1175776 189.4 T45b V.2 Thomas Aquinas Basic writinos Kansas city Kansas city, missoun Books will be issued only on presentation of library card. Please report lost cards and change of residence promptly. Card holders are responsible for all books, records, films, pictures or other library materials checked out on their cards, BASIC WRITINGS' OF Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume Two Kdited and Annotated, with an Introduction, by Anton C. Pegis Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University Graduate School RANDOM HOUSE • NEW YORK Frst Printing Nihil obstat Arthur J. Scanian, Censor Librorum Imprimatur * Franpis J, Sbkllman, u.il Archbishop, New York February ii, 1944. COPYRIOIIT, I94S» random HOimK, INC. PUBLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN PANADA BY ^ RANDOM HOUSE OF CANADA LIMITED MANXTFACTURF4) IN THE UNTTED KTATES AF GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume I GOD AND THE ORDER OF CREATION Summu 77/rr)/o/;/Vv/, Fart I (complete) I. Otnu THK mVINK tFKITY (qQ, 1-26) 5 II. c;0|3; tilK mviNK PKK.SONH (qQ. ■ 27-43) III. CW-.ATI0\ IX OKNKIUI. (W- 44-49) ^26 IV. THK AXt;PI.S (m. 50-64) 480 V. ‘UIF. WORK THE SIX DAYS (qO- 65-74) 609 VI. MAX im. 75nS()) 682 VIE OX THE FIRST MAM (gi,). ()0-I02) 864 Vin. THE DIVINE iiOVEKNMKNT (OQ. IO3-II9) 950 Volume 1 1 MAX AND THE CONDUCT OP LIFE Cummti Ctmim GV;i//7n' (III, (Tapters 1 - 113 ) IX. THE END OF MAM (CH. I-63) 3 X. MAN AMD THK PROVIDENXT: OF C.OD (c'H. 64-03) 113 Si^mnm 77ioi%/oi, First Fart of the Second Fart Xf. HOMAN ACTS (OQ. 6“2l) 225 XH. HAIIITS* VIRTOE.S AND VK'KS (qQ. 49-i^9) xiio TAW I'gg. c|o-ioH) 742 XIV, ORAOE (gg. 109-04) 979 Summu Tkeolu^iat, Second Fart of the Second Part XV. FAITH (c)g* 07) loss CONTENTS Volume II MAN AND THE CONDUCT OF LIFE IX. THE END OF MAN. TEXT: Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, Chapters 1-63. PAGE CHAI^TER I FOREWORD. 3 2 THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END. 5 3 THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD. 7 4 THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS. 9 5-6 ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT WITHOUT INTENTION [anD THEIR SOLUTION], 10, 7 THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE. 13 8-9 ARGUMENTS WHEREBY IT IS SEEMINGLY PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING [AND THEIR SOLUTION]. 14 3 0 THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD. 1 7 11 THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD. 21 12 THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD. 22 13 THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND. 23 14 THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE. 24 15 THAT THERE IS NO HIGHEST EVIL. 25 16 THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD. 26 17 THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD. 27 18 HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS. 29 19 THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD. 30 20 HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS. 30 21 THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD INASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE. 33 2 2 HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RE- SPECTIVE ENDS. 34 23 THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS IS FROM AN INTEL- LECTUAL PRINCIPLE. . 37 24 HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD. 41 2 5 THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTELLECTUAL SUB- STANCE. 43 26 DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF TFIE WILL? 47 27 THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES. 51 28 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONORS. 53 29 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN GLORY. 54 30 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WEALTH. 55 vii viii CONTENTS PACE CHAPTER 31 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WORLDLY POWER. 56 32 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN GOODS OF THE BODY. 56 33 THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES. 57 34 THAT man’s ultimate HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF THE MORAL VIRTUES. 57 35 THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE. 58 36 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART. 59 37 THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEM- PLATING GOD. 59 38 THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MA- JORITY. 6 1 39 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION. 62 40 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD BY FAITH. 64 41 IS IT POSSIBLE FOR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPA- RATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF THE SPECU- LATIVE SCIENCES? 65 42 THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUB- STANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER. 69 43 THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES^ IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVERROES. 72 44 THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IMAGINED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS. 76 45 THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPA- RATE SUBSTANCES. 77 46 THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF. 79 47 THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE. 82 48 THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE. 84 49 THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES. 87 50 THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD. 90 51 HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE. 92 52 THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE. 93 53 THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE. 95 54 ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE, AND THEIR SOLUTION. 97 55 THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE. 99 CONTENTS IX PAGE CHAPTER 56 THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING GOD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM. 100 57 THAT EVERY INTELLECT OP ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION. 102 58 THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER. 103 59 HOW THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS. 104 60 THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE. 106 61 THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE. 107 62 THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOREVER. 108 63 HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN’S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED. Ill X. MAN AND THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. TEXT: Summa Contra Gentiles, Book. Ill, Chapters 64-113. CHAPTER 64 THAT GOD GOVERNS ALL THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE. 113 65 THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN BEING. 116 66 THAT NOTHING GIVES BEING EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY god’s POWER. 118 67 THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF their OPERATING. 120 68 THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE. 121 69 CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS. 123 70 HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT, 129 71 that the DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS. 130 72 that the DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTIN- GENCY FROM THINGS. 133 73 THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE LIB- ERTY OF CHOICE. 134 74 THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FORTUNE AND CHANCE. 136 75 THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENTS. 137 76 THAT god’s PROVIDENCE CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDI- ATELY, 140 77 THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES. 143 78 THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREA- TURES ARE RULED BY GOD. 145 79 THAT LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER. 146 80 ON THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO ONE AN- OTHER. 147 X CONTENTS PACE CHAPTER 8 1 ON THE ORDERING OF MEN TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO OTHER THINGS. 82 THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 83 CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING. 155 84 THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES DO NOT ACT ON OUR INTELLECTS. 1.56 85 THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF ()UR WILLING AND CHOOSING. 159 86 THAT CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN THIS LOWER WORLD DO NOT RE- SULT OF NECESSITY FROM THE ACTION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 163 87 THAT THE MOVEMENT OF A HEAVENLY BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR CHOOSING BY VIRTUE OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME SAY. 167 88 that created separate substances CANNOT BE THE DIRECT CAUSES OF OUR ACT OF CHOOSING AND WILLING, BUT GOD ALONE. 1 68 89 THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL, AND NOT ONLY THE POWER OF THE WILL, IS CAUSED BY GOD. 170 90 THAT HUMAN CHOICE AND WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE. 171 91 HOW HUMAN AFFAIRS MAY BE REFERRED TO HIGHER CAUSES. 173 92 HOW A MAN MAY BE SAID TO BE FORTUNATE, AND HOW HE IS ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES. 174 93 IS THERE SUCH A THING AS FATE, AND WHAT IS IT? 179 94 OF THE CERTAINTY OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE. 180 95-96 THAT THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USEFULNESS OF PRAYER. 184 97 HOW THE DISPOSITION OF PROVIDENCE IS ACCORDING TO A PLAN. 189 98 HOW IT IS POSSIBLE, AND HOW IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOR GOD TO DO SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE. 193 99 THAT GOD CAN WORK OUTSIDE THE ORDER IMPOSED ON THINGS, BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT THEIR PROXIMATE CAUSES. 194 100 THAT WHAT GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF NATURE IS NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE. 197 1 01 ON MIRACLES. 198 102 THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES. 199 103 HOW SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO WONDERS WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TRULY MIRACLES. 201 104 THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DO NOT RESULT ONLY FROM THE INFLUENCE OF HEAVENLY BODIES. 204 105 WHENCE THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DERIVE THEIR EFFICACY. 206 106 THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH GIVES EFFICACY TO THE PRACTICES OF MAGIC IS NOT GOOD ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. 209 107 THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHOSE ASSISTANCE IS EMPLOYED IN THE MAGIC ARTS IS NOT EVIL IN ITS NATURE. 210 CONTE^iTS xi PAGE CHAPTER I08 ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO SIN IN THE DEMONS. 213 109 THAT THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE DEMONS, AND HOW THIS IS POSSIBLE. 215 no SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS. 218 111 THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL MANNER. 219 1 12 THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE GOVERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, AND OTHER CREATURES AS DIRECTED TO THEM. 220 1 13 THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS DIRECTED TO ITS ACTIONS BY GOD NOT ONLY IN WHAT BEFITS THE SPECIES, BUT ALSO IN WHAT BEFITS THE INDIVIDUAL. 223 XI. HUMAN ACTS. TEXT: Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions 6-21. Q. 6 ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY. 225 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN HUMAN ACTS? 226 2 WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 228 3 WHETHER THERE CAN BE VOLUNTARINESS WITHOUT ANY ACT? 229 4 WHETHER VIOLENCE CAN BE DONE TO THE WILL? 230 5 WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? 232 6 WHETHER FEAR CAUSES WHAT IS VOLUNTARY ABSOLUTELY? 233 7 WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? 235 8 WHETHER IGNORANCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? 236 Q. 7 ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS. 239 ART. I WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE IS AN ACCIDENT OF A HUMAN ACT? 239 2 WHETHER THEOLOGIANS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE CIRCUM- STANCES OF HUMAN ACTS? 240 3 WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PROPERLY SET FORTH IN THE THIRD BOOK OF THE EthicS? 242 4 WHETHER THE MOST IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE why AND in what the act consists? 243 Q. 8 ON THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS. 245 ART. I WHETHER THE WILL IS OF GOOD ONLY? 245 2 WHETHER VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS? 247 3 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SAME ACT TO THE END AND TO TFIE MEANS? 248 Q, 9 ON THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL. 250 ART. I. WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT? 250 2 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? 252 3 WHETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF? 253 4 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? 254 s WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY BODY? 255 6 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY GOD ALONE, AS EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? 257 CONTENTS xii PAGE Q. 10 ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED, 259 ART. y WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED TO ANYTHING NATURALLY? 259 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY ITS OBJECT? 261 3 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE LOWER APPETITE? 262 4 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE EXTERIOR MOVER WHICH IS GOD? 264 Q. 11 ON ENJOYMENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL, 266 ART. I WHETHER tO enjoj IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER? 266 2 WHETHER TO ENJOY BELONGS TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE ALONE, OR ALSO TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 267 3 WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE LAST END? 268 4 WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE END POSSESSED? 270 Q. 12 ON INTENTION. 272 ART. I WHETHER INTENTION IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL? 272 2 WHETHER INTENTION IS ONLY OF THE LAST END? 273 3 WHETHER ONE CAN INTEND TWO THINGS AT THE SAME TIME? 274 4 WHETHER THE INTENTION OF THE END IS THE SAME ACT AS THE VOLITION OF THE MEANS TO THE END? 275 5 WHETHER INTENTION BEFITS IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 277 Q. 13 ON CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO THE MEANS TO THE END. 278 ART. I WHETHER CHOICE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL OR OF THE REASON? 273 2 WHETHER CHOICE IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 279 3 WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END OR SOMETIMES ALSO OF THE END? 281 4 WHETHER CHOICE IS OF THOSE THINGS ONLY THAT ARE DONE BY US? 282 5 WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF POSSIBLE THINGS? 283 6 WHETHER MAN CHOOSES OF NECESSITY OR FREELY? 284 Q. 14 ON COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE. 286 ART. I WHETHER COUNSEL IS AN INQUIRY? 286 2 WHETHER COUNSEL IS OF THE END, OR ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END? 287 3 WHETHER COUNSEL IS ONLY OF THINGS THAT WE DQ? 288 4 WHETHER COUNSEL IS ABOUT ALL THINGS THAT WE DO? 289 5 WHETHER COUNSEL PROCEEDS BY WAY OF RESOLUTION? 291 6 WHETHER THE PROCESS OF COUNSEL IS WITHOUT END? 292 Q. 15 ON CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELA- TION TO THE MEANS. 294 ART. I WHETHER CONSENT IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE OR OF THE APPREHENSIVE POWER? 294 2 WHETHER CONSENT IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 295 3 WHETHER CONSENT IS DIRECTED TO THE END OR TO THE MEANS TO THE END? 296 CONTENTS xiii PAGE 4 WHETHER CONSENT TO THE ACT BELONGS ONLY TO THE HIGHER PART OF THE SOUL? 297 Q. 16 ON USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO THE MEANS TO THE END. 299 ART. I WI-IETHER USE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL? 299 2 WHETHER USE IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 300 3 WHETHER USE CAN APPLY ALSO TO THE LAST END? 301 4 WHETHER USE PRECEDES CHOICE? 302 Q. 17 ON THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL. 304 ART. I WHETHER COMMAND IS AN ACT OF THE REASON OR OF THE WILL? 304 2 WHETHER COMMAND BELONGS TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 305 3 WHETHER USE PRECEDES COMMAND? 306 4 WHETHER COMMAND AND THE COMMANDED ACT ARE ONE ACT, OR DISTINCT? 307 5 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE WILL IS COMMANDED? 309 6 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE REASON IS COMMANDED? 310 7 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE IS COM- MANDED? 311 8 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL IS COMMANDED? 313 9 WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE EXTERNAL MEMBERS ARE COM- MANDED? 314 Q. 18 ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL. 317 ART. I WHETPIER EVERY HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD, OR ARE THERE EVIL ACTIONS? 317 2 WHETHER TPIE GOOD OR EVIL OF A MAN^S ACTION IS DERIVED FROM ITS OBJECT? 319 3 WHETHER man’s ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM A CIRCUM- STANCE? 320 4 WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END? 321 5 WHETHER A HUMAN -ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL IN ITS SPECIES? 322 6 WHETHER AN ACT HAS THE SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END? 324 7 WHETHER TPIE SPECIES DERiyED FROM THE END IS CONTAINED UNDER THE SPECIES DERIVED FROM THE OBJECT AS UNDER ITS GENUS OR CONVERSELY? 325 8 WHETHER ANY ACT IS INDIFFERENT IN ITS SPECIES? 327 9 WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL ACT CAN BE INDIFFERENT? 329 10 WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE PLACES A MORAL ACT IN A SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL? 330 11 WPIETHER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAKES AN ACT BETTER OR WORSE PLACES A MORAL ACTION IN A SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL? 332 Q. 19 ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL. 334 ART. I WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT? 334 XIV CONTENTS PAGE 2 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT ALONE? 335 3 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON REASON? 337 4 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE ETERNAL LAW? 338 5 WHETHER THE WILL IS EVIL WHEN IT IS AT VARIANCE WITH ERRING REASON? 339 6 WHETHER THE WILL IS GOOD WHEN IT ABIDES BY ERRING REASON? 341 7 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL, AS REGARDS THE MEANS, DEPENDS ON THE INTENTION OF THE END? 343 8 WHETHER THE DEGREE OF GOODNESS OR MALICE IN THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE OF GOOD OR EVIL IN THE INTENTION? 344 9 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON ITS CON- FORMITY TO THE DIVINE WILL? 346 10 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE HUMAN WILL, IN ORDER TO BE GOOD, TO BE CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL AS REGARDS THE THING WILLED? 347 Q. 20 ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTS. 350 ART. I WHETHER GOODNESS OR MALICE IS FIRST IN THE ACT OF TFIE WILL, OR IN THE EXTERNAL ACT? 350 2 WHETHER THE WHOLE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE EXTER- NAL ACT DEPEND ON THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL? 351 3 WHETHER THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE EXTERNAL ACT ARE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE INTERIOR ACT? 352 4 WHETHER THE EXTERNAL ACT ADDS ANY GOODNESS OR MALICE TO THAT OF THE INTERIOR ACT? 354 5 WHETHER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXTERNAL ACT IN- CREASE ITS GOODNESS OR MALICE? 356 6 WHETHER ONE AND THE SAME EXTERNAL ACT CAN BE BOTH GOOD AND EVIL? 357 Q. 21 ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE. - 359 ART. I WHETHER A HUMAN ACT IS RIGHT OR SINFUL IN SO FAR AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL? 359 2 WHETHER A HUMAN ACT DESERVES PRAISE OR BLAME BY REASON OF ITS BEING GOOD OR EVIL? 361 3 WHETHER A HUMAN ACT IS MERITORIOUS OR DEMERITORIOUS IN SO FAR AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL? 362 4 WHETHER A HUMAN ACT IS MERITORIOUS OR DEMERITORIOUS BEFORE GOD ACCORDING AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL? 364 XII. HABITS, VIRTyES AND VICES. TEXT: Summa Theologicaj I-II, Questions 49-89. Q. 49 ON HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE. 366 ART. I WHETHER HABIT IS A QUALITY? 366 2 WHETHER HABIT IS A DISTINCT SPECIES OF QUALITY? 368 CONTENTS XV PAGE 3 WHETHER HABIT IMPLIES ORDER TO AN ACT? 371 4 WHETHER HABITS ARE NECESSARY? 372 Q. so ON THE SUBJECT OF HABITS. 375 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS A HABIT IN THE BODY? 375 2 WHETHER THE SOUL IS THE SUBJECT OF HABIT ACCORDING TO ITS ESSENCE OR ACCORDING TO ITS POWER? 377 3 WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY HABITS IN THE POWERS OF THE SENSITIVE PART? 379 4 WHETHER THERE IS ANY HABIT IN THE INTELLECT? 380 5 WHETHER ANY HABIT IS IN THE WILL? 382 6 WHETHER THERE ARE HABITS IN THE ANGELS? 383 Q. SI ON THE CAUSE OF HABITS AS TO THEIR FORMATION. 386 art. I WPIETHER ANY HABIT IS FROM NATURE? 386 2 WHETHER ANY HABIT IS CAUSED BY ACTS? 388 3 WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CAUSED BY ONE ACT? 390 4 WHETHER ANY HABITS ARE INFUSED IN MAN BY GOD? 391 Q. 52 ON THE INCREASE OF HABITS. 393 ART. I WHETHER HABITS INCREASE? 393 2 WHETHER HABIT INCREASES BY ADDITION? 397 3 WHETHER EVERY ACT INCREASES ITS HABIT? 399 Q. S3 HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED AND DIMINISHED. 400 ART. I WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CORRUPTED? 400 2 WHETHER A HABIT CAN DIMINISH? 402 3 WHETHER A HABIT IS CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED THROUGH MERE CESSATION FROM ACT? 404 Q. 54 ON THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS. 406 ART. I WHETHER MANY HABITS CAN BE IN ONE POWER? 406 2 WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS? 408 3 WHETHER HABITS ARE DIVIDED INTO GOOD AND BAD? 409 4 WHETHER ONE HABIT IS MADE UP OF MANY HABITS? 410 Q. 55 ON THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE. 412 ART. I WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A HABIT? 412 2 WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS AN OPERATIVE HABIT? 414 3 WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A GOOD HABIT? 415 4 WHETHER VIRTUE IS SUITABLY DEFINED? 416 Q. 56 ON THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE. 419 ART. I WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN A POWER OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUB- JECT? . 419 2 WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE IN SEVERAL POWERS? 420 3 WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 421 4 WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS ARE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 423 XVI CONTENTS pa(;e 5 WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS OF APPREHENSION ARE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 425 6 WHETHER THE WILL CAN BE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 426 Q. 57 ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 429 ART. I WHETHER THE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT ARE VIRTUES? 429 2 WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY THREE HABITS OF THE SPECULA- TIVE INTELLECT, VIZ., wisdom, scicncc AND understanding? 431 3 WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL HABIT art IS A VIRTUE? 433 4 WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A DISTINCT VIRTUE FROM ART? 434 5 WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A VIRTUE NECESSARY TO MAN? 436 6 WHETHER eubulia^ synesis and gnome are virtues annexed TO prudence? 438 Q. 58 ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLEC- TUAL VIRTUES. 440 ART. I WHETHER EVERY VIRTUE IS A MORAL VIRTUE? 440 2 WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE DIFFERS FROM INTELLECTUAL VIR- TUE? 441 3 WHETHER VIRTUE IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL? 443 4 WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITHOUT INTELLEC- TUAL VIRTUE? 445 5 WHETHER THERE CAN BE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE WITHOUT MORAL VIRTUE? 446 Q. 59 THE DISTINCTION OF THE MORAL VIRTUES IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS. 449 ART. I WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE IS A PASSION? 449 2 WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITH PASSION? 450 3 WHETHER SORROW IS COMPATIBLE WITH MORAL VIRTUE? 452 4 WHETHER ALL THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE ABOUT THE PASSIONS? 454 5 WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITHOUT PASSION? 455 Q. 60 HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER. 457 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE? 457 2 WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT OPERATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT ARE ABOUT PASSIONS? 458 3 WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE ABOUT OPERA- TIONS? 450 4 WHETHER THERE ARE DIFFERENT MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT DIF- FERENT PASSIONS? 451 5 WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORD- ING TO THE VARIOUS OBJECTS OF THE PASSIONS? 463 CONTENTS xvii PAGE Q. 61 THE CARDINAL VIRTUES. 455 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED CARDINAL OR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES? 466 2 WHETHER THERE ARE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES? 467 3 WHETHER ANY OTHER VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED PRINCIPAL RATHER THAN THESE? 468 4 WHETPIER THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER? 470 5 WHETHER THE CARDINAL VIRTUES ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO POLITICAL VIRTUES, PERFECTING, PERFECT AND EXEMPLAR VIRTUES? 472 Q. 62 THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES. 475 ART. I WHETHER THERE ARE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? 475 2 WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUES? 476 3 WHETHER FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY RECK- ONED AS THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? 477 4 WHETHER FAITH PRECEDES HOPE, AND HOPE CHARITY? 479 Q. 63 THE CAUSE OF THE VIRTUES. 481 ART. I WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN US BY NATURE? 481 2 WHETHER ANY VIRTUE IS CAUSED IN US BY HABITUATION FROM OUR ACTS? 483 3 WHETHER ANY MORAL VIRTUES ARE IN US BY INFUSION? 484 4 WHETHER VIRTUE ACQUIRED BY HABITUATION PROM OUR ACTS BELONGS TO THE. SAME SPECIES AS INFUSED VIRTUE? 486 Q. 64 ON THE MEAN OF VIRTUE. 488 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? 488 2 WHETHER THE MEAN OF MORAL VIRTUE IS A REAL MEAN, OR A MEAN OF REASON? 490 3 WHETPIER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? 491 4 WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? 492 Q. 65 THE CONNECTION OF THE VJRTUES. 495 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER? 495 2 WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY? 498 3 WHETPIER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT THE, MORAL VIRTUES? 500 4 WHETHER FAITH AND HOPE CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY? 501 5 WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT FAITH AND HOPE? 503 Q. 66 ON EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES. 505 ART. I WHETHER. ONE VIRTUE CAN BE GREATER OR LESSER THAN AN- OTHER? ' 505 2 WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES, THAT ARE TOGETHER IN ONE MAN, ARE EQUAL? 507 xviii CONTENTS PAGE 3 WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE BETTER THAN THE INTEL- LECTUAL VIRTUES? 4 WHETHER JUSTICE IS THE CHIEF OF THE MORAL VIRTUES? 510 5 WHETHER WISDOM IS THE GREATEST OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES? 6 WHETHER CHARITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? Q. 67 ON THE DURATION OF THE VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE. 516 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE? 516 2 WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE? 3 WHETHER FAITH REMAINS AFTER THIS LIFE? 519 4 WHETHER HOPE REMAINS, AFTER DEATH, IN THE STATE OF GLORY? 522 5 WHETHER ANYTHING OF FAITH OR HOPE REMAINS IN GLORY? 524 6 WHETHER CHARITY REMAINS, AFTER THIS LIFE, IN GLORY? 525 Q. 68 ON THE GIFTS. * 527 ART. I WHETHER THE GIFTS DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES? 527 2 WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAN FOR SALVATION? 530 3 WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE HABITS? 532 4 WHETHER THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE SUIT- ABLY ENUMERATED? 533 5 WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONNECTED? 536 6 WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST REMAIN IN HEAVEN? 537 7 WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE SET DOWN BY ISAIAS IN THEIR OR- DER OF DIGNITY? 539 8 WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE GIFTS? 541 Q. 69 ON THE BEATITUDES. 543 ART. I WHETHER THE BEATITUDES DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS? 543 2 WHETHER THE REWARDS ASSIGNED TO THE BEATITUDES BE- LONG TO THIS LIFE? 544 3 WHETHER THE BEATITUDES ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED? 546 4 WHETHER THE REWARDS OF THE BEATITUDES AI^E SUITABLY ENUMERATED? 550 Q. 70 ON THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST. 552 ART. I WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST WHICH THE APOSTLE ENUMERATES IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS ARE ACTS? 552 2 WHETHER THE FRUITS DIFFER FROM THE BEATITUDES? 554 3 WHETHER THE FRUITS ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED BY THE APOSTLE? 554 CONTENTS xix PAGE 4 WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONTRARY TO THE WORKS OF THE FLESH? 557 Q. 71 ON VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES. 559 ART. I WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO VIRTUE? 559 2 WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO NATURE? 561 3 WHETHER VICE IS WORSE THAN A VICIOUS ACT? 562 4 WHETHER SIN IS COMPATIBLE WITH VIRTUE? 563 5 WHETHER EVERY SIN INCLUDES SOME ACT? 565 6 WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS a word, deed Or de- sire contrary to the eternal law? 567 Q. 72 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS. 569 ART. I WHETHER SINS DIFFER IN SPECIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OB- JECTS? 569 2 WHETHER SPIRITUAL SINS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CARNAL SINS? 570 3 WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCE TO THEIR CAUSES? 572 4 WPIETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SIN AGAINST GOD, AGAINST ONESELF, AND AGAINST ONE’S NEIGHBOR? 574 5 WHETHER THE DIVISION OF SINS ACCORDING TO THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT DIVERSIFIES THEIR SPECIES? 575 6 WHETHER SINS OF COMMISSION AND OMISSION DIFFER SPE- CIFICALLY? 577 7 WHETHER SINS ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SINS OF THOUGHT, WORD AND DEED? 579 8 WHETHER EXCESS AND DEFICIENCY DIVERSIFY THE SPECIES OF SINS? 580 9 WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY ACCORDING TO DIFFER- ENT CIRCUMSTANCES? 582 Q. 73 ON THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER. , 584 ART. I WHETHER ALL SINS ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER? 584 2 WHETHER ALL SINS ARE EQUAL? 586 3 WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS VARIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS? 587 4 WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS DEPENDS ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE VIRTUES TO WHICH THEY ARE OPPOSED? 589 5 WHETHER CARNAL SINS ARE OF LESS GUILT THAN SPIRITUAL SINS? ^90 6 WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF A SIN DEPENDS ON ITS CAUSE? 592 7 WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE AGGRAVATES A SIN? 593 8 WHETHER SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF ITS CAUSING MORE HARM? ' 595 9 WHETHER A SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT IS COMMITTED? 597 XX CONTENTS PAGE 10 WHETHER THE EXCELLENCE OF THE PERSON SINNING AG- GRAVATES THE SIN? 599 Q. 74 ON THE SUBJECT OF SIN. 601 ART. I WHETHER THE WILL IS A SUBJECT OF SIN? 601 2 WHETHER THE WILL ALONE IS THE SUBJECT OF SIN? ‘ 602 3 WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE SENSUALITY? 603 4 WHETHER MORTAL SIN CAN BE IN THE SENSUALITY? 60S 5 WHETHER SIN CAN BE IN THE REASON? 606 6 WHETHER THE SIN OF LINGERING DELECTATION IS IN THE REASON? 607 7 WHETHER THE SIN OF CONSENT TO THE ACT IS IN THE HIGHER REASON? 608 8 WHETHER CONSENT TO DELECTATION IS A MORTAL SIN? 610 9 WHETHER THERE CAN BE VENIAL SIN IN THE HIGPIER REASON AS DIRECTING THE LOWER POWERS? 613 10 WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN THE HIGHER REASON AS SUCH? 614 Q. 75 THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL. 617 ART. I WHETHER SIN HAS A CAUSE? 617 2 WHETHER SIN HAS AN INTERNAL CAUSE? 618 3 WHETHER SIN HAS AN EXTERNAL CAUSE? 620 4 WHETHER ONE SIN IS A CAUSE OF ANOTHER? 621 Q. 76 THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR. 623 ART. I WHETHER IGNORANCE CAN BE A CAUSE OF SIN? 623 2 WHETHER IGNORANCE IS A SIN? 624 3 WHETHER IGNORANCE EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER? 626 4 WHETHER IGNORANCE DIMINISHES A SIN? 628 Q. 77 THE CAUSE OF SIN ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE AP- PETITE. 630 ART. I WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A PASSION OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? 630 2 WHETHER THE REASON CAN BE OVERCOME BY A PASSION, AGAINST ITS KNOWLEDGE? 632 3 WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION SHOULD BE CALLED A SIN OF WEAKNESS? 635 4 WHETHER SELF-LOVE IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY SIN? 636 5 WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE OF THE FLESH, CONCUPISCENCE OF THE EYES AND PRIDE OF LIFE ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS CAUSES OF SIN? ' 637 6 WHETHER SIN IS DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF PASSION? 639 7 WHETHER PASSION EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER? 640 8 WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION CAN BE MOR- TAi? 642 CONTENTS XXI PAGE Q. 78 ON THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE. 644 ART. I WHETHER ANYONE SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE? 644 2 WHETHER EVERYONE THAT SINS THROUGH HABIT SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE? 646 3 WHETHER ONE WHO SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE SINS THROUGH HABIT? 647 4 WHETHER IT IS MORE GRIEVOUS TO SIN THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE THAN THROUGH PASSION? 649 Q. 79 ON THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN. 651 ART. I WHETHER GOD IS A CAUSE OF SIN? 651 2 WHETHER THE ACT OF SIN IS FROM GOD? 653 3 WHETHER GOD IS THE CAUSE OF SPIRITUAL BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART? 654 4 WHETHER BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART ARE DIRECTED TO THE SALVATION OF THOSE WHO ARE BLINDED AND HARD- ENED? 656 Q. 80 ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, THE DEVIL. 658 ART. I WHETHER THE DEVIL IS DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OF MAN^S SINNING? 658 2 WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN BY INTERNAL INSTIGATIONS? 660 3 WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN OF NECESSITY? 661 4 WHETHER ALL THE SINS OF MEN ARE DUE TO THE DEVIL’s SUGGESTION? 663 Q. 81 ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, MAN. 664 ART. T WHETHER THE FIRST SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENT IS CONTRACTED BY HIS DESCENDANTS, BY WAY OF ORIGIN? 664 2 WHETHER ALSO OTHER SINS OF THE FIRST PARENT OR OF NEARER ANCESTORS ARE TRANSMITTED TO THEIR DESCENDANTS? 667 3 WHETHER THE SIN OF THE FIRST PARENT IS TRANSMITTED, BY WAY OF ORIGIN, TO ALL MEN? 669 4 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN WOULD BE CONTRACTED BY A PERSON FORMED MIRACULOUSLY FROM HUMAN FLESH? 670 5 WHETHER IF EVE, AND NOT ADAM, HAD SINNED, THEIR CHIL- DREN WOULD HAVE CONTRACTED ORIGINAL SIN? 671 Q. 82 ON ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE. 673 ART. I WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS A HABIT? 673 2 WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORIGINAL SINS IN ONE MAN? 674 3 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS CONCUPISCENCE? 676 4 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS EQUALLY IN ALL? 677 Q. 83 ON THE SUBJECT^ OF ORIGINAL SIN. 679 ART. I WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS MORE IN THE FLESH THAN IN THE SOUL? “ 679 xxn CONTENTS PACJE 2 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS IN THE ESSENCE OE THE SOUL RATHER THAN IN THE POWERS? 3 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN INFECTS THE WILL BEFORE THE OTHER POWERS? 4 WHETHER THE AFORESAID POWERS ARE MORE INFECTED THAN THE OTHERS? Q. 84 ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN SO FAR AS ONE SIN IS THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER. ART. I WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE ROOT OF ALL SINS? 2 WHETHER PRIDE IS THE BEGINNING OF EVERY SIN? 3 WHETHER ANY OTHER SPECIAL SINS, BESIDES PRIDE AND AVA- RICE, SHOULD BE CALLED CAPITAL? 4 WHETHER THE SEVEN CAPITAL VICES ARE SUITABLY RECKONED? Q. 83 ON THE EFFECTS OF SIN: CONCERNING THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE. ART. I WHETHER SIN DIMINISHES THE GOOD OF NATURE? 2 WHETHER THE ENTIRE GOOD OF HUMAN NATURE CAN BE DE- STROYED BY SIN? 3 WHETHER WEAKNESS, IGNORANCE, MALICE AND CONCUPIS- CENCE ARE SUITABLY RECKONED AS THE WOUNDS OF NATURE CONSEQUENT UPON SIN? 4 WHETHER PRIVATION OF MODE, SPECIES AND ORDER IS THE EFFECT OF SIN? 5 WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER BODILY DEFECTS ARE THE RESULT OF SIN? . 6 WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER DEFECTS ARE NATURAL TO MAN? Q. 86 ON THE STAIN OF SIN. ART. I WHETHER SIN CAUSES A STAIN ON THE SOUL? 2 WHETHER THE STAIN REMAINS IN THE SOUL AFTER THE ACT OF SIN? 681 683 684 686 686 687 689 690 694 694 696 698 699 700 702 70S 705 706 Q. 87 ON THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT. 708 ART. I WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT IS AN EFFECT OF SIN? 708 2 WHETHER SIN CAN BE THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN? 709 3 WHETHER ANY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT? 711 4 WHETHER SIN INCURS A DEBT OF PUNISHMENT INFINITE IN QUANTITY? 712 5 WHETHER EVERY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISH- MENT? 714 6 WHETHER THE DEBT, OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER SIN? 715 7 WHETHER EVERY PUNISHMENT IS INFLUCTED FOR A SIN? 716 8 WHETHER ANYONE IS PUNISHED FOR ANCJ^HER’S SIN? 718 Q. 88 ON VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN. 721 ART. I WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS FITTINGLY CO-DIVIDED AGAINST mortal SIN? 721 CONTENTS XXlll PAGE 2 WHETHER MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN DIFFER GENERICALLY? 723 3 WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS A DISPOSITION TO MORTAL SIN? 725 4 WHETHER A VENIAL SIN CAN BECOME MORTAL? 726 5 WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE A VENIAL SIN TO BE MORTAL? 723 6 WHETHER A MORTAL SIN CAN BECOME VENIAL? 730 Q. 89 ON VENIAL SIN CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. 732 ART. I WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAUSES A STAIN IN THE SOUL^ 732 2 WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE SUITABLY DESIGNATED AS WOod, hay AND stubble} 733 3 WHETHER MAN COULD COMMIT A VENIAL SIN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE? 735 4 WHETHER A GOOD OR A WICKED ANGEL CAN SIN VENIALLY? 737 5 WHETHER THE FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE SENSUALITY IN UNBELIEVERS ARE MORTAL SINS^ 738 6 WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN ANYONE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ALONE? 740 XIII. LAW. TEXT: Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions 90-108. Q. 90 ON THE ESSENCE OF LAW. 742 ART. r WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON? 742 2 WHETHER LAW IS ALWAYS DIRECTED TO THE COMMON GOOD? 744 3 WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT TO MAKE LAWS? 745 4 WHETHER PROMULGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO LAW? 746 Q. 91 ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW. 748 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW? < 748 2 WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW? 749 3 WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW? 750 4 WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW? 752 5 WHETHER THERE IS BUT ONE DIVINE LAW? 754 6 WHETHER THERE IS A LAW IN THE jomes OF SIN? 755 Q. 92 ON THE EFFECTS OF LAW. 758 ART. I WHETHER IT IS AN EFFECT OF LAW TO MAKE MEN GOOD? 758 2 WHETHER THE ACTS OF LAW ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED? 760 Q. 93 THE ETERNAL LAW. * 762 ART. I WHETHER THi^gETERNAL LAW IS A SUPREME EXEMPLAR EX- ISTING XN%0J ^ ' 762 2 WHETHER THI^'^ETERNAL LAW IS KNOWN TO ALL? 764 3 WHETHER EVERY LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW? 765 4 WHETHER NEO^SSARY AND ETERNAL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? 766 xxiv CONTENTS PAGE 5 WHETHER NATURAL CONTINGENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETER- NAL LAW? 768 6 WHETHER ALL HUMAN AFFAIRS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? 769 Q. 94 THE NATURAL LAW. 772 ART. I WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS A HABIT? 772 2 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL PRECEPTS, OR ONLY ONE? 773 3 WHETHER ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE NATURAL LAW? 775 4 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS TPIE SAME IN ALL MEN? 777 5 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE CHANGED? 779 6 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE ABOLISHED FROM THE HEART OF MAN? 780 Q. 95. HUMAN LAW. 782 ART. I WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR LAWS TO BE FRAMED BY MEN? 782 2 WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW? 784 3 WHETHER ISIDORE’S DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE LAW IS APPROPRIATE? 785 4 WHETHER ISIDORE’S DIVISION OF HUMAN LAW IS APPROPRIATE? 787 Q. 96 ON THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW. 790 ART. I WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE FRAMED IN A COMMON WAY RATHER THAN IN THE PARTICULAR? 790 2 WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO REPRESS ALL VICKS? 791 3 WHETHER HUMAN LAW PRESCRIBES THE ACTS OF ALL THE VIRTUES? 793 4 WHETHER HUMAN LAW BINDS A MAN IN CONSCIENCE? 794 . 5 WHETHER ALL ARE SUBJECT TO LAW? 796 6 WHETHER HE WHO IS UNDER A LAW MAY ACT OUTSIDE THE LETTER OF THE LAW? 797 Q, 97 ON CHANGE IN LAWS. gOO ART. I WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY? 800 2 WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD ALWAYS BE CHANGED WHEN- EVER SOMETHING BETTER OCCURS? 801 3 WHETHER CUSTOM CAN OBTAIN THE FORCE OF LAW? 802 4 WHETHER THE RULERS OF THE PEOPLE CAN DISPENSE FROM HUMAN LAWS? g04 Q. 98 ON THE OLD LAW. g06 ART. r WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GOOD? $06 2 WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS FROM GOD? 808 3 WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GIVEN THROUGH THE ANGELS? 810 CONTENTS 4 WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE JEWS ALONE? 5 WHETHER ALL MEN WERE. BOUND TO OBSERVE THE OLD LAW? 6 WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS SUITABLY GIVEN AT THE TIME OE MOSES? Q. 99 ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW. ART. I WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ONLY ONE PRECEPT? 2 WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS MORAL PRECEPTS? 3 WHETHER THE OLD LAW COMPRISES CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS BESIDES MORAL PRECEPTS? 4 WHETHER, BESIDES THE MORAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS THERE ARE ALSO JUDICIAL PRECEPTS? 5 WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ANY OTHERS BESIDE THE MORAL, JUDICIAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? 6 WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE ‘INDUCED MEN TO THE OBSERVANCE OF ITS PRECEPTS BY MEANS OF TEMPORAL PROM- ISES AND THREATS? Q. 100 ON THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW. ART. I WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BELONG TO THE LAW OF NATURE? 2 WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW ARE ABOUT ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES? 3 WHETHER ALL TPIE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW ARE REDUCIBLE TO THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE? 4 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER? 5 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY SET FORTH? 6 WHETHER THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE GIVEN IN THE PROPER ORDER? 7 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY FORMULATED? 8 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE DISPENSABLE? 9 WHETHER THE MODE OF VIRTUE FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE LAW? 10 WHETHER THE MODE OF CHARITY FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE DIVINE LAW? 1 1 WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO DISTINGUISH OTHER MORAL PRECEPTS » OF THE LAW BESIDES THE DECALOGUE? 12 WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW JUSTIFIED MAN? Q. 101 ON THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES. ART. I WHETHER THE NATURE OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS CON- SISTS IN THEIR PERTAINING TO THE WORSHIP OF GOD? 2 WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS ARE FIGURATIVE? XXV PAGE 811 813 815 817 817 818 820 821 823 825 827 827 829 830 832 834 838 840 842 844 846 848 853 853 853 855 XXVI CONTENTS PAGE 3 WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANY CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? 4 WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW ARE SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO SACRIFICES, SACRED THINGS, SACRAMENTS AND OBSERVANCES? Q. 102 ON THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS. 861 ART. I WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CAUSE FOR THE CEREMONIAL PRE- CEPTS? 2 WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS HAVE A LITERAL CAUSE OR MERELY A FIGURATIVE CAUSE? 862 3 WHETHER A SUITABLE CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CERE- MONIES WHICH PERTAINED TO THE SACRIFICES? 864 4 WHETHER SUFFICIENT REASON CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CEREMONIES PERTAINING TO HOLY THINGS? 871 5 WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY SUITABLE CAUSE FOR THE SACRA-: MENTS OF THE OLD LAW? 883 6 WHETHER THERE WAS ANY REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THE CERE- MONIAL OBSERVANCES? 898 Q. 103 ON THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS. 908 ART. I WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE LAW WERE IN EXISTENCE BEFORE THE LAW? 908 2 WHETHER, AT THE TIME OF THE LAW, THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW HAD ANY POWER OF JUSTIFICATION? 910 3 WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW CEASED AT THE COMING OF CHRIST? 912 4 WHETHER, AFTER CHRIST’S PASSION, THE LEGAL CEREMONIES CAN BE OBSERVED WITHOUT COMMITTING MORTAL SIN? 914 Q. 104 - ON THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS. 919 ART. I WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE THOSE WHICH DI- RECTED MAN IN RELATION TO HIS NEIGHBOR? 919 2 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE FIGURATIVE? 921 3 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BIND FOREVER? 922 4 WHETHER IT ,IS POSSIBLE TO ASSIGN A DEFINITE DIVISION OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS? 924 Q. 105 ON THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS. 926 ART. I WHETHER THE OLD LAW ENJOINED FITTING PRECEPTS CON- CERNING RULERS? 926 2 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE SUITABLY FRAMED AS TO THE RELATIONS OF ONE MAN WITH ANOTHER? 930 3 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS REGARDING FOREIGNERS WERE FRAMED IN A SUITABLE MANNER? 940 4^ WHETHER THE OLD LAW SET FORTH SUITABLE PRECEPTS ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD? 944 CONTENTS xxvii PAGE Q. 106 ON THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. 949 ART. I WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS A WRITTEN LAW? 949 2 WHETHER THE NEW LAW JUSTIFIES? 951 3 WHETHER THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD? 952 4 WFIETHER THE NEW LAW WILL LAST TILL THE END OF THE WORLD? 954 Q. 107 ON THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD. 957 ART. 1 WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS DISTINCT FROM THE OLD LAW? 957 2 WHETHER THE NEW LAW FULFILLS THE OLD? 960 3 WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS CONTAINED IN THE OLD? 963 4 WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS MORE BURDENSOME THAN THE OLD? 964 Q. 108 ON THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW. 967 ART. I WHETHER THE NEW LAW OUGHT TO PRESCRIBE OR PROHIBIT ANY EXTERNAL ACTS? 967 2 WHETPIER TI-IE NEW LAW MADE SUFFICIENT ORDINATIONS ABOUT EXTERNAL ACTS? 969 3 WHETPIER THE NEW LAW DIRECTED MAN SUFFICIENTLY AS REGARDS INTERIOR ACTIONS? 972 4 WHETHER CERTAIN DEFINITE COUNSELS ARE FITTINGLY PRO- POSED IN THE NEW LAW? 976 XIV. GRACE. TEXT: Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions 109-114. Q. 109 ON THE EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ACTS, NAMELY, THE GRACE OF GOD. 979 ART. I WHETHER WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN KNOW ANY TRUTH? 979 2 WHteTHER MAN CAN WILL OR DO ANY GOOD WITHOUT GRACE? 981 3 WI^ETHER BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS AND WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS? 983 4 WHETHER MAN, WITHOUT GRACE AND BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS, CAN FULFILL THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE LAW? 985 5 WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE WITHOUT GRACE? 986 6 WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE? 987 7 WHETHER MAN CAN RISE FROM SIN WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE? 989 8 WHETHER MAN WITHOUT GRACE CAN AVOID SIN? 991 9 WHETHER ONE WHO HAS ALREADY OBTAINED GRACE CAN, OF HIMSELF AND WITHOUT FURTHER HELP OF GRACE, DO GOOD AND AVOID SIN? 993 xxviii CONTENTS pa(;e 10 WHETHER MAN POSSESSED OF GRACE NEEDS THE HELP OF GRACE IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE? 994 Q. no ON THE GRACE OF GOD, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE. 996 ART. I WHETHER GRACE POSITS ANYTHING IN THE SOUL? 996 2 WHETHER GRACE IS A QUALITY OF THE SOUL? 998 3 WHETHER GRACE IS THE SAME AS VIRTUE? 999 4 WHETHER GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT, OR IN ONE OF THE POWERS? 1001 Q. Ill ON THE DIVISION OF GRACE. 1003 ART. I WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SANCTIFYING GRACE AND GRATUITOUS GRACE? 1003 2 WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE? 1005 3 WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PREVENIENT AND SUBSEQUENT GRACE? 1006 4 WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED BY THE APOSTLE? 1008 5 WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS NOBLER THAN SANCTIFYING GRACE? 1010 Q. 112 ON THE CAUSE OF GRACE. 1012 ART. I WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE? 1012 2 WHETHER ANY PREPARATION AND DISPOSITION FOR GRACE IS REQUIRED ON MAN’S PART? 1013 3 WHETHER GRACE IS NECESSARILY GIVEN TO WPIOEVER PRE- PARES HIMSELF FOR IT, OR TO WHOEVER DOES WHAT HE CAN? 1014 4 WHETHER GRACE IS GREATER IN ONE THAN IN ANOTHER? 1016 5 WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE HAS GRACE? 1017 Q. 113 ON THE EFFECTS OF GRACE. 1020 ART. I WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS THE RE- MISSION OF SINS? 1020 2 WHETHER THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS REQUIRED FOR THE RE- MISSION OF GUILT, i.e,, FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UN- GODLY? 1022 3 WHETHER FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY THERE IS REQUIRED A MOVEMENT OF FREE CHOICE? 1023 4 WHETHER A MOVEMENT OF FAITH IS REQUIRED FOR THE JUS- TIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY? 1025 5 WHETHER FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY THERE IS REQUIRED A MOVEMENT OF FREE CHOICE AGAINST SIN? 1026 6 WHETHER THE REMISSION OF SINS OUGHT TO BE RECKONED AMONG THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR JUSTIFICATION? 1028 7 WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY TAKES PLACE IN AN INSTANT OR SUCCESSIVELY? 1029 CONTENTS XXIX PAGE 8 WHETHER THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS NATURALLY THE FIRST OF THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY? 1032 9 WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS GOD’S GREATEST WORK? 1034 10 WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS A MIRACU- LOUS WORK? 1035 Q. 114 ON MERIT, WHICH IS THE EFFECT OF CO-OPERATING GRACE. 1038 ART* I WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT ANYTHING FROM GOD? 1038 2 WHETHER ANYONE WITHOUT GRACE CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE? 1040 3 WHETHER A MAN IN GRACE CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE CON- DIGNLY? 1041 4 WHETHER GRACE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF MERIT THROUGH CHARITY MORE THAN THROUGH THE OTHER VIRTUES? 1042 5 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT FOR HIMSELF THE FIRST GRACE? 1044 6 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT THE FIRST GRACE FOR ANOTHER? 1045 7 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT RESTORATION AFTER A FALL? 1046 8 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT THE INCREASE OF GRACE OR CHARITY? 1048 9 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT PERSEVERANCE? 1049 10 WHETHER TEMPORAL GOODS PALL UNDER MERIT? 1050 XV. FAITH. TEXT: Summa Theologica, II-II, Questions 1-7. Q. 1 ON THE FAITH. 1055 ART. I WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH IS THE FIRST TRUTH? 1055 2 WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH IS SOMETHING COMPLEX, SUCH AS A PROPOSITION? 1056 3 WHETHER ANYTHING FALSE CAN COME UNDER FAITH? 1058 4 WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH CAN BE SOMETHING SEEN? 1059 5 WHETHER THOSE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH CAN BE AN OBJECT OF SCIENCE? 1061 6 WHETHER THOSE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO CERTAIN ARTICLES? 1063 7 WHETHER THE ARTICLES OF FAITH HAVE INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME? 1065 8 WHETHER THE ARTICLES OP FAITH ARE SUITABLY FORMU- LATED? 1067 9 WHETHER IT IS SUITABLE FOR THE ARTICLES OF FAITH TO BE EMBODIED IN A SYMBOL? 1070 lO WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE SOVEREIGN PONTIFF TO DRAW UP A SYMBOL OF FAITH? 1072 XXX CONTENTS PAGE Q. 2 ON THE INTERIOR ACT OF FAITH. 1074 ART. I WHETHER TO BELIEVE IS TO THINK WITH ASSENT? 1074 2 WHETHER THE ACT OF FAITH IS SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED AS BELIEVING GOD, BELIEVING IN A GOD, AND BELIEVING IN GOD? 1076 3 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION TO BELIEVE ANY- THING ABOVE THE NATURAL REASON? 1077 4 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO BELIEVE THOSE THINGS WHICH CAN BE PROVED BY NATURAL REASON ? 1079 5 WHETHER MAN IS BOUND TO BELIEVE ANYTHING EXPLICITLY? 1080 6 WHETHER ALL ARE EQUALLY BOUND TO HAVE EXPLICIT FAITH? 1082 7 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SALVATION OF ALL THAT THEY SHOULD BELIEVE EXPLICITLY IN THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST? 1083 8 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION TO BELIEVE EX- PLICITLY IN THE TRINITY? 1086 9 WHETHER TO BELIEVE IS MERITORIOUS? 1087 10 WHETHER REASONS IN SUPPORT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE LESSEN THE MERIT OF FAITH? 1088 Q. 3 ON THE EXTERIOR ACT OF FAITH. 1091 ART. I WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF FAITH? * 1091 2 WHETHER CONFESSION OF FAITH IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION? 1092 Q. 4 ON THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH. 1094 ART. I WHETHER THIS IS A FITTING DEFINITION OF FAITH: jaith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not? 1094 2 WHETHER FAITH RESIDES IN THE INTELLECT? 1097 3 WHETHER CHARITY IS THE FORM OF FAITH? 1098 4 WHETHER FORMLESS FAITH CAN BECOME FORMED, OR FORMED FAITH, FORMLESS? 1099 5 WHETHER FAITH IS A VIRTUE? 1101 6 WHETHER FAITH IS ONE VIRTUE? 1103 7 WHETHER FAITH IS THE FIRST OF THE VIRTUES? 1104 8 WHETHER FAITH IS MORE CERTAIN THAN SCIENCE AND THE OTHER INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES? 1106 Q. S CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH. 1108 ART. I WHETHER THERE WAS FAITH IN THE ANGELS, OR IN MAN, IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATE? 1108 2 WHETHER IN THE DEMONS THERE IS FAITH? 1110 3 WHETHER A MAN WHO DISBELIEVES ONE ARTICLE OF FAITH CAN HAVE FORMLESS FAITH IN THE OTHER ARTICLES? 1111 4 WHETHER FAITH CAN BE GREATER IN ONE MAN THAN IN ANOTHER? ‘ 1113 CONTENTS xxxi PAGE Q. 6 ON THE CAUSE OF FAITH. 1115 ART. I WHETHER FAITH IS INFUSED INTO MAN BY GOD? 1115 2 WHETHER FORMLESS FAITH IS A GIFT OF GOD? 1116 Q. 7 ON THE EFFECTS OF FAITH. 1119 ART. I WHETHER FEAR IS AN EFFECT OF FAITH? 1119 2 WHETHER FAITH HAS THE EFFECT OF PURIFYING THE HEART? 1120 INDEX MAN AND THE CONDUCT OF LIFE THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES THIRD BOOK CHAPTER I FOREWORD The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods. For the Lord will not reject people. For in His hands are all the ends of the earth. and the heights of the moun- tains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land (Ps. xdv. 3 seqg.) We have shown in the preceding books that there is one First Being, pos- sessing the full perfection of all being, Whom we "call God, and Who, of the abundance of His perfection, bestows being on all that exists, so that He is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover He bestows being on others, not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of His will, as we have shown above.’^ Hence it fol- lows that He is the Lord of the things made by Him, since we are masters over those things .that are subject to our will. Now it is a perfect dominion that He exercises over things made by Him, for in making them He needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of His work. For He is the universal efficient cause of all being. Now everything that is produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent, because the good and the end are the proper object of the will; and therefore whatever proceeds from a will must needs be directed to an end. But each thing attains its end by its own action, which action needs to be directed by him who endowed things with the principles whereby they act. Consequently God, Who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all things with being, must needs be the Ruler of all, Himself ruled by none; nor is any thing to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there any thing that does not owe its being to Him. Therefore, as He is perfect in being and causing, so He is perfect in ruling. The effect of this ruling is seen to differ in different things, according to the difference of natures. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to Him and reflect His image. Hence, not only are they directed, but they direct themselves to their ap- pointed end by their own actions. And if in thus directing themselves they " C. G., 11 , 23. 3 4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES be subject to the divine ruling, they are admitted by that divine ruling to the attainment of their last end; but they are excluded therefrom if they direct themselves otherwise. Others there are, lacking intelligence, which do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another. Of these some, being incorruptible, even as they are not subject to defect in their natural being, so neither do they wander, in their own actions, from the direction to their appointed end, but are subject, without fail, to the ruling of the supreme ruler. Such are the heavenly bodies, whose movements are invariable. Others, however, being corruptible, are subject to defects in their natural being; and yet this defect is supplied to the advantage of another, since when one thing is corrupted, another is generated. Likewise, they fail from their natural direction in their own actions, and yet this failing is compensated by some resultant good. Whence it is clear that not even those things which are seen to wander from the direction of the supreme ruling, escape from the power of the supreme ruler; for just as these corruptible bodies are created by God, so too’ are they perfectly subject to Him. There- fore, considering this, tjhe Psalmist, filled with the divine spirit, in order to give us an illustration of the divine government, first describes to us the perfection of the supreme governor, — as to His nature when he says, God; as to His power, when he says, a great Lord, implying that He needs no one for His power to produce its effect; as to His authority, when he says, A great king above all gods, since, although there be many rulers, yet are all subject to His rule. Secondly, he describes to us the manner of this government. He describes it as regards intellectual beings, which, if they submit to His rule, receive from Him their last end which is Himself; and therefore he says. For the Lord will not reject His people. As regards things corruptible which, albeit at times they wander from their proper mode of action, never escape the power of the supreme ruler, he says. Because in His hands are all the ends of the earth. And as regards the heavenly bodies, which transcend the highest summits of the earth (that is, of cor- ruptible bodies), and always maintain the order of the divine government, he says. And the mountain heights are His. Thirdly, he assigns the reason for this universal government, for the things that God made must needs be governed by Him. To this he refers when he says, For the sea is Ilis, etc. Since, then, in the First Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and, in the Second, of the perfection of the divine power, inasmuch as He is the creator and lord of all: it remains for us in this Third Book to treat of His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as Pie is the end and governor of all. We must therefore proceed in this wise, so as first to treat of Him as the end of all things; secondly of His universal government, inasmuch as He governs every creature;^ thirdly, of that special government, whereby He governs creatures endowed with intellect.^ =^Ch. 64* ®Ch. III. EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END 5 CHAPTER II THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END Accordingly we must first show that every agent, by its action, intends an end. For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends; for when this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended. This may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter, as to this, whether that which tends to an end be endowed with knowledge or not; for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow’s flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate, since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating pro- ceeds from heat, and cooling from cold; and therefore actions are dif- ferentiated by their active principles. Action sometimes terminates in something made, as for instance building terminates in a house, and healing in health; while sometimes it does not so terminate, as for instance, in the case of understanding and sensation. And if action terminates in soniething made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards the thing made; while if it. does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It, follows therefore that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself^ some- times a thing made by the action. Again. In all things that act for an end, that is said to be the last end beyond which the agent seeks nothing further; and thus the physician’s action goes as far as health, and when this is attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go; or else actions would tend to infinity, which is im- possible, for since it is not possible to pass through an infinite medium^ the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore every agent acts for an end. ~T3oreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must needs result either in something made, or not. If the result is some- thing made, the being of that thing made will follow after an infinity of actions. But that which presupposes an infinity of things cannot possibly be, since an infinite medium cannot be passed through. Now impossibility of being argues impossibility of becoming, and that which cannot become, it is impossible to make. Therefore it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing for the making of which an infinity of actions is presupposed. Aristotle, Post. Ami., I, 22 (82b 38). 6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES If^ however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active powers (for instance, if a man feels that he may imagine, and imagines that he may understand, and understands that he may will), or according to the order of objects (for instance, I consider the body that I may consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God). Now it is not possible to pro- ceed to infinity, either in active powers (as neither is this possible in the forms of things, as is proved in Metaph, ii,^ since the form is the principle of activity), or in objects (as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above) ^ Therefore it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity, and consequently there must be some- thing, upon whose attainment the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore ev ery a gejit a^cts for an end. Further. In things that act for an end, whatsoever comes between the first agent and the last end, is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to something determinate, and if its action, as stated, pro- ceeds to infinity, the active principles must needs proceed to infinity; which is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate. Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intellect. Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intellect act for an end, since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and they act through such a preconception; for this is to act by intellect. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural agent there pre-exists the likeness of the natural effect, by virtue of which the action is determined to the appointed effect; for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Therefore, even as that which acts by intel- lect tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore every agent acts for an end. Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end, for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not ap- pointed ; and thus we find fault with a physician if he fail to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly, and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the ca^e of monstrosities. Therefor e every agent, wh^^Lacmrdmio. mtune,^- or according to ant,, Qj .P^bting of Wpurpose, acts for an end. Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent td many effects does not produce one rather than another* Therefore, from that which is indifferent to ^Aristotle, Metaph,, I a, 2 (994, 6). ®C. G.. I, 42. EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD 7 either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end. There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention, such as scratching one’s beard, and the like. Whence some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end. — But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves an end. Playful actions are sometimes an end, when one plays for the mere pleasure of play; and sometimes they are for an end,- as when we play that afterwards we may study better. Actions done with- out attention do not proceed from the intellect, but from some sudden act of the imagination, or some natural principle; and thus a disordered humor produces an itching sensation and is the cause of a man scratching his beard, which he does without his intellect attending to it. Such actions do tend to an end, although outside the order of the intellect. Hereby is ex- cluded the error of certain natural philosophers of old, who maintained that all things happen by the necessity of matter, thus utterly banishing the final cause from things.^ CHAPTER III i/" THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD Hence we must go on to prove that every agent acts for a good. For that every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends to something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent, since the agent would not tend to it save because of some fittingness thereto. BuLlhat.. which is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good. Further. The end is that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover comes to rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very no- tion of good to be the term of appetite, since goo(^isJ^^pk}^cLaf .0V£r.y appetit$? Therefore all action and movement is for a good. Again. All action and movement would seem to be directed in some way to being, either for the preservation of being in the species or in the individual, or for the acquisition of being. Now this itse lf, namely, being, is a,good ; and for this reason all thinjgs desir^^^ Therefore all action and movement Is loFa good. Furthermore. All action and movement is for some perfection. For if the action itself be the end, it is clearly a second perfection of the agent. And if the action consist in the transformation of external matter, clearly the Aristotle, 11 , 8 (198b 12), ® Aristotle, Eth,, 1 , i (iog4a 1), 8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES mover intends to induce some perfection into the thing moved, towards which perfection the movable also tends, if the movement be natural. Now we saj^that this is to bje good, namely, to be perfect. Therefore every action andTnovement is for a good. Also. Every agent acts according as it is actual. Now by acting it tends to something similar to itself. Therefore it tends to an act. But an act has the nature of good, since evil is not found save in a potentiality lacking act. Therefore every action is for a good. Moreover. The intellectual agent ‘acts for an end, as determining for itself its end; whereas the natural agent, though it acts for ^n end, as was proved above, ^ does not determine its end for itself, since it knows not the nature of end, but is moved to the end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not determine the end for itself except under the aspect of good; for the intelligible object does not move except it be con- sidered as a good, which is the object of the will. Therefore the natural agent also is not moved, nor does it act for an end, except in so far as this end is a good, since the end is determined for the natural agent by some appetite. Therefore every agent acts for a good. Again. To shun evil and to seek good are of the same nature, even as movement downward and upward are of the s^me nature. Now we observe that all things shun evil, for intellectual agents shun a thing for the reason that they apprehend it as evil, and all natural agents, in proportion to their strength, resist corruption which is the evil of everything. Therefore all things act for a good. Again. That which results from the agent’s action outside his intention, is said to happen by chance or luck. Now we observe in the works of nature that either always or more often that happens which is best: thus in plants the leaves are so placed as to protect the fruit; and the parts of an animal are so disposed as to conduce to the animal’s safety. Therefore, if this happens outside the intention of the natural agent, it will be the result of chance or luck. But that is impossible, because things that happen always, or frequently, are not by chance or fortuitous, but those which occur seldom.^ Therefore the natural agent tends to ti^t which is best; and much more evidently is this jo with the intellectual agent. Therefore every agent intends a good in acting. Moreover. Whatever is moved is brought to the term of movement by the mover and agent. Therefore mover and moved tend to the same term. Now that which is moved, since it is in potentiality, tends to an act, and conse- quently to perfection and goodness; for by its movement it passes from potentiality to act. 'Hijeref o£e moyer and agent by moving and acting always intend a good. Ch. 2. Aristotle, Phys., 11, 5 (196b ii). EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL 9 Hence the philosophers in defining the good said: The good is the object of every appetite; and Dionysius says that all things desire the good and the best}- CHAPTER IV THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS It follows from the above that evil is incidental to things beside the inten- tion of an agent. For when the result of an action differs from the intention of the agent, it is clear that such result occurs unintentionally. Now evil d iffers from gQfld^Jduch«£very a^^ intends. Therefore evil happens without intention. Also. Defect in effect and action results from defect in the principles of action. Thus a monstrosity results from a defect in the seed, and limping results from a curvature of the leg. Now an agent acts according as it is possessed of active power, and not according as it suffers from defective power. And according as it acts, it intends the end. Therefore it intends an end corresponding to its power. Hence whatever.. fQUows.XQxresponding to the defective power will be outside the agent’s intention. And this is. evil. Tha’efore' evil occurs without intention. Again. The movement of the thing moved has the same tendency as the motion of the mover. Now the thing moved tends per se to good, but to evil it tends accidentally and unintentionally. This is most evident in genera- tion and corruption. For matter, while it underlies one form, is in potenti- ality to another form, and to the privation of the form which it has already. Thus, when it is under the form of air, it is in potentiality to the form of fire and the privation of the form of air. And the transformation of matter terminates in both at the same time: in the form of fire by reason of fire being generated, and in the privation of the form of air by reason of the air being corrupted. But the intention and appetite of matter is not towards the privation, but towards the form. For it does not tend towards the impossible, and it is impossible for master to be alone under a privation, whereas it is possible for it to be under a form. Therefore it is uninten- tional that it terminate in privation; but it terminates therein in so far as it attains the form which.it intends, the necessary result of which is the pri- vation of the other form. Therefore in generation and corruption the trans- formation of matter is directed per se to the form, and privation results unintentionally. And the same must needs apply to all movements, so that in every movement there is generation and corruption in some respect. For instance, when a thing is changed from white to black, a white thing is ^De Div. Norn,, IV, 4 (PG 3, 699). 10 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES corrupted and a black one results. Now the good is according as matter is perfected by the form, and potentiality by its proper act; while evil is according as it is deprived of its proper act. Consequently, whatever is moved intends in its movement to attain some good ; and it attains evil with- out its intention. Hence, since every agent and mover tends to the good, evil occurs without the intention of the agent. Moreover. In those things that act by intellect or any kind of judgment, intention follows apprehension, because the intention is towards that which is apprehended as an end. Accordingly if something is attained that has no species in the apprehension, it will be outside the intention. For instance, if one were to intend to eat honey, and were to eat gall thinking that it was honey, this will be outside the intention. But every intellectual agent tends to something in so far as he considers it under the aspect of good, as we have shown above.^ Therefore if this be not a good but an evil, it will be without intention. Therefore that which acts by intellect does not work evil except unintentionally. Therefore, since to tend to a good is common to intellectual and natural agents, evil does not ensue from the intention of an agent except without that intention. In this sense Dionysius says that evil is unintentional and involuntary ? CHAPTERS V AND VI ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT WITHOUT INTENTION [aND THEIR SOLUTION] There are, however, some objections that would seem to run counter to this conclusion. [1] For that which occurs without the intention of the agent is said to happen fortuitously, by chance and seldom. But evil is not said to happen fortuitously and by chance, nor does it occur seldom but always or fre- quently. For in the physical order generation is always accompanied by corruption. And in voluntary agents sin is of frequent occurrence, since it is as difficult to behave virtuously j as to find the center of a circle, as Aristotle states.® Therefore it would seem that evil is not an unintentional occurrence. [ 2 ] Again. Aristotle says expressly that vice is voluntary,^ and he proves this from the fact that a man does an injustice voluntarily (and it is ab- surd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions voluntarily does not wish to be unjust, and that he who rapes voluntarily does not wish to be incontinent), and again from the fact that legislators punish evil-doers as ^ Ch. 3. ^De Div. N om,, IV, 32 ; 35 (PG 3, 732 ; 736) . ^ Op. cit.. Ill, 5 (1112b 16). Eth., II, 9 (1109a 24). EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL ii doing evil voluntarily. Therefore evil would seem not to be unintentional or involuntary. [3] Further. Every natural movement has an end intended by nature. Now corruption is a natural movement, even as is generation. Therefore its end, which is privation having the aspect of evil, is intended by nature; even as are the form and the good, which are the end of generation. [Chapter VI] In order that the solution of the arguments here given may be made clear we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. In a substance there is evil through its lack- ing something natural and due to it. For, that a man have not wings is not an evil to him, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man have not fair hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he have no hands, which are natural and due to him, if he be perfect; and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due; and consequently the character of evil is always in a privation thus understood. Matter, since it is in potentiality to all forms, is adapted by nature to all of them, yet no one is due to it; since it c^n be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter; for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly, the privation of such a form, in relation to matter, is not an evil to matter; but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is an evil (and thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil for fire). And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except inasmuch as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject wherein it is, it will be an evil absolutely. Otherwise it will be the evil of something, but not absolutely. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil abso- lutely; but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil ab- solutely, but an evil of the air. On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must needs be an evil absolutely. Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or by chance, as the jirst argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or by chance. Thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitqus nor by chance, but it would be by chance if such a result were to occur seldqm. Therefore the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue outside the intention of the generator, follows nevertheless always, since the presence of one formis always accompanied by the privation of another. Therefore 12 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES corruption does not ensue by chance, nor even seldom; although sometimes privation is not an evil absolutely, but the evil of some particular thing, as was stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the Jung generated of that which is due to it, it will be by chance and an evil ab- solutely, as in the birth of monstrosities. For this does not follow of neces- sity from that which was intended, but is opposed thereto; since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated. Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect m the active power. Hence if the agent’s power be defective, this evil ensues without intention ; yet it will not be by chance, because it follows^ of necessity from such an agent (provided always that the agent in question always or fre- quently suffers this defect) . But it will be by chance if this* defect seldom accompanies this agent. ^ , In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow; for movement is not caused by universes but by •singulars, among which actions are found. Hence, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of the good dictated by the reason, moral evil ensues not by chance, but either always or fre- quently: as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery: wherefore the evil of adultery is not by chance. It would, how- ever, be a chance evil, if sin were to ensue seldom from what he intends* as in one who, while aiming at a bird, kills a man. That anyone should intend such goods which frequently result in privation of a good dictated by the reason is due to the fact that many live according to sense; for sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place: and privation of the good dictated by the reason ensues from many goods of that kind. Hence it follows that, although evil is without intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states, accidentally however and not per se. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake. But the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it absolutely. For instance, the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety, intends not the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo, not ab- solutely, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the sake of obtain- ing a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it absolutely, but for the sake of something in particular. In the same way, therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary, as the throwing of a ship’s cargo into the sea. The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of cor- ruption is never found without the change of generation; and consequently neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE 13 nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of genera- tion, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of water. Accordingly, nature intends directly that there should be air, but it does not intend that there should not be water except in so far as this is involved by the existence of air. Therefore priva- tions are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally, whereas forms are intended directly. From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil absolutely is utterly with- out intention in the operations of nature, for example, the birth of mon- strosities; but which is evil, not absolutely, but relatively, is intended by nature, not directly, but accidentally. CHAPTER VII THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE From this it follows that no essence is evil in itself. For evil, as we have said,^ is nothing else but the 'privation of what is connatural and due to anyone; for the term evil is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is the non-existence of something in a substance? Therefore evil is not a real essence. Again. Each thing has being according to its essence. Now in so far as it has being, it has a share of good ; for if good is what all desire ^ being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore a thing is good in so far as it has an essence. But good and evil ar^e opposed to each other. Therefore nothing is evil in so far as it has an essence. Therefore no essence is evil. Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner, neither can it be something made, since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore nothing is evil as to its essence. Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what. is like it and becoming to it. Now everything by acting intends a good* as we proved above.^ Therefore no being as such is evil. Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of a thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must needs flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance; although perchance it may not be natural to some other substance. Thus heat is natural to fire, whereas it is ^Ch. 6. ^Aristotle, Metaph,, III, 2 (1004a 16), ®Ch. 3. 14 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil, since it is the priva- tion of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence, whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore no essence is evil in itself. Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form, since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the character of goodness, for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends ; and it is the act whereby whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore evil has not an essence. Further. Being is divided by act and potentiality. Now act, as such, is a good, because in so far as a thing is in act, it is perfect. Again, potentiality is a good, for potentiality tends to act, as may clearly be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary thereto. Moreover it is in the same genus as act. Furthermore privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore everything that is, in whatever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is a good. Therefore evil has not an essence. Again. It has been proved in the Second Book of this work that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God;^ and we have shown in the First Book that God is perfect goodness.^ Since,’ then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hence it is that it is said {Gen, i. 31) : God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; and {Eccles, iii. ii): Ee hath made all things good in their time; and (i Tim, iv. 4) : Every creature of God is good. Again, Dionysius says that evil is not a thing that exists^ namely, per se, nor is it something in things that exist, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.® Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature. CHAPTERS VIII AND IX ARqUMENTS WHEREBY IT IS SEEMINGLY PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING [and their solution] It would seem that certain arguments militate against the aforesaid state- ment. [i] For each thing derives its species from its proper difference. Now evil is a specific difference in certain genera, namely in moral habits and ^C. G,, II, 15. ®C. G., I, 28 and 41. ^De Div. Nom,, IV, 20-21 (PG 3, 721). EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE 15 acts; for just as virtue according to its species is a good habit, so the con- trary vice is an evil habit according to its species. The same applies to virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore evil gives certain things their species. Therefore it is an essence, and is natural to certain things. [2] Further. Each of two contraries is a nature, for if it expressed nothing, one of the contraries would be a pure privation or negation. But good and evil are said to be contraries. Therefore evil is a nature. [3] Again. Aristotle in his Categories says that good and evil are genera of contraries} Now every genus has an essence or nature, for there are no species or differences of non-being, so that what is not cannot be a genus. Therefore evil is an essence and a nature. [4] Also. Whatever is active is a thing. Now evil as such is active, for it counteracts and corrupts good. Therefore evil as such is a thing. [5] Moreover. Whatever can be more or less must be a thing admitting of degrees, since negations and privations do not admit of being more or less. Now among evils we find one to be worse than another. Therefore, seemingly, evil must be a thing. [6] Furthermore. Thing and being are convertible terms. Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it is a thing and a nature. [Chapter IX\ These objections, however, are easily solved. For evil and good in morals are said to be specific differences, as the first argument stated, because moral matters depend on the will; for a thing comes under the head of morals so far as it is voluntary. Now the will’s object is the end and the good. Hence moral matters are specified by their end, even as natural actions are specified by the form of their active principle, for in- stance, the action of heating is specified by heat. Since, then, good and evil are predicated in respect of the universal direction to an end, or the priva- tion of that direction, it follows that in morals the first differences are those of good and evil. Now for one genus there must be one first measure; and the measure in morals is reason. Consequently good and evil in moral mat- ters must depend on the end appointed by reason. Accordingly, in morals, that which derives its species from an end that is in accord with reason is said to be specifically good; and that which derives its species from an end discordant from reason is said to be specifically bad. And yet this end, though it sets aside the end appointed by reason, is nevertheless some kind of good, such as a pleasurable object of the senses, or something similar, so that in some animals this end is good, and even in man when it is mod- erated by reason. Also it happens that what is evil for one is good for an- other. Therefore evil, so far as it is a specific difference in the moral genus, does not denote a thing essentially evil; but it rather denotes something that is good in itself, but evil for man, in so far as it removes the order of reason, which is man’s good. From this it follows that evil and good are contraries according as they are applied to the moral genus. But they are ^ Cat., XI (14a 24). i6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES not contraries in their absolute signification, as the second objection stated, but evil is a privation of good so far as it is evil. In the same way we may understand the saying that evil and good, taken in the moral order, are genera of contraries, on whith the third objec-^ tion was based. For of all moral contraries, either both are evil, as prodi- gality and stinginess, or one is good and the other evil, as liberality and stinginess. Hence moral evil is both a genus and a difference, not through being the privation of a good appointed by reason (whence it is called evil), but through the nature of the action or habit that is directed to an end incompatible with the right end appointed by reason. Thus a blind man is a human individual, not as being blind, but as being this particular man; and irrational is a difference of animal, not through the privation of reason, but because of the particular nature to which privation of reason is consequent. It may also be said that Aristotle asserts evil and good to be genera, not in his own opinion, since he does not number them among the ten first genera in each of which some contrariety is found, but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who affirmed that good and evil are supreme genera and first principles.^ Under each of them he placed ten supreme contraries, so that we have the good which is limited, which is equal, which is one, which is on the right hand, the male, the resting, the straight, the luminous, the square, and lastly, the good; while under evil he placed the unlimited, the unequal, the manifold, the left-hand, the female, the moving, the crooked, the darksome, the oblong, and lastly, the evil. In the same way, and in several passages of his works on logic, he employs examples according to the opinions of other philosophers, as being probable at the time. Moreover, this saying contains a certain amount of truth, for it is im- possible that a probable statement should be utterly false. Now of all con- traries one is perfect, while the other is incomplete, as containing some kind of privation. Thus, white and hot are perfect, while cold and black are imperfect, as indicating a kind of privation. Since then incompleteness and privation are a kind of evil, while every perfection and completeness comes under the head of good, it follows that in contraries one seems to be com- prised under good, while the other approaches to the notion of evil In this way good and evil seem to be genera of all contraries. In this way too it is clear how evil is opposed to good, which was the line taken by the fourth objection. Because in so far as form and end, which have the aspect of good, and are the true principles of action, involve priva- tion of a contrary form and end, the action that is consequent upon this form and end is ascribed to privation and evil; accidentally however, since privation, as such, is not a principle of action. Rightly therefore does Dionysius say that evil does not oppose good, except by virtue of a good, and ^Cf. op. cit., IV (ib 25). "Cf. Metaph., I, 5 (986a 26). EVIL IS CAUSED BY GOOD 17 in itself it^ is powerless and weak}- as not being a principle of action. Evil, however, is said to corrupt good, not only as acting by virtue of a good, as was explained, but formally by itself; even as blindness is said to corrupt the^ sight, through being the very corruption of sight. In the same way, whiteness is said to color the wall, because it is the very color of the wall. A thing is said to be a greater or lesser evil by reason of its distance from the good. For thus it is that things which imply privation admit of degrees, as inequality and unlikeness ^ and thus, to be more unequal is to be more distant from equality, and to be more unlike is to go further from likeness. Therefore that is said to be more evil which is more deprived of good, as being more distant from good. But privations are subject to increase, not as having a kind of essence, as do qualities and forms, as the fifth argument presumed, but through the increase of the cause of privation. Thus air is more dark according as the light is impeded by the interposition of more obstacles, for thus it is further removed from a participation of light. Again, evil is said to be in the world, not as though it had an essence, or were some thing, as the sixth argument supposed, but according as a thing is said to be evil with evil; even as blindness and privation of any kind is said to be, because an animal is blind with blindness. For being is predicated in two ways, as the Philosopher teaches.^ First, as indicating the essence of a thing, and thus it is divided into the ten categories. In this way no priva- tion can be called a being. Secondly, as denoting the truth of judgment. In this way evil and privation are called a being, inasmuch as a thing is said to be deprived by a privation. CHAPTER X THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD We may conclude from .the foregoing that evil is not caused except by a good. For were some evil caused by an evil, since evil does not act save by virtue of a good, as was proved above,^ it follows that good itself is the primary cause of evil. Again. That which is not, is not the cause of anything. Therefore every cause must be some being. Now evil is not a being, as was shown above."^ Therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. Hence if evil be caused by something, this must be a good. Again. Whatever is properly and by itself the cause* of something in- tends its proper effect. Hence, if evil by itself be the cause of something, it would intend its proper effect, namely, evil. But this is false, for it has been . Div. Nom., IV, 29 (PG 3, 729), ^ Metaph., IV, 7 (lojya 8).~Cf. St. Thomas, In Metaph,, V, lect. 9. ® Ch. 9. ^ Ch. 7. i8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES shown that every agent intends a good.^ Therefore evil by itself is not the cause of anything, but only accidentally. Now every accidental cause is reduced to a per se cause. But good alone can be a per sc cause, and evil cannot be a per se cause. Therefore evil is caused by good. Further. Every cause is either matter, or form, or agent, or end. But evil cannot be either matter or form, for it has been shown above that being, whether actual or potential, is a good.^ Neither can it be an agent, since a thing acts inasmuch as it is actual and has a form. Nor again can it be an end, since it is without intention, as we have shown/^ Therefore evil cannot be the cause of a thing, and if anything be the cause of an evil, that evil must be caused by a good. Since, however, evil and good are opposite to each other, and one oppo- site cannot be the cause of the other except accidentally (thus a cold thing causes heat, as is stated in Physics viii.'^), it follows that good cannot be the effective cause of evil except accidentally. In the physical order, this accident may be on the part of the agent, or on the part of the effect. It is on the part of the agent, as when the agent's power is defective, with the result that the action is defective, and the effect deficient. And thus when the power of the digestive organ is defec- tive, the result is imperfect digestion of the food and an indigested humor, which are physical evils. Now it is accidental to the agent as such that its power be defective, for it acts, not as having a defective power, but as having some power; for if it lacked power altogether, it would not act at all. Accordingly, evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, inas- much as the agent’s power is defective. Hence it is said that evil has not an efficient, but a deficient, cause; because evil does not follow from an active cause, except in so far as this cause is defective in power, and in this respect it is riot effective. — ^And it comes to the same if defect in the action and the effect results from a defect in the instrument, or in any thing else required for the agent’s action: as when the motive power causes a limp because of crookedness in the leg; for the agent, acts by both its power and its instrument. On the part of the effect, evil is caused by good accidentally, either on the part of the matter of the effect, or on the part of its form. For if the matter be indisposed to receive the impression of the agent, the effect must needs be defective. Thus a deformed offspring results from an indis- position of matter. Nor is it imputed to defect in the agent, if it fail to transform an indisposed matter to perfect actuality; for to each natural agent there is appointed a power in proportion to its nature, and if it go not beyond that power, it will not on that account fall short of its power, but only when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature. On the part of the effect’s form, evil occurs accidentally in so far as one form necessarily involves the privation of another; and therefore the gen- ^ Ch. 3. ^ Ch. 7. ^ Ch. 4. ^Aristotle, Phys., VIII, i (251a 33). EVIL IS CAUSED BY GOOD 19 erating of one thing is necessarily followed by the corruption of another. But this evil is not an evil of the effect intended by the agent, as was made clear above, ^ but of the other thing. Accordingly it is evident that evil is caused only accidentally by a good. — And the same applies to things produced by art, for art, in its work, copies nature,^ and faults occur in both in the same way. In morals, however, the case would seem to be different. For moral fault does not apparently follow from a defective power, since weakness of power either wholly excludes, or at least diminishes, moral fault; since weakness does not deserve punishment, which is due to guilt, but rather mercy and pardon, seeing that moral fault must be voluntary and not necessary. But if we consider the matter carefully, we shall find that there is a likeness in one respect, and unlikeness in another. There is unlikeness in that moral fault is considered in the action alone, and not in some produced effect, for moral virtues are directed not to making but to doing. But the arts are directed to making, for which reason it has been stated that faults occur in them in the same way as in nature. Therefore moral evil is considered as resulting, not from the matter or form of the effect, but only from the agent. Now, in moral actions four active principles are to be found in due order. The first of these is the executive power, namely the motive power, whereby the members are moved to execute the will’s command. Hence this power is moved by the will which is a second principle. And the will is moved by the judgment of the apprehensive power, which judges that a particular thing is good or evil, which are objects of the will, the one moving to pursuit, the other to flight. Again, the apprehensive power is moved by the thing ap- prehended. Hence the first active principle in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive power; the third is the will; and the fourth is the motive power, which carries out the command of reason. Now the act of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil. For these external acts do not belong to morals, except according as they are voluntary. Therefore if the act of the will be good, the external act will also be good, and evil, if it be evil. And there would be nothing savoring of moral evil if the defect in a defective external act has nothing to do with the will; for limping is not a moral, but a physical, evil. There- fore a defect in this executive power either wholly excuses or diminishes moral fault. — ^Again, the act whereby the thing moves the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault; for the visible object moves the sight ac- cording to the natural order of things, and so too does every object move a passive power. — Again, considered in itself, the act of the apprehensive power is 'devoid of moral fault, since a defect therein either excuses or diminishes moral fault, in the same way as a defect in the executive power; for weakness and ignorance equally excuse or diminish sin. — It follows, ^Ch. 6. ^Aristotle, Phys., II, 2 (194a 22). 20 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES then, that moral fault is found first and chiefly in the sole act of the will, and an act is properly called moral precisely because it is voluntary. There- fore the root and origin of moral fault is to be sought in the act of the will. But there is a difficulty, seemingly, attendant upon this inquiry. For since a defective act results from a defect in the active principle, we must presuppose a defect in the will to precede the moral fault. And if this defect be natural, it will always adhere to the will, so that the will must be guilty of moral fault whenever it acts. But acts of virtue prove this to be false. But if the defect be voluntary, it is .already a moral fault, whose cause will still remain to be sought; and thus the reason will carry on indefinitely. Accordingly, we must say that the defect already existing in the will is not natural, lest it follow that the will sins in every act; and that neither is it by chancy or fortuitous, for then there would ‘be no moral fault in us, since chance events are unforeseen and outside the domain of reason. Therefore it is, voluntary. Yet it is not a moral fault, — lest we be forced to proceed indefinitely. How this may be, remains to be considered. The perfection of every active principle depends on a higher active prin- ciple, since the second agent acts through the power of the first. While, therefore, the second agent remains subordinate to the first, it acts unfail- ingly; but it fails in acting if it happen to stray from the order of the first agent: as in the case of an instrument that falls short of the first agent^s movement. Now it has been said that, in the order of moral actions, two principle's precede the will, namely, the apprehensive power, and the ap- prehended object, which is the end. And since for each movable there is a corresponding proper motive power, every apprehensive power is not the motive force due to every appetitive power, but this one belongs to this, and another to that. Accordingly, just as the proper motive power of the sensitive appetite is the apprehensive power of the senses, so the proper motive power of the will is the reason itself. Again, since the reason is able to apprehend many goods and many ends, and each one has its proper end, the will also must have as its end and first mover, not any, but a definite good. Hence when the will tends to its act, through being moved by the apprehension of reason presenting to it its proper good, a right action follows. But when the will breaks away at the apprehension of the sensitive power, or even of the reason which presents some good other than its proper good, there follows in the will’s act a moral fault. Consequently, the sin of action is preceded in the will by a failure of order to reason, and to its proper end: to reason, as when the will, on the sudden apprehension of a sense, tends to a good that is pleasurable to sense; —to its due end, as when, by deliberating, the reason arrives at stome good which is not good either now or in some particular way, and yet the will tends to that good as though it were its proper good. Now this failure of order is voluntary, for it is in the will’s power to will or not to will. Again, 21 EVERY EVIL RESIDES IN A GOOD it is in the will’s power that the reason actually consider the matter, or cease from considering it, or that it consider this matter, or that. Nor is this failure of order a moral evil, for if the reason were to consider nothing, or to consider any good whatever, as yet there is no sin, until the will tends to an undue end; and this itself is an act of the will. Accordingly, both in the physical and in the moral order it is clear that evil is not caused by good except accidentally. CHAPTER XI THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD From what we have said it can be shown that every evil resides in some good. For evil cannot exist by itself, since it has no essence, as was proved above.^ Therefore evil needs to he in some subject. Now every subject, as it is a substance, is a good, as is evident from what has been said.^ There- fore every evil is in a good. Also. Evil is a privation, as we have shown.® Now privation and the lacking form are in the same subject. But the subject of a form is a being in potentiality to that form, and this being is a good, for potentiality and act are in the same genus. Therefore privation, which is an evil, is in some good as its subject. Moreover. A thing is called evil because it injures,^ and this only because it injures a good, for it is good to injure evil, since the corruption of evil is good. Now it would not injure a good formally, unless it were in that good; and thus blindness is hurtful to a man in so far as it is in him. Therefore evil must be in a good. Again. Evil is not caused except by good, and then only accidentally.® Now whatever is accidental is reducible to that which is per se. Conse- quently, together with the evil effect that is caused accidentally by a good, there must be some good which is the per se effect of that good, so as to be the foundation of that evil; because what is accidental is founded on what is per se. Seeing, however, that good and evil are mutually opposed, and that one of two opposites cannot be the subject of the other, but expels it, someone at a cursory glance might think it unreasonable to state that good is the subject of evil. And yet it is not unreasonable, if the truth be sought thoroughly. For good, even as being, is predicated universally, since every being, as such, is good, as we have shown.^ Now it is not unreasonable that non-being ^Ch. 7. ^Ihid. ® Ch. 9. * St. Augustine, EwcHf., XII (PL 40, 237). '^Ch, 10. ®Ch. 7. 22 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES should have being for its subject, for every privation is a non-being, and yet its subject is a substance, which is a being. But non-being is not in a being opposed to it as in its subject. For blindness is not universal non- being, but a particular kind of non-being, namely privation of sight, and therefore it is not in sight, as its subject, but in an animal. In like manner, evil has for its subject not the opposite good (for it is the privation of this good), but some other good. Thus moral evil is in a natural good; and an evil of nature, namely, privation of a form, is in matter, which is a good as a being in potentiality. ' CHAPTER XII THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD It is clear from the foregoing that however much evil be increased it can never destroy good entirely, since there must always remain the subject of evil, as long as evil remains. Now the subject of evil is a good.^ Therefore, some good must always remain. But seeing that evil may be increased indefinitely, and that good is al- ways diminished by the increase of evil, it would seem that good is de- creased by evil indefinitely. Now a good that can be diminished by evil must needs be finite, because infinite good is incompatible with evil, as we proved in the First Book.^ Seemingly, therefore, a good is sometimes wholly destroyed by evil, since if something is subtracted indefinitely from the finite, this must at length be destroyed through such subtraction. Nor may it be said, as some say, that if the subsequent subtraction be made in the same proportion as the preceding one, and continue thus in- definitely, the good cannot be destroyed, as may be seen in the division of a continuous quantity. Thus if from a line two cubits long you subtract half, and from the remainder subtract half, and continue thus indefinitely, there will always remain something to be divided. But in this process of division that which is subtracted afterwards must always be less in quan- tity; for half of the whole which was subtracted at first is greater in abso- lute quantity than half of the half, albeit the same proportion remains. This, however, in no way applies to the diminution of good by evil. For the more a good is diminished by an evil, the weaker it becomes, and thus it will be more capable of diminution by the subsequent evil. Again, this subsequent evil may be equal to or greater than the previous one, and hence it will not happen that a smaller quantity of good will always be subsequently subtracted from the good, even if the same proportion be observed. ^Ch. ii: ^C. G.,I,39. EVIL HAS SOME CAUSE 23 We must therefore find a different solution. It is clear from what has been already said that evil entirely destroys the opposite good, as blind- ness destroys sight/ and yet there must needs remain the good which is the subject of that evil. Now this subject, as such, has the aspect of a good, considered as in potentiality to the actuality of the good which is removed by the evil. Therefore, the less it is in potentiality to that good, the less good will it be. Now a subject becomes less in potentiality to a form, not indeed by the mere subtraction of some part of that subject, nor by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality, but by the fact that the poten- tiality is hindered by a contrary actuality from reaching to the actuality of the form; and thus according as heat is the more increased in a subject, the less is that subject potentially cold. Therefore good is diminished by evil more by the addition of its contrary than by the subtraction of good. This applies also to what we have said of evil. For we have said that evil happens outside the intention of the agent,^ which always intends some good, the result of which is the exclusion of some other good opposed thereto. Hence the more we increase that intended good, the result of which is an evil outside the agent ^s intention, the more the potentiality to the contrary good will be diminished. And it is thus that the diminution of good by evil increases. Now this diminution of good by evil cannot go on indefinitely in the physical order. Because all physical forms and powers are limited, and reach a certain term beyond which they cannot reach. Consequently neither can a contrary form, nor can the power of a contrary agent, be increased indefinitely, so as to result in the indefinite diminution of good by evil. On the other hand, this diminution can proceed indefinitely in moral matters. For the intellect and will have no limit fixed to their actions, since the intellect can proceed indefinitely in understanding: wherefore the mathematical species of numbers and figures are infinite. In like manner, the will goes on indefinitely in willing, since he who wills to commit a theft can so will again, and so on to infinity. Now the more the will tends to unfitting ends, the more difficult is it for it to return to its proper and fitting end; as is evident in those who have acquired a vicious habit through sinning frequently. Hence the good of natural aptitude may be diminished indefinitely by moral evil ; and yet it will never be entirely destroyed, and will always accompany the nature that remains. CHAPTER XIII THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND It can be shown from what precedes that although evil has no per se cause, yet every evil must needs have an accidental cause. "Ch. II. ''Ch.4. 24 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILEwS For whatever is in a thing as its subject must needs have a cause, since it results either from the principles of the subject, or from some external cause. Now evil is in good as its subject, as was shown above.^ Therefore evil must have a cause. Again. That which is in potentiality to either of two opposites is not actualized by either except by some cause, for no potentiality actualizes itself. Now evil is the privation of that which is connatural and due to any- one;^ since it is because of this that a thing is said to be evil. Therefore evil is in a subject that is in potentiality to evil and its opposite. Therefore evil must have some cause. Moreover. Whatever is in a thing in addition to its nature supervenes through some other cause; for whatever is natural to it is permanent, un- less something else be in the way. And thus a stone is not borne upwards, unless someone throws it, and water is not heated unless something makes it hot. Now evil, in whatever subject it be, is always there in addition to the nature of that subject, since it is the privation of what is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil must always have a cause, either per sc or accidental. Further. Every evil follows upon some good;'^ and thus corruption fol- lows upon generation. Now every good has a cause, except the First Good, in which there is no evil, as was proved in the First Book.'^ Therefore every evil has a cause, from which it results accidentally. CHAPTER XIV THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE From the same premises it is clear that although evil is not a per se cause, it is nevertheless an accidental cause. For if A is the cause of B per se, whatever is accidental to A is the accidental cause of B. Thus white, which is accidental to the builder, is the accidental cause of the house. Now every evil is in some good,*'^ and every good is in some way the cause of something. For matter is in a way the cause of form, while the converse is in a way also true; and the same applies to the agent and the end. Therefore there does not follow an indefinite sequence in causes, if each thing be the cause of something else, because the circle observed in causes and effects is com- posed of various kinds of cause. Therefore evil is an accidental cause. Again. Evil is a privation, as was shown above.^^ Now privation is an accidental principle in movable things, even as matter and form are per se principles.'^ Therefore evil is an accidental cause of something. ■^Ch. II. ^Ch. 7. "Ch. 10. *C. G., I, 39. ^Ch. ii. <»Ch. 7. ^Cf. Aristotle, Pkys., I, 7 (190b 26). THERE IS NO HIGHEST EVIL 25 Moreover. From a defect in the cause there follows defect in the effect. Now defect in a cause is an evil. And yet it cannot be a per se cause, since a thing is not a cause in that it is defective, but in that it is a being; for were it wholly defective, it would be the cause of nothing. Therefore evil is a cause of something, not per se, but accidentally. Further. If we run through all the kinds of cause, we find that evil is an accidental cause: in the species of efficient cause, because defect in effect and action results from a defect in the efficient cause; in the species of material cause, because a fault in the effect arises from indisposition in the matter; in the species of formal cause, because every form is accompanied by the privation of the opposite form; and in the species of final cause, because evil is united to an undue end, inasmuch as the due end is hindered thereby. It is therefore evident that evil is an accidental cause, and cannot be a cause per se. CHAPTER XV THAT THERE IS NO HIGHEST EVIL It follows from this that there cannot be a highest evil, that is the prin- ciple of all evils. For a highest evil must needs exclude the association of all good, just as the highest good is that which is wholly disconnected from all evil. Now there cannot be an evil entirely apart from good, for it has been proved that evil resides in some good.^ Therefore nothing is supremely evil. Again. If anything be supremely evil, it must be essentially evil, even as the supreme good is that which is essentially good. But this is impossible, since” evil has no essence, as was shown above.^ Therefore it is impossible to suppose a supreme evil that is the principle of evils. Also. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. Now every evil is caused by a good, as we have proved.^ Therefore evil is not a first principle. Further. Evil does not act except by virtue of a good, as we have proved.^ But a first principle acts by its own power. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle. Moreover. Since that which is accidental is subsequent to that which is per se/* the accidental cannot be first. Now evil does not occur except acci- dentally and unintentionally, as we have proved.® Therefore evil cannot be a first principle. Again. Every evil has an accidental cause, as we have shown.'^ But a first ^Ch. II. ®Ch, 7. ®Ch. 10. *Ch. 9. ® Aristotle, Phys., II, 6 (198a 7). ®Ch.4. ^Ch. 13. 26 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES principle has no cause, either per se^ or accidental. Therefore evil cannot be the first cause in any genus. Furthermore. A per se cause precedes one that is accidental. But evil is none but an accidental cause, as we have proved.^ Therefore evil cannot be a first principle. Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees, who maintained the ex- istence of a highest evil, that is the first principle of all evils.^ CHAPTER XVI THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD Accordingly if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above, it follows that good is the end of each thing. For everything is directed by its action to some end; for either the action itself is an end, or the end of the action is also the end of the agent: and this is its good. Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good, for the philosophers define good as the object of all appetite.^ Therefore the end of everything is a good. Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and wherein it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection is moved towards it, as far as in it lies; and if it have that perfection, it rests therein. Therefore the end of a thing is its perfec- tion. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore every thing is directed to good as its end. Further. Things that know the end and things that do not know the end are equally directed to the end; although those which know the end are moved thereto per se, whereas those which do not know it tend thereto as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end are always directed to a good as their end; because the will, which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. There- fore those things also that do not know the end are directed to a good as their end. Therefore the end of all is a good. ^Ch. 14. ^Cf. St. Augustine, De Haeres., 46 (PL 42, 34). ®Ch. 3. g., Aristotle, Eth., I, i (1094a 2). ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO GOD 27 CHAPTER XVII THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD From the foregoing it is dear that all things are directed to one good as their last end. For if nothing tends to something as its end, except in so far as this is good, it follows that good, as such, is an end. Consequently that which is the supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one supreme good, namely God, as we have shown in the First Book.^ Therefore all things are directed to the highest good, namely God, as their end. Again. That which is supreme in any genus is the cause of everything in that^ genus? Thus fire which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in other bodies. Therefore the supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all things good. Therefore He is the cause of every end being an end, since whatever is an end is such in so far as it is good. Now the cause that a thing is so is itself more so? Therefore God is supremely the end of all things. Further. In every genus of causes, the first cause is more a cause than the second cause, since the second cause is not a cause save through the first. Therefore that which is the first cause in the order of final causes must needs be more the final cause of each thing than the proximate final cause. Now God is the first cause in the order of final causes, for He is supreme in the order of good things. Therefore He is the end of each thing more even than any proximate end. Moreover, In all ordered ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end. Thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man, and is given to him that he may be purged, and he be purged that he may be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are ordered in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, which is the cause of all goodness; and so, since good has the nature of an end, all things are ordered under God as preceding ends under the last end. Therefore God must be the end of all. Furthermore. The particular good is directed to the common good as its end, for the being of the part is for the sake of the being of the whole.^ So it is that the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man? ^ow the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on Him; and the good, whereby each thing is good, ^C. G., I, 42. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I a, i (993b 22). ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 2 (72a 28). ^Aristotle, Polit., I, 4 (1254a 9). ® Aristotle, Eth., I, 2 (1094b 9). 28 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, namely God, as their end. Again. Order among ends is consequent on the order among agents. For just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so all the ends of sec- ond agents must be directed to the end of the supreme agent, since what- ever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are ordered by the first agent to its own end. Now the first agent in all things is God, as we proved in the Second Book,^ And His will has no other end but His own goodness, which is Himself, as we showed in the First Book.^ Therefore all things, whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are ordered to God as their end. But this applies to all things, for, as we proved in the Second Book,^ there can be nothing that has not its being from Him. Therefore all things are ordered to God as their end. Moreover. The last end of every maker, as such, is himself, for what we make we use for our own sake; and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else, it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure, or his virtue. Now God is the producing cause of all things: of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as we have explained above. ^ Therefore He is the end of all things. And again. The end holds the primary place among causes, and it is from it that all other causes derive their actual causality; since the agent does not act except for the end, as was proved.^ Now it is due to the agent that the matter is brought to the actuality of the form, and therefore the matter is made actually the matter, and the form is made the form, of this particu- lar thing, through the agent^s action, and consequently through the end. The later end also is the cause that the preceding end is intended as an end; for a thing is not moved towards a proximate end except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the last end is the first cause of all. Now it must nec- essarily befit the First Being, namely God, to be the first cause of all, as we proved above.^ Therefore God is the last end of all. Hence it is written {Prov, xvi. 4): The Lord hath made all things for himself; and {Apoc, xxii. 13), / am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, " C. G,, 11 , IS. ^ C. G., I, 74. ® C. G., II, IS. " Ibid, ® Ch. 2. C. (?., 11, IS. HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS 29 CHAPTER XVIII HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS It remains to ask how God is the end of all things. This will be made clear from what has been said. For He is the end of all things, yet so as to precede all in being.^ Now there is an end which, though it holds the first place in causing in so far as it is in the intention, is nevertheless last in execution. This applies to any end which the agent establishes by his action. Thus the physician by his action establishes health in the sick man, which is nevertheless his end. There is also an end which, just as it precedes in causing, so also does it precede in being. Thus, that which one intends to acquire by one’s motion or action is said to be one’s end. For instance, fire seeks to reach a higher place by its movement, and the king seeks to take a city by fighting. Ac- cordingly, God is the end of things as something to be obtained by each thing in its own way. Again. God is at once the last end of things and the first agent, as we have shown.^ Now the end effected by the agent’s action cannot be the first agent, but rather is it the agent’s effect. God, therefore, cannot be the end of things as though He were something effected, but only as something already existing and to be acquired. Further. If a thing act for the sake of something already in existence, and if by its action some result ensue, then something through the agent’s ac- tion must accrue to the thing for the sake of which it acts; and thus sol- diers fight for the cause of their captain, to whom victory accrues, which the soldiers bring about by their actions. Now nothing can accrue to God from the action of anything whatever, since His goodness is perfect in every way, as we proved in the First Book.^ It follows, then, that God is the end of things, not as something made or effected by them, nor as though He obtained something from things, but in this way alone, that He is obtained by them. Moreover. The effect must tend to the end in the same way as the agent acts for the end. Now God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as .though He gained something by His action, but as bestowing something thereby; since He is not in potentiality so that He can acquire something, but solely in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow. Things there- fore are not ordered to God as to an end to which something will be added'; they are ordered to Him to obtain God Himself from Him according to their measure, since He is their end. G.,1, 13. ^Ch. 17. ]0 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XIX THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD From the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, creatures are made like unto God. Therefore, if all things tend to God as their last end, so as to acquire His goodness,^ it follows that the last end of things is to become like unto God. Moreover. The agent is said to be the end of the effect in so far as the effect tends to be like the agent; and hence it is that the form of the genera- tor is the end of the act of generation? Now God is the end of things in such wise as to be also their first producing cause. Therefore all things tend to a likeness to God, as their last end. Again. Things give evidence that they naturally desire to be;'^ so that if any are corruptible, they naturally resist corruptives, and tend to where they can be safeguarded, as the fire tends upwards and earth downwards. Now all things have being in so far as they are like God, Who is self- subsistent being, since they are all beings only by participation. Therefore all things desire as their last end to be like God. Further. All creatures are images of fhe first agent, namely God, since the agent produces its like? Now the perfection of an image consists in representing the original by a likeness to it, for this is why an image is made. Therefore all things exist for the purpose of acquiring a likeness to God, as for their last end. Again. Each thing by its movement or action tends to some good as its end, as was proved above.^ Now a thing partakes of good in so far as it is like to the first goodness, which is God. Therefore all things, by their movements and actions, tend to a likeness to God as to their last end. CHAPTER XX HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS From what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to be- come like God. Now, that which has properly the nature of an' end is the good. Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God inas- much as He is good. Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God, even though each thing imitates the divine goodness according to its own manner. For the divine goodness is simple, being, as it were, all in one. ^Ch. i8. 2 Aristotle, Phys., II, 7 (i'9Sa 26). "Aristotle, Eth,, IX, 7 (n68a s) ; 9 (1170a 26). ^Aristotle, De Gener,, I, 7 (324a ii). "Ch. 16. HOW THINGS IMITATE GOD 31 For the divine being contains the whole fullness of perfection, as we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God’s being is His perfect goodness; for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God, as though the sum total of His goodness were God’s very being. Again, the divine being is the substance of the ex- isting God.^ But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the Second Book that no created substance is its own being.^ Therefore, if a thing is good so far as it is, and if no creature is its own being, none is its own goodness, but each one is good by participating in goodness, even as by participating in being it is a being. Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and actuality: such, namely, as are com- petent, by the mere fact that they exist, to be actually and to be good. But in others, the substance is composed of matter and form, and such are com- petent to be actually and to be good, though it is by some part of their being, namely, their form. Accordingly, God’s substance is His goodness, whereas a simple substance participates in goodness by the very fact that it exists, and a composite substance participates in goodness by some part of itself. In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in re- spect of being. For in some substances composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potentiality of matter, in such a way that the matter retains no potentiality to another form, and consequently neither is there in any other matter a potentiality to this same form. Such are the heav- enly bodies, which exhaust their entire matter. — In others’ the form does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, so that the matter retains a poten- tiality to another form, and in another part of matter there remains poten- tiality to this form; for instance in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in sub- stance, it is clear that, together with this form which does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potentiality of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potentiality to some- thing else, for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality and since evil is the privation of good, it is clear that in this last order of sub- stances, good is changeable, and has an admixture of the opposite evil; which cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore the sub- stance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness. " C. G„ I, 28. C. G., I, 2iff. " C. G., n, 15. ^Aristotle, Phys., Ill, i (201a 10). 32 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of the substance com- posed of matter and form. For since matter considered in itself is being in potentiality, and since form is its act; and, again, since a composite sub- stance has actual existence through its form, it follows that the form is, in itself, good, the composite substance is good as having its form actually, and the matter is good as being in potentiality to the form. And although a thing is good in so far as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is being only potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order, for a thing is said to be good, not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end; but even though it has not attained the end, so long as it is directed to the end, for this very rea- son it is said to be good. Accordingly, matter cannot be called a being abso- lutely, in so far as it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being; but this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, because of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being; for which reason Dionysius says that the good includes both existing and non-existing things?- For even non-existent things (namely, matter, considered as subject to privation) seek a good, namely, to exist. Hence it follows that matter is also good, for nothing but the good seeks the good. In yet another way the creature’s goodness falls short of that of God. For, as we have stated, God, in His very being, contains the supreme per- fection of goodness. But the creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many, because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Therefore, in respect of one and the same thing, virtue, wisdom and opera- tion are predicated of God; but of creatures, they are predicated in respect of different things, and the further a creature is from the first goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that, although the first and highest good is utterly simple, and although the substances nearest to it in goodness ap- proach likewise thereto in simplicity, yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher. Elements, for instance, are simpler than animals and men, because they are unable to reach the per- fection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain. From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness according to the manner of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Therefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness. Thus a man who, being despoiled of virtue, is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely, as a being, and as a man; but he is not said to be ^De Div. Norn., IV, 7 (PG 3, 704). HOW THINGS IMITATE GOD 33 good absolutely, but rather evil. Accordingly, in every creature to be and to be good are not the same absolutely, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, whereas in God to be and to be good are absolutely one and the same. If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God’s goodness as its end; and if a thing is like God’s goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its good- ness; and if furthermore the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved: it is clear that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are accidental thereto and belong to its perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing’s perfection. CHAPTER XXI THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD INASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE It is^ clear from the foregoing that things have a tendency to be like God also in that they are causes of others. For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now, by its opera- tion, one thing is the cause of another. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness in this also, that they are causes of other things. Again. Things tend to be like God in so far as He is good, as was stated above.^ Now it is out of His goodness that God bestows being on others, for all things act inasmuch as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek to be like God in this respect by being causes of others. Moreover. Order towards good is itself a good, as we have shown above.^ Now every thing, in so far as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good; for good alone is caused per se, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved.''^ Therefore to be a cause of others is a good. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing’s tendency is to a divine likeness, since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things. Again. That the effect tends to be like the agent amounts to the same as that the agent causes its likeness in its effect; for the effect tends to the end towards which it is directed by the agent. Now the agent tends to as- similate the patient to itself not only in respect of its being, but also in re- spect of its causality; because the agent gives to its natural effect not only those natural principles whereby it subsists, but also those whereby it is a cause of other things. Thus, the animal, when begotten, receives from its ^Ch.20. ^Ibid, "Ch. 10. 34 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES begetter both the power of self-nourishment, and the power of generation. Therefore the effect tends to be like the agent not only as to its species, but also as to its being the cause of other things. Now things tend to be like God, even as effects tend to be like the agent, as was proved aboved Therefore things have a natural tendency towards a divine likeness in this, that they are causes of other things. Moreover. A thing is most perfect when it is able to produce its like, tor that light shines perfectly which gives light to others. Now whatever tends to its own perfection tends to a divine likeness. Therefore a thing tends to a divine likeness from the very fact that it tends to be the cause of other things. Since, however, a cause as such is higher than its effect, it is evident that to tend in this way to a divine likeness, so as to be a cause of other things, belongs to the more perfect among beings. Furthermore. A thing is perfect in itself before being able to cause an- other, as we have stated already. Hence to be the cause of other things is a perfection that is last to come to a thing. Since, then, the creature tends to a divine likeness in many ways,^ this remains last, that it seek a likeness to God by being a cause of others. Therefore Dionysius says that it is of dll things most godlike to be God's co-operator in which sense the Apostle says ( J Cor, iii. g): We are God's coadjutors. CHAPTER XXII HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ENDS It may be shown from the foregoing that the last means whereby a thing is directed to its end is its operation; in various ways, however, according to the variety of operations. For some things have an operation whereby they move something else (e.g., heating and cutting)^ and some have an opera- tion in being moved by another {c.g., being heated and being cut). Some ^operations are a perfection of an actually existing operator, and do not tend to the transmutation of something else: in the former respect these differ from passion and movement, and in the latter from an action which effects a transmutation on some external matter: as an instance of such an operation we have understanding, sensation, will. Hence it is clear that things which are set to move or operate only, without moving or making any thing themselves, tend to the divine likeness in that they are perfect in themselves; while those which make and move, as such, tend to a divine likeness in that they are causes of other things; and that those which move through being moved tend to the divine likeness in both ways. "Ch. 19. "Ch. 20. ^De Cael. Bier,, III, 2 (PG 3, 165). THE DIRECTION OF THINGS 35 The lower bodies, in so far as they are moved with natural movements, are considered to be moved only, and not to move except accidentally. For if a stone in its descent puts into motion something that stood in its path, it is an accident; and the same applies to alteration and other movements. Therefore the end of such movements is that they attain to a divine like- ness in the point of their being perfect in themselves, as having their proper form and their proper place. The heavenly bodies, however, move because they are moved; so that the end of their movement is to attain to a divine likeness in both respects, (i) As regards their own perfection this is true, inasmuch as a heavenly body may be actually where previously it was potentially. — Nor does it for this reason attain less to its perfection, although it retains its potentiality to be where it was before. For in the same way primary matter tends to its perfection by acquiring actually the form which before it had potentially, although it ceases to have the one which before it had actually. For thus matter receives successively all the forms to which it has a potentiality, so that its whole potentiality is actualized successively; which could not hap- pen all at one time. Therefore, since a heavenly body is in potentiality to a particular whereabouts, even as primary matter is to a particular form, it attains to its perfection by the fact that its entire potentiality to a particu- lar whereabouts is successively actualized, which could not happen simul- taneously. ( 2 ) Inasmuch as they move by moving, the end of their movement is the attainment of a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. Now they are the causes of other things by causing generation and corruption and other movements in this lower world. Accordingly the movements of heavenly bodies, in so far as they cause motion, ar^ directed to generation and corruption in the world beneath them. And it is not unfitting that the movements of heavenly bodies conduce to the generation of these lower things, although these inferior bodies are less noble than the heavenly bodies, since the end should be of greater account than the means. For the generator’s action tends to the form of the generated, and yet that which is generated is not of greater worth than the generator, but, in univocal agents, is of the same species with it. For the generator intends as its ulti- mate end not the form of the generated (which form is the end of genera- tion), but the likeness to the divine Being in the perpetuation of the spe- ‘ cies, and the diffusion of His goodness, by bestowing its specific form on others, and being the cause of other things. Likewise, the heavenly bodies, although more noble than the lower bodies, nevertheless intend by means of their movements the generation of the latter bodies, and to bring to actuality the forms of things generated; not indeed as though this were their ultimate end, but as a means whereby to attain to an ultimate end, namely the divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. We must take note, however, that a thing, according as it participates in 36 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES a likeness to God’s goodness, which is the object of His will, so too has it a share in a likeness to God’s will, whereby things are brought into being and preserved. The higher beings, however, participate in a likeness to the divine goodness in a more simple and universal manner; but the lower be- ings, in a more particular and divided way. Hence between heavenly and lower bodies we observe a likeness, not of equality, as in things belonging to the same species, but as that which is to be observed between the uni- versal agent and a particular effect. Consequently, just as in this lower world the intention of the particular agent is confined to good of this or that species, so the intention of the celestial body is inclined to the common good of the corporeal substance, which by generation is preserved, multiplied and increased. But since, as was already stated, everything moved tends as such towards a divine likeness in order to be perfect in itself, and since a thing is perfect in so far as it becomes actual, it follows that the intention of every thing that is in potentiality is to tend to actuality by way of move- ment. Hence the more an act is more final and more perfect, the more is the appetite of matter inclined to it. Therefore the appetite whereby mat- ter seeks a form must tend towards the last and most perfect act to which matter can attain, as to the ultimate end of generation. Now certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For primary matter is in potentiality, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potentiality to the form of a mixed body; and that is why elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potentiality to a vegetative soul, for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potentiality to the sensitive, and the sensi- tive to the intellective.^This is proved by the process of generation, for in generation we have first the fetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life. After this no later or more noble form is to be found in things subject to generation and corruption. There- fore the last end of all generation is the human soul, and to this does mat- ter tend as its ultimate form. Consequently, the elements are for the sake of the mixed body, the mixed body for the sake of living things, and of these plants are for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man. Therefore man is the end of all generation. And since the same thing is the cause of generation and preservation in things, the order of the preservation of things is in keeping with the afore- said order of their generation. Hence we find that mixed bodies are pre- served by the qualities becoming to the elements; plants are nourished by mixed bodies; animals derive their nourishment from plants; and some tha\ are more perfect and powerful from the imperfect and weak. As for man, he employs all kinds of things for his own use: some for food, some for clothing Hence by nature he was made naked, as being able to make him- self clothes from other things; even as nature provided him with no suit- THE MOTION OF THE HEAVENS 37 able nourishment except milk, so that he might supply himself with food from a variety of things. Some things also he employs as a means of transit, for he is inferior to many animals in swiftness and endurance, as though other animals were furnished for his needs. Over and above this, he employs all things endowed with a sensitive life for the perfection of his intellectual knowledge. Wherefore of man is it said in Psalm viii. 8, in words addressed to God: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet. And Aris- totle says that man has a natural dominion over all animals.^ If, therefore, the movement of the heavens is directed to generation, and if all generation is directed to man as the last end of this genus, it is evi- dent that the end of the movement of the heavens is directed to man as its last end in the genus of things subject to generation and movement. Hence it is said {Deut. iv. 19) that God made the heavenly bodies for the service of all the nations. CHAPTER XXIII THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS IS FROM AN INTELLECTIVE PRINCIPLE It can also be shown from the foregoing that the first principle that causes the movement of the heavens is intellective. For nothing that acts according to its own species intends a form higher than its own, since every agent intends its like. Now a heavenly body, in so far as it acts by its own movement, intends the ultimate form, which is the human intellect, which is higher than any corporeal form, as we have proved above.- Therefore the body of the heavens acts to the effect of generation, not in respect of its own species, as the principal agent does, but in respect of the species of some higher intellectual agent, in relation to which the body of the heavens is like an instrument in relation to a principal agent. Now the heavens acts to the effect of generation, inasmuch as it is moved. Therefore the body of the heavens is moved by some intellectual substance. Again. Whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another, as we proved above.^* Therefore the body of the heavens is moved by another. Now this other is either wholly separated from it, or else it is united to it, so that what is composed of the heavens and its mover is said to move it- self, inasmuch as one part thereof is moved and the other is mover. If this be the case, then since whatever moves itself is living and animate, it fol- lows that the heavens is animate. And it is animate not otherwise than with an intellectual soul, for it could not be animated with a nutritive soul, since in the body of the heavens there is no generation or corruption; nor Polit., I, 5 (i2S4b 9). "Ch. 22. . "C. G., I, 13. 38 THE SUMMA CO'NTRA GENTILES with a sensitive soul, since the body of the heavens has no variety of organs. Therefore it follows that it is moved by an intellectual soul.— If, on the other hand, it be moved by an extrinsic mover, this will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it does not cause movement without being moved, for no body moves unless it be moved, as was shown a!)Ove.’ Hence this too will require to be moved by another. But as it is not possible to have an infinite series of bodies, we must come to some incorporeal first mover. Now that which is utterly separated from a body must be intellec- tual, as we have shown.- Therefore the movement of the heavens, which is first among corporeal beings, is caused by some intellectual substance. Moreover. Heavy and light bodies are moved by their generator and by that which removes obstacles, as is proved in PhyslCs^ viii;** for it is impos- sible that their form be mover and the matter moved, for nothing is moved except a body. Now, as the elemental bodies are simple, and there is no composition in them, except that of matter and form, so too are the heav- enly bodies simple. Hence, if they be moved in the manner of heavy^and' light bodies, it follows that they are moved per sc by their generator, and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle. But this is impossible, for these bodies cannot be generated, because there is no contrariety in them, and their movements cannot be hindered. Therefore these bodies must needs be moved by beings that cause movement by a power of apprehen- sion. This power cannot be sensitive, as we have proved. Therefore it must be an intellective power. Further. If the principle of the movement of the heavens be nature alone, without any kind of apprehension, it follows that it must be the form of the heavenly body, as is the case with the elements; for although simple forms do not cause movement, they are f^rinciples of movements, since natural movements, like all other natural properties, follow from them. Now it is impossible that the heavenly movement follow the form of the heavenly body as its active principle. For the form is the principle of local movement inasmuch as to a particular body, in respect of its form, is, due a particular place, to which it is moved by virtue of its form, which tends to that place; and because the generator gives this form, it is said to be a mover. Thus, it is due to fire, in accord with its form, to be in a higher place. Now one place is not more due to a heavenly body because of its form, than another. Therefore nature alone is not the principle of the heavenly rhovement; and consequently the principle of its movement must be something that moves it by apprehension. Again. Nature always tends to one thing, and therefore things that come from nature come always in the same way, unless they be hindered, which does not happen frequently. Therefore that which is essentially varied in form cannot possibly be an end towards which nature tends. Now move- ment is essentially such, for that which is moved, as such, is conditioned ^C. G., II, 20. ^c. G., I, 44. ^Phys., VIII, 4 (255b 35). THE MOTION OF THE HEAVENS 39 otherwise now and before} Consequently nature cannot intend movement for its own sake. Therefore it intends through movement to obtain rest which is related to movement as one to many; for a thing is at rest which is conditioned in the same way now as before} Accordingly, if the move- ment of the heavens were from nature alone, it would be directed to some kind of rest; whereas the contrary is the case, for movement is unceasing. Therefore the movement of the heavens is not from nature as its active prin- ciple, but from an intelligent substance. Also. In every movement that is from nature as its active principle, if approach to a particular term be natural, recession from that term must be unnatural and contrary to nature. Thus, a heavy body naturally seeks a lower place, and recedes therefrom unnaturally. Therefore, if the move- ment of the heavens were natural, since it tends to the west naturally, it would be contrary to nature for. it to return from the west to the east. But this is impossible, for nothing in the movement of the heavens is violent or unnatural. Consequently, it is impossible for nature to be the active principle of the movement of the heavens. Therefore its active principle is some apprehensive power, which must be an intelligence, as we have proved above. Therefore the body of the heavens is moved by an intellec- tual substance. And yet we must not deny that the movement of the heavens is natural. For a movement is said to be natural, not only, because of its active principle, but also because of its passive principle. This is evident in the generation of simple bodies, since such generation cannot be called natural in relation to the active principle. Because for a thing to be moved naturally hy an active principle, it must have this active principle within itself, for nature is a principle of movement in a thing in which it is;^ whereas the active principle in the generation of a simple body is separate. Therefore it is not natural by reason of its active principle, but only by reason of its passive principle, namely matter, wherein there is a natural appetite for its natural form. Accordingly, the movement of the heavenly body, as to its active principle, is not natural, but voluntary and intellec- tual, while. as to its passive principle it is natural, since a heavenly body has a natural inclination for that movement. This is made clear if we consider the relation of a heavenly body to its place. For a thing is passive and moved according as it is in potentiality, and it is active and moves according as it is in a state of actuality. Now a heavenly body, considered in its substance, is found to be potentially in- different to any place, even as primary matter is indifferent to any form, as we have stated.'* But it is otherwise with a heavy or light body, which, considered in itself, is not indifferent to any place, and has a definite place appointed to it by reason of its form. Therefore the nature of heavy and ^ Aristotle, I (224b i). Op. cit.,Y, 6 (229b 23). ^ Op. cit., II, i (192b 23). ^Ch. 22. 40 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES light bodies is the active principle of their movements, while the nature of a heavenly body is the passive principle of its movement. Consequently, we must not think that it is moved by violence, like heavy and light bodies, which are moved by us through our intellect. For heavy and light bodies have a natural aptitude for a movement contrary to that with which they are moved by us; and so they are moved by us violently, although the movement of an animaPs body, whereby that body is moved by the soul, is not violent to that body as animated, although it is violent in so far as that body is something heavy. On the other hand, the heavenly bodies have no aptitude for a contrary movement, but only for that where- with they are moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is both voluntary, as regards its active principle, and natural, as to its passive principle. That the movement of the heavens be voluntary in relation to its active principle is not inconsistent with the fact that it is one and uniform, as we might think from the fact that the will is indifferent to many things and is not determined to any one. For just as nature is determined to one course by its power, so is the will determined to one by its wisdom, by which the will is unerringly directed to one end. It is evident from the foregoing that neither approach to any one place nor recession therefrom is contrary to nature. For this happens in the movement of heavy and light bodies for two reasons. First, because the intention of nature, in heavy and light bodies, is determined towards one place, and therefore just as a body tends thereto naturally, so does it recede therefrom against nature; secondly, because two movements, one of which approaches a given term and the other recedes therefrom, are contrary. If, however, we take not the last but a middle place in the movement of heavy and light bodies, both approach thereto and recession therefrom are natu- ral; for the whole movement comes under the intention of nature, and the movements are not contrary, but are one and continuous movement. It is the same in the movement of heavenly bodies, because the inten- tion of nature is not towards one determinate place, as we have said already. Moreover, the movement with which a body moved in a circle recedes from any given place, is not contrary to the movement with which it approaches towards it, but is one and continuous movement; so that any given point in the movement of the heavens is like a middle point, and not like the term in a straight movement. Nor does it make any difference, as to the present question, whether a heavenly body be moved by an intellectual substance united to it, which would be its soul, or by a separate substance. Nor does it make any difference whether each heavenly body be moved by God immediately, or none, and each be moved by the intermediary of created intellectual sub- stances; nor whether only the first heavenly body by God immediately, and HOW THINGS ACT FOR AN END 41 the others through the intermediary of created substances: so long as we admit that the movement of the heavens is caused by an intellectual sub- stance. CHAPTER XXIV 1/ HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD If, as we have shown/ the body of the heavens is moved by an intelligent substance, and if the movement of the body of the heavens is directed to generation in this lower world, it follows that the generations and move- ments of these lower bodies proceed from the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent bears on the same thing as that of the instrument. Now the heavens is the cause of the movements of lower bodies by reason of its movement, with which it is moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is as an instrument of an intelligent substance. Therefore the forms and movements of lower bodies are caused by an intelligent substance and intended by it as by a principal agent, and by the body of the heavens, as by an instrument. Now the species of things caused and intended by an intellectual agent must pre-exist in his intellect, just as the forms of the products of art pre- exist in the intellect of the craftsman and flow thence into his work. Con- sequently, all forms that are in these lower bodies, and all their movements, flow from intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance or substances. Hence Boethius says that forms which are in matter origi- nated in forms that are immaterial? Iii this respect the saying of Plato is verified, that separate Forms are the principles of forms that exist in mat- ter although Plato held them to be per se subsistent, and to be the im- mediate cause of the forms of sensible bodies, whereas we hold them to exist in an intellect, and to cause lower forms through the movement of the heavens. Now since whatever is moved by anything per se, and not accidentally, is directed thereby towards the end of its movement, and since the body of the heavens is moved by an intellectual substance; and since, furthermore, the body of the heavens, by its movement, causes all movement in this lower world:— it follows of necessity that the body of the heavens is di- rected to the end of- its movement by an intellectual substance, and conse- quently all lower bodies to their respective ends. Accordingly, it is easy to understand how natural bodies devoid of knowledge are moved and act for the sake of an end. For they tend to an ^ Ch. 23. 'De Trin,, II (PL 64, 1250). ® CL Aristotle, Metaph., I, 6 (987b 7) . 42 . THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES end as directed thereto by an intelligent substance, in the same way as an arrow, directed by the archer, tends to the mark. Because as the arrow receives its direction to a fixed end through the impulse of the archer, so, too, natural bodies receive an inclination to their natural ends from their natural movers, from whom they derive their forms, powers and movements. Therefore it is also clear that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance, because an effect is ascribed more especially to the direction of the first mover towards the end than to the instruments which receive that direction. For this reason the operations of nature are seen to proceed to the end in an orderly manner even as do the operations of a wise man. It is therefore evident that even things devoid of knowledge can work for an end, can desire the good with a natural appetite, and can seek a divine likeness as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, the former or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, since a thing is good in so far as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tends to a divine like- ness, since a thing is like God in so far as it is good. Now this or that par- ticular good is so far appetible as it bears a likeness to the first goodness. Therefore the reason why a thing tends to its own good is because it tends to a divine likeness, and not vice versa. It is clear therefore that all things seek a divine likeness a.s their last end. A thing’s own good can be understood in several ways. First, in the sense that it is proper to that thing on the part of the individual. Thus an animal desires its own good when it desires food, whereby its existence is preserved. — Secondly, as being proper to that thing on the part of its species. Thus an animal desires its own good, in so far as it desires to beget offspring and to feed them, as well as whatever else conduces to the preservation or defense of the individuals of its species. — ^Thirdly, on the part of the genus. And thus an equivocal agent, for instance the heavens, desires its own good, in causing. — Fourthly, on the part of a likeness of analogy of effects to their cause. Thus God, Who is outside a' genus, gives being to all things !)eccmse of His own goodness. This clearly proves that the more perfect a thing’s power, and the higher its degree of goodness, the more universal is its desire for good, and the greater the range of goodness to which its appetite and operation extend. For imperfect things extend no further than their own individual good; perfect things extend to the good of the species; more perfect things, to the good of the genus ; and God, Who is most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Therefore it is said by some, not without reason, that goody as such, is diffusive,^ because the better a thing is, the further does the outpouring of its goodness extend. And since in every genus that which is most perfect is the exemplar and measure of all that belongs to that ^Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div. Nom., IV, i (PG 3, 693). THE END OF INTELLECTUAL BEINGS 43 genus , it follows that God, Who is most perfect in goodness, and pours forth his goodness most universally, is in His outpouring the exemplar of all things that pour forth goodness. Now one thing becomes a cause of another by pouring forth its own goodness into that other. And so it is again evident that whatever tends to be the cause of something else, tends to a divine likeness, and yet tends to its own good. Consequently, it is not unfitting to say that the movements of heavenly bodies, and the actions of their movers, are in a way for the sake of these bodies that are generated and corrupted, and less noble than they are. For they are not for the sake of these as their last end; but by intending the generation of these, they intend their own good, and the divine likeness as their last end. CHAPTER XXV THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTEL- LECTUAL SUBSTANCE Now, seeing -that all creatures, even those that are devoid of reason, are directed to God as their last end, and that all reach this end in so far as they have some share of a likeness to Him, the intellectual creature attains to Him in a special way, namely, through its proper operation, by under- standing Him. Consequently this must be the end of the intellectual crea- ture, namely, to understand God. For, as we have shown above, ^ God is the end of each thing, and hence, as far as it is possible to it, each thing intends to be united to God as its last end. Now a thing is more closely united to God by reaching in a way to the very substance of God; which happens when it knows something of the divine substance, rather than when it reaches to a divine likeness. Therefore the intellectual substance tends to the knowledge of God as its last end. Again. The operation proper to a thing is its end, for it is its second per- fection ; so that when a thing is well conditioned for its proper operation it is said to be fit and good. Now understanding is the proper operation of the intellectual substance, and consequently is its end. Therefore, what- ever is most perfect in this operation is its last end; and especially in those operations which are not directed to some product, such as understanding and sensation. And since operations of this kind take their species from their objects, by which also- they are known, it follows that the more per- fect the object of any such operation, the more perfect is the operation. Consequently to understand the most perfect intelligible, namely God, is the most perfect in the genus of the operation which consists in under- ^ Aristotle, Metaph., I a, i (993b 23). ^Ch. 17. 44 the summa contra gentiles standing. Therefore to know God by an act of understanding is the last end of every intellectual substance. Someone, however, might say that the last end of an intellectual sub- stance consists indeed in understanding the best intelligible object, but that what is the best intelligible for this or that intellectual substance is not .ab- solutely the best intelligible ; and that the higher the intellectual substance, the higher is its best intelligible. So that possibly the supreme intellectual substance has for its best intelligible object that which is best absolutely, and its happiness will consist in understanding God ; whereas the happiness of any lower intellectual substance will consist in understanding •some lower intelligible object, which however will be the highest thing understood by that substance. Especially would it seem not to be in the power of the human intellect to understand that which is absolutely the best intelligible, because of its weakness; for it is as much adapted for knowing the supreme intelligible as the owVs eye for seeing the sun} Nevertheless it is evident that the end of any intellectual substance, even the lowest, is to understand God. For it has been shown above that God is the last end towards which all things tend.^ And the human intellect, al- though the lowest in the order of intelligent substances, is superior to all that are devoid of understanding. Since then a more noble substance has not a less noble end, God will be the end also of the human intellect. Now every intelligent being attains to its last end by understanding it, as we have proved. Therefore the human intellect attains to God as its elid, by understanding Him. Again. Just as things devoid of intellect tend to God as their end by way of assimilation, so do intellectual substances by way of knowledge, as clearly appears from what has been said. Now, although things devoid of reason tend towards a likeness to their proximate causes, the intention of nature does not rest there, but has for its end a likeness to the highest good, as we have proved,^ although they are able to attain to this likeness in a most imperfect manner. Therefore, however little be the knowledge of God to which the intellect is able to attain, this will be the intellect's last end, rather than a perfect knowledge of lower intelligibles. Moreover. Everything desires most of all its last end. Now the human intellect desires, loves and enjoys the knowledge of divine things, although it can grasp but little about them, more than the perfect knowledge which it has of the lowest things. Therefore man^s last end is to understand God in some way. Further. Everything tends to a divine likeness as its own end. Therefore a thing’s last end is that whereby it is most of all like God. Now the intel- lectual creature is especially likened to God in that it is intellectual, since this likeness belongs to it above other creatures, and includes all other like- nesses. And in this particular kind of likeness it is more like God in under- ^ Aristotle, Metaph., I a, i (993b g). “Ch. 17. *'Ch. 19. THE END OF INTELLECTUAL BEINGS 45 standing actually than in understanding habitually or potentially, because God is always actually understanding, as we proved in the First Book.^ Furthermore, in understanding actually, the intellectual creature is espe- cially like God in understanding God; for by understanding Himself God understand all other things, as we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore the last end of every intellectual substance is to understand God. Again. That which is lovable only because of another is for the sake of that which is lovable for its own sake alone; because we cannot go on in- definitely in the appetite of nature,. since then nature’s desire would be in vain, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite number of things. Now all practical sciences, arts and powers are lovable only for the sake of some- thing else, since their end is not knowledge, but work. But speculative sci- ences are lovable for their own sake, for their end is knowledge itself. Nor can we find any action in human life that is not directed to some other end, with the exception of speculative consideration. For even playful actions, which seem to be done without any purpose, have some end due to them, namely that the mind may be relaxed, and that thereby we may afterwards become more fit for studious occupations; or otherwise we should always have to be playing, if play were desirable for its own sake, and this is un- reasonable. Accordingly, the practical arts are directed to the speculative arts, and again every human operation, to intellectual speculation, as its end. Now, in all sciences and arts that are mutually ordered, the last end seems to belong to the one from which others take their rules and prin- ciples. Thus the art of sailing, to which belongs the ship’s purpose, namely its use, provides rules and principles to the art of ship-building. And such is the relation of first philosophy to other speculative sciences, for all others depend thereon, since they derive their principles from it, and are directed by it in defending those principles; and moreover first philosophy is wholly directed to the knowledge of God as its last end, and is consequently called the divine science.^ Therefore the knowledge of God is the last end of all human knowledge and activity. Furthermore. In all mutually ordered agents and movers, the end of the first agent and mover must be the end of all, even as the end of the com- mander-in-chief is the end of all who are soldiering under him^ Now of all the parts of man, the intellect is the highest mover, for it moves the appe- tite, by proposing its object to it; and the intellective appetite, or will, moves the sensitive appetites, namely the irascible and concupiscible. Hence it is that we do not obey the concupiscence, unless the will command ; while the sensitive appetite, when the will has given Its consent, moves the body. Therefore the end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. Now the intellect's end and good are the true,^ and its last end is the first truth. ^ 6!., I, 56. "C. G.,1,49. Eth., VI, 2 (1139a 27). ® Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (983a 6). Aristotle, 46 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES. Therefore the last end of the whole man, and of all his deeds and desires, is to know the first truth, namely, God. Moreover. Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever he sees; and so through wondering at what they saw, and not knowing its cause, men first began to philosophize, and when they had discovered the cause they were at rest. Nor do they cease inquiring until they come to the first cause; and then do we deem ourselves to know perfectly when wc know the first cause?- Therefore man naturally desires, as his last end, to know the first cause. But God is the first cagse of all things. Therefore man’s last end is to know God. Besides. Man naturally desires to know the cause of any known effect. But the human intellect knows universal being. Therefore it naturally de- sires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in the Second Book.^ Now one has not attained to one’s last end until the natural desire is at rest. Therefore the knowledge of any intelligible object is not enough for man’s happiness, which is his last end, unless he know God also, which knowledge terminates his natural desire as his last end. Therefore this very knowledge of God is man’s last end. Further. A body that tends by its natural appetite to its place is moved all the more vehemently and rapidly the nearer it approaches its end. Hence Aristotle proves that a natural straight movement cannot be towards an indefinite point, because it would not be more moved afterwards than before.^ Hence that which tends more vehemently to a thing afterwards than before is not moved towards an indefinite point but towards some- thing fixed. Now this we find in the desire of knowledge, for the more one knows, the greater one’s desire to know. Consequently, man’s natural de- sire in knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be none other than the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man’s last end. ^ N ow the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called hap- piness or beatitude, for it is this that every intellectual substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or hap- piness of any intellectual substance is to know God. Hence it is said {Matt. v. 8): Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God] and {Jo. xvii. 3): This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God. Aristotle himself agrees with this judgment when he says that man s ultimate happiness is speculative, and this with regard to the highest object of speculation."^ ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 3 (983a 25). "C. G., 11 , 13. ^ De Caelo, I, 8 (277a 18) X, 7 (1177a 18). . » V // /. HAPPINESS AND THE WILL 47 CHAPTER XXVI DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL? Since the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone might think that man’s last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing God, but in loving Him, or in some other act of the will towards Him; [i] espe- cially since the object of the will is the good, which has the nature of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the na- ture of an end except in so far as it also is a good. Therefore, seemingly, man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will. [2] Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, which per- facts operation as beauty perfects youth, as the Philosopher says.^ Hence, if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect. [3] Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake, so that it is never desired for the sake of something else; for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely, that it be sought for its own sake. Therefore, seemingly, the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect. [4] Moreover. All agree in their desire of the last end, for it is a natural desire. But more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge. [s] Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect, for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his in- tellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Therefore, seemingly, the action of the will is more noble than the action of the intellect. There- fore, it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect. But this can be clearly shown to be impossible. For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature according to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is found diversely in diverse things. This diversity, how- ever, arises from the fact that things are diversely related to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite; those that have a sensitive knowledge have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised; and those X, 4 (1174b 31), THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 48 which have intellectual knowledge have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely, the will. The will, therefore, in so far as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand, the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual nature. Therefore, beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the will. Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is natu- rally prior to the acts of those powers, even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved. Now the will is such a power, for the appe- tible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will’s object is naturally prior to its act, and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will. Besides. Inwall those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is bfouiht to bear on its own act. For if the intellect understands that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands; for this very act of understanding, which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on forever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way, the first thing willed cannot be the very act of willing, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intellectual nature is. beatitude or happiness; because it is for its sake that we will whatever we will. Therefore, happiness cannot consist in an act of the will. Further. The truth of a thing’s nature is derived from those things which constitute its substance; for a true man differs from a man in a picture by the things which constitute man’s substance. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will; because, whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no differ- ence to the will in its desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or not. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an^act of the intellect rather than of the will. Again. If an act of the wfU' were happiness itself, this act would be an act either of desire, or love, or delight. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to what it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end. — ^Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not, because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not; and if the love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this HAPPINESS AND THE WILL 49 arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end, and another to love it; for love was imperfect before we possessed the end, and perfect after we obtained possession. — Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight, whether we are conscious of possessing it actually, or call to mind our previous possession, or hope to possess it in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end. — Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially. Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this' is not true. For the desirability of a delight depends on what gives rise to the delight, since that which arises from good and desir- able operations is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and de- sirability are from something else, and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness. Moreover. The right order of things agrees with the order of nature, for in the natural order things are ordered to their end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly ordered to necessary ends: for instance, to the use of food that is ordered to the preservation of the individual, and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species; since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these neces- sary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end. Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it, so too natural bodies have a natural inclina- tion to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place. For if it were nature’s chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inclination; but it gives the inclination so that the body may tend towards its proper place, and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it. Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will. Besides. If a thing haye something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end. Thus, for those whose end is money possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the last end of the intellectual substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beati- tude. And this is understanding, since we cannot will what we do not under- 50 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES stand. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect; it is not an act of the will. From what has been said we can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that hap- piness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the ^rst argument reasoned. OnUhe contrary, the fact that it is the first object of the will shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said. Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever must be the end of that thing, as the second objection argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first, it perfects a thing that has its species; secondly, it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfec- tion of a house, considered as already having its species, is that to which the species ^^house” is directed, namely to be a dwelling; for one would not build a house but for that purpose, and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand, the perfection that conduces to the species of a house is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance, its substantial principles ; and also that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance, the buttresses which are made to support the building; as well as those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the beauty of the house. Accordingly, that which is the per- fection of a thing, considered as already having its species, is its end; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand, whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species is not the end of that thing; in fact, the thing itself is its end, for matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, whatever preserves the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, although it perfects the animal, is not the animal’s end, but vice versa. And again, whatever adapts a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attain- ment of its proper end, is not the end of that thing, but vice versa; for instance, a man’s comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says that they conduce to happiness instrumcntally } — Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends (thus, eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual) ; but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing’s species, since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Hence the Philosopher says that Bth.f I, 8 (1099b 2); 9 (1099b 28). HAPPINESS IS NOT BODILY PLEASURE 51 delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth, for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth and not vice versa. Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the third objection argued. Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end, since delight arises from the attain- ment of the end. Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intel- lectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto ; because those things that are outside us are better known to the majority, in that human knowl- edge takes its beginning from sensible objects. The suggestion put forward by the fifth argument, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter’s motive power, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will first and per se, for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, namely, as the act of understanding is itself apprehended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, with the result that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never desire understanding, did not the intellect first apprehend its understanding as a good. — ^And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving presupposes the end, for the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. It is therefore clear that the intel- lect is higher than the will absolutely, while the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense. CHAPTER XXVII THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex. It has been shown that according to nature’s order pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely.^ Therefore, if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations ^Op. cit., X, 4 (1174b 31). " Ch. 26. 52 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above are not the last end ; for they are directed to certain manifest ends: eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of chil- dren. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them. Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite, for it moves the sensitive appetite, as was stated above.^ But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved." Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite. Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man, for it is an abuse of terms to speak of brute animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are com- mon to man and brute. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them. The last end is the most noble of things belonging to a reality, for it has the nature of that which is best. But the aforementioned pleasures do not befit man according to what is most noble in him, namely, the intellect, but according to the sense. Therefore happiness is not to be located in such pleasures. Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now the above pleasures consist in man’s bfeing united through his senses to things beneath him, namely, certain sensible things. Therefore we must not assign happiness to such pleasures. Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate; for other- wise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures are not in themselves man’s good. But the highest good is good of itself, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore such pleasures are not man’s highest good, which is happiness. Again. In all per^se predications, if A be predicated of B absolutely, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B. Thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing will heat most. Ac- cordingly, if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much would be very good. But this is clearly false, because it is considered sinful to use them too much; besides, it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not per se man’s good, and human happiness does not consist in them. Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being ordered to happi- ness.^ If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue, for the act of temperance ^Ibid. Ibid. ' ^Cf. Aristotle, Eth., I, 12 (iioib 14). HAPPINESS IS NOT HONORS 53 is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures ; whence that act takes its name. Therefore man’s happiness is not in these pleasures. Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above. ^ We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things, and consequently with- draw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures. Flereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans who ascribed man’s happi- ness to pleasures of this kind. In their person Solomon says {Eccles. v. 17) : This thcj'ejo 7 'e hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labor . . . and this is his portion] and (Wis. ii. 9) : Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy, for this is our portion, and this is our lot. The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted. For they pretended, that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table. Hence they are called ^Chiliastaef " or believers in the Millennium. The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted, who pre- tend that the reward of the righteous consists in such pleasures. For happiness is the reward of virtue. CHAPTER XXVIII THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONORS From the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man’s highest good, or happiness, consist in honors. For man’s ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect operation, as we have shown above.'^ But man’s honor does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him respect.*^ Therefore man’s happiness must not be placed in honors. Again. That which is for the sake of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honor, for a man is not rightly honored, e*x- cept because of some other ‘good in him. For this reason men seek to be honored, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them; so that they rejoice more in being honored by the great and the wise. Therefore we must not assign man’s happiness to honors. ^Ch. 17. ^St. Augustine, De Haeres , 8 (PL 42, 27). ^Ch, 25. Cf. Aris- totle, Eth., I, 5 (1095b 25). 54 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, or else they would not be praiseworthy. Therefore happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man's power to secure honor, rather is it in the power of the man who pays honor. Therefore happiness is not to be assigned to honors. Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honor, and yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honored. Therefore it is better to become worthy of honor, than to be honored. Therefore honor is not man's supreme good. Furthermore. The highest good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore that which is in possession of the highest good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honor. There- fore honor is not man's supreme good. CHAPTER XXTX THAT man’s happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN GLORY Therefore it is evident also that man’s supreme good docs not consist in glory, which is the recognition of one’s good name. For glory, according to Cicero, is the general recognition and praise of a personas good name} and, in the words of Ambrose, consists in being well known and praised? Now men seek praise and distinction through being famous, so that they may be honored by those whom their fame reaches. Therefore glory is sought for the sake of honor, and consequently if honor be not the highest good, much less is glory. Again. Those goods are worthy of praise, whereby a man shows himself to be ordered to his end. Now he who is directed to his end has not yet reached his last end. Therefore praise is not bestowed on one who has reached his last end; rather does he receive honor, as the Philosopher says.*^ Therefore glory cannot be the highest good, since it consists chiefly in praise. Besides. It is better to know than to be known, because only the higher realities know, whereas the lowest are known. Therefore man’s highest good cannot be glory, which consists in a man’s being known. Further. A man does not seek to be known except in good things; in evil things he seeks to be hidden. Therefore, fo be known is good and de- sirable, because of the good things that are known in a man. Therefore these good things are better still. Consequently glory, which consists in a man’s being known, is not his highest good. ^De Inventione, II, 55 (p. 150^). ""Cf. St. Augustine, Contra Maximin., II, (PL 42, 770). ^ Eth., I, 12 (iioib 24). WEALTH IS NOT HAPPINESS 55 Moreover. The highest good must needs be perfect^ for it satisfies the appetite. But the knowledge of one’s good name, wherein glory consists, is imperfect, for it is beset with much uncertainty and error. Therefore glory of this kind cannot be the supreme good. Furthermore. Man’s highest good must be supremely stable in human things, for it is natural to desire unfailing endurance in one’s goods. Now glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable, since nothing is more changeable than human opinion and praise. Therefore such glory is not man’s highest good. CHAPTER XXX THAT man’s happiness does not consist in wealth Hence it is evident that neither is wealth man’s highest good. For w ealth is not sougM except for the sake of something else, because of itself it ^o^gbod, but only when we use it, whether for the support of the body or for some similar purpose. Now the highest good is sought for its own, and not for another’s sake. Therefore wealth is not man’s highest good. Again. Man’s highest good cannot consist in the possession or preserva- tion of things whose chief advantage for man consists in their being spent. Now the chief advantage of wealth is in its being spent, for this is its use. Therefore the possession of wealth cannot be man’s highest good. Moreover. Acts of virtue deserve praise according as they lead to happiness. Now acts of liberality and magnificence, which are concerned with money, are deserving of praise because of money being spent rather than because of its being kept; and it is from this that these virtues derive their names. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the possession of wealth. Besides., Man’s highest good must consist in obtaining something better than man. But man is better than wealth, since wealth is something di- rected to man’s use. Therefore man’s supreme good does not consist in wealth. Further. Man’s highest good is not subject to fortuned For things that are fortuitous escape the forethought of reason, whereas man has to attain his own end by means of his reason. But fortune occupies the greatest place in the attaining of wealth. Therefore human happiness ‘does not consist in wealth. ■ Moreover* This is evident from the fact that wealth is lost unwillingly; also because wealth can come into the possession of evil persons, who, of necessity, must lack the highest good. Again because wealth is unstable. Other similar reasons can be gathered from the arguments given above.^ ^ Mth., I, 9 (1099b 24). ^ Ch. 28ff. S6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XXXI ^ THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WORLDLY POWER In like manner, neither can worldly power be man’s highest happiness, since in the achievement thereof chance can effect much. Again, it is un- stable, and not subject to man’s will; and it is often obtained by evil men. These are incompatible with the highest good, as was already stated.’^ Again, Man is said to be good especially according as he approaches the highest good. But in respect to his having power, he is not said to be either good or evil, since not everyone who can do good deeds is good, nor is a person evil because he can do evil deeds. Therefore the highest good does not consist in being powerful. Besides, Every power implies reference to something else. But the high- est good is not referred to anything further. Therefore power is not man’s highest good. Moreover. Man’s highest good cannot be a thing that one can use both well and ill; for the better things are those that we cannot abuse. But one can use one’s power both well and ill, for rational powers can be directed to contrary objects? Therefore human power is not man’s good. Further. If any power be man’s highest good, it must be mo.st perfect. Now human power is most imperfect, for it is based on human will and opinion, which are full of inconstancies. Also, the greater a power is re- puted to be, the greater number of people does it depend on; which again conduces to its weakness, since what depends on many is in many ways destructible. Therefore man’s highest good does not consist in worldly power. Consequently man’s happiness does not consist in any external good, for all external goods, which are known as fortuitous goods, are contained under those we have mentioned.^ CHAPTER XXXII / THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN GOODS OF THE BODY Like arguments avail to prove that man’s highest good does not consist in goods of the body, such as health, beauty and strength. For they are com- mon to good and evil, they are unstable, and they are not subject to the will. ^ Ch. 28ff. ^Aristotle, Metaph,, IX, 2 (1046b 25). ® Ch. 28ff. 57 HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THE SENSES Besides. The soul is better than the body, which neither lives nor pos- sesses these goods without the soul. Therefore, the soul’s good, such as understanding and the like, is better than the body’s good. Therefore the body’s good is not man’s highest good. ^ Again. These goods are common to man and other animals, whereas hap- piness is a good proper to man. Therefore man’s happiness does not con- sist in the things mentioned. Moreover. Many animals surpass man in goods of the body, for some are fleeter than he, some more sturdy, and so on. Accordingly, if man’s highest good consisted in these things, man would not excel all animals; which is clearly untrue. Therefore human happiness does not consist in goods of the body. CHAPTER XXXIII THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES By the same arguments it is evident that neither does man’s highest good consist in goods of his sensitive nature. For these goods, again, are common to man and other animals. Again. Intellect is superior to sense. Therefore the intellect’s good is better than that of the sense. Consequently man’s supreme good is not seated in the senses. Besides. The greatest sensual pleasures are those of the table and of sex, wherein the supreme good must needs be, if seated in the senses. But it does not consist in them. Therefore man’s highest good is not in the senses. Moreover. The senses are appreciated for their utility and for knowledge. Now the entire utility of thq senses is referred to the goods of the body. Again, sensitive knowledge is ordered to intellectual knowledge, and hence animals devoid of intellect take no pleasure in sensation except in reference to some bodily utility, in so far as by sensitive knowledge they obtain food or sexual intercourse. Therefore, man’s highest good which is happiness is not seated in the sensitive part of man. CHAPTER XXXIV THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF THE MOPAL VIRTUES It is clear that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral activities. For human happiness, if ultimate, cannot be directed to a further end. But all moral activities can be directed to something else. This is clear from 58 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES a consideration of the principal among them. Because deeds of fortitude in time of war are directed to victory and peace; for it were foolish to go to war merely for its own sake.^ Again, deeds of justice are directed to keep- ing peace among men, for each man possesses with contentment what is his own. The same applies to all the other virtues. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in moral deeds. Again. The purpose of the moral virtues is that through them we may observe the mean in the passions within us, and in things outside us. Now it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of man’s life, since both passions and external things can be directed to something less. Therefore it is not possible that the practice of moral virtue be man’s final happiness. Further. Since man is man through the possession of reason, his proper good, which is happiness, must needs be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Now that which reason has in itself is more proper to reason than what it effects in something else. Seeing, then, that the good of moral virtue is a good established by reason in something other than itself, it cannot be the greatest good of man which happiness is; rather this good must be a good that is in reason itself. Moreover. We have already proved that the last end of all things is to become like God.^ Therefore that in which man chiefly becomes like God will be his happiness. Now this is not in terms of moral actions, since such actions cannot be ascribed to God, except metaphorically; for it is not befitting to God to have passions, or the like, with which moral virtue is concerned. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions. Furthermore. Happiness is man’s proper good. Therefore that good, which of all goods is most proper to man in comparison with other animals, is the one in which we must seek his ultimate happiness. Now this is not the practice of moral virtue, for animals share somewhat either in liberality or in fortitude, whereas no animal has a share in intellectual activity. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral acts. CHAPTER XXXV '/ THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT 'CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE It is also evident from the foregoing that neither does man’s happiness consist in the act of prudence. For acts of prudence are solely about matters of moral virtue, Bu.t hu- « ^ Cf. Aristotle, Eth., X, 7 (1177b 9) . - Ch. 19. HAPPINESS IS THE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD 59 man happiness does not consist in the practice of moral virtue.^ Neither therefore does it consist in the practice of prudence. Again. Man’s ultimate happiness consists in man’s most excellent opera- tion. Now man s most excellent operation, in terms of what is proper to man, is in relation to most perfect objects. But the act of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect objects of intellect or reason; for it is not about necessary things, but about contingent practical matters.^ Therefore its act is not man’s ultimate happiness. Besides. That which is ordered to another as to its end is not man’s ulti- mate happiness. Now the act of prudence is ordered to another as to its end, both because all practical knowledge, under which prudence is com- prised, is ordered to operation, and because prudence disposes a man well in choosing means to an end, as may be gathered from Aristotle.^ Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in the practice of prudence. Furthermore. Irrational animals have no share of happiness, as Aristotle proves."^ Yet some of them have a certain share of prudence, as may be gathered from the same author.^ Therefore happiness does not consist in an act of prudence. CHAPTER XXXVry THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART It is also evident that it cannot consist in the practice of art. For even the knowledge of art is practical, and so is directed to an end, and is not the ultimate end. Besides. The end of the practice of art is the thing produced by art, and such a thing cannot be the ultimate end of human life, since it is rather we who are the end of those products, for they are all made for man’s use. Therefore final happiness cannot consist in the practice of art. CHAPTER XXXVII / THAT man’s ultimate- HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEMPLATING GOD Accordingly, if man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in external things, which are called goods of fortune; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive part; nor as regards the intellec- ^ Ch. 34. ^Cf. Aristotle, Eth., VI, 5 (1104a 35). ^ Op. cit., VI, 13 (1145a 6). '^Op cit., I, 9 (1099b 33). ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, i (980a 30). 6o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES tual part, in terms of the life of moral virtue; nor in terms of the intellectual virtues which are concerned with action, namely, art and prudence:— it remains for us to conclude that man^s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth. For this operation alone is proper to man, and it is in it that none of the other animals communicates. Again. This is not directed to anything further as to its end, since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake. Again. By this operation man is united to beings above him, by becom- ing like them; because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in the separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever. Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it. Further. All other human operations seem to be ordered to this as to their end. For perfect contemplation requires that the body should be dis- encumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and of prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which the whole governance of the civil life is directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations appear to serve those who contemplate the truth. Now, it is not possible that man’s ultimate happiness consist in contem- plation based on the understanding of first principles; for this is most im- perfect, as being most universal, containing potentially the knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human inquiry, and come? to us from nature, and not through the pursuit of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object, since happiness must consist in an opera- tion of the intellect in relation to the most noble intelligible objects. It fol- lows^ then that man’s ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things. ^ It is therefore evident also by way of induction that man’s ultimate hap- piness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.^ ^ Ch. 25 . HAPPINESS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 6i CHAPTER XXXVIII/ THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MAJORITY It remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ulti- mate happiness of an intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other prin- ciples of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book,’’^ or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things run their course according to a fixed order, and since there cannot he order without a cause of order, men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who orders the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration; just as, when we see a man in motion, and performing other works, we perceive that in him there is some cause of these operations which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of soulj but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question. Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness. For the activity of the happy man must be without any defect; but this knowledge of God is subject to an admixture of many errors. Thus, some believed that there was no other governor of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; and so they said that the heavenly bodies were gods. — Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they thought that their movements and natural operations were not introduced into them by an external governor, but that the order in other things was caused by them. — ^And some, deeming huma!n acts not to be subject to any but a human rule, decjared that men who cause order in other men were gods. — Evidently this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness. * Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as to their end; indeed, it is in every- one almost right from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God. Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness; nay, those who lack it and seek it are praised. But he who lacks the aforesaid knowl- edge of God is seemingly very much to be blamed, since it is a very clear ^ C. G., 1, 10. 62 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES sign of a man’s dullness of perception if he fail to perceive such evident signs of God; even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, under- stood not that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm (xiii. i : lii. i ) : The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. Therefore it is not this knowledge of God which suffices for happiness. Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in terms of what is proper to it, is most imperfect. Such is the knowledge which is had of man from the fact that he is moved; for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only potentially, because the proper is only potentially con- tained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man’s highest good must needs be in terms of what exists actually, and not in terms of what exists only potentially ; since potentiality perfected by act has the character of a good. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness. CHAPTER XXXIX W THAT man’s happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION There is also another knowledge of God, higher than the one just men- tioned, which is acquired by means of a demonstration, and which ap- proaches nearer to a proper knowledge of Him; for by means of a demon- tration many things are removed from Him, so that in consequtmcc we understand Him as something apart from other things. For demonstration proves that God is immovable, eternal, incorporeal, utterly simple, one, and the like, as we have shown in the First Book. Now we arrive at the proper knowledge of a thing not only by affirmations, but also by negations. For just as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so is it proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. Yet there is this difference between these two modes of proper knowledge, that when we have proper knowledge of a thing by affirmations we know what that thing is, and how it is distin- guished from others; whereas when we have proper knowledge of a thing by negations, we know that it is distinct from others, but remain ignorant of what it is. Such is the proper knowledge of God that can be obtained by demonstrations. But neither does this suffice for man’s ultimate happiness. For things belonging to one species for the most part attain to the end of that species, because nature achieves its purpose always or nearly always, and fails in a few instances because of some corruption. Now happiness is the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. There- fore happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to some whereby they be deprived of it.^ Few, how- ^ Cf. Aristotle, Eth., I, 9 (1099b 18). HAPPINESS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 63 ever, attain to the possession of the aforesaid knowledge of God by way of demonstration, because of the obstacles to this knowledge mentioned at the beginning of this work.^ Therefore this knowledge is not essentially man’s happiness. Again. To be actual is the end of that which exists potentially, as was made clear above. “ Therefore happiness, which is the last end, is an act free of any potentiality to a further act. Now this knowledge of God that is acquired by way of demonstration is still in potentiality to a further knowledge of God, or to the same knowledge, but by a better way: because those who came afterwards endeavored to add something to the knowledge of God besides, that which they found handed down to them by those who preceded them. Therefore such knowledge is not man’s ultimate happiness. Further. Happiness excludes all unhappiness, for no man can be at the same time happy and qnhappy. Now deception and error have a large place in unhappiness, since all naturally avoid them. But the aforesaid knowl- edge of God is subject to the admixture of many errors, as evidenced by many who knew some truths about God through demonstration, yet, fol- lowing their own opinions, when they lacked proof, fell into many errors. And if there were some who by the way of demonstration discovered the truth about divine things, without any admixture of error in their opinions, it is evident that they were very few. This fact is not in keeping with hap- piness, which is the common end. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not seated in such knowledge as this. Moreover. Happiness consists in a perfect operation. Now perfect knowl- edge requires certitude, and that is why we cannot be said to know unless we know what cannot be otherwise, as is stated in Post. Anal, But the aforesaid knowledge is beset with uncertainty, as is clear from the diversity among sciences about divine things elaborated by those who endeavored to discover something about God by the way of demonstration. Therefore ultimate happiness does not consist in such knowledge. Besides. When the will has obtained its last end, its desire is at rest. Now the ultimate end of all human knowledge is happiness. Therefore happiness is essentially, that knowledge of God the possession of which leaves no knowledge to be desired of anything knowable. Such, however, is not the knowledge which the philosophers were able to have about God by the way of demonstration; because even when we have this knowledge, we still desire to know other things — things that we do not yet know by means of this knowledge. Therefore happiness does not consist in such a knowledge of God. Furthermore. The end of everything that exists in potentiality is that it be brought to actuality; for to this does it tend by means of the movement with which it is moved to its end. Now every potential being tends to be- coming actualized as far as possible. For there are things in potentiality ^C. G., I, 4. ^Ch. 20, 22. ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 2 (72a 17). 64 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES whose whole potentiality is reducible to act: the end of such things is that they be wholly actualized. Thus, a heavy body that is outside its medium is in potentiality to its proper place. There are also things whose potential- ity cannot be actualized all at once, — for instance primary matter : so that by its movement it seeks actualization by various forms in succession, which cannot be in the matter at the same time because of their diversity. Fur- thermore, our intellect is in potentiality to all intelligibles, as was stated in the Second Book.^ Now it is possible for two intelligible objects to be in the possible intellect at the same time according to the first act which is science^ although perhaps not in respect of the second act which is con- sideration. Accordingly, it is clear that the whole potentiidity of the pos- sible intellect can be actualized at one time; and consequently this is re- quired for its ultimate end, which is happiness. But the aforesaid knowl- edge, which can be acquired about God by the way of demonstration, does not accomplish this, since when we have it we still are ignorant of many things. Therefore such a knowledge of God does not suffice for ultimate happiness. CHAPTER XLJ THAT man’s happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH There is yet another knowledge of God, in one respect superior to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely, that whereby God is known by men through faith. Now this knowledge surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration in this respect, namely, that by faith we know certain things about God which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work.2 But not even in this knowledge of God can man’s ultimate hap- piness consist. For happiness is the intellect’s perfect operation, as was already de- clared.® But in knowledge by faith, the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards the contribution of the intellect, although it is most perfect on the part of the object; for the intellect in believing does not grasp .the object of its assent. Therefore neither does man’s hap- piness consist in this knowledge of God. Again. It has been shown that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will.« Now in knowledge by faith, the will has the leading place; for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it, because it so wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth. Therefore man’s final happiness does not consist in this knowledge. ^C.G., 11, 47. ’’C.G.,I,s. “Ch.2S. ‘Ch. 26. MAN’S KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 65 Besides. A believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself ; so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man would not believe in what is unseen by him, and proposed to him by another, unless he thought this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed than he himself has who sees not. Either therefore the judgment of the believer is wrong, or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we can- not proceed thus indefinitely, for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude, since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself, to give certitude to the faith of believers. Now, in reality, it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work;^ and yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in such knowledge. There is therefore some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowl- edge of faith, whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, as when we believe Christ, or whether he receives the truth from him who sees it immediately, as when we believe the Apostles and Prophets. Since, then, man’s happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith. Moreover. Since happiness is the last end, the natural desire is set at rest thereby. But the knowledge of faith does not set the desire at rest, but inflames it; for everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of faith. Further. The knowledge of God has been declared to be the end inas- much as it unites us to the last end of all, namely, God. Now the knowledge of faith does not make the thing believed to be perfectly present to the in- tellect, since faith is of absent, and not present, things. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor, v. 6, 7) that so long as we walk by faith ^ we are pilgrims front the Lord, Yet faith makes God to be present to love, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to the saying of Ephes. hi. 17: That Christ may dwell by faith in our hearts. Therefore the knowledge of faith cannot be man’s ultimate happiness. CHAPTER XLI IS IT POSSIBLE POR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF the SPECULATIVE SCIENCES? An intellectual* substance has yet another knowledge of God. For we have said in the Second Book that the separate intellectual substance, by know- ing its own essence, knows both what is above it and what is below it, in a ^C. G„ 1 , 7. 66 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES way proportionate to its substance.^ This must especially be the case if that which is above it be its cause, since the likeness to the cause must be found in the effect. Hence, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as was proved above,- it follows that separate intellectual sub- stances, by knowing their own essence, know God Himself by way of some kind of vision; for the intellect knows by way of vision the thing whose likeness is in the intellect, in the same way as the likeness of the thing seen corporeally is in the sense of the one seeing. Whatever intellect, therefore, apprehends a separate substance by knowing its essence, sees God in a higher way than He is known by any of the kinds of knowledge mentioned above. Accordingly, since some have deemed man’s ultimate happiness to be in this life, for the reason that he knows separate substances,'^ we must in- quire whether in this life man be able to know separate substances. It is a point that may well be questioned. For our intellect, according to its present state, understands nothing without a phantasm, which stands in the same relation to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colors to the sight, as was made clear in the Second Book.‘^ Hence if, through the intel- lectual knowledge which is acquired from phantasms it be possible for any of us to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be possible for ^someone in this life to understand these same separate substances; and in consequence, by seeing these separate substances, he will participate in that mode of knowledge by which the separate substance, by understanding itself, understands God. If, on the other hand, by knowledge derived from phantasms, it be altogether unable to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be impossible for man in the present state of life to ac- quire the above mode of knowing divine things. The possibility of succeeding in understanding separate substances, through knowledge derived from phantasms, has been explained by some in various ways. Avempace maintained that by the study of the speculative sciences it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of separate substances from understanding those things which we know through phantasms.^* B’'or we are able by the action of the intellect to extract the quiddity of a thing which has quiddity without being its own quiddity. For the intellect is natu- rally adapted to know any quiddity as such, since the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is. Now if that which is first understood by the possible intellect is something that has a quiddity, we can, by the possible intellect, abstract the quiddity of the thing first understood; and if this quiddity has again a quiddity, it will be again possible to abstract the quid- dity of this quiddity. And since we cannot go on indefinitely, we must stop somewhere. Therefore by way of analysis our intellect can arrive at know- C. G., II, 96ff. ^C. G.j II, 15. ®Cf. Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 36 (VI, i75r ff). ^C. G., II, 59 and 74. ‘’Cf. Averroes, ibid. (VI, I77v-i78r). MAN^S KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 67 ing a quiddity that has no quiddity; and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Consequently, through its knowledge of these sensible things, acquired from phantasms, our intellect can arrive at understanding sep- arate substances. He goes on to prove the same conclusion by another and similar way. Thus, he lays down that that which we understand of a thing, for instance, of a horse, is multiplied in me and in you only through the multiplication of the spiritual species, which are diverse in you and me. It follows, then, that an understood thing which is not clothed with any such form is the same in you and me. Now, as we have proved, the quiddity of the under- stood thing, which our intellect can abstract, has no spiritual and indi- vidual species; for the quiddity ‘of the thing understood is not the quiddity of an individual, whether corporeal or spiritual, since the thing understood, as such, is universal. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to under- stand a quiddity of which the thing understood is one for all. Such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to know separate substances. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, these explanations are frivolous. For since the thing understood as such is universal, the quiddity of such a thing must be the quiddity of a universal, namely, genus or species. Now the quiddity of the genus or species in the case of sensible things, the intel- lectual knowledge of which we acquire through phantasms, includes both matter and form. Consequently it is quite unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which is simple and immaterial. Therefore it is impossible to understand the quiddity of a separate substance through understanding the quiddity of a sensible thing. Again. A form that, as to its very being, cannot be separated from a par- ticular subject is not of the same kind as a form which, in its being, is sep- arated from a particular subject, although both may be considered apart from that particular subject. For magnitude is not the same kind of thing as a separate substarice, unless we suppose that there are separated magni- tudes midway between the Forms and sensible things, as some Platonists have maintained. But the quiddity of a genus or, species in the case of sen- sible things cannot be separated, in its very being, from a particular indi- vidual matter; unless, perhaps, as the Platonists think, we suppose the essences of things to exist separately, which Aristotle has refuted.^ Conse- quently, the aforesaid quiddity is altogether different from separate sub- stances, which are in no way in matter. Therefore it does not follow, from the fact that these quiddities are understood, that separate substances can be understood. Moreover. If we grant that the quiddity of a separate substance is of the same kind as the quiddity of the genus or species in the case of sensible things, it cannot be said to be of the same specific kind, unless we say that '^Metaph., I, 9 (990b i). 68 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES the essences of these sensible things are the separate substances themselves, as the Platonists maintained. It follows that they are of the same kind only according to the nature of quiddity as quiddity, which is the common nature of genus and substance. Consequently, by means of these quiddities we shall understand nothing about separate substances except their remote genus. Now by knowing the genus, we do not therefore know the species, except potentially. Therefore it will not be possible to understand a separate substance through understanding the quiddities of these sensible things. Besides. A separate substance differs more from sensible things than one sensible thing from another. But understanding the quiddity of one sen- sible thing does not suffice for understanding the quiddity of anolhcT; for a man who is born blind is quite unable, through understanding the quid- dity of sound, to understand the quiddity of color. Much less, therefore, will anyone, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible substance, be able to understand the quiddity of a separate substance. Further. If, again, we hold that separate substances move the spheres, through whose movements are caused the forms of sensible substances, even this mode of knowing separate substances through sensible things does not suffice for knowing their quiddity. Because from the effect we know a cause either in the point of likeness between cause and effect, or in so far as the effect indicates the power of the cause. In the point of likeness, we do not gather from the effect the nature of the cause, unless agent and effect be of one species; and this is not the case with separate substances and sensible things. In the point of power, it is again impossible unless the ef- fect equal the power of the cause; since then the whole power of the cause is known from the effect, and the power of a thing indicates its substance. But this cannot apply to the situation in question, because the powers of separate substances surpass all the sensible effects that our intellect under- stands, even as a universal power surpasses a particular effect. It is there- fore impossible, through understanding sensible things, to arrive at the understanding of separate substances. Moreover. Whatever intelligible things we are able to come to know by means of inquiry and study belong to one or other of the speculative sci- ences. Accordingly, if through understanding the natures and quiddities of these sensible things we succeed in understanding separate substances, it follows that we would understand separate substances through one or an- other speculative science. Yet we do not find this to be the case, for no speculative science teaches what any separate substance is, but only the fact that it is. It is therefore not possible to succeed in understanding sep- arate substances through understanding the natures of sensible things* And if it be said that such a speculative science is possible, although it has" not yet been discovered, the objection is empty, since it is not possible, from any principles known to us, to arrive at understanding the aforesaid substances. Because all the proper principles of any science whatever de- THE ERROR OF ALEXANDER 69 pend on the first indemonstrable self-evident principles, the knowledge of which we acquire from sensible things, as is stated in Post. Anal, ii.^ But sensible things do not sufficiently lead to the knowledge of immaterial beings, as we have proved by the preceding arguments. Therefore no sci- ence is possible whereby one may be able to attain to the understanding of separate substances. CHAPTER XLII THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER Alexander supposed the possible intellect to be subject to generation and corruption, as being a disposition of human nature resulting from the mix- ture of the elements, as we have seen in the Second Book.^ Now it is not possible for a power of this kind to rise above material things. And so he maintained that our possible intellect can never attain to the understanding of separate substances; but he also held that, according to our present state of life, we are nevertheless able to understand separate substances.® He endeavored to prove this as follows. Whenever a thing is completed in its generation, and has reached the ultimate perfection of its substance, its proper operation, whether action or passion, will also be completed; for even as operation follows substance, so does perfection of operation follow perfection of substance. Hence an animal, when quite perfect, is able to walk by itself. Now the habitual intellect, which is nothing else but the in- telligible species formed by the agent intellect, and residing in the possible intellect, has a twofold operation. One is to make things potentially under- stood to be actually understood, — and this operation it has through the agent intellect, — ^while the other is to understand what is actually under- stood; for it is these two things that man is able to do by an intellectual habit. Accordingly, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, both of these operations will be completed in it. Now whenever the intellect acquires new species it reaches the complement of its generation. And so its generation must necessarily be completed eventually, unless there be an impediment, since no generation tends to the infinite. Therefore, eventually, both operations will be completed in the habitual intellect, by its making all things potentially understood to be understood actually, — ^which is the com- plement of the first operation; — and by understanding all things intelligible, both separate and not separate. But since, according to the opinion of Alexander (as we have stated), the possible intellect is unable to understand separate substances, he means ^Aristotle, Post. Anal, 11 , 18 (99b 20). ^C. G., II, 62. —Cf. Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 5 (VI, i62r-i63r). ^Cf. Averroes, ibid. 70 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES that we shall understand separate substances by the habitual intellect, in so far as the agent intellect, which according to him is a separate substance, will become the form of the habitual intellect and be united to us. The re- sult will be that we shall understand through it even as now we understand through the possible intellect. And since it is in the power of the agent intellect to make actually understood things which are potentially under- standable, and to understand separate substances, in that state we shall understand separate substances, as well as all non-separate intelligible things. According to this explanation, by this knowledge which we derive from phantasms, we attain to the knowledge of a separate substance; not as though the phantasms themselves and the things understood from them were a means for knowing separate substances, as happens in the specula- tive sciences, which was the position of the previous opinion,^ hut in so far as the intelligible species are in us a kind of disposition to this particular form which is the agent intellect. This is the first point of difference be- tween these two opinions. Consequently, when the habitual intellect becomes perfect through these intelligible species produced in us by the agent intellect, the agent intellect itself becomes a form united to us, as stated. And he calls this the acquired intellect, which, they say, Aristotle held to come from the outside. And so, although man’s ultimate perfection is not seated in the speculative sciences, as the previous opinion maintained, yet by them man is disposed for the attainment of his ultimate perfection. This is the second point of difference between the second and first opinions. Thirdly they differ in this, that, according to the first opinion, our understanding of the agent intellect is the cause of its union with us. Whereas, in the second opinion, the reverse is the case, since it is because it is united to us as a form that we understand it and other separate sub- stances. But there is no reason in these statements. For the habitual intellect, like the possible intellect, is supposed by Alexander to be subject to generation and corruption. Now, according to him, that which is eternal cannot be- come the form of that which can be generated and corrupted; for this is why he maintains that the possible intellect, which is united to us as a form, is subject to generation and corruption, while the agent intellect, which is incorruptible, is a separate substance. Since, then, according to Alexander, the agent intellect is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the agent intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect. Again. The form of the intellect, as intellect, is the intelligible, just as the form of the sense is the sensible; for the intellect does not receive a thing, properly speaking, except intelligibly, as_ neither does the sense, except ^Ch. 41. THE ERROR OF ALEXANDER 71 sensibly. If, then, the agent intellect cannot become an intelligible through the habitual intellect, it cannot possibly be its form. Besides. There are three ways in which we are said to understand by means of something. First, we understand by means of the intellect, which is the power that elicits this operation. And so the intellect itself is said to understand, and the very act of the intellect in understanding becomes our act of understanding. — Secondly, we understand by means of the intelligible species. By it we are said to understand, not as though the species itself understood, but because the intellectual power is actualized by it, just as the power of sight is by the species of color. — Thirdly, as by a medium through the knowledge of which we arrive at the knowledge of something else. If, then, man at length understands separate substances through the agent intellect, it must be in one of these ways. It is not in the third way, because Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands the agent intellect. — Nor is it in the second way, be- cause to understand by means of an intelligible species is ascribed to the intellectual power that is informed by that species; but Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands sep- arate substances. Consequently we cannot possibly understand separate substances by means of the agent intellect in the same way as we under- stand things by means of an intelligible species. — ^And if it is as by an in- tellectual power, it follows that the agent intellect’s act of understanding is the man’s act of understanding. Now this cannot be unless the substance of the agent intellect and the substance of the man become one in being; for it is impossible that there be identity of operation where there is diver- sity of substances. Hence the agent intellect will be one in being with man; but not one in being accidentally, because the agent intellect would then be, not a substance, but an accident; as for instance color added to a body makes a unity in being that is accidental. It remains, then, that the agent intellect together with man makes one being substantially. Therefore, it will be either the human soul or a part of it, and not a separate substance, as Alexander maintained. Therefore the opinion of Alexander does not explain how man can understand separate substances. Moreover. If the agent intellect at any time becomes the form of this particular man, so that he be able to understand by means of it, for the same reason it may become the form of some other man who will likewise understand by its means. It will then follow that at the same time two men will understand through the agent intellect as through their own form. But this means that the agent intellect’s act of understanding is the act of understanding of the man who understands by its means, as was already stated; and consequently two men who understand will have one act of understanding. Which is impossible. Moreover his argument is altogether frivolous. First, because, when the 72 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES generation of a genus is perfected, its operation must be perfected, yet in keeping with the mode of that genus, but not of a higher genus; for when the generation of air is perfected, it has generation and c(>mij)lelc upward movement, yet not so as to be moved towards the place of fire. So, too, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, its operation, which is to understand, will be complete, according to its mode, liut not according to the mode of understanding in separate substances, so as to understand separate substances. Consequently, from the generation of the habitual in- tellect it cannot be concluded that at some time man will understand sep- arate substances. Secondly, because it belongs to the same power to complete an operation and to perform it. Consequently, if the perfection of the habitual intellect’s operation be to understand separate substances, it follows that the habitual intellect sometimes understands separate substances. But Alexander does not hold this; for it would follow that to understand separate substances comes to us through the speculative sciences, which are comprised under the habitual intellect. Thirdly, those things that begin to be generated for the most part be- come completely generated; for all generations of things are due to deter- minate causes, which produce their effects either always or in the majority of cases. If, then, completeness of action follows completeness of generation, it is necessary that complete operation should follow things generated, al- ways or most frequently. And yet those who study in order that the habit- ual intellect may be engendered in them do not succeed in understanding separate substances, either in most, or in all, cases. In fact no one has boasted of having attained to this point of perfection. Therefore the per- fection of the habitual intellect is not to understand separate substances. . CHAPTER XLIII THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES, IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVKRROES As the greatest difficulty presented by Alexander’s opinion was that he sup- posed the habitual intellect to be altogether corruptible, Averroes thought to offer an easier proof that at times we understand separate substances, in that he deemed the possible intellect to be incorruptible and substantially separate from us, just as the agent intellect.'^ First, he shows the necessity of admitting that the relation of the agent intellect to those principals which we know naturally is either that of agent to instrument or that of form to matter. For the habitual intellect, whereby we understand, has for its activity not only that which consists in under- ^In De Anima, III, comm. 5 (VI, i64r). THE ERROR OF AVERROES 73 standing, but also that which consists in producing the actually understood; for we know by experience that both are in our power. Now “to produce the actually understood'’ indicates more especially the habitual intellect than to understand,” because it is necessary to produce the actually under- stood before one understands it. Now, in us certain things are made actu- ally understood naturally, and not by study or by choice: the first in- telligible principles. But it does not belong to the habitual intellect to make these actually understood, for it belongs to it to make actually under- stood those things which we know by study. Rather are the first intelligibles a beginning of the habitual intellect; and so Aristotle gives the name of understanding to the habit of these principles.^ They themselves are made actually understood by the agent intellect’ alone, but by them other things aie made actually understood which we know by study. Accordingly, to make those things which are actually understood by derivation, is an act both of the habitual intellect, as to first principles, and of the agent intellect. Now one action does not proceed from two principles unless one of them be compared to the other as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. Consequently the agent intellect must be compared to the first principles of the habitual intellect either as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. How this may be possible he explains as follows. Since the possible in- tellect, according to his opinion, is a separate substance, ^ it understands the agent intellect and other separate substances, as well as the first principles of speculative knowledge; and consequently it is the subject of both. Now whenever two things come together in one subject, one of them is as the form of the other ; just as, since color and light are in the diaphanous body as their subject, one of them, namely light, must be the form of the other, namely color. And this is necessary when they afe mutually ordered, but not when they are united accidentally in the same subject, as whiteness and music. Now the objects of speculative knowledge and the agent intellect are mutually ordered, since these understood speculative truths are made actually understood by the agent intellect. Therefore the agent intellect is related to these understood speculative truths as form to matter. Conse- quently, since these same truths are joined to us by phantasms, which are a kind of subject thereof, it follows that the agent intellect also is joined to us, as being the form of these truths. When, therefore, these truths are in us potentially only, the agent intellect is joined to us potentially only. When some of these truths are in us actually and some potentially, the agent in- tellect is joined to us actually in part, and potentially in part. Then it is said to be moved towards the above union; for the more things are made actually understood in us, the more perfectly is the agent intellect joined to us. And this progress and movement towards union is effected by study in the speculative sciences, through which we acquire true knowledge, and false opinions are put aside, which are outside the order of this movement, VI, 6 (1141a 7). "Cf. C. G ., II, 59. 74 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES just as monstrosities are outside the order of natural operation. Therefore men help one another towards this progress, just as they help one another in the speculative sciences. And so when all potential knowledge has become actual in us, the agent intellect will be perfectly joined to us as a form, and we shall understand perfectly by it, just as now we understand perfectly by the habitual intellect. Consequently, since it belongs to the agent intellect to understand separate substances, we shall then understand separate sub- stances, just as now we understand speculative knowledge. This will be man’s ultimate happiness, wherein man will be as a sort of God} That this explanation is of no account whatever is made clear enough by what we have already said; for it is based on many suppositions that have been already disproved. First, we have shown above that the possible intellect is not a substance separate from us in being.- Hence it does not follow that it is the subject of separate substances; especially since Aristotle asserts that the possible in- tellect is the power of becoming all things so that seemingly it is the sub- ject of such things only as are made to be understood. Again. It has also been proved above that the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul,*-^ to which Aristotle assigns the operation of making things to be actually understood} which lies in our power. Hence it does not follow that understanding by means of the agent intellect is the cause of our being able to understand separate substances; or else we would always understand them. Further. If the agent intellect is a separate substance, it is not joined to us except by means of species made to be actually understood, according to his explanation; just as neither would the possible intellect be united to us, even though the possible intellect is related to those species as matter to form, while the agent intellect, on the contrary, is related to them as form' to matter. Now the species which are made to be actually understood are joined to us, according to him, because of the phantasms, which stand re- lated to the possible intellect as colors to the sight, but to the agent intellect as colors to the light, as may be gathered from the statement of Aristotle.^* Now we cannot ascribe to a stone, in which there is color, either the action of seeing, so that it see, or the action of the sun, so that it give light. There- fore, according to this opinion, we cannot ascribe to man either the action of the possible intellect so that he understand, or the action of the agent intellect, so that he understand separate substances, or that he make things to be actually understood. Besides. According to this opinion, the agent intellect is not supposed to be joined to us as a form, except through its being the form of the prin- ciples of understanding, whose form it is stated to be also because the agent ^In De Anima, III, comm. 36 (VI, i79r-i8or). ®C. G., II, 59. ^De An,, ni, s (430a 14) . ^ c. G., II, 76. ** De. An., Ill, 5 (430a 15) . ” Ibid. (430a 16) . THE ERROR OF AVERROES 75 intellect and these principles have an action in common, namely, to make things actually understood. Consequently, it cannot be a form to us, except in so far as the principles of knowledge have an action in common with it. But these principles have no share in the action which it has of under- standing separate substances, because they are species of sensible things; unless we return to the opinion of Avempace, that the quiddities of sep- arate substances can be known by means of what we know of the sensible world. Therefore in no way can we understand separate substances by this means. Moreover. The agent intellect bears a different relation to the principles of knowledge, of which it is the cause, and to separate substances, of which it is not the cause, but which it only knows, according to his theory. There- fore, if it be joined to us through being the cause of the principles of knowl- edge, it does not follow that it .is joined to us in so far as it knows separate substances. Quite the contrary, his argument clearly contains a fallacy of accident. Again. If we know separate substances by means of the agent intellect, this is not in so far as the agent intellect is the form of this or that principle of understanding, but in so far as it becomes a form in us; for it is thus that we are able to understand by its means. Now it becomes a form in us also by means of the first principles of understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore from the very beginning man can understand separate substances by means of the agent intellect. If, however, it be said that the agent intellect does not become a form in us perfectly by means of some principles of understanding, so that we be able to understand separate substances: — the sole reason for this is because these principles of understanding do not equal the perfection of the agent intellect in understanding separate substances. But not even all the in- telligible truths combined together equal this perfection of the agent intel- lect in understanding separate substances; since all of them are not in- telligible except in so far as they are made to be actually understood, whereas the latter are intelligible by their very nature. Therefore, although we shall know all the intelligible truths, it does not follow that the agent intellect will become a form in us so perfectly that we understand separate substances by it. Otherwise, if this be not required, we shall have to admit that by understanding anything intelligible we also understand separate substances. 76 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XLIV THAT man’s ultimate HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IMAGINED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS But it is likewise impossible to allow that man’s happiness consists in such a knowledge of separate substances as the above mentioned opinions main- tained.^ For that is futile which is for an end that cannot be secured. Since, then, man’s ultimate end is happiness, to which his natural desire tends, it is impossible to assign man’s happiness to that which he cannot obtain; or else it would follow that man was made in vain, and that his natural desire is empty, which is impossible. Now it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for man to understand separate substances, according to the above mentioned opinions. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in such a knowledge of separate substances. Again. In order that the agent intellect be united to us as a form, in such a way that by it we may understand separate substances, it is required that the generation of the habitual intellect be complete, according to Alex- ander or that all the speculative truths be actualized in us, according to Averroes.^ Both of these opinions come to the same, because the habitual intellect is engendered in us in so far as speculative truths are actualized in us. Now all the species of sensible things are understood potentially. There- fore, in order that the agent intellect be joined to a man, it is necessary that he actually understand by his speculative intellect all the natures of sen- sible things, and all their powers, operations and movements. But it is im- possible for a man to know all this through the principles of the speculative sciences, whereby we are moved to the union with the agent intellect, as they themselves say; for it is not possible to acquire knowledge of all these things, from knowing those which come under the perception of our senses, whence the principles of the speculative sciences are derived. Therefore it is impossible for any man to arrive at this union in the way assigned by them; and consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in such a union. Besides. Granted that it be possible for man to be united to the agent intellect in the manner suggested, it is clear that such a perfection is ob- tainable by very few; so much so that neither they nor any others, how- ever much they be advanced and skilled in the speculative sciences, have dared to boast of having obtained this perfection. In fact, all of them have confessed to ignorance of many things: thus Aristotle, speaking of the quad- rature of a circle,^ and of the principles of the order of the heavenly bodies "Cf.ch.41ff. "Ch.42. ®Ch.43. vn (7b3i). OUR KNOWLEDGE O’F SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 77 states that he can give only probable arguments;^ and he leaves to others to decide what is necessary in these bodies and their movers.^ Now happi- ness is a common good, to which many can arrive, unless they be prevented, as Aristotle says.^ This is true also of any natural end of a species, namely, that it is obtained by the majority of the members of that species. There- fore man’s ultimate happiness cannot consist in the aforesaid union . It is clear that Aristotle, whose opinion the philosophers in question en- deavored to follow, did not hold that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a union of this kind. For he proves that man’s happiness is an operation of his own according to perfect virtue.^ That is why he had to treat specially of the virtues, which he divided into moral and intellectual. Furthermore, he proves that man’s ultimate happiness consists in speculation.^ Hence it follows that it is not seated in the act of a moral virtue, nor of prudence or art, even though these are intellectual virtues. Consequently, it must be an operation according to wisdom, which is the chief of the three remaining intellectual virtues, namely, wisdom, science and understanding, as he proves in Ethics vi.® For which reason he declares that the wise man is a hs-ppy man."^ Now according to him wisdom is one of the speculative sci- ences, the head of the others] and at the beginning of the Metaphysics he gives the name of wisdom to the science of which he purposes to treat in that work.^’ Clearly, therefore, the opinion of Aristotle was that tlie ultimate happiness, which man is able to obtain in this life, is that knowl- edge of divine things which can be acquired through the speculative sci- ences. But that other way of knowing divine things, not through the specu- lative sciences, but by a kind of natural process of generation, was invented by some of his commentators. CHAPTER XLV THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES Since then in this life separate substances cannot be known by us in the ways mentioned above, it remains for us to inquire whether we be able to understand separate substances in this life in any way at all. Themistius seeks to prove that this is possible by an argument a fortioriP For separate substances are more intelligible than material things, since the latter are intelligible in so far as the agent intellect causes them to be actu- ally understood, whereas the former are intelligible in themselves. If, there- Cmlo, II, 5 (288a 2). '^Metaph., XI, 8 (1073b 2). ^Eth., I, 9 (1099b 19). ^Op, cit., I, 13 (1102a 5). ^Op. cit., X, 7 (1177a 18). " 0 ^, czL, VI, 6 (1141a 3). Op. dl., X, 8 (iiyga 32) . Op. czL, VI, 7 (1141a 16) ^Metaph.,l,i (981b 26). ^”Cf. Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm 36 (VI, 176V). 78 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fore, our intellect understands these material things, much more is it adapted to understand separate substances. This argument must be appraised in the light of the various opinions about the possible intellect. For if the possible intellect is a power inde- pendent of matter, and has its being apart from the body, as Averroes maintains, it will follow that it has no necessary relation to material things; so that the more a thing is intelligible in itself, the more will it be intelligible to the possible intellect. But then it would seem to follow, since we under- stand from the beginning by means of the possible intellect, that we under- stand separate substances from the beginning: which is clearly false. (Aver- roes seeks to avoid this difficulty, as we have explained above in setting forth his opinion, which we proved to be false.^) If, however, the possible intellect is not separate from the body in its very beginning, from the very fact that it is united in being to such a body it has a necessary relation to material things, so that only through them can it acquire knowledge of other things. Hence it does not follow, if sep- arate substances be more intelligible in themselves, that they are more intelligible to our intellect. This is pointed out by the words of Aristotle. For he says there that the difficulty of understanding those things is in us and not in them; because our intellect stands in relation to things most evi- dent as the eye of the owl to the sunlight? Consequently, seeing that we cannot arrive at understanding separate substances through understanding material things, as we have proved,^ it follows that our possible intellect can in no way understand separate substances. This appears again from the relation of the possible to the agent intellect. For a passive power is in potentiality to those things only which are in- cluded in the range of its proper active principle; for every passive power has a corresponding active power in nature, or otherwise a passive power would be useless, since it cannot be brought to actuality, except by an active power. Hence we find that the sight is receptive only of colors, which are illumined by the light. Now the possible intellect is a power in a certain sense passive, and therefore it has its corresponding agent, namely, the agent intellect, which stands in relation to the possible intellect as light to the sight. Consequently, the possible intellect is in potentiality to those in- telligible objects only which have been made so by the agent intellect. Hence Aristotle, in describing each intellect, says that the possible intellect is the power to become all things, while the agent intellect is the power of making all things : ^ so that the power in either case refers to the same ob- jects, being active in the one and passive in the other. Since, then, separate substances are not made actually intelligible by the agent intellect, and only material things are so made, it follows that the possible intellect extends to these alone. Therefore we cannot understand separate substances through it. ^Ch. 43- ^ Metaph., I a, i (993b 9). Ch. 41. An., Ill, 3 (430a 14). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 79 Therefore Aristotle employed a fitting example, for the owPs eye can never see the light of the sun. And yet that is why Averroes tries to weaken this example, saying that the likeness between our intellect in relation to separate substances, and the owFs eye in relation to the sun’s light, is one of difficulty, not of impossibility.^ He proves this as follows. Because if it were impossible for us to understand things intelligible in themselves, namely separate substances, they would be without purpose, just as to no purpose would a thing be visible, if it could not be seen by any sight. Now this argument is clearly of no account. For even though these sub- stances be never understood by us, yet they are understood by themselves; so that not without purpose would they be intelligible, as neither is the sun uselessly visible, — to continue Aristotle’s comparison — because the owl cannot see it, since man and other animals can see it. Accordingly, if we suppose the possible intellect to be united in being to the body, it cannot understand separate substances. It makes a difference, however, what we hold with regard to its substance. For if we suppose it to be a material power subject to generation and corruption, as some have maintained,^ it follows that by its very substance it is confined to the understanding of material things. Consequently it would not in any way be able to understand separate substances, since it itself could not possibly be separate. — On the other hand, if the possible intellect, although united to the body, is incorruptible and independent of matter in its being, as we have proved above, ^ it follows that its confinement to the understanding of material things befalls it through its union with the body. And so, when the soul shall be separated from the body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are intelligible in themselves, namely separate sub- stances, by the light of the agent intellect, which in the soul is like the intellectual light that is in separate substances. This is what our Faith holds about our understanding separate sub- stances after death, and not in this life. CHAPTER XLVI ’ THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF A CERTAIN difficulty would seem to arise against what we have been saying, because of a passage of Augustine which must be carefully discussed. For he says: Just as the mind gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses, so does it acquire knowledge of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it also knows itself through itself, since it is '•Averroes, In Metaph., II, comm, i (VIII, 14V). '^Cf. ch. 42. ®C. G., II, 79ff. 8o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES incorporeal }■ For it would seem to follow from these words that the soul understands itself through itself, and that, by understanding itself, it under- stands separate substances; and this is contrary to what we have proved. We must, accordingly, inquire how the soul understands itself through itself. Now it cannot possibly be said that by itself it understands its own essence. Because a knowing power is made actually knowing by something in it whereby it knows. And if this be in it potentially, it knows poten- tially; if it be in it actually, it knows actually; and if it be in a middle way, it knows habitually. Now the soul is always actually present to it- self, and never only potentially or habitually. Therefore, if the soul knows its own nature through itself, it will always understand actually what it is; and this is clearly false. Again. If the soul, through itself, understands its own nature, since every man has a soul, every man will know what his soul is; which is evidently untrue. Moreover. Knowledge that results from something implanted in us by nature is itself natural: e.g., the indemonstrable principles which are known through the light of the agent intellect. Accordingly, if through the soul itself we know what the soul is, we shall know it naturally. But no one can err in things that we know naturally, for no one errs in the knowledge of indemonstrable principles. Hence no one would err about what the soul is, if the soul knew this through itself. But this is clearly false, since many have maintained the soul to be this or that body, and some, that it consisted in number or harmony.^ Therefore the soul does not know its own nature through itself. Besides. In every order that which is per se precedes and causes that which is through another? Accordingly, that which is known per se is known before all things that are known through something else, and is the principle through which they are known: e.g,, first principles in com- parison with conclusions. Therefore if the soul, through itself, knows its own nature, this will be known per se, and consequently it will be known first, and will be the principle whereby other things are known. But this is clearly false, for science does not postulate what the soul is as being some- thing already known, but proposes it as a point of inquiry from other sources. Therefore the soul does not, through itself, know its own nature. But it is clear that neither did Augustine intend this. For he says that when the soul seeks s el j -knowledge, it does not seek to see itself as though it were absent, but to discern itself as present; not to know itself, as though it knew not, but in order to distinguish itself from what it knows to be something else? Whereby he gives one to understand that through itself the soul knows itself as present to itself, but not as distinct from other things. Hence he says that some erred in not distinguishing the soul from ^De Tnn., IX, 3 (PL 42, 963). "Cf. C. G., II, 63, 64. Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (257a 32). ^De Trin., X, g (PL 42, 980). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 8i things that are different from it.^ Now through knowing what a thing is, one knows it as distinct from others. That is why a definition, which states what a thing is, distinguishes the thing defined from all others. Conse- quently, Augustine did not mean that the soul, through itself, knows what it is. Neither did Aristotle mean this. He says, in fact, that the possible intel- lect understands itselj even as it understands other things? Because it understands . itself by means of an intelligible species, by which it is brought to actual intelligibility. For, considered in itself, it is only poten- tially an intelligible being. Now nothing is known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act. Hence separate substances, whose substance is as something actual in the genus of intelligibles, under- stand through their very substances what they are; whereas our possible intellect understands what it is through the intelligible species by which it is made actually understanding. And so Aristotle shows the nature of the possible intellect from the act of understanding, namely, that it is un- mixed and incorruptible^ as we explained above.^ Accordingly, Augustine means to say that our mind loiows itself through itself inasmuch as it knows that it is. For, by the very fact that it perceives itself to act, it perceives that it exists; and since it acts through itself, it knows through itself that it exists. In this way, then, the soul, by knowing itself, knows of the separate substances that they are; but not what they are, which is to understand their substance. For when either by demonstration or by faith we know about separate substances that they are certain intellectual substances, in neither way could we receive this knowledge, unless our soul derived from itself the knowledge of an intellectual being. Consequently, we must use the science about the soul’s intellect as a principle on which to establish all our knowledge about separate substances. But it does not follow, if by the speculative sciences we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, that by means of these sciences we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what separate substances are; because our understanding, by which we arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, is far removed from the intelligence of a separate substance. Nevertheless, through knowing what our soul is, we are able to go so far as to know some remote genus of the separate substances; but this is not the same as to understand their substance. And just as through the soul itself we know that the soul is, inasmuch as we perceive its acts, and seek by a study of its acts and their objects to know what it is, through the principles of speculative sciences, so, too, con- cerning those things that are in our soul, namely its powers and habits, we know indeed that they are, inasmuch as we perceive their acts, but what they are we gather from the nature of these same acts. ^Op, cit.f X, 6 (PL 42, 978). ^Ve An., Ill, 4 (430a 2). c. G., n, 59ff. ^ Ihid. (429a 2). 82 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XLVII THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE If, in this life, we are unable to understand separate substances by reason of our intellect’s connatural relation to phantasms, much less can we see the divine essence in this life, since it is far above all separate substances. We may take it as a sign of this, that the more our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more it is withdrawn from sensible things. Now the divine substance is the ultimate term to which contempla- tion can reach, and hence the mind that sees the divine substance must be wholly freed from the corporeal senses, either by death or by rapture. Therefore it is said in God’s person {Exod. xxxiii. 20) : Man shall not sec me, and live. If it is stated in Holy Scripture that some have seen God, we must under- stand this to have been either through an imaginary vision — or even a bodily vision, when the presence of the divine power is shown by corporeal species, whether appearing externally, or formed internally in the imagina- tion, or by gathering some intellectual knowledge of God from His spiritual effects. A difficulty, however, arises through some words of Augustine which would seem to imply that we are able to understand God in this life. For he says that with the sight of the soul we see in the eternal truth, from which all temporal things have been made, the form according to which we are and according to which we effect something, in ourselves or in bodies, with a true and right reason; and it is from the same source that we conceive and possess a true knowledge of things.'^ Again he says: If we both see that what you say is true, and that what I say is true, where, 1 ask, do we see this? Surely, neither I in you, nor you in me, hut both of us in the immutable truth itself which transcends our minds? Again, he says that we judge of all things according to the divine truth and again: We must first know the truth by which other things can be known? re- ferring, it would seem, to the divine truth. It would seem, then, from his words, that we see God Himself Who is His own truth, and that through Him we know other things. Other words of his would seem to point to the same conclusion. In De Trin. xii he says: It is the office of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas which, unless they were above the human mind, would surely not he unchangeable? Now un- ^De Trin., IX, 7 (PL 42, 967). ^Confess., XII, 25 (PL 32, 840). ^ De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 148). I, 15 (PL 32, 883). De Tnn., XII, 2 (PL 42, 999). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD’S ESSENCE 83 changeable and eternal ideas cannot be elsewhere than in God, since, ac- cording to the teaching of Faith, God alone is eternal. Accordingly it would seem to follow that we can see God in this life, and that, through seeing Him and the ideas of things in Him, we judge of other things. Yet it is not to be believed that Augustine, by these words, meant that we are able in this life to see God in His essence. We must therefore inquire how, in this life, we see that unchangeable truth, or these eternal ideas, and how we judge of other things according to this truth. Augustine allows that truth is in the soul,^ and therefore it is that he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul not only in the same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence, or as He is in all things by His likeness (in so far, namely, as a thing is true according as it approaches to a likeness of God), for then the soul would not be higher than other things in this respect. It is there- fore in the soul in a special way, inasmuch as the soul knows truth. Ac- cordingly, just as the soul and other things are said to be true in their nature according as they are likened to that supreme nature, which is truth itself, since it is its own understood being, so too, that which is known by the soul is true so far as it contains a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. Therefore a Gloss on Ps. xi. 2, Truths are decayed from among the children of men, says that as from one man^s face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth? Now although different things are known, and different things believed to be true, by different people, yet some truths there are in which all men agree, such as the first principles both of the speculative and of the practical intellect, inasmuch as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men. Consequently, when a mind knows with certitude anything at all, and by tracing it back to the principles by which we judge of everything, comes to see it in those principles, it is said to see all such things in the divine truth or in the eternal ideas, and to judge of all things according to them. This explanation is confirmed by Augustine’s words: The speculations of the sciences are seen in the divine truth, even as these visible things are seen in the light of the sun? For it is evident that these things are not seen in the body of the sun, but by the light, which is a likeness of the solar brilliance reflected in the air, and cast upon such bodies. Therefore, from these words of Augustine we cannot conclude that God is seen in His essence in this life, but only as in a mirror; and to this the Apostle witnesses as regards the knowledge of this life (i Cor. xiii. 12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner. And though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God in a higher way than creatures of lower degree, yet the knowledge ^ Solil., II, 19 (PL 32, 901). ^ Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm, super XI, 2 (PL 36, 138) ; Peter Lombard, In Psalm, super XI, 2 (PL 191, iSS). ^ SoUl., I, 8 (PL 32, 877). 84 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES of God that can be gathered from the human mind does not transcend the genus of the knowledge gathered from sensible things; since even the soul knows what it itself is through understanding the natures of sensible things, as we have already stated.^ Consequently, even in this way God is not known in higher manner than the cause is known from its effect. CHAPTER XLVIII THAT man’s ultimate HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE Seeing, then, that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowl- edge of God whereby He is known by all or many in a vague kind of opin- ion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby He is known in the specu- lative sciences through demonstration, nor in that knowledge whereby He is known through faith, as we have proved above;- and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in His essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God through that which is nearest to Him, so to say, as we have proved ; and since we must place, our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown — it is impossible for man’s happiness to be in this life. Again. Man’s last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more; because if he still has a move- ment towards something, he has not yet reached an end wherein to be at rest. Now this cannot happen in this life, since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him (for this is natural to man), unless perhaps there be someone who understands all things. Now in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone that was a mere man, seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved.'"*^ Therefore man’s ulti- mate happiness cannot possibly be in this life. Besides. Whatever is 'in motion towards an end has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein. Hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man naturally desires. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently, unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When, therefore, a man acquires happiness, he also ac- quires stability and rest; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a nec- essary condition of happiness. Hence the Philosopher says: We do not look " Ch. 45, 46 . " Ch. 38 ff. Ch. 45. ^Ch. 37. ” Ch. 45. ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE 85 upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon} Now in this life there is no sure stability, since, however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in- the operation, whatever it be, in which happiness consists. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness can- not be in this life. Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being; for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end. Hence we see that animals which live but a short time are perfected in a short time. But if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue, ^ whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative mat- ters, wherein man’s ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved;^ for hardly is man able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life, and then, in the majority of cases, but a short space of life remains to him. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. - Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good, or else it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil; just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life, and not only fro'm evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For there is no one who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions ; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, wherein virtue con- sists,^ either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another ; or who at least is not ignorant of what he would wish to know, or does not feel doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore no man is happy in this life. ^ Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it, not only shun- ning it at the moment when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot obtain not to die. Therefore it is not possible for man to be happy in this life. ^ Besides. Ultimate happiness consists, not in a habit, but in an operation, since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore man cannot be entirely happy in this life. Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. There- fore its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death, since it is possible for every man in this life to I, 10 (iioob s). ^Op, cit., X, 7 (1177a n). ®Ch. 37. * Cf. Aristotle, Eth.f n, 6 (iio6b 24). 86 THE SUMMA CONTRA 'GENTILES encounter sickness, whereby he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue, e.g.^ madness and the like, which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness therefore always has sorrow naturally connected with it, and consequently it will not be perfect happiness. But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect, namely, in separate substances, and that in man it is imperfect, and by a kind of participation. For man can arrive at a full understanding of the truth only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and he fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved. Therefore neither is happiness, in its perfect nature, possible to man; but he has a certain participation of it, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle’s opinion about happiness. Hence, in- quiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfec- tion are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness absolutely, but in a human way.^ We must now show that this explanation does not remove the foregoing arguments. For although man is below the separate substances according to the order of nature, he is above irrational creatures, and so he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further. Thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place, and when an animal enjoys sen- sible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more, therefore, when man has obtained his last end, must his natural desire be at rest. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore in this life man does not obtain hap- piness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore he must obtain it after this life. Again. Natural desire cannot be empty, since nature does nothing in vain? But nature’s desire would be empty if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man’s natural desire can be fulfilled. But not in this life, as we have shown. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is after* this life. Besides. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection, it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are always in motion and tending towards perfection; because those who follow make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as is also stated in Metaph, ii,'"^ Therefore in the knowledge of truth man is not sit- uated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since, then, as Aristotle himself shows, ^ man’s ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently ^Op. cii., I, 10 (iioia i8). ^Aristotle, De Caelo, 11 , ii (291b 13), ® Aristotle, Metaph,, I a, i (993a 31). ^Eth,, X, 7 (1177a 18). SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AND GOD’S ESSENCE 87 in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot pos- sibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life. Moreover, Whatever is in potentiality tends to become actual, so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of all the forms of things, and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently, it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows all things, at least all these material things. But man cannot obtain this through the speculative sciences, by which we know truth in this life. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. For these and like reasons, Alexander and Averroes held that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that human knowledge obtained through the speculative sciences, but in that which results from a union with a separate substance, which union they deemed possible to man in this life.^ But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through the speculative sciences, he maintained that man attains to a happiness which is not perfect, but a human one. Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, shall be freed from these straits if we hold, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the Second Book.^ Therefore man’s ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which the human mind possesses after this life, a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reward in heaven {Matt. v. 12) and states {Matt. xxii. 30) that the saints shall be as the angels, who always see God in heaven {Matt. xviii. 10), CHAPTER XLIX THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM .BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES We must now inquire whether this same knowledge, whereby separate substances and souls after death know God by their own essences, is suf- ficient for their ultimate happiness. In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first show that to know God in this way is not to know His essence. Cf. ch. 42, 43. ^C. G., II, 81. 88 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES It is possible to know a cause from its effect in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and char- acter of the cause. This happens in the sciences which prove the cause from the effect. — Secondly, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect. Thus a man is seen in a mirror because of his likeness. This way differs from the first, because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, of which one is the cause of the other; for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. In the second way, however, there is one sight of both, because, while seeing the effect, we see the cause therein at the same time. — Thirdly, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: e.g.^ if a box had an intel- lect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect what the cause is, unless the effect be equal to the cause, and express the whole power of the cause. Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not however in the first way, because then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another ; and also in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God’s power, as we have shown in the Second Book."^ Therefore they can- not see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge. Besides. The intelligible likeness, whereby a thing is understood in its substance, must be of the same species, in fact it must be its species ; even as the form of the house, which is in the architect’s mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species. For we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature, indeed, not even of the same genus, as we showed in the First Book.^ Therefore a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature. Further. Every created thing is limited to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created. Moreover. Every intelligible species, through which the quiddity or es- sence of a thing is understood, comprehends that thing in representing it. And so the words signifying what a thing is are called terms and definitions. But no created likeness can possibly represent God thus, since every created likeness belongs to some determinate genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the First Book.^ Therefore it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created likeness. " C. G., II, 22. " C. G., I, 2S. " C. G., 1, 28, 43. "C. G., I, 23. SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AND GOD’S ESSENCE 89 Further. It was^ proved in the First Book that God’s substance is His being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the Second Book.- Therefore the essence of a separate sub- stance is not a sufficient means whereby God may be seen in His essence. And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows of God that He is, that He is the cause of all things, that He is above all and far removed from all, not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able somewhat to obtain, because from His effects we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause of other things, sur- passing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point' of our knowledge in this life in which, as Dionysius says, we are united to God as to something unknown? This happens when we know of Him what He is not, while what He is remains utterly unknown. Hence, in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses {E>xod. XX. 21) that he went to the dark cloud wherein God was. Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate sub- stances, that know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God, than the effects through which we know God. There- fore separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists. — ^Again. Since by negations we come by any way what- ever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as was stated above,^ the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propin- quity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of Him; just as he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now separate substances know more things than we do, and things that are nearer to God; and consequently by their intellect they remove from God more things and things nearer to God than we do. Therefore they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we; although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance. Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed, the better the knowledge one has of his eminence. Thus, although a peas- ant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has busi- ness, he does not realize the king’s exalted position, as one who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king ^ C. G., I, 22. "C. G., 11 , 52. Myst. TUol., I, i (PG 3, 997)- "Ch. 39. 90 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES to be placed ; although neither of them may comprehend the height of the kingly rank. Now we know none but the lowest things, and consequently, although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, since they know the highest orders of things, and also that God is higher than them all. Again. It is clear that the causality and power of a cause are all the bet- ter known, according as more and greater effects of it are known. There- fore it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, even though we know God to be the cause of all. CHAPTER L THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL ICNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD Now it is not possible that the natural desire of a separate substance rest in such a knowledge of God. For whatever is imperfect in a species seeks to acquire the perfection of that species. Thus, whoso has an opinion about a matter, and therefore an imperfect knowledge about it, for this very reason is spurred to the desire for certain knowledge about it. Now the aforesaid knowledge which separate substances have about God, which does not include a knowledge of His substance, is an imperfect kind of knowledge; for we do not deem ourselves to know a thing if we do not know its substance. Hence, the chief point in knowing a thing is to know what it is. Therefore this knowledge, which the separate substances have about God, does not set their appetite at rest, but spurs it on to the vision of the divine substance. Again. The knowledge of effects is an incitement to know the cause. Therefore it was that men began to philosophize because they sought the causes of things.^ Therefore the desire for knowledge naturally implanted in all intellectual substances does not rest unless, having acquired the knowledge 'of the substance of the effects, they know also the substance of their cause. Consequently, since separate substances know that God is the cause of all the things whose substances they see, their natural desire does not rest, unless they see God^s substance also. Besides. As knowing why a thing is so [propter quid] is related to know- ing whether it is so [quia], so knowing what a thing is [quid is re- lated to knowing whether it is [an For the question why a thing is so seeks the means of demonstrating that a thing is so, 04., that the rhoon is in eclipse. So, too, the question what a thing is seeks a means of dem- onstrating whether a thing is so. Such is the teaching of Post. Anal, ii.^ Now we observe that those who know that a thing is so naturally seek to " Ch Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982b 12). ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., 11 , x (89b 22). NATURAL DESIRE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 91 know the why of its being so. Therefore those who know that a thing exists naturally seek to know what it is; and this is to know its essence. There- fore the natural desire for knowledge is not set at rest by that knowledge of God whereby it is known that He exists. Further. Nothing finite can set the intellect’s desire at rest. This is proved from the fact that the intellect, given any finite thing, strives to go beyond it ; so that, given a finite line of any length, it strives to apprehend a longer. So, too, in the case of numbers. This is the reason why we can add indefinitely to numbers and mathematical lines. Now the excellence and power of any created substance is finite. Therefore the intellect of a sepa- rate substance is not satisfied with knowing separate substances, however excellent they be, but still tends by its natural desire to understand the substance which is of an infinite excellence, as we proved in the First Book concerning the divine substance.^ Moreover. Just as there is a natural desire for knowledge in all intellec- tual natures, so there is in them a natural desire to rid themselves of igno- rance or nescience. Now separate substances, as has been stated,^ know in the manner already mentioned that God’s substance is above them, and above everything that they understand; and therefore they know that the divine substance is unknown to them. Therefore their natural desire tends to understand the divine substance. Besides. The nearer a thing is to its end, the greater the desire with which it tends to that end. Hence we see that the natural movement of bodies is increased towards the end. Now the intellects of separate sub- stances are nearer to the knowledge of God than ours, and consequently they desire to know God more intensely than we do. And however much we know that God is, and other things mentioned above,^ we still go on desiring and seek to know Him in His essence. Much more therefore do separate substances desire this naturally; and consequently their natural desire is not satisfied with the above-mentioned knowledge of God. Hence we conclude that the ultimate happiness of a separate substance does not consist in the knowledge whereby it knows God by its own sub- stance, since its desire still leads it on to the substance of God. It also clearly follows from this that ultimate happiness is to be sought nowhere else but in an operation of the intellect, since no desire leads us so high as the desire of knowing the truth. For all our desires, whether of pleasure or of anything else that man wants, can be satisfied with other things ; whereas the aforesaid desire does not rest until it has reached God, the supreme cause and maker of all. Hence Wisdom fittingly says {Ecclus. xxiv. 7) : / dwell in the highest places j and my throne is in a pillar of a cloud. It is also written {Prov. ix. 3) that Wisdom by her maids inviteth to the tower. They should blush, then, who seek man’s happiness in the lowest things, when it is placed on such a height. ^C. G., I, 43. “Ch. 49- 92 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LI HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE Since, then, it is impossible for a natural desire to be empty (and it would be, were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance, for all minds desire this naturally) , we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen through the intellect, both by separate intel- lectual substances, and by our souls. It is sufficiently clear, from what has been said, what manner of vision this is. For we have proved that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect by means of any created species.^ Therefore, if God’s essence is to be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it through the divine essence itself; so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision. Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular sub- stance unless it be actualized by a species informing it, which is the likeness of the thing understood, someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God through the divine essence as an intelligible species. For the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the First Book that God cannot be the form of anything.- In order to understand this truth, we must note that a self-subsisting substance is either a form alone, or a composite of matter and form. Ac- cordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else, because the form therein is already confined to that mat- ter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which so sub- sists that it is yet a form alone, can be the form of something else, pro- vided its being be such that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the Second Book;^ If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything, because by its very being it is determined in itself, just as ma- terial things are determined by their matter. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God, for, since truth is consequent upon being,^ that alone is its own truth, which is its own being ; and this belongs to God alone, as we have proved in the Second Book.^‘ Con- sequently, other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject; for each of them is a true ^ Ch. 49. ^ C. G., I, 26ff. ® C. G.y 11 , 68. * Cf. Aristotle, Metaph,, I a, x (993b 30 ). ^C,G,yll,lS, NO CREATURE CAN SEE GOD NATURALLY 93 thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. It is therefore clear that the divine essence* can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands; which cannot be said of the essence of any separate substance. And yet it cannot be the form of another thing through its natural being. For it would follow that, once united to another being, it would constitute one nature; which is impossible, since the divine essence is in itself perfect in its own nature. But an intelligible species, in its union with the intellect, does not consti- tute a nature, but perfects the intellect for understanding; and this is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence. This immediate vision of God is promised to us in Holy Scripture ( i Cor, xiii. 12) : We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. It would be impious to understand this in a material way, and imag- ine a material face in the Godhead; for we have proved that God is not a body.^ Nor is it possible for us to see God with a bodily face, since the eyes of the body, which are situated in the face, can see only bodily things. Thus then shall we see God face to face, because we shall see Him imme- diately, even as a man whom we see face to face. It is through this vision that we become most like God, and participators of His blessedness, since God understands His substance through His es- sence, and this is His blessedness. Therefore it is said (i John hi. 2) : When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; because we shall see Him as He is. Again, our Lord said {Luke xxii. 29, 30) : I dispose to you, as My Father hath disposed to Me, a banquet, that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom. Now these words cannot be understood as refer- ring to bodily food and drink, but to that which is taken from the table of Wisdom, of which Wisdom says {Prov. ix. 5) : Eat my bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you. Accordingly, to eat and drink at God’s table is to enjoy the same blessedness as that which makes God happy, and to see God as He sees Himself. CHAPTER LII THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE However, it is not possible for any created substance to attain, by its own power, to this way of seeing God. For that which is proper to the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher nature to which it properly belongs. Thus water cannot become hot except through the action of heat. Now to see God through His essence is proper to the divine nature, ’ C. G., 1 , 27. 94 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES since to operate through his own form is proper to each operator. There- fore no intellectual substance can see God through the divine essence, unless God Himself bring this about. Again. A form proper to A does not become B’s except through A’s agency, because an agent produces its like by communicating its form to another. Now it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine essence itself become the form by which the intellect understands, as we have proved.^ Therefore no created substance can attain to that vision, except through the divine agency. Besides. If any two things have to be united together so that one be formal and the other material, their union must be completed by an action on the part of the one that is formal, and not by the action of the one that is material; for the form is the principle of action, whereas matter is the passive principle. Now in order that the created intellect see God’s sub- stance, the divine essence itself must be united to the intellect as an intel- ligible form, as we have proved. Therefore no created intellect can attain to this vision except through the divine agency. Further. What is so of itself is the cause of what is so through another r Now the divine intellect sees through itself the divine substance, for the divine intellect is the divine essence itself, by means of which God’s sub- stance is seen, as we proved in the First Book.*^ But the created intellect sees the divine substance through the divine essence as through something other than itself. Therefore this vision cannot be acquired by the created intel- lect, except through the action of God. Moreover. Whatever exceeds the limits of a given nature, cannot be ac- quired by that nature except through the agency of another; and thus water does not flow upwards unless it be moved by something else. Now it is beyond the limits of any created nature to see God’s substance, because it is proper to every created intellectual nature to 'understand according to the mode of its substance. But the divine substance cannot be thus under- stood, as we proved above.'^ Therefore no created intellect can possibly attain to a vision of the divine substance except by the agency of God, Who surpasses all creatures. Hence it is said (Rom, vi. 23): The grace of God is life everlasting. For we have proved that man’s happiness consists in seeing God, which is called life everlasting.® Now we are said to obtain this by God’s grace alone, because that vision surpasses the ability of every creature, and it is im- passible to attain thereto except by God’s gift; and when such things are obtained by a creature, it is put down to God’s grace. And so our Lord says (Jo, xiv. 21): I will manifest myself to him, ^Ch. sx. ‘"Cf. Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (257a 3X), " Ch. so. “C. G, I, 45. ^ Ch. 49. CREATURES NEED GOD’S AID TO SEE HIM 9S CHAPTER LIII THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ES- SENCE To SO sublime a, vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the divine goodness. For it is impossible that the proper form of anything become the form of another, unless this other bear some resemblance to the thing to which that form properly belongs. Thus light does not actualize a body which has nothing in common with the di- aphanous, Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate to it; for these three, understanding, means of understanding and object understood are one in God. Therefore that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except because the created intellect participates in some divine likeness. Therefore this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen. Again. Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be raised through some disposition to the capacity for this form; for every act is realized in its proper potency. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Therefore, in order that the divine essence become the in- telligible species of a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised to that capacity by some higher disposition. Besides. Tf two things, after not being united, become united, this must be either because both are changed, or only one. Now if we suppose that some created intellect begins to see the divine essence, it follows, from what we have said,^ that the divine essence comes to be united to that in- tellect as an intelligible species. But it is impossible that the divine essence be changed, as we have proved.^ Therefore this union must begin through a change in the created intellect, and this change can consist only in the fact that the created intellect acquires some new disposition. — The same con- clusion follows if we suppose some created intellect to be endowed from the outset of its creation with such a vision. For if, as we have proved,^ this vision exceeds the ability of nature, it is possible to conceive any created intellect as complete in the species of its nature without its seeing God’s substance. Consequently, whether it see God from the beginning, or begin to see Him afterwards, its nature needs something to be added to it. Further. Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be strengthened in two ways. ^Ch. 51. 13. "Ch.S2. 96 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES First, by a mere intensifying of its power. Thus, the active power of a hot thing is increased by the intensity of the heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action of the same species. Secondly, by the addition of a new form. Thus the power of a diaplaanoiis body is strengthened so that it can give light, through its being made actually lucid by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order to accomplish an operation of another species. Now the natural power of the created in- tellect is not sufficient for the vision of the divine substance, as we have shown.^ Therefore its power needs to be increased in order that it attain to that vision. But increase through intensification of the natural power is insufficient, because that vision is not of the same kind as the natural vision of the created intellect; which is clear from the distance separating the things seen. Therefore there must be an increase of the intellectual power through its receiving a new disposition. Now, owing to the fact that we derive our knowledge of intelligible be- ings from sensible things, we transfer the terms employed in sensible knowl- edge to our intellectual knowledge; especially those terms that pertain to the sight, which of all the senses is the highest and most spiritual, and therefore most akin to the intellect. It is for this reason that intellectual knowledge is called sight [visio]. And because bodily sight is not effected without light, those things which serve for the perfection of intellectual vision are called light; and so Aristotle compares the agent intellect to light, because the agent intellect makes things actually intelligible, even as light somehow makes things to be actually visible.- Accordingly, the dispo- sition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance is rightly called the light of glory; not indeed because it makes the object actually intelligible, as the light of the agent intellect does, but because it makes the intellect able to understand actually. This is the light of which it is said {Ps. xxxv. lo) : In Thy light wc shall see light j i.e., the light of the divine substance. Again it is said {Apoc. xxii. 5 [cf. xxi. 23]): The city, namely of the Blessed, hath no mod of the sun, nor of the moon ... for the glory of God hath enlightened it. Again it is said {Isa. lx. 19) : Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee; but the Lord shall be unto thee for an everlasting light, and thy God for thy glory.— Pox this reason, too, since in God to be is the same as to understand, and because He is to all the cause of their understanding, He is said to be the light {Jo. L 9): That was the true light which enlightencth every man that cometh into this world] and (i John i. 5) : God is light. Again {Ps. ciii. 2) : Thou . . . art clothed with light as with a garment. — For this reason, too, both God and the angels are described in Holy Scripture in figures of fire, be- cause of the splendor of fire {Exod. xxiv. 17; Acts ii. 3; Ps. ciii. 4), '^Ihid. ^De An., Ill, 5 (430a 15). GOD’S ESSENCE CAN BE SEEN 97 CHAPTER LIV ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE, AND THEIR SOLUTION Someone will object against the foregoing: [ I ] No^ additional light can help the sight to see things that surpass the natural ability of corporeal sight, since the sight can see only colored things. Now the divine substance surpasses every capacity of a created intellect, more even than the intellect surpasses the senses’ capacity. Therefore no additional light can raise the created intellect to see the divine substance. [2] Again. This light, that is received into the created intellect, is some- thing created. Therefore it also is infinitely distant from God, and conse- quently such a light cannot help the created intellect to see the divine substance. [3] Besides. If the aforesaid light can do this for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine substance, since every intellectual substance, for the very reason that it is intellectual, bears a likeness to God, the nature itself of an intellectual substance will suffice for it to see God. [4] Further. If this light is created, since there is no reason why that which is created should not be connatural to some creature, there might possibly be a creature that would see the divine substance through its con- natural light. But the contrary of this has been proved.^ [5] Moreover. The infinite, ds such, is unknown? Now we proved in the First Book that God is infinite.^ Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through the light in question. [6] Again. There should be a proportion between the one understand- ing and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between the cre- ated intellect, even perfected by this light, and the divine substance; for there still remains an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot be raised by any light to see the divine substance. By these and like arguments some have been induced to maintain that the divine substance is never seen by a created intellect. This opinion both destroys the rational creature’s true happiness, which can consist in nothing but the vision of the divine substance, as we have proved,^ and is contrary to the authority of Holy Scripture, as appears from what we have said.^ Therefore it should be rejected as false and heretical. Now it is not difficult to answer the above arguments. For the divine substance is not so outside the range of the created intellect, as to be abso- lutely beyond its reach, as sound is to the sight, or an immaterial substance to the senses. For the divine substance is the first intelligible, and the prin- ^ Ch. 52. ® Aristotle, Thys., I, 4 (187b 7). ® C. G., I, 43. ^ Ch. 50. ® Ch. 31. 98 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES ciple of all intellectual knowledge. Rather, it is outside the range of the created intellect as exceeding its power, just as the highest sensibles are outside the range of the senses. Therefore the Philosopher says that our intellect stands in relation to the most evident things as the owVs eye docs in relation to the sun} Therefore the created intellect needs to be strength- ened by some divine light in order to be able to see the divine substance. This solves the jirst argument. Moreover, this light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not because of its affinity to the divine substance, but because of the power which it receives from God to produce such an effect; even though in its being it is infinitely distant from God, as the second argument stated. For this light unites the created intellect to God, not in being, but only in understanding. Since, however, it belongs to God Himself to understand His substance perfectly, the light in question is a likeness of God in this that it perfects the intellect for seeing the divine substance. Now no intellectual substance can be like God in this way. For since no created substance’s simplicity is equal to the divine simplicity, it is impossible for the created substance to have its entire perfection in one subject: for this is proper to God, as we proved in the First Book,- Who is being, understanding and blessed in re- spect of the same reality. Consequently, in the intellectual substance, the created light through which it is raised to the beatific vision of God differs from any light whereby it is perfected in its specific nature and under- stands proportionately to its substance. Hence the reply to the third argu- ment is clear. The fourth argument is solved thus. The vision of the divine substance surpasses all natural power, as was shown. Consequently the light whereby the created intellect is perfected in order to see the divine substance must needs, be supernatural. Nor can the fact that God is infinite be an obstacle to the vision of the divine substance, as the fifth objection argued. For He is not said to be infinite by way of privation, as is quantity. The infinite of this kind is quite logically unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form, which is the principle of knowledge. But God is said to be infinite negatively, as a per sc subsistent form that is not limited by being received into matter. There- fore, that which is infinite in this way is in itself most, knowable. There is, furthermore, a proportion between the created intellect and understanding God, a proportion not of a common measure, but of a rela- tion of one thing to another, such as of matter to form, or cause to effect. In this way there is no reason against there being in the creature a propor- tion to God, consisting in the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, as well as of an effect to its cause. Therefore the solutiop of the sixth objection is clear. ^Metaph,, I a, i (g93b 9). ^ C. G., I, 28. CREATURES CANNOT COMPREHEND GOD 99 CHAPTER LV THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE The mode of any action whatever depends on the efficacity of its active principle, for that which has the stronger heat imparts greater heat. Hence it is that the mode of knowledge also must depend on the efhcacity of the principle of knowledge. Now the light mentioned above is a principle of knowing God,^ since thereby the created intellect is raised to the vision of the divine substance. Accordingly, the mode of the divine vision must be commensurate with the power of this same light. But this light is far short in strength of the clarity of the divine intelligence. Therefore it is impossible that the divine sub- stance be seen through the aforesaid light as perfectly as it is seen by the divine intellect. Now the divine intellect sees this substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible, because the truth of the divine substance and the clarity of the divine intellect are equal, nay more, are one. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly by the aforesaid light see the divine sub- stance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. Now whoever knows a thing so as to comprehend it, knows it as perfectly as it is knowable. For whoever knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, as a matter of opinion based on probable reasons, because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend it; but only he does who knows it as a scientific conclu- sion, through the means that cause that conclusion. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance. Again. A finite power cannot in its operation rise to the level of an in- finite object. Now the divine substance is something infinite in coinparison .with every created intellect, since every created intellect is limited to a certain species. Therefore the vision of a created intellect cannot possibly rise to the level of the divine substance in seeing it, namely, by seeing the divine substance as perfectly as it is visible. Therefore no created intellect comprehends it. Further. Every agent acts perfectly so far as it perfectly participates in the form that is the principle of action. Now the intelligible form by which the divine substance is seen is the divine essence itself ; and although it be- comes the intelligible form of the created intellect, the created intellect does not grasp it as much as it can be grasped. Therefore it does not see it as perfectly as it can be seen. Therefore it is not comprehended by the crea1?fed intellect. » Besides. Nothing comprehended goes beyond the limits of the one com- ^ Ch. 53- 100 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES prehending. Consequently if the created intellect were to comprehend the divine substance, this would not exceed the limits of the created intellect; which is impossible. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly com- prehend the divine substance. We do not however say that the divine substance is seen, yet not com- prehended by a created intellect, as though something of it were seen and something not seen; for the divine substance is utterly simple. But we say it because it is not seen as perfectly by the created intellect as it is visible, even as one who holds a demonstrated conclusion as an opihion is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is, scientifically, although there be no part of it that he does not know. CHAPTER LVI THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING COD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM Hence it is clear that, though the created intellect may see the divine sub- stance, it does not know all that can be seen in the divine substance. For then alone does it necessarily follow that, if one principle be known, all its effects are known through it, when that principle is comprehended by the intellect; because a principle is then known as to its whole power, when all its effects are known from it. Now other things are known through the divine essence as effects are known from their cause. Consequently, since the created intellect cannot know the divine substance so as to com- prehend it, it does not follow that, because it sees it, it sees also all that can be known through it. Again. The higher the intellect the more it knows, — either a greater num- ber of things, or at least more about the same things. Now the divine in-, tellect surpasses every created intellect, and consequently it knows more things than any created intellect. Yet it does not know things except through knowing its own essence, as we have proved in the First Book.^ Therefore more things are knowable through the divine essence than any created intellect can see through it. Besides. The measure of a power is according to what it can do. Conse- quently , to know all that a power can do is the same as to comprehend that power. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can com- prehend it any more than it can comprehend its essence, as we have proved above. Neither, therefore, can a created intellect know all that the divine power can do. Yet all the things that the divine power can do are knowable through the divine essence, because God knows them all, and not otherwise I, 49. ®Ch. 56. WE CANNOT SEE GOD'S ESSENCE WHOLLY loi than through His essence. Therefore a created intellect, by seeing the divine essence, does not see all that can be seen in the divine substance. Moreover. No cognitive power knows a thing except under the aspect of its own proper object ; and thus by sight we do not know a thing except as colored. Now the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, namely, the substance of a thing, as is stated in De Anima iii.^ Consequently what- ever the intellect knows of a thing, it knows it through the knowledge of its substance, so that whenever by demonstration we become acquainted with the proper accidents of a thing, we take as principle what that thing is, as is stated in Post. Anal, i.^ On the other hand, if the intellect knows the substance through the accidents (according to the statement in De Anima i, that accidents are a great help in knowing what a thing is^) this is acci- dental, in so far as the knowledge of the intellect arises from the senses, and so by knowing the accidents as perceived by the senses we need to arrive at knowing the substance. For this reason this does not occur in mathematics, but only in physics. Consequently, whatever cannot be known in a thing by knowing its substance must remain unknown to the intellect. Now by knowing the substance of one who wills, we cannot arrive at know- ing what he wills, because the will does not tend altogether naturally to that which it wills ; and for which reason will and nature are said to be two active principles. Therefore the intellect cannot know what a person wills, except perhaps from certain effects; and thus if we see a person working willingly, we know what he willed. Or again from a cause; and thus God knows what we will, as also other of His effects, in that He is the cause of our willing. Or again by someone indicating his will to another, as when by speaking he makes known his likes and dislikes. Since, then, many things depend on God’s simple will, as we have partly shown above,^ and will show yet more clearly further on,^ although the created intellect may see the divine essence, it does not know all the things that God sees through His substance. Someone may object to what has been said, that God’s substance is some- thing greater than all the things He can do, or understand, or will, except Himself; and therefore if the created intellect can see God’s substance, much more can it know all that God either understands, or wills, or can do, except Himself. But if we consider carefully, to know a thing in itself is not the same as to know it in its cause, since there are things which are easy to know in themselves, but not easy to know in their causes. It is true, then, that to know God in Himself is more than to know anything else besides Him, if this can be known in itself. But it belongs to a more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance and to see its effects therein, than to know the ^Aristotle, De An., Ill, 4 (429b 10). — Cf. St. Thomas, In De An., Ill, lect^ 8. ^Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 4 (73a 37). ® Aristotle, De An., I, i (402b 21). ^C. G., 1,81. ®Ch. 64ff. 102 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES divine substance without seeing its effects in it. Now it is possible to see the divine substance without comprehending it. But it is not possible to know all that can be known in that substance without comprehending it, as we have proved. CHAPTER LVII THAT EVERY INTELLECT OF ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION Since, as we have proved,^ the created intellect is raised by a kind of supernatural light to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intellect of so low a degree in its nature that cannot be raised to this vision. For we have proved that this light cannot be connatural to any creature,^ but surpasses every created nature in its power. Now that which is done by a supernatural power is not hindered by any diversity of nature, since the divine power is infinite; and so in the miraculous healing of a sick man, it matters not whether he ail much or little. Consequently, the diversity of degrees in the intellectual nature does not prevent the lowest in that nature from being raised by the aforesaid light to that vision. Again. The highest intellect in the order of nature is infinitely distant from God in perfection and goodness, whereas its distance from the lowest intellect is finite; for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite thing and another. Consequently the distance between the lowest created intellect and the highest is as nothing in comparison with the distance be- tween the highest created intellect and God. Now that which is as nothing cannot cause an appreciable variation. Thus, the distance between the center of the earth and the human eye is as nothing in comparison with the dis- tance between the human eye and the eighth sphere, compared with which the earth occupies the space of a mere point; for which reason no appre- ciable variation arises from the fact that astronomers use the human eye as the center of the earth in their demonstrations. It makes no difference, therefore, what intellect be raised by the aforesaid light to the vision of God, whether it be of the highest, or of the lowest, or of a middle degree. Beside^. It was proved above that every intellect desires naturally to see the divine substance.^ Now natural desire cannot be empty. Therefore every created intellect can arrive at the vision of the divine substance, without any obstacle arising from the lowliness of its nature. Hence it is that {Matt, xxii., 30) our Lord promises men the glory of the angels: They shall be^ He says, speaking of men, like the angels of God in heaven. Again, {Apoc. xx [cf. xxi. 17]) it is stated that the measure of a man is that of an angel. For this reason nearly everywhere in Holy Scripture ^Ch. S3. ""Md. ^Ch.so. GOD CAN BE SEEN MORE AND LESS PERFECTLY 103 angels are described in the form of men, either wholly, as the angels who appeared to Abraham in the likeness of men {Gen. xviii. 2), or in part, as may be seen in the animals {Ezech. i. 8) of which it is said that they had the hands of a man under their wings. Hereby is removed the error of those who said that, however much the human soul be raised, it cannot attain to an equality with the higher intellects. CHAPTER LVIII THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER Because the mode of operation follows from the form that is the principle of operation, and the aforesaid light is a principle of the vision whereby the created intellect sees the divine substance, as we have proved,^ it follows that the mode of the divine vision is in keeping with the mode of this light. Now it is possible that there be various degrees of participation in this light, so that one be more perfectly illumined than another. Therefore it is pos- sible that, of those who see God, one may see Him more perfectly than an- other, even though both see His substance. Again. In whatever genus there is one thing higher than the others, we shall find degrees according as these others approach more or less to that thing; and thus things are more or less hot according as they approach to fire which is supremely hot. Now God sees His own substance most per- fectly, inasmuch as He alone comprehends it, as we have proved above.^ Therefore, of those who see Him, one sees His substance more perfectly than another, according to their greater or lesser approach to Him. Besides. The light of glory raises one to the divine vision for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine intellect, as we have stated.® Now a thing may be more or less like to God. Therefore it is possible for one to see the divine substance more or less perfectly. Further. Since there is proportion between the end and things directed to the end, it follows that things directed differently to an end participate in that end differently. Now the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have shown.^ But intellectual sub- stances are not all equally prepared for that end, for some are more virtu- ous, some less; and virtue is the way to happiness. Consequently, there must be diversity in the divine vision, in that some see the divine substance more perfectly, some less perfectly. Hence, in order to indicate this differ- ence in happiness, our Lord says {Jo. xiv. 2) : In my Father's house there are many mansions. ^Ch.53. "Ch.55. Ch. 53. "Ch.50. 104 the SUMMA contra GENTILES Hereby loo is excluded the error of those who say that all rewards are equal. Again, just as the mode of vision indicates a diversity of degrees among the blessed, so the object of the vision shows that their glory is the same; for each one’s happiness consists in his seeing God’s substance, as we have proved. The same thing then makes them all happy, but they do not all de- rive an equal happiness therefrom. Hence it does not stand in the way of what has been said that our Lord declares {Matt,xx, lo) the laborers in the vineyard to have received the same wage, namely, a penny, although they did not work equally; because the same thing is appointed as a reward to be seen and enjoyed, namely, God. Wherein it must also be observed that corporeal and spiritual movements are somewhat contrary to each other. For all corporeal movements have the identically same first subject, but their ends are diverse; whereas spiritual movements, namely intellectual apprehensions and acts of the will, have various first subjects, but one identical end. CHAPTER LIX HO'W THOSE W'HO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS Now since the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intel- lectual substance, as we have proved,^ and since the appetite of everything that has obtained its last end is at rest, it follows that the natural appetite of the intellectual substance that sees the divine substance must be entirely at rest. Now the natural desire of the intellect is to know all the genera, species and powers of things, and the whole order of the universe; as is evident from the fact of man’s pursuit of all these things. Therefore every- one that sees the divine substance knows all the things mentioned above. Again. Intellect and sense differ, as is clear from De Anima iii,^ in that sense is destroyed or weakened by powerful sensibles, so that afterwards it cannot perceive weaker objects, whereas the intellect, through not being destroyed or weakened by its object, but only perfected thereby, afWr it has understood a higher intelligible, is not less but more able to understand other intelligibles. Now the highest in the genus of intelligibles is the divine substance. Consequently, the intellect which by the divine light is raised to see the substance of God is a jortiori perfected by the same light so as to see all other intelligibles in the universe. Besides. Intelligible being is not of less, but may be of greater, extent than physical being ; for the intellect is naturally adapted to understand all the things in the universe, as well as things that have no physical being, such as negations and privations. Consequently, anything required for the ^ Ch. 50. ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 4 (429a 14). HOW THOSE SEEING GOD SEE ALL THINGS 105 perfection of physical being, that and even more is required for the perfec- tion of intelligible being. Now the perfection of intelligible being is realized when the intellect has reached its last end, even as the perfection of physi- cal being consists in the very making of a thing. Therefore God makes known to the intellect, which,sees Him, all the things that He has made for the perfection of the universe. Moreover. Although of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another, as we have shown, ^ yet each one sees Him so perfectly that all his natural capacity is filled ; indeed, the vision itself surpasses all natu- ral capacity, as was proved above.^ Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance must needs know in the divine substance all the things to which his natural capacity extends. Now the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowledge of all genera and species, and the order of things. Therefore everyone that sees God will know these things in the divine substance. Hence the Lord’s answer to Moses’ request to see the divine substance {Exod, xxxiii. 19 )- I ’will show thee all good] and Gregory says: What know they not who know Him that knows all?^ If we consider carefully the foregoing, it is clear that those who see the divine substance in one sense see all things, and in another sense do not. For if by all we understand those things that belong- to the perfection of the universe, it is evident from what has been said that those who see God see all things, as the arguments just adduced prove. For as the intellect is, in a sense, all things,^ whatever belongs to the perfection of nature belongs also to the perfection of intelligible being; and for this reason, according to Augustine, all things made by the Word of God that they might subsist in their respective natures, were made likewise in the angelic intelligence so as to be understood by the angels.^ Now, to the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, their properties and powers, because the intention of nature is directed to the specific natures, since individuals are for the sake of the species. Consequently, it belongs to the perfection of an intel- lectual substance to know the nature, powers and proper accidents of every species ; and therefore it will obtain this in the final beatitude through the vision of the divine essence. — Moreover, through its knowledge of natural species, the individuals contained in these species are also known by the intellect that sees God, as may be gathered from what has been already said of the divine and angelic knowledge.^ On the other hand, if by all we understand all that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intellect sees all things in the divine substance, as we have shown.'^ This may be considered in respect of several things. "Ch. 58. "Ch. 52. “St. Gregory, DiaL, 11 , 33 (PL 66, 194). ^ De An,, III, 5 (430a 14). De Genesi ad Litt., II, 8 (PL 34, 269). ® C. G., I, 69; 11 , 96ff. " Ch. 56. io6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES First; as to those things which God can make, but neither has made nor ever will make. For all such things cannot be known without comprehending His power, which is impossible for any created intellect, as we have proved.^ Hence it is said {Job. xi. 7, seqq .) : Per adventure thou wilt under- stand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven^ and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. For these things are said, not as though God were great in dimensive quantity, but because His power is not limited to all that are seen to be great, so that He be unable to make greater still. Secondly, as to the reasons of things made, which reasons cannot all be known by an intellect without its comprehending the divine goodness. Be- cause the reason for every thing made is taken from the end which the maker has in view. Now the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness, and therefore the reason for things made is that the divine good- ness may be diffused in things. Hence, a man would know all the reasons of created things, if he knew every good that can accrue to things according to the order of divine wisdom ; and this would be to comprehend the divine goodness and wisdom, which is impossible to any created in- tellect. Therefore it is said (Eccles. viii. 17): / understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God. Thirdly, as to the things whiclx depend on God’s will alone, such as predestination, election and justification, and whatever belongs to the creature’s sanctification. Hence it is said ( i Cor. ii. ii) : No man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. CHAPTER LX THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE Since we have shown that the created intellect, which sees the divine sub- stance, sees therein all the species of things;- and since whatever is seen in one species must needs be seen at once and by one vision, because vision must correspond to the principle of vision, it follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance sees all things, not successively, but at once. Again. The supreme and perfect happiness of the intellectual nature con- sists in seeing God, as was proved above.'"^ Now happiness results, not from a habit, but from an act, since it is the ultimate perfection and last end. Consequently, whatever we see in the beatific vision of the divine substance is all seen by us actually, and therefore not one thing after another. ^ Ch. 55 ^ Ch. 59. « Ch. 50. THE VISION OF GOD AND ETERNAL LIFE 107 Besides. Whenever a thing arrives at its last end, it is at rest, since all movement is toward the attainment of an end. Now the last end of the in- tellect is the vision of the divine substance, as was shown above.^ There- fore the intellect that sees the divine substance does not pass from one in- telligible thing to another. Therefore whatsoever it knows in this vision, it considers it all actually. Moreover. In the divine substance the intellect knows all the species of things, as we have proved.^ Now of some genera there are an infinite num- ber of species, for instance of numbers, figures and proportions. Therefore the intellect sees an infinite number of things in the divine substance. But it would not see them all unless it saw them at one time, because it is not possible to pass through the infinite. Consequently all the intellect sees in the divine substance, it sees at once. Hence Augustine says: Our thoughts will not then be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another, hut we shall see all we know by one glance? CHAPTER LXI THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE It follows that by the aforesaid vision the created intellect is made a par- talcer of eternal life. For eternity differs from time in that the latter has its being in a kind of succession, whereas the former is all simultaneously.^ Now it has already been proved that there is no succession in the vision in question,® and that whatsoever is seen in it, is seen at once and at a glance. Therefore this vision takes place in a kind of participation of eternity. Moreover this vision is a kind of life, because the act of the intellect is a kind of life.® Therefore by that vision the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life. Again, Actions take their species from their objects. Now the object of the aforesaid vision is the divine substance in its very being, and not in some created likeness, as we have shown.'’^ But the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the aforesaid vision con- sists in a participation of eternity. Besides. If an action takes place in time, this is either because the prin- ciple of the^action is in time (for instance, the actions of natural things are temporal), or because of the term of the action (for instance, the ac- tions which spiritual substances, which are above time, exercise on things subject to time). Now the vision in question is not subject to time on the "Ch. S9.. ^De Tnn., XV, 16 (PL 42, 1079)- ' Cf. Boethius, De Consol., V, prose 6 (PL 63, 838). ^ Ch. 60. ^ Eth., IX, 9 (ii 7 oa 18). ’ Ch. 30. io8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES part of the thing seen, since this is an eternal substance; nor on the part of the medium of vision, which is also the eternal substance; nor on the part of the seer, namely the intellect, whose being is independent of time because it is incorruptible, as we have proved.^ Therefore this vision is according to a participation of eternity, as altogether transcending time. Further. The intellectual soul is created 07 i the border line between eternity and time, as is stated in the Book of Causes and was explained above,""* because it is the last in order among intellects, and yet its substance stands above corporeal matter, and is independent thereof. On the other hand, its action, in respect of which it comes into conjunction with lower and temporal things, is itself temporal. Consequently, its action, by reason of which it comes into conjunction with higher things that are above time, partakes of eternity. Especially does this apply to the vision in which it sees the divine substance. Therefore by this vision it enters into a participation of eternity; and for the same reason, so too does any other created intellect that sees God. For this reason our Lord says {Jo. xvii. 3) : This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God. CHAPTER LXII THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOEEVER It follows from what has been said that those who obtain ultimate happi- ness from the divine vision never fall away from it. Because whatever at one time is, and at another time is not, is measured by time, as is stated in Physics iv.^ Now the vision in question, which makes intellectual creatures happy, is not in time but in eternity.^ Therefore no one, having once become a partaker thereof, can lose it. Again. The intellectual creature does not arrive at its last end except until its natural desire is at rest. Now just as it naturally desires happiness, so does it desire perpetuity of happiness; for, since it is perpetual in its substance, that which it desires for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, it desires to have always. Consequently happiness would not be its last end unless it endured forever. Besides. Whatever is possessed with love causes sorrow if it be known that at length it will be lost. Now since the vision in question, which makes the possessor happy, is supremely enjoyable and desirable, it is supremely loved by those who possess it. Therefore they could not but be sorrowful if they knew that they would lose it some time. But if it were not perpetual, they would know this, for it has been shown that in seeing the divine sub- " C. G., II, 55, 79. " De Causis, II (p. 162) . * C. G., II, 68. * Aristotle, Phys., IV, 12 (22Jb 28). ®Ch. 6j. THE VISION OF GOD IS ETERNAL 109 stance, they know also other things that exist naturally;^ and hence much more do they know the conditions of that vision, whether it be perpetual or about to cease eventually. Therefore they would not possess that vision without sorrow. Consequently it would not be true happiness, which should insure man from all evil, as we have proved.^ Moreover. That which is naturally moved towards a thing as the end of its movement, is not moved away from it except by violence; as a heavy body, when it is projected upwards. Now it is clear from what has been said that every intellectual substance tends to that vision with a natural desire.^ Therefore it cannot fall away from it except by violence. But noth- ing is taken away by violence unless the power of him who takes it exceeds that of him who caused it. Now the cause of the divine vision is God, as we have proved.'^ Consequently, as no power exceeds God’s, it is impossible for that vision to be taken away by violence. Therefore it will last forever. Further. If a man ceases to see what he saw hitherto, this will be either because he loses the ability to see — as when a man dies, or becomes blind, or is hindered in some other way ; or because he wishes no longer to see, — as when we turn our eyes away from a thing we saw before; or because the object is withdrawn. And this is invariably true, whether we speak of sen- sitive or of intellective vision. Now the intellectual substance that sees God cannot lose the ability to see God, either through ceasing to exist, since it is immortal, as we proved above;-''' or through failure of the light by which it sees God, since that light is received incorruptibly, on the part both of the recipient and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy that vision, for it knows its ultimate happiness to consist in that vision, even as it can- not but desire to be happy. Nor will it cease to see through the withdrawal of the object, because that object, which is God, is unchangeable, nor does He withdraw Himself more than we withdraw from Him. Therefore it is impossible for this beatific vision ever to cease. Again. It is impossible for a man to wish to give up a good which he is enjoying, except because of some evil that he thinks to be attached to the enjoyment of that good, which enjoyment, at least, is an obstacle to a greater good; for just as the appetite desires nothing except under the as- pect of a good, so does it shun nothing except as an evil. But in the enjoy- ment of that vision there cannot be any evil, since it is the greatest good to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor is it possible that one who enjoys that vision deem any evil to be in it, or anything to be better than it, because the vision of that Supreme Truth excludes all false opinion. Therefore it is impossible that the intellectual substance which sees God ever desire to lose that vision. Moreover. The reason why we become weary of what we enjoyed hitherto is that it causes some kind of change, by destroying or diminishing one’s power. Hence fatigue is incidental to the exercise of the sensitive powers, " Ch. 59. " Ch. 48 . " Ch. so. " Ch. 53- " C. G., II, SS- no THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES through the action of the sensible objects on the bodily organ (in fact, the power may be altogether destroyed by too powerful an object) and after a time they are loth to enjoy that which hitherto had been a pleasant sensa- tion. For the same reason we become weary in mind after long or concen- trated thought, because powers that employ organs of the body are sub- ject to fatigue, and in this life it is not possible to give the intellect to thought without employing those organs. Now the divine substance does not corrupt but, more than anything, perfects the intellect. Nor does any action performed by a corporeal organ concur in the vision of God. There- fore it is impossible for anyone to be weary of seeing Him, when they have once enjoyed the sight of Him. Further. Nothing can be wearisome that is wonderful to him that looks on it, because as long as we wonder at it, it still moves our desire. Now the created intellect always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect can comprehend it. Therefore the intellectual substance cannot possibly become weary of that vision; and consequently it cannot, of its own choice, desist from it. Besides. If two things were united before, and afterwards become sepa- rated, this must be the result of a change in one of them ; because just as a relationship does not begin except through a change in one of the relatives, so does it not cease except through a fresh change in one of them. Now th^e created intellect sees God through being, in some way, united to Him, as was proved above.^ Consequently, if that vision cease, through the cessation of that union, this must result from a change either in the divine substance or in the intellect of the one who sees it. But neither of these is possible, since the divine substance is unchangeable, as we proved in the First Book ; 2 and the intellectual substance is raised above all changes, when it sees the divine substance. Therefore it is impossible to lapse from the hap- piness of seeing God. Furthermore. The nearer a thing is to God, Who is utterly unchangeable, the less changeable and the more enduring is it; so that certain bodies, through being far distant from God, cannot last for ever, as is stated in De Gener. ii.^"^ But no creature can come nearer to God than one who sees His substance. Therefore the intellectual creature that sees the divine substance becomes, in a very high degree, unchangeable. Therefore it can never fall away from that vision. Hence it is said (Ps, Ixxxiii. 5): Blessed arc they that dwell in Thy house, 0 Lord: they shall praise Thee for ever and ever; and elsewhere (Ps. cxxiv. 1): He shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. Again {Isa. xxxiii. 21) : Thy eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed: neither shall the nails thereof be taken away for ever, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken, because only there our Lord is magnificent; and {Apoc. hi. 12): Ch. SI. "C. G., I, 13. ® Aristotle, De Gener., II, 10 (336b 30). ULTIMATE HAPPINESS FULFILLS ALL DESIRE iii He that shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go out no more. Hereby is excluded the error of the Platonists who said that souls after being separated from the body, and obtaining ultimate happiness, begin to desire reunion with the body, and that when the happiness of that life is ended, they are plunged once more into this life of unhappiness; and again that of Origen, who maintained that souls and angels can return from blessedness to unhappiness.^ CHAPTER LXIII HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN’S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED It is evident, from what has been said, that in this happy state, which re- sults from the divine vision, man’s every desire is fulfilled (according to Ps. cii. S, Who satis fieth thy desire with good things) and his every end achieved. This is clear to anyone who considers man’s various desires in the particular. There is a desire in man, as an intellectual being, to knowjhe^jruth, and men pursue this desire by the pursuit of the contemplative life. And this will be most clearly fulfilled in that vision, when the intellect, by gazing on the First Truth, will know all that it naturally desires to know, as we have proved above.^ , . There is also a desire in man as a rational be|ng j:apable of„regulat ing things beneath him, and he pursues this desire in the occupations of the active’and 'dvicTife. The chief object of this desire is that man’s entire life be regulated in accord with reason, namely, that he may live according to virtue; because the end of every virtuous man in all his actions is the good of his own virtue, — that of the brave man, for instance, that he may act bravely. Now this desire will then be wholly fulfilled, because the reason will be in the full flood of its power, being enlightened with the very light of God lest it stray from righteousness. Consequent to his life as a citizen, there are also certain goods that man needs for his civic actions. Such is a position of honor, through inordinate desire of which men become proud aM'ambiHoi^^ by this vision men are raised to the highest position of honor, because, in -a way, they are united to God, as we have proved above.*'^ Hence, even as God Himself is the King of ages, so the Blessed united to Him are said to be kings (Apoc. XX. 6): They shall reign with Christ. ^ . There is another desirable thing consequent to the civic life, and this is ^Origen, Peri Archon, II, 3 (PG ii, 242-243). “Ch. 59. ®Ch. 51. II2 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES to b e well known, through inordinate desire of which men are said to be desirous of vain glory. Now by this vision the Blessed become well known, not in the opinion of men, who can both deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge both of God and of all the Blessed. Hence this happiness is many times described as glory in Holy Scripture, Thus it is said in the Psalm (cxlix. 5): The saints shall rejoice in glory. There is yet another desirable thing in the civic life, and this is riches, through inordinate desire of which men become ilHbeRil and unjust. Now in that happy state there is a sufficiency of all goods, inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy Him Who contains the perfection of all goods. Hence it is said (Wis. vii. ii) : All good things came to me together with her; and again {Ps. cxi. 3) : Glory and wealth shall be in his house. There is a third desire in man, common to him and' other animals, namely the desire for the of pleasu re, and this men pursue especially by leading a voluptuous life, and through lack of moderation become intem- perate and incontinent. Now in that blessedness there is the most perfect pleasure, all the more perfect than the pleasure of sense, which brute ani- mals can enjoy, as the intellect is above the senses; and also as the good, in which we shall delight surpasses all sensible good, is more penetrating, and more continuously delightful; and as that pleasure is freer from all alloy of sorrow, or trouble of anxiety, of which it is said {Ps. xxxv. 9): They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, and Thou shall make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. There is also the natural desire, common to all things, whereby all seek to be preserved in their being, as far as possible; and through lack of mod- eration in this desire, men become timorous, and spare themselves over- much from strenuous work. This desire will be altogether fulfilled when the Blessed obtain perfect immortality, and security from all evil, according to Isa, xlix. 10 and Apoc, xxi. 4 [cf. vii. 16] : They shall no more hunger or thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat. It is therefore evident that intellectual substances by seeing God attain to true beatitude, when their every desire is satisfied, and when there is a sufficiency of all good things, as is required for happiness, according to Aristotle.! Hence Boethius says that happiness is a state of life made per- fect by the accumulation of all goods? In^ this life there is nothing so like this ultimate and perfect happiness as the life of those who contemplate the truth, as far as that is possible in this life. Hence the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of that final beatitude placed man’s ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life.^ For this reason, too. Holy Scripture com- mends the contemplative rather than other forms of life, when our Lord said {Luke x. 42) : Mary hath chosen the better part, namely the contem- '"PiK X, 7 (1177a 24). Consol., Ill, prose 2 (PL 63, 724). ® Cf. Aristotle, X, 7 (1177a 18). THE EXISTENCE OF PROVIDENCE 113 plation of truth, which shall not be taken from her. For the contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come; while the active and civic life does not transcend the limits of this life. CHAPTER LXIV THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE From what has been laid down in the preceding chapters, it has been suf- ficiently proved that God is the end of all things; and from this we may further conclude that by His providence He governs or rules all things. For whenever certain things are ordered to a certain end, they are all subject to the disposal of the one to whom chiefly that end belongs. This may be seen in an army, since all the parts of the army, and their actions, are directed to the good of the general, namely, victory, as their ultimate end; for which reason the government of the whole army belongs to the general. In the same way, that art which is concerned with the end dictates and gives laws to the art which is concerned with things directed to the end: thus, statecraft rules the military art, and this directs the art of horse- manship; and the art of sailing directs the art of ship-building. Since, then, all things are directed to the divine goodness as their last end, as we have shown above, ^ it follows that God to Whom that goodness belongs chiefly as being substantially possessed, understood and loved, must be the gov- ernor of all things. Again. Whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for that end. Now it has been shown above that whatsoever has being in any way is an effect of God,^ and that God makes all things for an end which is Himself.^ Therefore He uses everything by directing it to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore God, by His providence, is the governor of all. Besides. It has been shown that God is the first unmoved moverA Now the first mover moves no less than do second movers; more so, indeed, be- cause without Him they do not move other things. But all things that are moved, are moved for an end, as was shown above.'^ Therefore God moves each thing to its end. Moreover He moves them by His intellect, for it has been proved above that He acts, not by natural necessity, but by intellect and will.^ Now to rule and 'govern by providence is nothing else but to move certain things to their end by one^s intellect. Therefore God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved to their end, whether they be moved corporeally, or spiritually, as the seeker is said to be moved by the object desired. ^Ch. 17. "C. G., IF IS. I, 81; 11 , 23 fl “C. G.. I. 1^. *C. G., I, 13. ^Ch. 2. "C. G, II4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Moreover. It was proved that natural bodies are moved and work towards an end, although they have no knowledge of an end, from the fact that always or nearly always that which is best happens to them, nor would they be made otherwise if they were made by artd Now it is impossible that things without knowledge of an end should act for an end, and attain to that end in an orderly manner, unless they be moved to that end l)y one who has knowledge of the end; just as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer. Therefore the whole operation of nature must be directed by some knowledge. This must be traced back to God mediately or imme- diately; because every subordinate art and knowledge must take its prin- ciples from a higher one, as may be seen in the speculative and practical sciences. Therefore God governs the world by His providence. Further. Things distinct in their nature do not converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yet they all converge into one order, with some things acting on others, and some helping or directing others. TherefQ.re there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe. Moreover. Natural necessity cannot be alleged as the reason for the various phenomena to be observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies; for the movements of some are more numerous than, and wholly different from, the movements of others. Therefore the ordering of their movements must come from some providence, and consequently so must the ordering of all those movements and operations, here below, that are ordered by the movements of the heavens. Besides. The nearer a thing is to its cause the greater share it has in the effect. Therefore if we observe that a thing is the more perfectly shared by certain individuals, according as these are nearer to a certain thing, this is a sign that this thing is the cause of that which is shared in various de- grees; and thus, if certain things are hotter according as they are nearer fire, this shows that fire is the cause of their heat. Now we see that things are all the more perfectly ordered according as they are nearer to God. For in the lower bodies, which are farthest removed from God by imlike- ness of nature, we sometimes find defects from the ordinary course of na- ture, as in monstrosities and in other chance happenings; whereas this never happens in the heavenly bodies, although they are changeable in a certain degree, nor in the separate intellectual substances. Therefore God is the cause of the entire order of things, and consequently He is the gov- ernor of the whole universe by His providence. Further. As we proved above, God brought all things into being, not by natural necessity, but by His intellect and will. Now His intellect and will can have no other ultimate end but His goodness, that is, to bestow His Ch.3. THE EXISTENCE OF PROVIDENCE 115 goodness on things, as was shown above.^ Now things partake of the divine goodness by way of likeness, in being themselves good. But the greatest good in the things made by God is the good consisting in the order of the universe, which is most perfect, as the Philosopher says,^ with whom divine Scripture also agrees {Gen. i. 31): God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good; whereas of each single work it was said simply that they were good. Consequently, that which is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the order of the things of which He is the cause. But to govern things is nothing else but to impose order on them. Therefore God by His intellect and will governs all things. Moreover. Whoever has an end in view cares more for what is nearest to the last end, because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of God’s will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe; because every particular good of this or that thing is ordered to it as to its end, just as the less perfect is ordered to that which is more perfect, even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequently that which God cares for most in created things is the order of the universe; and therefore He governs it. Again. Every created thing attains its ultimate perfection by its proper operation, because a thing’s ultimate end and perfection must be either an operation or the term or effect of an operation (the form, whereby a thing is, is its first perfection, as it is stated in De Anima ii ^). Now the order among effects, according to distinction and grades among natures, issues from divine wisdom, as we showed in the Second Book.^ Therefore, so, too, does the order also among the operations, whereby things approach nearer to their ultimate end. But to direct the actions of things to their end is to govern them. Therefore God, by the providence of His wisdom, governs and rules things. Hence Holy Scripture acclaims God as Lord and King, according to Psalm xcix. 2 : The Lord, He is God, and Psalm xlvi. 8 : God is the King of all the earth; because the king and lord is he whose office it is to rule and govern subjects. Therefore Holy Scripture ascribes the course of events to the divine command {Joh ix. 7) : Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and shutteth up the stars, as it were under a seal] and {Ps. cxlviii. 6 ) : He hath made a decree and it shall not pass away. Hereby is refuted the error of the ancient naturalists, who held that everything happens from the necessity of matter; whence it followed that all things happen by chance, and not by the ordinance of Providence. ^C. G., I, 75ff. ^Metaph., XI, 10 (1075a 12). ^Aristotle, De An., II, i (412a 28). ^C.G.,II,4S- THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES li6 CHAPTER LXV THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN BEING From the fact that God governs things by His providence, it follows that He preserves them in being. For whatever is required in order that certain things obtain their end belongs to the government of those things, because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God, namely, the divine good- ness, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist. For inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine good- ness, which is the end of all .things, as we have proved.^ Therefore it be- longs to divine providence that things be preserved in being. Again. The cause of a thing must needs be the same as the cause of its preservation, because preservation is nothing else than its continued being. Now we have shown above that God is the cause of being for all things by His intellect and will.^ Therefore by His intellect and will He preserves things in being. Besides. No particular univocal agent can be absolutely the cause of its species. Thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But, properly speaking, the individual is the cause of the individual. Now this individual man exists inasmuch as human nature is in this particular matter which is the principle of individuation. There- fore the individual man is not the cause of a man except in so far as he is the cause of the human form being in this particular matter. Now this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is conse- quently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there must needs be some per se active cause of the human species; as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally. The same applies to all other species of natural things. This cause is God, either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown that He is the first cause of all things.'^ Consequently He must stand in relation to the species of things in the same way as in nature the individual generator to generation, of which He is the per se cause. But generation ceases when the generator’s action ceases. Therefore all the species of things would cease, were the divine operation to cease. Therefore by His operation He preserves things in being. ^ Ch. 19. ^ c. G., II, 23ff. ^ C. a, 1, 13 ; 11, 15. THE CONSERVATION OF THINGS BY GOD 117 Moreover. Although moveraent may aiEfect an existing thing, it is some- thing additional to the thing’s being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except in so far as it is moved, because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves.^ Therefore no body is the cause of a thing’s being, as such; but it is the cause of a thing’s being moved towards being, that is, of its becoming. Now the being of a thing is par- ticipated being, since no thing is its own being, save God, as we have proved above." Consequently, God, Who is His own being, must be first and essentially the cause of all being. Accordingly, the divine operation stands in the same relation to the being of things as the movement of a corporeal mover to the being made and the being moved of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore a thing cannot pos- sibly continue to exist except through the divine operation. Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God. For art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature; a house, for instance, by the solidity of the stones. Therefore all natural things continue to exist only by the power of God. Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it become part of the nature of the effect. For the forms of generated things, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, since they become natural to them. In like manner, the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they become part of nature, whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not for always, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand, that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus in no way remains after the action of the agent; and thus light does not re- main in the diaphanous body after the cause of light has been removed. Now being is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the First Book.^ Therefore nothing could continue to remain in being, if the divine operation were to cease. Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God fi’om eternity.^ According to either explanation it is necessary to say that things are preserved in being by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their being as jwell as their non-being must result from the divine will; because He permitted things not to be when ^Phys., VII, 2 (243a 3). " C. G., I, 22 ; 11, 15. « C. G., I, 22. ^ Cf. C. G,, II, 3iff ; De Pot., I, 5 ; III, i ; III, 4-5 ; 5 . T., I, q. 44, a. 2. ii8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES He so willed, and caused them to be when He so willed. Therefore they exist so long as He wills them to exist. Therefore His will is the preserver of things. — If, on the other hand, things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their being is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore He preserves things in being by His operation. Hence it is said {Heh. i. 3): Upholding all things by the word of His power. Augustine, too, says: The power of the Creator, and the strength of the Almighty and All-upholder, is the cause of every creature* s subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from His creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone; whereas the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew His support.'^ Hereby is refuted the position of certain Moslem theologians,- who in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation; as though a thing did not need an active cause except while in the process of being made. — And so some of them are stated to have maintained that the indi- visible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone, according to them, have any permanency, would be able for a time to remain in being, if God were to withdraw His government from things. — Some of these even say that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of ceasing-to-be. — All of which is plainly absurd. CHAPTER LXVI THAT NOTHING GIVES BEING EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY GOD^S POWER It is evident from what has gone before that all inferior agents do not give being except in so far as they act by God’s power. Nothing gives being except in so far as it is a being in act. Now God preserves things in being by His providence, as we have proved.*^ There- fore it is by God’s power that a thing causes being. Again. When several different agents are subordinate to one agent, the effect that proceeds from them in common must needs be ascribed to them in so far as they are unitec^ together in partaking of the movement and power of that agent; for many things do not make up what is one, except in '^De Genesi ad Litt., IV, 12 (PL 34, 304). - Cf, Maimonides, Guide, I, 73 (p. 124). ® Ch. 63. THINGS ACT IN GOD’S POWER 119 so far as they are one. Thus it is clear that all the men in an army work in order to bring about victory; and this effect they bring about. inasmuch as they are subordinate to the general, whose proper effects the victory is. Now it was shown in the First Book that the first agent is God.^ Since, then, being is the effect common to all agents, for every agent makes a thing to be actually, it follows that they produce this effect in so far as they are subordinate to the first agent, and act by its power. Besides. In all ordered active causes, the last thing in the order of gen- eration and the first in the intention is the proper effect of the first cause. Thus the form of a house, which is the proper effect of the builder, comes into being after the cement, stones and timber have prepared the way, which is the work of the subordinate workmen who are subject to the builder. Now in every action actual being is the chief thing intended, and is the last thing in the order of generation; because, when it is obtained, the agent ceases to act, and the passive principle ceases to be acted upon. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first cause, namely God, and whatever gives being does so in so far as it acts by the power of God. Moreover. Among the things that can be reached by the power of a secondary agent, the limit in goodness and perfection is that which comes within its range through the power of the first agent; because the second- ary agent’s power receives its complement from the first agent. Now the most perfect of all effects is being, since every nature and form is perfected through being actually, and is compared to being actually as potency to act itself. Therefore being is what secondary agents produce by the power of the first agent. Besides. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being, for all others are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first agent, and all other agents produce it by the power of the first agent. Furthermore secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the first agent, produce, as their proper effects, the other perfections which determine being. Furthermore. That which is such by its essence is the proper cause of that which is such by participation. Thus fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now God alone is being by His essence, while all other things are beings by participation; for in God alone being is His essence. Therefore the being of every existing thing is His proper effect, so that whatever brings a thing into being does so in so far as it acts by God’s power. Therefore it is said (Wis. i. 14): God created, that all things might he] and in several passages of Holy Scripture it is stated that God makes all things. — Again, in the Book of Causes it is said that not even an intelli- gence gives being except in so jar as it is something divine,^ i.e., in so far as it acts by God’s power. ^ C. G., I, 13. " Dc Causis, I (p. 162). 120 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LXVII THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OPERATING Hence it is clear that in all things that operate God is the cause of their Operating. For everything that operates is in some way a cause of l)eing, either of substantial or of accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God’s power, as has been shown. ^ Therefore everything that operates acts by God’s power. Again. Every operation consequent upon a certain power is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect to cause. Thus the natural movement of heavy and light bodies is consequent upon their form, whereby they are heavy or light; and hence the cause of their movement is said to be the generating agent, which gave them their form. Now all the power of any agent whatsoever is from God as from the first principle of all perfection. Therefore, since all operation is consequent upon some power, it follows that God is the cause of every operation. Moreover. It is clear that every action that cannot continue after the influence of a given agent has ceased is from that agent. Thus, the visi- bility of colors cannot continue after the action of the sun has ceased to illumine the air, and therefore without doubt it is the cause of the visibility of colors. The same applies to violent motion, which ceases when the vio- lence of the impelling force has ceased. Now since God not only gave being to things when they first began to exist, but also causes being in them as long as they exist, by preserving them in being, as we have proved,^ so not only did He give them active powers when He first made them, but is always causing these powers in them. Consequently, if the divine influence were to cease, all operation would come to an end. Therefore every opera- tion of a thing is reduced to Him as to its cause. Besides. Whatever applies an active power to action is said to be the cause of that action; for the craftsman, when he applies the forces of nature to an action, is said to be the cause of that action, — as the cook is the cause of cooking, which is done by fire. Now every application of power to action is chiefly and primarily from God. For active powers are applied to their proper operations by some movement of the body or of the soul. Now the first principle of either movement is God. For He is the first mover, wholly immovable, as we have proved above.^ Likewise every move- ment of the will, whereby certain powers are applied to action, is reduced to God as to the first object of appetite, and to the first willing cause. There- ^Ch.6s. ^C.(?.,I,i3. ' Ch. 66. GOD IS EVERYWHERE 121 fore every operation should be ascribed to God as to its first and principal agent. Further. In all ordered active causes, the causes that follow must always act by the power of the first. Thus, in natural things the lower bodies act by the^ power of the heavenly bodies; and in voluntary things all the subordinate craftsmen act in accordance with the direction of the master craftsman. Now, in the order of active causes, God is the first cause, as we proved in the First Book.^ Consequently all the lower active causes act by His power. But the cause of an action is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which does it; just as the principal agent is more the cause of an action than the instrument. Therefore God is more the cause of every action than even secondary active causes. Further. Every operator is directed through its operation to its ultimate end, since either the operation itself is its last end, or the thing done, namely, the effect of the operation. Now it belongs to God Himself to direct things to their end, as we have proved.^ Therefore we must conclude that every agent acts by the power of God, and consequently it is He who causes the actions of all things. Hence it is said {Isa. xxvi. 12) : Lord^ Thou hast wrought all our works in US] and {Jo. xv. 5) : Without Me you can do nothing] so, too {Philip, ii. 13): It is God. who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. For this reason Holy Scripture often as- cribes natural effects to the divine operation, because it is He Who works in every agent, natural or voluntary, as it is written in Job x. 10, ri: Hast Thou not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews] and again in Psalm xvii. 14: The Lord thundered jrom heaven, and the highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire. CHAPTER LXVIII THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE From this it is evident that God must be everywhere and in all things. For the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as 'the Philoso- pher proves.'^ Now God moves all things to their actions, as we have proved.^ Therefore He is in all things. Again. Whatever is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, is in some way in contact with it ; for a body is located somewhere by contact of dimensive quantity, while an incorporeal thing is said to be somewhere by contact of its power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Accordingly, an incorporeal being stands in relation to being somewhere by its power, as a body to ^Ibid. "Ch. 64. yhys., VII, 2 (243a 3)- "Ch. 67. THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES being somewhere by dimensive quantity. And if there were a body having infinite dimensive quantity, it would of necessity be everywhere. Conse- quently, if there be an incorporeal being with infinite power, it must needs be everywhere. Now we proved in the First Book that God has infinite power.^ Therefore He is everywhere. Besides. As an individual cause is to an individual effect, so a universal cause is to a universal effect. Now the individual cause must needs be present to its proper effect. Thus fire by its substance gives out heat, and the soul by its essence gives life to the body. Since, then, God is the uni- versal cause of all being, as we proved in the Second Book,- it follows that wherever being is to be found,, there also God is present. Furthermore. If an agent be present to but one of its effects, its action cannot extend to other things except through that one, because agent and patient must be simultaneous. Thus the motive power moves the various members of the body not otherwise than through the heart. Consequently, if God were present to but one of His effects, such as the primum mobile^ which is moved by Him immediately, it would follow that His action could not extend to other things except through that first effect. But this is incongruous. For if the action* of an agent cannot extend to other things except through some first effect, the latter must be equal to the agent as regards the agent’s whole power, or else the agent could not use its whole power. And so we see that all the movements which the motive power is able to cause can be performed by the heart. Now there is no creature through which can be done everything that the divine power is capable of doing; for the divine power surpasses infinitely every created thing, as we proved in the First Book.^ Consequently it is incongruous to say that the divine action does not extend to other things except through some first thing. Therefore He is present, not in one effect only, but in all His effects. — For it would amount to the same if someone were to say that He is in some, and not in all; because no matter how many divine effects we take, they will not suffice to carry into effect the execution of the divine power. Moreover. The active cause must needs be joined together with its proxi- mate and immediate effect. Now in each thing there is a proximate and immediate effect of God. For we proved in the Second Book that God alone can create.^ Now in each thing there is something caused by crea- tion: in bodies, there is primary matter; in incorporeal beings there is their simple essence. This is clear from what we have said in the Second BookA Accordingly, God must be present in all things at the same time, especially since those things which He called into being from non-being are continually preserved in being by Him, as we have proved.^’ Therefore it is said {Jer. xxiii. 24): / fill heaven and earth] and {Ps. cxxxviii. 8) : If I ascend into heaven^ Thou art there: if I descend into hell, Thou art present. "C. G., I, 43. "C. G., 11 , 15. «C. G., I, 43^ C..G., n, 21. G., II, THE CAUSALITY OF THINGS 123 Hereby is removed the error of some who said that God is in a definite part of the world, for instance in the first heaven, and in the eastern por- tion, so that He is the principle of the heavenly movement. — Yet this state- ment of theirs might be upheld, if rightly understood; so that the meaning be, not that God is confined to some particular part of the world, but that according to the order of nature all corporeal movement begins in one particular part under the divine motion. For this reason Holy Scripture specially describes God as being in heaven, according to Isa. Ixvi. i : Heaven is My throne j and Ps. cxiii. 16: The heaven of heavens is the Lord/Sj etc. — However, the fact that God works in the lowest bodies some effect outside the ordinary course of nature, which cannot be wrought by the power of a heavenly body, shows clearly that God is immediately pres- ent not only to the heavenly body but also to the lowest things. But we must not think that God is everywhere in such a way as to be distributed throughout local space, with one part of Him here, another there; for God is everywhere wholly, since, being utterly simple, He has no parts. Nor is He simple in the way that a point is simple. For a point is the term of a continuous quantity, and consequently occupies a definite place therein ; so that one point cannot be elsewhere than in one indivisible place. But God is indivisible as existing altogether outside the genus of continu- ous quantity. Consequently He is not necessitated by His essence to a definite place, great or small, as though He needed to be in some place; for He was from eternity before there was any place. Yet by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in a place, because He is the universal cause of being, as we have stated. Accordingly, He is wholly wheresoever He is, because He reaches to all things by His simple power. And yet again we must not think that He is in things as though mingled with them; for we proved in the First Book that He is neither the matter nor the form of anything.^ But He is in all things after the manner of an agent. CHAPTER LXIX CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS This conclusion was an occasion of error to some who thought that no creature has an active part in the production of natural effects; so that, for example, fire would not heat, but God would cause heat at the pres- ence of fire. They maintain the like in the case of all other natural effects.^ They have endeavored to confirm this error with arguments, by show- G.f I, 17, 27. ^Cf. Averroes, In Metaph., IX, comm. 7; XII, comm. 18 (VIII, io9r; 143V). 124 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES ing that no form, whether substanital or accidental, is brought into being except by the way of creation. Because forms and accidents cannot be made out of matter, since matter is not a part of them. Hence, if they be made, they must be made oyt of nothing, and this is to be created. And since creation is the act of God alone, as we proved in the Second Book,^ it would seem to follow that God alone produces both the substantial and accidental forms in nature. The opinion of certain philosophers agreed in part with this position. For, seeing that whatever is not per se must result from that which is per se, it would seem that the forms of things, which do not exist by themselves but in matter, result from forms that are by themselves without matter; which would mean that forms existing in matter were participations of forms that are without matter. For this reason Plato held that the species of sensible things are certain separate Forms, which are causes of being for the things of sense, in so far as these partake of the Forms.- Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms emanate from the agent intellect? But as to accidental forms, he held them to be dispositions of matter, resulting from the action of lower agents disposing the matter; and in this he avoided the absurdity of the previous opinion. A sign of this ap- parently was that no active power can be found in these bodies except an accidental form, active and passive qualities, for instance; and these would not seem capable of causing substantial forms. Moreover in this sublunary world we find certain things that are not generated from their like: animals caused through putrefaction, for in- stance. Therefore, apparently, the forms of these are caused by higher principles. And in like manner other forms, some of which are much more perfect. Some, too, find proof of this in the inadequacy of natural bodies for action. Because the form of every natural body is joined to quantity. Now quantity is an obstacle to action and movement, a sign of which they see in the fact that the more we add to the quantity of a body, the heavier it becomes, and the slower its movement. Whence they conclude that no body is active, but that all bodies are purely passive. They also attempt to prove this from the fact that every patient is recipient to the agent, and that every agent, save the first which creates, requires a subject inferior to itself. But no substance is inferior to a body. Therefore seemingly no body is active. They add also that corporeal substance is the most removed from the first agent, and therefore they do not see how the active power can reach as far as corporeal substance. They maintain, therefore, that, as God is purely active, so corporeal substance, being the lowest thing of all, is purely passive. For these reasons, then, Avicebron held in the Fount of Life that ^C. G., II, 21. "Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., I, 9 (990a 34). ^Metaph., IX, 5 (foL THE CAUSALITY OF THLNGS 125 no bocty is active, but that the power of a spiritual substance pervading through bodies produces the actions which seem to be performed by .bodies.^ Moreover certain Moslem theologians are said to have argued that even accidents are not the result of corporeal activity, because an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Hence they deem it impossible for heat to pass from a hot body into another body so as to heat it. What they say is that all such accidents are created by God.^ However, many absurdities arise from the foregoing positions. For if no inferior cause, above all a body, is active, and if God works alone in all things, then, since God is not changed through working in various things, no diversity will follow among the effects through the diversity of the things in which God works. Now this is evidently false to the senses, for from the application of a hot body there follows, not cooling, but only heating, and from human seed only a man is generated. Therefore the causing of inferior effects is hot to be ascribed to the divine power in such a way as to withdraw the causality of inferior agents. Again. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom that anything should be done in vain in the works of a wise man. But if creatures did nothing at all towards the production of their effects, and God alone wrought every- thing immediately, other things would be employed by Him in vain for the production of those effects. Therefore the above position is incompatible with -divine wisdom. Besides. He who gives something essential, gives whatever accompanies it ; and thus, the cause that gives gravity to an element, gives it downward movement. Now to make something actual results from being actual, as we see to be the case in God; for He is pure act, and is also the first cause of being in all things, as we proved above.^ If therefore He bestowed His like- ness on others in respect of being, in so far as He brought things into being, it follows that He also bestowed on them His likeness in respect of being causes, so that creatures too should have their proper actions. Further. The perfection of the effect indicates the perfection of the cause, since a greater power produces a more perfect effect. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore things created by Him must needs re- ceive perfection from him. Consequently to detract from the creature’s perfection is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature exercises an action for the production of an effect, much is de- tracted from the perfection of the creature; because it is due to the abun- dance of its perfection that a thing is able to communicate to another the perfection that it has. Therefore this opinion detracts from the divine power. Moreover. Just as it belongs to the good to produce a good, so it belongs to the highest good to make a thing best. Now God is the highest good, as '^Fons Vitae^ II, 9 (p. 41) ; III, 44, 45 (p. 177, 179-180). ^ Cf. Maimonides, Guides 1,73 (P. 125). 126 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore it belongs to Him to make all things best. Now it is better that the good bestowed on someone should be common to many than that it should be proper to one: since the com- mon good is always considered more godlike than the good of one only? But the good of one becomes common to many if it flows from the one to the others, and this can be only when the one, by its own action, commu- nicates it to them; but if it has not the power to transmit it to others, that good remains its own property. Accordingly, God communicated His good- ness to His creatures in such wise that, one thing can communicate to another the good it has received. Therefore it is derogatory to the divine goodness to deny to things their proper operations. Again. To take order away from creatures is to deny them the best thing they have, because, though each one is good in itself, together they are very good because of the order of the universe; for the whole is always bet- ter than the parts, and is their end. Now if we take away action from things, the order among things is withdrawn; because things differing in nature are not bound together in the unity of order, except through the fact that some are active and some passive. Therefore it is unfitting to say that things have not their proper actions. Besides. If effects be produced not by the act of creatures but only by the act of God, the power of a created cause cannot possibly be manifested by its effect, since the effect is no indication of the cause’s power, except by reason of the action which proceeds from the power and terminates in the effect. Now the nature of a cause is not known from its effect except in so far as this is an indication of its power which results from its nature. Consequently if creatures have no action for the production of effects, it will follow that the nature of a creature can never be known from its effect: so that all knowledge in the philosophy of nature would be denied us, for it is there that demonstrations from effects are chiefly employed. Further. By induction it can be proved that like produces like. Now that which is produced in lower things is not a mere form, but a composite of matter and form; because every generation is out of something, namely, matter j and to something, namely, form. Therefore the generating cause must be, not a mere form, but composed of matter and form. Therefore the cause of forms which exist in matter is not the separate species of things, as the Platonists maintained, nor the agent intellect, as Avicenna said, but an individual composed of matter and form. Again. If action is consequent upon being actual, it is unreasonable that the more perfect act be deprived of action. Now the substantial form is a more perfect act than the accidental. Consequently, if the accidental forms in corporeal things have their proper actions, much more has the substan- tial form an operation proper to it. But this action does not consist in disposing matter, because this is effected by alteration, for which acci- ^ C. G.j I, 41. ^Aristotle, Eth., I, 2 (1094b 9). THE CAUSALITY OF THINGS 127 dental forms suffice. .Therefore the substantial form of the generating cause is the principle of the action whereby the substantial form is intro- duced into the thing generated. The arguments they adduce are easily solved. For since a thing is made that it may be, just as a form is called a being, not as though it itself had being, but because by it the composite is, so neither is the form made, properly speaking, but it begins to be through the fact that the composite is brought from potentiality to the act which is the form. Nor is it necessary that whatever has a form by way of participation receive it from that which is a form essentially; for it may receive it im- mediately from something having a like form in a like manner, namely, by participation (though it may act in the power of that separate form, if there be any such) ; and thus like agent produces like effect. Nor does it follow, because every action of inferior bodies is effected through active or passive qualities, which are accidents, that nothing, save accidents, results from those actions; for even as those accidental forms are caused by the substantial form, which together with matter is the cause of all the proper accidents, so do they act by virtue of the substantial form. Now that which acts by virtue of another produces an effect like not only to itself, but also, and more, to that by virtue of which it acts. Thus the action of the instrument reproduces in the work done the likeness of the art. Hence the action of accidental forms produces substantial forms, inas- much as they act instrumentally in the power of substantial forms. As to animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused in them through the agency of a body, namely, a heavenly body, and that is the first principle of alteration; consequently in this lower sphere whatever acts dispositively to a form must act by virtue of that body. That is why the power of the heavenly body suffices, without an univocal agent, for the production of certain imperfect forms; whereas for the production of more perfect forms, such as the souls of perfect animals, a univocal agent is required besides the celestial agent. For such animals are not produced otherwise than by seed, and hence Aristotle says that man and the sun generate man} Again, it is untrue that quantity is an obstacle to a form’s activity, except accidentally, namely, in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter. Now a form which exists in matter, through being less actual, has less active power; so that the body which has less matter and more form, fire, for instance, is more active. But if we suppose the measure of action of which a form existing in matter is capable, then quantity favors an increase rather than a decrease of action. For the greater the fiery body, supposing the heat to be equally intense, the more heat does it give; and supposing an equally intense gravity, the greater a heavy body is, the more rapid will be ^ Phys ., 11, 2 (194b 14). 128 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES its natural movement, and for the same reason the slower will its non- natural movement be. Accordingly, the fact that heavy bodies are slower in their non-natural movements, through being of greater quantity, is no proof that quantity is an obstacle to action, but rather that it is a help to its increase. Again, it does not follow that all bodies must be without action, because, in the order of things, corporeal substance is of the lowest kind; since even among bodies one is higher, more formal and more active than another, as fire in comparison with lower bodies, and yet not even the lowest body is excluded from activity. For it is clear that a body cannot be wholly active, since it is composed of matter, which is being potentially, and form which is act. For a thing acts according as it is actual, and therefore every body acts according to its form, to which the other body, namely, the recipient, is compared, according to its matter, as subject, inasmuch as its matter is in potentiality to the form of the agent. If, on the other hand, the matter of the active body be in potentiality to the form of the passive body, they will be mutually agent and recipient, as in the case of two elementary bodies; or else, one will be purely active and the other purely passive in relation to it, as a heavenly body compared to the elementary body. Ac- cordingly, a body acts on a subject, not by reason of its entirety, but by reason of the form by which it works. Nor is it true that bodies are most removed from God. For as God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him according as they are more or less in act or potentiality. Hence, of all things that is most distant from God which is pure potentiality, namely, primary matter, which is therefore purely passive and in no way active. On the other hand, bodies, being composed of matter and form, approach to a likeness to God inas- much as they have a form, which Aristotle calls a divine tiling;^ and there- fore they act inasmuch as they have a form, and are passive inasmuch as they have matter. Again, it is absurd to say that a body is not active because accidents do not pass from one subject to another. For when we say that a hot body gives heat, we do not mean that the identical heat which is in the heater passes into the heated body; but that by virtue of the heat in the heater, another heat, individually distinct, which previously had been in it poten- tially, becomes actual in the heated body. For the natural agent does not transmit its own form into another subject, but reduces the receptive sub- ject from potentiality to act. Consequently, we do not deny creatures their proper actions, although we ascribe all the effects of creatures to God, as operating in all things. ^Phys., I, 9 (192a 16). GOD AND NATURAL AGENTS 129 CHAPTER LXX HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT Some find it difficult to understand how the effects of nature are ascribed to God and to the natural agent. For it would seem impossible that one action should proceed from two agents. Hence if the action productive of a natural effect proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God. Again. If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is super- fluous to do it by means of several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices. Since, then, the divine power suffices to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ, for the pro- duction of the same effects, the powers of nature also; or, if the forces of nature suffice, it is superfluous for the divine power to work for the same effect. Besides. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Therefore, it seems impossible that God produce the same effects as natural things. However, these arguments offer no difficulty if we consider what has been already said. For two things may be considered in every agent, namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts. Thus fire by its heat makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent de- pends on the power of the higher agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or ap- plies it to action. Thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect, although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently, the action of the lower agent must not only proceed from the lower agent through the agent^s own power, but also through the power of all the higher agents, for it acts by the power of them all. Now just as the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of the effect; because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the power of the supreme agent is found to produce the effects of itself, as though it were the immediate cause, as may be seen in the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. Accord- ingly, just as it is not unreasonable that one action be produced by an agent and by the power of that agent, so is it not unreasonable that the same effect be produced by the inferior agent and by God, and by both immediately, though in a different way. 130 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES It is also evident that there is nothing superfluous if a natural thing produce its proper effect and God also produce it, since a natural thing does not produce it except by God’s power. Nor is it superfluous, if God can produce all natural effects by Himself, that they should be produced by certain other causes; because this is not Swing to the insufficiency of His power, but to the immensity of His good- ness, by which it was His will to communicate His likeness to things not only in the point of their being, but also in the point of their being causes of other things. For it is in these two ways that all creatures in common have the divine likeness bestowed on them, as we proved aboveJ — In this way, too, the beauty of order is made evident in creatures. It is also clear that the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part were effected by God and part by the natural agent ; but the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways, just as the whole of one and the same effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent. CHAPTER LXXI THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS From the foregoing it is also clear that the divine providence, which gov- erns things, does not prevent corruption, defects and evil from being in the world. For the divine government whereby God works among things does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown." Now, a defect may occur in an effect through a defect in the secondary active cause, without there being any defect in the first agent. Thus there may be a defect in the work of a craftsman, who is perfect in his craft, because of some defect in the instrument; even so, a man with a healthy locomotive power may limp, through no fault in the locomotive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly, in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found because of defects in the secondary agents, even though there is no defect in God Himself. Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things unless there were degrees of goodness, so that, namely, there be some things better than others; or else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover, this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and, what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the elimi- ^Ch. 20, 21. "^Ch. 69 fE. PROVIDENCE AND EVIL 131 nation of multitude, since it is because things differ from one another that one is better than another: e.g,, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently, if there were absolute equality among things, there would be but one created good ; which is clearly deroga- tory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness ; and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Therefore the perfection of the uni- verse requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things gov- erned. Therefore it does not belong to the providence of God to exclude from things completely the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility, because that which can fail, at times does fail; and this very failure is evil, as we have proved.^ Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to remove evil entirely from things. Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed according to their mode, for in this consists the justice of the regime. Consequently, even as it would be contrary to the nature of human rule, if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties, — except perhaps for a time, because of some particular urgency, — so it would be contrary to the notion of God^s gov- ernment, if He did not allow creatures to act in accordance with the mode of their respective natures. Now because things thus act according to the mode of their natures, corruption and evil result in things ; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether. Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil, except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above Now it does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good; for thus many goods would be ban- ished from the universe. And so, if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like, a consequence of which is the evil of the burning of combustible things, the good consisting in the generation of fire and its preservation in its species would be done away. Therefore it is not part of the divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things. Further. There are in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils. Thus there would be no patience of the righteous, if there were no ill-will of the persecutors; nor would there be any place for a vindicating justice, were there no crimes; and even in the physical order there would be no generation of one thing, unless there were corruption of another. Consequently, if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by the divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good things. This ought not to be, since good is more ^Ch. 7 - "Ch. 3, 4. 132 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES powerful in goodness than evil is in malice, as was shown above. ^ There- fore evil should not be utterly excluded from things by the divine provi- dence. Again. The good of the whole is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore it belongs to a prudent governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole. Thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground, that the whole house may stand firm. Now if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of the universe would be much dimin- ished, since its beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from the failure of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. Therefore evil should not be excluded from things by the divine providence. Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, are directed to man^s good as their end. But if there were no evils in the world, man’s good would be lessened considerably, both in his knowledge, and in his desire or love of the good. For his knowledge of the good is increased by compari- son with evil, and through suffering evil his desire of doing good is kindled; and thus the sick know best what a great good health is, and they, too, are more keen about it than those who have it. Therefore it does not be- long to the divine providence to exclude evil from the world altogether. Hence it is said {Isa. xlv. 7) : / make peace and create evil; and {Amos iii. 6) : Shall there be evil in the city, which the Lord hath not done? Hereby is refuted the error of those who, through observing the presence of evil in the world, said that there is no God. Thus Boethius introduces a philosopher who asks: If there be a God, whence comes cvil?'^ On the contrary, he should have argued: If there is evil, there is a God. For thei*e would be no evil, if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil; and there would be no such order, if there were no God. Moreover, by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that the divine providence extends to this corruptible world, because they observed that many evils occur in it. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God’s providence, because no de- fects and no evils are to be found in them. So, too, there is also removed an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place under the providence of a good God. The doubt, also, of some is solved, namely, whether evil deeds are from God. For since we proved that every agent produces its action in so far as it acts by the power of God,^ and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions; and since, again, we proved that evil and defect in things ruled by the divine providence result from the condition of the sec- ' Ch. II, 12. ^De Consol., I, prose 4 (PL 63, 625). ®Ch. 66. PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENCY 133 ondary causes, wiiich may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes. But in so far as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God; even as a limp is from the locomotive power in so far as it has movement, but in so far as it has a defect it is from the crooked- ness of the leg. CHAPTER LXXII THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTINGENCY EROM THINGS Just as the divine providence does not altogether banish evil from the world, so neither does it exclude contingency, nor impose necessity on things. For we have already proved that the operation of providence, whereby God operates in the world, does not exclude secondary causes, but is ful- filled by them inasmuch as they act by God’s power J Now certain effects are said to be necessary or contingent in relation to their proximate, not to their remote, causes. Thus, for a plant to bear fruit is a contingent effect because of the proximate cause, which is the power of germination, that can be hindered and fail; although a remote cause, namely the sun, is a cause that acts of necessity. Since, then, among proximate causes there are many that can fail, not all the effects subject to the divine providence will be necessary, but many of them will be contingent. Again. It belongs to the divine providence that the possible degrees of being be fulfilled, as was made evident above Now being is divided into contingent and necessary, and this is an essential division of being. There- fore, if the divine providence excluded all contingency, not all the degrees of being would be preserved. Besides. The nearer things are to God, the more they partake of a like- ness to Him; and the further they are from Him, the more they fail in their likeness to Him. Now those things that are nearest to God are alto- gether immovable. Such are the separate substances which' approach near- est to a likeness to God, Who is utterly immovable. On the other hand, such beings as are nearest to them and are immediately moved by those that are unchangeable retain a certain degree of immobility in that they are always moved in the same way (for instance, the heavenly bodies). Con- seciuently, those beings that come after the foregoing, and are moved by them, are further removed from the divine immobility, so that they are not always moved in the same way; and in this the beauty of order is evident. But every necessary being, as such, never varies. Therefore it would be "Ch. 71. " Ch. 6 off. 134 the SUMMA contra GENTILES incompatible with the divine providence, to which it belongs to establish and preserve order among things, if all things happened of necessity. Moreover. That which is of necessity is always. Now nothing corruptible is always. Therefore, if the divine providence requires all things to be nec- essary, it would follow that nothing in the world is corruptible, and conse- quently neither is anything generable. Hence the whole realm of things subject to generation and corruption would be withdrawn from the world. Now this detracts from the perfection of the universe. Further. In every movement there is some generation and corruption, since in a thing that is moved, something begins to be, and something ceases to be. Consequently, if all generation and corruption were banished, through the elimination of all contingent things, as we have just proved, all move- ment and all movable things would as a result be taken away. Besides. If the power of a substance be weakened, or if it be hindered by a contrary agent, this argues some change in that power. Consequently, if the divine providence does not banish movement from things, it will prevent neither the weakening of their power nor the impediment arising from the resistance of another agent. Now it is because that power is some- times weakened and hindered that nalure does not always work in the same way, but sometimes fails in that which belongs to a thing according to its nature, so that natural effects do not follow of necessity. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to impose necessity on the things governed. Moreover. In things that are fittingly ruled by providence, there should be nothing in vain. Since, therefore, it is evident that some causes are con- tingent, seeing that they can be hindered from producing their effects, it is clearly inconsistent with providence that all things should happen of neces- sity. Therefore the divine providence does not impose necessity on things, by excluding contingency from them altogether. CHAPTER LXXIII THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE LIBERTY OF CHOICE Hence it is also clear that providence does not exclude the liberty of the will. ‘ For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfec- tion of the things governed, whether it be to attain it, or increase it, or preserve it. Therefore whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence^ rather than what is part of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, contingency in causes arises from imperfection and de- ficiency, because by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always produce, unless there be an impediment due either to weakness PROVIDENCE AND LIBERTY OF CHOICE 135 ^ power, or to some extrinsic agency, or to the indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result^ but generally produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand, it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not limited to one effect; indeed, the will has it in its power to produce this or that effect, and consequently is undeter- mined to either. Therefore it belongs to the divine providence to preserve the liberty of the will, more than contingency in natural causes. Moreover. It belongs to the divine providence to use things according to their rnode. But the mode of a thing^s action is in keeping with its form, which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determined, because the will acts through a form appre- hended by the intellect, since it is the apprehended good that moves the will as its object. Now, precisely, the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms. That is why the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to exclude the liberty of the will. Again. The things governed are brought to a fitting end by the govern- ment of providence ; and so Gregory of Nyssa says of the divine providence that it is God’s will from which all existing things receive a fitting end?- Now the last end of every creature is to attain to God’s likeness, as we proved above." It would therefore be inconsistent with the divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God’s likeness in that he acts freely, for we have proved that there is free choice in God.® Therefore providence does not deprive the will of liberty. Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore whatever would deprive things of many goods does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of liberty, many goods would be done away, for no praise would be given to human virtue, since virtue would be as nothing if man did not act freely ; there would be no justice in rewarding or punishing, if man were not free in acting well or ill ; and there would be no prudence in taking counsel, which would be of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore it would be against the nature of providence to deprive the will of liberty. Hence it is said {Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel] and again {ibid,, 18) : Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him. Hereby is removed the opinion of the Stoics who held that all things happen of necessity according' to the order of infallible causes, which order the Greeks called eEptaptxevY].