowed the Danish police, courts, and prisons to deal with sabotage cases where these concerned Danish factories, communications, materials, &c.—even though the incidents had been detrimental to German interests. Later, with the appointment of the SS General von Hanneken as Commander-in-Chief and the advent of the collaborationist Scavenius Government in October—November 1942, offences against Wehrmacht property (as well as attempted espionage) were made punishable by German court martial.

As a true SS man von Hanneken would have liked (as he threatened to do by means of the Danish press in February 1943) to introduce the whole paraphernalia of German frightfulness—death sentences, hostages, and collective fines—without more ado, in order to stamp out the threat to the security of his army. But Dr. Werner Best, who had arrived as the new plenipotentiary of the Reich at almost the same time as the General (5 November 1942), although also a SS man, had the support of Berlin in his policy of continuing moderation and conciliation for as long as possible. Both men had taken up their appointments in the midst of a prolonged crisis, which appeared to have been largely engineered by the Germans for the purpose of intimidating the Danes and testing their reactions to plans for greater subordination of their country to Germany and the German war effort. The crisis, which began with the recall of the German Minister von Renthe-Fink and of the 'too mild' German Commander-in-Chief General Luetke, almost exactly coincided in duration with a month's leave accorded to the Danish Nazis who had been formed into a 'Danish

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1 Owing to the enormous extent of unemployment in the months following the invasion about 25,000 Danish workers accepted contracts to work in the Reich on apparently advantageous terms. But these workers became greatly dissatisfied when they found that contracts were altered to their disadvantage after their arrival in Germany.

2 'The struggle of the Norwegian Church against Quisling and the Germans aroused great sympathy and admiration in the Danish Church, but by a German-inspired government order in July 1943 the Danish clergy were forbidden to mention any information about it that had not appeared in the daily press. This order evoked protests and defiance from pastors all over the country, who declared that they could not accept directives from the state regarding the inner life of the Church and therefore reserved the right to make references to the Church struggle in Norway when addressing their congregations.

3 See above, p. 105.
Free Corps', and had been fighting for the Germans on the eastern front; during their period of leave the members of this corps submitted their country to the utmost provocation by their behaviour. During this period also the Germans 'planted' a rumour that an ultimatum had been presented to the Danish Government requiring the arming in the German interest of the Danish merchant navy (that part of it which had not already gone over to the Allies), demanding more scope for control by the Gestapo and the Danish Nazis, and including other terms which implied a much more active participation by Denmark in the war on the German side. Nevertheless, this 'war of nerves' seemed to stiffen rather than to weaken the Danish will to resist, and, although the King was eventually forced to appoint the pro-German Scavenius as Prime Minister on 8 November 1942, a giant rally organized by the Danish Nazis on 1 November 1942, in the hopes of demonstrating their hold on the country and paving the way for a Putsch, was a complete fiasco.

It was therefore in a last attempt to win round the Danes by concessions—as well as with the aim of obtaining a legal mandate for the indigenous Nazis—that, at very short notice and after much haveriing, Best gave permission for the holding of parliamentary elections on 23 March 1943. But, instead of having the desired effect, this unique and unprecedented concession by the Germans to an occupied country resulted in the Danish Nazi Party obtaining only a little more than 2 per cent. of the votes and in an overwhelming vote of confidence in the coalition of democratic parties upon which the Government was based. A highly significant feature of the election lay in the fact that the Conservatives—generally regarded as the strongest opponents of concessions to Germany—gained 120,000 votes, or 40 per cent., and, although the whole result did not affect the composition and policy of the Scavenius Government, it was valued by the Danes as a demonstration of adherence to democratic rule and the integrity of the nation. Although the Germans had heavily subsidized the DNSAP (Danish Nazi Party), they cannot ever have entertained much hope of turning its leader, Frits Clausen, into a cat's-paw of the order of Vidkun Quisling of Norway. Clausen's personality was so mediocre that he was unable to preserve unity even in so diminutive a party as the DNSAP. By the time of the 1943 elections he had already been more or less eclipsed by his compatriot K. B. Martinsen, Commander of the 'Danish Free Corps' on the eastern front, who, returning to Denmark at this time, began to recruit for a new 'security force' known as the

1 Best, shortly after his arrival, had demanded the inclusion of Danish Nazis in the Government (see above, p. 122).
2 *J.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxviii. 669 (901-RF). In 1935 this new party won about 15,000 votes but no seat in Parliament; in 1939 it won about 30,000 votes and three seats in Parliament; yet in 1943, with the country completely under German Nazi domination, it only increased its votes to 43,000, and still only won three seats.
3 See also above, p. 122.
Schalburg Corps, without reference to Clausen and the DNSAP, and, even more significantly, with the tacit approval of the Germans for his independent action. After the elections there were evident signs that the Germans had drastically reduced, if not altogether ceased, financial support for the DNSAP and had certainly withdrawn their moral support from Frits Clausen, while they were encouraging and bolstering up the purely militant bodies such as the ‘Waffen SS Danmark’ and the Schalburg Corps. This gave the coup de grâce to Clausen’s precarious hold on his already disintegrating party, and thereafter he was variously reported as having been expelled from the DNSAP, arrested by the Germans for misappropriation of funds, and sent to the eastern front.

The election concession also failed in its other aim, for, far from abating, resistance and sabotage increased to an even greater degree of intensity than before. The general public was becoming increasingly uneasy at German exploitation of Danish labour and resources. Moreover, the mounting Allied air offensive against the Continent persuaded even the most pacific-minded elements that it would be preferable to earn for themselves the credit of destroying German assets in Denmark rather than to be exposed to air attacks. A crucial stage—for it became a turning-point in the development of Danish resistance—was reached on 4 August 1943, when the Germans delivered an ultimatum to the Danish Government demanding the imposition of martial law, the death penalty for sabotage and the carrying of arms, and even the trial of saboteurs by German law in German courts. The Government—with the King’s full approval—refused to introduce measures contrary to the law and Constitution of the country, which, moreover, they claimed would render the maintenance of order even more difficult than heretofore. Despite a last appeal to the population for restraint from provocation, widespread strikes and greatly intensified sabotage broke out, and Scavenius tendered his resignation to Best on 10 August 1943; but the latter’s dependence on Scavenius as a tool constrained him to refuse it. After a further attempt to browbeat the Government had failed there remained only one solution. Martial law was proclaimed, Government and Parliament were dissolved, the King became a virtual prisoner, army and navy officers were interned, and the Germans assumed direct control of the country over the heads of Danish permanent officials running day-to-day administration (29 August

1 Named after the former commander of the ‘Danish Free Corps’, von Schalburg, who was killed in action on the eastern front in June 1942.
2 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 July 1943.
3 See New York Herald Tribune, 14 October 1943 and France, 15 October 1943.
4 The first act of the Germans during the early hours of 29 August before martial law had actually been proclaimed was to occupy a concentration camp in which were interned some 260 Communists who had been arrested by the Danish authorities at the time of the German invasion of Russia. About 100 of the men eluded capture, but the rest were deported to Germany at the beginning of October (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 633 and 671 (901-RF)).
1943). These events appeared to mark the temporary collapse of Best’s conciliatory policy and the triumph of his rival for supremacy, General von Hanneken, who, now that martial law was declared, superseded Best as the highest German authority in Denmark having both legislative and executive power. They also united in open revolt a Resistance Movement which had hitherto tended to split into two camps—the activists, and those who preferred to await ‘the Day’ before making an active contribution. Now too, for the first time, a sentence of death was pronounced by a German court martial and executed upon a Danish engineer for sabotage.

Simultaneously with the declaration of martial law a ‘Freedom Council’ was formed on 29 August 1943 which included one representative of the Free Danish Movement abroad. Members undertook to resist Germany and Danish Nazis and to lay aside party considerations. The Council contained representatives of all the activist groups, which previously had had little contact with one another, and a unified policy and a methodical programme were now developed. Unorganized sabotage and attacks against the persons of individual Germans or Danish Nazis were strongly discouraged; all efforts were now to be concentrated against vital industries serving German interests and against transport and communications.

While martial law was still in force it was decided in Berlin—apparently on Best’s recommendation—that the Danish Jews should be rounded up and deported to Bohemia. Clumsy attempts were made to excuse the persecution of the Jews by ascribing all sabotage to Jewish malevolence; but the fresh wave of sabotage which the German action evoked showed that resistance was by no means confined to one section of the population.

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1 Ibid. p. 671. See The Times, New York Times, Daily Telegraph, 30 August 1943. The forethought and prompt action of responsible officers deprived the Germans of almost the whole of the small Danish fleet, for those vessels which did not succeed in escaping to Sweden were scuttled, while shore installations and fortifications were blown up. Danish seamen and other patriots fought the Germans fiercely to give cover for these operations.

2 A German plan put forward shortly afterwards to replace the military control with a puppet régime under Best as ‘Protector’ (Parliament to be dissolved after legalizing this régime) was unanimously rejected by a committee representing the ‘big five’ Danish political parties (see New York Times, 21 September 1943).

3 The victim was Paul Soerensen, alleged to have been caught red-handed while attempting to hide explosives dropped by British aircraft (see Daily Telegraph, 9 September 1943, cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 631 (901-RF)).

4 The first proclamation of the Freedom Council was published in the clandestine press and points from it were reproduced in the Daily Telegraph, 12 October 1943. A further declaration regarding post-war plans for a return to democratic government and the treatment of collaborators was summarized in The Times, 10 December 1943.

5 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 152 (517-D).

6 Ibid.

7 The German-controlled Petit Pariser (16/17 October 1943) said: ‘A wave of agitation and interior sabotage conducted by British spies dropped by parachute swept the country. Britain could not tolerate good relations between Denmark and Germany; her agents found active collaborators among the Jewish colony. The German military authorities, in order to ensure their security, decreed a state of emergency, disarmed and interned the Danish army and decided to transplant the Jews to a ghetto in Poland.’
The operation against the Jews, which took place during the night of 1–2 October, resulted in the deportation of fewer than 500 persons, the great majority of the members of the Jewish community having heard rumours of what was in store for them and made their escape to Sweden.1

A few days later, on 6 October 1943, Best was allowed to declare the state of emergency at an end and to resume his ‘normal functions’ as Reichshevollmächtiger—though in point of fact, with the exception of the curfew, most of the provisions of the state of emergency remained in force. But as sabotage increased steadily in intensity throughout the winter (during November cases were estimated at twenty daily),2 Best was driven to harsher methods of combating it, if only to hold his own against von Hannenken, who constantly clamoured for the reintroduction of martial law. In one week of November, 15 persons were sentenced to death, 130 arrested, and 31 deported to concentration camps in Germany. This terrorism culminated in the announcement in April 1944 that saboteurs already under arrest would be executed if further acts of sabotage occurred,3 as well as in the application of ‘counter-sabotage’ (i.e. the destruction of purely Danish property by way of reprisal) by Danish Nazis and members of the Schalburg Corps, and the perpetration of political murders,4 of which the most notable example was that of the dauntless patriot and poet, Pastor Kaj Munk, on 5 January 1944.5

Best’s exasperation with the growing toll of sabotage finally led him to

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1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 634 and 675 (901-RF). See also Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 October 1943; The Times, 4 and 11 October 1943; Daily Telegraph, 6 October 1943.
2 See News Chronicle, 8 November 1943, and speech by Count Reventlow as reported in the same paper. 19 November 1943.
3 According to the Stockholm correspondent of The Times (26 April 1944) Best summoned the editors of Copenhagen papers and told them: ‘If the interests of the German war command continue to be attacked by saboteurs it will be impossible in future to show mercy to arrested saboteurs who legally have forfeited their lives.’ This followed a night during which sixty explosions were heard in different parts of Copenhagen and twenty acts of sabotage occurred in buildings used by Germans or in factories working for them. During the next six weeks some twenty-four persons were condemned to death. The execution of persons under arrest for sabotage as a sequel to fresh acts of which they could not have been guilty was the nearest that the Germans came in Denmark to applying the policy, which they followed in other countries, of putting hostages to death in reprisal for anti-German activities. About 500 prominent Danes had been arrested as hostages on 29 August 1943, but none of them was shot and all were eventually released (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 638 and 679 (901-RF)). Some use was, however, made of ‘prophylactic hostages’, and relatives of persons belonging to the Resistance Movement were arrested as a means of coercion (ibid.).
4 The campaign of counter-sabotage was known among the Danes as ‘Schalburgtag’. For details of this campaign and of the political assassinations or ‘clearing murders’ see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 699–73 and 681–90 (901-RF). See also above, p. 152. Denmark had been excluded from the operation of the ‘Nacht und Nebel’ decree of 7 December 1944 (see above, p. 150, and Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 180). In regard to Hitler’s ‘Terror and Sabotage’ order of 30 July 1944 (see above, p. 151, and Documents (R.I.A.), cit. p. 191), Keitel, in a supplementary decree of 18 August 1944, reserved to himself the decision whether it should apply to Denmark (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 506 (764-D); Documents (R.I.A.), cit. p. 191).
5 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 685 (901-RF).
another step which, though less sanguinary, precipitated another great crisis in the occupied state. His imposition of a curfew in June 1944—during the longest summer days—proved the last straw to Copenhagen. The Danes openly defied it (a number being shot in the streets by German troops) and called a general strike on 30 June 1944. Best retaliated by cutting off all supplies of water, gas, and electricity to the capital and declaring a state of siege. The Freedom Council issued a proclamation urging the population to continue the strike until the Germans complied with four demands: the removal of the Schalburg Corps, the cancellation of the curfew, the restoration of supplies and communications, and a guarantee that no reprisals would be taken against strikers. After only a few days of haggling, during which the strike continued undiminished, Best gave in to all the Danish demands on 4 July. For, in retaliating, he would appear to have had his military colleagues and economic advisers against him: the former fearing an increase in the difficulties and unpopularity of the Wehrmacht, and the latter dreading the loss which a prolonged strike might cause to the German war potential at this crucial period of the war. Thus, though the disunity among the Germans in Denmark was again demonstrated, it was noteworthy that the position had been completely reversed since the last great crisis in August 1943. Then the German military authorities wished to crush resistance at all costs, while Best strove to avoid an open clash. This time the military joined with the economic advisers to restrain Best from precipitating a trial of strength.

However, the July attempt on Hitler’s life which brought the Gestapo to supremacy in Germany had corresponding repercussions in Denmark, which threw both the former rival powers there into the shade. Indeed, Best was sent for and personally abused by Hitler for his mishandling of the general strike and told that both he and von Hanneken had disobeyed the orders telling them how to deal with Denmark. Early in August, therefore, the Gestapo took over the judicial power in Denmark from the German courts martial and a new wave of terror was inaugurated by their chief, Gunther Pancke, who now became the dominant power in the land.

1 This followed the most spectacular act of sabotage so far committed in Denmark, on 24 June 1944, when about seventy patriots drove up to the plant of the Danish Rifle Syndicate in Copenhagen free harbour in three lorries bearing fire brigade and ambulance markings. They overpowered the guards, drove the workers to shelter, and placed about fifteen TNT bombs in vital parts of the establishment, virtually wrecking the whole factory. It was Denmark’s only source of machine-guns, anti-tank guns, and repeating rifles, and had been working exclusively for the Germans since the occupation began (see The Times, 26 June 1944).

2 Total casualties during the few days of disorder were given as 93 killed and 670 wounded (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6 July 1944).

3 See The Times and Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 July 1944.

4 One of the first acts of the new reign of terror was the murder on 9 August of eleven young Danes arrested for sabotage or carrying arms. They were shot on the pretext that they were
But, despite Pancke's wiles and terrorism, sabotage continued to increase and the Resistance Movement remained largely intact and unaffected. In September, in retaliation against certain deportations and acts of terror, the Freedom Council called a 48-hour general strike, and Pancke used this as a pretext for obliterating the Danish police force, which he—probably rightly—accused of favouring the patriots and strikers.¹ A false air-raid alarm on 19 September 1944 enabled the Germans to occupy all police posts and to seize police agents who, according to their importance, were either deported to Germany, interned, or otherwise deprived of the exercise of their functions.²

From now on until the liberation in May 1945 a virtual state of open war existed between the German authorities and the Danish population. Danish solidarity was strengthened rather than shaken by the fate of the Danish police, in spite of the fact that the latter's removal placed the population at the mercy of the ordinary criminal and the black-marketeer and that such things as air raid precautions and traffic control collapsed. Nor did the Danes allow themselves to be even momentarily deflected from their methodical sabotage programme when Best made a last attempt at appeasement early in November, in which he stressed the military necessity and purely temporary nature of the occupation and the lack of any revengeful spirit in the occupying Power, and pleaded for order and co-operation.³ In any case, any agreeable impression was quickly effaced by a warning on 18 November from Pancke that strikers would in future be treated as members of the Resistance Movement, since they had identified themselves with it, and by the replacement in February 1945 of General von Hanneken by General Lindemann, who began a new cam-

trying to escape while they were en route from police headquarters to another destination (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 635 and 677 (901-RF)). Incomplete reports of this incident were published (see The Times, 14 August 1944) and in protest extensive strikes broke out in Copenhagen on 15 and 16 August and later in many provincial centres.

¹ On 14 September the Gestapo conducted widespread raids throughout Denmark and arrested hundreds or even thousands of Danes (Daily Telegraph, 15 September 1944). On 16 September the general strike was called against the Germans' breach of faith in deporting to Germany on the preceding day 201 captives taken at random from 1,200 inmates of Froeslev camp in South Jutland, where they had been held by the Danish authorities under a special agreement with the Germans as an alternative to their being sent to a concentration camp in Germany (The Times, 18 September 1944; I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 635 and 676 (901-RF)).

² Ibid. pp. 635 and 690-1. See also The Times, 20 September, Daily Telegraph, 21 September 1944. The number of police and gendarmes deported was about 2,000 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 635 (901-RF)).

³ On 5 November 1944, the second anniversary of his appointment as German plenipotentiary in Denmark, Best was interviewed by the organ of the German minority, the Nordschleswigsche Zeitung, and the entire Danish press was compelled to report the interview, covering at least three columns on the front page. The greatest sabotage coup was carried out on 2 January 1945 when about eighty armed Danish patriots, some in German uniform, stormed and completely wrecked with time-bombs a wireless factory at Charlottenlund, Copenhagen, which was producing V.2 components. A few days later armed patriots stormed the Horsens state prison and liberated fifteen political prisoners (The Times, 4 and 9 January 1945).
paign of terrorism on his own account.¹ To the brutalities of the Germans there were now added, in these last months of occupation, grave material difficulties. Food supplies became uncertain, partly because of increased German requisitioning and partly because of transport difficulties. The latter in turn were due partly to sabotage and partly to diminished fuel supplies. With the Russian occupation of Silesia the meagre coal deliveries from Germany to Denmark ceased completely and the Germans confiscated almost all the remaining coal reserves in the country.² In spite of this the Germans proceeded to demand accommodation in Denmark for German refugees and wounded from eastern Germany and by the end of April over 300,000 such persons, many in an appalling condition, had arrived in the country.

As the day of liberation approached the members of the Resistance Movement became increasingly interested in the future shape of things in Denmark as well as in their own future. In March a leading clandestine paper Dansk Presse conducted an underground Gallup poll which revealed that 80 per cent. of those questioned wished the Freedom Council to be represented in the first free government and the Communist Party to be represented in the Rigsdag (it had been banned in the 1943 general election). With some exceptions there was a general feeling that the Resistance Movement was not a ‘party’ which should compete with the political parties after the war. The Freedom Council itself was strongly in favour of infusing the ideals of the Resistance into the established parties rather than preserving the underground as a body.³ This was the more natural since members of all parties had played leading parts in the Resistance—however loath the Communists might be to recognize this fact afterwards. For, although, as in other countries, the Communists came greatly to the fore in the Danish Resistance Movement, other elements also obtained a firm foothold in it from the very start and thus helped to offset the Communist influence. The earliest resister of all was probably Christmas Moeller, the Conservative leader, as was proved by his expulsion from Government and Parliament within six months of the start of the occupation. Other leading Conservatives also played an active and prominent part in the Resistance, such as the Youth Movement leader Aksel Moeller, and the chairman of the Conservative group in the Folketing.⁴ Bjorn

¹ Ferocious ‘counter-sabotage’ measures began immediately after Lindemann’s appointment. For incidents during February and March 1945 see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvii. 648–9 and 688–9 (901-RF). See also Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23, 25, 26 February and 2 March 1945.
² See ibid. 2 and 26 March, 19 April 1945.
³ According to the report, published in The Times (21 September 1944), of a Dane (whose identity was for obvious reasons not disclosed) who attended a meeting of the Freedom Council in the latter half of 1944.
⁴ At a national congress of the Danish Conservative Party in Copenhagen on 25 November 1940 a resolution was unanimously passed declaring that ‘the freedom, independence and full sovereignty of the Danish state must be the aim of Danish policy’ and that it was ‘of the utmost
Kraft, who founded the underground paper *Dansk Tidende* in collaboration with the Social Democrat Hedtoft, and whom the Germans attempted to murder in December 1943. Another Social Democrat, Frode Jakobsen, founded the Resistance organization known as *Ringen* in 1941 and in 1943 founded the Freedom Council, in which he became ‘Minister of Defence’, that is, responsible for the military organization of the underground forces. Moreover, as soon as Hitler’s attack on Russia permitted the Communists to come forward as fanatical patriots and resisters, their hitherto implacable leader Aksel Larsen even consented to collaborate with Christmas Moeller in the production of the leading underground newspaper *Fri Denmark*.\(^1\) It is true that the greatest figure in the Resistance inside Denmark (after Moeller’s escape to England and Larsen’s arrest and deportation) was a former member of the Communist Party and undoubtedly still a fervent fellow traveller—namely Dr. Mogens Fog; but it was impossible for the Communists to disguise the fact of the other parties’ contributions to the Resistance. At the same time, since the other Left-wing party, the Social Democrats, had just as good a Resistance record as the Communists, they could afford after the liberation to challenge the latter’s right to any monopolization of Left-wing sentiment as well as to spurn their overtures for any form of collaboration or fusion.

(v) Norway

The Germans launched their surprise attack on Norway during the night of 8–9 April 1940, some hours before they presented the Norwegian Government with a notification of their intention to occupy the country and a demand that there should be no resistance.\(^2\) The Norwegian Foreign Minister was also handed a note setting out the steps which the German Government desired the Norwegian Government to take and which would have reduced Norway at once to the status of a puppet state.\(^3\) These

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1 The first number appeared on 16 December 1940.
2 The German Minister in Oslo arrived at the Foreign Ministry with his Government’s note about 4 a.m. on 9 April; the first shots between German warships and the Norwegian forts had been exchanged at about 1 a.m. (Relevant extracts from the *Ny Norsk Kistbok* [New Norwegian White Book] (London, Norwegian Foreign Affairs Department, 1941) are translated in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.): *Norway and the War, 1939–45*. For these events see pp. 48–49). Even Quisling had not been informed in advance of the exact time of the German attack (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxix. 207 (079-UK)).
3 The German Government had given Norway an assurance on 2 September 1939 that they intended to respect Norway’s integrity in all circumstances, but had stated that they expected absolute neutrality on Norway’s part (ibid. p. 34 (031-TC)). The German invasion was represented in the note to Norway as ‘protective occupation’, designed to forestall an Allied invasion (ibid. pp. 52–56 (055-TC); *Documents* (R.I.I.A.), cit. pp. 54–57). The Allies, in fact, not only mined Norwegian waters but were also preparing to send a small expeditionary force to the Scandinavian peninsula (Churchill: *Second World War*, i. 457; U.S. edition, i. 578; *Documents* (R.I.I.A.), cit. pp. 43–48).
demands were met by a prompt and categorical refusal; the Norwegian forces resisted the invaders and, in conjunction with the Allies, fought a campaign on Norwegian soil for sixty-two days until the collapse of the western front on the continent of Europe obliged the Allies to withdraw. Thereupon, the King and the Government, under the premiership of Johan Nygaardsvold, having eluded the Germans and having earlier (at Hamar and Elverum on 9 April) received a mandate from the Storting to carry on the war against Germany, if necessary from outside Norway, left the country for England on 7 June 1940.2

Meanwhile, on the evening of the very first day of the German onslaught, the leader of the Norwegian ‘Nazi’ Party (the Nasjonal Samling), Vidkun Quisling, had, with the support of the Germans, proclaimed the formation of a new Norwegian Government in Oslo, with himself as the head of it. However, so incensed was the Norwegian public by the sudden prominence given to the already despised and distrusted Quisling that this Government lasted only a few days. Moreover, under the Constitution, governments were appointed by the King, and, despite the efforts of a German negotiator to obtain an ex post facto ratification of Quisling’s self-imposed authority, the King, with the concurrence of his Ministers, refused such ratification. Further, constitutional practice demanded that the Government should represent the predominant political party and was therefore flagrantly violated by the pretensions of a party which had not even achieved the return of a single member to the Storting.3 Indeed, there was at first more bitterness against Quisling and his henchmen than against the Germans, for the exercise of illegal power by a foreign conqueror did not wound the national pride to so great an extent as a like exercise of power by members of a party which, in a six-years’ campaign, had never won the support of more than 2 per cent. of the electorate.4

In retrospect, the persistent attempt to use Quisling as an instrument of German policy may be seen as a grave error of judgement on Hitler’s part, because it did much to crystallize the opposition to the Germans and because there was a distinct possibility at one moment that without it a government might have been found which would have been prepared to

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1 Halvdan Koht: Norway Neutral and Invaded (London. Hutchinson, 1941), pp. 70-80.
2 Such units of the Royal Norwegian Navy as escaped the Germans served beside the British navy in the war at sea; later their number was added to and they were re-equipped. The Norwegian merchant fleet, comprising nearly 4 million tons, about 1,000 vessels, and 25,000 sailors (see speech by Crown Prince Olav reported in the Christian Science Monitor, 26 March 1941), also played a highly important role in the Battle of the Atlantic and the supplying of the United Kingdom, despite the offer of tempting bribes to the sailors at sea and the victimization of the ship-owners in Norway by the Germans. Norwegian airmen went to Canada to organize and train new squadrons which later took their place beside the R.A.F. in Britain. A Norwegian expeditionary land force was also trained in Scotland and ultimately took part in the liberation of the homeland.
3 Documents (R.I.A.), cit. pp. 52-53.
4 Details of the Quisling movement will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: The Realignment of Europe.
collaborate with the Germans and even perhaps to go to the length of ultimately dethroning the King. Indications to this effect were forthcoming when the first Quisling Government was succeeded by a so-called Administrative Council on 15 April 1940, appointed by the Supreme Court (whose members had remained in Oslo), and composed for the most part of loyal Norwegians who wished to preserve national solidarity and save their country from the ever-present threat of direct German rule by proffering some kind of national government acceptable to the Germans. The Germans, too, were naturally anxious if possible to secure Norwegian co-operation in reversing the Elverum and Hamar enactments which confronted them with such a formidable constitutional obstacle. Protracted negotiations along these lines throughout the summer and autumn of 1940 ultimately came to nothing, but it was significant that the Presidential Board of the Storting should actually, though admittedly under heavy German pressure, have gone so far, on 27 June 1940, as to request the King to abdicate as a necessary condition of a peace treaty. Happily for the future of the country, the King, supported by the legal Government in Exile, returned a flat refusal on 3 July 1940; but, though the Presidential Board was a body with no constitutional powers and not necessarily representative of the Storting as a whole, the episode remained as a very black mark against the Storting, which was remembered at the time of the liberation.

Having failed in the attempt to win the Norwegians’ support for the subversion of their own Constitution by setting up on 11 September 1940 a Council of State (Riksraad) endowed with the full powers of the absent King and Government, and having scotched the attempt of the five major political parties to form a coalition government based on a united anti-

2 'It was, in fact, an emergency step of doubtful constitutional validity and it is to be observed that the [Supreme] Court sought the approval of the King. This was conceded, after it had been made clear that the Administrative Council was not in any sense a Government, or a representative of the will of the Norwegian people. The proclamation of the Council by the Supreme Court was made conditional upon the withdrawal of Quisling and his supporters' (Great Britain, Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department: Norway: Basic Handbook (London, H.M.S.O., 1943), part II, p. 1). It is to be noted, however, that both Chief Justice Berg and Bishop Berggrav (see below, pp. 538–9) were members of the Council and that it was said to have been founded on their initiative—and both these men became the foremost leaders of the Resistance. Indeed, one of the reasons for the Bishop’s arrest in 1942 was said to be his possession of a letter, dated 30 April 1940, from the then German Minister in Oslo inviting him to take this initiative in view of Quisling’s manifest unacceptability among his own countrymen (see New York Times, 11 April 1942).
5 It was a Committee of six members consisting of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Storting and of each of the latter’s divisions—the Odelsting and Lagting.
6 An account of the liberation of Norway will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
Quisling front, the Germans suddenly and characteristically switched from blandishments to bludgeonings. On 25 September 1940 the Reich Commissioner, Josef Terboven—who had earlier (24 April) been installed as the highest representative of German authority in Norway—declared the King and his House dethroned, the Government and the Storting and the political parties (except Quisling's) abolished, and the Administrative Council dismissed; and appointed a board of 'Provisional State Counsellors' to assist him, as Supreme Administrator, in the various branches of administration. Most of these 'ministers' were members of Quisling's party, though Quisling himself, owing to his extreme unpopularity, was kept in reserve, while remaining the actual leader of the collaborators. There was no attempt to conceal the fact that the 'State Counsellors' derived their authority exclusively from the occupying Power and that therefore the validity of their decrees could not be tested by the Norwegian courts. In any case, the Reich Commissioner, as the holder of supreme governmental power, was empowered to issue his own decrees, having the force of law, and to make use of German police for their enforcement. But, on 21 December 1940, all the original members of the Norwegian Supreme Court resigned in protest against the Germans' violation of the Norwegian law and Constitution—especially as it stultified their own special function of testing the validity of new laws. This enabled the Quisling-controlled 'Department of Justice' to fill their places with 'yes-men' who ultimately, by some legal casuistry, endorsed the formation of a 'Norwegian National Government' under the leadership of Quisling. Accordingly on 1 February

1 A correspondent of the German Pommersche Zeitung (quoted in the Manchester Guardian, 27 September 1940) complained that 'a great number of Norwegians still hope for a British victory... They refuse to believe that German might is sufficient to become master over Britain.' The writer added that the Germans felt 'uncomfortable' in Norway and found no response to their plans for a new Europe.

2 See above, p. 102.

3 See Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete, no. 5, 26 September 1940, p. 10; Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 499. An article in the Völkischer Beobachter (28 September 1940) declared that there could obviously be no question of allowing 'the old, guilt-laden political parties to begin their games again... since this party-world was largely responsible for the fact that a pronounced anglophilism reigned in Norway, together with a correspondingly hostile attitude towards Germany', and it would, as Terboven said, be tantamount to 'setting the fox to keep the geese'. In January 1941 local government was also gleichgeschaltet, the party-political element being eliminated and the old local autonomy being replaced by an authoritarian system under which local 'presidents' and 'councillors' were appointed by the Quisling Government and Party.

4 See above, p. 120, for Quisling's complaint to Hitler in August 1940 that he was not receiving adequate support from Terboven.

5 See above, p. 120, for Quisling's complaint to Hitler in August 1940 that he was not receiving adequate support from Terboven.


7 See letters from the Supreme Court to the Department of Justice, 19 November and 12 December 1940 (Norsk Tidend, 27 December 1940; Documents (R.I.A.) cit. pp. 144-5).
1942 Quisling was ceremoniously promoted to the position of 'Minister-President' with a Cabinet consisting of thirteen 'constituted ministers' (eleven of whom were the same ones as before). But it was merely a puppet government, and both Quisling and it remained subject to the orders of Terboven, in spite of Quisling's decree (7 February 1942) vesting in himself the authority constitutionally belonging to the King and the Storting.¹

The resignation of the Supreme Court judges in December 1940 was not only the first real gesture of resistance to the German domination: it also came from a highly significant and influential quarter. This was to have a very important influence on the future development and character of the Norwegian Resistance Movement generally; for the President of the Supreme Court, the seventy-year old former Liberal Minister Paal Berg, founded the first Resistance group together with Bishop Berggrav, and later became Leader of the Norwegian 'Home Front'. The latter comprised both a military and a civilian division, and though Berg had no former military experience he gradually built it into one of the most effective Resistance organizations in Europe. But in the beginning the underground movement had sprung up spontaneously in various parts of Norway, and it was only gradually that the separate organizations which had at first worked in isolation were brought together under one leadership, until the Home Front organization covered the whole country from Lindesnaes to the North Cape. If the Gestapo succeeded in discovering and crushing a local section a new one was immediately organized. The underground press produced some 200 to 300 illegal newspapers, some of which were even produced in the concentration camps.² An 'emigration service' brought about 50,000 persons to Sweden and England by various means. At first the actions undertaken were on a small scale, often clumsily executed, and therefore visited with swift and costly retribution by the Germans; but later they took the form of expertly executed sabotage, on a large scale, of those industries which were most vital to the German war effort.

¹ In his speech at the inauguration ceremony Quisling declared that 'the Norwegian people need a severe schoolmaster who knows the people thoroughly and who can teach national discipline' (Manchester Guardian, 2 February 1942). He also said that the foremost task was to conclude peace with Germany. (For Raeder's advocacy of a peace treaty with Norway see above, p. 128.) But the reaction of the leading Swedish papers was not encouraging. Dagens Nyheter wrote: 'Quisling is just as dependent upon the occupation authorities as before and just as repugnant to his own people. His powers are just as full as the Germans choose to make them', and Svenska Dagbladet described Quisling and his ministers as 'Marionettes of the Occupying Power' (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2 February 1942). According to the decree of 7 February 1942, the Minister-President's legislative power overruled the Constitution with only the following slight concession to formalities: 'Legislation at variance with the Constitution shall be countersigned by the head of the Department of Justice and shall carry a preamble stating that it is valid, regardless of the rules of the Constitution' (The Times, 9 February 1942).

² For varying estimates of the number of illegal newspapers see Chicago Daily News, 9 June 1942; Newspaper World, 10 October 1942.
Of equal significance with the leadership given by Chief Justice Berg, the highest officer of the law, was that given by Bishop Berggrav of Oslo, the Primate and the greatest personality of the Norwegian State Church, who joined Berg in founding the first Resistance group and by virtue of his personal prestige persuaded the trade unions and the Socialists to co-operate. His resignation and that of the other six Norwegian bishops on 24 February 1942, and of nearly all the pastors in the land, were ultimately followed by his arrest on 9 April. Even when confined in a concentration camp and later when under 'house arrest' the bishop managed to communicate with and to direct the forces of resistance. Beginning in February 1941 and in defiance of the bans and threats of the quislingite 'Minister of Church and Education', Skancke, he led the other bishops in a continuous fire of courageous pastoral letters violently protesting against the execution of resisters, the persecution of the Jews, the terrorization by the Hird (Quisling's storm-troopers), against forced labour and deportation, against the planned un-Christian education of youth, the penaliza-

1 Despite the predominantly Socialist flavour of the Government in Exile, and despite their good record later, in the beginning of the occupation the Socialists in Norway adopted a suspicious and uncooperative attitude towards the efforts of the other parties to form a national front, and even gave evidence of wishing to exploit the country's plight for their own ends. All this changed, however, when the Germans shot the Norwegian Labour leaders Hansteen and Wickstrom on 10 September 1941. (Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: The Realignment of Europe.)


3 E. Berggrav: With God in the Darkness (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1943), pp. 104-6. In October 1940 a decree was issued debarring Jews from certain professions, e.g. medicine and law. In June 1942 a register of Jews, half-Jews, &c., was compiled. In September 1942 many Jews were arrested under pretext of complicity in the murder of a quisling policeman, and the Chief Rabbi of Oslo on a charge of espionage. In October 1942 the confiscation of all Jewish property was ordered, and finally in November all remaining Jews (about 750) were rounded up and deported to Germany or Poland 'where practically all of them died in gas chambers or concentration camps' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 210 (079-UK)). (There were said never to have been more than 1,400 Jews in Norway at any time.)

4 The Sunday Times (2 March 1941) reported that 'Norwegian schoolchildren are on strike in Oslo, Bergen, and other towns as a protest against the brutal activities of the Quisling "Youth Guard" and the attempt to impose Nazi teaching', and the Manchester Guardian (15 March 1941) gave details of patriotic demonstrations, strikes, &c., by schoolchildren and of brutal quisling reprisals. The same paper (7 November 1941) described the quisling attempts to revise school curricula and replace text-books and teachers, and the strong resistance with which they met. This resistance was in turn countered by the quislings by the closing of scores of schools throughout the country. One of the first acts of the new Quisling Government set up on 1 February 1942 was to promulgate a law compelling all boys and girls to become members of a Nazi organization and all teachers to join a Nazi Teachers' Association. At the same time instructions were issued for the teaching of Nazi ideology in the schools. Protests from parents and teachers all over the country against these measures were strongly backed by the bishops and clergy. The majority of Norwegian teachers refused to join the Teachers' Association even when threatened with deportation to the north of Norway for compulsory labour. By the end of March 1942 some 1,300 teachers had been arrested and sent to prisons, concentration camps, or compulsory labour. This resistance was to a large extent effective in preventing the carrying out of the plans for the nazification of Norwegian youth (see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 209-10 (079-UK)). For the
tion of conscientious teachers, &c. Moreover, in April 1941 the mal-
practices of the Germans, and especially of Quisling's henchmen, brought
forth a direct protest to the Reich Commissioner on behalf of forty-four
Norwegian organizations, embracing lawyers, teachers, professors, clergy-
men, trade unionists, state officials, doctors, judges, engineers, architects,
chemists, railwaymen, foresters, &c. But in September of the same year
the struggle entered a new phase, when enthusiastic demonstrations over
a British air-raid on Oslo, coupled with strikes there in connexion with the
exporting of milk to Germany, were met by the Germans with the pro-
clamation of a state of emergency, the execution of two of the workers'
leaders—Hansteen and Wickström—on 10 September 1941, deportations,
mass arrests, confiscation of radio sets, &c. Further death penalties were
imposed during the autumn and winter. By the following year the exploita-
tion of the country by the Germans had caused an acute crisis. Food
stocks were used up or exported by the Germans; grain, fuel, and
textiles could not be imported in sufficient quantities. The 'wooing' was
now definitely turned off and the 'rightfulness' turned on. Between
January and October 1942 (in which month a crisis was reached, a state
of siege declared in Trondhjem, and savage reprisals perpetrated) it would
appear from contemporary press reports that 151 persons were executed
and closed on 4,000 arrested or deported. The Norwegians were now
thoroughly alienated and Resistance had become a duty to be undertaken
more seriously, determinedly, and 'professionally'. Moreover, since the
Germans had taken charge of the trade unions and had made the control
attitude of the Church see a letter from the bishops to the Minister for Church and Education,
Skancke, 14 February 1942 (Berggrav: With God in the Darkness, pp. 89-90).

1 On 20 March 1941 the quislingite 'Government' in Norway relieved the quisling party
(Nasjonal Samling) of responsibility to Norwegian law—even quisling law—by giving the party
a free hand to take reprisals against anti-quisling Norwegians. Explaining this step, Norvik, the
'State Advocate', said that no legal proceedings would be allowed against members of the
Nasjonal Samling Party for reprisals which they considered necessary when provoked by their
opponents (The Times, 22 March 1941).

2 The protest declared that since the quislingites had assumed power in September 1940 all
standards of justice and decency had been systematically violated, thus making ordered life
impossible (ibid. 7 June 1941).

3 See above, p. 144.

4 A state of emergency had also been declared a month earlier, on 2 August 1941, after 5,000
Norwegians had rioted at Aalesund on the occasion of the Germans' coming to arrest the families
of young men who had escaped to England (see New York Times, 2 August 1941).

5 A decree issued by Terboven on 17 September 1941 made Norwegians accused of violations
of the Reich Commissioner's orders subject to the jurisdiction of the German SS Tribunal. This
court from first to last sentenced more than 150 Norwegians to death and many others to long
terms of imprisonment (J.M. T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 211 (679-UK)).

6 In a speech in Oslo on 4 October 1941 Terboven complained that the Norwegians had failed
to appreciate German magnanimity. He said that they were foolishly looking to England for
help, not realizing that England wanted to starve Norway, whereas the Germans brought
Norway food although they were not bound to do so by the international rules for forces occup-
ying another's country, and although 'it is a matter of complete indifference to Germany and to
the war which Germany is fighting if a few thousand or tens of thousands of Norwegian men,
women, and children starve during the war' (The Times, 6 October 1941).
of industry and labour the first object of their policy in Norway, the Resistance now received the whole-hearted support of the trade unionists and Socialists, if it had not had it before. Indeed, immediately after Terboven had announced the inauguration of the New Order on 25 September 1940, the unions had resolved to cheat him of his prey by voluntarily dissolving themselves, destroying their lists of members and other records, and leaving their quisling successors to patch up some sort of 'labour front' on the German pattern.

Labour service (Arbeitsdienst) on a soi-disant 'voluntary' basis was introduced very soon after the beginning of the occupation. It was made compulsory by a law of 17 April 1941 (which came into effect on 1 May) and thereafter all young Norwegian men between the ages of twenty and twenty-six were conscribed for three months' compulsory labour service. This was intended to produce an annual supply of 25,000 young men, but in practice produced about 18,000 in 1941 rising to 20,000 in 1942. But in 1942 these arrangements were overshadowed by further decrees requiring all firms and enterprises first to give up one-third of their personnel for seasonal work in agriculture (April 1942) and then later to give up a similar proportion for compulsory work with the Organisation Todt on aerodromes and fortifications on the west coast of Norway (May 1942): it was estimated that some 70,000 workers were immediately transferred to defence work for the Germans. In 1943, however, a barely disguised attempt to round up the whole of Norway's man- and woman-power and to impress it into the service of Germany was embarked upon in a series of decrees issued between January and March. In a speech announcing the measures Quisling, who was allowed to try to give them a semblance of national, as against German, expediency, pleaded the double necessity of strengthening national defence against the threat of invasion from Russia (which he depicted as imminent), and of ensuring national supplies. In reality the primary aim of the conscription was to gain control, first, of all young men of military age for work on fortifications and railways, and, secondly, of all young able-bodied women to replace the men in these tasks in the event of the latter being sent to the war-fronts or to work in the Reich. In the beginning pains were taken to dispel anxiety as to the destination of workers until the latter were 'in the bag', but reports soon leaked out of men being shipped to Germany or, equally illegally, being

1 Ibid. 3 June 1942.
2 See p. 227 above for the appointment of Sauckel to mobilize man-power in the occupied countries.
3 The principal decree was promulgated on 3 February 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 213 (079-UK)). In a speech on 22 February 1943 Quisling explained that men between the ages of 18 and 55 and women between the ages of 21 and 40 were to be conscribed for any sort of labour that the authorities might decide (see The Times and New York Times, 23 February 1943).
ordered to join units of a semi-military character such as the Organisation Todt.\(^1\)

The increasing awareness on the part of the Germans' victims of their designs, as well as of their growing desperation in face of the rising tide of Allied successes in 1943 (desertion from the German army in Norway became sufficiently serious to be referred to by its commander), rendered the implementation of the labour decrees an exceedingly slow and difficult process for the occupying Power. The rate of escape to Sweden and elsewhere rose steeply and every possible means was employed to obstruct and retard the registration of workers. It was even claimed that Norwegian sabotage of the labour conscription plan had succeeded in cutting down the number of workers conscribed from the 35,000 expected by the Germans to 3,500.\(^2\) In August the Oslo chief of police, Gunnar Eilifsen, was shot for refusing to enforce the labour conscription by arresting recalcitrant women, and the whole of the Norwegian police and para-military formations were put under German military discipline. Norwegian army officers, on the other hand, were arrested and sent to concentration camps. Correspondingly the morale of the collaborating party declined. Soon after Quisling's assumption of the premiership secret registers and documents of the party had fallen into the hands of the patriots and extracts had been published in the clandestine press in July 1942, causing many members to take fright and resign. Then, in September 1942, Quisling's cherished plans for a 'corporative' parliament had been completely thwarted by mass resignations from the trade unions (which he had earlier taken over and 'quislingized') in protest against his decree of 10 September 1942 making membership of these unions compulsory. In December 1943 Oslo University was closed and about 1,500 students and 65 professors were arrested, nearly 400 of the former being subsequently deported and about 500 sent to concentration camps, for resisting Quisling's attempt to introduce political tests as a condition of entrance.\(^3\) Moreover, throughout 1943 a continual stream of reports reached the outside world regarding splits in Quisling's party and numerous resignations from it. Indeed, in a speech at Trondheim on 7 June 1943 Quisling was reduced to expressing the pious hope that every tenth person among the population might become a member of the Nasjonal Samling.\(^4\) They needed no more than

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3. See *The Times*, 5 and 12 January 1944.
4. Two years earlier the *New York Times* (18 May 1941) quoted the correspondent of *Stockholms Tidningen* as saying that 'in German circles the Quisling party membership is put at around 30,000. An important Quislingite put it at over 40,000, just over 1 per cent. of the Norwegian population.' On the other hand Quisling himself, in a speech at Borre on 25 May 1942, declared: 'The Nasjonal Samling is now so strong that we have to ask ourselves whether we even want any new members' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 26 May 1942). But later he issued a decree forbidding resignations from the party (*New York Times*, 3 November 1942).
Norway

this, he said, to govern the people and the country. This was an admission of the extremely small proportion of the nation which the Nasjonal Samling so far represented, as well as an indication that Quisling had abandoned any hope of widespread adherence and was anxious only to attain the percentage which the Germans had set as the condition for allowing him to continue as nominal ruler of Norway. Already at the beginning of April 1943 his powers had been curtailed in humiliating fashion by German orders which placed every quisling mayor under the supervision of a representative of either the Reich Commissioner or of the local Wehrmacht Commander. At the same time the press was informed that in future they must never refer to a decree as being ‘issued’ by Quisling, but as being ‘signed by the Minister-President’.¹ But his only real hope, temporarily at least, lay in appeasing the German Moloch with the bodily usefulness of his compatriots.² It was the discovery of his attempt to do this, however, which hardened the Norwegians’ resistance to an implacable degree and hastened his own and his masters’ doom. The year 1944 saw the complete transition from passive to active resistance because it was early in that year that the Resistance forces captured plans revealing Quisling’s promise to Hitler to mobilize 75,000 young Norwegians for military service with the Wehrmacht.³ The premature disclosure compelled the Germans and quislings to postpone putting the plan into execution for some months, and this delay gave the patriots the chance to organize counter-measures, so that when the Germans and their Norwegian tools eventually attempted in May 1944 to call up three age-groups for compulsory labour (ostensibly under the labour decrees of the preceding year) the menaced youth of Norway had gone into hiding in the mountains and forests and the net hauled in scarcely any of them.⁴ This was accompanied by the methodical sabotage of German records as well as sabotage on a mounting scale of industries working for them. Consequently German reprisals increased in number and severity until, by the end of the year, some 16,000 Norwegians

¹ Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2 April, New York Times, 5 April 1943.
² As early as January 1941 Quisling had launched an appeal for the formation of a volunteer force ‘Regiment Nordland’ ‘to partake in the German-Norwegian fight against Britain’ (New York Times, 13 January 1941). The regiment was incorporated in the German Waff-n-SS and put under the command (to the chagrin even of quislingites) of the German SS General Damm. When the Russian war-front opened in June 1941 Terboven announced the formation of a ‘Norwegian Legion’ to operate as ‘an individual and integrated unit under Norwegian leadership and formed on Norwegian military lines’ (Frankfurter Zeitung, 1 July 1941). In July 1942 Quisling also created a ‘Germanic SS Norway’ to form part of the ‘Grossgermanische SS’, as a kind of political police for work on the ‘home front’. (For text of the Order of 21 July 1942 see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 694-5 (926-RF)).
⁴ This was admitted by Quisling himself in an address to Norwegian SS men on 3 June 1944: ‘Norwegian youth hides and takes to the forests when we demand that it work for the people and the country’ (The Times, 5 June 1944).
were reported to be confined in prisons and concentration camps—many of them in Germany.¹

Under the stress of these events and of the generally deteriorating outlook for the Germans, Quisling’s party began to disintegrate more rapidly. There had long been a rift in the Nasional Samling between moderates and extremists, and now that rift became even deeper and wider, with Quisling desperately trying to b estride the chasm. During this year (1944) three of Quisling’s ‘ministers’ left his Government. Quisling himself, though remaining nominally Leader and ‘Minister-President’, was pushed more and more into the background by his rival Jonas Lie, the ‘Minister of Police’, who gained the special favour of the Germans by the ruthless brutality with which he collaborated with the German Gestapo chief, Rediess, in the persecution of the Norwegian patriots. The inevitable tendency was for the extremists, whose fanaticism naturally found greater support from the Germans, to oust the moderates, who were not only useless to the Germans but desperately anxious to extricate themselves from the German mesh and dodge the vengeance of their compatriots. Large numbers of the latter now began to escape into Sweden or, in a belated attempt to redeem themselves, to ‘join the Rowing Club’ (as the process was popularly called).² Indeed, for these people there was just as much incentive now to escape from their own leaders as from the vengeance of the Resistance or the Allies. For the die-hard and irremediably committed leaders were now driven to the desperate course of attempting by all means to reinforce their military strength, in an endeavour to ensure their survival, by putting that strength at the disposal of their German masters. Accordingly, having exhausted appeals for volunteers, these leaders turned to methods of compulsion, and early in September 1944 it was announced that members of the Nasional Samling between the ages of eighteen and forty-five could now be called up for military training and service, though still with the pledge that they would not be called on to

¹ See Annual Register, 1944, p. 272. On the other hand executions were fewer than in the preceding year: fifty-seven compared with eighty-one reported in the foreign press. Towards the end of 1944, however, successful acts of sabotage in two dockyards at Oslo caused Terboven to ask for authority to shoot workers in any plants that might be attacked and possibly also their relations. A message from Keitel, dated 6 December 1944, commenting on this proposal, showed him to be in agreement with the principle that only ruthless reprisals were likely to be effective against sabotage in Norway (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 387–91 (870 and 871-PS); N.C.A. iii. 623–6). In all about 40,000 Norwegians were arrested during the occupation and put in prisons or concentration camps in Norway or Germany. About 2,100 lost their lives, of whom 336 were executed, while about 1,500 died of starvation, illness, or maltreatment in concentration camps and prisons. Many were tortured, and some of them survived maimed or crippled (see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 211–13 (1979-UK) and Norway Year Book, 1950 (Oslo, Johan Grundt Tarum), p. 95).

² The clue to this popular expression may be found in an extract from a bitter article in the Norwegian Nazi organ Germaner (11 November 1944): ‘We see it clearly everywhere . . . even where we did not expect it, mistrust and dissension . . . and the damned tendency to start rowing for the shore.’
serve outside Norway. As a result hundreds of 'quislings' now took to the woods to escape conscription in the same way as the loyal population had earlier done to avoid the labour mobilization.

On 25 October 1944 the Red Army, pursuing the retreating Germans from Finland, crossed the Norwegian frontier and quickly liberated the whole of Finnmark, Norway's most northerly province. Orders were at once given to the German Northern Army Headquarters Staff to evacuate by force all the inhabitants of Finnmark and burn their houses.1 The Germans carried out this 'scorched earth' policy—which was rendered infinitely more terrible by the local seasonal conditions of arctic cold and perpetual night—with ruthless efficiency, burning towns and villages, slaughtering cattle and livestock, and evacuating as much of the population as they could lay their hands on.2 At the time there was much bitterness among North Norwegians that the Home Front leadership and the Government in exile would not encourage any resistance to this unprecedented terrorization. But in truth the latter were justifiably anxious to discourage big risks being taken for relatively small results, such as by independent acts of sabotage, &c., which might only end in worsening the situation for everyone by incurring terrible reprisals. Although units of the Norwegian army in Britain had been sent to support the Russians3 there was also disappointment, voiced ultimately even by the Prime Minister in exile, that a strong Allied expeditionary force was not sent from the west to cut off the Germans on their southward retreat.4 These very natural feelings were, moreover, exploited, though not entirely successfully, by the Communists, who had all along conducted an independent and more spectacular resistance policy of their own.5

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1 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 287 8 (75-1 PS); N.C.A. iii. 514-5; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46: Hitler's Europe, p. 226. For terboven's proclamation to the population see ibid. xxxix. 214-15 (079-UK); Documents (R.I.A.), cit. p. 227.
3 The arrival of a Norwegian military mission to the Soviet command in Norway and of the first detachments of Norwegian troops from Britain to fight beside the Russians was reported in The Times and New York Times, 15 November 1944.
4 In a broadcast on 26 December 1944 the Premier, Norgaardsvold, told the Norwegian people that his government had strongly urged this step upon the Western Allies and indicated that it had been rejected (see The Times and New York Herald Tribune, 27 December 1944). The Minister of Justice, Wold, after a visit to the northern front, had made a similar appeal even earlier (see Daily Telegraph, 9 December 1944).
5 The Stockholm correspondent of The Times (29 December 1944) considered that the influence of the Communists had already diminished since the preceding year and that in face of Communist jibes at the Home Front's 'passivity' and at General Eisenhower's and Crown Prince Olav's warnings against premature risings 'it is significant that the population has followed the Home Front's and not the Communists' slogans. Thus the intensification of specialized industrial sabotage in Norway during recent months is a clear result of Home Front directives, while earlier Communist appeals have received no response.' Nevertheless, when liberation was already in sight, the clandestine paper Fritt Land (as quoted in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 March 1945) found it necessary to urge that King Haakon, as the only figure with the requisite authority,
Nevertheless, the German evacuation from Finnmark was by no means free from molestation. General Rendulic, who had taken over the command of all German forces in Norway from General von Falkenhorst in November, had the task of moving the seven divisions which he had evacuated from Finland to Germany whence they could be distributed to the more hard-pressed battle-fronts. Thanks to constant harassing and sabotage by Norwegian Home Front forces, Norwegian paratroopers flown from Britain, and R.A.F. and Royal Navy operations, Rendulic had by the end of December only succeeded in transporting two of these divisions. With the turn of the year, moreover, and the almost daily growing advantage of the Allies, it became possible to give freer rein and greater aid to the Resistance. A methodical series of important sabotage operations against oil stores, ships, railways, and factories was carried out with the expert aid of British-trained Norwegians who had come back to their country as secret agents. There was also a considerable strengthening of the underground forces, which now received great quantities of weapons and other equipment, mostly dropped by parachute. On the other hand, the inevitable corollary to this development was that reprisals became even more severe. Mass executions became frequent, the victims partly being taken from the prisons and concentration camps and partly consisting of unoffending hostages picked out for the occasion from among well-known and respected citizens in order to make the deepest possible impression on the public mind. An indication of the awareness of the persecutors, both native and German, of the degree of cruelty and oppression which they had meted out to the Norwegian people may be found in the suicide, in the hour of liberation, of no fewer than four of them: Terboven, the Reich Commissioner; Rediess, the Gestapo chief; Jonas Lie, the ‘Minister of Police’; and Rogstad, the Chief of Security Police. Quisling, on the other hand, with several of his ‘ministers’ and his entire bodyguard of sixty men, surrendered to the Home Front forces.

The conduct of the Home Front forces in the hour of their triumph was orderly and dignified, for the preparations for them to take over control of the country when the Germans capitulated had been worked out several months earlier in close collaboration with the Government in Exile. Indeed, co-operation with the London Government had been close since the creation of the Home Front organization in the latter part of 1940, though, in the main, the Government recognized that the Home Front should return the instant the Germans departed in order to prevent a Communist coup d'état and to rally all anti-Communist elements in an effort to resist such an attempt if necessary by force of arms.

1 In February 1945, after the killing of Martensen, Quisling’s police chief, by Norwegian patriots, thirty-four of the latter were executed in the course of two days.

2 An account of Quisling’s conviction as a traitor and his execution will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
had the best possible facilities for estimating the situation inside Norway and was content to leave internal matters very much in the hands of the people at home. It was not, however, till 15 March 1944 that a manifesto broadcast from London made known the existence of the Home Front leadership (without mentioning any names) as the body co-ordinating and directing all forms of resistance inside Norway as well as the fact of its constant contact and co-operation with the Government in Exile. But, as the day of liberation drew visibly nearer, the Government deemed it prudent to reassure public opinion at home that it had no intention either of brushing aside the Resistance when the moment came or of otherwise ignoring the political proprieties. On 26 December 1944 the Premier, Nygaardsvold, broadcast from London to the Norwegian people to confirm that his Government intended to resign immediately on their return to Oslo in order that a new Government might be formed including representatives of the Home Front; also that preparations were being made for the rapid trial of traitors and for the holding of parliamentary and municipal elections as soon as possible.¹

These gestures were not the merely formal ones which they might have appeared to be, for the attitude of the Resistance Movement as a whole (as distinct from that of the Home Front leadership) to the Nygaardsvold Government had remained at least somewhat reserved. The intense bitterness which was widely felt during the first months after the Government had left Norway gradually faded and gave way to the realization that their action had been both unavoidable and wise, and fortunately the hostility never extended to King Haakon, who was cherished as a non-political and unifying symbol of the nation's independence. On the other hand, the Labour origin of the Nygaardsvold Government never permitted it, in the eyes of non-Socialists, to free itself from the suspicion of being influenced in its attitude by party-political considerations. Moreover, as has been already shown, the attitude of Socialists in Norway in the early part of the occupation might justifiably have increased suspicions of the party generally. Yet, even later, when Socialists in Norway had committed themselves to full co-operation with the Resistance, they found themselves, by an ironical turn of fate, again being excluded from its leadership. For the very reason that organized labour was one of the best channels for clandestine activities, the Germans and 'quislings' tended to concentrate their disruptive action against it. Therefore the maintenance of the Home Front liaison with organized labour, wherever the latter still existed, became increasingly difficult as a result of the arrest or expulsion of leading local labour personalities, and the Home Front tended to become less representative of Norwegian labour than it had been earlier on, and, by force of circumstance, to acquire a rather Conservative tone.

¹ See New York Times, 27 December 1944.
Yet the prevailing political wind in Norway—as the elections soon clearly showed—still blew from the Left. It was thus natural, perhaps, that at the liberation both Nygaardsvold, the war-time Premier, and Paal Berg, the Home Front Leader, should have proved unacceptable as candidates to head the first post-war Government and that the honour should have fallen to Einar Gerhardsen, who symbolized in his person both Labour and the Resistance.¹

¹ An account of the post-war Government of Norway will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: The Realignment of Europe.
PART VI

THE OCCUPIED AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

(i) Poland

By Sidney Lowery

(a) The Administrative Organization of German-occupied Territory

By a decree of 25 September 1939 Hitler ordered the establishment of a provisional military administration in the part of Poland which fell to Germany's share under the terms of the secret protocol attached to the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-aggression of 23 August 1939. The boundary between the German and Russian territories was fixed by a German-Soviet agreement of 28 September, and the German Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, at once proceeded to organize four military districts with their headquarters respectively in Łódź, Cracow, Poznań, and Danzig. Each district was under a military commander, who had full executive authority, and was assisted in the organization of the administration by a civilian administrative chief (Verwaltungschef). The military commander at Łódź, von Rundstedt, exercised general command over all the districts, and his civilian assistant, Hans Frank, had general responsibility for seeing that the administration throughout the occupied territories was set up on uniform lines.

The military régime lasted until 26 October, on which day there came into force two decrees signed by Hitler: one, dated 8 October, incorporated the four westernmost provinces of inter-war Poland in the Reich, and the other, dated 12 October, established a civilian administration in the rest of inter-war Polish territory west of the German-Soviet demarcation line.

The provinces of Poland annexed to the Reich by the decree of 8 October 1939 included not only all territory which had been part of Prussia before 1918, but also a wide belt of land (amounting to nearly half the total annexed territory) which had never before belonged to the German Reich, though it had been incorporated in Prussia between the

1 Details of this treaty will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: The Eve of War, 1939. For text of the treaty and protocol see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, i: 408-10.
2 Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
3 The decree of 8 October was also signed by Lammers, Goring, Frick, and Hess. Texts of both decrees will be found in Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, pp. 2042 and 2077; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, pp. 238-42.
third partition of Poland in 1795 and the peace settlement at Tilsit in 1807.

The pre-1939 province of East Prussia was enlarged towards the east by the inclusion of the Suwalki salient, and towards the south by the inclusion of the small area of Dzialdowo (Soldau) which had been ceded to Germany by Poland in 1919, in addition to part of the province of Warsaw, bounded on the south by the Vistula and on the east by the Narew, which was formed into the district (Regierungsbezirk) of Giech- now (Zichenau). This enlargement of East Prussia increased the population of the province by about one million persons, the great majority of whom were Poles. On the western frontier of East Prussia, however, the Regierungsbezirk of Marienwerder, with the towns of Elbing and Marienburg, was detached and incorporated in the new Reichsgau Danzig–Westpreussen, which covered the area of the Free City of Danzig and the Polish province of Pomorze. The effect of the transfer of Marienwerder was to restore the eastern and southern frontiers of the pre-1919 Imperial German province of West Prussia\(^1\) and to strengthen the German element in the population of the former ‘Polish Corridor’. South of Danzig–Westpreussen the Reichsgau of Wartheland included the German Imperial province of Posen\(^2\) (Polish province of Poznań) and extended eastwards to take in the greater part of the inter-war Polish province of Łódź and part of the province of Warsaw. Excluding the population of Danzig, nearly 10 million inhabitants, of whom probably no more than 6 per cent. were Germans, were transferred to the Reich in these two new Reichsgaue. Finally, in Silesia, the boundaries of pre-1919 Germany were enlarged by extending the province to the foothills of the Carpathians, taking in the whole coal and iron basin of south-western Poland, the coal-mining districts of Tcschcn, and parts of the Polish provinces of Cracow and Kielce. The area incorporated in the province of Silesia thus included not only the parts of pre-1914 Prussian Silesia which were allocated to Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War, but also a small area of Congress Poland, as well as parts of old Austrian Galicia, which had never before been under German rule. The capital of Upper Silesia was transferred from Oppeln to Katowice (Kattowitz). The population transferred numbered about 1,600,000, of whom not more than 120,000 were Germans.

In the annexed parts of Poland, the Nazis set out to assimilate the administration as quickly as possible to that of the Reich. The two new Reichsgaue were placed under the control of Gauleiters who were also

\(^1\) West Prussia, without Danzig and the Warthe area, had been incorporated in Prussia by the first partition of Poland in 1772. Danzig and the Warthe area were added by the second partition in 1793.

\(^2\) The Prussian province of Posen as constituted before 1919 had become part of Prussia in the peace settlement of Vienna in 1815.
Provincial Governors (Reichsstatthalter). In Danzig–Westpreußen, this post was filled by Forster, the former Gauleiter of Danzig, while Arthur Greiser, the former President of the Danzig Senate, became Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of the Warthegau. The Gauleiter-Reichsstatthalter acted under the orders of the Reich Government, but had full authority in his own administrative sphere as Hitler’s personal representative. Each of the new Reichsgau was divided into three Regierungsbezirke, and in the Warthegau, on account of its large area, Government Presidents (Regierungspräsidenten) were appointed to act as links between the central administration of the Gau and urban and rural districts.

For a time, Polish law remained partially in force in the annexed regions, but it was provided that Reich and Prussian laws could be introduced by decree. The policy of germanizing the regions destined to form part of the Reich was pursued with ruthless speed as soon as they came under military occupation. In Gdynia, for instance, every Polish name and poster had been removed and every street renamed before the decree of 8 October came into force. On 26 November, at Bydgoszcz (Bromberg), Forster announced that all Poles and Jews must leave Danzig–Westpreußen, and a few weeks later a high official of the Reich Propaganda Ministry, in an article in the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, made it clear that this policy of eviction was to be carried out in all the districts incorporated in Germany. The forced migration of Polish and Jewish population into the territory between the new frontiers of the Greater Reich and the German-Soviet demarcation line took place during the winter of 1939–40: the inhabitants of towns, it was reported, were evacuated street by street with a day’s warning.

In the economic field, the Nazis’ policy was to develop to the full the economic resources which they had acquired in the annexed territories—including some of the richest food-producing regions of Poland, as well as the coal-mines, metal and engineering works of Upper Silesia, Teschen, Dombrowa, and Sosnkowice, and the textile industry which had its centre at Łódź. They had begun the task of integrating the economy of the conquered territory with that of the Reich during the period of military administration, by the issue of regulations over the signature of Brauchitsch.

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1 For the position of the supreme Reich representatives in the occupied territories see pp. 98 seqq. above.
2 National Zeitung, 3 November 1939.
3 Volkischer Beobachter, 20 October 1939. See also above, p. 132. Before the establishment of the civil administration a decree issued by Brauchitsch on 11 October had given German courts jurisdiction over crimes committed in Polish territory before the war and stipulated that German criminal law must be applied.
4 The Times, 23 October 1939.
5 Temps, 29 November 1939.
6 Manchester Guardian, 18 December 1939.
7 The Times, 5 February 1940. See also a secret report prepared by the Academy of German Law in January 1940 on the plans for the transfer of Jews and elements of the Polish intelligentsia from the incorporated territories into the General Government (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 211 (661-PS); N.C.A. iii. 473).
8 See also above, pp. 188, 195–6.
as Commander-in-Chief. Decrees promulgated between 11 September and 7 October established the Reichsmark as legal tender side by side with the Polish zloty;¹ set up Reich Credit Banks (Reichskreditkassen);² gave German trustees control over Polish enterprises and property and stipulated that such enterprises and property could be acquired only with Brauchitsch’s permission; froze securities and other valuables, and controlled foreign exchange transactions.³

The economic policy for the ‘territories incorporated politically into the Reich’ was summed up as follows by Göring in a directive of 19 October 1939:⁴ ‘The reconstruction and expansion of their economy and the safeguarding of their production and supplies must be pushed forward with a view to complete absorption as soon as possible in the German economic system.’

Göring, however, drew a sharp distinction between the incorporated territories and the remnant of Polish territory west of the German-Soviet demarcation line. From the latter ‘all raw materials, scrap, machinery, &c., which could be used in the German economy’ were to be removed. Enterprises which were not ‘absolutely essential for the maintenance at a low level of the bare existence of the inhabitants must be transferred to Germany’, or exploited for Germany’s benefit ‘where they now stand’.⁵ On the following day, 20 October, Hess issued an order that Warsaw was not to be rebuilt and that no industrial enterprise was to be reconstructed in this region.⁶

The area between the frontiers of the incorporated Polish territories and the Bug-Narew river system came to be known as the ‘General Government’.⁷ It comprised the Polish province of Lublin and parts of the provinces of Warsaw, Kielce, and Cracow, and it included the cities of Cracow, Czestochowa, Lublin, and Warsaw. According to a statement by the Governor General, Hans Frank, its population in February 1940, after the

¹ For text of the decree of 11 September see Weh, E 200.
² Ibid. E 201; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939 46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 236. See also p. 268 above.
³ See Foreign Exchange Decree for the General Government, issued by Frank from Cracow, 15 November 1939 (Weh, E 300).
⁵ The relevant passage from this directive is quoted in full on p. 195 above. Cf. the statement of the objectives of German policy in the General Government in a memorandum by Lammers of 12 April 1943, cited on p. 127 above.
⁶ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 484 (411-EC); N.C.A. vii. 469.
⁷ This name was not used in the decree of 12 October, but came into general use almost immediately. It was apparently derived from ‘Guberniya’, the Russian name for the territorial subdivision of Tsarist Russia which included part of Poland. Under Russian rule the Poles had been excluded from the Government of their country and subjected to ruthless russification and the name might therefore be regarded as a programme in itself (New York Times, 13 November 1939). The original title of ‘Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete’ was shortened to ‘Generalgouvernement’ by a decree issued by Frank on 3 July 1940 (cf. Dokumente der deutschen Politik, vol. 8, part 2, p. 598).
transfer of Poles and Jews from the west during the winter, was about 143\,\text{million}, of whom 12\,\text{million} were Poles, 2\,\text{million} Jews, 400,000 or 500,000 Ukrainians, and 60,000 Volksdeutsche.\footnote{New York Times, 10 February 1940. 'The Poles' estimate of the total population was higher than the German estimate. According to News from Poland (published by the Polish Embassy in London), 28 December 1939, between 18 and 20\,\text{million} Poles, excluding Jews, would have to be squeezed into an area of about 36,000\,\text{square miles} (about 93,500\,\text{square kilometres}).} The area of the General Government was originally about a quarter of that of the former Polish Republic (i.e. about 97,000\,\text{square kilometres}) but was enlarged to 150,000\,\text{square kilometres} in 1941, after the German attack on Russia, by the inclusion of Eastern Galicia.

The other administrative changes made after 30 June 1941 in the parts of inter-war Poland which had been under Russian occupation since the end of September 1939 were as follows. The district of Bialystok was attached to the Gau East Prussia, with the intention of incorporating it eventually in the Reich.\footnote{The area was virtually incorporated in East Prussia in March 1942 (see p. 93 above).} Unlike other occupied territories which were destined for annexation, Bialystok could hardly be said to have a large native population of German or partly German origin, since the former German minority, numbering about 8,000, had been 'repatriated' to the Reich in 1939 when the Russians occupied the area. It might, however, conceivably be claimed as former German territory in that, with the exception of the town of Grodno, it had been Prussian from 1795 to 1806 as a result of the third partition of Poland. The rest of the north-eastern area of inter-war Poland (except for Vilna) was included in the Ostland as part of the general Commissariat for Occupied White Russia, while farther south the greater part of Volhynia and southern Polesie was included in the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine.

\textit{(b) German Policy towards the General Government}

The possible creation of a Polish rump state had been discussed during the German-Soviet negotiations in September 1939, but the Russians had finally decided against the project.\footnote{An account of this will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.} The Germans, however, had not given up the idea, which might, they believed, be useful in helping them to persuade the Western Powers that there was no point in continuing hostilities against Germany.

In a speech before the Reichstag on 6 October 1939\footnote{For text see Volkscher Beobachter, 7 October 1939.} Hitler argued at length in favour of holding a peace conference without delay, now that Germany and the U.S.S.R. had jointly assumed responsibility for transforming the territories of the former Polish state into 'a zone of peaceful development'. The German aims in regard to the conquered territories, as outlined by Hitler in this speech, included 'the formation of a Polish
state so constituted as to prevent its becoming once again either a hot-bed of anti-German activity or a centre of intrigue against Germany and Russia.'

Some light is thrown on Hitler's ideas at this stage about the future of the territory which became the General Government by a conversation which he had with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, on 1 October. Ciano got the impression that Hitler had not yet definitely decided on the status of this territory but that he was willing, in principle, to allow 'a form of state' which would 'guarantee the peaceful development of Polish national life' subject to the fulfilment of several conditions: the frontiers must be drawn so as to ensure the return of all Germans to the Reich, even where they were to a large extent intermingled with the Polish population; the state must not be capable of becoming a centre of propaganda and intrigue against Germany; it must never be a military Power; it must recognize German political and economic interests as predominant; it must not be an obstacle to German-Soviet collaboration. Hitler did not answer Ciano's inquiry whether the future Poland was to be a sovereign state, but he explained that he did not mean to 'take over direct control of Polish life' because 'the misery of the country' was 'terrifying'. Hitler added that he would not 'permit any form of state organisation until after the peace settlement with the Western Powers' and until the 'ethnographic situation' of Germany had been 'improved as a result of large population movements'. On the day of Hitler's Reichstag speech, 6 October, Ciano saw Ley, who told him definitely that a Polish state was to be set up in the purely Polish district between 'the true boundary of the Reich' and the river Bug. This state, Ley said, would be 'a sort of protectorate, which, since it contains such great Polish centres as Cracow, Czestochowa, Warsaw and Lublin, will be able . . . to be called "new Poland".'

The Nazis' conception of the 'new Poland' was thus a puppet state, with the strings which controlled its movements held firmly in the German grasp. Their original intention seems to have been to set up a native government similar to that of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, but this purpose was defeated by their inability to find a Polish leader willing to play the part of a Hácha—still less that of a Quisling. They were thus obliged, in spite

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1 Ciano: Europa, pp. 469–70; Eng. version, pp. 311–12.
2 This condition was fulfilled by the decree of 8 October 1939 incorporating the Western provinces of inter-war Poland in the Reich.
3 Leader of the Nazi Labour Front.
4 Ciano: Europa, pp. 484–5; Eng. version, pp. 321–2. Ley also said that between the Bug and the Vistula a district would be set apart to be inhabited solely by Jews, who would be forbidden to cross the Vistula. A Jewish reservation was established in the Lublin area at the end of October 1939, and for a time Jews were sent there from other countries as well as from other parts of Poland (see p. 156 above). This plan was later abandoned in favour of concentrating the Polish Jews in ghettos in Warsaw and other cities and in some forty small towns in which no non-Jewish population was permitted. For this concentration and the policy of extermination to which it was the prelude see pp. 161 above and 565–8 below.
of Hitler’s statement to Ciano, to undertake direct control of the Polish territory. Moreover, in view of the lack of response from the Western Powers to Hitler’s peace overtures, it was not thought worth while to elaborate the fiction of an independent Polish state; and Göring’s directive of 19 October shows that by that date, whatever the original intention may have been, the General Government was regarded as a region to be despoiled as rapidly and completely as possible.

Hitler’s decree of 12 October ‘concerning the administration of the Occupied Polish Territories’ nominated Hans Frank as Governor General and Seyss-Inquart\(^2\) as his deputy.\(^3\) The headquarters of the administration were established at Cracow, and Frank moved there from Łódź and entered upon his duties early in November. He had already, by a decree of 26 October, divided the General Government into four administrative districts, centring round Cracow, Lublin, Radom, and Warsaw, and these in turn were divided into rural and urban Kreise.\(^4\)

During the first winter of the war and the spring and early summer of 1940 the Nazis seem to have remained uncertain whether it would pay them better to maintain the General Government as a separate entity, exploiting its resources and its man-power to the full for the Reich’s benefit,\(^5\) or to bring it completely within the Greater German system. The forced migration of Poles and Jews from the incorporated territory into the General Government appeared to indicate an intention to preserve the latter’s Polish character; and it was also significant that the professors of Cracow University, after being deported en masse towards the end of 1939 and interned in Germany, were allowed in February 1940 to return to their homes.\(^6\) A few weeks later, also, it was reported that Polish doctors were being allowed to take charge of medical services in Warsaw and other towns.\(^7\) On the other hand, from the beginning of the civilian régime there were signs pointing towards an intention of germanization—for

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1 Göring mentioned in this directive that ‘in all probability’ the General Government would ‘not be made a part of Germany’. This indicated that the Nazi leaders had still not finally made up their minds about the status of the predominantly Polish-inhabited region of Central Poland.
2 For the part played by Seyss-Inquart in the Anschluss of Austria see Survey for 1938, i. 179-259. He was appointed ‘Reichskommissar for the Occupied Netherlands Territories’ in May 1940. For his activities in this post see pp. 491-505 above.
3 For the reservations on Frank’s law-making powers see p. 134 above.
4 For the administrative machinery which Frank set up see above, pp. 93-95, 100-1. For the judicial system see p. 141 above, and for the economic administration, p. 180 above.
5 The property of the former Polish state was confiscated by a decree of 15 November 1939 (see p. 203 above). Another decree issued by Frank on 24 January 1940 empowered German officials in the General Government to engage in the wholesale seizure of property; and in the same month instructions were issued for the forcible deportation of Polish labour to the Reich (I.M.T. Nuremberg, iii. 575-6). For the deportation of labour see also p. 245 above.
6 New York Times, 21 February 1940. Ten of the professors had died in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, and many of those who returned were seriously ill as the result of the treatment that they had received.
7 The Times, 5 April 1940.
instance, the reported destruction of Polish monuments,¹ and the establishment of German schools on a scale which seemed excessive for the needs of the Volksdeutsche and of the German officials in the General Government.²

The exact status of the General Government was never very clearly defined,³ but any doubts about applying the policy of germanization in the territory had been resolved by the middle of 1940, though progress in the desired direction was less rapid than had been expected. Frank, to whom it fell to carry out the measures of ruthless repression and terrorization, not stopping short of mass murder, which marked the later years of German rule over the General Government, later presented his American captors with some forty-two volumes of his diary, in which he had carefully recorded his acts in Poland, and which served at the Nuremberg Trial as the most incriminating evidence against him. Frank's guilt for the crime of 'genocide' in Poland was shared by Himmler, who, by a secret decree of 7 October 1939,⁴ had been placed in general charge of the germanization policy, including the elimination of 'the harmful influence of those alien population groups which might constitute a danger to the Reich and to the German people's community'.

The directives setting out policy towards the General Government, which were interpreted and administered by Frank and Himmler, had political, social, cultural and religious, economic, biological, physical, and moral aspects. Politically, the General Government was regarded as a German colony, and was to be recognized as such by the 'inferior' peoples. Socially, the first aim was the elimination of the Jews and the Polish intelligentsia. Culturally, all Polish institutions of higher learning were abolished; only primary and vocational education was tolerated for the Poles, and this under German supervision and in the German language. Measures were also taken to break the influence of the church. Economically, the policy followed was that laid down in Göring's directive for despoliation on behalf of the Reich, and at the expense of the native population. Biologically, 'silent' measures were to eliminate the Jews, and to decrease the birth-rate of the Poles.⁵ Physically, the subject popula-

¹ The Times, 12 January 1940.
² Seventeen new German schools were reported to have been opened in Warsaw by the beginning of January 1940 and twenty-five more were expected to be ready shortly, while in other districts of the General Government thirty-two German schools had either been opened or were on the point of completion at this date (Daily Telegraph, 9 January 1940).
³ See above, pp. 93–94.
⁴ The decree was signed by Hitler, Göring, and Keitel. Text in I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 255–7 (686-PS); trans. in Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, pp. 2–4; cf. N.C.A. iii. 496–8. For the resettlement programme for which Himmler was responsible in virtue of the powers given him by this decree see pp. 80–83 above.
⁵ The secret report prepared by the Academy of German Law in January 1940 shows that the deportation of Polish labour was intended not only to relieve living-space in the General Government and furnish cheap labour for the Germans, but also to separate Polish males from
tions were starved and brutally persecuted. Morally, the most debased instincts of the non-German population were encouraged.1

The dislocation and confusion following the invasion in 1939 had been used to good advantage by the Germans to take measures against the Polish intelligentsia, and Himmler later boasted that at the time the German police ‘had to have the toughness . . . to shoot thousands of leading Poles’.2 In addition to this, as we have seen, large numbers of the Polish intelligentsia were deported, mainly from the Cracow area, to prison camps in late 1939. Severe as the German policies were, however, they did not prevent the early establishment of a widespread underground organization throughout the inter-war territory of Poland, which caused great trouble to German leaders early in 1940.3 So great was their concern that in May 1940, at the time of the German offensive against the Low Countries and France, orders were given, in accordance with Hitler’s desire for peace in the cast, for ‘Außerordentliche Befriedungsaktion’, or ‘A.B. [Extraordinary Pacification] Action’ against the Polish underground movement.4 On 15 June, therefore, several thousand members of the underground organization were arrested, and at Frank’s orders were brought in October before a drum-head court martial, after which approximately half of them were executed.5

Immediately after the occupation the German authorities had begun to recruit able-bodied Poles, particularly agricultural labourers, for work in Germany. By the middle of 1940 the supply of able-bodied workers in the incorporated areas was rapidly becoming exhausted, and voluntary measures had achieved only partial success in the General Government. Frank thereupon gave orders in the summer of 1940 that coercive measures were to be introduced for the recruitment of labour.6 During 1941 and

1 Lemption: _Axis Rule in Occupied Europe_, pp. 79–95, ‘Genocide’.

2 Speech delivered by Himmler to SS officers (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 104 (1918-PS); N.C.A. iv. 553). On 6 February 1940 Frank commented on von Neurath’s poster announcing the execution of Czech students: ‘If I wished to order that one should hang up posters about every seven Poles shot, there would not be enough forests in Poland with which to make the paper for these posters’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxii. 542).

3 See below, pp. 561–5.

4 Frank gave the order in May to carry out the operation (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 398–400 (2233-PS)) in accordance with a directive issued by Hitler in March (ibid. p. 373 (2233-PS); N.C.A. iv. 906–7). See also excerpts from Frank’s diary quoted by his counsel in _I.M.T. Nuremberg_, xviii. 147–8.

5 All of them had been sentenced to death, but some of their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment through a Pardon Board (see ibid. p. 148). In a decree of 31 October 1939 Frank had laid down the principle that all acts of violence and incitement to resistance against the Germans should be tried by Standgerichte (see p. 144 above). Frank said on 30 May 1940 that he was taking advantage of the offensive in the west to liquidate thousands of Poles who would be likely to resist German domination of Poland, including ‘the leading representatives of the Polish intelligentsia’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxii. 542).

6 Before Frank gave the order, approximately 200,000 workers had been sent to the Reich from the General Government. Frank’s diary gives his account of the discussion with subordinate
1942 he continually expressed his pride in the effectiveness of such measures as street raids for this purpose, and as he promised to Sauckel in August 1942, he was able to report in December 1942 that the General Government had supplied over 940,000 workers for the Reich.¹

As early as September 1941 Frank was aware that the population of the General Government had been reduced nearly to starvation level.² Yet almost a year later, after a conference in Berlin in which Göring informed him of the seriousness of the food situation in Germany, Frank committed the General Government to supplying 500,000 tons of bread grains for the Reich, over and above the already excessive demands. He instructed his subordinates in August 1942 that the entire contribution must be made ‘at the expense of the foreign [non-German] population’, and directed them further that ‘it must be done cold-bloodedly and without pity’.³

As it later appeared, the immediate necessity for extracting the utmost from the productive labour of the Poles for the economic benefit of the Reich was the main reason why the full programme of germanization was temporarily postponed in the General Government.⁴ Subsequent records, however, show that the fate which was ultimately intended for Poland was never forgotten by the German leaders. In a speech in Cracow in April 1941 Frank declared that ‘the time will come when the valley of the Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as German as the valley of the Rhine’.⁵ It was for Himmler, however, to decide the way in which the germanization policy was to be carried out in the General

 officials on the subject at the time he gave the order (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 392-4 (2233-PS); N.C.A. iv. 907-8; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 243; see also pp. 224, 245 above).

¹ Frank’s diary for 18 August 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 546 (2233-PS); N.C.A. iv. 912-13); diary for 14 December 1942 (ibid. pp. 565 and 915 respectively). On 18 March 1942 Frank expressed his apprehension lest the transfer of non-Germans to the Reich for labour should result in a ‘retrogression of Germanism’. For this reason, he added, ‘everything revealing itself as a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again and again with ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad, it will happen silently’ (Frank’s diary for 18 March 1942, conference in Cracow; ibid. pp. 508 and 911 respectively).

² His diary records that a medical officer informed him on 9 September that the health condition of the Polish population had deteriorated because most of them consumed only 600 calories a day, whereas the normal human requirement was 2,300 calories, and that this increased their susceptibility to typhus (ibid. pp. 474 and 909 respectively).

³ Diary for 24 August 1942: Cabinet session in Cracow on 24 August 1942. Subject: A new plan for seizure and for nourishment in the General Government (ibid. pp. 572-81 and 893-902 respectively; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 257). Frank justified the move by referring to the saying commonly used by Germans: ‘Before the catastrophe of hunger befalls the German people, the occupied territories and their people will be exposed to starvation’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 574 (2233-PS)).

⁴ Frank said in August 1942 that German colonization was being postponed because ‘under the present war conditions we have to allow foreign racial groups to perform here the work which must be carried out in the service of Greater Germany’: Frank’s diary for 5 August 1942 (N.C.A. iv. 912 (2233-PS)).

⁵ Frank’s diary for 19 April 1941: speech in Cracow (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 471 (2233-PS); N.C.A. iv. 905).
Government. This, indeed, became the source of many bitter jurisdictional disputes between Himmler and Frank. The Volksliste was established in the General Government in March 1941, for the purpose of germanization or, if necessary, 're-germanization' of persons of German descent. Both Himmler and Frank, however, obviously became concerned early in 1942 about the slow progress of germanization, and more active measures were undertaken in the desired direction. Himmler visited Cracow in March, where he explained his plans to Frank. It was intended, he said, that 'islands of German settlers' should be transplanted from European nations and that 'in any case the first thing to be done was to establish a strong settlement along the San and the Bug so as to encircle the alien parts of Poland'. He also told Frank of his plans for settling German families from Eastern Europe in the provinces of Lublin and Zamosc. His plans were elaborated further during subsequent months, and on 4 August the resettlement plan was being discussed in detail in Frank's presence, with a view to its implementation in November. Plans went forward, and the first group was moved into the Zamosc region before Christmas. It was obvious, however, that the brutal methods used to expel the native residents caused great alarm and antagonism among the Polish population, who feared, naturally enough, that this was the beginning of the mass deportation of the entire Polish population from the General Government. As the operations continued in the Lublin district during the winter, this alarm at the displacement of the Polish population caused large numbers to take to the woods and join guerrilla bands. The effect on the Poles was so serious, indeed, that Frank later complained bitterly in a long report to Hitler on 19 June 1943 about the methods which Himmler had adopted.

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1 See above, pp. 81-83.  
2 See above, pp. 116-18.  
3 See above, p. 88.  
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 408-10 (910-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 254; cf. N.C.A. iii. 639-41. Himmler added: 'In order not to disturb the resident population, particularly the peasant population, and thereby endanger the result of the harvest, these German peasant families should only be settled on country estates and large holdings.'  
5 Himmler's plan for settlements in Lublin and Zamosc in the following year (1943) was as follows: 1,000 peasant settlements (families of 6) for Bosnian Germans; 1,200 other kinds of settlements; 1,000 settlements for Bessarabian Germans; 200 for Serbian Germans; 2,000 for Leningrad Germans; 4,000 for Baltic Germans; 500 for Volhynia Germans and 200 settlements for Flemish, Danish, and Dutch Germans, in all 10,000 settlements for 50,000 to 60,000 persons (Frank's diary for 4 August 1942: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 542-3 (2233-PS); N.C.A. iv. 911-12).  
6 Frank's diary for 25 January 1943 recording a conference on security held in Warsaw (ibid. pp. 642-3 and 916 respectively). At this conference Krüger (head of police in the General Government) said: 'A great deal of unrest has resulted because of this resettlement.'  
7 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 32-33 (437-PS). Frank complained: 'The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among the populace. At short notice families were torn apart, those able to work were sent to the Reich, while old
After the turn of the tide at Stalingrad Frank seems to have become aware of the implications of the Russian victory for Germany, for he made belated attempts in 1943 to court the sympathy of the Poles. The first half of the year found him in a constant struggle with Himmler to prevent SS excesses from further antagonizing the population of the General Government. The two Nazi leaders had apparently arrived at an understanding in 1942 to allow the Gestapo to take co-ordinated measures against the Polish underground movement, which was active throughout the entire area of inter-war Poland, but Himmler had agreed at the same time to submit all measures for the General Government to Frank before action was taken.\(^1\) Frank considered, however, that Himmler did not keep his part of the bargain, and felt deeply resentful on that account. It was clear that the situation was fast getting out of hand in the General Government. The underground movement had reached such a high degree of organization, and was carrying out its operations on such a grand scale, that there was little doubt that far-reaching measures would be necessary to restore any sort of order.\(^2\) By his long report to Hitler of 19 June, just mentioned, Frank had hoped to persuade him to use his influence with Himmler to reduce the excesses of the SS units in Poland, and to allow Frank to introduce measures calculated to secure some cooperation from the population in the face of the advancing Russians. In this report Frank gave details showing that the severe deterioration in the attitude of the entire Polish population towards the Germans was a direct result of Frank's own policies, aggravated by those of Himmler, and he recommended a change to a more sensible policy.\(^3\)

Frank had fallen out of favour with Hitler a year earlier, on account of his denunciation of the Nazis' campaign against the independence of the

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\(^2\) At a meeting on 31 May one of Frank's subordinates stated: 'In their activities the guerrilla bands have revealed an increasingly well-developed system. They have now gone over to the systematic destruction of institutions belonging to the German administration; they steal money, typewriters and duplicators, destroy quota-lists and lists of workers in the communal offices, and take away or burn criminal records and taxation lists. Moreover, raids on important production centres in the country have multiplied, for instance on sawmills, dairies, and distilleries, as also on bridges, railway installations, and post offices. The organization of the guerrillas has become strongly military in character' (see quotation from Frank's diary: \textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xviii. 156).

\(^3\) Ibid. xxvi. 14-37 (437-PS); \textit{Documents} (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: \textit{Hitler's Europe}, p. 258. An extract will be found in \textit{N.C.A.} iii. 396, and a partial translation was read into the record by Frank's counsel at Nuremberg (see \textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xii. 124-8). Frank's chronic objections to divided jurisdiction in the General Government had led him to make a habit of submitting his resignation to Hitler, and of having it refused.
judges, so that his representations were not likely to carry much weight against those of Himmler. But even if his appeal had been successful, it was, of course, too late. The policies which Frank, Himmler, and Göring had followed since the original invasion of Poland in 1939 had produced an accumulated effect over the years. It is doubtful, indeed, if any policy which might have been devised at this time would have made the slightest impression upon the Poles. Their justified hatred for the Germans had, after their experiences at German hands, become ingrained in the subject population, and had strengthened the collective determination to resist. From this time on, the story of the German occupation was one of reprisal and counter-reprisal by the German authorities and the Polish underground, increasing in savagery in direct proportion to the advance of the Red Army into Eastern Europe.

(c) THE POLISH UNDERGROUND STATE AND HOME ARMY

If German and Soviet leaders, after the division of Poland in September 1939, had expected docile obedience from the Poles to the occupying authorities, they had sadly underestimated the spirit and determination of their victims. For the Poles had a tradition of conspiracy which dated back at least to the Partitions, and the technique of underground struggle had been developed through several generations. They were accustomed to methods of silent opposition to German and Russian domination, and most of the heroes of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Poland, including Josef Pilsudski, were beloved among the Poles because of their exploits in underground warfare. It was not surprising, then, though it seemed incredible to the Allies at the time, that during the early part of the war the Poles should have been able to build an immense underground apparatus throughout the inter-war territory of Poland, and to consolidate it into a secret state complete with ministries, parliament, and army, all of which were subordinate to and in liaison with the Polish Government in Exile.

After the invasion from west and east in 1939 the Poles had organized many separate underground units throughout the territory of inter-war Poland to carry on the struggle against the occupying Powers. The main ones were organized by the four main political parties of the former Polish state. The Peasant Party organization, with its military formations (the Bataliony Chłopskie or Peasant Battalions), was strong in the rural areas, and conducted most of its activities on behalf of the peasants in occupied Poland. The Socialist organization, together with its military formations, was more active in urban and industrial areas, where the organized trade unions and co-operatives had been influential before the war. In addition to these two main groups, the National Democratic and Christian

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1 See above, pp. 26-29.
2 See above, p. 149.
Democratic parties also had their separate political and military organizations.

Not long after the beginning of the war several Polish officers who were still in Poland, including Colonels ‘Grot’ (Rowecki) and ‘Bor’ (Komorowski), received orders from General Sikorski to consolidate these varied individual units into a single cohesive force. This was the origin of the redoubtable Polish ‘Home Army’, which had developed into a force of 380,000 men by the time of the Warsaw rising in 1944, and which was organized to correspond to the territorial divisions of independent Poland. The military organization was eventually co-ordinated with a civilian administration and ‘political representation’ and was placed under the authority of a delegate from the Government in Exile; the entire structure was in continuous contact with London, both by wireless and courier.

As one of the couriers, Karski, later explained, the purpose of the Polish secret state was to give continuity to the Poland which existed before the war (which was based on the Constitution of 1935), and to maintain the governmental administrative structure in preparation for the eventual liberation. If this meant that the Poles were determined not to recognize the German or Russian occupation, it was nevertheless true that the leaders of the Government in Exile under General Sikorski were determined that the Government of post-war Poland should be of a very different political nature from that which was in power before September 1939.

The administrative authority of this secret state was exercised through the ‘Government Delegate’ and delegates for the various regions of Poland. In each of these regions there were twelve departments which corresponded to the Ministries of the Polish Government in Exile. The Commander of the Home Army, Colonel (later General) ‘Grot’ (Rowecki), was himself under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of Polish Forces in London. The unity of the underground state was made possible by the co-operation of the four major political parties—Socialist, Peasant, Christian Democratic, and National Democratic—which had representa-

1 Grot (‘Spear-head’) and Bor (‘Forest’) were *noms de guerre* adopted by Rowecki and Komorowski. Since the war the latter has used the name ‘Bor-Komorowski’.


3 An account of this will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: *The Realignment of Europe*.

4 Bor, pp. 25 and 149.

5 Ibid. p. 41. Systems of communication with the Government in Exile were disrupted and had to be reorganized after the fall of France.


7 For an account of the political party organizations, their activities and co-operation, see Seton-Watson: *East European Revolution*, pp. 111-13.

8 Karski, p. 194. The first commander had been General Tokarzewski before he was sent to the Soviet zone (Bor, p. 28).
tives in an underground ‘political representation’ or parliament in Poland, and other representatives with the Polish Government in London. According to Karski there was another branch which helped to maintain the unyielding civilian attitude to the occupying Powers, and to eliminate any collaborationists. While the co-operation of the various political elements was secure enough to be impressive, it was never smooth. Sections of the main parties did not approve of the policies of the underground leaders, even in the early stages, and while the political parties co-operated in contributing men to the Home Army they still retained autonomous control over their separate, independent military organizations.

The size and strength of the secret state were indicated by its various activities, some of which have already been mentioned. It seems almost unbelievable, for example, that organized education could have been carried on underground, especially in view of the penalty that inevitably followed discovery. Yet, after the primary schools were germanized and the secondary schools and universities were closed by the Germans, the Poles continued to educate their children according to Polish tradition—holding classes and examinations in secret, under the nose of the Gestapo. Other branches of activity in this Polish underground and Home Army were the secret press, which continued to print publications of many varieties throughout the war, and the Home Army’s secret plants for the production of arms. Military courts functioned for the purpose of trying war criminals and Nazi leaders, and many death sentences were carried out. The degree of rigidity developed in the unified attitude of resistance to the Germans later made it possible for the Poles to boast of the unique record of never having produced a Quisling. General Bor-Komorowski emphasized the difference between the Home Army and the Polish Army which had existed before the war. Previously, he said, the backbone of the army had consisted of a core of professionals, who refrained from politics and from membership of political parties. The policy of the Home Army, however, was to allow each soldier complete freedom to indulge in the political activities of his choice, while remaining obedient to the orders of his Commander-in-Chief in the common struggle. The doctrine set forth by General Bor-Komorowski, however, probably arose

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2 Karski, p. 195.
3 Ibid. pp. 249-52; Bor, p. 38.
4 The number and types of publication are listed in Bor, pp. 167-8. See also Karski, pp. 217-25.
5 Bor, pp. 73-78, 153.
6 Ibid. p. 44, 155-60.
7 The advisory group under Count Renikier, set up by Frank, had neither authority nor any support whatsoever (Seton-Watson: East European Revolution, pp. 76-77).
8 Bor, pp. 42-43.
more from necessity than from liberal principles, for 'Bor' was an officer of the Polish aristocratic tradition, similar to 'the generals' who had supported the Sanacja policy of Pilsudski's post-coup dictatorship and who had later assumed control themselves. His dependence on the support of the political parties forced him to adjust himself to a position more in accordance with their political views. Yet the great social gulf that existed between such officers as 'Bor' and such men as those who made up the military formations of the Peasant Party, for example, made co-operation between them difficult throughout the war, and eventually led to serious rifts between the Peasant Party formations and the Home Army leadership. For the time being, however, Bor-Komorowski co-operated with the political parties, and carried out the orders of their leaders in the Government in Exile. As far as his military conduct was concerned, therefore, he was not at variance with the policy of the political leaders of the secret state or with General Sikorski, who wanted Poland to emerge from the war with a sound basis of political freedom, in the Western sense.  

At first the force of the underground struggle was directed against both the Germans and the Russians, since both were in occupation of what had been independent Poland. The aims of the organization were to prepare for an armed rising, and to support the Allied war effort by sabotage, diversionary activity, and intelligence work directed primarily against the Germans who were at war with the Allies, but also against the efforts of the Soviet Government to send supplies and otherwise to aid the Nazi war effort. The fall of France removed the Polish hope of an Allied victory in the near future, and forced the leaders of the secret state to adopt a long-range policy, concentrating mainly on intelligence, press, and propaganda activities, and reducing the bulk of the organization to a minimum in order to lessen the effectiveness of the drastic measures taken by the Gestapo.  

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 wrought a great change in underground activity, as it did in Polish activities elsewhere. The struggle in eastern Poland against the NKVD ceased abruptly, and the Home Army began to supply valuable help to the Red Army by diversionary activities directed against German communications behind the front lines, and by intelligence supplied direct to (and gladly received by) the Soviet Government through the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev and the Govern-

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1 W. J. Rose (*The Rise of Polish Democracy* (London, Bell, 1944), p. 149 and *passim*) calls this also the policy of the Non-Party Bloc.  
2 Karski, p. 311.  
3 *Bor*, pp. 30, 40.  
4 Ibid. pp. 49-50. A secret protocol signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop on 28 September 1939 had laid the foundations for co-operation between the Gestapo and the NKVD [later MVD, the People's Commissariat (later Ministry) for Internal Affairs, to which all branches of the Russian police were subordinate] in measures against Polish underground activities (*Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 107).
ment in London. Emphasis was now placed on the manufacture of arms and ammunition for a future rising, and carefully planned measures against strategic spots in the German communication lines running through Poland. Press and propaganda activities continued as before. The deportation of Poles for forced labour in Germany enabled the Polish underground to expand into the heart of the Reich, and to establish connexions with resistance forces in France. Their extensive and elaborate organization enabled them to supply valuable information about the situation in Germany to the Allied Governments during the course of the war. Moreover, their connexions with other underground organizations in occupied Europe made it possible for them to participate in a well-organized and efficient network through which captured Allied soldiers and stranded airmen could be systematically smuggled through the German lines to safety.

As we have seen, the alarm felt by the Germans as early as 1940 at the impressive extent and strength of the organization caused them to take the drastic steps known as 'A.B. Action'. In later stages, when the Germans adopted the system of collective responsibility and the murder of hostages, their policies had the opposite effect to that which they intended, for the Poles refused to be intimidated, and instituted a series of counter-reprisals against the Germans. Measures and counter-measures steadily became more drastic, and occupied Poland soon developed into a scene of terror and savage brutality between German and Pole

(d) The Rising in the Warsaw Ghetto

In April 1943, at the same time as the strange and tragic revelation was being made to the world by the Germans that thousands of Polish officers had been murdered and buried in Katyn forest, near Smolensk, another no less tragic drama was taking place inside Warsaw, but although authentic reports of what was happening there were being continuously received in London, the information was not made public.

The story of the Jews in Warsaw, unbelievable though it seemed, was only a part of the vast Nazi operation directed towards the extermination of European Jewry. The many extermination camps in Poland—such camps as Treblinka, Majdanek, Belzec, Birkenau, and Oświęcim (Auschwitz)—were scenes of the murder of several million Jews. As far as

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1 Bor, pp. 67–70. Previously the Poles had supplied information to the British Government about the German preparations for the invasion.
2 Ibid. pp. 68–74.
3 See above, p. 557.
4 See the account of the assassination of one of Frank's assistants, SS Major General Kutschera, in Bor, pp. 155–60. See also above, pp. 147 seqq.
5 An account of the Katyn affair and its effects on Polish-Russian relations will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
6 According to a German Security Service official, more than 4 million Jews died in the camps (affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 85–87 (2738-PS)). See also above, p. 163.
Poland herself was concerned, stories of massacres in ghettos were not confined to Warsaw alone, since similar events were taking place in ghettos throughout Poland and the eastern territories occupied by the Germans. These areas were selected by Himmler and his subordinates as the major slaughterhouse for the Jews in occupied Europe. The story of the separate German racial war against the Jews, carried on simultaneously with military battles elsewhere, cannot be told here. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that the Warsaw Ghetto gained a special place of honour by its final chapter of despairing resistance, when the only prospect was eventual extermination.

Centuries earlier the Jewish population of Warsaw had lived together in their own quarter of the city, which came to be called a ghetto, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many of them became prosperous in commerce, and Jewish families settled throughout the city, leaving only their poorer brethren living in the slums of the Ghetto. In their planned campaign against the Jews in Europe, the Germans began, soon after the occupation, to concentrate the Jews in central areas. The area chosen in Warsaw was the former Ghetto, and the resettlement of Jews in that location was ordered by Governor General Frank in October 1940. The 330,000 Jews in Warsaw were then rounded up and placed in the Ghetto area, and within a month, after many refugees from the provinces had been added to their number, there were 400,000 Jews packed inside. The Germans then proceeded to build a high brick wall around the Ghetto area, and took measures to ensure that from that time onward the Jews were sealed off from the rest of the population of Warsaw. Between November 1940 and June 1942 their story was one of fantastic overcrowding, miserable squalor, starvation, and attempted degradation of the soul of the inhabitants. It was not until 1942, however, that the Nazi plans for the Jews reached their full macabre dimensions. On 22 July 1942


2 Governor General Frank said on 16 December 1941 that there were perhaps 3½ million Jews in the General Government (Frank's diary: *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxix. 503 (2233-PS); *N.C.A.* iv. 892). On 25 January 1944 he told representatives of the German press that 'at the present time we still have in the General Government perhaps 100,000 Jews' (Frank's diary, ibid. pp. 678 and 902 respectively).

3 SS Major General Stroop outlined the course of events in the planning and establishment of the Ghetto, as well as its systematic destruction in his report: *The Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw No Longer Exists* (*I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxvi. 628-94 (1061-PS); *N.C.A.* iii. 718-75). The reason given for the original moves to segregate the Jews from the rest of the population was for purposes of hygiene, and the prevention of the spread of epidemics. See also Simon Segal: *Nazi Rule in Poland* (London, Hale, 1943), pp. 143-7.

4 *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxvi. 634 (1061-PS); *N.C.A.* iii. 720.