^ ^Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XLIII (PG 40, 792), “Ch. 19. ^ C. G., I, 8S. ^Neinesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXVII (PG 40, 752). 136 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LXXIV THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FORTUNE AND CHANCE It is also evident from what has been said that the divine providence docs not remove from the world fortune and chance. Fortune and chance are said of things that happen seldom. If nothing happened seldom, all things would happen of necessity; because those things that happen more frequently than not differ from necessary things in this alone, that they may possibly fail in a few instances. Now it would be against the nature of the divine providence if all things happened of necessity, as we proved above.^ Therefore it would also be against the na- ture of the divine providence if nothing happened in the world fortuitously and by chance. Again. It would be against the nature of providence if things subject to providence were not to act for an end, since it is the part of providence to direct all things to their end. Furthermore, it would be contrary to the perfection of the universe, were there nothing corruptible, nor any power subject to failure, as we proved above.^ Now it is owing to the fact that an agent acting for the sake of some end fails to attain that end, that certain things happen by chance. Therefore it would be against the nature of providence, and the perfection of the world, if nothing happened by chance. Besides. The number and diversity of causes result from the ordering of divine providence and disposition. Now given a diversity of causes, it must happen sometimes that one concurs with another, so that one is either hindered or assisted in producing its effect. But chance occurrences are due to the concurrence of two or more causes, when some end which was not intended happens from the concurrence of some cause. For instance, the finding of his debtor by one who went to market to buy something hap- pened because the debtor also went to market. Therefore it is not against the divine providence that there be fortuitous and chance happenings in the world. Moreover. That which is not, cannot be the cause of any thing. Therefore a thing must stand in relation to being a cause in the same way as to being. Hence the diversity of order in causes must be in keeping with diversity of order among things. Now it belongs to the perfection of the world that there should be in it not only substances, but also accidents. Because things which have not their ultimate perfection in their substance must needs acquire some perfection by means of accidents, which accidents will be all the more numerous, as the things themselves are more distant from God’s "Ch. 72- ^'Ch. 71. PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENT SINGULARS 137 simplicity. Now if a subject has many accidents, it follows that it is a being accidentally, since subject and accident, or two accidents in one subject, are one and being accidentally: e.g.j a white man^ and a musical white thing. Therefore the perfection of the world requires that there should also be accidental causes. But that which results accidentally from a cause is said to occur by chance or fortuitously. Therefore it is not against the nature of providence that some things happen by chance or fortune. Further. It belongs to the order of the divine providence that there be an order and a gradation among causes. Now the higher a cause is above its effect, the greater its power, so that its causality extends to a greater number of things. But the intention of a natural cause never extends fur- ther than its power, for such an intention would be in vain. Consequently the intention of a particular cause cannot possibly extend to all possible contingencies. Now it is because things happen outside the intention of the agent that things occur by chance or fortuitously. Therefore the order of the divine providence requires the presence of chance and fortune in the world. Hence it is said {Eccles. ix. ii): / saw that ... the race is not to the swift, etc,, but time and chance in all, namely, here below. CHAPTER LXXV THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENTS From what we have proved it is evident that the divine providence reaches to each individual among things subject to generation and corruption. For the only reason for excluding such things from providence would seem to be their contingent nature, and the fact that many of them are chance or fortuitous occurrences; for in this alone do they differ from in- corruptible realities and from the universals of corruptible things, with which it is said that providence is concerned. Now providence is not incon- sistent with contingency, chance and fortune, as neither is it with voluntary action, as we have proved.^ There is no reason, therefore, why providence should not be about such things, even as it is about incorruptibles and uni- versals. Besides. If God^s providence does not extend to these singular things, this is either because He does not know them, or because He is unable or unwilling to care for them. But it cannot be said that God does not know singulars, since we have proved that He has knowledge of them.^ Nor can it be said that God. is unable to care for them, since His power is infinite, ^Ch. 72ff. ^C.G.,1,65. 138 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES as we proved above.^ Nor, again, can it be said that these singulars are incapable of being governed, since we see them to be governed by the ef- forts of reason, a? is evident in man, or by natural instinct, as is evident in bees and many brute animals, which are governed by a kind of natural instinct. Nor, finally, can it be said that God is unwilling to govern them, since His will is the universal cause of all good, and the good of things governed consists chiefly in the order of government. Therefore it cannot be said that God has no care for these singulars. Besides. Every secondary cause, by the mere fact of its being a cause, attains to a likeness to God, as was proved above.“ Now it is to be uni- versally observed that things which are productive have the care of the things they produce; and thus, animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care of the things of which He is the cause. Now He is the cause even of these singulars, as was proved above.'^ Therefore He has care of them. Further. It was proved above that God acts in created things, not from natural necessity, but by His will and intellect.*^ But things that are done by will and intellect are subject to providence, which seems to consist in ruling things by the intellect. Consequently the things done by God are subject to His providence. But it has been proved that God works in all second causes, and that all their effects are to be referred to God as their cause, so that whatever is done in these individuals is His own work.’"’ Con- sequently, these individual things, their movements and operations, are subject to the divine providence. Again. A man’s providence is foolish if he cares not for those things without which the things he cares for cannot be. Now it is clear that if all individuals ceased to exist, their universals would likewise cease. There- fore if God cares only for universals, and neglects these individuals alto- gether, His providence will be foolish and imperfect. If, however, someone say that God cares for these individuals so far as to preserve them in existence, but no further, this is quite impossible, since whatever happens to individuals concerns their preservation or their cor- ruption. Consequently, if God cares for individuals as to their preservation. He cares also for whatever happens to them. Yet someone can say that the mere care of universals suffices for the preservation of individuals in being, since each species is provided with the means of self-preservation for every individual of that species. Thus ani- mals were given organs for taking and digesting food, and horns for self- protection; and the usefulness of these organs does not fail except in a few cases, since that which is of nature produces its effect either always or more frequently. Hence all the individuals could not cease to exist, although some might. "C. G,, II, 22. Ch. 21. “C. 15. * C. G., II, 23f£. “ Ch. 67. PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENT SINGULARS 139 But, according to this way of reasoning, whatever happens to individuals will be subject to providence, even as is their preservation in being; for nothing can happen to the individual member of a species that cannot in some way be referred to the principles of that species. Accordingly, indi- viduals are not more subject to the divine providence as to their preservation in being than they are in other matters. Moreover. The order of things in relation to the end is such that accidents are for the sake of substances, in order that the latter may be perfected by them. And in substances, matter is for the sake of the form, since it is through the form that matter has a participation in the divine goodness, for the sake of which all things were made, as we proved above.^ Hence it is evident that the individual is for the sake of the universal nature. A sign of this is that where the universal nature can be preserved in one indi- vidual, there are not many individuals of one species: e,g., the moon and sun. Now since providence has the ordering of things to their end, it follows that to providence belong both the end and the things directed to the end. Therefore, not only universals, but also individuals, are subject to the divine providence. Again. The difference between speculative and practical knowledge is that speculative knowledge and what is connected with it is perfected in the universal, whereas what pertains to practical knowledge is perfected in the particular. For the end of speculative knowledge is truth, which con- sists first and of its very nature in the immaterial and universal; whereas the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is about individual things. Hence the physician does not heal a universal man, but this particu- lar man, and the whole of medical science is directed to this. Now it is clear that providence belongs to practical knowledge, since it directs things to their end. Therefore God^s providence would be most imperfect if it extended no further than universals and did not reach individuals. Besides. Speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are known better than individuals; and that is why the knowledge of the most universal principles is common to all. Yet the more perfect in speculative knowledge is he who possesses not only a universal, but also a proper, knowledge of things; since he who knows a thing only universally knows it only potentially. For this reason the disciple is led from the universal knowledge of principles to the proper knowledge of conclusions by the teacher, who is possessed of both knowl- edges, just as a thing is brought from potentiality to act by that which is in act. A fortiori, therefore, the more perfect in practical knowledge is he who directs things to actuality not only universally but also in particular. Consequently, the divine providence, being supremely perfect, extends to in- dividuals. "Ch. 17. 140 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Moreover. Since God is the cause of being as being, as we proved above, ^ it follows that His providence must care for being as being, since He gov- erns things inasmuch as He is their cause. Therefore, whatever exists, no matter in what way it exists, is subject to His providence. Now individuals are beings, and more so than universals, because universals do not exist by themselves, but only in individuals. Therefore the divine providence is also concerned about individuals. Further. Creatures are subject to the divine providence as being directed thereby to their end, which is the divine goodness. Therefore participation in the divine goodness by creatures is the work of the divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. There- fore the divine providence must extend also to them. Hence it is said {Matt. x. 29) : Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your F other j etc.; again {Wis. viii. i): She reacheth . . . from end to end mightily , that is, from the highest creatures to the lowest. Moreover, the opinion is refuted of some who said {Ezech. ix. 9): The Lord hath forsaken the earthy and the Lord seeth noty and of those who asserted {Job xxii. 14) : He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven. Hereby is refuted the opinion of some who maintained that the divine providence does not extend to these individual things, — an opinion ascribed by some to Aristotle, although it cannot be gathered from his words. CHAPTER LXXVI THAT god’s providence CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDIATELY Now some have granted that the divine providence reaches to these indi- vidual things, but through certain intermediary causes. For Plato, ac- cording to Gregory of Nyssa,- posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme. God, who cares first and foremost for His own, i.e. spiritual and intellectual beings, and then for the whole world, as regards genera, species and the universal causes, i.e., the heavenly bodies. The sec- ond consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato ascribed to the gods who circulated in the heavens, while Aristotle ascribes the causality of such things to the oblique circle.^ The third providence he places over things per- taining to human life, and he ascribes it to certain demons who dwell in the neighborhood of the earth and, according to him, are in charge of human ^C. G.y II, 15. ^Nemesius, De Nat. Bom., XLIV (PG 40, 793). ^ De Gener., n, 10 (336a 32). THE IMMEDIACY OF PROVIDENCE 141 actions. However, according to Plato, the second and third providence de- pend on the first, because the supreme God appointed those of the second and third class as governors. This opinion accords with the Catholic Faith in so far as it refers uni- versal providence to God as its first author. But it seems contrary to the Faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to the divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down. For God has immediate knowledge of individuals as knowing them, not merely in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the First Book.^ Now it seems incongruous if, knowing individuals, He did not desire their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is the source of all goodness. Consequently, just as He knows individuals im- mediately, so He establishes order among them immediately. Again. The order established by providence in the things governed is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor; just as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one sub- ordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly, supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God; in fact, all perfections proceed from Him into other things in descending order, as we proved above. ^ And the order of things must be in the gov- ernors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual; or else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more, therefore, is the order of individuals under the con- trol of the divine providence. Besides. In things ruled by human providence, it is to be observed that someone is placed at the head, who has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them; while he himself does not devise the order of minor affairs, but leaves this to others lower than himself. Now this is owing to a defect on his part, inasmuch as he is ignorant of the conditions of particular matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of every thing because of the labor and delay required for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God, for He knows all individual things, nor does He require labor or time in order to understand them, since by under- standing Himself, He knows all other things, as we proved above. ^ There- fore He Himself devises the order of all individuals, and consequently His providence extends to all individuals immediately. ^ C. G., I, 65ff. ^ C, G., I, 38ff. ® C. G., I, 46. 142 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Moreover. In human affairs, lesser officials by their own skill devise the ordering of the things committed to their government by the chief gov- ernor. This skill they do not receive from the chief, nor its use, for if they received it from the chief, the ordering would be done by the superior, and they would no longer be devisers of this ordering, but executors. Now from what has been said it is clear that all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intelligent being by the supreme God;^ nor can any intellect under- stand anything except by God's power, even as neither does any agent act except in so far as it acts by God's power. Therefore God Himself cares for all things immediately by His providence, and whoever is said to govern under Him is the executor of His providence. Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower providence, even as the statesman gives rules and laws to the commander in chief of the army, who in turn gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Con- sequently, if there be other providences subordinate to the highest provi- dence of the supreme God, God must give the second and third governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, He gives universal rules and laws or particular. If He gives them universal rules, since universal rules are not always applicable to particular cases, especially in matters that are sub- ject to movement and change, it would be necessary for these governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently, they would exercise judgment on the rules given to them, as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them. Now this is impossible, because such a judgment belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and the dispensation from their observance belong to Him Who made the law. Accordingly, judgment concerning universal rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief ; and this would not be possible unless He concerned Himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, He should be the immediate governor of such things. — If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes imme- diately from the divine providence. Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the ar- rangements made by thei lower governors, as to whether they be fitting or not. Consequently, if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor, it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them; which would be impossible if God did not consider the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore He personally cares for individuals bv Himself. Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by ^Ch. 67. PROVIDENCE AND SECONDARY CAUSES 143 Himself, this is either because He despises them or, as some say,^ lest His dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is absurd. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things, than in oper- ating in them. Consequently, if God works in all things, as was proved above, ^ and if, far from being derogatory to His dignity, on the contrary, this belongs to His all-pervading and supreme power, it is in no way con- temptible in Him, nor does it besmirch His dignity, if His providence ex- tends to these individual things immediately. Further. Every wise man, who uses his power providently, moderates that use in his actions, by directing the purpose and extent of that use ; or else his power would not be subject to his wisdom. Now it is clear from what has been said that the divine power, in its operations, extends to the lowest things.^ Consequently, divine wisdom directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they are to result therefrom, even in the very lowest of things. Therefore God Himself, by His providence, im- mediately plans the ordering of all things. Hence it is said {Rjom. xiii. i): Those that are, are ordained of God] and again {Judith ix. 4): Thou hast done the things of old, and hast de- vised one thing after another, and what thou hast designed hath been done. CHAPTER LXXVII THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES It must be observed that two things are required for providence, an order and an execution of the order. The first is the work of the cognitive power, and so those that are more perfect in knowledge are said to order others. For it belongs to the wise man to order The second is the work of the operative power. Now these two are in inverse proportion to each other. For the ordering is the more perfect according as it extends to the smallest things, whereas the execution of the least things belongs to a* lower power, proportionate to the effect. In God we find the highest perfection as to both, since in Him is the most perfect wisdom for ordering, and the most perfect power for operation. Consequently, He it is Who by His wisdom disposes all things even the very least in their order; but He executes the least or lowest things by means of other inferior powers, through which He operates, as a universal and higher power through an inferior and particular power. It is fitting, therefore, that there should be inferior active powers to execute the divine providence. "Cf. Averroes, In Metaph., XII, comm. 37; 52 (VIII, isov; 158V). ^Ch. 67!?. ^ Ibid. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982a iS)> 144 the SUMMA contra GENTILES Again. It was proved above that the divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes.^ But whatever is effected by the operations of secondary causes is subject to the divine providence, since God directs all individual things by Himself, as was proved above.- Therefore secondary causes execute the divine providence. Besides. The stronger the power of an agent, the further does its opera- tion extend; and thus, the greater the fire, the more distant things docs it heat. But this is not the case with an agent that does not act through an intermediary, because everything on which it acts is close to it. wSincc, then, the power of the divine providence is supreme, it must bring its operation to bear on the most distant things through certain intermediaries. Further. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and various executors of his rule, for the greater the number of his subordinates of various degrees, the more complete and extensive is his dominion shown to be. But no government can compare with the divine in point of dignity. Therefore it is fitting that the execution of the divine providence be com- mitted to agents of various degrees. Moreover. Suitable order is a proof of perfect providence, for order is the proper effect of providence. Now suitable order implies that nothing be allowed to be out of order. Consequently, the perfection of the divine provi- dence requires that it should reduce the excess of certain things over others to a suitable order. Now this is done by allowing those who have less to benefit from the superabundance of others. Since, then, the perfection of the universe requires that some share more abundantly in the divine good- ness, as we proved above, ^ the perfection of the divine providence demands that the execution of the divine government be fulfilled by those beings which have the larger share of divine goodness. Again. The order of causes excels the order of effects, even as the cause excels the effect consequently it is a greater witness to the perfection of providence. Now if there were no intermediary causes to execute the divine providence, there would be no order of causes in the world, but of effects only. Therefore the perfection of the divine providence requires interme- diary causes for its fulfillment. Hence it is written {Ps. cii. 21) : Bless the Lord, all ye His hosts: you ministers of His who do His will; and {Ps. cxlviii. 8) : Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfill His word, ^Ch. 69ff. “Ch. 76. ®C. G., 11, 45. PROVIDENCE AND INTELLECTUAL CREATURES 145 CHAPTER LXXVIII THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREATURES ARE RULED BY GOD Since it belongs to the divine providence that order be preserved in the world, and since suitable order consists in a proportionate descent from the highest to the lowest, it is proper that the divine providence should reach the most distant things according to a certain proportion. This proportion consists in this, that just as the highest creatures are subject to God and governed by Him, so the lower creatures are subject to, and are governed by, the higher. Now of all creatures the highest is the intellectual, as was proved above.^ Therefore, the very nature of the divine providence de- mands that the remaining creatures be ruled by rational creatures. Again. Whatever creature executes the order of the divine providence, does so in so far as it shares in the power of the supreme providence; just as the instrument has no movement except in so far as, through being moved, it shares in the power of the principal agent. Accordingly, those things which have a larger share in the power of the divine providence are the executors of the divine providence in regard to those whose share is smaller. Now intellectual creatures have a greater share in this power than others, because, while providence requires both the disposition of order, which is effected by a cognitive power, and execution, which is the work of the operative power, rational creatures share in both powers, whereas other creatures have only the latter. Therefore, all other creatures are ruled, under the divine providence, by rational creatures. Moreover. To whomsoever God gives a power, it is given in relation to the effect of that power; for then are all things disposed in the best way, when each one is directed to all the goods that it has a natural aptitude to produce. Now the intellectual power by its very nature is a directive and governing power. Hence we see that when they are united in the one sub- ject, the operative power follows the rule of the intellectual power: e.g,, in man the members of the body move at the will's command. The same may also be seen if they be in different subjects; since those men who excel in the operative power need to be directed by those who excel in the intellec- tual po,wer. Therefore the nature of the divine providence requires that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures. Again. Particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers, as may be seen both in art and in nature. Now it is evident that the intellectual power is more universal than any other operative power because it contains universal forms, whereas all operative powers proceed only from (?.,II, 46. 146 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES a form belonging to the operator. Therefore all other creatures must be moved and ruled by intellectual powers. Moreover. In all ordered powers, that one is directive of another which has the better knowledge about the plan to be followed. Thus we may ob- serve in the arts that the art which is concerned with the end (whence is taken the entire plan of the work to be produced) directs and governs the art that is immediately productive of that work: for instance, the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding, and the art which gives the form governs the art which prepares the material. On the other hand, the instru- ments, through having no knowledge of any plan, are governed only. Since, then, intellectual creatures alone are able to know the plan of the ordering of creatures, it belongs to them to rule and govern all other creatures. Further. That which is through itself is the cause of that which is by an- other. Now intellectual creatures alone act through themselves, since they are masters of their own actions through the choice of their wills; whereas other creatures act through natural necessity, as being moved by another. Therefore intellectual creatures by their operations move and rule other creatures. CHAPTER LXXIX THAT LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER Since some intellectual creatures are higher than others, as we have shown, ^ the lower intellectual natures must needs be governed by the higher. Again. The more universal powers move the particular powers, as was already stated.^ But the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as we have proved.^ Therefore they rule the lower intellectual na- tures. Besides. The intellectual power that is nearer to the principle is always found to be the ruler of the intellectual power that is more distant from the principle. This is evident both in the speculative and in the practical sci- ences. For the speculative science that receives its principles of demonstra- tion from another is said to be subalternate to it, and the practical science that is nearer to the end, which is the principle in practical matters, is the master science in comparison with the more distant. Since, then, some in- tellectual substances are nearer to the first principle, namely, God, as we have shown,^ they will be the rulers of the others. ^ Moreover. The higher intellectual substances receive the influence of the divine wisdom more perfectly, since each one receives something according to its mode. Now all things are governed by the divine wisdom, so that ^ C. G., II, 91, 95. "Ch. 78. *C.G.,n, 98. *C. CP., 11 , 95. THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS 147 those which have the greater share of divine wisdom govern those which have the smaller share. Therefore the lower intellectual substances are gov- erned by the higher. Therefore the higher spirits are called both angels j inasmuch as they direct the lower spirits, by annunciation as it were, for angels are so called as being messengers; and minister Sj inasmuch as by their operation they execute, even in corporeal things, the order of the divine providence, be- cause a minister is like an animate instrument, according to the Philoso- pher.^ And so it is said {Ps. ciii. 4) : Who makest thy angels spirits, and thy ministers a burning fire. CHAPTER LXXX THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS TOWARDS ONE ANOTHER Since corporeal beings are governed by spiritual beings, as we have proved,^ and since there is an order among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. Now the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power. But the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body. Therefore the higher intellec- tual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power, and consequently are not united to bodies, whereas the lower intellectual substances have limited powers which depend on certain corporeal instru- ments for their work, and consequently need to be united to bodies. And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposition of things, in that they are acquainted with the plan of the order, even as regards individuals, by receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance, made by God, reaches to the lowest intellectual sub- stances. As it is said (Job xxv. 3) : Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise? On the other hand, the lower in- tellects do not receive this manifestation so perfectly as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of the divine providence left to their exe- cution, but only in a general way; and the lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so, that the human intel- lect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most universal things. Accordingly, the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question. This perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them; just as we have I, 4 (1253b 29). ®Ch. 78. 148 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES said above that the universal knowledge of the disciple is brought to per- fection by means of the specific knowledge of the teacher.^ Hence it is that Dionysius, speaking of the highest intellectual substances which he assigns to the first hierarchy or holy sovereignty , says that they are not sanctified by means of other substances, hut that they are placed by God Himself immediately around Him, and as far as possible close to Ilis immaterial and invisible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemn plate the intelligible models of His works] and by these, he says, the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed? Hence the higher intellects receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge. Now in every disposition of providence, the ordering itself among effects is derived from the form of the agents, since the effect must needs proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. But it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the disposition of providence is the end ; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of the effects. Con- sequently, in the ordination of the intellect the most important thing is that the nature of order be considered in the end] the second thing is that the na- ture of order be considered in the form] while the third thing is that the dis- position itself of the order be known in itself and not in a higher principle. Therefore the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, just as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding; and the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements preparing the way for the form, just as the art of ship- building governs the handiwork of the builders. Consequently, there is a certain order among the intellects which take from God Himself an immediate and perfect knowledge of the order of the divine providence. The first and highest perceive the nature of the provi- dential order in the last end itself which is the divine goodness. Some of them, however, perceive more clearly than others; and these are called Seraphim, i.e,, fiery or setting on fire, because fire is used to designate the intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their fervent and intent activity towards God, and their leading of lower things to God as their end? The second place belongs to those that know perfectly the nature of the providential order in the divine form; and these are called Cherubim, which signifies fullness of knowledge, for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Therefore Dionysius says that their name indi- cates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty? The third grade is of those that contemplate the disposition of divine judgments in itself; and they are called Thrones, because the throne is sig- ^Ch. 75. Caeh Eier., VII, 2 (PG 3, 208). ^ Op. cit., VII, i (PG 3, 205). ^Ibid. THE ORDERING OF THE ANGEL'S 149 nificative of judicial power, according to Ps. ix. 5: Thou hast sat on the throne^ who judgest justice. Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are God-hearers and ready for the obedient fulfillment of all divine undertakings} ^ What has been said, however, must not be understood as though the divine goodness, the divine essence and the divine knowledge of the dispo- sition of things were three distinct things, but in the sense that there is a different consideration of God according to these different attributes. Again. There must be order among even the lower spirits who receive from the higher spirits a perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. Because the higher ones among them are also of a more universal power of understanding, so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes; but those beneath them, from more particular causes, for a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies would be of a higher in- tellect than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly, those spirits that are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God, the supremely universal cause, and particular causes, are themselves between those who are able to consider the nature of the aforesaid order in God Himself and those who need to consider it in particu- lar causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy which, according to him, governs the lowest hierarchy, just as it is governed by the highest.^ Again. Among these intellectual substances also there must be some kind of order, since the universal disposition of providence is distributed, first of all, among many executors. This work belongs to the order of Domina- tionsj because to command what others execute belongs to one having do- minion. Hence Dionysius says that domination signifies a certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection} Secondly, it is distributed by the operator and executor in reference to many effects. This is done by the order of Virtues, whose names, as Dionyi^us says in the same passage, designates a certain strength and virility in carrying out the divine opera- tions, without so much as swerving, through weakness, from the divine movement. Hence ii is evident that the principle of universal operation belongs to this order: so that apparently the movement of the heavenly bodies belongs to this order also, from which as from universal causes par- ticular effects ensue in nature. That is why they are called powers of heaven in Luke xxi. 26, where it is said: The powers of heaven shall be moved. To the same spirits seems to belong the execution of those divine works which are done outside the order of nature. For these are the high- est of God’s ministries, and hence Gregory says that the Virtues are those spirits through which miracles are frequently wrought} And if there be ^Op. cit., VIII, 1 (PG 3, 237). ^Tn Evang., horn. 34 (PL 76, 1251). 150 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES anything else of a universal and prominent nature in the fulfillment of the divine ministry, it is fittingly ascribed to this order. Thirdly, the universal order of providence, once established in its effects, is guarded from confusion by curbing the things which might disturb that order. This belongs to the order of Powers. Therefore Dionysius says in the same place that the name Powers implies a well-established order ^ without confusion j in the dimne undertakings] and so Gregory says that it belongs to this order to check contrary powers?- The lowest of superior intellectual substances are those that receive from God the knowledge of the order of the divine providence as knowable in relation to particular causes. These are placed in immediate authority over human affairs. Of them Dionysius says: This third rank of spirits presides, in consequence, over the human hierarchy? By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes that are sub- ordinated to man and serve for his use, as we have already explained.'^ Among these also there is a certain order. For in human affairs there is a common good, namely, the good of the city or of the nation,’^ and this seems to belong to the order of Principalities. Hence Dionysius says in the same chapter that the name Principality indicates leadership in a sacred order. Hence mention is made {Dan. x. 12-20) of Michael the Prince of the Jews, of a Prince of the Persians, and of a Prince of the Greeks. And thus the government of kingdoms, and the change of supremacy from one nation to another, must belong to the ministry of this order. It would also seem part of their office to instruct those men who are in positions of au- thority in matters pertaining to the administration of their office. There is also a human good, not common to many, but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: e.g., those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like. This belongs to the Archangels, of whom Gregory says that they announce the highest things? Thus we call Gabriel an Archangel, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, which is an article of faith for all. There is also a human good that belongs to each one singly. This per- tains to the order of Angels, of whom Gregory says that they announce minor matters.^ Hence they are called guardian angels according to Ps. xc. 11: He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. Therefore Dionysius says that the Archangels are between the Principali- ties and the Angels, because they have something in common with both: with the Principalities, inasmuch as they lead the lower angels, and rightly so, because in human affairs matters of restricted interest must be regu- lated according to those that are of common interest; and with the Angels, because they announce to the Angels, and through the Angels, to us, for it -^Ihid. ^De Gael. Hier., IX, 2 (PG 3, 260). ^Ch. 71. "Cf. Aristotle, Eih,, I, 2 (1094b 8). ^In Evang., bom. 34 (PL 76, 1250), '^THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS 151 is the duty of the latter to announce to men what concerns each individ- ual} For this reason the lowest order has received as proper the name common to all, because, that is to say, its duty is to announce to us imme- diately. And so the name Archangel is, as it were, composed of both, since Archangel means a Principal Angel, Gregory, however, assigns the ordering of the heavenly spirits differ- ently.- For he places the Principalities among the spirits of the second rank, immediately after the Dominations, and the Virtues among the low- est, above the Archangels. But to one who considers the matter carefully, the difference is but small. For, according to Gregory, the Principalities are not placed over nations but over good spirits, as holding the principal place in the execution of the divine ministry. For, says he, to he principal is to stand in a higher place than others} According to the explanation given above, we said that this belonged to the Virtues. — As for the Virtues, ac- cording to Gregory they are assigned to certain’ particular operations when, in some special case, outside the usual order of things, miracles have to be wrought. In this way they are fittingly numbered among the lowest angels. Both explanations have the authority of the Apostle. For he says {Ephes. i. 20, 21): Setting Him, namely Christ, on his right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion, where it is clear that in the ascending order he places the Powers above the Prin- cipalities, and the Virtues above these, and the Dominations above the last named. This is the order adopted by Dionysius. But speaking of Christ to the Colossians (i. 16) ..he says: Whether thrones or dominations or princi- palities or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him. Here we see that beginning with the Thrones, in a descending order, he places the Dominations under them, beneath these the Principalities, and lower still the Powers. This is the order adopted by Gregory. Mention is made of the Seraphim in Isa. vi. 2, 6 ; of the Cherubim, Ezech. i. 3 ; of the Archangels, in the canonical epistle of Jude (9) : When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, etc.; and of the Angels, in the Psalms, as was already observed. In all ordered powers there is this in common, that the lower all work by the power of the higher. Hence what we have stated as belonging to the order of Seraphim, all the lower angels accomplish by the power of the Seraphim; and the same applies to the other orders. '^De Gael. Bier., IX, 2 (PG 3, 257). ^ In Evang., horn. 34 (PL 76, 1249). (PL 76, 1251). Ibid. 152 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LXXXI ON THE ORDERING OF MEN TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO OTHER THINGS In compaxison with other intellectual substances, the human soul holds the lowest place, because, as we have already stated,^ when it is first cre- ated it receives the knowledge of the order of the divine providence only in a general way; whereas, in order to acquire a perfect knowledge of that order in the particular, it needs to start from things themselves, in which the order of the divine providence is already established in detail. Conse- quently the human soul needs bodily organs, so as to be able to receive knowledge from corporeal things. But because of the weakness of its intellectual light, it is unable to acquire from things a perfect knowledge of what concerns man without the help of higher spirits; for God so dis- poses that the lower spirits reach perfection through the higher, as we have already proved.- Since, however, man has some share of intellectual light, brute animals, which have none at all, are subject to man according to the order of the divine providence. Hence it is said {Gen. i. 26) : Let ms make man to our own image and likeness, that is to say, inasmuch as he is an intelligent being, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth. Brute animals, though bereft of intellect, yet, since they have some kind of knowledge, are placed by the order of the divine providence above plants and other things devoid of knowledge. Hence it is said {Gen. i, 29-30) : Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth. Among those that are wholly bereft of knowledge, one thing is placed before another according as one is more capable of action than another. For they have no share in the disposition of providence, but only in the execution. And since man has both intellect and sense, and bodily power, these are ordered to one another, according to the disposition of the divine provi- dence, in likeness to the order to be observed in the universe. For bodily power is subject to the powers of sense and intellect, as carrying out their commands; and the sensitive power is subject to the intellectual power, and is controlled by its rule. In the same way, we find order among men. For those who excel in intel- lect are naturally rulers, whereas those who are less intelligent, but strong in body, seem made by nature for service, as Aristotle says in his Politics? ^ Ch. 80. ® Ch. 79. spoilt., I, 5 (1254b 2$). THE ORDERING OF MEN 153 The statement of Solomon (Prov. xi. 29) is in agreement with this: The fool shall serve the wise; as also the words of Exodus (xviii. 21, 22) : Pro- vide out of all the people wise men such as fear God . . . who may fudge the people at all times. And just as in the works of one man there is disorder because the intel- lect is obsequious to the sensual power, while the sensual power, through the indisposition of the body, is drawn to the movement of the body, as is evident in those who limp: so, too, in human government disorder results when a man is set in authority, not because of his excelling in intellect, but because he has usurped the government by bodily force, or because he has been appointed to rule through motives of sensual desire. Nor does Solomon omit to mention this disorder, for he says {Eccles. x. 5, 6) : There is an evil that I have seen under the sun^ as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince; a fool set in high dignity. Now the divine provi- dence is not denied by a disorder of this kind. For it results, by God^s per- mission, from a defect in the lower agents, just as we have said of other evils. ^ Nor is the natural order wholly perverted by such a disorder, for the government of fools is weak, unless it be strengthened by the counsels of the wise. Hence it is said {Prov. xx. 18) : Designs are strengthened by counsels f and wars are to be arranged by governments; and (xxiv. 5, 6): A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety when there are many counsels. And since the counsellor rules him who receives his coun- sel, and, in a sense, governs him, it is said {Prov. xvii. 2) that a wise serv- ant shall rule over foolish sons. It is therefore evident that the divine providence imposes order on all things, and thus the Apostle says truly {Rom. xiii. i ) that the things which are of God are well ordered. CHAPTER LXXXII THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES Just as in intellectual substances some are of higher and some of lower degree, so too in corporeal substances. Now intellectual substances are governed by higher substances, so that the disposition of the divine provi- dence may reach down proportionately to the lowest things, as we have already said.^ Therefore, in like manner, bodies of lower degree are ruled by those of a higher. Again. The higher a body is as regards its place, the more formal it is; and hence it is reasonably the place of a lower body, because form con- ^Ch. 71. "Ch. 78ff.. 154 the SUMMA contra GENTILES tains even as place does. Thus water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. Now the heavenly bodies have a higher place than all others. Therefore they are more formal and consequently more active than all other bodies. Therefore they act on lower bodies, and consequently the latter are ruled by them. Besides. That which in its nature is perfected without contrariety is of more universal power than that which in its nature is not perfected with- out contrariety. For contrariety arises from differences which determine and contract the genus, and therefore in the conception of the intellect, inasmuch as it is universal, the species of contraries are not contrary to one another, since they coexist in the intellect. Now the heavenly bodies are perfected in their respective natures without any contrariety, for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold, whereas lower bodies are not perfected in their respective natures without any contrariety. This is proved by their movements, for there is no contrary to the circular move- ment of the heavenly bodies, so that there can be nothing violent in them; whereas there are movements contrary to that of the lower bodies: c.g., downward movement is contrary to upward movement. Iherefore the heavenly bodies have a more universal power than lower bodies. Now universal powers move particular powers, as we have proved.^ Therefore the heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies. Moreover. We have shown that all other things are ruled by intellectual substances.^ Now the heavenly bodies resemble the intellectual substances more than other bodies do, inasmuch as they are incorruptible. Moreover, they are nearer to them, inasmuch as they are moved by them immediately, as we have shown above. ^ Therefore lower bodies are ruled by them. Further. The first principle of movement must be something unmoved. Consequently, things that approach nearest to immobility must be the movers of others. Now the heavenly bodies approach nearer to the immo- bility of a first principle than do lower bodies, for they have but one species of movement, namely local, whereas other bodies have all manner of move- ments. Therefore the heavenly bodies move and rule the lower bodies. Again, In each genus the first is the cause of that which comes after. Now the movement of the heavens is the first of all movements. First, be- cause local movement precedes all others. — It precedes time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in Physics viii.‘^ It precedes in nature, because without it there could be no other, since a thing cannot be in- creased without a previous alteration, whereby that which was dissimilar is transformed and assimilated; nor can there be alteration without a pre- vious change of place, since in order that there be alteration, the cause of alternation must become nearer to the subject altered than it was before. — And it precedes in perfection, because local movement does not cause a thing to vary in respect of something inherent, but only in respect of some- 78. ®Ch. 80. ^ Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 7 (260b 29). DIVINE GOVERNMENT: CONCLUSION 155 thing extrinsic; and for this reason it belongs to a thing already perfect. Secondly, because, even among local movements, circular movement holds the first place. It is first in time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in Physics viii.^ It is first by nature, because it excels in simplicity and unity, since it is not divided into beginning, middle and end, but is all middle, as it were. And it is first in perfection, because it returns to its principle. Thirdly, because only the movement of the heavens is always regular and uniform, since in the movements of heavy and light bodies the speed increases towards the end if the movement be natural, and decreases if the movement be violent. Therefore the movement of the heavens must be the cause of all other movements. Further. As that which is absolutely immovable is in comparison with movement absolutely, so is that which is immovable in respect of a par- ticular kind of movement, in comparison with that particular movement. Now that which is absolutely immovable is the principle of all movement, as we have proved.^ Therefore that which is immovable in respect of altera- tion is the principle of all alteration. But of all corporeal things the heav- enly bodies alone are unalterable, and this is proved by their disposition, which is always the same. Therefore the body of the heavens is the cause of alteration in all alterable things. But in this lower world alteration is the principle of all movement, because alteration leads to augmentation and generation, and the generator is an essential mover in the local move- ment of heavy and light bodies. Consequently, the heavens must be the cause of all movement in these lower bodies. Therefore it is evident that lower bodies are governed by God by means of the heavenly bodies. CHAPTER LXXXIII CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING From all that has been proved hitherto, we are able to conclude that, as regards the design of the order to be imposed on things, God governs all things by Himself.^ Therefore Gregory, commenting on Job xxxiv. 13 {What other hath He appointed over the earth?) says: He who created the world by Himself governs it by Himself]^ and Boethius says: God rules all things by Himself alone^ As to the execution, however, He gov- erns the lower by means of the higher things: — ^bodily things by means of spiritual things,^ and hence Gregory says: In this visible world nothing ^op. cit,, vm, 8 (261b 27). ^C. G., I, 13. '^Ch. 77. ^ Moral, XXIV, 20 (PL 76, 314). ^De Consol, III, prose 12 (PL 63, 777). Ch. 78. 156 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES can he ruled except by means of the invisible creature] '—the lower spirits by the higher,^ and hence Dionysius says that the intelligent heavenly substances first of all shed forth the divine enlightenment on themselves, and bestow on us manifestations which surpass our capacity]'^-— nuA the lower bodies by the higher,^ and hence Dionysius says that the sun con- tributes to the generation of visible bodies, as also to life itself, by means of nourishment, growth and perfection, by cleansing and renewing themJ^ Of all these together Augustine says: As the grosser and lower bodies arc ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power, so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the sinful rational spirit by the righteous rational spirit!' CHAPTER LXXXIV THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES DO NOT ACT ON OUR INTELLECTS From what has been said it is at once clear that the heavenly bodies can- not be the causes of what belongs to the intellect. For it has already been shown that the order of divine providence requires lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher.'^' Now the intellect, according to the order of nature, surpasses all bodies, as we have already proved;'^ Consequently, the heavenly bodies cannot act directly on the intellect. Therefore they can- not be the direct cause of what belongs to the intellect. Again. No body acts except through movement, as is proved in Physics viii.'^ Now things that are immovable are not caused by movement, because nothing is the result of the movement of an agent except when the agent, while in motion, moves the patient. Consequently, things that are wholly outside movement cannot be caused by the heavenly bodies. But what ])e- longs to the intellect is, properly speaking, wholly outside movement, as the Philosopher states.^'' In fact, the soul becomes prudent and wise through being free from movement, as he says in the same place. It is not possible, therefore, that the heavenly bodies be the direct cause of what belongs to the intellect. Besides. If nothing be caused by a body except in so far as the body causes movement through being moved, it follows that whatever receives an impression from a body must be moved. Now nothing is moved except a body, as is proved in Physics vi.^"'- Therefore whatever receives an impres- sion from a body must be either a body or a bodily power. But it was proved in the Second Book that the intellect is neither a body nor a bodily power Therefore the heavenly bodies cannot directly act on the intellect. ^Dial, IV, 6 (PL 77, 329). "Ch. 79. ^De Gael Hier., IV, 2 (PG 3, iSo). ^ Ch. 82. Div. Nom., IV, 4 (PG 3, 697, 700). ”De Trin., Ill, 4 (PL 42, 873). "Ch. 78fl «C. G., II, 49ff- ‘'Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 6 (2S9b 7). Op. cit., VII, 3 (247b i) . Op. cit., VI, 4 (234b lo) . “ C. G., II, 49ff. MAN^S INTELLECT AND HEAVENLY BODIES 157 Further. Whatever is moved by a thing is reduced by it from poten- tiality to act. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something intact. Therefore every agent and mover must be, in some way, in act with regard to those things to which the passive or moved subject is in potentiality. But the heavenly bodies are not actually intelligible because they are singular sensibles. Since, then, our intellect is not in poten- tiality except to what is actually intelligible, it is impossible for the heav- enly bodies to act directly on the intellect. Moreover. A thing’s proper operation follows its nature, which generated things acquire by generation, together with their proper operation. This may be seen in heavy and light things, which have their proper movement as soon as they are generated, unless there be an obstacle; and for this reason the generator is said to be a mover. Consequently, that which, as regards the cause of its nature, is not subject to the action of the heavenly bodies, cannot be subject to them in respect of its operation. Now the intel- lectual part of man is not caused by any bodily principles, but is entirely from an extrinsic source, as we proved above.^ Therefore the operation of the intellect is not directly subject to the heavenly bodies. Again. Things caused by the heavenly movements are subject to time, which is the measure of the first heavenly movement? Therefore those things that wholly abstract from time are not subject to heavenly move- ments. Now the intellect in its operation abstracts from time, as also from place; for it considers the universal which abstracts from here and now. Hence the operation of the intellect is not subject to heavenly movements. Further. Nothing acts outside its species. Now the act of understanding transcends the species and form of any corporeal agent, since every cor- poreal form is material and individuated ; whereas the act of understanding is informed by its object which is universal and immaterial. Consequently, no body can understand by means of its corporeal form. Much less, therefore, can any body whatsoever cause in another the act of understanding. Besides. A thing is not subject to that which is beneath it in respect of that by which it is united to things above it. Now our soul, inasmuch as it is intelligent, is united to intellectual substances, which in the order of nature are above heavenly bodies; because our soul cannot understand except in so far as it derives its intellectual light from those substances. Therefore the intellectual operation cannot be directly subject to the heav- enly movements. Moreover. We shall find a confirmation of this if we consider what phi- losophers have said in the matter. The natural philosophers of old, e.g,, Democritus, Empedocles and others, held that intellect does not differ from sense, as is stated in Metaph. iv^ and De Anima iii.^ Hence it followed that, as sense is a corporeal power resultiiig from a corporeal transmuta- ’ C. G., 11 , 86 ff. ’'Aristotle, Phys., IV, 14 (223b 17)* ® Aristotle, Metaph., IV, 5 (xoo9b 13). ‘‘Aristotle, De An., Ill, 3 (427a 21). 158 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES tion, so likewise was the intellect. Therefore they said, as the transmutation of the lower bodies follows transmutation of the higher bodies, that intel- lectual operation follows the movements of the heavenly bodies. In the words of Homer: The intellect of gods and men on earth is even as their dajf which comes from the father of men and godsf^ — namely, the sun, or rather Jupiter, whom they called the supreme god, understanding by this the whole heavens, as Augustine says.^ Hence, too, followed the opinion of the Stoics who said that intellectual knowledge is caused by images of bodies being imprinted on the mind, just as a mirror, or a page, receives the imprinted characters without any action on its part, as Boethius relates.^ According to this opinion, it fol- lowed that our intellectual notions were chiefly the result of impressions received from heavenly bodies; and consequently it was chiefly the Stoics who held that man’s life was bound by a kind of fatal necessity. — This opinion, however, is shown to be false, as Boethius says in the same refer- ence, by the fact that the intellect is capable of composing and dividing, compares the highest with the lowest, and knows universal and simple forms, — none of which is within the capacity of bodies. Consequently, it is evident that the intellect does not merely receive the images of bodies, but is possessed of a power that transcends bodies; for the external senses, which receive only images of bodies, do not extend to the things mentioned above. All subsequent philosophers, however, distinguished intellect from sense, and assigned, not bodies, but immaterial things as the cause of our knowl- edge. Thus Plato ascribed this to the Forms and Aristotle to the agent intellect. From all this we may gather that to say that the heavenly bodies are the cause of our knowledge is a sequel to the opinion of those who held that intellect does not differ from sense, as Aristotle also observes.'^ Now it is evident that this opinion is false. Therefore, manifestly false is like- wise the opinion of those who maintained that the heavenly bodies are the direct cause of our knowledge. For this reason Holy Scripture assigns as the cause of our knowledge, not a body, but God {Job xxxv. lo, ii) : Where is God who made me; who hath given songs in the night; who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air? Again {Ps. xciii. lo) : He that teacheth man knowledge. Nevertheless, we must observe that, although the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of our knowledge, they can contribute something indi- rectly towards it. For though the intellect is not a power of the body, yet in us the operation of the intellect cannot be exercised without the opera- tion of bodily powers, namely, the imagination, the memory and the cogita- ^ Odyssey, XVIII, 136^. • ^ De Civit. Dei, IV, ii (PL 41, 121). “De Consol., V, verse 4 (PL 63, 850). ^De An., Ill, 3 (427a 21). FREE CHOICE AND HEAVENLY BODIES 159 tive power, as we have already shown.^ Hence it is that when the activity of these powers is hampered by some bodily indisposition, the activity of the intellect is also hampered, as may be seen in cases of frenzy, lethargy and the like. For the same reason, goodness of disposition in a man's body fits him to understand easily, inasmuch as these bodily powers are strength- ened by such a disposition. Therefore it is said in De Anima ii, that It is to be observed that men of soft flesh are of quick intelligence? Now the disposition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movements. For Augustine says that it is not altogether absurd to ascribe the mere differ- ences between bodies to the influence of the stars and Damascene says that the various planets produce in us various temperaments j habits and dispositions? Consequently, the heavenly bodies contribute indirectly to the goodness of our understanding. Thus, even as physicians are able to judge of a man's intellect from his bodily temperament, as a proximate disposition thereto, so too can an astrologer, from the heavenly movements, as being a remote cause of this disposition. In this sense we can approve of the saying of Ptolemy: When Mercury is in one of Saturn^ s regions at the time of a man^s birth j and he is waxing j he bestows on him a quick in- telligence of the inner nature of things? CHAPTER LXXXV THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR WILLING AND CHOOSING It is also evident from the foregoing that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing. For the will is in the intellectual part of the soul, according to the Phi- losopher.^ Therefore, if the heavenly bodies cannot make a direct impres- sion on bur intellect, as we have proved,'^ neither will they be able to influ- ence the will directly. Moreover. All choice and actual willing in us is caused immediately through an intellectual apprehension, for the apprehended good is the ob- ject of the will.^ Therefore there cannot ensue perverseness of choice, un- less the judgment of the intellect err in the particular object of choice, as the Philosopher states.^ But the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our intellectual apprehension. Therefore neither can they be the cause of our choice. Further. Whatever takes place in this lower world, through the influence G., II, 68. ® Aristotle, De An., II, 9 (421a 26). ^ De Civit. Dei, V, 6 (PL 41, 146). ^De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893). ® Ptolemy, Centiloquium, verbum 38. ^De An., Ill, 9 (432b 6). '^Ch. 84. ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433a 16). ^ Eth., VII, 3 (1147a i). i6o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES of heavenly bodies, happens naturally, since the things here below are natu- rally subordinate to them. If, therefore, the heavenly bodies have any influ- ence on our choice, this must happen naturally; so that, in fact, man natu- rally chooses to perform his actions, even as brute animals perform theirs from natural instinct, and as inanimate bodies are moved naturally. Con- sequently, there not be two active principles, namely, the free and the natural, but only one, namely, nature. But Aristotle proves the contrary.^ Therefore it is untrue that the influence of the heavenly bodies is the cause of our choice. Besides. Things that happen naturally are brought to their end by deter- minate means. Hence they always happen in the same way, for nature is determined to uniformity. But man’s choice tends to the end in various ways, both in morals and in things made by art. Therefore man’s choosing does not come from nature. Again. Things which are done naturally, for the most part are done rightly, since nature fails but seldom. Consequently, if man chose by na- ture, his choice would be right for the most part; which is clearly false. Therefore man does not choose naturally, although this would be the case if his choice were subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies. Further. Things of the same species do not differ in those natural opera- tions which result from the specific nature. Hence each swallow makes its nest in the same way, and every man equally understands the first prin- ciples which are known naturally. Now choosing is an operation that re- sults from the human species. Consequently, if man chose naturally, all men would choose in the same way; and this is evidently untrue, both in morals and in things made by art. Moreover. Virtue and vice are proper principles of choice, because the virtuous and the vicious man differ through choosing contraries. Now political virtues and vices are not in us by nature but by habituation. The Philosopher proves this from the fact that we acquire the habit of those pperations to which we are accustomed, especially from childhood.- Our choosing therefore does not come from nature, and consequently, it is not caused by the influence of the heavenly bodies, whose effects happen naturally. Again. The heavenly bodies make no direct impression except on bodies, as we have shown.'"^ Consequently, if they are the cause of our choosing, this will be by an impression made either on our bodies or on external bodies. Yet in neither way can they be a sufficient cause of our choosing. For the objective presentation of some corporeal thing cannot be the suf- ficient cause of our choice, since it is clear that when a man meets with something that pleases him, be it meat or woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose these things, whereas the intemperate is. Again, no possible change wrought in our bodies by an impression of the heavenly '^Phys., n, 5 (196b 16). II, i (1103a 19). ''‘Ch. 84. FREE. CHOICE AND HEAVENLY BODIES i6i bodies can suffice to cause us to make a choice. For all that results there- from are certain passions, more or less violent, and passions, however vio- lent, are not a sufficient cause of choosing, since the same passions lead the incontinent to follow them by choice, and fail to induce the continent man. Therefore it cannot be said that the heavenly bodies cause our choice. Further. No power is bestowed on a being without a purpose. Now man has the power of judging and of taking counsel about all matters relative to his own actions, whether in the use of externals, or in giving a loose or a tight rein to his internal passions. But this would be of no use, if our choice were the result of the heavenly bodies and not in our own power. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our choice. Besides. Man is naturally a political or social animal} This is evident from the fact that one man does not suffice for himself if he live alone, because the things are few wherein nature makes adequate provision for man, since she gave him his reason by means of which he might provide himself with all necessaries of life, such as food, clothes and so forth, for the production of which one man is not enough. Therefore man has a natural inclination to live in society. Now the order of providence does not deprive a thing of what is natural to it; rather is each thing provided for according to its nature, as we have said above.^ Therefore man is not so made by the order of providence as to be deprived of social life. Yet he would be deprived of it, were our choice to proceed from the influence of the heavenly bodies, like the natural instinct of other animals. Moreover. Laws and precepts of conduct would be useless were man not the master of his own choice; and useless, too, would be punishments and rewards for the good and the wicked, if it were not in our power to choose this or that. And yet, if there were not such things, there would be at once an end to society. Consequently, man is not so made according to the order of providence that his choice should result from the movements of the heavenly bodies. Again. A man’s choice is of good and evil things. Hence, if our choosing were the result of the movements of the stars, it would follow that the stars are the essential cause of wicked deeds. But that which is evil has no natu- ral cause, since evil results from a defect in a cause, and has no essential cause, as we have proved.^ Therefore it is impossible that our choice be the direct and essential effect of the heavenly bodies. Someone, however, might endeavor to meet this argument by saying that every evil choice results from the desire of some particular good, as we have proved above. ^ Thus the choice of the lustful man arises from his desire for a good consisting in sexual pleasure ; and some star causes move- ment to this general good. In fact, this is necessary for the generating of animals; and this common good was not to be omitted because of the ^Aristotle, I, 7 (1097b ii)' ^Ch. 71. * Ch. 4ff. ^ Ch. s and 6. 162 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES particular evil of an individual who, through this instigation, chooses an evil. But this reply is not sufficient if we suppose the heavenly bodies to be the essential cause of our choice by making direct impressions on our intel- lect and will. For the impression made by a universal cause is received in a thing according to that thing’s mode. Consequently, the effect of a star, which causes a movement towards pleasure connected in an ordinate man- ner with generation, will be received into a thing according to the mode proper thereto. Thus we see that various animals have various ways and various times of coming together, as becomes their nature, as Aristotle remarks.^ Hence the intellect and will receive the impression of that star according to their mode. Now when a thing is desired according to the mode of the intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice, which is always evil through not being according to right reason. Therefore if the heavenly bodies were the cause of our choice, we should never make an evil choice. Further. No active power extends to things above the species and nature of the agent, because every agent acts through its form. Now, to will, as also to understand, transcends every corporeal species; for just as our intel- lect understands the universal, so our will tends to the universal: e.g., we dislike every kind of thief, as the Philosopher says.- Therefore the act of the will is not caused by a heavenly body. Besides. Things directed to an end are proportioned to that end. Now, our choice is directed to happiness as to the last end. And this does not consist in bodily goods, but in the union of our soul, through the intellect, with divine things. This was proved above to be the case both according to the teaching of Faith and according to the teaching of the philoso- phers.^ Therefore the heavenly bodies cannot be the cause of our choice. Hence it is said (Jer. x. 2, ^): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven which the heathens fear; for the laws of people are vain. Thus is refuted the opinion of the Stoics,'^ who held that all our actions, even our every choice, are governed by the heavenly bodies.— This is also said to have been the opinion of the Pharisees among the Jews of old.^^— And the Priscillianists were also guilty of this error, as is stated in De Haeresibus,^ This was also the opinion of the ancient physicists, who held that intel- lect does not differ from sense.’^ Therefore Empedocles, as quoted by Aris- totle, said that the will of mafi, like that of other animals , is strengthened presently, i.e., according to the present moment, by the movement of the heavens which is the cause of time. We must observe, however, that although the heavenly bodies are not the Fwi. V, 8 (542a i). II, 4 (1382a 6) . ^ Ch 25ff Cf ch. 84. ^ Josephus, Antiquities, XIII, 5, 9 (VII, 3x0, 3x2). « St. Augustine, De Haeres., 70 (PL 42, 44)- ^ Cf. ch. 84. ^ De An,, III, 3 (427a 22). THE HEAVENLY BODIES AND CONTINGENCY 163 direct cause of our choosing, by making a direct impression on our will, nevertheless indirectly they do occasion our choice, through making an impression on bodies. This happens in two ways. First, the impression made by a heavenly body on bodies other than our own may be an occa- sion of our making a particular choice. Thus, when through the action of the heavenly bodies the air becomes intensely cold, we choose to warm ourselves by the fire, or to do something similarly befitting the moment. Secondly, they may make impressions on our own body. Now when the body is affected, movements of the passions arise, either because such im- pressions make us liable to certain passions (for instance, the bilious are prone to anger), or because they produce in us a bodily disposition that occasions a particular choice (thus, when we are ill, we choose to' take medicine). — Sometimes, too, the heavenly bodies are a cause of human acts, when through an indisposition of the body a person goes out of his mind, and loses the use of reason. Such persons are not capable of choos- ing, properly speaking, but they are moved by a natural instinct, like brute animals. It is evident, however, and we know by experience, that such occasions, whether exterior or interior, are not a necessary cause of choice ; since man can use his reason to reject or obey them. But those who follow their natural bent are in the majority, and few, namely, the wise alone, are those who avoid the occasions of ill-doing and who follow not the impulse of nature. Hence Ptolemy says that the soul of the wise man assists the work of the stars and that the astrologer cannot read the stars unless, he knows well the bent of the mind and the natural temperament \ and that the astrologer should not express himself in detail hut only in general terms?’ For the majority do not resist their bodily disposition, and so the impression of the stars takes effect in them; but not always in this or that individual who, it may happen, uses his reason to resist that inclination. CHAPTER LXXXVI THAT CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN THIS LOWER WORLD DO NOT RESULT OF NECESSITY FROM THE ACTION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES Not only are the heavenly bodies unable to necessitate man’s choice, but even corporeal effects do not proceed from them of necessity. For the impressions of universal causes are received by their effects according to the mode of the recipient. Now the things of this lower world are fluctuating and changeable, both by reason of matter, which is in po- ^Ptolemy, Centiloquiwnf verbum 8. ^ Op, cit,, verbum i. THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 164 tentiality to several forms, and because of the contrariety of forms and powers. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies are not received with necessity by these lower bodies. Again. A remote cause does not lead to a necessary result, unless the middle cause be also necessary. In a syllogism, for instance, if the major premise be a necessary proposition, and the minor a contingent proposi- tion, the conclusion that follows is not necessary. Now the heavenly bodies are remote causes, and the proximate causes of the effects here below are the active and passive powers in the bodies of this lower world; and these are not necessary, but contingent, causes, for they can fail in a few in- stances. Therefore the heavenly bodies do not produce necessary effects in these lower bodies. Besides. The heavenly bodies are always moved in the same way. Con- sequently, if the heavenly bodies produced a necessary effect on these lower bodies, there would be no variety in the things that happen in this world. Now, they are not always the same, but only for the most part. Therefore they do not happen necessarily. Moreover. Many contingents do not make one necessary thing, since, just as each one of them by itself may fail in its effect, so too may all of them together. Now it is evident that in these lower bodies each thing that happens through the influence of the heavenly bodies is contingent. There- fore the things that happen here below through the influence of heavenly bodies are not necessarily connected with necessity, since it is evident that each one of them may be hindered. Further. The heavenly bodies are natural agents and therefore require matter on which to act. Consequently, their action does not remove what is required by matter. Now the matter on which the heavenly bodies act is the bodies of this lower world. And since these are by nature corruptible, they can fail in action just as they can fail in being, so that their nature requires that they should produce their effects without necessity. There- fore the effects of the heavenly bodies on the bodies of this lower world do not result of necessity. Perhaps someone will say that the effects of the heavenly bodies must necessarily follow, and yet potentiality is not therefore removed from this lower world, because each effect is in potentiality before it comes into being, and is then said to be possible; but when it is in act, it passes from potentiality to necessity. The whole of this process is subject to the heav- enly movements, and consequently a given effect is not prevented from being at some time possible, although it is necessary that it be at length produced. In fact, Albumasar tries to defend the possible along these lines in the First Book of his Introductorium. But the possible cannot be defended in this way. For there is one kind of possible which follows from that which is necessary. Because that which must be necessarily, is possible; since what cannot possibly be, is impos- THE HEAVENLY BODIES AND CONTINGENCY 165 sible, and that which is impossible, necessarily is not. Consequently [if what is necessary is not possible] what must necessarily be, must neces- sarily not be: which is impossible. Hence it is impossible that the same thing should be necessarily, and yet that at the same time it should be impossible for it to be. Therefore the possible follows from the necessary. But it is not this kind of possible that we need defend against the con- tention that effects result of necessity; we must rather defend the possible which is contrary to the necessary , in the sense in which we say that that is possible which can be and not be. Now a thing is not said to be possible or contingent merely because it is at one time potential and at another time actual, as the foregoing reply supposes; since thus, even in the heavenly movements there is possibility and contingency. For the sun and moon are not always actually in conjunction or opposition, but sometimes actually and sometimes potentially: and yet these are necessary phenomena, since such matters are subject to demonstration. But the possible or contingent that is contrary to the necessary is of such a nature that there is no neces- sity for it to be, when it is not. And the reason for this is that it does not follow necessarily from its cause. Thus we say that it is contingent that Socrates will sit, whereas it is necessary that he will die, because the latter results from its cause necessarily, but not the former. Consequently, if it follows necessarily from the movements of the heavenly bodies that their effects will result at some time, there will be nothing possible or contingent contrary to that which is necessary. We must observe, however, that Avicenna, having a mind to prove that the effects of the heavenly bodies result of necessity, offers the following argument.^ If an effect of the heavenly bodies is hindered, this must be due to some cause either voluntary or natural. Now every cause, whether voluntary or natural, is reducible to some heavenly principle. Therefore even the impediment to the heavenly bodies’ effect results from some heav- enly principles. Consequently, if we take the whole heavenly order at once, it is impossible for its effect ever to fail. Whence he concludes that the heav- enly bodies must necessarily produce effects in this lower world, both vol- untary and natural. This argument, as Aristotle observes,^ was employed by some of the ancierits who denied the existence of chance and fortune, for the reason that every effect has its determinate cause, and that given the cause the effect follows of necessity; so that, since everything happens necessarily, nothing can be referred to chance and fortune. He solves this argument by denying the two propositions on which it is based.^ One is that given any cause whatsoever ^ the effect must follow of necessity. For this is not true of every cause, since even the essential, proper and sufficient cause of a certain effect may be hindered through the '^Metaph., X, i (fol. loSra). ‘"^Phys , 11, 4 (iQSb 36). ® Aristotle, Metaph,, V, 3 (1027a 8). i66 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES entrance of another cause, so that it fails to produce that effect. — The other proposition which Aristotle denies is that not everything that exists in any way whatever has a per se cause, but only that which exists per se,‘ and things which exist accidentally have no cause at all. For instance, that a man be musical is to be ascribed to a cause, but that he be musical as well as white is not due to any cause. Because whatever things concur because of some cause are mutually related by reason of that cause; whereas accidental things are not mutually related, and consequently 'they are not the result of a per se active cause, but are merely an accidental result. Thus it is accidental to the teacher of music that his pupil be a white man, since it is outside his intention, for his intention is to teach one who is recep- tive of instruction. Accordingly, given any particular effect, we shall say that it had a cause from which it did not necessarily result, because it might have been hin- dered by the accidental concurrence of another cause. And although we may trace that concurrent cause to some higher cause, we cannot ascribe to any cause the concurrence itself that proved to be a hindrance. Conse- quently, we cannot say that the hindrance to this or that effect is to be traced to some heavenly principle. Therefore we cannot say that the effects of heavenly bodies happen of necessity in this lower world. Hence Damascene says in the Second Book that the heavenly bodies do not cause the generation of things that are made, nor the corruption of things that are destroyed]'^ because, that is to say, their effects do not follow of necessity. Aristotle likewise says that many things betokened by corporeal things, even heavenly bodies, by water for instance or wind, do not happen. For if a stronger movement arise than that which presaged the future, the latter fails in its effect; even so, we often renounce our first intent, though it he well conceived, because of other and better beginnings? Ptolemy also says: Again, we must not think that the things which occur through the influence of higher beings are inevitable, like those which hap- pen by divine decree and are altogether unavoidable, and such as do actually and necessarily occur? He says again in the Centiloquium: These princi- ples which I give you are midway between the necessary and the possible."^ ^ De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893). ^Cf. De Divin. per Somn., 11 (463b 23). ® Ptolemy, Quadripartitum, I, 2. * Ptolemy, Centiloquium, verbum i. HEAVENLY MOTION AND FREE CHOICE 167 CHAPTER LXXXVII THAT THE MOVEMENT OF A HEAVENLY BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR CHOOSING BY VIRTUE OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME SAY We must observe, however, that Avicenna also holds that the movements of the heavenly bodies are the causes of our choice, not merely by being its occasion, but even as a per se cause.^ For he holds the heavenly bodies to be animate, and hence, since the movement of the heavens proceeds from its soul, and is the movement of a body, it follows that just as, inas- much as it is a body’s movement, it must have the power to transform bodies, so, inasmuch as it comes from a soul, it must have the power to make impressions on our souls. Hence the movement of the heavens is the cause of our acts of will and choice. The position of Albumasar would seem to come to the same, according to the First Book of his Intro duct orium? But this position is unreasonable. Because any effect that is caused by an agent through an instrument, must be proportionate to the instrument as well as to the agent; for we do not employ any instrument for any effect. Consequently, it is not possible to produce by means of an instru- ment an effect which is utterly outside the scope of its action. Now it is altogether beyond the scope of a body’s action to affect the intellect or will, as was proved above,^ 'except perhaps indirectly by making an im- pression on the body, as we have said.^ Therefore it is impossible for the soul of a heavenly body, if it have one, to make an impression on the intellect and will by means of the movement of that heavenly Body. Moreover. The particular active cause, while acting, bears a resemblance to the universal active cause, and imitates it. Now if a human soul were to make an impression on another human soul through an action of the body, as when it reveals its mind by means of vocal signs, the bodily action that proceeds from the one soul does not reach the other soul except by means of the body; for the vocal sounds affect the organ of hearing, and thus, being perceived by the sense, its meaning reaches the understanding. Consequently, if the celestial soul makes an impression on our soul by means of a corporeal movement, its action will not reach our soul except through a change effected in our body. But this does not cause our choice, but only occasions it, as we have shown above.^ Therefore the movement of the heavens is not the cause, but only the occasion, of our choice. Again. Since mover and moved must be simultaneous, as is proved in '^Metaph., X, i (foL loSrb). ^Cf. P. Duhem, Le systeme du monde^ II, pp. 374- 376. "Ch. 84ff. ^Ibid, ^Ibid, i68 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Physics vii/ it follows that movement must come from the first mover to the last thing moved in a certain order, so that, namely, the mover moves that which is distant through that which is nearest. Now our body is nearer to the body of the heavens, which is supposed to be moved by the soul united to it, than our soul, which is not related to the body of the heavens except through its own body. This is proved by the fact that separated intellects are not related to the body of the heavens, except perhaps as a mover to that which it moves. Therefore the impression of a heavenly body that originates in its soul does not reach our soul save through our body. But our soul is not moved in response to the movement of the body, except accidentally, nor does choice result from an impression made on the body except as occasioned thereby, as we have said. Therefore the movement of the heavens cannot be the cause of our choice on the hypothesis that it is from the soul of the heavens. Besides. According to the opinion of Avicenna and certain other philoso- phers, the agent intellect is a separate substance which acts on our souls in so far as it makes what is potentially intelligible to be understood ac- tually.^ Now this is the result of abstraction from all material conditions, as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book.'^ Consequently, that which acts directly on the soul does so, not by means of a corporeal movement, but rather by abstraction of everything corporeal. Therefore the soul of the heavens, if it have a soul, cannot be, through the movement of the heavens, the cause of our acts of choosing or understanding. By the same arguments it can be proved that the movement of the heavens is not the cause of our choice by the power of a separate sub- stance, if anyone suppose the heaven not to be animate, but to be moved by a separate substance. CHAPTER LXXXVIII THAT CREATED SEPARATE SUBSTANCES CANNOT BE THE DIRECT CAUSES OP OUR’ACTS OP CHOOSING AND WILLING, BUT GOD ALONE We must not think, however, that the souls of heavenly bodies, if there be any,^ or any separate intellectual substances, can directly impel our will or cause our choice. For the actions of all creatures are subordinate to the divine providence j so that they are unable to act outside its laws. Now it is a law of providence that everything is moved immediately by its proximate cause. Conse- quently, unless this order be observed, the higher created cause can neither ^Aristotle, Phys., VII, 2 (243a 3). "Cf. C. G., II, 76. « ‘C. G., II, 70. C. G,, TI, 50, 59. SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AND HUMAN CHOICE 169 move nor act.^ But the proximate moving cause of the will is the apprehended good, which is its object, and the will is moved by it as sight is by color. Therefore no created substance can move the will except by means of the apprehended good in so far, namely, as it shows it that a particular thing is good to do , and this is to persuade. Therefore no created substance can act on the will, or cause our choice, except by way of persuasion. Again. A thing is naturally moved by, and passive to, that agent by whose form.it can be reduced to act; since every agent acts by its form. Now the will is made actual by the appetible object, which satisfies the movement of its desire. But the will’s desire is satisfied by the divine good alone as its last end, as we have proved above.^ Therefore God alone can move the will as an agent. Besides. The natural inclination (which we call the natural appetite) of inanimate things for their proper end is like the will or intellectual appe- tite in intellectual substances. Now a natural inclination cannot be given except by the maker of nature. Therefore the will cannot be inclined to anything except by the maker of the intellectual nature. But this belongs to God alone, as we have proved above.^ Therefore He alone can incline our will to anything. Moreover. As is stated in Ethics iii, a violent action is one in which the principle is external, and the one who suffers violence contributes nothing? Consequently, if the will be moved by an external principle, its movement will be violent; — and I speak of being moved by an external principle that moves as an agent, and not as an end. Now the violent is opposed to the voluntary.' Therefore it is impossible that the will be moved by an external principle as an agent, but every movement of the will must come from within. But no created substance is united to the intellectual soul in its inmost being except God alone. Who alone is the cause and sustainer of its being. Therefore the movement of the will can be caused by none but God alone. Further. Violent movement is contrary to natural and voluntary move- ment, because both of these must be from an internal principle. But an external agent does not cause a natural movement except in so far as it causes an internal principle of movement to be in the movable thing. Thus, the generator, that gives the form of gravity to the generated heavy body, gives it a natural downward movement. And nothing else external can move a natural body without violence, except perhaps indirectly, as that which removes an obstacle, for such a thing makes use of natural move- ment or action rather than causes it. Therefore that agent alone can cause a movement of the will without violence which causes the internal prin- ciple of that movement, namely, the power itself of the will. And this is God, Who alone creates the soul, as we proved in the Second Book.^ There- fore God alone can move the will, -as an agent, without violence. "Ch. 37. ^C. G., II, 87. "Aristotle, Eth., Ill, i (mob i). " C. G., II, 87. lyo THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES This is expressed in the words of Prov, xxi. i: The heart of the King is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it\ and Philip. ii. 13: It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, accord- ing to His good will. CHAPTER LXXXIX THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL, AND NOT ONLY THE POWER OF THE WILL, IS CAUSED BY GOD Some, nevertheless, unable to understand how God can cause in us the movement of the will without prejudice to the liberty of the will, have tried to give a false exposition to the authorities quoted.’- They say, in fact, that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, by causing in us the power to will, and not by causing us to will this or that. This is the exposition of Origen who defended free choice in a sense contrary to the aforesaid authori- ties.^ Apparently this was the source of the opinion of some who maintained that providence does not regard things subject to free choice, namely, our elections, but only external happenings. For he who chooses to get or do something, for instance, to build or get rich, is not always able to succeed ; and so the outcome of our actions is not subject to our free choice, but is ordained by providence. But the authority of Scripture is in manifest opposition to all this. For it is said {Isa. xxvi. 12): 0 Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us. Hence we receive from God not only the power to will, but also our very operations. Further. The very words of Solomon, Whithersoever He will He shall turn it, show that the divine causality extends not only to the will, but also to its act. Again. Not only does God give things their powers, but it is also true that nothing can act by its own power, unless it act by His power, as we proved above.^ Therefore man cannot use the power of will given to him, except in so far as he acts by God’s power. Now that by whose power the agent acts, is the cause not only of the power but also of the act. This is apparent in the craftsman, by whose power the instrument acts, even though it may not have received its own form from the craftsman in ques- tion, and is merely applied by him to action. Therefore God is the cause not only of our will but also of our willing. Further. Order in spiritual beings is more perfect than in corporeal beings. Now in corporeal beings every movement is caused by the first ^Peri Archon, III, i (PG ii, 293). ® Ch. 67 and 70. Cf. end of ch. 88. DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND HUMAN CHOICE 171 movement. Therefore in spiritual beings every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is God’s. Besides. We proved above that God is the cause of every action, and that He works in every agent.^ Therefore He is the cause of the movements of the will. Again. Aristotle argues in the same sense as follows.^ There must be some cause which explains the fact that a person understands, takes coun- sel, chooses and wills, because everything new must have a cause. Now if the cause of these acts was another act of counsel and another act of will, since in such things we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come at length to something first. And this first thing must be something better than the reason. Now nothing but God is better than the intellect and the reason. Therefore God is the first principle of our acts of counsel and will. CHAPTER XC THAT HUMAN CHOICE AND WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE Hence it follows that human will and choice are subject to divine provi- dence. For whatsoever God does. He does according to the order of His provi- dence. Therefore, since He is the cause of our choice and will, these are subject to divine providence. Moreover. All corporeal beings are governed by means of spiritual beings, as we have shown above.^ Now spiritual beings act on corporeal beings by their will. Consequently, if the acts of choice and the movements of the will in intellectual substances are not the concern of God’s providence, it follows that corporeal beings also are withdrawn from His providence, so that there will be no providence at all. Besides. The higher a thing is placed in the universe, the more must it participate in the order in which the good of the universe consists. Hence Aristotle reproaches the ancient philosophers for admitting chance and fortune in the scheme of the heavenly bodies, but not in the things of the lower world.^ Now intellectual substances hold a higher place than cor- poreal substances. Therefore if corporeal substances, as regards their es- sence and operation, are included in the order of providence, much more so are intellectual substances. Again. Those things which are nearest to the end are more subject to the order whereby things are directed to the end, since by their means even other things are ordered to the end. Now the actions of intellectual sub- ® JSt/j. Eudem,, VII, 14 (1248a i8). " Ch. 78. ^Phys., II, 4 (196a 25). ^Ibid, 172 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES stances are raore intimately ordered to God as their end than the actions of other things, as we have proved above.^ Therefore the actions of intel- lectual substances come under the order of providence, whereby God di- rects all things to Himself, more than the actions of other things. Further. The government of providence proceeds from God’s love for the things created by Him; for love consists chiefly in this, that the lover desires the good of the beloved?' Consequently, the more God loves a thing, the more it comes under His providence. This is the teaching of Holy Scrip- ture, Ps. cxliv. 20, where it is said: The Lord keepeth all them that love Him] and the Philosopher also says that God cares most for those who love the intellect, as being His friends.^ From this we may again conclude that He loves intellectual substances most of all. Therefore their acts of will and choice are the object of His providence. Moreover. Man’s interior goods, which depend on his will and action, are more proper to man than external goods, such as acquiring wealth, and the like. Hence a man is said to be good in respect of the former and not of the latter. Consequently, if human choice and the movements of man’s will do not come under divine providence, but only external happenings, it will be truer to say that human affairs are not the concern of providence than that they are. But the former saying is put into the mouth of blas- phemers {Job xxii. 14): He doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven] and {Ezech, ix. 9): The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not] and {Lament, iii. 37): Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not? Some passages in Holy Scripture might seem to give utterance to that opinion. Thus it is said {Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made man from the begin- ning and left him in the hand of his own counsel] and further on (17, 18) : He hath set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him. Again {Deut. xxx. 15): Consider that I have set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil— But these words indicate that man has free choice, not that his choice is withdrawn from divine providence. Likewise the statement of Gregory of Nyssa, in his book On Man: Providence regards those things that are not in our power, and not those that are,^ and the saying of Damascene, who followed him, in the Second Book, that God preknows but does not predetermine the things which are in our power, ^ are to be understood as meaning that the things which are in our power are not subject to the divine predetermination in such a way as to be necessitated thereby. ^ ^ Ch. 25 and 78. "Aristotle, Rhetor., II, 4 (1380b 35)- ^ m., X, 8 (1179a 29). Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XLIV (PG 40, 813). ® De Fide Orth., II, 30 (PG 94, 972) , HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HIGHER CAUSES 173 CHAPTER XCI HOW HUMAN AFFAIRS MAY BE REFERRED TO HIGHER CAUSES From what has been proved we are able to gather how human affairs are to be referred to higher causes, and do not happen by chance. For acts of choice and movements of will are under the immediate gov- ernance of God.^ Human knowledge, however, as pertaining to the intellect, is directed by God through angelic intermediaries;^ while things pertaining to the body, whether internal or external, and adapted to man’s use, are governed by God by means of the angels and heavenly bodies.^ There is one general reason for this. Because every thing that is multi- form, changeable and defectible must be referred to a principle that is uniform, unchangeable and indefectible. Now everything connected with us is multiform, changeable and defectible. For it is clear that our choice is made in many different ways, since dif- ferent people choose different things in different circumstances. Again, our choice is changeable, both through the instability of the soul, which is not firmly fixed on the last end, and because things themselves surrounding us change. That man’s choice is defectible is proved by his sins. On the other hand, the divine will is uniform, since by willing one thing God wills all things, and is unchangeable and indefectible, as we proved in the First Book."^ Therefore all movements of will and choice must be reduced to the divine will, and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our willing and choosing. In like manner, our understanding is manifold, since from many sen- sible things we gather into one, as it were, the intelligible truth. It is also changeable, since by movement it passes from one thing to another dis- cursively, proceeding from the known to the unknown. Again, it is de- fectible, through admixture of imagination and sense, as the errors of men testify. — On the other hand, the knowledge of the angels is uniform, because they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fount of truth, namely, God.^ It is also unchangeable, because they see the truth about things, not by proceeding discursively from effects to cause or vice versa, but by simple intuition.^ It is also indefectible, since they see intuitively the very natures or quiddities of things in themselves, about which the intellect can- not err, as neither can the senses about their proper sensible objects; whereas we figure out the nature of a thing from its accidents and effects. Therefore, our intellectual knowledge must be ruled by the knowledge of the angels. ^Ch. 85ff. "Ch. 79. "Ch. 78 and 82. ® C. G., 11 , 96ff. ^C. G., I, 13 and 75. ®Ch. 80. 174 the SUMMA contra GENTILES Again. As to human bodies and the external things of which men make use, it is evident that they are blended together and contrary to one an- other in many ways, that they are not always moved in the same way, because their movements cannot be continual, and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption. — But the heavenly bodies are uniform, being simple and devoid of all contrariety. Also, their movements are uniform, continual and unchangeable. Nor can there be corruption or alteration in them. Consequently, our bodies, and whatever else serves for our use, must be ruled by the movements of the heavenly bodies. CHAPTER XCII HOW A MAN MAY BE SAID TO BE FORTUNATE, AND HOW HE IS ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES It may be seen from what has been said how a man is said to be fortunate. For a man is said to have good fortune when something good happens to him outside his intention:^ e.g., when a man, while digging in a field, finds a treasure which he was not seeking. Now a man, while working, may do something outside his own intention, yet not outside the intention of someone above him: e.g., if a master sends a servant to a place whither he had already sent another servant without the knowledge of the former, the finding of the latter is unintentional to the former, but not to the master who sent him; and therefore, although in relation to this servant the meet- ing is fortuitous and by chance, it is not so in relation to the master, but is intentional. Since, then, man, as to his body, is subordinate to the heav- enly bodies, as to his intellect, to the angels, and as to his will, to God, it is possible for something to happen outside the intention of man, 'which is nevertheless according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the influ- ence of the angels, or even of God. And although God’s action alone has a direct bearing on man’s choice, nevertheless, the angel’s action has a cer- tain bearing on man’s choice by way of persuasion; and the action of a heavenly body by way of disposition, inasmuch as the corporeal impres- sions of the heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose us to choose in certain ways. Accordingly, when, through the influence of higher causes, in the aforesaid manner, a man is led to choose such things as turn to his profit without his being aware of their utility by his own reason; and when, be- sides this, his understanding is enlightened from the light of intellectual substances to the effect of doing those same things; and when, too, through the divine operation his will is inclined so as to choose that which is profit- able to him, without knowing why it is so, — he is said to be fortunate. On the contrary, he is said to be unfortunate when, through the influence ^Aristotle, Magna Moralia, II, 8 (1207a 28). HOW MAN IS CALLED FORTUNATE 175 of higher causes, his choice is inclined to contrary things; as it is said of someone xxii. 30): Write this man barren, a man that shall not prosper in his days. Yet herein we must observe a difference. For the impressions of the heavenly bodies on our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the body. Consequently, from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, one is said not only to be fortunate or unfortunate, but also to have a good or a bad natural disposition, in which sense the Philosopher says that to be fortunate is to have a good natural disposition.^ For it is incon- ceivable that the fact of one person choosing what is useful and another what is hurtful, without their knowing it, be due to any difference in understanding, since the nature of the intellect and the will is the same in all; because a formal diversity would cause a specific diversity, whereas a material diversity causes a diversity according to number. Consequently, in so far as the human intellect is enlightened for the purpose of operation, or the will instigated by God, a man is not said to be well disposed by nature, but to be well guarded or well governed. Again. Another difference is to be observed here. For the operation of an angel. and of a heavenly body merely disposes a man to choose, whereas the operation of God gives accomplishment to his choice. And since the disposition arising from a quality affecting the body, or from the per- suasion of the intellect, does not necessitate his choice, man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines him; whereas he always chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is some- times frustrated, according to Jer. li. 9: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed, and much more so the influence of the heavenly bodies; whereas divine providence never fails. Yet another difference must be observed. For a heavenly body does not dispose a man to choose, except in so far as it affects our bodies, so that a man is influenced in his choice in the same way as he is led by his pas- sions to choose; and hence every disposition towards choosing, resulting from the influence of the heavenly bodies, is in the manner of a passion, as when one is led to make a certain choice through hate, love, or anger and the like. — On the other hand, a man is disposed by an angel to make a certain choice by way of intellectual consideration, without passion. And this happens in two ways. Sometimes man’s understanding is enlightened by an angel so as to know only that a certain thing is good to do, without being instructed as to the reason for its being good, which depends on the end. Consequently sometimes a man thinks it good to do a certain thing, and yet were he asked why, he would answer that he did not know? Hence when he achieves the useful end, to which he had given no thought, it will be fortuitous for him. Sometimes, however, he is instructed by the angel (1207a 35), ^ lUd . (1207b i). 176 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES who enlightens him, both as to the goodness of a thing to be done, and as to the reason why it is good, which depends on the end. And so, when he achieves the end to which he looked forward, it will not be fortuitous. — It must also be noted that the active power of a spiritual nature surpasses that of a corporeal nature in being wider in its scope even as it is higher in its kind. Consequently, the disposition caused by a heavenly body does not extend to all those things that come under the scope of man’s choice. Again. The power of the human soul or even of an angel is restricted in comparison with the divine power, which extends universally to all beings. Hence some good can happen to a man both outside his intention, and out- side the influence of heavenly bodies, and also outside the angelic enlight- enment, but not outside divine providence which is the governor, even as it is the maker, of being qua being, and hence must hold all things in its power. Consequently, some good or evil may happen to a man by chance both in relation to himself, and in relation to heavenly bodies, and in rela- tion to the angels, but not in relation to God. For in relation to God, not only in human affairs but in all things whatsoever, there then can be noth- ing fortuitous or unforeseen. But since fortuitous things are those which are unintentional, and since moral goods cannot be unintentional, because they are founded on choice, in relation to them no man can be described as fortunate or unfortunate, although one may say that in relation toward goods he has by nature a good or evil disposition, when through the natural dispositions of his body he is inclined to the choice of virtue or vice. With regard to external goods, which can accrue to man outside his intention, he may be described both as having a natural disposition for them, and as having good fortune^ and as governed by God^ and as guarded by the angels. Man receives yet another assistance from higher causes, with regard to the performance of his actions. For whereas man has the power to choose and to pursue what he has chosen, in either case he is sometimes helped by higher causes, and sometimes hindered: with regard to his choice, as we have said, in so far as a man is either disposed to choose a certain thing through the influence of heavenly bodies, or enlightened as it were through the guardianship of angels, or inclined through the operation of God; — with regard to the execution, in so far as man receives from some higher cause the strength and the efficacy to accomplish his choice. These things may come not only from God and the angels, but even from heavenly bodies, in so far as the said efficacy resides in a body. For it is evident that even inanimate bodies receive certain forces and abilities from the heavenly bodies, even besides those which result from the active and pas- sive qualities of the elements (which qualities themselves, without any doubt, are subject to the heavenly bodies) . Thus that the magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a heavenly body, and in the same way certain stones and plants have other hidden powers. Therefore there is no reason HOW MAN IS CALLED FORTUNATE 177 why one man should not receive, through the influence of a heavenly body, a certain efficacy for certain corporeal effects, that is not possessed by another man: e.g.^ a physician for healing, a farmer for planting, a soldier for fighting. But this efficacy is bestowed on men by God much more per- fectly for the purpose of accomplishing their works. Accordingly, as re- gards the first kind of assistance, which man receives in choosing, God is said to direct him; as to the second, He is said to strengthen him. These two assistances are indicated in the Psalms (xxvi. i), where it is said, in reference to the first: The Lord is my light and my salvation j whom shall I jear? and in reference to the second: The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid? There is, however, a twofold difference between these two assistances. The first is that man is assisted by the first both in things subject to his power, and in others; whereas the second assistance extends only to those things for which man’s power is adequate. Thus, if a man, while digging a grave, find a treasure, this does not result from any power of his; and hence with a view to such a result a man may be assisted through being instigated to seek where the treasure is, but not by receiving the power for finding treasures. But that a physician heal, or that a soldier conquer in battle, may result both from assistance received in the choice of means adapted to the end, and from the power received from a higher cause for the success of their actions. Hence the first assistance is more universal. — The other difference is that the second assistance is given for the purpose of accomplishing what one intends to do. Therefore, since the fortuitous is unintentional, a man cannot, properly speaking, be said to be iortunate through receiving such assistance, as he can through receiving the former kind of assistance, as we have shown above. Now, a man is fortunate or unfortunate sometimes when he acts alone, as when he finds a hidden treasure while he is digging; and sometimes through the concurrent action of another cause, as when a man, while going to market intent on buying, meets a debtor whom he did not expect to meet. In the first instance, the man was assisted to his good fortune solely in that he was directed in the choice of something to which a profit was accidentally attached outside his intention. In the second instance, both agents need to be directed to choose an action or movement resulting in their mutual encounter. There is yet another observation to be made about the foregoing. For it has been said that the happening of good or bad fortune to a man is from God, and may be from a heavenly body, inasmuch as man is led by God to choose a thing to which some advantage or disadvantage is attached which the chooser had not expected, and in so far as he is disposed by a heavenly body to make such a choice. This advantage or disadvantage, in reference to man’s choice, is fortuitous; in reference to God, it is not for- tuitous ; whereas it is so in reference to the heavenly body. This is proved lyS THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES as follows. An event does not cease to be fortuitous until it is referred to a per se cause. Now the power of a heavenly body is an active cause, not by way of understanding or choosing, but by way of nature; and it is proper to nature to tend to one thing. Accordingly, if a certain effect is not one thing, no natural power can be its per se cause. Now when two things are united together accidentally, they are one, not really, but only accidentally. Therefore no natural cause can be the per se cause of such a conjunction. Suppose, then, that the man in question is led through the impression of a heavenly body, as by a passion, as we said before, to dig a grave. Now the grave and the place of the treasure are not one thing save accidentally, because they have no mutual connection. Consequently, the power of the heavenly body cannot cause an inclination per se to this effect considered as a whole, namely, that the man in question should dig a grave and a place where a treasure is. But one that acts through the intel- lect can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelli- gent being to direct many things to one. It is also plain that a man who knew the treasure to be there might send another, who knew it not, to dig a grave in the same place, so that he might "find the treasure unintention- ally. Accordingly, such fortuitous events, when referred to the divine caus- ality, cease to be fortuitous, but not when they are referred to a heavenly body. The same argument shows that a man cannot be fortunate in every pos- sible way through the influence of a heavenly body, but only in this or that respect. When I say in every way, I mean that a man is not by nature such that, through the influence of a heavenly body, he chooses always or nearly always those particular things to which some advantage or disad- vantage is accidentally connected. For nature is directed to one thing only, and the things in regard to which man is fortunate or unfortunate are not reducible to something one, but are indeterminate and infinite in number, as the Philosopher says,^ and is evident to the sense. Therefore it is impos- sible for anyone to be of such a nature as invariably to choose those things which have some advantage incidental to them. But one may be inclined by a heavenly body to choose something to which an incidental advantage is attached, and by some other inclination, to choose something else, and by yet a third inclination, to choose yet another thing, but not by one inclination to choose them all. But man can be directed to all things by one divine disposition, ^Phys., 11 , 5 (196b 28). WHAT IS FATE? 179 CHAPTER XCIII IS THERE SUCH A THING AS FATE, AND WHAT IS IT? We may gather from the foregoing what we should think about fate. For observing that many things happen in this world accidentally^ if particular causes be taken into consideration, some have maintained that such things are not subject even to any superior causes. According to this opinion, there is no such thing as fate. Others, however, have tried to refer such things to certain higher causes, from which, according to some plan, they proceed in an orderly way. These held that there is fate, as though things which appear to happen by chance were effata, that is, foretold or preordained by someone to be. Some of these pretended to ascribe all contingent occurrences of this world to the causality of heavenly bodies, not excluding human elections, and they held that all such things are subject to the directing force of the stars, which force they called fate. This opinion is impossible and contrary to faith, as we have already shown.^ Others, however, wished to assign to the direction of divine providence all such things as appear to happen by chance in this lower world. Hence they maintained that all these things are subject to fate, for this was the name given by them to the disposition which divine providence causes to be in things. Hence Boethius says that fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, by which providence connects each one with its proper order? In this definition disposition stands for order] the words inherent in things are included to differentiate fate from providence, because the order as existing in the divine mind and not yet impressed on things is providence, but as already expressed in things, is called fate; changeable is added to show that the order of providence does not deprive things of contingency and changeableness, as some maintained. In this sense, to deny fate is to deny divine providence. Since, however, we should not use even names in common with unbelievers, lest use of the same expressions be the occasion of error, the faithful should not use the word fate, lest they seem to agree with those who, having false notions about fate, subject all things to a necessity imposed by the stars. Hence Augustine says: If anyone gives the name of fate to God^s will or power, let him keep his opinion, hut hold his tongue f and Gregory says to the same effect: Far be it from the minds of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.^ ^Ch. 84ff. ^De Consol, IV, prose 6 (PL 63, 815). 41, 141). ^In Evang., I, horn. 10 (PL 76, 1112). De Civit. Dei, V, i (PL i8o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XCIV OF THE CERTAINTY OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE A DIFFICULTY, howcver, arises from what has been said. For if all, even the contingent, happenings of this lower world are subject to the divine providence, it would follow, apparently, that either providence is uncer- tain, or all happenings necessary. [1] For the Philosopher proves that if we suppose every effect to have a per se cause, and again that given any per se cause, we must of necessity grant the effect, it will follow that all future events happen of necessity.^ For if every effect has a per se cause, every effect will be reducible to some cause either present or past. Thus, if it be .asked whether a certain man will be killed by robbers, this effect is preceded by a cause which is his being met by the robbers; and this effect is again preceded by another cause, .namely, that he went out ; and this again was preceded by another cause, namely, that he went to fetch some water ; and this by another cause, namely, that he was thirsty; and this was caused by his partaking of salt meat; which he is either eating now or has already eaten. Accordingly, if, given the cause, we must necessarily grant the effect, if he eats the salt meat, he is of necessity thirsty; if he thirsts, it is necessary that he wish to seek water;' and if he wish to seek water, that he leave his house; and if he go out, that the robbers meet him; and if they meet him, that they kill him. Therefore from first to last, it is necessary that this eater of salt meat be killed by robbers. The Philosopher concludes, then, that it is untrue that, given the cause, the effect must of necessity be also granted, since some of these causes may be ineffective. Nor again is it true that every effect has a per se cause; because that which is accidental, namely, that the man who wants water should meet some robbers, has no cause. This argument proves, then, that all effects reducible to a per se cause, whether present or past, from which, if it is posited, the effect follows of necessity, happen themselves of necessity. Either, therefore, we must say that not all effects are subject to the divine providence (and thus providence would not extend to all things, contrary to what was proved above^), or we must say that, granted providence, it is not necessary for its effects to fol- low (and then providence will not be .certain), or that all things must needs happen of necessity. For providence is not only in the present and the past, but from eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal. [ 2 ] Further. If the divine providence is certain, this conditional propo- sition must be true: If God foresaw this, it will be. Now the antecedent of this proposition is necessary, for it is eternal. Therefore the consequent is '^Metaph., V, 3 (1027a 29). ®Ch. 64. THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE i8i necessary, because whenever the antecedent of a conditional proposition is necessary, the consequent is likewise necessary; so that the consequent is like a conclusion of the antecedent. Now whatever follows from the neces- sary is itself necessary. Accordingly, if the divine providence is certain, all things must happen of necessity. [3] Moreover. Supposing a thing to be foreseen by God, for instance, that so and so will be king. Either then it is possible for it to happen that he does not reign, or it is not possible. If it is not possible for him not to reign, then it is impossible; and therefore it is necessary that he will reign. On the other hand, if it is possible that he will not reign, then, since given « possibility nothing impossible follows, it remains that it is not impos- sible for the divine providence to fail; for we are here saying that the divine providence does fail. Consequently, it follows, if all things are foreseen by God, that either the divine providence is uncertain, or that all things hap- pen of necessity. ^ [4] Again. Tully argues thus A If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. If this be true, then all things are subject to fate. If all things are subject to fate, nothing is subject to our power, and the choice of the will is non-existent. Therefore, if the divine providence is cer- tain, there is no free choice. And it will also follow that there is no such thing as a contingent cause. [5] Besides. The divine providence does not exclude intermediary causes, as we have proved.^ But some causes are contingent and defectible. Therefore an effect of the divine providence may Jail. Therefore God^'s providence is uncertain. In order to solve these difficulties, we must recall some points already laid down, so as to make it clear that nothing escapes the divine provi- dence; that the order of the divine providence is utterly unchangeable; and that, notwithstanding, it does not follow that whatever results from the divine providence must happen of necessity. First, we must observe that as God is the cause of all existent things, by giving them their very being, the order of His providence must needs in- clude all things; because to those things to which He has given being, He must grant a continuance of being, and He must grant perfection in the last end.^ Now in everyone that exercises providence there are two points for con- sideration,'^ namely, forethought about the order of things, and establish- ment of the premeditated order in the things subject to providence. The former pertains to the cognitive power, and the latter to the operative power. There is this difference between them, that in the forethought given to the order, providence is so much the more perfect, as its order is more able to reach the most minute things. For it is owing to our defective knowl- edge, which cannot comprise all individual things, that we are unable to ^De DivinaL, 11 , 7 (P- 71^). ®Ch. 77 * "Ch. 64ff " Ch. 77 i 82 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES arrange beforehand all the particulars in those matters that are subject to our direction. Now a man is considered more fit to make provision accord- ing as his foresight extends to more particulars; but one whose foresight extends only to general considerations has but a small share of prudence. The same may be observed in all productive arts. On the other hand, as regards the causing of the premeditated order to be in things, the provi- dence of the governor is the higher in order and perfection, according as it is more universal, and brings about the realization of its fore- thought through more ministers; for the organization itself of the sub- ordinate ministers has a large place in the order of providence. — Now God's providence must be supremely perfect because He is absolutely and universally perfect, as we proved in the First Book.^ Consequently, in His providence He orders all things, even the most trivial, by the eternal forethought of His wisdom: and whatsoever things operate, do so as instru- ments moved by Him,^ and serve Him obediently, so as to bring forth into the world the order of providence excogitated, as it were, from eternity. — And if all things that are capable of action must needs act as His minis- ters, it is impossible that any agent hinder the execution of the divine provi- dence by acting contrary thereto. Nor, again, is it possible for the divine providence to be hindered through a defect in any agent or patient, since every power, active or passive, is caused in things according to God’s dis- position.^ Again, it is impossible for the execution of the divine providence to be prevented through a change in the author of providence, since God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved.^ It follows, therefore, that the divine providence cannot possibly fail. Secondly, it must be observed that every agent aims at a good, and at a greater good so far as it is able, as we have proved.^' Now, good and better are not the same as considered in the whole and as considered in the parts.^ For in the whole, the good consists in the integrity which results from the order and composition of the parts. Consequently, for the whole it is better that there be disparity of parts, which is necessary for the order and per- fection of the whole, than that all the parts be equal, with each part on a level with the most excellent part; whereas each part of inferior degree would be better, considered in itself, if it were on the same level as a higher part. Take, as an example, the human body. The foot would be a more excellent part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye; but the whole body would be more imperfect, if it were deprived of the service of the foot. Accordingly, the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent; for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can, whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently, a defect is outside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. Thus the generation of a female is clearly outside the " C. G., I, 28. " Ch. 67. ® Ch. 70. * C. G., I, 13. Ch. 3. « Ch. 71. THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE 183 intention of a particular nature, namely, of this particular force in this particular seed, the tendency of which is to make the embryo as perfect as possible; on the other hand, it is the purpose of universal nature, namely, of the power of the universal cause of generation in inferior beings, that a female be generated, which is a necessary condition for the generation of many animals. In like manner, corruption, diminution and every defect is in^the purpose of universal nature, but not of the particular nature; be- cause each particular thing shuns defect and, for its own part, aims at perfection. It is clear, then, that the particular agent aims at the greatest possible perfection of its effect in its kind ; while the universal nature aims at a particular perfection in a particular effect, for instance, the perfection of a male in one effect, that of a female in another. Among the parts of the whole universe, the first distinction to be observed is between the contingent and the necessary.^ For the higher beings are necessary, incorruptible and unchangeable, and the lower a thing is, the more it falls short of this condition; so that the lowest are corruptible in their very being, changeable in their disposition, and produce their effects, not of necessity, but contingently. Therefore every agent that is a part of the universe has a tendency to persist in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect; while God, Who governs the universe, intends to establish some of His effects by way of necessity, and others by way of contingency. Accordingly, He adapts various causes to those effects, to some necessary, to others contingent causes. Therefore it belongs to the order of the divine providence, not only that such and such an effect be produced, but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect be produced contingently. Consequently, some of the things subject to the divine providence are nec- essary, and some contingent; they are not all necessary. — It is therefore evident that, though the divine providence is the per se cause of a partic- ular future effect, and though it is present and past, yet more truly eternal, it does not follow, as the first argument pretended, that this particular effect necessarily will be; for the divine providence is the per se cause that this particular effect will happen contingently. And this cannot fail. Hence it is also clear that this conditional proposition is true: If God foresaw that this would happen, it will be so, as the second argument stated. But it will be as God foresaw that it would be. Now, He foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows infallibly, then, that it will be contingently and not of necessity. It is also clear that if this thing, which we suppose to be foreseen by God as future, be of a contingent nature, it will be possible for it not to happen considered in itself; for it is foreseen in such a way as to be contingent, and possible not to be. Yet the order of the divine providence cannot fail to enable this future thing to happen contingently. Thus the third argu- ment is solved. Consequently, we may say that the man in question will not ^Ch. 72. i 84 the SUMMA contra GENTILES reign if we consider the statement in itself, but not if we consider it as foreseen. Again. The argument advanced by Tully appears of small account in the light of what we have said. For seeing that not only effects but also causes and modes of being are subject to the divine providence, as is clear from the foregoing, it does not follow, if all things are ruled by the divine provi- dence, that nothing is under our control; for they are so foreseen by God as to be freely done by us. Nor can the defectibility of second causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, deprive the divine providence of certainty, as the fifth objection argued. For God Himself works in all things according to the decree of His will, as we proved above.^ Consequently, it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing. Such arguments as might be used to prove the necessity of things fore- seen by God from the certitude of His knowledge were solved above when we were treating of the divine knowledge.- CHAPTERS XCV AND XCVI THAT THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USEFULNESS OF PRAYER We must also observe that, as the unchangeableness of providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it exclude the useful- ness of prayer. For we do not pray that the eternal disposition of His provi- dence may be changed, since this is impossible, but that He may grant what we desire. For it is fitting that God should assent to the holy desires of the rational creature; not that our desires have the effect of changing a God Who is unchangeable, but as an effect befitting His goodness in granting our de- sires. Because, since all things naturally desire the good, as we have proved,''^ and since it belongs to the supereminence of the divine goodness to bestow being and well-being on all things in a certain order, it follows that He fulfills, according to His goodness, the holy desires of which our prayers are the expression. Again. He who causes a thing to move should lead that thing to the end. Hence a thing is moved to its end, attains to that end and rests therein through one and the same nature. Now every desire is a movement to a good, and it cannot be in a thing except it come from God, Who is good in His essence, and the source of goodness; for every mover moves to its like. Therefore it belongs to God, according to His goodness, to bring to a fitting " Ch. 67 ; C. G., II, 23. ^ C. G., I, ch. 63ff. " Ch. 3. PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER 185 issue the fitting desires which are expressed by means of one’s prayers. Besides. The nearer things are to their mover, the more effectively do they receive the mover’s impression. Thus things which are nearer to a fire are more heated thereby. Now intellectual substances are nearer to God than inanimate natural substances. Consequently, the impression of the divine motion is more efficacious in intellectual substances than in other natural substances. Now natural bodies participate in the divine motion to the extent that they receive therefrom a natural appetite for the good, as well as the fulfillment of that appetite, which is realized when they attain to their respective ends. Much more therefore do intellectual substances attain to the fulfillment of their desires which are proffered to God in their prayers. Moreover. It is essential to friendship that the lover wish the desire of the beloved to be fulfilled, inasmuch as he seeks his good and perfection. Hence it has been said that friends have but one will} Now we have proved that God loves His creature,^ and so much the more as it has a greater share of His goodness, which is the first and chief object of His love.^ Hence He wills the desires of the rational creature to be fulfilled, since of all creatures it participates most perfectly in the divine goodness. Now His will is perfective of things, because He is the cause of things through His will, as was proved above.^ Therefore it belongs to God’s goodness to fulfill the rational creature’s desires, as laid before Him in prayer. Besides. The creature’s good flows from the divine goodness, according to a certain likeness. Now it is a most praiseworthy trait in a man if he grant the request of those whose petition is just, since for this reason he is said to be liberal, clement, merciful and kind. Therefore it belongs in a special manner to the divine goodness to grant holy prayers. Therefore it is said in the Psalm (cxliv. 19) : He will do the will of them that fear Him, and He will hear their prayers and save them] so too our Lord says {Matt. vii. 8): Every one that asketh receiveth: and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. [Chapter XCVI] And yet it is not unfitting that sometimes the peti- tions of those who pray be not granted by God. For it was proved that God fulfills the desires of the rational creature inasmuch as the good is the object of the creature’s desire. Sometimes, however, it happens that what we seek is not a true good but an apparent one, and is, absolutely speaking, evil. Such a prayer, therefore, cannot be granted by God; and hence it is said {Jas. iv. 3): You ask and you receive not, because you ask amiss. Again. It was shown to be fitting that God fulfills our desires, because He moves us to desire. Now the thing moved is not brought to the end of its movement by the mover unless the movement continue. Accordingly, if the ^Sallust, Catiline, XX (ed. A. Ahlberg, Leipsig: B. G, Teubner, 1919), p. 16. ® C. G., I, 75 - " C. G., I, 74. " C. G., II, 23ff. i86 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES movement of desire be not continued by repeated prayer, it is not unfitting that the prayer be ineffectual. Thus our Lord says {Luke xviii. i ) that wc ought always to pray and not to faint] and (i Thess, v. 17) Apostle says: Pray without ceasing. Further. We proved that God fittingly fulfills the desire of the rational creature inasmuch as the creature approaches to Him. Now a man ap- proaches to God by contemplation, devout affection, and humble and firm resolution. A prayer, therefore, that lacks these conditions in its approach to God does not deserve to be granted by Him. Hence it is said in the Psalm (ci. 18): He hath had regard to the prayer of the humble] and {Jas i. 6) : Let him ask in faith j nothing wavering. Moreover. We have proved that God grants the prayers of the devout on the score of friendship. Consequently, if a man rejects God’s friendship, his prayer is unworthy of being granted. Hence it is said {Prov. xxviii. 9) : He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination] and {Isa. i. 15): When you multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood. It is on the same principle that sometimes a friend of God is not heard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends. Thus it is said {Jer. vii. 16) : Therefore do not thou pray for this people, nor take to thee praise and supplication for them; and do not withstand me, for I will not hear thee. It happens, too, sometimes that through friendship a man refuses his friend’s request, because he knows it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him; even as a physician will sometimes refuse a sick man what he asks, knowing that it is not good for regaining his health. There- fore, since it has been proved that Godj for love of the rational creature, fulfills the desires set forth in his prayers, we must not be surprised if some- times He does not fulfill the prayers of those even who are most dear to Him, that He may accomplish what is best for the welfare of the suppliant. That is why He did not remove from Paul the thorn in his flesh, though thrice he prayed for this, because He foresaw that this would be good for him by keeping him humble, as is related in a Cor. xii. 8, 9. Hence also our Lord said to some {Matt. xx. 22): You know not what you ask] and {Rom. viii. 26) it is said: For we know not what we should pray for as we ought. For this reason Augustine says: The Lord is good, for often lie grants not what we want, that He may give what we want more)' It is clear, then, from what has been said, that prayers and holy desires are the cause of some of the things done by God. Now it has been shown that God’s providence does not exclude other causes;^ rather indeed does He dispose of them so that the order appointed by His providence may be established in things. Consequently, second causes are not opposed to providence; in fact, they accomplish the effect of providence. Accordingly, ^Episi. XXXI, I (PL 33, 121). ^Ch. 77. PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER 187 prayers are efficacious before God; yet they do not upset the unchangeable order of the divine providence, since even the granting of each suppliant’s prayer is included within the order of the divine providence. To say, there- fore, that we must not pray that we may obtain something from God, be- cause the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we must not walk in order to arrive at a place, nor eat that we may have nour- ishment; all of which is clearly absurd. By the foregoing there is removed a twofold error about prayer. For some have said that prayer has no fruit. This was asserted both by those who, like the Epicureans, utterly denied the divine providence, and by those who, like certain Peripatetics, withdrew human affairs from the provi- dence of God ; ^ and again by those who with the Stoics contended that all things subject to providence happen of necessity For it follows from all these opinions that prayer produces no fruit, and that consequently all wor- ship of the Godhead is in vain. There is an allusion to this error in Malach. iii. 14: You have said: He lahoreth in vain that serveth God. And what profit is it that we have kept His ordinances y and that we have walked sorrowful before the Lord of hosts? On the other hand, some have contended that the divine ordinance can be changed by our prayers. Thus the Egyptians said that fate was averted by prayers, certain images, incensings or incantations. Certain passages in Holy Scripture would seem at the first glance to admit of being taken in this sense. For it is related (Isa. xxxviii. 1-5) that Isaias, at God’s com- mand, said to King Ezechias: Thus saith the Lord: Take order with thy housCy for thou shalt die, and shalt not live\ and that after Ezechias had prayed, the word of the Lord came to Isaias saying: Go and say to Ezechias ... I have heard thy prayer . . . behold I will add to thy days fifteen years. — ^Again (Jer. xviii. 7, 8) it is said in the name of God; / will sud~ denly speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them. And (Joel ii. 13, 14): Turn to the Lord your God; for He is gracious and merciful. . . . Who knoweth hut He will return and forgive? These passages, if taken in their superficial sense, lead to an incon- gruous result. For, in the first place, it follows that God’s will is change- able. Also, that God acquires something in the course of time. Further, that things happening in time to creatures cause something that is in God. These are all impossible, as appears evidently from what has already been laid down.^ They are also contrary to Holy Scripture which contains the expression of infallible truth. For it is said (Num. xxiii. 19) : God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should he changed. Hath He said then, and will He not do? Hath He spoken, and will He not fulfill? " Cf. the end of ch. 75- ' Cf. the end of ch. 73- ^ C. G., I, isff. i88 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Again (i Kings xv. 29) : The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance ; for He is not a man that He should repent. And {Malach. iii. 6) : / am the Lord and I change not. Now it suffices to consider carefully what we have said above for one to realize that every error occurring in the present matter is due to one’s over- looking the difference between the universal and the particular orders. For, since all effects are ordered one to another, inasmuch as they have one common cause, this order must needs be the more universal as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause, which is God, must of necessity include all things. There is nothing therefore to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner; because there is outside that order something that can change it. Therefore it is not strange that the Egyptians, who reduced the ordering of human affairs to the heavenly bodies, held that fate, having its origin in the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and rites; because outside and above the heavenly bodies there is God, Who can hinder the heavenly bodies from producing the effect which was to have taken place in this lower world as a result of their influence. — But outside that order which includes all things, it is not possible to assign a thing whereby the order depending on the universal cause can be subverted. For this reason the Stoics, who reduced the ordering of all things to God as the universal cause, held that the order appointed by God is utterly unchangeable. But these again failed to consider the universal order, in that they held prayers to be altogether useless, thus implying that man’s volitions and desires, which lead him to pray, are not included in that universal order. For, when they say that, whether we pray or not, the result is the same because of the universal order of things, it is clear that they exclude the suppliant’s prayers from that order. For if they were contained in that order, effects would fol- low through the divine ordinance from these prayers in the same way as they follow through other causes. Accordingly, to deny the efficacy of prayer is to deny the efficacy of all other causes. And if the imchangeable- ness of the divine order does not deprive other causes of their efficacy, neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer. Therefore prayers have value, not as though they bring about a change in the order appointed from eter- nity, but as included in that very order. On the other hand, there is no reason why the particular order of an inferior cause should not be changed by God through the efficacy of prayer; for He transcends all causes, so that He is not bound by the order of any cause, but on the contrary all necessity imposed by the order of a lower cause is subject to Him, because it originated from Him. Accordingly, when some change is brought about by prayer in the order of inferior causes established by God, God is said to return or to repent] not that His eternal ordinance is changed, but that some effett of His is changed. Hence Greg- ory says that God changes not His mind, although at times He changes THAT PROVIDENCE HAS A PLAN 189 His judgment‘s not that judgment, mark you, which expresses His eternal decree, but that which expresses the order of lower causes, in keeping with which Ezechias was to die, and a nation was to be exterminated for its sins. Such a change of judgment is described metaphorically as repentance in God, inasmuch as He behaves like a penitent, who shows himself penitent by changing his behavior. In the same way. He is said figuratively to be angry j inasmuch as by punishing He does what an angry man does,^ CHAPTER XCVII HOW THE DISPOSITION OF PROVIDENCE IS ACCORDING TO A PLAN From what has been said, one can see clearly that things are arranged by divine providence according to a plan. For we have proved that God, by His providence, directs all things to His goodness as their endj^ not indeed as though His goodness gains any- thing from the things that are made, but in order that the likeness of His goodness may be impressed on things as far as possible."^ But since every created substance must needs fall short of the perfection of the divine good- ness, it was necessary, in order that the divine goodness might the more perfectly be bestowed on things, that there should be diversity among them, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one individual thing might be more perfectly represented in various ways by things of various kinds. Thus when man finds that he cannot adequately express an idea by one word, he uses several words so as to express his idea in several ways. In this too we are able to consider the eminence of the divine perfection, since perfect goodness, which in God exists in a united and simple manner, can- not be in creatures otherwise than in many ways and many subjects. Now things are diversified through having diverse forms whence they derive their species. Consequently, the reason for diversity in the forms of things is taken from the end. But the plan of the order in things is taken from the diversity of forms. Because, as it is from the form that a thing has its being, and as a thing, in so far as it has being, approaches to a likeness to God, Who is His own simple being, it follows of necessity that the form is nothing else than a divine likeness existing by participation in things. Therefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, rightly says that it is something godlike and desir- able.^ Now a likeness to one simple thing cannot be diversified except because the resemblance is more or less close, or more or less distant. Now the closer a thing approaches to the divine likeness, the more perfect ^ Moral, XVI, 10 (PL 76, 1127). ®Cf. C. G., I, 91. " Ch. 64. ‘^Ch. iSff. Phys., I, 9 (192a 17). 190 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES it is. Consequently, a difference in forms must be according as one is more perfect than another; for which reason Aristotle likens definitions, whereby the natures and forms of things are indicated, to numbers among which species are diversified by addition or subtraction of unity.^ We are thus given to understand that diversity of forms requires a diverse degree of perfec- tion. This is evident to anyone who studies the natures of things. For, if he consider carefully he will find that the diversity of things is made up of degrees, since above inanimate bodies he will find plants, and above these irrational animals, above these intelligent substances, and in each one of these he will find diversity according as some are more perfect than others; sb much so, that the highest members of a lower genus appear to be close to the higher genus, and conversely: e.g., animals that cannot move are like plants. Hence Dionysius says that divine wisdom has joined together the last things of higher degree to the first things of lower degree? Therefore it is clear that the diversity of things requires that all be not equal, but that there be order and degrees in the universe. From the diversity of forms, whence things derive their specific differ- ences, there follows also the difference of operations. For since things act according as they are actual (because those things that are in potentiality, as such, are devoid of action), and since a thing is actual by its form, a thing’s operation must needs follow its form. Accordingly, if there be diverse forms, these must have diverse operations. Furthermore, since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper action, it follows that there must be diverse proper ends in things, although there is one common end of all. Moreover. From the diversity of forms there results a diversity in the relation of matter to things. For since forms are diverse according as some are more perfect than others, some of them are perfect to the extent of being subsistent and complete in themselves, having no need of the assist- ance of matter. Whereas some are unable to subsist perfectly by them- selves, and require matter to uphold them, so that what subsists is not a form only, nor matter only — ^which by itself is not an actual being — but something composed of both. Now matter and form would be unable to concur in making one thing unless they were mutually proportionate. But if they need to be propor- tionate, it follows that diverse matters correspond to diverse forms. Con- sequently, certain forms require simple, while others require composite, matter; and to diverse forms there must correspond a diverse composition of parts, in keeping with the species and operation of the form. From the diverse relation to matter there results diversity of agents and patients. For since a thing acts by reason of its form, and is receptive by reason of its matter, it follows that things which have more perfect and ^Metaph., VII, 3 (1043b 34). " De Div, Norn., VII, 3 (PG 3, 872). THAT PROVIDENCE HAS A PLAN 191 less material forms, act on those that are more material and have more imperfect forms. Again. From the diversity of forms, matters and agents there results diversity of properties and accidents. For since substance is the cause of accident, as the perfect of the imperfect, it follows that diverse proper acci- dents must result from diverse substantial principles. Moreover, since di- verse agents produce diverse impressions on patients, it follows that a diversity of agents must result in a diversity of accidents proceeding from their activity. From what has been said, then, it is clear that it is not without reason that the divine providence has appointed to creatures diverse accidents, actions, passions and orders. Therefore Holy Scripture ascribes the forma- tion and government of things to the divine wisdom and prudence. Thus it is said {Prov, hi. 19, 20) : The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth: He hath established the heavens by prudence. By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew. Again {Wis. viii. i) it is said that divine wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily, and or- der eth all things sweetly] and (xi. 21): Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight, where by measure we are to understand the quantity, mode, or degree of perfection in each thing; by number, the multitude and diversity of species resulting from the various degrees of perfection; and by weight the various inclinations of things to their re- spective ends and operations, as well as the agents and patients, and such accidents as result from a diversity of species. In this same order wherein we find the plan of the divine providence, we have stated that the first place must be assigned to the divine goodness, as being the last end, which is the first principle in practical matters; and after this comes the multiplicity of things, the establishment of which needs a diversity of grades in forms and matters, agents and patients, actions and accidents. Accordingly, as the fundamental principle of the divine providence, absolutely speaking, is the divine goodness, so the funda- mental principle in creatures is their multitude, to the making and pres- ervation of which all other things are seen to be subordinated. In this sense Boethius, it would seem, fittingly said that number seems to have been the aim of nature in the original formation of things} We must, however, observe that the practical and speculative reasons partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that as speculative rea- son starts from a principle and employs means to reach the intended con- clusion, so the practical reason begins from some first principle and through certain means arrives at the intended operation or product of operation. In speculative matters, the principle is the form and the es- sence; whereas in practical matters it is the end, which sometimes is a form, at other times something else. Moreover, the principle in speculative Arith., I, 2 (PL 6j, 1083). 192 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES matters must always be necessary, whereas in practical matters it is some- times necessary and sometimes not. Thus it is necessary that man desire happiness as his end, but it is not necessary that he desire to build a house. Likewise in demonstrations, that which follows is always a necessary se- quel to that which precedes, but in practical matters not always, but only when the end cannot be obtained except by the way indicated. Thus he who would build a house must needs get some wood; but it depends on his absolute will, and not on his will to build a house, that he gets pine. Accordingly, that God loves His own goodness is something necessary, but it does not necessarily follow from this that it should be embodied in creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without this. Consequently, although the divine goodness is the reason why creatures were originally brought into being, yet this depends on the absolute will of God.— Sup- posing, however, that God wishes to communicate His goodness to His creatures by way of likeness as far as it is possible, this is the reason why creatures are of diverse kinds; although there is no necessity for this di- versity being according to this or that degree of perfection, or this or that number of things. — ^And supposing it to be God’s will to establish a par- ticular number in things, and to bestow on each thing a particular measure of perfection, this is the reason why a particular thing has such and such a form and such and such matter; and so on in like manner. It is therefore clear that the dispensations of providence are according to a certain plan, and yet this plan presupposes the divine will. Accordingly a twofold error is refuted by what we have said. First, there is the error of those who maintain that all things are the result of God’s absolute will without any plan. This is the error of the Moslem theologians, as Rabbi Moses relates,^ according to whom the sole reason why fire heats rather than chills is because God so wills. Secondly, there is included the error of those who assert that the ordering of causes pro- ceeds from the divine providence by way of necessity,^ Both of these views are false, as is clear from what has been said. There are, however, certain expressions of Scripture that would seem to ascribe all things to God’s absolute will. But such things are said, not to remove any plan from the dispensations of providence, but to show that God’s will is the first cause of all things, as we have already shown. Such are the words of the Psalm (cxxxiv. 6) : Whatsoever the Lord pleased j He hath donOj and of Job ix. 12: Who can say: Why dost Thou so? and of Rom. ix. 19: Who resisteth His will? Augustine likewise says: God^s will alone is the first cause of health and sickness, reward and punishment, grace and retribution.^ Accordingly, if we be asked the wherefore of a particular natural effect, we can assign the reason to some proximate cause, provided, however, that Maimonides, Guide, III, 25 (p. 308) . Cf. ch. yaff ; ch. 94. « De Tnn., Ill, 3 ; 4 (PL 42, 872; 873). GOD AND THE ORDER OF PROVIDENCE 193 we refer all things to the divine will as their first cause. Thus if it be asked: Why was the wood heated in the presence of fire? we reply: Because to heat is the natural action of fire, and this because heat is its proper acci-^ dent and this results from its proper form — and so on until we come to the divine will. Hence if we reply to the question Why was the wood made hot? by saying: Because God so willed, we shall answer rightly, if we intend to trace the question back to its first cause, but incorrectly if we intend to exclude all other causes. CHAPTER XCVIII HOW IT IS POSSIBLE, AND HOW IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOP GOD TO DO SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE ODDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE From what has been said we are able to consider a tvi^ofold order: the one, dependent on the first cause of all things, and hence embracing all; the other, a particular order, dependent on some created cause, and comprising such things as are subordinate to that cause. The latter order is manifold, in accordance with the diversity of causes to be found among creatures. Yet one such order is subordinate to another, even as one cause is subor- dinate to another. Consequently, all particular orders of causes are com- prised under, and are derived from, that universal order found in things in so far as they are dependent on the first cause. We have an example of this in political affairs. For there is a certain order among all the mem- bers of a household according as they are subject to the head of the house; again, the head of the house and all the other heads of houses in the same city have a certain order among themselves, and in relation to the governor of the city; and he again, together with all the other gov- ernors in the kingdom, is subordinate to the king. This universal order, according to which all things are ruled by the divine providence, may be considered in two ways: namely, with regard to the things subject to that order, and with regard to the plan of the order, which depends on the principle *of the order. Now we proved in the Second Book that the things themselves, which are ordered by God, do not proceed from Him as from an agent that is necessitated by nature or by anything else, but rather proceed from His absolute will, especially as regards the original establishment of things.^ Consequently, there are other things that God can do besides those which are comprised under the order of divine providence, since His power is not limited to them. On the other hand, if we consider the aforesaid order with respect to the plan that depends on the principle, then it is not possible for God to do ^ C. G., II, 23 if. 194 the SUMMA contra GENTILES anything outside that order. For this order, as we have proved,^ proceeds from the knowledge and will of God directing all things to His goodness as their end. Now, it is not possible that God do anything that is not willed by Him, since creatures proceed from Him, not by nature, but because He wills them to, as we have proved. Nor is it possible for anything to be done by Him that is not included in His knowledge, since nothing can be willed that is not known. Nor, again, is it possible for Him to do anything as regards creatures, that is not directed to His goodness as its end, since His goodness is the proper object of His will. Likewise, since God is utterly unchangeable. He cannot possibly will that which He did not previously will, or begin to know something anew, or direct it to His goodness. There- fore God can do nothing but what is comprised in the order of His provi- dence, even as He can do only what is subject to His operation. And yet, if we consider His power absolutely. He can do other things besides those that are subject to His providence or operation; but He cannot do what has not been eternally contained in the order of His providence, because He is unchangeable. Through failing to observe this distinction some have fallen into various errors. Some, in an endeavor to extend to things themselves the unchange- ableness of the divine order, said that all things must of necessity be as they are; so much so, that some declared that God is able to do only what He does.^ Against this we have the words of Matt. xxvi. 53 : Cannot I ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels? Others, however, thinking in their carnal wisdom that God, like carnal man, is inconstant of will, ascribed the changeableness of things subject to the divine providence to changeableness in the divine providence itself. Against this it is said {Num. xxiii. 19) : God is not as a man that he should lie; nor as the son of man that He should he changed. Others again withdrew contingent things from the divine providence. Against these it is said {Lament, iii. 37) : Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not? CHAPTER XCIX THAT GOD CAN WORIC OUTSID-E THE ORDEE IMPOSED ON THINGS, BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT THEIR PROXI- MATE CAUSES It remains to be proved that God can act outside the order imposed on things by Himself. ^ Ch. 97. ^ Cf. St. Thomas, De Pot., q. i, a. 5. THAT GOD CAN ACT WITHOUT SECOND CAUSES 195 For the order imposed on things by God is that lower things be moved by the higher, as was shown above.^ Now God can act independently of this order. In other words, He can by Himself produce an effect in inferior things, without a higher agent doing anything towards that effect. For the agent that works by natural necessity differs from the agent that acts by will in this, that the effect cannot result from the former except according to the mode of its active power. Hence the agent which has very great power cannot produce immediately a small effect, but produces an effect proportionate to its power. In this effect, however, there will sometimes be less power than in its cause, so that at length through many intermediaries a small effect results from the highest cause. But it is not so in the agent that acts by its will. Because the agent that acts by its will can at once, without any intermediary, produce any effect . that does not surpass its power. Thus the most perfect craftsman can produce a work such as an imperfect craftsman would produce. Now God works by His will, and not by necessity of nature, as we proved above.^ Therefore He can produce lesser effects, that are produced by inferior causes, immediately without their proper causes. Again. The divine power is compared to all active powers as a universal power to particular powers, as is clear from what has been said above.^ Now an active universal power may be determined to the production of a particular effect in two ways. First, by a particular intermediary cause. Thus, the active power of a heavenly body is determined to the effect which is the begetting of a man by the particular power seated in the semen; just as the power of a universal proposition in a syllogism is deter- mined to a particular conclusion by the assumption of a particular prop- osition. Secondly, by an intellect which apprehends a particular form and produces it in the effect. Now the divine intellect knows not only its own essence, which is like a universal active power, nor only universal and first causes, but also all particular causes, as we have proved above.^ Therefore God can produce immediately every effect that is produced by any par- ticular agent. Further. Since accidents accompany the substantial principles of a thing, it follows that he who is the immediate cause of the substance is able to produce in a thing whatever accompanies the substance; for the generator, which gives the form, gives likewise all the resultant properties and movements. Now we have shown that God, in the original production of things, brought all things into being immediately by creation.^ There- fore He can move any being to a given effect independently of intermediate causes. Besides. The order of things comes from God into things according as it is preknown in His intellect. So, too, in human affairs we see that the head of the state imposes on the citizens the order preconceived by him. Now ^ Ch. 83 and 88. ^ C. G., II, 23^. ® Ch. 67. C. G., I, 50. " C. G., II, 21. 196 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES the divine intellect is not necessarily limited to this particular order, so as to be unable to conceive any other, since even we are able by our intellect to apprehend another order; for it is intelligible to us that God might make a man of earth and not of seed. Therefore God can produce an effect with- out the inferior causes to which that effect is proper. Moreover. Although the order imposed on things by the divine provi- dence reflects the divine goodness in its own particular way, yet it does not reflect it perfectly, since the creature’s goodness does not reach to an equality with the goodness of God. Now, that which is not perfectly rep- resented by one copy can be represented again in some other way. Now the representation of the divine goodness in things is the end of their pro- duction by God, as was above stated.^ Therefore God’s will is not confined to this particular order of causes and effects, as though He could not choose to produce an effect in lower things immediately and independently of other causes. Further. All creatures are more subject to God than man’s body is to his soul; for the soul is proportionate to the body as its form, whereas God surpasses all proportion to the creature. Now sometimes, when the soul imagines a thing and is strongly drawn towards it, there results a change in the body in the direction of health or sickness, independently of any action on the part of those bodily principles whose natural function is to cause sickness or health in the body. Much more, therefore, by the divine will can an effect be produced in creatures independently of the causes which in the course of nature produce that effect naturally. Further. According to the order of nature, the active powers of the ele- ments are subordinate to the active powers of the heavenly bodies. Now the power of a heavenly body sometimes produces an effect proper to elemental powers without the action of an element. Thus the sun heats without the action of fire. Much more, therefore, can the power of God produce the ef- fects of created causes without any action on their part. If, however, anyone were to say that, since God has implanted this order in things, He cannot produce in them effects apart from their proper causes without a change in Himself, he can be answered by referring to the very nature of things. For the order imposed on things by God is in terms of that which is wont to occur in things for the most pari, but it is not every- where in terms of what always occurs, because many natural causes pro- duce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since some- times (though seldom) it happens otherwise, whether because of a de- fect in the power of the agent, or through indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency: as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man. Yet the order of providence does not therefore fail or change, because the fact itself that the natural order, established according to what happens for the most part, may at times fail, is subject to the divine provi- ^Ch. Ip. GOD DOES NOT ACT CONTRARY TO NATURE 197 dence. Therefore, if it be possible for the natural order to be changed by a created power from that which is of frequent to that which is of rare occur- rence, without any change in the divine providence, much more can the divine power at times work apart from the order assigned by God to nature, with- out prejudice to His providence. In fact, He does this sometimes in order to manifest His power. For by no other means can it better be made mani- fest that all nature is subject to the divine will, than by the fact that He sometimes works independently of the order of nature; for this shows that the order of things proceeded from Him, not through natural necessity, but through His free will. Nor should it be deemed a slight argument that God should produce something in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men, since it was shown above that all corporeal creatures are in some way directed to the intellectual nature as their end,^ while the end of the intellectual creature itself is the knowledge of God, as we have proved.^ It is not strange, then, if some change be wrought in a corporeal substance, in order to bring the intellectual nature to the knowledge of God. CHAPTER C THAT WHAT GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF NATURE IS NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE It would seem, however, necessary to observe that, although God some- times does something outside the order assigned to things, yet He does nothing contrary to nature. For since God is pure act, whereas all other things have some admixture of potentiality, it follows that God must be compared to all things as the mover to the thing moved, and as the active to the potential. Now, when that which in the natural order is in potentiality with regard to a certain agent, is acted upon by that agent, this is not contrary to nature absolutely, although sometimes it is contrary to that particular form which is cor- rupted by such action. Thus when fire is generated, and air is corrupted through the action of the fire, both generation and corruption are natural. Consequently, whatever is done by God in created things is not contrary to nature, although it may seem to be contrary to the order proper to a particular nature. Again. Since God is the first agent, as we have proved,^ all subsequent agents are as His instruments. Now the purpose of an instrument is to serve the action of the principal agent while it is being moved by it. Hence the matter and form of an instrument must be such as to be suitable for the action intended by the principal agent. Hence it is not contrary, but most ^Ch. 22. "Ch. 25. ^C. G., I, 13. 198 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES becoming, to the nature of an instrument to be moved by the principal agent. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature that creatures be moved by God in any way whatsoever, since they were made that they might serve Him. Further. Even in corporeal agents we observe that the movements re- sulting in inferior bodies from the influence of higher bodies are neither violent nor unnatural, although they may seem unsuited to the natural movement which the inferior body has as proper to its form. For we do not say that the ebb and flow of the sea is a violent movement just because it results from the influence of a heavenly body, even though the natural movement of water is only in one direction, namely, toward the center. Much less, therefore, can whatsoever God does in any creature be described as violent or unnatural. Besides. The first measure of every essence and nature is God, just as He is the first being, which is the cause of being in all other things. Since, then, we judge of everything by its measure, we must regard as natural to a thing that whereby it is conformed 'to its measure. Hence, whatever is implanted in a thing by God is natural to that thing. Therefore, if some- thing else be implanted by God in that same thing, it will not be unnatural. Moreover. All creatures are compared to God as works of art are com- pared to the artist, as appears from what we have already said."^ Hence all nature is the work of the divine art. Now it is not inconsistent with a work of art that the artist make some alteration in his work, even after giving it its first form. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature if God does something in natural things other than that which occurs in the ordi- nary course of nature. Therefore Augustine says: Godj the creator and author of all natures, does nothing unnatural; because, to each thing that is natural which is caused by Him from whom is all measure, number and order in nature? CHAPTER Cl ON MIRACLES These works, however, that are sometimes done by God outside the usual order assigned to things are wont to be called miracles, because we are astonished [admiramur] at a thing when we see an effect without know- ing the cause. And since at times one and the same cause is known to some and unknown to others, it happens that, of several who see an effect, some are astonished and some not. Thus an astronomer is not astonished when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows the cause; whereas one who is ignorant of this science must needs wonder, since he knows not the cause. G., II, 24. "Contra Faust., XXVI, 3 (PL 42, 480). GOD AND MIRACLES 199 There foie it is wonderful to the latter but not to the former. Accordingly, a thing is wonderful absolutely when its cause is hidden absolutely. This is what we mean by a miracle, something, namely, that is wonderful in itself and not only in respect of this person or that. Now God is the cause which is absolutely hidden from every man. For we have proved above that in this state of life no man can comprehend Him by his intellect.^ Therefore, properly speaking, miracles are works done by God outside the order usually observed in things. Of these miracles there are various degrees and orders. The highest degree in miracles comprises those works wherein something is done by God that nature can never do. For instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still, that the sea be divided and make way to passers by. Among these also there is a certain order. For the greater the work done by God, and the further it is removed from the capability of nature, the greater the miracle. Thus it is a greater miracle that the sun recede than that the waters be divided. The second degree in miracles belongs to those whereby God does some- thing that nature can do, but not in the same order. Thus it is a work of nature that an animal live, see and walk; but that an animal live after being dead, see after being blind, walk after being lame, this nature can- not do, but God does these things sometimes by a miracle. Among these miracles, also, there are degrees, according as the thing done is further removed from the power of nature. In the third degree of miracles God does what is wont to be done by the operation of nature, but without the operation of the natural prin- ciples: e,g., when by the power of God a man is cured of a fever that nature is able to cure; or when it rains without the operation of the prin- ciples of nature. CHAPTER CII THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES From what has been said it can be shown that God alone can work miracles. For whatever is entirely subject to an order cannot do anything above that order. Now every creature is placed under the order established in things by God. Therefore no creature can do anything above that order (which is to work miracles). Again. When a finite power produces the proper effect to which it is limited, it is not a miracle although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand that power. Thus to an ignorant person it is wonder- ^Ch. 47. 200 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fill that the magnet attracts iron, or that a small fish should stop a ship. Now every creature’s power is limited to one definite effect, or to a few. Therefore, whatever is done by the power of any creature whatsoever can- not properly be described as a miracle, although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand the power of that creature. But that which is done by the power of God, which, being infinite, is incomprehensible, is truly a miracle. Moreover. Every creature requires in its action a subject on which to act; for it belongs to God alone to make something out of nothing, as we proved above.^ Now that which requires a subject in its action can do only those things to which that subject is in potentiality; for the agent acts on the subject in order to bring it from potentiality to act. Therefore, just as a creature cannot create, so neither can it do in a thing save what is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles wrought by God, something is done in a thing that is not in that thing’s capacity; for in- stance, that the dead live again, that the sun recede, that two bodies occupy the same place. Therefore such miracles cannot be wrought by any created power. Further. The subject acted upon is ordered both to the agent that re- duces it from potentiality to act, and to the act to which it is reduced. Accordingly, just as any particular subject is in potentiality to some deter- minate act, and not to any act, so it cannot be brought from potentiality to a determinate act except by some determinate agent; for agents must needs differ according as they introduce different acts. Thus, whereas air is potentially fire or water, one agent makes it to be actually fire, and another makes it to be actually water. Likewise it is clear that corporeal matter is not brought to a perfect actuality by the sole action of a uni- versal power, but there must be some proper agent by which the action of the universal power is determined to a particular effect. Nevertheless, cor- poreal matter can be brought to a less perfect actuality by the universal power alone, without a particular agent. Thus perfect animals are not formed by the power of a heavenly body alone, but determinate seed is necessary; whereas the power of a heavenly body, without any seed, suf- fices for the generation of certain imperfect animals. Accordingly, effects produced among these lower things, if they be of a nature to be wrought by universal higher causes, without the action of particular inferior causes, can be produced in this way without any' miracle. Thus it is not a miracle that animals be formed from putrefaction without seed. But if they be not of a nature to be produced by superior causes alone, then particular in- ferior causes are required for their perfect formation. Now there is no miracle if an effect be produced by a higher cause by means of its proper principles. Therefore it is altogether impossible for miracles to be wrought by the power of the higher creatures. ^ C. G., 11 , 1 6 and 21. SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES AND WONDERS 201 Moreover. Seemingly these amount to the same: — the production of a work out of a subject; — the production of that to which the subject is in potentiality; — and the orderly production of something through definite intermediary stages. Because a subject is not in proximate potentiality to the ultimate effect, until it has arrived at the middle stage. Thus food is not in immediate potentiality flesh, but only when it is changed into blood. Now every creature needs a subject in order to produce something, nor can it produce other than that to which the subject is in potentiality, as we have shown. Therefore it cannot produce anything without bringing the subject to actuality through definite intervening stages. Therefore miracles, which consist in something being done without observing the order in which it is naturally feasible, cannot be worked by the power of a creature. Also. There is a natural order to be observed in the various kinds of movement. The first is local movement, and hence it is the cause of other movements, because in every genus that which is first is the cause of all that follows in that genus. Now every effect that is produced in this lower world must needs result from some generation or alteration. Consequently, it must be caused through something that is moved locally, if it be the effect of an incorporeal agent which, properly speaking, is incapable of local movement. But no effect that is caused by incorporeal substances through corporeal instruments is a miracle, since bodies have no operation that is not natural. Therefore, created incorporeal substances cannot work miracles by their own power; and much less corporeal substances^ whose every action is natural. Therefore it belongs to God alone to work miracles. For He is above the order which contains all things, as one from whose providence the whole of this order is derived. Moreover, His power, being absolutely infinite, is not determined to any special effect, nor to the producing of its effect in any particular way or order. Therefore it is said of God in the Psalm (cxxxv. 4) : Who alone doth great wonders. CHAPTER CHI HOW SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO WONDERS WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TRULY MIRACLES Now it was the opinion of Avicenna that matter is more obedient to sepa- rate substances in the production of an effect than to contrary agents in matter. Hence he states that sometimes, at the apprehension of the afore- said substances, an effect ensues in this lower world, such as rain, or the healing of a sick person, without any corporeal agent intervening. 202 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES He regarded as a sign of this the fact that when our soul is of strong imagination, the body is affected by mere thought aloned Thus a man, while walking on a plank at a height, easily falls, because through fear he imagines himself to fall; whereas he would not fall, were the plank placed on the ground, so that he would not fear to fall. It is also clear that the body is heated at a mere apprehension of the soul, for instance in lustful or angry persons; or again, becomes cold, as happens in those who are seized with fear. Sometimes, too, through a strong apprehension, it is inclined to some illness, for instance fever or even leprosy. In this way, says he, if the soul be pure and not subject to the passions of the body, and strong of apprehension, not only its own body is obedient to its apprehension, but even external bodies; so much so that a sick man is healed, or something similar occurs, at its mere apprehension. He holds this to be the cause of fascination, namely, because a certain person’s soul, being deeply affected with malevolence, exercises a baneful influence on some- one, especially on a child, who by reason of the softness of the body is most impressionable. Hence he maintains that much more, without the action of a corporeal agent, do certain effects result in these lower bodies, at the apprehension of the separate substances, which he considers to be the souls or movers of the spheres. This theory is consistent enough with other opinions of his.^ For he holds that all substantial forms emanate from a separate substance into these lower bodies, and that corporeal agents merely dispose matter to receive the impression of the separate agent. But this is untrue according to the teaching of Aristotle, who proves that the forms which are in matter do not come from separate forms, but from forms in matter; for thus it is that we find a likeness between the maker and the thing made.'* Moreover. The comparison with the soul’s impression on the body does not advance his theory very much. For no impression is made on the body as a result of an apprehension, unless united to the apprehension there be some emotion, as of joy, fear, desire, or of some other passion. Now these passions are accompanied by a certain definite movement of the heart, from which there results a change in the entire body, either in terms of local motion, or in terms of some alteration. Hence it still remains that the apprehension of a spiritual substance does not affect the body, except by means of local movement. As to his remark about fascination, this does not happen because the apprehension of one affects immediately the body of another; but because the apprehension affects the conjoined body through the movement of the heart, the influence of which reaches even to the eye, which is able to work evil on an external object, especially if it be easily impressionable, — as the eye of a woman in her menses infects a mirror.^ ^Avicenna, De An,, IV, 4 (fol. 2ovb). ® Avicenna, Meiaph., IX, 5 (fol. io5rv). ^ Met aph., VI, 8 (1033b 26). ^ De Somno, 11 (4S9b 29). SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES AND WONDERS 203 Accordingly, except through the local movement of a body, a created spiritual substance cannot, by its own power, induce any form into cor- poreal matter, as though matter, obedient to it, were to assume the act of some form. For it is in the power of a created spiritual substance that a body should be obedient to it in respect of local movement. Now by mov- ing a particular body locally, it applies certain natural forces to the pro- duction of certain effects ; just as the art of the smith applies fire to make the iron malleable. But this is not miraculous, properly speaking. It fol- lows, therefore, that created spiritual substances do not work miracles by their own power. And I say by their own power, because nothing prevents these substances from working miracles in so far as they work by divine power. This indeed may be seen from the fact that, as Gregory states, one order of angels is especially deputed to the working of miracles.^ He also says that certain saints sometimes work miracles by power ^ and not merely by intercession.^ We must observe, however, that when angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce certain definite effects, they employ them as instruments, just as a physician uses certain herbs as instruments for the purpose of healing. Now from an instrument there proceeds an effect, not only in proportion to its power, but also in excess thereof, inasmuch as it acts by the power of the principal agent. Thus a saw or an axe could not produce a bedstead except through being applied by craftsmanship for that particular effect ; nor could natural heat produce flesh, except by the power of the vegetative soul that employs it as an instrument. It is therefore fit- ting that certain higher effects should result from these same natural things, as a consequence of the fact that spiritual substances employ them as instru- ments. Accordingly, although such effects cannot be called miracles absolutely, since they result from natural causes, yet they are wonderful to us in two ways. First, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects by spiritual substances in a way that is strange to us; even so the works of skillful craftsmen seem wonderful to others who do not see how the work is done. — Secondly, because the natural causes employed for the production of certain effects are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances; and this comes nearer to the nature of a miracle. ^ Cf. ch. 80. ^Dial, 11 , 31 (PL 66, 190). 204 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER CIV THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DO NOT RESULT ONLY FROM THE INFLUENCE OF HEAVENLY BODIES There were some who said that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done, not by certain spiritual substance’s, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practice works of this kind observe the position of the stars. They are also assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power. But this is in contradiction with the apparitions [in the works of ma- gicians]. For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above,^ it is impossible for effects- that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature; for instance, answers are given about stolen goods, and the like, and this could not be done except through an intellect. Therefore it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body. Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear speaking to men and reasoning about various matters. Therefore such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies. If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present, not accord- ing to the external sense, but only according to the imagination: — this is, in the first place, evidently untrue. For imaginary forms do not appear to anyone to be actual things unless he is alienated from his external senses; since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality, ex- cept the natural judgments of the senses be fettered. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary. Besides. No imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired capability of his intellect. This is evident in dreams, since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it fre- quently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the capability of his intellect, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes true answers are given in mat- " Ch. 84. MAGIC AND THE HEAVENLY BODIES 205 ters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary, or at least this is the work of some higher intellect, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings. Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect, since it is natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to any- thing, cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works. For instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are un- locked, that a certain man becomes invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore this cannot be done by the power of the heavenly bodies. Further. The reception, through the power of the heavenly bodies, of that which follows, implies the reception of what precedes. Now movement of its very nature follows from having a soul, since it is proper to animate things to move themselves. Therefore it is impossible for an inanimate being to be moved by itself, through the power of a heavenly body. Yet it is stated that by the magic art a statue is made to move of itself, or to speak. Therefore it is not possible for the effects of the magic art to be caused by the power of a heavenly body. And if it be said that the statue in question is endowed with some vital principle by the power of the heavenly bodies, this is impossible. For the principle of life in all living things is the substantial form, because, as the Philosopher says, in living things to be is to live?- Now it is impossible for anything to receive anew a substantial form, unless it lose the form which it had previously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of an- other? But in the making of a statue no substantial form is discarded, and there is only a change of shape, which is an accident, since the form of copper or something of the kind remains. Therefore the statue in question cannot possibly be endowed with some vital principle. Further. If anything is moved by a principle of life, it is necessarily en- dowed with sense, for the principle of movement is sensation or under- standing. But understanding is not found without sensation in generable and corruptible things. Now there cannot be sense where there is not touch, nor touch, without an organ of mean temperature. Such a temperature, how- ever, is not found in the stone or wax or metal out of which the statue is made. It is not possible, therefore, that statues of this sort should be moved by a principle of life. Besides. Perfect living beings are generated not only by a celestial power, but also from seed, for man and the sun generate man;^ and such as are generated by a celestial power alone without seed, are animals formed by putrefaction, belonging to a lower grade than the others. Ac- cordingly, if these statues be endowed with a vital principle by a celestial ^De An., II, 4 (4isb*i3). (194b 14). Aristotle, Phys., Ill, 8 (208a 10). Op. cit., II, 2 2o6 the SUMMA contra GENTILES power alone, so as to move themselves, it follows that they belong to the lowest grade of animals. And yet this would be false if they worked by an intrinsic principle of life, since among their operations some are of a high degree, for they give answers about hidden things. Therefore it is not pos- sible that their operations and movements proceed from a principle of life. Again. We sometimes find a natural effect produced by the power of the heavenly bodies without the operation of art. Thus, although one may try to produce frogs, or something of the kind, by means of some artifice, frogs do happen to be produced without any artifice. Consequently, if these statues, that are made by necromancy, are endowed with a vital principle by the power of heavenly bodies, it will be possible for them to be formed without the operation of art. But this is not the case. Therefore it is evi- dent that such statues have not a principle of life, nor are they moved by the power of the heavenly bodies. Hereby is removed the opinion of Hermes who, according to Augustine, expressed himself thus: As God is the cause of the heavenly gods, so man fashions the gods that reside in temples, satisfied to live near men. 1 refer to those animated statues, endowed with sense and spirit, that do great and wonderful things, statues gifted with knowledge of the future, and that foretell by dreams and many other things; who afflict men with ailments and heal them, who bring sorrow and joy to them according to their merits} This opinion is also refuted by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm (cxxxiv. 15 seqq.) : The idols of the Gentiles are silver and gold, the works of men^s hands. They have a mouth but they speak not . . . neither is there any breath in their mouths. Yet we must not absolutely deny the possibility of some kind of efficacy being in these things through the power of the heavenly bodies; but only for such effects as some lower bodies are able to cause by the power of the heavenly bodies. CHAPTER CV WHENCE THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DERIVE THEIR EFFICACY <• It remains for us to inquire whence the magic arts derive their efficacy: a question that will present no difficulty if we consider their mode of opera- tion. For in the practice of their art they make use of certain significative words in order to produce certain definite effects. Now, words, in so far as ^De Civit.JDei, VIII, 23 (PL 41, 247). THE CAUSE OF THE EFFICACY OF MAGIC 207 they signify something, have no power except as derived from some intel- lect, either of the speaker, or of the person to whom they are spoken: from the intellect of the speaker, as when an intellect is of such great power that it can cause things by its mere thought, which the voice serves to convey, as it were, to the things that are to be produced; from the in- tellect of the person to whom the words are addressed, as when the hearer is induced to do some particular thing when his intellect receives the sig- nification of those words. Now it cannot be said that these significative words uttered by magicians derive any efficacy from the intellect of the speaker. For since power follows essence, diversity of power indicates di- versity of essential principles. But man’s intellect is invariably of such a disposition that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it is able by its mere thought to cause things. Consequently, if there be any men that are able of their own power to transform things by words ex- pressive of their thoughts, they will belong to another species, and it would be an equivocation to call them men. Further. By learning we acquire, not the power to do a thing, but the knowledge of how to do it. Yet some, by learning, are rendered able to perform these magic works. Therefore they must have only knowledge, 'and not the power, to produce these effects. But suppose someone were to say that these men, by the influence of the stars, are born with the aforesaid power, while others are excluded from it; so that however much the others, who are born without this power, may be instructed, they cannot succeed in performing these works. To this we must reply, first that, as was shown above,^ the heavenly bodies cannot make an impression on the intellect. Therefore a man’s intellect cannot, through the influence of. the stars, receive a power whereby the vocal ex- pression of its thoughts is productive of something. And if it be said that the imagination likewise produces an effect in the utterance of significative words, and that the heavenly bodies can act on the imagination, since its operation is performed by a bodily organ: — this does not apply to all the results produced by this art. For we have shown that these effects cannot all be produced by the power of the stars Neither, therefore, can anyone by the power of the stars receive the power to produce these effects. Consequently, it follows that these effects are accomplished by an in- tellect to whom the discourse of the person- uttering these words is ad- dressed. We have an indication of this in the fact that the significative words employed by the magician are invocations, supplications, adjura- tions, or even commands, as though he were addressing another. Again. Certain characters and definite figures are employed in the ob- servances of this art. Now a figure cannot be the principle of either action or passion, or else, mathematical bodies would be active and passive, There- " Ch. 84. Ch, 104. 208 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fore matter cannot, by deiSnite figures, be disposed to receive a certain natural effect. Therefore magicians do not employ figures as dispositions. It remains, then, that they employ them only as signs, for there is no third solution. But we make signs only to other intelligent beings. Therefore the magic arts derive their efficacy from another intelligent being, to whom the magician’s words are addressed. And if someone were to say that certain figures are appropriated to certain heavenly bodies, and hence that the lower bodies are determined by certain figures to receive the impressions of certain heavenly bodies: — this does not seem to be a reasonable statement. For the patient is not directed to receive the impression of the agent, except through being in potentiality. Hence those things alone determine it to receive a particular impression, that cause it to be somehow in potentiality. Now figures do not cause matter to be in potentiality to any particular form, because a figure, as such, abstracts from all matter and sensible forms, since it is something mathematical. Therefore a body is not determined by figures or characters to receive the influence of a heavenly body. Besides. Certain figures are appropriated to the heavenly bodies as their effects, for the figures of the lower bodies are caused by heavenly bodies. Now, the aforesaid arts do not use characters or figures as produced by the heavenly bodies; in fact, they are produced by the man practicing the art. Therefore the appropriation of figures to certain heavenly bodies has nothing to do with the question. Further. As we have shown, matter is in no way disposed to form by means of figures. Hence the bodies on* which these figures are impressed are as capable of receiving the influence of heavenly bodies as are other bodies of the same species. Now, that an agent act on one rather than another of several equally disposed things, by reason of something appropriated to be found in it, is a mark of its operating, not by natural necessity, but by choice. Hence it is clear that these arts which employ figures in order to produce certain effects derive their efficacy, not from something that acts by nature, but from some intellectual substance that acts through its in- tellect. This is also proved by the very name character which they apply to these figures; for a character is a sign. Thereby we are given to under- stand that they employ these figures merely as signs shown to some intel- lectual nature. Since, however, in the products of art, figures are like specific forms, someone might say that there is no reason why, through the influence of a heavenly body, some ppwer should not shape the figure that gives an image its species, not indeed as a figure, but as specifying the product of art, which acquires this power from the stars. But as to the letters that form an inscription on a statue, and other characters, nothing else can be said of them, but that they are signs. Therefore they are directed to only THE CAUSE OF MAGIC IS NOT VIRTUOUS 209 some intellect. ^This is also proved by the sacrifices, prostrations and other similar practices, which can be nothing else than signs of reverence shown to an intellectual nature. CHAPTER CVI THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH GIVES EFFICACY TO THE PRACTICES OF MAGIC IS NOT GOOD ACCORDING TO VIRTUE We must furthermore inquire what is this intellectual nature by whose power these works are done. And in the first place it is plain that it is not good and praiseworthy. For it is the mark of an ill-disposed intellect to countenance things con- trary to virtue. Now this is what happens in these arts, for they are often employed in order' to further adultery, theft, murder and like malefices; and therefore those who practice these arts are called malefics. Therefore the intellectual nature on whose assistance these arts depend is not well disposed according to virtue. Again. It is not the mark of an intellect well disposed according to virtue, to befriend and assist men of evil life, rather than any upright man. Now those who practice these arts are generally men of evil life. Therefore the intellectual nature from whose assistance these arts derive their efficacy is not well disposed according to virtue. Further. It is the mark of a well disposed intellect to guide men towards those goods that are proper to man, namely, the goods of reason. Conse- quently, to lead men away from these, and to draw men to goods of the least worth, shows a mind of evil disposition. Now by these arts men progress, not in the goods of reason, which are the sciences and the virtues, but in goods of least account, such as the discovery of stolen goods, the capture of thieves, and so forth. Therefore the intellectual substances, whose assistance these arts, employ, are not well disposed according to virtue. Moreover. There is a certain deception and irrationality in the works of these arts; for they require a man indifferent to lustful pleasure, whereas they are frequently employed to further lustful intercourse. But there is nothing irrational or contradictory in the work of a well-disposed intellect. Therefore these arts do not employ the assistance of an intellect that is well disposed as to virtue. Besides. It is an ill-disposed intellect that is incited by the commission of crime to lend his assistance to another. But this is done in these arts, for we read of innocent children being slain by those who practice them. 210 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Therefore the persons by whose assistance such things are done have an evil intellect. Again. The proper good of the intellect is truth. Since, therefore, it be- longs to good to lead others to good, it belongs to any well-disposed intel- lect to lead others to truth. In the works of the magicians, however, many things are done by which men are mocked and deceived. The intellect whose help they use, therefore, is not morally well disposed. Further. A well-disposed intellect is allured by truth in which it takes delight, but not by lies. The magicians, however, in their invocations make use of various lies, whereby they allure those whose help they employ. For they threaten certain impossible things, as for instance that, unless the one who is called upon gives help, he who invokes him will shatter the heavens or displace the stars, as Porphyry narrates in his Letter to Ane- bontesA Those intellectual substances, therefore, with whose help the works of the magicians are performed, do not seem to be intellectually well disposed. ’Moreover. That a superior should be subject as an inferior to one that commands him, or that an inferior should allow himself’ to be invoked as a superior, would seem to indicate a person of an ill-disposed intellect. Now, magicians call upon those whose assistance they employ, as though these were their superiors, and as soon as they appear they command them as inferiors. In no way therefore do they appear to be of a well-disposed intellect. Hereby is removed the error of the pagans, who ascribed these works to the gods. CHAPTER evil THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHOSE ASSISTANCE IS EMPLOYED IN THE MAGIC ARTS IS NOT EVIL IN ITS NATURE It is impossible that there be natural malice in the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed in the practice oT the magic arts. For if a being tends to something by its nature, it tends to it not acci- dentally but essentially, as a heavy body tends downwards. Now if these intellectual substances are evil essentially, they tend to evil naturally and, consequently, not accidentally but essentially. But this is impossible, for we have proved that all things tend essentially to good, and nothing tends to evil except accidentally Therefore these intellectual substances are not naturally evil. Again. Everything that exists must be either cause or caused, or other- ^Cf. St. Augustine, De Civit, Dei^ X, ii (PL 41, 290). ®Cli. 3ff, 2II —BUT IT IS NOT EVIL IN NATURE wise there would be no order between it and other things. Hence the sub- stances in question are either causes only, or are also caused. If they be causes, since evil cannot cause a thing save accidentally, as was proved above,^ and since whatever is accidental must be traced to something es- sential, it follows that there must be in them something preceding their malice, whereby they are causes. Now in each thing it is the nature and essence that comes first. Therefore these substances are not evil by nature. The same follows if they be caused. For no agent acts except by intend- ing some good. Therefore evil cannot be the effect of a cause except acci- dentally. Now that which is caused only by accident cannot exist naturally, since every nature has a definite mode of coming into being. Therefore it is impossible for the substances in question to be evil by nature. Besides'. Every being has its own being according to the mode of its nature. Now to bCj as such, is good, a sign of which is that all things desire being. Consequently, if these substances were evil by nature, they would have no being. Moreover. We have proved that nothing can exist that does not have being from the first being and that the first being is the highest good.