5 The penalty for being found outside the Ghetto was generally immediate death.

6 Food rations consisted of 4½ lb. of bread per month. For impressions of conditions in the Ghetto see Bor, pp. 95-96.
there began the first systematic evacuation from the Warsaw Ghetto to the extermination camps.¹ Between June and October of 1942, 310,322—almost the entire pre-war Jewish population of Warsaw—had been deported in this fashion.² A few of them were selected for labour, but the remainder were sent to their death. At the end of this extermination campaign the Ghetto seemed deserted, but there were still large numbers concealed, mainly in subterranean hiding places.³ Among those remaining in the Ghetto there was organized in October 1942 the Jewish Militant Organization, whose members were determined to defend themselves rather than submit to massacre. With aid from the Polish Home Army they began to gather arms and to plan a defence of the Ghetto.⁴ On 18 January 1943 the Germans became aware that they were faced with organized resistance, whereupon different plans were adopted for luring the Jews outside the Ghetto.⁵ Several thousand took the bait, but when news got back that they had been massacred the Jews decided that the Germans should not get another man without a fight.⁶

On 19 April, when the Germans met with heavy armed resistance, the final campaign for the annihilation of the Ghetto began. The Germans adopted siege tactics designed to keep their losses to a minimum. According to General ‘Bor’ Polish Home Army units made sporadic attacks in the rear of the Germans, and organized resistance lasted until 26 April.⁷ It was not until 16 May, however, that the Jews ceased struggling, and the Nazis contrived a symbolic end to the campaign by dynamiting the great Jewish Synagogue.⁸ According to the Germans 56,065 Jews were caught, including 7,000 killed in action and 6,929 sent to Treblinka extermination camp. There were estimates that 5,000 or 6,000 more died in the ruins

¹ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 634–5 (1061-PS); N.C.A. i. iii. 721. For a description of conditions in the Ghetto during the evacuations see Karasi, chapter xxix. For a description of the Belzec extermination camp see ibid. chapter xxx.
² I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 634–5 (1061-PS); N.C.A. iii. 721. Cf. Tenenbaum: In Search of a Lost People, p. 31. See also Bor, pp. 98–104.
³ Ibid. pp. 103, 105. Bor-Komorowski estimates that 80,000 Jews remained.
⁴ For the story of the formation of this organization, and of arms and other aid given by the Home Army, see ibid. pp. 104–5. The Jews also succeeded in purchasing arms from the Germans.
⁵ For one account of the skirmish that took place on that day see ibid. p. 105. For another account of this period see Tenenbaum, op. cit. pp. 38–48. For accounts of the tactical use of Walter Toebbens, the director of a large factory employing Jews, to induce the Jews to leave see ibid. pp. 47–48, and Bor, pp. 102, 105. See also I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 635 (1061-PS); N.C.A. iii. 721.
⁶ Bor, p. 106.
⁷ Major General Stroop’s report gives the detailed account of the Warsaw Ghetto rising from the German point of view. Stroop presents his report as an account for the German people of the heroism of the German soldiers who took part. There is apparent a kind of maniacal jubilation over the massacres of the Jews, and his soldiers seemed to have derived pleasure from this sort of thing: see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 634–94 (1061-PS); N.C.A. iii. 721–75, where most of General Stroop’s communications on the subject are included. Films were shown at Nuremberg to supplement Stroop’s account. See also Tenenbaum, op. cit. pp. 48–63. For an account of the Home Army activities see Bor, pp. 107–8.
⁸ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 693 (1061-PS); N.C.A. iii. 772.
and flames. The Germans had systematically destroyed the Ghetto, reducing it to a level pile of rubble. Officially the Germans claimed the loss of only fifteen men; their actual losses amounted to many more than that. But the Jews who died in action in the Warsaw Ghetto rising preserved far more than could be measured in terms of human life.

(ii) The Ostland

By Sidney Lowery

Several months before ‘Operation Barbarossa’ (the German code-name for the invasion of Russia) was launched Alfred Rosenberg was reflecting on plans for the territory which, it was expected, would be conquered and occupied in the east. His general policy directive, issued in May 1941, said: ‘The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the German Reich from großrussisch (Russian-expansionist) pressure for centuries to come’, and he accordingly formulated a general policy to be followed in the eastern territories. The fate of the Ostland was intended to be quite different from that of the Ukraine, Caucasus, and the ‘adjoining territories to the north of it’, for it was to be developed into a germanized protectorate as the first step towards progressively closer union with Germany. More detailed political plans for the Ostland, which was to include the three Baltic countries and White Russia, were given in Rosenberg’s instructions for a (future) Reich Commissioner for the Ostland; in these he stressed the European character of the region, which the history of 700 years had added to ‘the living-space of Greater Germany’. In these instructions Rosenberg described the methods by which the region was to be transformed into part of the Greater German Reich, and discussed the varying possibilities for the racial assimilation of the Baltic populations. White Russia, on the other hand, was to be used as a dumping-ground for

1 N.C.A. iii. 772–3 (24 May 1943). Major General Stroop also lists the arms and equipment seized during the campaign.
2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 628–9; N.C.A. iii. 718.
3 Bor-Komorowski states that German losses in five days were ‘about 100 killed’ (Bor, p. 197). Tenenbaum gives indications of numerous German losses in his account. There were other losses among Baltic nationals who formed many of the enlisted personnel of the Waffen-SS units. It has been estimated that German casualties numbered more than 1,000 (see p. 161 above).
5 On 20 April 1941 he was designated by Hitler as ‘Delegate for the Central Study of Questions relating to the Eastern European Region’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 383–6 (865-PS); N.C.A. iii. 621–3).
6 ‘The Ukraine will become an independent state allied to Germany, and Caucasus with the adjoining territories to the north of it a federal state with a German plenipotentiary’ (Rosenberg’s general instructions for all Reich Commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 8 May 1941: I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 576–80 (1030-PS); Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939 46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 280).
7 Ibid. pp. 573 6 (1029-PS), and pp. 281–3 respectively. See also above, p. 60.
various racial groups who were to form a barrier against Bolshevism. The Ostland as a whole was ‘to be established as a mighty German borderland’.\(^1\)

Hitler appointed Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on 17 July 1941,\(^2\) when the offensive against Russia had been under way for some time, and on the same day the Reich Commissariat for the Ostland was established under Heinrich Lohse (Oberpräsident and Gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein), and the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine under Erich Koch.\(^3\) Lohse’s authority was to extend over the civil administration of the territories of the former Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the rather indefinite area of White Russia, including the predominantly White Russian areas of inter-war Poland, and those parts of the occupied U.S.S.R. which would be turned over to him by the military authorities. The Reich Commissariat for the Ostland was divided into the General Commissariats for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, each of which was, in turn, subdivided into several Kreisgebiete, and the General Commissariat for White Russia, which was subdivided into Hauptgebiete. In comparison with the unified authority of Koch’s Ukraine, the authority over the Ostland was delegated to a much larger extent, mainly because of the varied nature of the Ostland territories, but nevertheless political authority was derived direct through Lohse’s head-quarters in Riga from Rosenberg’s in Berlin.\(^4\) Although the authority remained firmly in German hands, particularly for economic and military matters, the internal administration of the three Baltic states was placed in the hands of native self-governing bodies, which were appointed and closely supervised by the German authorities. If these bodies were not governments in the true sense of the word, they at least relieved the Germans of many tedious duties.\(^5\)

It was intended originally that the General Commissariat for White Russia should consist of those parts of the Voivodeships of Nowogrodeck and Polesie which formed part of inter-war Poland north of the borderline of Koch’s Ukraine, together with the province of Smolensk and the entire Soviet Republic of Byelorussia.\(^6\) By the autumn of 1942, however, German

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1 See p. 84 above for Himmler’s later plans for German settlements in the Ostland.
3 For Koch’s Ukraine see pp. 632–48 below.
5 The officials of these native bodies were mainly heads of department, called National Directors in Estonia, Directors-General in Latvia, and Councillors-General in Lithuania. They apparently had little popular support. An Estonian professor resident at the time in Tartu said of Dr. Mae, the head of the Estonian native administration: ‘Few people even troubled to despise him’ (Ants Oras: Baltic Eclipse (London, Gollancz, 1948), p. 237).
6 An article by Lohse in Nationalsocialistische Monatshefte for January 1942 mentioned that, in addition to the Hauptgebiete of Minsk and Baranowicze, the Hauptgebiete of Mogilev, Vitebsk, and Smolensk were also part of the Ostland Commissariat.
civil authority had extended only as far east as Borissow, and the Commissariat for White Russia included, in addition to the former Polish areas, only the areas around Minsk, Sluzk, and Borissow. The remainder of occupied White Russia, as it turned out, never left the hands of the military authorities. The Russian province of Pskov, however, was included in the General Commissariat for Estonia, while the city of Vilna, with part of its surrounding area, remained part of the General Commissariat for Lithuania as it had been under Soviet occupation.

The policies which had been followed by the Russians during their year of occupation after June 1940 had left the Baltic populations thoroughly antagonized. The incorporation of the three states in the Soviet Union, after dubious elections, and the subsequent deportation into the U.S.S.R. proper of large numbers of the leading elements, had resulted in an accumulated bitterness, and it was quite natural that the invading Germans should find many willing allies in the battle against the Russians when they entered the Baltic region in June 1941. The Lithuanians even staged a revolt as the Red Army withdrew, and hopefully established a Provisional Government under Dr. Amrazevicius, only to see it dissolved by the Germans in August, and its leaders arrested. In Latvia and Estonia, as well, many volunteers took part in the fight against the Russians at the time of their withdrawal.

Lohse thus found a favourable situation for the establishment of his civil administration in the three Baltic states, and the bitter feelings towards the Russians were used to good advantage in the early stages. The psychological atmosphere was ripe for a reversal of Soviet economic and political policies. Whereas in the Baltic countries the Russians had only had one year to make progress in nationalization and collectivization, the situation was different in the former areas of inter-war Poland, which had been under Russian authority since September 1939, and even to a more marked degree in the territories of the U.S.S.R. now occupied by Germany, which had known only Soviet administration since 1918. The contrasting situations made it impossible for the Germans to establish a uniform economic and political policy in the Ostland, and ensured that different policies would be necessary for White Russia and for the three Baltic countries.

The strong desire of the Baltic peoples, as a result of Russian policy, for a return to some form of individual ownership and enterprise received

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1 General Commissioner Kube outlined the extent of his authority in an article in Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, for 30 August 1942.
3 German propagandists played heavily on British commitments in support of Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States, especially after Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941.
4 For the organization of the economic exploitation of the Ostland see also p. 181 above.
a jarring setback, however, when Lohse issued an order on 19 August 1941, confiscating the entire property of the U.S.S.R. in the Ostland. In order to preserve a smooth-working economy for the war effort it was found expedient by the Germans to take over immediately the nationalized and collective economic institutions established by the Russians. Lohse’s order stated, however, that ‘it is intended to restore private property completely’.\(^1\) Regardless of such assurances to the Baltic populations, Russian state ownership was simply replaced by German state ownership of all property. It was intended that this situation should last until circumstances allowed the German authorities to put into effect their post-war colonial policy in the east. In the meantime, a return to a private economy was allowed in small-scale agriculture and enterprise, but only if the owners would consent to be agents of the Germans.\(^2\) This was necessary if only in order to keep the economy going. Different treatment, however, was given to large-scale enterprise, which was placed under the control of a Trust Administration in Berlin.\(^3\) The establishment of German trustee ownership had the double advantage of ensuring the smooth functioning of large-scale agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprise, and of maintaining a place for German colonists to establish themselves in the post-war period.\(^4\)

The very different circumstances in the territories which had been part of the U.S.S.R. before 1939, where the consolidation of Soviet institutions had been in process since the end of the First World War, required a different policy. For the occupied territories of the U.S.S.R. (as it was before 1939) which were, or were scheduled to be, under German civil administration, Rosenberg’s office drew up a ‘New Agrarian Decree’, which was issued, in agreement with Göring, on 16 February 1942.\(^5\) Under the decree the Soviet ‘constitution of collective farms’ was abolished and a ‘new order’ was to be established to guide the peasants gradually back to individual farming. This was to be done in several stages, the first of which was to turn the collective farms into communal farms. The possibilities of this agricultural policy excited German leaders, including others in the highest

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\(^1\) Order concerning the Sequestration of the Property of the U.S.S.R. in the Territory of the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, 19 August 1941. Text in Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 304 (translated from Verkundungsblatt für das Ostland, 1941, no. 2, p. 5).

\(^2\) In this sphere, collective farms established by the Russians were divided among peasant owners upon proof of their ability and means to work the land efficiently. Urban property was returned to former owners ‘provided that such an assignment was not contrary to public interest’, and handicrafts, small industry, and retail trade were restored to former owners, with similar conditions. See Decrees in Lemkin, op. cit. pp. 308, 310. Jews were placed in a special category and their property was confiscated outright (see p. 131 above).

\(^3\) The Trust Administration was created by an order of 24 October 1941.

\(^4\) The White Russian areas of inter-war Poland had a relatively greater number of large-scale collective institutions—particularly *sovkhozy* (state-farms)—than the Baltic States, which had had only one year of Soviet control. A trust society to administer the state-farms in the Polish areas was established by Lohse’s order of 16 January 1942.

circles besides Rosenberg, for it was felt that this might be the key to winning the support of the Russian population.\(^1\)

Although Rosenberg told the press in January that the first task was to mobilize all possible forces for the protection of the Ostland, and for the supply of the German army's needs,\(^2\) he was at the same time preoccupied with measures for securing help from the native population. The efficiency shown by the Baltic native administration set up under German supervision in the autumn of 1941\(^3\) led to its formal recognition in a decree of 7 March 1942.\(^4\) The Baltic peoples, within limits, had been scheduled for privileged treatment because they were considered as racially kindred peoples,\(^5\) and, in line with the German intention to stimulate their affinities with the West, rather than the East, they received much more lenient treatment than those peoples who were considered to be 'racially inferior' (such as the Jews, and, to a lesser extent, the Slavs).\(^6\) This policy was successful to a certain extent, for the Germans were able to secure valuable assistance from native authorities in internal administration, particularly from the native police and militia, and many Estonian and Latvian men volunteered for active service on the eastern front.\(^7\) A certain degree of legal autonomy was also established in the Ostland,\(^8\) but the Germans then found that they were plagued with a great confusion of legal codes. The attempts to secure native support met with a reverse in Latvia and Lithuania, however, when it became known that plans were being made for the return of the Baltic Germans who had gone to the Reich in 1941.

\(^1\) Although he had great contempt for Rosenberg's administrative abilities, Goebbels was enthusiastic about the possible effect of this scheme in Russia (Goebbels Diaries, p. 21).

\(^2\) Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, 18 January 1942.

\(^3\) See above, p. 95.

\(^4\) See above, p. 124. According to an official announcement the decree stated that 'the local population has given, during the war and occupation period, so many proofs of its willingness to co-operate that it is possible to grant it a fair measure of self-government' (Frankfurter Zeitung, 20 March 1942; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 290).

\(^5\) Rosenberg's instructions for a Reich Commissioner in the Ostland described the Estonians as a kindred nation, who had been 'germanized to the extent of 50 per cent.' by German, Danish, and Swedish blood. A considerably smaller section of the Latvian population was regarded as capable of being assimilated, and in Lithuania the proportion was still smaller (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 574 (1029-PS); Documents (R.I.A.), cit. p. 282).

\(^6\) A good indication of the difference in treatment between the Baltic peoples and the Poles, for example, could be seen in the attitude of the German authorities towards fraternization or marriage. In Poland Germans were forbidden to fraternize with Poles, and Poles were actively discouraged from marrying even among themselves (see above, p. 556, note 5). The official German attitude towards the Baltic peoples, however, was indicated in a statement in the Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland of 13 March 1942, which said that Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians were not among the peoples of alien race whom the Germans were forbidden to marry—on the contrary, they were closely related to the German race. German law required only that their race and physical soundness should be established before marriage.

\(^7\) The Latvian and Lithuanian police forces were incorporated in Himmler's security service, while in Estonia Dr. Mac said in March that 12,600 Estonian volunteers were on active service.

\(^8\) For the legal system and the administration of justice in the Ostland see pp. 135–6 above.
in connexion with the Nazi-Soviet treaties of 1939. The prevalence of Anglo-Saxon sympathies among the Baltic peoples also worked to the disadvantage of the Germans, but they made great efforts to counteract it in propaganda. Fear and hatred of the Bolsheviks was played upon to good effect, particularly at the time of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, when the Germans could claim, with good reason, that the English had secretly agreed to give the Soviet Government a free hand in the Baltic. The relative scarcity of Jews, compared with the large numbers in Poland and Russia, simplified for the Germans the Jewish situation in the Baltic countries, but there were enough for the civil authorities to establish ghettos for them in Tallinn, Riga, and Kaunas.

In White Russia, as in the Ukraine and other captured sectors of the U.S.S.R., Rosenberg had intended from the beginning to stimulate the national consciousness against Moscow. He had also regarded the area as relatively backward, and had contemplated the settlement there of various racial groups as a bulwark against the Russians. Because of the long period in which the area had been a part of the Soviet Union, Rosenberg had difficulty in applying a policy which would secure any support from the native population. Some progress was made during 1942 with the application of his 'New Agrarian Decree', especially in the Pskov area, but any constructive policies that might have had a chance of success were hampered by a number of factors. Himmler's and Rosenberg's offices, for example, were dabbling in various schemes for colonization of the area, and plans were well advanced for the settlement of Dutch and of Rumanian Germans in the Ostland. From the beginning, however, the German civil authorities were forced to cope with a Partisan movement which was serious enough as early as November 1941 to make Lohse proclaim the principle of collective responsibility against the native population. In addition to the effect produced by the rapidly growing Resistance Movement in the forests, moreover, Rosenberg's

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1 See above, p. 86. About 36,000 Germans were moved back to Lithuania in the autumn of 1942 (Dagens Nyheter, 19 December 1942; Mittag (Dusseldorf), 26 May 1943).
2 DNB, 17 June 1942.
3 See also above, p. 131.
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 573-80 (1029-PS, 1030-PS); Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 282. One of his early notes had recommended, in case such a policy were adopted, that White Russia should not be carved up for the benefit of the General Government of Poland (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 547-54 (1017-PS); Documents (R.I.I.A.), cit. p. 74).
5 See above, p. 568.
6 In the beginning of 1942 his subordinates were complaining about the backwardness of the area. One of them remarked that, in the occupied portions of the U.S.S.R., 'bolshevization had been pushed to such a point that men had lost all comprehension of such notions as possession, property, and personal initiative' (National Zeitung, 14 February 1942).
7 For details of Germany's scheme for settlement of Dutch peasants in the Ostland see Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, 9 June 1943. See also p. 51 above.
8 Lohse's proclamation of 15 November 1941 (Verkündungsblatt für das Ostland, 1941, p. 61); Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 556.
authority was becoming steadily less effective in a chaos of parallel jurisdiction.¹

As the military situation began to change to Germany's disadvantage towards the end of 1942, policies became less lenient in the Ostland. Efforts increased to exploit the economic potentialities of the territories for the benefit of the Reich, and new attempts were initiated to recruit man-power for the war effort. In August a concerted campaign was begun in the Baltic countries to enlist able-bodied men either into Baltic legions of the Waffen-SS or into compulsory labour.² The campaign was successful in Estonia, but had less positive results in Latvia, and none at all in Lithuania. The abysmal failure of the plan in Lithuania, indeed, was followed by mass arrests, which included several members of the 'self-administration'. In addition, the Universities of Vilna and Kaunas, which with other Baltic universities had only recently been allowed to resume their activities, were closed as a measure of reprisal against the students.³ The increasing severity of methods of recruitment was accompanied by a proportionate increase in Partisan activity, as many men fled to the forests to escape conscription.⁴ The situation in Lithuania, which had deteriorated as a result of the recruitment campaign, was exacerbated by the return of Baltic Germans who had left during the period of Soviet occupation. After the failure to form a SS Legion, the German authorities had been able to conclude a belated agreement with the Lithuanians for the formation of native battalions of engineers to work on fortifications on Lithuanian territory. In the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. Rosenberg made some almost desperate efforts to save his agricultural policy by ordering that the 'reprivatizing' of farms should be speeded up.⁵ In the early part of 1943, however, Partisan activity was increasing at an alarming rate. Soviet aid to the Partisans was becoming steadily more effective, and the Partisans had reached a much more advanced state of organization.⁶

¹ Rosenberg's civil authority had no control over the military nor over Himmler's separate security organization. Sauckel had control over labour, and Göring and Speer over economic matters (cf. above, p. 176). The Reich Ministries of Transport and Postal Services were also separate. Goebbels expressed contempt for Rosenberg's ability to implement his theories in the east, and for his continuous bickerings with other Nazi leaders: see Goebbels Diaries, pp. 24, 35, 47, 99. For Rosenberg's feud with Erich Koch see below, p. 637; for the clash between him and Ribbentrop over the responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry in the areas conquered from Russia see p. 111 above.

² See above, p. 79, for the policy of recruiting non-Germans for the Waffen-SS; and pp. 227–30 for Sauckel's efforts to recruit labour.

³ Afstonbladet, 7 June 1943.

⁴ In Latvia the publication of a decree to force former officers in the Latvian army to report for service or suffer the death penalty resulted in the escape of many of them to the forests where some of them became leaders of partisan detachments (Svenska Dagbladet, 21 June 1943).

⁵ DNB, 23 February 1943.

⁶ Revaler Zeitung (11 June 1943) published a small sketch map showing Partisan-held 'infested areas' of 500–600 sq. kilometres including the towns of Minsk, Pinsk, Gomel, Briansk, Smolensk, and Vitebsk, with the main railway lines running right through them. See also Goebbels Diaries, pp. 83–84.
The political campaign in occupied Russia took an unusual turn in March, when the Germans produced a captured Soviet General (Lieut.-General A. A. Vlasov) as the centre of a propaganda effort directed towards Soviet citizens and prisoners of war. General Vlasov did not associate himself with Tsarist émigrés or other questionable elements, but proclaimed himself, with German support, as the leader of a 'Russian National Liberation Committee', and a 'Russian Army of Liberation'. Over Radio Berlin he advocated a new social and economic policy for a Russia liberated from the Soviet régime, under which he would abolish forced labour and restore the collective farms to individual holdings. During March and April Vlasov was sent to speak to Russian prisoners of war in Eastern Europe, as well as to civilian gatherings in occupied Russia. His appeal evidently caused some discussion among Russians in German prisoner-of-war camps, and he even succeeded in forming an armed force of sorts; but, largely because his stimulation of Russian nationalism conflicted with Rosenberg's policies of encouraging opposition to the authority and power of Moscow, German support was soon withdrawn, and Vlasov gradually faded from public view.  

Conditions were rapidly approaching chaos in the Ostland towards the end of 1943. Except in Estonia the German civil authorities had by this time lost, for the most part, the support of the native populations. The success of Partisan activities effectively supported by Russian parachutists and Russian supplies caused the Germans in turn to launch a campaign of terror in Lithuania and White Russia. Unrest in Estonia and Latvia was complicated by large groups of German and Volksdeutsche refugees fleeing from the Eastern Territories, together with refugees bombed out of cities in the Reich. Rosenberg's anticipated 'mighty German borderland' in the Ostland had thus remained not much more than a dream. In little more than two years from the launching of the German attack, the dreaded 'großrussisch pressure' was again being applied to Germany, and the occupied Baltic and Russian territories had become the scene of administrative confusion, wild refugee movements, and guerrilla warfare.

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1 See above, p. 80.

2 Vlasov declared over Radio Berlin that, although he had been faithful to his duty, he had changed heart because of bitterness over the Red Army purges of the late nineteen-thirties and the ruthlessness of the political commissars. While desiring to retain the technical progress produced by the Soviet régime, he wanted to place their achievements in the hands of the Russian people. Besides an assistant, General Malyshkin, few of his supporters were explicitly named (Novoge Slovo (Berlin), 16 March 1943). Goebbels mentions the effect produced on Russian prisoners of war, and the reason why Vlasov was eventually shelved (Diaries, pp. 255, 271). Another reason for Vlasov's return to obscurity was the Katyn incident, which attracted much attention all over the world in April and May (see p. 565 above).

3 See above, p. 84.
(iii) Finland

By Sidney Lowery

In the summer of 1940 the relief brought to the Soviet leaders by the German occupation of Norway, which precluded their immediate involvement in the war, had given them time to develop their western strategic position by taking possession of most of the territories which had been allotted to the Soviet sphere of influence by the Russo-German boundary and non-aggression agreement of 1939.\(^1\) Thus, the three Baltic states and parts of inter-war Rumania were added to the Polish territories previously acquired, and incorporated in the U.S.S.R. Finland alone remained, and the Russians began in the late summer to apply full pressure in that direction with the apparent intention of following a procedure similar to that recently applied in the other areas of Soviet predominance.\(^2\) Approximately at the same time Germany’s concern about the security of her recently acquired ports in Norway had resulted in agreement being reached with the Finnish military authorities for the transport of men and material over Finnish railroads to Kirkenes in northern Norway.\(^3\) Since June the Russians had been pressing for an agreement with the Finns on the Åland Islands question, and simultaneously had been increasing pressure in the direction of Petsamo.\(^4\) But Germany, too, was interested in Petsamo, and the Russo-German clash of interests over Petsamo and its nickel mines developed into one of the points of power conflict that came to a head in November when Molotov conferred with Hitler in Berlin.\(^5\)

\(^1\) Schulenburg (the German Ambassador in Moscow) said that as a result of Anglo-French hostility expressed towards neutrals early in 1940, particularly towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government feared being forced by the ‘Entente’ into a war for which they were not prepared. They feared, he said, an Anglo-French appearance on the shores of the Baltic and a reopening of the Finnish question. They showed obvious relief, therefore, when the German occupation of Norway forestalled such a development. See Schulenburg’s memorandum of 11 April 1940 (\textit{Nazi-Soviet Relations}, pp. 138-40).

\(^2\) Molotov told Hitler on 13 November that he imagined the settlement of the question of Finland within the framework of the agreement of 1939 as ‘on the same scale as in Bessarabia and in the adjacent countries’ (ibid. p. 240; \textit{Documents (R.I.A.)} for 1939-46, ii: \textit{Hitler’s Europe}, p. 296).

\(^3\) Details of the Finnish-German transit agreement, negotiated in August–September 1940, will be found in the \textit{Survey} for 1939-46: \textit{Initial Triumph of the Axis}. Cf. J. H. Wuorinen: \textit{Finland and World War II} (New York, The Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 92–95. [This book will be referred to hereafter as Wuorinen.] On Molotov’s request for information about the agreement, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to inform him on 2 October that the agreement had no political implications, and that ‘just as we reached an understanding with Sweden about similar transport through Swedish territory to the areas of Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik, an understanding was reached with Finland about transit to the area of Kirkenes’. He also quoted four points from the agreement (\textit{Nazi-Soviet Relations}, p. 202).

\(^4\) An account of the Åland Islands and Petsamo questions will be found in the \textit{Survey} for 1939-46: \textit{Initial Triumph of the Axis}.

\(^5\) A German Foreign Ministry memorandum of 8 October 1940 gave the reasons for the change in the German attitude on the Petsamo question. Success of the Soviet policy in Petsamo would
In the light of German documentation it would appear that Hitler's suggestion in November that the Soviet Government should become one of the signatories of a Four-Power Pact was merely an attempt to divert Soviet attention towards the Central Asian sphere. On the very day that Molotov arrived in Berlin (12 November 1940) Hitler had ordered his commanders to prepare for the eastern campaign. For the carrying out of the immediate German intentions in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, however, much depended on the Soviet attitude, which still remained to be explored, and it is probable that Hitler's plans were not inflexible, at least until he had conferred with Molotov. If a more cordial relationship between Germany and Russia were to develop even temporarily it was necessary that the points of tension should be handled with delicacy and restraint, virtues which were not highly developed in the Soviet Foreign Minister. Molotov insisted on directing the discussions towards Baltic and Finnish questions, and on 12 November he brought up the question of Finland. In the discussion on the following day Hitler assured him that, so far as Germany was concerned, Finland still remained politically in the Soviet sphere of influence. In support of this assurance he offered to terminate the movement of German troops and equipment through Finland that was taking place under the transit agreement. But in return for this assurance Hitler emphasized the German interest, for the duration of the war, in nickel and timber from Finland. Furthermore, he said, another war in the Baltic might have 'unforeseeable consequences'. Molotov, however, was determined to make a definite test of Hitler's position with regard to Soviet plans in Finland, and his unremitting questions goaded Hitler into making an unequivocal statement to the effect that German-Russian relations would not survive the strain of another war in the area of the Baltic Sea. Molotov was finally satisfied on this question, although his dogged insistence on the clarification of German-Soviet points of conflict in Finland and South-Eastern Europe must have irritated Hitler, and lessened his inclination to attempt to reduce the tension with Soviet Russia or to include her as a participant in Axis plans to divide the world into spheres of influence. Molotov had not responded to Hitler's hint that they should fight 'back to back', but had insisted instead on facing Germany 'breast to breast'.

interfere with German nickel interests, and Soviet territory would border on Kirkenes. It was necessary, therefore, to go beyond the previous passive policy and 'strengthen the Finnish will to resist' (Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 205; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 293).

1 Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.

2 Since January 1940 he had been considering a campaign against Russia and disputing the merits of such a plan with his commanders, who opposed it (see Anthony Martienssen: Hitler and His Admirals, p. 92).

3 Hitler's secret directive No. 18, dated 12 November 1940 (Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, p. 3). See also Wiskemann: Rome–Berlin Axis, pp. 246–7.

4 Memorandum of Conversation between Hitler and Molotov on 13 November 1940 (Nazi-
Whatever the reasons for Hitler’s decision to attack Soviet Russia, the definitive directive was issued on 18 December 1940 for ‘Operation Barbarossa’, and in this both Finland and Rumania were counted on as active participants in the war.¹ The testimony of Field Marshal Paulus and of General Buschenhagen during the Nuremberg Trial painted a picture of close and cordial collaboration in plans for war against Russia between Finnish and German military authorities from the date of the Barbarossa directive.² Indeed, a statement made in a conference with Hitler on 3 February 1941 by the Chief of the German Army General Staff suggests that the German military leaders had by that time already had extensive military discussions with the Finns, although Hitler made it clear at the same conference that agreements would not be concluded ‘until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage’.

Buschenhagen described the evolution of German and subsequently Finnish-German plans for the joint military operation to take place in northern Finland, which progressed in a series of conferences and in a joint reconnaissance in the latter part of February. The resulting plans, he said, were approved by OKW as ‘Operation Blue Fox’.⁴ If the Germans achieved co-operation

Soviet Relations, pp. 234–47; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 293). On 25 November Molotov included, as one of the conditions of Soviet participation in the proposed Four-Power Pact, the proposal that German troops in transit be withdrawn from Finland, in return for an assurance by the Soviet Government to protect German economic (nickel and timber) interests in Finland (Schelenburg’s message of 25 November: Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 258–9). Ribbentrop told Matsuoka on 29 March 1941 that the conditions demanded by the U.S.S.R. with regard to Finland and Turkey had been unacceptable to the Germans. The German position on Finland, he said, was based not only on economic interests, but also on sentiment. Germany had remained neutral during the Winter War because of her commitments to Russia, and also because there was no reason to help the anti-Hitler Social Democratic Government in Finland. Sentimental feeling, however, caused by the valiant stand of the Finns had affected the German attitude ‘since an occupation by Russia would lead to complete destruction of the country, as was shown by the example of the Baltic States’ (Ribbentrop’s conversation with Matsuoka in Berlin on 29 March 1941: ibid. p. 304).

¹ The order said: ‘Finland will cover the concentration of the re-deployed German North Group (parts of the XXI Group) coming from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides, Finland will be assigned the task of eliminating Hango.’ See Hitler’s directive No. 21 (‘Operation Barbarossa’) of 18 December 1940 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 47–52 (446-PS); Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 260–4; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 70).

² Both officers testified that the Finnish Chief of Staff, General Heinrichs, visited German OKH Headquarters in Zossen in December 1940, where he gave a speech to German officers on the methods of warfare and fighting value of the Soviet and Finnish armies during the Winter War (I.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 258–9, 309–10).

³ The Chief of Staff said: ‘The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South with 4 Army Corps, of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake Onega, 2 against Hango—they need strong support’ (ibid. xxvi. 394 (872-PS); N.C.A. iii. 629). Hitler’s statement, in the same document, made an exception in the case of Rumania (ibid. pp. 398 and 632 respectively).

⁴ I.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 310–11. Both Paulus and Buschenhagen, it should be remembered, were at the time witnesses produced by the Russian authorities, which—in the light of known Soviet methods of ‘preparing’ witnesses—may cast doubts on the soundness of their testimony. Paulus had previously been converted to the Soviet cause.
with the Finns in their plans in the north, however, they were apparently less successful in their attempt to involve the main Finnish forces in the south. According to the German general, Waldemar Erfurth, who later became liaison officer with the Finns, the initiative for co-operation in the first half of 1941 came entirely from the Germans. He describes the conferences which took place in Salzburg and Berlin on 25 and 26 May, in which the approaches of the German commanders, Jodl and Halder, brought no response from the Finnish Chief of Staff. The Finns discussed operations in which they would participate if they were attacked by Russia, but they continued to steer clear of a direct alliance with Germany.¹

Meanwhile, if the November conversations in Berlin had frustrated Russian plans in regard to Finland as a whole, they did not discourage the Soviet leaders from their designs on Petsamo. During January and February Molotov and Vyshinsky were making use of a variety of diplomatic techniques in an attempt to gain a foothold in the area. The Finns managed to hold them off, however, on the question of managership of the mines, and their attitude gradually stiffened, with German moral support, after the beginning of May.²

The period immediately preceding the Finnish involvement in the war had not been entirely clarified at the time of writing (1953). Finnish military co-operation with the Germans, particularly in the north, together with the activities and sympathies of some of Finland’s leaders, suggest that the connexion with Germany was stronger than it was claimed to have been after the event.³ Whatever the truth of the situation Finland was

¹ Heinrichs declared to Halder, according to Erfurth, that direct co-operation with Germany would never be supported by authoritative military and political persons in Finland. Jodl, apparently, indicated that he would be satisfied if the Finns held the Soviet forces at their frontiers. For details of the conferences see Waldemar Erfurth: Der finnische Krieg 1941-44 (Wiesbaden, Limes, 1950), pp. 30-32. [This book will be referred to hereafter as Erfurth.] Cf. Wuorinen, pp. 97-98: Wuorinen states that the conversations were limited to hypothetical operations based on an attack by Russia against Finland (p. 98).

² For the progress of the Soviet-Finnish discussions and negotiations on Petsamo from January to May see Finland: Finland reveals her secret documents on Soviet policy, March 1940–June 1941: Official Blue-White Book of Finland (New York, Funk, 1941), Documents 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71. [This book will be referred to hereafter as Finnish Blue-White Book.]

³ Wuorinen (pp. 102-5) defends the theory from the Finnish viewpoint (admittedly on incomplete evidence) that Finland was simply the victim of a power-political chess game. General Buschenhagen, on the other hand, testified at Nuremberg that Finnish-German joint military co-operation extended to a joint action between Mannerheim’s forces and German forces in Eastern Europe towards Leningrad, and to planned measures for Finnish mobilization; and he added that ‘for cogent military reasons the operations for attack from Finnish territory could only start 8-10 days after the beginning of the attack against Russia’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 313). A former major in the Finnish army, Erwin Lessner, told of Finnish Right-wing connivance with the Germans extending back as far as March 1940, after the Winter War (Lessner: ‘Finnish Tragedy’, Harper’s Magazine, June 1944). If the military co-operation was as extensive as was later alleged, however, it was kept a careful secret before May 1941, for the German leaders did not formally approach the Finns until that time (Erfurth, pp. 28-29).
undoubtedly caught up in a chain of circumstances, and one factor of primary importance was the presence of German troops in Finland.¹

As German and Russian forces drew up to face one another before the German attack, the Finns began in early June to mobilize by stages, and Finnish troops were gradually concentrated in defensive positions.² With two German divisions already in Finland, on 17 June German naval vessels undertook the protection of Finnish waters against the Russian Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt. General Erfurth had arrived at Finnish Headquarters as German liaison officer several days before.³ The primary object of Finnish policy, apparently, was defence. The German commanders, however, had made ample provision that the northern flank of the German armies should be defended, and that the numerically scarce Finns should not be without support, if they should need it.⁴

In the confusion following the German attack on 22 June, and in the atmosphere created by Hitler's speech implicating the Finns, the Finnish attempt to remain neutral, particularly with German forces on their soil, was futile.⁵ Falkenhorst's mountain corps marched into the Petsamo area from Kirkenes, and another division from Norway was on its way through Sweden. Finnish and German naval craft together began to seal with mines the routes of the Russian Baltic Fleet out of the Gulf of Finland.⁶ It must have been difficult in the circumstances for the Russians not to believe what Hitler had proclaimed to the world.⁷ With the large force of German troops on Finnish soil, not to mention active co-operation in the north and on the Baltic, it was inevitable that the Russians would eventually fire on the Finns. They fired north, from Hangó toward the Finnish troops in position in that area, and Russian bombers bombed Finnish vessels in Finnish waters. The Finnish attempt at neutrality was suddenly cut short, and the confused and indefinite situation was clarified.

¹ Wuorinen describes the German movement, under the transit agreement, of one division from the north, and one from the south, ostensibly to replace it in Norway, so that two German divisions with their equipment were in Finland before the German attack began (Wuorinen, p. 103).

² Erfurth (p. 35) says that there was no general mobilization order, but orders were passed verbally to individuals. Finnish troops manned defensive positions on the eastern border, and on the border opposite the Russian base at Hangó. On 19 June Finnish forces were given the order to man the Åland Islands, the demilitarization agreement for which had been signed with the Russians in the previous October (see Wuorinen, p. 103).

³ Erfurth, p. 36.

⁴ Hitler said in his speech of 22 June, as the attack against Russia was launched: 'United with their Finnish comrades, the fighters of the victory at Narvik are standing in the Northern Arctic. German divisions commanded by the conqueror of Norway, in co-operation with the heroes of Finnish freedom under their marshal, are protecting Finnish soil' (New York Times, 23 June 1941; Erfurth, p. 196).

⁵ For the period of neutrality in Finnish foreign policy, lasting from 22 to 25 June, see Wuorinen, pp. 106–7.

⁶ Ibid. p. 105; Erfurth, p. 38.

⁷ Molotov, on 23 June, demanded clarification of the Finnish Government's attitude towards the Russo-German war, insisting that Russia had been attacked from Finnish territory (Wuorinen, p. 108).
on 25 June, when it became apparent, with the Russian bombing of major Finnish cities, that the Soviet Government had taken the decision to extend the war to Finland.\(^1\) Regardless of their previous intentions the Finnish people thus suddenly found themselves at war once again with Soviet Russia.\(^2\)

When Mannerheim decided on 28 June, against the wishes of the German High Command, to launch an offensive on 10 July on both sides of Jämsäjärvi in a south-easterly direction he unquestionably had the support of the majority of his nation behind him.\(^3\) Soviet policies since the beginning of the Winter War had left an accumulated sense of grievance against the Russians, and most of the Finnish people at the time seemed to favour the recovery of the land ceded to Soviet Russia by the Moscow Peace.\(^4\) This, they felt, was the continuation of their previous separate war. They had no desire to become involved with the other Great Powers. In the enthusiasm generated by the attack on 10 July, when the moment seemed to have arrived for the settling of old scores with their eastern neighbour,\(^5\) the wider aspects of the struggle were generally overlooked. Most political leaders, however soon saw the wisdom of restraint, and in the late autumn and winter Finland’s war aims gradually settled down to the recovery of the territory lost in 1940 and the establishment of military security.\(^6\)

German military leaders desired Mannerheim to make the main attack to the east of Lake Ladoga toward Lodeinoje Pole on the Swir, and to join forces with German troops advancing over the Volkhov (Wolchow) River. Mannerheim insisted, however, in making his main attack on the Karelian Isthmus, although he intended to follow the German suggestion at a later stage. Because of the delicate political issues involved in crossing the Russian border, for two months President Ryti delayed giving Mannerheim permission to continue the attack with his ‘Karelian Army’, but finally agreed at the beginning of September on condition that Mannerheim should not co-operate with the Germans in attacking Leningrad.\(^7\) Although Mannerheim’s plan in September was to establish tactical positions on the outskirts of Leningrad, which could be held with an economical use of troops,\(^8\) the German attempts to secure Finnish military co-operation in an attack against that city were successfully resisted by the

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\(^1\) Ibid. p. 109; cf. Erfurth, p. 39.

\(^2\) For excerpts from the speech broadcast by President Ryti on 26 June, when Finland was already at war, see Finnish Blue-White Book, Document 74. pp. 99-105; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 296.

\(^3\) Erfurth, pp. 42-43.

\(^4\) Ibid. p. 197.

\(^5\) Finnish political leaders had some trouble in explaining away Mannerheim’s Order of the Day of 10 July, in which he exhorted his men to ‘liberate the Karelians’ (Wuorinen, pp. 123-4).

\(^6\) Wuorinen, pp. 124-7; cf. Erfurth, p. 197.

\(^7\) Ibid. p. 199.

\(^8\) Ibid. p. 67.
Finns.1 The severe shortage of man-power in Finland was one of the main factors influencing Finnish plans, and by November, when the Finns began to realize that the war would not be over quickly, as they had at first expected, the shortage of men, which threatened to paralyse the nation's economy, damped the enthusiasm of Finnish military plans. At Mannerheim's request the Finnish forces under German command in the north were placed on the defensive in November.2

As Finnish forces proceeded to cross the 1939 borders to seize Russian fortifications and bases for 'security' purposes, the British Government began to bring pressure, at the request of their Russian ally, for the withdrawal of the Finns.3 The United States Government, although still a non-belligerent, hinted that they would help the Finns to get out of the war. The unwillingness of the Finns to stop before they had secured strategic bases on Russian soil led to a British ultimatum on 28 November4 that, if the Finns did not cease military operations and active participation in hostilities, they would find themselves at war with Great Britain. Churchill supplemented the British note by a personal letter to Mannerheim, which assured the Finnish commander that no publicity was necessary if Finnish activity could be brought de facto to a halt. The indefinite reply from Mannerheim, and that from the Finnish Government,5 were not considered satisfactory and the British declared war on 6 December.6

The Finnish military connexion with the Germans, according to General Erfurth, was never closer than liaison and consultation,7 although the political leaders went so far in November 1941 as to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.8 Concerted operations against the Murmansk railway were discussed in December but were not carried out, although Mannerheim was the architect of the plan for the principal attack, against Soroka (Belomorsk).9 When the change in the military situation made it impossible for the Germans to relieve the Finns in the south, Mannerheim

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1 Wuorinen, pp. 126-7.
2 Erfurth, pp. 85 86. 16 per cent. of the Finnish population were in the armed forces; cf. Wuorinen, p. 127.
3 Hull: Memoirs, ii. 980.
5 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941-1942, pp. 641-2; Wuorinen, p. 135. See also Documents (R.I.I.A.), cit. p. 305.
6 Mannerheim's Order of the Day of 6 December 1941 changed the military effort from the offensive to the defensive, but the Finns were twenty-four hours too late in this matter.
7 Erfurth, pp. 36-37.
9 The seizure of Soroka (Belomorsk), on the White Sea, would have cut the Murmansk-Leningrad line at its junction with the line running to the east along the south shore of the White Sea; this was being used by the Russians instead of the line running south from Soroka, which was cut by the Finns (Erfurth, p. 89). [The line from Soroka to Obozerskaya, which joined the Murmansk-Leningrad line to the Archangel-Moscow line, was completed and opened in the spring of 1941, a short time before the Germans and Finns attacked Russia.]
refused to take part in the attack. The weakest point of the Finnish front was on the Swir, south of Lake Onega, and Mannerheim insisted that the Germans must first send relief for his troops in the southern sector before the Finns would be able to take part in an offensive against Soroka.  

As the Germans were achieving their greatest military successes elsewhere during the first half of 1942, the front from Leningrad to the Arctic Sea stood relatively quiet. The German-Finnish comradeship in arms was cemented by a visit by Hitler to Helsinki on Mannerheim’s seventy-fifth birthday on 4 June, and by a return visit made shortly afterwards by Mannerheim to Hitler’s headquarters in Germany. The failure of the Germans to take Leningrad, however, proved to be the main obstacle to further Finnish-German operations on the Russian front. In the late summer military co-operation approached a crisis over a proposed German offensive against the Murmansk railway, in which the Finns were expected to undertake the seizure of Soroka. When Mannerheim referred to the bargain made previously with the Germans, whereby Finnish participation would depend on the success of German activity round Leningrad, the Germans sent back an abrupt response on 15 August, in which they demanded to know definitely whether the Finns would take part in the attack. They offered aid to the Finns in such an event, but said that, if Mannerheim insisted on operations first in the south, the proposed attack (Lachsfang, i.e. ‘operation Salmon-fishing’) would have to be given up. Mannerheim did not reply directly, but sent his Chief of Staff and an assistant to discuss the matter. As a result of the dispute, by the end of August the Germans had decided to give up the attack against the Murmansk railway, and turned their attention instead to planning an attack (Nordlicht: ‘Operation Northern Lights’) against Leningrad. In the event, German reverses in the autumn of 1942 led to the abandonment of the planned attack on Leningrad, and shifted the attention of the Germans toward the safety of their northern flank. After the German forces in the north had been ordered to assume the defensive in October, Finnish-German consultations became increasingly concerned with the question of transport for German reinforcements to Norwegian ports.

As long as good fortune attended German military ventures, particularly during the first part of 1942, little opposition could be found among the

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1 Erfurth, pp. 101-2.


3 For the German response see ibid. p. 118.

4 In August, as a gesture to Russia (Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1177), the United States Government closed Finnish consulates in America. United States pressure was also exerted in the autumn of 1942 upon the Finns to refrain from attacking either Leningrad or the Murmansk railway (Wuorinen, p. 141).

5 After the Allied landings in North Africa (7-8 November 1942) the Germans became concerned about a possible Allied landing in Northern Norway, in combination with the Russian offensive.
Finns to the 'brothers in arms' policy of their Government. It was only after the winter of 1942–3, when the German forces suffered reverses in Russia and elsewhere, that an opposition began to develop in Finland to participation in the war at the side of Germany. After Stalingrad Mannerheim made it clear to the Finnish Government that Germany must inevitably suffer defeat, but the economic ties with Germany, and the large German force in the north, made the Finns aware of the serious consequences that might result from a sudden separate peace.  

The United States Government had continued, somehow, to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland, although their Russian, and, theoretically at least, their British ally were at war with her, and the Americans continued to exert efforts to prevent either a Finnish-German alliance, or Finnish participation in further offensive action against Soviet Russia. The Finns, meanwhile, had not responded to Soviet overtures for peace in 1942, and only in February 1943, after the reversal of military fortunes in the war, did the desire for a separate peace find expression among the Finns. In the atmosphere inspired by attempts of various friendly nations in 1943 to induce Finland to withdraw from the war, the United States Government submitted a memorandum to the Finns on 20 March, offering their good offices in arranging peace between Russia and Finland. When the Finns did not respond, but instead sent their new Foreign Minister, Dr. Henrik Ramsay, to discuss the matter with Ribbentrop, the outcome was a deterioration in relations not only with America, but with Germany as well. Hitler and Ribbentrop, far from feeling grateful towards the Finns for the gesture, demanded not only that the United States offer should be rejected, and that Germany should be informed of the terms of the reply, but also that the Finns should sign a written undertaking not to conclude a separate peace. The Finns did not submit to this demand, but, when the Finnish reply in April was sent first to the Germans for approval, the United States Government very nearly severed relations with Finland, although for various reasons the breach was never completed. After Ramsay's journey by air to Berlin, however, and its reverberations in April, relations began to cool between the Finns and their German co-belligerents, who became increasingly irritated at the indications of growing opposition, especially among the Finnish Social Democrats, to the policies of Finnish-German co-operation that had been followed up to this time in the war by the political and military leaders of Finland.

1 Wuorinen, pp. 144–6.
2 Ibid. pp. 149–50.
3 On 15 February 1943 the Finnish Social Democratic Party adopted a resolution declaring Finland's right to withdraw from the war (ibid. pp. 151–2; cf. Erfurth: p. 208).
5 A description of subsequent events in Finland will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: The Realignment of Europe.
Partitioned Czechoslovakia

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

(a) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1939 to May 1945

According to the traditions of the more intransigent Germans of the old Habsburg Monarchy, and notably of Hitler himself, the most active German group in Bohemia and Moravia had always regarded these ‘Historic Provinces’ as mystically, and therefore eternally, integrated into a greater German Reich. This belief had been fostered by Professor Spann and the theorists of the Sudeten German Party in the days of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Among themselves these people would speak of how the Führer would soon come to ‘reclaim’ the whole territory—it was to foreigners that they indulged in the nuances of Sudeten German autonomy. While Hitler himself was pathologically, but also very realistically, inconsistent in his use of ideologies, a thread of fidelity to the German-Austrian chauvinism of his schoolmasters at Linz ran through his life. Thus the entry into the Hradčany on 15 March 1939 was in Hitler’s eyes one of the retributive triumphs of his life, and for him his Bohemia–Moravia Protectorate had a particular significance in Axis Europe.

It was, however, a crippled territory since the annexations to Germany in the previous autumn, for in both Czech and German eyes Bohemia and Moravia within their historic frontiers were indivisible. It is at first the more difficult to see precisely why this maimed Bohemia–Moravia became a Protectorate and not merely a newly annexed Gau; apparently the Germans still considered it worth while, for the sake of propaganda, to play at the game of Czech autonomy. The decree of 16 March 1939 establishing the Protectorate handed over the helpless Czechs to the mercy of the Reichsprotektor, who was then, three months later, empowered to

1 Cf. the opening paragraph of the decree which established the Protectorate: ‘For ten centuries the Bohemian-Moravian lands belonged to the living space of the German people ...’ (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part I, p. 485; N.C.A. viii. 404 (051-TC); Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–1946, i. 62).

2 See Survey for 1938, ii. 50–51. On 4 March 1941 in a speech in Vienna Henlein publicly boasted of the deceptions practised by himself and his followers before Munich (Neue Tag of Prague, 5 March 1941, quoted in the Survey for 1938, ii. p. 49, note 6).

3 The Austrian motif needs to be stressed because the Reich-Germans felt little natural concern with Bohemia - their impulses were anti-Polish.

4 Both Magyars and Rumanians felt much the same about Transylvania. Was it instinctive or deliberate nihilism in Hitler to break the bonds of tradition in practice while paying lip-service to them whenever it suited him to do so?

5 Article III (1) of the Decree of 16 March 1939 declared that ‘the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and administers itself’. On the status of the Protectorate see also above, p. 94.


7 For the status of the Reichsprotektor see above, pp. 103–4.
override the very decree which had created his post to any extent that he chose.

For the first few weeks after the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 the German army was in control. Then on 5 April the new Reichsprotektor (Baron von Neurath, who had had to make way for Ribbentrop in the Wilhelmsstrasse in February 1938) arrived in Prague. With him, as State Secretary, police chief, and Gestapo representative all in one, came Karl Hermann Frank, the most ferocious of the Sudeten German leaders in the former Czechoslovak Republic. Czech hearts sank at the news, for the Czechs understood the significance of Frank’s appointment very well. The less crude Henlein, Gauleiter of all the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia, was passed over in Frank’s favour, because Frank symbolized the spirit of Karl Hermann Wolf after whom he was named. It was Karl Hermann Wolf who had claimed, in the gentler air of the old Austrian Parliament in 1917, that the non-Germans—and he meant the Czechs when he spoke—should be whipped as if they were tigers. A German called Bürgsdorf was appointed Under-Secretary to Frank and fifteen German Oberlandräte represented the Protector regionally.

On 15 March the Czech Fascist, Gajda, had issued a proclamation on his own account by which he claimed to assume the leadership of the nation. But his following had always been ludicrously small, and, although he continued to be restive for some time, he was scarcely taken up and was very soon dropped by the Germans. The farce of Czech autonomy was preserved by the retention of Hácha with the title of President together with a practically powerless Cabinet of Czech Ministers, most of them specialists who had held office under Beran or even earlier. On 27 April General Eliáš, a professional soldier without political experience, became Premier; the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence were abolished, the Czech army being already disarmed. German functionaries in the Protector’s Office to some extent duplicated the Czech Ministers, and into the bargain German representatives soon appeared in the various Czech Ministries. It was nevertheless found necessary to set up a co-ordinating committee between the Protector’s Office and the Czech Cabinet, direct contact between the two being regarded with disfavour by the

1 For an account of the occupation and the events leading up to it see Survey for 1938, iii.
3 Between 16 March and 16 April 1939 he was civilian adviser to the German Army Command in Moravia.
4 Originally nineteen, and appointed by the Wehrmacht (U.S.A., Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch: Civil Affairs Handbook, Germany. Section 2L: German Military Government over Europe: The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia (Headquarters Army Service Forces, 14 April 1944), pp. 9 and 22–23). [This will be referred to hereafter as U.S. Manual 356-2L.]
5 See Survey for 1938, iii. 272.
PARTITIONED CZECHOSLOVAKIA

There was one exception, it seems, to this rule, for the Czech Minister of Justice, Jaroslav Krejčí, was allowed direct contact with Frank. A nominee of Hácha called Havelka, who had worked for the President in his days at the Supreme Court, became a deputy Premier, and was felt to adopt an unnecessarily pro-German demeanour. The Czech Government, in so far as they were responsible for legislation at all, worked by emergency decrees which had been permitted by a law passed before parliamentary life was quite killed in December 1938.