^ Since then every agent, as such, produces its like, whatever proceeds from the first being must be good. Therefore the aforesaid substances, in so far as they exist, and have a certain nature, cannot be evil. Further. There cannot possibly exist a thing that is altogether deprived of a participation in good; for since the good and the appetible are the same, if a thing were utterly without a share in good, there would be noth- ing appetible in it. But its own being is appetible to each thing. Conse- quently, if anything be described as evil in its nature, this must be, not be- cause it is absolutely evil, but because it is evil to this being, or in some respect. Thus poison is not evil absolutely, but to one to whom it is harm- ful; and hence one man’s poison is another man’s meat. Now this happens because the particular good that is proper to one is contrary to the par- ticular good that is proper to another; and thus heat, which is the good of fire, is contrary to cold, which is the good of water, and destroys it. Accordingly, that which by its nature is directed, not to this or that good, but to good absolutely, cannot possibly, even in this way, be called evil by its nature. Now such is every intellect, because its good is in its own opera- - tion, the object of which is the universal, and things that exist absolutely. Therefore no intellect can be evil in its nature, either absolutely or in rela- tion to something else. Again. In every intellectual subject,, the intellect moves the appetite, according to the order of nature, because the proper object of the will is the understood good. Now the good of the will consists in its following the intellect. Thus, in man, the good is that which is according to reason, and whatever is outside this is evil. It is according to a natural order, there- ^ Ch. 14. " C. G., 11 , IS. " C. G., I, 4x. 212 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fore, that an intellectual substance wills the good. Consequently, it is im- possible that the intellectual substances, whose assistance is employed by magical arts, be naturally evil. Besides. Since the will tends naturally to the understood good, as its proper object and end, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally, evil, unless its intellect err naturally in its judgment of good. Now there can be no such intellect, because false judgments in the acts of the intellect are like monstrosities in natural things, for they are not according to, but outside, nature; since the good and natural end of the intellect is the knowledge of truth. Therefore there cannot be an intel- lect that is naturally deceived in its judgment of truth. Neither, conse- quently, is it possible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil. Further. No cognitive power fails in the knowledge of its object, save be- cause of being defective or corrupted, since by its very nature it is di- rected to the knowledge of that object. Thus the sight does not fail in the perception of color, unless the sight itself be injured. Now every defect and corruption is outside nature, because nature aims at the being and perfection of a thing. Therefore no cognitive power can fail in the right judgment of its object. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore there cannot be an intellect that errs naturally in the knowledge of truth. Neither, therefore, can any will fall away naturally from the good. This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (i Tim, iv. 4) : Every creature of God is good; and {Gen. i. 31) : God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. Hereby also is removed the error of the Manicheans who held that these intellectual substances, which we are wont to call demons or devils, are naturally evil. There is also removed the error described by Porphyry in his Letter to Anebontes, where he says that some are of the opinion that there is a genus of spirits, to whom it belongs to grant the prayers of magicians, spirits naturally deceitful, appearing under all kinds of' forms, pretending to be gods, or demons, or souls of the departed. It is they who cause all these effects that seem either good or evil. As to those effects that are really good, they give no assistance; in fact, they know nothing about them. But they counsel evil, and impugn and sometimes hinder those who are intent on leading a virtuous life; they are full of presumption and arro- gance; they delight in vanities, and are fascinated by flattery.'^ These words of Porphyry indicate clearly enough the malice of the demons, whose assistance the magic arts employ. In this alone are his words reprehensible that he states this malice to be natural to the demons. ^ Cf. St. Augustine, De Civil. Dei, X, ii (PL 41, 289). SIN IN THE DEMONS 213 CHAPTER CVIII ARGUMFNTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO SIN IN THE DEMONS Since malice in the demons is not natural to them, and since it has been proved that they are evil,^ it follows of necessity that the evil in them is voluntary. Accordingly, we must inquire how this can be, for it would seem altogether impossible. [1] For we proved in' the Second Book that no intellectual substance is naturally united to a body, except the human soul ^ (or according to some, the souls of the heavenly bodies,^ which it is unfitting to deem evil, since the movement of heavenly bodies is most orderly, and, in a sense, is the prin- ciple of the entire natural order) . Now every other cognitive power, except the intellect, employs animate corporeal organs. Therefore the substances in question cannot have any cognitive power besides the intellect. There- fore whatever they know they understand. Now one does not err in what one understands, since all error results from lack of understanding. There- fore there can be no error in the knowledge of such substances. But there can be no sin in the will without error, because the will always tends to the apprehended good ; so that unless there be error in the apprehension of good, there cannot be sin in the will. Therefore it seems that there can be no sin of the will in those substances. [2] Again. In man, sin occurs in the will about matters of which we have true knowledge in general, through the fact that the judgment of the reason is hindered by a passion that shackles the reason in a particular instance. But there can be no such passions in the demons, because passions belong to the sensitive part of the soul, which exercises no operation with- out a corporeal organ. Consequently, if these separate substances have a right knowledge in general, it is impossible for their will to tend to evil through defective knowledge in a particular matter. [3] Moreover. No cognitive power is deceived about its proper object, but only about one that is extraneous. Thus, the sight is not deceived in its judgment about colors; whereas deception may occur if a man judge by sight of taste, or of the species of a thing. Now the proper object of the in- tellect is the quiddity of a thing. Consequently, there can be no deception in the knowledge of the intellect, if it were to apprehend the mere quid- dities of things; but all deception of the intellect would seem to occur through its apprehending the forms of things mingled with phantasms, as is the case with man. But this mode of knowledge is not in intellectual sub- stances that are not united to bodies, since there can be no phantasms apart "C. G.,II, 90. "C. G., I, 70, ' Ch. 106. 214 the summa contra gentiles from a body. Therefore there can be no error in the knowledge of separate substances, and consequently neither can there be sin in the will. [4] Besides. In man, falsehood occurs in the work of the intellect com- posing and dividing, because the intellect does not apprehend the quiddity of a thing absolutely, but composes something with the apprehended thing. Now in the operation whereby the intellect apprehends the essence, false- hood does not occur except accidentally, in so far as, in this operation also, there is a certain mixture of the work of composing and dividing by the intellect. This happens because our intellect attains to the knowledge of the quiddity of a thing, not at once, but in a certain order of inquiry. Thus, at first we apprehend animal, then we divide it by opposite differ- ences, and setting one of these aside, add the other to the genus, until we come to the definition of the species. In this process there may be false- hood, if we take as a difference of the genus one that is not a difference of the genus. Now, to proceed thus to the knowledge of the essence of a thing belongs to an intellect that proceeds discursively from one thing to another by reasoning; but it is not becoming to separate intellectual sub- stances, as we proved above.^ Seemingly, therefore, there can be no error in the knowledge of such substances. Consequently, neither can there be sin in their will. [5] ^ Moreover. Since nothing desires other than its own good, it would seem impossible for that which has but one single good, to err in its appetite. For this reason, although faults happen in natural things through some defect occurring in the execution of the appetite, they never happen in the natural appetite. For a stone always tends to a lower place, whether it reach it or be hindered. Now, in man, sin happens in the act of appetite, because, as our nature is composed of spiritual and corporeal elements, there is more than one good in man; for one thing is his good in relation to the intellect, another is his good in relation to the senses, or even in relation to the body. But among these various things that are man’s goods, there is an order, so that what is of less account must be subordinate to that which is of more account. Hence, sin of the will occurs in man when, in defiance of this order, he desires that which is good for him in a restricted sense in preference to that which is good absolutely. But this composition and diversity of goods is not in separate substances. In fact, their every good is in relation to the intellect. Therefore, seemingly, no sin of the will is possible in them. " [6] Again. In man, sin of the will results from excess or deficiency, between which virtue stands. Consequently, in matters that do not admit of excess and deficiency, but only of the mean, the will cannot sin. Hence no man can sin in desiring justice, since justice itself is a kind of mean. Now separate substances cannot desire other than intellectual goods, for it is absurd to say that beings by nature incorporeal desire corporeal goods, or ^C, G,, II, loi. HOW SIN IN THE DEMONS IS POSSIBLE 215 that those which have no senses desire sensible goods. But in intellectual goods there can be no excess, for by their very nature they are a mean be- tween excess and deficiency. Thus the truth is a mean between two errors, one of which is on the side of excess, the other on that of deficiency (and that is why sensible and corporeal goods are in the mean in so far as they are according to reason). Therefore, seemingly, separate intellectual sub- stances cannot sin through the will. [7] Moreover. An incorporeal substance is, seemingly, more remote from defects than a corporeal substance. Now no defect can occur in those corporeal substances that are remote from contrariety, namely, the heavenly bodies. Much less, therefore, can any sin occur in separate sub- stances that are remote both from contrariety, and from matter, and from movement, which seem to be the sources of any possible defect. CHAPTER CIX THAT THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE DEMONS, AND HOW THIS IS POSSIBLE That sin of the will is in the demons is clear from the authority of Scrip- ture. For it is said (i John hi, 8) that the devil sinneth from the beginning] again it is said {Jo, viii. 44) that the devil is a liar, and the father of lies, and that he was a murderer from the beginning] and it is also said {Wis, ii. 24) that by the envy of the devil, death came into the world. If anyone chose to follow the opinions of the Platonists,^ he would easily explain the above arguments. For they assert that the demons are living beings with a body composed of air] and so, since they have a body united to them, there can be a sensitive part in them. Hence they ascribe to them passions which in us are a cause of sin, namely, anger, hate and the like. That is why Apuleius says that they are susceptive in mind. Moreover. Independently of their being united to bodies, as the Platonists hold, perhaps yet another kind of knowledge might be assigned to them besides that of the intellect. For, according to Plato, the sensitive soul also is incorruptible,^ so that it must have an operation in which the body does not concur. Consequently, nothing prevents the operation of the sensitive soul, and therefore the passions, from being in an intellectual substance, even though it be not united to a body. Hence the same source of sin is found in them as in us. But both of these explanations are impossible. For it has been proved above that, with the exception of human souls, no other intellectual sub- stances are united to bodies.^ And that the operations of the sensitive soul ^ Cf. St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, VII, i4ff. (PL 41, 239). " C, G., II, 90. " Cf. C. G,, II, 82. 2i6 the SUMMA contra GENTILES are impossible apart from a body is clear from the fact that when a sen- sorial organ is destroyed, one operation of sense is destroyed. Thus sight ceases with the loss of an eye. For this reason, as soon as the organ of touch, which is necessary to the constitution of the animal,^ is destroyed, the animal must die. In order to solve the question proposed,^ then, we must observe that, just as there is order among active causes, so too among final causes; so that, namely, the secondary end depends on the principal end, even as the secondary agent depends on the principal agent. Now a fault occurs in active causes when the secondary agent departs from the order of the principal agent; just as, when the leg fails to accomplish the movement commanded by the appetitive power through being crooked, the result is a limping gait. In the same way, therefore, in final causes also, when the secondary end is not subordinate to the principal end, there is sin in the will, the object of which is the good and the end. Now every will naturally desires that which is the proper good of the one willing, namely, perfect being, nor can it will anything contrary to this. Accordingly, no sin of the will can occur in anyone willing whose proper good is the ultimate end, which is not subordinate to any other end, and to which all other ends are subordinate. Such a willing being is God, whose being is the highest good, which is the ultimate end. Therefore in God there can be no sin of the will. But in every other voluntary being, whose proper good must needs be subordinate to another good, sin of the will can occur, if we consider such a voluntary being in his nature. For, though there be a natural inclination of the will in every voluntary being to will and love his own perfection, so that he cannot will anything contrary thereto, yet it is not naturally im- planted in him so that he directs his perfection to another end unfailingly; since the higher end is not his proper end, but that of the superior nature. Therefore it is left to his choice to direct his own perfection to a higher end. For beings endowed with a will differ from those which are not so endowed, in that the former direct themselves and what is theirs to an end, and are therefore said to have free choice; whereas the latter do not direct themselves to an end, but are directed by a higher agent, being, as it were, moved to the end by another’s action, and not by their own. Hence there could be sin in the will of a separate substance, from the fact that he did not direct his own good and perfection to his last end, but adhered to his own good as his end. And since rules of action must needs be taken from- the end, the consequence is that, through making himself his own end, he pretended to submit other things to his rule, and that his will was not subject to another higher than himself. But this belongs to God alone. In this sense then we are to understand that he desired to be equal to God [Isa. xiv. 14] ; not that his good might be equal to the divine Aristatle, De An., II, 2 (413b 4). ^l.e, the question in ch. 108. HOW SIN IN THE DEMONS IS POSSIBLE 217 good, because such a thing could not come into his mind, and because by desiring it he would be desiring not to be, since the distinction of species is according to the various degrees of things, as is clear from what has been said above. -Now, the will to rule others, and the refusal to submit one^s will to the ruling of a superior, is the will to be supreme and, so to say, not to be subject; which is the sin of pride. Hence it is fittingly said that the dernon s first sin was pride . — But as from one error concerning a principle various and manifold errors result, so from the first disorder in the demon’s will, there arose all manner of sins in his will: both of hate towards God as resisting his pride and most justly punishing his fault; and of envy towards man ; and of many such sins. We must also observe that, as the proper good of a thing is subordinate to several higher goods, he who wills is free to depart from the order of one superior, and not from the order of another that is either higher or lower than the former. Thus, a soldier who is subordinate both to his king and to his general, can direct his will to the good of the general, and not that of the king, or mce versa. But if the general depart from the order of the king, the will of the soldier will be good, if he depart from the will of his general, and direct his own will to his king; and the will of the soldier who obeys the will of his general against the will of his king will be evil, because the order of the lower principle depends on the order of the higher. Now, separate substances are not only subordinate to God, but one of them is subordinate to another, from the first to the last, as we proved in the Second Book.^ And since in every voluntary being under God there can be sin of the will, if such a being be considered in his nature, it was possible for one of the higher separate substances, or even the highest of all, to sin in his will. And this indeed is not improbable, for he would not have rested in his good as his end unless that good were very perfect. Possibly, then, some of the lower separate substances, of their own will, directed their good to him, thus departing from the divine order, and so sinned even as he did; while others, adhering by the movement of their will to the divine order, rightly departed from the order of the one who sinned, although he was higher than they according to the order of nature. In the Fourth Book we shall show how in either case their wills persevere in goodness or malice unchangeably.^ For this regards the punishments or rewards of the good or wicked. There is, however, this difference between a man and a separated sub- stance, that in one man there are several appetitive powers which are subordinated one to the other. But this is not the case with separate sub- stances, although one substance is subordinated to another. Now sin occurs in the will whenever the inferior appetite rebels. Just as sin, therefore, would be brought about in a separate substance either by its being turned aside from the divine order or because an inferior substance is turned aside " Cb. 97. ' C. G., 11, 95. ' C. G., IV, 92ff. 2i8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES from its order to a superior one (which latter remains under the divine order), so in a man sin occurs in two ways. It occurs in one way from the fact that the human will does not direct its proper good to God ; and this sin is common both to man and to separate substances. It occurs in another way from the fact that the good of the lower appetite is not regulated with regard to the higher, as for instance when we will the delights of the flesh, towards which the concupiscible appetite tends, not in accordance with the rule of reason. This kind of sin is not found in separate substances. CHAPTER CX SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS Consequently it is not difficult to solve the objections that have been raised.^ [1-4] For we are not forced to say that there was error in the intellect of the separate substance because he judged a good not to be good; the error consisted rather in not considering the higher good to which his own good should have been referred. For his will, through being intent on his own good, could be the cause of this lack of consideration, since it is free to the will to turn to this or that.^ [5] It is also clear that he desired but one good, and that was his own good; but his sin consisted in his disregarding the higher good, to which his own should have been directed. For just as in us there is sin through our desiring inferior goods, those, namely, of the body, outside the order of reason, so in the devil was there sin through his not referring his own good to the divine. ^ [6] It is also clear that he ignored the mean of virtue, inasmuch as he did not submit to the order of his superior. Thus he gave to himself more than his due, and to God less than was due to Him as the sovereign rule to whose order all things should be subject. Consequently, it is evident that in this sin the mean was not missed through excess of passion, but merely through inequality of justice, which is concerned with operations. For in separate substances there can be operations, but passions not at all. [7] Nor does it follow that, because in the higher bodies there can be no defects, there can be no sin in separate substances. Because bodies and all irrational beings are acted upon, and do not put themselves in action, for they have no dominion over their actions. Therefore they cannot escape the first rule that puts them in action and moves them, unless they be un- able to receive adequately the rectitude of the supreme rule, owing to an indisposition of matter. Therefore the higher bodies, in which there cannot be any indisposition of matter, can never fall from the rectitude of the ^ Ch. 108, " Cf. St, Thomas, De MolOf q. i, a. 3, RATIONAL CREATURES AND PROVIDENCE 219 first rule. But rational or intellectual substances are not only acted upon, but also move themselves to their own actions. And this applies to them all the more, according as their nature is the more perfect, since the more perfect a thing’s nature, the more perfect is its power for action. Conse- quently, the perfection of their nature does not. prevent the possibility of sin in them in the manner explained above, namely, through adhering to them- selves, and disregarding the order of the superior agent. CHAPTER CXI THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL MANNER From what has been proved up to now,^ it is evident that the divine providence extends to all things. And yet there must be some special aspect of providence to found in the case of intellectual and rational creatures, over and above other creatures. For they surpass other creatures both in the perfection of their nature, and in the excellence of their end: in the perfection of their nature, because the rational creature alone has domin- ion over its action, since it moves itself freely to act, whereas other crea- tures are moved to their proper actions rather than act themselves, as was proved above in the excellence of their end, because the intellectual crea- ture alone by its own operation attains to the last end of the universe, namely, by knowing and loving God, whereas other creatures cannot attain to the last end except by a certain participation of His likeness. Now, actions vary in kind according to the diversity of end and of their subject matter. Thus in art the operations vary according to the difference of end and matter; for a physician acts differently to expel sickness, and to con- firm health; and differently, again, in bodies of different temperament. In like manner, in the government of a state, a different kind of order must be observed according to the different status of the subjects, and according to the different ends to which they are directed; for there must be a different rule for soldiers to make them ready to fight, and for craftsmen that they may be able to work. Accordingly, there is one kind of order whereby ra- tional creatures are subject to the divine providence, and another whereby other creatures are subject to it. ^ Ch. 64ff. " Ch. 47. 220 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER CXII THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE GOVERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, AND OTHER CREATURES AS DIRECTED TO THEM In the first place, then, the very condition of the rational creature, as having dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake; whereas the condition of other things, that have no dominion over their actions, shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. For that which acts only when moved by another is like an instrument, whereas that which acts by itself is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required, not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it. Hence, whatever ds done for the care of instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end; whereas any action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly, intellectual creatures are ruled by God as though He cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures. Again. That which has dominion over its own act is free in its action, because he is free who is his own master whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act is subject to slavery. There- fore every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake; but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accord- ingly, the divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature. Moreover. Whenever things are directed to a certain end, if any of them are unable of themselves to attain to the end, they must needs be directed to those that attain to the end, which are directed to the end for their own sake. Thus the end of the army is victory, which the soldiers ob- tain by their own action in fighting, and they alone in the army are re- quired for their own sake; whereas all others, to whom other duties are assigned, such as the care of horses, the preparing of arms, are requisite for the sake of the soldiers of the army. Now it is clear from what has been said that God is the last end of the universe,^ Whom the intellectual natiir«e alone obtains in Himself, namely, by knowing and loving Him, as wa.s proved above. ^ Therefore the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982b 26). ^Ch. 17. ®Ch. 25!!. RATIONAL CREATURES AND PROVIDENCE 221 Further. In every whole, the principal parts are requisite on their own account for the establishment of the whole, while the others are required for the preservation or betterment of the former. Now, of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they ap- proach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore the divine providence pro- vides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake. Besides. It is clear that all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, since the whole is not for the sake of the parts, but the parts for the sake of the whole. Now intellectual natures are more akin to the whole than other natures; because, in a sense, the intellectual substance is all things, inasmuch as by its intellect it is able to comprehend all things, whereas every other substance has only a particular participation of being. Consequently, God fittingly cares for other things for the sake of in- tellectual substances. Besides. Whatever happens to a thing in the course of nature happens to it naturally. Now we see that in the course of nature the intellectual sub- stance uses all others for its own sake: either for the perfection of the in- tellect, which sees the truth in them as in a mirror; or for the execution of its power and the development of its knowledge, in the same way as a craftsman develops the conception of his art in corporeal matter; or, again, to sustain the body that is united to the intellectual soul, as is the case in man. It is clear, therefore, that God cares for all things for the sake of intellectual substances. Moreover. If a man seeks something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because what is per se, is always] whereas if he seek a thing for the sake of something else, he does not of necessity seek it always but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it. Now, as we proved above, things derive their being from the divine will.^ Therefore whatever is always is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always is willed by God, not for its own sake, but for another's. Now intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible. They are, moreover, unchangeable, except in their choice. Therefore, intellectual substances are governed as it were for their own sake, while others for the sake of intellectual substances. The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion, since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, in so far as one part serves another. Thus in the human body, it is clear that the lungs be- long to the body's perfection, in that they serve the heart; and hence there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the whole animal. In like manner, that other natures are for the sake of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of ^ C. G., II, 23. 222 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES the universe; for without the things required for the perfection of the in- tellectual substance, the universe would not be complete. Nor again does the fact that individuals are for the sake of the species argue against what has been said. Because, through being directed to their species, they are directed also to the intellectual nature. For a corruptible thing is directed to man, not for the sake of only one individual man, but for the sake of the whole human species. Yet a corruptible thing could not serve the whole human species, except in terms of its own entire species. Hence the order whereby corruptible things are directed to man requires that individuals be directed to the species. When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by the divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also re- ferred to God and to the perfection of the universe. Accordingly, they are said to be provided for for their own sake, and others for them, because the goods bestowed on them by the divine providence are not given them for another’s profit. Wherea's those bestowed on others are in the divine plan in tended for the use of intellectual substances. Hence it is said {Deut. iv. 19) : Lest thou see the sun and the moon and the other stars, and being deceived by error, thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven] and {Ps. viii. 8) : Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen; moreover, the beasts also of the field] again {Wis. xii. 18): Thou, being master of power, judgest with tranquillity, and with great favor disposest of us. Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill brute animals; for by the divine providence they are intended for man’s use according to the order of nature. Hence it is not wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noe {Gen. ix. 3): As the green herbs I have de~ livered all flesh to you. And if any passages of Holy Scripture seem to forbid us to be cruel to brute animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young {Deut. xxii. 6], this is either to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings; or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another; or because of some signification, as the Apostle expounds [i Cor. ix. 9] the prohibition against muzzling the ox that treadeth the corn {Deut. xxv. 4] . RATIONAL CREATURES AND PROVIDENCE 223 CHAPTER CXIII THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS DIRECTED TO ITS ACTIONS BY GOD NOT ONLY IN WHAT BEFITS THE SPECIES, BUT ALSO IN WHAT BEFITS THE INDIVIDUAL ^ Hence it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God, not only in what befits the species, but also in what befits the individual. For everything is for the sake of its operation, since opera- tion is the ultimate perfection of a thing. Therefore each thing is directed to its action by God, according as it is subject to the divine providence. Now the rational creature is subject to the divine providence as being for its own sake governed and cared for, and not, as other corruptible creatures, for the sake of the species only. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, whereas the ra- tional creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear.^ Ac- cordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake, not only of the species, but also of the individual. Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species, have not the power to act or not to act; since whatever results from the species is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species, and we have no choice about what is natural. Hence, if man were directed in his actions only in reference to what befits the species, he would not have the power to act or not to act, but he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their attions, not only in accord with what befits the species, but also in accord with what befits the individual.. Moreover. As we have proved above, the divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least.^ Therefore whatever things have actions outside the inclination of the species, must in such actions receive from the divine providence a direction beyond that which pertains to the species. But many actions are found in the rational creature, for which the inclina- tion of the species is not sufficient; and a sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore the rational crea- ture must be directed to its actions by God, not only in accord with what befits the species, but also in accord with what befits the individual. Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity. For He made each creature such that He knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through His government. Now the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions, not only in accord with what befits the species, "Ch. 112. "Ch. 75if. 224 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES but also in accord with what befits the individual. For it has intellect and reason, and hence is able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times and places. Therefore the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions, not only in accord with what befits the species, but also in accord with what befits the individual. Besides. The^’ational creature is subject to the divine providence in such a way, that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence; so that it is capable of exercising providence and government in relation to others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they participate in providence only by being subject to it. Now through being capable of providence, a man can direct and govern his own actions also. Therefore the rational creature participates in the divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing; for it gov- erns itself in its own actions, and also other things. Now every lower provi- dence is subject to the divine providence as to the highest providence. Therefore the government of a rational creature’s acts, as personal acts, belongs to the divine providence. Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now the rational soul is capable of per- petuity, not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore the acts of a rational creature are directed by the divine providence, not only in so far as they belong to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal. Hence it is that, though all things are subject to the divine providence, yet Holy Scripture ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner, ac- cording to Ps. viii. 5: What is man that thou art mindful of him? and I Cor. ix. 9: Doth God take care of oxen? These things are said because God watches over man’s actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts. THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART Question VI ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY {In Eight Articles) Since therefore happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must as a consequence consider human acts in order to know by what acts we may obtain happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtain- ing it. But because operations and acts are concerned with what is singular, consequently, all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in the particular. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider, first, what is universal; and, secondly, what pertains to the particular.^ In treating of what is universal in human acts, the points that offer them- selves for our consideration are (i) human acts themselves; (2) their principles.^ Now of human acts some are proper to man, while others are common to man and animals. And since happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called pas- sions of the soul.^ The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (i) What makes a human act? (2 ) What distinguishes human acts? ^ And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, be- cause the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary. First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately;^ thirdly, those acts which are volun- tary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.^ Furthermore, because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, ac- cording to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first ^ 5 , J-., II-II. "Q. 49. ®Q. 22. ^Q. 18. ®Q,8. "Q. 17. 225 226 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6. Art. i consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circum- stances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary^ Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? (2) Whether in irrational animals? (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any act? (4) Whether violence can be done to the will? (5) Whether violence causes involuntari- ness? (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness? (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? First Article WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN HUMAN ACTS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary which has its principle within itself j as Gregory of Nyssa,® Damascene^ and Aristotle^® declare. But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him, since man’s appetite is moved to act by the appetible object which is outside him, and which is as a mover unmoved}-'^ Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts. Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher proves that in animals no new move- ment arises that is not preceded by another and exterior motion.^^ But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from outside man, and therefore there is nothing volun- tary in them. Obj. 3. Further, he that acts voluntarily can act of himself. But this is not true of man, for it is written {Jo. xv. 5) : Without Me you can do noth- ing. Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts. On the contrary, Damascene says that the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation}^ Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts. / answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts is within the agent, or in that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone; whereas, when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move them- selves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved acts or is moved for an end, as was stated above, those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of move- ^ Q. 7- ® Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 728) . ® De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953)* Ill, I (iiiia 23). Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433b ii). ^Phys., VIII, 2 (253a ii). ^^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953). I, a. 2. 227 Q. 6. Art. i VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ment for an end. Now in order that a thing be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is so moved by an intrinsic principle that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless, the prin- ciple of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in some- thing else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Therefore such things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And, consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, i.e., that they act and that they act for an end, the movements and acts of such things are said to be voluntary; for the term voluntary signifies that their movements and acts are from their own in- clination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle,^® Greg- ory of Nyssa^^ and Damascene, the voluntary is defined not only as hav- ing a principle within the agent, but also as implying knowledge. There- fore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found. Reply Obj. i. Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless, it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle; for it is not of the nature of the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. — Nevertheless, it must be observed that a principle of move- ment may happen to be first in a genus, but not first absolutely. Thus, in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is the body of the heavens, which nevertheless is not the first mover abso- lutely, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic prin- ciple of the voluntary act, i,e., the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement. Reply Obj. 2. New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a mo- tion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an animabs senses are confronted with something sen- sible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing the approach of the stag through its movement, begins to be moved to- wards the stag. — Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animabs body, for example, through cold or heat; and when the body is thus affected by the motion of an exterior body, the sensitive appetite likewise, which is the power of a bodily organ, is moved ^Eth., m, I (iiiia 23). "®Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 728), Fide Orth., H, 24 (PG 94, 953). 228 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6 . Art. 2 accidentally. Thus, it happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as was stated above, for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement. Reply Obj. 3. God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; for every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with na- ture that the movement of nature be from God as the First Mover, inas- much as nature is an instrument of God moving it, so it is not contrary to the character of a voluntary act that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless, both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it belongs to the nature of both that they should proceed from a principle within the agent. Second Article WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For voluntary is so called from voluntas [will]. Now since the will is in the reason,^® it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them. Obj. 2. Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters of their actions; for they act not, but rather are they acted upon, as Damascene says.^^ Therefore there is no voluntary act in irrational animals. Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says that voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.^^ But neither praise nor blame befits the acts of irrational animals. Therefore such acts are not voluntary. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary?'^ The same is said by Gregory of Nyssa^^ and Damascene.^^ 1 answer that, As was stated above, it is of the nature of a volun- tary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowl- edge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold, perfect and imper- fect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And -such a knowledge of the end belongs to none but the rational nature. — But imperfect knowledge of Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). ^ De Fide Orth., II, 27 (PG 94, 960). Op. at., II, 24 (PG 94, 953). "^Eth., Ill, 2 (iiiib 8). Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 729). ^ De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 956) Q. 6. Art. 3 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 229 the end consists in a mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such a knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power. Consequently, perfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary in its perfect nature, inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the- end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. — But imperfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary in its imperfect nature, inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Therefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature, whereas the imperfect voluntary belongs also to irra- tional animals. Reply Ob j. i. The will is the name of the rational appetite, and conse- quently it cannot be in beings devoid of reason. But the term voluntary is derived from voluntas [will^^ and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge. Reply Oh], 2. The fact that man is master of his actions is due to his being able to deliberate about them; for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposites, the will can proceed to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as was stated above. Reply Ob], 3. Praise and blame attach to the voluntary act according to the perfect notion of the voluntary, which is not to be found in irrational animals. Third Article WHETHER THERE CAN BE VOLUNTARINESS WITHOUT ANY ACT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will itself. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act. Obj. 2. Further, just as one is said to will by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to will. But not to will causes involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases. Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is part of the nature of the voluntary, as was stated above. But. knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act. On the contrary, The term voluntary is applied to that of which we 230 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 6. Art. 4 are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore, just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will. I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly, in which sense some- thing proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts: e,g,, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly, in which sense something proceeds from another through the fact that this other does not act. Thus the sinking of a ship is attributed to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer. — But we must take note that the cause of what follows from the failure to act is not always the agent as not acting, but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship, or if the ship’s helm were not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be attributed to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm. Since, then, by willing and acting, the will is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting, this not-willing and not-acting is im- puted to the will as though proceeding from it. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act, and this sometimes without an outward act, but with an interior act, for instance, when one wills not to act, and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act. Reply Obj. i.^We apply the term voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its agent, but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its non-agent. Reply Oh']. 2. Not to will is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of I’-do-not-will. Consequently, just as when I say I do not will to read, the sense is, / will not to read, so not to will to read is the same as to will not to read; and in this sense not to will causes involuntariness. — Secondly it is taken as a sentence, and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense not to will does not cause involuntariness. Reply Obj. 3. Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will, namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to will and to act. And then, just as not to will and not to act, when it is time to will and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider. Fourth Article WHETHER VIOLENCE CAN BE DONE TO THE WILL? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there ^ sornethmg, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him. Q. 6. Art. 4 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 231 ^ Obj. 2. Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active prin- ciple, when it is^ changed by it. But the will is a passive power, for it is a moved mover Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active prin- ciple, it seems that it is sometimes compelled. Obj. 3. Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature, as is clear of the will’s movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says.^^ Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled. On the contrary, Augustine says that what is done voluntarily is not done of necessity Now whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity, and consequently what is done by the will cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act. I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, to will; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power: e.g., to walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be exe- cuted by means of the power of locomotion. As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will’s command. But as to the will’s own proper act, vio- lence cannot be done to the will. The reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceed- ing from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently, it is contrary to the nature of the will’s own act that it should be subject to compulsion or violence; just as it is also contrary to the nature of the natural inclination or the movement of a stone to be moved upwards. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In like manner, a man may be dragged by force, but it is contrary to the very notion of violence that he be thus dragged of his own will. Reply Obj. i. God, Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. xxi. i: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it. But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will. Reply Obj. 2. It is not always a violent movement when a passive sub- ject is moved by its active principle, but only then when this is done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise, every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural and vio- lent; whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433a 9; b 16). ^ De Fide Orth., IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196). ^ De Civil, Dei, V, 10 (PL 41, 152), 232 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 6. Art. 5 of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner, when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary. Reply Obj. 3. That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, is nevertheless appre- hended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit. Fifth Article WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in terms of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as was shown above. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness. Obj. 2. Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene^'^ and the Philosopher^^ say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. Obj. 3. Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will, for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards, or when a man contorts his members in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. On the contrary. The Philosopher^^ and Damascene^® say that things done under compulsion are involuntary. I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas the violent is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowl- edge violence effects something against nature, so in things endowed with knowledge it effects something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural, and, in like manner, that which is against the will is said to be involuntary. Therefore violence causes involuntariness. Reply Obj. i. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said that not only the act which proceeds immediately from the will is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as was stated above. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence, and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness. De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953). ^ Eth., Ill, i (iiiia 20). (1109b 35). Fide Orth., 11 , 24 (PG 94, 953). ^ Ihid. Q. 6. Art. 6 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 233 Reply ObJ. 2. Just a,s that is said to be natural which is according to the inclination of nature, so that is said to be voluntary which is accord- ing to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active principle: e.g., it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle, because, namely, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle. Thus, the movement of the heavens is said to be natural by reason of the natural aptitude in the body of the heavens to receive such movement, although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner, an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wills to act; sec- ondly, in regard to passion, as when one wills to receive an action from another. Hence, when action is inflicted by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, this is not violent absolutely ; for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary. Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,^^ the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless in a way natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not absolutely, but relatively. — The same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his members in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. For this is violent relatively, i.e,, as to that particular member; but not absolutely, i.e,, as to the man himself. Sixth Article WHETHER FEAR CAUSES WHAT IS INVOLUNTARY ABSOLUTELY? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that fear causes what is involuntary abso- lutely. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will in the present, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes what is involuntary absolutely. Therefore fear too causes what is involuntary absolutely. Obj. 2. Further, that which is of itself such, remains such, whatever be added to it. Thus what is of itself hot, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear is involun- tary in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear it is involuntary. Obj. 3. Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect ; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such abso- lutely. Thus, what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some ^^Phys., VIII, 4 ( 2 S 4 h 14). 234 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6. Art. 6 respect, but what is necessary without qualification is necessary abso- lutely. But that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely; and it is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely. On the contrary j Gregory of Nyssa^^ and the Philosopher^^ say that such things as are done through fear are voluntary rather than involuntary . I answer that, As the Philosopher says,^^ and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book On Man,^^ such things as are done through fear are of a mixed character, being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared. But if the matter be considered rightly, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary absolutely, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be absolutely according as it is in act ; but according as it is only in the apprehension, it is not so absolutely, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars, and since the singular, as such, is here and now, that which is done is in act in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. Hence that which- is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; and thus, the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of danger, and so it is clear that it is voluntary absolutely. And hence it is that what is done out of fear has the nature of what is voluntary, because its principle is within. — But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this exists only according to our consideration of things; and consequently it is involun- tary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circum- stances of this or that particular case. Reply Obj. i. Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion; whereas what is done through fear becomes voluntary because the will is moved towards it, although not for its own sake, but because of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done because of some- thing else voluntary; since the voluntary is not only what we will for its own sake as an end, but also what we will for the sake of something else as an end. It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly, whereas in what is done through fear, the will ^"Cf. Nemesius, De Nat, Bom., XXX (PG- 40 , 721). Eth., Ill, i (iiioa 12). ^'Ibid. ^Ci. Nemesius, De Nat. Bom., XXX (PG 40, 721). Q. 6. Art. 7 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 235 does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa sayS;^^ in order to ex- clude things done through fear, a violent action is defined not only as one whose principle is from the outside, but with the addition, in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all; for the will of him that is in fear does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear. Reply Oh]. 2. Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them: e.g., a cold thing, or a white thing; but things that are such relatively vary according as they are compared with different things. F or what is big in comparison with one thing is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were, absolutely; But also for the sake of something else, as it were, relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing, which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another. Reply Obj. 3. That which is done through fear is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done; but it is involun- tary under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threat- ening. Consequently, this argument proves rather the opposite. Seventh Article WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i.'It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes involun- tariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too. Obj. 2. Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also. Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But con- cupiscence impairs knowledge, for the Philosopher says that delight, or the lust of pleasure, destroys the judgment of prudence. Therefore con- cupiscence causes involuntariness. On the contrary, Damascene says: The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret?'^ But neither of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness. 1 answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but, on the contrary, makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be volun- tary from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of con- ^^Ibid. (PG 40, 720). Eth., VI, 5 (1140b 12). ^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94 , , 953 )' 236 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 6. Art. 8 cupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary. Reply Obj. i. Fear has reference to evil, but concupiscence has refer- ence to good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good har- monizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than con- cupiscence to cause involuntariness. Reply Obj. 2. He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from con- cupiscence, e.g.j an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; rather his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Ac- cordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is in no way involun- tary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now. Reply Obj. 3. If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet, prop- erly speaking, it would not make the act involuntary, because in beings bereft of reason there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge is not com- pletely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken away en- tirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example, not to act or not to will, and in like m.anner not to consider; for the will can resist the pas- sion, as we shall state later on.^^ Eighth Article WHETHER IGNORANCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntari- ness. For the involuntary act deserves pardon, as Damascene says.^^ But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to i Cor. xiv. I j any man know not, he shall not be known. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness. Obj. 2. Further, every sin implies ignorance, according to Prov. xiv. 22: They err, that work evil. If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary; which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that every sin is voluntary Obj. 3. Further, involuntariness is not without sadness, as Damascene ®"Q, 10, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7. ""Te Fide Orth.,. 11 , 24 (PG 94, 953). Relig., XIV (PL 34, 133). ^De Vera Q. 6. Art. 8 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 237 says.^^ But some things are done out of ignorance, but without sadness. For instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involun- tariness. On the contrary j Damascene^^ and the Philosopher^^ say that what is done through ignorance is involuntary. I answer that. If ignorance cause involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above. But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a three- fold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, concomitantly ; in another, consequently] in a third way, antecedently. Concomitantly^ when there is ignorance of what is done, but so that even if it were known, it would be cfone. For then ignorance does not induce one to will this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done and not known. Thus, in the example given, a man did indeed will to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher states,^® does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will; but it causes non-voluntariness, since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is consequent to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary; and this happens in two ways in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of the voluntary. First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance, as when a man wills not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin, according to Job xxi. 14: We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. And this is called affected ignorance. — Secondly, ignorance is said to be volun- tary, when it regards that which one can and ought to know, for in this sense not to act and not to will are said to be voluntary, as was stated above. And ignorance of this kind happens either when one does not ac- tually consider what one can and ought to consider (this is called igno- rance of evil choice, and arises from some passion or habit), or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have ; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one ought to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways ignorance is voluntary, it can- not cause what is involuntary absolutely. Nevertheless it causes involun- tariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowl- edge. Ignorance is antecedent to the act of the will when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would not will otherwise. ' ^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953)* ^Ihid. (mob 25). ^ Eth., Ill, I (iiioa i). Ibid. 238 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6. Art. 8 Thus a man ifiay be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, with the result that he does that which he would not do if he knew of that circumstance. For instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes what is involuntary absolutely. From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. The sec- ond, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as was stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will. Question VII ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS {In Four Articles) We must now consider the circumstances of human acts, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) What is a circumstance? (2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts? (3) How many circumstances are there? (4) Which are the most important of them? First Article WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE IS AN ACCIDENT OE A HUMAN ACT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says that a circumstance is that from which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument} But oratorical argu- ments are derived principally from things pertaining to the substance of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments.^ Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. Obj. 2. Further, to be in is proper to an accident. But that which sur- rounds [cir cumstat'] is rather out than in. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human acts. Obj. 3. Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of acts. On the contrary y The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher calls the circum- stances particular things,^ i.e.y the particular conditions of each act. There- fore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts. / answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher,^ names are the signs of our concepts, it must needs be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge pro- ceeds from the more known to the less known. Accordingly, with us, names of more known things are transferred so as to signify less known things. Hence it is that, as is stated in Metaph. x.,^ the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally to all kinds of opposition; ^De Invent., I, 24 (p. 31^). ^Cicero, Topica, III (pp. 457-428). ^ Eth., Ill, I (mob 33). ^ Perih., I (i6a 3). . ® Aristotle, Metaph., IX, 4 (1055a 9). 239 240 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 7. Art. 2 and, in like manner, names that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies, which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that the name circumstance has passed from located things to human acts. Now in located things, that is said to surround something which is out- side it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. But what is outside a thing’s substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Therefore the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents. Reply Obj. i. The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and, secondly, from the circumstances of the act. So, too, a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or from motives of greed, or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted it is said pointedly that the orator adds strength to Ms argument^ as though this were something secondary. Reply Oh']. 2. A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing; and thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject; thus, whiteness is an accident of the musical inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. Arid in this sense circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts. Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, an accident is said to be the acci- dent of an accident from the fact that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation to one another: e.g., whiteness and music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are re- lated to one another, as when the subject receives one accident by means ‘of the other: for instance, a body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another, for we speak of color as being in the surface. Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances, that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent other- wise than through the act: e.g., place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act: e.g., the manner in which the act is done. Second Article WHETHER THEOLOGIANS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that theologians should not take note of Q. 7. Art. 2 CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 241 the circumstances of human acts. For theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts, for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, Uy that which is outside it, but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts. Obj. 2. Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents, and so the Philosopher says that no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophis- try. Theiefore the theologian has not to consider circumstances. Obj. 3. Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian’s business to consider circumstances. On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be invol- untary, according to Damascene’^ and Gregory of Nyssa.^ But involun- tariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theo- logian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian. / answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the theo- logian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers human acts inasmuch as man is thereby directed to happiness. Now everything that is directed to an end should be proportioned to that end. But acts are proportioned to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. — Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse; and this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on.^ — Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be vol- untary or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circum- stances, as was stated above.^® Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances. Reply Obj. i. The good that is directed to the en(^ is said to be useful, and this implies some kind of relation; and so the Philosopher says that the good in the genus ‘relation' is the useful. Now, in the genus of relation a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it; as may be seen in the expressions right and left, equal and unequal, and the like. Accord- ingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, noth- ing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to things that attend them extrinsically. ^Op. cit., V, 2 (1026b 3), De Fide Orth., 11 , 24 (PG 94, 953). ®Cf Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXI (PG 40, 724). °Q. 18, a. 10 and ii; q. 73, a. 7. 6, a. 8. ^ Eth., I, 6 (1096a 26). 242 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 7. Art. 3 Reply Obj, 2. Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such acci- dents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances, although, as we have stated above, they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art. Reply Obj, 3. The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the statesman and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and pas- sions. To the statesman and to the orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however, because where the orator persuades, the statesman judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs in all the aforesaid ways, since to him all the other arts are subservient; for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and statesman he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment. Third Article WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PROPERLY SET FORTH IN THE THIRD BOOK OF THEETF/C^? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethics iii.^^ For a circumstance of an act is described as some- thing outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. There- fore there are only two circumstances, namely, when and where, Obj, 2. Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circumstances are included under one, which is the mode of acting. Obj. 3. Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accord- ingly, neither who, nor why, nor about what, are circumstances, since who refers to the efficient cause, why to the final cause, and about what to the material cause. On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethics iii.^® / answer that, In his Rhetoric^^ Tully gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliiSf cur, quomodo, quando — Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when, ^Op. cit., Ill, I (iiiia 3). ^^Ibid. Invent., I, 24 (p. 32'’). Q. 7. Art. 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 243 For in acts we must take note of who did it, by what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how and when he did it. But Aristotle in Ethics iii.^^ adds yet another, namely, about what, which Tully includes in the circumstance what. The reason for this enumeration may be considered as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inas- much as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either as a measure, as time and place, or by qualifying the act, as the mode of acting. It touches the effect when we consider what is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance why] as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance about what] as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance who] and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance by what aids. Reply Obj. i. Time and place surround [circumstant] the act as a meas- ure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way ac- cording as they are extrinsic to the substance of the act. Reply Ob], 2. The mode well or ill is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a special circumstance: e.g., that a man walks fast or slowly, that he strikes hard or gently, and so forth. Reply Obj. 3. That condition of the cause on which the substance of the act depends is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another’s property, for this belongs to the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circum- stances which are considered in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act valiantly for the sake of the good of the virtue of fortitude, is not a circumstance; but it is if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance what] for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a cir- cumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him, heal him or harm him, these are circumstances. Fourth Article WHETHER THE MOST IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE WHY AND IN WHAT THE ACT CONSISTS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i.- It would seem that these are not the most important cir- Ill, I (i Ilia 4). 244 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 7 . Art. 4 cumstances, namely, the circumstances why and in which the act is^ as is stated in Ethics iii.^^ For place and time seem to be the circumstances in which the act is, and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most important circumstances. Obj. 2. Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance. Obj, 3. Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the person that does it, while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. There- fore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest importance. On the contrary^ Gregory of Nyssa says that the most important cir- cumstances are why it is done and what is done}'^ I answer that, As we have stated above, acts are properly called human inasmuch as they are voluntary Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz., the circumstance why, and the second in importance is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz., the circumstance what he did. As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these. Reply Obj, 1, By those things in which the act is the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself.^® Therefore Gregory of Nyssa, as though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter^s term, in which the act is, substitutes, what is done?^ Reply Obj, 2. Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Therefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end. Reply Obj, 3. The person that dohs the act is the cause of that act, inas- much as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act. But the other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act. — As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act. (iiiia 18). "^Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXI (PG 40, 728). ""Q. I, a. I. III, I (iiiia 18). ^ Ci. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXI (PG 40, 728). Question VIII ON THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS {In Three Articles) We must now consider the different acts of the will, and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.^ Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end. We must therefore consider (i) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means.^ And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end: viz., volition^ enjoyment and intention^ we must consider (i) volition; (2) enjoyment;^ (3) intention.^ — Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (i) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will moved (3) How is it moved Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will is of good only? (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means? (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means by the same movement? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS OF GOOD ONLY? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power is relatfed to opposites, for instance, sight to white and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil. Obj, 2. Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite courses, according to the Philosopher.'^ But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason j as is stated in De Anima iii.® Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently it is not confined to good, but extends to evil. Obj, 3. Further, good and being are convertible. But the will is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we will not to walk, or not to speak; and, again, at times we will future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only. ^Q. 17. ®Q. 13 ®Q. II. ^Q. 12. 9, ®Q. 10. '^Metaph., VIII, 2 (1046b 8). ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). 24s 246 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8. Art. i On the contrary y Dionysius says that evil is outside the scope of the will, and that all things desire good? 1 answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason for this is that the appetite is nothing else than the inclination of a being desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing in- clined. Since^ therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says that the good is that which all desire?^ But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellectual or rational appetite, called the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing, so the animal or the voluntary appetite tends to the apprehended good. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is -requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Therefore the Philosopher says that the end is a good, or an apparent good}^ Reply Ob], i. The same power is related to opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and to evil, but to good, by desiring it, and to evil, by shunning it. There- fore the actual desire of good is called will \volition\, meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now speaking of will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as nolition; and so just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil. Reply Obj. 2. A rational power is not directed to all opposites but to those which are contained under its proper object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now the object of the will is the good. There- fore the will can be directed to such opposites as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and the like; for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good. Reply Obj. 3. That which is not a being in nature is considered as a being in the reason, and so negations and privations are said to be beings of reason. In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good, and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Therefore the Philosopher says that to lack evil has the nature of a goodP ^De Div, Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 732) ; cf. op. cit., IV, 10 (PG 3, 708), Eth., I, I (1094a 3). ^Phys., II, 3 (i9Sa 26). ^ Eth,, V, i (1129b 8), Q. 8. Art. 2 THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 247 Second Article WHETHER VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS? We proceed thus to the’Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says that volition is of the end, while choice is of the means}^ Obj. 2. Further, For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul?-"^ Now the end and the means are in different genera of good, because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus quality, or action, or passion] whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to an end, is in the genus relation}^ There- fore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means. Obj. 3. Further, habits are proportioned to powers, since they are their perfections. But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art.^hus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the art of the helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means. On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle ground and arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle ground through which one arrives at the end^ or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means. I answer that. The term voluntas [wilt] sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [volition]. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which the nature of its object may be found in any way whatever. Thus the sight extends to all things what- soever that are in any way colored. Now the nature of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means. If, however, we speak of will in so far as it is properly the name of an act, then, strictly speaking, it is of the end only. For every act denomi- nated from a power designates the simple act of that power. Thus, to understand designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Therefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Therefore the will is directed to them only in so far as it is directed to the Op. cit., Ill, 2 (iiiib 26). ^^Op. cit., VI, I (1139a *8). Op. cit., I, 6 (1096a 26). THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 248 Q. 8. Art. 3 end; so that what it wills in them, is the end. So, too, to understand is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, Lc., first prin- ciples; but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. Now in morals the end is what principles are in speculative mat- ters.^® Reply Obj, i. The Philosopher is speaking of the will as signifying the simple act of the will, not as signifying the power of the will.^^ Reply Obj. 2. There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are mutually independent. For instance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not mutually independent, but are as that which is of itself and that which is in relation to another. Now such objects are always referred to the same power. For instance, the power of sight per- ceives both color and the light by which color is seen. Reply Obj. 3. Not everything that diversifies habits diversifies the powers, since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider .the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the end as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and the means that belong properly to that art. Third Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SAME ACT TO THE END AND TO THE MEANS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means. For according to the Philosopher, where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one}^ But the will does not will the means save for the sake of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act. Obj. 2. Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it wills the end and the means. Obj. 3. Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle ground to the terminus. But the means are in com- parison to the end as the middle ground is to the terminus. Therefore it is Op. cit., VII, 8 (1151a 16). Op, cit., Ill, 2 (iiiib 26). 2 (117a 18) ^^Top., Ill, Q. 8. Art. 3 THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 249 the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the means. On the contrary j Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act. / answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are willed only for the end, it is evident that the will can be moved to the end without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Accordingly, the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved, by one and the same movement, to the end, as the reason for will- ing the means, and to the means themselves. But it is another act by which the will is moved to the end absolutely. Sometimes, too, this act precedes the other in time, for example, when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards, deliberating by what means to be healed, he wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect, for at first a man understands the principles in themselves, but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the con- clusions because of the principles. Reply Ob], i. This argument holds according as the will is moved to the end as the reason for willing the means. Reply Obj. 2. Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like manner, whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not conversely. Reply Obj. 3. In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle ground, and the end as the terminus. Therefore, just as natural movement sometimes stops on the way and does not reach the terminus, so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But in willing it is the reverse, for it is through [willing] the end that the will comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions through the principles which are called means. Hence it is that sometimes the intellect understands a means and does not proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means. The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above. For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else; and so the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other, but not conversely. Question IX ON THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL {In Six Articles) We must now consider what moves the will, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will is moved by the intellect? (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite? (3) Whether the will moves itself? (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle? (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body? (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. cxviii. 20 {My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications) : The intellect flies ahead , the desire follows sluggishly or not at all; we know what is good, but deeds delight us not} But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect; for the movement of the movable results from the motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. Obj. 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will as the imagination in representing the ap- petible object to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not move the sensitive appetite; indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all.^ Therefore neither does the intellect move the will., Obj. 3. Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect, for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that the appetible is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.^ I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things. For that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is found to be in potentiality to different things in two ^Enarr. in Psalm., super CXVIII, 20, serm. VIII (PL 37 1532) De An., Ill, 3 (427b 23). ^Op. cit.. Ill, 6 (433b 10; b 16). 250 ^ Aristotle, Q. 9 Art, i WHAT MOWES THE WILL 251 ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus, the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not; and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs there- fore a mover in two respects: viz., as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the sub- ject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting; while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified. The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above,^ the principle of this motion lies in the end. Hence it is that the art, which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding? Now the good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the ends and the per- fections of every other power are included under the object of the will as particular goods; and the art or power, to which the universal end belongs, always moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particu- lar ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good — i.e., the order of the whole army — ^by his com- mand moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company. On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are speci- fied, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it. Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity. Reply Obj. 2. Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither docs the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desir- ability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practi- cal intellect.^ Reply Obj. 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect. I, a. 2. ® Aristotle, Phys., II, 2 (194b 5). (432b 26); 10 (433a 17). ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 252 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 9. Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensi- tive appetite. For to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive, as Augustine says.'^ But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite, just as sense is less excellent than intel- lect. Therefore, the sensitive appetite does not move the will. Obj. 2. Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore, it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect. Obj. 3. Further, as is proved in Physics viii., the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion.^'^ But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will. On the contrary, It is written {Jas. i. 14): Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will. I answer that, As we have stated above, that which is apprehended un- der the nature of what is good and befitting moves the will as an object. Now that a thing appear to be good and fitting happens from two causes, namely, from the condition either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation, and hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or un- fitting. Therefore as the Philosopher says: According as a man is, such does the end seem to him? Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Therefore, according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected; and thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm-. It is in this way that the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object. Reply Obj. i. Nothing hinders that which is better absolutely and in itself from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly, the will is absolutely more excellent than the sensitive appetite; but in respect of the De Genesi ad Litt., XH, 16 (PL 34, 467). ^ Eth., Ill, 5 (1114a 32). Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (2S7b 23). Q. g. Art. 3 WHAT MOVES THE WILL 253 man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent. Reply Obj. 2. Men’s acts and choices are concerned singulars. Therefore, from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases. Reply Ob’], 3. As the Philosopher says/<^ the reason, in which resides the will, moves the irascible and concupiscible powers by its command, not, indeed, by a despotic rule, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal and political rule, as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both the irascible and concupiscible parts can move counter to the will, and, accordingly, nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times. Third Article V^HETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act, whereas what is moved is in potentiality; for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality , in so jar as it is in potentiality}'^ Now the same is not in potentiality and in act in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself. Ob’p 2. Further, the movable is moved when the mover is present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false. Obj. 3. Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as was stated above. If, therefore, the will moves itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. There- fore the will does not move itself. On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself. / answer that, As was stated above, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will’s object. Now, as we have stated above, the end is in the order of appetibles what a principle is in the order of intelligibles.^^ But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of a principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act as to its knowledge of conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means. Reply Obj. i. It is not in the same respect that the will moves itself and is moved, and so neither is it in act and in potentiality in the same respect. I, 2 (1254b 5). ^Aristotle, Phys., HI, i (201a 10). 8, a. 2. 254 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q 9. Art. 4 But in so far as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act concerning the means, so as to will them actually. Reply Ob], 2. The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, by which it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly, it does not follow that it is always moving itself. Reply Oh], 3. The will is moved in the same way by the intellect and by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object, whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end. Fourth Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by anything ex- terior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is of the nature of the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is of the nature of the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior. Obj. 2. Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above.^^ But the violent act is one the principle of which is outside the agent}"^ Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior. Ob], 3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior. On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as was stated above. But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior. 1 answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must likewise hold it to be moved by some exterior principle. For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at an- other time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, which previously it did not will. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as was stated above, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it can- not do this without the aid of counsel. For when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician; and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be '"Q. 6, a. 4. ^"Aristotle, Eth., Ill, i (iiioa i). Q. 9 - Art. 5 WHAT MOVES THE WILL 255 healed. And if the will moved itself to will this^ it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Therefore we must, of necessity, sup- pose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eude- mian Ethics}^ Reply Obj. i. It is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent; but it is not necessary that this inward principle be a first principle unmoved by another. Therefore, though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless, its first principle is from the outside. Thus, too, the first principle of natural movement, namely, that which moves nature, is from the outside. Reply Obj. 2. For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add, without the concurrence of him that suffers violence. This does not , happen when the will is moved by an exterior prin- ciple; for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this move- ment would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible, since then the will would will and not will the same thing. Reply Obj. 3, The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say, as a proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Therefore it needs to be moved by an- other as first mover. Fifth Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY BODY? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved by Physics viii.^® But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, when previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uni- form according to its nature. Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine the lower bodies are moved by the higher. But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will. ^ Eth. Eudem., VII, 14 (1248a 14). Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 9 (265a 27); cf. op. cit., IV, 14 (223b 18). ^'^De Trin., Ill, 4 (PL 42, 873). 2s6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 9. Art. 5 Obj, 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so if the heavenly bodies could not move man’s will. There- fore the human will is moved by a heavenly body. On the contrary, Damascene says that the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts}^ But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies. / answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its exterior object, that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are sub- ject to the movements of the heavenly bodies. But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence directly on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act.^^ But this is impossible. For the will, as is stated in De Anima iii., is in the reason,^^ Now the reason is a power of the soul not bound to a bodily organ, and so it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse; for things incorporeal and immaterial have a power that is more formal and more universal than any corporeal things. Therefore it is impossible for a heav- enly body to act directly on the intellect or the will. For this reason Aristotle ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from the sense,^^ the theory that such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on^^ (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally by the heavenly bodies — ix., when those bodies are moved, whose acts they are. But since it has been stated that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, in so far, namely, as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite. Reply Obf. i. The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial sub- stance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be re- duced to the movement of the heavens as to its cause. Reply Obj, 2. The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement is somewhat due to the in- ^De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893). “Cf. H. Denifle, Chartularium, no. 432, error 4 (I, 487). Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). Empedocles: cf.. Aristotle, De An., Ill, 3 (427a 21). ^Ibid. (427a 25), —Homer, Odyss., XVIII, 136. Q. 9. Art. 6 WHAT MOVES THE WILL 257 fluence of heavenly bodies; — also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; — and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something: 6.g., when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from the outside, not on the part of an inward instigation. Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ.^^ Therefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural temperament. Now the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Con- sequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of the heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says, the wise man governs the stars^"^ as though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and in no way sub- ject to the movement of the heavens, to such effects of the heavenly bodies. Or, as Augustine says: We must con jess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits?"^ Sixth Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY GOD ALONE, AS EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? We proceed, thus to the Sixth Article : — > Objection j. It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its su- perior; and thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man’s will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle. Obj. 2. Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man’s intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who illumines it, as Dionysius says.^® For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel. Obj, 3. Further, God is not cause of other than good things, according to Gen. i. 31: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. If, therefore, man’s will were moved by God alone, it would never be ^S.T., I, q. 84, a. 6 and 7. ^ Centiloguium, verba 4-8. — Cf. also St. Albert, In II Sent,, d. XV, a. 4 (XXVII, 276). ^ De Genesi ad Litt., II, 17 (PL 34, 278). ^De Gael. Hier,, IV, 2 (PG 3, 180). 258 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 9. Art. 6 moved to evil ; and yet it is the will by which we sin and by which we do the right, as Augustine says.^"^ On the contrary, It is written {Phil, ii. 13) : It is God Who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish. I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as is also natural movement. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the nature of the thing moved, yet that alone which is in some way the cause of a thing’s nature can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone’s nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by none other than the cause of its nature. Therefore it is said in Physics viii. that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.^^ Accordingly, man en- dowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause ; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle which is not the cause of his will, is impossible. But the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone through creation, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Therefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good, while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good; and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence, neither can primary matter, which is in potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent. Reply Obj. 1, An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies. Reply Obj. 2. Man’s intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man’s knowl- edge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from the outside, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 3. God moves man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal mo- tion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is a true or apparent good. Nevertheless, some- times God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later ^Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 596). Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4 (25sb 35). ^ S. T., I, q. 90, a. 2 and 3. ®®Q. 109, a. 2. Question X ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED {In Four Articles) We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? (2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object? (3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite? (4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED TO ANYTHING NATURALLY? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i . It would seem that the will is not moved to anything natu- rally. For the natural agent is co-divided with the voluntary agent, as is stated at the beginning of Physics ii.^ Therefore the will is not moved to any- thing naturally. Obj. 2. Further, that which is natural is in a thing always, as being hot is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the will. Obj. 3. Further, nature is determined to one thing, whereas the will is related to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally. On the contrary. The movement of the will follows the act of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally. I answer that, As Boethius says,^ and the Philosopher also,^ the term nature is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense, nature is either matter or the material form, as is stated in Physics ii.^ In another sense, nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it according to its substance; and this is what is in a thing essentially. Now whatever does not belong to a thing essentially is reduced to something, which belongs to that thing essentially, as to its principle. Therefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect, for the principles of intellectual knowl- ^ Aristotle, Phys., II, i (192b 8) ; 5 (196b 21). ^ De Duah. Nat., I (PL 64, 1341)- ^Metaph., IV, 4 (1014b 16). ^Aristotle, Phys., H, i (193a 28). 259 260 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. lo. Art. i edge are naturally known. In like manner, the principle of voluntary move- ments must be something naturally willed. Now this is the good in general, namely, that to which the will tends naturally, in the same way as each power tends to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstration to things intelligible; and, speaking gen- erally, it is all those things which belong to the one willing according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. There- fore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers, such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect, and to be and to live and other like things which regard his natural well-being, — all of which are included in the object of the will as so many particular goods. Reply Obj. i. The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another, for some things happen ilaturally and some are done volun- tarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determined to one thing. But since the will is founded in some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent; just as what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a subsequent cause. For in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes voli- tion, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally. Reply Obj. 2. In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as con- sequent upon form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural, as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality; for form is act, whereas matter is po- tentiality. Now movement is the act of that which is in potentiality.^ Therefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in the case of natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move up- wards, but only when it is outside its own place. And in like manner, it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God’s will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition. Reply Obj. 3. Something one always corresponds to nature, proportioned to it. For to that which is nature generically there corresponds that which is one in genus; to nature considered in the species there corresponds that which is one in species ; and to individuated nature there corresponds some- thing that is individually one. Since, therefore, the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, there corresponds to it naturally a common unity, namely, the good, just as to the intellect likewise there corresponds a com- ^Op. cit., Ill, I (2Qia 10), Q. 10. Art. 2 HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 261 mon unity, namely, the true, or being, or essence. Now under the good which is common there are contained many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined. / Second Article T' ^ ^ WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY ITS OBJECT? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It seems that the will is moved of necessity by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to the movable, as is stated in De Anima hi.® But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the mov- able of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of neces?*./ by its object. Obj, 2. Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intel- lect; and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as was stated above. But the intellect is moved of necessity by its object. Therefore the will also is moved of necessity by its object. Obj. 3. Further, whatever one wills is either the end, or something or- dained to the end. But, it would seem, one wills an end necessarily, because it is like a principle in speculative matters, to which one assents of neces- sity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; and so it seems that we likewise will the means necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object. On the contrary. Rational powers, according to the Philosopher, are directed to opposites.*^ But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as is stated in De Anima iii.® Therefore the will is directed to op- posites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites. / answer that. The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man^s power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight under the aspect of color actually visible. Therefore, if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight neces- sarily, unless one turns one’s eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus would not see it. ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433b 10; b 16). Metaph., VIII, 2 (1046b 8). ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). 262 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. io. Art. 3 Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so good is the object of the will. Therefore if the will be offered an object which is good uni- versally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. — ^And since the lack of any good whatever is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing is such a good that the will Cannot not-will it ; and this is happiness. But any other particular goods, in so far as they are lack- ing in some good, can be regarded as non-goods; and, from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view. Reply Obj, i. The sufficient mover of a power is none other than that object that in every respect possesses the nature of the mover of that power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true; but not by that which may be either true or false, viz., by that which is contingent, as we have said of the good. Reply Obj. 3, The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good; so does whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as to be and to live, and the like. But other things, without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end; just as he who assents to a principle does not necessarily assent to the conclusions without which the principles can still be true. Third Article ^ WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE LOWER APPETITE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a pas- sion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says {Rom. vii. 19) : The good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do; and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion. Obj. 2. Further, as is stated in Ethics hi., according as a man is, such does the end seem to him? But it is not in man’s power to cast aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man’s power not to will that to which the passion inclines him. ® Aristotle, Eth., Ill, 5 (1114a 32). Q. 10. Art. 3 HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 263 Obj, 3. Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause; and so the universal reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as is stated in De Anima iii.^*^ But as the universal reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sen- sitive appetite happens to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense. On the contrary^ It is written {Gen. iv. 7) : Thy lust shall he under thee^ and thou shalt have dominion over it. Therefore man’s will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite. I answer that, As we have stated above, the passion of the sensitive ap- petite moves the will in so far as the will is moved by its object^^ — inas- much as, namely, through being disposed in such and such a way by a pas- sion, a man judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who, through violent anger or concupiscence, become mad or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; for such passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such men the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow of necessity the impulse of their passions; for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will. Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom ; and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly, in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in man, and the passion alone holds its sway, or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow passion. Reply Obj. i. Although the will cannot prevent the movement of con- cupiscence from arising (of which the Apostle says [Rom. vii. 19] : The evil which I will not, that 1 do — i.e., I desire) , yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire, or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence. Reply Obj. 2. Although there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive, sometimes man is entirely disposed in one way throughout his whole soul, and this either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the virtuous, or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in madmen. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of the reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be Aristotle, De An., Ill, ii (434a 19). ^Q. 9, a, 3. 264 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. io. Art. 4 led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously affected according to the .various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, ^han it does according to a passion. Reply Obj. 3. The will is moved not only by the universal good appre- hended by the reason, but also by the good apprehended by sense. There- fore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone, as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion. Fourth Article VTHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE EXTERIOR MOVER WHICH IS GOD? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God can- not be resisted, because His power is infinite; and so it is written {Rom. ix. 19) : Who resisteth His will? Therefore God moves the will of necessity. Obj. 2. Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills natu- rally, as was stated above. But whatever God does in a thing is what is natural to it, as Augustine says.^^ Therefore the will wills of necessity every- thing to which God moves it. Obj. 3. Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it, because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of neces- sity. On the contrary, It is written {Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Therefore He does not of necessity move man’s will. I answer that. As Dionysius says, it belongs to the divine providence, not to destroy, but to preserve the nature of things?-^ Therefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions, in such a way that from neces- sary causes, through the divine motion, effects follow of necessity, but from contingent causes effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle that is not determined to one thing, but having an indif- ferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally. Reply Obj. i. The divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is “ Contra Faust., XXVI, 3 (PL 42, 480). ^De Div. Norn., IV, 33 (PG 3, 733 ) Q. 10. Art. 4 HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 265 fitting to the nature of that thing. Hence, it would be more repugnant to the divine motion for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature. Reply Ob]. 2. That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it; for thus is something becoming to a thing, accord- ing as God wills it to be becoming. Now He does not will that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing, that it be subject to the divine power. Reply Obj. 3. If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible absolutely. Consequently, it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily. Question XI ON ENJOYMENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL {In Four Articles) We must now consider enjoyment [fruitio'\j concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? ( 2 ) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals? (3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? (4) Whether it is only of the end possessed? > o First Article A WHETHER TO ENJOY IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that to enjoy does not belong only to the ap- petitive power. For to enjoy [frui] seems nothing else than to receive the fruit [fructum capere] . But it is the intellect, in whose act happiness con- sists, as was shown above^ that receives the fruit of human life, which is happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the intellect. Obj. 2. Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection. Thus the end of sight is to know the visible, of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite. Obj. 3. Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object; and for the same reason, in- tellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive power, and not to the appetitive power. On the contrary j Augustine says: To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to some- thing for its own sake? But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore to enjoy likewise is an act of the appetitive power. / answer that, Fruitio [enjoyment] and fructus [fruit] seem to refer to the same thing, one being derived from the other; but which was derived from which matters not for our purpose, though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses; and that is why it seems that the term fruition is derived from sensible fruits. Now sensible ^ Q. 3, a. 4. ^De Doct. Christ., I, 4 (PL 34, 20) ; De Trin., X, 10; ii (PL 42, 981 ; 982). 266 Q. II. Art. 2 ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 267 fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce last, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. But the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. There- fore it is evident that fruition [enjoyment] is an act of the appetitive power. Reply Oh], i. Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly, the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. It is therefore as a good that the vision of God is enjoyed. Hence, the intellect attains this end as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving towards the end and enjoying the end attained. Reply Oh'], 2. The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the common, as was stated above.^ Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore-® the ap- petitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end. Reply Oh'], 3. In delight there are two things, the perception of what is befitting, which belongs to the apprehensive power, and satisfaction with what is offered as befitting, which belongs to the appetitive power, in which the nature of delight is fulfilled. Second Article WHETHER TO ENJOY BELONGS TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE ALONE, OR ALSO TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Oh']ection i. It would seem that to enjoy belongs to human beings alone. For Augustine says that it is given to us men to enjoy and to use,^ There- fore other animals cannot enjoy. Oh], 2. Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to enjoy. Oh], 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so the natural appetite is beneath the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy, and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals. On the contrary, Augustine says: It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure,^ I answer that, As was stated above, to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the ®Q. 9, a. I. ^De Doct. Christ., I, 22 (PL 34, 25). ^ Lib. S3 Quaest., q. 30 (PL 40, 19). 268 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. u. Art, 3 achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things devoid of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way of execution, e.g,, that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, and a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Therefore, it is clear that things de- void of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end; but this is for those only that are endowed with knowledge. Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end is that by which we know not only what it is that is the end and the good, but also the universal nature of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known dn the particular. Such knowledge is to be found in irrational ani- mals, whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Conse- quently, enjoyment, in its perfect nature, belongs to the rational nature; to irrational animals, imperfectly; and to other creatures, not at all. Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment. Reply Obj, 2. Enjoyment need not be of the last end absolutely, but it can be of that which each one chooses for his last end. Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge. Reply Obj. 4. Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment.^ This is clear from his manner of speaking, for he says that it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy j that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they use. Third Article WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE LAST END? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord. But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in man. There- fore to enjoy is not only of the last end. Obj. 2. Further, What we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says {Gal. V. 22): The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace and other like things, which have not the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. Obj. 3. Further, the acts of the will reflect on themselves; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will, since it is the will ^Ibid, Q. II. Art. 3 ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 269 with which we enjoy, as Augustine says.*^ Therefore a man enjoys his en- joyment. But the last end of man is not enjo3mient, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. On the contrary, Augustine says: A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else? But the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone. I answer that. As we have stated above, the notion of fruit implies two things: first, that it a. 4. 375 576 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 50. Art. i tioned to their operations. Whence by like acts like habits are formed.^ Therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body, namely, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul. If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and the like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit per- fectly, because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable. On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Categories,^ Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body, and held that the first species of quality be- longed to the soul alone. He held also that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Categories, not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example.'^ So his meaning would be that, just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle, both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness, as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Physics vii.® he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. Reply Obj. i. This objection concerns habit as a disposition to opera- tion, and those actions of the body which are from nature; but it does not concern those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. Reply Oh], 2. Bodily dispositions are not, absolutely, difficult to change because of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to change by comparison to such and such a subject, because, namely, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or be- cause they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are, absolutely, difficult to change because of the unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore Aristotle does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit absolutely, but that it is as a habit, as we read in the Greek.^ On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits absolutely. Reply Ob], 3. Bodily dispositions, which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained,^^ differ from qualities of the third species in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in becoming and movement, as it were, and therefore they are called passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in ® Aristotle, Eth,, II, i (1103b 21). Cat., VIII (pp. 233"%* 241^0. ’'Cat., VIII (8b 36). ^Phys., VII, 3 (246b 4). Aristotle, Cat., VIII (9a 3). Cf . Simplicius, In Cat., VIII (pp. 233^; 234^). Q. 50. Art. 2 THE SUBJECT OF HABITS 377 his Commentary disapproves of this.^^ For in this view heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aris- totle puts heat in the third. Therefore Porphyry, as Simplicius reports, says that passion, or pas- sion-like quality, and disposition and habit differ in bodies by way of in- tensity and remission. For when a thing receives heat only in this, that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is temporary; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit; so that disposition would be a certain intensity or perfection of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or perfection of disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remission do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse participation in it by the subject; so that there would thus be no diversity among the species of quality.^^ And therefore we must conclude otherwise. We must say that, as was explained above, the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, has the nature of disposition; and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sick- ness and health. But alteration does not occur, primarily and directly, in re- gard to such habits and dispositions. Second Article WHETHER THE SOUL IS THE SUBJECT OF HABIT ACCORDING TO ITS ESSENCE OR ACCORDING TO ITS POWER? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that habit is in the soul according to its es- sence rather than according to its powers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as was stated above.^^ But nature is considered according to the essence of the soul rather than the powers, because it is according to its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul according to its essence and not according to its powers. Obj, 2. Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the First Part.^^ Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. '^Ibid. (p. 234^0- ^Ibid. (p. 234®®). 49, a. 2, T., I, q. 77, a. i, ad 5. ^Ibid. (p. 234“). Q. 49, a. 2, ad i. 378 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 50. Art. 2 Obj. 3. Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. On the contrary, The Philosopher puts various habits in the various parts of the souL^'^ I answer that, As we have said above/^ habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If, therefore, we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul — that is, if we speak of human nature; for the soul itself is the form completing human nature. Hence, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its re- lation to the body. — But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker (according to 2 Peter i. 4, that we may be partakers of the divine nature), thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul according to its essence, as we shall state later on.^^ On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul, in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many. This indifference is a condition required for a habit, as we have said above.^^ And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul according to its powers. Reply Obj, i. The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not*as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed. Reply Obj. 2. Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further acci- dent. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another. Thus a surface is the subject of color. In this sense power is the subject of habit. Reply Obj. 3. Habit precedes power according as it implies a disposition to nature, whereas power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Therefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit precedes power as the complete precedes the incomplete, and as act precedes poten- tiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in the order of generation and time, as is stated in Metaph. vii. and ix.^^ I, 13 (1103a 3). 49, a. 2 and 3. ""“Q. no, a. 4. -"Q. 49, a. 4. “^Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 3 (1029a 5) ; VIII, 8 (1049b 4). Q. $0. Art. 3 THE SUBJECT OF HABITS 379 Third Article WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY HABITS IN THE POWERS OF THE SENSITIVE PART? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nu- tritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. Oh]. 2. Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes; for in them there is no will, which is included in the definition of habit, as we have said above.^^ Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. Oh]. 3. Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues; and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so virtue is related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences, since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part. On the contrary j The Philosopher says that some virtues, namely, tem- perance and fortitude, belong to the irrational parts. I answer that, The sensitive powers can be. considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct; secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is. Therefore, just as there are no habits in the natural powers, so likewise there are none in the sensitive powers in so far as they act from natural instinct. But according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. Reply Ob], i. The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn apti- tude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the com- mand of reason, and therefore habits can be in them; for in so ‘far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as is stated in Ethics i.^^ Reply Ob]. 2. The sensitive powers of brute animals do not act at the command of reason. But if they are left to themselves, such animals act from natural instinct, and so there are in them no habits ordained to opera- tions. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man’s reason brutes are disposed by a sort of conditioning to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, 49, a. 3. Ill, 10 (1117b 23). ^^ 0 ^. cit ., I, 13 (1102b 25; b 13). 38 o the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 50. Art. 4 to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in brute animals. Therefore Augustine says; TVc fifid the wost ufitaificd beasts detevTed, by fear of pain, from that wherein they take the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle?'^ But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be.no habits in them. Reply Ob’], 3. The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as is stated in De Anima iii.“^ But the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensi- tive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except accord- ing as they act at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, cogitation or imagination. So, too, the Philosopher says that custom conduces much to a good memory?'^ The reason for this is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason. On the other hand, the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptive of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature; just as are the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. Fourth Article WHETHER THERE IS ANY HABIT IN THE INTELLECT? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as was stated above. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as is stated in De Anima i.^® Therefore so are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body.^^ Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit. Obj, 2. Further, whatever is in a thing is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter is act only, whereas what is composed of form and matter has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore ^Lib. S3 Qiuiest., q. 36 (PL 40, 25). ^Aristotle, De An,, III, ii (434a 12). ^ De Memor., II (4S2a 28). ^Aristotle, De An., I, i (403a 8); 4 (408b 8). cit., in, 4 (429a 24). Q. 50. Art. 4 THE SUBJECT OF HABITS 381 habitj which has potentiality as well as act, being, as it were, intermediate be- tween the two, cannot be in the intellect, but only in the composite which is made up of soul and body. Obj. 3. Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as it is said in Metaph, But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body. Hence it is also stated that we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted?^ Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the body. On the contrary, The Philosopher puts science, wisdom and understand- ing, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.^^ I answer that, Concerning habits of knowledge there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one possible intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive powers.^^ For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that which, being only one, would be common to all men. Therefore, if there were but one single possible intellect of all men, the habits of the sciences, in which men differ from one another, could not be in the possible intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sen- sitive powers, which are multiplied in diverse men. Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation.^^ Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence.^^ Therefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover, he says expressly that when the possible intellect thus becomes each thing, that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species, then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the in- tellect can act of itself, i.e., by considering. And even then it is in poten- tiality in a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discover- ing.^^ Therefore the possible intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For just as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, so to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the habit. But to understand and Aristotle, Metaph., IV, 20 (1022b 10). Aristotle, De An., II, 9 (421a 26). ^ Eth., VI, 3 (1139b 16). ®®Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 5 (VI, i64r). Aristotle, Eth., I, 13 (1102b 13). ^ Op. cit., VI, 3 (1139b 16). ^ De An., Ill, 4 (429b 6). 382 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 50. Art. 5 to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect itself. Reply Obj, i. Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Categories^'^ that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the composite, as the Philosopher holds, therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the composite. And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, according to the argu- ment reported above.^^ But the argument is not cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object towards the power, but rather a disposition of the power towards the object. Therefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object. Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima i.^^ But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the possible intellect Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself, and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the possible intellect is the subject of habit. For that is a competent subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many; and this belongs, above all, to the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. Reply Obj. 2. As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intelligible being belongs to the possible intellect. Therefore nothing forbids habit to be in the possible intellect, for it is mid- way between pure potentiality and perfect act. Reply Ob]. 3. Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare the proper object for the possible intellect, therefore it is by the good dis- position of these powers, to which disposition the good disposition of the body contributes, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way an intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the possible intellect. Fifth Article WHETHER ANY HABIT IS IN THE WILL? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For it is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually under- stands, which are the habit that is in the intellect. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of any habit. Obj, 2. Further, no habit is allotted to the agent intellect, as there is to ^In Cat., Vm (p. 233"“’). ^De An., I, i (403a 8); 4 (408b 8). ^"Cf. Simplicius, In Cat., VIII (p. 241^). ^ AristoUe, De An., I, i (403a 5). Op. cit., Ill, 7 <43 la 14). ' Q. so. Art. 6 THE SUBJECT OF HABITS 383 the possible intellect, because the former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as was stated above.^^ Therefore there is no habit in the will. Obj. 3. Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determined to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will. On the contrary j Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will, for it is a habit whereby men will and do that which is just.^^ Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. / answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit it is clear that it is prin- cipally related to the will, inasmuch as habit is that which one uses when one wills, as was stated above. ^ Reply Obj. 1. Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the like- ness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above. And therefore towards those things to which it is inclined suffi- ciently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, that the ap- petitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. Reply Obj. 2. The agent intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved.*^^ Therefore the comparison between them does not hold, for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality. Reply Obj. 3. The will from the very nature of the power is inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason in order that action may follow more promptly. Sixth Article WHETHER THERE ARE HABITS IN THE ANGELS? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For 9, a. I. Aristotle, Eth., V, 1 (1129a 7). 6, a. 4. Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433b 16). 384 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 50. Art. 6 Maximus, the commentator of Dionysius, says: It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e., spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e., in the angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us, as though one were in the other as in a subject; for accident of any kind is foreign to them.^^ But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. Obj. 2. Further, as Dionysius says: The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences paHicipate, above all other things, in God^s goodness But that which is of itself is prior to and more powerful than that which is by an- other. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto con- formity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself. Obj. 3. Further, habit is a disposition."^^ But disposition, as is said in the same book, is the order of that which has parts.^^ Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. On the contrary, Dionysius says that the angels of the first hierarchy are called: Fire-bearers and Thrones and Out-pouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits?^ 1 answer that. Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: Their dispositions and the powers which are in them are essential, through the absence of matter in them.^‘^ And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Cate- gories: Wisdom which is in soul is a habit, but that which is in intellect is its substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in it- self.^^ Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is mani- fest, from what we have said, that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them ; and on that account they excluded from them habit and every kind of accident. Yet since, though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind, so neither are the respective habits of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says De Gael Hier., VII, i (PG 4, 65). De Gael. Hier., IV, 2 (PG 3, 180). In De Gael. Hier., VII, i (PG 4, 65). Aristotle, Metaph., IV, 20 (1022b 10). Op. cit., IV, 19 (1022b i). ^^De Gael. Hier., VII, i (PG 3, 205). De Gael. Hier., VII, I (PG 4, 6$). In Gat., VIII (p. 241®“-""). 49, a. 4. Q. so. Art. 6 THE SUBJECT OF HABITS 385 in his Commentary on the Categories that: The habits of an intellectual substance are not like the habits here below; rather are they like simple and immaterial species which it contains in itself. However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with re- gard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intel- lectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primary matter is as regards all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible beings, but as an act. Not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an ad- mixture of some potentiality; and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the First Part,^^ so far as it is in poten- tiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation; but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as is stated in the Book of Causes and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant from Him, for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in poten- tiality in regard to that Pure Act. Therefore Ejionysius says that their habits are godlike, that is to say, that by them they are made like to God. But those habits that are dispositions to natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial. Reply Obj. i. This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents. Reply Obj. 2. As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits. Reply Obj. 3. In angels there are no essential parts, but there are po- tential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things. Cat., Vm (p. 241^"-^). 55, a. i. Gael. Bier., VII, i (PG 3, 205). Causis, VIII (p. 168). Question LI ON THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION {In Four Articles) We must next consider the cause of habits. And firstly, as to their forma- tion; secondly, as to their increase;^ thirdly, as to their diminution and cor- ruption.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i ) Whether any habit is from nature? (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts? (3) Whether a habit can be generated by one act? (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God? First Article WHETHER ANY HABIT IS FROM NATURE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i . It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit is that which we use when we will, as the Commentator says on De Anima iii.® Therefore habit is not from nature. Obj, 2. Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If, therefore, the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. Obj, 3. Further, nature does not fail in the necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above.^ If, therefore, any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits. But this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. On the contrary, In Ethics vi.® among other habits place is given to the understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature. Hence, too, first principles are said to be known naturally.® / answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First, in respect of the specific nature, as the ability to laugh is natural to man, and to have an upward tendency is natural to fire. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sick- ness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective tempera- ments. ^Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natu- ^ ^Q. 52. ^Q. 53. ®Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 18 (VI, 169V). Q. 49, a. 4. ® Aristotle, Eth., VI, 6 (1141a 5). °Cf. a text of St. Albert, Summa de Bono, quoted by 0 . Xottin, Le droit naturel, p. 117. 386 Q. 51. Art; i THE FORMATION OF HABITS 387 ral in two ways: first, because it is entirely from the nature; secondly, be- cause it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature, but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. Therefore, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to differ- ent men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as was stated above, ^ may be natural both in respect of the specific nature and in respect of the individual nature: — in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them; which does not belong to human nature, as we said in the First Part,^ There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle. They exist in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself. Thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit.^ For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part. And the same is the case in like manner with regard to other such instances. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part, this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms. For this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that the knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.^® ^ Q. 5 o> a. 2. ® S.T.j I, q. 55, a. 2 ; q. 84, a. 3. ® For the opinions of Alexander of Hales and John of Rochelle on the “understanding of first principles,’^ cf. O. Lottin, “La synderese chez les premiers maitres franciscains de Paris” {Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, XXIX [1927], pp. 269, 273, 277). Post, Anal., II, 15 (looa 3). 388 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 51. Art. 2 But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect. In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit ; but only as to certain of its principles, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called th& seeds of the virtues}^ The reason for this is because the in- clination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural* beginnings. For some are dis- posed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or the like. Reply Obj. i. This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. Reply Obj, 2. Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, although it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself to be of itself capable of knowing all things; for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Evidently, that by which something is known must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known. Hence, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, it would follow that it was the likeness and act of all things. Therefore there must needs be added to the angels’ intellective power some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood; for it is by participation in the divine wisdom, and not by their own essence, that their intellects can be actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. Reply Obj. 3. Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits, since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we‘ have said above. And so it does not follow that, because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. Second Article WHETHER ANY HABIT IS CAUSED BY ACTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above.^^ Now every quality is caused in a sub- ject according as the subject is receptive of something. Since, then, the ^ Cf. the texts of St. Albert, Summa de Bono, as quoted by 0 . Lottin, Le droit naturel, p. 117. “Q. 49, a. i. Q. 51. Art. 2 THE FORMATION OF HABITS 389 agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives, it seems im- possible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. Obj. 2. Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled; whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If, therefore, habits were caused in any- thing by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive; which is impossible, as is stated in Physics vii.^^ Obj> 3. Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But a habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit, as is clear from the fact that habit makes an act to be more perfect. Therefore a habit can- not be caused by an act which precedes the habit. On the contrary, The Philosopher teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.^^ / answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act. For instance, in fire there is only the active principle of heating. In such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act; for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethics ii.^^ But there is an agent in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object; and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Therefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act which is a moved mover. For everything that is passive and moved by an- other is disposed by the action of the agent; and therefore if the acts be multiplied, a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit; just as the habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, ac- cording as it is moved by first propositions. Reply Obj. i. The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it; and thus a habit is caused. Reply Obj. 2. The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii,^® Reply Obj. 3. The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby; just as the reason is a more excellent principle “Aristotle, Phys., VII, i (241b 24). Eth., II, i (1103a 31). ^Ibid. (1103a 19). “Aristotle, Phys.j VIII, s (2S7a 31). 390 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 51. Art. 3 than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by re- peated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions. Third Article ■WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CAUSED BY ONE ACT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. Obj. 2. Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication, so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. So, too, if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. Obj, 3. Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill by one act. Therefore one act can cause a habit. On the contrary, The Philosopher says: ^ 4 ^ neither does one swallow nor one day make spring, so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy}-'^ But happiness is an operation according to a habit of perfect virtue}^ Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act. / answer that. As we have said already, habit is caused by act, in so far as a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at once over- come the combustible, it does not enkindle it at once, but gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that, by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason can- not entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act. For the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things, while the reason judges, in a single apt, what should be willed in the light of various conditions and circumstances. Therefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely over- come, so as to be inclined naturally to the same thing in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many. But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two pas- sive principles: one Is the possible intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle calls passive, and is the particular reason, that is, the cogi- tative power, with memory and imagination.^® With regard then to the Eth., I, 7 (1098a 18). ^ Ibid . (1098a 16); 13 (1102a s). '^^De An., Ill, 5 (430a 24). "^Cf. 5 . T., I, q. 78, a. 4. Q. 51. Art. 4 THE FORMATION OF HABITS 391 former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to over- come entirely, by one act, the power of its passive principle. Thus one self- evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion; but a probable proposition cannot do this. Therefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the possible intellect; whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the possible intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be re- peated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says that meditation strengthens memory Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power. Sometimes, for instance, a powerful medicine restores health at once. Hence the solutions to the objections are clear. Fourth Article WHETHER ANY HABITS ARE INFUSED IN MAN BY GOD? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If, therefore, He infuses habits into some. He would infuse them into all; which is clearly untrue. Obj. 2. Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature; for it belongs to the divine providence to preserve nature, as Dionysius says.^^ But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man ex- cept by acts. Obj. 3. Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But from those acts a like habit is caused?^ Consequently, there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible, for two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God. On the contrary, it is written {Ecclus. xv. 5): God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding. Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God. I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is dis- posed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as was stated above.^^ And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore it is necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, likewise ^De Memor., I (4Sia 12). De Div. Norn., IV, 33 (PG 3, 733 )- Eth., II, I (1103b 21). ^Q. 5. a. 5 - ^ Aristotle, 392 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 51. Art. 4 exceed the proportion of human nature. Therefore such habits can never be in man except by divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes without second causes themselves, as we have said in the First Part.^^ Just as, therefore, in order to show His power, God sometimes causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, though not so perfectly. * Reply Ob], i. God, considered in His nature, is the same to all; but, con- sidered according to the order of His wisdom, for some fixed motive, He gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others. Reply Obj. 2. That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do; rather it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. Reply Ob]. 3. Acts produced by an infused habit do not cause a habit, but strengthen an already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before. 5 . r., I, q. 105, a. 6. Question LII ON THE INCREASE OF HABITS {In Three Articles) We have now to consider the increase of habits, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether habits increase? (2) Whether they in- crease by addition? (3) Whether each act increases a habit? First Article WHETHER HABITS INCREASE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity.^ But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. Obj, 2. Further, habit is a perjection? But since perfection conveys a no- tion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be subject to more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. Obj, 3. Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration; for that which, from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Physics vii.^ Therefore habits cannot increase. On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases. So it was that the disciples said to our Lord {Luke xvii. 5) : Lord, increase our faith. There- fore habits increase. I answer that. Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to spiritual and intellectual realities be- cause of the natural connection of the human intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; and so a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. So, too, in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since the good has the nature of what is perfect, therefore in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better, as Augustine says.^ Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, ac- cording to the form itself: secondly, according to the participation' in the '^'Phys., V, 2 (226a 30). ®Oi>. dt,, VII, 3 (246a 13). ^Ihid. (246a 10). *Z)e Trin,, VI, 8 (PL 42, 929). 393 394 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 52. Art. i form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form ac- cording to the form itself, thus the form is said to be little or great: for instance, great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form according to the participation in it by the subject, it is said to be more or less: for instance, more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it according •as it is participated in a subject. In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concern- ing the intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Categories? For Plotinus^ and the other Pla- tonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more and less, for the reason that they were material, and so had a certain inde- termination because of the infinity of matter.'^ Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more and less; but that the things affected by them are said to be more and less, according to a diversity in participation: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing.® Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the Categories? The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues.^*^ The fourth opinion was held by some who said that quali- ties and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more and less, but that material forms are.^^ In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, that according to which a thing receives its species, must be some- thing fixed and permanent, and as it were indivisible ; for whatever attains to it is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it, more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Therefore the Philoso- pher says that the species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives through itself, or through something belonging to it, the nature of a species, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it should possess a defi- nite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness and other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to some- thing else; and much more so, substance, which is per se being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related can be diversified, in themselves, according to more or less, and none the less they remain in the same species, because of the oneness of that to which ^In Cat., VIII (p. 284^). ®Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, III. 20 (VI, 149). "SimpHcius, In Cat., VIII (p. 284^®-^''). ^ Ibid. (p. 284^'"®"). ^ Cat., VIII (lob 30). Simplidus, In Cat., VIII (p. 284^“^®). ^^Ihid. (p. 285'"''). '^Metaph., VII, 3 (1043b 33). Q. 52. Art. I THE INCREASE OF HABITS 395 they are related^ and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remitted, and yet it remains in the same species because of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the charac- ter of health according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal’s nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is there- fore variable as regards more or less, and yet the character of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says: Health itself may be more or less, for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one indi- vidual, but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health?-^ Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect. Therefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus, therefore, it is clear how a quality or form may increase or de- crease in itself, and how it cannot. But if we consider a quality or form according to its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptive of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this di- versity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is per se being.^^ Hence every form which is participated substantially by its subject cannot vary in intensity and remission; and therefore in the genus of substance nothing is predicated according to more or less. And because quantity is near to substance, and because shape fol- lows on quantity, therefore it is that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says that when a thing re- ceives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to become.^s But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are con- nected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, accord- ing to the participation by the subject. Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason for this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must re- main fixed and constant in something indivisible. Therefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated according to more or less. First, because the participator has its species through that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated according to more or less. Therefore the Philosopher says that, as a number cannot he more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance, that is, in respect of its participation in the specific form: but in so far as substance may be with matter, i,e., in respect of material dispositions, more and less are found in substance}^ Secondly, this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indi- X, 3 (1173a 24). Cat., VIII (p, 285""-"®). ^^Phys., VII, 3 (246a i). ^^Metaph., VII, 3 (1044a 9). 396 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 52. Art. i visible. Hence, if anything participate that form, it must needs participate it according to the nature of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more and less; because each species of number is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denomi- nated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Categories, where, in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle are accordingly triangles and circles P For indivisibility is essential to the nature of such, and hence whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility. It is clear, therefore, that since we speak of habits and dispositions ac- cording to a relation to something,^® intensity and remission may be ob- served in habits and dispositions in two ways. First, according to the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health, or greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, according to participation by the subject, namely, in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject, nor again do they essentially imply indi- visibility. We shall say further on how it is with virtue.^^ Reply Obj. i. As the name great is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms, so also is the name growth, the term of which is something great. Reply Ob]. 2. Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject, for instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Therefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptive of more or less. Reply Ob]. 3. Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species. For, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to the sciences and the virtues.^^ Cat., yill (iia 7). Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3 (246b 3; 247a i). a. I, Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3 (247a 6; 24Sa 6). ^Q. 66, Q. 52. Art, 2 THE INCREASE OF HABITS 397 Second Article WHETHER HABIT INCREASES BY ADDITION? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — ^ Objection i. It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addi- tion. For the name increase, as we have said, is transferred to forms from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase with- out addition ■ and therefore it is said that increase is an addition to a magni- tude already existing?^ Therefore in habits also there is no increase with- out addition. Ohj, 2. Further, a habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the receiving subject. For instance, that which heats causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition. Ohj. 3: Further, as that which is not white is in potentiality to be white, so that which is less white is in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not white is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white is not made more white, except by an added whiteness. On the contrary, The Philosopher says: That which is hot is made hot- ter, without making in the matter something hot, that was not hot when the thing was less hot?^ Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase. 1 answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remission happen, in one way, not on the part of the form itself considered in itself, but through a diverse participation in it by the subject. Therefore such increase of habits and other forms is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating, more or less perfectly, in one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made (as is proved in Metaph. vii.^^), so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating in the form more perfectly, not as though something were added to the form. For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could be only either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be under- stood of the form itself, it has already been stated that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from being yellow becomes white. — ^If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could be only ^Aristotle, De Gener,, I, 5 (320b 30). ^Fhys., IV, 9 (217a 34). ^Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 8 (1033b 5); 9 (1034b 7). 398 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 52. Art. either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say that cold increases in a man who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another) . But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. Since, however, as was stated above, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows; and yet the species remains the same because of the oneness of the terminus. Furthermore, movement increases in intensity through the participation of its subject, i.6., in so far as the same move- ment can be executed more or less speedily or readily. — In like manner, science likewise can increase in itself by addition. Thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man’s science increases in intensity, as to the subject’s participation in it, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. As to bodily habits, it is difficult to see that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be healthy or beautiful abso- lutely, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them. How this question affects virtues we shall state further on.^^ Reply Ob], i. Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another: such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all: such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Physics iv.^^ Reply Obj, 2. The cause that increases a habit always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. Rather it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. Reply Obj. 3. What is not already white is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness. Hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white is not in potentiality to a form, since it already has it actually; but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation, and this it receives through the agent’s action. ^Q. 66, a. I. ^Aristotle, Phys., IV, 7 (214b 2) ; 9 (217b 8). Q. 52. Art. 3 THE INCREASE OF HABITS 399 Third Article WHETHER EVERY ACT INCREASES ITS HABIT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of habits, as was stated above.^^ Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multi- plied. Obj. 2. Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike.^^. Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. Obj. 3. Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases its habit. On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethics ii., some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance, if they be done carelessly Therefore it is not every act that in- creases a habit. I answer that, Like acts cause like habits P Now things are like or unlike not only according to the sameness or diversity of their quality, but also according to the same or a diverse mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also the less white is unlike the more white; since movement likewise takes place from the less white to the more white, as from one opposite to another, as is stated in Physics v.^^ But since the use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above, just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it, so he may happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in propor- tion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act be in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to its increase, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases the animaPs size, as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone; but the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. — If, however, the act falls proportionately short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to its lessening. From this it is clear how to solve the objections. 51, a. 2. ^Aristotle, n, 2 (1104a 29). (1104a 18), cit., II, I (1103b 21). Aristotle, Phys., V, 5 (229b 14). 50,* a. 5. Question LIII HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED AND DIMINISHED {In Three Articles) We must now consider how habits are lost and weakened. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether a habit can be corrupted? (2) Whether it can be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted and diminished? First Article WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CORRUPTED? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject as a kind of nature, and that is why it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains. Ob], 2, Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to cor- ruption of its subject, or to its contrary. Thus, sickness ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. But science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its subject, since the intellect, which is its subject, is a substance that is incorruptible?- In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary, since in- telligible species are not contrary to one another Therefore the habit of science can in no way be lost. Obj, 3. Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a direct move- ment of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the body. But no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect, since the intellect, independently of the body, is the proper abode of the species; for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares, virtue is more lasting than learning? On the contrary, The Philosopher says that forgetfulness and deception ^Aristotle, De An., I, 4 (4oSb 18). ""Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 7 (1032b 2). I, 10 (iioob 14). 400 Q. 53. Art. i THE CORRUPTION OF HABITS 401 are the corruption of science.^ Moreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue, and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts.^ I answer thaty A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When, therefore, a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits— for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject, nevertheless reside secondarily in a cor- ruptible subject. Such is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the possible intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as was stated above.^ Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the possible intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers. We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. Now if there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly; but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly. But it is evident that an intel- ligible species residing in the possible intellect has no contrary; nor can the agent intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. There- fore, if in the possible intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the agent intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever; even as the Philosopher says about prudence that it cannot be lost by being for- gotten.'^ — There is, however, in the possible intellect a habit caused by the reason, namely, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting-point of the reason; for the assertion Good is not good is contrary to the assertion Good is good.^ Secondly, on the part of the process itself of reasoning, in so far as a sophis- tical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. There- fore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as was stated above, says that de- ception is the corruption of science? As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in the reason itself, as is stated in Ethics vi. ; and to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. — Some, however, viz., the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it ^ De Long, et Brev. Vitaej II (465a 23). ® Aristotle, Eth., II, i (1103b 7); 3 (1105a 15). ®Q. 50, a. 3, ad 3. Eth.j VI, 5 (1140b 29). ^ Perih., II, 14 (24a 2). ^ De Long, et Brev. Vitae, II (465a 23). ^“Aristotle, Eth., VI, i (1139a i); 2 (1139b 12). 402 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 53. Art. 2 to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. Reply Oh], i. As is stated in Ethics vii., a habit is like nature, and yet it falls short of it.^^ And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty. Reply Ob], 2. Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, as was stated above. Reply Oh], 3. Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, in so far as the intellect has need in its operation of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. — ^Nevertheless, when it is said that virtue is more lasting than learning this must be understood, not of the subject or cause, but of the act; because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not. Second Article WHETHER A HABIT CAN DIMINISH? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. Therefore, although a habit can be lost, it cannot diminish. Obj. 2. Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become more or less intense by reason of itself, or else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals according to more and less. Now if it can become less intense through the participation of its subject, it would fol- low that some property befell the habit, which was not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as is stated in De Anima i.^^ Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. Ob], 3. Further, the very notion and nature of a habit, as of any acci- dent, is inherence in a subject; and therefore any accident is defined with reference to its subject. Therefore, if a habit does not become more or less cit., VII, 10 (1152a 31). '^Op, cit., I, 10 (iioob 14). Aristotle, De An., I, I (403a 10). O s3--art. 2 THE Corruption of habits 403 intense in itself, neither can it be diminished in its inherence in its subject; and consequently it will be in no way less intense. On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since, therefore, a habit can increase, evidently it can also diminish. I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained. And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them; for the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand, the engender- ing of a habit is a foundation of its increase. Reply Obj. i. A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject’s potentiality^ is indeterminate, through its being able t^ .participate in a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things. Reply Obj, i. This argument would hold if the essence itself of a habit were in no way subject to decrease. This we do not hold , but that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. Reply Obj, 3. No matter how we take an accident, its very notion im- plies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an acci- dent in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject; for whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. Accordingly, in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz., the genus; but we give it the second place, which is that of the differ- ence: thus, we say that snubness is a curvature of the nose. But if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident; for a white thing is something that has whiteness. Accord- ingly, in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that the snub is a curved nose. Accordingly, whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents. Hence to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addi- tion, as we have already explained.^^ 52 , a. I. 52, a. 2. 404 THE SUMMA -THEOLOGICA Q. 53. Art. 3 Third Article WHETHER A HABIT IS CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED THROUGH MERE CESSATION FROM ACT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than passion- like qualities, as we have explained above.^^ But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act; for whiteness is not lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. Obj 2. Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since, therefore, cessation from act* does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. Obj, 3. Further, the habits of science and virtue are in .the intellectual soul, which is above time. Now those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if one should fail for long to exercise them. On the contrary j The Philosopher says that not only deception, but also forgetfulness, is the corruption of science}'^ Moreover he says that want of communication has dissolved many a friendships In like manner, other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. I answer that. As stated in Physics viii., a thing is a cause of movement in two ways.^® First, directly, and such a thing causes movement by reason of its own form: thus, fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly: for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, namely, as we cease from exercising an act which removed the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been stated that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agent. Conse- quently, all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agents which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are dimin- ished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and pas- sions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the norm of virtue, by reason of* the in- 49> a-* 2, ad 3; q. 50, a. i. De Long et. Brev. Vitae, II (46sa 23). Aristotle, Eth., VIII, 5 (1157b 13). Aristotle, Phys,, VIII, 4 (254b 7). Q. S3. Art. 3 THE CORRUPTION OF HABITS 405 clination of the sensitive appetite and of other and external causes. There- fore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. — The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render a man ready to judge rightly of those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when a man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, a man becomes less fit to judge rightly, and sometimes is even wholly dis- posed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. Reply Obj. i. Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold, which is destructive of heat, were to increase. Reply Obj, 2. Cessation from act is a moving cause conducive to corrup- tion or diminution, by removing the obstacles thereto, as was explained above. Reply Obj, 3. The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time; but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in the course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says that time makes us forget.^^ “^ Phys . IV, 12 (221a 32) ; 13 (222b 16). Question LIV ON THE .DISTINCTION OF HABITS {In Four Articles) We have now to consider the distinction of habits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether many habits can be in one power? (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad? (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits? First Article WHETHER MANY HABITS CAN BE IN ONE POWER? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in the same respect, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are dis- tinguished in the same respect, viz., their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. Obj. 2. Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents, for the subject is the cause of its accidents, and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. Obj. 3. Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore many habits cannot be at the same time in one power. On the contrary j The intellect is one power, wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. / answer thatj As was stated above, habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature.^ As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject; for in one subject we may consider parts in various ways, and according to the various dispositions of these parts there are various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as parts of the human body, according to their disposition in human nature, we ^Q. 49, a. 4. Q. 54. Art. i THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS 407 have the habit or disposition of health; if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is strength or weakness; and if we take the members, f.e., the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these which befits nature is beauty. Thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject. If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers, thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as was stated above for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was shown above Now a passive power is com- pared to the determinate act of any species as matter to form. For, just as matter is determined to one form by one agent, so, too, a passive power is determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Therefore, just as several objects can move one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclin- ing that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently, several habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. Reply Ob'], i. Even as in natural things diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus according to matter, as is stated in Metaph. v.^ (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera), so, too, a generic diversity of objects entails a distinction of powers (and so the Philosopher says in Ethics vi. that those things that differ generically belong to different parts of the soul) while a specific difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently also of habits. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Therefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species; but it does not follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one species, so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers. Reply Ob'], 2, Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different acts. Conse- quently, there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power. Reply Ob'], 3. A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries; whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently, one and the same power cannot have several acts at the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one shape enters into another, as ^Q. 51, a. 2. ^Ibid. * Aristotle, Metaph,^ IV, 28 (1024b 9) ; cf. op. cit., IX, 3 (1054b 26). ^ Eth.j VI, I (1139a 8). 4o8 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 54. Art. 2 a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time actually, and yet it can know several things at the same time habitually. Second Article WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of science re- gards contraries. Thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct. Oh], 2. Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences. Thus, both the natural philoso- pher and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as is stated in Physics ii.^ Therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects. Obj. 3. Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends. Thus, to give money to anyone, if it be done for God’s sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects. On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as was stated above.'^ But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific dis- tinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically, or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Now forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something, and all things that imply order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Novf a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz., to nature, and to an operation consequent to nature. Accordingly, habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows. Reply Obj. i. In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must con- sider the object, not in its material aspect, but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction, yet they are both known under one ® Aristotle, Phys., II, 2 (193b 23). "Q. 18, a. Q. 54- Art. 3 THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS 409 aspect, since one is known through the other. And, consequently, in so far as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cog- nitive habit. Reply Obj. 2. The natural philosopher proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another. For the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g., by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g., by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is a syllogism producing science, as is stated in Posterior Analytics i.,^ depends on the means. And consequently various means are as so many active principles according to which the habits of science are distinguished. Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says, the end is, in practical matters, what a principle is in demonstrative matters.^ Consequently, a diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as a diversity of active principles does. — Moreover, the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said.^® Third Article WHETHER HABITS ARE DIVIDED IKTO GOOD AND BAD? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards con- traries, as was stated above. Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. Obj. 2. Further, good is convertible with being, so that, since it is com- mon to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares.^^ Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot dif- ferentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. Obj. 3. Further, there can be different evil habits about one and the same object: for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of concupiscence; and in like manner there can be several good habits: for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher clearly states.^^ Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad. On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are distinct specifically. Therefore habits are divided spe- cifically into good and bad habits. I -answer that, As was stated above, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their rela- ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 2 (71b 18). ^ Phys., II, 9 (200a 15); Eth.j VII, 8 (1151a 16). “Q. 18, a. 6; q. ig, a. 2, ad i; q. 34, a. 4. ^Top., IV, 6 (127a 26). Eth., VII, I (1145a 15). 410 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 54. Art. 4 tion to nature. Now this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good habit is spe- cifically distinct from a bad habit. For a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent’s nature, while a bad habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are opposed to human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad. Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature. Reply Oh), i. The same habit may be about contraries in so far as con- traries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen t-hat contrary habits are in one species, since contrariety of habits follows con- trariety of aspect. Accordingly, habits are divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad ; but not because one habit is about something good, and another about something bad. Reply Obj. 2 . It is not the good which is common to every being that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; it is rather some deter- minate good, by reason of a suitability to some determinate, viz., hu- man, nature. In like manner, the evil that tonstitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a deter- minate nature. Reply Obj. 3. Several good habits about one and the same specific thing are distinguished according to their suitability to various natures, as was stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distin- guished according to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with nature. Thus, various vices about one and the same matter are con- trary to one virtue. Fourth Article WHETHER ONE HABIT IS MADE UP OF MANY HABITS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little, out of several acts, as was stated above. Therefore one habit is made up of several. “Q. SI. a. 3- 411 Q. 54. Art. 4 THE DISTINCTION OP HABITS Ob], 2. Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit. Thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, tem- perance and the other virtuesA^ Therefore one habit is made up of several. Ob]. 3. Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one science, to geometry , for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many. On the^ contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many. / answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly con- cerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection is proportioned to that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is ^one, extends to many things in so far as they have something in common {i.e., some general objective aspect), so also a habit extends to many things in so far as they are related to one thing, for instance, to some spe- cific objective aspect, or to one nature, or to one principle, as was stated above. If, then, we consider a habit from the standpoint of the things to which it ptends, we shall find a certain multiplicity in it. But since this multiplicity is directed to something one, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed of several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to something one, whence it derives its unity. Reply Obj. i. That a habit is engendered little by little is due, not to one pari: being engendered after another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and with difficulty changeable disposi- tion; and also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities. Reply Obj. 2. The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue are not integral parts that combine to form a whole, but subjective or poten- tial parts, as we shall explain further onA^ Reply Obj. 3. In any science, he who acquires by demonstration a sci- entific knowledge of one conclusion has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains by demonstration the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him, but the habit which was in him previously is made more perfect, in so far as it extends to more things. For the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are mutually ordered, and one flows from another. ""De Invent., II, 54 (p. 149^). 57, a. 6, ad 4; II-II, q. 48. Question LV ON THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE {In Four Articles) We come now to a particular consideration of habits. And since habits, as we have said, are divided into good and bad,^ we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely, the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits;^ in the second place, of bad habits, namely, of vices and sins.^ Now five things must be consid- ered about virtues: (i) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject;^ (3) the^ division of the virtues;® (4) the cause of virtue;^ (5) certain properties of virtue.*^ Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an operative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) The definition of virtue. First Article WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A HABIT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that human virtue is not a habit. For virtue is the peak of power? But the peak of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the peak, as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says that virtue is good use of free choice? But use of free choice is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. Obj. 3. Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions, or otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says that virtue is the order of love?^ and that the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy j and using what we ought to use.'^^ Now order, or ordering, de- nominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. "Q. 54, a. 3. -Q. 68. ^Q. 71. ^Q. 56. ''Q. 57. «Q. 63. ^Q. 64. ® Aristotle, De Caelo, I, ii (281a 14; a 18).— Cf. St. Thomas, In De Caelo, I, lect. 25. ^De Lib. Arb., II, 19 (PL 32, 1268) ; Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 598). De Mor. Eccl, I, IS (PL 32, 1322). ^Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 30 (PL 40, 19). 412 Q. 55. Art. I'VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE 413 Ob '], 5. Further, just as there are human virtues, so there are natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues habits. On the contrary^ The Philosopher says that science and virtue are habits}-^ 1 answer thatj Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in relation to its end. But the end of power is act. Therefore power is said to be perfect according as it is de- termined to its act. Now there are some powers which of themselves are determined to their acts, for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one par- ticular action, but are inclined indifferently to many; but they are deter- mined to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above.^^ Therefore human virtues are habits. Reply Ob'], i. Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object or to its act. For instance, we give the name faith to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we say that virtue is the peak of power, virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the high- est point to which a power can reach is said to be its virtue: for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [i.e., his strength] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the peak of power. Reply Ob']. 2. Good use of free choice is said to be a virtue in the same sense as above, that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For an act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free choice. Reply Obj. 3. We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running ; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the power of locomotion; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. Reply Obj. 4. When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered; because in us love is set in order by virtue. Reply Obj. 5. Natural powers are of themselves determined to one act; not so the rational powers. Hence there is no comparison, as we have said, VIII (8b 29). ^Q. 49, a. 4. 414 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 55- Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS AN OPERATIVE HABIT? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul.^^ But health and beauty are not opera- tive habits. Therefore neither is virtue. Obj. 2. Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act^ but also in reference to being, as is clear from the Philosopher,^^ for some things have a virtue to be always, while others have a virtue to be, not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so human virtue is in rational beings. Therefore human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being. Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says that virtue is the disposition of that which is perfect to that which is best}^ Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves, to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that the virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good}^ I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the name, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above. Therefore, since potency is of two kinds, namely, potency in reference to being, and potency in reference to act, the perfection of both these potencies is called virtue. But po- tency in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas potency in reference to act [or power] is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act. Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other ani- mals; and the same is to be said of the powers which are common to the soul and body; and only those powers which are proper to the soul, namely, the^ rational powers, belong to man alone. Therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Therefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. Tusc. Disp,, IV, 13 (pp. 375-376). VII, 3 (246b 23). — Cf. ibid. (246a 13). Eth., n, 6 (iio6a 15). ^De Caelo, I, 12 (281a 28). ^^JPhys., ^'^De Mor. Eccl, II, 3 (PL 32, 1347). 415 Q. 5S. Art. 3 VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE Reply Obj. i. The mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: or sue as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the princi- pie ot some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator, m respect of virtue, some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, namely, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one anotter, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it IS a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being also a principle of operation. Rep^ Obj. 2. Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man. I^ply Obj. 3. As God’s substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God IS in respect of some operation. Therefore, as we have said above, happiness or beatitude, by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.^^ Third Article WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A GOOD HABIT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin, according to i Cor. xv. 56: The virtue [Eouay, strength^ of sin is the Law. Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. Obj. 2. Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not referred only to good, but also to evil, according to Isa. v. 22: Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness. Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil. Obj. 3. Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. xii. 9) : Virtue [Douay, Power] is made perfect in infirmity. But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but al§o to evil. On the contrary, Augustine says: No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good\^^ and the Philosopher says: Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.^'^ I answer that. As we have said above, virtue implies a perfection of power, and therefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the peak of its power Now the peak of any power must needs be good, for all evil im- plies defect. Hence Dionysius says that every evil is a weakness.^^ And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. ^^ 0 - 3 j a. 2. ^ De Mor. EccL, I, 6 (PL 32, 1314). ^ Eth., 11 , 6 (iio6a 15). ^Aristotle, De Caelo, I, ii (281a 14; a 18). ^ De Div. Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 732). 4 i 6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. ss- Art. 4 Therefore human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, pro- ductive of good works. Reply Obj, i. Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good; for we speak of a perfect thief or robber, and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains.^^ In this way, there- fore, virtue is applied to evil things. And thus it is that the -virtue of sin is said to be the law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility. Reply Obj. 2. The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or in defection from it. But the perfection of that power, since it is accom- panied by a defection from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. Reply Obj. 3. Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect accord- ing as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And that is why human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be made perfect in infirmity, not indeed in an infirmity of the reason, but of the body and of the lower powers. Fourth Article WHETHER VIRTUE IS SIHTABLY DEFINED? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the definition usually given of virtue (namely. Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously , of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us^^) is not suitable. For virtue is man’s goodness, since it is virtue that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is white- ness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a good quality. Obj. 2. Further, no difference is more common than its genus, since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore good should not be put in the defini- tion of virtue, as a difference of quality. Obj. 3. Further, as Augustine says: When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something pertaining to the mind.^^ But there are virtues even of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher says.^^ Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality of the mind. Obj. 4. Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore ^Metaph., IV, 16 (1021b 17). ^Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent.j 11 , xxvii, 5 (I, 446). ^De Tnn., XII, 8 (PL 42, 1005). ^ Eth., Ill, 10 (1117b 23). Q. ss. Art. 4 VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE 417 unsuitable to put righteous in the definition of virtue, when it is said that virtue is that by which we live righteously. Oh]. 5. Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay themP^ It is untrue, therefore, that no one can make bad use of virtue. Obj. 6 . Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine, commenting on Jo. xiv. 12 {He shall do greater things than these) says; He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee.^^ It is therefore unsuit- able to say that God works virtue in us without us. On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine, from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii.®^ 1 answer that. This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect nature of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as a good quality; for quality is the genus of virtue, and the difference, good. To be sure, the definition would be more suitable if for quality we substitute habit, which is the proximate genus. Now virtue has no matter out of which it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has the matter about which it is concerned, and the matter in which it exists, namely, the subject. The matter about which vir- tue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for the material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when it is said that virtue is a good quality of the mind. The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation itself. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as are vicious habits. Others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil. For instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue. But virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. Hence the distinc- tion of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil is ex- pressed in the words by which we live righteously \ and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed to good, and sometimes to evil, is expressed in the words, of which no one makes bad use. Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this defini- tion applies; and this is expressed in the words which God works in us without us. If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused. Reply Obj. I . That which first falls in the intellect is being, and there- ^Epist. CCXI (PL 33, g 6 o). ^ Serm. CLXIX, ii (PL 38, 923) ; Tract. LXXII, super Ioann., XIV, 12 (PL 35, 1823). ^ De Lib. Arh., II, 19 (PL 32, 1268). 4iS THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. ss- A rt. 4 fore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. Hence we say that essence is being and one and good; and that oneness is being, ‘andi one and good; and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health, for everything that we apprehend is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, ob- serve that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them, so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but be- cause by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good. Reply Obj. 2. The good which is put in the definition of virtue is not the good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dio- nysius says that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason?^ Reply Obj. 3. Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason.^^ Therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. Reply Obj. 4. Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and which are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on.^^ But the righteous- ness which denotes order to a due end and to the divine law, which is the rule of the human^.will, as was stated above,^^ is common to all virtues. Reply Obj. 5. One can make bad use of a virtue considered as an object, for instance, by having evil thoughts about it, e.g., by hating it, or by being proud of it; but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. Reply Obj. 6. Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, udhich God works in us without us. As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. Div. Nom., IV, 32 (PG 3, 733). Aristotle, Eth., X, 13 (1102b 13; 1103 a 3). ""Q- 60, a. 2 ; II-II, q. 58, a. 8. 19, a. 4. Question LVI ON THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE {In Six Articles) We have now to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether virtue is in a power of the soul as in a sub- ject? (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? (3) Whether the intellect can be a subject of virtue? (4) Whether the irascible and con- cupiscible powers can be a subject of virtue? (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be a subject of virtue? (6) Whether the will can be a subject of virtue? First Article WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN A POWER OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says that virtue is that by which we live right- eously} But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not in a power, but in the essence of the sotil. Obj, 2. Further, the Philosopher says that virtue is that which makes its possessor goodj and his work good likewise} But as a work is established by a power, so he that has a virtue is established by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the es- sence of the soul. Obj, 3. Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above,^ and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. On the contrary, Virtue is the peak of power} But the peak is in that of which it is the peak. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul. / answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the very nature of virtue, which implies the perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. — Sec- ondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above.® Now all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. — De Lib, Arb,, 11 , ig (PL 32, 1268). ^ Eth,, II, 6 (iio6a 15). ®Q. 55, a. 4- * Aristotle, De Caelo, I, ii (281a 14; a 18). — Cf. St. Thomas, In De Caelo, I, lect. 25. ' ®Q. 55, a. 2. 419 420 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 56. Art. 2 Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best; and the best is the end, which is either a being’s operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the being’s power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. Reply Obj.j, To live may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very being of the living thing, and thus it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of being in the living thing. But sometimes to live is taken for the operation of the living thing, and in this sense we live righteously by virtue inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions. Reply Ob]. 2. Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. Therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and conse- quently, to the power. Reply Obj. 3. One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another, but because one accident inheres in a substance by means of another, as color in a body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. Second Article WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE IN SEVERAL POWERS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue can be in two powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various ways from several powers. Thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the power of locomotion as executing. There- fore also one habit can be in several powers. Obj, 2. Further, the Philosopher says that three things are required for virtue, namely: to know, to will, and to work steadfastly.^ But to know be- longs to the intellect, and to will belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers. Obj, 3. Further, prudence is in the reason, since it is the right reason of things to be done? And it is also in the will, for it cannot exist together with a perverse will.^ Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul. / answer that. It happens in two ways that one thing is in two subjects. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it is impossible Eth., II, 4 (1105a 31). Op. cit., VI, 5 (1140b 4; b 20); 13 (1144b 27). Op. cit., VE, 12 (1144a 36). Q. 56. Art. 3 THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE 421 for one virtue to be in two powers, since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows their specific conditions; and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits, but not vice versa. In another way, one thing can be in two or mote subjects, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another. Reply Obj. i. One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only in different ways, and in various degrees. Reply Obj. 2. To know is a condition required for moral virtue, inas- much as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite. Reply Obj. 2, • Prudence is really in the reason as in its subject; but it pre- supposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further on.9 Third Article WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the intellect is not a subject of virtue. For Augustine says that all virtue is love.^® But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. Obj. 2. Further, virtue is related to good, as is clear from what has been said above.^^ Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the ap- petitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power. Obj. 3. Further, virtue is that which makes its possessor good, as the Philosopher says.^^ But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make its possessor good, since a man is not said to be a good man because of his science or his art. Therefore the intellect is not a subject of virtue. On the contrary^ It is the intellect which is most especially called mind. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the above given defi- nition of virtue.^^ Therefore the intellect is a subject of yirtue. 1 answer that. As we have said above, virtue is a habit by which we work well.^^ Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness for a good act. For instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But gram- ®A. 3; q. 57, a. 4. Be Mor. Eccl., I, 15 (PL 32, 1322). 55, a. 3. ^Eth., II, 6 (iio6a 15). 55 , a. 4- ""Q- 55 , a. 3. 422 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 56. Art. 3 mar does not make a man always to speak correctly, for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or a solecism; and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness. For instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. And since a thing is not said absolutely to be good or a being in so far as it is potentially, but in so far as it is actually, therefore it is from having habits of the latter sort that man is said absolutely to do good, and to be good ; for instance,- because he is just, or temperate. And the same is true as re- gards other such virtues. And since virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise, these latter habits are called virtues absolutely, because they make the work to be actually good, and the sub- ject good absolutely. But habits of the first kind are not called virtues ab- solutely, because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good absolutely. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not absolutely but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian, or a good smith. And for this reason, science and art are often distinguished from virtue, while at other times they are called virtues. Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the specu- lative, without any reference to the will. For thus the Philosopher holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual vir- tues.^® But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue absolutely can be only the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason for this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other pow- ers that are in some way rational, as we have said above.^'’^ Therefore, if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore, the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself, or in some power as moved by the will. Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers; for a man considers something actually because he wills to do so. Hence the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of faith; for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for no man believeth, unless he wilL^^ But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is, in regard to their ends; and to these Aristotle, Eth., VI, 3 (1139b 16); 2 (1139b 13). ^^Op. cit., VI, 3 (1139b 16). 9, a. i; q. 17, a. i and s; I, q. 82, a. 4. “St. Augustine, Tract. XXVI, super Ioann., VI, 44 (PL 35, 1607). Q. 56. Art. 4 THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE 423 man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the agent intellect. Therefore, just as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in relation to the agent intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in relation to a right will. Reply Ob], i. The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue ab- solutely so called; not that every such virtue is love absolutely, but that it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above.^^ Reply Oh], 2. The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue. Reply Ob'], 3. This objection considers virtue absolutely so called. Fourth Article WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CON CUP IS CIBLE POWERS ARE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be a subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and brute animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the First Part.^° Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body, for the Apostle says {Rom, vii. 18) ; I know that good does not dwell in my flesh. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be a subject of virtue. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine proves that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul; and so it is entirely due to his soul that a man makes good use of his body: For in- stance^ if my coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving, this is all due to me?^ But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore, that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled is entirely due to the rational part. Now virtue is that by which we live rightly, as we have said above.^^ Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible pow- ers, but only in the rational part. “ Q. 25, a. I, 2 and 3 ; q. 27, a. 4; I, q. 20, a. i. Eccl., I, 5 (PL 32, 1314). “Q 55, a. 4. ^ 5 . T., I, q. 81, a. 2. ^JDe Mqt, 424 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 56. Art. 4 Obj. 4. Further, the principal act of moral virtue is choice?^ Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the reason, as we have said above Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and con- cupiscible powers, but in the reason. On the contrary j Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and tem- perance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher says that these virtues belong to the irrational parts of the soul?^ I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite; and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, because it belongs to their nature to obey the reason. And thus the irascible or the concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue; for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupis- cible powers. Because an act which proceeds from one power, according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect unless both powers be well disposed to the act; for instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore, in the case of the objects of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by reason, there must needs be, not only in the reason, but also in the irascible and concupis- cible powers, some habit aiding for the work of acting well. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved depends on its conformity with the power that moves it, therefore, the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. Reply Obj. i. The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and brute animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can be a subject of human virtue. Reply Obj. 2. Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as, being moved by reason, we yield our members to serve justice {Rom. vi. 19), so, also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the Tomes’; whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in them. Reply Obj. 3. The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and con- cupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body obeys Aristotle, Eih., VIII, 13 (1163a 22). ='Q. 13, a. 2. Eth., Ill, 10 (1117b 23). Q. s6. Art. s THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE 425 the soul instantly, without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul. Hence the Philosopher says that the soul rules the body with a despotic rule^^ as the master rules his slave; and that is why the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason instantly. On the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason; and hence the Philosopher says that the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political rule,^’^ such as that by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also there must be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers may be well disposed for operation. Reply Obj, 4. In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, which belongs to moral virtue, and the preferential selection of the means to the end, which belongs to prudence.^® But that the election has a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul is due to the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible powers. Hence, the moral virtues concerned with the passions are in the irascible and con- cupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason. Fifth Article WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS OF APPREHENSION ARE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the in- terior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite can be a subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason, for the powers of imagination, of cogitation and of memory act at the command of reason. Therefore there can be virtue in these powers. Ob], 2. Further, just as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act by the sensitive appetite, so also can the in- tellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. Just as, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension. Ob], 3. Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero says that memory is a part.^® Therefore in the power of memory also there can be a virtue; and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension. On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral.^^ Now all the I, 2 (i2S4b 4). ^ Ibid. (1254b 5). Aristotle, Eth.j VI, 12 (1144a 6). Invent., II, 53 (p. 147**). ^Aristotle, Etk., II, i (1103a 14). 426 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q 56. Art. 6 moral virtues are in the appetite, while the intellectual virtues are in the in- tellect or reason, as is clear from Ethics vi.^^ Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the Philosopher says, that in remembering one thing after another, we become accustomed to it; and custom is a sort of nature?^ Now a habit from custom is nothing else than a habit acquired by custom, which is like a nature. Therefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that it is a habit after the manner of a nature, in accord with reason?^ Yet, in man, that which he acquires by custom, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellectual parts of the soul, as we have said above.^^ Nevertheless, even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be called virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done; and so virtue must needs be in that power which completes a good act. But the knowledge of truth is not completed in the sensitive powers of apprehension, for such powers prepare the way to intellectual knowledge. Therefore in such powers there are none of the virtues by which we know truth; these are rather in the intellect or reason. Reply Oh], i. The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is a rational appetite, as being moved by it. Hence the work of the appetitive power is completed in the sensitive appetite, and for this reason the sensitive appetite is a subject of virtue. But the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather as moving it, for the phantasms are related to the intellectual soul as colors to sight.^^ Hence the work of knowledge is terminated in the intellect, and for this reason the cognitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason. And thus is made clear the Reply to the second objection. Reply Ob]. 3. Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called. The point is rather that one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is related to prudence after the manner of an integral part. Sixth Article WHETHER THE WILL CAN BE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not a subject of virtue. Be- cause no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, according to the Philoso- “o^'. cit., VI, 1 (1138b 35). ^De Memor., II (4S2a 27). “Q. so, a. 4. ad 3. Aristotle, De An., HI, 7 (431a 14). De Invent., ibid. Q. s6. Art. 6 THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE 427 pher, it is of the very essence of the will to tend to that which is good ac- cording to reason.^® And to this good every virtue is ordered, since every- thing naturally desires its own good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rheto- ric, is a habit after the manner of a nature, in accord with reasonP There- fore the will is not a subject of virtue. Ob), 2. Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral.^® But in- tellectual virtue is in the intellect and reason as in its subject, and not in the will; while moral virtue finds its subject in the irascible and concupisci- ble powers, which are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is in the will as in its subject. Ob). 3. Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are vol- untary. If, therefore, there is a virtue in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be a subject of virtue. On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers. I answer that. Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does, the power need a habit perfecting it for doing well (this habit is a virtue) when the power’s own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose. Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above, the object of the will is the good of reason proportioned to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it.^^ But if man’s will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species^uch as the divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the in- dividual, such as the good of one’s neighbor, then it is that the will needs virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man’s affections to God or to his neighbor, as charity, justice and the like, have the will as their subject. Reply Ob), i. This objection is true of that virtue which is ordained to the good belonging to the one willing, e.g., temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said.^® Reply Ob). 2. Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are ra- tional by participation, but the appetitive power altogether, i.e., in its en- tirety Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore ^^Op. dt., Ill, 9 (432b s). De Invent., II, 53 (p. 147*"). Aristotle, Eth., I, 13 (1103a 4) ; II, I (1103a 14). 19, a. 3. 25, a. 6, ad 3; h Q- 21, a. i, ad I ; q. 59, a. 4, ad 3. Aristotle, Eth., I, 13 (1102b 30). 428 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 56. Art. 6 whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be a theologi- cal one, as we shall see later on.^^ Reply Obj. 3. Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man, and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of those virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. ^Q. 62, a. 3. Question LVII ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES {In Six Articles) We now have to consider the distinction of the virtues, which are (i) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues;^ (3) the theological virtues." Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry; (i) Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? (2) Whether they are three, naniely, wisdom, science and under standing^ (3) Whether the intellectual habit art is a virtue? (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art? (S) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? (6) Whether eubulia, synesis and gnome are virtues annexed to prudence? First Article WHETHER THE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT ARE VIRTUES ? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above.^ But speculative habits are not operative, for what is speculative is distinguished from the practical, i.e.j the operative. Therefore the habits of the specu- lative intellect are not virtues. Obj, 2. Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed; for happiness is the reward of virtue A Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods by which man acc^uires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such habits cannot be called virtues. ^ 05 ;. 3. Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinguished from one another as genera which are not related subalter- nately, as the Philosopher proves in Topics iv.^ Therefore speculative habits are not virtues. On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher places cer- tain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are.^ Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues. ^Q- 58. ^Q. 62. 55, a. 2. ^Aristotle, Eth., I, 9 (1099b 16). ^Top., IV, 2 (i2ib 34). VI, I (1139a 7). 429 430 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 57. Art. i I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as was stated above,'' a habit, as we have already observed,® may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness for doing good; secondly, be- cause, besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above was stated,^ belongs to those habits alone which affect the ap- petitive part of the soul, since it is the soul’s appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses. Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the ap- petitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part, they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz., the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect) ; yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess the habit of a speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge. That he make use of the knowledge which he has, however, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently, a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these specu- lative habits. And in this way, too, there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity. Thus, Gregory says that the con- templative life has greater merit than the active life}^ Reply Obj, i. Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly, the practical or operative, which is distinguished from the speculative, is concerned with exterior work, to which a speculative habit is not ordained. But it is ordained to the interior work of the intellect, which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit. Reply Ob]. 2. Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place, a virtue is about its objects. In this sense, these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy, except, perhaps, in so far as the word whereby indicates the efficient cause or the object of complete happiness, i.e., God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. — Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts, and in this sense the intel- lectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy, both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as was stated above, and also because they are a kind of beginning of perfect beatitude, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated.^^ Reply Obj. 3. Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, according to which virtue belongs to the appetitive power. "Q. 5S, a. 3. ^Q. 56, a. 3. Ubid. Moral, VI, 37 (PL 75, 764). ^Q. 3, a. 7. Q. 57. Art. 2 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES Second Article WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY THREE HABITS OF THE SPECULA- TIVE INTELLECT, VIZ., WISDOM, SCIENCE AND UNDER- STANDING? We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection^ i. It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz., wisdom, science and understanding. For a species should not be -co-divided with its genus. But wisdom is a science, as is stated in Ethics vi.^*^ Therefore wisdom should not be co-divided with science among the intellectual virtues. Obj. 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly tjie formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained. Therefore habits are diversified, not according to their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the cause of having a science of conclusions. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the science of conclusions. ^ Obj. 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essen- tially rational part of the soul. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectical syllogism in its reasoning, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore, just as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is considered to be an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, science and understanding?-'^ I answer that, As has already been stated, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the considera- tion of truth; for this is its good work. Now truth is subject to a twofold consideration, namely, as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself is as a principle, and is at once understood by the intellect; and that is why the habit that perfects the intellect for the con- sideration of such truth is called understanding, which is the habit of principles. On the other hand, a truth which is known through another is under- stood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason’s inquiry, and is as a term. This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since things that are later knowable in relation to us are knowable first and chiefly in their nature, hence it is that that which is last with respect to all human knowledge is that which is know- Aristotle, Eth., VI, 7 (1141a 19). 54, a. 2, ad i; I, q. 77, a. 3. Eth., VI, 7 (1141a 19); 3 (1139b 16). Aristotle, I, i (184a 18). 432 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 57. Art. 2 able first and chiefly in its nature. And about these truths is wisdom , which considers the highest causes, as is stated in Metaph, i.^^ Therefore it rightly judges and orders all truths, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment except by resolution to first causes. — But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable truths, it is science that perfects the intellect. Therefore, according to the diverse genera of knowable truths, there are diverse habits of the sciences; whereas there is but one wisdom. Reply Obj. i. Wisdom is a science, in so far as it has that which is com- mon to all the sciences: viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inas- much as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. Reply Ob'], 2. When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one and the same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in relation to the formal aspect and the material object. Thus, it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of demonstration can be considered by themselves, without the conclusion being considered at all. They can also be considered together with the conclusions, in so far as the principles are ex- tended to lead to the conclusions. Accordingly, to consider principles in this second way belongs to science^ which considers the conclusions also; while to consider principles in themselves belongs to understanding. Consequently, if we consider the point rightly, these three virtues are not distinguished as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another: e,g.j the rational soul is more perfect than the sensi- tive soul, and the sensitive, than the vegetative soul. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree. So, too, both of these depend on wisdom as obtaining the highest place; for it con- tains beneath itself both understanding and science, as judging both of the conclusions of sciences and of the principles on which they are based. Reply Ob], 3. As was stated above, a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is in no way referable to evil.^'^ Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Therefore those habits alone are called in- tellectual virtues, whereby we express the truth and never a falsehood. But opinion and surmise can be about both truth and falsehood; and so, as is stated in Ethics vi.,^® they are not intellectual virtues. ""Aristotle, Metaph., I, i (981b 28) ; 2 (982b 9). "^Q. 55, a. 3 and 4. Aris- totle, Eth.j VI, 3 (1139b 17). 433 Q. 57- Art. 3 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES Third Article WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL HABIT ART IS A VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says that no one makes bad use of virtue. But one may make bad use of art, for a craftsman can work badly according to the science of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue. Obj. 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But there is a virtue of art, according to the Philosopher,^® Therefore art is not a virtue. Obj, 3. Further, the^liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that art is a virtueA^ However, he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul. I answer that. Art is nothing else but the right reason about certain works to be made. And yet the good of these things depends, not on the disposition of man’s appetite, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman as such is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits, since the disposition of the things considered by them is a matter of concern to the speculative habits also, although they are not concerned with the disposition of the appetite towards their objects. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetite is disposed, whether he be joyful or angry; even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, namely, as neither art nor a speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is distinctive of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the ability to work well. Reply Obj. i. When anyone endowed with an art produces bad work- manship, this is not the work of that art ; in fact, it is contrary to the art. In the same way, when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with what he knows, but contrary thereto. Therefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as was stated above, so it is with art; and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well ; for which purpose something further is requisite, even though there cannot be a good use without the art. Lib. Arb., II, i8; 19 (PL 32, 1267; 1268). 22). ^Op. cit., VI, 3 (ii39h 16) ; 7 (1141a 19). ^Aristotle, Eth., VI, 5 (1140b 434 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 57 . Art. 4 Reply Obj. 2. In order that a man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this rea- son the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue.. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. Reply Obj. 3. Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g.j the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such works of the speculative reason are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but liberal arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are or- dained to works done by the body; for these arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the bod3^ is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as re- gards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such work are called sciences absolutely, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them. Fourth Article WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A DISTINCT VIRTUE FROM ART? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art, since there are various arts about works widely different. Since, therefore, prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned an art. Obj. 2. Further, prudence has more in common with art than the specu- lative habits have, for they are both about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are.^^ Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art. Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to prudence to be of good counsel. But coimselling takes place in certain arts also, as is stated in Ethics iii.,^^ e.g., in the arts of warfare, of seamanship and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art. On the contrary j The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art.^^ I answer that^ Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring ability for a good work; while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring ability for a good work, but also through conferring the use.^^ But art confers the mere ability for good ^Aristotle, Eth., VI, 6 (1140b 35). ^Op. cit., Yl, 5 (1140a 25). -^Op. cit., Ill, 3 (1112b 3). ^ Op . cit.f VI, 3 (1139b 16); 5 (1140b 2; b 21). ®®A. i; q* 56; a. 3. Q. 57. Art. 4 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES 435 work, since it does not regard the appetite, whereas prudence confers not only ability for a good work, but also the use, for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude of the appetite. The reason for this difference is that art is the right reason of things to he madey whereas ^prudence is the right reason of things to be done. Now making and doing differ, as is stated in Metaph. ix.,-'' in that making is an action passing into external matter, e,g,, to build y to saWj and so forth; whereas doing is an action abiding in the agent, e.g.y to see, to willy and the like. Accordingly, prudence stands in the same relation to such human ac- tions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to external makings ; since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said' above that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts ends are what principles are in speculative matters, as is stated in Ethics vii.^^ Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to ends; and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Therefore, for prudence there is need of moral virtue, which rec- tifies the appetite. On the other hand, the good of things made by art is not the good of man’s appetite, but the good of the artificial things themselves, and hence art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The conse- quence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. — ^Accordingly, it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. Reply Obj. i . The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man, and therefore there is no diversification in the nature of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves, and hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as was stated above. Reply Obj, 2 . Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter; for they are both in the part of the soul that does not deal with necessary truths, as well as about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits than with prudence, as is clear from what has been said. Reply Obj, 3. Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life, and the last end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counsellors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not prudent absolutely; for only “^Aristotle, Metaph., VIII, 8 (1050a 30). Aristotle, Eth., VII, 8 (iisia 16). 436 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 57. Art. 5 those are prudent absolutely who give good counsel about what concerns man’s entire life. Fifth Article WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A VIRTUE NECESSARY TO MAN? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary for a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right rea- son, so prudence is to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man’s life; for prudence is the right reason about these things, as is stated in Ethics vi.^^ Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore, is prudence necessary to man for a good life, after he has be- come virtuous, but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous. Obj. 2. Further, It is by prudence that we are oj good counsel, as is stated in Ethics vi.^® But man can act not only from his own good counsel, but also from another’s. Therefore a man does not need prudence for a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men. Obj. 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always ex- presses the truth, and never what is false. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence, for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done, since human actions are about things that may be other- wise than they are. Hence it is written {Wis. ix. 14) : The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue. On the contrary. It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (IFw. viii. 7) of divine Wisdom: She teacheth tem- perance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life. 1 answer that. Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it ; in other words, it mat- ters that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. Now since choice is about means to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things, namely, the due end, and that which is suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. But to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about means ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Conse- quently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason Op. cit., VI, 5 (1140b 3). ^Ibid., (1140a 25) ; 7 (1141b 9). Q. 57. Art. 5 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES 437 and make it suitably affected towards means ordained to the end ; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary for a good life. Reply Oh], i. The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made. For, since making passes into external matter, it is not a perfection of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved. Now art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the agent himself, whose perfection consists in ac- tion itself; for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as was stated above. Consequently, art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well) , if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. There- fore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and an enduring one; whereas prudence is nec- essary to man that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be- come a good man. Reply Ob], 2. When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his operation is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Therefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well absolutely; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life. Reply Ob], 3. As is stated in Ethics vi.,^^ truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. For the truth of the speculative intellect depends on the conformity of the intellect to the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about neces- sary things. — On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in neces- sary matters, which are not effected by the human will, but only in con- tingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz., art, as regards things to be made, and prtidence, as regards things to be done. Aristotle, Eth., VI, 2 (1139a 26). 438 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 57. Art. 6 Sixth Article WHETHER EUBULIA, SYNESIS AND GNOME ARE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO PRUDENCE? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that eu^ouXta, cruvec-K; and are unfit- tingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For eu^ouXta {euhulia] is a habit whereby we take good counsel?^ Now it belongs to prudence to take good counsel, as is stated in the same place.^^ Therefore su^ouXta is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the higher to judge of the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now auvscyt^; [synesis] enables us to judge well. Therefore (juvsct*; is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue. Obj. 3. Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so there are different points on which one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides auveuti;, of the virtue of YVcI)[jLTQ \gnome\. Obj. 4. Further, Cicero mentions three other parts of prudence; viz., memory of the past, understanding of the present and foresight of the future. Moreover, Macrobius mentions yet others: viz., caution, docility and the like.^^"* Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence. On the contrary stands the authority of the Philosopher, who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.^® / answer that, Wherever several powers are ordered in relation to one another, that power is the highest which is ordered to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything to be done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to the acts of the speculative intellect which are in- quiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry; but the third is proper to the practical intellect in so far as the practical intellect is ordained to operation, for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which excels in commanding, viz., prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues anexed to it, viz., eu^ouXta, which perfects counsel; and (Tuveuc^; and which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on. Reply Obj. i. Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its ^Op. cit., VI, 9 (1142b 16). ^op. at., VI, 5 (1140a 25) ; 7 (1141b 9). ^De Invent., II, 53 (pp. ^ In Somn. Scipion., I, 8 (p. 518). ^ Eth., VI, II (1143a 25). Q. 57. Art. 6 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES 439 immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz., Reply Ob}. 2. Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further; for it may happen in some matter of action that a man’s judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The whole process does not attain its perfection until reason commands with rightness on what ought to be done. Reply Obj, 3. The judgment of anything should be based on that thing’s proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles, be- cause, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, for the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, whereas there are two virtues for good judgment, because distinction is based not on common but on proper principles. Con- sequently, in speculative matters, likewise, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. — Suvedtt; and YV(ot/.Y] are distinguished according to the different rules on which judg- ment is based; for cuvedcq judges of actions according to the common law, while Yv a. 3 and 4. Cf. above, q. 55, a. 4, obj. 1. a. 4. ^A. 1; q. SI, a. i. ’Q. 109, 49, a. 3. Q. 63. Art. 3 THE CAUSES OF THE VIRTUES 485 infused in us by God. For God does not do by Himself ^ save perhaps some- times miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; be- cause, as Dionysius says, it is God^s rule to bring about extremes through the meanP Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as was stated above. Therefore it is not fitting that they should be caused in us by infusion. Ob], 2. Further, much less superfluity is found in God’s works than in the works of nature. But the theological virtues suffice to direct us to the supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues re- quiring to be caused in us by God. Obj, 3. Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices. Much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, ac- cording to the Gloss on Heb, i. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion. On the contrary^ It is written {Wis. viii. 7) : She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude. I answer that, Effects must needs be proportioned to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as was stated above.^^ In the place of these natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, by which we are directed to a supernatural end, as was stated above.^^ Therefore we need to receive from God other habits annexed proportionately to the theological virtues, which are to the theo- logical virtues what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of the virtues. Reply Obj. i. Some moral and intellectual virtues can be caused in us by our actions, but they are not proportioned to the theological virtues. There- fore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportioned to those virtues. Reply Obj. 2. The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our super- natural end in an inchoate way, that is, in so far as it is to God Himself im- mediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. Reply Obj. 3. The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capability of nature. Consequently man needs in addi- tion to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end. ^De Gael. Hier., IV, 3 (PG 3, iSi)* ^Glossa ordin. (VI, 79E), ^A. i; q. 51, a. I. 62, a. i. 486 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 63. Art. 4 Fourth Article WHETHER VIRTUE ACQUIRED BY HABITUATION FROM OUR ACTS BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS INFUSED VIRTUE? Wh proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the infused virtues do not differ in species from the acquired virtues. For acquired and infused virtues, accord- ing to what has been said, do not seem to differ save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last end, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtues do not differ specifically from the acquired virtues. Obj. 2. Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz., to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. Obj, 3. Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, and that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one pro- duced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species. On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, which God works in us without us, as was stated above.^^ Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. / answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as was stated above, is taken from the special and formal aspects of their objects.-^ Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue’s proper matter. Thus, the object of temperance is a good in relation to the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason, which fixes the mean in these concupiscences ; while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed, in such concupiscences, according to the rule of human reason is of a different nature than the mean which is fixed according to the divine rule. For in- stance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason; whereas, according to the divine rule, it behooves man to chastise his body, and bring it into subjection (1 Cor, ix. 27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues. The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to A. 2 ; q. 55, a. 4. ^ Q. 54, a. 2 ; q. 56, a. 2 ; q. 60, a. i. Q. 63. Art. 4 THE CAUSES OF THE VIRTUES 487 which they are directed. For the health of a man and a horse is not of the same species, because of the diverse natures to which the health of the man and the health of the horse are directed. In the same sense, *the Philosopher says that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government.^^ In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, by which men behave well in relation to their being jellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God {Ephes. ii. 19), differ from the acquired virtues by which man behaves well in relation to human affairs. Reply Obj, i. Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as has been said. Reply Obj. 2. Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as was stated, and there- fore their respective acts are not identical. Reply Obj, 3. God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally, and consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as has been said. Polit., Ill, 2 (1276b 31). Question LXIV ON THE MEAN OF VIRTUE {In Four Articles) We must now consider the properties of virtues. We must consider (i) the mean of virtue; (2) the connection among the virtues;^ (3) the equality of the virtues;^ (4) the duration of the virtues.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the moral virtues consist in a mean? (2) VTiether the mean of moral virtue is a real mean or a mean of reason? (3) Whether the intellectual virtues consist in a mean? (4) Whether the theological virtues do? First Article WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that moral virtue does not consist in a mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Caelo i. that virtue is the peak of power A Therefore moral virtue does not consist in a mean. Obj. 2. Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditures, as is stated in Ethics ivA There- fore not every moral virtue consists in a mean. Obj. 3. Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to consist in a mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but on the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are per- fected by tending to something extreme. Thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity. In the same way, to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should consist in a mean. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in the meanF 1 answer that, As has already been explained, die nature of virtue is ^Q. 65. ^Q. 66. ®Q, 67. ^Aristotle, De Caelo, I, ii (281a ii; a 18). — Cf. St. Thomas, In De Caelo, I, lect. 25. ® Aristotle, Eth,, IV, 2 (1122a 18) : 3 (ii2^a 34). *0^, cit., II, 6 (iio6b 36). 488 Q. 64. Art. i THE MEAN OF VIRTUE 489 that it should direct man to good.*^ Now moral virtue is properly a perfec- tion of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter; and the measure and rule of the appetitive movement in relation to ap- petible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule; and, thus, the good of things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as we may clearly observe in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue consists in a mean. Reply Obj. i. Moral virtue derives its goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If, therefore, we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz., conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz., deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it has the nature of a mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philoso- pher says that virtue, as to its essence, is a mean, in so far as the rule of vir- tue is imposed on its proper matter; but it is an extreme in reference to the ‘‘besf^ and ^Hhe excellent,’’ viz., as to its conformity with reason.^ Reply Obj. 2. In actions and passions, the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances. Hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue according to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean according to other circumstances, through its con- formity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum ; but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean, since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e., where it is right, when it is right, and for an end that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum when it is not right, or where it is not right, or for an undue end\ and there will be de- ficiency if one fails to tend thereto where one ought, and when one ought. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher that the magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action P Reply Obj. 3. The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of mag- rianimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e., according to God's 55, a. 3. II, 6 (1107a 7). Op. cit., IV, 3 (1123b 13). 490 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 64. Art. 2 commandment, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, Le., out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency; as for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty. Second Article WHETHER THE MEAN OF MORAL VIRTUE IS A REAL MEAN, OR A MEAN OF REASON? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason, but a real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in a mean. Now good, as is stated in Metaph. vi, is in things themselves.^*^ There fore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean. Obj. 2. Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations and passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason, but a real mean. Obj. 3. Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as is stated in Ethics v.^^ Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason, but a real mean. On the contrary. The Philosopher says that moral virtue observes the mean in relation to us, that is set by reasonP I answer that, The mean of reason can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is found in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were reduced to a mean. In this sense, since moral virtue perfects, not the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason. Secondly, the mean of rea- son may be considered as that which the reason establishes in some par- ticular matter. In this sense, every mean of moral virtue is a mean of rea- son; for, as was stated above, moral virtue is said to consist in a mean through conformity with right reason. But it happens sometimes that the mean of reason is also a real mean, and in that case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean (for instance, in justice). On the other hand, sometimes the mean of reason is not the real mean, but is established in relation to us. Such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established absolutely and in itself, as was stated above.^^ Hence the mean of reason in justice is ^“Aristotle, Metaph,, VI, 4 (1027b 26). ^Aristotle, Eth,, V, 4 (1132a 2); 3 (1131b 13) ; II, 6 (iio6a 28). ^ Op. cit., II, 6 (iio6b 36). 60, a. 2. Q. 64. Art. 3 THE MEAN OF VIRTUE 491 the same as the real meaiij in so far, namely, as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions, wherein the right cannot be established in the same way, since men vary in their relations to their passions. Hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions with reference to us, who are influ- enced through the passions. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argu- ments take the mean of reason as being in the very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice. Third Article WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean. For the moral virtues observe the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in the reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean. Obj, 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue; for it is stated in Ethics ii. that virtue consists in a mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it}"^ If, therefore, intellectual virtues also consist in a mean, this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an infinite series among the virtues. Obj, 3. Further, a mean, properly speaking, is between contraries, as the Philosopher explains.^^ But there seems to be no contrariety in the intel- lect, since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in op- position to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues. On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue,^® and yet there is a mean in art.^'^ Therefore, intellectual virtue likewise consists in a mean. / answer that, The good of anything consists in a mean, according to which it is conformed to a rule or measure which it is possible to overstep or to fail to reach, as was stated above. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as we have already said.^^ Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in a mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true: in the case of con- templative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. Aristotle, Eth., II, 6 (iio6b 36). ^Metaph., IX, 7 (1057a 30). Aristotle, Eth., VI, 3 (1139b 16). Op. cit., II, 6 (iio6b 13). 56, a. 3. Aris- totle, Eth., VI, 2 (1139a 29). 492 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 64. Art. 4 Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is as something measured by things, since things are the measure of our in- tellect, as is stated in Metaph, For there is truth in what we think or say according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly, the good of specula- tive intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses that what is, is, and what is not, is not. In this consists the nature of the true. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality is not; and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is. The truth of practical intellectual virtue, however, if we consider it in relation to things, has the nature of that which is measured. Hence, both in the practical and in the speculative intellectual virtues, the mean con- sists in conformity with things. — But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the nature of a rule and measure. Consequently, the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence:- — of prudence, as ruling and measuring; of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner, the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases. Reply Oh], i. Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as we have stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure. Reply Obj. 2. There is no need for an infinite series among the virtues, because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things themselves. Reply Obj. 3. The things themselves that are contrary have no con- trariety in the soul, because one is the reason for knowing the other. Never- theless, there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as is stated at the end of the De Inter pretatione.-^ For though to be and not to be are not in contrary, but in contradictory, opposi- tion to one another, so long as we consider what they signify as existing in things themselves (for the one is being and the other is absolutely non- being), yet if wp refer them to the act of the soul, both posit something. Hence to be and not to be are contradictory; but the opinion stating that good is good is contrary to the opinion stating that good is not good. It is between two such contraries that intellectual virtue is a mean. Fourth Article WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? TVe proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that theological virtue consists in a mean. Aristotle, Metaph., DC, i (i0S3a 33). ” Aristotle, Penh., XIV (23a 27), Q. 64. Art. 4 THE MEAN OF VIRTUE 493 For the good of the other virtues consists in a mean. Now theological virtue surpasses the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue consist in a mean. Obj. 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason, while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intel- lect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both the intellect and the appetite, as was stated above.^^ Therefore theological virtue also consists in a mean. Obj. 3. Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise, faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, as Boethius states.-^ Thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person aiid one nature. Therefore theological virtue consists in a mean. On the contrary, Wherever virtue consists in a mean, it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue; for it is written {Ecclus. xliii. 33 ) • Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise. Therefore theological virtue does not consist in a mean. I answer that, As was stated above, the mean of virtue depends on con- formity with its rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself. For our faith is ruled according to divine truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the im- mensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power, so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less, therefore, can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit. The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. Consequently, it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us. Reply Obj. i . The good of the intellectual and the moral virtues consists in a mean through a conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas, absolutely speaking, this is not so in the case of theological virtue, as was stated above. Reply Obj, 2. Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and ~Q. 62, a. 3. ^ Be Buab. Nat., VII (PL 64, 1352). 494 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 64. Art. 4 appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Therefore the comparison fails. Reply Obj. 3. Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, namely, as a man is said to be presumptuous through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition, or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he could hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In like manner, faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much, but in so far as human opin- ion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was ex- plained above. Question LXV THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES {In Five Articles) We must now consider the connection of the virtues. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another? (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity? (3) Whether charity can be without them? (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity? (5) Whether charity can be without them? First Article WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected necessarily with one another. For the moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethics ii.^ But man can exercise him- self in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without an- other. Ob], 2. Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or mag- nanimity. For the Philosopher says that a poor man cannot be magnificent,^ and yet he may have other virtues; and that he who is worthy oj small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, hut not magnanimous^ There- fore the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Obj, 3. Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellectual part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected, since we may have one science without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another. Ob], 4. Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can be only because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, evidently, one may be prudent about things to be done which pertain to one virtue without being prudent in those that concern another. So, too, one may have the art of making ^Aristotle, Eth., II, i (1103a 31). ’ Op. cit., IV, 2 (1122b 26). ^Op. cit., IV, 3 (1123b 5). 4Q5 496 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 65. Art. i certain things without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. On the contrary, Ambrose says on Luke vi. 20: The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several:^ Like- wise, Augustine says that the virtues that reside in the human soul are quite inseparable from one another? And Gregory says that one virtue with- out the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect? So, too, Cicero says: If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you will have none at all? I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as im- perfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance, for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some sort of good deed, whether such an inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected, since we find itien who, by natural temperament or by being so accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. But a perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well ; and if we take the moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above, some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues;® as, for instance, by saying that discernment belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to tem- perance, and strength of soul to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties. According to this, the reason for the connection is evident, for strength of soul is not commended as virtuous, if it be without modera- tion or rectitude or discretion; and so forth. This, too, is the reason as- signed for the connection by Gregory, who says that a virtue cannot he perfect as a virtue, if isolated from the others] for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude? And he goes on to speak in like manner of the other virtues. Augustine also gives the same reason.^® Others, however, differentiate these virtues according to their subject matter,^^ and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection.^- For, as was stated above, no moral virtue can be had with- out prudence, since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, because it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the in- clination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also a correct choice of means to the end; and this is done by ^In Luc., V, super VI, 20 (PL 15, 1738). ^ De Trin., VI, 4 (PL 42, 927). ^ Moral., XXII, i (PL 76, 212). Tusc. Disp., II, 14 (p. 296). ®Q. 61, a. 3 and 4. ^ Moral., XXII, i (PL 76, 212). De Trin., VI, 4 (PL 42, 927). ^Cf. above, q. 61, a. 4. ^Eth., VI, 13 (1144b 36). “Q. 58, a. 4. Q. 65. Art. i CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES 497 prudence, that counsels, judges and commands the means to the end. In like manner, one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues, since prudence is right reason about things to be done, and the starting- point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues. From this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another. Reply Obj. i. Some moral virtues perfect man according to his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence, he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of con- cupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the com- plete character of virtue if prudence be lacking. But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity. And because it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues without actually having the habits of these virtues — ^provided we speak of ac- quired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired the other virtues, he possesses these in proximate potentiality. For when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come into the possession of a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice; even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which he had never before considered. Now we are said to have a thing when we can easily have it, according to the saying of the Philosopher: That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all}^ This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. Reply Obj. 3. The intellectual virtues are about diverse matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain primal passions, viz., love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz., pleasure and sorrow. In like manner, all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the pas- ^Phys., II, 5 (197a 29). 498 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 65. Art. 2 sions. Hence the whole matter of the moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. Nevertheless, all intelligibles are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles, even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as we have stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the under- standing of principles do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues. -The situation of the moral virtues is different, for they depend on prudence, because the appetite in a way moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as we have stated above.^^ Reply Oh], 4. Those things to which the moral virtues incline are related to prudence as principles, whereas the products of art are not the principles but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man were wrong about the principle, A whole is greater than its part, he could not acquire the science of geometry, because he would have to depart much from the truth in his future steps. — Moreover, things done are related to one another, but not things made, as was stated above. Consequently, the lack of prudence in one part of things to be done would result in a de- ficiency affecting other things to be done; whereas this does not occur in things to be made. Second Article WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Sentences of Prosper that every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.^^ But charity can be in none except the good, as is stated in the same reference. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. Ob], 2. Further, the moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as it is said in Ethics ii.,^*^ whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom, v. 5* The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us. Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity. Ob], 3. Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through de- pending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Ephes, iii. 19: The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge. Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, but can be without it. ^‘"Q- 9j a. i; q. 58, a. 5, ad i. *"' Aristotle, Eth,, II, i (1103a 31), Prosper of Aquitaine, Sent., VII (PL 51, 428). Q. 65. Art. 2 CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES 499 On the contrary. It is written ( j John iii. 14) : He that loveth not, abideth in death. Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is by them that we lead a good life, as Augustine states.^^ Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. I answer that. As we have stated above, it is possible by means of human works to acquire the moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural ability of man.^^ And when they are acquired thus,* they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the pagans. But in so far as they produce good works in re- lation to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly, and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence, and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because they make man well disposed to certain ends, from which prudence takes its nature. Now for the true character of prudence it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of the moral virtues; just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle that contradictories can- not both be true at the same time. It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity, nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues absolutely, since they direct man well to the absolutely ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not ab- solutely, for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particu- lar genus of action, but not in respect of the last end absolutely. Hence, on the words. All that is not of faith is sin {Rom. xiv. 23), the Gloss of Augus- tine says: He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good?^ Reply Obj, i. Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else, if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, it makes its possessor good, and consequently cannot be in the wicked. Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds good of the acquired virtues. Reply Obj, 3. Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet pru- dence depends on charity, as we have stated; and consequently so do aU the infused moral virtues. Lib, Arb., II, 19 (PL 32, 1268). ^Q. 63, a. 2. ^A. i; q. 58, a. 4 and 5. ^Glossa ordin, (VI, 30 B). — Cf. Prosper of Aquitaine, Sent., CVI (PL 51, 441). 500 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 65. Art. 3 Third Article WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT THE MORAL VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfillment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from i Cor, xiii. 4, seqq.: Charity is patient, is kind, etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. Obj, 2. Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake; and hence pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit. Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. Obj. 3. Further, charity is to be found in every saint, and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says that the saints are more humbled because of their not having certain virtues, than re- joiced at the virtues they have.^^ Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues. On the contrary. The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written {Rom. xiii. 8) : He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law. Now it is not possible to fulfill the whole Law without having all the moral virtues, since law contains precepts about all the acts of virtue, as is stated in Ethics v.^^ Therefore, he that has charity has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in one of his letters that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.^^ I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in the works of grace than in the works of nature. Now, in the works of nature we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution. Thus, animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls have the power to do. But it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are directed to the last end. Therefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work. It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also because of charity; and, again, that Aristotle, Eth., II, 3 (1104b 3). ^St. Bede, In Luc., V, super XVII, 10 (PL 92, 541). Aristotle, Eth., V, i (1129b 23). ^Epist. CLXVH (PL 33, 738). Q. 65. Art. 4 CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES 501 whoever loses charity through mortal sin forfeits all the infused moral virtues. Reply Ob], i. In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower, power; for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things that are means to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is a means to the end. For the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in relation to those things which are means to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. Reply Obj. 2. It sometimes happens that a man who has a habit finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and satisfaction in the act, because of some impediment entering from the outside. Thus, a man who has a habit of science finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner, sometimes the habits of the infused moral virtues experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain contrary dispositions surviving from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in the acquired moral virtues, because the repeated acts by which they are acquired remove also the contrary dispositions. Reply Obj. 3. Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of aU the virtues. Fourth Article WHETHER FAITH AND HOPE CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i . It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity. Obj. 2. Further, no man believes unwillingly, as Augustine says.^® But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as was stated above.^'^ There- fore faith cannot be without charity. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that there can be no hope without love?^ But love is charity; for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. On the contrary, The Gloss on Matt. i. 2 says that jaith begets hope, and hope, charity?^ Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be ^ Tract. XXVI, super Ioann., VI, 44 (PL 35, 1607). 62, a. 3. ^ Enchir., VIII (PL 40, 235). ^ Glossa interl., super Matt., I, 2 (V, 5r). S02 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 65. Art. 4 without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity. 1 answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways: first, in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the ability of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Otherwise, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; and therefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good, but it will not be the work of perfect virtue unless he do it well, i,e., by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. Accordingly, faith and hope can in a way exist without charity, but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the work of faith is to believe in God, and since to believe is to assent to someone of one^s own free will, hence, to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect work of faith. To will as one ought is caused by charity, which perfects the will; for every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says.^^ Hence, faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue; just as temperance or fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. For the act of hope consists in looking to God for future beatitude. This act is perfect if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future beatitude through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so called, because the nature of virtue requires that by it we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well.^^ Reply Obj. i. Moral virtue depends on prudence, and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz., the ultimate end. On the other hand, faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as we have stated. Reply Obj. 2. This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue. Reply Obj. 3. Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future beatitude through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity. ^De CiviL Dei, XIV, 9 (PL 41, 413). “^Aristotle, Eth., II, 6 (iio6a 23). Q. 6s. Art. s CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES 503 Fifth Article WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT FAITH AND HOPE? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God natu- rally, without already having faith or hope in future beatitude. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. Obj. 2. Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephes. iii. 17: Rooted and founded in charity. Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues. Obj. 3. Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope, because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on.^^ Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. xi. 6) : Without faith it is im- possible to please God] and this evidently belongs most to charity, accord- ing to Prov. viii. 17: / love them that love me. Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as was stated above.^^ Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. 7 answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a cer- tain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual re- turn of love, together with mutual communion, as is stated in Ethics viii.^'* That this belongs to charity is evident from i John iv. 16: He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him, and from i Cor. i. 9, where it is written: God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son. Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life by glory; and both of these things we hold by faith and hope. Therefore, just as friendship with a person would be im- possible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fel- lowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope. Reply Obj. i. Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of beatitude, to which we are directed by faith and hope. Reply Obj. 2. Charity is the root of faith and hope in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are presupposed ^S. T., Ill, q. 7, a. 3 and 4- ^Q. 62, a. 4. ""Aristotle, Etk., VIII, 2 (ii5Sb 28) ; 12 (ii6ib ii). 504 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q 65. Art. s to charityj as we have stated above/^ and so charity is impossible without them. Reply Obj. 3. In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, because of the imperfection they contain. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension; so that in Him there was perfect charity. ^ Q. 62 j a. 4. Question LXVI ON EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES {In Six Articles) We must now consider equality among the virtues. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal? (3) The moral virtues in comparison with the intellectual vir- tues. (4) The moral virtues as compared with one another. (5) The intel- lectual virtues in comparison with one another. (6) The theological virtues in comparison with one another. First Article WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE GREATER OR LESS THAN ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written {Apoc, xxi. 16) that the sides of the city of Jerusa- lem are equal, and the Gloss says that the sides denote the virtues.^ There- fore all the virtues are equal, and consequently one cannot be greater than another. Obj. 2. Further, a thing that by its nature consists in a maximum cannot be more or less. But the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is the peak of power, as the Philosopher states.^ And Augustine says that the virtues are very great goods, and no one can use them to evil purpose? Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. Obj. 3. Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz., infused virtues, are from God, Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and in- crease, for it is written {Matt, v. 20): Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven] and {Prov. xv. 5): In abundant justice there is the greatest Glossa ordin. (VI, 272 E). ^ De Caelo, I, ii (281a ii ; a 18). ^ De Lib. Arb., II, 18 (PL 32, 1267). 505 5o6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 66. Art. i strength [virtus]. Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another. I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another, since a cause is always more excellent than its effect, and among effects, those nearer to the cause are the more excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said that the cause and root of human good is the reason.*^ Hence prudence, which perfects the reason, surpasses in good- ness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power , in so far as it partakes of reason. And among the moral virtues, likewise, one is better than another according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently, justice, which is in the will, is superior to the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible part, which has a smaller share of reason, as is stated in Ethics vii.^ The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above, when we were treating of the intensity of habits,^ virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it great or little ac- cording to the things to which it extends. Now whoever has a virtue, e.g., temperance, has it in relation to everything to which temperance extends. But this does not apply to science and art, for every grammarian does not know ever3^hing relating to grammar. In this sense, the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Categories,'^ that virtue can- not be more or less, as science and art can; for the nature of virtue consists in a maximum. If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men. For one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, because of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one ac- cording to the measure of the giving of Christ, as is stated in Ephes. iv. 7. — ^And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue.^ Because the nature of virtue does not require that a man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as is stated in Ethics ii.® Moreover, one and the same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and ■^Q. iS, a. s; q. 61, a. 2. ° Aristotle, Eth., VII, 6 (1149b i). ®Q. 52, a. i. In Cat,, VIII (pp. 284^®^; 237®^®“’) • ®Cf. St. Augustine, Epist, CLXVII, 3 (PL 33> 73S). ® Aristotle, Eth., II, 9 (1109b 18). Q. 66. Art. 2 EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES 507 more readily by one than by another; as may also be seen when several archers aim at a fixed target. Reply Ob'], 1 . This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of pro- portion; because all virtues increase in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on. Reply Ob]. 2. This peak which belongs to virtue can have the character of something more or less good in the ways explained above; since, as we have stated, it is not an indivisible limit. Reply Ob]. 3. God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, by which He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Ephes. iv. 7: To every one of you is given grace ac- cording to the measure of the giving of Christ. Second Article WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES, THAT ARE TOGETHER IN ONE MAN, ARE EQUAL? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the virtues in one and the same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says (i Cor. vii. 7) : Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that. Now one gift would not be more individual than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. Obj. 2. Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case, since various saints are specially praised for different virtues: e.g., Abraham for faith {Rom. iv. i), Moses for his meekness {Num. xii. 3), Job for his pa- tience {Job ii. 12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most Eigh^^ since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. Obj. 3. Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one’s pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. There- fore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. On the contrary, Augustine says that those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance and so on. Now this would not be so unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. I answer that. As was explained above, the comparative greatness of Cf. the Epistle in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal), and cp. Ecclus., XLIV, 20. De Trin., VI, 4 (PL 42, 927) • 5o8 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 66. Art. 2 virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature, and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or weak in its subject. In this sense, all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their in- crease in man is equal. Thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way^ as the connection of virtues, for equality among the virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above^^ that a twofold principle in the connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understand these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter,^^ In this way, the virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality when he says: If you say these men are equal in fortitude , but that one is more prudent than the other, it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently, they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former’s fortitude is more prudent. Y ou will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way^‘^ The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters.^^ In this way, the principle in the connection among moral virtues is taken from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination which is found in the subject, as was stated above.^® Accordingly, the nature of the equality among virtues can also be consid- ered according to prudence, with reference to that which is formal in all the moral virtues; for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean must be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue. But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz., the in- clination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God. Reply Oh'], i. This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are' not common to all, nor all equal in one and the same subject. — ^We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, because of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. ^Q, 65, a. I. ^Cf. above, q. 61, a. 4. Trin., VI, 4 (PL 42, 927). 65, a. I and 2. ^^Ibid. Q. 66. Art. 3 EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES 509 Reply Ob ']. 2. One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, because of his more perfect readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another. This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. Third Article WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE BETTER THAN THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES ? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. For that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are more lasting even than the sciences which are intellectual virtues; and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues. Obj. 2. Further, virtue is defined as that which makes its possessor good. Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and not in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral virtue is better than intellectual virtue. Obj. Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethics vi. moral virtue gives a right intention of the end; whereas pru- dence gives the right choice of the means?^ Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation, while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as is stated in Ethics i.^^ Now the rational by essence is more excellent than the rational by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. 1 answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, absolutely; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better absolutely, e.g., learning than riches, and yet not better rela- tively, i.e., for one who is in want?^ Now to consider a thing absolutely is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as was explained above.^^ Hence, speaking abso- lutely, that virtue is more excellent which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite, since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking absolutely, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite. Aristotle, Eth,, I, lo (iioob 14). ^Op. cit., VI, 12 (1144a 8). dt., T, 13 (1103a i). “Aristotle, Top., Ill, 2 (ii8a 10). ^Q. 54, a. 2; q. 60, a. i. 510 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 66. Art. 4 But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other powers to act (as was stated above--) is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows also that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral virtue than with intel- lectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, ab- solutely speaking. Reply Ob], i. The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practiced in matters pertaining to everyday life. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of the moral virtues, which are certain particular matters of action. — ^That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life proves that they are more excellent, not absolutely, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not directed to something else, as a useful thing is re- ferred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as we have stated above.-^ Reply Obj. 2. The reason why a man is said to be good absolutely in re- lation to moral virtue, but not in relation to intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as was stated above.^'^ Therefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively. Reply Ob], 3. Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; and this mean is appointed according to the right reason of prudence, as it is said in Ethics ii. and vi.^^ Fourth Article WHETHER JUSTICE IS THE CHIEF OF THE MORAL VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection, i. It would seem that justice is not the chief of The moral virtues. For it is better to give of one’s own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice. Obj. 2. Further, that is most important in a thing which is most perfect in it. Now, according to James i. 4, Patience hath a perfect work. Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice. Obj. 3. Further, Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue, as ^Q. 9, a. I- “^Q. 3, a. 6. '^Q. 56, a. 3. ^Aristotle, II, 6 (1107a i) ; VI, 13 (1144b 21). Q. 66. Art. 4 EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES 511 is stated in Ethics iv,^® Therefore it magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice. On the contrary j The Philosopher says that justice is the most excellent of the virtues?'^ I answer that, A virtue, considered in its species, may be greater or less, either absolutely or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater absolutely when a greater good of reason shines forth, as was stated above. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as we have stated above its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to an- other. Hence justice is the most excellent of virtues?^ — ^Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the good of reason shine forth in each. Now in things affecting man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude, which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions; but it is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says that those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise, since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others, because the former, i.e., fortitude, is useful in war, and the latter, i.e., justice, both in war and in peace After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in mat- ters directly relating to life, m one individual or in the one species, viz., in matters of food and of sex. — ^And so these three virtues, together with pru- , dence, are called principal virtues also in dignity. A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorn- ing a principal virtue. So, too, substance is more excellent absolutely than accident, and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance, in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being. Reply Obj. i. The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own.^'^ Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between mine and thine] whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is, absolutely, greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation; while liberality is greater relatively, since it is an ornament and an addition to justice. Reply Obj. 2. Patience is said to have a perfect work by enduring evils, ^Op. cit., IV, 3 (1123b 30). ^Op. cit., V, I (1129b 27). ^Q. 8, a. i; q. 26, a. I. ^ Aristotle, Eth., V, i (1129b 27) . ^ Rhetor., I, 9 (1366b 3) . Aristotle, Polit., 11 , 2 (1263b 13). 512 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 66 . Art. 5 wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Therefore it is more perfect and excellent because it extirpates the very root of this matter. It is not, however, more perfect absolutely than all the other virtues. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. Reply Obj. 3. There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as is stated in Ethics iv.^^ Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that, relatively, it is greater than all the others, but not absolutely. Fifth Article WHETHER WISDOM IS THE GREATEST OE THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i . It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intel- lectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one com- manded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethics i. that political science, which belongs to prudence, orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each indivi- dual should devote himself, and to what extent?"^ Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to hap- piness, because virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best, as is stated in Physics vii.^^ Now prudence is right reason about things to be done, by which man is brought to happiness, whereas wisdom is not concerned with human acts, by which man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom. Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have a more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject matter of science, than of divine things, which are the subject matter of wisdom (according to the distinction given by Augustine^®), be- cause divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job xxxvi. 26: Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge. Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom. Obj. 4. Further, a knowledge of principles is more excellent than a knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemon- strable principles, which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even Aristotle, Eth., IV, 3 (1124a 2). ^ Op. cit., VI, 8 (1141b 20). ^Op. cU., I, 2 (1094a 28). ^Phys., VII, 3 (246b 23). ^De Tnn., XII, 14 (PL 42, 1009). Q. 66. Art. s EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES 513 as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wis- dom. On the contrary. The Philosopher says that wisdom is the head among the intellectual virtues.^'' 1 answer that, As was stated above, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues, because wisdom considers the high- est cause, which is God, as is stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics?^ And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects, hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is architectonic among them all. Reply Obj, 1. Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the highest cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, unless, as is stated in Ethics vi., man were the greatest thing in the world?^ Therefore we must say, as is stated in the same book, that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa, because the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himselj is judged of no man (i Cor. ii. 15). For prudence has no business with highest matters which are the subject matter of wisdom; but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz., how men are to obtain wisdom. Therefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. Reply Obj. 2. Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz., the highest intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom; but since, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participa- tion of future happiness; so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to hap- piness. Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says, one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain.^'^ Hence if the subjects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be the greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better thing is preferable to that which is more certain about a thing of inferior degree. Therefore the Philosopher says that it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial things, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning and again that it is better to know a little about sublime things than much Eth., VI, 7 (1141a 19). ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, i (981b 28); 2 (982b 9; 983a 7). ^Aristotle, Eth., VI, 7 (1141a 21). ^ Op. cU., VI, 13 (1145a 6). An., I, i (402a 2). ^ De Caelo, II, 12 (291b 27). 514 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 66. Art. 6 about mean things, Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession; for this belongs to God alone But yet this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge. Reply Oh], 4. The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depend on the meaning of the terms; for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms of which indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wis- dom; since universal being is the proper effect of the highest cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles, which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do. but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wis- dom is a greater virtue than understanding. Sixth Article WHETHER CHARITY IS THE GREATEST OE THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theo- logical virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, as we have already said, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above.^^ Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. Ob], 2, Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope is by way of addition to charity, for it presup- poses love, as Augustine says,'^® and it adds a certain movement of striving towards the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. ObJ, 3. Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity, for the Gloss on Matt. i. 2 says that faith begets hope, and hope, charity Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. On the contrary, The Apostle says ( j Cor. xiii. 13) : Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; hut the greatest of these is charity. I answer that, As we have stated above, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues ^De Part. Anim., I, 5 {644b 31). ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982b 28). 62, a. 3. ^EncMr., VIII (PL 40, 235). Glossa interl., super Matt., I, 2 (V, 51). Q. 66. Art. 6 EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES 515 concern God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object, since faith Js of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed, since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved. Hence it is written ( j John iv. 16) : He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him. Reply Obj. i. Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul, whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower, whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man, since a thing is in another according to the mode of the being in which it is. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence mod- erates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which belongs to the theological virtues; it only shows the object. And this appeti- tive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to Ephes. iii. 19: The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge. Reply Obj. 2. Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, by which he who desires good loves himself rather than something else. On the other 'hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as was stated above.^^ Reply Obj. 3. An efficient cause is more noble than its effect, but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope, charity; in the sense, namely, that one is a disposi- tion to the other. 62, a. 4. Question LXVII ON THE DURATION OF THE VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE {In Six Articles) We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Whether faith remains? (4) Whether hope remains? (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope? (6) WTether charity remains. First Article WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to Matt. xxii. 30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels, as is stated in Ethics x.^ Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. Obj. 2. Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life, for Gregory says: The works of the active life pass away with the body? Therefore the moral virtues do not remain after this life. Obj. i. Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states.^ Now the irra- tional parts of the soul are corrupted when the body is corrupted, since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. On the contrary, It is written (Wis. i. 15) that justice is perpetual and immortal. I answer that, As Augustine says, Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life, and that, as Augustine adds, in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable, that nature, namely, which created all others? Afterwards he himself concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different manner. ^Aristotle, Eth., X, 8 (ii7Sb 8). ^ Moral., VI, 37 (PL 75, 764). ^Eth., Ill, 10 (1117b 23). ^De Trin., XIV, 9 (PL 42, 1046). 516 Q. 67. Art. I THE DURATION OF THE VIRTUES 517 In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode; and since this mode is fixed by reason, hence the formal element in all the virtues is precisely this order of reason. Accordingly, we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex, nor fear and daring about dangers of death, nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most perfectly after this life in the blessed inasmuch as each one’s reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things con- cerning him according to that state of life, and, his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says that prudence will be there without any danger of error ; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires. Hence prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly ; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imper- fection.^ As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz., to be subject to God, because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice. Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues as to their material element. Thus he speaks of justice, as regards commuta- tions and distributions] of fortitude, as to matters of terror and danger] of temperance, in respect of lewd desires.^ The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life belong to the material element of the virtues. Reply Obj. 3. There is a twofold state after this life: one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actu- ally, but only radically in its essence, as has been stated in the First Part."^ Therefore, neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e.^ in the reason and will, wherein are certain seeds of these virtues, as we have stated above.^ Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence, of justice is it specially said that it is 'perpetual and immortal, ^Ibid. X, 8 (1178b 10). T., I, q. 77, a. 8. *Q. 63, a. i. Q. 67. Art. 2 S18 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible, and because its act will not change, as was said above. Second Article WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (r Cor. xiii. 8, 9) that knowledge shall be destroyed, and he states the reason to be because we know in part. Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e., imperfect, so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove;® for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. Obj. 3. Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since the soul understands nothing without a phantasm but after this life, phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. On the contrary j The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life, for in- stance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to Luke xvi. 25: Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life- time, and likewise Lazarus evil things. Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. / answer that, As we have stated in the First Part,^^ some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the possible intellect except when it actually understands;^^ and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz., in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted. Consequently, according to this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. ^Cat., VIII (8b 29). Aristotle, De An., Ill, 7 (431a 16). a. 6- “Avicenna, De An., V, 6 (26rb). “ 5 . T., I, q. 79, Q. 67. Art. 3 the DURATION OF THE VIRTUES 519 But this opinion is contrary to the doctrine of Aristotle, who states that the possible intellect is in act when it becomes each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually}^ It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the pos- sible intellect immovably, according to the mode of their recipient. Hence the possible intellect is called the abode of species, because it preserves the intelligible species. And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life by applying the intelligible species to them, as we have stated in the First Part,^""^ cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, the intellectual virtues cease when the body is de- stroyed; but as regards the intelligible species, which are in the possible intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi- formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, but not as regards their material ele- ment, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues. Reply Ob], i. The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to th^ mode of understanding; be- cause, namely, neither do the phantasms remain when the body is de- stroyed, nor will there be the use of science by turning to the phantasms. Reply Ob], 2. Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz., the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, which are in Uie possible intellect. Reply Obj. 3. As we have stated in the First Part,^® the separated soul has a mode of understanding other than by Turning to the phantasms. Consequently, science remains, yet not as to the same mode of operation, as we have likewise stated concerning the moral virtues. Third Article WHETHER FAITH REMAINS AFTER THIS LIFE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this life, as was stated above. Therefore faith remains also. Obj, 2. Further, it is written (i Cor, iii. ii): Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus, i.e,, faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which is built upon it re- mains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other virtue would remain. De An., HI, 4 (429b 6). Ibid. (429a 27). ^^ 5 . T., I, q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. I, ad 5. T., I, q. 89, a. i. 520 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 67. Art. 3 Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowledge. Thus in an angel there can be evening and morning knowledge ; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about one and the same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowl- edge of glory. On the contrary, The Apostle says {2 Cor, v. 6, 7) : While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight. But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory. I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, namely, as wherever two things are op- posite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition according to contrary forms. Thus, in colors we find white and black. In others, we find opposition according to perfect and imperfect- Therefore in alterations, more and less are con- sidered to be contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made more hot.^'^ And since perfect and imperfect are opposed to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time. Now we must note that imperfection sometimes belongs to a thing’s very nature, and pertains to its species; and thus, lack of reason belongs to the specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is changed. Thus, it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be ra- tional. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; and thus, sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason. Now it is evident that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially. It is clear, however, that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very na- ture of faith, for it is included in its definition, since faith is defined as the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not {Heb, xi. i). Therefore Augustine says: What is faith? Believing without seeing?-^ But it belongs to the imperfection of knowledge that it be of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently, imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith. Therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowl- edge, for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect knowledge ^"Aristotle, Pkys,, V, 2 (226b 2). Tract, XL, super Ioann,, VIH, 32 (PL 35, 1690). Q. 67. Art. 3 the DURATION OF THE VIRTUES 521 from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly, we must ob- serve that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the means; thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the wiotning and evening knowl- edge of the angels. For the morning knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the Word, while the evening knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. — On the part of the means, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative means, and through a probable means. — On the part of the subject, the difference of perfect and im- perfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith and science. For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm; to science it is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of principles; while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision. Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with one another in respect of the same means or the same subject. For nothing hinders a man from having, at one and the same time, through one and the same means, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g., about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the means is incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same means; but nothing hinders them being about the same object or in the same sub- ject. For one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative means. — ^Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz., that the believer sees not what he believes; whereas beatitude, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz., that the blessed see that which makes them happy, as we have stated above.^® Hence it is manifest that faith and beatitude are incom- patible in one and the same subject. Reply Obj. i. Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect “Q.j, a. 8. THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 522 Q. 67. Art. 4 mode of knowing its object, which, unlike faith, is not incompatible with the perfection of happiness, namely, vision. Reply Obj. 2. Faith is the foundation inasmuch as it is knowledge. Conse- quently, w’hen this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said. Fourth Article WHETHER HOPE REMAINS, AFTER DEATH, IN THE STATE OF GLORY? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that hope remains, after death, in the state of gloiy^ Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states.^^^ Much more then does hope remain. Obj, 2. Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: ' — in the blessed, filial fear, which abides forever — in the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. Obj, 3. Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. But in the blessed there is desire for future good, both for the glory of the body, which the souls of the blessed desire, as Augustine declares,-^ and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus, xxiv. 29: They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst; and i Pet. 1,12: On Whom the angels desire to look. Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the blessed after this life is past. On the contrary^ The Apostle says {Rom. viii. 24) : What a man seeth, why doth he hope for? But the blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz., God. Therefore they do not hope. I answer that, As was stated above, that which, in its very nature, im- plies imperfection in its subject is incompatible with the opposite perfec- tion in that subject. Thus, it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection in its subject, since it is the act of that which is in pofentkiity in so far as it is such; so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases, for a thing does not continue to become white when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that vrhich is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope.-^ Therefore, when we possess that which we hope for, viz., the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope. Reply Obj. i. Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is Trin ., XIV, 9 (PL 42, 104s). ^De Genesz ad LitL, XII, 35 (PL 34, 183) Q. 67. Art. 4 THE DURATION OF THE VIRTUES 523 God. But the acts of the morai virtues are not incompatible with the per- fection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual possession. Reply Ob], 2. Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on.“^ Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be the possibility of being punished. Filial fear, on the other hand, has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains; the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil, and no evil will be feared there, according to Frov. \, ly. Be , . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils. Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as we have stated above,-^ and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear of punishment, more than hope of glory is possible in the blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear; but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present. — ^And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as we have stated above, fear is never without some hope of escape;-^ and the lost will have no such hope. Consequently, neither will there be fear in them, except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. Reply Obj. 3. As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason al- ready given. Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking. Hope is possible neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good, nor in its general signification. For the object of hope is something difficult, as was stated above, while a good whose unfailing cause we already possess is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money, properly speaking, is not said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner, those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it. ^ 5 . T., II-II, q. 19, a. 2. ^ Q. 23, a. 2 ; q. 40, a. i. ^ Q. 42, a. 2, Q. 40, a. i. 524 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 67. Art. s Fifth Article WHETHER ANYTHING OF FAITH OR HOPE REi^AINS IN GLORY? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what is common. Thus, it is stated in the Book of Causes that if you take away rational^ there remains living, and when you remove living, there re- mains beingr^ Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz., knowledge; and there is something proper to it, viz., ob- scurity, for faith is knowledge in an obscure manner. Therefore, when the obscurity of faith is removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. Obj, 2. Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to Ephes. i. 17, 18: The eyes of your heart enlightened ,,, in the knowledge of God; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which it is written {Ps. xxxv, lo) : In Thy light we shall see light. Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes; for a candle is not extinguished when the sun’s rays appear. Therefore it seems 'that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory. Obj. 3. Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter; for a man may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his money, but he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this ceases, when the First Truth is seen, the habit of faith can still remain. On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since, therefore, faith does not remain entirely, but is taken away, as we have stated above, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. / anmser that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely, but that faith is taken away in part, viz., as to its obscurity, and remains in part, viz., as to the substance of its knowledge.^® And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically, but generically, it is ab- solutely true; since faith is of the same genus (viz., knowledge) as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly beatitude, because it is compared to the enjoyment of beatitude as movement is to rest in the term of movement. But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because, when you remove a ^>ecific difference, the substance of the genus does not re- main identically the same. Thus, if you remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as ” De Caush, I (p. i6i). William of Auxerre, Summa Atirea, HI, tr. 5, q. 5 (fol. 13S va) ; St. Albert, In HI Sent., d. xxxi, a. 7 (XXVIII, 586). Q. 67. Art. 6 THE DURATION OF THE VIRTUES 525 though the identical color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remain identically the same when the difference is removed, in the same way as the substance of matter remains identically the same when the form is changed 5 for genus and dif- ference are not the parts of a species, or otherwise they would not be predi- cated of the species. But even as the species signifies a whole, i,e,, the com- posite of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus: the genus denotes the whole by signifying it from that which is as matter; the difference, by signifying it from that which is as form; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that one and the same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect. ' It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus, if the difference be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the same; for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith either identically or specifically the same, but only generically. Reply Obj. i . If rational be withdrawn, the remaining living thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as we have stated. Reply Obj, 2. The imperfection of candle-light is not opposed to the per- fection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject; whereas imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air. Reply Obj. 3. He that loses his money does not lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is fitting for the habit of liberality to re- main. But in the state of glory, not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its possibility, by reason of the un- changeableness of heavenly beatitude; and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. Sixth Article WHETHER CHARITY REMAINS, AFTER THIS LIFE, IN GLORY? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that charity does not remain, after this life, in glory. Because according to i Cor, xiii. 10, when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part, i.e., that which is imperfect, shall be done 526 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 67. Art. 6 away,. Now tlie charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. Obj, 2. Further j habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is the apprehended good. Since therefore the apprehen- sion of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases. Obj. 3. Further, things of the same nature can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. On the contrary^ The Apostle says ( i Cor, xiii. 8) : Charity never jalleth away. I answer that, As we have stated above, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing from passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not removed by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. Reply Obj, i. The imperfection of charity is accidental to it, because im- perfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence when the imperfection of charity is removed charity itself is not done away. Reply Obj. 2. The object of charity is not knowledge itself, for if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of heaven; its object is, rather, the thing known, which remains the same, viz., God Himself. Reply Obj. 3. The reason why the charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven is a difference on the part of the cause; for vision is the cause of love, as is stated in Ethics ix.,^^ and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him. “Aristotle, Eth., IX, 5 {1167a 4). Question LXVIII ON THE GIFTS {In Eight Articles) We now come to consider the Gifts, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues? (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts. (3) Whether the Gifts are habits? (4) Which, and how many are they? (5) T\Tiether the Gifts are connected? (6) Whether they remain in heaven? (7) Of their comparison with one an- other. (8) Of their comparison with the virtues. First Article WHETHER THE GIFTS DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory, commenting on Job i. 2 {There were born to him seven sons) says: Seven sons are born to us when through the conception of heavenly thought j the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us]^ and he quotes the words of Isaias (xi. 2, 3) : And the Spirit ... of understanding . . . shall rest upon him, etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine, commenting on Matt. xii. 45 {Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits, etc), says: The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost, i.e., to the seven gifts.^ Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues, commonly so called. Obj. 3. Further, things whose definition is the same are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts, for each gift is a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life, etc. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues, for a gift is an unre- turnable giving, according to the Philosopher.® Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another. Obj. 4. Several of the things mentioned among the gifts are virtues. For, as we have stated above, wisdom, understanding and science are intel- lectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety is a species of justice. Moral., I, 27 (PL 75, 544). ^Quaest. Evang., 1 , 8, super Matt., XII, 45 (PL 35, 1325). ^Top., IV, 4 (125a 18). 528 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68. Art. i and fortitude is a moral virtue.'* Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. On the contrary, Gregory distinguishes the seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job^s three daughters.^ He also distin- guishes the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.® 1 answer that. If we speak of gijt and virtue with regard to the notion of each name, there is no opposition between them. Because the term virtue conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing,'^ while the term gift refers to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect an- other in well-doing, especially since we have already stated that some virtues are infused into us by God.® Therefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently, some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues.® But there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve, for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be distinguished from the virtues.^® But they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, namely, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, having seen that of the seven gifts four belong to the reason, viz., wisdom, science, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz., fortitude, piety and fear, they held that the gifts perfect free choice according as it is an ability of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as an ability of the will. They did this because they found only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz., faith and prudence, while the others were in the appetitive power or the affec- tions.^^ If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. Others, observing that Gregory says that the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul, endows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of tempta- tion by His sevenfold gift,^- said that the virtues are given to us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation.^® But neither is this distinction sufficient. For the virtues also resist those temp- ‘‘Q. 57, a. 2. ^ Moral., I, 27 (PL 75, 544). ^Op. cit., II, 49 (PL 75, 592). ^Q- SSf a. 3 and 4. ®Q. 63, a. 3. ®On this problem, cf. the study and texts pub- lished by O. Lottin, “Les dons du Saint-^lsprit chez les theologiens depuis P. Lom- bard jusqu’i s. Thomas d’Aquin” (Recherches de theologie ancienne et mSdievaJe, I, 1929, pp. 41-97).— For the present opinion, cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., HI, xxxiv, 2 (II, 699), and O. Lottin, art. cit., pp. 41-46. “Philip the Chancellor: cf. O. Lottin, art. at., pp. 46, 79. “ Praepositinus: cf. 0 . Lottin, art. cit., pp. 42, 66. ^ Moral., II, 49 (PL 75, 592). ^Philip the Chancellor: cf. 0 . Lottin, art. cit., pp. 35 > 76. Q. 68. Art. i THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 529 tations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for every- thing naturally resists its contrary, as is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written {Cant, viii. 7) : Many waters cannot quench charity. Others, again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Scripture as having been in Christ, according to Isa. xi. 2, 3, said that the virtues are intended absolutely that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor Yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself espe- cially wished us to be conformed to Him in humility and meekness (ac- cording to Matt, xi. 29: Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart) and in charity (according to John xv. 12 : Love one another^ as I have loved you). Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ’s Passion. Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we find there that the term employed is spirit rather than gift. For thus it is written {Isa. xi. 2, 3): The spirit ... of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him, etc. From these words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from the outside. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz., the reason, the other extrinsic to him, viz., God, as we have stated above.^'^ Moreover the Philosopher says the same thing in the chapter On Good Fortune}^ Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportioned to its mover ; and the perfection of what is moved, as such, consists in a disposi- tion whereby it is disposed to be weU moved by its mover. Hence, the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby that A^hich is moved is proportioned to its mover. Thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and ex- terior actions. Consequently, man needs yet higher perfections whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the divine inspiration, according to Isa. 1. 5: The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back. The Philosopher likewise says in the chapter On Good Fortune that for those who are moved by divine instigation there is no need to take Philip the Chancellor: cf. O. Lottin, art. dt., p. 80. ^Q. 9, a. 4 and 6. ^®Cf. Eth. Eudem.f VII, 14 (1248a 14). 530 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q 68. 'Art. 2 counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner prompt- ings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason. And this is what some say, viz., that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue.^® Reply Obj. 1 . Sometimes these gifts are called virtues in the broad sense of the term. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are divine virtues perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher places above virtue, com- monly so called, a kind of heroic or divine virtue, in respect of which some men are called divine}^ Reply Ob], 2. The vices are opposed to the virtues in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts inasmuch as they are opposed to the divine instigation. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light comes from God. Reply Obj. 3. This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, whereby we lead a good life, as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something, namely, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God. Reply Obj. 4. Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue in so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason; but it is called a gift according as its work proceeds from the divine instigation. The same applies to the other virtues. Second Article WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAN FOR SALVATION? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation, because they are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue; for such a perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Obj. 2. Further, it is enough for man's salvation that he behave well in matters concerning God and in matters concerning man. Now man's be- havior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues, and his Cf. ibid. (1248a 32). "^St. Albert, In III Sent., d. xxxiv, a. i (XXVIII, 616) ; St. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. xxxiv, a. i, q. i (III, 735). Bth., VII, i (1145a 20). Q. 68 . Art. 2 THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 531 behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Obj, 3. Further, Gregory says that the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against jolly, understanding against dullness, counsel against rashness, fortitude against fear, science against ignorance, piety against hardness of heart, and fear against prideP But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. On the contrary. Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. But both of these are necessary for salvation, since of wis- dom it is written {Wis, vii. 28): God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom] and of fear {Ecclus. i. 28): He that is without fear cannot be justified. Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary for salvation. I answer that. As we have stated above, the gifts are certain perfections of man by which he is disposed to follow promptly the divine instigation. Therefore, in those matters where the instigation of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the instigation of the Holy Ghost, there is conse- quently need for a gift. Now man’s reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, namely, the natural light of reason; secondly, with a super- natural perfection, namely, the theological virtues, as we have stated above.^^ And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter; because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evi- ‘ dent that anything that has a nature, or a form, or a virtue perfectly, can work through itself according to it. (This does not, however, exclude the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every nature and in every will.) On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot work through itself unless it be moved by another. Thus, the sun, which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon, which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by himself ; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by him- self, but needs to receive instructions from him. Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man is aided by a special instigation from God, this will be out of God’s superabundant goodness. Hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues had also the heroic or divine virtues.^^ But in matters directed to the super- ^ Moral., II, 49 (PL 75, 592). ^Q. 62, a. i. ^Aristotle, Eth., VII, i (1145^ 20). 532 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68 . Art. 3 natural last end, to which man's reason moves him according as it is, in a manner and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the instigation or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom, viii. 14, i?** Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God . . . and if sonSj heirs also] and Ps. cxlii. 10: Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land. For none can receive the inheritance of that land of the blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to reach this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. Reply Ob], 1, The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (this is the way in which the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, accord- ing as man is moved by a higher principle. Reply Obj. 2. By the theological and moral virtues man is not so per- fected in relation to his last end as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher instigation of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given. Reply Ob'], 3. Whether we ’consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor are all things possible to it. Consequently, it is unable under all circumstances to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, to Wffiose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His instigation, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. Third Article WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE HABITS? IFe proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. For a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as a quality difficult to remove, as is stated in the Categories?^ Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as is stated in Isa, xi. 2, 3. Moreover, it is written {Jo. i. 33) : Ee upon Whom thou shall see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth; on wffiich words Gregory comments as follows: The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful, but, in a singular way. He dwells always in the Mediator aloner^ Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Obj. 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as we have stated above. But in so far as Aristotle, Cat., VIII (8b 30). Moral., II, 56 (PL 75, 598). Q. 68. Art, 4 THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 533 man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Oh]. 3. Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to divine inspira- tion, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit, for the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets, as Gregory states."^ Neither, therefore; are the gifts of the Holy Ghost habits. On the contrary, Our Lord, in speaking of the Holy Ghost, said to His disciples {Jo. xiv. 17) : He shall abide with you, and shall be in you. Now the Holy Ghost is not in men without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in men. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions, but abiding habits. / answer that, As was stated above, the gifts are certain perfections of man by which he becomes amenable to the instigation of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, namely, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason.^® Accordingly, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are related to man in his relation to the Holy Ghost as the moral virtues are related to the appetitive power in its relation to reason. Now the moral virtues are certain habits by which the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits by which man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost. Reply Oh], i. Gregory solves this objection by saying that by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts.^’^ Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as we have stated above. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost always abides in the saints. Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds in the case of an instrument which has no power of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has free choice. Therefore he needs a habit. Reply Ob]. 3. Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifesta- tion of the Holy Ghost, not for the necessity of salvation. Hence the com- parison fails. Fourth Article WHETHER THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down cor- ^In Ezech., horn, i (PL 76, 788). ^Q. 58, a. 2. ^ Moral., 11 , 56 (PL 75, 598). 534 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68. Art. 4 responding to the intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, understanding, science and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz., piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz., the gift of fortitude ; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insuf- ficiently. Obj. 2. Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is as- signed to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. Obj. 3. Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. Ob]. 4. Further, just as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope and joy are passions co-divided against fear. Therefore, just as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. Ob]. 5. Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; science, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. On the contrary stands the authority of Holy Scripture {Isa. xi. 2, 3). I answer that, As we have stated above, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he be ready to follow the instigations of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the powers in man to be moved by the instigation of God, as by a superior power. Therefore what- ever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are of virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite. Now the reason is speculative and practical, and in both we find the ap- prehension of truth, which pertains to the discovery of truth and to the judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by understanding] the practical reason, by counsel. In order to judge rightly, furthermore, the speculative reason is perfected by wisdom] the practical reason by science. — ^The appetitive power, in matters touching a man’s relations to another, is perfected by piety; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by fortitude against the fear of dangers, and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by fear, accord- ing to Prov. XV. 27: By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil, and Ps. cxviii. 120: Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments . — ^Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all those things to which both the intellectual and moral virtues extend. Q. 68. Art. 4 THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 535 Reply Oh], i. The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters con- cerning a good life, whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to ex- teinal things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made.^^ However, we may also say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to ternperance; for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. Reply Obp 2, Justice is so caUed from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety, as Augus- tine observes.-® Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all is fittingly called piety. Reply Obj,^ 3. The soul of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost unless in some way it be united to Him ; even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman unless there be contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope and charity, and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived from them. Reply Obj. 4. Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the highest good. Therefore the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can in no way apply to God. Hence fear does not denote union with God, but rather withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil for higher motives than moral virtue does. Reply Obj, 5. Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing principle: on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. For the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the divine excellence, with which wisdom is concerned. ^Aristotle, Eth,, VI, 4 (1140a 10; a 17). ^De Civil, Dei, X, i (PL 41, 279). 536 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68. Art. 5 Fifth Article WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONNECTED? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says ( i Cor. xii. 8) : one ... by the Spirit j is given the word of wisdom^ and to another , the word of knowledge [science] y according to the same Spirit. Now wisdom and science are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to diverse men, and are not connected together in the same man. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says that many of the faithful have not sciencey though they have faith.^^ But some of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same man. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says that wisdom is of small account if it lack understanding y and understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom. . . . Counsel is worthlesSy when the strength of fortitude is lack- ing thereto y . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be not supported by counsel. . . . Science is nought if it hath not the use of piety, . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of science, . . . and as- suredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action. From this it seems that it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted with the following remark: It is worthy of note^ in this feast of Job's sons, that by turns they feed one another?- Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speak- ing, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another. / answer that. The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated that, just as the powers of appetite are disposed by the moral virtues in relation to the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. v. 5* The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us, even as our reason is per- fected by prudence. Therefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity; so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can be possessed without charity. Reply Obj. 1. Wisdom and science can be considered in one way as gratui top graces, in so far, namely, as man so far abounds in the science of things divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believers and ^DeT Tin., XIV, i (PL 42, 1037). ^ Moral., I, 32 (PL 75, 547) . ^Ibid. Q. 68. Art. 6 THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 537 confound the unbelievers. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and science. Hence he mentions pointedly the word of wisdom and the word of science. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and thus wisdom and science are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the instigation of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things divine and human. Conse- quently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity. Reply Oh], 2. Augustine is speaking there of science in connection with his exposition of the passage of the Apostle quoted above. Hence he is speaking of science, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: For it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the happy life, which is none other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of science?^ Reply Obj. 3. Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as we have stated above,^^ so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts in the same way from the fact that one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed that each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lends its support to another?^ We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another, but that if understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. Sixth Article WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST REMAIN IN HEAVEN? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not re- main in heaven. For Gregory says that by means of His sevenfold gift the Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations?^ Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to Isa, xi. 9: They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in ah My holy mountain. Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven. Ob], 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Gthost are habits, as was stated above. But habits are of no use where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says that under- standing . . . penetrates the truths heard, . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly, , , . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity, . . . ^De Trin., XIV, i (PL 42, 1037). 6$, a. i. ^ Moral,, I, 32 (PL 75, 547). ^Op, cit., II, 49 (PL 75, 592). 538 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68. Art. 6 piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy all of which are in- compatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory. Obj, 3. Further j some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g., wisdom and understanding, and some in the active life, e.g., piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with the present life, as Gregory states Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory. On the contrary, Ambrose says: The city of God, the heavenly Jerusa- lem, is not washed with the waters of an earthly river; it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste. Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue?^ I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways. First, as to their essence, and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of Ambrose just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost; which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be all in all ( / Cor. xv. 28), and man will be entirely subject to Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are, and thus in the present life they have an operation about things concerning which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues.^^ Reply Obj. i. Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they belong to the present state, for it is thus that they afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Reply Obj. 2. Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the future state. For he says that wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things of which two hope passes, and certainty remains. — Of understanding he says that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness, of which hearing passes away, since they shall teach no more every man . . . his brother {Jer. 34) ; but the enlightening of the mind remains. — Of counsel he says that it prevents us from being impetuous, which is necessary in the present life; and also that it makes the mind full of reason, which is necessary even in the future state. — Of fortitude he says that it fears not adversity, which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it sets before us the viands of confidence, which remains also in the future life. — ^With regard to science he mentions only one thing, viz., that she overcomes the void of ignorance, Op. cit., I, 32 (PL 75, 547). ^Op, cit., VI, 37 (PL 75, 764). ^ De Spir. Sancto, XVI (PL 16, 770). "Q. 67, a. i. ^Moral, II, 49 (PL 75, 592). Op. ciL, I, 32 (PL 75, 547). Q. 68. Art. 7 THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 539 which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds in the womb of the mind, this may refer figuratively to the fullness of knowledge, which be- longs to the future state. — Of piety he says that it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy. These words taken literally refer only to the present state, yet the close love of neighbor, signified by the inmost heart, belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but a fellowship of joy. Of fear he says that it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things, which refers to the present state, and that it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future, which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may likewise refer to the future state, as regards being strengthened for things we hope for here, and obtain there. Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be works of the active life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly beatitude. Seventh Article WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE SET DOWN BY ISAIAS IN THEIR ORDER OF DIGNITY? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection 1, It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is evidently that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts, for it is written {Deut, x. 12): And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God? and {Malach, L 6 ): If . . . I be a master, where is My fear? There- fore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. Ob], 2. Further, piety seems to*be a universal good, since the Apostle says ( I Tim. iv. 8) : Piety is profitable to all things. Now a universal good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. Obj. 3. Further, science perfects man's judgment, while counsel per- tains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. Therefore science is a more excellent gift than counsel, and yet it is set down as be- ing below it. Obj. 4. Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore science is a more excellent gift than fortitude, and yet the latter is given precedence. Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. On the contrary, Augustine says: It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and 540 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68 . Art. 7 expression with these (of which we read in Matt, v. 3) ; hut there is a dif- ference of order, for there (viz., in Isaias) the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts.^^ 1 answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, absolutely, viz., by comparison with their proper acts in so far as these proceed from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz., by comparison with their matter. If w’e consider the excellence of the gifts absolutely, they fol- low the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another ; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul’s powers, even as the virtues do, as we have stated above. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues have precedence over the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active, viz., wisdom, under- standing and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands be- fore understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia), so also among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, science and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude, fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude, temperance. — But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede science and piety, because fortitude and counsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and science regard ordinary matters. — Consequently, the excellence of the gifts corre- sponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but, so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered absolutely, while, so far as counsel and fortitude are preferred to science and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter. Reply Obj. i. Fear is chiefly required as being in a way the foundation of the perfection of the other gifts, for the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom {Ps, cx. 10; Ecclus, i. 16), and not as though it were more ex- cellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil because of fear (Prov, xvi. 16) before doing good works (which result from the other gifts). Reply Ob], 2. In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not com- pared with all God’s gifts, but only with bodily exercise, of which he had said that it is profitable to little. Reply Obj, 3. Although science stands before counsel by reason of its Judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter; for counsel is concerned only with matters of difliculty,^’^ whereas the judgment of science embraces all matters. Reply Obj, 4. The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts in so far as these proceed from their powers; for reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the matter, "De Serm. Dom,, I, 4 (PL 34, 1234). Aristotle, Eth,, III, 3 (1112b 9). Q. 68. Art. 8 THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST 541 counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is science united to piety; because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while science and piety are concerned with or- dinary matters. Hence counsel and fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to science and piety. Eighth Article WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE GIFTS? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says while speaking of charity: No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost ^ but, without charity, they avail nothing But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Obj. 2. Further, that which is naturally prior seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost, for Gregory says that the gift of the Holy Ghost, in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues (viz., the gifts), so as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, science; against hardness of heart, piety; against pride, fear.^^ Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that the virtues cannot be used to evil pur pose. But it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says: offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may make us proud; or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it* gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest science, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair. Therefore the virtues are more ex- cellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost. On the contrary. The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is 'shown in the passage quoted, so that they seem to accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. / answer that, As was shown above, there are three kinds of virtues; for ^De Tfin., XV, 18 (PL 42, 1082). ^ Moral, II, 49 (FL 75, 592). Lib. Arb., 11 , 18; 19 (PL 32, 1267; 1268). Moral., I, 35 (PL 75, 549). 542 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 68. Art. 8 some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral.^® The theological virtues are those whereb}^ man’s mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected ; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite for obedience to the reason. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the divine motion. Accordingly, the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his IMover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Therefore, just as the intellectual \artues are more excellent than the moral virtues and con- trol them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says that the seven sons, i,e., the seven gifts, never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all that they do be done in faith, hope, and charity P But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have precedence over the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul’s powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover, whereas the virtues perfect either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason. Now it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more excel- lent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. There- fore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues. Reply Ob], i. Charity is a theological virtue, and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. Reply Ob], 2, There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is according to the order of perfection and dignity, as the love of God precedes the love of neighbor; and in this way the gifts precede the intel- lectual and moral virtues, but are less perfect than the theological virtues. The other is the order of generation or disposition, and thus the love of one’s neighbor precedes the love of God, as regards the act. And in this way, the moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well ordered in relation to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly ordered in relation to God. Reply Obj. 3. Wisdom, understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which dealeth not per- versely {i Cor. xiii. 4). Consequently wisdom, understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say. "Q. 58, a. 3; q, 62, a, i. ^ Moral,, I, 27 (PL 75, 544). Question LXIX ON THE BEATITUDES {In Four Articles) We must now consider the beatitudes, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues? (2) The rewards of the beatitudes: whether they belong to this life? (3) The number of the beatitudes. (4) The fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes. First Article WHETHER THE BEATITUDES DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS? We thus proceed to the First Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine assigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v. 3, seqq,) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost and Ambrose in his com- mentary on Luke vi. 20, seqq,, ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there to the four cardinal virtues.^ Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. Ohj. 2. Further, there are but two rules of the human will, namely, the reason and the eternal law, as was stated above Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason, while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has been said."^ There- fore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them. Ohj. 3. Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g., poverty, mourning and peace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. / answer that. As we have stated above, happiness is the last end of human life.^ Now one is said to possess the end already when one hopes to possess it; and therefore the Philosopher says that children are said to be '^De Serm. I, 4 (PL 34, 1234). "In Luc., Y, super VI, 20 (PL 15, i734). ^Q. 19, a. 3 and 4; q. 21, a. i. *Q. 68, a. i and 3- 'Q- 2, a. 7; q- 3 . a. i- 543 544 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 69. Art. 2 happy because they are jull oj hope;^ and the Apostle says {Rom. viii. 24) . are saved by hope. Again, we hope to obtain an end because we are suitably moved towards that end and approach thereto; and this takes place through some action. N.w a man is moved towards the end which is happiness, and approaches to it by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be per- fected with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently, the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit from habit, but as an act from a habit. Reply Obj. i. Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues in the way that acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as we have stated above.'^ There- fore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, as- signs them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Reply Obj. 2. This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human life. Reply Obj. 3. Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness; and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to the gifts, because the gifts per- fect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as was stated above.^ Second Article WHETHER THE REWARDS ASSIGNED TO THE BEATITUDES BELONG TO THIS LIFE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not belong to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as we have stated above. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards belong to the life to come. Obj. 2. Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes in Luke vi. 25, where we read: Woe to you that are piled y for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep. Now these punishments do not belong to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job xxi. 13: They spend their days in wealth. Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes belong to this life. Obj. 3. Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward ^ Eth., I, 9 (iiooa 3). 68, a. 8. ®Q. 68, a. 2. Q. 69. Art. 2 THE BEATITUDES 545 of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says.® Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps. xvi. 1 5 : I shall be filled when Thy glory shall appear. — Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God, and that our divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 John iii. 2 : We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know thaty when He shall appeafy we shall be like to Hinij because we shall see Him as He is. Therefore these rewards belong to the future life. On the contrary y Augustine says: These promises can be fulfilled in this lifCy as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this life.^^ I answer that. The interpreters of Holy Scripture are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some hold, with Ambrose, that all these re- wards refer to the life to come;^^ while Augustine holds them to refer to the present life;^^ and Chrysostom in his homilies says that some refer to the future life, and some to the present life.^^ In order to make the matter clear we must note that hope of future hap- piness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to, future happiness, and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit. Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to, happiness, either perfect or inchoate; while those that are assigned as rewards may be either perfect happiness itself, and thus refer to the future life, or some beginning of hap- piness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. For when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and the gifts, it is to be hoped that he wiU arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom. Reply Obj. 1. Hope regards future happiness as the last end; and yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to the end, ac- cording to Ps. xxvii. 7: In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped. Reply Obj. 2, Although the wicked sometimes do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augus- tine says: Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord, that the disordered soul should be its own punishment. The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked Civit. Dei, XVII, 7 (PL 41, 539) ; De Serm. Dom., I, i (PL 34, 1231). “De Serm. Dom., I, 4 (PL 34, 1235). “/w Luc., V, super VI, 20 (PL 15, 1738). ^De Serm. Dom., I, 4 (PL 34, 1234). In Matt., horn. XV (PG 57, 223). Confess., I, 12 (PL 32, 670). 546 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 69. Art. 3 that their soul is divided against itself ^ . . . one part pulls this way, an- other that]'^'^ and afterwards he concludes, saying: If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice}^ In like manner, although, contrariwise, the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to Matt, xix. 29, and Mark x. 30: Ye shall receive a hundred times as much even in this time. Reply Ob], 3. All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come; but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this life. For the kingdom of heaven, as Augustine says, can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as the spirit begins to reign in men.^^ The pos- session of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by the land. — ^They are comforted in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the Paraclete, i.e., the Comforter.^^— They have their fill, even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said {Jo. iv. 34) : My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me. — ^Again, in this life, men obtain God’s mercy. — ^Again, when the eye is cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, see God. — ^Likewise, in this life, those who are the peace- makers of their own movements, approach to a likeness to God, and are called the children of Nevertheless, these things will be more per- fectly fulfilled in heaven. Third Article WHETHER THE BEATITUDES ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumer- ated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as has been stated above. Now some of the gifts, viz., wisdom and understanding, belong to the con- templative life; and yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of contempla- tion, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. There- fore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. Obj. 2, Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g., science and counsel; and yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of science or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently indicated. Obj. 3. Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to corre- spond to the beatitude of mercy; and yet nothing is included directly con- nected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. Obj. 4. Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Scripture. IX, 4 (ii66b 19). ^Ibid. (ii66b 27). De Serm. Dom., I, 4 (PL 34, 1235). “ Cf. St. Jerome, In Isaiam, XI, super XL, i (PL 24, 414). Q. 69. Art. 3 THE BEATITUDES 547 Thus, it is written {Job v. 17) * Blessed is the man whom God correctetk\ and {Ps. i. i) : Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly] and {Prov. iii. 13): Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. Ob '], 5. On the other handy it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, whereas eight beatitudes are in- dicated. Ob], 6. Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke (vi. 20). Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matt, (v. 3) are too many. 7 answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident, it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things;^® for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life. Now these three kinds of ^^PPi^^ss stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy. For sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude, while the happiness of the active life is dispositive towards future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if im- perfect, is a beginning thereof. And so Our Lord placed, in the beginning, certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors. F rom these a man is withdrawn by virtue, so that he uses them in modera- tion; and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them alto- gether. Hence the first beatitude isr Blessed are the poor in spirit, which may refer either to the contempt of riches or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one’s passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions, a man is withdrawn by a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the rule of reason; and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that, according to God’s will, a man is altogether undisturbed by them. Hence the second beatitude is: Blessed are the meek. From following the concupiscible passions, a man is with- drawn by virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation; and by a gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether — nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow. Hence the third beatitude is: Blessed are they that mourn. The active life, on the other hand, consists chiefly in man’s relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former we are disposed by virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice; and by a gift, so that we ^®Cf. Aristotle, Eth,, I, 5 (logsb 16). 548 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 69. Art. 3 do the same mnch more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man desires food and drink with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice. With regard to spontaneous favors, we are perfected by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we should give, e.g.^ to our friends or others united to us, which pertains to the virtue of liberality; and by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty. Hence it is written {Luke xiv. 12, 13) : When thou makest a dinner or supper , call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, etc. . . . hut . . . call the poor, the maimed, etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy. Hence the fifth beatitude is: Blessed are the merciful. Those things which concern the contemplative life are either final be- atitude itself, or some beginning thereof ; and therefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, 'which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included as merits in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and gifts by which man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man’s heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions. Hence the sixth beatitude is: Blessed are the clean of heart. But as regards the virtues and gifts by which man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to Isaias xxxii. 17: The work of justice shall be peace. Hence the seventh beatitude is: Blessed are the peacemakers. Reply Obj. i. The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are in- dicated in the merits themselves, but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. For to see God corresponds to the gift of understanding; and to be like God, by being adopted children of God, corresponds to the gift of wisdom. Reply Obj. 2. In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as also the Philoso- pher states.-*^ Therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life — such acts, namely, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g., to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of science; but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g., mourning in respect of science, and mercy in' respect of counsel. Reply Obj. 3. In applying the beatitudes to the gifts, we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way, all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to science and counsel as to their directing principles. But they must be distributed among the executive gifts, so that, namely, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy, too, correspond to piety, which perfects Eth ., 11, 2 C 1 103b 27). 549 Q. 69. Art. 3 THE BEATITUDES man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Luke vi. 22: It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger ^ and to curb indignation,^'^ since fortitude is concerned with the irascible passions; pov- erty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world. Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes, and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently in some respects. Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which be- longs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is science, whereby man knows his failings and those o-f worldly things, according to Eccles. i. 18: He that addeth knowledge [scientia], addeth also sorrow [Vulg., labor]. The principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul; and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to Dan. iv. 24: Let my counsel be acceptable to the king; and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor. — It is thus that Augustine assigns them.^^ Reply Obj. 4. All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Scripture must be re- duced to these, either as to merits or as to rewards; because they must all belong either to the active life or to the contemplative life. Accord- ingly, when we read, Blessed is the man wham the Lord correcteth, we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning ; when we read, Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, we must refer it to cleanness of the heart; and when we read, Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom, this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can be adduced. Reply Obj. 5. The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. For, from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude correspK)nds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. Reply Obj. 6. Luke relates Our Lord’s sermon as addressed to the mul- titude (vi. 17). Hence he sets down the. beatitudes according to the capac- ity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, temporal and earthly. Therefore by these four beatitudes Our L^rd excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by sa3dng: Blessed are ye poor . — The second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink and so forth, and this he excludes by saying in the second place: Blessed are ye that hunger. The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside by sa3dng: Blessed are ye that weep now. The fourth is the outward favor of man, and this he ex- cludes, saying, fourthly: Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you. ^In Luc., V, super VI, 22 (PL 1 $, 1739). “De Serm. Dorn., I, 4 (PL 34, 1234). 550 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 69. Art. 4 And, as Ambrose says on Luke vi. 20, poverty corresponds to temperance y which is unmoved by delights; hunger , to justice y since he who hungers is compassionate andy through compassiony gives; mourning , to prudence y which deplores perishable things; endurance of men’s hatred belongs to fortitude?^ Fourth Article WHETHER THE REWARDS OF THE BEATITUDES ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are un- suitably enumerated. For the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life, con- tains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. Obj. 2. Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground, it should have been assigned to all. Obj. 3. Further, the beatitudes are arranged in an ascending order, as Augustine remarks;-^ whereas the rewards seem to be placed in a descend- ing order, since to possess the land is less than to possess the kingdom of heaven. Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. On the contrary stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards {Matt. v. 3; Luke vi. 20). . I answer thaty These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness posited above. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists; which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz., in God, but in temporal and perishable things. Therefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to the things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz.. In riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are contained in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the king- dom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful pos- session of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are ^In Luc.y V, super VI, 20 (PL 15, 1739). ^ De Serm. Dorn., I, 4 (PL 34, 1234) . Q. 69. Art. 4 THE BEATITUDES 551 the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor; from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in corre- spondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal goods. Therefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, by which they shall be delivered from all misery. The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude. Hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions in- cluded in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly, and hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God. — Again, to make peace, either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, 'Who is a God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom. Reply Obj. i. As Chrysostom says,-^ all these rewards are one in reality, viz., eternal happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various goods known to us, while observing their fittingness in relation to the merits to which those rewards are assigned. Reply Obj. 2. Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it re- turns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be at- tributed consequently to it. Or else, according to Ambrose,-® the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as re- gards the glory of the body. Reply Obj. 3. The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it, since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fiU than simply to be comforted, because fullness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king’s son. Matt.^ horn. XV (PG 57, 228). ^ In Luc.j V, super VI, 20 (PL 15, 1737)- Question LXX ON THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST {In Four Articles) We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts? (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes? (3) Of their num- ber. (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh. First Article WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST WHICH THE APOSTLE ENUMERATES IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS ARE ACTS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle {GaL v. 22, 23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit, for it is written {Wis, iii. 15): The fruit of good labor is glorious f and {Jo. iv. 36): He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gather- eth fruit unto life e-derlasting. Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. Obj. 2. Further, as Augustine says, we enjoy [fruimur] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them A But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. Obj. 3. Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle num- bers certain virtues, viz., charity, meekness, faith and chastity. Now the virtues are not actions but habits, as we have stated above.^ Therefore the fruits are not actions. On the contrary. It is written {Matt. xii. 33): By the fruit the tree is known. That is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage.^ Therefore human actions themselves are called fruits. / answer that. The name fruit has been transferred from the material to the spiritual. Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation, namely, to the tree that produces it, and to the man who De Trin., X, 10 (PL 42, 981)- 'Q. 55, a. i. ^ Glossa ordin. (V, 29B). — Cf. below, q. 73, a. 6. S52 Q. 70. Art. i FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST 553 gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the name fruit in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that wLich he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are not called fruits, but that only which is last, namely, that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end, which is intended for his enjoyment. If, however, by man’s fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits. For operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If, then, man’s operation proceeds from man according to the ability of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason ; but if it proceeds from him according to a higher powrer, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man s operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a divine seed; for it is written (i John iii. 9): Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him. Reply Obj, i . Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits ; but, in so far as they are directed to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers. Hence it is written {Eccliis. xxiv. 23 ) : My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches. Reply Obj. 2. When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression for the sake of be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly, so that it express the formal cause; and in this way a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health for its own sake, as in an end; in a pleasant medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a bitter medicine, in no way for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. — Accord- ingly, we must say-that a man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness, which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says that virtuous deeds are called fruits because they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight.^ Reply Obj. 3. Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions. Thus Augustine writes: Faith is to believe what thou seest not\'^ and: Charity is the movement of the soul towards lovmg God and neigh- bor.^ It is tins that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits. *De Parad., XIII (PL 14, 325). ^ Tract. XL, super Ioann. VIII, 32 (PL 35, 1690). ° De Doct. Christ., Ill, 10 (PL 34, 71). i THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 70. Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER THE FRUITS DIFFER FROM THE BEATITUDES? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beati- tudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as we have stated above.' But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are the fruits of the Holy Ghost. Obj. 2. Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude, which is that of actual possession, so the fruits of the present life are related to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is future beatitude itself. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. Obj. 3. Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as we have stated above.® Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. On the contrary j Things divided into different species, differ from . one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. / answer thatj More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. For it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights, whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues, as we have already stated.® Reply Obj. i. This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. Reply Obj. 2. The fruit of eternal life is absolutely ultimate and perfect. Hence it differs in no way from future beatitude. On the other hand, the fruits of the present life are not absolutely ultimate and perfect; and there- fore not all the fruits are beatitudes. Reply Obj. 3. More is required for the nature of beatitude than for that of fruit, as has been stated. Third Article WHETHER THE FRUITS ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED BY THE APOSTLE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by ■'Q. 69, a. I, ad 1. ®Q. 3,a. i; q. 4, a. i. *Q. 6g, a. i, ad i. Q. 70. Art. 3 FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST 555 the Apostle {GaL v. 22, 23). Because he says elsewhere that there is only one fruit of the present life. Thus Rom. vi. 22: You have your jruit unto sanctification. Moreover it is written {Isa. xxvii. 9) : This is all the jruit . . . that the sin ... be taken away. Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. Obj. 2. Further, fruit is the product of a spiritual seed, as has been stated. But Our Lord mentions {Matt. xiii. 23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz., hundredfold, sixty fold and thirty- Jold. Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits. Obj. 3. Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle, for patience and long-siiffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated. Obj. 4. On the other hand. It seems that they are enumerated insuffi- ciently and incompletely. For it has been stated that all the beatitudes may be called fruits, and yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated. 1 answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable. There is possibly a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is written {Apoc. xxii. 2): On both sides of the river was the tree of life bearing twelve fruits. Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the difference among these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us. This process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. Accordingly, man’s mind is then well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our affections and the root of them all, as we have stated above.^® Therefore, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon charity first, in which the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written {Rom. V. 5) : The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us . — ^The necessary result of the love of charity is joy, because every lover rejoices at being imited to the beloved. Now charity has always present the God Whom it loves, according to i John iv. 16: He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him; and therefore the sequel of charity is joy. Now the perfection of joy is peace, and this in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance, for it is 27, a. 4; q. 28, a. 6, ad 2 ; q. 41, a. 2, ad i. 556 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 70. Art. 3 impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof ; and again, if a man’s heart is perfectly at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing. Hence it is written (Ps. cxviii. 165) : peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block^ because, namely, external things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the subsiding of restless desire, for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Therefore after charity and joy, peace is given the third place. — In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being dis- turbed whenever evil threatens, which pertains to patience; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed, which belongs to long-suffering^ since to lack good is a kind of evilP- Man’s mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz., his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good, and to this belongs goodness; sec- ondly, as to the execution of well-doing, and to this belongs benignity, for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame of love has enkindled the desire to do good to their neighbor; thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him, and to this belongs meek- ness, which curbs anger; fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit, and to this pertains faith, if we take it as meaning fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that is his to God. Alan is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by modesty, whereby we observe the mode in all our words and deeds; as r^ards internal desires, by continence and chastity (whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, continence also from lawful desires, or because the continent man is sub- ject to concupiscence, but is not led away, whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away by, them) . ^ Reply Obj. i. Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently, fruit is mentioned there in the singular because it is generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. Reply Obj. 2. The hundredfold, sixtyfold and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees of perfec- tion, even in the same virtue. Thus continence of the married state is said to be signified by the thirty fold fruit; the continence of widowhood, by the "'Cf. Cicero, Tusc, Disp., I, 36 (p. 262); Aristotle, Eth., V, 3 (1131b 21). Q. 70. Art. 4 FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST 557 sixtyfold; and virginal continence, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle and its end. Reply Obj. 3. The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is some- thing to delight in. — And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, inasmuch as it contains certainty. Hence the Gloss explains: Faith j which is certainty about the unseen}'^ Reply Obj, 4. As Augustine says on Gal, v. 22, 23, the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit there are; but to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after,^^ Hence, either more or fewer fruits might have been men- tioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Therefore the acts of wisdom, and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. Fourth Article WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONTRARY TO THE WORKS OF THE FLESH? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates {Gal, V. 19, seqq.). For contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not con- trary to them. Obj, 2. Further, one thing has one contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. Obj. 3. Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy and peace, to which fornication, uncleanness and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh, are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh. On the contrary, The Apostle says {ibid. 17) that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. ^ St. Jerome, Adv. lovin., I, 3 (PL 23, 223). Cf. St. Augustine, Quaest. Evang., I, 9, super Matt,, XIH, 13 (PL 35, 1325). Glossa interl, super Gal., V, 23 (VI, 87V). Gal., super V, 22 (PL 35, 2141). 558 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 70. Art, 4 I answer thatj The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general, and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost, considered in general, are contrary to the works of the flesh. For the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason; whereas the appetite of the flesh, viz., the sensitive appetite, draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Therefore, since upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit. Secondly, both fruits and carnal works as enumerated may be consid- ered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this way they are not of necessity contrary each to each, because, as was stated above, the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. — However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on GaL V. 22, 23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus to fornication^ which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wed- lock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God, wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturb- ances arise from fornication, and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is long-suffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell, while kindness helps us to cure those evils, and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, continence?-^ Reply Obj. i. That which proceeds from a tree, against the tree’s nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to reason, there- fore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, but not so works of vice. Reply Obj. 2. Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways, as Dionysius says.^'^ Hence, to one virtue many vices are contrary. Conse- quently, we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said. Gal., super V, 22 (PL 35, 2141). De Div. Nom., IV, 31 (PG 3, 732), Question LXXI ON VICE AND SIN, CONSIDERED IN THE:MSELVES {In Six Articles) We have in the next place to consider vice and sin, about which six points have to be considered: (i) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction;^ (3) their comparison with one another;- (4) the subject of sin;^ (5) the cause of sin; ^ (6) the effect of sin.^ Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) WTiether \’ice is contrary to virtue? (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature? (3) WTiich is worse, a vice or a vicious act? (4) WTiether a vicious act is compatible with virtue? (5) Whether every sin includes some act? (6) On the defini- tion of sin proposed by Augustine : Sin is a word, deed or desire against the eternal law.^ First Article WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x? Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it, since vice applies also to an undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever. Obj. 2. Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. But vice does not denote anything relative to a power. Therefore vice is not con- trary to virtue. Obj. 3. Further, Cicero says that virtue is the souths health,^ Now sick- ness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. On the contrary, Augustine says that vice is a quality according to which the soul is evil^ But virtue is a quality which makes its subject good, as was shown above.^® Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. I answer that. Two things may be considered in virtue, namely, the es- sence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained- In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider some- thing consequently. Virtue implies directly a disposition whereby the sub- ^Q. 72. ^Q. 73. ®Q. 74. ^Q. 75. ®Q. 85. ^Contra Faust,, XXII, 27 (PL 42, 418). ^Aristotle, Metaph., IX, 4 (lossa 19) ; 5 (1055b 30). ^Tmc. Disp., IV, 13 (pp. 375-376). "£>6 Perfect. lust., II (PL 44, 294). 55, a. 3 and 4- 559 56o the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 71. Art. i ject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature; and hence the Philosopher says that virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature}^ That which virtue implies consequently is that it is a kind of goodnesSj because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. Now that to which virtue is directed is a good actj as was shown above.^- xAccordingly, three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is sin, which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is or- dained; for, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act, even as an act of virtue is an ordered and due act. In respect of that which virtue im- plies consequently, viz., that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is malice] while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is vice, because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature. Hence Augustine says: Whatever is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a viceP Reply Ohj. i. These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect; for sin is opposed to virtue according as the latter is produc- tive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as virtue. Reply Obj. 2. Virtue signifies not only the perfection of a power which is the principle of action, but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act; so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. Reply Ob), 3. As Cicero says, disease and sickness are vicious qualities, for in speaking of the body he calls it disease when the whole body is in- fected, for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness when the disease is attended with weakness] and vice when the parts of the body are not well compacted together^ And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hid- den complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupa- tions. yet in the soid, as he says, these two things are indistinguishable, except in thoughtP For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties, since a tree is known by its fruit, i.e., a man by his works, according to Matt. xii. 33. But vice of the soul, as Cicero says, is a habit or affection of the son! discordant and at war with itself throughout life; and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e,g,, when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently, vice is of wider extent than sickness or '^Phys., VII, 3 (246a 13). Q. s6, a. 3. Disp,, IV, 13 (p. 375). -^^Ibid, ^De Lib. Arb., Ill, 14 (PL 32, 1291). Q. 71. Art. 2 VICE AND SIN IN GENERAL 561 disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health, for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue.^® Consequently, vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue more fittingly than sickness or disease. Second Article WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO NATURE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. For vice is contrary to virtue, as we have stated above. Now virtue is in us, not by nature, but by infusion or habituation, as was stated above.^”^ Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. Obj. 2. Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature. Thus a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement}^ But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. Obj, 3. Further, anything contrary to a nature is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written {Matt, vii. 13) : Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. There- fore vice is not contrary to nature. Obj. 4. Further, sin is compared to vice as act to habit, as was stated above. Now sin is defined as a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God, as Augustine shows.^^ But the law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. On the contrary, Augustine says: Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature?^ I answer that, As we have stated above, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as was stated above. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason that thing is vituperated, — a term which is derived from vice, according to Augustine.^^ But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul, and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now man^s good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states.