After Munich only two political parties or groupings had been allowed. Now these had become excessive in totalitarian eyes, and, just as the press was gleichgeschaltet, so also nothing was sanctioned but a single national front, the Národní Souručenství. This was presided over by Hácha himself, and large numbers of Czechs became members in order—most literally—to demonstrate their national solidarity in the only way left to them. In June 1941 Národní Souručenství reached the peak of a membership of over 4 million, but there was constant friction with the Germans, who were never satisfied with its personnel, and early in 1943 Národní Souručenství faded away.

When Britain and France declared war upon Hitler in September 1939 Czech hopes leapt up out of despair, but the evident impotence of the Western Powers while Poland was being destroyed was little calculated to recapture the sympathies which Munich had so profoundly shaken. At a conference held at the Reichspräsident’s Office on 9 October 1939, however, K. H. Frank complained of ‘difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem’. On this occasion, according to a memorandum drawn up on 15 October 1940 by General Friderici, three possible methods of dealing with the Czechs appear to have been considered.

1. German infiltration of Moravia and restriction of the Czech nation to a Bohemian rump.

This solution is considered to be unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.

1 See Sheila Grant Duff: A German Protectorate (London, Macmillan, 1942).
3 See Survey for 1938, iii. 130.
4 Národní Souručenství can be translated approximately as National Solidarity.
5 President Hácha did at least contrive to prevent official Czech participation in the war, whereas the Slovaks became belligerents. See below, p. 601.
6 For this Memorandum see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 375-7 (862-PS), translated in Documents (R.T.I.A.) for 1939-46 ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 313; cf. N.C.L. iii. 618-19. [In I.M.T. the Prague Conference is wrongly dated 1940.] General Friderici concluded by saying that the army had always favoured the third programme, and referred back to another memorandum of his on the Czech problem dated 12 July 1939. The last sentence quoted above was specially marked with two purple strokes in the margin of the original.
6 It will be seen that by ‘the Czech problem’ the Germans meant the Czech nation. See also pp. 87-88 above.
2. Many arguments can be brought against the most radical solution, the deportation of all the Czechs. . . .

3. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e. absorption of about half the Czech nation by the Germans, in so far as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint. This will also be the result among other things of increasing the employment of Czechs in Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district), in other words by dispersing the concentrated Czech population group.

The other half of the Czech nation must be deprived of its power, eliminated and shipped out of the country. . . . This applies particularly to the part which is racially Mongolian and to the major part of the intellectual class. . . .

Elements which work against the plan for germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.

The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from Reich territory into the Protectorate.

The Führer in fact decided for Solution (3). This meant that, ‘while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, germanization will have to be carried out uniformly . . . for years to come’. This decision in favour of assimilation perhaps explains the peculiar character of the Protectorate within the Great German Reich. It contrasted strikingly with Hitler’s decision a week later with regard to Poland, which was to be isolated and treated as a ‘Vorgeschobenes Glaes’ (spring-board) ready for offensive military action.2

The autumn of 1939 gave the Nazis an excellent opportunity to develop their policy towards the Czechs. Since 1918 the latter had celebrated 28 October as the day upon which their first Republic had been born. Though the Germans had cancelled the day as a holiday, large numbers of Czechs wearing national badges demonstrated in all the major Czech towns. The Czech authorities had begged their public for caution, but in what the Germans liked to call ‘German Prague’ German SS men deliberately provoked the people, tearing off their badges and so on, until the reactions led to merciless German police intervention. Numbers of Czechs were arrested and dragged off for ‘treatment’ at Gestapo headquarters in the Petschek Palace. A Czech student, Jan Opletal, was wounded, then beaten up, and died a fortnight later. At his funeral on 15 November his fellow students staged a large, quite orderly demonstration. A German car deliberately drove into the crowd. Thereupon the students’ discipline broke. They overturned the car and scuffling began. K. H. Frank’s chauffeur managed to get himself bruised. Neurath and Frank flew to

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Berlin with the chauffeur on 16 November to show Hitler the bruises, and an immediate display of frightfulness was decided upon. Special SS units were ordered to Prague on the same night and the students of the Czech University were arrested as a body. Those who were considered to have been leaders were executed and many others were terribly maltreated on the spot or sent to Buchenwald concentration camp. The Czech University of Prague and all other Czech universities—including some technical High Schools—in the Protectorate were closed for three years (they remained closed in fact until the liberation). This was the end of higher educational possibilities for the Czechs; students and even professors were fortunate if they could find some manual occupation near their homes rather than in a factory or concentration camp in the Reich. Gradually many secondary and even elementary schools were suppressed or germanized, and in the second half of the Protectorate period it was as likely that a Czech child who was more than ten years old would be impressed into a factory as that it would be able to attend any school at all.1

Thus by the end of 1939 the Germans were well on the way to the achievement of Solution (3) and to the elimination of a Czech intellectual class. On 11 July 1939 they had declared that both the German and Czech languages were ‘official’, and that German was always to appear first. According to Article II of the Decree of 16 March 1939 the German inhabitants of the Protectorate became Staatsangehörige and Reichsbürger, while the Czechs were nothing but German Staatsangehörige, subjects rather than citizens in their own homes. British air-raids soon helped to encourage Reich Germans to take up jobs in the Protectorate, where they enjoyed what are usually regarded as extraterritorial legal rights.2 It was Prague above all which became visibly germanized. If one recalls the gradual emergence in the capital after 18613 of the Czech majority which had not previously asserted its nationality, the bitterness felt over this prostitution of ‘golden and Slavonic Prague’ can easily be grasped; it was all the greater since the new Rector of the German University—the only one, now, since the Czech University had been suppressed—was Rudolf Jung, one of the Nazis whose published works had abused the Czechs in savagely primitive fashion. In view of its history Prague was probably easier to germanize than any other non-German town, and this gagged Czech resistance in a particular way.

As for the rest of Solution (3), Article IX of the Decree of 16 March 1939, by which the Protectorate was to become part of the Reich Customs

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1 See Czechoslovakia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Four Fighting Years* (London, Hutchinson for the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1943), p. 85. [This will be referred to hereafter as *Four Fighting Years.*] Only the cleverer children were kept at school, presumably because it was hoped to assimilate them.


area, was at last implemented, after the poor harvest of 1940, in October of that year, and the Arbeitseinsatz (transfer of workers to Germany) was duly accelerated. Between 1939 and 1941 about 150,000 skilled Czech workmen were sent to Germany for a start.  

To the Czechs themselves the Legion of the First World War and the Sokol\(^2\) organization were as essential as the universities, sinews of their national life. The Legion was technically abolished by the Germans in August 1939, but it was not until the beginning of 1941 that its members were dismissed on a large scale from the administration. The Sokols were suppressed during the course of 1941, being finally destroyed by Heydrich on 12 October.\(^3\) There was spasmodic friction between the office of the Protector and the Eliáš Government over issues such as these; the Czech Government offered its resignation several times, but was kept in office until the autumn of 1941.

Meanwhile the tension in the Protectorate was sensibly heightened when Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941. Both Pan-Slav traditions and Communist sympathies had already been stimulated by the experience of Munich. War in the east seemed more real than the German air and naval war with Britain, and the operations it involved gave practical scope for sabotage. Indeed so ‘unsolved’ did Hitler feel the Czech question to be (i.e. so persistent the existence of the Czechs), that in September 1941 he ‘granted’ Neurath indefinite sick-leave and sent to Prague as Deputy-Protector a semi-cultivated sadist who was also probably the most intelligent of the SS leaders, Reinhard Heydrich. On 28 September 1941, St. Wenceslas’s Day, Heydrich declared a state of emergency\(^4\) in all important regions of the Protectorate with a curfew at 10 p.m., and established new summary courts\(^5\) and nothing less than a Reign of Terror. In the following two months the new courts under German Gestapo presidents pronounced 394 death sentences and handed over 1,134 victims to the Gestapo for the terrible purpose of ‘further investigation’.\(^6\) Intellectuals and former army officers, Legionaries and Sokol people were prominent among the victims. At the outset the Prime Minister had been arrested as a ‘traitor’ with

\(^1\) *Four Fighting Years*, p. 63.

\(^2\) The Czech Sokol Movement, originally a gymnastic association, developed into a prominent and powerful nationalistic organization which, from its inception, assumed wider functions than that of physical training (see Edgar P. Young: *Czechoslovakia, Keystone of Peace and Democracy* (London, Gollancz, 1938), p. 192).

\(^3\) *New Tag* (Prague), 12 October 1941.

\(^4\) Ibid. 29 September 1941.

\(^5\) Since the establishment of the Protectorate German military courts had existed there, and any case in which even one German was concerned could be switched to a German court where only German was used; the legal and linguistic disadvantages for the Czechs are obvious, for German could be used in a Czech court but no use of Czech was allowed in a German court. German law had been introduced for dealing with treason and all political crimes (see Lymkin: *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, pp. 317-8 and U.S. Manual 356-21, pp. 53 seqq.)

\(^6\) See *Four Fighting Years*, p. 123, and also above, p. 144, note 3.
London contacts\(^1\) and handed over to a panel of the German People's Court presided over by Thierack himself,\(^2\) and on 1 October his death sentence was announced, though it was not carried out until the following year. His former Minister of Justice, Krejčí, succeeded him as Premier after a short interval.

In January 1942 Krejčí formed a second Cabinet which brought two significant innovations. A Reich German, Dr. Walter Bertsch, who had so far officiated in the Protector's Office, became Minister of Labour, a key post which controlled industrial labour within the Protectorate, but would obviously concern itself with feeding the labour needs of Germany proper. On 8 March he announced Hitler's decision that the economy of the Protectorate must be adapted to the war necessities of the Reich, and exploited for this purpose. Further, the most important Czech quisling, Colonel Emanuel Moravec, became Minister of Education.\(^3\) In the old days Moravec had been the mouthpiece of the Czechoslovak army, the man who had appealed to the Western Powers to appreciate the strategic value of Czechoslovakia against a rearming Germany while there was yet time. But the Western Powers had turned a deaf ear, and from the time of the Munich Agreement Moravec had sharply reversed his policy; in the new situation he held that there was nothing for the Czechs to do but identify their cause with that of Germany. His opinions were, of course, blazoned abroad by the Nazi-controlled press. When he was rewarded with the control of education he threw himself into the nazification of the school-teaching which still remained and the persecution of all those intellectuals who, unlike Colonel Moravec, had failed to recognize their German saviour in Berlin. The process of incorporating the Protectorate as an—inferior—part of Großdeutschland was speeded up under Heydrich—indeed pretences to the contrary were virtually dropped. This became particularly clear with Hitler's decree of 7 May 1942,\(^4\) ostensibly intended to 'simplify' the administration of Bohemia–Moravia; with effect from 15 June all local and police authorities were to administer the Protectorate as the Reichsauftragsverwaltung (RAV: Reich Administration Commission) on behalf of the Reich. The number of German Oberlandräte was now reduced to seven.\(^5\)

By this time the Schwejk tradition of passively playing the fool\(^b\) and

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\(^1\) Some such contacts vaguely existed, but Eliáš was not trusted by the Czechs in London. Havelka, too, was arrested at this time (30 September 1941) and so ended his political career.

\(^2\) Reich Minister of Justice.

\(^3\) Officially called 'Public Enlightenment'.


\(^b\) Already in July 1939 the Sudeten German Professor Pfitzner, who had been made vice-mayor of Prague, had complained that the Czech phrase for 'I do not understand' could not remain the sole means of communication between Germans and Czechs.
waiting had been changed into something considerably more positive, thanks also to the activities of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile. Dr. Beneš had returned to London from a five-months’ visit to the United States on 18 July 1939. When war broke out in September he insisted to the British, French, and Polish Governments that Czechoslovakia had been at war with Germany since 15 March 1939. On 6 October he went to Paris where the former Czechoslovak Minister, the Slovak Osuský, who had not resigned on 15 March, claimed to be in command of all the Czechs and Slovaks. Osuský had always resented the leadership of Beneš and there was a deadlock between them until Mgr. Šramek, more recently arrived from Prague, was able to induce Osuský to come to terms with Beneš. A Czechoslovak National Committee, which included all three of them, was formed, and was able to organize a Czechoslovak military unit which the French Government incorporated in the French army.1 After the collapse of France the Czechoslovak troops escaped to Britain, where their main body landed on 14 July 1940. A week later the Czech political leaders were officially recognized by the British Government as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government in London.2 On 23 July Beneš resumed the Presidency and appointed Šramek as Premier, with Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), Slavík (Interior), Outrata (Finance), Ingr (Defence), Feierabend and the recalcitrant Osuský (Ministers of State) as his Cabinet colleagues. This Provisional Government was of a vaguely Left-centre complexion; it contained neither Agrarians nor Slovak Clericals, nor Communists. The President also nominated a State Council of forty3—later increased to fifty—members, representing a fair diversity of views. On 25 October the Czech authorities signed a military agreement with Britain providing for the organization and employment of the Czechoslovak armed forces under British command.

It was not until a month after the German attack upon Russia, that is on 18 July 1941,4 that full British recognition was accorded to President Beneš as the head of a state: full Soviet recognition was accorded on the same day,5 and on 10 August it was announced that in conformity with the Soviet-Czech agreement of 18 July a Czechoslovak brigade was forming in Russia to balance the Czechoslovak armed forces established or forming in Britain. It is certain that a considerable proportion of the population

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2 Ibid. p. 231, III and p. 312 respectively.
3 This was formally opened on 11 December 1940.
4 Czechoslovak Year Book of International Law, p. 184.
5 Ibid. p. 236; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 315. Fierlinger, the former Czechoslovak Minister to the U.S.S.R., returned to Moscow. United States recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee as a provisional Government was declared on 30 July 1941 (Department of State Bulletin, 2 August 1941, p. 88; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 316), but full recognition did not follow until 26 October 1942 (see below, p. 594).
at home now risked capital punishment in order to listen in to the Russian wireless and more particularly to the B.B.C.—a large enough proportion, at all events, to keep the Czech public fairly well informed. Heydrich’s performance created a new and active indignation;¹ far from sabotage ceasing,² there was evidence of its increase, especially in the Kladno coal-mines in the spring of 1942. As elsewhere in Europe the Communists were well organized and their clandestine press functioned relatively well.

On the morning of 27 May, as Heydrich was driving through the suburb of Liben (Prague) to his office, a bomb was thrown which mortally wounded him; he died on 4 June. This was one of the great events in the resistance of Europe to Hitler. It was the first time that a prominent Nazi leader had been killed, and withal a specially protected SS chief. Indeed Heydrich may be regarded as the brains of the SS and his loss as irreparable from Hitler’s point of view.³ It appears that the subsequent Gestapo account of the incident was more or less true, i.e. that the coup had been planned by the Czechs in London and was carried out by parachutists—one Czech and one Slovak—from the Czechoslovak army in Britain who were dropped by the R.A.F. Their task accomplished, they were hidden and fed by the Orthodox priests of the Church of St. Charles Borromeo, where it seems that the Germans caught them and killed them, together with some of their protectors, in the church on 18 June.

The immediate result, within the Protectorate, of the attack upon Heydrich was a still more monstrous wave of terror. On the same day K. H. Frank proclaimed a fresh state of emergency, and Daluuge was rushed from Berlin to take Heydrich’s place. Between 28 May and 3 July 1,288 Czechs were executed more or less indiscriminately;⁴ the wretched Elias was one of the victims, for he was executed on 19 June. Sometimes whole families were shot without very much reason, and the entire male population of two villages was very brutally exterminated; on 10 June this happened at Lidice, a mining village near Kladno, and ten days later at a tiny place called Lezaky near Chrudim in the other direction from Prague; in each case the women were sent to concentration camps and the children disappeared.

It was soon after the news of the fate of Lidice and Lezaky that on 5 August 194² the British Government at last felt able to convey a formal

¹ In January 1942 Heydrich lifted the state of emergency which he had declared on 28 September 1941.
² Czech patriots were impeded by their difficulties in obtaining explosives, according to Czechs reporting to the Czechoslovak Minister in Switzerland in 1942.
³ Heydrich had already been nominated Gestapo Chief for all Occupied Europe.
⁴ Pretexts were found such as ordering everyone to be in possession of an identity card at impossibly short notice. Jan Stransky claims that ‘over 10,000 Czechs had to die in reprisal’ after Heydrich’s death (see East Wind over Prague (London, Hollis and Carter, 1950), p. 43).
⁵ Great Britain, Foreign Office: Exchange of Notes between . . . the United Kingdom and the . . . Czechoslovak Republic concerning the Policy of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to Czecho-
repudiation of the Munich Agreement to Beneš and Jan Masaryk. In June, when Molotov visited London, he had formally stated to Beneš (on 9 June) that the 'Soviet Government . . . takes its stand on the pre-Munich Czechoslovak frontiers', 1 which the Czechs not unnaturally took to mean that Carpatho-Ruthenia would return to their state. At last on 26 October the United States Government granted full recognition to the Czechoslovak Government. 2

The German failure at Stalingrad early in February 1943 marked the turning-point in the war, for all Eastern Europe at any rate. Already in November 1942 some 70,000 young Czechs had been mobilized for labour in the Reich, 3 and on 2 February 1943 all men between 16 and 65 and women between 17 and 45, together with some categories of schoolchildren under 16, were called up for war work in the Reich. Even the cry for total mobilization throughout Axis Europe did not seem seriously to affect the Germans in the Protectorate, and the Czechs were reminded of their old fears of total expulsion from Bohemia and Moravia. Life became bleaker than ever in Prague and the other Czech cities as food supplies dwindled, 4 at any rate for Czechs. On 16 February 1942, after the introduction of the usual Reich measures against Jews, Heydrich had condemned all Jews in the Protectorate to be shut into ghettos. The old fortress town of Terešín (Theresienstadt) was made into a Jewish camp to which the Czech Jews were sent to await, in painful but not yet horrifying circumstances, their further transportation to the gas chambers of Oświęcim (Auschwitz). Meanwhile more and more people, both Czechs and Jews, lived in hiding—illegally, without ration-cards—to avoid exile and death.

In August 1943 it was announced that Frick, who had been deposed from the Reich Ministry of the Interior by Himmler, would succeed Neurath as Reichsprotektor, and this took place on 14 October. The office was now admitted to be little more than a sinecure, and Karl Hermann Frank's authority was at last fully recognized; on 20 August he became a Reich Minister and Minister of State in charge of the Ministry for Bohemia–Moravia which took the place of the former Office of the Reichsprotektor. 5

1 The Times, 10 August 1942; Documents (R.I.I.A.), cit. p. 317.
2 Dr. Beneš paid a prolonged visit to the U.S. and also to Canada in May and June 1943. It was only on 29 September 1942 that the Free French authorities finally repudiated the Munich Agreement and the old Franco-Czechoslovak friendship was felt to be restored (France, 30 September 1942). For more detailed accounts of the relations between the Czechoslovak Government in Exile with their allies see Eduard Táborský: The Czechoslovak Cause (London, Witherby, for the Czechoslovak Branch of the International Law Association, 1944), and Sir R. Bruce Lockhart in the Slavonic Review, January 1950.
3 Four Fighting Years, p. 63.
4 A report from a Czech who escaped from Prague in the summer of 1942 referred to the compulsory filling of shop-windows with wooden sausages and sham sweets.
5 'The Prague wireless declared Frank 'to be in charge of Government affairs connected with the safeguarding of the interests of the Reich, under his own responsibility'.
During 1943 Beneš began to take the offensive in his broadcasts from London, and each time that he announced (a little previously) the imminent fall of the Prague authorities, they reacted fiercely. As far as it is possible to judge, Beneš’s national popularity was not only restored by now, but he had become the national figurehead par excellence. (Jan Masaryk, who was never really popular before the war, now began, thanks to his brilliant broadcasts, to take the second place, whereas the Czech Communists in Moscow counted for little—only the Yugoslav Tito was a favourite hero among young Czech people.) In another way the importance of Beneš expanded during the year. Because the outcome of the battle of Stalingrad meant that Germany would be beaten, it also meant that the interests of the English-speaking Powers and of the Russians ceased to correspond, and the short-lived truce between the Russians and the Polish Government in Exile broke down.¹ The Government most likely to be able to avert or postpone a breach between the Soviet and the Western World, was—thanks to the Russophile tradition which the Czechs combined with their Western affiliations—that of Beneš. His earlier negotiations for closer post-war collaboration with the Poles had always been difficult; with Sikorski’s death on 4 July 1943 they became impossible.² For some time the idea of a Czech-Polish rapprochement had been neglected in favour of wider aims; all this year, indeed, Beneš prepared himself for a visit to Moscow. There were British objections until after the three-Power Moscow Conference in October,³ and at last on 11 December Beneš arrived in the Russian capital. There the Czech Communist leaders, such as Gottwald, were not very friendly; they reproached the President because he had not defied the Western World and fallen back upon Soviet support in 1938, instead of being jockeyed into the surrender of Munich.

For the future, however, it seemed possible to envisage a modus vivendi, both national and international, the more since Beneš was convinced that it would be desirable in liberated Czechoslovakia to nationalize a major portion of the country’s economic life. On 12 December a Czechoslovak-

¹ See Survey for 1939-46: America, Britain, and Russia, p. 318.
² General Sikorski was one of the very few Polish leaders who genuinely desired Polish-Czech co-operation; when he became the head of the exiled Polish Government the hope of such a thing became solid and negotiations were begun. On 11 November 1940 (Czechoslovak Year Book of International Law, pp. 235-6; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 314) a joint Czechoslovak-Polish declaration was issued in London pledging both Governments to end ‘once and for all the period of past recriminations and disputes’, and after the war to enter into ‘a closer political and economic association’. Later even a Czechoslovak-Polish federation, as the basis for a larger Eastern federation, was discussed, but the Teschen question remained stubbornly in the way. In April 1913 the Katyn affair (see above, p. 1655) brought a diplomatic breach between the U.S.S.R. and Poland, and on 18 May the Czechoslovaks reminded the Poles of their dissatisfaction over the fact that Poland had never declared war upon Hungary (The Times, 19 May, New York Times, 20 May 1943). By the time of Sikorski’s death the Czechoslovak-Polish situation was profoundly unsatisfactory.
Soviet Treaty of Alliance was signed for twenty years; it provided for mutual assistance in the current war against Germany and in any future war against the same enemy. The two signatories promised to broaden their economic relationship and not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

During the early months of 1944 the Soviet armies pushed their way slowly towards the Carpathians. Accordingly on 13 March the Czechoslovak Government in London called upon their people—particularly those in Slovakia and Ruthenia, where conditions were more favourable—to ‘go over from individual exploits to organized mass actions. Form fighting detachments. Set up national committees. Form armed groups and guerrilla bands. . . .’ The Government will do all in order that you may have arms enough for defence and attack.’ On 17 March Beneš declared that the new Republic would be a national state (without privileges for minorities). On 8 April the Russians, together with General Svoboda’s Czechoslovak army, reached the frontiers of Ruthenia, that is, of the former Czechoslovak Republic. A month later, on 8 May, a Czechoslovak-Russian agreement was signed with regard to liberated territory: supreme authority in the zone of military operations was to rest with the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, aided by a delegate of the Czechoslovak Government who would create and direct administration in territories cleared of the enemy; as soon as any area ceased to be a zone of direct war operations the Czechoslovak Government were to take over its administration entirely.

Immediately after the liberating armies had reached the Ruthenian frontier the Czechoslovak Government in Exile urged their people at home to set up National Committees of proven patriots to stimulate resistance and to take over the responsibility for any internal area which might be liberated. But there was next to no open revolt in Bohemia or Moravia until May 1945; the German apparatus was too tightly clamped down, and the towns, in particular the capital, too successfully germanized. As the summer passed men slipped across the frontiers to join the Slovak Partisans or to try their luck at any kind of anti-German fighting in Ruthenia.

The Slovak rising at the beginning of August 1944 naturally aroused keen excitement in the Protectorate until it peters out at the end of October 1944. The Soviet armies with their Czechoslovak contingents entered Slovakia two days later, and there was little to be done but wait for

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4 In the summer of 1944 a few Partisan groups began to appear in the Moravian hills: see H. Seton-Watson: *The East European Revolution*, p. 149.

5 See below, p. 603.
the end. A national committee, such as had been created in all important
European centres as national hopes were reborn, was constituted in Prague
just before Christmas 1944. The Czechoslovak Provisional Government
left London in March to establish themselves temporarily in Košice in
Slovakia at the beginning of April 1945. But it was not until the end of
the war had come that the Czechs were finally liberated. Hitler and Musso-
lini were dead and Dönitz on the point of unconditional surrender when
on 4 May the population of Prague began to demonstrate. On 5 May the
Czech patriots, directed by Professor Pražák of the National Committee
and General Kutlvašr,¹ seized the broadcasting station, and in the night
barricades began to go up. The Germans had tanks and planes, and the
SS with their headquarters in the Czernin Palace (the old and present
Foreign Ministry) in Prague meant to hold out somehow in spite of the
German surrender at Flensburg on 7 May. Although the German com-
mander, General Toussaint, capitulated at 4 p.m. on 8 May SS planes
continued to bomb the defenceless city, while German tank reinforce-
ments arrived from Melník and elsewhere. For several days the situation seemed
desperate; the broadcasting station appealed to the world for help but none
came, except for the revolt of some Vlasov troops against the Germans.
Pro-Western elements in Czechoslovakia afterwards lamented the interval
during which the American army in the Böhmerwald and Plzeň honoured
the Western Powers' understanding with the U.S.S.R. by marking time
and waiting until Marshal Koniev and his troops reached Prague on
11 May.² On 14 May Hácha, Krejči,³ Gajda, and other collaborators
were arrested by the Czechs; Moravec and Henlemb were able to commit
suicide, and K. H. Frank surrendered to the Americans. On 16 May
President Beneš, who had been established in Košice since 3 April,
returned to a battered but enthusiastic Prague.

(b) Slovakia, March 1939 to March 1945

While the Czechs in Nazi eyes belonged to a sub-human category
destined to dismemberment, if not to annihilation, and while the Pro-
tectorate from at least September 1941 was treated accordingly, the
Slovaks were singled out for the Führer's favours. Slovakia, indeed, was
intended to provide the shining example of the reward meted out to those
who resigned themselves not ungracefully to Hitler's will. By the treaty
of 23 March 1939⁴ Slovakia was reduced in practice to complete depen-

¹ General Kutlvašr was arrested in December 1948 and sentenced (for 'plotting against the
Government') to imprisonment for life on 16 May 1949 (see Dana Adams Schmidt: Anatomy
² Russian troops began to arrive on 9 May. See Survey for 1939-46: America, Britain, and Russia,
pp. 572-3; also Stransky: East Wind over Prague, pp. 110-13.
³ He had actually resigned the premiership on 18 January 1945.
⁴ Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939 part II, p. 607; Documents (R.I.A.) 1939-46, i. 83-84. See also Survey
for 1938, iii. 274-8. It should, perhaps, be noted that the Reich and Slovakia had no common
idence on Germany, but the Germans kept within the military zones with which the treaty had provided them, allowing the Slovaks considerable autonomy in the rest of the country for over five years. Slovak indignation after the first Vienna Award in 1938 and after the military clashes with the Magyars, who had occupied Ruthenia, in March 1939,1 was directed against Hungary, and for this reason the Slovaks took some satisfaction in the protection of a Germany whom Hungary could not in the long run resist.

It was now a question of whether Slovakia was to be administered in the clerical tradition of Hlinka’s old party by Hlinka’s successor, Father Tiso,2 or in out-and-out Nazi fashion by the Magyarone Tuka3 and the Hlinka Guard leader, Sano Mach. Throughout the life-time of the first Czechoslovak Republic the Hlinka Party had been the largest single party in Slovakia, though it was never supported by more than 40 per cent. of the Slovak population until 1937 at the earliest, when German and Magyar propaganda was producing a change. The German attack upon the Poles, towards whom the Slovaks (unlike the Czechs) had always felt very friendly, did nothing to make the Slovaks more sympathetic to the Nazis. They were forced to declare war on Poland, but their sentiments became all the more anti-Tuka. In October 1939 Tiso was elected President of Slovakia and the Hlinka Party was reaffirmed as the only permitted Slovak political grouping. The German and Magyar minorities were also allowed ‘party’ organization.4 Karmasin, the leader of the Germans in Slovakia5 and State Secretary since October 1938, enjoyed particular prestige, and his German State Secretariat was autonomous within the Slovak state at the expense of the authority of the Slovak Government. (In mixed districts Slovak and German authorities collaborated.) Tuka now became Prime Minister, Mach Minister of Propaganda, and Durčansky6 Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior, but all three were very unpopular. The only Protestant Minister was General Čatloš, Minister of Defence. The Socialists had never been strong in Slovakia, but the Communists had some following;7 besides the ‘Marxists’, there were Protestant groups in Central Slovakia who had always been pro-Czech, and anti-clericals who had formerly voted for the Czechoslovak Agrarians. There were also a certain number of Czechs and a relatively large group of Slovak Jews. The former, particularly, were hit by the law of 24 April 1939,8 which

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1 Survey for 1938, iii. 252-6.  
2 Ibid. p. 119.  
3 Ibid. p. 122, note 1, 221.  
4 A law was, indeed, made on 15 May 1940 according to which the racial groups might form political parties (see Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 355).  
5 For Karmasin’s antecedents see I.M.T. Nuremberg, iii. 147 seqq. See also Survey for 1938, iii. 83, 122.  
6 Ibid. p. 83.  
7 Their local leaders, Široký and Duris, were in prison during most of the war.  
8 Aimed ostensively against those who had ‘gained wealth through politics’ between 1918 and 1938 (see Lemkin, op. cit. p. 360).
facilitated their expropriation, while the Nuremberg Laws were theoretically applied to the latter from September 1941 onwards.

For several years, there is no doubt, Tiso had the country behind him. 'The average Slovak' had no great objection to Tiso's corporate-state plans (along the same lines as those of Dollfuss in Austria some years earlier), and he believed that Tiso was best able to safeguard Slovak autonomy. All Slovaks were conscribed into the Hlinka Guard. On the other hand, a certain amount of discussion was possible in the National Council, and the Slovak press was allowed to be conspicuously more critical than that of either Reich or Protectorate. Every now and then, and notably at a meeting at Salzburg on 28 July 1940, Hitler rapped Tiso over the knuckles, and with some ministerial adjustment Tuka and Mach would think they had won their game; after the July encounter Tuka replaced Durčanský as Foreign Minister and Mach took his place at the Ministry of the Interior. But it seems to have been clear to Hitler that he could hold Slovakia most securely through Tiso, and he never really insisted upon a thorough-going tyranny in Bratislava. This time it was really a case of the carrot and not the whip. For Hitler took every opportunity to remind the Slovaks of their new allegedly sovereign status: it was emphasized, for instance, when the Slovak leaders were summoned to adhere to the Tripartite Pact on 24 November 1940, and Mach declared that Slovakia had 'appeared in international life for the first time as an equal factor'. Although Hungary was similarly associated with the Tripartite Pact, Slovak foreign policy—following Slovak sentiment—was steadily directed against her. In consequence Slovakia tended to align herself with Hungary's other enemies, Rumania, and—after the spring of 1941—Croatia.

It was in the economic sphere that Slovakia was allowed positively to blossom out during the war years, exactly when every other country in Hitler's Europe—including Germany—was tightening its belt. The Slovaks had always complained that the Czechs had done nothing to develop Slovakia, although strictly speaking the charge was not true. But now it suited the Germans, who directly controlled only the country's war industries, to increase Slovak production in general. They bought as much timber as Slovakia could supply. The Wehrmacht saw to it that roads and bridges were constructed such as the Slovaks had never possessed

1 With remarkable gentleness, as it happened; Dr. Paul Schmidt, the interpreter, comments on Hitler's odd relations with the Slovak priest, who, for his part, told Schmidt that he found it a marvellous antidote to consume large quantities of ham to relieve the nervous strain of a visit to the Berghof (see Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 510). Tuka and Mach accompanied Tiso to Salzburg.

2 See above, pp. 47-48.

3 Gardista (Slovakia), quoted in Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, 25 November 1940.

4 See below, p. 613.
Notably Tripartite for September important transformed German efforts, she (Bratislava), to home. order and the of the with confidential knowledge of 1939-46, May the German-Slovak Protectorate,— and Slovakia and the post-Anschluss Reich. But, in addition to Tiso’s hidden political tussle with Hitler, he had a commercial battle to wage to prevent a larger flow of exports than suited his countrymen. So much tended to go to Germany that Slovakia found herself with a quite unwieldy balance in Berlin, and she had to protect herself against German dumping. Thus so early as May 1940 duties were imposed upon the export of timber to Germany and the Protectorate, and timber-exporting from some areas was forbidden in order that the wood should be kept in the country for industrial use at home. Other restrictions upon export followed in the next few months, and on 15 September the railway freight charges on certain goods destined for the Protectorate were increased by 100 per cent. Despite all Slovakia’s efforts, however, Germany continued to engulf her commercially, still in 1942 accounting for 70 per cent. of her total trade.

As for the Czechs, so for the Slovaks, the German attack upon Russia transformed the situation, particularly since Slovakia provided such important roads and railways to the eastern front. It was no longer possible to keep unimpaired the atmosphere of a peaceful paradise, although the German army and SS contrived to remain remarkably unobtrusive until September 1944. As a recognized supporter of the New Order and the Tripartite Pact, Slovakia was immediately obliged to send a military

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1 Notably the Autobahn from Bratislava to Michalovce.
2 According to a report from Switzerland in June 1943. Cf. also Slovdk, quoted by Grenzbote (Bratislava), 4 August 1943.
3 The Germans chose to put Slovakia into the same class as Rumania and Croatia in the matter of anti-Semitism (see below, p. 616, note 5) but without justification.
4 Article III, para. 3. See I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxi. 121-3 (2793-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, i. 84-96; cf. N.C.A. v. 427-8.
5 Grenzbote (Bratislava), 22 May 1940.
6 Neue Tag (Prague), 12 September 1940.
7 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 September 1942.
Partitioned Czechoslovakia

Contingent to fight against the Soviet Union and to systematize supplies of Slovak labour for Germany. In March 1942 labour service, it was announced, was to be reorganized along German lines. In the following month it was stated that nearly half the able-bodied Slovaks were serving either as soldiers in Russia or as workers in the Reich: a year later it was estimated that each of these categories embraced about 120,000 men. The Slovak army, which was stationed in the Ukraine, was notoriously slack and unenthusiastic, and Communist propaganda seems to have made headway among its units except for the Volksdeutsche. In January 1943 it was at last found necessary to reorganize the Slovak army and distribute its Volksdeutsche so as to stiffen it. As time went on official complaints increased about the lack of pro-German enthusiasm, even among the Volksdeutsche. The Slovaks themselves were further alienated from their leaders by finding themselves at war with the United States with her relatively high proportion of Slovak citizens.

The turning-point came with Stalingrad. From this time Slovak sentiment turned fairly definitely against Germany, and Tiso and his friends began to contemplate the desertion of Hitler when opportunity should allow. Tiso’s friend Sidor, who was Slovak Minister to the Vatican throughout the war, was well informed and undoubtedly kept Tiso au fait with the evolution of outside events. On 8 March 1943 the Slovak bishops drew up a pastoral letter opposed to totalitarianism and anti-Semitism, and this in its turn was made public to the world from the Vatican on 21 June. In April 1943 the Slovak President was summoned to Salzburg, as most of the satellite leaders were at that time, to be reinvigorated by Hitler and to be warned against thinking of peace. On 25 April, two days after this Hitler-Tiso interview, in a broadcast to Czechoslovakia, Dr. Beneš stated that Slovak Government emissaries had already approached him; naturally this assertion was emphatically denied in Bratislava. Slovak feeling was probably never enthusiastically pro-Czech; at this point, while

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1 Cf. Mussolini’s memorandum for his Comando Supremo on 24 July 1941: ‘We cannot be less on the spot than Slovakia...’ (see Wiskemann: Rome-Berlin Axis, p. 285). The U.S.S.R. had recognized independent Slovakia on 16 September 1939; this action was nullified by the Russian Agreement with Beneš on 18 July 1941 (Czechoslovak Year Book of International Law, p. 236; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 315).

2 Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 March 1942. As a matter of fact the frequent repetition of most Slovak Government decrees shows that legislation was often ignored; the same thing used to happen in Habsburg Austria. When Tuka formulated a fourteen-point Nazi programme in January 1941 it seemed to repeat things which had already been decreed, and later orders, e.g. about the Jews, seemed to repeat them again.

3 See statement by the Slovak Minister in Vienna, April 1942, quoted in Bulletin of International News, 9 December 1944, xxi. 1052.

4 Ibid.

5 See, for instance, Karmasin, quoted in Deutsche Stimmen, 1 April 1944.

6 According to a non-Nazi German diplomat who was en poste in Bratislava during the war, Tiso believed in Hitler to the end; other evidence, however, hardly confirms this.

7 See Survey for 1938, iii. 122.
every Slovak wished above all to retain Slovak autonomy, the Right looked to Horthy,\(^1\) while the Centre and Left-centre wanted the re-establishment of some kind of link with the Czechs; indeed, for the next eighteen months Beneš enjoyed an unprecedented popularity among the Slovaks. The Communists in Slovakia were now led by Šmidke and Bacílek, who had been sent from Moscow; they were said to aim at making the country a member of the Soviet Union. In spite of the death penalty, which, like most other rules under Tiso, was not enforced, people listened increasingly to foreign wireless stations and especially to the B.B.C. Though the Pan-Slav tradition in Slovakia survived only among the older generation, a wave of Pan-Slav feeling rippled through the country with the news of Russia’s military successes, especially the Russian counter-offensive in July 1943. For months it had been common talk that the Communist elements in the Slovak army were gaining ground;\(^2\) the Catholics and the new Slovak industrialists felt afraid. According to Šmidke himself, the underground Slovak National Council was constituted in September 1943, but it was Christmas before its Communist and other elements drew up an agreed programme.

When Beneš visited Moscow in December 1943\(^3\) he naturally met Slovak Communists there; his journey served to smooth over his relations with both Czech and Slovak Communists for some years, and the cause of Czecho-Slovak reunion made sensible progress, though Osuský still used his influence on the Slovak National Council in London to oppose Beneš. Soon the Slovak situation was transformed by the German occupation of Hungary, on 19 March 1944, and the arrival of the Soviet army together with Czechoslovak troops on the frontiers of Ruthenia, the eastern province of the former Czechoslovak Republic, on 8 April 1944. Allied bombers based on Italy now menaced the oil refineries of the Bratislava region, and in March the Slovak capital began to be evacuated.\(^4\) From now onwards the régime began to totter. It has been seen\(^5\) that on 13 March the Government in Exile had appealed especially to the Slovaks and Ruthenians to rebel openly. More and more young Slovaks now took to their maquis, the lower mountain ranges leading to the West Beskids and the Tatra. The regular army showed a marked tendency to melt away in the same direction and the Wehrmacht encountered growing sabotage. That a state of emergency existed was admitted by the Slovak authorities in April 1944; on 27 July the National Council decided on the plan of the rising, and open fighting began early in August, at very much the same time as the rising in Warsaw. On 12 August\(^6\) Tiso proclaimed martial

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\(^1\) In spite of the quarrel with Hungary (see below, p. 615).

\(^2\) When Kállay saw Mussolini on 1 April 1943 he complained of both Pan-Slavism and Communism in Slovakia (see below, p. 622).

\(^3\) See above, p. 597.

\(^4\) Only one raid actually took place.

\(^5\) See above, p. 596.

\(^6\) DNB, 12 August 1944.
law and on 24 August total mobilization. In fact, the Slovak Partisans had taken the offensive by the middle of August, and on 26 August Mach admitted in a broadcast that Slovakia was in a state of war temporarily imposed upon it by parachutists and underground forces. The next day the Germans began to occupy the country—they claimed that Tiso had appealed to them for help; thereupon a part of what was left of the official Slovak army joined the Partisans, and on 2 September Tiso dismissed General Čatloš, its Commander-in-Chief. The fighting was serious throughout September, especially all round Banská Bystrica and Žilina. The arrival of the Soviet armies with their Czechoslovak detachments was hoped for by the Slovak Partisans every day, but it is possible that the central crest of the Carpathians proved insurmountable as in the past, and that it was only possible to outflank the mountains via Rumania and low-lying Ruthenia and Hungary; this was bound to waste precious time. It was, of course, suspected that the Russians preferred to monopolize the liberating role. What was also serious was that Osusky, in a letter published in The Times on 14 October, tried to dissociate the Slovak National Council and Partisans from the Czechoslovak Government, although the insurgents’ manifesto (1 September 1944) had declared in favour of a ‘progressive Czechoslovak Republic’. During October several representatives of the Beneš Government visited Banská Bystrica by air, and on 13 October a Slovak delegation from there was in London. At the same time Horthy was trying to negotiate a Hungarian surrender to Russia, for which the Germans deposed him on 16 October. Eleven days later, on 27 October, the Russians were in Úžhorod, but the Germans, by now strongly reinforced by SS élite divisions, simultaneously captured the Slovak Partisan key positions at Zvolen and Banská Bystrica. Only on 29 October did Soviet troops cross the Slovak frontier on any scale, though a Czechoslovak airborne brigade had arrived from Russia in Slovak National Council territory on 6 October.

It was not until the beginning of 1945, however, that the Russians were able to advance far. During January most of Slovakia was cleared, and on 1 February, Nemč, Beneš’s Minister for Liberated Territories, arrived at Košice. On 4 December Beneš had by decree assigned the actual administration to the National Committee of each area, and, notwithstanding Osusky, this had meant full recognition for the Slovak National Council from the Czechoslovak Government, a step which until the revolution of

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1 Tuka fell from office on 5 September 1944 and was replaced by Stefan Tiso, a relative of the President.
2 The battle for the Dukla Pass was fought from 8 September to 6 October with extremely heavy losses. See R. R. Betts on Czechoslovakia in Central and South-East Europe, 1945-8 (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 168.
3 See p. 631 below.
4 For further particulars on the Slovak rising see H. Seton-Watson: The East European Revolution, pp. 146–8.
February 1948 gave the Slovaks the autonomy by which they set such store. In the middle of March 1945 Beneš himself left London, and, travelling via Moscow, where he picked up the leading Czech refugees in the U.S.S.R., established the Czechoslovak Government at Košice on 3 April, one day before the liberation of Bratislava. Thus to all intents and purposes the Slovaks were freed some five weeks earlier than the Czechs.

(v) **Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, 1941–4**

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

(a) **The Three Small Powers and the German Attack on Russia, June to December 1941**

The documents relating to ‘Operation Barbarossa’,¹ Hitler’s attack upon Russia, show Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, like Finland, to have been—at least in his eyes—the merest pawns in Hitler’s game. For the rulers of these countries, however, the war against Russia created a fresh dilemma and national problems which had something in common but yet revealed remarkable local variations.

In some ways King Boris of Bulgaria had the advantage. There was no German minority under his rule to be exploited against him. He was neither intimidated² nor intoxicated by Hitler, and throughout 1941 he was able to insist with both accuracy and success that Bulgar Pan-Slav and Russophile sentiment was so strong that there could be no question of open warfare between Bulgaria and Russia. Apart from Southern Dobruja his troops had already occupied substantial territories in Western Thrace and Yugoslav and Greek Eastern Macedonia without any real fighting;³ if Bulgaria proper was forced to submit to the presence of German troops, Bulgarian soldiers were only asked to police the Balkans and to keep watch upon Turkey.⁴ As the Russian war exhausted German man-power, these Bulgarian duties naturally increased. Meanwhile, although in reality the King’s influence was supreme, Bulgaria retained the forms of political autonomy and even of parliamentary rule. A little criticism was allowed in Parliament and in the press, especially on the part of an independent conservative newspaper, *Mir*. The Bulgarian Jews, who, like those of Serbia, had been generally respected, were relieved of their wealth and

¹ *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxvi. 47–52 (446-PS); see especially p. 48: Vorauichtliche Verbündete und deren Aufgaben, for the original plan dated 18.12.40; also *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxiv. 228 seqq. (039-C) for *Zeitplan Barbarossa* dated 1.6.41; *Fuehrer Conferences, 1940*, pp. 133–5; *Documents (R.I.A.)* for 1939-46, ii: *Hitler’s Europe*, p. 68.


³ Details will be found in the *Survey* for 1939-46: *Initial Triumph of the Axis*.

⁴ See *I.M.T. Nuremberg*, xxxiv. 230 (039-C).
ordered out of Sofia, but were not in general molested until 1943. From
time to time the Germans demanded that measures should be taken
against the Jews, but, whenever serious anti-Semitic action was threatened
by the Gestapo or its Bulgarian agents, groups of Bulgarian deputies
effectually protested to the King. Police action against anti-German
Bulgars was, by Balkan standards and in spite of some Gestapo inter-
ference, not severe, except in the case of Communists, supposed or genuine.
From the time of the German occupation in February 1941 well-known
anti-Germans were interned in the Gonda Voda camp, generally for
several months; the Left-wing Agrarian leader, Nikola Petkov, was released
in June 1941.1 His chief, G. M. Dimitrov, had escaped to Istanbul and
worked with the British in the Middle East throughout the war. On 5
March, very soon after the German army arrived, the British Government
had broken off relations with Bulgaria, and on 10 March the British
Minister had left.2

While there was often news of the 'mopping up' of Russian parachutists
who had landed in Bulgaria, a Russian Minister remained in Sofia without
a break throughout the war.3 What was still more extraordinary was that,
while the Soviet Legation was kept under an almost aggressive surveillance
by the Bulgarian authorities, the Soviet Minister had contacts outside the
clandestine Communist Party. He even occasionally visited non-Commu-
nist anti-German politicians without secrecy, for they only refused to face
the police cordon around his Legation, not the detectives who shadowed
him. There was something of a crisis between Moscow and Sofia in
September 1941. On 10 September Molotov accused Bulgaria of intending
to join Germany;4 on 14 September the Bulgarians mobilized and on
19 September their Government proclaimed martial law. Instead, how-
ever, of going to war with the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria declared a rather hypo-
thesical war against Britain and the United States three months later, on
13 December 1941. It has been seen that the British had broken with
Bulgaria in the previous March; the move against America followed
(Filov, the Prime Minister, announced) from Bulgaria's adherence to the
Tripartite Pact5 renewed at Berlin a fortnight earlier.6 On the latter

1 See M. Padev: Dimitroff Wastes no Bullets (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), pp. 15 seqq.
2 This was the signal for the pro-British Bulgarian Minister in London to resign and to offer
his services to the British. A little earlier the Rumanian Minister had done the same. The Free
Rumanian, Bulgarian, and, later, Hungarian groups which were formed in Britain and the
United States were mostly divided among themselves; they cannot be said to have made a serious
contribution, such as that of the exiled Czechoslovak, Polish, and other Governments, to the
victory of the Allies.

3 The Russian Consulate at Varna was, however, closed.

4 The Times, New York Times, 12 September 1941; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's
Europe, p. 325.

5 Filov referred to Article 3 (Pester Lloyd, 14 December, Manchester Guardian, 15 December
1941).

6 25 November 1941 (Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 540).
occasion a Bulgarian representative had lined up for the first time in the full-length anti-Comintern queue.¹

General Antonescu, the Rumanian Conducator, had won Hitler's approval at his first meeting with him in Berlin on 22 November 1940² and, if we may rely upon his depositions quoted at Nuremberg,³ he had received on the same occasion indications that Russia would be attacked. Ion Antonescu was not a liar and sadist like Hitler, but, while he was probably a sound and competent soldier, he, too, was something of an exalté. Thus he was capable of fervent enthusiasm for a crusade against the Slavs or the Russians, as he admitted later to his Soviet captors when he spoke of 'aggressive intentions'.⁴ He was the only one of Hitler's allies to be informed of Hitler's plans,⁵ and he seems genuinely to have regarded Germany's war against Russia as Rumania's war. At the same time he never failed to insist that Rumania's claims to the whole of Transylvania must be realized in due course. Hitler, regardless of the guarantee⁶ which Germany and Italy had given to Rumania in August 1940 in order to persuade her to accept the concessions to Hungary's territorial demands made in the Second Vienna Award, agreed to anyone's claims upon the future so long as the claimant was useful, and he admired Antonescu's 'fanatical nationalism'. We have the evidence of the German interpreter Paul Schmidt that Hitler seemed favourably impressed by the one man who talked him down, enlarging on the history of Rumania since Dacian days, and who, at that same meeting on 22 November 1940, insisted on complaining to Hitler about the Second Vienna Award although he had been expressly warned not to mention it.⁷

In January 1941 Antonescu visited Hitler again, this time at the Berghof. Here he met Hitler's friend Killinger, the prospective German Minister to Rumania. He also conferred with Keitel and Jodl, and the war against the U.S.S.R. was discussed in more detail;⁸ he was assured that Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia would shortly be his, and this time it was suggested that Rumania might be consoled for the loss of Northern Transylvania with Russian territory beyond the Dniester. When Hitler met Mussolini at the Brenner on 2 June he breathed not a word of

¹ In November 1940 King Boris had successfully evaded the combined anti-Comintern demonstration. Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis. See also above, p. 599.
² Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
³ See I.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 162 seqq. and pp. 364-7. Historians seem to agree in thinking that the Russians did not tamper with documents of this kind; they only made careful selections.
⁴ See ibid. p. 163.
⁵ See above, p. 68.
⁶ Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
⁷ Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 511. Antonescu spoke French, but not German, so that Fuhrer and Conducator communicated with one another only through Dr. Schmidt. The Rumanians, like the Italians, seem never to have brought interpreters of their own when they visited Hitler.
his Barbarossa plan, but exactly ten days later, on 12 June, he received Antonescu at the Führerbau at Munich and recounted nearly every detail to the Conducutor; in addition to Bukovina and Bessarabia Hitler suggested that Rumania should ‘occupy and administer other Soviet territories right up to the Dnieper'. ‘I shall be with you from the first day of course’, exclaimed the delighted Antonescu, ‘you can always count upon Rumania when the Slavs are to be fought.'

The Rumanian people was, perhaps, less delighted than its Leader to find itself at war with the U.S.S.R. on 22 June 1941, but its constitutional rights had been destroyed and its press gleichgeschaltet, and there was little to be done but to obey. All political parties had been forbidden on 15 February 1941, and, although two plebiscites took place in the course of the year, they were little less farcical than those which were sometimes held in the Reich. During the first few months of the war Rumanian public opinion—which meant primarily the views of various groups of politicians in the towns—supported Antonescu's decision, for public feeling was passionately anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Many of the former political leaders still disliked an alliance with Germany, but the opportunity of beating the Russians was something not to be missed; further, the Rumanians persuaded themselves that they were not going to war with the British, who would certainly ‘understand'. Above all they hoped to steal a march on the Hungarians, who did not at first seem likely to become involved. As for the peasant masses, it would be foolish to hazard a guess as to what they felt. There was a handful of Rumanian Communists, nearly all in prison and nearly all Jews. Rumanian anti-Semitism was widespread and helped to reconcile the country to its dependence upon Germany. Although the extreme anti-Jewish legislation of the Goga Government early in 1938 had been modified, the Jews laboured under notable disabilities.

There were, in addition, two strongly pro-German ‘pressure groups' in Rumania, the large and, in Transylvania, prosperous German minority, and the followers of Horia Sima. Though Sima had disappeared to Ger-

1 See above, p. 299.
2 I.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 306-7. Antonescu in captivity told the Russians that he went to Munich in May 1941, but he must have made a slip over the month. Indeed, several errors of this kind are attributed to him in the U.S.S.R. documents.
3 Schmidt, op. cit. pp 537-8. In the OKW directive of 1 June 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiv. 230 (030-G)) it was recorded that the Rumanians had begun a partial, concealed mobilization against Russia.
4 Curentul, directed by the Guardist, Pamfil Seicaru, became the Volksches Beobachter of Rumania while Universul held back in the manner of the Frankfurter Zeitung.
5 On 2 March and on 23 November.
6 Goga himself died soon after relinquishing office, but his widow exerted considerable influence over Antonescu; she frequented the German Legation and was generally regarded as a German agent (Hassell: Von andern Deutschland, 16 April 1942).
7 Details will be found in the Survey for 1939 46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
many after the events of January 1941, he was not without ardent young followers at home even now; it was characteristic, but none the less remarkable, that Hitler harboured Antonescu in Germany throughout the Conducator's reign—in spite of the Führer's admiration for Antonescu he enjoyed the possibility of political blackmail at Antonescu's expense.

At first the Rumanian attack went swimmingly. On 5 July 1941 the liberation of the Bukovina after one year in Russian hands was announced, and by the end of the month Bessarabia was won back and the Rumanian army was at the Dniester.¹ In August the Rumanians crossed the Dniester, thus invading the Russian Ukraine, and on 16 October they captured Odessa; on 18 October the Conducator issued a decree² establishing the Rumanian province of Transnistria containing Odessa. But by now a new and longer and sadder phase was superseding the initial one. Maniu, particularly, but also other National Peasant and some Liberal Party politicians, began to object that Rumania had nothing to seek beyond the Dniester; her soldiers, said Maniu, should rather be sent to Transylvania to keep watch on the Hungarian troops who were now mobilized, since Hungary had, in fact, gone to war with Russia on 27 June. At the victory parade in Bucharest on 8 November, in the presence of Keitel, there were cries of 'Vrem Ardealul!' (We want Transylvania). A month later, to the dismay of many Rumanians, Britain declared war on their country (6 December),³ and on 12 December Antonescu, complying with the request of Hitler and Mussolini after Pearl Harbour, declared war on the United States. On 7 December the Germans had announced the close of their first Russian campaign.

The position and policy of Hungary in 1941 may be distinguished from those of Bulgaria and Rumania in a number of ways. Even more than Bulgaria, Hungary longed to recover all the territory she had ruled before the First World War; revisionist propaganda had created a nostalgic craving for territorial gains which only Germany might be able to satisfy. The Magyar ruling classes shared with those of Rumania a violent hatred both of the Russians and of Communism. These two factors impelled Hungary towards Germany's side in a war against the U.S.S.R. But Hungarian revisionism, even after August 1940, was directed first and foremost against Rumania, and the rulers of Hungary were perpetually

¹ Hitler wrote Antonescu the first of a series of congratulatory letters on 27 July 1941 and awarded him the Iron Cross on 6 August. On 21 August Antonescu promoted himself to the rank of Marshal.
² Giornale d'Italia, 21 October 1941; cf. The Times, 20 October 1941.
³ At the end of November the British had demanded from Finland, Rumania, and Hungary that they call off their war against Russia, and on 6 December the diplomatic correspondent of The Times stated that, since no satisfactory replies had been received, communications were being sent to these three Powers which would result in the existence of a state of war. In response the Rumanian Government insisted in vain that Rumania had been the victim of Russian aggression. In fact the British Minister had left Rumania on 14 February 1941.
torn between the attempt to outbid the Rumanians for Hitler's favour on the one hand, and, on the other, dislike of an alliance with Germany's ally, Rumania. Might it not be better, some Magyars argued, to remain inactive until Rumania had exhausted herself in the Russian war?

An important section of the Hungarian ruling classes, and especially magnates like Bethlen and Teleki (who for years had been losing influence to the more germanophile squirearchy), detested Hitler as an upstart and a revolutionary who disturbed their peasants and workmen and threatened the political independence of their country; Hitler heartily returned their dislike. His agents and allies in Hungary, the German minority there and the various Hungarian Nazi parties, had in fact stirred up great social discontent; the elections at Whitsun 1939 had shown strong pro-Nazi sympathies in the factories of Budapest, and, until they were called up to be sent to the eastern front, the landless peasantry, still numerically a very large factor, were attracted and disturbed by the catch-words of the Nazis. Policy was, of course, made by the magnates and the sires, by their representatives in Parliament and the army, and by Admiral Horthy, the Regent, whom they had chosen many years before. Anti-Semitism played a greater part in Hungary than in Bulgaria, but was less widespread than in Rumania.

While the parliamentary leaders were often cautious and undecided in their resistance to Germany's pressure, the Hungarian General Staff was unequivocally pro-German. The evidence put forward at Nuremberg suggested that the Hungarian Chief of Staff, General Werth, had committed himself as early as August 1940 to following the German lead, and it has been seen that he and his colleagues arranged the Hungarian invasion of Yugoslavia before the Government had decided that it should take place.¹ The Regent, certainly until late in 1941, was overborne by military pressure of various kinds, and by the hope of territorial gains. He was seventy-four by now, and his political judgement, it should perhaps be added, had never been remarkably acute. And at this stage many wiser men than he believed that Germany was 'bound to win'.

When the original Barbarossa Plan was drawn up it made no mention of Hungary;² even in the directive of 1 June 1941 it was only stated that after the middle of June Hungary would be required to allow parts of the German Heeresgruppe Süd on to her territory in order to drive a German wedge between the Hungarian and Rumanian armies.³ Not without a little

¹ Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis. See also N. Horthy: Ein Leben für Ungarn (Bonn, Athenaum-Verlag, 1953). A high proportion of Hungarian generals such as Werth were 'Swabians', that is, either members of or descendants from the German minority in Hungary.

² Although Sweden was mentioned, see I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 49 (446-PS).

³ Ibid. xxxiv. 230 (1939-C).
justification Hitler suspected both Italians and Magyars of gossiping,\(^1\) and it is by no means impossible that he intended all along to claim active military, as well as political and economic, support from Hungary. General Halder, it appears, demanded Magyar co-operation, not only against Yugoslavia, but also against the U.S.S.R., in a letter delivered to Werth late in March 1941. ‘Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he [Werth, in reply to Halder] agreed in principle, promising at least to mobilize the 8th Army Corps (Kressikosice) as well as the mechanized operation units demanded by Halder.’\(^2\) There seems no doubt that the planes which bombed Raho (in Ruthenia) and Kassa (Košice) at noon on 26 June, and whose action supplied Hungary’s excuse for joining in the war, were German planes with Russian markings.\(^3\)

After Teleki’s death at the beginning of April 1941 Horthy had chosen the then Foreign Minister, Bárđossy, to succeed him as Premier. Until recently Bárđossy had been a career diplomat, and the appointment was intended to be non-committal—though his wife was German, the new Prime Minister had never been regarded as germanophile. He was charming and vain, a weak man in a horribly difficult position. History is bound to condemn him—if less harshly than those who condemned him to death—for the manner in which he bowed to Hitler’s will. For he gave way stupidly and obviously to the Germans, at the same time deceiving his colleagues and the Regent. With friendly assurances arriving from Moscow,\(^4\) Bárđossy decided for Hungarian non-belligerence on 23 June; but, when the German Minister protested, he at once agreed to break off relations with the U.S.S.R. On 24 June the Hungarian Cabinet voted against a demand from General Werth for immediate war against Russia, but on 26 June Bárđossy accepted Werth’s request.\(^5\) The Regent was ill; Bárđossy went to see him to obtain his consent to a declaration of war. He deceived him over the allegedly Russian air-raids and deliberately kept from him the messages from Moscow. On the next day, 27 June, he published Hungary’s declaration of war upon the U.S.S.R. without the final consent of the Regent\(^6\)—certainly without his signature—and without consulting Parliament. The fact that in 1941 the Germans were not in

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\(^2\) Evidence of General Ujzaszy, of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, quoted at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 333).

\(^3\) This statement concerning violation of Hungarian territory by Soviet aircraft has been questioned by H. Seton-Watson in The East European Revolution (p. 99), but Admiral Horthy in his book Ein Leben für Ungarn (p. 235) has more recently confirmed it.

\(^4\) Conveyed by the Hungarian Minister in Moscow, Kristoffy. Soviet-Hungarian relations had only recently improved in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.


\(^6\) Or so Horthy afterwards maintained.
The occupation of Hungary, as they were of Bulgaria and Rumania, gave them the opportunity of using the additional threat—which they used effectively until the action was suited to the word—of a German invasion. There seems to be no evidence that this menace was expressed to Bárđossy in June 1941, but the possibility was always at the back of the Hungarian mind.

Thus the Hungarians joined in the German advance, but their rulers were haunted by the feeling that they had no tangible war aims against Russia. Indeed, from the autumn of 1941 onwards their energies were spent largely in trying to bring their troops home. At the end of the year they found themselves, like their Rumanian rivals, at war with Britain and the United States. This fresh predicament followed from the British alliance with the U.S.S.R., but also from Axis solidarity with Japan as demanded by Germany. Less than ten days before Pearl Harbour Hitler had summoned his allies and vassals to Berlin to renew the Anti-Comintern Pact for another five years, and Ribbentrop had exhorted all the visitors to the utmost exertion in the cause of European collaboration (together with Japan) against Russia. As Russian resistance stiffened at Moscow and Rostov the loudly trumpeted German advance was coming to an end, and Ciano described the atmosphere of the Berlin gathering as 'veramente singolare'. Since November 1940 the Bulgars and the Croats had joined the company. The common denominator of anti-Communism, Ciano noted, did not prevent Bárđossy, Tuka, and Mihai Antonescu from 'a cordial campaign of reciprocal denigration' carried on with everyone they met. Bárđossy threw in little hits at the Germans, too, at any rate when he talked with Ciano. This meeting incidentally provided the occasion for the international début of Mihai Antonescu, who was Vice-Premier of Rumania under the Condorator. Ciano thought he had an equivocal air; later he became known as the Ciano of Rumania.

(b) Disillusionment: January 1942 to Stalingrad

The history of Bulgaria during 1942 was relatively uneventful. In the middle of March the Germans considered that Bulgarian opposition to the war against Russia called for reproof, and on 14 March the Agence Anatolie circulated a semi-official statement from Berlin reminding Bul-

1 Bárđossy tried to conciliate the British by proving that Hungary was making no serious effort against Russia.
2 Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 24 November 1941.
3 Slovak Premier and Foreign Minister: see pp. 598-9 above.
4 Ciano: Europa, p. 687; Eng. version, p. 460.
5 Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 24 November 1941.
6 See below, p. 615.
7 Ciano: Diario (1939-43), 24 November 1941. Ciano, like most Italians, despised the Rumanians. This was his only redeeming feature in Horthy's eyes.
8 Cf. the Queen of Rumania to Hassell, 18 April 1942 (Hassell: Von andern Deutschland, 18 April 1942).
garians that 'they cannot expect to keep their territorial acquisitions nor to receive additional awards unless they make a more effective contribution to the war against Russia'. To this Filov replied in the Sobranye on 28 March that, if not openly fighting, 'we are now in a state of war with all its risks and dangers', and early in April he reshuffled his Cabinet; the pro-Nazi sympathies of Gabrovski, the Minister of the Interior, were reinforced by the appointment of Zachariev to the Ministry of Commerce.¹ In May there were rather more political arrests in Bulgaria than usual. The year 1942 is, however, a little grandiloquently named as the year of the foundation of the Fatherland Front. The latter was a rather fluid conception, based simply enough upon increased contacts between anti-German Bulgarian leaders such as the Left-wing Agrarian Nikola Petkov, the Communist Cyril Dramaliev, and Kimon Georgiev of Zveno.² By June 1942 a Social-Democrat, Grigor Chesmedjiev, was associated with the other three, and on 17 July a programme of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front based on these four parties was broadcast from the Soviet-controlled Hristo Botev wireless station. The Zveno people had support in the army, and Petkov had peasant support; until well into 1943, however, the activities of the Fatherland Front seem to have consisted of little but secret meetings between the leaders of the four parties and their friends. There were other oppositional groups who were not in the Front: the Democratic Party led by Mushanov and the Right-wing Agrarians led by Gichev. When public protests were made against government policy, these other parties were quite as much to the fore; being less suspect they carried more weight. But thanks to the veteran Bulgarian Communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, who was in Russia all through the war, Soviet propaganda built up the conception of the Fatherland Front. It is worth noting that when Hassell visited Sofia semi-officially in April 1942 he thought the King's position very strong, but added that 'things are simmering (es brodelt) under the surface'.³

For Hungary 1942 was a year crowded with events. It began with an inauspicious visit from Ribbentrop, who demanded the general mobilization of the country against Russia. This demand was resisted by Horthy, as he was able to tell Ciano very shortly afterwards, on economic grounds, and still more on account of the danger from Rumania.⁴ On 20 January

¹ The King on 13 April 1942 told Hassell that changes in the Cabinet were overdue for economic reasons (see Hassell: Vom andern Deutschland, 13 April 1942). Boris saw Hitler just before this at German Headquarters.
² A group of intellectuals connected with the review Zveno ('Link') who included two members of the Tsankov conspiracy of 1923 and had close relations with the army (see H. Seton-Watson: Eastern Europe, p. 249). See also The Bulgarian Resistance, published by the Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia, 1945). G. M. Dimitrov claimed to have contacted the Communists early in 1941 before he left Bulgaria (see Elisabeth Barker: Truce in the Balkans (London, Percival Marshall, 1948), p. 51).
³ Hassell, op. cit. 13 April 1942.
1942 Keitel arrived in Budapest. Late in 1941 the Regent had been persuaded to replace Werth as Hungarian Chief of Staff with a less germanophile general named Szombathelyi; from him Keitel extracted the promise that the Second Hungarian Army (under General Jány), i.e. one-third of Hungary’s armed forces, should be sent to the eastern front.¹

For the moment the crux of the relations between Budapest and Berlin had become the question of the succession to the Hungarian Regency. The Regent’s health was failing. For some time, it was said, he had harboured quasi-dynastic ambitions.² It was clear that in the case of his death the Hungarian Nazis of the various brands would make a bid for control of the powers of the crown, and that they would be vigorously backed by Berlin. Horthy himself desired an arrangement to ensure the succession of his elder son István, who was undistinguished,³ but certainly unwilling to be Germany’s tool. Since the family had by now acquired prestige, and since it was regarded as a symbol of Magyar autonomy, public opinion favoured István Horthy. Even the Legitimists at this point supported his candidature. Most astonishing of all was that the friends of Hitler in Hungary now suggested a Habsburg as their candidate, for the ex-Archduke Albrecht preferred Hitler to Horthy. On 18 February, however, both Hungarian Chambers chose the Regent’s son to be Vice-Regent of Hungary, and it was implicit in the title that he was to be the next Regent.

This implication was unwelcome to a certain number of people outside the Hungarian-Nazi ranks, and Horthy knew that it was unwelcome to Bárdossy. Altogether, although he did not know until after the war the extent to which Bárdossy had deceived him in June 1941, the Regent felt disappointed with him. On 10 March he appointed Kállay, president of the state irrigation bureau, to succeed Bárdossy as both Premier and Foreign Minister.

Although Kállay had until now played no political part he was a well-known figure in society, a friend of the Regent and of Bethlen. A master of persiflage, no one⁴ could speak of him without a chuckle. It was a clever move to appoint Kállay rather than Bethlen (whom the Nazis hated) to unhitch the Hungarian wagon from the German star, for he had never attacked the Germans in public; at the same time he could pronounce the necessary conventional phrases about Hungarian-German solidarity in such a way as to make it obvious to his countrymen that he intended to pull the German leg. It was some time before the Germans knew what to

¹ Ullein-Reviczky: Guerre allemande, paix russe, pp. 128 9.
² Probably Horthy’s wife and her family were more dynastically ambitious than the Regent himself.
⁴ With the one exception of Ullein-Reviczky, judging by the latter’s book which has been quoted several times.
make of him; gradually it became plain to them that he had certainly put the brake upon their influence within Hungary.¹

When Ciano was in Budapest in January 1942 he was struck with how war-free the city seemed, no black-out, normal traffic, bread as white as before the war (at any rate at the tables he frequented). There was no sign of war strain, either, he added in his note for Mussolini, since the Hungarian war effort had been insignificant—'even the small military force sent to Russia', he observed, 'has taken up winter quarters in comfortable villages in the third line'.²

By the end of the year, however, milk, meat, sugar, and bread were all scarce—the bread ration in this corn-growing country being only 160 grammes a day—thanks to Germany's demands upon Hungarian wheat.³ The Reich Germans in Hungary remained little in evidence, though at certain railway junctions like Szolnok there were barracks which seemed to overflow with German soldiers. The German minority in Hungary was invited by the German Government to enter the German army or SS, but it responded without great enthusiasm.⁴ The Jews of Hungary were to some extent protected by Horthy and Kállay. Many of them lost their jobs, but if they were lucky they remained in the firm to advise their non-Jewish successors. If they were unlucky they were sent to punitive 'labour camps' on the Russian front where they were wantonly exposed to the greatest dangers; a number of them never returned.⁵ In other cases, notably those of Manfred Weiss, the owner of the big arms factory at Csépél outside Budapest, and of Albert Hirsch, a big sugar manufacturer, no change took place.

Meanwhile Hungarian parliamentary life continued; indeed, in the course of the year one might even say that it was to some degree reanimated; it seemed to become easier for anti-Germans, that is members of the Smallholders' or Liberal Parties, to be heard. The Social Democrats and trade unions had a little more air to breathe, although Hitler had certainly demanded their suppression. The press remained cautious, but a few papers, and especially the independent Magyar Nemzet,⁶ were sometimes

¹ On one occasion he remarked in Parliament that he had inherited the state of belligerency with the U.S.S.R., he had not created it.
³ At rare intervals the Germans sent food trains very ostentatiously from the Reich to the satellite countries, but the 'Hitler trains' were received as a popular joke and did not soothe the soreness caused by all that Germany habitually took.
⁴ Pressure from the Reich had brought a recent increase in the privileges of the 'Schwaben' (see above, p. 609, note 1) in Hungary (more schools, &c.); but in spite of the exhortations of the local Nazi leader, Basch, the German minority was not wholly disloyal to the Hungarian state.
⁵ After the pro-Nazi General Bartha left the War Office the Jewish Labour service was organized with a little more humanity.
⁶ Both Magyar Nemzet and the Socialist Népszava were subject to fairly drastic censorship. The former was owned by certain business interests connected with Manfred Weiss; it had a progressive Catholic flavour.
gently critical and avoided all display of hostility towards Britain or the United States.

The reannexation by Hungary of a strip of Southern Slovakia, of Ruthenia, of North Transylvania, and of the formerly Yugoslav Bačka, Prekomurje, and Medjumurje between November 1938 and July 1941 complicated the tasks of the Magyar rulers.1 They nominated deputies to represent these territories in Parliament, but this did less than nothing to prevent the suspicion that an undue proportion of recruits of Slovak, Ruthene, or Rumanian descent was sent to the Russian front.2 Grievances of this kind were accentuated by the privileges of the German minority, while frontier incidents fed the resentment of non-Magyars at finding themselves reannexed to Hungary. The Slovak Government voiced constant indignation, and in December 1941 Pavelić had complained to Ciano, not about the Medjumurje so much as about a recent speech of the Hungarian Primate, Cardinal Serédi, anticipating the restoration of all the lands of St. Stephen.3 Thus the Hungarians found themselves at loggerheads with an Axis-sponsored resurrection of the Little Entente,4 and in May 1942 Rumania, Slovakia, and Croatia publicly proclaimed their anti-Magyar friendship.5 With Rumania in particular Hungary's relations became more explosive than ever in the course of 1942.

The rapid Rumanian advance into Russia in 1941 had been very costly in Rumanian soldiers' lives, and this inflamed Rumanian indignation and aroused anxiety with regard to Hungary, whose military effort had at first been so slight. In February 1942 Marshal Antonescu visited Hitler at his East Prussian Headquarters to express his country's feelings, and again he received encouragement.6 On 19 March 1942 Mihai Antonescu,7 in an address to the Bucharest Faculty of Law, protested against the sufferings of the Rumanians in Hungarian Transylvania. This was of double significance on account of the person and on account of his theme. Mihai Antonescu was relatively young; he was no relation to Ion Antonescu but had supplied valuable legal assistance to the Condacutor and his wife

1 Details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
2 The big majority of Honвед (army) prisoners taken by the Russians were not of Magyar race: naturally the non-Magyars were more willing to surrender.
3 Ciano: Europa, p. 704; Eng. version p. 472. Many national figures at this time made conventional but irritating speeches about the duty of non-Magyars to accept Magyar leadership.
4 As shown, for instance, in a speech by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky (member of the Smallholders' Party) in the Hungarian Parliament on 10 November 1942, in which he referred to the new Little Entente which differed little from the old one except that it was not inspired by France.
5 Bulletin of International News, 30 May 1942, xix. 503.
6 Antonescu arrived in Germany on 10 February 1942 and saw Hitler and Ribbentrop on 11 and 12 February; it appears that Ribbentrop was rewarded for his good wishes for a Great Rumania by the Rumanian Order of Charles I (J.M.T. Nuremberg, vii. 317, 323). On 3 April the Marshal again complained personally to Hitler that Hungarian insinuations about frontier changes after Ribbentrop's visit 'greatly demoralize the Rumanians' (ibid. p. 322).
before the war, and he was now established as the second person in the state. In the past he had guided the Marshal away from the Iron Guard, and in 1942, while still putting his money on Germany, it was he who conveyed Maniu’s messages to Ion Antonescu. Thus when, as Vice-Premier, Mihai Antonescu publicly referred to tension with Hungary great excitement was caused. On 10 May, Rumanian Independence Day, the Marshal himself announced that ‘friends and foes alike must understand that Rumanians will never rest till all the lands of their fathers have been recovered’. Over this, as Hungarian spokesmen sometimes pointed out, Maniu was in perfect accord with Antonescu. The letters of protest which Maniu addressed every month or so to the Conducator, and which were often signed by the Liberal leader, Dinu (Constantin) Bratianu, as well, attacked Antonescu only for the ‘long and continuous haemorrhage’ which Rumania was suffering in Russia.

It is worthy of note that Maniu seems never to have found it opportune to reproach the Conducator with the fate of the Rumanian Jews. As his relations with the Iron Guard deteriorated, Antonescu’s anti-Semitism became less violent. In the early stages of the war, however, he seems to have been willing to follow Hitler’s example; and apart from official action, many outrages took place which may have been beyond his control. By the end of 1942 the deportations and massacres, which had affected the Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina most cruelly, seem virtually to have ended. In the course of the war the number of Jews in Rumania was probably reduced from about 800,000 to about 300,000. It was an additional grievance with Hitler that the Hungarians refused to follow the Rumanian example with regard to the Jews.

By the summer of 1942 it was clear that Kállay could no longer postpone a visit to Hitler, whom Antonescu had already seen twice that year. The tension between Budapest and Bucharest, it was feared in Berlin, might well be exploited by the enemy; it was, indeed, rumoured that the Germans were themselves considering the occupation of Transylvania.

1 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 May 1942. Kállay later told Mussolini that Antonescu had twice approached him with a view to coming to terms over Transylvania; but these advances were barren.

2 This phrase was used in a letter of protest signed by Maniu and D. Bratianu in January 1942 (Sunday Times, 22 March 1942; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939 46, in: Hitler’s Europe, p. 426).  

3 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 183-4 (3319-PS); N.C.A. vi. 34.

4 On 19 September 1942, however, Antonescu issued a decree in Bucharest, condemning to death Jews who had been deported to Transnistria if they returned to ‘this country’ (see Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 567–8).

5 E.g. on 24 September 1942 it is recorded in a German Foreign Ministry document that Bulgaria, Hungary, and Denmark were being exhorted to follow the example of Slovakia, Croatia, and Rumania, the neo-Little Entente, with regard to the Jews (N.C.A. vi. 403 (3688-PS)).

6 See an article from Lisbon by David Walker in The Tablet, 8 April 1942. It appears that on one occasion Göring said to Antonescu: ‘After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about
Kállay reached German Headquarters on 5 June. In spite of his distaste for the grands seigneurs of Hungary, Hitler must have implied to him, exactly as he had in reverse to Antonescu, that the Hungarians were ‘free enough to lick’ the Rumanians once the Russians were dealt with. Rumours to this effect rushed round Budapest as they had after Ribbentrop’s visit, and soon reached Bucharest and Rome; Ciano was even said to have congratulated the Hungarian Minister in Rome on his country’s future victory. Thus the Hitler–Kállay interview had but made matters worse; on 24 July Blücher, the German Minister in Helsinki, reported to Berlin that the Finnish Government had news that Hungary was preparing to attack Rumania, while Rumania, Slovakia, and Croatia were preparing to attack Hungary. A lengthy, confused, and unconvincing refutation of the rumours about Hitler’s conversation with Kállay in June was sent by Ribbentrop to the German Minister in Budapest (Jagow) on 20 July and orders went to Mackensen on 24 July to clear the matter up in Rome.

Since the spring the Hungarian army in Russia had been steadily reinforced. The Vice-Regent joined the Szolnok Fighter Squadron in May and went to the front at the beginning of July. On 20 August, St. Stephen’s day, his plane crashed and he was killed: it was significant that in the cafés of Budapest most people declared that the Germans had deliberately brought about young Horthy’s death. Now the question of the succession was open once again. The Regent was said to favour the nomination of his grandchild of one year old as his successor, but the idea was unwelcome even to Kállay. Young Horthy’s funeral took place on 27 August, and on the day before, when Ciano arrived in Budapest, Kánya suggested to him that the King of Italy should become King of Hungary as well. This suggestion would have infuriated Hitler; almost as much as the idea which was now growing rather more popular in Hungary, that of the restoration of Otto of Habsburg himself. Even some Protestant Magyars with a strongly anti-Habsburg tradition began to regard the Legitimists’ aim as one which might lead to some kind of reconsolidation of Central Europe without subjection to Hitler or to Stalin.

On 15 July Milan Popović, the deputy nominated to represent the Serbs of the Bâkka, raised the question in the Hungarian Parliament of the massacres which had taken place at Novi Sad (Ujdeka) and Zsámblya in the Transylvania, which is actually more German than Rumanian or Hungarian? (J.M. T. Nuremberg, vii. 324).


3 Cf. ibid. pp. 118–25.

4 No representative of Rumania attended the funeral, nor was any message of condolence received from Bucharest.


6 Ciano: Danse (1939 43), 26 August 1942.
previous January. At that time the Yugoslav Partisan movement was beginning to make itself felt. The Hungarian army in occupation was commanded in the main by chauvinist and anti-Semitic officers, and minor clashes\textsuperscript{1} were allowed to result in the fairly indiscriminate destruction of at least 3,000 Serbs and Jews.\textsuperscript{2} The news leaked out\textsuperscript{3} and contributed to the tension between the Magyars and their neighbours on the one hand, and on the other to that between the more Nazi and the more liberal sections of Hungarian society. Kállay answered Popović on 15 July with his usual skill, admitting very little and yet a good deal, and proceedings were inaugurated against the officers responsible. A more immediate, if indirect, consequence of the affair was the replacement of General Bartha at the Hungarian War Office by the anti-German Vilmos Nagy.

In August 1942, the month which had brought the death of young Horthy, the Honvéd suffered great losses on the eastern front. On 19 November, the day of the Russian offensive under Zhukov, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, a member of the Smallholders' Party, who was becoming increasingly prominent, made a fiery speech in the Lower House against the supply of military equipment to Rumania by the Germans while Hungary's factories were supplying the Wehrmacht itself; 'the time has come', he said, 'when Hungary can have no policy but that of defending her own soil'. In the middle of January 1943 the Honvéd suffered a major disaster at Voronezh, and from that time on Hungary's rulers withdrew her troops from the eastern front as fast as the Germans would allow.

It was characteristic of the situation that in November 1942, at about the time of Zsilinszky's protest, Maniu wrote again to Antonescu to object to the sending of another strong Rumanian contingent to the Germans' help. More than once Hitler suggested to Antonescu that one should liquidate one's internal political enemies, but while Maniu and the rest were kept under close police supervision the Conducator refused to treat them worse than that. In December 1942 Hitler added a sting to the tail of his remarks by encouraging a recrudescence of Iron Guard activity; Horia Sima was allowed to escape from Germany, but, in reply to a sharp telegram from the Conducator, he was after all stopped before reaching Rumania. The Allies were advancing from the west and from the east in North Africa, and the Germans were encircled at Stalingrad when the two Antonescus arrived at Hitler's Headquarters on 10 January 1943; it was a week before the Hungarian defeat at Voronezh; the Italians and Rumanians were breaking too. All Hitler's allies complained bitterly that they had been exposed to Zhukov's offensive in November—thanks to the

\textsuperscript{1} Sometimes referred to as a Serb rising.

\textsuperscript{2} This is Ullein-Reviczky's estimate, which is not likely to be exaggerated (\textit{Guerre allemande}, \textit{paix russe}, p. 130). Kállay on 15 July 1942 spoke of 2,259 victims.

\textsuperscript{3} Bajcsy-Zsilinszky even questioned Bárdossy about it in February 1942 (see ibid. p. 130).
Germans—with inferior equipment, while Hitler, of course, reproached the others with 'running away'. On the retreat the Germans displayed more than their usual brutality in saving themselves and their arms and stores; it was towards the end of 1942 that the ordinary Hungarian or Rumanian soldier became thoroughly exasperated by the ruthlessness of his Nazi ally. At about the same time Russian air-raids on Bucharest and Ploesti did no decisive damage, but induced a great desire for peace in the Rumanian civilian population. Such circumstances fortified the growing effect of British broadcasting to South-Eastern Europe at this time.

(c) Defeat: Stalingrad to Surrender (1943–5)

By the end of 1942 the political situation in Hungary had developed into one of unusual interest. Since the war against the U.S.S.R. the menacing question of the landless, or all but landless, peasantry had become constantly more acute. In war time the peasantry of Eastern Europe cash in on their own potential value as the source of food, and governments mostly hasten to promise the satisfaction of their hunger for the land. The reannexation of territories, which had belonged to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia for about twenty years and had enjoyed a greater agrarian equity, stimulated the impulse towards reform. By the beginning of 1942 a peasant leader called Imre Kovács was attracting attention through his paper Szabad Szó. Ferenc Nagy, the Secretary of the Smallholders' Party, became the president of a league founded in September 1941 which called itself the Peasant Alliance; this league and Nagy himself were praised by the Pester Lloyd on 20 June 1942. Few practical steps were taken, however, except that where Jews owned land this was often expropriated in favour of peasants; the Germans were concerned to prevent reforms which were bound to interfere with production.

The anti-German political groupings, the Smallholders, Social Democrats, and a few Liberals and Independents, used the peasant question as part of their armour in their battle against the Nazi Weltanschauung. By Christmas 1942 a vaguely outlined anti-Nazi popular front was seen to

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1 When Hitler threw this reproach at Antonescu, the latter made a vigorous attack on 'die deutsche Führung, also indirekt Hitler selbst' according to Schmidt (Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 549).

2 Hungarian soldiers reported to their authorities that the Germans had not only done this, but had seized arms and transport from their allies, killing those who resisted them without hesitation.

3 In December 1942 the German Minister, Killinger, was quoted by Bucharest gossip as having said: 'The Rumanian peasants don't count, and of the educated classes 60 per cent. are Anglophile, 30 per cent. indifferent and 10 per cent. the sort of rascals who call themselves Nazis in order to do business with us.'

4 See F. Nagy: The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain (New York, Macmillan, 1948), p. 36. Béla Kovács, not to be confused with Imre, became Secretary to the Peasant Alliance.

5 The bill for expropriation of Jewish landowners in favour of peasants was debated on 10 June 1942.
exist, with *Magyar Nemzet* and the Socialist *Népszava* for its press; it was to some extent led by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. It was also supported by writers such as Illyés and P. Veres;¹ they belonged to a small and originally clandestine pro-peasant movement which stood to the left of the Smallholders, and had tentatively emerged just before the war as the National Peasant Party. Together with agrarian reform an enlightened policy towards the non-Magyar minorities was advocated by the anti-Nazi alliance. It was, indeed, something of an oppositional success when sentence was pronounced, strictly in camera, on 22 January 1943 against some of those responsible for the Novi Sad massacre twelve months before.²

During the spring of 1943, in spite of some mutual suspicion, the Socialist and Peasant leaders drew close to one another;³ at about the same time Jagow, the German Minister, spoke with anger of the need to replace Kállay by Imrédy. On 30 April Jáross and Rajniss, two pro-Nazi politicians, attacked the Government on account of the activities of the so-called Popular Front, and Rajniss not only blamed the Jews but also made an obvious thrust at Horthy’s friend and adviser Count Bethlen, who was now known to sympathize with the Popular Front. At the end of the debate, the House being nearly empty, the Government gained only 47 votes (including those of the Socialists) against 38.⁴ Kállay’s trump card in all such debates was that he could always threaten the country’s ‘subversive politicians’, frowning towards the Left in order to soothe the Germans and their friends; but the Left became increasingly sure that such thrusts from him were in fact aimed at the subversive Right.

At the end of January 1943 General Szombathelyi had insisted to the German General Staff that the Hungarians would wish to defend the Carpathians themselves,⁵ and towards the end of April the Hungarian Government succeeded in bringing General Jány and the remainders of his army home from the eastern front. From now on Kállay behaved almost more like the premier of a neutral, than of a belligerent, country. Meanwhile the Hungarian Nazis were preparing a parliamentary attack upon Keresztes-Fischer, the Minister of the Interior, as the defender of the Jews.⁶ Early in May, to cut short all this trouble, Kállay suddenly adjourned Parliament midway through a regular session.⁷ Even Anfuso, the Italian Minister, who later became a Neo-Fascist, reported to Rome that there

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² The Archduke Albrecht subsequently helped the three chief culprits to escape.
⁵ According to a confidential Hungarian News Agency (*M.T.I.*.) report dated 12 February 1943 the Germans suggested to Szombathelyi that their retreat at the time of the Hungarian disaster at Voronezh was deliberate; it was designed to bring the Russians into Poland, since this was sure to split the alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers.
⁶ See below, p. 622, for Horthy’s meetings with Hitler (16–17 April 1943) when the Jewish question was a major issue.
was little support in the country for Imrédy. From early 1943 the sympathies of many soldiers, labourers, and industrial workers inclined towards the U.S.S.R.,¹ certainly until the Russian military occupation. The views of the now recognized opposition were presented to Kállay in a long memorandum drawn up by the Smallholders’ Party and dated 31 July 1943; in time the memorandum received some publicity.

In Rumania and Bulgaria disillusionment with the Axis alliance was, if less eventful, equally obvious in the first half of 1943. Maniu’s letters continued to reach Antonescu: his mode of action was more like that of a battering ram than of a bombardment. In Bulgaria in February a series of political murders began, including that of the germanophile General Lukov (13 February), which suggested the growing strength of underground opposition. About the same time the Government felt obliged to give way to German pressure with regard to the Jews. It was not, however, those Jews who had been sent out of Sofia who were sacrificed, but the Jews to be found in the ‘liberated’ territories of Macedonia and Thrace who were deported for Gestapo liquidation. As the likelihood of an Allied invasion of Europe increased, the situation in Bulgaria became more and more tense; while it was generally agreed that the army would offer no resistance to Russian troops, it was not quite clear that it would not fight the British or Americans.

Though the fate of Stalingrad was not yet sealed, the German-Rumanian conversations on 10 January 1943 marked the beginning of a new phase, a phase during which all Hitler’s allies sought to save themselves from his shipwreck. When Mihai Antonescu returned to Bucharest he told the Italian Minister there that the Marshal and he had been most unfavourably impressed by the German atmosphere.² Hitler seemed obsessed by the Russian war, while Ribbentrop had snapped out that Russia simply must be resisted by force—no political solution was possible—and he was frankly rude about the Italian and Rumanian infantry which had recently broken under Russian attacks. At the end a German communiqué was broadcast saying that Germany’s alliance with the smaller nations was based upon the principle of ‘to each according to his merits after the victory should be won’.³

After Stalingrad (which was a Rumanian as well as a German disaster) all Hitler’s allies despairs of an Axis victory. With the news of Paulus’s surrender came news of the fall of Ciano; Mussolini himself took over the

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¹ There had been a mass trial of Communists, mostly from Transylvania, in January 1943 (Magyar Nemszet, 13 January 1943) and people had often been arrested as Communists before this.
² Schmidt (Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 549-50) suggests that Antonescu was encouraged by his talks with Hitler at the time, but was déja when he returned home and became aware of the hard facts. For Ion Antonescu’s suggestion to Mussolini a few days later that Italy and Rumania should make a joint approach to the Allies see p. 311 above.
³ Despatch from the Italian Minister in Bucharest, Bova Scoppa, to Rome, 15 January 1943.
Palazzo Chigi with Bastianini as Under-Secretary. In the following months Bastianini, Kállay, Mihai Antonescu, and the rest struggled hard to escape from the war through a compromise peace which should include some kind of European Charter with a guarantee of the rights of small nations. At the beginning of April 1943 Kállay paid a long-deferred visit to Mussolini and begged for some clarification of Axis objectives.

Hitler was already obsessed with the fear of an Allied invasion of the Balkans; he decided to devote the month of April to quelling the incipient rebellion among his vassals, guardians of the Balkan routes. He left East Prussia and summoned them one by one to Schloss Klessheim near Salzburg where correction was administered. On 2 April he saw Boris of Bulgaria. On 7–10 April he received Mussolini with Bastianini; the Italians urged him to lose no time in making peace with Russia.

On 12 April Marshal Antonescu arrived at Klessheim. He wanted exactly the opposite, peace with the West and every effort to be made against the U.S.S.R. This time Führer and Conducator had a thoroughly disagreeable meeting. Hitler was fairly well informed about the various peace moves in Ankara, Lisbon, Madrid, and Berne, and roundly scolded his visitor for Mihai Antonescu’s attempts even to arrive at a joint anti-Bolshevik declaration by small Powers and neutrals. The Marshal was not informed about all his Minister’s machinations and found himself in an embarrassing position. Further, Hitler accused the Rumanian Court of being anti-German, and, as he had done before, taunted Antonescu, apropos Maniu, with the remark ‘I killed my political opponents’, to which the Rumanian, it seems, simply replied ‘I did not’.

Four days later Horthy arrived at Klessheim and was received by Hitler with Ribbentrop on 16 and 17 April. After a lecture on the splendid way in which everything was organized in Germany and a lengthy scolding about the necessity of eliminating all the Jews (a demand which Horthy always resisted), the Regent was reproved, as Antonescu had been, for attempts to escape from the sinking ship. He, too, was confronted with decoded telegrams, which in this case, however, merely showed that Kállay had agreed to Turkish suggestions in favour of a future Balkan

1 Wiskemann: Rome-Berlin Axis, pp. 290–1, 294–5. See also above, p. 312.
2 Kállay also told Mussolini that a few days before he had refused a German request for three fresh Hungarian divisions to be sent to occupy a line between Bulgaria and Serbia.
3 Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 551.
4 Through intercepted and deciphered telegrams, according to Bova Scoppa, who seems to have enjoyed Mihai Antonescu’s particular confidence. On 8 April at Klessheim Ribbentrop complained bitterly of Rumanian attempts via Madrid, and Hungarian efforts through Ankara, to make peace.
5 Despatch from Bova Scoppa to Rome, 19 April 1943.
6 These suggestions originated, it appears, with Churchill, and the Turks had pleaded for the inclusion of Hungary. Kállay had informed the Germans, but then disobeyed their request to delay his answer (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxv. 430 (736-D)).
Federation against the U.S.S.R. The Regent, like the Conducator, was somewhat at a loss, but took full responsibility for any action of Kállyay's— he declared with loyalty that he himself had chosen him and felt absolute confidence in the choice. The Germans, according to Schmidt's minute, did not press for the replacement of Kállyay by Imrédy. Before the end of the month Tiso, Pavelić, and Lavall (and for the second time Bastianini) had also been summoned to Klessheim.

To all of them Hitler and Ribbentrop had declared with savage and insistent repetition that there was no political way out, nothing to be done but to fight stubbornly on against the rest of the world. All other attempts, they declared, would be interpreted as weakness, and must therefore be regarded as injurious from the military—the only possible—point of view.

The visitors were one and all unconvinced, but it was the politically agile Mihai Antonescu who seems to have been most active in the next month or so. Like Kállyay and like Mussolini's own Ministers and generals, he pressed particularly in favour of a peace-move from the Duce who, he declared to Bova Scoppa, might now again immortalize himself by a war-time Munich. Far from recovering the glory that was his in 1938 Mussolini was now slipping down the slope of his weakness to his destruction. After pressing for months for an invitation Mihai Antonescu at last managed to pay a visit to the Duce at Rocca delle Caminate on 1 July. But it was unavailing. Nine days later Allied forces landed, not in the Balkans, but in Sicily.

The fall of Mussolini at the end of July 1943 and the Italian armistice on 8 September were perhaps as momentous for Hungary and the Balkan countries as the German failure at Stalingrad. The small states had naturally played off Italy against Germany as far as they could, and Mussolini and Ciano had encouraged them to do so.

Bulgaria was least affected by the change in Italy, which allowed her superficially to strengthen her hold upon Macedonia. But by the time of the Italian armistice the position in Bulgaria had become critical for another reason. On 25 August Boris was again at Hitler's Headquarters and three days later he died a mysterious death at Sofia. Only German doctors were allowed to examine the corpse, and it was generally assumed, even by his pro-German brother Cyril, that his death had been arranged by Hitler after a stormy interview. Boris was succeeded by his son Simeon.

1 Ibid.
2 Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 552.
4 Memorandum of 5 June 1943 drawn up by Bova Scoppa for the Italian Foreign Minister, Bastianini, on conversations with Antonescu.
5 See above, p. 312.
7 Schmidt (op. cit. p. 572) says that Hitler's conversations with Boris were mostly not recorded, so that we may never know what was said on this occasion.
aged six and a half, with a Regency Council consisting of Prince Cyril, Filov, and the former War Minister, Michov. The real ruler was Filov. When a new Cabinet was formed under Bodjilov, it contained neither Gabrovski nor the pro-Nazi Professor Tsankov. Nevertheless, official subservience to Berlin increased and Prince Cyril visited Hitler both in October and November to receive his orders.⁴

The disappearance of Boris from the scene fortified clandestine opposition. On 30 September 1943, soon after an impressive Allied air-raid on Sofia, the central committee of the Fatherland Front decided to circulate news bulletins. During the autumn its members constantly disputed between Petkov's view, that one must wait until the professional army was ready to strike, and that of the Communists who wished to precipitate military action by Partisans;³ the Bulgarian Partisans in the west near the old Yugoslav frontier were probably a negligible quantity until after the end of 1943.

Italian events affected Rumania and Hungary more directly. Maniu hurried to Bucharest early in August 1943 to consult with his friends, and hopes ran high that Badoglio would make peace and that Rumania would be able to drop her own dictator and escape from the war. Both King Michael and his mother had long felt themselves to be kept in something like bondage by the Conducator,⁴ so that the Court, as Hitler knew, was eager to follow the recent example of the House of Savoy. In July Marshal Antonescu had been angered by an imperious demand (via Clodius)⁵ from Hitler for something like the gift of 18,000 million lei to be invested at once in German airfields in Moldavia, the further exploitation of Ploiești, &c. According to Mihai Antonescu, Hitler's request was supported by a fresh threat to the Conducator's position. After lengthy discussions the Romanians agreed to allot 8,700 million lei for the purposes indicated.⁶ Thus the Marshal was already incensed by Hitler when the news came of Mussolini's dismissal. This was followed by intensified oppositional pressure in Bucharest. But Antonescu refused to yield any ground, warning his critics that Hitler, as Clodius had so lately reminded him, was as ready as ever to set up a Guardist régime.

Four days after the announcement of the Italian armistice came the news of the German rescue of the person of Mussolini. The anti-climax was devastating. On 18 September Mussolini broadcast as the Duce of the

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¹ Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, pp. 572, 574.
² Le Procès Nicolas D. Petkov (Sofia, 1947), p. 266.
⁴ See Hassell's interview with Queen Helen on 18 April 1942 (Hassell: Vom andern Deutschland, 18 April 1942); see also Arthur Gould Lee: Crown against Sickle (London, Hutchinson, 1950), chapters III and IV. King Michael was, however, in intermittent contact with Maniu and other members of the Rumanian opposition during the major part of the war.
⁵ Carl Clodius, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937–43.
⁶ Despatch from Bova Scoppa to Rome, 24 July 1943.
new Italian Social Republic, and Hitler insisted upon his recognition in Bucharest, Budapest, and indeed in the capitals of all countries adhering to the Tripartite Pact. Antonescu’s acquiescence spurred Maniu to send him yet another letter dated 30 September 1943. In this the writer first decried Mussolini as a persistent enemy of Rumania and then proceeded to claim that since the Royal Italian Government, which had been accepted as legitimate even by Germany and Japan until 8 September, had made peace, this annulled the Tripartite Pact. ‘La reconnaissance du régime Mussolini a pour but de créer une fiction qui cache la caducité du pacte initial.’ Meanwhile the Rumanian Communists had formed a small ‘Patriotic Union’ which was joined by the ‘Ploughman’s Front’ leader, Dr. Petru Groza; at this stage Maniu rejected its advances.

Mutatis mutandis the Hungarians played on the same theme. Italy had supported Hungarian revisionism since 1927, and it was almost as Italy’s protégé after the second Belvedere Award that Hungary had adhered to the Tripartite Pact. That pact now being invalidated, all but the Hungarian-Nazi press began to hint that Hungary was free. It should not be forgotten that since their offensive was launched in the middle of July the Russians had won a good deal of ground; on 25 September they took Smolensk and soon after that were back along 400 miles of the Dnieper. It was in September 1943 that the evacuation of Budapest began to be organized, both on account of the Russian advance and of the fact that the South Italian air-bases were now in Allied hands. The failure of the Allies to make more of the advantage with which the fall of Mussolini had provided them postponed the hope of peace and, in doing so, re-subjected Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to Hitler’s will—at least on the surface of things.

In December 1943 Beneš’s visit to Moscow was of notable importance to the Danubian world, for the Czechoslovak leader expressly raised the question of Transylvania with Stalin and Molotov. In 1940 Russian policy was fluid and opportunistic with regard to Transylvania. Now, however, when Beneš emphasized Czech solidarity with Rumania and Yugoslavia with regard to Hungary, Molotov insisted that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina must remain in the U.S.S.R., but both the Russians committed themselves in principle to the restoration of Transylvania to Rumania.

Through Gafencu in Switzerland Beneš informed Maniu about the conversation he had had in Moscow; he sent word, also, that Stalin and Molotov looked for more definite anti-German activity in Rumania. Maniu, like Petkov, believed little in clandestine resistance and Partisan

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1 Chicago Daily News, 26 October 1913; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939 46. ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 327.
4 See above, p. 593.
warfare, but aimed at a well-timed political coup when the time should be ripe. He continued his barrage of letters to Antonescu, complaining at Christmas 1943 that the Condutorator's policy was making a hostile Soviet occupation of Rumania inevitable. In reply Antonescu indicated to Maniu that he, the Condutorator, was willing enough to make way for the National Peasant Party leader if Maniu could prove himself able to obtain better terms for Rumania. To this Maniu responded that to do so he must be allowed to make direct contact with the Allies, and finally Antonescu agreed that he should. In agreement with King Michael, Maniu and Dinu Bratianu chose as their envoy to the Allies Prince Barbu Stirbey, who duly arrived at Istanbul on 1 March 1944, expecting to proceed to London; instead he was directed by the British to Cairo where he arrived on 15 March. On 18 March the Russian army reached the Dniester and on 19 March the Germans occupied Hungary: it thus became an even more urgent but also more delicate task to come to terms with the Allies. In reply to Stirbey's insistence upon guarantees with regard to the independence and territorial integrity of Rumania, the Russians early in April repeated what they had already stated to Beneș about Bessarabia and Transylvania; they demanded a Rumanian break with the Germans in order to join hands with the Russians, but not a thorough-going Russian occupation of Rumania.

A second Rumanian envoy named Vișoianu arrived in Cairo on 26 May. He brought news from Maniu that a Patriotic (or national-democratic) bloc, to include Socialists and Communists with the Liberals and Peasant Party, was about to be constituted as a preliminary to a change of front. Maniu regarded this as a great concession, since he did not believe the Marxist parties had anything behind them; their representatives complained that he persisted in snubbing them until the Red Army had crossed the Dniester.

On 10 June Maniu accepted the Allied offer under some pressure. On

1 Letter dated 23 December 1943.
2 On 24 January 1944 Maniu wrote a letter to Beneș about the necessity for Danubian federation in the future; the tone of this letter was that of an active Prime Minister and, indeed, Maniu henceforward behaved as if he were Premier of Rumania.
3 A former Prime Minister aged seventy-four with a British son-in-law.
4 Three days earlier, on 27 February 1944, Antonescu was at Hitler's Headquarters again; it was on this occasion that Hitler asked for advice as to whether he should evacuate the Crimea. The evacuation was not completed until 13 May (Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 574).
5 Heavy Allied bombardments of Bucharest took place on 4, 15, and 21 April 1944.
6 Cf. the statement made by Molotov on 2 April 1944 (The Times, 3 April 1944; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 328). To all this the Western Allies had agreed. And on 5 May it was agreed between Eden and the Soviet Ambassador in London that 'in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and Greek affairs the concern of the United Kingdom' (Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1452, 1457). For the Anglo-Russian agreement on spheres of interest in the Balkans see also the Survey for 1939–46: America, Britain, and Russia, pp. 422–5, 495–7.
7 Barker: Truce in the Balkans, p. 130.
20 June\textsuperscript{1} he submitted his plan for overthrowing Antonescu and changing sides, together with requests for simultaneous Allied military aid in overpowering the German troops in Rumania.

The terms offered by the Russians in April had been offered to Antonescu as well as to Maniu, and the Soviet authorities were not eager to help Maniu to power at Antonescu’s expense. Maniu was notoriously stubborn and he was just as unbending as Antonescu or the Russians themselves over Bessarabia, whose national character was a fairly open question.\textsuperscript{2} Possibly the Kremlin thought an agreement with the Conducator would be of greater military value.\textsuperscript{3} At any rate Stalin continued negotiations with Antonescu through Madame Kollontay, the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm, all through July, and Maniu was left without an answer to his June propositions—after all the exchanges between March and June he and his collaborators felt understandably exasperated.

At last Maniu arranged with the King that regardless of the delay in Cairo the coup d’état should take place on 26 August. On 23 August, however, both the Conducator (back from his final visit to Hitler on 5 August) and Mihai Antonescu visited King Michael, who seized the opportunity to have them arrested and to announce to the world that Rumania had joined the Allies; on 25 August he declared war upon Germany. Thus the Russians, who had just launched a fresh offensive, entered Bucharest on 31 August as friends of one week’s standing. A democratic Rumanian Government was appointed by King Michael; it was presided over by the King’s confidant, General Sanatescu, with Maniu, Bratianu, the Socialist Patrescu, and the Communist Patrașcanu as Vice-Presidents. On 12 September an armistice\textsuperscript{4} was at last signed with the Russians, not in Cairo, but in Moscow.

As an epilogue to the rule of the Conducator it should perhaps be mentioned that immediately, on 24 August, the Rumanian Guardists in Germany were allowed to broadcast against King Michael and his ‘Badoglio clique’: even so late as 13 December an announcement was made from Germany of the reconstruction of the ‘Rumanian National Government’ under Horia Sima.

The Rumanian coup d’état on 23 August 1944 instantly transformed the Bulgarian situation.\textsuperscript{5} The American and British air-raids on Sofia in January—and especially in March—1944 had made a considerable im-

\textsuperscript{1} These dates are given by A. Crețianu, a former Rumanian Foreign Office official. E. Barker (op. cit. p. 131) gives 11 June and 22 June respectively.

\textsuperscript{2} The question of Bessarabia constituted another difficulty between Maniu and the Rumanian Communists (see H. Seton-Watson: The East European Revolution, p. 87).