^^ Therefore human virtue, Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3 (246b 4). ^’’Q. 63, a. i, 2 and 3. ^Aristotle, Eth., II, I (1103a 20). Contra Faust,, XXII, 27 (PL 42, 418). ^ De Lib, Arb., Ill, 13 (PL 32, 1290). ^Op. cit., ni, 14 (PL 32, 1291). ^De Div. Nom., IV, 32 (PG 3, 733). 562 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 71. Art. 3 wMch makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man s nature in so far as it accords with his reason; while vice is contrary to man’s nature in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. Reply Obj. 1 . Although the virtues are not caused by nature according to their perfect being, yet they incline us to that which accords with nature, i.e., with the order of reason. For Cicero says that virtue is a habit in accord with reason j after the manner of a nature'f^^ and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and, on the other hand, that vice is contrary to nature. Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing as being against nature in so far as being against nature is contrary to being from nature, and not in so far as being against nature is contrary to being in accord with nature, in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, inasmuch as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. Reply Obj. 3. There is a twofold nature in man, rational and sensitive. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man arrives at acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sen- sitive nature, than who follow the order of reason; because more reach the beginning of a thing than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason. Reply Obj. 4. WTiatever is contrary to the nature of a work of art is likewise contrary to the nature of the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says that every nature, as such, is from Gad; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the divine art whereby it was made.^^ Third Article WHETHER VICE IS WORSE THAN A VICIOUS ACT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that vice, i.e., a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e., a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a .vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. Obj. 2. Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. ®X>e Invent., II, 53 (p. 147*"). ^De Lib. Arh., Ill, 15 (PL 32, 1291). Q. 71- Art. 4 VICE AND SIN IN GENERAL 563 Obj, 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit pro- duces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness. There- fore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act, but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit. I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that, both in good and in evil, act is better than potency, as is stated in Metaph. ix.-^ For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and, in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil. Whence it also follows that, both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, namely, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act ; and hence a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act. Therefore, an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since the cause that a thing is such, is yet more so. Reply Obj. i. Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another absolutely, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above an- other absolutely, if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. But the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently, act excels absolutely in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect. Reply Obj. 2, A habit is several acts, not absolutely, but in a certain respect, i.e., virtually. Therefore this does not prove that habit precedes act absolutely, both in goodness and in badness. Reply Obj. 3. Habit causes act by way of efficient causality, but act causes habit by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently, act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Fourth Article WHETHER SIN IS COMPATIBLE WITH VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a vicious act, i.e., sin, is incompatible Aristotle, Metaph., VIII, 9 (losia 4). 564 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 71. Art. 4 with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in a way, contrary to virtue, as was stated above. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. Obj. 2. Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e,, an evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue. Neither, therefore, can sin. Ob], 3. Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary mat- ters.-^' Now sin never happens in natural things, except through some cor- ruption of a natural power. Thus monsters are due to a corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as is stated in Physics ii.^" Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul ; so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that virtue is engendered and cor- rupted by contrary causes Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as was stated above and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject. 1 answer that, Sin is compared to virtue as an evil act to a good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself, and therefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form. Thus, heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (unless perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover). But the habit that resides in the soul does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, can- not corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as a habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act, as was stated above.^® But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; and, consequently, when charity is banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled as virtues. And this I say for the sake of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it, neither does it, as a consequence, expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is ■ /.rlilotle, Phys., II, 8 (199a 33) Ibid, (199b 4). ^ Eth,, II, 3 (1105a 14). - , a. 3. "Q. 63, a. 2, ad 2. Q. 71. Art. 5 VICE AND SIN IN GENERAL 565 consistent with the acquired virtues; while venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired. Reply Ob], i. Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue. Reply Obj. 2. Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to a virtuous act; and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes an act of virtue. Reply Obj. 3. The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity. Hence the comparison fails. Fifth Article WHETHER EVERY SIN INCLUDES SOME ACT? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that every sin includes some act. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with \dce. Now there can be no merit without some act. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without some act. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says: So true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.^'^ Now nothing can be volun- tary save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies some act. Obj. 3. Further, if sin could be without some act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without some act. On the contrary, It is written {Jos. iv. 17): To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin. Now not to do does not signify some act. Therefore sin can be without an act. / answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some*^- say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or ex- terior: interior, as when a man wills not to go to church, when he is bound to go ; exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, conse- quently, to go without this other; unless, perchance, it does not occur to him that what he wishes to do will hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other ^De Lib. Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1295); De Vera Relig., XIV (PL 34, 133) • Anonymously reported by Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxxv, 3 (I, 495). S66 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 71. Art. 5 handj others^^ say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act; for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omis- sion we look merely at that in which the notion of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills not to go to church] while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church. If, however, in the sin of omission we consider also the causes or occa- sions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do. Now that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. If this cause be not in man’s power, the omission will not be sinful, as when someone omits going to church because of sick- ness. But if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and then such a cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs al- ways include some act, at least the interior act of the will. Now this act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills not to go to church, because it is too much trouble; and in this case the act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Some- times, however, the act of the will bears directly on something else, which hinders a man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with, the omission (as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church) or precede the omission (as when a man wills to sit up late at night, with the result that he does not go to church in the morning) . In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention. Now that which is outside the in- tention is said to be accidental,^^ Therefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding, the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. ^ Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is essen- tial, and not by that which is accidental; and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act, or else circumstantial acts and occa- sions would be es^ntial to other actual sins. Reply Obj, 1, More things are required for good than for evil, since good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect, as Dionysius states.^^ Hence, sin may arise when a man does what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought. But there can be no merit unless a man do willingly what he ought to do, and therefore there can be no merit without an act, whereas there can be sin without an act. ®Ci St. Albert, In 11 Sent., d. xxxv, a. 3 (XXVII, 565). Ih S (i 9 ^b 25). Div, Nom., IV, 30 (PG 3, 729). Aristotle, Phys., Q. 71. Art. 6 VICE AND SIN IN GENERAL 567 Reply Ob], 2, The term voluntary is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power 4:0 do or not to do, as is stated in Ethics iii.^^ Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will and not to will. Reply Obj. 3. The sin of omission is contrar^^ to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. Sixth Article WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS .4 WORD, DEED OR DESIRE CONTRARY TO THE ETERNAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law,^"^ Because word, deed and desire imply an act, whereas not every sin implies an act, as was stated above. Therefore, this definition does not include every sin. Obj, 2, Further, Augustine says: Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids.^^ Now will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire de- notes generally any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law, nor was there need to add word or deed, Obj, 3. Further, sin appears to consist properly in aversion from the end, for good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end, as was ex- plained above.^^ Therefore Augustine defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things and again he says that all human wickedness con- sists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use.^^ Now the definition in question contains no mention of aversion from our due end, and therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin. Obj, 4. Further, a thing is said to be forbidden because it is contrary to law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some are for- bidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. Obj. 5. Further, a sin denotes an evil human act, as was explained above.^^ Now man’s evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states.'^^ Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices.^^ Aristotle, Etk., Ill, 5 (1113b 20). ®^St. Augustine, Contra Faust., XXII, 27 (PL 42, 418). ^De Duab, An., XI (PL 42, 105). ®Q. 18, a. 6. ^ De Lib. Arb., I, II (PL 32, 1233). ^Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 30 (PL 40, 19). ^A. i; q. 21, a. I. ^De Div. Nom., IV, 32 (PG 3, 733). ^Contra Faust., XXII, 27 (PL 42, 418). 568 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 71. Art, 6 1 answer thatj As was shown above, sin is nothing else than an evil human act. Now an act is a human act because it is voluntary, as was stated above, whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g.j to*will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g., the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure. Now the conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is without measure. But there are tivo rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly, Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin: one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is, as it were, the matter of sin, when he says, wordy deed or desire; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, contrary to the eternal law. Reply Obj, i. Affirmation and negation are reduced to one and the same genus: e.g.y in divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus of relatiofij as Augustine observes.*^® Hence word and deed denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done. Reply Obj. 2. The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone sin is to be found; and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts themselves also belong to the substance of sin, because they are evil of themselves, as we have stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external acts. Reply Obj. 3. The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and, in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end. Hence, when he says, contrary to the eternal laWy he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of lack of order. Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that not every sin is evil on the ground that it is forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural tribunal of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited; since it is contrary to natural law precisely because it is lacking in order. Reply Obj. 5. The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God, and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin more fittingly with reference to its being contrary to the eternal law than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g.y in matters of faith. "Q. I, a. I. ^ De Trin., V, 6; 7 (PL 42, 914; 915). 20, a. i, 2 and 3. Question LXXII ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS {In Nine Articles) We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices, under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (i ) WTiether sins are distinguished specifi- cally by their objects? (2) The distinction between spiritual and carnal sins. (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes? (4) Whether they diher with respect to those who are sinned against? (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment? (6) WTiether they differ in regard to omission and commission? (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages? (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and de- ficiency? (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances? First Article WHETHER SINS DIFFER IN SPECIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sins do not differ in species according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil chiefly in relation to their end, as was shown above.^ Since, then, sin is nothing else than an evil human act, as was stated above, ^ it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. Obj. 2. Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects. Obj. 3. Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects; and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and ma- terial, as Gregory says,^ and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects. On the contrary j Sin is a word, deed or desire against God^s lawA Now words, deeds and desires differ in species according to their various objects, since acts differ by their objects, as was stated above.^ Therefore sins also differ in species according to their objects. ^Q. 18, a. 6. ^Q. 21, a. i; q. 71, a. i. ^ Moral., XXXIV, 23 (PL 76, 744). *St. Augustine, Contra Fatist., XXII, 27 (PL 42, 418). ®Q. 18, a. $; I, q. 77, a. 3. 569 570 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 72. Art. 2 I answer that, As we have stated above, two things concur in the nature of sin, viz., the voluntary act, and its lack of order, which consists in de- parting from God’s la'w.^ Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such a matter; the other, viz., the lack of order in the act, is referred accidentally to the intention^ of the sinner, for no one acts intending evil, as Dionysius de- clares.* Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental; for what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently, sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the lack of order inherent in sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was proved above.^ Therefore, it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects. Reply Ob], i. The end has primarily the nature of a good, and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently, it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends. Reply Ob], 2. Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order. Hence, sins differ specifically according to the objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were dis- tinguished in reference to the opposite virtues, it would come to the same; since the virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as was stated above.^ Reply Ob], 3. In various things differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things, and avarice seeks an abundance of things adapted to human use. Second Article WHETHER SPIRITUAL SINS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CARNAL SINS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distin- guished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says {Gal. v. 19); The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxup, idolatry, witchcrafts, etc., from which it seems that all the genera of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. 06 ;. 2. Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh,' as is stated in J?om. viii. 13; If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. Q. 72. Art. 2 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 571 But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the fleshy you shall live. Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins, since all sins are carnal. Obf. 3. Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to Ephes. iv. 23: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, where spirit stands for reason, according to the Gloss}^ Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; for consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on.^^ Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. Obf. 4. Further, if some sins are specifically carnal, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body. But, according to the Apostle (/ Cor. vi. 18), every sin that a man doth is without the body; but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body. Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle reckons covetousness with the carnal sins {Ephes. v. 3.). On the contrary, Gregory says that of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal}^ I answer that. As we have stated above, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. But, as was explained above, pleasure is two- fold.^^ One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere appre- hension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire ; and this can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g., when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure. Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure are called carnal sins, e.g., gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table, and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says {2 Cor. vii. i): Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit. Reply Obf. I. As the Gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, but not as though they consisted in carnal pleas- ure.^^ Rather flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine also says.^^ The rea- son for this is, because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. Glossa or din. (VI, 94 F) ; Glossa interl. (VI, 94v). ^Q. 74, a. 7. ^ Moral., XXXI, 45 (PL 76, 621). “Q. 31, a. 3. Glossa ordin., super Gal., V, 19 (VI, 87E) ; St. Augustine, De Civil. Dd, XIV, 2 (PL 41, 404). ^ Ibid. 572 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 72. Art. 3 This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. Reply Ob]. 3. Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz., the act of reason; but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure. Reply Obj. 4. As the Gloss says, in the sin of fornication the soul is the fiody^s slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else]^^ whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. — ^It may also be said that in this sin an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately ; and hence by this sin alone man is said especially to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another’s wife. — ^Again, it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins; but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, and therefore Gregory says that it is a spiritual sin. Third Article WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCE TO THEIR CAUSES? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in reference to the diversity of their causes. Obj. 2. Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like a material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes. Obj. 3, Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. Ixxix. 17 {Things set on fire and dug down), says that every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor. For it is written {i John ii. 16) that all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. Now a thing is said to be in the world because of sin, inasmuch as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes.^® Gregory, too, distinguishes all sins accord- ing to the seven capital vices.^® Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes. “Peter Lombard, In I Cor., super VI, 18 (PL 191, 1584). Enarr. in Psalm,, super LXXIX, 17 (PL 36, 1027). ^ Tract. II, super Ioann., I, 10 (PL 35, 1393). ^ Moral., XXXI, 45 (PL 76, 621). Q. 72. Art. 3 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 573 On the contrary. If this were the case, all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written {Ecclus. x. 15) that pride is the beginning of all sin, and ( / Tim. vi. 10) that the desire of money is the root of all evils. Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes. I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. For the formal and the material cause re- gard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ, in respect of their matter and form, both in species and in genus.— The agent and the end regard directly movement and operation. Therefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts, so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles. Thus, heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not deter- mined of necessity to one act, and consequently from one active or motive principle diverse species of sins can proceed. Thus from fear, engendering false humility, man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed fco his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence, it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above that human acts take their species from the end.^^ Reply Ohj. 1, The active principles in voluntary acts, not being deter- mined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves.^^ Consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. Reply Obj. 2. Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter about which, but in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter about which, they have the character of the termini from which movement takes its species.^- But even the termini of movement specify movements, in so far as a ter- minus has the character of an end. Reply Obj. 3. These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. “’Q. I, a. 3; q. 18, a. 6. ^ Metaph., VIII, 5 (1048a 10). “Aristotle, Phys., V, I (224b 7); Eth., X, 4 (1174b 4). 574 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Fourth Article Q. 72. Art« 4 WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SIN AGAINST GOD, against oneself, and against one’s neighbor? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i . It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one’s neighbor and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God, for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is against God’s law, as was stated above.-^ Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin. Obj. 2, Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another, for whoever sins against his neighbor sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three. Obj, 3. Further, specification is not taken from external things. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them, and, consequently, sin is unfittingly divided according to these three. On the contrary, Isidore, in giving the division of sins, says that man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor?"^ I answer that, As was stated above, sin is an inordinate act.^^ Now there should be a threefold order in man. One is in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rale of reason. Another order is in relation to the rule of the divine law, by which man should be directed in all things.. Now if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a political and social animal, as is proved in Politics i.,^® hence a third order is necessary, by which man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are com- prised under the order of God which surpass the human reason; e,g., mat- ters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because In all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neigh- bor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor. Now when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful and ^Q. 71, a. 6, "*It is not Isidore. Cf. the anonymous Summa Senteniiarum, III, 16 (PL 176, 1 13). ®Q, 71, a. I. ^Aristotle, Polit., I, i (1253a 2). Q. 72. Art. 5 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 57S the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and the murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor and himself are diverse. Therefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified. Hence this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins, because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said that by the theological virtues man is directed to God, by temperance and fortitude to himself, and by justice to his neighbor Reply Obj, i. To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. Reply Obj, 2. When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one exceeds another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures. For a triangle is dis- tinguished from a four-sided figure, not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby; and the same applies to the numbers three and four. Reply Obj. 3. Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as its object. Fifth Article WHETHER THE DIVISION OF SINS ACCORDING TO THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT DIVERSIFIES THEIR SPECIES? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the division of sins according to the debt of punishment diversifies their species, for instance, when sin is divided into mortal and venial. For things which are infinitely apart cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin. For the measure of the punishment corre- sponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Deut. xxv. 2: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. Therefore, venial and mortal sin are not in the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. Obj. 2. Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species, as mur- der and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as an idle word and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sin differ specifi- cally. ^ Q. 62, a. I ; q. 66, a. 4 and 6. 576 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 72. Art. 5 OS;. 3 . Further, as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, thus sin stands in relation to punishment. But reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as we have stated above. Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e,g,, specific differences. But punishment follows sin as its effect. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. 1 answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold differ- ence. The first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in diverse species, e.g., rational and irrational, animate and inanimate. The other difference is consequent upon specific diversity ; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent upon specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species. Thus white and black are consequent upon the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference in respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never con- stitutes a species; and what is outside the agent’s intention is accidental.^^ Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, and therefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless, it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz., the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore, the difference derived from the debt of punish- ment may be consequent upon the specific diversity of sins, but cannot con- stitute it. Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent upon the diversity of that lack of order which constitutes the nature of sin. For lack of order is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and an- other which, without destroying the principle of order, causes lack of order In the things which follow the principle. Thus, in an animal’s body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed: this is death; while, on the other hand, though the vital principle remains, there may be disorder in the bodily humors: and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as an indemonstrable principle does to mat- ters of speculation.^® Therefore, when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz., God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, then there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the separation of the principle of life, is irreparable *Artistotle, Phys., II, 5 (196b 23). ^Aristotle, Eth., VII, 8 (1151a 16). Q. 72. Art. 6 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 577 according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired because the vital principle itself remains, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs concerning principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise, in prac- tical matters, he who by sinning turns away from his last end, if we con- sider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment. But when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; and therefore he is said to sin venially, because, namely, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally. Reply Ob], i. Mortal and venial sin are infinitely apart as regards what they turn away from, not as regards what they turn to, viz,, the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins. For instance, in the species adultery the first move- ment is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin. Reply Ob'], 2, From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this dif- ference is consequent upon the specific difference of sins, not that it is their cause. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as we have stated above. Reply Ob], 3, The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtu- ally; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. Sixth Article WHETHER SINS OF COMMISSION AND OMISSION DIFFER SPECIFICALLY? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection 1, It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For offense and sin are co-divided against one another, according to Ephes, ii. i, where it is written: When you were dead in your offenses and sins, which words the Gloss explains, sa3dng: ^'Offenses,'' by omitting to do what was commanded, and '‘sins/’ by doing what was forbidden.^^ Whence it is evident that offense here denotes sins of omission; while sin denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are con- trasted with one another as different species. Ob], 2. Further, it is essential to sin to be against God’s law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said.^^ Now in God’s ^ Glossa interl, (VI, Qir) ; Peter Lombard, In Ephes., super II, i (PL 192, 179). 71, a. 6. 578 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 72. Art. 6 laWj the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of commission. Therefore, sins of omission and commission differ specifically. Ob'], 3. Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and nega- tion. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for there is neither species nor difference of non- beingj as the Philosopher states.^^ Therefore omission and commission can- not belong to the same species. On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission, and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically. / answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins, a material difference and a formal difference. The material difference is to be observed in the natural species of sinful acts, while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another materially in species, which are, nevertheless, formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end. Thus strangling, stoning and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species. — ^Accordingly, if we refer to the species in sins of omission and commission materially, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the species in sins of omis- sion and commission formally, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs and omits to give what he ought; and, in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins, for negation in things is always founded on affirmation, which in a way is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head that fire gives forth heat and that it does not give forth cold. Reply Ob], i. This division in terms of commission and omission is not according to formally different formal species, but only according to ma- terially different species, as has been stated. Reply Obj. 2. In God’s law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, to which we are induced by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative pre- cepts. Therefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they ^Phys., IV, 8 (2isa 10). Q. 72. Art. 7 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 579 are not, of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. ^Moreover, sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently, sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law. Reply Oh]. 3. This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. Seventh Article WHETHER SINS ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SINS OF THOUGHT, WORD AND DEED? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word and deed. For Augustine describes three stages of sin, of which the first is when the carnal sense offers an enticement , which is a sin of thought ; the second stage is reached when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of the thought] and the third stage, when consent is given to the deed?^ Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfit- ting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. Obj, 2 . Further, Gregory reckons four degrees of sin, the first of which is a fault hidden in the heart] the second, when it is done openly] the third, when it is formed into a habit] and the fourth, when man goes so jar as to presume on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair?^ There is no distinction here between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other de- grees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. Obj. 3. Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there pre- cede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. There- fore they should not be co-divided against one another. On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Ezech, xliii, 23, says: The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed?^ I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species, and thus a horse and an ox differ specifically; sec- ondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement, and thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares.^® The same can apply to the generation of animals. Accordingly, sins are divided into these three (viz., into sins of thought, word and deed), not as into various ^De Tnn., XII, 12 (PL 42, 1008). ^ Moral., I\^ 27 (PL 75, 661). ^In Ezech., XIII, super XLIII, 23 (PL 25, 446). Etk., X, 4 (1174a 19). 58 o the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 72. Art. 8 complete species, for the consummation of sin is in the deed, and therefore it is sins of deed that have the complete species. But the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as a man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought ; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently, these three differ according to the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless, it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds. The same applies to lust and to any other sin. Reply Ob], i. All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in re- spect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz., of cogitation, pleasure and consent. Reply Obj. 2. Sins of word and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory reckons them under one head; whereas Jerome distin- guishes between them because in sins of word there is nothing but mani- festation which is principally intended, while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man. Reply Obj. 3. Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinguished from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself; even as one part of a movement is not distinguished from the whole movement when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement. Eighth Article WHETHER EXCESS AND DEFICIENCY DIVERSIFY THE SPECIES OF SINS? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now more and less do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. Obj. 2. Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to departing from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to de- parting from the truth of a thing. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the thing. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by departing more or less from the rectitude of reason. Q. 72. Art. 8 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 581 Obj. 3. Further, one species cannot be made out of two, as Porphyry de- clares.^^ Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin, for some are at once illiberal and wasteful, of which illiberality is a sin by deficiency, and prodigality, a sin by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diver- sify the species of sins. On the contrary j Contraries differ specifically, for contrariety is a differ- ence of forMj as is stated in Metaph. x.^® Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to waste- fulness. Therefore they differ specifically. I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz., the act itself and its lack of order, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its lack of order, which is outside the sinner’s intention, as was stated above, but, on the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner’s intention is directed. Consequently, wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning in sins by excess is not the same as the motive for sinning in sins by deficiency; in fact, they are con- trary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are con- trary to one another. Reply Obj, i. Although more and less do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent upon specific difference, in so far as they are the result of a diversity of form. Such would be the case if we were to say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says that those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof P In this way, to exceed reason or to fall short of it belongs to specifically different sins, in so far as they result from different motives. Reply Obj. 2, It is not the sinner’s intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through depart- ing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood intends to hide the truth, and therefore, in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are differ- ent kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the boaster, who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the cheat, who tells less than the truth in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. ^ Isagoge, trans- BoetMus (PL 64, 150). ^Aristotle, Metaph., DC, 4 (1055a 3). ^Eth., VIII, I (iissb 13). 582 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 72. Art. 9 Reply Obj, One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects. For instance; one may be illiberal in taking what one ought not, and prodigal in giving what one ought not. Now nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. Ninth Article WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES? We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that vices and sins differ specifically accord- ing to different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says, evil results from each single defectp^ Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. Obj. 2. Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as we have stated above.”^^ Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. Obj. 3. Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: Hastily, sumptuously, excessively, greedily, daintily. Now these pertain to various circumstances, for hastily means sooner than is right; excessively, more than is right, and so on with the others. There- fore, the species of sin are diversified according to the various circumstances. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not\^^ and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect. I answer that, As we have stated above, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that, although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive. Thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the other circum- stances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money; and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diver- sify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species. Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives. For instance, that a man eat hastily may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, because of a rapid ^ De Div. Norn., IV, 30 (PG 3, 729). 15) ; IV, I (1119b 22). Q. 18, a. 10. Ill, 7 (1115b Q. 72. Art. 9 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS 583 exhaustion of the digestive humors; that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; and that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence, in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins. Reply Obj. i. Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the things of which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from privation or aversion, as was stated above, but from turning to the object of the act. Reply Obj. 2. A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. Reply Obj. 3. In the various species of gluttony there are various mo- tives, as we have stated. Question LXXIII ON THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER {In Ten Articles) We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another, under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (i) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another? (2) Whether all are equal? (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object? (4) WHiether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed? (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins? (6) Whether the gravity of sins de- pends on their causes? (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances? (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues? (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against? (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning? First Article WHETHER ALL SINS ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written {Jas, ii. 10): Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of alL Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of law is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says, sin is a transgression of the divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments^ Therefore, whoever commits one sin is guilty of all. Obj, 2, Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above.- Therefore whoever com- mits one sin is deprived of all the virtues. But whoever lacks a virtue has its opposite vice. Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all sins. Ohj, 3. Further, all the virtues are connected which they have a principle in common, as was stated above.^ Now just as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares.^ Therefore all vices and sins are also connected, so that whoever has one has them all. Farad., VIII (PL 14, 309). -Q. 65, a. i. ®Q. 65, a. i and 2. * De Civil. Dd, XIV, 28 (PL 41, 436). 5S4 Q. 73. Art. i COMPARISON OF SINS 5S5 On the contrary. Some vices are contrary to one anotlierj as the Philoso- pher states.^ But contraries cannot be together in the same subject. There- fore, it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another. / answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason is different from the intention of the sinner in de- parting from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, and hence the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz., prudence, as was stated above.® But the intention of the sinner is not directed to- wards departing from the path of reason: rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner’s intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact, they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin’s species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many. Reply Oh], i. James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns, and which causes the distinction of sins, as was stated above, but as regards that from which sin turns away, inasmuch as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the Law. Now all the commandments of the Law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever abends in one point, is become guilty of all, inasmuch as, by com- mitting one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. Reply Ob]. 2. As we have stated above, the opposite virtue is not ban- ished by every act of sin.^ For venial sin does not destroy virtue, while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act of sin, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue. However, if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, and its destruction entails the loss of prudence, since, when a man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as was stated above.^ Consequently, all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they par- take of prudence; yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless, it does not follow that for this ^ Eth., II, 8 (iioSb 27). ®Q. 65, a. i. "^Q. 72, a. i. ®Q. 71, a. 4. ®Q. S8, a. 4; q. 65, a. i. 536 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73 . Art. 2 reason man contracts all vices or sins: first, because several vices are op- posed to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue’s inclination to act, as was stated aboveA^ Therefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. Reply Obj. 3. The love of God is unitive, inasmuch as it draws man’s affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man’s af- fections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds. Hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together. Second Article WHETHER ALL SINS ARE EQUAL? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that all sins are equal. For sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. Obj. 2. Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal. Obj. 3. Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states.^^ Therefore all sins are equal. On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate {Jo. xix. ii): He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin, and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another. I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes,^- was that all sins are equal; and from this opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal.^^ So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero, the Stoics arriv^ at their conclusion by looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, namely, as it is a departure from reason. Hence, considering without reservation that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of “Q. 71, a. I. ^Paradoxa Stoicorum, III, i (p. 12). ^Ibid. “Jovinian, in St. Jerome, Adv. lovin., II, 18; 31 (PL 23, 326; 342). ^Cf. St. Augustine, De Haeres., 82 (PL 42, 45). Q. 73. Art. 3 COMPARISON OF SINS 587 privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in being corrupted. Thus, death is a privation of life, and darkness is a privation of light. Such privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; and hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were cov- ered by a single shade shutting out all the light. — There is, however, an- other privation which is not absolute, but retains something of the op- posite habit. It consists in becoming corrupted rather than in being cor- rupted: e.g., sickness, which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, or else the animal would cease to live. The same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains of the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of the humors or the members. The same applies to vices and sins, because in them the priva- tion of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether ; or else evil, if total, destroys itself, as is stated in Ethics iv.^^ For the substance of the act or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. There- fore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason; and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal. Reply Obj. i. To commit sin is unlawful because of some lack of order in them; and therefore those which contain a greater lack of order are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. Reply Obj, 2. This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. Reply Obj, 3. Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject. However, one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species; and, again, one man is more virtuous than another in the same species of virtue, as was stated above.^^ Moreover, even if the virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not. Third Article WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS VARIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary accord- Aristotle, Eth., IV, 5 (1126a 12). ^Q. 66, a. I and 2. 588 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73. Art. 3 ing to their objects. For the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality, whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects. Obj. 2. Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its turning to its object, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that from which it turns away. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects, Obj, 3. Further, sins that have different objects are of different genera. But things of different genera cannot be compared with one another, as is proved in Physics vii.^® Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects. On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above.^'^ But some sins are graver than others according to their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects. / answer that, As is clear from what has been said, the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another.^^ For just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animaFs nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle, the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness. Thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Therefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end, and therefore the higher the end which at- taches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. But the object of an act is its end, as was stated above, and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Therefore a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g,, mur- der, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g., theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g., unbelief, blas- phemy, and the like. Furthermore, in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or a lower principle. And since sins take their species from their objects, the differ- ence of gravity, which is derived from the objects, first and foremost re- sults, as it were, from the species. Reply Obj. i. Although the object is the matter about which an act is “ Aristotle, Phys., VII, 4 (248b 6) . Q. 72, a. i. A. £ ; q. 72, a. 5. Q. 72, a. 3, ad 2. Q. 73 . 4 COMPARISON OF SINS 589 concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is directed to it, as was stated above.“® Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above Reply Obj. 2, From the very fact that a man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion stamps perfectly the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns. Reply Obj, 3. All the objects of human acts are related to one another, and therefore all human acts have in a way one genus, in so far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore, nothing prevents all sins from being comparable with one another. Fourth Article WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS DEPENDS ON THE EXCEL- LENCE OF THE VIRTUES TO WHICH THEY ARE OPPOSED? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary ac- cording to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, namely, the graver sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, accord- ing to Prov. XV. 5, in abundant justice there is the greatest strength. Now. as Our Lord says {Matt. v. 20, seqq.), abundant justice restrains anger, that is a less grievous sin than murder, which a less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. Obj. 2. Further, it is stated in Ethics ii. that virtue is about the difficult and the goodp' from which it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. Obj. 3. Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13) . Now hatred, which is opposed to charity, is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair, which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. On the contrary. The Philosopher says that the worst is opposed to the best.^^ Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue, and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways. First, principally and directly, and this is the sin which is about the same object as virtue; for contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin ^Ibid. 18, a. 6; q. 72, a. 6. cit., VIII, 10 (ii6ob 9). ^Op. ^Aristotle, Eth., n, 3 (1105a 9). 590 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73. Art. 5 “must needs be opposed to tbe greater virtue, because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their species from the object, as was shown above.-’^ Therefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being most removed from it in the same genus. — Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered according to a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins; just as the more perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter’s effect. Reply Ohj. i. This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins. Reply Obj, 2. The greater virtue, which is about a more difficult good, is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more in- tent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty. Reply Obj. 3. Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God. Hence, not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. Fifth Article WHETHER CARNAL SINS ARE OF LESS GUILT THAN SPIRITUAL SINS? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt thqn spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, for it is written {Prov. vi. 30, 32) : The fault is not so great when a man has stolen, ... but he that is an adidterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his (mn souL Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin, while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus that the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry . But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt. Obj. 3, Further, the Philosopher proves that it is more shameful to be incominent in lust than in anger . But anger is a spiritual sin, according ®"Q. 60, a. s ; q. 72, a. i. ®Z)e Cwit. Dd, II, 4; 26 (PL 41, 50; 74). VII, 6 (1149b 2; b 24). Q. 73. Art. 5 COMPARISON OF SINS 591 to Gregory,-'^ while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin. On the contrary, Gregory says that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame, than spiritual sins.-^ I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins. Now this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin, but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject, for spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are con- summated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly be- longs to turn to goods of the body. Hence carnal sin, as such, denotes more a turning to something, and for that reason implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a turning from something, whence the notion of guilt arises, and for this reason it involves greater guilt. — second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed. For carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner’s own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins; and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. — ^A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz., our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. Reply Ob], i. Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as the Gloss observes on Ephes. v. 5 {No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person, etc.)^^; so that adultery is so much the more grievous than theft as a man loves his wife more than his chattels. Reply Obj, .2. The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust be- cause it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difflculty be with- drawn from it. For the desire of pleasure is insatiable, as the Philosopher states.^^ Reply Obj, 3. As the Philosopher himself says, the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger is that lust partakes less of reason and in the same sense he says that sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational animals?^ Hence, by these sins man is, so to ^ Moral,, XXXI, 45 (PL 76, 62). ^Op. cit., XXXIII, 12 (PL 76, 6SS). ^ Glossa ordin. (VI, 9SE) ; Peter Lombard, In Ephes,, super V, 5 (PL 192, 209). — Cf. St. Jerome, In Ephes,, III, super V, 5 (PL 26, 554). ^ Etk,, III, 12 (1119b 8). ^Op, cit., VII, 6 (1149b 2; b 24). ^Op. cit., Ill, 10 (iiiSb 2). 592 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73. Art. 6 speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says that they are more shameful. Sixth Article WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF A SIN DEPENDS ON ITS CAUSE? IFe proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. For the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist. For it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause. Obj, 2. Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin, and therefore the Gloss on Rom, vii. 7 {For 1 had not known concupiscence) says: The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.^^ Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause. Obj. 3. Further, just as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin; so much so, that he who lacks the use of reason is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause. On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. There- fore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin. I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, which is the will to sin; for it is compared to the sinful act as a tree to its fruit, as the Gloss observes on Matt. vii. 18 (^4 good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit). And the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those by which the will is inclined to sin, j^mong these causes we must make a distinction, for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will. Such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and fay such a cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end.— Other causes incline the will to sin against the nature and order of the will, vrhose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the Glossa ordin. (VI, i6E) ; Glossa interl. (VI, i6v) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super VII. 7 (PL 191, 1416). Glossa ordin. (V. 29B). Q. 73 - Art. 7 COMPARISON OF SINS 593 judgment of reason. Therefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g., ignorance) j or which weaken the free movement of the will weakness, violence, fear or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be alto- gether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. ^ Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as was stated. Reply Obj. 2. If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, be- cause the man who sins, being stiipulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, and therefore is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence, taken in this sense, follows the judg- ment of reason and the movement of the will, then the greater the con- cupiscence, the graver the sin; because sometimes the movement of con- cupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as was stated. Seventh Article WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE AGGRAVATES A SIN? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. For sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravitv of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. Obj. 2. Further, a circumstance is either evil or not. If it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance in no way aggravates a sin. Obj. 3. Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away [from God]. But circumstances affect sin on* the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin’s malice. On the contrary. Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin, for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance deserves to be forgiven.®^ Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. There- fore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous. 1 answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of the habits of virtue, it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it?^ Now it Aristotle, Eth., Ill, i (iiiia i). ^Op. cit., 11 , 2 (1104a 27). 594 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73. Art. 7 Is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance, for the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Therefore it is evident that it is natu- ral for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one genus to another. Thus, fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wdfe ; but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz., injustice, in so far as he usurps another’s property. And in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. — Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the character of sin. Thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were merely to give to whom he ought not; and for that very reason his sin is more grievous, even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says that in taking Ms father^ s life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes Ms lands, his house, Ms position in the re public P — ^Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance. Thus, taking another’s property constitutes the sin of theft, but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another’s property, the sin will be more grievous; although, in itself, to take much or little has not the character of a good or of an evil act. Reply Obj. i. Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as was stated above.^® Nevertheless a circumstance which does not specify may aggra- vate a sin; because, just as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to some accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. Reply Obj, 2. A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin’s species; for it can multiply the character of evil within the same species, as was stated above. And if it be not evil, it can aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. Reply Obj, 3. Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circum- stance, for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not. Now to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. But this turning aside from the rule of reason results from man’s turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason. ^ Farad, Stoic,, III, 2 (pp. 13-14). ®®Q. 18, a. 10. Q. 73. Art. 8 COMPARISON OF SINS 595 Eighth Article WHETHER SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF ITS CAUSING MORE HARM? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. For the harm done is an issue consequent upon the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malicCj as was stated above.^^ Therefore a sin is not aggravated because of its causing more harm. Obj. 2. Further, harm is inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor. For no one wishes to harm himself, and no one can harm God, according to Job XXXV. 6, 8: // thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee. If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself. Obj. 3. Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, and so much so, that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking ab- solutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If, therefore, a sin were more grievous because of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous because of its causing a greater harm. On the contrary, Augustine says: Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of a nature.^^ Now the diminution of the integrity of a nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm. I answer that. Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. For sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g., a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harnt aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. — Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, with the result that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case, again, the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, namely, as it is because his will is strongly inclined to sin that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish absolutely. — Sometimes, however, the ^Q. 20, a. 5. Ub. Arb., HI, 14 (PL 32, 1291). Q. 73. Art. 8 596 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA harm is neither foreseen nor intended, and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly. But be- cause he neglects to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follows directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because what- ever is directly consequent upon a sin belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin. For instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his inten- tion, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly. But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner him- self incurs. Such harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin. Such would be the case of a man who, in running to kill someone, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent upon the sinful act, although per- haps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft; but his sin is not aggravated because of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, who is seen to sin more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. Reply Obj. i. As we have already stated, in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action, if foreseen and in- tended, adds to the goodness and malice of an act.'^^ Reply Obj. 2. Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous. In fact, it is lack of order which of itself aggravates a sin. Therefore the harm itself that en- sues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are ^the most grievous, since a much greater lack of order is to be found in sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. — Moreover, we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g., by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. — ^Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for ex- ample, delivery from some anxiety. ^Q. 20, a. 5, Q. 73. Art. 9 COMPARISON OF SINS 597 Reply Oh]. 3. This argument does not hold, for two reasons. First, be- cause the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors, whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death, whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another’s spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. Ninth Article WHETHER A SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF THE CONDI- TION OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT IS COMMITTED? We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were the case, a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin, because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him than others who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. There- fore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. Obj. 2. Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin; for, as Cicero says, the man who kills his slave sins once; he that takes his father^ s life sins many timesA^ But the kinship of a person sinned against does not seem to aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to himself, and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g., to kill one’s own, than another’s horse, as the Philosopher declares.*^^ Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin. Obj. 3. Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly because of his position or knowledge, according to Wis. vi. 7: The mighty shall be mightily tormented] and Luke xii. 47: The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes. Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowl- edge. But it does not seem to be a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since there is no respect of persons with God {Rom. ii. ii), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin. On the contrary. Holy Scripture censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (j Kings xix. 14) : They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with Farad. Stoic., Ill, 2 (p. 13). ^Eth.,V, II (1138a 28). 59S THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73. Art. 9 the sword. — Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Mich. vii. 6: The son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother . — Furthermore, sins committed against persons of rank are expressly con- demned. Thus it is written {Job xxxiv. 18) : Who saith to the king: ‘^Thou art an apostate” ; who calleth rulers ungodly. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin. I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object, so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself and his neighbor. For whatever we do, it is because of one of these that we do it; although one of them is sub- ordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three. First, on the part of God, to WTom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God; so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds to God, according to Zach. ii. 8: He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye. Therefore a sin is the more grievous according as it is committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. — On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously according as the person against whom he sins is more united to^ him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. xiv. 5: He that is evil to himself, to whom will he he good? — On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously according as his sin affects more persons; so that a sin com- mitted against a public personage, e.g., a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person. Hence it is expressly prohibited (Exod. xxii. 28) : The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse. In like manner, it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence is all the more grave because of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. Reply Obj. 1. He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenu- ate the sin of the injurer. Reply Obj. 2. The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance, his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will ; but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an Q. 73 . Art. io COMPARISON OF SINS 599 injury on oneself, for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than an- other. Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the^ dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of in- juries done to such things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval. Reply Ob]. 3. There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank ; for this is done be- cause such an injury redounds to the harm of many. Tenth Article WHETHER THE EXCELLENCE OF THE PERSON SINNING AGGRAVATES THE SIN? We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : — Objection i . It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ecclus. xxv. 13: How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord. Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him; for it is written (a Paral. xxx. 18, 19) * The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. Obj. 2. Further, there is no respect of persons with God {Rom. iL 11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. Obj. 3. Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy because of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning. On the contrary, Isidore says: A sin is deemed so much the more griev^ ous, as the sinner is held to be a more excellent person}^ I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares because of the weakness of human nature, and such sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in restraining such sins. However, human weakness does not allow us to escape them alto- gether. — But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation, and these sins are all the more imputed to a man according as he is more ex- cellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a more ex- cellent person, e.g., one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; and hence Our Lord said {Luke xii. 47) that the servant who ^ Sent., II, 18 (PL 83, 621). 6oo THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 73- Art. lo knew the will of his lord, . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes. — SecondlVj because of ingratitudej because every good in wMch a man excels is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins; and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggra- vates a sin, according to Tl'w. vi. 7: The mighty shall be mightily tor- mented. — ^Thirdly, because the sinful act is particularly inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning. Such would be the case if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. — Fourthly, because of example or scandal, because, as Gregory says: Sm becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his posi- tions'^ For the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more indignation. Reply Ob], i. The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. Reply Obj. 2. God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as was stated. Reply Obj. 3. The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. Pastor., I, 2 (PL 77, 16). Question LXXIV ON THE SUBJECT OF SIN {In Ten Articles) We must now consider the subject of vice or sin, tinder which head there are ten points of inquirt^: (i) Whether the will can be the subject of sin? (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin? (3) W'hether the sensual- ity can be the subject of sin? (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin? (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? (6) WTiether lingering delectation [delectatio morosa], or non-lingering delectationj is in the lower reason as in its subject? (7) WThether the sin of consent to the act of sin is in the higher reason as in its subject? (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? (9) W^hether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? (10) Wliether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object? First Article WTHETHER THE WILL IS A SUBJECT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysi-us says that evil is outside the will and the intention} But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. Obj, 2. Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that the will wishes the good, it does not sin; and that it wishes what seems good, but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is in no way in the will. Obj. 3. Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin, because the efficient and the material cause do not coincider Now -the will is the efficient cause of sin, because the first cause of sinning is the will, as i\ugustine states.^ Therefore it is not the subject of sin. On the contrary j Augustine says that it is by the will that we sin^ and by which we live righteously} 1 answer that, Sin is an act, as was stated above.^ Now some acts pass ^De Div. Norn., W, 32 (PG 3, 732). ^Aristotle, Phys., II, 7 (198a 24). ®De Duab, Anim., X; XI (PL 42, 104; 105); cf. De Lib. Arb., Ill, 17 (PL 32, 1295). ^ Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 596). ®Q. 21, a. i; q. 71, a. i and 6, 601 602 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74. Art. 2 into external matter, e,g., to cut and to burn, and such acts have for their matter and subject the thing into which the action passes. Hence the Philosopher states that movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover. ^ — On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g., to desire and to know; and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently, the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they be voluntary, as we have stated above/ it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the prin- ciple of sins. Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject. Reply Obj. i. Evil is said to be outside the will because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense sin is in the will. Reply Obj. 2, If the defect in the apprehensive power were in no way subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the ap- prehensive power, as is evident in the case of those whose ignorance is in- vincible. It remains, therefore, that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. Reply Obj. 3. This argument applies to those efficient causes whose ac- tions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things ; but it is the contrary of this that is to be observed in the will, and hence the argument does not hold. Second Article WHETHER THE WILL ALONE IS THE SUBJECT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says that no one sins except by the will? Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. Ohj. 2. Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. Obj. 3. Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states, so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no^ sin at all.^ Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin, which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. ^Phys., Ill, 3 (202a 13). '^Q. I, a. i; q. 18, a. 6 and 9. Duab. Anim., X (PL 42, 104). ^De Lib. Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1295); De Vera Relig., XIV (BL 34, 133). 0. 74* Art 3 THE SUBJECT OF SIN 603 On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue, and contraries are about one and the same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as was stated above.^^ Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. I answer that, As was shown above, whatever is a principle of a volun- tary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we have stated above in treating of voluntariness.^^ Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject. Reply Obj, i. We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. Reply Obj. 2. Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. Reply Obj. 3. The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action, and hence they are compared to the soul which moves them as a slave who is moved but does not move. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Politics i.^- Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Conse- quently there is no comparison. Third Article WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE SENSUALITY? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man, who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now the sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin can- not be in the sensuality. Obj. 2. Further, no man sins in what he cannot avoid, as Augustine states.^^ But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since the sensuality always remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life, and therefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine declares.^^ Therefore the inordinate movement of the sen- suality is not a sin. 56, a. 3 and 4. ^Q. 6, a. 4. ^Aristotle, Polit., I, 2 (1254b 4). ^ De Lib. Arh., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1295). Trin., XII, 12; 13 (PL 42, 1007; 1009). 604 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74. Art. 3 Ob']. 3. Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the deliberation of reason, as the Philosopher says.^^ Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. On the contrary, It is written {Rom. vii. 19): The good which 1 will 1 do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do; which words Augustine explains as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a move- ment of the sensuality.^*^ Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. 1 answer that. As was stated above, sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality can be voluntary, in so far as the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally able to be moved by the will. Therefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality. Reply Obj. i. Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a cer- tain excellence through being united to the reason. Thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part inasmuch as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as was stated in the First Part.^”^ In the same way, our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason ; and in this respect it can be the principle of a volimtary act and, consequently, the subject of sin. Reply Obj. 2. The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be under- stood as referring to the ^fomes,’ which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the Tomes’ does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements (if he be pre- sentient of them), for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate move- ment may arise about this also. Thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleas- ures to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated move- ment of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, because of the aforesaid corruption; but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. Reply Obj. 3. Man does not do perfectly what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of a man does nothing therein. Hence, this is not perfectly a human act, and consequently it can- not be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. q- ^ Eth., IX, 8 (ii68b 35). 78, a. 4. ^^ 5 . T., I, ^°Serm. XXX, 2; 3 (PL 38, 188; 189). Q. 74. Art. 4 THE SUBJECT OF SIN 605 Fourth Article WHETHER MORTAL SIN CAN BE IN THE SENSUALITY? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. For an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g., about carnal pleasures. There- fore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, and hence mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. Ob], 2. Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality, for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states.^® Therefore, since it is natural to con- traries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. Ob], 3. Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since, therefore, venial sin may be in the sensuality, as was stated above, mortal sin can be there also. On the contrary, xA.ugustine says, and the Gloss on Rom. vii. 14 repeats: The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sen- suality, can even be in those who are in a state of grace, in whom, how- ever, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin. I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body’s life causes the body’s death, so, too, a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz., the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as was stated above.^^ Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end; and disorder in respect of the end can belong only to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Therefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason. Reply Obj. i. The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin; and yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to which the order- ing to the end belongs. Consequently, mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. Reply Obj. 2. An act of virtue is p>erfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose; for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice, and therefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of Ill, 10 (1117b 23). ^Retract., I, 23 (PL 32, 621); Glossa ordin, (VI, 17E). 72, a. s. 6o6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74. Art. 5 pradenccj which perfects the rational power. The same applies to mortal sin, as we have just stated. Reply Obj. 3. A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: — for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same sub- ject: thus, inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science; — sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing: thus, heat is a dis- position to the form of fire; — sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are ordered to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other: e.g., goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science, which is in the intellect. In this way the venial sin, that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. Fifth Article WHETHER SIN CAN BE IN THE REASON? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect in it. But the fault of the reason is not a sin; on the contrary, it excuses sin, for a man is excused from sin because of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. Obj, 2. Further, the primary subject of sin is the will, as was stated above. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. 06/. 3. Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control, since by nature some are intellectually slow, and some are quick. Therefore no sin is in the reason. ’ On the contrary j Augustine says that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.^^ 1 answer that^ The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown. Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in re- lation to its proper object, and this is the act of knowing a truth; the other is the act of the reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowl- edge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know; — secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the defect in the proper act of tile reason in relation to its proper object, and under circumstances when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know; ^De Trin., XII, 12 (PL 42, 1008), Q. 74. Art. 6 THE SUBJECT OF SIN 607 for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evi- dent with regard to the actions of madmen. — ^If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. — The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers is always imputed to reason as a sin, because the reason can always obvi- ate this defect by means of its proper act. Reply Ob'], 2. As was stated above, when we were treating of the acts of the will and the reason, the will moves and precedes the reason in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another.-- Hence both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly, sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the fact that the reason is the principle of the will’s act. The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said. Sixth Article WHETHER THE SIN OF LINGERING DELECTATION IS IN THE REASON? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of lingering delectation {de- lect atio morosa] is not in the reason.-^ For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as was stated above.-"^ But the appetitive pdwer is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore lingering delectation is not in the reason. Obj. 2. Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now linger- ing delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of lingering delectation is not in the reason. Obj, 3. Further, a thing is said to be lingering through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore, lingering delectation does not belong to the reason. On the contrary, Augustine says that 2/ the consent to a sensual delecta- tion goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit,^'^ Now the woman denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains. Therefore the sin of lingering delectation is in the reason. I answer that. As has already been stated, sin may sometimes be in the “Q. 17, a. I. ®®On this and the remaming problems in this question, cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., 11 , xxiv, 5-13 (I, 422-428). ^Q. 3L a. i. Trin., XII, 12 (PL 42, 1007). 6oS THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74- Art. 7 reason considered as directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently, when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions. First, when it commands un- lawful passions: for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust; secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion: for instance, when a man, having de- liberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, con- tinues, notwithstanding, to dwell upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of lingering delectation is said to be in the reason. Reply Ob], i . Delectation is, indeed, in the appetitive power as its proxi- mate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover. This is in accord- ance with what has been stated above, viz., that actions which do not pass into external matter are in their principles as in their subjects* Reply Ob]. 2. Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object, but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason; and, accordingly, delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason. Reply Obj. 3. Delectation is said to be lingering not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells thereon, and fails to drive it away, deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind, as Augustine says.^^ Seventh Article W’^HETHER THE SIN OF CONSENT TO THE ACT IS IN THE HIGHER REASON? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as was stated above,-” whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. Obj. 2. Further, the higher reason is intent on contemplating and con- sulting the eternal exemplars, as Augustine states.-*^ But sometimes con- sent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal exemplars, since man does not always think about divine things whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason. Obj. 3. Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal exemplars, so he can regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfill it by deed be- ‘^Ibid. (PL 42, lOoS). ^Q. IS, a. i. ^ De Tnn., XII, 7 (PL 42, 1005). Q. 74. Art. 7 THE SUBJECT OF SIN 609 longs to the lower reason, as Augustine states.-^ Therefore the consent to a sinful act likewise should sometimes be ascribed to the lower reason. Ohj. 4. Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand or foot. Therefore sometimes the lower reason likewise may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason. On the contrary, Augustine says: // the consent to the evil me of things, that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband, who signifies the higher reason. Therefore it belongs to the higher reason to consent to the act of sin. I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme tribunal, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles. For, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can still be submitted to it, and hence the judgment is still in suspense, since the final sentence has not as yet been pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule Is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and, further still, from the rule of the divine law, as was stated above.^^ Consequently, since the rule of the divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal exemplars. Now when judg- ment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last. But in human acts the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble to it. Therefore the consent to an act belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower tribunal; although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower tribunal is subject also to the judgment of the higher, but not conversely. Reply Obf. i. Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as was stated above.^^ Because, that the consent is finally given to a thing is ^ Op. dt., XII, 12 (PL 42, looS). ^Ibid, ®^Q. 19, a. 4; q. 71, a. 6. iS» a. 3. 6io THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74. Art. s due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has al- ready passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. Reply Obj, 2. The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the divine law (which direction would impede the act of sin), whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God’s law, it holds it in actual contempt; and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason, because, as Augustine says, the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed?^ Reply Obj. 3. The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action. Nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced, the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation; and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal exemplars, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. Reply Obj. 4. The apprehension of the imagination is sudden and inde- liberate, and hence it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time during which the higher reason can also deliberate; and, consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it. Eighth Article WHETHER CONSENT TO DELECTATION IS A MORTAL SIN? W e proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not con- sider the eternal exemplars, i.e., the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from the divine law, as is evident from Augustine’s definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above.^^ Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. Obj. 2. Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now the cause that anything is such is yet more so, or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents ^ De Trin., XII, 12 (PL 42, 1008). ^Q. 71, a. 6 . Q. 74. Art. 8 THE SUBJECT OF SIN 6ii cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin. Ob'], 3. Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states.^^ Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g.^ fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent upon the act of inward thought dif- fers in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and, consequently, there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought, and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation. Ob'], 4. Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason of a lack of order in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the lack of order in the act. Therefore he does not seem to sin mortally. Ob]. 5. Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornica- tion. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. Much less, therefore, is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication. Ob]. 6. Further, the Lord’s Prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts.^® Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord’s Prayer; for he says that this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfill it by deed, and hence we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: ‘^Forgive us our trespasses.”^'^ Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: Man will be alto- gether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them?^ But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin, / answer that, There have been various opinions on this point. For some^^ have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others^® have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must note that, since every delectation results from soihe action, as is stated in Ethics x.,^^ and again, that, since every delectation has an object, it follows that every delectation may be ^ Eth., X, 5 (ii7Sb 26). ^Enchir., LXXI (PL 40, 265). ^ De Trin., XII, 12 (PL 43, 1008). ^Ibid. ®®The reference seems to be to St. Albert, Summa de Creatur., I, tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3 (XXXIV, 713b) ; In U Sent., d. sxiv, a. 13 (XXVII, 412a). ^ Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxiv, 12 (I, 425-427). Aristotle, Eth., X, 4 (ii 7 Sa S)- 6i2 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74. Art. 8 compared to two things, viz., to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end in which the person, who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the ob- ject of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him. At other times, the delight consequent upon an action, e.g., a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accord- ingly, a man who is thinking of fornication may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself; secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought. But the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin. Sometimes, indeed, it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it: for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently, such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all ; and hence neither*is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. But that a man, in thinking of fornication, takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to the fact that his desire is inclined to this act. There- fore, the fact that a man consents to such a delectation amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication; for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Therefore, such a consent to de- lectation in a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion main- tains. Reply Obj. i. Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as was stated above. Nevertheless, the lower reason may turn away from the eternal exemplars, for, though it is not intent on them as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them as being regulated according to them. And it is thus that by turning from them it may sin mortally; for even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in ruling them according to the eternal exemplars. Reply Obj, 2. Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take Q. 74. Art. 9 THE SUBJECT OF SIK 613 pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delecta- tion in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin , and that it be a venial sin, before the consent is given, is accidental, viz., because of the incompleteness of the act. This incompleteness ceases when the deliber- ate consent has been given, so that, therefore, it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin. Reply Ohj. 3. This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object. Reply Obj. 4. The delectation which has an external act for its object cannot be without pleasure in the external act as such, even though there be no decision to fulfill it because of the prohibition of some higher author- ity. Hence the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will also be inordinate. Reply Ob']. 5, The consent to delectation, resulting from taking pleasure in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also; but not the consent to delectation resulting from pleasure taken in the thought of murder. Reply Obj. 6. The Lord’s Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved, not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. Ninth Article WHETHER THERE CAN BE VENIAL SIN IN THE HIGHER REASON AS DIRECTING THE LOWER POWERS? We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e.j as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says that the higher reason is intent on considering and consult- ing the eternal exemplars}- But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal exemplars. Therefore it seems that there can be only mortal sin in the higher reason. Obj. 2. Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, just as the heart is of the body’s life. But the diseases of the heart are fatal. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal, Obj. 3. Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible deliberately to commit even a venial sin without contempt. Since, then, the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, because of the contempt of the divine law. On the contrary. Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as was stated above. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason. ^De Trin., XII, 7 (PL 42, 1005). 6i4 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74- Art. io 1 answer that, As Augustine says, the higher reason is intent on contem- plating or consulting the eternal exemplars It contemplates the exemplars b}’’ considering their truth; it consults them by judging and directing other things according to them, and to this pertains the fact that, by deliberating through the eternal exemplars, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to which it consents is not contrary to the eternal exemplars in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is outside them, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore, when the higher reason consents to an act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal exemplars; and therefore it sins, not mortally, but venially. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Reply Ob']. 2. Disease of the heart is twofold. One is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural equilibrium; such a disease is always mortal. The other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the heart ; such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner, there is mortal sin in ^ the higher reason whenever the order itself ‘of the higher reason to its proper object, namely, the eternal exemplars, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. Reply Ob]. 3. Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the divine law. Tenth Article WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN THE HIGHER REASON AS SUCH? We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : — Objection 1 . It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e., as considering the eternal exemplars. For the act of a power is not found to fail except it be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal exemplars, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore, there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. Obj. 2. Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such. Obj. 3. Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us un- awares is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, because the reason, in deliberating, has recourse to some higher good, by acting against ^IbM. Q. 74- Art. io THE SUBJECT OF SIX 615 which man sins more grievously; just as when the reason, in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore, if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent delibera' tion make it a mortal sin ; which is clearly false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore, there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such. 1 answer that, The higher reason tends to its own object otherwise than to the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. For it does not tend to the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal exemplars about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. X^ow deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple intuition, and deliberation, in respect of which it again consults the eternal exemplars about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an in- ordinate movement about divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of God. XTow it is possible for one of the doctrines of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal exemplar, Le,, the law of God, is con- sulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it as soon as he has thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus, or it may sin mortally by giving a deliberate con- sent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. Reply Oh], i. A sin which is against the eternal exemplars, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, because of the incomplete- ness of a sudden action, as has been stated. Reply Obj. 2. In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles, from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as does 6i6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 74. xA.rt. 10 the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the rea- son both to syllogize and to form propositions. Consequently, the reason also can have a sudden movement. Reply Obj. 3. One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other. Thus the existence of God may be considered either as capable of being known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by divine revelation, which is a higher con- sideration. Therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher considera- tion ; and in this way, that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above. Question LXXV THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL {In Four Articles) We must now consider the causes of sin: (i) in general; (2) in particular.^ Under the first head there a,re four points of inquiry: (i) Whether sin has a cause? (2) Whether it has an internal cause? (3) Whether it has an ex- ternal cause? (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another? First Article WHETHER SIN HAS A CAUSE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as was stated above.- But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says.® Therefore sin has no cause. Obj, 2. Further, a cause is that from which something follows of neces- sity. Now that which is of necessity seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. Obj. 3. Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit {Matt. vii. 18) . Likewise, neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause. On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job. v. 6, nothing upon earth is done without a cause. But sin is something done, since it is a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God A Therefore sin has a cause. I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, in so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, in so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation. First, the ab- sence of the cause of affirmation : i.e., the negation of the cause itself is the cause of the negation in itself, since the result of removing the cause is the removal of the effect. Thus, the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a ^Q, 76. ®Q. 71, a. 6. ®De Div. Ncm., IV, 30 (PG 3, 732). ^ St. Augustine, Contra Faust., XXII, 27 (PL 42, 41S). 617 6i8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 75. Art. 2 sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation. Thus fire, by caus- ing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a priva- tion of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the lack of order in sin and in every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such a lack of order must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which natu- rally is and ought to be in a thing is never lacking except because of some impeding cause. And, accordingly, we are wont to say that evil, which con- sists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Xow every accidental cause is reducible to an essential cause. Since, then, sin has, on the part of its lack of order, an accidental efficient cause, and, on the part of the act, an essential efficient cause, it follows that the lack of order in sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly, then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin essentially, and the lack of order in the act accidentally and without intention; for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will. Reply Ob], i. Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which priva- tion is its lack of order, but also the act which is the subject of that priva- tion, which has the nature of evil. How this evil has a cause, has been explained. Reply Ob'] 2. If this definition of cause is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not im- peded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and yet that the effect does not follow of necessity, because of some super- vening impediment ; or else it would follow that all things happen of neces- sity, as is proved in Metaph. vi.^ Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. Reply Ob], 3. As was stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the divine law is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not apply- ing the rule of reason or of the divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied to the act. Accordingly, therefore, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good. Second Article WHETHER SIN HAS AN INTERNAL CAUSE? W e proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If, therefore, sin had an internal cause, man would* always be sinning, since, given the cause, the effect follows. ® Aristotle, Metaph., V, 3 (1027a 29). Q. 75. Art. 2 CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL 619 Ob]. 2. Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin. Ob]. 3. Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contraiy to nature, as Damascene states;^ while that which is voluntary, if it be in- ordinate, is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. On the contrary, Augustine says that the will is the cause of stn 7 I answer that, As we have stated above, the essential cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The prox- imate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, according to which man has free choice; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive ap- petite is inclined to something, which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain further on.® Accordingly, a double in- terior cause of sin may be assigned: one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensi- tive appetite. But since we have said above that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz., the rule of reason or the divine law, this motive, which is an apparent good, pertains to the appre- hension of the senses and to the appetite; the lack of the due rule pertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act pertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. Reply Obj. 1. That which is within a thing as its natural power is always in it; but that which is within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since, therefore, the move- ments that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. Reply Obj. 2. It is not true that all the internal movements belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. ^De Fide Orth., II, 4; 30; IV, 20 (PG 94, 876; 976; 1196). '' De Lib. Arh., Ill, 17 (PL 32, 1294); De Duah. Anim., X; XI (PL 42, 104; 105). ®Q. 77 , a. i. 620 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 75. Art. 3 Reply Obj. 3. That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is sometimes natural, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe. Third Article WHETHER SIN HAS AN EXTERNAL CAUSE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. Obj, 2. Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to none other than to an internal cause: for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore, in the moral order, sin can arise from none other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause. Obj. 3. Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man’s inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. On the contrary. It is written (Num. xxxi. 16) : Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor? Therefore something ex- ternal can be a cause of sin. I answer that, As we have stated above, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rale, and the sensitive appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly, something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as was stated above, none can move the will inwardly save God alone, ^ Who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on.^^ Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally of necessity move the sensitive appetite, ex- cept perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore, some- thing external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be its suffi- Q. 9, a. 6 . 79 , a. I. 621 Q. 75. Art. 4 CAUSES OF SIX, IN GENERAL dent cause. But the sufficient accomplishing cause of sin is the will alone. Reply Obj. i. From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. Reply Ob']. 2. The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as was stated. Reply Ob]. 3. If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless, the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the fact that the act is voluntary and in our power. Fourth Article WHETHER ONE SIN IS A CAUSE OF ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin causing another. For the end has the character of good, and this is incon- sistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like maimer, neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since evil is not an efficient cause j hut is weak and powerless, as Dionysius declares.^ ^ The material and formal causes seem to have no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause. Obj. 2. Further, to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing, as is stated in Meteor, iv.^^ But sin is essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another. Obj. 3. Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel: A sin that is not quickly blotted out by repentance is both a sin and a cause of sin.^^ I answer that. Inasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another in the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another according to the four kinds of causes. — First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both essentially and ac- cidentally. Accidentally, as that which removes an impediment is called an accidental cause of movement; for when a man, by one sinful act, loses ^De Div. Norn., IV, 31 (PG 3, 732). “Aristotle, Meteor., W, 3 14). “In Ezech., I, horn, ii (PL 76, 915). 622 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 75. Art. 4 grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Essentially, as when by one sinful act a man is disposed to commit more readily another like act; because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. — Secondly, after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another by preparing its matter. Thus covetous- ness prepares the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. — Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambi- tion, or fornication for the purpose of theft. — ^And since the end gives the form in moral matters, as was stated above, it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another; because in the act of fornication, committed for the purpose of theft, the former is as matter while the latter is as form. Reply Ob], i. Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil, but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, as its end; so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. — ^A sin has matter, not out of which, but about which it is; and it has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another according to the four kinds of cause, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 2. Sin is something imperfect because of the moral imperfec- tion involved in its lack of order. Nevertheless, as an act it can have the perfection of a nature, and thus it can be the cause of another sin. Reply Obj. 3. Not every cause of one sin is another sin. Hence, there is no need to go on to infinity, for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin. I, a. 3 ; q. 18, a. 6. Question LXXVI THE CAUSES OF SIX, IN PARTICULAR {In Four Articles) We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular: (i) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes;^ and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins.^ In view of what has been said above, the first consideration will be threefold, so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;^ thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will."^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin? (2) WTether ignorance is a sin? (3) Wliether it excuses from sin altogether? (4) Whether it diminishes sin? First Article WHETHER IGNORANCE CAN BE A CAUSE OF SIN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin, be- cause what does not exist is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. Obj. 2. Further, causes of sin should be reckoned according to the fact that sin is a turning to something, as was stated above.^ Now ignorance seems to savor of turning away from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. Obj. 3. Further, every sin is seated in the will, as we have said above.® Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the apprehended good. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. On the contrary j Augustine says that some sin through ignorance.'^ I answer that, According to the Philosopher a moving cause is twofold, essential and accidental.® An essential cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. xAn accidental cause is either the cause itself that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment. It is in this way that ignorance can be ^Q. 79. ^Q. 84. ®Q. 77 - ^Q-78. ®Q. 75 , a. I. «Q. 74, a. i. De Nat. et Grat., LXVU (PL 44, 287); cf. De Lib. Arb., IH, 18 (PL 32, 1295). ^Phys., VIII, 4 (254b 7). $23 624 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 76. Art. 2 the cause of a sinful act , because it is a privation of the knowledge perfect- ing the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, namely, universal and particular. For in con- ferring about 'what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars, and therefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposi- tion. Thus, a man is restrained from an act of parricide by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one’s father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz., of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which vrould prevent the sinful act. Consequently, if a man’s will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin. Hence such a man sins, not through ignorance but in ignorance, as the Philosopher states.® Reply Ob], i. Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything, but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. Reply Obj. 2. As science, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so, too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. Reply Obj. 3. The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown; but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that the being whom he is killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. Second Article WHETHER IGNORANCE IS A SIN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law, as was stated above.^® Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. Obj. 2. Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Ivow privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance, which is privation of knowledge, is not a sin. Ill, I (mob 25). 71, a. 6 . Q. 76. Art. 2 CAUSES OF SIN,— IGXORANXE 625 Oh]. 3. Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can be only in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin through being voluntar\\ it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore, ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. Ob]. 4. Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt yet remain in act. Now ig- norance is not removed b}'' repentance, but remains actually even when all guilt has been removed by repentance. Therefore, ignorance is not a sin, un- less perchance it be original sin. Obj. 5. Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance 'would be continually sinning, which is clearly false; or else ignorance would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to z Cor. xiv. 38: // any man know not, he shall not be known. Therefore ignorance is a sin. I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge. Therefore whoever lacks knowledge about any- thing can be said to be nescient about it; in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels. On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e., lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, namely, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Therefore, all are bound in common to know what belongs to faith, and the universal precepts of law; and .each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. However, there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, \’et he is not bound to know them: e.g., the geometrical theorems, and contingent par- ticulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omis- sion. Therefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to a man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently, ignorance of such things is called inmncible, because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin. Hence it is evident that no imdncible ignorance is a sin. On the ’ other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. Reply Ob'], i. As was stated above, when we say that sin is a word, deed or desire, w’e include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin.^^ Hence negligence, through which ignorance is a ^De Gael. Hier., VII, 3 (PG 3, 209) ; cf. De Eedes. Hur., VI, pt. iii, 6 (PG 3, 537). “Q. 71, a. 6, ad i. 626 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 76. Art. 3 siiij is comprised in the above definition of sin, in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have. Reply Ob]. 2. Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace it may have the char- acter of sin* even as can ignorance. Nevertheless, there is a difference here, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God^s favor. Reply Obj. 3. Just as in a sin of transgression the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will, so in a sin of omission, not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way voluntary; and, accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack itself of consideration, is a sin. Reply Obj. 4. Although when the guilt has passed away through re- pentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless, the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ig- norance is said to be a sin. Reply Obj. 5. Just as in other sins of omission a man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so it is with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have. Third Article WHETHER IGNORANCE EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For, as Augustine says, every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes in- voluntariness, as was stated above.^'^ Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. Obj. 2. Further, that which is done without intention is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is ac- cidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts should be deemed sinful or virtuous. Obj. 3. Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin in so far as he is a partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge, which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. On the contrary, Augustine says that some things done through ignorance are rightly reprovedP Now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore, some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore, ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. ^De Vera Relig., XIV (PL 34, 133) ; Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 595). ^ De Lib. Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1295), 6, a. 8. Q. 76. Art. 3 CAUSES OF SIN,— IGNORANCE 627 / answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were present, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the term involuntary. If, however, the knowledge which is removed by ignorance would not have prevented the act, because of the inclination of the will to it, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as is stated in Ethics iii.^^ Now such ignorance, which is not the cause of the sinful act, as we have already stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but fol- lows or accompanies, the sinful act. On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin because voluntari- ness is essential to sin. — But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person is ignorant of some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful: such is the case, for example, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin) ; or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Therefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, notwithstand- ing, he has knowledge of the. sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, namely, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowl- edge which would restrain him from sin. For such negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently, this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely in- voluntary, either through being invincible or through being about matters one is not bound to know, then such ignorance excuses from sin altogether. Reply Obj. i. Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as was stated above. Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether. Reply Obj. 2. So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the Aristotle, Etk., Ill, i (mob 23). 628 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 76. Art. 4 intention of sin remains in Mm; so that, in this respect, his sin is not ac- cidental. Reply Obj. 3. If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles; but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin, and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. Fourth Article WHETHER IGNORANCE DIMINISHES A SIN? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says^^ that every evil man is ig- norant, Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. Obj. 2. Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ig- norance is itself a sin, as was stated above. Therefore it does not diminish a sin. Obj. 3. Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin, for Ambrose, commenting on Rom. ii. 4 {Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?) says: Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.^^ Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. Obj. 4. Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it; for the Philosopher says that the punishment is doubled for a drunken man.^^ Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. On the contrary j Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from / Tim. i. 13: 1 obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly. Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. / answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, in no way does it diminish the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntaiy^) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the commission of the sin, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin. Therefore, sin cannot be diminished by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such ignorance is directly (mob 28). Cf. Glossa ordin. (\% 6 F). Etk,, III, 5 (1113b 31). Q. 76 . Art. 4 CAUSES OF SIN,— IGNORANCE 629 and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely. Ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will’s intention to sin that he is willing to bear the burden of ignorance for the sake of free- dom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or acciden- tally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, "with the result that he is ignorant; or as when a man wilfully drinks too much wine, with the result that he becomes drunk and indiscreet. This ignorance diminishes voluntariness and, consequently, also the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; and therefore in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. Reply Ob '], i. The ignorance w’hereby every evil man is ignorant is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz., the passion or habit inclining to sin. Reply Obj. 2. One sin added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a greater sin, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but remain separate sins. And so it may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have. Thus, murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins; because drunkenness diminishes the sinful- ness of the resulting sin beyond its own gravity. Reply Ob]. 3. The words *of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or, again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Reply Ob]. 4. The drunken man deserves a double punishment for the two sins which he commits, viz., drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness; and yet drunkenness, because of the ignorance con- nected with it, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as was stated above. — It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they as- saulted anyone, having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes.-*^ ^PoUt., II, 9 (1274b 18). Question LXXVII THE CAUSE OF SIN ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE {In Eight Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will? (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter’s knowledge? (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness? (4) Wliether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin? (5 ) On the three causes of sin mentioned in i / ohn ii. 16: Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh and Pride of life, (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it? (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A PASSION OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general.^ Since, therefore, the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but rather the good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will. Obj, 2, Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower. Thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite as a higher mover to a lower; for the Philosopher says that the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.^ Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. Obj. 3. Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is ma- terial. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a cor- ^ De An., Ill, 10 (433b 16)- ^Op. cit., Ill, ii (434a 12). 630 Q. 77. Art. I CAUSES OF SIN— THE PASSIONS 631 poreal organ, since it is in the reason, as is stated in De Anima iii.;^ whereas the sensitive appetite is a material power, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite. On the contrary j It is written {Dan, xiii. 56): Lust hath perverted thy heart. I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction. For, since all the soul’s powders are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes relaxed in its operation, or is even altogether impeded, both because every power is weakened by being extended to many things (so that, on the contrary, through being concentrated on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several), and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is strengthened in respect of any pas- sion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become relaxed or altogether impeded. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will’s object, which is the good apprehended by reason. For the judgment and apprehension of rea- son is impeded because of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the dis- position of the tongue; and for this reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their affections. The result is that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will’s movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason. Reply Obj. i. Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as we have stated. Reply Obj. 2. The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as has been stated. The Third Objection is solved in like manner. ^Op. dt., ni, 9 (432b 5). 632 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 77. Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER THE REASON CAN BE OVERCOME BY A PASSION, AGAINST ITS KNOWLEDGE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, because of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon passes away.'^ Obj. 2. Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now 'when a passion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowl- edge of the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. Obj. 3. Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter, — on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction: e.g., Every man, and Not every man. Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as is stated in De Interpretatione ii.^ If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. Obj. 4. Further, whoever knows the universal knows also the particular, which he knows to be contained in the universal. Thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Posterior Analytics i.^ Now he who knows something in general, e.g,, that no fornication is lawful, knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, This is an act of fornication. Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular. Obj. 5. Further, according to the Philosopher, words express the thoughts of the souU Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in the particular. Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. * Aristotle, Cat,, VIII (gb 28). ® Aristotle, Perik., XIV (23b 40). « Aristotle, Past. Anal., I, i (71a 17). Perth., I (i6a 3). Q. 77. Art. 2 CAUSES OF SIX,— THE PASSIONS 633 On the contrary. The Apostle says {Rom. vii. 23) : I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the^ law of sin. Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since, then, concupiscence is a pas- sion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. I answer that, As the Philosopher states, the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion.^ Therefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance.® In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil unless there were some ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written {Prov. xiv, 22) : They err that work evil. Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by divine authority, according to the words of Luke xii. 47: The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes] and the words of James iv. 17: To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin. Consequently Socrates was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher, to make a distinction.^® Because, since man is di- rected to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz., universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices* to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as we have stated above.^^ It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g., that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done ; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually. Hence, it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually; and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually may happen through mere lack of attention. For instance, a man who knows geometry may not attend to the consideration of geo- metrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Some- times a man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, because of some supervening hindrance, e.g., some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the pas- sions hinder him from considering it. VII, 2 (1145b 23). cf. op . di ., VI, 13 (1144b 19; b 28). “ 0 ^ dt ., VII, 3 (1146b 31). 76, a. I. 634 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 77. Art. 2 Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as was explained above. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in the universal. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, because of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether; for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in the particular against the knowledge which it has in the universal. Reply Ob], i. Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars; and therefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. Reply Ob j. 2. The fact that something appears good in the particular to the reason, which yet is not good, is due to a passion; and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. Reply Obj, 3. It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa; but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a uni- versal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about'a particu- lar negative. For an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. Reply Obj, 4. He that has knowledge in the universal is hindered, because of a passion, from reasoning in the light of that universal, so as to draw the conclusion; but he reasons in the light of another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion ac- cordingly. Hence the Philosopher says that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, including two universal, of which one comes from the reason, e.g,, No fornication is lawful, and the other, from passion, e.g.. Pleasure is to be pursued.^- Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from thinking and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second. Reply Obj. 5. Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, since his drunkenness hinders him, so a man who is in a state of passion may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as is stated in Ethics viiP VII, 3 (1147a 24). ^^Ibid. (1147a 18), Q. 77. Art. 3 CAUSES OF SIN —THE PASSIONS 6 35 Third Article WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION SHOULD BE CALLED A SIN OF WEAKNESS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1 . It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite, as was stated above. Now vehemence of movement is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of -weakness. Obj. 2. Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh, and hence it is written (P^. Ixxvii. 39) : He re- membered that they are flesh. Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a passion. Obj. 3. Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's -will, whether he shall do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to Gen. iv. 7: Thy appetite shall be under thee, and thou shall have dominion over it. Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of -weakness. On the contrary, Cicero calls the passions diseases of the soul.^^ Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from pas- sion should be called a sin of weakness. / answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which sin chiefly resides. Now weakness may be attributed to the soul by way of a likeness to the weakness of the body. But man’s body is said to be weak when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action. This takes place through some disorder of the body’s parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states.^^ Therefore weakness is attributed to the soul when it is hindered from fulfilling its proper action because of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the baiy are said to be out of order when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate when they are not subject to the order of reason; for the reason is the ruling power of the souFs parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, with the result that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher compares the incontinent man to a paralytic whose mem- bers move in a manner contrary to his intention.^® ^^Tusc. Disp., IV, 14 (p. 377 ). De Hist. Anim., X, i (633b 20). Etk., I, 13 (1102b 18). 636 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 77. Art. 4 Reply Obj, 1. Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. Reply Obj, 2. Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body; for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as was stated above. Hence, when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us, for the sensitive appetite is a power using a cor- poreal organ. Reply Ob], 3. It is in the wilFs power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered by passion in the way already explained. Fourth Article WHETHER SELF-LOVE IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY SIN? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself. Hence it is that man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Levit. xix. 18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says {Rom. vii. 8) : Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence] on which words the Gloss says that the law is good, since by forbidding concupis- cence, it forbids all evils.^"' The reason for this is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as was stated above.^^ Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine, in commenting on Ps. Ixxix. 17 {Things set on fire and dug down), says that every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility}^ Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. Obj. 4. Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so he sometimes sins through inordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self- love is not the cause of every sin. On the contrary, Augustine says that self-love, amounting to contempt Glossa ordin, (VI, 16 E) ; Glossa interl. (VI, i6v). — Cf. St. Augustine, De Spir. et Liu., TV (PL 44, 204). ^'^Q. 23, a. 4; q. 30, a. 2. Enarr, in Psalm., super LXXIX, 17 (PL 36, 1027). Q. 77 . Aet. 5 CAUSES OF SIN,— THE PASSIONS 637 of Godj builds up the city of Babylon?^ Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. I answer thatj As we have stated above, the proper and essential cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good.^^ In this respect, every sinful act proceeds from an inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordi- nately is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. Reply Obj. i. Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to the contempt of God, that Augustine reckons to be the cause of sin. Reply Obj. 2. Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as we have stated. Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself for whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g., a man is said to love wine or money) admits fear as its cause, which pertains to the avoidance of evil ; for every sin arises either from an inordinate desire for some good, or from an inordinate avoidance of sonae evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that a man either desires good things or avoids evil things. Reply Obj. 4. A friend is like another self. Therefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend seems to be committed through self- love. Fifth Article WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE OF THE FLESH, CONCUPISCENCE OF THE EYES AND PRIDE OF LIFE ARE FITTINGLY DE- SCRIBED AS CAUSES OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes and pride of life are unfittingly described as causes of sin. For according to the Apostle (i Tim. vi. 10), covetousness is the root of all evils. Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. Obj. 2. Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. xiii. 56: Beauty hath deceived thee. Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be co-divided against con- cupiscence of the flesh. Obj. 3. Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as was stated above.^^ Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but ^ De Civil. Dei, XW 28 (PL 41, 436). ^ Q. 75, a. i. ^Q. 30, a. x. 638 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 77. Art. 5 also by the other senses. Therefore concupiscence of the hearing and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. Ohf. 4. Further, just as man is induced to sin through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as was stated above. But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoid- ance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described. On the contrary, It is written ( i John ii. 16) : All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eyes, or pride of life. Now a thing is said to be in the world by reason of sin; and hence it is written {ibid. v. 19) : The whole world is seated in wickedness. Therefore these three are causes of sin. I answer that, As was stated above, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes an inordinate desire of good, for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that an inordinate de- sire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of something difficult, according as it is the ob- ject of the irascible part, as was stated above.^^ But concupiscence is twofold, as we have stated above.^^ One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters. The inordinate appetite of such things is called concupiscence of the flesh. The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustenance or pleasure by way of the senses of the flesh, but are delectable according to the apprehension of imagination, or some similar mode or perception. Such are money, apparel, and the like. This spiritual concupiscence is called concupiscence of the eyes, whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity, according to Augustine’s exposition or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetous- ness, according to the explanation of others. The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the pride of life] for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall state further on.^® It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be re- duced to these three. For all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions naturally conform to spiritual concupiscence. Reply Ob}, i. Pride of life is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, ^Q* 23, a. I. ^Q. 30, a. 3. ^Confess., X, 35 (PL 32, 802). ^Q. 84, a. 2; II-II, q. 162, a. I. Q. 77- Art. 6 CAUSES OF SIN,— THE PASSIONS 639 as a special vice, which goes by the name of avarice, is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on.-^ Reply Obj. 2. Concupiscence of the eyes does not mean here the con- cupiscence for all things that can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i,e,, of any apprehensive power. Reply Obj. 3. The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a'larger ground, as is stated in Metaph. i.-^ Hence its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states?^ Reply Obj. 4. Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as was stated above,^® and so those passions alone are mentioned which in- cline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil. Sixth Article WHETHER SIN IS DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF PASSION? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin is not diminished because of passion. For an increase in the cause adds to the effect. Thus, if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as was stated. Therefore, the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. Obj. 2. Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit; for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion increases rather than diminishes a sin. Obj. 3. Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states.^^ Therefore passion diminishes sin. 1 answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is an ability of the will and the reason;^- while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free choice antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion ^Q. 84, a. I. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, i (gSoa 23). ^ Serm. CXII, 6 (PL 38, 646). 25, a. 2; q. 29, a. 2. ^ De Civil. Dei, XIV, 12 (PL 41, 420) ; De Nat. et Grat., XXV (PL 44, 261). ^ Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxiv, 3 (I, 421). 640 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 77. Art. 7 of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or the will, as we have stated above and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers affect the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin, because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control through the reason and will ; and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness. On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it, or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, namely, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. Reply Obj, 1. Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to some- thing else, — accidentally, i.e., without intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its essential cause. Reply Obj, 2. A good passion consequent upon the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action. Reply Obj. 3. Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the wilFs own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. Seventh Article WHETHER PASSION EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i. It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involun- tary, according to Gal. v. 17: The flesh Imteth against the spirit ... so that you do not the things that you would. Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. Obj. 2. Further, passion causes a certain ignorance in the particular, as we have stated above. But ignorance in the particular excuses from sin ^A. I and 2; q. 9, a. 2 ; q. 10, a. 3. Q. 77. Art. 7 CAUSES OF SIN,— THE PASSIONS 641 altogether, as was stated above Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. Obj. 3. Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more therefore does passion, which is a disease of the soul. On the contrary, The Apostle {Rom. vii. 5) speaks of the passions as 'passions of sins, for no other reason than that they cause sin ; which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. I answer that. An act which is evil in its genus cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such' that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. Here two points should be observed: First, a thing may be voluntaiy^ either in itself, as when the will tends towards it directly, or in its cause, when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect (as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk). Secondly, we must ob- serve that a thing is said to be voluntary directly or indirectly: directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but does not. Accordingly, therefore, we must make a distinction. For a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then, if such a pas- sion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if any- one through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as de- prives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether. In that case reason can drive the passion away by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect, since the members are not put to work except by the consent of reason, as we have stated above.^^ Therefore such a pas- sion does not excuse from sin altogether. Reply Obj. i The words, So that you do not the things that you would, are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of con- cupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil. It is in this sense that we are to understand the words of Rom. vii. 19: The evil which I will not, that I do. — Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent who act counter to their resolu- tion because of their concupiscence. 19, a. 6. “ Q. 17, a. 9. 642 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 77. Art. 8 Reply Obj, 2. Ignorance in the particular, which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes an ignorance of law in the par- ticular by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particu- lar act; and this passion the reason is able to drive away, as was stated. Reply Obj, 3. Bodily disease is involuntary. There would be a compari- son, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease. Eighth Article WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION CAN BE MORTAL? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. For venial sin is co-divided against mortal sin. Now sin com- mitted from weakness is ’denial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weak- ness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. Obj, 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as was stated above.^® Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Obj, 3. Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as we have explained above. Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. On the contrary, The x\postle says {Rom, vii. 5) that the passions of the sins , , . work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin com- mitted through passion may be mortal. I answer that, Mortal sin, as was stated above, consists in turning away from our last end, which is God;^”^ which aversion pertains to the deliberat- ing reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore, that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly; and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as we have stated above.^® Therefore, if it does not come to the rescue, there is a ®®Q. 74 » a. 4. 72, a. s. A. 7; q. 10, a. 3, ad 2. Q. 77- Art. 8 CAUSES OF SIN,— THE PASSIONS 643 mortal sin ; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion. Reply Obj. i. A sin may be venial in three ways. Firsts through its cause, i.e., through having a cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; and thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; and thus every’' sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i,e,, receives pardon. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g., an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin, whereas the objection regards the first kind. Reply Obj, 2. Passion causes sin because of the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin is due to the aversion, which follows acciden- tally from the adherence, as was stated above. Hence the argument does not prove. Reply Obj, 3. Passion does not always hinder the act of reason alto- gether. Consequently, the reason remains in possession of its free choice, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of rea-* son be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial. Question LXXVIII ON THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE {In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice ; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i,e,, purposely? (2) l^Tiether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice? (3) WTiether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit? (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion? First Article WHETHER ANYONE SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through cer- tain malice. For ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now every evil man is ignorant, according to the Philosopher.^ And it is written {Prov, xiv. 22): They err that work evil. Therefore no one sins through certain malice. Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says that no one works intending evil.^ Now to sin through malice [malitia] seems to denote the intention of doing evil {malum] in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins . through malice. Obj. 3. Further, malice itself is a sin. If, therefore, malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, which is ridicu- lous. Therefore no one sins through malice. On the contrary, it is, written {Job xxxiv. 27) : \Who] as it were on pur- pose have revolted from God, and would not understand all His ways. Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice. I answer that, Man, like any other being, has naturally an appetite for the good, and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man; for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect and the appetite, both rational {i.e., the will) and sensitive. III, I (mob 28). "De Div.Nom., IV, 19; $i (PG 3, 716; 732). 644 Q. 78. Art. I CAUSES OF SIN,— AIALICE 645 Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through pas- sion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. But the consequence is that one chooses to suffer some disadvantage in relation to a good that is loved less, in order to obtain a good that one loves more; as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a bodily member that he may save his life, which he loves more. Accordingly, when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g., riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or divine law, or divine charity^ or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good, and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil absolutely, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good; and hence he is said to sin through certain malice, or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. Reply Ob'], i. Ignorance sometimes excludes the absolute knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance; sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion; and sometimes it ex- cludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but. not the absolute knowledge that is an evil. It is thus that a man is ignorant when he sins through certain malice. Reply Ob]. 2. Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake, but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining an- other good, as was stated above. In such a case, anyone would choose to ob- tain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the other good, even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offend- ing God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sin- ning, and thereby incurring God^s anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. Reply Ob]. 3. The malice through which anyone sins may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher calls an evil habit by the name .of malice,^ just as a good habit is called virtue; and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when he sins through the mclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice in so far as he sins through making a choice of evil) , or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause, for the interior act is the cause of the II, s (iiosb 19). 646 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 78. Art. 2 exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above.^ Second Article WHETHER EVERYONE THAT SINS THROUGH HABIT, SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not everyone who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. For sin committed through certain malice seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice. Obj. 2. Further, Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits are formed? But the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. Obj, 3. Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. ii. 14: Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things ; and this because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit are sorrowful after committing a sin, because had men, i,e,, those who have a vicious habit, are full of remorse? Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. On the contrary, A sin committed Hirough certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to which we are inclined by habit, as is stated in Ethics vi.”^ with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed through certain malice. / answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed through habit ; for it is not neces- sary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has. that habit. Hence habit is defined as being something we use when we will, as was stated above.* And thus, just as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act (because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, and something of it remains unimpaired, so that a sinner does some works which are generically good), so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit acts, not from that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ig- ^Q- 75r a. 4, ad 3. ® Aristotle, Etk,, II, 2 (1104a 27; a 33). (ii66b 24). Op, dt., VI, 2 (1139a 32). ®Q. so, a. i, obj. i. ^ Op, dt., IX, 4 Q. 78. Art. 3 CAUSES OF SIN,— MALICE 647 norance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice; because, to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him according to that habit has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a sort of nature. Now the very thing which befits a man according to a vicious habit is something that excludes a spiritual good ; and from this it follows that a man chooses a spiritual evil that he may obtain possession of what befits him in that habit. And this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore, it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through cer- tain malice. Reply Ob], i. Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Therefore it is an evil, not absolutely, but in a relative sense; and for that reason the habit thereof is not an absolute, but a relative, evil. Reply Ob], 2. Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed; but they differ from them as the perfect from the imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. Reply Obj, 3. He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin, not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but because of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. Third Article WHETHER ONE WHO SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE, SINS THROUGH HABIT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says that an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it, i.e., through choice, unless it be done through habit? Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as was stated above. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin. Obj. 2, Further, Origen says that a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.^^ But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit. ^Op. cit., V, 6 (1134a 17; a 20). Archon, I, 3 (PG ii, 155). 648 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 78. Art. 3 Obj. 3. Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil, but to good. Therefore, if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is a passion or a habit. But when a man sins through passion, he sins, not through certain malice, but through weakness, as was stated.^^ Therefore whenever any- one sins through certain malice, he sins through habit. Obj, 4. On the contrary ^ The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore some- times also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. / answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil. For from the very nature of the power it is inclined to the good of reason as to its proper object; and therefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined to some evil by its choice, this must be occa- sioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice, for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, according to that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the wiirtends as to something good, because everything tends of its own accord to that which is suitable to it. Moreover, this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. — Secondly, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil through the removal of some obstacle. For instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not because sin is in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, having been fre^, as it were, from the bridle. It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice al- ways presupposes some lack of order in man, which, however, is not always a habit; so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through cer- tain malice, that he sins through habit. Reply Obj, i. To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleas- 77, a. 3. Q. 78 . Art. 4 CAUSES OF SIN,— MALICE 649 lire, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason ; and this oc- curs only in one who has a habit. Reply Obj, 2. It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, as we have stated above. Reply Obj. 3. That which inclines the will to evil is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else, as we have said. Reply Obj, 4. There is no comparison between choosing good and choos- ing evil, because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfectly without the evil of fault. Fourth Article WHETHER IT IS MORE GRIEVOUS TO SIN THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE THAN THROUGH PASSION? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one w-ho sins through certain malice than in one who sins through passion. For he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which, according to the Philosopher, is ignorance of principle;^- for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore, there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion. Obj. 2. Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous Ms sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice is im- pelled by habit, the impulse of ^ which is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion. Obj. 3. Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice. On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job xxxiv. 26: He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it mere on purpose, have re- volted from Him, Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e., through certain malice. / answer that, A sin committed through certain malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being (iiSia 16). 650 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 78. Art. 4 equal, a sin is all the more grievous according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through certain malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. There- fore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through cer- tain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. — Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin soon passes away, so that a man repents of his sin, and soon re- turns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently.^^ — ^Thirdly, because he who sins through cer- tain malice is ill-disposed in relation to the end itself, which is the princi- ple in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted, for the time being, because of the passion. Now the worst of all defects is a defect of principle. Therefore, it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion. Reply Obj. i. Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as was stated above.^^ Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of this kind make a sin to be less grave. Reply Obj. 2. The impulse due to passion is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will; whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails. Reply Obj. 3. It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through pa^^ion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first prin- ciple of his sin; for he is induced, through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way al- ready explained; so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin. That is why he is said to sin through choosing. ^Ibid. (1150b 32). Q, 76, a. 3 and 4. Question LXXIX ON THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN , {In Four Articles) We must now consider the external causes of sin, and ( i ) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil (3) on the part of man.- Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Wliether God is a cause of sin? (2) WTiether the act of sin is from God? (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart? (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened? First Article WHETHER GOD IS A CAUSE OF SIN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection 1, It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain people {Rom, i. 28) : God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right ; and the Gloss comments on this by saying that God works in men^s hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil.^ Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin. Obj, 2. Further, it is written {Wis. xiv. ii): The creatures of God are turned to an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men. But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the First Part,^ it seems that God is a cause of sin by provoking man to sin. Obj, 3. Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of free choice, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. Obj, 4. Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God’s goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written (Isa, xlv. 7) that God creates evil, and {Amos iii. 6) : Shall there be evil in the city which God hath not done? Therefore, it is not in- compatible even with God’s goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. ^Q. 80. ®Q. 81. ® Glossa ordtn, ad 2; q. 54, a. 3, ad 2. ^Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 3 (PL 40, ii). De duplid Praedest. Dei, I, 19 (PL 65, 167). Q. 79. Art. 3 DOES GOD CAUSE SIN? 655 On the contrary^ It is written (Isa, vi. 10) : Blind the heart of this people ^ and make their ears heavy \ and Rom, ix. 18: He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth. 1 answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the divine light. As regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not illumined by God to see rightly, and man’s heart is not softened to live rightly. As regards this, God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the illumination of souls, according to John i. 9: That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, even as the sun is the universal cause of the illumination of bodies, though not in the same way. For the sun illumines by necessity of nature, whereas God works freely through the order of His wisdom. Now, although the sun, so far as it is concerned, illumines all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness. This is what happens to a house whose window- shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house. The cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds ffis grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle; so that the cause of the with- holding of grace is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace, but also God Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart. These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz., sight and hearing, of which the former assists discovery, and the latter, teaching, hence it is that spiritual blindness corre^nds to sight, heaviness of the ears to hearing, and hardness of heart to the affec- tions. Reply Obj, i. Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withhold- ing of grace, are punishments and, therefore, in this respect, they do not make a man worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he in- curs them, even as other pimishments. Reply Obj, 2. This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. Reply Obj, 3. Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment; and in this way, too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. 656 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 79, Art. 4 Fourth Article ' WHETHER BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART ARE DI- RECTED TO THE SALVATION OF THOSE WHO ARE BLINDED AND HARDENED? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says that as God is supremely good, He would in no way allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every evil}^^ Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as was stated above. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. Obj, 2. Further, it is written {Wis. i. 13) that God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly. Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to their profit; just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. Obj. 3. Further, God is not a respecter of persons {Acts x. 34) . Now He directs the blinding of some to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through not be- lieving, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, as is related by Augustine.^® Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. Obj. 4. On the other hand, According to Rom. iii. 8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of their welfare. 1 answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble .to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation, — to one thing directly, viz., to the sinner’s damnation; — to another by reason of God’s mercy or providence, viz., that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin that by ac- knowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states.^"^ Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damna- tion of those who are blinded ; and for this reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God’s mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestined, to whom all things work together unto good {Rom. viii. 28). ^Enckir., XI (PL 40, 236). ^^Quaest. ly in Matt., q. 14, super XIII, 15 (PL 35, 1372). Nat, et Grat., XXVII (PL 44, 262). Q. 79* Art. 4 DOES GOD CAUSE SIX? 657 Therefore, as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation, as Augustine says.^^ Reply Obj. i . Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good. But it is not always directed to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe. Thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the pun- ishment of the lost to the glory' of His justice. Reply Ob], 2. God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss. Reply Oh], 3. That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare is due to His mercy ; but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to His justice. As for the fact that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, this does not make God a respecter of persons, as was explained in the First Part.^^ Reply Obj. 4. Evil of fault must not be done that g(x>d may^ ensue: but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. ^Quaest. 17 in Matt., q. 14, super XIII, 15 (PL 35, 1372). ^ S. J., I, q. 23, a. 5^ ad 3. Question LXXX ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, THE DEVIL {In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin? (2 ) Whether the devil induces us to sin by persuading us inwardly? (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity? (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil’s suggestion? First Article WHETHER THE DEVIL IS DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OE MAN’S SINNING? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man’^s sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. But Augustine says that the devil inspires his friends with evil desires]^ and Bede, com- menting on Acts V. 3, says that the devil draws the mind to evil desires]^ and Isidore says that the devil fills men's hearts with secret lusts? There- fore the devil is directly the cause of sin. Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says that as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil? But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics: There must needs he some extrinsic principle of human counsel? Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so directly is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and conse- quently is directly the cause of sin. On the contrary, Augustine proves that nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire? Now man does not become a slave to his desire except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man’s own will alone. / answer that. Sin is an action, and so a thing can be directly the cause of sin in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and '^De Trin., IV, 12 (PL 42, 897)- ^ In Act,, super V, 3 (PL 92, 954). ^ Sent., n, 12 (PL 83, 647). ^Adv. lovin., II (PL 23, 299). ^ Eth, Eudem., VII, 14 (1248a 22). ^De Lib, Arb., I, ii (PL 32, 1233); III, i (PL 32, 1271). 658 Q. 80. Art. I DOES THE DEVIL CAUSE SIN? 659 this can happen only by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since ever\" sin is vol- untary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act. Now the willj as we have stated above, can be moved by two things.^ First, by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite; secondly, by that agent which moves the will invirardly to will, and this is hone other than either the will itself or God, as was shown above.® Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as was stated above.® There- fore it follows that, in this respect, a man^s will alone is directly the cause of his sin. As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will. Thus we say that food arouses man’s desire to eat. — Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. — ^Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has the nature of a good, for he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. — ^Accord- first way sensible things, which we see outside us, move a man’s will to sin. — In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as we have stated above.^® Consequently, neither the thing offered to it externally nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite. Reply Obj. i. All these, and other like authorities that may be found, are to be imderstood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin either by suggesting to him or by offering him objects of appetite. Reply Obj. 2. This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not bear on the way in which they are causes. For God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. Reply Obj. 3. God is the universal cause of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite. ^Q- 9, a. I, 4 and 6; I, q. 105, a. 4. ®Q. 9, a. 3. a. 2; I, q. los, a. 4. ®Q. 79, a. I. 10, 66o THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. So. Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN BY INTERNAL INSTIGATIONS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin by in- ternal instigations. For the internal movements of the soul are vital func- tions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic prin- ciple, not even those of the vegetative soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his in- ternal movements, Obj. 2. Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything outside the order of nature, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man’s internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses. Obj. 3. Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as was stated in the First Part, the devil does not act on the human intellect.^- Nor does it seem possible for him to act on the imagination, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter; which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the First Part.^® Therefore the de\dl cannot, through man’s internal movements, induce him to sin. On the contrary j In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive, and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated the deviFs relation to it. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which jllumines it for the knowledge of truth, and the devil has certainly no intention of exercising such an activity towards man. Rather does he darken man’s reason so that it may consent to sin, and this darkness comes from the imagination and the sensitive appetite. Consequently, the whole interior operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and the sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in present- ing certain forms to the imagination; and he is also able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other. The reason for this is that, as we have stated in the First Part, the cor- poreal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature.^"^ Hence the devil can produce all those effects which can result % “ 5 . T.j I, q. no, a. 4. T., I, q. in, a. 2, ad 2. S. T I, q. no, a. 2. ^^ 5 . T., I, q. no, a. 3. 66i Q. 80, Art. 3 DOES THE DEVIL CAUSE SIN? from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement. For the Philosopher says that when an animal sleeps, the blood descends In abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz., the impressions left by the action of sensible things, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they ap- pear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time}^ Hence such a local movement of the \dtal spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake; and so it happens that man’s imagination is set to work. In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions ac- cording to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits, and therefore the devil can co-operate in this also. And when certain passions have been aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought, in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle; since, as the Philos- opher observes, lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an appre- hension of the beloved}^ It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination is judged as being something to be pursued, because to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion in- clines him to seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. Reply Obj, i. Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic prin- ciple, yet an extrinsic agent can co-operate with them, even as external heat co-operates with the functions of the vegetative soul, that food may be more easily digested. Reply Obj. 2. This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether out- side the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as was explained above. Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses. Third Article WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN OF NECESSITY? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. For the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job xli. 24) that there is no power on earth that can compare with him. Therefore he can compel man to sin, while man dwells on the earth, “iJe Sottmo, III (461b ii). “Oi>. at., II (460b $). 662 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8o, Art. 3 Obj. 2. Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in relation to things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination; because all our knowledge arises from the senses j and we cannot understand without a phantasm^ Now the devil can move man's imagination, as was stated above, and also the external senses, for Augus- tine says that this evil, of which, namely, the devil is the cause, extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor,^^ Therefore it can incline man’s reason to sin of necessity. Obj, 3. Further, Augustine says that there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit P Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity. On the contrary. It is written (i Fet. v. 8): Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour. Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the neces- sity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity. Further, it is likewise written {Jas. iv. 7) : Be subject ... to God, but resist the devU, and he will fly from you, which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin. I answer that. The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can induce anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason. Now the devil is able to impede the use of the reason altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, when the reason is thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as was stated above.^® It is consequently evident that the devil can in no way compel a man to sin. Reply Obj. i. Not every power that is greater than man can move man's will; God alone can do this, as we have stated above.^^ Reply Obj. 2. That which is apprehended by fhe senses or the imagina- tion does not move the will of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason. Reply Obj. 3. The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. Now that reason does not resist is not in the devil's power, and therefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. Aristotle, De An., Ill, 7 (431a 16). ^Lih. 83 Quaest., q. 12 (PL 40, 14), ^De Civil. Dd, XIX, 4 (PL 41, 629). 77, a. 7. ^Q. 9, a. 6. Q. 8o. Art. 4 DOES THE DEVIL CAUSE SIX? 663 Fourth Article WHETHER AIL THE SINS OF MEN ARE DUE TO THE DEVIL SUGGESTION? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devIFs suggestions. For Dionysius says that the crowd of demons is the cause of all evils f both to themselves and to others?^ Obj,^ 2. Further, whoever sins mortally becomes the slave of the devil, according to / ohn vii. 34 : Whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin. Now by whom a man is overcome^ of the same also he is the slave (2 Pet. il. 19). Therefore, whoever commits a sin has been overcome by the devnl. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says that the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other’s suggestion.-^ Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free choice, and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable; which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion. On the contrary f It is written: Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil j sometimes they are due to a movement of our free choice?^ 1 answer that, The devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected that we are all prone to sin ; even as the burn- ing of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. — ^He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this from the fact that even if the devil did not exist, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like.-^ Now this desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is sub- ject to free choice. Reply Obj. i. The crowd of demons is the cause of all our evils, as re- gards their original cause, as we have stated. Reply Obj. 2. A man becomes another’s slave not only by being over- come by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously; and it is thus that one who sins of his own accord becomes the slave of the devil. Reply Obj. 3. The devil’s sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another’s suggestion, but also because he was not already prone to sin, as the result of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin in man. ^De Div. Norn., IV, 18 (PG 3, 716). ^Mard., IV, 3 (PL 75. ^42). ^Gen- nadius, De Eccles. Dogm., LXXXH (PL 58, 999). ^ Peri Archon, IH, 3 (PG ii, 305). Question LXXXI ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, MAN {In Five Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now while man, like the devil, is the cause of another’s sin by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Therefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three- fold: (i) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence;^ (3) of its subject.^ Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether man’s first sin is transmitted, by way of origin, to his descendants? (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin? (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation? (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miracu- lously from some part of the human body? (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if woman, and not man, had sinned? First Article WHETHER THE FIRST SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENT IS CON- TRACTED BY HIS DESCENDANTS, BY WAY OF ORIGIN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written {Ezech. xviii. 20) : The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father. But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. Obj. 2. Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one subj'ect to another. Now the rational soul, which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the First Part.^ There- fore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin. Obj. 3. Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. Obj. 4. Further, that which is more perfect in nature is more powerful ^ Q. 82. ® Q. 83. " 5 . T, I, q. 118, a. 2. 664 Q. 8i. Art. i CAUSES OF SIN,— MAX 665 in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, or else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul. Ob]. 5. Further, the Philosopher says: No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, hut only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness Now those are said to be naturally ugly who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blame- worthy or sinful. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. v. 12): By one man sin en- tered into this world, and by sin death. Nor can this be understood as de- noting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (TFij. ii. 24) : By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. It follows, therefore, that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world. I answer that. According to the Catholic Faith, we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin.^ For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, as having to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books.^ In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be trans- mitted by way of origin to his descendants, various WTiters have gone about it in various ways. For some,’’" considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others,^ rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parentis soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child. Thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, because of some seminal cor- ruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportioned to the soul, and since the souFs defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child through the transmission of the semen, although the semen itself is not the subject of guilt. But all these explanations are insufficient. For granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted, in consequence, because of a defect in a bodily disposition, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots, nevertheless, the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to ex- clude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. There- *Eth., Ill, S (1114a 23). ®Cf. the Council of Carthage (418), can. 2 (Mansi, IV, 327). ^Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 598) ; Contra Mian., HI, i (PL 44, 703) ; De Dono Persev., II; XI (PL 45, 996; 1008). ’Anonymously reported by Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxxi, 2 (I, 468).— Cf. A. Gaudel, “Peche originel” (in Dkt. de thiol, catk., vol. XII (1933), coL 450. * Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxxi, 3-6 (I, 469-472). 666 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8i. Art. i fore, granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says, no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him? Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying that all men bom of Adam may be considered as one man inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed, Porphyry says that by sharing the same species, many men are one man}^ Accordingly, the multitude of men born of Adam are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand, for instance, is voluntary, not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Therefore, a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man’s first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who origi- nate from him, even as the soul’s will moves all the members to their ac- tions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called original, just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called actual. And just as the actual sin that is com- mitted by a member of the body is not the sin of that member, except in- asmuch as that member is a part of the man (for which reason it is called a human sin), so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent (for which reason it is called the sin of nature, according to Ephes. ii. 3: TTe . , . were by nature children of wrath). Reply, Ob j. 1. The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, be- cause he is not punished for his father’s sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us, because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated. Reply Obf. 2. Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul; so that the semen, by its own power, transmits the human nature from parent to child and, with that nature, the stain which infects it. For he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that ^ Eth., Ill, 5 (1114a 26). ^®Cf. St. Augustine, De Nupt. et Concupisc., II, 5 (PL 44, 444) ; A. Gaudel, loc, cit., col. 395. ^Isagoge, trans. BoetHus (PL 64, iii) , Q. 8I. Art. 2 CAUSES OF SIN —MAN 667 he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation. Reply Obj. 3. Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually, accompanied by that guilt. Reply Obj, 4. The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by the semen than by the flesh which is already perfect, and al- ready belonging to a certain person. Reply Obj. 5. A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if the man born be considered in himself. But if we consider him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it; and thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace because of a crime committed by one of his forbears. Second Article WHETHER ALSO OTHER SINS OF THE FIRST PARENT OR OF NEARER ANCESTORS ARE TRANSMITTED TO THEIR DESCEND- ANTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the Judgment of God for the sins of their immediate parents, according to Exod, XX. 5: / am . . . God, . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. Further- more, according to human law, the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. Obj. 2. Further, a man can better transmit to another that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another. Thus, fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much more there- fore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself. Obj. 3. Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which, however it be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. xxii. 1 1 : He that is filthy, let him be filthier still. Therefore children contract, by way of origin, the sins of their nearer an- cestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. On the contrary. Good is more self-diflusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their sins. 058 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8i. Art. 2 / answer that, Augustine raises this question in the Enchiridion, and leaves it unsolved.'^- Yet if we look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first parent, to be transmitted by way^ of ^ origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in the individual. Consequently, those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children; for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature. Thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition are transmitted to the children, e.g., fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but in no way those that are purely personal, as was stated above. Now just as something may belong to the person through himself, and also something through the gift of grace, so something may belong to nature through itself, viz., whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as was stated in the First Part, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent.^^ This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Therefore, just as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. — Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e., in respect of the proneness to sin; and consequently other sins are .not transmitted. Reply Obj, i. According to Augustine, in his letter to Avitus,^^ children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment because of their parents, un- less they share in their guilt, either fix their origin or by imitation, because every soul is God’s immediate possession, as is stated in Ezech. xviii. 4. Sometimes, however, by divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment because of their parents, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of its father. Reply Obj. 2. A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as we have stated above. Reply Obj, 3. The first sin infects nature with a human corruption per- taining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertain- ing only to the person. ^Enchir,, XLVI; XLVII CPL 40, 254; 255)- ^ S, T., I, q. 100, a. i. ^^Epist. CCL (PL 33, 1066). Q. 8i. Art. 3 CAUSES OF SIN,— MAN 669 Tliird Article WHETHER THE SIN OE THE FIRST PARENT IS TRANSMITTED, BY THE WAY OF ORIGIN, TO ALL MEN? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not trans- mitted, by the way of origin, to all men. For death is a punishment con- sequent upon original sin. But not all those who are born of the seed of Adam will die, since those who will be still living at the coming of our Lord will never die, as may be gathered from i Thess. iv. 14: We who are alive , . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept. Therefore they do not contract original sin. Obj. 2. Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not transmit it to his children. Obj. 3. Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares {Rom. v. 15, seqq.). But the gift of Christ is not trans- mitted to all men; neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. v. 12): Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned. I answer that. According to the Catholic Faith, we must firmly believe that, with the exception of Christ alone, all men descended from Adam contract original sin from him; or else all would not need redemption, which is through Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated, viz., that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity; just as from the souFs will actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation. Reply Obj. i. It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord will die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the Third Part.^^ If, how- ever, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die (an opinion which Jerome mentions, among others, in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrec- tion of the Body^^), then we must say in reply to the objection that al- though they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. Reply Obj. 2. Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as r^ards the mind. Nevertheless original S. r., Ill, SuppL, q. 78, a. i, obj. 3. Epbt. CXTX (PL 22, 971). 670 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8 i. Art. 4 sin remains in its effect as regards the Tomes/ which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself (in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation) . Consequently, those who are baptized transmit original sin, since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin. Reply Obj, 3. Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporeally, so the grace of Christ is transmitted to all that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism; and this, not only in order to remove the sin of their first parent, but also to remove actual sins, and to lead them to glory. Fourth Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN WOULD BE CONTRACTED BY A PERSON FORMED MIRACULOUSLY FROM HUMAN FLESH? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For the Gloss on Gen. iv. i says that Adames entire posterity was corrupted in his loins j because they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned.^’^ But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. There- fore it would contract original sin. Obj. 2. Further, original sin is caused in us in so far as the soul is infected through the flesh. But man’s flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man’s soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. Obj. 3. Further, original sin comes to all from our first parent in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might be formed out of human flesh would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin. On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam according to a seminal principle, which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states.^^ I answer that, As was stated above, original sin is transmitted from the first parent to Ms posterity inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by the so^il to actual s'in. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active^power of genera- tion; so that those alone contract original sin who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation originally derived from Glossa ordin. (I, 44F) ; cf. St. Augustine, De. Gened ad Litt., IX, 4 (PL 34, 396). ^Op. cit., X, 18; 20 (PL 34j 422; 424)’ Q. 8i. Art. 5 CAUSES OF SIX,— MAN 671 Adam, i.e., those who are descended from him through a seminal principle. For the seminal principle is nothing else than the active power of genera- tion. But if anyone were to be formed by God out of human iesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. Conse- quently, he would not contract original sin, even as a hand would have no part in a human sin if it were moved, not by the man’s will, but by some external mover. Reply Ob], i. Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Con- sequently it is not because of the place of exile, but because of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. Reply Oh]. 2. The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. Reply Ob]. 3. If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam by way of bodily substance, but not according to a seminal principle, as was stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. Fifth Article WHETHER IF EVE, AND NOT ADAM, HAD SINNED, THEIR CHILDREN WOULD HAVE CONTRACTED ORIGINAL SIN? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. For we contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle {Rom. v. 12): In whom all have sinned. Now a man pre- exists in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother’s sin as well as from his father’s. Obj. 2. Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is the mother that provides the matter in generation as the Philosopher states^® — and death and liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would contract original sin. Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says that the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin (of whom Christ was to be bom without original sin), purifying her?^ But this purification would not have been necessary if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother; so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. ^De Gmtr. Anim., II, 4 (738t> 20). ^De Fide Orth., Ill, 2 (PG 94, 985)- 672 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8i. Art. 5 On the contrary j The Apostie says {Rom, v. 12): By one man sin en- tered into this world. Now, if woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children. And so it has been said that if anyone were begotten only materially of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that, in the opinion of philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter.^^ Therefore original sin is contracted, not from the mother, but from the father; so that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract original sin. "Whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. Reply Ob], i. The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother as in its rriaterial and passive principle. Consequently the comparison fails. Reply Ob], 2, Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary re- sult of the matter, which is provided by the mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects.-- — ^This, however, seems unreasonable. For, as was stated in the First Part,-^ immortality and impassibility in the original state were a result, not of the* condition of matter, but of originaf justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now the privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity because of Eve’s sin, it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice; and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying. . Reply Ob], 3. This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it behoved the Mother of God to shine with the greatest purity. For nothing is worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps, xcii. 5: Holiness becometh Thy House, 0 Lord, Aristotle, De Gener. Anim., II, 4 20); Avicenna, De Nat. Anim., IX, i (4ira); 3 (421). ^ St. Albert, In IV Sent., d. i, a. 21’ (XXIX, 37). ^S. T., I, q. 97, a. I ; a. 2, ad 4. Question LXXXII ON ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE {In Four Articles) We must now consider original sin as to its essence^ and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether original sin is a habit? (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man? (3) WTiether original sin is concupiscence? (4) Whether original sin is equally in all? First Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS A HABIT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — ^ Objection i. If would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states.^ Hence original sin is a privation. But a privation is opposed to a habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit. Obj. 2. Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than does original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault, or else it would follow that a man, while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of a fault. Obj, 3. Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the baptism of infants that because of original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act.- Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is a habit. I answer that, As was stated above, habit is twofold.^ The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act; and thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a nature composed of many principles — a dis- position according to which that nature is well or ill disposed to something, and chiefly when such a disposition has become a sort of nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense, original sin is a habit. For it is an in- ordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which ^ De Conceptu Virg,, 11 ; III (PL 158, 434; 435). Pecc, Mentis et Remiss., I, 39 (PL 44, 150). — Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., n, rxx, 9 (I, 465). ®Q. 49, a. 4; q. 50, a. I. 67s THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 674 Q. 82. Art. 2 was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate dis- position of the body, by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the languor of nature.^ Reply Obj. i. As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz., the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit. Reply Obj, 2. Actual sin is a lack of order in an act, whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as was stated above.^ Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not; and for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot. Reply Obj. 3. This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act. But original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless, a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz., by the removal of an obstacle, i.e., original justice, which hindered inordinate movements; just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it neces- sary to say that original sin is an infused habit, or an acquired habit, except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act; but it is an inborn habit due to our corrupt origin. Second Article WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORIGINAL SINS IN ONE MAN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written {Ps. 1 . 7): Behold I was conceived in iniquities j and in sins did my mother conceive me. But the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. Obj. 2. Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries, since the inclination of a habit is like that of nature, which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit, but several. Obj, 3. Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the differ- ent parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as was shown above.® Since, then, one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. * Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxx, 8 (I, 464). ®Q, 81, a. i. ®Q. 74. Q. 82. Art. 2 ESSENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN 675 On the contrary, It is written {Jo, i. 29) : Behold the Lamb of God, be-- hold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world. The reason for the em- ployment of the singular is that .the sin of the world is original sin, as the Gloss expounds this passaged I answer that. In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity.® Therefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i,e,, in relation to its first principle. — ^The second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. For in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness. Various species of sickness proceed from diverse causes, e,g,, from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin is one only, viz., the privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man’s mind to God. Conse- quently, original sin is specifically one, and in one man can be only one in number; while in different men it is one in species and in proportion, but numerically many. Reply Ob], 1, The employment of the plural, in sins, may be explained by the custom of the divine Scriptures which frequently use the plural for the singular, e.g,, They are dead that sought the life of the child {Matt, ii, 20) ; — or by the fact that all actual sins pre-exist virtually in original sin as in a principle, so that it is virtually many; — or by the fact that there were many deformities in the sin of our first parent, viz., pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; — or because the several parts of the soul are in- fected by original sin. Reply Ob], 2, Of itself and directly, i,e., by its own form, one habit can- not incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it should not do so indirectly and accidentally, i.e,, by the removal of an obstacle. Thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements tend to contrary places. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies. Reply Ob], 3. Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice held all the soul’s parts together in one. Consequently, there is but one original sin, just as there is but one fever in one man, although the various parts of the body are affected. Glossa ordin. (V, 1S9F) . Q. 81, a. 2. 676 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 82. Art, 3 Third Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS CONCUPISCENCE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene.^ But concupis- cence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the con- cupiscible part which is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. Obj. 2. Further, through original sin the passions of sins are in us, accord- ing to the Apostle (Rom. vii. 5). Now there are several other passions be- sides concupiscence, as was stated above.^° Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. Obj. 3. Further, by original sin all the parts of the soul are disordered, as was stated above. But the intellect is the highest of the soul’s parts, as the Philosopher states.^^ Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence. ® On the contrary j Augustine says: Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin}^ I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form, and we have said above that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Conse- quently, the formal element of original sin must be considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore, the cause of original sin must be considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which 4 s opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in man’s will being subject to God. This subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as was stated above.^^ Hence, when the will was turned away from God, all the other powers of the soul became inordinate. Accord- ingly, the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul’s powers is a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the lack of order in the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; and this lack of order may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence materially, but the privation of original justice formally. Reply Obj. i. Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally gov- erned by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to reason. Such is the con- cupiscence of original sin. ^De Fide Orth., II, 4; 30; IV, 20 (PG 94, 876; 976; 1196). '"'Q. 23, a. 4 ^ Eth., X, 7 (1177a 20) '^Retract., I, 15 (PL 32, 608). 9, a. i. Q. 82. Art. 4 ESSENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN 677 Reply Obj. 2. As was stated above, all the irascible passions are reducible to the concupiscible passions as to more principle ones;^"^ and of these, concupiscence Js the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as was stated above.^^ Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence both as being the chief passion and as including all the others, in a fashion. Reply Obj, 3. As in good things the intellect and reason stand first, so, conversely, in evil things the lower part of the soul is found to take preced- ence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as was stated above.^^ Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance,^* although ig- norance likewise is comprised among the material defects of original sin. Fourth Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS EQUALLY IN ALL? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. For original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as was stated above. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. Obj, 2. Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. Obj, 3. Further, Augustine says that lust transmits original sin to the off spring. But the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. On the contrary f Original sin is a sin of nature, as was stated above,^‘‘* But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too. 1 answer thatj There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something en- tirely, such as death and darloiess, cannot be more or less, as was stated above.^*^ In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second, since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently, it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another. Reply Obj. i. When the bond of original justice, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, is broken, each power of the soul 25, a. I. ^Q. 25, a, 2, ad i. ^®Q. 77, a. i and 2; q. So, a. 2. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent.j II, xxx, 8 (I, 464). — Cf. also Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., I, pt. vii, 26 (PL 176, 298). ^ De Nupt. et Concupisc., I, 23; 24 (PL 44, 428; 429). — Cf- Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, II (PL 65, 679). 81, a. i. 73, a. 2. 678 . THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 82. Art. 4 tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul’s powers are stronger in one man than in another because of the different bodily temperaments. Conse- quently, if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as we have stated. Reply Obj. 2. Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all. For instance, if a fever be caused by cor- ruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or lesser, and nearer to or further from the principle of life. But the cause of original sin is equal in all, so that there is no comparison. Reply Obj, 3. It is not actual lust that transmits original sin; for, sup- posing that God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin. We must rather understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all. Question LXXXIII ON THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN {In Four Articles) We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul? (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers? (3) WTiether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin? (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power and the sense of touch? First Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS MORE IN THE FLESH THAN IN THE SOUL? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. For the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh, for the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 2^): I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh. Obj. 2. Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect. Thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul. Obj. 3. Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him according to a seminal principle. Now our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh. Obj. 4. Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion; and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the souFs creation and infusion. Obj. 5. Further, no wise man would pour a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, Who is 679 68o THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 83. Art. i wisdom itself j would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does. Therefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh. On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue, for the Apostle says {Rom. vii. 18) : / knojv that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul. 1 answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accord- ingly, the original sin of all men was in Adam as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle {Rom. v. 12): In whom all have sinned j whereas it is in the bodily semen as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the offspring. But original sin can in no way be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. The reason for this is that, as we have stated above, original sin is trans- mitted from the will of our first parent to his posterity by a certain move- ment of generation in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man’s will to his other parts.^ Now in this transmission, it is to be observed that whatever accrues, from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus, from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible power, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt, whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh has the character, not of guilt, but of punishment; so that the soul is thus the subject of original sin, arid not the flesh. Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says,- the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell in the flesh. Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. Reply Obj. 2. Original sin is caused by the semen as by an instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect, but only in the principal cause; and, in this way. ^Q. 81, a. I. Retract., I, 26 (PL 32, 629). Q. 83 . Art. 2 THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN 68i original sin was in Adam more fuUy, since in him it had the nature of actual sin. Reply Ob], 3. The soul of any individual man was in Adamy according to a serninal principle, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle; because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. Reply Obj. 4. The corruption of original sin is in no "way caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. — On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stairied through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. Reply Obj. 5. The common good takes precedence over private good. Therefore God, according to His wisdom, does not set aside the universal order of things, which is that such a soul be infused into such a body^, so that this soul avoid its particular corruption; all the more so as the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as was stated in the First Part.^ And it is better for the soul to be thus, ac- cording to its nature, than not to be at ail, especially since it ran avoid damnation by means of grace. Second Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL RATHER THAN IN THE POWERS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the sub- ject of sin according to those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence, but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only according to the powers. Obj, 2. Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence. Obj, 3. Further, just as original sin is derived by the soul from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. ^S. T., I, q. 90, a. 4; q. 118, a. 3* 682 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 83. Art. 2 Ob], 4. Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as was stated.^ But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. On the contrary, Original sin is called a sin of nature, as was stated above.^ Now the soul is the form and nature of the body according to its essence and not according to its powers, as was stated in the First Part.® Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly according to its essence. I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the moving cause of that sin primarily pertains. Thus, if the moving cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man^s origin is the primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body; and this belongs to the soul according to its own essence, as was proved in the First Part.'^ Therefore the soul is through its essence the primary subject of original sin. Reply Obj. i. As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the souPs powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as has been stated. Reply Obj. 2. Even original justice pertained primarily to the essence of the soul, because it was God’s gift to human nature, to which the es- sence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem rather to regard the person, inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are tihe sins of the person. Reply Obj. 3. The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which, though it is subsequent in order of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers as a subject to its proper accidents, which are subsequent to their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Con- sequently the comparison fails. ^ Reply Obj. 4. Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the posi- tion of matter and effect, as we have stated above.® ^Q. 82, a. 3. "Q. 81, a. i. T., I, q. 76, a. 6. Ibid. ®Q. 82, a. 3. Q. 83. Art. 3 THE SUBJECT OF ORIGIXAL SIX 683 Third Article WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN INFECTS THE WILL BEFORE THE OTHER POWERS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that original sin does not infect the will be- fore the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it is caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative powder more than to the others. Obj. 2. Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will. Obj. 3. Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the understood good. If, therefore, original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. On the contrary. Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is the 'rectitude of the will, as Anselm states.*^ Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. 1 answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject, and in this respect it is related first to the essence of the soul, as was stated above. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act, and in this way it is related to the powers of the soul. It must therefore be related, first of all, to that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as was stated above.^® Therefore original sin is related, first of all, to the will. Reply Obj. i. Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the offspring, but by the act of the parental generative power. Conse- quently it does not follow that the child’s generative power is the subject of original sin. Reply Obj. 2. Original sin spreads in two ways: from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. There- fore, although the other, viz., the sensitive powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first. Reply Obj. 3. The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to act, — ^which is the motion that pertains to sin. ^ De Conceptu Virg., Ill (PL 158, 436). ^“Q. 74, a. i and 2. 684 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 83. Art. 4 Fourth Article WHETHER THE AFORESAID POWERS ARE MORE INFECTED THAN THE OTHERS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more in- fected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. Obj, 2. Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason, as is stated in Ethics i.^^ Therefore the generative power is not the most in- fected by original sin. Obj, 3. Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far as it shows us how a number of things differ}^ But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch. On the contrary, Augustine says that the injection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation, which are not subject to reasonP Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of origi- nal sin regards these three chiefly, viz., the generative power, the concupisci- ble power and the sense of touch. 1 answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to an- other. Hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is trans- mitted by the act of generation, as we have stated above.^^ Therefore the powers which concur in this act are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power inasmuch as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most potent object of the concupiscible power. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are specially said to be corrupted and infected. Reply Obj, i. Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as we have stated above. But in so far as it is trans- mitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. Reply Obj, 2. The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers ^Aristotle, Eth., I, 13 (1102b 29). “Aristotle, Metaph. I, i (980a 27). Civit. Dei, XIV, 20 (PL 41, 428). 81, a. i. Q. 83. Art. 4 THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN 685 which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through the origin of his nature, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. Reply Obj. 3. Sight is not related to the act of generation except in re- spect of remote disposition, in so far as the form of the concupiscible ob- ject is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Therefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight. Question LXXXIV ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN SO FAR AS ONE SIN IS THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER {In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin is the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins? (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin? (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness? (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they? First Article WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE ROOT OF ALL SINS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is an immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. There- fore covetousness is not the root of all sins. Obj. 2. Further, the desire for the means proceeds from the desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are not desired except as being useful for some end, as is stated in Ethics i.^ There- fore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from some deeper root. Obj. 3. Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins. On the contrary, The Apostle says (i Tim. vi. 10) : The desire of money is the root of all evil. I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in three ways.- First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches; and thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good; and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as was stated above.^ Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible ^Aristotle, Eth., I, 5 (1096a 7). “Cf. St. Albert, In II Sent., d. xlii, a. 8 (XXVII, 668). ®Q. 72, a. 2. 686 Q. 84. Art. 2 SIN, THE CAUSE OF SIN 687 goods inordinately; and they say that in this sense covetousness is the r(X)t of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from the earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things."* Now, though all this is true, it does not seem according to the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil . . . for covet otis- ness is the root of all evils. Hence it is evident that he is speaking of covet- ousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we see that by riches a man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps a man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles. X. 19: All things obey money. Hence, in this sense the desire for riches is the root of all sins. Reply Ob'], i. Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of a mutable good; and consequently the desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the immutable Good; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Ephes. iii. 17: Rooted and founded in charity. Reply Obj. 2 . The desire for money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end, but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a particular good, it moves the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by means of money. Reply Obj. 3. Just as in natural things we do not aim at knowing what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature of corruptible things can be hindered so as not to act always in the same way, so also in moral matters we consider what happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise from it, for the reason given. Second Article WHETHER PRIDE IS THE BEGINNING OP EVERY SIN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. * Cf. St. Albert, In II Sent., d. xlii, a. 8 (XXVII, 667). 688 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 84. Art. 2 For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as was stated above. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride. Obj, 2. Further, it is written {Ecclus. x. 14) : The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy from God, But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. Ob'], 3. Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, according to Augus- tine, builds up the city of Babylon,^ Therefore self-love, and not pride, is the beginning of every sin. On the contrary j It is written {Ecclus, x. 15) : Pride is the beginning of all sin, I answer thatj Some sdy that pride is to be taken in three ways.® First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel ; and thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, in so far as this means that they are not subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corrup- tion of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered (for which reason covetousness is called the root)^ whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject (for which reason it is called the beginnings because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from God). Now though all this is true, nevertheless, it is not according to the mind of the wise man who said. Pride ns the beginning of all sin. For it is evi- dent that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows {verse 17) : God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes; indeed, this is the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the begin- ning of every sin. For we must note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, namely, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before.'^ Now man’s end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may have some distinctive perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the beginning of every sin. — On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which, by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root; and such are riches. Hence, ^ De Civil. Dei, XW, 28 (PL 41, 436) ; cf. Enarr. in Psalm., super LXrV, i (PL 36, 773) . ® Cf. St. Albert, In 11 Sent., d. xlii, a. 8 (XXVII, 668) . " Q. i, a. i, ad i ; q. 18, a. 7, ad 2; q. 20, a. i, ad 2\ q. 25, a. 2. Q. 84. Art. 3 SIN, THE CAUSE OF SIN 689 from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the root of all evils, as we have stated above. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Reply Obj. 2. Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride in so far as it denotes a turning away from God; because, from the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires in- ordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Therefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in a turning away from the im- mutable good. — It may also be said that apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride because it is the first species of pride. For it is char- acteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and espe- cially to God ; and from this it happens that a man is unduly lifted up in relation to the other species of pride. Reply Obj. 3. In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently, it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of ever}" evil. Third Article WHETHER ANY OTHER SPECIAL SINS, BESIDES PRIDE AND AVARICE, SHOULD BE CALLED CAPITAL? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1 , It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. For the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant, as is stated in De Anima ii.,® for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the root of all evils, it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. Obj. 2. Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head [caput] ; so that no sins should be called capital. Obj. 3. Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punish- ment, But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus. There- fore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. On the contrary, Gregory enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.^ I answer that, Capital is derived from caput [head]. Now the head, property speaking, is that part of an animaFs body which is the principle and director of Ae whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly, a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from ® Aristotle, De An., 11 , 4 (416a 4). ^ Moral., XXXI, 45 (PL 76, 621). 690 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 84. Art. 4 head taken in the proper sense; and thus the name capital is given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term capital is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or direc- tor of others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause; which origin is formal, as was stated above.^® Therefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader; because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in mat- ters concerning the means. Hence Gregory compares these capital vices to the leaders of an army}'^ Reply Obj, r. The term capital is taken from caput and applied to some- thing connected with, or partaking of, the head, as having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the root, and pride which is called the begin- ning, but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. Reply Obj. 2. Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil; and evil, according to Augustine, is the privation of mode, species and order P But in so far as sin implies a turning to some- thing, it refers to some good, and therefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. Reply Obj, 3. This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. Fourth Article WHETHER THE SEVEN CAPITAL VICES ARE SUITABLY RECKONED? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz., vainglory, envy, anger, covetousness, sloth, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as was stated above.^^ Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. Obj. 2. Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as was stated above.^^ But -there are four principal passions of the soul, two of which, viz., hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas cer- tain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. 72, a. 6 . Moral, XXXI, 4$ (PL 76, 620). 42, 553)- 61, a. 2. ' 77. “De Nat. Boni, IV (PL Q. 84. Art. 4 SIX, THE CAUSE OF SIX 691 Ob']. 3 . Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. Obj. 4. Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so pride is the beginning of sin, as was stated above. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. ObJ. 5. Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these, as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g.^ steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way.^® I answer that, As was stated above, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially in the manner of a final cause. Xow this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, because of the condition of the sinner, who is so disposed as to have a strong inclination for one par- ticular end, with the result that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man^s particular dispositions are infinite in number. — Secondly, because of a natural relationship of the ends to one another; and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art. Accordingly, therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain fundamental modes of moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental modes that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its very na- ture. Thus, good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and because of something else, as it were. Thus one seeks an evil because of some attendant good, or avoids a good because of some attendant evil. Now man^s good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility merely through being apprehended, viz., the excellence of honor and praise; and this good is sought inordinately by vainglory. Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this pertains either to the preservation of the individual, e.g., meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony, — or the preserva- tion of the species, e.g., sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordi- nately by lust. Thirdly, there is external good, viz., riches, to which covet- ousness is directed. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. Or, again, the good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now, in the first place ^ Moral., XXXI, 45 (PL 76, 621). 692 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 84. Art. 4 it is of the nature of happiness to contain perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, that is desired by pride or vainglory. Secondly, it is of the nature of happiness to contain satiety, which covetousness seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it is of its nature to contain pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as is stated in Ethics i. and x,/® and this gluttony and lust pursue. On the other hand, the avoidance of good because of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one’s own good, and thus we have sloth, which is sadness about one’s spiritual good be- cause of the attendant bodily labor; or else it happens in respect of an- other’s good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to envy, which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one’s own excel- lence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is anger. Furthermore, these same vices attack the contrary evils. Reply Ob'], i. Virtue and vice do not originate .in the same way, since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for a mutable good. Therefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. Reply Obj. 2. Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from the passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as was stated above.^^ Reply Obj. 3. Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a dis- tinct place among the capital vices because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as one attacks the good of another as though to do so were a virtuous good, i.e., as though to do so were a vindi- cation of justice. Reply Obj. 4. Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin according to the nature of an end, as was stated above; and it is according to the same nature of an end that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Therefore pride is not counted along with the others as a universal vice, but is reckoned as the queen of them all, as Gregory states.^^ But covetous- ness is said to be the root from another point of view, as we have stated above. Reply Obj. 5. These vices are called capital because others arise from them most frequently; so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes. — ^Nevertheless, we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence Aristotle, Etk., I, 8 (1099a 7); X, 7 (1177a 22). ^'Q. 25, a. 4. Moral., XXXI, 45 (PL 76, 620). Q. 84. Art. 4 SIX, THE CAUSE OF SIN 693 by which a man refuses to acquire spiritual goods because of the attendant labor;, for the ignorance that can cause sin is due to negligence, as we have stated above.^^ As for the fact that a man commits a sin with a good in- tention, this seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he does not know that evils should not be done that good may come of them. “ Q. 76, a. 2. Question LXXXV ON THE EFFECTS OF SIN: CONCERNING THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE {In Six Articles) We must now consider the effects of sin: (i) concerning the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul;^ (3) the debt of punish- ment.^ Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin? (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether? (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which hu- man nature is stricken in consequence of sin. (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin? (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin? (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man? First Article WHETHER SIN DIMINISHES THE GOOD OF NATURE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man^s sin is no worse than the devil’s. But natural goods remain un- impaired in the demons after sin, as Dionysius states.^ Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature, Obj. 2. Further, when that which is subsequent is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. Obj. 3. Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his nature. Obj, 4. Further, no accident acts on its subject, because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an accident is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. "Q. 86. ®Q. 87. ^De Div. Norn., W, 23 (PG 3, 725). 694 Q. 85. Art. i THE EFFECTS OF SIX 695 On the contrary j A certain man going down jrotn Jerusalem to Jericho {Luke X. 30) j i.e.j to the corruption 0} sin, was stripped oj his gifts, and wounded in his nature, as Bede expounds the passage."^ Therefore sin di- minishes the good of nature. / answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as was stated above,*" this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original jus- tice, conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz., the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. For human acts produce an in- clination to like acts, as was stated above.^ Now from the very fact that a thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Therefore, as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins there results a diminution of that good of nature which is the inclination to virtue. Reply Ob], i. Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of na- ture, which is to he, to live and to understand"^ as anyone may see who reads the text. Reply Oh]. 2. Although nature precedes the voluntary action, yet it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Therefore, nature itself is* not changed in itself through a change in the voluntary action; it is the in- clination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its terminus. Reply Obj. 3. A voluntary action proceeds from distinct powers, of which one is active and the other passive. The result is that, through voluntary actions, something is caused in the man who acts, or taken from him, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits.^ Reply Obj. 4. An accident does not act as an agent on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way, there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, because it belongs to the lack of order in our acts. But as regards the lack of order in the agent, we must say that such a lack of order is caused by the fact that, in the acts of the soul, there is an active and a passive element. Thus, the sensible object moves the sensitive appe- tite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as we have stated above.^ Hence results the lack of order, not as though an accident * Glossa ordin. (V, 153A). ®Q. 51, a. i; q. 63, a. i. ®Q. 50, a. i. ''' De Div. Nom., IV, 23 (PG 3, 725). ®Q. 51, a. 2. ®Q. 77, a. i and 2. 696 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 85. Art. 2 acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and causes it to act without order. Second Article WHETHER THE ENTIRE GOOD OF HUMAN NATURE CAN BE DESTROYED BY SIN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Ob jection i . It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since, therefore, the good of nature can be con- tinually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. Obj, 2. Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since, therefore, its part can be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. Obj. 3. Further, that good of nature which is weakened by sin is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some because of sin. Thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely. On the contrary j Augustine says that evil does not exist except in some good}^ But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, be- cause they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely. I answer that, As was stated above, the good of nature that is diminished by sin is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he per- forms actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin canriot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Therefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be entirely destroyed. Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely de- stroyed.^^ For the Philosopher says that, if from a finite magnitude a con- tinual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at last* be entirely destroyed: e,g., if from any finite length I were to subtract continuously the length of a span.^^ If, however, the subtraction be made each time in Enchir., XIV (PL 40, 238). ^Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, II, tr. 26, q. 5 (fol. S7a). ^ Phys., Ill, 6 (206b 3 ). Q. 8s. Art. 2 THE EFFECTS OF SIN 697 the same proportioiij and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefi- nitely; aSj for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. — But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but possibly more, if it be a more grievous sin. We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as intermediate between two terms; for it is based on the rational nature as in its root, and tends to the good of virtue as to its term and end. Consequently, its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its root, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as we have stated above. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first “way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the complete destruction of the rational nature. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is placed against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely (because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin), and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or apti- tude is diminished because of supervening clouds, although it always re- mains rooted in the nature of the body. Repy Ob], i. This objection holds when diminution is made by subtrac- tion. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as we have stated above. Reply Ob’], 2. The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform; never- theless, it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, and accord- ing to this diversity of relation, it is diminished in one way, and not in another. Reply Ob], 3. Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, or else they would have no remorse of conscience. The fact, however, that it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace according to divine justice. Thus, even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight; and yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight. 698 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 85. Art. 3 Third Article WHETHER WEAKNESS, IGNORANCE, MALICE AND CONCUPIS- CENCE ARE SUITABLY RECKONED AS THE WOUNDS OF NATURE CONSEQUENT UPON SIN? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and con- cupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one and the same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above.^^ Therefore, they should not be reckoned as effects of sin. Obj, 2. Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. Obj. 3. Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is the act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reck- oned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Obj. 4. Further, it has been stated that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion.^"^ But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be co-divided against weakness. Obj, 5. Further, Augustine reckons two things to be punishments in- flicted on the soul of the sinner ^ viz., ignorance and difficulty ^ from which arise error and vexationj^^ which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. On the contrary j The authority of Bede suffices.^® I answer that. As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God in being subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as we have already stated,^"^ so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue. Now destitution is called a wounding of nature. Furthermore, there are four of the souks powers that can be the subject of virtue, as wa^ slated above, viz., the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore, in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, 76, a. I ; q. 77, a. 3 and 5 ; q. 78, a. i. 77, a. 3. ^ De Nat. et Grat., LXVII (PL 44, 287) ; De Lib. Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1296). ^^Cf. 5 . T., I, q. loi, a. I, obj. 2. 81, a. 2. ^Q. 61, a. 2. Q. 85. Art. 4 THE EFFECTS OF SIX 699 there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is de- prived of its order to the delectable as moderated by reason j there is the wound of concupiscence. Accordingly, these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual because of actual sin, as was explained above, these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, namely, through sin the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened against the good, good actions become more difficult, and concupiscence more inflamed. Reply Obj. i. There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another; for the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again. Reply Obj, 2. Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen. viii. 2 1 : Man^s senses are prone to evil from his youth. Reply Obj. 3. As we have stated above, concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason whereas, in so far as it goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. Reply Obj. 4. Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the souFs strength and impedes the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude, which pertains to the irascible part. Reply Obj. 5. The difficulty which is mentioned in this book of Augus- tine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz., malice^ weakness and concupiscence; for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. Error and vexation are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed because he is weakened in relation to the objects of ins concupiscence. Fourth Article WHETHER PRIVATION OF MODE, SPECIES AND ORDER IS THE EFFECT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says that where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all.^^ But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. Obj. 2. Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the privation ^Q. 82, a. 3, ad i. ^ De Nat. Boni, III (PL 42, 553). 700 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 85. Art. 5 of mode, species and order, as Augustine states.-^ Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. Obf. 3. Further, diverse effects result from diverse sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of sins that are di- verse. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each sin. On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, accord- ing to Fs. vi. 3, 'Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. Therefore sin deprives the soul of mode, species and order. I answer that. As we have stated in the First Part, mode, species and order belong to every created good, as such, and also every being.^^ For every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its species. Again, any kind of form, whether substantial or acci- dental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure; and hence it is stated in Metaph. viii. that the forms of things are like numbers, so that a form has a certain mode corresponding to its measure. Lastly, owing to its form, each thing has a relation of order to something else. Accordingly, there are different grades of mode, species and order cor- responding to the different degrees of good. There is therefore a good be- longing to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as was stated above, but is not en- tirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace; and this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species and order; and the privation of this is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order. This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections. Reply Obf. 3. Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as we have explained above; and so they are destroyed or diminished to- gether. Fifth Article WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER BODILY DEFECTS ARE THE RESULT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not czt., IV (PL 42, 553). ^s. T., I, q. 5, a. 5. ^Aristotle, Metaph., VII, 3 (1043b 33). Q. 85. Art. 5 THE EFFECTS OF SIN 701 the result of sin. For equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others; whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is equal in all, as was stated above.-^ Therefore death -and such defects are not the result of sin. Obj, 2. Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed when all sin is removed by baptism or penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. ^ Oh]. 3. Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body by sub- jecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. v. 12): By one man sin tered into this world, and by sin death. I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, essentially; secondly, accidentally. One thing is the cause of another essentially, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form ; and hence the effect is essentially intended by the cause. Consequently, since death and such defects are outside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not essentially the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle. Thus it is stated in Physics viii. that by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon?^ In this way, the sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, by which not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as was stated in the First Part.^® Therefore, when original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as we have stated above, so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all con- sequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although these defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless, they are ordered ac- cording to the justice of God, Who inflicts them as punishments. Reply Ob], i. Causes that produce their effects through themselves, if equal, produce equal effects; for if such causes be increased or diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of the removal of an obstacle do not point to equal effects. For, supposing a man employs 82, a. 4. ® Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4 (255b 25), ^S. T., I, q. 97, a. i. ""A. 3; q. 82, a. 3. 702 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 85. Art. 6 equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the move- ments of the stones resting on them will be equal; rather, one will move with the greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural tem- peraments some men^s bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. Reply Obj, 2. Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle {Rom. viii. 1 1 ) : He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies j because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you] but each is done according to the order of divine wisdom, at a fitting time. For it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ’s sufferings before attainging to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it is necessary that our bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. Reply Obj. 3. Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the character of fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect; and thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Therefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does. Sixth Article WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER DEFECTS ARE NATURAL TO MAN? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — - Objection i. It would seem that death and such defects are natural to man. For the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically?^ But man is of the same genus as other animals, which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally cor- ruptible, as having within itself the cause of its corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. Obj. 3. Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since, therefore, the vital func- tions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as is stated in De Anima ii.,^^ it seems that death and such defects are natural to man. On the contrary j i. God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now ^Aristotle, Metaph., IX, 10 (1058b 28). ^Aristotle, De An., II, 4 (416b 29). Q. 8s. Art. 6 THE EFFECTS OF SIX 703 God made not death (IFw. i. 13). Therefore death is not natoral to man. 2. Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil, since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death and such defects are the punishment of original sin, as was stated above. There- fore they are not natural to man. 3. Further, matter is proportioned to form, and ever^Thing to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as was stated above, and the form of the human body is the rational soul, which is incorruptible, as was proved in the First Part.^^ Therefore the human body is naturallv incorrupt- ible. I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways: first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular nature, A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self- preservation; and in respect of this nature, every corruption and deject is contrary to nature, as is stated in De Caelo ii.,^- since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it belongs. On the other hand, the universal nature is an active power in some universal principle of nature, for instance, in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be the Nature Who makes nature?^ This power intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things are requisite; and in this respect, corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclina- tion of matter which is allotted proportionately to its particular form ac- cording to the allotment of the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul, for the rational soul is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are: indeed, it has an immaterial operation of its own, as was stated in the First Part.®^ Conse- quently, as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since the rational soul likewise is Joined to a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole man. In this respect, man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter, if it is left to its own in- clination, but not as regards the nature of his form. The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Therefore in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man, which is the rational soul, is pro- portioned to its end, which is everlasting happiness, because of its incor- ruptibility; whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in Q. 2, a. 7 ; q. s, a. 3 and 4. ^ S. T., I, q. 75, a. 6. ® Aristotle, De Caelo, II, 6 (288b 14). ^ Natura naiurans: cf. H. Siebeck in Archiv fur GescMcMe der Phi-' losophie. III (1889-1890), pp. 37off. T,, I, q. 75, a. 2. 704 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 85. Art. 0 respect of its nature, is in a way proportioned to its form and, in another way, not. For we may note a twofold condition in any matter, namely, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, in order to make a knife, a smith chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting; and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife. But that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, re- sults from the natural disposition of iron; nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could. Therefore this disposition of matter is not proportioned to the workman’s intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner, the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensi- tive and motive powers; whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature. Indeed, nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the First Part.^^ It is in this sense that it is said that God made not death, and that death is the punishment of sin. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. r., I, q. 97, a. I. Question LXXXVI ON THE STAIN OF SIN {In Two Articles) We must now consider the stain of sin, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul? (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin? First Article WHETHER SIN CAUSES A STAIN ON THE SOUL? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin causes no stain on the souL For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature; and so the sun’s ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says.^ Now the human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, t© which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning. Obj, 2. Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as was stated above.- Now the will is in the reason j as is stated in De Anima iii.^ But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; rather is it per- fected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. Obj, 3. Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something posi- tive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can be only either a disposition or a habit; for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit. For it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who, after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. — Again, neither is it a pure privation. For all sins agree as concerns aversion and the privation of grace; and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore stain is not the effect of sin. On tjie contrary, It was said to Solomon {Ecclus, xlvii. 22): Thou hast stained thy glory; and it is written {Ephes, v. 27): That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle. In each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin. ^St. Augustine (?), Contra 5 Eaeres., V (PL 42, 1107). ®Q. 74» a. i and 2. \Aristotle, De An.^ Ill, 9 (432b 5). 705 7o6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. S6. Art, 2 I answer that, K stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a shiny body loses its sheen through contact with another body, e.g., a gar- ment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly, a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a twofold splendor: one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby man is directed in his actions; the other from the refulgence of the divine light, viz., of wis- dom and grace, whereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul; and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things against the light of reason and of the divine law, as was shown above.*^ Therefore the loss of splendor, occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. Re fly Obj, i. The soul is not defiled by inferior things, through their own power, as though they acted on the soul; on the contrary, the soul defiles itself by its own action, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the divine law. Reply Obj. 2. The action of the intellect is accomplished according as intelligible things are in the intellect according to the mode of the intel- lect; so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement towards things them- selves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, according to Osee ix. 10: They . . . became abominable as those things were which they loved. Reply Obj. 3. The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation; it denotes a privation of the soul's splen- dor in relation to its cause, which is sin. Hence, diverse sins cause diverse stains. We may say that stain is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies. Second Article WHETHER THE STAIN REMAINS IN THE SOUL AFTER THE ACT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an act, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or a disposition, as was stated above. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. Obj. 2. Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as was stated above. But the shadow does not remain when the body has 71, a. 6. Q. 86. Art. 2 THE STAIN OF SIN. 7^7 passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past. Ob], 3. Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore, when the act of sin is no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. On the contrary. It is written {Jos, xxii. 17); Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor , and the stain of that crime remaineth in you to this day? I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as was stated above, de- notes a blemish in the splendor of the soul, because of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the divine law. Hence, so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him; but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin, by which man withdrew from the light of reason and of the divine law, ceases, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, but it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus, if a man is separated from someone because of some sort of motion, he is not there- fore brought any nearer when the motion ceases; it is still necessary for him to retrace his way by a contraiy^ motion. Reply Ob], i. Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something privative, viz., the privation of union with the divine light. Reply Ob'], 2. After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation towards the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God ; and so there is no comparison. Reply Obj,s, The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the loss of splendor, just as local movement causes local separation. There- fore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed. Question LXXXVII ON THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT {In Eight Articles) We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (i) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the pun- ishment due to them.^ Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? (2) Whether one sin can be the pun- ishment of another? (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punish- ment? (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity? (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite pun- ishment? (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin? (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another’s sin? First Article WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT IS AN EFFECT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is outside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt of pun- ishment is not an effect of sin. Oh], 2. Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil. Oh], 3. Further, Augustine says that every inordinate affection is its own punishment? But punishment does not incur a further debt of pun- ishment, because this would be to go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. On the contrary j It is written {Rom, ii. 9): Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil. But to work evil is to sin. There- fore sin incurs a punishment, which is signified by the terms tribulation and anguish, I answer that, It is by a transfer from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment ^Q. 88. “Confess., I, 12 (PL 32, 670). Q. 87. Art. 2 THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT 709 therefrom. For we observe in natural things that one contrary acts with greater intensity, when the other contrary supervenes; and for this reason hot water freezes more rapidly, as is stated in Meteor, i? Therefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order are, in a manner, one in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order is put down by that order or by its principle. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against some order. Hence he is put down, in consequence, by that same order; and this repression is punishment. Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment, corre- sponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place, a man’s nature is subject to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subject to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subject to the universal order of the divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and divine law. There- fore he incurs a threefold punishment: one, inflicted by himself, viz., re- morse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. Reply Obj. i. Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its inordinateness. Therefore, just as evil is accidental to the sinner’s act, being outside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. Reply Obj. 2. Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man; and hence the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly, but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punish- ment, and that is an evil; for Dionysius says that punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is.^ Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin. Reply Obj. 3. This punishment of the inordinate affection is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless, sin incurs a further pun- ishment, through disturbing the order of divine or human law. Second Article WHETHER SIN CAN BE THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher declares.^ Now sin does not bring man back to the good ® Aristotle, Meteor., I, 12 (348b 32). ^ De Dm. Nom., IV, 22 (PG 3, 724). ^ Etk., X, 9 (1180a 4)- 710 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 87. Art. 2 of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. Ob], 2. Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says.® But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. Ob], 3. Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as was shown above.'^ There- fore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. On the contrary, Gregory says that some sins are punishments* of others.^ / answer that. We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin, as such, can in no way be the punishment of another. For, considered in its essence, sin is some- thing proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the char- acter of guilt; whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, as was stated in the First Part.® Consequently, it is evident that sin, regarded in its essence, can in no way be the punishment of sin. On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of divine grace which is withdrawn because of sin. Therefore, since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as was stated above^® the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks {Rom. i. 24) when he says: Wherefore' God gave them up to the desires of their heart, i.e., to their passions; because, namely, when men are deprived of the help of divine grace, they are over- come by their passions. In this way, sin is always said to be the punish- ment of a preceding sin. — Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, ac- cording to Wis. V. 7: We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity . — Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punish- ment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself. Reply Obj. 1. Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for the good of those who are punished, when, namely, men arise from sin more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of others, who, seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. — ^With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the punish- ment is intended for the sinner^s amendment, since the very fact that a ^ Lib. 83 Qnaest.j q. 82 (PL 40, 98). 74, a. i and 2. II (PL 76, 91S)- ""S. T., I, q. 48, a. 5. ^Q. 79, a. 3. In Ezech., I, horn. Q. 87. Art. 3 THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT in man endures toil and loss in sinning is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. Reply Obj. 2. This objection considers sin essentially as such; and the same answer applies to the Third Objection. Third Article WHETHER ANY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT? We proceed thm to the Third Article : — Objection, i. It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punish- ment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality; and hence it is written {ha. xxvii. S): In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it. Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment. Obj. 2. Further, punishments are a kind oj medicine.^^ But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and what is directed to an end is not infinite, as the Philosopher states.^- Therefore no punish- ment should be infinite. Obj. 3. Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men. There- fore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man. Obj. 4. Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is acci- dental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore it can- not be of infinite duration. On the contrary, It is written {Matt. xxv. 46): These shall go into ever- lasting punishment; and {Mark iii. 29) : He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin. I answer that. As we have stated above, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Therefore, so long as the disturbance of the order remains, the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable, because a defect which de- stroys the principle is irreparable, whereas, if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle by which one becomes a mem- ber of that order. Consequently, if a sin destroys the principle of the order by which man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself irreparable, although it is possible to repair It by the ^PoUi., I, 3 (1257b 27). ^Aristotle, Eth., II, 3 (1104b 17). THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 712 Q. 87. Art. 4 power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. Reply Obj. i. Punishment is proportioned to sin in point of severity, both in divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says,^^ is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment; in fact, they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life, — sometimes even by death. Now this does not take into consideration the time occupied in killing, but aims at removing a murderer from the society of the living; so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punish- ment inflicted by God. Now, according to Gregory, it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God’s eter- nity. A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only because he sinned throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin everlastingly. Therefore Gregory says that the wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins jor ever}^ Reply Obj. 2. Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws is not always intended as a remedy for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others. Thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, who at least may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Prov. xix. 25: The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser. Accordingly, the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate are remedial punish- ments for those who refrain from sin through the thoughts of those punish- ments, according to Ps. lix. 6: Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered. Reply Obj. 3. God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. Reply Obj. 4. Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, never- theless, it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, and to God’s justice. Therefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. Fourth Article WHETHER SIN INCURS A DEBT OF PUNISHMENT INFINITE IN QUANTITY? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite ^De Civit. Dei, XXI, 11 (PL 41, 725). Moral, XXXIV, 19 (PL 76, 738). ^Ibid. Q. 87. Art. 4 THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT 713 in quantity. For it is written {Jer, x. 24): Correct me, 0 Lord, but yet with judgment ; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing. Now God’s anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of divine jus- tice; and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment^ even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore, according to God’s vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. Obj. 2. Further, the quantity of punishment corresponds to the quantity of fault, according to Deut. xx\". 2: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. Now a sin which is committed against God is infinite. For the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (and, thus, it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual); and Gods greatness is infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. Obj. 3. Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is infinite in quantity also. On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal, because one infinite is not greater than another. I answer that, Punishment is proportioned to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite; and therefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be in- finite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from some- thing, its corresponding punishment is the pain of loss, which also is infi- nite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e., God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the pain of sense, which also is finite. Reply Obj. i. It would be inconsistent with divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that the divine justice requires, as was stated above. However, the expression to be brought to nothing is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to i Cor. xiii. 2: If I . . . have not charity, 1 am nothing. ' Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers sin as a turning away from some- thing, for it is thus that man sins against God. Reply Obj. 3. The duration of punishment corresponds to the duration of fault, not indeed on the part of the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punish- ment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. Now a fault which is irreparable is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; and hence it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns 714 THE SUMMA JHEOLOGICA Q. 87. Art. s to; and hence, in this respect, it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. Fifth Article WHETHER EVERY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal pum ishment. For pxmishmentj as was stated above, is proportioned to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment, whereas no sin seems to differ infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since, therefore, some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as was stated above, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. Obj. 2. Further, original sin is the least of all sins, and therefore Au- gustine says that the lightest punishment is incurred by those who ore punished for original sin alone}^ But original sin incurs everlasting pun- ishment, since children who have died in original sin, because they have not been baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as is shown by our Lord’s words {Jo. iii. 3): Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God. Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. Obj. 3. Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin, for divine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mor- tal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal pun- ishment is not due for any sin. On the contrary, Gregory says that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life.^^ Therefore all sins are not punished eternally. I answer that. As was stated above, a sin incurs a debt of eternal pun- ishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable breach in the order of divine justice by being opposed to the very principle of that order, viz., the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder, but such as not to involve opposition to the last end, but only opposition to the things referable to the end. This takes place when one is too much or too little intent on them, without prejudicing the order to the last end; as, for in- stance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God, for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Conse- quently, such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal, punishment. Reply Obj. 1. Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance '^Enchir., XCIII (PL 40, 275). Dial., IV, 39 (PL 77 , 396). Q. 87- Art. 6 THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT 7^5 of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. For some sins consist in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things which are means to the end. Now the last end differs infinitely from the things that are means to it. Reply Oh). 2. Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not because of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz., a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. For the eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as we have stated above. Sixth Article WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER SIN? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. Obj. 2. Further, sin is removed when man returns to virtue. Now a vir- tuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. Obj. 3. Further, Punishments are a kind of medicine. But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment does not remain. On the contrary, It is written (2 Kings xii. 13, 14): David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless, be-- cause thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die. Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven; and so the debt of punidiment re- mains when the sin has been removed. I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; for the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal com- pensation which restores him to the equality of justice. Hence, according to the order of divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandment, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to ^Aristotle, Eth., 11 , 3 (1104b 17). 7 i 6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. S7. Art. 7 one’s fellow men. Consequently, it is evident that when the sinful or in- jurious act has ceased, there still remains the debt of punishment. But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul without the soul being united to God; since it was through being separated from Him that it suf- fered the loss of its splendor, in which the stain consists, as was stated above.^^ Now man is united to God by his will. Therefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man unless his will accepts the order of divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment has the character of satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment, for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless, in this particular case and for this particular purpose it is voluntary. Consequently, it is voluntary absolutely, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary.^® We must therefore say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment absolutely, but of satisfactory punishment. Reply Ob}, i. Just as, after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as was stated above, so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as we have stated. Reply Obj, 2. The virtuous man does not deserve punishment abso- lutely, but he may deserve it as satisfactory, because his very virtue de- mands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. Reply Ob], 3. ^^en the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were disordered by the sin com- mitted. In other words, punishment is still requisite so that the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover, pun- ishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin may be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the ex- ample of David quoted above. Seventh Article WHETHER EVERY PUNISHMENT IS INFLICTED FOR A SIN? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written {Jo, ix. 2, 3) about the man born blind: Neither hath 86, a. I. ^Q. 6, a. 6. 86, a. 2 . Q. 87. Art. 7 THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT 717 this man sinned, nor his parents , . . that he should be born blind. In like manner, we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover, before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every pun- ishment is inflicted for a sin. Obj. 2. Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is fre- quently observed in human affairs; for it is written about the wicked {P$, Ixxii. 5) : They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men', and {Job xxi. 7): the wicked live, are advanced, and strengthened with riches; and {Habac. i. 13): Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous and boldest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppres- seth the man that is more just than himself? Therefore not everv’ punish- ment is inflicted for a sin. ^ Obj. 3. Further, it is written of Christ (i Pet. ii. 22) that He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth. And yet it is said {ibid., 21) that He suffered for us. Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. On the contrary, It is written {Job iv. 7, seqq.) : Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God', and Augus- tine writes that all punishment is just, and is inflicted for sin?'‘^ I answer that,.hs we have already stated, punishment can be considered in two ways, absolutely, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punish- ment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned bears willingly the punishment for another. Thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. — If, however, we speak of punishment absolutely, according as it has the nature of punishment, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to' actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin, and this either principally or consequently: principally, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and de- prived of original justice; and consequently, there are all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature. Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems {>enal, and yet has not the nature of punishment absolutely. For punishment is a species of evil, as was stated in the First Part.-® Now evil is a privation of good. And since a man’s good is manifold, viz., the good of the soul, the good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometime that a man ^Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 598) ; De Idb. Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1296). ^ S. T., I, q. 48, a. 5. 7i8 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 87. Art. 8 suffers the loss of a lesser good that he may profit in a greater good; as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these for the sake of his souPs health and the glory of God. In such cases, the loss is an evil to a man, not absolutely, but relatively; and hence it does not answer to the name of punishment absolutely, but of medicinal punishment, because a doctor prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such are not pun- ishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense; because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines is due to the corruption of nature, which is itself the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue is reduced to original sin as its cause. Reply Obj. i. Such defects in those who are born with them, or from which children suffer, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, as we have stated above. Furthermore, they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above.-*^ As for the fact that they are not equally in all, this is due to the diversity of nature which is left to itself, as was stated above.-^ Nevertheless, they are directed by divine providence to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are ad- monished by their means — and also to the glory of God. Reply Obj, 2. Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account; whereas spiritual goods are man’s great goods. Consequently, it belongs to divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much of temporal goods or evils as suffices for virtue; for, as Dionysius says,^® divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts. The very fact that others receive temporal goods is detrimental to their spiritual good; and hence the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6 ): Therefore pride hath held them fast. Reply Obj, 3. Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His sins, but for ours. Eighth Article WHETHER ANYONE IS PUNISHED FOR ANOTHER’S SIN? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i . It would seem that one may be punished for another’s sin. For it is written (Exod, xx. 5): / am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth gen- eration of them that hate Me; and (Matt, xxiii. 35): That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth. ^Q- 85, a. 5 , ad 2. ®Q. 85, a. 5, ad i. ^ De Div, Norn., VIII, 8 (PG 3, 896). Q. 87. Art. 8 THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT 719 Ob'], 2. Furtherj human justice comes from divine justice. NoWj accord- ing^ to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to divine justice, one is punished for another’s sin. Obj. 3. Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father’s sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father’s wicked- ness, this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their parents. On the contrary j It is written {Ezech, xviii. 20) : The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another’s punishment in so far as they are, in some way, one, as was stated above. — If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted because of sin, inasmuch as it has the nature of punishment, then each one is punished only for his own sin, because the sinful act is something personal. — But if we speak of a punishment that is remedial, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another’s sin. For it has been stated that ills sustained in bodily goods, or even in the body itself, are remedial punishments intended for the health of the soul. Therefore, there is no reason why such punishments should not be inflicted on one for another’s sin, either by God or by man: e,g,, on chil- dren for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they belong to them in some way. This must be in such a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the char- acter of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely remedial (except accidentally, if he consent to the other’s sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it patiently. With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely remedial, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. Conse- quently, no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Therefore, as Augustine says,^ such punishments are not inflicted on one for another’s sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father’s property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by sa3dng {Ezech, xviii. 4) : All souls are mine. Reply Obj. i. Both the passages quoted should be referred, apparently, to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of their parents, and descendants, of their forefathers. — Or, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference St. Augustine, Epist. CCL (PL 33, 1066). 720 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 87. Art. 8 to the imitation of sin; and so in Exodus these words are added, Of them that hate Me, and in the chapter quoted from Matthew {verse 32) we read: Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers. — ^The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents’ crimes, both by be- coming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents’ example, con- forming to their authority, as it were. Moreover, they deserve heavier pun- ishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways. — ^The text adds, to the third and fourth generation, because men are wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents’ sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children’s punishments so as to grieve for them. Reply Obj. 2. The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another’s sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or medi- cines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others, may be restrained from similar faults. Reply Obj. 3. Those who are near of kin are said to be punished for the sins of others, rather than outsiders, both because the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as was stated above, in so far as the child is the father’s property, and because the examples and the punishments that occur in one’s own household are more moving. Consequently, when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he follows them more intensely, and if he is not deterred by their punish- ments, he would seem to be the more obstinate and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. Question LXXXVIII ON VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN {In Six Articles) In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.^ Under the -first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether venial sin is fittingly co-divided against mortal sin? (2 ) Whether they differ generi- cally? (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin? (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal? (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance? (6} Whether a mortal sin can become venial? First Article WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS FITTINGLY CO-DIVIDED AGAINST MORTAL SIN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Ob jection 1 . It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly co-divided against mortal sin. For Augustine says: Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law? But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not co-divided against mortal sin. Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (i Cor. x. 31): Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do, do all to the glory of God. Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God’s glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. Obf. 3. Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states:^ But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it; for he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, — ^which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine. Therefore, whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness, as Augustine again says.^ Therefore, since p&rverseness denotes a mortal sin, it ^ms that whoever sins, sins mortally. ^Q. 89. ^Contra Faust., XXII, 27 (PL 42, 418). DocL Christ., 1 , 3 (PL 34, 20). *Lib. S3 Quaest., q. 30 (PL 40, 19). 721 722 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8S. Art. i Obj, 4. Further, whoever approaches one term, by that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, consequently, turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly co-divided against mortal sin. On the contrary, Augustine says, that a crime is one that merits dam- nation, and a venial sin, one that does not? But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly co-divided against mortal sin. 1 answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphori- cally. Thus to smile is not opposed to being dry; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues, this is opposed to drought. In like manner, if mortal be taken liter- ally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphori- cally, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as was stated above,® is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the loss of a principle, as we have stated above.'^ Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as was stated above.^ And if this order be lost, it cannot be restored by any intrinsic principle, but only by the power of God, as we have stated above.® For disorders in things referred to the end are restored through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be corrected through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be restored through some- thing else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Therefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, but under the condition that the order to the end itself is preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial, because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as was explained above.^® Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable; and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly co-divided against mortal sin. Reply Ob], i. The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a divi- sion of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature; but it is the division of an analogous term into its members, of which it is predicated according to priority and posteriority. Consequently, the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On ^ Tract. XLI, super Ioann., Ill, 35 (PL 35, 1697). ®Q. a. i, ad 3; q. 72, a. 5; q. 74, a. 9, ad 2. "Q. 72, a. S- ®Q. 72, a. 3; q. 87, a. 3. ®Q. 87, a. 3. 87, a. 6. Q. 88. Art. 2 VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN 723 the other hand, venial sin is called a sin according to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin; even as an accident is called a being in relation to substance, according to an imperfect notion of being. For it is not against the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts outside the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. Reply Obj. 2, This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently, everyone who does not actually refer all his actions to the glory of God does not therefore act against this pre- cept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God’s glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God’s glory, and not habitual reference; because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. Reply Obj, 3. He who sins venially cleaves to a temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by refer- ring it to God, not actually, but habitually. Reply Obj. 4. Mutable good is considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one’s end is fixed therein; because what is referred to the end has not the character of an end. Second Article WHETHER MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN DIFFER GENERICALLY ? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as was stated above.^^ Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter, since a man can love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. Obj, 2. Further, as was stated above, a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired.^^ Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible; whereas reparability belong to sins committed through weakness or igno- rance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ, not in genus, but in cause, as ^ Q. 18, a. 2. ""A. i;q. 72,a, 5;q. 87, a. 3. 724 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 88. Art. 2 was stated above.^^ Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generi- cally. Ob], 3. Further, it was stated above that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins.^'^ But sudden movements oc- cur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial. On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on purgatory enumerates cer- tain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins.^^ I answer that, Venial sin is so called from venia [pardon^ . Consequently, a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been pardoned; and thus Ambrose says that penance makes every sin venial}^ This is called venial jrom the result. Secondly, a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything, either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned; partially, as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e,g., a sin committed through weakness or ignorance, and this is called venial jrom the cause] totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, and therefore it deserves temporal punishment, but not everlasting pun- ishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus ; whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, by which man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by rea- son of its object. Consequently, it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e,g,, blasphemy, perjury and the like, or against the love of one’s neighbor, e,g., murder, adultery and the like. Therefore, such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, how- ever, the sinner’s will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinate- ness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one’s neighbor, e.g., an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth; and such sins are venial by reason of their genus. Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of the agent, as was stated above, it sometimes happens that a sin which is ve- nial generically, by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus: e.g., if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner, it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial because the act is imperfect, i.e,, not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden move- ments of unbelief.^® 77, a. 8, ad i. 74, a. 3, ad 3; a. 10. ^St. Augustine (?), Serm, CIV (PL 39, 1946). Farad., XIV (PL 14, 327). 18, a. 4 and 6. 74 j a. 10. Q. 88 . Art. 3 VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN 725 Reply Obj. i. The very fact that anyone chooses something that is con- trary to divine charity proves that he prefers it to the love of God and, consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence, that some- thing is loved more than God belongs to the genus of sins which are of themselves contrary to charity; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause. Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers those sins w^hich are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act. Third Article WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS A DISPOSITION TO MORTAL SIN? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Ob jection 1 . It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin are co-divided as contrary to one another, as was stated above. There- fore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. Obj. 2, Further, an act disposes to something of like species, and hence it is stated in Ethics ii. that jrom like acts like dispositions and habits are engendered^ But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as was stated above. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. Obj. 3. Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; and that is why Augustine says in his Rule that pride lies in wait for good works that it may destroy them?^ Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd. On the contrary^ It is written (Ecclus. xix. i): He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little. Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small ^ings. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away altogether into mortal sin. / answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause, and therefore, as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats; and there is a cause which moves indirectly, by re- moving an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly, an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent. For the disposition or habit Aristotle, Eth., II, i (1103a 26)- ^ Epist. CCXI (PL 33, 960). 726 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 88. Art. 4 may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin; since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit, and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, he is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, l3y choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. Reply Ohj. i. Venial and mortal sin are not co-divided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as was stated above, but as an accident is co-divided against substance. Therefore, as an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal sin. Reply Obj. 2. Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species, but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, although in differ- ent ways, as we have stated. Reply Obj. 3. A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin, but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as we have stated. Fourth Article WHETHER A VENIAL SIN CAN BECOME MORTAL? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine, in explaining the words of John hi. 36 {He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life), says: The slightest, i.e., venial, sins kill if we make little of them?^ Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. Obj. 2. Further, a movement in the sensuality is a venial sin before the consent of reason, but after consent, it is a mortal sin, as was stated above.^^ Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. Obj. 3. Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as was stated above. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. Obj. 4. Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as was stated. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. On the contrary. Things that differ infinitely are not changed into one another. Now venial and mortal sin differ infinitely, as is evident from ^ Tract, XII, super Ioann., Ill, 19 (PI. 35, 1492), ^Q. 74, a. 8, ad 2, Q. 88. Art. 4 VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN 727 what has been said above.-^ Therefore a venial sin cannot become mortal. / answer that. For a venial sin to become a mortal sin may be under- stood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at first a venial sin, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible, because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will; so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, even though the act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial be- comes mortal. This is possible in so far as one may fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as was stated above. Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense that many venial sins make up one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mor- tal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as we have stated above.-^ — It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states.-^ — It is likewise evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punish- ments may perhaps not be with proportion to one another. If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin. Reply Ob], i. Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively. Reply Ob]. 2. The very same movement of the sensuality which pre- ceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the move- ment of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 3. Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposi- tion; and, therefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again; so that in this respect the comparison fails. Reply Obj. 4. A disposition that becomes a habit is as something imper- fect in the same species: and thus imperfect science, by being per- fected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, like an accident which disposes to a sub- stantial form, into which it is never changed. ^Q. 72, a. 5, ad i; q. 87, a. 5, ad i. xxni (PG 57, 317). ^Q. 87, a. 3 and 5. ^In Mail., horn. 728 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 88. Art. 5 Fifth Article WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE A VENIAL SIN TO BE MORTAL? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin be mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on purgatory that, if anger con- tinue for a long time, or if drunkenness he frequent, they become mortal sins?^ But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins gener- ically, or else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal. Obj. 2. Further, the Master of the Sentences says that delectation, if lingering, is a mortal sin, but that if it be not lingering, it is a venial sin.^^ Now lingering in delectation is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal. Ob], 3. Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, there- fore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity can- not exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act’s genus, because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident; since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evi- dent from what has been said.^® I answer that^ As was stated above, when we were treating of circum- stances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act;^® and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus. Thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chas- tity; but if this other be another man’s wife, there is an additional de- formity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to an- other. Accordingly, this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery. It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin be- come mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it has been stated above that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the. deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently, it is ^St. Augustine (?), Serm. CIV (PL 39, 1946). ^ Sent., II, xxiv, 12 (I, 425). ^ Q. 72, a. 5, ad i ; q. 87, a. 5, ad i. ^ Q. 7, a. i ; q. 18, a. 5, ad 4; a. 10 and ii. Q. 88. Art. 5 VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN 729 evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of the moral act. Reply Obj. i. Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something super- vene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e,g,j diso- bedience, contempt, or the like. We must therefore say that, since anger is a movement of the soul tend- ing to the injury of one’s neighbor, if the angry movement tend to an injury which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically. xAnd if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality; whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason. — If, on the other hand, the injury to which the angry movement tends is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to "wish to say some trifling word in jest that would vex him a little, the anger will not be a mortal sin, how- ever long it last, unless perhaps accidentally, e.g,, if it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind. With regard to drunkenness, we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. For, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, by which he is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it be a venial sin, is due to some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own weak- ness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk; for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine; and therefore the sin returns to its specific nature. Reply Obj. 2. Lingering delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the delecta- tion be not lingering, there is a venial sin through the imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger; because anger is said to be last- ing, and delectation to be lingering, because of the approval of the deliberat- ing reason. Reply Obj, 3. A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, un- less it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above?^ ^Q. 18, a. s, ad 4. 730 THE SmiMA THEOLOGICA Q. 88. Art. 6 Sixth Article WHETHER A MORTAL SIN CAN BECOME VENIAL? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. For venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as was stated above. Therefore, likewise, a mortal sin can become venial. Obj, 2. Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a per- son, in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than God ; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his sin will be a venial sin, and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. Obj, 3. Further, as was stated above, good is more distant from evil than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in itself can become good; and thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal sin become venial. On the contrary j An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mor- tal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. 1 answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as we have stated above. Now the imperfect can become per- fect by some sort of addition; and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a deformity pertain- ing to the genus of venial sin. For the sin is not diminished if a man com- mit fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity. Nevertheless, a sin which is generically mortal can become venial by rea- son of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfill the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sud- den act, as is evident from what we have said above. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a sub- traction the species of the act is destroyed. Reply Obj, i. Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even Q. 88. Art. 6 VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN 73i as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a rnanj and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not hold. Reply Obj. 2. If* the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or a lunatic, then he that commits fornication in a state of such ignorance commits no sin, either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neg- lects to learn those things by which he can safeguard himself in the love of God. Reply Obj. 3 . As Augustine says, those things which are evil in them- selves cannot be well done jor any good end?^ Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can in no way be well done. But, as Augustine states, the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the state are not murderers?^ ^Contra Mendacium, I, 4; 5 (PL 32, 1226; 1227). ^ De Lib. Arb., I. 7 (PL 40, 528). Question LXXXIX ON VENIAL SIN CONSIDERED IN ITSELF {In Six Articles) We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul? (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as symbolized by wood, hay, stubble (j Cor, hi. 12). (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence? (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially? (5) Whether the first movements ‘of unbelievers are venial sins? (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone? First Article - WHETHER VENIAX SIN CAUSES A STAIN IN THE SOUL? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse.^ But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the souFs beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. Obj, 2. Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, because of the lack of order in the act and affection of the sinner. But, in venial sin, there is a lack of order in the act and the affection. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul. Obj, 3. Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a tem- poral thing, through love thereof, as was stated above.^ But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. There- fore venial sin brings a stain on to the soul. On the contrary, It is written {Ephes, v. 27) : That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle, on which the Gloss says: i,e., some grievous sin? Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain in the soul. / answer that. As was stated above, ^ a stain denotes a loss of splendor due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal things, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of likeness. Now just as in the body there is a twofold splendor, one resulting from the ^St. Augustine (?), Serm. CIV (PL 39, 1947). "Q. 86, a. i. ^ Peter Lombard, In Ephes,, super V, 27 (PL 192, 214). '*Q. 86, a. i. 732 Q- 89- Art. 2 VENIAL SIN 733 inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting from an outward and added brightness, so, too, in the soul, there is a twofold splen- dor, one habitual, and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other, actual, like an out- ward brilliance. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual splendor, but not to habitual splendor, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on,® but only hinders their acts. On the other hand, a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, and therefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habit- ual rather than of actual splendor. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated an3rwhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hin- ders the splendor that results from acts of virtue. ^ Reply Obj, i. Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively; because otherwise they would not sever the soul from the embrace of its heavenly spouse. Reply Obj. 2, In mortal sin, the lack of order in the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. Reply Obj. 3. In mortal sin, the soul com^ into contact with a tem- poral thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which comes to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end. Hence there is no comparison. Second Article WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE SUITABLY DESIGNATED AS WOOD, HAY AND STUBBLE We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as wood, hay and stubble (i Cor, iii. 12). For wood, hay and stubble are said to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside science. Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. Obj, 2. Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved yet so as by fire {verse 15). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin will not be saved, even by fire, e.g,, when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore venial sins are unsuitably desig- nated by wood, hay and stubble. Obj, 3. Further, according to the Apostle {verse 12) those who build gold, silver, precious stones, i,e,, the love of God and neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay and stubble. But even those who love God and neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins; II-II, q. 24, a. 10; q. 133, a. i, ad 2, 734 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 89- Art. 2 for it is written ( i John i. 8) : Ij we say that we have no sin we deceive our- selves. Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three. Oh]. 4. Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three. On the contrary, The Apostle says (j Cor. iii. 15) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved yet so as by fire, so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as was stated above.® Therefore these three signify venial sins. I answer that. Some have understood the foundation to be unformed faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, )vhich according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this explanation,'^ because, as the Apostle says {Gal. v. 21), he who does the works of the flesh, shall not obtain the kingdom of God, which signifies to be saved ; whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay and stubble shall be saved yet so as by fire. Consequently wood, hay and stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins.® Thus, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife, or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, namely, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. — But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God and one’s neighbor, and therefore they are designated by gold, silver and precious stones, and con- sequently not by wood, hay and stubble. We must therefore. say that it is the very venial sins themselves, which insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, that are designated by wood, hay and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he gains eternal salvation. Reply Obj. i. Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they are laid alongside it; in the same sense as it is written {Ps. cxxxvi. i): Upon the waters of Babylon, i.e., beside the waters. For venial sins do not destroy the spiritual edifice. ®Q. 87, a. 5. - De Fide et Oper., XV (PL 40, 213). ® Peter Lombard. Sent., IV. xxi, 5 (II, 882) ; St. Augustine, Enchir., LXVIII (PL 40, 264). VENIAL SIN Q. Sg. Art. 3 735 Reply Obj. 2. It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build upon the foundation. And this foundation is not unformed faith, as some have esteemed,^ but faith quickened by charity, according to Ephes. iii. 17: Rooted and founded in chanty. Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins has indeed wood, hay and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. Reply Obj. 3. Although those who are withdrawm from the care of tem- poral things sometimes sin venially, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity. Hence, they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly things remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them. Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says, all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, and the end.^^ Accordingly, all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz., to wood, which remains longer in the fire; stubble, which is burnt up at once; and hay, which is between these two; because venial sins are removed by fire quickly or slowly, ac- cording as man is more or less attached to them. Third Article WHETHER MAN COULD COMMIT A VENIAL SIN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. For on i Tim. ii. 14 {Adam was not seduced) the Gloss says: Having had no experience of God^s severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin.^'^ But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mor- tally. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says: We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in man’s soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked.^^ Now the vainglory which preceded man’s defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. — ^In like manner, Augustine says that man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit. — ^Again there seems to have ®Cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper., XV (PL 40, 213). Caelo, I, i (268a 12). ^Glossa ordin. (VI, 119 B). — ^St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, XIV, ii (PL 41, 420), ^De Genesi ad Litt., XI, 5 (PL 34, 432). cit., XI, 42 (PL 34, 454 )* 736 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 89. Art. 3 been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her sa3dng (Gen, iii. 3) : Lest perhaps we die. Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin. Obj. 3. Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the origi- nal state than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. On the contrary j Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares. Therefore he could not commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man^s state. There- fore he could not sin venially. 1 answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence.^^ This, however, is not to be under- stood as though, because of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it.^® For the dignity of a person is a circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or of vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently, what is in itself venial could not be changed into mortal sin by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was in itself venial before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally. The reason for this is that venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements in the genus of mortal sin, or through some lack of order in respect of things referred to the end, when the due order to the end is safeguarded. Now each of these happens because of some defect of order, by reason of the fact that the lower powers are not checked by the higher. For the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the fact that sensuality is not perfectly subject to reason; the sudden rising of a movement in the reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as was stated above.^'^ And that the Human soul be out of order as regards things directed to the end, when the due order to the end is safeguarded, results from the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly contained under the ordination of the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as was stated above.^^ Now, in the state of innocence, as we have stated in the De Civil, Dei, XIV, 10 (PL 41, 417). ^Cf. St. Albert, In II Sent., d. xxi, a. 10 (XXVII, 369)- St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. xxi, a. 3, q. i (II, 505). 74, a. 10. “Q. 10, a. I ; a. 2, ad 3; q. 72, a. 5. Q. 89. Art. 4 VENIAL SIN 737 First Part/® there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as Augustine says.^® Hence there could be no lack of order in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to God, which takes place through mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before com- mitting a mortal sin. Reply Obj, i. In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven. Reply Ob], 2, This vainglory, which preceded man’s downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make an experiment, and, in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory merely through hearing the^ serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept. Reply Ob], 3. Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state because it destroys that state; and this a venial sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the original state is incompatible with any lack of order whatever, the result is that the first man could not sin venially before committing a mortal sin. Fourth Article WHETHER A GOOD OR A WICKED ANGEL CAN SIN VENIALLY? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a good or a wicked angel ran sin venially. Because man is like the angels in the higher part of his soul, which is called the mind, according to Gregory who says that man under- stands in common with the angels?^ But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also. Ob], 2. Further, He that can do more, can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. Ob], 3. Further, wicked angels seem to do certain things which are venial sins generically, by provoking man to laughter, and other like fri- volities. But the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial, as was stated above, unless there be a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially. ^ S. T., I, q. 95, a. 1. ^De Civil. Dei, XIV, 17; 23; XIII, 13 (PL 41, 425; 431; 386). ^In Evang., 11 , horn. 29 (PL 76, 1214). 738 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 89. Art. 5 On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in his original state. But in his original state man could not sin venially; much less, therefore, can an angel. I answer that, An angehs intellect, as we have stated in the First Part,^^ is not discursive, ix., it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated,^^ ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Therefore, an angePs mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no lack of order in relation to the means, unless at the same time they have a lack of order in relation to the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end, which is God; and hence all their actions are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. — ^This does not apply to the natural desire for the good, which is in them, as we said in the First Part.-^ Reply Obj, i. Man is indeed like the angels in mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as we have stated above. Reply Ob']. 2. An angel could not love a creature less than God without, at the same time, either referring it to God as the last end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. Reply Obj. 3. The demons incite man to all such things which seem to be venial, that they may become intimate with him so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently, in all such things they sin mortally because of the end they have in view. Fifth Article WHETHER THE FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE SENSUALITY IN UNBELIEVERS ARE MORTAL SINS? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says {Rom. viii. i) that there is .. . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh; and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (ch. vii.). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e., by consenting to concupiscence, is ^ 5 . T., I, q. 58, a. 3; q. 79, a. 8. ^Q. 8, a. 2; q. 10, a. i ; a. 2, ad 3 ; q. 72, a. 5, ^ S. r., I, q. 63, a. 4; q. 64, a. 2, ad 5. VENIAL SIN Q. 89. Art. 5 739 because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins. Ob], 2. Further, Anselm says: Those who are not in Christ, when they jeel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the fiesh?^ But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in un- believers are mortal sins. Obf. 3. Further, Anselm says: Man was so made that he should not have felt concupiscence.^^ Now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mor- tal sin, because he acts against what he ought to do. On the contrary, It is stated in Acts x. 34 that God is not a respecter of persons. Therefore He does not impute to one unto condemnation what He does not impute to another. But He does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither, therefore, does He impute them to unbelievers. I answer that. It is senseless to say that the first movements of unbe- lievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself cannot be the subject of mortal sin, as we have stated above.-’^ Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the sinner. For the excellence of the person never diminishes sin but, on the contrary, increases it, as was stated above.^® Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbe- liever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserv- ing of forgiveness because of his ignorance, according to i Tim. L 13: / obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief; whereas the sins of believers are more grievous because of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. x. 29: How much more, do you think, he de- serveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the tes- tament unclean, by which he was sanctified? Reply Obf. i. The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the fames of concupiscence remain. Therefore the fact that be- lievers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemna- tion due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm. Therefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident. ^De Concord. Praesc, cum Lib. Arb., Ill, 7 (PL 158, 530). ^Ibid, ”Q. 74, a. 4. ^Q. 73, a. 10. 740 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 89. Art. 6 Reply Ob'], 3. This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Therefore that which is opposed to such liability per- tains, not to actual sin, but to original sin. Sixth Article WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN ANYONE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ALONE? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above."^ Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin; and so at some time unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. Obj. 2. Further, venial sin has less in common and less connection with mortal sin than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original sin can commit one mortal sin without committing an- other, Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin. Obj. 3. Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin; and when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short while, at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens even in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. There- fore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children’s limbo, where there is no pain of sense, as we shall state further whereas men are punished in hell for none other than mortal sin. There- fore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin. I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin, alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because, before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin. Hence, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin; whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, ^ Q. 88, a. 3. ^5. T,, m, Suppl., q. 69, a. 6. Q- 89. Art. 6 VENIAL SIN 741 he will sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly, thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mor- tal sin until after all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace. ^ Reply Obj, 1. Venial sin precedes mortal sin not as a necessary disposi- tion, but as a contingent one, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. Reply Oh), 2. Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not because of its want of connection or likeness, but because of the lack of the use of reason, as we have stated above. Reply Ob), 3. The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the afore- said sin of omission, unless it turn to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who reaches the age of discretion is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God’s affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (.Zach. i. 3) : Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you. TREATISE ON LAW Question XC ON THE ESSENCE OF LAW (In Four Articles) We Lave now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the First PartA But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace. There- fore, in the first place, we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.^ Concerning law, we must consider (i) law itself in general; (2) its parts.^ Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration: (i) its essence; (2) the different kinds of law;^ (3) the effects of law.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether law is something pertaining to reason? (2) Concerning the end of law. (3) Its cause. (4) The promulgation of law. First Article WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to rea- son. For the Apostle says (Rom, vii. 23) : I see another law in my mem- bers, etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members, since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not some- thing pertaining to reason. Ohj. 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason, because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues, of which we have spoken above.^ Nor again is it an act of reason, because then law would cease when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason. Ohj, 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act rightly. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what 5 . T., I, q. 114. ®Q. 109. ®Q. 93. 742 92. «Q. 57. *Q- 91- Q. go. Art. i THE ESSENCE OF L-AW 743 has been said aboveJ Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will, according to the words of the Jurist;® Whatsoever pleaseth the sover- eign has the force of law. On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as was stated above.^ Therefore law Is something pertaining to reason. / answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is in- duced to act or is restrained from acting; for lex \law\ is derived from ligare \to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above.^^ For it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher.^^ Now that which is the principle in any genus is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Con- sequently, it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. Reply Obj. i. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules; and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. — Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In thts way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something because of some law; so that any inclination arising from a law may be called a law, not essentially, but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called the law of the members P' Reply Obj. 2. Just as, in external acts, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance, the work of building and the house built, so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e., to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With re- gard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since the prac- tical reason also makes use of the syllogism in operable matters, as we have stated above^^ and as the Philosopher teaches,^*^ hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations as, in the speculative reason, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such universal propositions of the practical reason that are directed to operations have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, whOe sometimes thev are re- tained in the reason by means of a habit. Reply Obj. 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as was stated above for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the '^Q. 9, a. I. I, iv, I (I, 35a). ®Q. 17, a. i. “Q. i, a. i, ad 3. ^Phys., n, 9 (200a 22) ; Eth., VII, 8 (1151a 16). “Peter Lombard, Sent., II xxx, 8 (I, 464). “Q. 13, a. 3; q. 76, a. i; q. 77, a. 2, ad 4. ^ Eth., Vn, 3 (1147a 24). “Q. 17, a. I, 744 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. go. Art. 2 reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; or otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law. Second Article WHETHER LAW IS ALWAYS DIRECTED TO THE COMMON GOOD? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that law is not always directed to the com- mon good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of law is not always the common good. Ob], 2. Further, law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore law is directed to some par- ticular good. Obj, 3. Further, Isidore says: If law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law}^ But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed to private good. Therefore law is not directed only to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual. On the contrary, Isidore says that laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens. I answer that, As we have stated above, law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as rea- son is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest. Hence to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is happiness or beatitude, as we have stated above.^^ Consequently, law must needs concern itself mainly with the order that is in beatitude. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect, and since one man is a part of the per- fect community, law must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness. Therefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters, mentions both happiness and the body politic, since he says that we call those legal matters just which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic}^ For the state is a perfect community, as he says in Politics i.^ EtymoL, II, 10; V, 3 (PL 82, 130; 199). Op. cit., V, 21 (PL 82, 203). ^Q. 2, a. 7; q. 3, a. i; q. 69, a. i. ^ Eth., V, i (1129b 17). Aristotle, PoUt., I, i (1252a s). Q. 90. Art. 3 THE ESSENCE OF LAW 745 NoWj in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus according to some order towards that thing. Thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good. Reply Obj, i. A command denotes the application of a law to matters regulated by law. Now the order to the common good, at which law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters. Reply Obj, 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters, but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end. Reply Obj. 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the specula- tive reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, un- less it be directed to the last end which is the common good. Now whatever stands to reason in this sense has the nature of a law. Third Article WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT TO MAKE LAWS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says {Rom. ii. 14) that when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are oj the law, . . . they are a law to themselves. Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself. Obj. 2. Further, as the Philosopher says, the intention oj the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue.^'^ But every man can lead another to virtue. There- fore the reason of any man is competent to make laws. Obj. 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household. On the contrary, Isidore says, and the Decretals repeat: A law is an ordi- nance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty. Therefore not everyone can make laws. II, I (1103b 3). ^EtymoL, V, 10 (PL 82, 200); Gratian, Decretum, I, ii, I (I, 3)- 746 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. go- A rt. 4 I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the vicegerent of the whole people. Hence the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people ; for in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs. Reply Obj, i. As was stated above, a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also, by participation, as in one that is ruled. In the latter way, each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direc- tion that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on: Who show the work of the law written in their hearts {Rom. ii. 15). Reply Oh]. 2. A private person cannot lead another to virtue effica- ciously; for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an effica- cious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says.^^ But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on.^^ Therefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone. Reply Ob]. 3. As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state; and the state is a perfect community, according to Politics ir^ Therefore, just as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good, so too the good of one household is or- dained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Con- sequently, he that governs a family can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the nature of law. Fourth Article WHETHER PROMULGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO LAW? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that promulgation is not essential to law. For the natural law, above all, has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to law that it be promulgated. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs properly to law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulga- tion is not essential to law. Obj. 3. Further, the binding force of law extends even to the future, since laws are binding in matters of the future, as the jurists say.^® But X, 9 (iiSoa 20). ^Q. 92, a. 2, ad 3; II-II, q. 64, a. 3. ^Aristotle, Polit., I, I (1252a 5). ^ Codex Justinianus, I, xiv, 7 (II, 68a). 0. 90 . 4 the essence of law 747 promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to law. On the contrary j It is laid down in the Decretals that laws are estab- lished when they are promulgated?^^ I answer that^ As was stated above, a law is imposed on others as a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Therefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. But such application is made by its being made known to them by promulgation. Therefore promul- gation is necessary for law to obtain its force. Thus, from the four preceding articles, the dehnition of law may be gathered. Law is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community. Reply Obj. i. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be known by him naturally. Reply Obj. 2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is made known or can be made known to them by others, after it has been promulgated. Reply Obj. 3. The promulgation that takes place in the present extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says that lex {law\ is derived from legere [to read\ because it is written.^^ ^Gratian, Decretum, I, iv, 3 (I, 6). Ely mol., II, 10 (PL 82, 130). Question XCI ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (In Six Articles) We must now consider the various kinds of law, under which head there are six points of inquiry; (i) Whether there is an eternal law? (2) Whether there is a natural law? (3) Whether there is a human law? (4) Whether there is a divine law? (5) Whether there is one divine law, or several? (6) Whether there is a law of sin? First Article WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is no eternal law. For every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed, since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal. Obj. 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity, because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal. Obj, 3. Further, law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal, for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal. On the contrary f Augustine says: That Law which is the Supreme Rea- son cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal,^ I answer that^ As we have stated above, law is nothing else but a dic- tate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community.^ Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by divine providence, as was stated in the First Part,^ that the whole commtmity of the universe is governed by the divine reason. Therefore the very notion of the government of things in God, the ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the divine reason’s conception of things is not subject to time, but is eternal, according to Prov. viii. 23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal. Reply Obj. r. Those things that do not exist in themselves exist in God, inasmuch as they are known and preordained by Him, according to Rom, ^De Lib. Arb.j I, 6 (PL 33, 1229). ®Q. 90, a. i, ad 2; a. 3 and 4. T., I, q. 22, a. I, ad 2. 748 Q. 91. Art. 2 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW 749 iv. 17: Who calls those things that are not^ as those that are. Accordingly, the eternal concept of the divine law bears the character of an eternal law in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him. Reply Obj, 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing, and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated, because both the divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulga- tion cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads. Reply Ob], 3. Law implies order to the end actively, namely, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively, — that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end, except accidentally, in a gov- ernor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the divine government is God Himself, and His law is not something other than Himself. Therefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end. Second Article WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. For man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law, since Augustine says that the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly,^ But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore man has no natural law. Obj. 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as was stated above.^ But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore man has no natural law. Obj, 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals because of his free choice, with which he is endowed in distinction from all other animals. Since, therefore, other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law. On the contraary y the Gloss on Rom. ii. 14 (When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are oj the law) com- ments as follows: Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil.^ I answer that, As we have stated above/ law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and ^ De Lib, Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229), 90, a. 2. ^ Glossa ordin, (Vb 7E) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super II, 14 (PL 191, 1345). ‘ Q. 90, a. i, ad i. 750 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q, 91. Art. 3 measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured in so far as it partakes of the rule or meas- ure. Therefore, since all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above, it is evident that all things partake in some way in the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, in so far as it itself partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Therefore it has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end; and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist, after sa3dng {Ps. iv. 6): Offer up the sacrifice of justice, as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: Many say, Who showeth us good things? in answer to which question he says: The light of Thy countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us. He thus implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an im- print on us of the divine light: It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law. Reply Obj. i. This argument would hold if the natural law were some- thing different from the eternal law; whereas it is nothing but a participa- tion thereof, as we have stated above. Reply Obj. 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as was stated above.^ For every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly, the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be through the natural law. Reply Obj. 3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the eternal reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as was stated above.^ Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, and therefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of likeness. Third Article WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the ® Q. 10, a. I. ® Q. 90, a. i. Q. 91. Art. 3 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW 751 natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as was stated above. Now through the eternal law all things are most orderly^ as Augustine states.^® Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law. Obj, 2. Further, law has the character of a measure, as was stated above.^^ But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as is stated in Metaph, Therefore no law can emanate from the human reason. Obj, 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as is stated in Metaph. x.^^ But the dictates of the human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. ix. 14: The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Therefore no law can emanate from the human reason. On the contrary, Augustine distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.^^ I answer that, As we have stated above, a law is a dictate of the prac- tical reason.^^ Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason, for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as was stated above.^® Accordingly, we conclude that, just as in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is that from the precepts of the natural law, as from common and indemonstrable principles, the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided that the other essential conditions of law be observed, as was stated above.^'^ Therefore Tully says in his Rhetoric that justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature, and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence far the law,^^ Reply Obj. i. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the divine reason, but according to its own mode, and im- perfectly. Consequently, just as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of divine wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain common principles, but not a proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the divine wisdom, so, too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain common principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). ^Q. 90* a. i. Aristotle, Iletaph., IX, i (1053a 31). ^Ibid. Lib, Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). ^Q. go, a. i, ad 2. ^Ibid. 90. ^De Invent,, II, $3 (p. 148*’). 752 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 91. Art. 4 eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanc- tion them by law. Reply Obj, 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things. But the principles impressed on it by nature are the general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, of which the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature. Reply Ob]. 3. The practical reason is concerned with operable matters, which are singular and contingent, but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Therefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of the sci- ences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus. Fourth Article WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there was no need for a divine law. For, as was stated above, the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is the divine law, as was stated above Therefore there is no need for a divine law in addition to the natural law and to human laws derived therefrom. Obj. 2. Further, it is written {Ecclus. xv. 14) that God left man in the hand of Ms own counsel. Now counsel is an act of reason, as was stated above.^® Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dic- tate of human reason is a human law, as was stated above. Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a divine law. Obj, 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a divine law in addition to the natural law. On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying {Ps. cxviii. 33) : Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, 0 Lord, I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. Now if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural ability, there would be no need for man to have any further direction, on the part of his rea- son, in addition to the natural law and humanly devised law which is de- rived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness 14, a. I. Q. 91. Art. 4 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW 753 which exceeds man’s natural ability, as we have stated abover^ there- fore it was necessary that, in addition to the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God. Secondly, because, by reason of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form dif- ferent judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt -what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err. Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of w'hich he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior move- ments, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which are observable: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself rightly in both kinds of acts. Consequently, human law could not suf- ficiently curb and direct interior acts, and it was necessary for this pur- pose that a divine law should supervene. Fourthly, because, as Augustine says,-^ human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds, since, while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human living. In order, there- fore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was neces- sary for the divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. cxviii. 8, where it is said: The law of the Lord is unspotted, i,e,, allowing no foulness of sin; converting souls, because it directs not only exterior, but also interior, acts; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, because of the certainty of what is true and right; giving wisdom to little ones, by directing man to an end supernatural and divine. Reply Obj. i. By the natural law the eternal law is participated propor- tionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law. Reply Obj. 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry, and hence must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above; but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the divine law. Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers. Consequently the comparison fails. 5, a. 5. ^De Lib. Arb., I, 5 (PL 32, 1228). 754 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 91. Art. 5 Fifth Article WHETHER THERE IS BUT ONE DIVINE LAW? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection x. It would seem that there is but one divine law. For, where there is one king in one kingdom, there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps, xlvi. 8 : God is the King of all the earth. Therefore there is but one divine law. Obj. 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men, since according to i Tim. ii. 4: He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Therefore there is but one divine law. Obj. 3, Further, the divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. But natural law is one for all men. Therefore much more is the divine law but one. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Eeb. vii. 12) : The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law. But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz., the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the divine law is two- fold, namely, the Old Law and the New Law. I answer that, As we have stated in the First Part, distinction is the cause of number.-- Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g., a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g., a boy and a man; and in this way the divine law is distinguished into Old and New. Hence the Apostle {Gal. iii. 24, 25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child under a pedagogue; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is no longer under a pedagogue. Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as was stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the com- mon good as to its end, as was stated above.^^ This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good, and to this man was directly or- dained by the Old Law. Hence it is that, at the very outset of the Law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans {Exod. iii. 8, 17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good, and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Therefore, at the very* beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying {Matt. iv. 17) • Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Hence Augus- ^S. T., I, q. 30, a. 3. go, a. 2. Q. 91- Art. 6 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW 755 tine says ihzt promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testa- ment, for which reason it is called old, but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament?^ Secondly, it belongs to law to direct human acts according to the order of justice; wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Matt. v. 20: Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Hence the saying that the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the soul?^ Thirdly, it belongs to law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment, but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestoTred in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says that there is little difference between the Law and the Gospel — fear [/imor] and love [^mor].^® Reply Obj. 1. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one king- dom, gave one law to men while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for divine things. Reply Obj. 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts iv. 12: There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved. Consequently, the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be bom, a law containing certain rudiments of justice unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him. Reply Obj. 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect. Hence it is one and the same for all. But the divine law directs man also in certain par- ticular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the divine law to be twofold, as we have already explained. Sixth Article WHETHER THERE IS A LAW IN THE POMES OF SIN? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is no law of the Tomes’ of sin.^'^ For Isidore says that the law is based on reason.^^ But the Tomes^ of sin ^Contra Faust., IV, 2 (PL 42, 217). ^Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., Ill, xl, i (II, 734). ^Contra AdimanL, XVII (PL 42, 159). ^Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., II, XXX, 8 ( 1 , 464) ; St. John Damascene, De Fide Orth., IV, 22 (PG 94, 1200)- ^ EtymoL, V, 3 (PL 82, 199). 756 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 91. Art. 6 is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the ^femes’ has not the nature of a law. Ob], 2. Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor from not following the instigations ' of the Tomes,’ but rather from his following them. Therefore the Tomes’ has not the nature of a law. Ob'], 3. Further, law is ordained to the common good, as was stated above.^^ But the Tomes’ inclines us, not to the common good, but to our own private good. Therefore the Tomes’ has not the nature of law. On the contrary. The Apostle says {Rom. vii. 23): / see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind. I answer that, As we have stated above, law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures, but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to law is called a law by participation, as was stated above.^^ Now those who are subject to law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something. According to this, he directs different subjects to different acts ; and in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly, and thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were. For example, if a soldier be turned out of the army, he will become a subject of rural or of mercan- tile legislation. Accordingly, under the divine Lawgiver, various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another. Thus, I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the divine ordinance, is allotted to him accord- ing to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason; and this law was so effective in man’s first state, that nothing either outside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses. In fact, this happens to each one individually, according as he has the more departed from the path of reason; so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. xlviii. 21: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them. Accordingly, then, this very inclination of sensuality, which is called the Tomes,’ in other animals has absolutely the nature of law, yet only in so far as we may consider as law what is an inclination subject to law. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way; rather is it a devia- tion from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man ^Q. 90, a. 2. ®°A. 2j q. 90, a. i, ad i. ^Ibid. Q. 91. Art. 6 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW 757 is deprived of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this im- pulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, has the nature of a law in so far as it is a penalty following from the divine law depriving man of his proper dignity. Reply Obj, i. This argument considers the Tomes’ in itself as an incen- tive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as we have stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the divine law; much as though we were to say that it is a law that a nobleman should be made subject to menial labor because of some misdeed. Reply Obj, 2. This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure; for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law b'^come transgressors. But the Tomes’ is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as was stated above. Reply Ob], 3. This argument considers the Tomes’ as to its proper in- clination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the indi- vidual. This is true in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called the Tomes’ in so far as it departs from the order of reason. Question XCII ON THE EFFECTS OF LAW {In Two Articles) We must now consider the effects of law, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is an effect of law to make men good? (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit and to punish, as the Jurist states?^ First Article WHETHER IT IS AN EFFECT OF LAW TO MAKE MEN GOOD? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as is stated in Ethics ii., is that which makes its subject good? But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who works it in us without us, as was stated above in the definition of virtue.^ Therefore it does not belong to law to make men good. Obj. 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good. 3* Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as was" stated above."^ But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it does not belong to law to make men good. Obj. 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says.^ But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good. ^ On the contrary. The Philosopher says that the intention of every law- giver is to make men good? I answer that, As we have stated above, a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed.'^ Now the virtue of any being that is a subject consists in its being well subor- dinated to that by which it is regulated; and thus we see that the virtue of ^Dig., I, m. 7 (I, 34a). “Aristotle, Eth., II, 6 (iio6a 15). ®Q. 55, a. 4, Q. 90, a. 2. ^Polzt., Ill, 6 (1282b 12). ^Eih., II, i (1103b 3), 90, a i, ad 2 ; a. 3 and 4. 7SS Q. 92. Art. i THE EFFECTS OF LAW 759 the irascible and concupiscible powers consists in their being obedient to reason. In the same way, the virtue of every subject consists in Ms being well subjected to his ruler j as the Philosopher says.^ But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue; and since virtue is that which makes its subject goody it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those, to whom it is given, good, either absolutely or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the law- giver is fixed on a true good, which is the common good regulated accord- ing to divine justice, it follows that the effect of law is to make men good absolutely. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not good absolutely, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in opposition to divine justice, then law does not make men good absolutely, but in a relative way, namely, in relation to that particular government. In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves. Thus a man is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end. Reply Obj. i. Virtue is twofold, as was explained above, viz., acquired and infused.^ Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue, while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts, insofar as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Therefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics that lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works?^ Reply Obj, 2. It is not always through the perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictate of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as we have stated above.^^ Reply Obj, 3. The goodness of any part is considered in its relation with the whole; and hence Augustine says that unseemly is the part that har- monizes not with the whole to which it belongs}^ Since, then, every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he be well ordered to the common good, nor can the whole be well ordered unle^ its parts be proportioned to it. Consequently, the common good of the state cannot flourish, xmless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose busi- ness it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says that the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good manP^ spoilt., I, 5 (1260a 20). ®Q. 63, a. 2. ’®Cf. Eth,y n, I (1103b 3). a. I. '^Conjess.j III, 8 (PL 32, 689)- ^ PoUt., Ill, 2 (1277a 20). 63. 76o the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 92. Art. 2 Reply Obj. 4. A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, its aim is that the citi- zens be good. For it has the nature of law only in so far as it is an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them; and this is to make them good, not absolutely, but with respect to that par- ticular government. Second Article WHETHER THE ACTS OF LAW ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in command, prohibition, permission and punishment}"^ For every law is a general precept, as the Jurist states.^*^ But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are superfluous. Obj. 2. Further, the effect of law is to induce its subjects to be good, as was stated above. But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command. Obj. 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore, if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward. Obj. 4, Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as was stated above. But he that obeys the law merely through fear of being punished is not good; because, although a good deed may be done through servile fear, i.e., fear of punishment, it is not done well, as Augustine says.^® Therefore punishment is not a proper effect of law. On the contrary, Isidore says: Every law either permits something, as: brave man may demand his reward^^; or forbids something, as: Wo man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage^] or punishes, as: ^Let him that commits a murder be put to death I answer that. Just as an enunciation is a dictate of rekson as asserting something, so a law is a dictate of reason as commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Therefore, just as, in the demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law. Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above.^® But there are three kinds of human acts. For, as was stated above, some acts are good of their nature, viz., acts of ^'‘Gratian, Decretum, I, iii, 4 (I, 5). — Cf. St. Isidore, EtymoL, V, 19 (PL 82, 202). Dig., I, iii. I (I, 33b) . Contra duas Epist. Pelag., IT, 9 (PL 44, 586) . EtymoL, V, 19 (PL 82, 202). ^Q. 90, a. I and 2; q. 91, a. 4. 76 i Q. 92. Art, 2 THE EFFECTS OF LAW virtue, and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept 01 com- mand, for the law commands all acts of virtue?^ Other acts are evil of their nature, viz., acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. And other acts are, of their nature, indifferent, and in respect of these the law permits. (We may add that all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent.) Furthermore, it is the fear of punishment that law mak^ use. of in order to ensure obedience ; and in this respect punishment is an effect of law. Reply Ob], i. Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a pro- hibition is a kind of precept; and, accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, every law is regularly called a precept. Reply Obj. 2. To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competence even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Hence, the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (i Cor. vii. 12) says: / speak ^ not the Lord. Consequently, it is not reckoned as an effect of law. Reply Obj. 3. To reward may also pertain to anyone, but to punish pertains to none but the administrator of the law, by whose authority the pain is inflicted. Therefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish. Reply Obj. 4. From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so like- wise with pleasure and of one’s own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good. “Q. 18, a. 8. “^^ristotle, EtK V, i (1129b 19). Question XCIII THE ETERj^AL LAW {In Six Articles) We must now consider each law by itself: (i) the eternal law; (2) the natural law;^ (3) the human law;- (4) the Old Law;^ (5) the New LaWj which is the law of the Gospel.*^ Of the sixth law, which is the law of the ‘fomes/ what we have said when treating of original sin must suffice.^ Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (i) What is the eternal law? (2) Whether it is known to all? (3) TOiether every law is derived from it? (4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law? (5) Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? (6) Whether all human things are subject to it? First Article WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW IS A SUPREME EXEMPLAR EXISTING IN GOD? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the eternal law is not a supreme ex- emplar existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. 3ut there are many exemplars of things in the divine mind, for Augustine says that God made each thing according to its exemplar P Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be the same as an exemplar existing in the divine mind. Obj. 2. Further, it is of the nature of a law that it be promulgated by word, as was stated above.'^ But Word is a Personal name in God, as was stated in the First Part,® whereas exemplar refers to the essence. There- fore the eternal law is not the same as a divine exemplar. Obj. 3- Further, Augustine says: We see a law above our minds, which is called truth? But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the notion of truth is not the same as the notion of an exemplar. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the supreme exemplar. On the contrary, Augustine says that the eternal law is the supreme exemplar to which we must always conform?^ Q. 94. -Q. 95 . ^ 98. ^Q. 106. ^Q. 81, S2, 83. ^Lib. 83 QuaesL, q. 46 (PL 40, 30). • Q. 90, a. 4; q. 91, a. i, ad 2. ®S. T., I, q. 34, a. i. ® De Vera Rekg., XXX (PL 34, 147). Lib, Arb,, I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). 762 Q. 93. Art. i THE ETERNAL LAW 763 1 answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists an exemplar of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the exemplar of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the exemplar of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or model of the products of that art, so, too, the exemplar in him who governs the acts of his sub- jects bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above as belonging to the nature of law.^^ Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things, in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Moreover, He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the First Part.^'^ There- fore, just as the exemplar of the divine wisdom, inasmuch as all things are created by it, has the character of an art, a model or an idea, so the exemplar of divine wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the charac- ter of law. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements. Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal exem- plars which refer to the proper nature of each single thing: and conse- quently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as was stated in the First Part.^^ But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as was stated above.^^ Now things which are in themselves diverse may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to something common. Therefore the eternal law is one since it is the exemplar of this order. Reply Obj. 2. With regard to any sort of word, two points may be con- sidered: viz., the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and ex- presses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else than something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses mentally the things of which he is thinking. So, too, in God, therefore, the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person; but all things that are in the Father^s knowledge, whether they refer to the essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares.^^ But among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is ex- pressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God. Nevertheless, it is appropriated to the Son, because of the suit- ability of exemplar to word. Reply Obj. 3. The exemplars of the divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things as do the exemplars of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true Q. 90. “ S. r., I, q. 14, a. 8. “ S. r., I, q. 103, a. 5. "" S. T., I, q. 15, a. 2. Q. 90, a. 2. De Tnn., XV, 14 (PL 42, 1076) . 764 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 93. Art. 2 by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since an opinion is true or false according as things are or are not. But the divine intellect is the measure of things, since each thing has truth in it in so far as it is like the divine intellect, as was stated in the First Part.^'^ Consequently the divine intellect is true in itself, and its exemplar is truth itself. Second Article WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW IS KNOWN TO ALL? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. For, as the Apostle says (i Cor. ii. ii), the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. But the eternal law is an exemplar existing in the divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. Obj. 2. Further, as Augustine says, the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should he most orderly. But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of manP But according to Ethics i., any man can judge well of what he knows. Therefore the eternal law is not known to us. On the contrary, Augustine says that knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on usP I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; sec- ondly, in its effect, in which some likeness of that thing is found: e.g., someone, not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. Hence we must say that no one can know the eternal law as it is in itself, except God and the blessed who see God in His essence. But every rational creature knows it according to some reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says.^^ Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law. As to the other truths, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect they know the eternal law In a greater or lesser degree. Reply Obj. i. We cannot know the things that are of God as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Rom. i. 20: The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being under-- stood by the things that are made. Reply Obj. 2. Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it, r., I, q. 16, a. I. Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). ^ De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 148). "^Aristotle, Eth., I, 3 (1094b 27). ^De Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). ^De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 147). Q. 93* Art. 3 THE ETERNAL LAW 765 for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law, in the aforesaid way, knows also the whole order of things whereby they are most orderly. Reply Obj, 3. To judge of a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job xii. II : Doth not the ear discern words, arid the palate of Mm that eateth, the taste? It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that anyone judges well of what he knows by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way, we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law. Third Article WHETHER EVERY LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the Tomes,’ as was stated above, which is not derived from that divine law which is the eternal law, since to it pertains the prudence of the flesh, of which the Apostle says (Rom, viii. 7) that it cannot be subject to the law of God, Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law. Obj, 2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as was stated above, the eternal law is that according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly. But some laws are unjust, according to Isa, x. i: Woe to them that make wicked laws. Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law. Obj, 3. Further, Augustine says that the Icm which is framed for ruling the people rightly permits many things which are punished by the divine providence?'^ But the exemplar of the divine providence is the eternal law, as was stated above. Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law. On the contrary, divine Wisdom says (Prov. viii. 15) : By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. But the exemplar of divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as was stated above. Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law. / answer that, As was stated above, law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end.^® Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover, since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Therefore we observe the same in all those I, 3 (1094b 27). ®*Q. 91, a. 6. ^De Lib, Arb,, I, 5 (PL 32, 1228). ^Q. 90, a. I and 2. 766 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 93. Art. 4 who govern, namely, that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief. Thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king’s command to his inferior administrators; and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen who work with their hands. Since, then, the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all the other laws which are in addition to the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says that in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful but what man has drawn from the eternal lawP Reply Obj. i. The Tomes’ has the nature of law in man in so far as it is a punishment resulting from the divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a prone- ness to sin, it is contrary to the divine law, and has not the nature of law, as was stated above.^® Reply Obj. 2. Human law has the nature of law in so far as it par- takes of right reason ; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law, but of violence. Nevertheless, even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, through being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; for all power is from the Lord God, according to Rom. xiii. i. Reply Obj. 3. Human law is said to permit certain things, not as ap- proving of them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not concern itself with matters it cannot direct comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently, it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law; what follows is rather that it is not on a perfect equality with it. Fourth Article WHETHER NECESSARY AND ETERNAL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i . It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to reason. But the eternal law is the divine reason. Therefore God’s will is subject to the ^ De Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). 91, a. 6. Q. 93. Art. 4 THE ETERNAL LAW 767 eternal law. ^ But Gods will is something eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law. whatever is subject to a king is subject to the king’s law Now the Son, according to i Cor. xv. 28, 24, shall be subject ... to Goa and the Father^ . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him. Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law. Obj. 3 . Further, the eternal law is the exemplar of the divine providence. But many necessary things are subject to the divine providence: for in- stance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law. On the contrary. Things that are necessary’' cannot be otherwise than they are, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men in order to restrain them from evil, as w’as explained above.-® There- fore necessary things are not subject to law. I answer that. As we have stated above, the eternal law is the exemplar of the divine government. Consequently, ’whatever is subject to the divine government is subject to the eternal law; while if anything is not subject to the divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The applica- tion of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man (for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet) is not subject to human government. Accordingly, all that is in things created by God, whether it be contingent or necessarj^, is subject to the eternal law; while things pertaining to the divine nature or essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself. Reply Obj. 1. We may speak of God’s will in two ways. First, as to the will itself, and thus, since God’s will is His very essence, it is subject neither to the divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God’s will with reference to the things themselves that God wills about creatures. Now these things are subject to the eternal law in so far as their exemplar is in the divine wis- dom. In reference to these things, God’s will is said to be reasonable [rationalis], though regarded in itself it should rather be called their exemplar [ratio]. Reply Obj. 2. God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently, He is not subject to the divine providence or to the eternal law, but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains^® But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which likewise the Father is said to be greater than He {Jo. xiv. 28). The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created. Q. 92, a. 2. ^De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34 . i47). 768 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 93. Art. 5 Reply Ob'], 4. As the Philosopher says, some necessary things have a cause of their necessity, and therefore they derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise.^^ And this is in itself a most effective part of restraint, for whatever is restrained is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to. Fifth Article WHETHER NATURAL CONTINGENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. For promulgation is part of the nature of law, as was stated above.^- But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational crea- tures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law, and consequently natural contingents are not. Obj. 2. Further, Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason, as is stated in Ethics But the eternal law is the supreme exemplar, as was stated above. Since, then, natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether without reason, it seems that they are not sub- ject to the eternal law. Obj. 3. Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contin- gents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal law. On the contrary, It is written (Prov. viii. 29) : When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits, I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason for this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone. Hence, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man is done by the act of man himself moving those things; for such irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as was stated above.^^ Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational beings sub- ject to him, in so far as, by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action. Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so it is in this ^Metaph,, IV, 5 (loisb 10). ^Q. 90, a. 4. Aristotle, Eth,, I, 13 (1102b 25; b 13). I, a. 2. Q. 93 . Art. 6 THE ETERNAL LAW 769 way that God is said to command the whole of naturCj according to Ps. cxlviii. 6: He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away. And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Consequently, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by the divine providence; but not, as rational crea- tures are, through understanding the divine commandment. Reply Obj. i. The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things what the promulgation of law is to men ; because law, by being pro- mulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 2. Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason, whereas they do partake of the divine reason by obeying It : for the power of the divine reason extends over more things than the power of the human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subject to reason, so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, for that reason, being rational. Reply Obj. 3. Although the defects which occur in natural things are out- side the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of uni- versal causes, especially the order of the First Cause, Le., God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as was stated in the First Part.^^ And since the eternal law is the exemplar of the divine providence, as was stated above, hence it is that the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal law. Sixth Article WHETHER ALL HUMAN AFFAIRS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says {Gal. v. 18) : If you are led by the spirit, you are not under the law. But the just, who are the sons of God by adop- tion, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rom. viii. 14: Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. Therefore not all men are under the eternal law. Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says {Rom. viii. 7): The prudence of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not subject to the law of God. But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law, which is the law of God. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that the eternal Icm is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of blessedness.^^ But those who ® S. T., I, q. 22, a. 2. ^De Ub. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). 770 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 93. Art. 6 are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under the eternal law. On the contrary, Augustine says: Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is ad- ministered?'^ I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as we have explained above: first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i,e., by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward moving principle. In this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, as was stated above. But since the rational nature, along with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways. For each rational creature both has some knowledge of the eternal law, as was stated above, and it also has a natural inclination to that which is in har- mony with the eternal law; for we are naturally adapted to be the recipients of virtue, as it is said in Ethics ii.^^ Both ways, however, are imperfect and to a certain extent destroyed in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of what is good is darkened in them by passions and habits of sin. But in the good, both ways are found more perfect, because in them, besides the natural knowledge of what is good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom ; and, again, besides the natural inclination to what is good, there is the added interior motive of grace and virtue. Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it. But the wicked are subject to the eternal law, imper- fectly as to their actions, since both their knowledge of what is good and their inclination thereto are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine says: / esteem that the just act according to the eternal law;^^ and: Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most suitable laws?^ Reply Obj, i. This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law because he is unwillingly subject to the binding power of the law, much as though this were a great burden. Hence, on the same passage the Gloss says that he is under the law who refrains from evil deeds through fear of the punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue?^ The spiritual man is not under the ^De Civit. Dei, XIX, 12 (PL 41, 640). Aristotle, Eth., 11 , i (1103a 25). ^De Lib. Arb., I, 15 (PL 32, 1238). ^ De Catech. Rud., XVIII (PL 40, 333). Peter Lombard, In Gal., super V, 18 (PL 192, 158). Q. 93- Art. 6 THE ETERNAL LAW 771 law in this way, for he fulfills the law willingly through charity, which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are said to be the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as we have stated above, it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says {2 Cor, hi. 17) : Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. Reply Oh]. 2. The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action, since it inclines to actions contrary to the divine law; yet it is subject to the law of God as regards passion, since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of divine justice. Nevertheless, in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature; and consequently there remains in man the inclination to do the things which belong to the eternal law. For we have seen above that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.”^- Reply Ohj. 3. A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause. Thus heaviness, which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place, is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that, just as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly, both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law. ^Q. 85, a. 2. Question XCIV THE NATURAL LAW {In Six Articles) We must now consider the natural law, concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (i) What is the natural law? (2) What are the precepts of the natural law? (3) Whether all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law? (4) WLether the natural law is the same in all? (5) Whether it is changeable? (6) W^hether it can be abolished from the mind of man? First Article WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS A HABIT? We proceed thus to the First Article: — Objection i. It would seem that the natural law is a habit. For, as the Philosopher says, there are three things in the soul, power, habit and pas- sion} But the natural law is not one of the soul’s powers, nor is it one of the passions, as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit. Obj. 2. Further, Basil says that the conscience or synderesis is the law of our mindf which can apply only to the natural law. But synderesis is a habit, as was shown in the First Part.^ Therefore the natural law is a habit. Obj. 3. Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on. But man’s reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but a habit. On the contrary, Augustine says that a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary} But such is not the natural law, since it is in in- fants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit. I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially, and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason.^ Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it, for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since, then, a habit is that by which we act, a law can- not be a habit properly and essentially. 11 , s (iiosb 20). ^Cf. In Hexdem., horn. VII (PG 29, 158); St. John Damascene, De Fide Orth., IV, 22 (PG 94, 1200). ^ 5 . T., I, q. 79, a. 12. ^ De Bono Coniug., XXI (PL 40, 390). ®Q. 90, a. i, ad 2. 772 Q. 94. Art. 2 THE NATURAL LAW 773 Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit. Thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. Accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. So, too, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold these principles; they are rather the principles of which we possess the habit. Reply Objz 1. The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue;® and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he men- tions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz., powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul besides th se three: e.g,, acts, as to will is in the one that wills; again, there are things known in the knower; moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like. Reply Obj. 2. Synderesis is said to be the law of our intellect because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions. Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that the natural law is held habitu- ally; and this is granted. To the argument advanced in the contrary seme we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, because of some impediment. Thus, because of sleep, a man is unable to use the habh of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of the understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually. Second Article WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL PRECEPTS, OR ONLY ONE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but only one. For law is a kind of precept, as was stated aboveJ If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws, Obj. 2. Further, the natural law is consequent upon human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one, though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature because of the unity of nature as a whole, or there are many by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible power would belong to the natural law. Obj. 3. Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as was stated Eth ., II, 5 (1105b 20). Q. 92, a. 2. 774 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 94. Art. 2 above.^ Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law. On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in rela- tion to operable matters as first principles do to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law. I answer that, As was stated above, the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason, because both are self-evident principles.^ Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is 'contained in the notion of the subject; even though it may happen that to one who does not know the definition of the subject, such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, Man is a rational being, is, in its very nature, self-evident, since he who says man, says a rational beings and yet to one who does not know what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says/® certain axioms or propo- sitions are universally self-evident to all; and such are the propositions whose terms are known to all, as, Rvery whole is greater than its part, and. Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another. But some propo- sitions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions. Thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place. But this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it. Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended by men. For that which first falls under apprehension is being, the under- standing of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing can- not be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph, iv.^^ Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the ap- prehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action (since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so that all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided. Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of the ®Q. 90, a. I. ®Q. 91, a. 3. Eehdom. (PL 64, 1311). ^Aristotle, Metaph., HI, 3 (loosb 29). Q. 94- Art. 3 THE NATURAL LAW 775 contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclina- tion are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Therefore, the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. For there is in man, first of all, an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances, inasmuch, namely, as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature; and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its ob- stacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals; and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law which nature has taught to all animals such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him. Thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law: e.g., to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. Reply Obj, 1, All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept. Reply Obj, 2. All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e,g,, of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as was stated above. And thus the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but they are based on one common foundation. Reply Obj, 3. Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man ; so that whatever can be ruled by reason is contained under the law of reason. Third Article WHETHER ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE NATURAL LAW^? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not all the acts of the virtues are pre- scribed by the natural law. For, as was stated above, it is of the nature of law that it be ordained to the common good.^^ But some acts of the virtues are ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially in regard to acts of temperance. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues are the subject of natural law. I, i, I (I, 29a).— Cf. 0 . Lottm, Le droit naturel, pp. 34, 78- ^"Q. 90, a. 2. 776 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 94. Art. 3 Obj. 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature; whereas this applies to certain spe- cial sins. Ob], 3. Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But the acts of the virtues are not common to all, since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law. On the contrary, Damascene says that virtues are natural}"^ Therefore virtuous acts also are subject to the natural law. I answer that. We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, in so far as they are virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper species. If, then, we are speaking of the acts of the virtues in so far as they are virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: e.g., fire is inclined to give heat. Therefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to* act according to reason; and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law, since each one^s reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i,e,, in their proper species, thus not all vir- tuous acts are prescribed by the natural law. For many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not primarily incline, but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well- living. Reply Obj. i. Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the common good of nature, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good. Reply Obj.^ 2. By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man, and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states ; or we may mean that nature which is com- mon to man and other animals, and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature: e,g. contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime. Reply Obj, 3. This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportioned and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as not being proportioned to them. Fide Orth., Ill, 14 (PG 94, 1045). 976,* 1196). ^ Op, du, n, 4; 30; rv, 20 (PG 94, 876; Q. 94. Art. 4 THE NATURAL LAW 777 Fourth Article WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS THE SAME IN ALL MEN? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals that the natural law is that which is con-- tained in the Law and the Gospel}^ But this is not common to all men^ be- cause, as it is written {Rom. x. 16)^ all do not obey the gospel. Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men. Obj. 2. Further, Things which are according to the law are said to be just, as is stated in Ethics v.^'^ But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so just for all as not to be subject to change in regard to some men.^® Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men. Obj. 3. Further, as was stated above, to the natural law belongs every- thing to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things, — some to the desire of pleas- ures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. There- fore, there is not one natural law for all. On the contrary, Isidore says: The natural law is common to all nations. I answer that, As we have stated above, to the natural law belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally; and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now it belongs to the reason to proceed from what is common to what is proper, as is stated in Physics i.^® The speculative reason, however, is differently situated, in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is con- cerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is concerned with con- tingent matters, which is the domain of human actions; and, consequently, although there is necessity in the common principles, the more we descend towards the particular, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accord- ingly, then, in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions; although the truth is not known to all as re- gards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions?'^ But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all as to what is particular, but only as to the common principles; and where there is the same rectitude in relation to particulars, it is not equally known to all. It is therefore evident that, as regards the common principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. But as to the proper conclusions of the speculative ^®Gratian, Decretum, I, i. prol. (I, i). Aristotle, Etk., V, i (1129b 12). ^Op. cit., V, 7 (1134b 32). ^ EtymoL, V, 4 (PL 82, 199). Aristotle, Phys., I, I (184a 16). ^Boethius, De Hebdom. (PL 64, 1311). 778 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 94. Art. 4 reason, the truth is the same for all, but it is not equally known to all. Thus, it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus, it is right and true for all to act according to reason, and from this principle it follows, as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases. But it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one’s country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further towards the particular, e.g,, if one were to say that goods held in trust should be re- stored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore. Consequently, we must say that the natural law, as to the first common principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain more particular aspects, which are conclusions, as it were, of those common principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures sub- ject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases because of some obstacle) , and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by pas- sion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature. Thus at one time theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates.^^ Reply Obj, i. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Therefore Gratian, after say- ing that the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel, adds at once, by way of example, by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by?^ Reply Obj, 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as common principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.^^ Reply Obj. 3: Just as in man reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Therefore it is universally right for all men that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason. ^Caesar, De Bello GaUico, VI, 23 (I, 348). ^Decretum, I, i, prol. (I, i). V, I (1129b 12). 779 Q. 94- Art. 5 THE NATURAL LAW Fifth Article WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE CHANGED? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the natural law can be changed. For on Ecclus. xvii. 9 {He gave them instructions, and the law of life) the Gloss says: He wished the law of the letter to he written, in order to cor- rect the law of nature?'^ But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed. Ohf. 