\textsuperscript{3} Barker, op. cit. p. 132.


\textsuperscript{5} See H. Seton-Watson, op. cit. pp. 89-90.
pression. Since early in the year the Bulgarian Partisans, based upon the Bulgarian Communist Party but now joined by many deserters from the army, had made themselves felt in the hills and the mountains to the west. But they never counted for very much; although their leaders were Communists, their Macedonian susceptibilities made them suspicious of the big Yugoslav Partisan Movement with which they needed to cooperate.  

After 23 August the Russians quickly arrived on the Danube, the northern frontier of Bulgaria. The Regents sent for all the Opposition leaders of whom they could think. As the Fatherland Front avoided the summons a Cabinet of pro-Western moderates was formed on 2 September under the leadership of the Right-wing Agrarian, Muraviev. On 5 September, forestalling a Bulgarian break with Germany, the U.S.S.R. declared war on Bulgaria and invaded the north-east. The Bulgarians were panic-stricken. The Government immediately asked for an armistice and declared war on Germany. The Fatherland Front, however, felt that the revolutionary moment had come; in the night of 8-9 September, through a military coup organized by Velchev, it seized power. "We are saved, but it was only the Fatherland Front that could have saved us", people felt, as they turned out to hail the Red Army as friends and liberators instead of enemies and avengers.  

Since the spring of 1943 a German occupation of Hungary had become not only possible but probable, and by the autumn it seemed to be imminent. The Hungarian soldiers in Russia had been withdrawn behind the front lines to serve only as an occupation force, but they were in retreat anyway. The Hungarian Government wished to have them on the Carpathians or, as Tito's strength grew, on the Yugoslav frontiers, but the Germans always found objections to make. As the Russians advanced in January and February 1944 Kállay began to despair, since he had put all his money on the Anglo-American card. Early in March the Russians reached Rówe and Luck and were approaching the Dniester. Hitler summoned Horthy to Klessheim again and the Regent set out with Ghyczy (Foreign Minister), Csatay (Minister of Defence), and Szombathelyi, Kállay refusing point-blank to join them. When Horthy arrived he was invited to a tête-à-tête with Hitler, who reproached him with Hun-

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1 The Hristo Botev battalion was composed largely of deserters; see Barker, *Macedonia*, p. 80.  
4 Report by the Hungarian press attaché in Berlin who was transferred to a neutral country about 1 October 1943. About the same time Keitel had occasion to remark to the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, Ghyczy, that he could not escape from a burning house.  
5 See Kállay's long letter to Ullein-Reviczky dated 1 March 1944 in Ullein-Reviczky: *Guerre allemande, paix russe*, pp. 140–53. Beneš's visit to Moscow had, of course, weakened Hungary's and Kállay's position, but the letter shows the characteristic anti-Czech bias of the Magyar.
HUNGARY, RUMANIA, AND BULGARIA

Hungarian treachery and declared the necessity of a German occupation of Hungary. Horthy protested indignantly, stalked out of the room, and called for the special train which had brought him. He was not treated quite so shockingly as Hácha five years earlier, but an air-raid was faked and the Regent was informed that he could neither leave Klessheim nor telephone to Budapest. Some hours later Horthy was considered to have given way sufficiently for him to be allowed to return in state, but his train was delayed and he was still telephonically cut off; by the time he arrived home on 19 March the German occupation of Hungary was complete. Kállay took refuge in the Turkish Legation, and on 22 March a new Government was formed under General Dome Sztójay, until now Hungarian Minister in Berlin; the real ruler of Hungary from this time on was a SS figure, Vecsenmayer, a self-constituted expert on South-Eastern Europe who succeeded Jagow as German Minister in Budapest. It was noticed that the new Government contained neither members of the extreme Szállasi group nor members of the German minority. Although Imrédy did not immediately take office, the Cabinet was based on the pro-German section of the Government Party, or M.F.P., and upon the Imrédist.²

The immediate and obvious results of the German occupation were the suppression of all manifestations of the 'Popular Front', the Smallholders' and Socialist Parties, the trade unions and the Peasant Alliance, together with the newspapers which in any way expressed their views. Even the chauvinist Turáni Vadászok (Turanian hunters) were suppressed, since they had been staunchly anti-German as well as anti-everything else. The Gestapo arrested all those well known for their dislike of Hungary's association with and dependence upon Nazi Germany. Prominent figures such as the former Minister of the Interior, Keresztes-Fischer, were at first confined and maltreated in a temporary Gestapo prison in the cellars of the National Bank. Later, concentration camps on the German model were set up, although many of the better-known Hungarian victims were sent to the Austrian concentration camp of Mauthausen. From this time on the Hungarian Jews were condemned, in theory at least, to thorough-going Nazi treatment;¹ some like Hirsch died at Mauthausen and many were sent to be gassed in Poland.

¹ Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 576.
² The most important figures in the new Government were Jáross as Minister of the Interior and Reményi-Schneller as Minster of Finance. General Csatay remained at the Ministry of Defence.
¹ The importance attached by the Nazi leadership to the Jewish question at this time is amply illustrated by the material published in J.A.I.T. Nuremberg, xxxii. 158–93 (3319 PS); N.C.A. vi. 4–38, especially with regard to the Arbeitstagung der Judenreferenten, 3 and 4 April 1944 (ibid. pp. 164 seqq. and pp. 10 seqq. respectively). What these Referenten reported from the different countries cannot be taken quite seriously, since they must, on the whole, have been very stupid men (cf. complaints of Jewish influence on the International Red Cross at Geneva, &c.).
The main resistance offered to the Germans at this stage was perhaps in connexion with the Jews. The Protestant churches took the initiative in discovering devices to protect Hungarian Jews, and private persons often helped them to go into hiding. When the German troops first crossed the Hungarian frontier on 19 March there was some active if only brief resistance at Sopron and Novi Sad, and a certain number of Hungarians crossed the frontiers to join Tito. When the SS came to arrest Bajcsy-Zsilinszky he defended himself and was wounded by his captors. But on the whole no serious resistance was offered nor did it develop. With Zsilinszky lost to them, would-be leaders such as Tildy and Nagy were ineffectual; such attempts to organize as they made were regarded by the Catholic majority as rather the affair of a handful of Protestants. A small Communist group emerged under the leadership of a certain Rajk, with whom General Ujszaszky later got into touch on Horthy’s behalf. But the Hungarian Communists were fairly ineffectual. In the factories, for instance at Csépel, there had been a suggestion of sabotage now and then before March, but after the Germans’ arrival production seemed to go pretty smoothly ahead. The Csépel armament works belonged to the Jewish family of Manfred Weiss and his sons-in-law, Chorin and Kornfeldt. It was Chorin, probably, who bought the life and liberty of the family by handing over the whole concern to the German Secret Police.

During the summer of 1944 the Sztójay régime proved curiously unable to consolidate itself. The situation in Hungary was reminiscent of Antonescu’s conflict with the Iron Guard in Rumania. For, although all Leftist opposition had been forced underground, there was constant friction between the new Government and the groups even farther to the Right, the Hubay National Socialists and Szálasí’s Arrow Cross (Nyilás) people. While Horthy did what he could to resist both Right-extremist and German pressure, the Magyar Right-extremists themselves often conflicted with Veessenmayer in their hostility to the ‘Swabians’. The Rumanians’ volte-face on 23 August, their renunciation of the 1940 Vienna Award on 24 August, and the announcement of Russia’s support of their claims against Hungary on 25 August precipitated a fresh crisis in Hungary. All political parties were now dissolved, and on 30 August Sztójay resigned and a new Government took office with General Lakatos as Premier. ‘In essentials, Hungarian policy had certainly gone back to Kállay.’ It was Horthy’s last attempt to restore Hungarian autonomy, and, thanks to the state of war with Rumania, opinion rallied in support of the Regent’s attempt.1

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1 See H. Seton-Watson: The East European Revolution, p. 104. The most important Magyar Communist, Rákosi, after sixteen years in prison in Hungary, had been exchanged in 1940 for a prisoner in Russian hands and remained in Russia until early in 1945.

2 In the summer of the following year Horthy stated that he had refused to allow the
In fact Horthy's closest advisers, and especially Bethlen, were already considering how to ask Russia for an armistice. Every day this became more urgent, but it was not a simple matter to establish contact. At the beginning of October the Russians crossed the Hungarian frontier and attacked Kolosvár, and by 10 October they had reached Debrecen. Five days later it was announced by the Budapest wireless that the Regent had requested an armistice from them. This was the signal for Veesenmayer,\(^1\) who had been holding Szálasi in readiness, to intervene. The German SS stormed the Budapest broadcasting station (in the Sándor utca), where they met with resistance, only just too late to prevent the Regent's announcement. At 5 a.m. on Monday 16 October, headed by Skorzeny, Mussolini's SS rescuer, they attacked the Burg and Horthy surrendered himself into their hands.\(^2\) It seems that he was tricked, by a promise to release his son, into signing a statement that he had appointed Szálasi as Premier and had then abdicated. By the end of that day the Germans, with their allies, young Nyilás toughs, had overcome all resistance; among other outrages they shot dead to the last man a Jewish labour battalion as it marched across the Budapest chain-bridge. Szálasi cancelled the armistice announcement in Horthy's name, and declared that Hungary had been snatched from the jaws of Bolshevism just in time. Hungary would reconquer her independence by fighting for it; she was a bastion as essential to German strategy as West Germany or East Prussia.\(^3\) Szálasi, unlike Horia Sima or Tsankov, at least began his reign in the capital town of his country, but he withdrew to Szombathely near the Austrian frontier in November; in December he even visited Hitler in the capacity of Head of the Hungarian State.\(^4\) Meanwhile on 17 October the Hungarian Commander-in-Chief, General Miklós, had gone over to the Russians together with his Chief of Staff. It was 20 January 1945 by the time the Hungarian armistice was signed in Moscow,\(^5\) and it was the middle of February before the citadel of Buda, which Hitler had ordered to be defended at all costs, was conquered by the Russians from the Germans. The major part of Hungary had been in Russian occupation since the beginning of the year, but it was not until 4 April 1945 that the last Germans escaped to Austria or surrendered or were killed.

Hungarian army to occupy the South Transylvanian passes at this point, as he wished to 'be correct'.

\(^1\) Horthy had informed Veesenmayer officially of the step he was taking and offered to try to get terms which would allow the Germans an unmolested retreat. Their reply was to kidnap Horthy's younger son on the morning of the 16 October coup and to send SS reinforcements; this caused Horthy to hurry forward the broadcasting of the armistice statement.

\(^2\) He was sent by the Germans as a prisoner to Waldbichl.

\(^3\) Pester Lloyd (Morgenblatt), 19 October 1944.

\(^4\) Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, p. 573.

(vi) The Ukraine under German Occupation, 1941–4

By Clifton J. Child

Although the German military advance into the Ukraine was rapid and spectacular (reaching Kharkov by 29 August 1941) it was only a relatively short time before the tide began to turn. On 24 November 1941 the Red Army launched its first counter-offensive west of Rostov. By February 1943 disaster had overtaken the Sixth Army at Stalingrad and the Germans were in retreat. Thus, though the Reich Commissioner could boast that ‘two months after the firing of the first . . . shot the German administrators entered the country’,¹ it was only about two years before the civil authorities as far west as Kazatin were moving out again.² By the beginning of November 1943 the Russians were back in Kiev, and by the following February the Reichskommissariat had, as Göring admitted, become ‘almost exclusively army territory again’.³ Within another half year the Russians had reoccupied the whole of the country.

Upon their own admission the Germans never fully mastered the Ukraine during their comparatively brief occupation. At first the German troops were welcomed as liberators by the population, whose representatives greeted them with the traditional bread and salt at the entrances to the towns and villages.⁴ But disillusionment followed rapidly upon the transference of authority from the Wehrmacht to the civil administration, and it was not long before open resistance began to manifest itself. As early as March 1942 Heydrich was constrained to admit that the activity of Partisan bands was plunging the rural population into ‘anxiety and terror’.⁵ By June 1943 ‘about 1,400,000 hectares of forest, i.e. 80 per cent. of the afforested area’ and ‘about 60 per cent.⁶ of the arable land of the General District of Zhitomir, in the north-west of the Reichskommissariat, was under the control of the Partisans, who were able regularly to supply the peasants with seed and thus to take a share of the harvest later in the year.⁷ The lot of the German administrator who was sent to the more remote rural areas was thus by no means a happy one, and many a Landwirtschaftsführer, according to the NS-Landpost, ‘died a hero’s death’

¹ Volkscher Beobachter, 20 August 1942.
³ Letter to Rosenberg of 14 February 1944 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 453 (179–USSR)).
⁴ See Kleist: Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 1939–1945, p. 130 [in this section (vi) this book will be referred to hereafter as ‘Kleist’]; also Goebbels Diaries, p. 135. The welcome accorded to the Germans appears to have been particularly cordial in the Western Ukraine. Cf. article by Arthur Reiss in Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 27 August 1941.
⁵ Report on the activities of the Einsatzgruppen (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxiii. 294 (3876-PS)).
⁶ Report by Generalkommissar Leyser (ibid. xxv. 319–20 (265-PS); N.C.A. iii. 235–6).
at the hands of the Resistance groups, and many were awarded the Iron Cross for fighting the Partisans.¹

At no stage of the occupation were communications adequate to the needs of either the army or the civil administration. In the latter months of the occupation, especially, road transport was completely disorganized by the Partisans, there being, for example, in the General District of Zhitomir only one main road (from Zhitomir to Vinnitsa) which could be travelled without escort.² The postal system was subject to frequent breakdowns, and after February 1943 the regular parcel-post service for civilians had to be suspended.³ The only reliable telephone network was that which was operated by the Wehrmacht, and even the Reich Commissioner, Koch, was forced to complain that, after eighteen months of office, he could still reach three of his six General Commissars (those in Nikolaev, Dnipropetrovsk, and Melitopol) only by telegraph.⁴

Nor were the boundaries of the Reichskommissariat ever very precisely defined. As the front moved backwards and forwards whole regions fluctuated between civil and military control, so that when the German press published maps giving the frontiers of the territory it had to be pointed out that these were for ‘illustrative’ purposes only.⁵ Rosenberg, who had been serving as ‘Delegate for the Central Study of Questions Relating to the Eastern European Space’ since April 1941, although he was not officially appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories until 17 July,⁶ seems to have intended the Reichskommissariat to include all the ‘actual area of settlement of the Ukraine’ except the Crimea (which would apparently be retained by the Germans as a base for controlling the Black Sea area).⁷ That is, its boundaries were to extend as far east as Kursk, Voronezh, Tambov, and Saratov, thus including a corner of the former German Volga Republic, which the Soviet Government had liquidated early in the war,⁸ and giving the Reichskommissariat

¹ Quoted by Hamburger Tageblatt, 17 July 1942.
² Report by Generalkommissar Leyser (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 322 (265-PS); N.C.A. iii. 237).
³ DNB, 27 February 1943.
⁴ Memorandum of 16 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 257 (192-PS)).
⁵ Cf., for example, the remarks of the German Foreign Ministry spokesman, Schmidt, on the map which appeared in Das Reich in January 1943, NPD (German News Agency), 14 January 1943. This would presumably also apply to the map with the boundaries of the Generalbezirke which appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung of 26 August 1913.
⁶ The decree of appointment (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 231–7 (1997-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 283) was never published, and the appointment was not mentioned in the German press until the following November. For Rosenberg’s appointment as ‘Delegate for the Central Study of Questions Relating to the Eastern European Space’ cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 383–4 (865-PS).
⁷ ‘Instruktion für einen Reichskommissar in der Ukraine’ (ibid. pp. 572–3 (1028 PS)).
⁸ Rosenberg’s idea of extending the eastern frontier of the Ukraine to the Volga was apparently based upon strategic, rather than upon ethnic, grounds. It was also designed to compensate the Ukrainians for the loss of Galicia.
an area of about 1.1 million square kilometres and a population of 59.5 million.¹

In the event, however, the Reichskommissariat probably never embraced more than half this area, while the population which came under its control certainly never exceeded 30 million.² The maps which the German newspapers published early in 1943 suggest that, in the east, Poltava, Kremenchug, and Zaporozhe lay (at that time, at any rate) within the area of civil administration, although Stalino was apparently then under military control (i.e. as so-called rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet) — as were Kharkov and the Crimea.³ In the west the boundaries were drawn well beyond the 1939 Soviet frontier to embrace the former Polish district of Volhynia. To the great disappointment of the Ukrainian nationalists, they did not, however, include Galicia and the great Ukrainian cultural centre of Lwów, which Hitler personally insisted upon incorporating in the General Government.⁴ Nor did they include the area of the former Soviet Ukraine between the Bug and the Dniester, which was assigned to Rumania as ‘Transnistria’. In the north the boundary with the Reichskommissariat Ostland was apparently pushed somewhat to the north of the Pripiet River, so that it lay well within the frontiers of the former White Russian S.S.R.

Rosenberg’s original intention was to divide the Reichskommissariat into eight General Commissariats. However, only six of these sub-regions — or Generalbezirke, as they were officially called in Hitler’s decree of 17 July 1941 — were eventually constituted. The Generalbezirk Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, and Nikolaev were set up in the course of 1941; the Generalbezirk Crimea, with Melitopol as its capital, came into existence in September 1942.⁵ These six Generalbezirke were divided into 114 Kreisgebiete, and the latter in turn were subdivided into 443 ‘rayons’.⁶ At the head of each Generalbezirk stood a Generalkommissar; and at the head of each Kreisgebiet, a Gebietskommissar. The ‘rayons’, which consisted of groups of villages, were adminis-

¹ Rosenberg’s speech of 20 June 1941 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 623–4 (1058–PS)).
² The German press in 1941–2 estimated the urban population of the Reichskommissariat at 10 million and the rural at 19 million, while the Deutsche Ukrainizeitung of 29 February 1943 gave the population then under civil administration as 16,910,008. The 1939 Soviet census gave the population of the Ukrainian Republic as 31 million.
³ Kremenchug and Poltava were incorporated in the Generalbezirk Kiev, and Zaporozhe in the Generalbezirk Dnepropetrovsk in September 1942.
⁴ Rosenberg apparently drew up a memorandum against the incorporation of Galicia in the General Government, but Hitler ignored it (cf. Kleist, p. 187).
⁵ In accordance with Rosenberg’s suggestion (see above, p. 633) the Crimea proper was not included in the Generalbezirk Crimea, which was formed out of the old government of Tauris and the Nogai Steppe, together with parts of the former Nikolaev and Zaporozhe Provinces (cf. Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 November 1942).
⁶ Deutsche Ukrainizeitung, 20 February 1943. In addition there were five Stadtgebiete: Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Krivoi Rog, and Kamenskoe.
tered by Ukrainian ‘Rayonchefs’.

1 At the very base of the administrative structure stood the rural communes, under the supervision of Ukrainian ‘bailiffs’, and the towns, which had Ukrainian mayors. The ‘Rayonchefs’, ‘bailiffs’ and mayors, and the ‘assessors’ (Schöffen) and ‘arbitrators’ (Schlichter), who assisted with the dispensation of justice, represented the limit of native participation in the government of the territory, and even this carefully circumscribed measure of responsibility was granted only because there were not enough properly trained Germans to take over the entire administration.

The story of the German civil administration in the Ukraine is to a large extent one of conflict and intrigue between the two officials principally responsible for the territory—the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories in Berlin and the nominally subordinate Reich Commissioner in Równe—whose differences, as Lammers was constrained to point out at Nuremberg, eventually came to fill ‘volumes and volumes of records’. To Rosenberg, who spent two months secretly expounding German aims as Hitler’s ‘Delegate for the Central Study of Questions Relating to the Eastern European Space’ before the attack on the Soviet Union was actually launched, the overriding objective must be to ‘free the German Reich from großrussisch [Russian expansionist] pressure for centuries to come’. This could only be done by setting up a cordon sanitaire along the eastern frontiers of the Reich with the non-Russian parts of a dismembered ‘Great Russia’, and by ‘bringing into being a free Ukrainian State in the closest alliance with the Greater German Reich’. With this end in view Ukrainian nationalism must be given every encouragement: Ukrainian writers, scholars, and political leaders must be ‘assigned the task of reviving the Ukrainian historical consciousness’; steps must be taken to found a ‘great university’ at Kiev, along with other universities and technical colleges in other parts of the country; and eventually an attempt might even be made, using the remnants of the ‘Free Ukrainian Cossack Organization’ of 1918, to establish an ‘Ukrainian political party’, which would ‘provide a link between the Reich Commissioner, his Ukrainian advisers, and the broad mass of the Ukrainian population’.

In his attempts to secure the acceptance of this policy Rosenberg had

1 Volksischer Beobachter, 11 April 1942.
2 Towns with German headquarters had German mayors. Large and medium-sized towns also had German Town Commissars.
3 Cf. above, p. 143.
4 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 48.
5 ‘Allgemeine Instruktion fur alle Reichskommissare in den besetzten Ostgebieten’ (ibid. xxvi. 577 (1030-PS); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 280).
6 ‘Instruktion fur einen Reichskommissar in der Ukraine’ (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 568·9 (1028-PS)). Cf. also Rosenberg’s speech of 20 June 1941 (ibid. pp. 610-27 (1058-PS)). The same ideas were put forward—apparently without commanding much attention—at the Führerhauptquartier meeting of 16 July 1941 (cf. ibid. xxxviii. 89 (221-I.); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 230).
the enthusiastic support of the Hauptabteilung Politik of his Eastern Ministry, a body composed almost entirely of Russian experts like Georg Leibbrandt, the former Chief of the Eastern Division of the Nazi Party's Foreign Political Office, who became its head and Otto Bräutigam, a former consul with many years' service in the Soviet Union, who became Leibbrandt's deputy. The policy could only be successful, however, if it were acceptable to the German administrators in the field, as well as to the officials of the Eastern Ministry in Berlin, and here Rosenberg suffered a decisive setback at the outset as a result of Hitler's decision to give the post of Reich Commissioner to Gauleiter Erich Koch of East Prussia.\(^1\) A 'man of pronounced action and brute force' (as Goebbels described him), Koch was strongly supported for the appointment by Göring, who believed him to have a good eye for the opportunities of economic exploitation which the Ukraine afforded.\(^4\) While proving very willing, in return for this support, to carry out the orders which Göring gave him as head of the Four-Year Plan, Koch had only the most profound contempt for his colleagues in the Eastern Ministry and their intellectual approach to the Ukrainian problem. Boasting, as he did, that his attitude towards the Slavs was based upon the ideas expounded by Hitler in Mein Kampf,\(^5\) he regarded all the inhabitants of the east—Ukrainians, Caucasians, and Great Russians alike—as 'second class peoples'. Consequently he was determined that there should be 'no free Ukraine'; on the contrary, the aim of the German administration must be 'to make the Ukrainians work for Germany, and not to make the people happy'.\(^6\) As he declared at Kiev on 5 March 1943:

I shall get the last ounce out of this country. I have not come here to spread bliss. I have come here to help the Führer... We are, indeed, not here to bring manna; we are here to create the basis of victory. We are a race of masters [Herrenvolk], who must always remember that the most humble German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here.\(^7\)

1. Leibbrandt was a native of Russia who had volunteered for the German army in the Ukraine during the First World War.
2. Rosenberg had originally had Staatssekretär Herbert Backe, a native of Batum, in mind for the post of Reich Commissioner, and he strongly opposed Koch's appointment. Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg xxvi. 556 (1019-PS); N.C.A. iii. 682, and I.M.T. xxxviii. 90 (221-L); Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 234.
3. Goebbels Diaries, p. 149.
4. Koch had also tried to enlist the support of Backe and Funk for his candidature by promising to repeat in the Ukraine the success which he had already had in increasing the agricultural (particularly pig) production of East Prussia (cf. Lang and Schenck: Portrait eines Menschenverbrechers, p. 308).
5. Cf. his memorandum of 16 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 285-6 (192-PS)).
6. Speech at a conference held in Równe, 27-28 August 1942 (ibid. p. 318 (264-PS)).
7. Ibid. xxvii. 10 (1130-PS); cf. N.C.A. iii. 798.
It therefore became Koch's policy systematically to persecute the Ukrainian intelligentsia with a view to depriving the people of their leaders, to suppress all manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, and to exploit the peasants to the utmost for the benefit of Germany.

Koch was made Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine on 20 August 1941, although the news of his appointment was not published until later in the year. He had, however, hardly taken office before the main lines of conflict between him and Rosenberg became sharply drawn. In theory the Reich Commissioner was Rosenberg's subordinate, Hitler's 'Decree on the Administration of the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories' of 17 July 1941 being quite specific on this point. Nevertheless Koch, who in the first months of the German occupation apparently deigned to set foot in the Ukraine only at very rare intervals, prided himself on having, as 'an old Gauleiter', the right to take his grievances straight to the Führer, and he did not, in fact, hesitate to go to Hitler whenever Rosenberg gave him orders which did not suit his book. Rosenberg, for his part, was greatly handicapped by the fact that he did not enjoy final and complete authority even within his own sphere of competence as Reich Minister. In economic matters he could be overruled by Göring as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and by Sauckel as General Plenipotentiary for the Recruitment of Labour; and in police matters he had to give way to Himmler who, as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police, had the right to issue orders direct to all SS formations engaged in 'security' operations in the Eastern Territories. His position was also weakened by the fact that the departmental chiefs of his Ministry (e.g. for economics, labour, food and agriculture, and forestry and timber) also held posts in other government departments (the Four-Year Plan, the Economic Staff East, Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, &c.), which either seconded officials of inferior calibre to him or else sent along their strongest personalities with a view to retaining control over matters in which they were particularly interested. Added to this he himself made the fatal mistake of keeping the Hauptabteilung Politik on a par with the specialist departments of his Ministry (i.e. those dealing with economics, labour, &c.), which meant that important political considerations could never take precedence over

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1 *U.S. Military Tribunals, Case 11*, pp. 992-3. The news of the appointment was first published in Germany in the *Volkischer Beobachter* and other papers of 18 November 1941.


3 Cf. Rosenberg's letter to Himmler of 2 April 1943 (I.M.T. *Nuremberg*, xxv. 93 (032-PS); N.C.A. *Supplement* A, p. 331). As late as February 1942 Koch dated correspondence as Reich Commissioner from Konigsberg (cf. I.M.T. *Nuremberg*, xli. 184 (Rosenberg-10)).

4 Theoretically the Higher SS and Police Leader Ukraine was subordinate to Koch. Contrary to all Rosenberg's demands, he was not also subordinate to the Reich Minister.

5 Kleist, pp. 147 8.
the day-to-day exploitation of the territory with which these other departments were primarily concerned.¹

The first major conflict between Rosenberg and Koch arose when they came to formulate an agricultural policy for the Reichskommissariat. To Koch the Ukraine was solely ein Ausbeutungsobjekt² to be exploited by substituting Nazi for Bolshevik officials and by leaving the Soviet collective system otherwise intact. Rosenberg, on the other hand, believed that the people of the Ukraine could never be brought to work for the Germans with enthusiasm until the 'hated' kolkhozy (collective farms) had been abolished and the land redistributed among the peasants. Both Rosenberg and Koch had, however, to frame their policies according to the over-all aims set by Hitler, who believed the Ukraine to be capable of supplying 3 million tons of grain during the first year of the occupation³ and 'a minimum of 7 million tons' during the following year.⁴ The issue therefore resolved itself into one of method, rather than of basic objective. Koch at first found a powerful ally in Göring, whose Economic Staff East feared that a division of the land into peasant holdings would make it impossible for the Germans to control agricultural production, and consequently gave orders that any attempt to dissolve the kolkhozy was to be 'fought with the severest measures'.⁵ Soon, however, the lack of heavy machinery, upon which the kolkhozy depended, began to militate in Rosenberg's favour, while at the same time the Wehrmacht also began, for purely political reasons, to press for the gradual restoration of private ownership in the areas under military control. But many months were to elapse before a final decision was reached, and it was not until 16 February 1942 that Rosenberg was able to issue his long-awaited 'New Agrarian Order'. This converted the kolkhozy into communal farms (Gemeinwirtschaften) and enabled the land to be turned over to the peasants for 'individual development and use' through agricultural co-operatives (Landbau-Genossenschaften) as soon as the 'necessary economic and technical prerequisites were at hand'.⁶

The next stage in the abolition of the collective system depended upon Koch, who followed the 'New Agrarian Order' with a decree of his own setting up a special company (the Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ukraine m.b.H.) to assume responsibility for the new communal farms and co-

¹ Kleist, p. 149. Rosenberg was also severely handicapped by his own lack of organizing ability.
² Statement to a group of German journalists in November 1942. Cf. Riecke's letter to Rosenberg of 30 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 196 (Rosenberg-19)).
³ Note on the Röwe Conference, 26–28 August 1942 (ibid. xxv. 318 (264–PS)).
⁴ According to Hitler a minimum of 7,000,000, but much more likely 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons of grain could be harvested: Memorandum on meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at Schloss Klessheim, 29 April 1942 (Department of State Bulletin, 14 July 1946, pp. 57 seqq.).
⁵ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxvi. 146 (126–EC); cf. N.C.A. vii. 30. This gives the detailed German plan for the economic exploitation of the Ukraine.
operatives, as well as for the former Soviet sovkhozy (now converted, under the ‘New Agrarian Order’, into German Staatsgüter) and motor tractor and experimental seed stations. Although he had failed to save the kolkhozy the Reich Commissioner was determined to preserve the sovkhozy and to cover the Ukraine with German ‘combines’ (deutsche Großbetriebe) which would employ the local population as ‘at best hired labourers’. Nor did he make any secret of his aversion to the ‘New Agrarian Order’ and of his determination to hold up its application wherever this was possible—with the result that, instead of 20 per cent. of the communal farms being converted into co-operatives in 1942, as intended, only half that number were turned over. At the same time he robbed Rosenberg’s plan of much of its moral value by continuing to make the Ukrainian peasant surrender so much of his produce (particularly his grain) that he was no better off under the ‘New Agrarian Order’ than he had been under the collective system.

In the economic sphere Rosenberg and Koch were also to clash over Sauckel’s labour recruitment programme, to which the Ukraine was called upon to make one of the biggest contributions in the whole of Hitler’s Europe. Here again, however, the issue resolved itself into one of method, rather than of over-all objective. Rosenberg apparently saw no reason to question Sauckel’s demands, but he believed a system of voluntary recruitment to be preferable ‘for political reasons’ to one of coercion, to which recourse should only be had in the ‘most exceptional circumstances’. On the other hand, Koch, who was able to boast in his 1943 New Year Message that he had ‘recruited’ no less than 710,000 workers in the Ukraine, was from the beginning wedded to methods which the Hauptabteilung Politik described as having their parallel ‘only in the blackest days of the slave trade’, his favourite device being to burn down the houses and farms of peasants who tried to avoid being sent to the Reich. Realizing that such methods could only spell disaster for his plan of winning over the Ukrainians as allies for the Reich, Rosenberg made frequent attempts to tone down Koch’s labour recruitment orders and even to institute disciplinary measures against officials who carried out the Reich Commissioner’s more barbarous instructions. He also, on 21 December 1942, wrote a long

2 Brautigam’s memorandum of 25 October 1942 (J.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 336 (294–PS)) and Riecke’s letter to Rosenberg of 30 March 1943 (ibid. xli. 195 6 (Rosenberg–19)). Also testimony of Lammers at Nuremberg (ibid. xi. 48).
3 In fact his Ministry informed both Koch in the Ukraine and Lohse in the Ostland on 6 March 1942 that 330,000 agricultural and 247,000 industrial workers had to be made available without delay (cf. ibid. xxvi. 162 (580–PS); N.C.L. Supplement A, p. 447).
4 Coercion should then take the form of invoking his order for the general direction of labour of 19 December 1941. Cf. J.M.T. Nuremberg, xxix. 186 (1975–PS); .N.C.L., Supplement A, p. 408.
5 Brautigam’s memorandum (J.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 338 (294–PS)).
6 Koch’s memorandum of 16 March 1943 (ibid. p. 268 (192–PS)).
letter to Sauckel in which he pointed out that the whole system of labour recruitment in the east was playing into the hands of the Partisans, and in which he 'emphatically' requested that methods should not be employed 'which might one day be held against [him] and [his] associates'.

In the political sphere it was inevitable that Rosenberg and Koch, with their divergent views on the desirability of fostering Ukrainian nationalism, should come into conflict over the Ukrainian émigrés, many of whom were Western Ukrainians who had been active in Germany before the war. In this case there was at first much confusion because, in their attempts to play off the racial minorities against the Poles in the General Government, the Germans had already recognized a so-called 'National Committee' among the Western Ukrainians. They had also, through Admiral Canaris, the Chief of the Abwehr, cultivated a number of active Ukrainian nationalists so that, at the time when the plans for an attack on the Soviet Union were still being hatched, Rosenberg had found it necessary to go to Canaris and ask him to name 'individuals . . . of political standing' whose 'possible employment at a later date' might be considered. His own attitude towards the émigrés at this stage seems to have been one of extreme caution. On the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union he instructed his subordinates not to use the Ukrainian leaders unless he himself had first been consulted, and when an Ukrainian 'National Government' proceeded to constitute itself at Lwów it was immediately arrested and sent to Sachsenhausen.

Once, however, the Ukraine had been occupied the activities of the various émigré groups came to be widely tolerated, if not indeed actively encouraged, by the Eastern Ministry. According to Koch, émigré leaders, among them the 'plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian émigrés in Slovakia', Dr. Galetka, were given credentials to enable them to visit the Ukraine; Western Ukrainian agitators were permitted to enter the territory in the guise of medical practitioners; and the Bandera and Melnik movements were allowed to become active to a degree which, in Koch’s view, could only endanger German security.

To Koch, who had the greatest contempt for Skoropadsky, the Ukrain-
ian Hetman who was still being generously provided with funds by the Germans, the émigrés were nothing but trouble-makers with whom he made up his mind to deal ruthlessly if and when they dared to show themselves in the Reichskommissariat. (He did in fact arrest a group who ventured to appear in Kiev.) As far as he was concerned there would be no repetition of the 1918 ‘experiment’ in the Ukraine. In fact, studiously ignoring Rosenberg’s avowed intention of setting up an autonomous Ukrainian State he publicly warned the émigré organizations in his 1943 New Year Message that it was useless for them to cherish hopes that a puppet administration would be established, it being his view (he said) that, if they were given their head, they would only plunge the country into the same chaos as the Bolsheviks before them.

As a result of this confusion and bickering the Ukrainian national groups were left in constant doubt regarding German intentions, so that their two major organizations, the O.U.N. and the U.P.A., vacillated until the end between lukewarm support of, and avowed hostility towards, the German cause. At times they encouraged their followers to join the Galician SS; at others they openly fought the Germans, as they later fought the Russians. But at no time could the Germans—especially the Wehrmacht which pursued a much more positive policy towards them—feel that they had the Ukrainian nationalists solidly behind them.

Just as Koch believed Rosenberg to be showing undue indulgence towards the émigrés and Ukrainian nationalists, so he had reason to complain that the Reich Minister neglected the Volksdeutsche—the descendants of that earlier generation of Germans who had come to Russia in search of Lebensraum in the reign of Catherine the Great. This, as the Reich Commissioner saw it, was particularly deplorable in view of the conditions which the Germans discovered among the Volksdeutsche when they took over the territory in 1941. The villages occupied by the Russian Germans (who in the census of 1926 numbered 393,924, and who were congregated mainly in the Nikolaev, Zaporozhie, and Dnepropetrovsk areas in the south) were found to be ‘generally in the worst state of all’, being unable, ‘as a result of the deportation of the best elements’ by the Bolsheviks, ‘to maintain themselves without help from outside’. They were, moreover, completely isolated from the Nazi fatherland: ‘a great part of

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1 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 145.
2 He had, he said, been strengthened in his attitude towards the émigrés by a remark of the Fuhrer’s to the effect that he would have had them all shot at the beginning of the war in the east if he had known at that time what their attitude was to be. Cf. Koch’s memorandum of 16 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv, 271–2 (192–PS)).
3 Peter Lloyd, 6 January 1943.
4 The U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) was the Partisan organization set up and controlled by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.
them scarcely knew the Führer by name' and (what was apparently considered even more regrettable) 'they failed to take measures against the remaining Jews after the German troops had marched in'.

Unlike the Volksdeutsche in other occupied countries they consequently constituted 'no reliable element upon which the administration and economy could rely'.

Believing that the German civil administration had a special obligation towards the Volksdeutsche, Koch appealed to Rosenberg in the summer of 1942 to issue a decree which (to quote his own words) would permit their 'reincorporation in the German community and the restitution of their rights'; having himself already granted them special tax exemptions and brought them under the operation of the German marriage laws. Rosenberg, however, with all his admiration for the 'enormous achievements' of the German settlers in the 'eastern area', was reluctant to give them a status which would isolate them from the rest of the Ukrainian community and turn their settlements into 'German ghettos'. He therefore ignored Koch's appeal, with the result that the latter turned to Himmler. As Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationality, Himmler believed that the maintenance of German 'political prestige' demanded that the surviving Volksdeutsche families must be 'given a new home'. He therefore decided that, notwithstanding the decimation caused by the Soviet deportations, they must be brought together in closed settlements, where the 'necessary advice and special support' must be made available. With this end in view he caused Koch to issue a decree recognizing the Germans of the Ukraine as Volksdeutsche within the meaning of the basic 'Order Concerning the German Volksliste and German Citizenship in the Incorporated Eastern Territories' of 4 March 1941, and permitting them as such to have their names entered on the German racial register. This was accompanied by an order giving certain categories of Volksdeutsche the right to farm (but not to own outright) agricultural holdings comparable in size and value with those which they had possessed before

1 The SD found that Reich German Communists had been active among them and that some were of an 'out-and-out proletarian type' (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxviii. 300–3 (102 R)).
2 Ibid. xxxii. 75 (3257–PS); cf. N.C.A. v. 997.
3 Memorandum of 16 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 263–4 (192–PS)).
5 Ibid. U.II.C5.
7 For example, in a decree of 4 July 1942— to which Koch took exception—he insisted that the creation of a German quarter at Dneprpetrovsok should not be allowed to isolate the Germans from the other inhabitants of the city. Cf. Koch's memorandum of 16 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 265 (192–PS)).
10 i.e. those placed in categories 1 to 3 of the Volksliste.
the First World War. Neither of these measures had, however, been submitted in advance to Rosenberg, who was so incensed by the fact that Koch had gone behind his back to Himmler that, on 28 September 1942, he issued a decree formally censuring the Reich Commissioner for the action which he had taken. But for the fundamentally anti-Christian attitude of both Rosenberg and Koch the same story of conflict might have been repeated when it came to devising a religious policy for the Ukraine. In so far as he ever committed himself to an opinion on the religious question Koch is reported to have spoken of the desirability of founding two or three rival churches, so that he could play one off against another. Rosenberg, for his part, felt that the Germans had 'neither the task of reviving an oppressed church life nor the duty of persisting with the Bolshevik policy of extermination' and that the Reich Commissioner should merely tolerate 'confessional associations' without according them any 'state support'. Neither was consequently very anxious to take the initiative, so that the first major decision with regard to the future of the Eastern Churches came not from the Reich Minister or the Reich Commissioner, but from the Wehrmacht. Notwithstanding Hitler's express wish that there should be no revival of religious activity in the Eastern Territories, the military authorities were apparently so much impressed by the increase in church-going in the German-occupied areas that they decided to take matters into their own hands and to restore a limited degree of religious freedom—leaving Rosenberg no alternative but to acquiesce in the action which they had taken.

Thanks to this benevolent intervention on the part of the Wehrmacht (and also, of course, to the disappearance of the Soviet secret police), the Ukrainian religious revival made rapid strides in the early months of 1942. Steps now taken to reorganize the Churches included the appointment of an 'administrator' for the autocephalous Church in the 'liberated Ukraine' in the person of Polkarp Sikorsky, the self-styled Archbishop of Luck and Kowel, and the installation of bishops at Kiev, Zhitomir, Poltava, Kirovograd, Lubny, Dnepropetrovsk, and Biala Tserkov. As yet, however,

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2 Koch's memorandum of 16 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 264 (192-PS)).
3 There was, however, some friction, even here. Cf. Rosenberg's memorandum for Hitler of 16 March 1942 (ibid. p. 97 (045 PS); N.C.A., Supplement A, pp. 335-6) and Riecke's letter to Rosenberg of 30 March 1943 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xii. 196 (Rosenberg-19)).
5 'Instruktion fur einen Reichskommissar in der Ukraine (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvi. 570-1 (1028-PS)).
6 Ibid. xi. 462.
7 Svenska Dagbladet, 23 February 1942; Transocean, 19 May 1942; and Krakiska Visti, 1 July 1942. Archbishop Alexander of Pinsk and Polesie continued in the see to which he had been appointed before the war. There was also an autonomous church under Archbishop Alexei of Volhynia.
the Germans had issued no formal edict of toleration, although it had become clear that the matter could not be held in suspense much longer. A conference to consider the religious question was therefore held at the Führerhauptquartier on 8 May 1942, and after some argument as to whether Rosenberg or Koch should make the next move it was decided that the initiative could best be left to Koch.1 In June, therefore, the Reich Commissioner issued orders regulating religious activity in the Ukraine.2 There was, however, no formal proclamation of the German decision to permit freedom of worship, and the edict of toleration in the end merely took the form of a secret instruction to Koch not to interfere with the reopening of the churches, the ordination of clergy, and the holding of religious services. By handling the religious question in this inept and furtive way the Germans missed a valuable opportunity of exploiting the situation for propaganda purposes, so that when, in one of his most astute propaganda moves of the war, Stalin restored the Moscow Patriarchate in September 1943 they had no effective riposte to offer.3

So pronounced had the differences between Rosenberg and Koch become by the summer of 1942 that it became necessary to submit them to the adjudication of the Führerhauptquartier. This augured well for Koch, for he clearly possessed, to a much greater degree than Rosenberg, the gift of ingratiating himself with Hitler.4 Moreover Koch had the ear of Bormann, who now dominated the Führerhauptquartier, and who had never been on terms of very great friendship with Rosenberg.5 The result was that in July 1942 Bormann was prevailed upon to issue instructions to the Reich Minister which, in their brutality and cynicism, read like a caricature of Koch’s own policy;6 although, as a sop to Rosenberg, Hitler at the same time issued a decree making the latter (for what the appointment was worth) the ‘sole delegate of the Reich Government in matters of policy relating to all peoples of the former Soviet territories’.7

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1 It was apparently feared that, if the Reichsminister Ost issued a religious decree there might be ‘repercussions’ and protests from the Churches in the Reich. Cf. Rosenberg’s memorandum on a discussion with Hitler, 8 May 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxvii. 286 (1520-PS); N.C.A. iv. 68).
3 Kleist (p. 183) speaks of a toleration edict having an ‘enthusiastic reception’ from the populace. Bräutigam, however, makes it clear that the decision to allow freedom of worship was soft-pedalled as much as possible. Cf. memorandum of 25 October 1942 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 336 (294-PS)).
4 While Rosenberg bored Hitler, Koch had the knack of making himself acceptable to the Fuhrer by providing him with ‘something novel at every interview, something extravagant, exorbitant and impressive’ (Gisevius: Bis zum bittern Ende, p. 353).
6 The Slavs were to work for Germany, and, in so far as they were not needed, they could be allowed to die off, &c. (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xviii. 81).
7 Fuhrererlass of 28 July 1942. Cf. Rosenberg’s letter to Hitler of 12 October 1944 (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 191 (Rosenberg–14)).
Sensing the direction in which the wind was blowing at the Führer-hauptquartier, Rosenberg now decided (so he claimed) to appease Bormann and Hitler by feigning compliance with the new instructions. Nevertheless he did not give up hope that his own more enlightened ideas might eventually prevail and, being determined to keep Koch in check, he concentrated upon trying to make it more difficult for the Reich Commissioner and his associates to have access to Hitler. In fact, on 21 August 1942, the 'subordinate offices' of the Reichskommissariat were expressly forbidden to report direct to the Führer in future.

The effect of this prohibition could only be to embitter relations still further between Berlin and Równe. Smarting under the restrictions now imposed upon him, Koch in September 1942 irately demanded that Rosenberg 'either take no further account of the fact that a Reich Commissioner exists as far as the administration of the Ukraine is concerned' and inform him accordingly, or else 'issue orders to the Reich Ministry which will from now on ensure to the appropriate degree [his] participation in all questions concerning the Ukraine'. (Coming from Koch this had a somewhat ironic ring, in that the latter had for some time been endeavouring to sever his connexion with the Reich Ministry by forbidding his subordinates to receive Rosenberg’s officials in the Ukraine or to call at the Ministry when visiting Berlin.) A month later the Hauptabteilung Politik countered with a memorandum by Bräutigam recapitulating the long record of failure in the Ukraine and suggesting that the time had come ‘to put at the head of the Reichskommissariat a personality of standing who was also sufficiently qualified politically’.

The next move on Rosenberg’s part was to insist upon being allowed to scrutinize every decree which Koch proposed to issue—a practice which resulted in his revoking or modifying almost every important piece of legislation which the latter promulgated. On 20 October the Reich Commissioner issued an order closing all the trade schools in the Ukraine on the ground that the corresponding institutions had already been closed in the Reich. On 23 February 1943 Rosenberg replied with a decree countermanding Koch’s order and reopening the trade schools and many other centres of learning in the Reichskommissariat. Finally, on 13 March 1943, the tension reached breaking-point when Rosenberg ordered the

1 This apparently gave rise to considerable apprehension among officials of his Ministry and inspired the Markull memorandum of 5 September 1942 (cf. ibid. xviii. 81).
2 Koch’s memorandum of 16 March 1943 (ibid. xxv. 282 (192–PS)).
3 Ibid. p. 275.
4 The Ministry was consequently dependent upon the Ukrainians for information as to what was going on in the Reichskommissariat (Kleist, p. 150).
5 I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxv. 341 (294–PS).
6 Riecke’s letter to Rosenberg of 30 March 1943 (ibid. xli. 196 (Rosenberg–19)).
7 Koch’s memorandum of 16 March 1943 and Riecke’s letter of 30 March 1943 (ibid. xxv. 276 and xli. 196 respectively).
withdrawal of a circular which Koch had sent out to his subordinates encouraging them to be ruthless in rounding up labour for the spring sowing and for the Sauckel programme. To this Koch replied on 16 March with a long and heated memorandum which, after reciting the many difficulties which he had encountered in trying to work with Rosenberg and his Ministry, stated that it had become impossible for him to continue with his tasks in the Ukraine and that his position had been so 'encroached upon' that 'it could only be restored by the Führer'.

A copy of the memorandum was sent to Bormann, and Koch went to Hitler. The upshot was that both the Reich Commissioner and the Reich Minister were asked to appear at the Reich Chancellery; a 'conflict developed in Hitler's presence'; but Koch apparently prevailed. Rosenberg could only retort by asking to be relieved of his post.

From that time on Rosenberg had the _idées fixes_ of Hitler, as well as the ill will and obstruction of Koch, to contend with. He was, moreover, without an ally in the Nazi hierarchy, for none of the other leaders whose influence might have counted with the Führer—Göring, Himmler, Ribbentrop—was prepared to give him his support. He was therefore left to plead alone with Hitler, whose hatred of Bolshevism, always closely linked with his anti-Semitism, had by now developed into a sort of 'anti-Eastern, anti-Slav "Untermenschen" complex'.

Besides having an ingrained hatred of everything Slav, Hitler had never abandoned the dream of a colonial empire in the east which he had unfolded to an incredulous world in _Mein Kampf_. Such an empire, he believed, must be created by crushing the Soviet armies in the field and not by bemusing the populations of the conquered territories with promises of independence. In so far as the eastern peoples had any place in his calculations at all, it was only as the object of a policy of ruthless exploitation, such as Koch was endeavouring to pursue in the Ukraine. Koch could thus rightly boast that his programme was based upon the wishes of the Führer, whose confidence in the Reich Commissioner never waned, as was proved when, at the height of the German retreat in the east, the latter was given control over the

1 Koch’s memorandum, which is fifty-two pages long in the original, contains a detailed, if somewhat biased, account of the Koch–Rosenberg conflict. The burden of the Reich Commissioner’s complaint was that the Reich Ministry intervened too much in matters of detail, and without knowledge of local conditions; that it was indiscreet in its contact with, and use of, the émigrés; and that it did not take sufficiently into account Koch’s position under Hitler’s decree of 17 July 1941. The memorandum cited numerous examples of bureaucracy and muddle-headedness on the part of the Ministry.

2 Copies apparently also went to Berger of the SS-Hauptamt and to all the Gauleiters.

3 Statement by Dr. Thoma, Rosenberg’s counsel, at Nuremberg (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xi. 506).

4 Kleist, p. 143. Rosenberg himself, as Kleist points out, was also ‘much too weak and indolent to fight for the recognition of his political ideas’.

5 Ibid. p. 137.

6 ‘Wenn wir aber heute in Europa von neuem Grund und Boden reden, können wir in erster Linie nur an Russland und die ihm untertanen Randstaaten denken’ (Mein Kampf, p. 742; tr. Murphy, p. 533).
'exploitation' and evacuation of agricultural and industrial assets in the Ostland.\textsuperscript{1} With characteristic stubbornness Hitler thus refused to listen to criticism of Koch\textsuperscript{2} and turned an equally deaf ear to all the proposals for a more enlightened eastern policy which his Propaganda Minister, Goebbels, and others endeavoured to put to him.\textsuperscript{3}

Instead, therefore, of trying to resolve the differences between Rosenberg and Koch, Hitler was content to leave it to Bormann and Lammers to try to decide between them.\textsuperscript{4} When, at the beginning of April 1943, Rosenberg submitted what looked like a damning indictment of Koch's methods in the form of a report on the notorious Zuman affair, he made no attempt to have the matter investigated, but calmly acquiesced in the explanation which Koch provided.\textsuperscript{5} In the following June, while Rosenberg was on a visit to the Ukraine, he issued a decree instructing the Reich Minister to confine himself, as far as the Occupied Eastern Territories were concerned, to matters of 'basic principle' and not to interest himself 'too much in details of administration'—the immediate cause of this new snub being a quarrel between Rosenberg and Koch over a declaration which the Reich Minister had issued on 3 June, giving the peasants in the Eastern Territories full ownership of the land which they had received under the 'New Agrarian Order' of February 1942.\textsuperscript{7}

In the following November Rosenberg paid his last visit to the Führerhauptquartier, being thereafter able to communicate with Hitler only through Bormann or Lammers.\textsuperscript{8} Meanwhile, believing that it might help matters to introduce a strong man into the Hauptabteilung Politik, he had replaced the faithful Leibbrandt with SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlieb Berger, the head of the SS-Hauptamt. Berger, however, apparently had neither the influence nor the inclination to try conclusions with Koch, but preferred to use his new position to build up a sort of shadow Eastern Ministry within the SS-Hauptamt, which continued to be his main interest.\textsuperscript{9} Thus Rosenberg was finally left with no alternative but to appeal to Hitler

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. message from Keitel to army commands, 8 September 1944 (\textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xxvi. 281–3 (743–PS); \textit{N.C.A. iii. 530}).
\textsuperscript{2} For his reaction to von Schirach's suggestion that 'a free and autonomous Ukraine would serve the Reich better than a Ukraine ruled by the violence of Herr Koch' cf. \textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xiv. 428.
\textsuperscript{3} Goebbels tried to persuade Hitler to issue a 'proclamation for the East' and in this he apparently had the support of Göring and Kluge (cf. Goebbels Diaries, pp. 200–1, 216, 256).
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xi. 120.
\textsuperscript{5} The report showed that, in December 1942, Koch had had the entire population of the Zuman forest area shot or forcibly removed so that he could use the area as a 'private shoot' (cf. Rosenberg's letter to Himmler of 2 April 1943: ibid. xxv. 93–94 (932–PS); \textit{N.C.A.}, \textit{Supplement A}, pp. 331–3). Koch's explanation was that the forest was cleared so that the timber could be used for railway construction, and that those shot had been Partisans (\textit{I.M.T. Nuremberg}, xi. 507).
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. p. 503.
\textsuperscript{7} Kleist, pp. 183 and 317.
\textsuperscript{8} He alone of the top-ranking Nazi Ministers had never maintained a liaison officer at the Führerhauptquartier (ibid. p. 189).
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid. pp. 150–1.
personally to restore his dwindling authority. This he did in a letter of 12 October 1944, in which he asked the Führer either to give his Ministry the substance as well as the semblance of power in the east or to tell him quite frankly that his services were no longer required. In an enclosure to the letter he submitted a scheme (which Hitler apparently ignored completely) for enlisting the support of the eastern peoples in the struggle against Bolshevism by having the Reich Government formally recognize the ‘National Committees’ which were attached to his Ministry.¹

By this time, however, the Soviet armies were approaching the frontiers of the Reich, and Koch had left Równe to exhort the old men and children of East Prussia to make their last-ditch stand in the Volkssturm. In Volhynia and Galicia the Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.) and the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (U.P.A.) were engaged in a struggle to the death with both the Germans and the Russians. Elsewhere the curtain had descended upon the German régime with the Wehrmacht plundering the offices of the civil administration² and with the Ukrainian militia deserting, looting, and shooting any German who dared to interfere with them.³ In these last hours the Ukraine had passed through its second ordeal of scorched earth in little more than two years, for orders had been given to the German troops to leave ‘no house standing, no coal-mine that was not put out of action for years, no well that was not poisoned’ so that ‘only a country totally consumed by fire and destruction’ would fall into the hands of the advancing Russian armies.⁴

(vii) Partitioned Yugoslavia

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

(a) The ‘Independent’ State of Croatia

Before the middle of April 1941 the notorious terrorist, Ante Pavelić,⁵ was established as the Leader or Poglavnik of an inflated fascist Croat state, which was soon to include the whole of Bosnia with Syrmia right up to Belgrade while losing most of Dalmatia. On 16 April he nominated the ‘first Croatian National Government’ with himself as Premier and General

¹ I.M.T. Nuremberg, xli. 186–94 (Rosenberg 14).
² Reports to the Reich Commissioner and to the General Commissioner for Zhitomir, November-December 1943 (ibid. xxv. 324–9 (288 PS)).
³ Cf. for example, the incident described in the evacuation report of Gebietskommissar Steudel (ibid. xxvii. 472 (1702-PS)).
⁴ Himmler’s letter to Higher SS and Police Leader Ukraine, 7 September 1943 (ibid. xxxviii. 210 (007-NO)). In most places, of course, the German retreat was much too rapid for orders such as this to be carried out.
⁵ See Survey for 1934, p. 559, note 2. Further details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
Slavko Kvaternik as his Minister of Defence. The Bosnian Muslim leader, Osman Kulenović, succeeded by his brother Džafar in July, became Vice-Premier, and Artuković, who had been involved in preparing the murder of King Alexander in 1934, was appointed Minister of the Interior. Among the earliest legislation to be undertaken was the prohibition of the Cyrillic alphabet in Croatia and the differentiation of Croat nationals from Croat citizens, the latter of whom must be Aryan and innocent of previous ‘activities against the liberation efforts of the Croatian people’. Legal transactions with or between Jews were nullified even before the nomination of the Government.

There now existed the situation which Maček, the leader of the Croat Peasant Party, had had in mind at the time of his broadcast from his home in Kupinec on 8 April (he was thinking in terms of an inevitable period of Ustaša domination under German control). The Croats as a whole remained true to the Croat Peasant Party and condemned Pavelić as the agent of Mussolini. But time-servers preferred to be safely on the Axis side, and the Ustaša toughs who now emerged into the daylight terrified the population. Further, anti-Serb feeling was really very strong and the glowing fiction of regained Croatian independence after a thousand years’ servitude inevitably won applause. The Right Wing of the Peasant Party had often flirted with the Ustaše, and this perhaps encouraged Pavelić to suppose that he would succeed in either winning Maček to his side or in winning the Peasant Party away from Maček; upon this depended any hope of permanence for the new Croatian State.

Accordingly on 24 January 1942 the Poglavnik set up a Croat Council of State to include not only the Ustaša leaders and, of course, representatives of the German minority, but also the surviving Croat members of the last Sabor of 1918 and of the Skupština elected in 1938, together with other Croat Peasant Party leaders. At the same time a Labour Front was founded, and the rest of the fascist pattern was gradually filled in. The most positive performance of the Ustaša State was an atrocious series of

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1 Lenkin: *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p. 606. Kvaternik had married a daughter of the old pro-Austrian separatist leader, Dr. Frank, who was a Jew.

2 25 April 1941 (Lenkin, op. cit. p. 626).


4 14 April 1941 (Lenkin, op. cit. pp. 625–6).

5 Giano remarked on the cowboy atmosphere which prevailed at the Poglavnik’s court (see Giano: *Diario (1939–43)*, 7 May 1941).

6 When Pavelić met Giano at Venice on 16 December 1941 he showed anxiety to postpone the arrival of the Duke of Spoletto, the King-elect (to be crowned as Tomislav II), as long as possible (Giano: *Europa*, p. 706; Eng. version, p. 473). The Italian police both in December and in the following month advised against a visit by Giano to Zagreb (see Giano: *Diario (1939–43)*, 1 December 1941 and 5 January 1942).

7 Lenkin, op. cit. pp. 608–9; *Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler’s Europe*, p. 331. This Council of State was at first called the Sabor.

8 On 23 January 1942 (see Lenkin, op. cit. p. 623).
massacres; the Serbs in Bosnia, and Jews, wherever they were found, were the victims of the unbridled fury of the savage Praetorians of Pavelić, \(^1\) ably seconded by groups of Muslims from Bosnia; it was like a new religious war with Catholics and Muslims allied against the Orthodox and the Jews. It seemed little else but ironical that in the spring of 1942 the Poglavnik should establish a Croat Orthodox Church\(^2\) in order to control more tightly those Serbs who had survived the massacre.\(^3\)

If the Croats had hated the Serbs and had never loved the Jews, the deeds of the Ustaše genuinely shocked them. It was, however, the too obvious dependence of Pavelić upon Italy and Germany which prevented any real consolidation of his régime. The 'citizens' of his estate found it impossible to forgive the carving out of an Italian Dalmatia from their national territory, and the subjection of the foreign policy of Zagreb to that of Rome.\(^4\) At first few Croats had been anti-German, although small politically-minded groups had watched the activities of the German minority with misgivings for years. Now, in order to hold the necessary lines of communication, German troops commanded by General Glaise-Horstenau, a former imperial Austrian general, remained in occupation of all important Croat towns outside the Italian zones.\(^5\) This fact, coupled with the new privileges of the German Volksguppe in Croatia, provoked much irritation; no one had wished the Germans in Croatia to succeed to the power and privileges of the Serb officials of the days before the Sporazum (the August 1939 Agreement between the Serbs and the Croats).\(^6\) For Altgayer, the leader of the Volksguppe in Croatia, like Karmasin in Slovakia, acquired the powers of a Secretary of State in charge of German affairs and was responsible only to Pavelić. By the winter of 1941–2 anti-German resentment was further fortified by the receding probability of the final triumph of Hitler.

During the early months of 1942 the Croats in general began to become aware of small Partisan groups who were active in Bosnia; they were mostly Serbs who had risen in self-defence against the Ustaše, but they

\(^1\) The victims were often assembled at Glina where mass murders were carried out. The massacre at Glina is described in Stephen Clissold's Whirlwind (London, Cresset Press, 1949), pp. 94–96.

\(^2\) On 3 April 1942 (Lemkin, op. cit. p. 617).

\(^3\) By the Statute of 5 June 1942 (ibid. pp. 617–20, section 4) the use of Cyrillic was expressly forbidden even to the Croat Orthodox Church. The Poglavnik found no one willing to be Patriarch except a discredited White Russian priest called Hermogen.

\(^4\) Further details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis. In August 1941 the Italian troops moved in to Zone B, the demilitarized Croat hinterland of Dalmatia.

\(^5\) Glaise-Horstenau hated the Italians and was on the worst of terms with the German Minister, Siegfried Kasche, a young SS protégé of Ribbentrop. Already on 21 April 1941 Ciano had observed that Croatia 'to Ribbentrop's mind is a state very near to, even if it is not already actually a part of, the political and economic system of the Reich' (Ciano: Europa, p. 653; Eng. version, p. 436). See also Wissemann: Rome-Berlin Axis, pp. 273, 277.

\(^6\) Details of this agreement will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
were led by a Croat named Orešković; during the spring and summer their numbers were swollen by men who had escaped from the fighting farther south. On 20 July 1942 the Poglavnik found it necessary to proclaim a law to establish concentration camps in which to confine 'individual members of the family of persons who alone or as members of armed bands violate public order and safety'.¹ For Draža Mihailović,² who stood for the Great-Serb ideology against which they had rebelled, and for his Četnici who had formerly persecuted them on behalf of the authorities in Belgrade, the Croats could have no sympathy; indeed, as news dribbled in of the open collaboration between Četnici and Italians in Dalmatia,³ their feelings hardened on the one hand against the Italians who seemed to have deserted the Croats for the Serbs, and on the other against Mihailović and the Yugoslav Government in London by which he was backed. When later, after a series of agreements culminating in June 1942,⁴ the Ustaše openly came to terms with the Četnici, Croat feeling against Pavelić mounted. Meanwhile news had come of other guerrillas who were opposed to the Četnici. A good deal of mystery hung about the identity of their leader, Jošip Brož, called Tito,⁵ but gradually it became known that he himself was a Croat. Far from feeling enthusiasm for the Gothic descent which Ustaše propagandists offered them,⁶ the Croats were reminded by Russia’s resistance to Germany of their Pan-Slav loyalties. The Communist bogey seemed to have been overplayed, and, if Tito’s Partisans were friends to Russia, all the better. Croat peasants and some of the younger Peasant Party leaders began to disappear into the forests to form ‘cadres verts’ (as they were called) whose attitude towards the Partisans was friendly, even co-operative. The requisitioning of the harvest in the summer of 1942 stimulated the anger of the peasants against the Pavelić régime. This shook the loyalty of the Home Guard (Domobranstvo) which, except for the Ustaše officers, had lacked enthusiasm from its inception; it could never be trusted to fight the Partisans; when a contingent was sent to the eastern front, it did not show up well. The war against the Partisans at home was left to the Germans, both those from elsewhere and those on the spot who were enrolled in the Prinz Eugen SS divisions. Part of the German minority was indeed evacuated from Bosnia and south-west Croatia to the Reich in October 1942, no doubt to save it from the Partisans.⁷

All along Maček (who was in poor health) had remained passive and withdrawn, leaving Košutić in charge of Peasant Party activities. In order to isolate Maček and to prevent demonstrations in his favour, Ustaše guards were posted round his home at Kupinec, and this in its turn aroused

resentment. If there was to be a Poglavnik the peasants wished it to be Maček, not a stranger who treated Maček no better than the rulers in Belgrade had treated him. A few Peasant Party politicians attended the meetings of the Council of State, but they were not co-operative, indeed their history had made them expert obstructionists. Kvaternik had a son Eugen, nicknamed Dido, who was the head of the Ustaša secret police and, of course, worked with the Gestapo in Zagreb, and who now insisted upon a more totalitarian severity. On 25 August 1942 Košutić was arrested with many of his party colleagues including Pezelj, who had formerly held semi-Ustaša views. At the same time Toth, the Croat Minister of Industry and Commerce and a former follower of Maček, was disgraced—on account of German dissatisfaction with Croatia’s economic contribution to the Axis war effort, it was said. A Volksgruppe leader named Kraft took over much of Toth’s work as Director of Food.

The arrests had otherwise done nothing to end the impasse,¹ and it was now decided to make a fresh bid for Maček’s support. The Foreign Minister, Lorković, was sent to negotiate at Kupinec at the end of September, but Maček would make no concession. At this point it seems that the elder Kvaternik (now a Marshal), who had always been liè with the Germans rather than the Italians, denounced the Poglavnik to Hitler as incapable—as indeed he was—of mastering the situation in Croatia. Hitler appears to have notified Mussolini, and Casertano, the Italian Minister, hurried to see the Poglavnik on 30 October. It was decided that strong action was called for, all the more since the Italians were indignant over the tremendous pressure exerted by the Germans, partly through Kvaternik, in Zagreb, in flagrant contradiction of all the offers of a free hand in Croatia which the Germans had made to the Italians, and of the Italo-Croat treaties. That same evening Marshal Kvaternik left by air for Slovakia, on compulsory and indefinite sick-leave.² Pavlić took over the Ministry of Defence himself and appointed a new Chief of Staff, General Prpić; he also enlisted in his Cabinet the extreme Croat chauvinist, Mile Starčević. The Germans allowed all this to happen, but their hold was strengthened, nevertheless, as they gradually brought up fresh troops for their ‘Fourth Offensive’ against the Partisans.³

The autumn and winter were spent by Pavlić in feverishly reorganizing his régime; his efforts were as futile as those in a bad dream in which the victim sees each solution of his difficulties elude him at the last moment. The Council of State was remodelled, existing members of the Ustaša

¹ According to the rather obscure accounts in the press at the time the arrests followed Maček’s intransigence in September, but according to accounts which reached Switzerland directly in October 1942 through Peasant Party and other contacts they took place, as stated, on 25 August.
² Marshal Kvaternik’s retirement was not officially announced until 7 January 1943.
³ See below, p. 661.
organization deposed, and the control of the police and army placed in the hands of less branded persons, who, it was hoped, might prove both more efficient and less corrupt\(^1\) and unpopular. Ministers made a series of propaganda speeches, almost pleading for support.\(^2\)

On 1 March 1943 a Peasant Association was officially inaugurated; to this all peasants were to be compelled to belong. The authorities hoped to be able both to shake their allegiance to Maček and to curb their desertion to the forest battalions. It was also hoped to stimulate production, for the position by now was grave and Zagreb very near to starvation, while the infertile Lika district and Dalmatia were in a state of famine.

The efforts of the Poglavljenik were in vain—the heads of the hydra only multiplied. Already early in October 1942 the Partisans, with Tito himself in command, had been able to establish themselves at Bihać in Bosnia, disturbingly close at hand. There on 26 and 27 November they had held their first Anti-Fascist Vrće (council).\(^3\) The younger generation in Croatia was increasingly attracted by the activity of Tito rather than by the passivity of Maček, and the federal programme first enunciated at Bihać intensified this attraction. It was characteristic of the Croat situation that early in 1943 there was an Ustaša attempt upon Prpić’s life because he, a Domobransko general, was now in friendly contact with the Partisans. It was characteristic, too, that at much the same time the elderly Vladimir Nazor, Croatia’s best-known poet, joined Tito at Bihać. Meanwhile the Bosnian Muslims, who had been staunch supporters of Pavelić in the beginning, fell away. The Catholic Church became more openly critical. At first the lower clergy\(^4\) had favoured the Ustaše as champions of the Catholic against the Orthodox Church; Stepinač, the Archbishop of Zagreb, and most of the bishops were all along less friendly. In March 1943, when the last surviving Jews were ordered to report to the police (which suggested that they, like those before them, would be deported to Poland), the Archbishop protested forcibly.\(^5\) When on 27 April Pavelić was received by Hitler at Klessheim, even Hitler’s entourage observed that a mayor had never been received by the Head of a State with so much ceremony—even at Klessheim it was known that by now the Poglavljenik controlled little more than the city of Zagreb.\(^6\)

\(^1\) There were so many corruption scandals that in the spring of 1943 two senior officials were executed for corrupt offences.

\(^2\) The most talked-of of these speeches was that of Lorković at Sisak on 15 November 1942.

\(^3\) See below, p. 659. After this Pavelić had Maček brought to Zagreb for fear of a Partisan coup de main on Kupince.

\(^4\) Franciscan monks in Bosnia, for instance, sometimes fought at the side of the Ustaše. At an early stage the audience granted to Pavelić by the Pope on 19 May 1941 had made an impression. From the Vatican Pavelić had proceeded to visit Hitler.

\(^5\) On 14 March 1943 (Radio Vatican, 12 May 1943).

\(^6\) Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bahn, p. 552. Before this the Partisans sometimes held a suburb of Zagreb for a few days at a time. On 13 June 1943 the Anti-Fascist Council for Croatia
The fall of Mussolini and the surrender of Italy to the Allies appeared to give the Pavelić régime a new lease of life. Since the autumn of 1942 Italian influence had dwindled and the Poglavnik had been able to join Rumania and Slovakia more openly in their anti-Magyar agitation,¹ which was never very welcome to Rome. Now the Duke of Spoleto renounced the Croatian throne while Pavelić made haste to repudiate the Italian connexion and to ‘liberate’ the Italian province of Dalmatia; on this new basis he made fresh advances to the Croat Peasant Party to share governmental responsibility with him. Some of the Italian soldiers surrendered to official Croat troops, but, while Pavelić claimed Fiume and Istria, the substantial gains of the day went either to Hitler² or to Tito. As for Košutić, who was summoned to negotiate once more with the Poglavnik, he remained intransigent, and together with Torbar (a prominent leading member of the Croat Peasant Party) finally rejected the advances made to the party in a letter to Pavelić dated 30 September. Effective power was now concentrated in the hands of the German Minister, Kasche, who for his part distrusted Maček’s followers and condemned the new plans for co-operation with them. Yet, if the German hold was stronger, the Germans were more hated than ever at this stage because they brought two divisions of the German-trained army of Russian deserters under General Vlasov into Croatia where the so-called Cossacks ran amok.

Through the winter of 1943–4 and the summer of 1944 Pavelić clung miserably to the remnants of his power: he deputed the premiership to an elderly follower of Starčević called Mandić and felt himself compelled to make the germanophile Budak Foreign Minister. With the fall of Rome and the defection of Rumania the whole Balkan peninsula expected Allied forces to appear any day, and the major part of the Croat army prepared to give them a welcome. Indeed, at the beginning of September Vokić, the latest Minister of Defence, planned to turn upon the German troops in Zagreb. The Germans heard of this plot and thereupon forced Pavelić to arrest the most important of his last remaining colleagues; the position in Zagreb was now literally reduced to absurdity. In November an envoy from Pavelić actually brought a memorandum on Croatia’s rights to Allied Headquarters in Caserta, but like the rest this desperate attempt proved abortive.³ All kinds of fascist refugees now clustered round Zagreb and the macabre scene lingered on until on 4 May 1945 the last Germans withdrew and Pavelić took to flight, finally reaching South America by

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¹ See above, p. 615.
² According to Croat Peasant Party sources the Germans immediately co-operated with the Četnici they found in Dalmatia (see below, p. 663).
³ Clissold: Whirlwind, p. 222.
devious routes. A more tragic departure from Croatia at this time was that of Maček,¹ who had always chosen to share his people's fate until now.

(b) Serbia, Montenegro, the Banat, and Bačka: The Guerrilla War; Mihailović and Tito

The history of the Bačka and the Yugoslav Banat (together called the Voivodina by the Yugoslavs), the flat country lying north of the Danube, was comparatively uneventful between 1941 and 1944: this kind of terrain was easy for an occupation force to hold down. In the Bačka, towards the end of 1941, part of the Serb population became restive, and the Hungarian army retaliated with ferocity in the massacre at Novi Sad.² After this many Voivodina Serbs made their way south-westwards to Bosnia where they formed a division in the main Partisan army. As for the Banat, Hitler had hinted to Horthy that it, too, would revert to Hungary in due course, though his favourite, Antonescu, had asked to annex it to that part of the ancient Banat which had fallen to Rumania in 1918. In practice, however, it was, like Serbia proper, occupied by the German army, and, since it contained a fairly large German Volksgruppe, it was administered through these Germans on the spot.³ When the Nedić government was established at Belgrade it appointed a local German, Sepp Lapp, as Vizebanus (Vice-Governor) of the Banat. This man was chosen with the approval of Dr. Sepp Janko, leader of the Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und Serbien, and was practically given a free hand to appoint whom he liked in Banat territory: his position was similar to that of Altgayer in Croatia or the German Führer in Hungary and Rumania, but he had the additional advantage of having a specific area under his—and the German army's—rule.

In Serbia the second half of April and the whole of May 1941 were a time of indescribable confusion while the German authorities struggled to consolidate their position. Only a small group of Serb fascists organized themselves in their party, the Žbor, and, led by the elderly Ljotić, offered them support.⁴ For the Serbs are people who do not accept defeat, and important parts of the lands in which they live are mountainous and wild; further, the proclaimed policy of the Germans and Ustaša Croats, which sounded something like the extermination of the Serbs, gave them the

¹ According to the French Consul in Zagreb, Pavlić left in the same convoy as Maček, evidently hoping that Maček's presence might provide him with protection. The French Consul had informed Maček that his life was in danger from the Communists.
² See above, p. 617.
³ Teleki had anticipated the creation of a German state of this kind. (Further details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.) See U.S.A., Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch. Civil Affairs Handbook, Germany, Section 2F, German Military Government over Europe, pp. 40-42. Also Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 602–6, quoting from Amtsblatt der serbischen Ministerien, 11 June-4 July, 1941.
⁴ For relations between Ljotić and Mihailović see The Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović (Belgrade, 1946), pp. 282–3.
courage of despair. Fractions of the defeated army, with such weapons as they could save, took refuge in the mountains of Šumadija in western Serbia; there Colonel Draža Mihailović, with a mixed following, reached the plateau of Ravna Gora on 11 May 1941. Various groups of Ćetnici, armed bands (formerly supported by the Karageorgević régime) which had spasmodically terrorized the country in the inter-war period, looked to his leadership; this was obviously inspired by the Great-Serb chauvinism of the politically aggressive cliques of officers whose ambitions had formerly centred in the organizations of the Black or the White Hand. The formal head of the Ćetnici, a hero of the First World War, Kosta Pečanac, at this time raised his standard in the Leskovac region farther to the southeast. Other groups of soldiers withdrew to the mountains of Montenegro, the most forbidding of all, and subject to the less efficient control of the Italians.

At the same time the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was laying its plans. It was not in itself either large or powerful. Since 1937, however, it had been reorganized by a particularly able Croatian Secretary-General, usually known as Tito, who worked mostly from Zagreb; with the establishment of the Ustaša régime in Croatia, he transferred himself to Belgrade early in May 1941. His most able political helpers, probably, were the Serb Ranković and the Slovene Kardelj. Later the staff and commanders of his army were mostly Yugoslavs who had fought against Franco in Spain. The role of the Communists in Yugoslavia between the German attack upon Belgrade and the German invasion of Russia was hotly disputed at the time and later. Their most violent enemies accused them of complete inactivity, while the Communist journalist, Dedijer, claimed in his diary to have received the party's first war-time leaflet in Belgrade on 12 April 1941 with an appeal 'to all its best sons to defend their country against Hitler'.

With the German attack upon Russia on 22 June 1941 a wave of emotion swept over Yugoslavia, comparable in its intensity with that which had brought about the Belgrade coup d'état three months earlier, but much wider in its scope. Once again Russia was the hope of the Yugoslavs, and they rose up against the Germans in an as yet incoherent revolt or series of revolts from July until the Germans counter-attacked in November. At first Serb fighters instinctively joined Mihailović or the other Ćetni commanders, since the Ćetnici were essentially Serb and—which came t

1 Clissold: Whirlwind, p. 57.
2 Tito had had a good deal to do with arranging their transport, though it is not known the he ever went to Spain himself.
3 He claims, further, that by 22 June the Serb Communists had ‘the core of five Odreds [sm: fighting groups] ready’ (Basil Davidson: Partisan Picture (Bedford, Bedford Books, 1946), p. 8 Dedijer: With Tito through the War, p. 28).
4 Details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
the same thing—attached to the Orthodox Church. The Communist Party was the best organized from the beginning; it hoped to lead this great wave of resistance to Russia's enemies. In September Tito established his military headquarters near Užice, not far from Ravna Gora, and asked for a meeting with Mihailović; the two men met for the first time at Struganik and agreed rather vaguely to work together against the occupiers: there were difficulties about the rank of the Communist officers who had mostly been non-commissioned officers in the former Royal Army. But it was the Communist, and not the Četnik, leader who wished for an all-out effort, and this gave his movement a zeal and an attraction which brought a rush of recruits. It was Tito's Partisan formations which entered Užice on 24 September 1941. In this small town there was also a small light-arms factory, and the problem of equipping the insurgents could be faced; the factory supplied both Četnici and Partisans. Soon afterwards the Germans replied to Partisan activities by the massacre of some 7,000 inhabitants of the Serb town of Kragujevac on 21 October. Six days later Tito met Mihailović again at Braići, but, although the latter then accepted the offers of Tito, at the beginning of November he withdrew his followers from the combined patriot force which was to have attacked the Germans in Kraljevo, and arranged to try to scise Užice from the Partisans. The Germans were preparing for their first offensive against the insurgents, and their task was greatly facilitated by the conflict which had thus arisen between Četnici and Partisans.

This tragic quarrel was a dominant theme in the history of Yugoslavia from now on: it led, indeed, to the bitterest and maddest of all such disputes. There were patriots and ruffians on both sides, but there were certain clear issues between them. Mihailović's motives were (1) dread of the extermination of the Serbs which was foreshadowed by the massacre at Kragujevac and the German and Ustaša policy of reprisals; and (2) fear of revolutionary change. The second motive meant that he stood for the return of the Karagorgević régime, the character of which had been shaped by King Alexander. The latter had made the régime, or allowed it to become, on the one hand, an over-centralized Serb tyranny over the other Yugoslavs, and, on the other, a corrupt and socially negative system. When the Partisans occupied a town or a village even for a short time they established something quite different, a village committee for which the

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1 Clissold: Whirlwind, p. 68.
2 Ibid. p. 66. Tito: Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [referred to hereafter as Tito: Report] (Belgrade, 1948), pp. 76-77. Kragujevac was an important munitions centre and thus had, for Serbia, an unusually big industrial population.
3 Dedijer in his Diary says 26 October. Tito himself referred to 27 October, see his Report, p. 73.
4 Ibid. p. 75.
5 There were abortive meetings between their leaders at Čačak on 27 November 1941, and on two other occasions (Clissold, op. cit. pp. 72-73).
peasants often felt respect; its directives seemed to be just, and to be based upon the idea that a place should be managed more for the benefit of those who lived in it, however poor, and less for those who were smart in exploiting other people; the Partisan slogan of 'Death to Fascism, Freedom to the people' did not seem to mean anything more complicated than that. Yugoslav peasants are not violently individualistic, and the idea of communal village organization did not necessarily alarm them, since many village communities were like—or indeed were—large families. The frightening thing about the Partisans was their uncompromising policy of 'attack the enemy wherever and however you can', which led to appalling German reprisals, the shooting of the men by the hundred for the death of one German, and the burning down of the villages, sometimes with the women and children locked alive in the church. Since Tito's strategy was one of extreme mobility, to hold a village while he attacked the enemy's lines of communication nearby, and then to disperse his people when the enemy struck back, the inhabitants of the village were left defenceless unless they, too, joined the Partisans. Once mastered by the fear of reprisals and suspicion of the Partisans, Mihailović and his Četnici became militarily inactive while they searched for political 'accommodation'. It was at the end of August 1941 that Nedić had agreed to head an ostensibly obedient Serb 'Government of National Salvation' in Belgrade. It was claimed for him that he, too, was a patriot of the Pétain type who wished only to gain time in order to preserve his race. Certainly he and Mihailović had a good deal in common and made use of one another as it suited them, while Pećanac, the official head of the Četnik organization, openly supported Nedić.

Thus towards the end of the year the Germans were helped both by Nedić and by various Četnik groups in their attack upon the Partisan forces in Serbia, which were thrown back, some into the Sanjak of Novipazar, but more particularly into Hercegovina and Bosnia. In Bosnia Ustaša atrocities had been such as to prepare something of a welcome for the Partisans, and they withstood a further German-Ustaša attack upon them in eastern Bosnia in January 1942.

Simultaneously with the first Serb rising against the Germans the Montenegrins had risen against the Italians. On 12 July 1941, with

1 Of course, the peasants everywhere dreaded the foraging which the arrival of any of the major and minor armies involved.
3 This is hotly denied by Martin (op. cit. p. 157), but affirmed by most of the authorities with first-hand knowledge of the situation, such as Glisold.
4 The Partisans called this the First Enemy Offensive.
5 See section on Croatia above, pp. 648-55.
6 Subsequently termed the Second Enemy Offensive.
Italian backing, the Montenegrin separatists (the Zelenaši or ‘Greens’) had called a National Assembly at Cetinje, but on the very next day the majority of the people rose against them and the Italian occupation was very seriously threatened.\(^1\) The Italian Military Governor, General Pirzio Biroli, therefore came to terms with the local Četnik leaders, Stanisić and Djurišić, the latter a personal friend of Mihailović,\(^2\) and gave them to understand that he would leave the mountains to them provided they did not interfere with the Italian garrisons in the towns of Cetinje, Nikšić, and Podgorica. The fighting swayed backwards and forwards, and the conflict between Partisans on the one side and Četnici and Italians on the other merged into the savage tribal feuds of Montenegro. In February 1942 the Partisans ‘with typical Montenegrin exuberance’ proclaimed liberated Montenegro an integral part of the U.S.S.R.\(^3\) The reaction against this step enabled Pirzio Biroli and the Četnik chiefs to turn upon the Reds in what the latter called the Third Enemy Offensive in the spring of 1942, and to drive them out;\(^4\) Mihailović for the time being moved his headquarters to Upper Lipovo in Montenegro.\(^5\) At last in June Tito himself led the defeated Montenegrin and other Partisans from Hercegovina up to western Bosnia. The mountains of Serbia and Montenegro were left for the time being to Četnik leaders who were sometimes independent of Mihailović’s control. A few Partisan groups were left hidden here and there. The towns and major lines of communication remained in the hands of German or Italian troops.

Tito reached a suitable operational centre at Bihać only at the beginning of October 1942. By this time the Partisans had gained control of a large part of Bosnia and held the Lika uplands to the north-west. Tito decided to summon an assembly of representatives of the Yugoslav peoples at Bihać; the majority were Communists from the now liberated territories, but other regions were represented, and several other points of view—indeed, the assembly was presided over by Dr. Ivan Ribar, an elderly Croat democrat from Belgrade, who had also presided over the parliamentary session in Belgrade in 1921 when the suppression of the original Yugoslav Communist Party was voted. The Anti-Fascist Council (or Veće) of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (A.V.N.O.J.)\(^6\) sat on 26 and 27 November 1942. It was regarded as the central organ of government in liberated territory, whose function it was to co-ordinate the activities of

\(^1\) Tito: Report, p. 57. The July rising in Montenegro was organized by the ‘original’ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Moša Pijade, and by the Montenegrin, Djilas.

\(^2\) Clissold: Whirlwind, p. 88. See also The Trial of Mihailović, p. 284.

\(^3\) Clissold, op. cit. p. 84. ‘Tito condemned this step (Report, p. 107).

\(^4\) Cf. Tito (op. cit. p. 84) who says they withdrew for lack of ammunition.

\(^5\) Clissold, op. cit. p. 88; but Mihailović himself avoided active co-operation with the enemy probably until early in 1943. He allowed his representatives to come to terms with the Ustaše as early as June 1942. See p. 651 above.

the numbers of new local bodies through which Communist officials were following up liberation with political education. It also issued a six-point programme, whose second point guaranteed private property and individual initiative, and whose third postponed all radical change until after the holding of democratic elections. The sixth point, however, was the most important: 'The National Liberation Movement fully recognises the national rights of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, and all other regions. . . . It guarantees that the national rights of all the peoples of Yugoslavia will be preserved.' After the inter-racial massacres, it was the hope Tito offered of genuine Yugoslav federation which increasingly attracted to his movement men and women of the most various views. News of the Bihać assembly was broadcast by the Soviet-controlled 'Free Yugoslavia' wireless at a time when the B.B.C. still sang the praises of Mihailović.

The exiled Yugoslav Government in London had at first continued under the premiership of General Simović, but of all governments in exile it was possibly the most trouble-making. While its Croat members showed their natural truculence, its Serb members gave vent to their hatred of the Croats, and carried on the worst traditions of Belgrade; their habits and prejudices were exploited by some of their more chauvinist diplomats and soldiers. Not long after Mihailović had established wireless contact with London Professor Slobodan Jovanović became Prime Minister and Mihailović was promoted General and War Minister (January 1942). As the one Minister on Yugoslav territory he thus became King Peter's only representative there, and much of the Serb population was affected by the prestige of this role. The B.B.C., as a matter both of courtesy and policy, was bound to try to support the exiled Government, whose representatives exploited their position by using their own codes to send anti-Croat and anti-Communist messages of which the British could not have approved. The B.B.C. was also used to describe the heroic actions of General Mihailović after he had decided upon a course which involved inaction or intermittent collaboration with the Italians, and indirectly with the Germans, against the Communists, the ultimate enemies of all his own values. It should, perhaps, be repeated that Mihailović's control over many Četnik leaders was ineffectual—he had nothing like Tito's centralized organization—and men like Jevdjević, the dexterous Serb lawyer from Hercegovina, negotiated with Pirzio Biroli on their own.

2 See above, p. 653, and below, pp. 671-2.
3 Further details will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
5 Clissold, op. cit. p. 127.
6 This may be inferred from the evidence he gave at his trial, which seemed to show that he often did not know to what other Četnik leaders had agreed (The Trial of Mihailović, especially pp. 285-9).
7 Jevdjević persuaded the Italians to supply food to Hercegovina at a very critical time.
On 22 January 1943\(^1\) the Axis forces launched a more serious offensive, which the Germans called ‘Operation White’, against the embryonic state whose existence had been proclaimed at Bihać two months before. The gravest of all Tito’s problems was that he had neither aeroplanes nor anti-aircraft guns with which to reply to the Luftwaffe.\(^2\) In this ‘Fourth Offensive’ Mihailović and important Ćetnik bands, together with some Ustaša forces, for the first time fought openly ‘as part of a large-scale operation jointly planned by the Axis Command’.\(^3\) Tito chose to give battle in the Neretva valley, and a long and extremely critical fight was waged between Ćetnici and Partisans at Konjic,\(^4\) the Partisans suffering terrible losses. Finally the Ćetnici broke and fled. While the Partisans were ‘progressive’ and clean-shaven (when possible), the Ćetnici had cultivated tradition and bushy beards. The Ćetnik rank and file now begged razors from the villagers they met, and if they could shave in time they often deserted to the Partisans. By the end of April the ‘Fourth Offensive’ had abated. The Partisans had survived it, while the fighting had gravely discredited the soldiers of Mihailović. The Bihać programme had thus acquired a new significance at home as well as abroad.

It was already embarrassing enough for the British that the B.B.C. should be expected by the Yugoslav Government in Exile to make pronouncements in direct contradiction of the news broadcast by their Russian ally. Moreover, it was rapidly becoming ridiculous, and therefore injurious, to do so, since it was increasingly evident that the Russians and the Yugoslav Partisans were right when they claimed that Mihailović was collaborating with the enemy against whom Tito was desperately fighting. When during ‘Operation White’ Mihailović moved his headquarters he refused to allow Colonel Bailey and the British mission accredited to him since 1941 to accompany him,\(^5\) and by now it was clear that such material aid as he had received from the British had either been hoarded or used to fight the battles of the Axis. Meanwhile the Bihać programme harmonized with the avowed war aims of the British. It was decided to send British officers to Tito’s headquarters (now in Montenegro) to report, and during the night of 28–29 May 1943 Captain Bill Stuart and Captain F. W. Deakin\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Tito: Report, p. 95. Clissold (op. cit. p. 125) says 15 January. Dedijer (With Tito Through the War, p. 257) says 20 January. The offensive was prefaced by an order from Keitel (16 December 1942) advocating the utmost brutality in fighting the Partisans (I.M.T. Nuremberg, xxxix. 128–9 (066–UK); Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 333).

\(^2\) Fitzroy Maclean: Eastern Approaches (London, Cape, 1949), p. 333. Another acute problem in mobile Partisan warfare was the transport of the wounded.

\(^3\) H. Seton-Watson: The East European Revolution, p. 128.


\(^5\) See Bailey’s statement of 14 June 1946 quoted by H. Seton-Watson in The East European Revolution, p. 128, note 2. In 1941 the British mission was led by Captain Hudson: Colonel Bailey arrived on Christmas Day 1942.

\(^6\) This officer has supplied valuable information for the compilation of this account.
were dropped there by parachute. Other minor missions arrived soon after, including in August that of Basil Davidson, who worked his way to the Bačka to stimulate resistance there.\(^1\) From about this time material support from the Allies to Mihailović came to an end, although their missions remained with him for a time.

The unfortunate Četnik leader was now to be condemned on both sides. Hitler and the Nazi Party had never approved of the co-operation with many Četnik leaders which a number of Reichswehr officers, like the Italian High Command, had found convenient. From November 1942 the Führer was obsessed with the possibility of an Allied invasion of Europe which he expected in the Balkan peninsula.\(^2\) From this time on Hitler unconditionally condemned all collaboration with the Četnici. It was on 16 February 1943, not long after the launching of ‘Operation White’, that he wrote a tremendous letter to Mussolini in which he warned him to beware of Mihailović.\(^3\) He was informed, he wrote, that vast preparations were being made by the Četnici to destroy or disarm the Italian forces in Hercegovina and Montenegro, and that Anglo-Saxon efforts to bring about collaboration between the Communists and the followers of Mihailović were making further progress. He had therefore given orders, he said, to suppress all the Mihailović troops.\(^4\) This letter of Hitler’s was delivered to Mussolini by Ribbentrop on 24 February and its contents were suitably emphasized by the Reich Foreign Minister. The Duce protested that the Germans themselves had made use of the Četnici, and in a letter to Hitler written on 9 March, while he grudgingly accepted the Führer’s orders, he added with obvious relish that he had just received fresh news that the Reichswehr was still arming the Četnici.\(^5\) Later in March Hitler asked Kállay for Hungarian troops to occupy a line between Bulgaria and Serbia.\(^6\)

After the failure of the Axis Fourth Offensive Hitler was more determined than ever. He wrote Mussolini on 19 May a furious attack upon the pro-Četnik policy of Pirzio Biroli and insisted that the Četnici must be disarmed.\(^7\) He had also seen to it that a fresh attack, more specifically prepared for the task of destroying guerrillas in mountainous country, should be launched against Tito. Thus Deakin and Stuart arrived shortly after the beginning of the Fifth Axis Offensive in Montenegro; in the course

\(^1\) See Davidson: *Partisan Picture*.


\(^3\) *Hitler e Mussolini*, p. 133.


\(^5\) So late as 9 April 1943 the German military authorities posted up a notice in the important Bosnian town of Banja Luka referring to the confidence they had shown in the Četnici. (In this case the Četnik commander, Rade Radić, was meant.) At the same time it complained of breaches of agreements and of Četnik connexions with Partisans. Banja Luka was the town where Pavelić had established the Supreme Court of Croatia on 7 January 1942.

\(^6\) Although this was before the Bulgarian Partisans had any importance, Kállay refused.

\(^7\) Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 298. The Četnik leader, Djurišić, and his men had already been disarmed and sent to internment in Germany.
of this fighting Tito and Deakin were wounded together on 9 June. Tito broke through the enemy ring in an unexpected direction, that is into north-east Bosnia, and in the middle of July the enemy gave up this latest attempt. By now the Italians were more demoralized than ever by the news of the Allied landing in Sicily, and the Germans were faced with an important Russian counter-offensive on the eastern front.

Here it should perhaps be pointed out that the arrival of the British missions to the Partisans had by no means simplified the political pattern in Yugoslavia in 1943. Tito was highly suspicious of British aims in the Balkans; in the case of an Allied invasion at this time Mihailović would probably have switched over to support it against the Axis, while the Partisans would have pursued the opposite policy in order to resist the 'British and American imperialists'. It was a Balkan tradition, as men like Brigadier Maclean (soon to be seconded to Tito’s headquarters) appreciated, to react to every opportunity without losing sight of ultimate aims.

At the end of the first week of September the Italian capitulation was announced. Tito resented the fact that he had not been forewarned by the British. Thus, without the initial advantage for which he might have hoped, he was left to scramble for the spoils with Pavelić and the Germans. The Dalmatian territory which Pavelić now claimed from Italy, like the mountainous areas of his shadow Kingdom, fell into Partisan hands. On the other hand Tito was still too weak to hold the important Dalmatian port of Split - he could only clear out the arms it contained before the Germans arrived. Many Italian soldiers went over to the Partisans, but the Germans soon afterwards annexed Trieste with Istria, and occupied the chief ports all down the coast.

During this same month (September 1943) Tito received more formal recognition from Britain with the arrival of Brigadier Maclean (with a larger personnel) to co-ordinate the earlier missions. Maclean soon agreed with Deakin and the others that the Partisans who, he reckoned, were holding down twelve or more divisions, were worth helping seriously, and he set about trying to arrange before all else the air support which Tito so acutely needed. Late in October the Germans attacked the Partisans again, with some support also from the Bulgarians and from Ustaša and Nedić troops. This Sixth Offensive petered out like the rest.

Tito’s High Command had been established at Jajce in Bosnia since

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1 See Clissold: *Whirlwind*, p. 151, for Velebit’s negotiations with the Germans (in spite of Hitler) in Zagreb in the spring of 1943. Tito seems also to have been in touch with a German Communist at German headquarters (see ibid, p. 129). See also Martin: *Ally Betrayed*, p. 132, on collaboration between Italians and Partisans—he quotes German sources a great deal.

2 Clissold, op. cit. p. 158.

3 Ibid. p. 159.

4 See above, p. 332.

5 See below, p. 671.


25 August 1943. On 29 November, a year after the Bihać session and in spite of the fresh German attack, the Partisan leader assembled the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation again. In the speech he then addressed to it he attacked not Draža Mihailović alone, but the whole exiled Government, including the King.1 Wherever one’s sympathies might lie there was no doubt that Tito’s authority was now based on greater reality than that of King Peter II. The Jajce Veće passed a resolution transferring the authority of the Government in Exile to itself as ‘the supreme executive and legislative body of the Yugoslav State’, and forbidding the King to return to Yugoslavia; ‘the question of King and monarchy will be settled by the people by its own will after the liberation of the country’. The assembly further conferred the title of Marshal upon Tito and elected a provisional government—the National Committee of Liberation—with Tito as Premier, three vice-premiers, and thirteen ‘trustees’ charged with departmental duties.2 At Jajce the Anti-Fascist Veće also proclaimed a ‘Decision on the Federative Organization of Yugoslavia’: its second paragraph ran as follows:

In order that Yugoslavia may be the true home of all its people, and no longer an arena for the machinations of reactionary influences, Yugoslavia is being built up on a federal principle which will ensure full equality for the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina.3

The last three had been added since the meeting of the Veće at Bihać. At the same time it was made clear that Slovenia was to include all Slovene-inhabited territory plus Trieste, and that the word Macedonia would be generously interpreted. The Kremlin, it seems, feared that the performance at Jajce had been too bold.4 In fact it had made more evident that something of permanence was likely to be achieved by the Yugoslav Partisans.

Allied and especially British help to Tito could only become effectual as the winter of 1943-4 passed.5 A Russian military mission at last arrived on 22 February 1944, but little material help came from the U.S.S.R.6 From April 1944 supplies of all kinds arrived from the West, and the problem of the Partisan wounded was partly solved by evacuating the worst cases by air. The Germans now tried to beat the Partisans at their own game; they formed shock brigades and attempted what Tito called

1 Clissold: Whirlwind, pp. 178-80.
5 Maclean: Eastern Approaches, pp. 460-1.
6 Pijade, loc. cit.
'the tactic of rapid penetration and deconcentration of troops'. They also made sharp surprise attacks by air, intended to eliminate the key Partisan leaders. On 25 May 1944 a German parachutist attack on Tito's headquarters at Drvar (in Bosnia) was successful in capturing that town, and a good deal of territory including some of the islands. Tito himself narrowly escaped, and was then evacuated to Italy by a force of sixteen Allied aircraft out of which he chose the only Russian plane for his personal conveyance. His headquarters from now until the autumn were established on the Yugoslav island of Vis which was defended by a joint Yugoslav and British force; here Brigadier Maclean remained with him until the middle of August.

Meanwhile Mihailović and some of the other Četnik chiefs still held positions in Serbia and eastern Montenegro. It has been seen that they had already been discredited by their open collaboration with the enemy but still more by their own inactivity. In October 1943 the British induced Mihailović to destroy an important bridge near Všegrad. Otherwise the Četnici were evasive; they seemed to prefer political intrigue to sabotage, while there were increasingly frequent defections, not only to the Partisans, but also to the Germans or to Ljotić. Too late Mihailović tried to compete with Tito by extending his contacts and by liberalizing his programme. He made advances to Pavčić and attempted to strengthen his links with General Rupnik in Slovenia; he appealed to the Hungarian and to other foreign governments for co-operation against Communism. Towards the end of January 1944 Mihailović called a political congress at Ba in Serbia, enlisting the support of a Socialist named Topalović, with next to no following, to moderate the traditional tones of the Četnici. This Congress of St. Sava voted for a halfway decentralization, going back to the 1918 conception of the Triune Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and emphasized its allegiance to the Monarchy.

In June 1943 the Yugoslav Premier in exile, Professor Jovanović, had

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1 Tito: Report, p. 97. These German operations were called the Seventh Offensive by the Partisans; it proved to be the last.
3 From at least 1943 onwards Croat Peasant Party leaders claimed that while the acquiescent Serbs enjoyed Italian and German favour, they, the Croats, were causing the Axis Powers constant anxiety. It is true that although the Serbs, both in Serbia and Bosnia, had started the whole Resistance Movement, the Italians and Germans after 1941 had less trouble in Serbia than in Croatia-cum-Bosnia. It is difficult to be certain, but Seton-Watson is probably correct when he says: 'Only from the end of 1943 did Croats join the Partisan forces in considerable numbers' (op. cit. p. 130, note 3).
4 A defection of importance in May 1944 was that of Đurić, the chief Četnik leader in southern Serbia, where Macedonian Partisans were beginning to advance. Đurić went over to Tito. See above, p. 655.
5 See Martin: Ally Betrayed, pp. 190-1; Clissold, op. cit. p. 200.
resigned. He was succeeded by Trifunović and then by the former Minister in Paris, Purić, who insisted upon the retention of Mihailović as Minister of War, and refused to be shaken by the Decisions of Jajce. It was not until 1 June 1944 that British pressure\(^1\) induced the King and his advisers to come to terms with the facts; on that day the Croat Dr. Ivan Šubašić was appointed Prime Minister by King Peter. Dr. Šubašić, who had been Governor of Croatia until 1941, had kept aloof from the intrigues of the other exiles and had openly expressed sympathy for the Partisans. He immediately prepared to pay a visit to Tito at Vis. This took place from 14 to 17 June 1944 and a compromise was reached with remarkable speed on 16 June. Šubašić promised that his Government would do everything it could to work with the National Committee of Liberation, and both sides agreed that ‘the final solution of the organisation of the State shall be decided by the people after the liberation of the whole country’.\(^2\)

In August 1944 Marshal Tito was invited to visit General Maitland Wilson at Caserta General Headquarters to discuss the co-ordination of military plans in Italy and Yugoslavia. Churchill arrived in Italy shortly afterwards and invited Tito to meet him at General Wilson’s villa outside Naples on 12 August. The meeting, with Velebit to support Tito and Olga Ninčić as interpreter,\(^3\) was generally counted a success. Churchill was encouraging, but made it clear that the British Government could only accord formal recognition to the National Committee of Liberation if it came to some kind of terms with the King. He also expressed a hope that Communism would not later be introduced into Yugoslavia, and Tito denied the intention of doing so.\(^4\) Before he returned from Italy to Vis the Marshal saw Dr. Šubašić again. Upon his return he published a declaration\(^5\) on behalf of the National Committee insisting upon its ‘one single important aim: to fight against the occupiers and their lackeys and build up a federative, democratic Yugoslavia, and not—as our enemies accuse us—the aim of introducing Communism’. The declaration continued with references to the agreement with Šubašić, and concluded with an expression of gratitude for the help received from ‘our great Allies, Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union’. Just before this the Yugoslav Government in London had published a statement calling on ‘all our people to rally in a United Fighting Front under

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\(^1\) The British mission had been finally withdrawn from Mihailović in May 1944.

\(^2\) These statements were not published until August—see Free Europe, 8 September 1944, pp. 74–75; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 335; cf. Tito: Report, pp. 113 seqq.

\(^3\) Velebit had become Tito’s chief liaison officer with the British and had been to London with Brigadier Maclean in the spring. Olga Ninčić was the Communist daughter of the former Foreign Minister, who had also held office in the Yugoslav Government in London.


\(^5\) Free Europe, 8 September 1944, p. 75; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939–46, ii: Hitler’s Europe, p. 337.
the command of Marshal Tito', and promising 'to concentrate all its strength on the building-up of the internal peace of the future democratic and federal Yugoslavia...'. On 26 August a Royal Yugoslav decree was issued bringing to an end the headquarters of the High Command under General Mihailović. At about this time Brigadier Maclean went to Serbia with Tito's General Žujović to stimulate the swing-over 'away from the Četniks' policy of compromise and inactivity and into sympathy with the total war of the Partisans'. The coup d'état in Rumania created another part of the new background to the scene of battle; it accelerated the Russian approach.

In the first week of September came the first signs of German retreat. There followed the change-over in Bulgaria which brought the Bulgarian army to Tito's side. On 12 September King Peter broadcast from London an appeal for unity under Tito, and this at last reconciled the royalism of many Serb peasants with support of the Partisans—it did not, naturally, carry conviction to the opponents of the Monarchy, either Communist or Croat. The course of British relations with Tito still, however, failed to run smooth, for on 19 September the Marshal annoyed his best British friends by completely disappearing from Vis. It was afterwards revealed that he had been in Moscow to meet Stalin for the first time; when Brigadier Maclean got news of him he was back in Yugoslavia—in the Voivodina.

From now on the Germans withdrew as quickly as they could, not without heavy fighting between them and the Partisans, reinforced by the troops of the U.S.S.R. It was on 20 October 1944 that the Russians and Yugoslav Partisans drove the Germans out of Belgrade and with them, Ljotić and Nedić: Mihailović with some last followers withdrew to Bosnia. Tito arrived in the Yugoslav capital a day or so after its liberation, and was joined there by Šubašić and Velebit, who had just arrived from London. By 1 November a preliminary agreement had been worked out between Tito and Šubašić, and the latter left for Moscow, this time in the company of Kardelj. On 7 December Šubašić, having flown back to Belgrade, signed the agreement with Tito. Its main provision was for a Regency Council to be formed as sponsor to a provisional government, pending a plebiscite on the question of whether the King should return. An annex dated 7 December provided for free elections within three months of the country's liberation. The Anti-Fascist Council was to

1 Ibid. pp. 74–75 and 336–7 respectively.  
2 Maclean, op. cit. p. 478.  
3 See above, p. 627.  
4 See above, p. 628.  
5 Maclean, op. cit. p. 501.  
6 Tito: Report, p. 104.  
7 Maclean, op. cit. pp. 504 seqq.  
8 Mihailović was captured in March 1946, and tried for treason and shot, by order of the Yugoslav Government, on 17 July 1946.  
10 Ibid.
function as legislature until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. When, however, Šubašić returned to London to gain King Peter’s consent the King made every difficulty. Thereupon anti-monarchist demonstrations were encouraged in Belgrade and Churchill, addressing the House of Commons on 18 January 1945, expressed approval of the Tito-Šubašić agreement, and added that ‘if we were so unfortunate as not to be able to obtain the consent of King Peter, the matter would have, in fact, to go ahead, his assent being presumed’.¹ The King’s reaction to this snub was to announce on 22 January 1945² that he had lost confidence in Šubašić and to hint at direct negotiation between himself and Tito; on the following day the Tito-Šubašić agreement of 1 November 1944 was published in London. After unconciliatory speeches from Tito in Belgrade, the King made it up with Šubašić, and lengthy discussions began as to who the three Regents were to be. It was only on 12 February, when the Yalta communiqué stated³ that Tito and Šubašić would be advised to put their agreement into effect immediately, and failed to mention King Peter, that the latter surrendered over the Regency question, and Šubašić and his colleagues hurried off to Belgrade.

At last the three Regents were chosen on 2 March 1945:⁴ the Serb Srdjan Budisavljević (one of the Ministers who had resigned on 20 March 1941),⁵ the Croat Ante Mandić,⁶ and the Slovene Dušan Sernec; they were sworn in three days later when Tito tendered the resignation of the Committee of National Liberation to Dr. Ribar, the President of the Anti-Fascist Council, and was immediately asked to form a new government. This he proceeded to do on 7 March. His Cabinet consisted of eight Croats, six Serbs from Serbia and six from elsewhere in the country, four Slovenes, two Macedonians, one Montenegrin, one Bosnian Moslem; it included six members of the last Yugoslav Government in Exile, with Šubašić as Foreign Minister and Grol as one Deputy Premier. The other Deputy Premier was Kardelj. Other Communist Ministers were Žujović (Finance), Hebrang (Industry), and Djilas, who became Minister for Montenegro. The important post of Minister of the Interior went to the Partisan priest Žecević, while Ranković worked behind the scenes.⁷ In a

² The Times, 23 January 1945.
⁴ Tito’s position had been further fortified by a visit from Field Marshal Alexander towards the end of February. It should also be noted that at Yalta the Big Three recommended to Tito the extension of his Anti-Fascist Assembly so as to include members of the last Skupština who were free from the taint of collaboration.
⁵ Details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
⁶ Not the Starčevist (see above, p. 654), but a lawyer from Istria.
⁷ For Tito’s attitude to the Provisional Government see his Report to the Communist Party three years later, pp. 121–2.
broadcast on 9 March Tito again asserted that private property and private initiative would be safeguarded, although a form of government control was necessary for the time being. After a great deal of bickering over the supervision of UNRRA distribution, UNRRA relief was beginning to reach the famine-stricken country. By now Pavelić in Croatia and Rupnik in Slovenia\(^1\) were within a few weeks of flight, and then apart from the question of the Austrian frontier only that of Trieste would remain; in the meantime Tito, Velebit, and Kardelj took every opportunity to assert their claims to advance the Yugoslav frontier to the Isonzo at the least.\(^2\)

\(\text{(c) Slovenia}\)

The Slovenes in Yugoslavia before its disruption numbered almost exactly 1 million, although another half million Slovenes lived across the frontier from Slovenia proper, most of them in Istria and the Italian province of Venezia Giulia, and some in Carinthia in the German province of Austria.\(^3\) Their importance was out of proportion to their numbers, both before the war when they had contrived to hold a kind of balance between the Croats and the Serbs in Belgrade, and during the war because they inhabited the territory around Trieste and the northern Adriatic. The major part of Yugoslav Slovenia was annexed by the Germans in the spring of 1941, the rest with Ljubljana being left to Italy.\(^4\)

The Slovenes were in many ways like the Czechs, and the Germans resolved to treat them similarly\(^5\) but even more harshly. For Hitler refused to recognize their national existence at all. As in the case of the Czechs he found it necessary to eliminate the Slovene intellectual and professional class, whose wholesale deportation the Germans proceeded to organize. The more fortunate of their victims were deported to Croatia or Serbia,\(^6\) the less fortunate to Germany; some excuse or other caused some merely to be killed. The working population which remained was told that it was really German and could easily remember to speak its native German language again; a Styrian Heimathund was formed to assist the Slovene memory. Slovenes of suitable age and no obviously hostile convictions were called up to serve in the German army. Some Germans from

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\(^1\) See below, p. 671.

\(^2\) See below, pp. 670–2.

\(^3\) The word province is here used in its general and not particular sense.

\(^4\) Further details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.

\(^5\) See above, pp. 587–9.

\(^6\) According to Slovene estimates made at the time about 14,000 Slovenes had been deported to Croatia, 12,000 to Serbia, and 12,000 to Germany, by November 1941. About 20,000 were thought to have fled to the Italian province of Ljubljana. Cf. I.M.T. Nuremberg, viii. 254 and x. 433 for references to a conference presided over by Kasche at the German Legation in Zagreb on 4 June 1941 to discuss expulsions of Slovenes and Serbs. Families were as usual remorselessly broken up by the German authorities in Lower Styria. The small strip of Slovenia which was annexed to Carinthia was treated slightly more leniently.
Bessarabia and Bosnia were settled in Slovenia to replace deported or incorrigible Slovenes.

It is, however, difficult to explain why, if the Germans wished to eliminate Slovene nationality, they left the town of Ljubljana to the more tender mercies of the Italians: for the University of Ljubljana was a great centre of intellectual activity. Clerical influences were very strong throughout Slovenia, but among the Ljubljana students there were enthusiastic Communists. In 1940 Boris Kidrič and the schoolmaster Edvard Kardelj, who had been working with Tito since 1937, had been able to found a society called the Friends of the Soviet Union. Not long after the Italian occupation a secret Slovene Alliance was founded by non-Communist parties, and on 27 April Communist and other Leftists had founded the Liberation Front. The former group made contact as soon as it could with the Yugoslav Government in London (which included prominent Slovene representatives), but the Government insisted with considerable logic that so small an ethnical group must wait and take no risks if it wished to survive at all.

The Liberation Front was, of course, in favour of action, and from the beginning of 1942 began to organize a series of audacious attacks upon people it damned as traitors. Finally in October 1942 the former Governor of Slovenia, Natlačen, one of the two Slovene members of the Consulta which the Italians had set up, was murdered. Italian-occupied Slovenia, moreover, contained more suitable terrain for Partisans, and groups of young people belonging to the Liberation Front were able to form in the forests and in the mountains around Mount Rog. As elsewhere minor punitive expeditions on the part of the Italians also drove unpolitical people to take refuge in the maquis; once there it was difficult to return and they often joined the Partisans. Kardelj had returned from a visit to Tito at the beginning of 1942 to inspire the Liberation Front to greater activity, and by June the Slovene Partisans had considerably extended the area under their control and had even established small short-lived Communist republics here and there. Meanwhile Slovene and Croat Partisans in Venezia Giulia gave the Italians some trouble. In July Mussolini appeared in Gorizia to encourage the local authorities with a speech. He also reviewed the Italian troops now concentrated for a counter-attack which was launched under General Robotti on 16 July 1942. Its effect was much the same as that of the Axis offensives against Tito. The Partisans suffered heavy losses, but as usual saved their movement by dispersing. The Italians naturally enrolled as many of the population as they could to help

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1 The population of the Italian province of 'Lubiana' was about 350,000.
2 See above, p. 656.
3 See Kerner, ed.: Yugoslavia, chapter by W. S. Vucinich, p. 370; also Tito: Report, p. 78.
4 The combined Slovene group was roughly a quarter of the size of the Serb population.
them in their fight against the Communists, and many Slovene peasants were willing enough to join the White Guard formed for the purpose. The Italians also armed Major Novak, a representative of Mihailović who had been in Slovenia since the spring of 1942, and who now formed a Blue Guard of his own to fight against the Partisans.

Slovenia, in fact, presented in miniature the picture of a Leftist liberation struggle similar to that directly led by Tito, from which it was entirely cut off for the present, apart from the clandestine journeys of Kardelj. The capitulation of Italy affected the Slovene, more directly than the other Yugoslav, battlefields and it raised the question of Trieste in a new form. The immediate consequence of the Italian collapse was the encirclement of the White and Blue Guard forces by the Partisans, who caught 700 of them in the fortress of Turjak. Much Italian equipment had fallen into Partisan hands, and a number of Italian soldiers joined the Slovene Liberation Front; indeed, the mixed Slav-Italian regions of Venezia Giulia and Friuli were, together with the mountains near the Swiss frontier, the earliest scenes of Italian anti-fascist resistance. At the end of September 1943 elections were held to the first Parliament of the Slovene Socialist Republic and Kardelj presided over the assembled deputies on 1 October at Kočevje, where representatives to go to the Vête of Jajce were elected. ¹ To the Croats and Macedonians the importance of the Jajce Vête lay in the hope that it offered of autonomy: to the Slovenes its importance lay in Tito's Slovene irredentism and the emphasis with which he claimed Trieste.

During October 1943, however, the Germans drove the Slovene Partisans back to their hiding-places. They annexed Istria with Trieste as Gau Küstenland. At first they tried to be conciliatory towards the Slovene population there, but very soon, especially in Trieste, German policy involved support of the Italians representing Mussolini's Neo-Fascist Republic of Salò. In the province of Ljubljana the Germans put a Slovene General, Rupnik, at the head of the administration, and encouraged the population to join what was now called a Home Guard (Domobranci) to defend themselves from the Partisans. The response was considerable, on account of genuine fear of Communist plans, and in order that they might be armed and ready for the day when the Germans might retreat and the Western Allies land. The Slovene Partisans were, however, better organized, and events (the gradual triumph of Tito over Mihailović combined with the Marshal's confidence in Kardelj) played into their hands. Naturally Slovenia, lying to the north-west, was the last of the Yugoslav regions to be liberated—early in May 1945—nearly two months after the

¹ Kerner, ed.: Yugoslavnia, loc. cit.; see also Dedijer: With Tito through the War, pp. 367–80, the chapter called 'The People will decide their Own Fate', which is one of the most useful sections of the book.
formation of the Yugoslav Provisional Government in which Kardelj held a leading position. The most powerful factor, however, in the consolidation of Communist power in Slovenia had been Tito’s persistent championship of the Slovene nationalist claim to Trieste and to the Italian and Austrian territory where Slovenes lived.

(d) Macedonia

The Axis conquest of Yugoslavia in 1941 brought the Bulgarians into Vardar or Serbian Macedonia, and by doing so opened a new phase in the Macedonian question as a whole. For with the exception of Greek western Macedonia, which was occupied by the Italians, the whole of Macedonia was now in Bulgarian hands as it was to have been by the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878. Although the Germans vetoed formal annexation by the Bulgarians the latter treated Vardar Macedonia as liberated Bulgarian territory. They established Bulgarian schools, opened a national theatre, library, and museum in Skopje and in December 1943 the ‘King Boris University’. The Vardar Macedonians had been glad enough to see the last of the Royal Yugoslav authorities, but they soon felt equally irritated by the Royal Bulgarian ones.

Both the Yugoslav and the Bulgarian Communist Parties betrayed a chauvinism not unlike that of the various government officials; each assured the Macedonians that it aimed at a free and united Macedonia while doing all that it could to realize Yugoslav or, alternatively, Bulgarian claims to the whole of Macedonia, including that part of it which was formally in northern Greece. Indeed the two fraternal parties hotly competed as to which of them was to control party organization in southern Serbia. In August 1941 the Comintern decided in favour of Tito’s party, on the ground, it appears, that the attitude of the Bulgarian comrades was too passive towards the Russo-German war. The representatives of the Yugoslav Party were led by a young Yugoslav Macedonian called Kolishevski; they proceeded to form some Partisan detachments at Prilep and at Kumanovo, where on 11 October 1941 they were destroyed by the enemy. Soon after this Kolishevski fell into the hands of the Bulgarian police.

Tito had little time to give to retrieving the Macedonian situation until he reached Bihać in the autumn of 1942. The reference to Macedonia in the sixth point of the Bihać Vete’s programme has been quoted above. Earlier in that same November he had dispatched one of his most trusted emissaries, the Montenegrin Svetozar Vukmanović, popularly known as Tempo, upon a journey to Macedonia via Zagreb and Belgrade; it was

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1 Details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
2 Barker: Macedonia, p. 79.
3 Tito: Report, p. 106.
4 See above, pp. 659–60.
late February 1943 by the time Tempo arrived in Skoplje, a town in which he had previously worked. He apparently succeeded in winning substantial support for Tito's programme and for the inclusion of Macedonia in a Yugoslav Federation. It has been succinctly pointed out that this plan was ambiguous; it might mean simply Vardar Macedonia as part of Yugoslavia as it had before, or it might mean the inclusion of greater Macedonia within Yugoslav frontiers, or it might mean greater Macedonia within a Southern Slav Federation which included Bulgaria. Croat political leaders such as Stjepan Radić had often insisted that the Bulgars were Southern Slavs as much as the Serbs, so that a federal Yugoslavia—in the literal sense of Southern-Slavia—would contain the Bulgars too: it may have been that the Croat Tito followed the Radić lead. 

Early in October 1943 a newly formed pro-Tito 'General Staff of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Macedonia' met at 'Srvena Voda and issued a manifesto which clearly implied that the Macedonia within Yugoslavia for which it intended to fight was to be a united greater Macedonia. But Bulgarians of all parties were obviously hostile to this hope and a Skoplje group calling itself the National Liberation Action Committee made a protest. At Jajce, it has been seen, Macedonia was mentioned as it had been at Bihać, but without any indication that it was to be extended to include Pirin and Greek Macedonia (which contained Salonika). At Jajce, moreover, Macedonia was very thinly represented, while there was no Macedonian member of the National Liberation Committee. In the following month, December 1943, the Bulgarian Fatherland Front declared the only solution to be 'an integral, free and independent Macedonia'.

At the time of Tempo's visit it had been decided to operate from the less sternly controlled area of Italian-Albanian occupation, and Tempo himself established liaison with the Albanian and Greek Communist leaders. With Italy's collapse the Partisans gained arms and territory in Western Macedonia. Towards the end of the year Bulgarian deserters began to join them; indeed the Hristo Botev battalion and other Bulgarian Partisan units first formed in Macedonian territory. After growing Partisan success in 1944 the Anti-Fascist Assembly (Sobranje) of National Liberation of Macedonia met on 2 August, the anniversary of the anti-Turkish rising of 1903, and proclaimed the formation of the Macedonian People's Republic within Federal Yugoslavia. When on 9 September the

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1 Barker, op. cit. p. 94.
2 The Radić formulation had, of course, been superseded with regard to Macedonia by the influx of non-Slav Greeks from Asia Minor, and although the Axis Powers had offered Salonika to Yugoslavia in March 1941 there was no visible chance of the offer being seriously repeated.
3 Barker, op. cit. p. 93.
5 Barker, op. cit. p. 97.
6 See below, p. 680.
4 See above, p. 664.
7 Barker, loc. cit.
Fatherland Front seized power in Sofia,\(^1\) the Yugoslav Macedonian Partisans, who had been working with Partisan groups in Pirin Macedonia, expected to take the latter territory from Bulgaria and incorporate it in their own. Tito at this stage, however, agreed to postpone any decision on this momentous issue, and accepted Bulgarian promises of extensive autonomy with a view to Macedonian unity at a later date.

(viii) Albania, 1939–45

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

Of all the Balkan countries Albania was the most backward and the most anomalous. Its population was racially distinct from that of all its neighbours. As in Slovenia proper the population within its frontiers when the Italians arrived was about a million, while more than half a million lived abroad, a few in Greece and a great many in Yugoslavia. It happened, moreover, that Albanians were the predominant race precisely in that district in southern Serbia which was historically dearest to the Serbs—the Kossovo plain. The existence of the Albanian minority there gave the war against Greece a certain attraction, though the participating Albanian troops proved unreliable.\(^2\) In the spring of 1941 the war against Yugoslavia and the occupation of the Kossovo territory\(^3\) came too late to make the connexion with Italy popular for long.

While attempting to preserve an air of spontaneity about the Albanians’ allegiance to the King of Italy, the Italian Government had also attempted to gain an administrative, and, of course, an economic, hold upon Albania, greater than that of its former conquerors. The population consisted of the so-called Ghegs to the north of the river Shkumbi and the Tosks to its south. Most of the Ghegs were Muslims, but there were also some Roman Catholics, and they lived a primitive tribal life. Among the Tosks, who were either Muslim or Greek Orthodox, the beginnings of modern economic developments might be discerned; it was in their territory that the oil-wells of Devoli lay in which the Italians were so greatly interested. In the coastal plains, and in the towns to be found there, Italian power could be felt, but the Gheg clans in the mountains remained practically independent, and it was not very different in many Tosk regions.

There was a danger signal in the middle of May 1941, nearly two months before the risings in Serbia and Montenegro; a youth with poetic aspirations fired at the royal carriage as King Victor Emmanuel was preparing

\(^1\) About this time, according to Clissold (Whirlwind, p. 220), the Germans sent Mihailov, leader of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, from Zagreb to Macedonia to try to raise the old IMRO cry for autonomy. But the attempt was as ill-timed as those of Szálasi or Horia Sima.
\(^2\) Ciano: Diario (1939–1943), 7 November 1940.
\(^3\) Details will be found in the Survey for 1939–46: Initial Triumph of the Axis.
to leave Tirana at the end of a brief visit to Albania. In the following month Mussolini agreed with Jacomoni that more autonomy was required, and that not only the beys but other classes must be won over. The position did not improve. Meanwhile the Gheg chief, Mustafa Kruya, began to intrigue against the Prime Minister, the Tosk lord Verlaçi. He tried in vain to win over to the side of collaboration another Gheg chief, Abas Kupi, a chieftain of Kruya and the only Albanian leader who had fought the Italians in April 1939. By the end of the year Kruya had replaced Verlaçi as Prime Minister. In February 1942 he visited Rome and gave a rosy account of Albania, so that Ciano spoke of it as the one occupied (sic) country so far free of disturbance and intrigue.

The very first flash of Albanian resistance was prepared in the Belgrade of Simović. On the night of 7 April 1941 about 300 Albanians led by the legitimist Abas Kupi, the Communist Gjinishi, and three patriot brothers of a Jakova (Kossovo) clan called Kryeziu, had indeed crossed the frontier of Albania from Yugoslavia in order to attack the Italians, but after the general débâcle of the Yugoslav army they were forced to disperse and save themselves as best they could.

In addition to the various Gheg chieftains and Tosk landowners, a few Albanian intellectuals who had studied in Belgrade or Paris held Socialist or Communist views, and after June 1941 felt admiration for and allegiance to Russia; among the Tosks there was an embryonic ‘proletariat’ which helped to provide a Communist rank and file. It was not until 8 November 1941 that the Albanian Communist Party was founded with the help of the Yugoslavs who were members of the Communist regional committee for Kossovo-Metohija. In spite of the vastly different opinions of the resisting chieftains and the Communists, a National Liberation Movement L.N.C., was formed by the representatives of both at a meeting on 10 September 1942 at Peza. Among the Communist leaders appeared Gjinishi and a former schoolmaster from Korcha called Enver Hoxha. Soon after this a more conservative National Union or ‘Balli Kombetar’ was formed among the Tosks; it was republican, being led by former opponents of King Zog, including the Frasheri family. Both L.N.C. and Balli Kombetar, but especially the latter, were passionately nationalistic; this constituted a permanent if not insuperable obstacle between both groups and the Allies,

1 Ciano: Diario (1939-1943), 17 May 1941.
2 General Francesco Jacomoni di Sanlavino, Italian Minister to Albania, appointed Lieutenant-General of Albania 1939 (ibid. 8 February 1939, note 37).
3 Ibid. 13 June 1941.
5 Ciano: Diario (1939-1943), 17 February 1942.
7 V. Dedijer: Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 1939-48 (Belgrade, 1949). The two Yugoslavs concerned were Miladin Popović and Dušan Mugoša.
8 Amery, op. cit. p. 56. L.N.C. stands for Levisiya Nacional Cllirimtare.
since the latter could hardly be expected to turn a deaf ear to Yugoslav and Greek claims to the Kossovo and Metohija territory.

It has been seen\(^1\) that in March 1943, having completed his task in Skoplje, Titò's emissary, Tempo, had strengthened the links between his people and the L.N.C. Already in January Kruya had resigned, and on 1 February Ciano noted that other former friends like Verlaçi were falling away. It was decided to replace Jacomoni by a military government.\(^2\) By now Albanian hostility appeared so serious to the Italian High Command as to cause it to bring the strength of the Italian army of occupation up to five and a half divisions.\(^3\) During the same period two British liaison officers were sent into Albania\(^4\) only to find the usual pattern of the day, that is to say, the opposed political groups, as their fear of the Axis diminished, beginning to manoeuvre against one another in preparation for the day of liberation. The British officers were as ever concerned to preserve unity at all costs until the defeat of the enemy was achieved. Their interest, therefore, coincided with that of Abas Kupi, who dreaded the results of the factiousness which he could observe and who believed that the monarchy should be restored. Between them the British officers and Abas Kupi persuaded L.N.C. and Balli Kombetar leaders to meet at a village called Mukai near Tirana towards the end of July 1943. It seemed impossible to agree until quite suddenly the news of the fall of Mussolini arrived, and amidst general enthusiasm agreement was reached.

'The fall of the Duca was the signal for a general revolt against the Italians, a spontaneous movement of the whole population inspired by every passion from the loftiest patriotism to the basest greed for loot.'\(^5\) Two Italian divisions went over to the Albanians who gained much equipment besides; during August and the first half of September the country was almost entirely liberated, and in many villages the usual liberation committees were set up by the Partisans. Late in September the Germans sharply intervened. They could only afford two and a half divisions for Albania, so, having thrown back the patriot forces, they concentrated upon guarding their own communications and the Adriatic coast. Further, they followed up their advantage as the heirs to the former Habsburg patrons of Albania, where they were in fact relatively popular. Under German protection a Council of Regency was set up to which Mehdi Frasheri belonged and to which the Balli Kombetar people felt no particular hostility. The fascist Constitution was repealed and Albania declared neutral on the analogy of Egypt.\(^6\)

Enver Hoxha, who had become increasingly prominent among the Partisans, now denounced the Balli Kombetar for collaboration; in

\(^1\) See above, pp. 672–3.

\(^2\) Ciano: Diario (1939–1943), 3 February 1943.

\(^3\) Amery: Sons of the Eagle, p. 58.

\(^4\) Major Smiley and Colonel (Bill) Maclean.

\(^5\) Amery, op. cit. p. 62.

\(^6\) Ibid. p. 65.
October he ordered his men to attack the Balli Kombetar forces. Thereupon Abas Kupi abandoned the hope of a really united front. He was already greatly irritated by finding L.N.C. committees always under Communist domination and decided to leave the L.N.C. himself. On 21 November 1943 he made a 'Declaration of Legality' in favour of the restoration of Zog which he claimed to be the desire of the majority of Albanians.\(^1\) He was still ready to work with the L.N.C. against the invader, but the L.N.C. now rejected him as a traitor. The Germans naturally profited from the Albanians' quarrels. They formed an Albanian army and were able to recruit four battalions among the Kossovo Albanians whom they later formed into the SS ‘Skanderbeg’ division; this was used both against the L.N.C. and against Tito's Partisans in Montenegro. They also made the most of Albania's economic possibilities\(^2\) and removed the Albanian gold reserve from Rome to Berlin.

After the inevitable winter lull hostilities revived in the spring of 1944. The L.N.C. was still weak among the Gheg chiefs, and in April an enlarged British military mission was sent to Kupi to invigorate resistance in the north and reconcile the chiefs with the L.N.C. But the L.N.C. was becoming more formidable. It now called itself a National Liberation Army and in May fought a battle against Germans and Balli Kombetar combined. About the same time the Albanian Partisans set up an anti-fascist council on the Yugoslav model and a provisional government under Enver Hoxha. At a congress at Permeti both King Zog and Abas Kupi were denounced.\(^3\) It is difficult to estimate the Albanian reaction at this time to vague Yugoslav hints about the inclusion of Albania within Tito's grand federation. The Albanians were not Slavs, but it is possible that Communist leaders like Koçi Xoxe,\(^4\) who was in touch with Tito's representatives—the chief one in 1944 seems to have been Velimir Stoinić—saw real advantage in a degree of collaboration in peace-time as well as in war. It was already clear that Tito intended to reunite the Kossovo region, where by now his forces were active, to his Serbian People's Republic—Serb sentiment could never have been satisfied without this.

In June 1944 the first German-sponsored Albanian régime broke down and could never be satisfactorily replaced. From this time onwards it was clear that the Germans had lost their hold. The Partisans pushed north, and, in spite of the fight put up by one of the Kryeziu brothers and his men against the Germans from July to September, the L.N.C. army was

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\(^1\) See his newspaper Atjheu, 15 January 1944.


\(^3\) Amery, op. cit. p. 116.

\(^4\) See article called 'Defeat of Tito's Agency in Albania' by Bedri Spahić in *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucharest), 15 August 1949. This refers to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party in November 1944 at Berat as decisive in drawing the new Albania into the wake of Tito.
able to drive out the Gheg chiefs. The Germans left Albania in October 1944. The Partisans harassed their rearguard but allowed their best troops to get away. The L.N.C. army entered Valona in that same month, and Tirana and Durazzo in November. The Albanian People’s Republic was established under Enver Hoxha, and Abas Kupi was forced into exile in Italy.

(ix) Greece

By Elisabeth Barker

Greece, during the years of Axis occupation from April 1941 to October 1944, was the field of a confused three-sided conflict. One of the contending forces was the German occupation authority (until September 1943 feebly seconded by the Italian occupation authority, and somewhat inadequately served by three successive collaborationist Greek Governments and their organs). The second force was composed of the British Government and their military and political representatives in the Middle East and inside Greece, the Greek King and Government in Exile, and the non-Communist Resistance organizations in the Greek mountains. The third contending force was formed by the Greek Communist Party and the Resistance organizations which it sponsored; the Communist leadership aimed at serving Russia’s interests, but was, until the summer of 1944, only remotely directed by Russia.

In theory, the second and third of these forces were allied in a common struggle against the first—the Axis. In practice, the alliance was always uneasy and, as the prospect of liberation drew near, was often strained to breaking-point.

The antagonism between the two anti-Axis forces in Greece was due in part to the latent conflict between British and Soviet policy, and in part to the fact that, during the latter part of the occupation, Greece was no more than a strategic backwater lying remote from the main tideways of the war.

Until the Tehran Conference in November 1943 Churchill still cherished the plan of major Allied operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would have involved Greece. If this plan had been adopted by Stalin and Roosevelt, the military and moral demands it would have imposed on the Greeks might have compelled war-time unity. It was, however, rejected at Tehran, in favour of a landing in southern France in support of ‘Overlord’, the invasion in the west.  

In consequence, the German withdrawal from Greece was not the outcome of Greek or Allied operations within the country but of the Red

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1 See Tito: Report, p. 104, for reference to ‘two brotherly Albanian divisions’ who ‘also participated in the battles with the Germans from the Albanian border to Prijepolje’.

Army's advance, far to the north, through Rumania, and, to a lesser extent, of the Allied advance up Italy. Thus the Greeks could not feel, as they had felt when they repelled the Italians in 1940, that they were united in driving the invader from Greek soil.

Such was the strategic background of developments in Greece under the occupation. The occupation, during the first few months, did not bear particularly heavily upon the Greeks. The Italian and German occupation authorities, who had assumed control in May 1941, made little attempt to create a new political order. King George II, his Government, and a small number of officials and a larger number of army officers had gone; but the old administrative machine, including its police and gendarmerie, was left virtually intact. The main change was that the Greek army ceased to exist inside Greece; it was demobilized, and the men were allowed to return home. Only the Government was new, new particularly in that no Greek regarded it as a Greek Government. At the end of April, the Germans had installed as Prime Minister General George Tsolakoglou, the man who, in the absence of orders, had signed an armistice a week earlier. Under his ineffectual control the administration functioned at first much as before the occupation.

It was, however, totally unable to cope with the first crisis which Greece experienced under the occupation: the famine of the winter of 1941. To prevent disaster, an agreement was reached between belligerents and neutrals to permit famine relief. Distribution of American and Canadian food supplies was carried out by an International Red Cross organization staffed by Swedes and Swiss. Nevertheless, during that winter there were thousands of deaths from hunger, mainly in Athens. Mussolini, in a letter to Hitler written on 22 July 1942, just after a visit to Athens, estimated them at 24,000. After the winter of 1941 the food situation was somewhat better.

Famine was followed in the summer of 1942, in spite of partial economic recovery, by inflation. Prices rose until in late 1944 they were astronomical; the drachma ceased to have any real value and Greek economy reverted to a system of barter, supplemented by payment in gold sovereigns for large transactions.

As Greek resistance developed from the autumn of 1942 onwards, the constant interruption of communications and the 'liberation' of considerable areas of Central Greece by the guerrillas added to the disruption of the country's economy. The arrival at the end of 1942 of Hitler's special plenipotentiary, Neubacher, failed to spur the Italian authorities into greater activity or to check the growth of resistance or the process of economic decay.

1 See also above, p. 222.
The Bulgarians, on their side, had virtually annexed the tobacco- and grain-growing areas of Greek Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace and incorporated them in the Bulgarian economy: a process which they accompanied by the confiscation of land belonging to Greeks, conscription and deportation of Greeks, and the settlement of Bulgarians on former Greek property. After the Italian surrender in September 1943, the Germans allowed the Bulgarians to move into certain centres of Greek Western Macedonia also.

The Italian occupation forces, during their twenty-eight months in Greece, from time to time took violent reprisals against the Greeks; but these were carried out in isolated instances and often against isolated individuals rather than on any systematic basis or mass scale. The German forces, as Greek resistance spread in 1943, became increasingly harsh in their repressive measures. In August 1943 the German authorities announced that, for every German soldier killed, fifty Greeks would be executed;¹ and this order was actually carried out on various occasions in Athens. In the countryside a more frequent form of reprisal was to enter a village believed to be supporting the guerrilla bands, execute those of the menfolk who could be caught, and burn the houses. One American authority estimates that in the course of the occupation one-quarter of all buildings in Greece were damaged to some extent.² In the later stages of the occupation sabotage action by Greek guerrillas or British officers and men caused widespread damage or destruction to bridges, railways (such as existed), and roads, mainly in central and northern Greece.

Thus from 1943 onwards the normal economic life and administration were increasingly disrupted until they came almost to a standstill. In the guerrilla-dominated mountain areas of the centre and north the old system was replaced to some extent by an improvised economic and administrative system (including posts and telephones) run by the guerrillas. The collaborationist Government in Athens, on their side, turned their energies to the organization of anti-Communist Security Battalions, designed to supplement the activities of the gendarmerie and German troops in the countryside.

This task was achieved primarily by the initiative of John Rallis, third and last of the collaborationist Prime Ministers. General Tsolakoglou had resigned in December 1942, shortly after guerrilla formations had begun to take shape. He was replaced by a former Rector of Athens University, Constantin Logothetopoulos, who had pro-German sympathies. However, in April 1943, he was succeeded by Rallis, a former member of the pro-royalist Populist Party who had achieved Cabinet rank.

Rallis believed it to be his first task to hold the Communists in check and to maintain order; and his chief weapon was the formation of the Security

¹ McNeill: *Greek Dilemma*, p. 46.
² Ibid. p. 50.
Battalions in the second half of 1943. These were military units, commanded mainly by former officers of the Greek regular army, which operated in liaison with the German occupation forces, but seem to have regarded themselves as a Greek national force. Their maximum strength was about 5,000.  

The successive collaborationist Governments, the Security Battalions, and a few heterogeneous armed bands, operating mainly in Greek Macedonia, were virtually the only elements in Greece which actively helped the Axis. In fact, until mid-1943 there was a striking and almost unprecedented spirit of unity among the Greek people as a whole. But from 1943 onwards this unity was steadily undermined, first by the dispute over the monarchy (skillfully exploited by the Communists), and then by the far graver dispute between the Communists and their sympathizers and the rest of Greece.

Outside Greece the Greek King and his successive Governments in Exile achieved little, at least until May 1944, towards stopping the rot.

When King George II escaped first to Crete and later to Egypt in May 1941, his firm stand in the face of Axis aggression and his close co-operation with the British had led most Greeks to regard him with far greater respect than in the past. But temperamentally the King lacked the gift of making himself understood by ordinary Greeks; and he could not easily live down his four-year sponsorship of the militarist authoritarian régime of Metaxas. Further, there was in Greece a strong republican tradition which had, if anything, been strengthened by the years of Metaxist government.

When the King first arrived in Cairo his Cabinet was headed by a Cretan, Emmanuel Tsouderos, an economist and banker who had been a Liberal in politics: the few Metaxists in it were gradually eliminated. The King and his Government moved in July 1941 to South Africa and then in September 1941 to London. It was over a year and a half before the King himself moved back to Cairo. Meanwhile, the constitutional question had again become a subject for heated discussion inside Greece.

The King was slow to commit himself on this question. It was not until January 1942 that he formally proclaimed the termination of the dictatorial régime instituted by Metaxas on 4 August 1936. This act was not taken in time to prevent the issuing of a manifesto, signed on 31 March by a group of politicians in Athens, declaring that there should be a plebiscite on the King’s return before he went back to Greece.

The British Government at this period were not prepared to put any pressure on King George II. British official policy at this time, although not formulated publicly until some time later, was already in favour of the early return of the King to Greece, which, it was hoped, would be a stabilizing influence in the confusion of Greek politics.

1 Ibid. pp. 50–51.
Since this was the British attitude, the King was naturally reluctant to make concessions. On 4 July 1943 he made a broadcast\(^1\) from Cairo to the Greek people promising that, as soon as the security of the country was complete, a constituent assembly would be elected. He said nothing, however, about the timing of his own return to Greece.

Shortly after, on 13 August 1943, a guerrilla delegation, formed by four representatives of the Communist-led Resistance organization and one representative each from two non-Communist organizations, was flown by the British to Cairo. The delegates united in the demand that the King should undertake not to go back to Greece until a plebiscite had been held. The King, after consulting Churchill and Roosevelt, opposed this demand.\(^2\) The delegation went back to Greece frustrated.

The Tsouderos Government, however, continued to urge the King to make some further gesture. On 8 November 1943 the King wrote a letter to Tsouderos saying: 'When the long-desired hour of the liberation of our motherland strikes, I shall examine anew the question of my return to Greece in agreement with the Government in the light of the political and military conditions of the time, and with the national interest . . . as my counsel.'\(^3\) This compromise pledge was followed on the next day by a statement by Churchill in the House of Commons which clearly left it open to the King to return in advance of a plebiscite. In reply to a question Churchill denied that he had given any undertaking about the future status of the King of the Hellenes, and said: 'In accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, it will be for the Greek people to decide on the future government of their country.' After recalling the King's broadcast of 4 July 1943 Churchill declared: 'Until the Greek people can express their will in conditions of freedom and tranquillity, it is the settled policy of His Majesty's Government to support the King of the Hellenes, who is at once our loyal Ally and the constitutional head of the Greek State.'\(^4\)

Directly after Churchill's statement, however, consultations took place between the British and United States war leaders, followed by the Tehran Conference. As a result the British dropped the idea of any major Allied operation in Greece, and so also dropped the idea of King George's returning with an Allied liberating force. Eden saw King George in Cairo in December 1943 and explained the changed situation. He also put forward the suggestion, which had resulted from exchanges between Tsouderos and a group of Greek politicians in Athens, that the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, should be nominated to act as head of a

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\(^1\) *The Times* and *Glasgow Herald*, 5 July 1943.


\(^4\) 9 November 1943, H.C Deb. 5th ser., vol. 393, col. 1080.
Regency Committee in Athens when the Germans withdrew. Within Greece this scheme had the support of virtually all parties, including the Communists. King George, after consulting Roosevelt, rejected it.

Nevertheless, Tsouderos continued long-range discussions with the Athens politicians and also with the Communist-led Resistance organization. His aim was to broaden the Government in Exile by including political representatives from inside Greece. The Athens politicians procrastinated, while insisting that the King should not return before a plebiscite had been held. Early in 1944 Tsouderos again appealed to the King, then in London, to give some undertaking. The King, in March 1944, again refused to do so. By this time the Greek Communist leaders had decided to force the pace. In mid-March they sponsored the formation of a Political Committee of National Liberation in the mountains of Greece. When this Committee sent its first message to Tsouderos, on 16 March, it still declared its aim to be 'the firm foundation of a government of general national unity'. But it was obvious that at any moment it might lay claim to be itself the legitimate Government of Greece.

It was at this moment that trouble which had long been brewing in the Greek forces in the Middle East came to a head. The Republican League, an anti-royalist political organization within the armed forces, had come increasingly under the influence of agents and sympathizers of the Greek Communist Party; and in March 1944 the establishment of the Political Committee of National Liberation in the Greek mountains provoked a crisis.

On 31 March a group of officers called on Tsouderos demanding agreement with the Committee; and the Republican League decided that the time had come to strike. On 3 April Tsouderos resigned.

Mutiny spread to nearly all units of the Greek army in Egypt, including the First Brigade, which was just preparing to go to Italy. It also spread to the ships of the Greek navy. On 11 April King George II arrived in Cairo from England, and on the following day announced that Greece should decide by a free vote, after the liberation, what form of government it desired. On 13 April Venizelos formed a Cabinet in Cairo without Tsouderos. His first act was to announce that the guerrilla organizations in Greece had agreed to send representatives to Cairo for discussions; but he was ineffective in stopping the mutinies. Greek boarding parties, led by Admiral Voulgaris, had to take over the Greek ships at Alexandria; and British troops had to secure the surrender of the First Brigade. Venizelos's premiership lasted a bare fortnight; he was then succeeded by a former

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1 Leeper, op. cit. pp. 34-35.
2 Ibid. p. 41.
4 McNeill: Greek Dilemma, p. 104.
5 The Times, 13 April 1944; Documents (R.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 348.
6 Sophocles Venizelos, son of the founder of the Greek Liberal Party, Eleftherios Venizelos.
OCCUPIED EASTERN EUROPE

Liberal, now a 'Democratic Socialist', George Papandreou, who had just arrived in Cairo from Athens.

Acting in close consultation with the British, whose policy was now the overriding force in Greek government circles, Papandreou made it his mission to reach agreement with the Communist-sponsored Political Committee of National Liberation in the mountains, the Resistance organizations, and with the Athens politicians. At a conference held in Lebanon from 17 to 20 May 1944, and attended by representatives of all these elements, this aim was achieved in principle, on the basis of a document prepared by Papandreou himself. This document, which came to be known as the Lebanon Charter, called for a Government of National Unity which, after the liberation, was to secure order and liberty in Greece and enable the people to decide, freely and without pressure, 'both on their constitution and their régime and Government'. There was no specific reference to the King's return. The Lebanon Charter called for unification and discipline in all guerrilla bands inside Greece.

In spite of the apparent agreement reached at the Lebanon Conference, three and a half months passed before the Government of National Unity was actually formed. During this time the Political Committee of National Liberation presented a series of constantly changing demands about the composition and political weighting of the Government of National Unity.

The political developments of the summer of 1944, inside and outside Greece, were perhaps influenced by the discussions on the Balkans which were being conducted between London, Moscow, and Washington. According to the memoirs of the former American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, the British Foreign Secretary, Eden, had a conversation with Gusev, the Soviet Ambassador in London, on 5 May. This led to a British suggestion (as subsequently reported by Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, to Cordell Hull) that 'in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and Greek affairs the concern of the United Kingdom'. On 18 May Gusev (as subsequently quoted by Churchill) reported Moscow's agreement but asked, before giving final assent, whether the United States Government approved. Britain consulted the United States Government on 30 May. Cordell Hull strongly opposed the idea, but on 12 June Roosevelt cabled his agreement to the proposal 'for a trial period of three months', on the understanding that it would not involve post-war spheres of influence.

On 26 July a Soviet mission of eight men, led by Colonel Popov, landed in Greece, without the knowledge of any local British or American

2 Hull: Memoirs, ii. 1452 and 1457.
3 Ibid. p. 1453.
4 Ibid. p. 1455.
and Anglo-Russian mission recent without influence driven the political throughout the Government of National Unity, suddenly agreed to content itself with five only. On 2 September the Government of National Unity was at last formed, with six representatives of the Committee, only two of whom were Communists. The dissolution of the Political Committee of National Liberation was simultaneously proclaimed.

Thus at last a temporary unity was created between the exiled King and Government and the Communist-led Resistance organization inside Greece. By that time, however, the Greek Communist Party had created for itself so strong a position inside the country that this unity was inevitably precarious.

At the beginning of the occupation the Communist Party, known in Greece by its Greek initials, KKE, was a small organization, experienced in underground action, with a hard kernel of men who had had thorough training in the U.S.S.R. During the occupation their chief was George Siantos, a tough and wily ex-tobacco-worker, who had spent two years in Russia in the early 1930s, and who had also served terms of imprisonment in Greece. Others were Dimitrios Partsalides, Miltiades Porfyrogenis, Petros Roussos, John Ioannides, the Macedonian Andreas Tsimas, and, in a category apart, that strange mixture of military leader, adventurer, sadist, and pervert known as Ares Veloukhiotis.

KKE was the first group to start resistance to the occupation authorities. On 27 September 1941 a ‘National Liberation Movement’, known by its Greek initials EAM, was founded. It was nominally a coalition of KKE and five other small political groups: the Union of Popular Democracy, the Socialist Party, the United Socialist Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Republican Party. Only the first two of these had any existence independent of KKE, and in practice KKE members held the key posts throughout the organization.

The early programme of EAM, subsequently issued in pamphlet form in 1942, was moderate and designed to appeal to Greeks of almost all political parties. It called principally for passive and active resistance to the occupying forces, and declared that, after the occupiers had been driven out, elections were to be held to a Constituent Assembly which

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1 Woodhouse (Apple of Discord, pp. 197-8) takes the view that the arrival of the Russians without warning to the local British authorities was not in accordance with the spirit of the recent discussions between the British and Soviet Governments on their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans. Cf. McNeill (Greek Dilemma, p. 121) who says that the Russian mission did not take an active part in directing ELAS (see below, p. 686) activities. For the Anglo-Russian discussions in May on spheres of influence see Survey for 1939-46: America, Britain, and Russia, pp. 422-5.

2 Woodhouse, op. cit. p. 199.

should decide on the future form of government. Gradually, during the occupation, EAM's propaganda, at least in its less public forms, became increasingly hostile to King George II, or 'George Glucksberg' as it chose to call him, and also increasingly anti-British in its tendency.

EAM's first task was to establish its control in the towns, by organizing the industrial workers, students, and intellectuals, conducting propaganda and circulating news-sheets, and organizing demonstrations and strikes. In the spring of 1942 EAM also started organizing the military side of the Resistance. It laid down a plan for establishing a National People's Liberation Army, called by its Greek initials, ELAS. Men were recruited mainly from the villages, and submitted to severe discipline and a good deal of political indoctrination. Throughout the occupation, however, the rank and file of ELAS consisted mainly of men who had little interest in Communism but who sincerely wanted to join in the most effective form of resistance to their country's invaders. ELAS had grown by the summer of 1943 into a force of about 20,000 men relying on the civilian support of the far greater numbers enrolled in EAM.

Strained relations between the ELAS Headquarters and the British authorities seriously diminished its usefulness as a fighting force against the Germans. The KKE leaders who really controlled ELAS were preoccupied first with the task of mopping up rival Resistance groups, and later with preparations for the post-liberation seizure of power. In the pursuit of both aims they met with British opposition. In spite of this antagonism at higher levels, in those areas of Greece where the local ELAS commanders were permitted, or chose, to devote themselves primarily to attacking the occupation forces, they fought well.

The chief rival of ELAS in the Resistance, and virtually the only one to survive the entire occupation, was the EDES force in the north-west corner of Greece, commanded by Colonel (later General) Napoleon Zervas. EDES (the Greek initials for the 'National Republican Greek League'), although it never numbered more than a few thousand men, and although it was always confined to an area of small strategic importance, co-operated well with the British authorities and fought effectively, in accordance with British plans, against the Italians and Germans. It received consistent British support, and this enabled it to withstand repeated attacks from ELAS. By 1944, however, EDES in Athens was collaborating with the occupying authorities; and the main force under Zervas, though it

1 McNeill: Greek Dilemma, p. 78.
2 Ibid. p. 69. The same authority states that when ELAS was disarmed in 1945 about 45,500 rifles were handed over or found (Ibid. p. 163), which indicated that the strength of the force had grown to at least that number and was probably a good deal higher.
3 McNeill (op. cit. p. 111) gives about 2 million as the probable total for the membership of EAM at the time of liberation.
4 Ibid. p. 90.
5 Ibid. p. 87.
broke with the Athens group under Gonatas, had by that time changed its original republican principles for royalist ones and was becoming increasingly conservative.¹ In the later stages of the occupation the EDES force attracted a growing number of former Greek army officers, who were above all anti-Communist.

Other competitors of EAM/ELAS in the Resistance were less fortunate. Some rival leaders, such as General Saraphis, were captured and then, by threats, induced to accept high command in ELAS. Other groups were more simply accused (with or without justification) of collaborating with the Axis, and wiped out militarily by ELAS. The most tragic case was that of Colonel Psaros, military representative of a small but progressive political group in Athens which called itself ‘National and Social Liberation’ (known by its Greek initials as EKKA). Colonel Psaros’s force was twice attacked and almost annihilated by ELAS during 1943, and in April 1944 was finally wiped out.

These were the various Greek Resistance groups with which a number of British officers, serving under GHQ Middle East, had the task of maintaining liaison from the autumn of 1942 until the end of the occupation. The first British officers were dropped by parachute from three aircraft into central Greece on 1 October 1942.² Their specific task was to break the Salonika-Athens railway and interrupt supplies to General Rommel in Africa. The British party succeeded in making contact with General Zervas, who came 100 miles to assist them; contact was also established, mainly by chance, with the Communist, Ares Veloukhiotis, who far more reluctantly agreed that his ELAS band should co-operate.³ Mixed guerrillas forces, on the night of 25–26 November, attacked the Italians guarding the Gorgopotamos bridge, while the British party successfully demolished part of the bridge and so fulfilled their mission.⁴

The British party, contrary to their original expectations, stayed on in Greece, and was expanded into the British Military Mission. British liaison officers were attached to both EDES and ELAS bands for operational purposes; but early in their association ELAS came to suspect the British of favouring EDES in supplies of arms and money. Clashes in the early summer of 1943 between ELAS and outlying EDES bands and also with the EKKA band were checked by the British, who with some difficulty induced all three to sign the ‘National Bands’ agreement of July 1943. Under this agreement, all three forces were recognized as independent formations under the command of GHQ Middle East.⁵

¹ Ibid. p. 91.
³ Ibid. p. 100; Woodhouse: Apple of Discord, p. 141.
⁴ Hamson, op. cit. pp. 103 seqq.
Meanwhile, in June 1943, a British party had been obliged, by ELAS’s refusal to co-operate, to carry out, without any Greek aid, a second attack on the Athens-Salonika railway, this time at the Asopos bridge. The same lack of co-operation was in general also shown by ELAS GHQ in the series of operations, mainly sabotage, which GHQ Middle East had called for as part of the scheme of strategic deception designed to make the Axis believe that the Allies were about to invade the Balkans, not Sicily and Italy. In September 1943 KKE’s political ambitions were inflated by the Italian surrender: ELAS succeeded in taking the surrender of the Italian Pincerolo Division and subsequently disarming it. Thus the Italian collapse brought ELAS a vast reinforcement in weapons, and made it by far the strongest Resistance organization. ELAS acted rapidly: in October, in spite of the ‘National Bands’ agreement of the previous July, it again attacked EDES bands, and also took action to eliminate smaller rival groups.

In this situation, relations between the Allied Military Mission (the first United States officer had joined the British in Greece in September 1943) and ELAS became strained almost to breaking-point. The British suspended arms supplies to ELAS. At the same time they increased supplies to General Zervas, and so enabled him to withstand the ELAS attacks. It was not until 29 February 1944 that the Allied Military Mission managed to bring about the Plaka Agreement, terminating hostilities between EAM/ELAS and EDES, delimiting their respective areas of operation, and calling on GHQ Middle East to give all available supplies to all forces in Greece resisting the Germans. As a preliminary to the Plaka Agreement the same parties had also signed, on 19 February 1944, a joint denunciation of the Security Battalions, which ELAS had always suspected the British of tolerating.

However, just as stability seemed restored, EAM/ELAS sprang a fresh surprise on the Allied Military Mission, on 26 March, by the announcement of the formation of the Political Committee of National Liberation (known by its Greek initials, PEEA) as a ‘preparatory governmental committee’. Only members of EAM/ELAS, and a few independent public men who hurried to join them, were included in PEEA. Its first President was Colonel Euripides Bakirdzis, formerly associated with EKKA; but he was succeeded in April by Professor Alexander Svolos, of Athens University, an intellectual of Socialist views.

The nominal leader of the PEEA delegation at the Lebanon conference in May was this Professor Svolos, and he, partly, perhaps, influenced by the British representatives with whom he came in contact, took a fairly

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1 McNeill: *Greek Dilemma*, p. 89.
2 Ibid. pp. 89–90.
conciliatory tone which contributed to the Lebanon Agreement. When, however, the PEEA delegation returned to Greece they found the directors of KKE and EAM determined to obstruct the implementation of the Agreement. In consequence, relations between ELAS Headquarters and the Allied Military Mission became increasingly antagonistic during the summer of 1944.

Nevertheless, by the time the Government of National Unity was at last formed under Papandreu on 2 September 1944, full preparations had already been made for the Allied landings in Greece on the withdrawal of the Germans. The United States authorities had decided that U.S. forces should take no part in the military side of the operation, but that American participation should be confined to relief work.\(^{1}\) The consequence of this was that the landing force, purely British, could not exceed about 4,000 men, a number so small that, if EAM/ELAS were to oppose the British by force, the British position would be dangerous in the extreme.

Towards the end of August the Prime Minister, Papandreu, had visited Churchill in Italy, and Churchill had at last agreed that it would be inadvisable for King George to return to Greek soil almost immediately, as had earlier been the plan; his return was to be delayed until a plebiscite could be held; and the Government of National Unity was to be re-formed after its arrival in Greece.

A few days after the Government of National Unity was formed, it moved from Cairo to Salerno, in Italy. Before the end of September, General Saraphis, representing ELAS, and General Zervas arrived at Caserta and concluded a military-political agreement\(^{2}\) with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, and Papandreu, by which all guerrilla forces in Greece recognized the authority of the Government of National Unity. The Government in turn placed these forces under the command of General Ronald Scobie, as the representative of the Allied Command. The guerrilla forces were not to attempt to seize power at the moment of liberation, but were to 'form a national union in order to co-ordinate their activities'.

At the end of September British troops started landing in Greece, though the landings were not publicly announced until 5 October. The British, ELAS bands, and EDES bands all harassed the retreating Germans, but there were no large-scale actions. Relations between the British landing forces and the local EAM/ELAS chiefs were in places severely strained, but in general remained superficially correct. The British troops were received nearly everywhere by the Greeks with the greatest friendliness.

The main body of the Government of National Unity, together with the

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1 McNeill: *Greek Dilemma*, p. 122.
British Ambassador (Mr., later Sir Reginald, Leeper) arrived in Athens a few days after its liberation on 18 October. Skirmishes with the retreating Germans lasted in northern Greece for some days longer, but by the beginning of November the German withdrawal had been completed.

The Bulgarian withdrawal from northern Greece was a more complicated process, because on 9 September Bulgaria had become, in the estimation of its new Fatherland Front government, a co-belligerent, and was eager that the Bulgarian occupation forces in Greek Macedonia should attack the retreating Germans. Britain and the Greek Government of National Unity (or most of its members) were insistent that the Bulgarians should leave Greek soil. Russia was not prepared to back the Bulgarian proposal. Pressure was exerted on the Bulgarian armistice delegation in Moscow, and by 25 October the last Bulgarian had left. The enemy occupation of Greece was over.
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1 In the cross-references in this index references in capitals and small capitals are to other main headings, while those in ordinary type are to subdivisions of the same main heading.
For the explanation of Abbreviations see also list on pp. xiii-xvi.
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