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. xxii. 2); and when He ordered the Jews to borro'w and purloin the vessels of the Eg5^tians (Exod. xii. 35) ; and when He commanded Osee to take to him- self a wife of fornications (Osee i. 2). Therefore the natural law can be changed. Obj. 3, Further, Isidore says that the possession of all things in com- mon, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law?^ But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals: The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable.^'^ I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense, nothing hinders the natural law from being changed, since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the divine law and by human laws. Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of sub- traction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles. But in its secondary principles, which, as we have said, are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as was stated above. Reply Obj. i. The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law, or because the natural law was so perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction. ^ Glossa ordin. (Ill, 403B), ^ EtymoL, V, 4 (PL 82, 199). ®^Gratian, Dt- cretum, I, v, proL (I, 7). 78o the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 94. Art. 6 Reply Obj, 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature; which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God because of original sin, according to i Kings ii. 6: The Lord killeth and maketh alive. Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. — In like manner, adul- tery is intercourse with another’s wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. — ^The same ap- plies to theft, which is the taking of another’s property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. — Nor is it only in human things that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God is, in some way, nat- ural, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Reply Obj. 3. A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g., that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring with it the contrary. Thus, we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, the posses- sion of all things in common and universal freedom are said to be of the natural law, because, namely, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the bene- fit of human life. Accordingly, the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition. Sixth Article WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE ABOLISHED FROM THE HEART OF MAN? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. For on Rom. ii. 14 {When the Gentiles who have not the law, etc.) the Gloss says that the law of justice, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace?^ But the law of justice is the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out. Obj. 2. Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more, therefore, can the law of nature be blotted out. Obj. 3. Further, that which is established by law is proposed as some- thing just. But many things are enacted by men which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man. ^S.T., I, q. 105, a. 6, ad I. „ ^ Glossa ordin. (VI, 7E) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super II, 14 (PL 191, 1345). 78i Q. 94- Art. 6 THE NATURAL LAW On the contrary j Augustine says: Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not?^ But the law which is written in men’s hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out. / answer that. As we have stated above, there belong to the natural law, first, certain most common precepts that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more particular precepts, which are, as it were, con- clusions following closely from first principles. As to the common principles, the natural law, in its universal meaning, cannot in any way be blotted out from men’s hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the common principle to the par- ticular action because of concupiscence or some other passion, as was stated above.^^ — But as to the other, ix., the secondary precepts, the natural laiv can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary" conclusions: or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as, among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states {Rom. i. 24), were not esteemed sinful. Reply Obj. 1. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above. Reply Obj. 2. Although “grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, an(h therefore more enduring. Reply Obj. 3. This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust. ^Confess., II, 4 (PL 32, 678). 77, a. 2. Question XCV HUMAN LAW {In Four Articles) We must now consider human law, and ( i ) concerning this law considered in itself; (2) its power (3) its mutability.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Its utility. (2) Its origin. (3) Its quality. (4) Its division. First Article WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR LAWS TO BE FRAMED BY MEN? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. For the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as was stated above.^ But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. There- fore there was no need to frame laws. Obj, 2. Further, As the Philosopher says, men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice A But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which is contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the exe- cution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges than to frame laws in addition. Obj. 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above.® But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matters pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws. On the contrary, Isidore says: Laws were made that in fear thereof hu- man audacity might be held in check, that, innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might pre- vent the wicked from doing harm,^ But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made. ^Q. 96. ^Q. 97. ®Q. 92, a. I. ^Eth., V, 4 (1132a 22). ®Q. 90, a. i and 2. ^ Etymol., V, 20 (PL 82, 202). 782 Q. 95. Art. i HUMAN LAW 783 ^ / answer that^ As we have stated above, man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training.'^ Thus we observe that a man is helped by diligence in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz., his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given suf- ficiently of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training, since the perfection of virtue con- sists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be dissolute and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. There- fore, in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed; for, as the Philosopher says, as man is the most noble of animals if he he perfect in virtue, so he is the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and justice,^ For man can use his reason to devise means of satis- fying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do. Reply Ob], i . Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion; but men whose disposition is evil are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says, it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges? And this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge rightly of each single case. — Secondly, because those who make laws con- sider long beforehand what laws to make, whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises ; and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by con- sidering one solitary instance. — Thirdly, because lawgivers judge univer- sally and about future events, whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; and thus their judgment becomes perverted. Since, then, the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be bent, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for ^Q. 63, a. i; q. 94, a. 3. ^PoUt,, I, i (1253a 31), ^Rhetor., I, i ( 1354 ^ 3 ^)' 784 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 95. Art. 2 the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men. Reply Obj. 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law have necessarily to be committed to judges, as the Philosopher says in the same passage: e.g., concerning something that has happened or not happened, and the like,^® Second Article WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says that the legal just is that which originally was a matter of ifidifference}^ But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not all derived from the natural law. Obj. 2. Further, positive law is divided against natural law, as is stated by Isidore^^ and the Philosopher.^^ But those things which flow as conclu- sions from the common principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as was stated above.^^ Therefore that which is established by human law is not derived from the natural law. Obj. 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all, since the Philoso- pher says that the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere.^^ If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all; which is clearly false. Obj. 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are de- rived from the natural law. But it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers, as the Jurist says.^^ Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law. On the contrary, Tully says: Things which emanated from nature, and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.'^'^ I answer that. As Augustine says, that which is not just seems to be no law at all.^^ Hence the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it departs from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law. (1354b 13). ^Eth., V, 7 (1134b 20). ^EtymoL, V, 4 (PL 82, 199). V, 7 (1134b 18). 94, a. 4. V, 7 (1134b 19). “Pig., I, iii, 20 (Ij 34a). Invent., II, 53 (p. 148^). ^®Pe Lih. Arb., I, 5 (PL 32, 1227). Q. 91, a. 2, ad 2. Q..95-ART. 3 HUMAN LAW 785 But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways : first j as a conclusion from principles : secondly, by way of a determination of certain common notions. The first way is like to that by which, in the sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the prin- ciples; while the second is likened to that whereby, in the arts, common forms are determined to some particular. Thus, the craftsman needs to deter- mine the common form of a house to the shape of this or that particular house. Some things are therefore derived from the common principles of the natural law by way of conclusions: e.g., that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man; while some are derived therefrom by way of determination: e.g,, the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is a determination of the law of nature. Accordingly, both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way are contained in human law, not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but as having some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way have no other force than that of human law. Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law. Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds for those things that are derived from the natural law by way of conclusion. Reply Obj. 3. The common principles of the natural law cannot be ap- plied to all men in the same way because of the great variety of human affairs; and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people. Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to the decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law; and to these determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is related as to its principles, in so far, namely, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide. Hence the Philosopher says that, in such matters. we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience^ age and prudence^ as to their demonstrations.^^ Third Article WHETHER ISIDORE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE LAW IS APPROPRIATE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says: Imw shall be virtuous^ just^ possible to nature^ according to the custom of the country ^ suitable to place and timCj necessary , useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead ^ Eth.jW^ II (1143b ii). 786 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 95. Art. 3 to misunderstanding ; framed for no private benefit ^ but for the common good?^ For lie had previously expressed the quality of law in three condi- tions, saying that law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common welfare?^ There- fore it was needless to add any further conditions to these. Ob]. 2. Further, Justice is included in virtue [honestas], as Tully says.^^ Therefore, after saying virtuous, it was superfluous to add just. Ob]. 3. Further, written law is co-divided against custom, according to Isidore?^ Therefore it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is according to the custom of the country. Ob], 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be neces- sary absolutely, because it cannot be otherwise; and that which is necessary in this way is not subject to human judgment. Hence human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again, a thing may be necessary for an end, and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is super- fluous to say both necessary and useful. On the contrary stands the authority of Isidore. / answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be deter- mined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportioned to its rule and measure. Now both these condi- tions are verified in human law, since it is both something ordained to an end, and it is also a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. Now this higher measure is twofold, viz., the divine law and the natural law, as was explained above.^® But the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the Jurist states.^'' Therefore Isidore, in determining the nature of law| first lays down three conditions; viz., that it foster religion, inasmuch as it is proportioned to the divine law; that it be helpful to discipline, inas- much as it is proportioned to the natural law; and that it further the com- mon welfare, inasmuch as it is proportioned to the utility of mankind. All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time, he implies that it should be suitable to discipline. For human discipline depends, first, on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying just. Secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent, because discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same bur- dens should not be laid on children as on adults); and it should be ac- cording to human customs, since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others. Thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect ^Etymol, V, 21 (PL 82, 203). -Op. cit., V, 3 (PL 82, 199). ^ De Off., 1 , 7 (p. ii). -^EtymoL, 11 , 10; V, 3 (PL 82, 131; 199). ^Aristotle, Phys., 11 , 9 (200a 10; b 5). ^ A. 2 ; q. 93, a. 3. ^ Dig., I, iii, 25 (I, 34b). Q. 95. Art. 4 HUMAN LAW 787 of which he says, adapted to place and time. The remaining words, neces- sary, useful, etc., mean that law should further the common welfare: so that necessity refers to the removal of evils, usefulness, to the attainment of good, clearness of expression, to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as was stated above, law is ordained to the common good,-^ this is expressed in the last part of the description. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Fourth Article WHETHER ISIDORE'S DIVISION OF HUMAN LAWS IS APPROPRIATE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that Isidore divided human statutes or hu- man law wrongly. For under this law he includes the law of nations, so called, because, as he says, nearly all nations use it.“^ But, as he says, natu- ral law is that which is common to all nations?^ Therefore the law of na- tions is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law. Obj. 2 . Further, those laws which have the same force seem to differ, not formally, but only materially. But statutes, decrees of the commomlty, senatorial decrees, and the like which he mentions, all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction, since it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate. Obj. 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and sol- diers, so there are other human offices. Therefore it seems that, as this division includes military law, and public law^^ referring to priests and magistrates, so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state. Obj. 4. Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the Cornelian law, another the Falcidian law, etc.^^ On the contrary. The authority of Isidore suffices. I answer that, A thing can be divided essentially in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul, either rational or irra- tional, is contained in the notion of animal; and therefore animal is divided properly and essentially in respect of its being rational or irrational, but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely outside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many things are con- 90, a. 2. ^Etymol., V, 6 (PL 82, 200). ^ Op. ciL, V, 4 (PB 82, 199)- ^Op. cit., V, 9 (PL 82, 200). "^Op. cit., V, 7; 8 (PL 82, 200). "^Op. at., V, 15 (PL 82, 201). 788 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 95. Art. 4 tained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and essentially. For, in the first place, it belongs to the notion of human law to be derived from the law of nature, as was explained above. In this respect positive law is divided into the law of nations and civil law, according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature, as was stated above. For to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature as conclusions from principles, e.g., just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live together; and this belongs to the law of nature, since man is by nature a social ani- mal, as is proved in Politics i.^"^ But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself. Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect, human law may be divided ac- cording to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e,g., priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Therefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men. Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law to be framed by the one who governs the community of the state, as was shown above.®^ In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher,^^ one is monarchy, i.e., when the state is governed by one; and then we have Royal Ordinances, Another form is aristocracy, i.e., government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the Authoritative legal opinions {Responsa Prudentum\ and Decrees of the Senate [Senatus consulta\ . Another form is oligarchy, i,e,, government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have Praetorian, also called Honorary, law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called democracy, and there we have Decrees of the commonalty [Plebiscita] . There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best; and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the Lords and Commons, as is stated by Isidore.®'^ Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors. Thus we have the Lex Julia about adultery the Lex Cornelia concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not because of the authors, but because of the matters to which they refer. Reply Obj. i. The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natursTl to man, Aristotle, Polit., I, i (1253a 2). ^Q. 90, a. 3. ^Polit., Ill, 7 (1279a 26). EtymoL, V, 10; II, 10 (PL 82, 200; 130). ^ Dig., XLVIII, v (I, 84Sa). ^ Op. ciL, XLVIII, viii (I, 8s2b). > V , 45 ; y HUMAN LAW Q, 95. Art. 4 7S9 in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its principles. Therefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless, it is distinct from the natural law, especially from that natural law which is common to all animals. The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said. Question XCVI ON THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW {In Six Articles) We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether human law should be framed in a common way? (2) mether human law should repress all vices? (3) Whether human law is competent to direct the acts of all the virtues? (4) Whether it binds man in conscience? (5) Whether all men are subject to human law? (6) Whether those who are under the law may act outside the letter of the law? First Article WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE FRAMED IN A COMMON WAY RATHER THAN IN THE PARTICULAR? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that human law should be framed, not in a common way, but rather in the particular. For the Philosopher says that the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of decrees^ which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only in a common way, but also in the particular. Obj. 2. Further, law is the director of human acts, as was stated above.^ But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not in a common way, but rather in the particular. Obj. 3 . Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as was stated above.^ But a measure should be most certain, as is stated in Metaph. x.^ Since, therefore, in human acts no universal proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed, not in a common way, but in the particular. On the contrary, The Jurist says that laws should be made to suit the majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case? I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportioned to that end. Now the end of law is the common good, because, as Isidore says, law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of Eth,, V, 7 (1134b 23). “Q. 90, a. I and 2, ^Ibid, '‘Aristotle, Metaph,, IX, I (1053a i). I, iii, 3; 4 (I, 34a). 79Q 791 Q. 96. Art. 2 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW all the citizens,^ Hence human laws should be proportioned to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Therefore law should take account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. For the community of the state is composed of many persons, and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short .time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another^ as Augustine says."^ Reply Ob], i. The Philosopher divides the legal just, I.e., positive law, into three parts For some things are laid down absolutely in a common way, and these are the common laws. Of these he says that the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference j but which ^ when enacted, is so no longer: e.g., the fixing of the ransom of a captive. — Some things affect the community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called privileges, i.e., private laws^ as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these, he adds, and further, all particular acts of legislation. — Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being applications of common laws to particular cases. Such are decrees which have the force of law; and in re- gard to these he adds, all matters subject to decrees. Reply Obj. 2. A principle of direction should be applicable to many. Hence the Philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single act. For the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions, whereas law is a common precept, as was stated above.^^ Reply Obj. 3. We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things Consequently, in contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though at times, and less frequently, it fail. Second Article WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO REPRESS ALL VICES? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says that laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, ^ Etymol., II, 10; V, 21 (PL 82, 131; 203). De Civit. Dei, XXII, 6 (PL 41, 759). V, 7 (1134b 20). ® CL Gratian, Decretum, I, iii, 3 (I, 5) ; St. Isidore, EtymoL, V, 18 (PL 82, 202). ^^Metaph., LX, i (1052b 18). ^Q. 92, a. 2, obj. i. ^Aristotle, Eth., I, 3 (1094b 13). 792 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 96. Art. 2 man’s audacity might be held in check P But it would not be held in check sufficiently unless all evils were repressed by law. Therefore human law should repress all evils. ^ Obj. 2. Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices. Obj. 3. Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as was stated above.^^ But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices. On the contrary j We read in De Libero ArbitriOj i: It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits these things, and that divine providence punishes them}^ But divine provi- dence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them. 1 answer that, As was stated above, law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts.^® Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as is stated in Metaph, since different things are meas- ured by different measures. Therefore laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says, law should be possible both according to nature, and according to the customs of the country}^ Now the ability or facility of action is due to an interior habit or disposi- tion, since the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same thing is not possible to a child as to a full-grown man, and for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner, many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man. Now human law is framed for the multitude of human beings, the major- ity of whom are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are injurious to others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained. Thus human law prohibits murder, theft and the like. Reply Obj. i. Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Conse- quently, it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one’s neighbor is injured. These sins are forbidden by human law, as was stated. Reply Obj. 2. The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Therefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz., that ^EtymoL, V, 20 (PL 82, 202). Q. 95, a. 2. "^St. Augustine, De Uh. Arb,, I, S (PL 32, 1228). 90, a. I and 2. Aristotle, Metapk, DC, i (lossa 24). ^EtymoL, II, 10; V, 21 (PL 82, 131, 203). Q, 96. Art. 3 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW 793 they should abstain from all e\dl. Otherwise these imperfect ones^ being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils. As it is written {Prov. xxx. 33): He that violently blowcth Ms nose^ bringcth out blood] again {Matt^ ix. 17): if new wine, i.e., precepts of a perfect life, is put into old bottles, i.e., into imperfect men, the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, i.e., the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break out into evils worse still. Reply Obj. 3. The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law, while human law falls short of the eternal law. For Augustine says: The law which is framed for the government of states allows and leaves unpun- ished many things that are punished by divine providence. N or, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it doesP Therefore, human law likewise does not prohibit every- thing that is forbidden by the natural law. Third Article WHETHER HUMAN LAW PRESCRIBES THE ACTS OF ALL THE VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that human law does not prescribe the acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But hu- man law does not prohibit all vices, as was stated above. Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. Obj. 2. Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law, so that whatever is from a virtue cannot come under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. Obj. 3. Further, law is ordained to the common good, as was stated above.^® But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that law prescribes the perform- ance of the acts of a brave man, . . . and the acts of the temperate wmn, . . . and the acts of the meek man; and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the former, forbidding the latter?'^ I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as was explained above.“^ Now all the objects of the virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the multitude. Thus, matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a friend; and in like manner with the other virtues. But law, as was stated above, is ordained to the common good.^^ Therefore, there is no virtue whose acts cannot be pre- scribed by the law. Nevertheless, human law does not prescribe concem- Lib. Arb., I, 5 (PL 32, 1228). ®®Q. 90, a. 2. ^ Eth., V, i (1129b 19). ®Q. 54, a- 2; q. 60, a, i; q. 62, a. 2, “Q. 90, a. 2. 794 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 96. Art. 4 ing all the acts of every virtue, but only in regard to those that are ordain- able to the common good, — either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good, — or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace. Reply Ob], i. Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obliga- tion of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue. Reply Oh]. 2. An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous ; and thus the act of jus- tice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things. In this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. — Secondly, an act of virtue is so called when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue. Nor does it come under a precept of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims. Reply Ob], 3. There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as was stated above, either mediately or immediately. Fourth Article WHETHER HUMAN LAW BINDS A MAN IN CONSCIENCE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i , It would seem that human law does not bind a man in con- science. For an inferior power cannot impose its law on the judgment of a higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept on a divine judgment, such as is the judgment of conscience. Obj. 2. Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the com- mandments of God. But sometimes God’s commandments are made void by human laws, according to Matt. xv. 6: You have made void the com- mandment of God for your tradition. Therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience. Obj. 3. Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man, according to Isa. x. i, 2 : Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do vio-, lence to the cause of the humble of My people. But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore human laws do not bind man in conscience. Onthe contrary. It is written (i Pet. ii. 19) : This is thanksworthy, if for conscience ... a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully. I answer that. Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience from the eternal law whence they are derived, according to Prov, viii. 15: By Me kings reign, Q. 96. Art. 4 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW 795 and lawgivers decree just things. Now laws are said to be just, both from the end (when, namely, they are ordained to the common good), from their author (that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver), and from their form (when, namely, burdens are laid on the subjects according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good). For, since one man is a part of the community, each man, in all that he is and has, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole. So, too, nature inflicts a loss on the part in order to save the whole; so that for this reason such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are legal laws. On the other hand, laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being con- trary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned above: — either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory; or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him; or in re- spect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the com- munity, although with a view to the common good. Such are acts of vio- lence rather than laws, because, as Augustine says, a law that is not just seems to be no law at allr'^ Therefore, such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to Matt, v. 40, 41: Ij a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other two. Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the divine good. Such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else con- trary to the divine law. Laws of this kind must in no way be observed, be- cause, as is stated in Acts v. 29, we ought to obey God rather than men. Reply Obj. i. As the Apostle says {Rom, xiii. i, 2), all human power is from God . , . therefore he that resisteth the power, in matters that are within its scope, resisteth the ordinance of God; so that he becomes guilty in conscience. Reply Obj. 2. This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of [human] power. Therefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed. Reply Obj. 3. This argument is true of a law that inflicts an unjust bur- den on its subjects. Furthermore, the power that man holds from God does* not extend to this. Hence neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous injury. ^De Lib. Arb., I, 5 (PL 32, 1227). 796 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 96. Art. 5 Fifth Article WHETHER ALL ARE SUBJECT TO LAW? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle says (i Tim. i. 9) : The law is not made for the just man. Therefore the just are not subject to human law. Ohj. 2. Further, Pope Urban says (this is also found in the Decretals ) : He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by the public lawr^ Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said {Rom. viii. 14) : Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. There- fore not all men are subject to human law. Obj. 3. Further, the Jurist says that the sovereign is exempt from the laws.^^ But he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are subject to law. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. xiii. i) : Let every soul be sub- ject to the higher powers. But subjection to a power seems to imply sub- jection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men should be subject to law. I answer that, As was stated above, the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive power Therefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator; and whoever is subject to a power in this way is subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is not subject to a power. In one way, by being alto- gether free from its authority. And so it happens that the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher law. Thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the subject re- ceives his orders from the emperor ; for in these matters he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed by that of a higher. In this way, one who is subject absolutely to a law may not be subject thereto in certain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by a higher law. Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are not subject to law, but only the wicked. For coercion and violence are contrary to the will ; but the will of the good is in harmony with law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Therefore in this sense the good are not subject to law, but only the wicked. ^ “'Gratian, Decretum, II, xix, q. 2, can. 2 (I, 840). ^ '’’Q. 90, a. I and 2; a. 3, ad 2. Dig., I, iii. 31 (I, 34b). Q. 96. Art. 6 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW 797 Reply Obj. i. This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion, for, in this way, the law is not made for the just men, because they are a law to themselves , since they show the work of the law written in their hearts, as the Apostle says {Rom. ii* 14, 15). Consequently law does not coerce them in the way that it does the wicked. Reply Obj. 2. The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man, and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are incon- sistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless, it is an effect of the guidance of the Holy Ghost that spiritual men are subject to human laws, according to i Pet. ii. 13: Be ye subject ... to every human creature for God^s sake. Reply Obj. 3. The sovereign is said to be exempt from the law, as to its coercive power, since, properly speaking, no man is coerced by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law because none is com- petent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the law. Therefore on Ps. I . 6 {To Thee only have I sinned) the Glo^s says that there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king.^^ But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will, according to the statement that whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep himself. And the authority of a wise man says: Obey the law that thou makest thy- self. Moreover the Lord reproaches those who say and do not; and who bind heavy burdens and lay them on merCs shoulders, but with a finger of their own they will not move them {Matt, xxiii. 3, 4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its direc- tive force; but he should fulfill it voluntarily, and not of constraint. Again, the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he can change the law, and rule within it according to time and place. Sixth Article WHETHER HE WHO IS UNDER A LAW MAY ACT OUTSIDE THE LETTER OF THE LAW? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act out- side the letter of the law. For Augustine says: Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment, not on them, hut according to them?^ But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the intention of the ^ Peter Lombard, In Psalm., super. I, 6 (PL 191, 486). — Cf. Glossa ordin. (Ill, 157E). Decretal. Greg. IX, I, ii, 6 (II, 8) . ^ Pseudo-Ausonius, Septem Sapientum Sententiae, II, Pittacus (Ausonius, ed. H. G. E. White, New York: G. P. Putnam^s Sons, 1921, vol. II, p. 272). ^^De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 148). 798 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 96. Art. 6 lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under a law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver. Ob]. 2. Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the law. There- fore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter of the law. Obj. 3. Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise, for Wis- dom says {Prov. viii. 15): By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver other- wise than by the words of the law. On the contrary, Hilary says: The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it; because things are not subject to speech, but speech to thingsP" Therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words. 1 answer that. As was stated above, every law is directed to the common welfare of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly,; but in so far as it fails of this common welfare, it is without binding power. Hence the Jurist says: By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man}^ Now it often happens that the observance of some point of law conduces to the common welfare in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very injurious. Since, then, the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention to the common good. Hence, if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be injurious to the general welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule; but if it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great calamity for the city if the gates were not opened to them; and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to main- tain the common welfare, which the lawgiver had in view. Nevertheless, it must be noted that if the observance of the law ac- cording to the letter does not involve any sudden risk, needing instant remedy, it is not permissible for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state; rather those alone can do this who are in authority, and who, in the event of such cases, have the power to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow the delay involved in referring the matter to authority, the necessity itself carries with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law. ^De Trin., IV (PL 10, 107), I, iii, 25 (I, 34b), Q. 96. Art. 6 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW 799 Reply 06 ;. I. He who in a case of necessity acts outside the letter of the law does not judge of the law; but he judges of a particular case in which he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed. Reply Obj. 2. He who follows the intention of the lawgiver does not in- terpret the law absolutely; but he interprets the law in a case in which it is evident, by reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the law, or consult those in power. Reply Ob]. 3. No man is so wise as to be able to consider every single case; and therefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration, he ought not to mention thern all, in order to avoid confusion; but he should frame the law ac- cording to that which is of most common occurrence. Question XCVII ON CHANGE IN LAWS {In Four Articles) We must now consider change in laws, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether human law is changeable? (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs? (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law? (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by the dis- pensation of those in authority? First Article WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. For human law is derived from the natural law, as was stated above.^ But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change. Ohj, 2. Further, as the Philosopher says, a measure should be absolutely stable.^ But human law is the measure of human acts, as was stated above.^ Therefore it should remain without change. Ob], 3. Further, it is of the nature of law to be just and right, as was stated above.^ But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once should always be law. On the contrary, Augustine says: A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in the course of time.^ I answer that, As was stated above, human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed.® Thus there may be two causes for the just change of human law; one on the part of reason, the other on the part of the men whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of rea- son is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in the speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was after- wards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters, for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into consider- 95 > a. 2. ^ Eth., V, 5 (1133a 25). ^Q. 90, a. i and 2. De Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). ®Q. 91, a. 3. 800 ^Q. 95, a. 2. Q. 97. Art. 2 CHANGE IN LAWS 801 ation, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in relation to the common welfare. On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightfully changed because of changed condition among men, to whom dif- ferent things are expedient according to the difference of their conditions. An example is proposed by Augustine: If a people have a sense of modera- tion and, responsibility j and are most careful guardians of the common welfare, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals, then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the choice de- volves to a few good menJ Reply Obj. i. The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as was stated above,^ and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the divine reason, the author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect, and so his law is sub- ject to change. Moreover, the natural law contains certain universal pre- cepts which are everlasting; whereas human law contains certain particular precepts, according to various circumstances. Reply Obj. 2. A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable. Reply Obj. 3. In corporeal things, right is predicated absolutely, and therefore, as far as it itself is concerned, always remains right. But recti- tude is predicated of law with reference to the common welfare, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as was stated above; and hence rectitude of this kind is subject to change. Second Article WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD ALWAYS BE CHANGED WHENEVER SOMETHING BETTER OCCURS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that human law should be changed whenever something better occurs. For human laws are devised by human reason, like the other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same should apply to human laws. Obj. 2. Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued, because the De Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229). ®Q. 91, a. 2 ; q. 96, a. 2, ad 3. 8o2 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 97. Art. 3 laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore it seems that laws should be changed whenever anything better occurs to be enacted. Obj, 3. Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by ex- perience, which requires time, as is stated in Ethics ii.® Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur for legisla- tion. On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals: It is absurd, and a de- testable shame, that we should suffer those traditions to be changed which we ham received from the fathers of old}^ I answer that, As was stated above, human law is rightly changed in so far as such change is conducive to the common welfare. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common wel- fare, because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as a rather serious offense. Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. There- fore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common welfare be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great . and very evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the ex- treme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Therefore the Jurist says that in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law. which has long been considered just}-'^ Reply Obj. i. Rules of art derive their force from reason alone, and there- fore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto should be changed. But laws derive the greatest force from custom, as the Philoso- pher states, and consequently they should not be easily changed. Reply Obj. 2. This argument proves that laws ought to be changed, not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit, or in a case of great urgency, as was stated above. This answer applies also to the Third Objection. Third Article WHETHER CUSTOM CAN OBTAIN THE EORCE OF LAW? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that custom cannot obtain the force of law, nor abolish a law. For human law is derived from the natural law and from ® Aristotle, Eth., 11 , i (1103a 16). ^‘'Gratian, Decretum, I, xii, 3 (I, 28) Dk 1 . iv, 2 (I, 3sa). 11 , 5 (1269a 20). Q. 97. Art. 3 CHANGE IN LAWS 803 the divine law, as was stated above.^^ But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law. Oh]. 2. Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good, since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that custom itself should ob- tain the force of law. Oh]. 3. Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; and that is why private individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain the force of law, so as to abolish the law. On the contrary, Augustine says: The customs of GoTs people and the institutions of our ancestors are to he considered as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.^^ I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver, — the divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God, the human law from the will of man as regulated by reason. Now just as the human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech, so they may be made known by deeds; for evidently a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that, by human speech, law can be both changed and set forth, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Therefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and set forth ; and furthermore something can be established which obtains the force of law, in so far as, by repeated external actions, the in- ward movement of the will and the conceptions of the reason are most re- vealingly declared. For when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law. Reply Oh], i. The natural and divine laws proceed from the divine will, as was stated above. Therefore they cannot be changed by a custom pro- ceeding from the will of man, but only by divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the divine or natural laws; for Isidore says: Let custom yield to authority, and let evil customs he eradicated hy law and reason}^ Reply Oh]. 2. As was stated above, human laws fail in some cases.^® Hence it is possible sometimes to act outside the law, namely, in a case where the law fails; and yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows that 93j a. 3; q. 95, a. 2. Cf. Gratian, Decretum, I, xi, 7 (I, 25). — St. Augustine, Epist. XXXVI, I (PL 33, 136). ^Synonym., II, 80 (PL 83, 863). ^®Q. 96, a. 6. 8 o 4 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 97. Art. 4 the law is no longer useful; just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, the same reason re- mains, for which the law was hitherto useful, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law^that overcomes the custom; unless perhaps the sole reason why the law seems useless is that it is not possible according to the custom of the country ^ which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law.^”^ For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people. Reply Obj. 3. The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance than does the authority of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. There- fore, although each individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If, however, the people have not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority, nevertheless, among such a people a prevailing custom obtains the force of law in so far as it is toler- ated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people ; because, by the very fact that they tolerate it, they seem to approve of that which is in- troduced by custom. Fourth Article WHETHER THE RULERS OF THE PEOPLE CAN DISPENSE FROM HUMAN LAWS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For law is established for the common welfare, as Isi- dore says.^^ But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual, because, as the Philosopher says, the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one manP Therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the common law. Obj, 2. Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows (Deut, i. 17) : You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man^s person, because it is the judgment of God, But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the divine law. Obj, 3. Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and divine laws, or else it would not foster religion, nor be helpful to discipline, which is requisite to the nature of law, as is laid down by ^^St. Isidore, EtymoL, V, 21 (PL 82, 203)- cit,, II, 10; V, 21 (PL 82, 131; 203). Eth., I, 2 (1094b 10). Q. 97. Art. 4 CHANGE IN LAWS 805 Isidore.^^ But no man can dispense from the divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from human law. On the contrary, The Apostle says (i Cor. ix. 17): A dispensation is committed to me. I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods. Thus the head of a household is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he dis- tributes work and the necessaries of life in due weight and measure. Ac- cordingly, in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some common precept is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as we have ex- plained above.^^ But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as was stated above.^^ Consequently, he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense from a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or cir- cumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If, however, he grant this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view, imprudent, if he ignores the nature and function of granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says {Luke xii. 42): Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser whom his lord set- teth over his family? Reply Oh), i. When a person is dispensed from observing the common law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the common good. Reply Ob'). 2. It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Therefore, when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor. Reply Obj. 3. Natural law, so far as it contains common precepts which never fail, does not allow of dispensation. In the other precepts, however, which are as conclusions of the common precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the divine law each man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject. Therefore, just as none can dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate, so, in the precepts of the divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose. ^EtymoL, II, 10; V, 3 (PL 82, 131; 199). 96, a. 6. ^^^Ibid. Question XCVIII ON THE OLD LAW {In Six Articles) We must consequently now consider the Old Law. And (i) the Law itself: (2) its precepts.^ Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Old Law was good? (2) Whether it was from God? (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels? (4) Whether it was given to all? (5) Whether it is binding on all? (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time? First Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GOOD? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written {Ezech, xx. 25): I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live. But a law is not said to be good except because of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says.^ But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and injurious. For the Apostle says {Rom. vii. 8, seq .) : Without the law sin was dead. And 1 lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. Again he says {Rom. v. 20) : Law entered in that sin might abound. Therefore the Old Law was not good. Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the goodness of law that it should be pos- sible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to human custom. But such the Old Law was not, since Peter says {Acts xv. 10) : Why tempt you [God] to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. On the contrary. The Apostle says {Rom. vii. 12): Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be true by the fact that it accords with right reason, so a law is proved to be good by the fact that it accords with reason. Now ^Q. 99. ^ Ety mol., II, 10; V, 21 (PL 82, 13 1; 203). 806 Q. 98. Art. i THE OLD LAW 807 the Old Law was in accordance with reason. For it repressed concupis- cence, which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods {Exod. xx. 17). Moreover, the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way {Rom, vii.): 1 am delighted, says he {verse 22), with the law of God, according to the inward man] and again {verse 16): I con- sent to the law, that is good. But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states.^ For there is a perfect good, and an imperfect good. In things or- dained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end; while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Now it must be observed that the end of human law is different from the end of divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, and this end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting hap- piness; and this end is hindered by any sin, not only of external action, but also of internal action. Consequently, that which suffices for the per- fection of human law, viz., the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the divine law; but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby charity, which fulfills the law, ... is spread abroad in our hearts {Rom. v. 5) ; for the grace of God is life everlasting {ibid. vi. 23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written {Jo. i. 17), the law was given by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imper- fect, according to Heb. vii. 19: The law brought nothing to perfection. Reply Obj. i. The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; and these are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed him- self a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, and judgments in which they shall not live; i.e., whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: And I polluted them, i.e., showed them to be polluted, in their own gifts, when they offered all that opened the womb, for their offenses. Reply Obj, 2. The law is said to have been deadly, as being, not the cause, but the occasion of death, because of its imperfection, and this in so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfill what it prescribed, and Div. Norn., IV, 20 (PG 3, 720). 8o8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 98. Art. 2 to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, but taken by them. Therefore the Apostle says {ibid, ii): Sin^ taking occa- sion by the commandment , seduced me, and by it killed me. In the same sense, when it is said that the law entered in that sin might abound ^ the conjunction that must be taken as consecutive and not final: namely, in so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more when it is for- bidden. Reply Obj. 3. The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer; for it is written {Rom. ix. 16): It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth j viz., that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, but of God that showeth mercy. Therefore it is written {Ps. cxviii. 32): / have run the way of Thy com- mandments j when Thou didst enlarge my heart, i.e., by giving me grace and charity. Second Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS FROM GOD? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written {Deut. xxxii. 4): The works of God are perfect. But the Law was imperfect, as was stated above.*^ Therefore the Old Law was not from God. Obj. 2. Further, it is written {Eccles. hi. 14): / have learned that all the works which God hath made continue forever. But the Old Law does not continue forever, since the Apostle says {Heb. vii. 18): There is in- deed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. Obj. 3. Further, a wise lawgiver should remove not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion 'of sin, as was stated above. Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom none is like among the lawgivers {Job xxxvi. 22). Obj. 4. Further, it is written (i Tim. ii. 4) that God will have all men to be saved. But the Old Law did not suffice to save men, as was stated above.^ Therefore the giving of such a law did not pertain to God. There- fore the Old Law was not from God. On the contrary. Our Lord said {Matt. xv. 6), while speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition. And shortly before {verse 4) He had said: Honor thy father and mother, which is contained expressly in the Old Law {Exod. XX. 1 2 ; Deut. v. 16) . Therefore the Old Law was from God. *A. i; q. 91, a. 5. ®A. i; q. 91, a. 5, ad 2. Q. 98. Art. 2 THE OLD LAW 809 1 answer thatj The Old Law was given by the good God^ Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two ways. First, by bearing witness to Christ; and so He Himself says {Luke xxiv. 44) : All things must needs be fulfilled^ which are written in the law . . . , and in the prophets , and in the psalms , concerning Me] and {Jo. V. 46) : If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me. — Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship it directed them to the worship of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Therefore the Apostle says {Gal. iii. 23): Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up unto that faith which was to be revealed. Now it is evident that it is the same thing which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end ; and when I say the same, I mean that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the devil would not have made a law whereby men would be led to Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to Matt. xii. 26: If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same God from Whom came sal- vation to man, through the grace of Christ. Reply Obj, 1. Nothing prevents a thing from being not perfect abso- lutely, and yet perfect according to a certain time. Thus a boy is said to be perfect, not absolutely, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison with the condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not perfect absolutely. And such were the precepts of the Law. Hence the Apostle says {Gal. iii. 24) : The law was our pedagogue in Christ. Reply Obj. 2. Those works of God endure forever which God so made that they would endure forever; and these are His perfect works. But the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace, not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, the law brought nothing to perfection {Heb. vii. 19). Hence he says {Gal. iii, 25): After the faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue. Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled.® So also did He wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves to be sinners, and, being humbled, might have recourse to the help of grace. Reply Obj. 4. Although the Old Law did not suffice to save men, yet another help for salvation from God besides the Law was available for men, viz., faith in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we are. Accordingly, God did not fail men by giving them insuf- ficient aids to salvation. Q. 79, a. 4. 8io THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 98. Art. 3 Third Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GIVEN THROUGH THE ANGELS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a messenger , so that the word angel denotes ministry, not lordship, according to Ps, cii. 20, 21: Bless the Lord all ye His angels , . . you ministers of His. But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord, for it is written {Exod. XX. i): And the Lord spoke . . . these words, and further on: I am the Lord Thy God. Moreover, the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and in the books following the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God immediately. Obj. 2. Further, according to Jo. i. 17, the Law was given by Moses. But Moses received it from God immediately, for it is written {Exod. xxxiii. ii): The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend. Therefore the Old Law was given by God immediately. Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as was stated aboveJ But God alone is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls, while the angels are the ministering spirits, as is stated in Heb. i. 14. There- fore it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls. On the contrary, The Apostle said {Gal. iii. 19) that the Law was given by angels in the hand of a Mediator. And Stephen said {Acts vii. 53) : \Who\ have received the Law by the disposition of angels. I answer that, The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius, viz., that the gifts of God should he brought to men by means of the angels,^ there is a special rea- son why the Old Law should have been given through them. For it has been stated that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race which was to come through Christ. Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place exercises the principal and perfect acts ; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his subordinates. Thus, the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist him under his direction. Consequently, it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be given by the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e., by the angels. It is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (i. 2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old; because in the New Testament God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son, whereas in the Old Testament the word was spoken by angels (ii. 2). ^ Q. 90, a. 3. Gael. Hier., IV, 2 (PG 3, 180). Q. 98. Art. 4 THE OLD LAW 811 Reply Obj. i. As Gregory says at the beginning of his Moralia, the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses is sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in truth, in so jar as he performed the service of exterior speech; and the Lord, because He was the Master within Who supplied the power of s peaking P Hence also it is that the angel spoke in the name of the Lord. Reply Obj, 2. As Augustine says/^ it is stated in Exodus (xxxiii. ii) that the Lord spoke to Moses face to face; and shortly afterwards we read (xxxiii. 18): ^Show me Thy glory J Therefore he perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not. Hence he did not see the very essence of God, and consequently he was not taught by God immediately. Accord- ingly? when Scripture states that He spoke to him face to face, this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, although God spoke and appeared to him by means of a subordinate creature, i.e,, an angel and a cloud. — ^Again, we may say that this vision face to face means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the divine essence. Reply Obj. 3. It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes, after making a law, he promulgates it through others. Thus, God made the Law by His own authority, but He promul- gated it through the angels. Fourth Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE JEWS ALONE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as was stated above. But that salva- tion was to come, not to the Jews alone, but to all nations, according to Isa. xlix. 6: It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of lacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salva- tion, even to the farthest part of the earth. Therefore the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to one people only. Obj. 2. Further, according to Acts x. 34, 35, God is not a respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him. Therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another. Obj. 3. Further, the law was given through the angels, as was stated above. But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels, not to^ ^ Moral,, Praef., i (PL 75, 517). Genesi ad Litt., XII, 27 (PL 34, 477) - 8i2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 98. Art. 4 the Jews alone, but to all nations; for it is written {Ecclus. xvii. 14) : Over every nation He set a ruler. Furthermore, on all nations He bestows tem- poral goods, which are of less account with God than spiritual goods. There- fore He should likewise have given the Law to all peoples. On the contrary f It is written {Rom. iii, i, 2): What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. Firsts indeed j because the words of God were committed to them; and {Fs. cxlvii. 9): He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made mani- fest unto them. I answer that. It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews, rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; and so the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs. But this reason does not seem fitting, because that people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made; and this was more grievous, as is clear from Exod. xxxii. and from Amos v. 25, 26: Did you offer vic- tims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years ^ 0 house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves. Moreover it is stated expressly {Deut. ix. 6): Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art a very stiff-necked people. But the real reason is given in the preceding verse: That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says {Gal. iii. 16) that to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, ‘And to his seeds f as of many: but as of one, ‘And to thy seed, which is Christ.’ And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special benefits to that people because of the promise made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people of whom Christ was to be born should be signalized by a special sanctification, according to the words of Levit. xix. 2: Be ye holy, because I .. . am holy. Nor again was it because of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz., that Christ should be born of his seed; but it was because of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written {Isa. xli. 2): Who hath raised up the just one from the east, hath called him to follow him? It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung from them received the law, according to Deut. iv. 36, 37: Ye did hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their •seed after them. And if again it be asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof, a fitting answer is given Q. 98. Art. 5 THE OLD LAW 813 by Augustine: Why He draweth one and draweth not another^ seek not thou to judge j if thou wish not to errP- Reply Obj. i. Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peo- ples, according to Rom. ix. 4: To whom, namely, the Jews, belongeth the adoption as of children of God, . , . and the testament, and the giving of the Law; . . , whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh. Reply Obj. 2. Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to what is due; but it has no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously. For he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another is not a respecter of persons; but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them ac- cording to personal merits, he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the human race gratuitously; and so He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says: All whom God teaches. He teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not\'^^ for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent. Reply Obj. 3. The benefits of grace are forfeited by man because of sin, but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz., that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings; and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps, XXXV. 7: Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord. Fifth Article WHETHER ALL MEN WERE BOUND TO OBSERVE THE OLD LAW? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. For whoever is subject to the king must needs be subject to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is King of all the earth {Ps. xlvi. 8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the Law. Obj. 2. Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law; for it is written {Deut. xxvii. 26): Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work. If, therefore, other men could be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men. Obj. 3. Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to Tract. XXVI, super Ioann., VI, 44 (PL 35, 1607). ^ De Praedest. Sanct., VIII (PL 44, 971). 8i4 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 98. Art. 5 the observances of the Law; for it is written {Exod. xii. 48) : If any stran- ger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lordj all his males shall first he circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it accord- ing to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land. But it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances accord- ing to the divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing the Law. On the contrary, Dionysius says that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels.^^ But it is clear that the Gentiles did not ob- serve the Law. Therefore some could have been saved without observing the Law. I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those pre- cepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to ob- serve the Old Law, not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on any save the Jewish people alone. The reason for this is because the Old Law, as was stated above, was given to the Jewish people that it might receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of that people. Now when any laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, these are binding on them alone; and thus clerics who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound, and religious likewise are bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which the secular clergy is not bound. In like manner, this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Therefore it is written {Deut. xviii. 13): Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God] and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Deut. xxvi. 3 : I profess this day before the Lord thy God, etc. Reply Ob], i. Whoever are subject to a king are bound to observe his law, which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto. Reply Obj. 2. The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes; and so the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is written {Deut. iv. 8) : What other nation is there so renowned that hath cere- monies and fust judgments, and all the law? In like manner, from this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the laity, and the state of religious than that of the secular clergy. Reply Obj. 3. The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more Gael. Hier., IX, 4 (PG 3, 261). Q. 98. Art. 6 THE OLD LAW 815 securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural law; and for this reason they were admitted to them. So, too, the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular priests to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. Sixth Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS SUITABLY GIVEN AT THE TIME OF MOSES? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. For the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as was stated above. But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin. Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the seed, which is Christ {Gal. iii. 16), was first made to Abraham, as is related in Gen. xii. 7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. Obj. 3. Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made, so was He born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the prom- ise was renewed, according to 2 Kings xxiii. i: The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said. Therefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Gal. iii. 19) that the Law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator: — or- dained, i.e.j given in an orderly fashion, as the Gloss explains.^^ Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order of time. I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. For it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law restrains and tames; and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfill what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as would be appropriate for overcoming man’s pride. For man was proud of two things, viz., of knowl- edge and of power. He was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation; and, accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of Peter Lombard, In Gal., super III, 19 (PL 192, 127). — Cf. Glossa ordin. (VI, 83B). 8i6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 98. Art. 6 his reason without the help of a written law. And so man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Therefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance, because by the Law is the knowledge of sin {Rom. iii. 20). But after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of weakness, since he was unable to fulfill what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. viii. 3, 4), what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sent His own Son, . . . that the justification of the Law might be ful- filled in us. With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help. Now this was most needed by the people at the time when the natural law began to be obscured because of the exuberance of sin; for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection. And so it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace. Reply Obj. i. It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man, both because man was so confident in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law, and because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual sinning. ‘ Reply Obj. 2. A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a common precept, as was stated above.^^ Hence at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar and, as it were, household precepts; but when Abraham’s descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law. For slaves are not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the law to be directed, as the Philosopher says.^® Reply Obj. 3. Since the Law had to be given to a certain people, not only those of whom Christ was born received the Law, but the whole people who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, according to Rom. iv. II. Hence, even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together. ^Q. 96, a. I. ^^Polit., Ill, 5 (1280a 32) ; cf. op. cit., IV, 4 (1291a 9). Question XCIX ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW {In Six Articles) We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law. And (i) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept.^ Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Old Law con- tains several precepts or only one? (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts? (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addi- tion to the moral precepts? (4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts? (5) Whether it contains any others besides these three? (6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts. First Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ONLY ONE PRECEPT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. For a law is nothing else than a precept, as was stated above.^ Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept. Obj, 2. Further, the Apostle says {Rom, xiii. 9): // there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shall love thy neigh- bor as thyself. But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contains but one commandment. Obj. 3. Further, it is written {Matt. vii. 12): All things . . . what- soever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets. But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one precept. On the contrary. The Apostle says {Ephes. ii. 15): Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees] where he is referring to the Old Law, as the Gloss comments on the passage.^ Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments. I answer that. Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done; and that a thing must be done arises from the neces- sity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very notion, a relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being ^Q. 100. ^Q. 92, a. 2, ad i. ^ Glossa ordin. (VI, 91F). — Cf. Ambrosiaster, In Ephes., super II, 15 (PL 17, 401), 817 8i8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 99. Art. 2 necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently, we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one as being related to one end; and yet they are many according to the diversity of the things that are ordained to that end. Reply Obj. i. The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end; but it comprises various precepts, according to the distinction of the things which it directs to the end. So, too, the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a house; and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto. Reply Obj, 2. As the Apostle says (i Tim, i. 5), the end of the com- mandment is charity^ since every law aims at establishing friendship either between man and man, or between man and God. Therefore the whole Law is fulfilled in this one commandment, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, as expressing the end of all the commandments; for the love of one’s neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neigh- bor for God’s sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one’s neighbor, and of which Our Lord said {Matt. xxii. 40) : On these two commandments de- pendeth the whole Law and the prophets. Reply Obj. 3. As is stated in Ethics ix., friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself,"^ in so far as a man looks on another as on himself. Hence, when it is said. All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them, this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself] so that it is an explanation of this commandment. Second Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS MORAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinguished from the law of nature, as was stated above.^ But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law. Obj. 2. Further, the divine law should have come to man’s assistance where human reason fails him; as is evident in regard to things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man’s reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law, which is a divine law. ^ Arisfotle, Eth., IX, 4 (ii66a i). " Q. 91, a. 4 and 5; q. 98, a. 5. Q. 99- Art. 2 PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW 819 Obj. 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be the letter that killeth {2 Cor, hi. 6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to Ps. cxviii. 93: Thy justifications I will never forget ^ for by them Thou hast given me life. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law. On the contrary j It is written {Ecclus. xvii. 9): Moreover, He gave them discipline and the law of life for an inheritance. Now discipline be- longs to morals; for the Gloss on Heb. xii. ii {Now all chastisement \^dis- ciplina\, etc.) says: Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of diffi- culties.^ Therefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral pre- cepts. / answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts, as is evi- dent from Exod. xx. 13, 15: Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal. And this was reasonable, because, just as the principal intention of human law is to create friendship between man and man, so the chief intention of the divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since likeness is the principle of love, according to Ecclus. xiii. 19: Every beast loveth its like, there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless men become good; and so it is written {Levit. xix. 2; cf. xi. 45) : You shall be holy, for I am holy. But the good- ness of man is virtue, which makes its possessor good. Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue; and these are the moral precepts of the Law. Reply Obj. 1. The Old Law is distinguished from the natural law, not as being altogether foreign to it, but as something added thereto. For just as grace presupposes nature, so the divine law must presuppose the natural law. Reply Obj. 2. It was fitting that the divine law should come to man’s assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now as to the most common principles of the natural law, the human reason could not err universally in moral matters; but through being habituated to sin, it became darkened as to what ought to be done in the particular. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from the common principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extent of judging to be lawful things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus, among the articles of faith, not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead, but also those to which right reason can attain, such as that God is one; and this in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable. Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine proves,'^ even the letter of the law is said ^ Glossa ordin. (VI, 1S9B) ; Peter Lombard, In Hebr., super XII, ii (PL 192, 503). De Spir. et Lilt., XIV (PL 44, 216). 820 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 99. Art. 3 to be the occasion of death, as to the moral precepts; that is to say, it prescribes what is good without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfill- ment. Third Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW COMPRISES CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS BESIDES MORAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise cere- monial precepts besides moral precepts. For every law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing human acts. Now human acts are called moral, as was stated above.^ Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts. Obj, 2. Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the divine worship. But divine worship is the act of a virtue, viz., reli- gion, which, as Tully says, offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature? Since, then, the moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as was stated above, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distin- guished from the moral precepts. Obj. 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes, oj all signs employed by men words hold the first place}^ Therefore there was no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions. On the contrary, It is written {Deut. iv. 13, 14): Ten words . , . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do. But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts there are others which are ceremonial. I answer that, As was stated above, the divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God, while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not con- cerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to divine wor- ship except as affecting the common good of mankind; and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating to divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals, as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand, the divine law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are to believe, to hope and to love, but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God; and it is these works that are said to belong to the divine worship. This worship is called ceremony, ®Q. I, a. 3. ° De Invent., II, 53 (p. 148^) . “ De Doct. Christ., II, 3 (PL 34, 37) . 821 Q. 99. Art. 4 PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW — as meaning the munia, Le.^ giRs, of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say/^ because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits; — or because, as Valerius Maximus states,^- the word ceremony was introduced among the Latins to signify the divine worship, being de- rived from a town near Rome called Caere; since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly, those precepts of the Law which refer to the divine, worship are specially called ceremonial. Reply Obj. i. Human acts extend also to the divine worship, and there- fore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also. Reply Obj. 2. As was stated above, the precepts of the natural law are common and require to be determined.^^ Now they are determined both by human law and by divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of posi- tive, law, so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law effected by the divine law are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Therefore, to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of this precept, namely, that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently, the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. Reply Obj. 3. As Dionysius says, the things of God cannot be mani- fested to men except by means of sensible likenesses.^^ Now these like- nesses move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Therefore the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by likenesses expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions, but also by likenesses of things set before the eyes ; and this pertains to the ceremonial precepts. Fourth Article WHETHER, BESIDES THE MORAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS, THERE ARE ALSO JUDICIAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addi- tion to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says that in the Old Law there are precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed.^^ Now the pre- cepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts, and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore, besides these two kinds of precepts, we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. ^ St. Albert, In IV Sent., d. i, a. 7 (XXIX, 19). ^ Factorum et Dictorum Memora- bilium Libri Novem, I, i. 10 (ed. C. Kempf, Leipsig: B. G. Teubner, 1888), p. 6. ^Q. 91, a. 3. Cael. Hier., I, 3 (PG 3, 121). '^Contra Faust., VI, 2; X, 2 (PL 42, 228; 243). 822 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 99. Art. 4 Obj, 2. Further, the Gloss on Ps. cxviii. 102 (/ have not declined from Thy judgments) says, — i.e,, from the rule of life Thou hast set for me}^ But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial pre- cepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts. Obj. 3. Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to Ps. xciii. 15: Until justice be turned into judgment. But acts of justice, like the acts of the other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. On the contrary^ It is written {Deut. vi. i) : These are the precepts j and ceremonies, and judgments] where precepts stands for moral precepts an- tonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts. / answer that, As we have stated above, it belongs to the divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs, from a universal point of view, to the dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred; yet each of them has to be deter- mined by divine or human law, because naturally known principles are common, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly, just as the determination of the common principle about divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the common precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judi- cial precepts. We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept 'in the Old Law, viz., moral precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; ceremonial precepts, which are determinations of the divine worship; and judicial precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Therefore the Apostle {Rom. vii. 12), after saying that the Law is holy, adds that the commandment is just, and holy, and good: just, in respect of the judicial precepts; holy, with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since that is holy which is consecrated to God) ; and good, i.e., conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. Reply Obj. 1. Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the order- ing of human life; and consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz., under the precepts of the life we have to lead. Reply Obj. 2. Judgment denotes the execution of justice, by an applica- tion of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the judi- cial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason, and something in common with the cere- monial precepts, in that they are determinations of common precepts. This explains why sometimes judgments comprise both judicial and moral pre- ^^Glossa ordin. (Ill, 269A). — Cf. Cassiodorus, Expos, in Psalt., super Ps. CXVIII, 102 (PL 70, 870). Q. 99 . Art. s PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW 823 cep ts, as in Deut, v. i: Hear, 0 Israel, the ceremonies and judgments] and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Levit. xviii. 4: You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts, where precepts denotes moral precepts, while judgments refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts. Reply Obj. 3. The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral pre- cepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts. Fifth Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ANY OTHERS BESIDES THE MORAL, JUDICIAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law contains other precepts besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts. For the judicial pre- cepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man, while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is wor- shipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz., temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as was stated above.^^ Therefore, besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others. Obj, 2. Further, it is written {Deut. xi. i) : Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies. His judgments and commandments. Now precepts concern moral matters, as was stated above. Therefore, be- sides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called commandments. Obj. 3. Further, it is written {Deut. vi. 17): Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have com- manded thee. Therefore, in addition to the above, the Law comprises testimonies. Obj. 4. Further, it is written {Ps. cxviii. 93): Thy justifications {i.e., Thy Law, according to the Gloss'^^) I will never forget. Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called justifications. On the contrary. It is written {Deut. vi. i) : These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you. And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. / answer that. Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfillment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done. To their fulfillment man is induced by two considerations: viz., the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfillment, which benefit consists in the ab 60, a. 5. Glossa interl. (Ill, 268v) ; Peter Lombard, In Psalm., super CXVIII, 93 (PL 191, 1090). 824 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 99. Art. 5 tainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g.j Deut, vi. 4: Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord] and Gen, i. 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth] and these are called testimonies. — ^Again, it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress, as may be seen in Deut. xxviii. i : If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord Thy God ... He will make thee higher than all the nations, etc. ; and these are called justifications, according as God pun- ishes or rewards certain persons justly. The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold, namely, one according to the rule of reason, the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty. And, in the same way, the Philosopher distin- guishes a twofold just — moral and legal.^^ Moral duty is twofold, because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue Would be destroyed, or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. According to this, some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or pro- hibition, as Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal] and these are prop- erly called precepts. Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called commandments, because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion. An example is found in Exod. xxii. 26: If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset] and there are other like cases. Therefore Jerome says that justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments?^ — Duty as fixed by the Law belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the cere- monial precepts, as regards divine matters. Nevertheless, those ordinances also which refer to punishments and re- wards may be called testimonies, in so far as they testify to the divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled justifications, as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore, the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called precepts which God Himself prescribed; and those things commandments which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the very word seems to denote. From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as was stated above. Reply Obj. i. Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently, moral matters are determinable by law in so far as Eth., V, 7 (ii34h 18). ^ Cf. Pelagius, In Marc,, proem. (PL 30, 610). Q. 99. Art. 6 PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW 825 they belong to justice: of which religion is likewise a part, as Tully says.^^ Therefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts. The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said. Sixth Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE INDUCED MEN TO THE OBSERVANCE OF ITS PRECEPTS BY MEANS OF TEMPORAL PROMISES AND THREATS? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts by means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose of the divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love, and hence it is written (pent. x. 12) : And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him? But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God, for Augustine says that covetousness is the bane of charity P Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver; and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares.^^ Obj. 2. Further, the divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in the sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises as means of persuading man, the divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. Obj. 3. Further, the reward of justice and the punishment of guilt can- not be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Eccles. ix. 2, all temporal things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offer eth victims, and to him that' despiseth sacrifices. Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments or re- wards of the commandments of the divine law. On the contrary. It is written {Isa. i. 19, 20): If you he willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath, the sword shall devour you. I answer that. Just as in the speculative sciences men are led to assent to the conclusions by syllogistic means, so, too, in every law, men are led to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in the speculative sciences, the means are adapted to the conditions of the recipient; and so the mode of procedure must be an orderly one, so that the instruction is based on principles more generally ^De Invent., II, 53 (p. 148^). ^ Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 36 (PL 40, 25). ^ PoUt., VII, 2 (1324b 23). 826 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 99. Art. 6 known. So, likewise, he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above that the Old Law disposed men to Christ, as the imperfect disposes to the perfect and therefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ’s coming. For this reason, that people is com- pared to a child that is still under a pedagogue {Gal. iii. 24). But the per- fection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle {Phil. iii. 13, 15) : Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth myself to those that are before. . . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded. Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God; whereas the perverse place their end in temporal goods. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection. Reply Ob), i. Covetousness, whereby man places his end in temporal goods, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. xlviii. 19: He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him. Reply Obj. 2. Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or by punishments to be inflicted by men; whereas the divine law per- suades men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means. Reply Obj. 3. As anyone can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common condition of the people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law, they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain indi- viduals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfor- tunes, either because they had already become spiritual (so that misfor- tune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried), or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on tem- poral goods, and far removed from God, according to ha. xxix. 13 [Matt. XV. 8]: This people honor eth Me with their lips; but their heart is far from Me. Q. 91, a. s, ad 2 ; q. 98, a. i, 2 and 3. Question C ON THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW {In Twelve Articles) We must now consider each kind of precept in the Old Law. And (i) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts,^ (3) the judicial precepts.- Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (i) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature? (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues? (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue? (4) How the precepts of the deca- logue are distinguished from one another. (5) Their number. (6) Their order. (7) The manner in which they were given. (8) Whether they are dispensable? (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law? (10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept? (ii) The distinction of other moral precepts. (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justify man? First Article ’WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BELONG TO THE LAW OF NATURE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written {Ecclus. xvii. 9) : Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance. But instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature, since the law of nature is not learned, but possessed by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law. Obj. 2. Further, the divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals to those that be- long to the law of nature; as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the divine law should add to the law of nature ordinances pertaining to good morals. Obj. 3. Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith. Hence it is written {Gal. v. 6) that faith worketh by charity. But faith is not included in the law of nature, since that which ^ Q. loi. ® Q. 104. 827 828 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loo. Art. i is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral precepts of the divine law belong to the law of nature. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom, ii. 14) that the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law; which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature. 1 answer that. The moral precepts are distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, for they are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to rea- son, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are dis- cordant from reason. And as every judgment of the speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of the practical reason proceeds from naturally known principles, as was stated above.^ From these principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these common first principles ; while other matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much con- sideration of the various circumstances. Not all are able to do this care- fully, but only those who are wise; just as it is not possible for all to con- sider the particular conclusions of the sciences, but only for those who are philosophers. Lastly, there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by divine instruction: e.g,, matters of faith. It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals are such as are in accord with reason; and since every judgment of human reason must needs be derived in some way from natural reason, — it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature, but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g.. Honor thy father and thy mother, and. Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal {Exod, xx. 12, 13, 15); and these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful con- sideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g.. Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged, man {Levit. xix. 32), and the like. — ^And there are some things, to judge of which human reason needs divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g.. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain {Exod. xx. 4, 7). This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. ® Q. 94, a. 2 and 4. Q. loo. Art. 2 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 829 Second Article WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW ARE ABOUT ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of the virtues. For the observance of the precepts of the Old Law is called justification, according toV.y. cxviii. 8: I will keep Thy jus- tifications. But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice. Obj. 2. Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice. Obj. 3. Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore say^.^ But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the Phi- losopher says.^ Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice. On the contrary, Ambrose says that a sin is a transgression of the divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven.^ But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to the divine law to direct all the acts of virtue. I answer that. Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as was stated above,"^ the precepts of the Law must needs be diversi- fied according to the various kinds of community. Hence the Philosopher teaches that the laws which are made in a state that is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state that is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state.® Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the divine law for another kind. For human law is ordained for the civil community, which men have in relation to one an- other; and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human community. Therefore human law makes precepts only about acts of jus- tice; and if it commands acts of the other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains.^ But the community for which the divine law is ordained is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. Therefore the divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ^ EtymoLj II, 10; V, 21 (PL 82, 131; 203). ^ Eth., V, i (1130a 4). ^De Farad., VIII (PL 14, 309). ""Q. 90, a. 2. ^Polit., IV, i (1289a ii; a. 22). ^ Eth., V, i (1129b 23). 830 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q loo. Art. 3 ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God’s image. Therefore the divine law proposes pre- cepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues, since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves, while the moral vir- tues set in good order the acts of the reason in reference to interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues, and yet in such a way that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept, while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. Reply Obj. i. The fulfillment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God; or, again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason. Reply Obj, 2. Justice, properly so called, regards the duty of one man to another; but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks of a kind of metaphorical justice.^® The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community. Third Article WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW ARE REDUCIBLE TO THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first and principal precepts of the Law are. Thou shall love the Lord thy God, and, Thou shall love thy neighbor, as is stated in Matt. xxii. 37, 39. But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Obj. 2. Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz.. Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day (Exod. XX. 8). Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue. Obj, 3. Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of the virtues. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of V, II (1138b 5). Q. 100. Art. 3 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 831 justice, as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts. On the contrary. The Gloss on Matt, v. ii {Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, etc.) says that Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detaiiy^ Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue. 1 answer that. The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other pre- cepts of the Law in the fact that God Himself is said to have given the pre- cepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Therefore the decalogue includes those precepts the knowl- edge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which, with but slight reflection, can be gathered at once from the first common prin- ciples, and those also which become known to man immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently, two kinds of precepts are not reck- oned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz., the first common principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident, as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles; — and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason, for the people receive these principles from God, through the teaching of wise men. Nevertheless, both kinds of precepts are contained in the pre- cepts of the decalogue, but in different ways. For the first common prin- ciples are contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles. Reply Obj. i. These two principles are the first common principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through nature or through faith. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these as conclusions to common principles. Reply Obj, 2, The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of God, according to Ps, xlv. ii: Be still and see that I am God, In this re- spect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue; but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. Reply Obj, 3. The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Therefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law. ^Glossa ordin, (V, 19B). S32 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loo. Art. 4 Fourth Article WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuit- ably distinguished from one another (Exod. xx.) . For worship is a virtue dis- tinct from faith. Now the precepts are about the acts of the virtues. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, belongs to faith; and that which is added, Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing, etc., belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts,^^ but two. Obj, 2. Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e,g.. Honor thy father and thy mother, and. Thou shalt not kill. But this, / am the Lord thy God, is affirmative; and that which follows. Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says, make one. Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says {Rom, vii. 7): 1 had not known con- cupiscence, if the Law did not say: ^Thou shalt not covet f Hence it seems that this precept. Thou shalt not covet, is one precept, and, therefore, should not be divided into two. On the contrary stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus, distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.^^ I answer that. The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius, commenting on Levit, xxvi. 26 {Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven) says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one pf the ten precepts, because its observ- ance, in the letter, is not binding for all time.^^ But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, of which the first is I am the Lord thy God] the second. Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, -in his commentary on Osee x. 10, On thy two iniquities'^^) ; the third precept, according to him, is. Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing] and the fourth, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. He states that there are six precepts per- taining to our neighbor: the first, Honor thy father and thy mother] the second, Thou shalt not kill] the third. Thou shalt not commit adultery] the fourth, Thou shalt not steal] the fifth, Thou shalt not bear false witness] the sixth, Thou shalt not covet. But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sab- bath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if it in ^Quaest. in Heptat., II, q. 71, super Exod., XX, 3 (PL 34, 621). (PL 34, 620). '^^In Levit., VII, super XXVI, 26 (PG 93, 1150). In Osee, III, super X, 10 (PL 25, 952). Q. 100. Art. 4 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 833 no way belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written {Matt, vi. 24), No man can serve two masters, the two statements, / am the Lord thy God, and, Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen, who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one precept, and reckons in the second place. Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing] as third., Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain] and as fourth, Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day}^ The other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius. Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as gods — for God commanded an image of the Seraphim to be made and placed in the tabernacle, as is related in Exod. xxv. 18 — ^Augustine more fittingly unites these two. Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, and, Thou shalt not make , , . any graven thing, into one precept. Likewise, to covet another’s wife, for the purpose of carnal union, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the pur- pose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes. And so Augus- tine reckons as distinct precepts that which forbids the coveting of an- other’s goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another’s wife.^'^ Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as re- ferring to our neighbor. And this is better. Reply Obj. 1. Worship is merely a declaration of faith, and therefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those about faith. Nevertheless, precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the pre- cepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as the first common precepts of the natural law are self-evident to one having natural reason, and need no promulgation, so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to one possessed of faith; for he that someth to God must believe that He is {Heh. xi. 6). Hence it needs no other promul- gation than the infusion of faith. Reply Obj. 2. The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative when one is not comprised in the other. Thus that a man should honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man ; nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct precepts are given. Thus, there is not one precept saying that Thou shalt not steal, and another binding one to keep another’s property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way, there are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not believing in strange gods. Reply Obj. 3. All covetousness has one common notion, and therefore Exod., horn. VII (PG 12, 351)- XX, 17 (PL 34, 621). Qmest. in Heptat., II, q. 71, super Exod., 834 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. ioo. Art. s the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, there- fore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against coveting; for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or the things coveted, as the Philosopher says.^® Fifth Article WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY SET FORTH? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are un- suitably set forth. For sin, as is stated by Ambrose, is a transgression of the divine law and a' disobedience to the commandments of heaven}^ But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and his neighbor, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated. Obj, 2. Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also, pertain- ing to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite. Obj. 3. Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury: Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine. Obj. 4. Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity extends to all our neighbors. But the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity, according to i Tim. i. 5: The end of the commandment is charity. Therefore, as there is a precept referring to parents, so there should have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbors. Obj. 5. Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the prohibi- tion of sins of deed, that is, when it is said, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, is distinct from the prohibition of the sin of thought, that is, when it is said. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbors goods, and. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife. Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false witness. X, 5 (1175b 28). Farad., VIII (PL 14, 309). Q. 100. Art. s MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 835 Ob]. 6. Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible part, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible part. But some pre- cepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, as when it is said, Thou shalt not covet. Therefore the decalogue should have included some precepts forbid- ding the disorders of the irascible part. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated. On the contrary j It is written {Deut. iv. 13) : He shewed you His cove- nant ^ which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tables of stone. I answer that, As we have stated above, just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of the divine law direct man in his relations to a community or common- wealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell rightly in a community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well towards the head of the community; the other is that he behave well to- wards those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the divine law should contain, in the first place, precepts ordering man in his relations to God, and, in’ the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his neighbors and live with him under God. Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another; and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the words. Thou shalt not have strange gods. Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him; and this is conveyed by the second commandment. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him; and to this belongs the third commandment on the sanctification of the Sabbath in remembrance of the creation of all things. To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general: in particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one’s parents; in general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one’s neighbor, — sometimes in his person, i.e., as to his personal existence, and this is for- bidden by the words, Thou shalt not kill; — sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring, and this is prohibited by the words, Thou shalt not commit adultery ; — sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid, and with regard to this it is said, Thou shalt not steal. — ^Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor; and harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, Thou shalt not covet. The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also 836 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 100. Art. 5 be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds, and hence it is said, Thou shalt not make a graven thing] the second, to words, and hence it is said, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord^ thy God in vain] the third, to thoughts, because the sanctification of the Sabbath, in so far as it is the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in God. — Or, according to Augustine, by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the divine truth; by the third, His goodness, whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end.^^ Reply Obj. i. This objection may be answered in two ways. First, be- cause the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural law had become ob- scured because of sin; but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its vigor (or because love of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one’s neighbor; since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God) . And for this reason the decalogue in- cludes only those precepts which refer to our neighbor and to God. Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from God immediately; and so it is written (Deut. X. 4) : He wrote in the tables j according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. Hence the precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. Now a precept has the nature of a duty. But it is easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident; for, at first glance, it seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit the disorders of a man with re- gard to himself reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters ; and, consequently, they are not contained in the dec- alogue. Reply Obj, 2. All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in cele- bration of some divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or in sign of some favor to come; and in like manner, all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the divine favors to be commemorated, the chief was that of the creation, which was called to mind by the sanc- tification of the Sabbath; and so the reason for this precept is given in Exod. XX. 1 1 : In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory. Thj« repose was also foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance; and conse- quently it is written {Isa. Iviii. 13): If thou turn away thy foot from the ^ Enarr. in Psalm. ^ super XXXII, 2 (PL 36, 281). Q. 100. Art. 5 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 837 Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious. For these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. — But other solemnities were celebrated because of certain particular temporal and transitory favors, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery from Eg5^t, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which, though temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue. Reply Ob]. 3. As the Apostle says {Heb. vi. 16), men swear by one greater than themselves ; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy. Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. But the sin of false doctrine applies only to a few, and therefore it was not neces- sary that it should be mentioned among the precepts of the decalogue. Ac- cording to one interpretation, however, the words, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain, are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one Gloss expounds them thus: Thou shalt not say that Christ is a crea- ture. Reply Ob']. 4. That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason, and therefore the precepts of the decalogue that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an im- mediate dictate of the natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son’s debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by denying it; for the father is the principle of generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Hence the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone except to one’s parents. On the other hand, parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Furthermore, a child is a part of his father, and parents love their children as being a part of them- selves, as the Philosopher states.^^ Hence, just as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to man’s behavior towards himself, sO; for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one’s children. Reply Obj. 5. The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are, of themselves, objects of appetite; and for this reason they needed to be for- bidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and false- hood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth), and are desired only for the sake of some- ^ Glossa ordin.j super Deut., V, n (I, 337A) ; St. Isidore, Quaest. in Vet. Test., In Exod., XXIX, super XX, 7 (PL 83, 301). ^Eth., VIII, 12 (ii6ib 19). 838 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q loo. Art. 6 thing else. Consequently, with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. Reply Ob], 6. As was stated above, all the passions of the irascible part arise from the passions of the concupiscible part.^^ Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions. Sixth Article WHETHER THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE GIVEN IN THE PROPER ORDER? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not given in the proper order. For love of one’s neighbor is seemingly prior to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is. This is according to i John iv. 20: He that loveth not his hr other ^ whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? But the first three precepts be- long to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not given in the proper order. Obj, 2. Further, acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius, in his commentary on the Categories, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown.-"^ Therefore, among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative. Obj. 3. Further, the precepts of the Law are about men’s actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. xiii. i) : The things that are of God, are well ordered. But the precepts of the decalogue were given im- mediately by God, as was stated above. Therefore they are arranged in a becoming order. / answer that. As we have stated above, the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason as its con- trary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. But since the order of reason begins with the end, it is clear that for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end is supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently, it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man to God, since the con- trary to this is most grievous. So, too, in an army, which is ordained to the ^ Q. 25, a. I. Cat. Arist., IV (PL 64, 277). Q. loo. Art. 6 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 839 commander as to its end, it is requisite, first, that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and, secondly, it is requisite that he should be in co-ordination with the other soldiers. Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in com- mon with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence. And the third is that he should offer Him his service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe than to be insolent to his commander; and this last is more griev- ous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him. As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in his rela- tions to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to reason to sin by deed than by word , and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods. Reply Obj. i. Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless, the love of God is the reason for the love of our neighbor, as will be made clear later on.^® Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded priority over the others. Reply Obj. 2. Just as God is the universal principle of being for all things, so is a father a principle of being for his son. Therefore the precept re- garding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. The argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed ; although even then it is not altogether cogent. For al- though, in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown (according to Ps. xxxiii, 15: Turn away from evil, and do good] and Isa. i. 16, 17: Cease to do perversely; learn to do well), yet in the order of knowledge virtue precedes vice, because the crooked line is known by the straight, and by the law is the knowledge of sin {Rom. hi. 20). Therefore the affirmative precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which was given above. For in the precepts regarding God, which belong to the first table, an affirmative pre- cept is placed last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin. Reply Obj. 3. Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execu- tion, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of reason. ^5. T.f II-II, q. 25, a. i; q. 26, a. 3, ^Aristotle, De An., I, 5 (411a 5). 840 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 100. Art. 7 Seventh Article WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY FORMULATED? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuit- ably formulated. For the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore, in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others. Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says that every law is based on reason.^'^ But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third. Obj, 3. Further, by observing the precepts, man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts. There- fore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the first and fourth. Obj, 4. Further, the Old Law is called the law of fear,^^ in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts by means of the threat of punishments. But all the precepts 6f the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and not only in the first and second. Obj. 5. Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the memory, for it is written {Prov. iii. 3): Write them in the tables of thy heart. Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently, it seems that the pre- cepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. On the contrary, It is written {Wis, xi. 21) that God made all things in measure, number and weight. Much more therefore did He observe a suit- able manner in formulating His Law. I answer that. The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the divine law, and hence it is written {Deut. iv. 6) : This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations. Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth. Reply Obj. i. Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite; but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the EtymoL, 11, 10; V, 3 (PL 82, 130; 199). I, 28 (PL 32, 1334 )' Cf. St. Augustine, De Mor. EccL, Q. 100. Art. 7 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 841 affirmation of the other. For it follows that, if a thing is white, it is not blacky, but it does not follow that, if it is not black, it is white, because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence, too, that one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless, it is a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz., God and man s father, as is stated in Ethics viii.“^ Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts, one about the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in remembrance of the divine favor. Obj. 2. The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest, and so there was no need to add a reason. But some of the precepts include ceremonial matters, or a determination of a common moral precept. Thus, the first precept includes the determination, Thou shalt not make a graven thing ; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently, there was need to state the reason in each case. Reply Ob]. 3. Generally speaking, men direct their actions to something useful. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was neces- sary to add a promise of reward. And since parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them; and so a promise of reward is added to the precept about honoring one’s parent^ The same ap- plies to the precept forbidding idolatry, since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by entering into a compact with the demons. Reply Obj. 4. Punishments are especially necessary against those who are prone to evil, as is stated in Ethics x.^® Therefore a threat of punishment is affixed only to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury because of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts. Reply Obj. 5. The commandment about the Sabbath was made in re- membrance of a past blessing. Therefore special mention of the memory is made therein. — Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a de- termination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law, and so this precept needed a special admonition. Aristotle, Etk, VIII, 14 (1163b 15). ^Op. ciL, X, 9 (1180a 4). S42 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 100. Art. S Eighth Article WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE DISPENSABLE? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dis- pensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, as does human nature, as the Philosopher says.^^ Now the failure of law to apply in certain par- ticular cases is a reason for dispensation, as was stated above.^^ Therefore a dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue. Obj, 2, Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to divine law. But man can dispense from the precepts of a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense from them. Now our superiors are God’s vicegerents on earth, for the Apostle says (2 Cor. ii. 10) : For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ. Therefore superiors can dispense from the precepts of the decalogue. Obj. 3. Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept: e.g.j when according to the prescription of human law men such as evil- doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the deca- logue are dispensable. Obj. 4. Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept, for it is written ( i Machah. ii. 41 ) : And they determined in that day, saying: Who- soever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day , we will fight against him. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. On the contrary are the words of Isa. xxiv. 5, where some are reproved be- cause they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant] which words, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation. I answer that, As we have stated above, precepts admit of dispensation when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated.^^ Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If, therefore, there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indis- ^^Op. cit., V, 7 (1134b 29). 96, a. 6; q. 97, a. 4. ^ Ibid. Q. 100. Art. 8 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 843 pensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as this, that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the law- giver. For instance, if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this because of some greater utility. Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the law- giver, Who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, namely, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently, the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice; for it is a never-failing principle that justice should be preserved. But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in certain cases. Reply Obj. 2. As the Apostle says (2 Tim. ii. 13), God continueth faith- fulj He cannot deny Himself. But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Therefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another. Reply Obj. 3. The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue; for in this sense the precept contains the very notion of justice. Human law, however, cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain without due cause. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain; and so this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue, and such killing is not murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes.^^ In like manner, when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. Consequently when the children of Israel, by God’s command, took away the spoils of the Eg3^tians {Exod. xii. 35), this was not theft, since it was due to them by the sentence of God. — ^Likewise, when Abraham consented to slay his son {Gen. xxii), he did not consent to murder, because his son Lib. Arh.^ I, 4 (PL 32, 1236). 844 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loo. Art. 9 was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death; for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both the just and the unjust because of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. — ^Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman (Osee i. 2), was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication; for he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage. Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the notion of justice which they contain, are unchangeable ; but as to any determina- tion by application to individual actions, — for instance, that this or that be murder, theft, or adultery, or not — in this point, they admit of change. Sometimes this takes place by divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively of divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely, in such matters as are sub- ject to human jurisdiction; for in this respect men stand in the place of God, though not in all respects. Reply Obj. 4. This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath if he does something necessary for human welfare, as Our Lord proves (Matt, xii. 3 seq,). Ninth Article WHETHER THE MODE OF VIRTUE FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE LAW? We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the pre- cept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Deut. xvi. 20) that thou shalt follow justly after that which is just. Therefore the mode of vir- tue falls under the precept. Obj. 2. Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as is stated in Ethics ii.^^ Now it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. Obj. 3. Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of the divine law, for it is written (Ps, xciv. 2) : Serve ye the Lord with gladness] and (2 Cor. ix. 7): Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver. On this the Gloss says: Whatever good ye do, do gladly, and then Aristotle, Eth., II, i (1103b 3). Q. loo. Art. 9 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 845 you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowjully, it is done in thee, not by thee?^ Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. On the contrary j No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains.^^ Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue would deserve to be punished, what- ever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept. I answer that. As was stated above, a precept of law has compulsory power Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as is stated in Ethics x.,^^ because that properly falls under the precept of the law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But divine law and human law are differently situated as to the appoint- ment of penalties, since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to judge only of outward acts, because man seeth those things that appear, according to i Kings xvi. 7; while God alone, the framer of the divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, accord- ing to Ps. vii, 10: The searcher of hearts and reins is God, Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some respect regarded both by human and by divine law; in some respect it is regarded by the divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethics ii.*^^ The first is that man should act knowingly, and this is subject to the judgment of both divine and human law, because what a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence, according to both human and divine law, certain things are judged according to ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. The second point is that a man should act deliberately, i.e., from choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above.^^ And concerning these two, divine law alone, and not hu- man law, is competent to judge. For human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, but slays not; whereas the divine law does, according to Matt, V. 22; Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment. The third point is that he should act from a firm and immovable prin- Glossa ordin. (Ill, 226A; VI, 72 A) ; St. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm., super XCI, 4 (PL 37, 1174). Eth., II, 4 (xio5a 17); V, 8 (ii3Sb 24). ®®Q. 90, a. 3, ad 2, Aristotle, Eth., X, 9 (1179b ii; iiSoa 3; a 21). Eth., II, 4 (iiosa 31). ^Q. 8 and 12. 846 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 100. Art. 10 ciple, which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety. Reply Obj, i. The mode of doing an act of justice, which falls under the precept, is that it be done in accordance with the order of what is right, but not that they be done from the habit of justice. Reply Obj. 2. The intention of the lawgiver bears on two things. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law; and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept; and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, viz., an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same; just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end. Reply Obj. 3. That works of virtue should be done without sadness falls under the precept of the divine law, for whoever works with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e., joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz., in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one’s neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and since love is the cause of pleasure. In another respect, to work with pleas- ure does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit ^ as is stated in Ethics ii.^- For an act may give pleasure either because of its end or through its proceeding from a becoming habit. Tenth Article WHETHER THE MODE OF CHARITY FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE DIVINE LAW? We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the pre- cept of the divine law. For it is written {Matt. xix. 17) : If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments \ whence it seems to follow that the ob- servance of the commandments suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity; for it is written ( i Cor. xiii. 3) : If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment. Obj. 2. Further, the mode of charity consists, properly speaking, in doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept, for the Apostle ^Aristotle, Eth., II, 3 (1104b 3). Q. 100. Art. io MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 847 says (i Cor. x. 31): Do all to the glory of God. Therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept. Obj. 3. Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfill the precepts of the law without having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always united with charity. Therefore one can fulfill the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine de- clares.^^ Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment. On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If, therefore, the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that who- ever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that who- ever has not charity sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself ; which is absurd. I answer that, Opinions have been opposed on this question.*^^ For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept ; and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfill this precept, be- cause he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind; because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one possesses chanty. — On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept. Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. For the act of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself, and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, viz., Thou shall love the Lord thy God {Deut. vi. 5), and Thou shall love thy neighbor {Levit. xix. 18). In this sense, the first opinion is true. For it is not impos- sible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity, since a man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e., inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is the end of the commandment, as is stated in I Tim. i. 5 ; for it has been said above that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to the end.*^^ In this sense, the second opin- ion is true in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the pre- cept, that is to say, that this commandment, Honor thy father, does not mean that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Therefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break this precept; although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. Reply Obj. i. Our Lord did not say, If thou wilt enter into life, keep one ^De Haeres., 88 (PL 42, 47) . 677). ^ Q. 8j a. 2, Cf. St, Albert, In 111 Sent., d. xxxvi, a. 6 (XXVIII, 848 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loo. Art. h commandment] but keep all the commandments , among which is also in- cluded the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor. Reply Ob]. 2. The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things should be referred to God. Consequently, man cannot fulfill the precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Therefore he that honors his father and mother is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue of the pre- cept, Honor thy father and mother ^ but in virtue of the precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. And since these are two affirmative precepts that do not bind for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different time; so that it may happen that a man fulfills the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity. Reply Obj. 3. Man cannot fulfill all the precepts of the law, unless he ful- fill the precept of charity, which is impossible without grace. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfill the law without grace. Eleventh Article WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO DISTINGUISH OTHER MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW BESIDES THE DECALOGUE? We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. For, as Our Lord declared {Matt. xxii. 40), on these two commandments of charity dependeth the whole law and the prophets. But these two commandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts. Obj. 2. Further, the moral precepts are distinguished from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as was stated above.^^ But the determinations of the common moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts; and the common moral precepts are contained in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as was stated above. Therefore it was un- suitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue. Obj. 3. Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues, as was stated above. Therefore, as the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy and chastity, so there should have been a'dded some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue. 99, a. 3. Q. 100. Art. ii MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 849 On the contrary, It is written {Ps. xviii. 8) : The law of the Lord is un- spotted, converting souls. But man is preserved from the stain of sin and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral pre- cepts. / answer that, As is evident from what has been stated, the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their institution alone since, before they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there are three grades. For some are most certain, and so evident as to need no promulgation. Such are the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as was stated above, which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments ; and so no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more par- ticular, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp ; and yet they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few in- stances, happens to be led astray concerning them. These are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason for which is not so evident to everyone, but only to the wise; and these are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron. But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, the other moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue as so many corol- laries. Thus, the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods, and to this are added other precepts forbidding things re- lating to the worship of idols. Thus it is written {Deut. xviii. 10, ii): Neither let there he found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there be any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. The second com- mandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy {Levit, xxiv. 15 seq.) and the prohibition of false doctrine {Deut. xiii.). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment, prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the aged, according to Levit, xix. 32 : Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man] and likewise all precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of vio- lence inflicted on our neighbor, according to Levit, xix. 16: Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor] and likewise the prohibition 850 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loo. Art. h against hating one’s brother {ibid. 17) : Thou shall not hate thy brother in thy heart. To the sixth commandment, which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to Deut. xxiii. 17: There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel; and the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Levit. xviii. 22, 23: Thou shall not lie with mankind , . . thou shall not copulate with any beast. To the seventh commandment, which prohibits theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to Deut. xxiii. 19: Thou shall not lend to thy brother money to usury; and the prohibition against fraud, according to Deut. xxv. 13: Thou shall not have divers weights in thy bag; and, universally, all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Exod. xxiii. 2 : Neither shall thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth; and the prohibition against lying {ibid. 7): Thou shall fly lying; and the prohibition against detraction, according to Levit. xix. 16: Thou shall not he a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people. To the* other two commandments no further precepts are added, because all evil desires are forbidden by them. Reply Obj. i. The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently. Reply Obj. 2. It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral pre- cepts. Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as was stated above.^® And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species, hence precepts bearing directly on these virtues are given both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude, there are the orders to be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common good; as is clear from Deut. xx. 3, where the priest is com- manded [to speak thus] : Be not afraid, do not give back. In like manner, the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; and so it is said {Deut. xxi. 20) in the person of parents: He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings. ^Q. 90, a. 2. Q. 100. Art. 12 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW 8S1 Twelfth Article WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW JUSTIFIED MAN? We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man. For the Apostle says {Rom. ii. 13): For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified. But the doers of the Law are those who fulfill the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justifica- tion. Obj. 2. Further, it is written {Levit. xviii. 5): Keep My laws and My judgments j which if a man do, he shall live in them. But the spiritual life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. Obj. 3. Further, the divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man, since there is a kind of justice consisting in ful- filling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man. On the contrary, The Apostle says {2 Cor. iii. 6): The letter killeth, which, according to Augustine, refers even to the moral precepts.^^ There- fore the moral precepts did not cause justice. I answer that, Just as healthy is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or a safeguard of health, so justification means first and properly the causing of justice, while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, namely, as they disposed men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified. For, as Augustine says, even the life of that people foretold and fore- shadowed Christ. But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be considered as it is found in the habit or as in the act; so that, accordingly, justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just by becoming possessed of the habit of justice; secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other vir- tues, may denote either the acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated.®^ The acquired virtue is caused by works, but the in- fused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according to Rom. iv. 2: If Abraham were spir. et Litt., XIV (PL 44, 215). ^Contra Faust., XXII, 24 (PL 42, 417). 63, a. 4. 852 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. ioo. Art. 12 justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. Hence this justice could not be caused by the moral precepts, which are about human actions ; and therefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice. If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various ways. For the ceremonial precepts, taken as a whole, contained something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas, taken individually, they contained that which is just, not in itself, but by being a determination of the divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand, the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular, contained that which is just in itself ; but the moral precepts contained that which is just in itself according to that general justice which is every virtue, according to Ethics v. ; whereas the judicial precepts belonged to special justice, which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man and another. Reply Ob j. i . The Apostle takes justification for the execution of justice. Reply Obj. 2. The man who fulfills the precepts of the Law is said to live in them because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the Law in- flicted on its transgressors. It is in this sense that the Apostle quotes this passage {Gal. iii. 12). Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of human law justify man by acquired jus- tice; but it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about that justice which is before God. Aristotle, Eth., V, i (1129b 30). Question Cl ON THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES {In Four Articles) We must now consider the ceremonial precepts, and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause thirdly, their duration.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) The nature of the cere- monial precepts. (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Whether there should have been many of them? (4) Of their various kinds. First Article WHETHER THE NATURE OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS CON- SISTS IN THEIR PERTAINING TO THE WORSHIP OF GOD? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God.'^ For, in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food {Levit, xi. 19); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. {Levit. xix. 19) : Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts; and again {Num, xv. 38) : To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments. But these are not moral precepts, since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts, since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to divine worship. Obj. 2. Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the cerei [candles] which are lit up on those occasions.^ But many other things be- sides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the divine worship. Obj. 3. Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e., rules, of salvation , because the Greek xaTps is the same as the Latin salve.^ But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those ^ Q. 102. ''Q. 103. ® Cf. St. Albert, In IV Sent., d. i, a. 7 (XXIX, 19) ; Cicero, De Nat. Deor., II, 28 (p. 78). ^St. Albert, In IV Sent., d. i, a. 7 (XXEX, 18). ® Unknown. 853 854 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. ioi. Art. i that pertain to the worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to the divine worship are called ceremonial. Ob], 4. Further, Rabbi Moses says that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason.® But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God: e.g., the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of God. On the contrary j It is written {Exod. xviii. 19, 20) : Be thou to the peo- ple in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the ceremonies and the manner of worshipping. I answer that, As was stated above, the ceremonial precepts are determi- nations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor.*^ Now man is directed to God by the worship due to Him. Therefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial which pertain to the divine worship. — ^The reason for their being so called was given above when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts.® Reply Ob], i. The divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him. Thus, too, in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly, those precepts of the Law which re- gard the clothing and food of God’s worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with a view to fitting them for the divine worship; just as those who administer to a king make use of certain special observances. Consequently, such are contained under the ceremonial precepts. Reply Ob'], 2. The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable, especially as the Law does not contain many instances of the lighting of candles in solemnities, since even the lamps of the Candlestick were furnished with oil of olives, as is stated in Levit. xxiv. 2. Nevertheless, we may say that all things pertaining to the divine worship were more care- fully observed on solemn festivals; so that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities. Reply Ob], 3. Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point, since the word ceremony is not Greek but Latin. We may say, however, that, since man’s salvation is from God, those pre- cepts above all seem to be rules of salvation which direct man to God ; and accordingly those which refer to divine worship are called ceremonial pre- cepts. Reply Ob], 4. This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain ® Guide, III, 28 (p. 314). 99, a. 4. ®Q. 99, a. 3. Q. loi. Art. 2 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 855 amount of probability. Not that they are called ceremonial precisely be- cause there is no evident reason for them; rather this is a kind of conse- quence. For, since the precepts referring to the divine worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on, the consequence is that the rea- son for them is not so very evident. Second Article WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS ARE FIGURATIVE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figura- tive. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states.^ Now this seems very neces- sary in the framing of a law, because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should he manifest, as Isidore declares.^® If, therefore, the precepts of the Law were given as figures of something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts with- out explaining what they signified. Obj, 2. Further, whatever is done for the worship of God should be en- tirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in repre- sentation of others seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama; because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent the ac- tions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the divine worship, as was stated above.. Therefore they should not be figurative, Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope and charity But the precepts of faith, hope and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative. Obj, 4. Further, Our Lord says {Jo. iv. 24) : God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth. But a figure is not the very truth; in fact, one is co-divided against the other. Therefore the cere- monial precepts, which refer to the divine worship, should not be figurative. On the contrary. The Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 16, 17) : Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come. I answer that, As was stated above, the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God.^^ Now the divine worship is twofold: interior, and exterior. For since man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God, the soul by an interior wor- ship, and the body by an outward worship. Hence it is written (Ps. Ixxxiii. 3 ) : My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God. And just as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the exterior worship is or- ^ De Doct. Christ., IV, 8; 10 (PL 34, 98; 99). Etymol., II, 10; V, 21 (PL 82, 131 ; 203). '^Enchir., Ill; IV (PL 40, 232; 233). ‘‘^A. i; q. 99, a. 3 and 4. 856 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loi. Art. 2 dained to the interior worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and by affection. Therefore,, according to the various ways in which the intellect and the affection of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his exterior actions are applied in various ways to the divine worship. For in the state of future beatitude, the human intellect will gaze on the divine truth in itself. Therefore the exterior worship will not consist in any- thing figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the in- ward knowledge and affection, according to Isa. li. y. Joy and gladness shall be found therein, tlfanksgiving and the voice of praise. But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze upon the divine truth in itself, and we need the ray of the divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states; in various ways, however, according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the divine truth manifest in itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares {Heb. ix. 8). Hence the exterior worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our heav- enly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law this way is already revealed, and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as something past or present; and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says {Heb. x. i): The Law has a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things; for a shadow is less than an image, so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the Old. Reply Ob], i. The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity, or else he would be in danger of a downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the divine mysteries should be revealed to an uncultivated people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God. Reply Obj. 2. Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions because of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp divine things perfectly, because of the sublimity of the truth they contain; and therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible figures. Reply Obj. 3. Augustine is speaking there of interior worship; to which, however, exterior worship should be ordained, as we stated above. The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection, because men were taught by Christ to practise more perfectly the spiritual worship of God. Q. 101. Art. 3 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 857 Third Article WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANY CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there should not have been many cere- monial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be pro- portioned to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as was stated above, are ordained to the worship of God and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now there is hut one God, of Whom are all things, , . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things ( j Cor. viii. 6) . Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. Obj. 2. Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occa- sion of transgression, according to the words of Peter {Acts xv. lo): Why tempt you God to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bectr? Now the transgression of the divine precepts is an obstacle to man’s salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man’s salvation, as Isidore says,^^ it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number. Obj. 3 Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the exterior and bodily worship of God, as was stated above. But the Law should have les- sened this bodily worship, sihce it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship God in spirit and in truth, as is stated in John iv. 23. Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. On the contrary. It is written {Osee viii. 12) : I shall write to them My manifold laws; and {Job xi. 6): That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold. I answer that. As we have stated above, every law is given to a people.^^ Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as was stated above others, in- clined to good, either from nature or from custom, or even from grace, and these have to be taught and improved by means of the precepts of law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men, it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry, and so it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary, on the other hand, to devise many means of repressing every single one; and, again, to lay many obligations on such men, in order that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to, the divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to good, it was likewise necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts, both because ^^EtymoL, II, 10; V, 3 (PL 82, 13 1; 199). “Q. 96, a. i. ^Q. 95, a. i. THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 858 Q. loi. Art. 4 their mind was thus turned to God in many ways, and more continually, and because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these cere- monial precepts, brought many useful things to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified by various cere- monies. Reply Obj. i . When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to con- duce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end. Thus one remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore man to health, and then the remedies need not to be multiplied. But when that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied ; and thus many reme- dies are given to a sick man, when one is not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, because of its surpassing excellence, and for sub- jugating men’s minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 18, 19): There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weak- ness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfec- tion. Consequently, these ceremonies needed to be in great number. Reply Ob]. 2. A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions that the greater may be avoided. And, therefore, in order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, if they were to fulfill all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial precepts. Reply Obj. 3. The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. Many such things it enacted for the lessening of bodily worship, as Rabbi Moses the Egyptian testifies.^® Nevertheless, it was necessary not to attenuate- the bodily worship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the wor- ship of idols. Fourth Article WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW ARE SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO SACRIFICES, SACRED THINGS, SACRAMENTS AND OBSERVANCES? We proceed thus to 4 he Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are un- suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments and observances.'^'^ For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed ^e sacrifice in which Christ delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God (Ephes. v. 2 ) . There- fore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies. Guide, III, 32 (p. 325) . Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., IV, i, 6 1 4 ( 11 , 748 ; 746) , Q, loi. Art. 4 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 859 Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should not have been a distinction between sacrifices and sacraments, Obj, 3. Further, a sacred thing is something dedicated to God; in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as was stated above. Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore sacred things should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies. Ob], 4. Further, Observances are so called from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed. For it is written (Deut. viii. 1 1 ) : Observe and beware lest at any time thou j or get the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and judgments and ceremonies. There- fore the observances should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies. Obj, 5. Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the cere- monial, since they were a shadow of things to come {Coloss, ii. 16, 17) ; and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle {Eeb. ix; 9). And yet these do not seem to be included in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is unsuitable. On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies {Hum, xv. 24): They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies re- quire. Of the sacrament of Order it is written {Levit. vii. 35) : This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies. Of sacred things also it is written {Exod. xxxviii. 21) : These are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony ... in the ceremonies of the Levites. And again of the observances it is written {3 Kings ix. 6) : // you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not observe My . . . ceremonies which 1 have set before you. I answer that, As was stated above, the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship con- sists especially in sacrifices, which are offered up in honor of God. The in- struments of worship refer, to the sacred things, such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the worshippers, two points may be considered. The first point is their preparation for divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the sacraments refer. The second point is their particular mode of life, whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God; and to this pertain the observances, for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth. Reply Obj. i. It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men; and all this pertained to the worship of God. Therefore, just as their sacrifices signified Christ the vie- 86o THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. loi. Art. 4 tim, so too their sacraments and sacred things foreshadowed the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law, while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law. All of these things per- tain to Christ. Reply Obj. 2. The sacrifice of the New Law, viz., the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification; for He sanctified the peo- ple by His own blood (Heb, xiii. 12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacra- ment. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but fore- shadowed Him; and hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments, apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united. Reply Obj. 3. The sacrifices and sacraments were, of course, sacred things. But certain things were sacred through being dedicated to the divine wor- ship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments; and so they retained the common designation of sacred things. Reply Obj. 4. Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God retained the common designation of ob- servances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not called sacred things because they had no immediate connection with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort of conse- quence, they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God. Reply Obj. 5. Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so they were offered at fixed times; and for this reason the solemn festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. But the oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices because they were offered to God, and hence the Apostle says {Heb. v. i): Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things that appertain to God^ that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices. Question CII ON THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS {In Six Articles) We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative? (3) The causes of the sacrifices. (4) The causes of the sacraments. (5) The causes of the sacred things. (6) The causes of the observances. First Article WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CAUSE FOR THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. For on Ephes, ii. 15 {Making void the law of the commandments) the Gloss says, i.e,, making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances j by substituting decrees, i.e., evangelical precepts, which are based on rea- son} But if the observances of the Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law. Obj, 2. Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that man’s obedience might be tested, as Augustine says concerning the prohibition about the tree of life.- Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man’s obedience, having no reason in themselves, Obj. 3. Further, man’s works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If, therefore, there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems, therefore, that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts ; for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause. On the contrary. It is written {Ps. xviii. 9) : The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. But the ceremonial precepts are '^Glossa interl. (VI, giv) ; Peter Lombard, In Ephes., super II, 15 (PL 192, 185). ^ De Gened ad Litt., VIII, 6; 13 (PL 34, 377; 383). 861 862 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 102. Art. 2 commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome; and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial pre- cepts have a reasonable cause. I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher, it is the function of a wise man to dispose everything in order ^ those things which proceed from the divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states {Rom. xih. i) . Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action; for those things that happen by chance, outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be proportioned to the end. From this it follows that the rea- son for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the end. Thus the rea- son for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its end, as is stated in Physics ii.^ Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were institutions of divine wisdom; and so it is written {Deut. iv. 6) : This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations. Consequently, we must needs say that the ceremonial pre- cepts were ordained to a certain end, from which their reasonable causes can be gathered. Reply Obj. 1. It may be said that there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing done: for instance, that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in their relation to some- thing else, namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which consist chiefly in faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act. Reply Obj. 2. The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil; and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, inas- much as it signified something. And so, too, the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable because of their relation to something else. Reply Obj. 3. The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: e.g., Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal. But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as was stated above. Second Article WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS HAVE A LITERAL CAUSE OR MERELY A FIGURATIVE CAUSE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a lit- Metapk., I, 2 (982a 18). ^Aristotle, Phys., II, 9 (200a 10; b s). Q. 102. Art. 2 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 863 eral, but merely a figurative, cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, the chief were circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause, because each was given as a sign. For it is written (Gen. xvii. ii): You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may he for a sign of the covenant between Me and you] and of the celebration of the Passover it is written {Exod. xiii. 9): It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes. There- fore much more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a figura- tive reason. Obj. 2. Further, an effect is proportioned to its cause. But all the cere- monial precepts are figurative, as was stated above.^ Therefore they have only a figurative cause. ObJ. 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the precepts of the Old Law. ^ On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament; for it is written ( j Cor. x. ii ) that all {these things^ happened to them in figure. Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative, causes. / answer that, As was stated above, the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial pre- cepts was twofold, for they were ordained to the divine worship for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words of the prophet regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on Osee i. 3.® Accordingly, the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the divine worship which was to be observed for that particular time; and these reasons are literal, whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry, or recall certain divine benefits, or remind men of the divine excellence, or point out the disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped God. — Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being ordained to foreshadow Christ ; and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical, whether they re- fer to Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegori- cal sense, or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense, or to the state of future glory, inasmuch as we are brought thereto by Christ, which pertains to the anagogical sense. ® Q. loi, a. 2. ^In Osee, I, super I, 3 (PL 25, 364) . 864 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 3 Reply Obj, i. Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in order to convey that particular meaning, so also the meaning of those legal cere- monies which commemorated certain divine benefits, because of which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes. Consequently, when we assert that the cause of the celebration of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abra- ham, we assign the literal cause. Reply Ob], 2. This argument would avail, if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the purpose of worshipping God then and there. Reply Ob]. 3. As we stated when speaking of human laws, there is a reason for them in the universal, but not in regard to the particular condi- tions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame them.'^ So, too, many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative cause; whereas, considered universally, they have a literal cause. Third Article % WHETHER A SUITABLE CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CEREMONIES WHICH PERTAINED TO SACRIFICES? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were offered in sacrifice are such as are necessary for sustaining human life: e.g., animals and certain loaves. But God needs no such sustenance, according to Ps. xlix. 13: Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats? Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God. Obj. 2. Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to God, viz., oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the turtledove and the dove; but especially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble than these. Since, there- fore, whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have been offered to Him. Obj. 3. Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. Consequently, it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices. Obj. 4. Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since, then, the young of the dove are commanded to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove. Obj. 5. Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of ^ Q. 96, a. I and 6. Q. 102. Art. 3 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 865 animals, as is clear from Gen, i. 20, seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us {Rom, xii. r) to present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing vnto God, Obj, 6 . Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore it was un- fitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds {Levit, i. 1 5, seqq.). Obj. 7. Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, it was unreason- able to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g., a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal. Obj. 8. Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle ( j Cor. x. 18) : Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar? It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breast-bone and the right shoulder. Obj. 9. Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animal was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that neverthe- less birds should not be offered up in peace-offerings. Obj. 10. Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. There- fore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so that it was for- bidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other peace-offerings, as is laid down in Levit. vii. 15, seqq. Obj. II. Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all sins. Obj. 12. Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice were of- fered up in one way, viz., slain. Therefore it does not seem to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways. For some- times an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread; and sometimes the bread was baked in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron. Obj. 13. Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be rec- ognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that besides animals nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense and salt should be offered to God. Obj. 14. Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward sacrifice the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt 866 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 3 represents; for it is written {Ecclus, xxiv. 27): My spirit is sweet above honey. Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven, which makes bread savory, should be forbidden in a sacrifice ; while the use was prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently, it seems that things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause. On the contrary, It is written {Levit. i. 13) ^ The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar for a holocaust and most sweet savor to the Lord. Now according to Wis. vii. 28, God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom ; whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes. I answer that, As was stated above, the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz., a literal cause, according as they were intended for divine worship, and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ; and in either case the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause. For according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God rightly, man must recognize that whatever he has is from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and sacrifices by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his hav- ing received them from God, according to the saying of David (i Paral. xxix. 14) : All things are Thine; and we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand. Therefore, in offering up sacrifices, man made protestation that God is the first principle of the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to be directed to God rightly, it must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end in any other, for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according to Exod. xxii. 20: He that sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord. Therefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence, too, it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry by worshipping the molten calf ; as though such sacrifices were instituted that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written {Jer. vii. 22): / spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices. Q. 102. Art. 3 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 867 Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; and so it is written {Jo. hi. 16) : God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever helieveth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself delivered Himself ... to God for an odor of sweetness {Ephes. v. 2 ) . And for this reason all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice — the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says {Heb. x. ii) that the priest of the Old Law often offered the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins; but Christ offered one sacrifice for sins, forever. And since the reason for a figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore, the reasons for the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ. Reply Obj. i. God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him be- cause of the things themselves that were offered, as though He stood in need of them; and so it is written ( 7 ^^z. i. ii): I desire not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs and buck-goats. But, as was stated above, He wished them to be offered to Him in order to prevent idolatry; — in order to signify the right ordering of man’s mind to God; — and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ. Reply Obj. 2. In all the respects mentioned above, there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered up in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. For idolaters offered all other ani- mals to their gods, or made use of them in their sorceries; on the other hand, the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) consid- ered it abominable to slay these animals, and so they did not offer them in sacrifice to their gods. Hence it is written {Exod. viii. 26) : We shall sacri- fice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God. For they wor- shipped the sheep; they reverenced the ram (because' demons appeared under the form thereof) ; while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by them as something sacred. Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man’s mind to God; and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained, and moreover they are most clean and partake of a most clean food; whereas other animals are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men, or, if they be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and geese. Now nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were offered in sacrifice, because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. — Secondly, because the sacrificing of. these animals represented purity of heart. For, as the Gloss says on Levit. i.. We offer a calf when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when we con- 868 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 3 quer our wantonness ; a turtledove j when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we jeast on the unleavened bread of sincerity? And it is evi- dent that the dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart. Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. For, as the same Gloss observes, Christ is offered in the calf to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; in the goat, to signify the likeness of sinful flesh. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures; or else the turtledove signified chastity, while the dove was a figure of charity. The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of be- lievers with the water of Baptism? Reply Obj. 3. Fish, through living in water, are further removed from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish die as soon as they are taken out of water, and so they could not be offered in the temple like other animals. Reply Obj. 4. Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young, while with doves the case is the reverse. Therefore, as Rabbi Moses observes,^^ turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered be- cause nothing should be offered to God but what is best. Reply Obj. 5. The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, be- cause it is by being killed that they become useful to man, inasmuch as God gave them to man for food. So, too, they were burnt with fire, because it is by being cooked that they are made fit for human consumption. More- over, the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins, and also that man deserved death because of his sms; as though these animals were slain in man’s stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. — Again, the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ. Reply Obj. 6. The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters sacri- ficed animals to idols. — Or again, as Rabbi Moses says, the Law chose that manner of slaying' which was least painful to the slain animal. This ex- cluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals slain. Reply Obj. 7. It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in con- tempt among men that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to God; and for this reason, too, they were forbidden {Deut. xxiii. 18) to offer the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of .. . God. For the same reason they did not offer animals before the seventh day, because such were abortive, as it were, since the flesh was not yet firm because of its exceeding softness. Reply Obj. 8. There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called a holo- ^Glossa ordin. (I, 214B) ; St. Isidore, Quaest. in Vet. Test., In Levit., I (PL 83, 321) ^Ibid. Guide, III, 46 (p. 360). '^Op. cit.. Ill, 48 (p. 371). Q. 102. Art. 3 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 869 caust, i.e., all burnt. For. this kind of sacrifice was offered to God especially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His goodness; and it typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfillment of the counsels. Therefore the whole was burnt up, so that as the whole animal, by being dissolved into vapor, soared aloft, so it might denote that the whole man, and what- ever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be offered to Him. Another sacrifice was the sin-offering, which was offered to God because of man’s need for the forgiveness of sin ; and this typifies the state of peni- tents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts, for one part was burnt, while the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that the remission of sins is granted by God through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or especially for the sin of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction for sin; for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not been offered. The third kind of sacrifice was called the peace-offering, which was of- fered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be re- ceived; and this typifies the state of those who are proficient in the ob- servance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into three parts, for one part was burnt in honor of God, another part was allotted to the use of the priests, and the third part to the use of the offerers, in order to signify that man’s salvation is from God, by the direction of God’s minis- ters, and through the co-operation of those who are saved. But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers; but the blood was poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar (Levit. ix. 9, 10). The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry, for idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat of the victims, according to Deut. xxxii. 38: Of whose victims they ate the fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings. — Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; and so it is written {Gen. ix. 4, 5) : Flesh with blood you shall not eat, for 1 will require the blood of your lives. And they were forbidden to eat the fat, in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness, and hence it is written {Ezech. xxxiv. 3): You have killed that which was fat. — Thirdly, because of the reverence due to God. For blood is most necessary for life, for which reason life is said to be in the blood {Levit. xvii. ii, 14) ; while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Therefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency 870 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 3 of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. — Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding of Christ’s blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us. In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were al- lotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind of divina- tion which is known as spatulamantia, so called because it was customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade \spatula\ and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; and so these things were taken away from the offerers. This also denoted the priest’s need of wisdom in the heart, to in- struct the people (signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart), and his need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty (signified by the right shoulder). Reply Obj. 9. Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacri- fice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust; for the female is an imperfect animal. — The offering of turtledoves and doves was because of the poverty of the offerers, who were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against his will, hence these birds were offered, not among the peace-victims, but among the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, because of their lofty flight, were be- fitting the perfection of the holocausts; and they were suitable for sin- offerings, because their song is doleful. Reply Obj. 10. The holocaust was the chief of all' the sacrifices, because all was burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The second place in holiness belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice (Levit. vii. 6, 15). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the ex-voto peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound to God, chiefly be- cause of His majesty; secondly, because of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him. Reply Obj. ii. Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sin- ner, as was stated above and so different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private indi- vidual. But, as Rabbi Moses says, we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower the species of animal offered for it. Therefore the goat, which is a very base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a calf was of- fered for a pries fs ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince P Reply Obj. 12. In the matter of sacrifices, the Law had in view the pov- erty of the offerers, so that those who could not have a four-footed animal 73 , a. 10. Guide, III, 46 (p. 363). Q. 102. Art. 4 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 871 at their disposal might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn. The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the living bread {Jo. vi. 41, 51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in the fire, i.e., formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron. Reply Ob]. 13. The products of the soil are useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was offered ; or as drink, and of these wine was offered ; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells sweetly and binds easily to- gether. Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ; salt. His knowledge; incense. His prayer. Reply Obj. 14. Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both be- cause it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols, and in order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who in- tend to sacrifice to God. — ^Leaven was not offered, to denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps, too, it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols. Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of putre- faction; for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh. Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary in the offerer; and, again, to signify the odor of a good name, for incense is composed of matter both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice of jealousy did not proceed from devotion, but rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein {Num. v. 15). Fourth Article WHETHER A SUFFICIENT REASON CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CEREMONIES PERTAINING TO HOLY THINGS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For Paul said {Acts xvii. 24) : Godj Who made the world and all things therein, He being Lord of heaven and earth, dweUeth not in temples made by hands. It was 872 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 4 therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God. Obj. 2. Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple. Obj. 3. Further, the divine law, more than any other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship requires multiplication of altars and temples, as is evident in regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that, also under the Old Law, there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many. Obj. 4.. Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils. Obj. 5. Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e., God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point to the east rather than the west. Obj. 6. Further, the Lord commanded {Exod. xx. 4) that they should not make ... a graven things nor the likeness of anything. It was therefore unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple. In like manner the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause. Obj. 7. Further, the Lord commanded {Exod. xx. 24) : You shall make an altar of earth unto Me\ and again {ibid.^ 26) : Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar. It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass, and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps. For it is written {Exod. xxvii. i, 2) : Thou shalt make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad, . . . and three cubits high . . . and thou shalt cover it with brass\ and {Exod. XXX. I, 3): Thou shalt make ... an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold. Obj. 8. Further, in God’s works nothing should be superfluous, for neither in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found. But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz., curtains, curtains of goats’ hair, rams’ skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins {Exod. xxvi.). Obj. 9. Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the sub- ject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate things. Obj. 10. Further, it is written {Ps. xxxiii. 2): I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth. But the solemn festivals Q. 102. Art. 4 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 873 were instituted for the praise of God. Therjefore it was not fitting that cer- tain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Heb. viii. 4) that those who o-ffer gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the pattern which was shown thee on the mount. But that is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause. / answer that. The chief purpose of the whole external worship of God is that man may hold God in reverence. Now man’s tendency is to reverence less those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from others in some point of excellence.^^ Hence, too, it is customary among men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster and more beauti- ful abodes. And for this reason it behoved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers to be appointed for the divine wor- ship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater rever- ence for God. In like manner, the state of the Old Law, as was observed above, was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ.^^ Now that which foreshadows something should be determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, certain special points had to be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of God. Reply Obj. 1, The divine worship regards two things, namely, God Who is worshipped, and the persons who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, is confined to no bodily place, and so there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, who worship Him, are corporeal beings, and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ’s divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement of various details in such temple or tabernacle. To this Solomon refers (5 Kings viii. 27) when he says: If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built for Thee? And further on {ibid, 29, 30) he adds: That Thy eyes may be open upon this house of which Thou hast said: My name shall be there; , , , that Thou mayest hearken to the supplica- tion of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel, From this it is evident that Cf. Moses Maimonides, Guide, III, 45 (p. 357 ) • ^ A. 2 ; q. 100, a. 12 ; q. loi, a. 2. g74 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 4 the house of the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God’s name might dwell there, i.e., that God might be made known there by means of things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more devoutly, so as to be heard more readily. Reply Obj. 2. Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfillment of the Law, which was effected in Christ alone; but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the Law. For, at first, the people were in the desert, having no fixed abode ; afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neigh- boring nations; and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one of great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is written {Gen. xxii. 2) that the Lord com- manded Abraham to offer his son jor a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee\ and it is related further on (ibid. 14) that he called the name of that place, The Lord seeth, as though, according to the divine prevision, that place were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written {Deut. xii. 5, 6) : You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and vic- tims. Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; and this for three reasons as- signed by Rabbi Moses.^® First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, as though no place was as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the literal reason for the distinc- tion between the tabernacle and the temple. The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, signifies the state of the present changeable life; whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, signifies the state of future life which is altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state. — Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law, while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the taber- nacle, whereas the temple was built with the co-operation of the Gentiles, viz., the T5n:ians and Sidonians. ^^Gtdde, III, 45 (p. 355). Q. 102. Art. 4 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 875 Obj. 3. The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion of idol- atry. For the Gentiles put up various temples to various gods; and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief in the divine unity, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only. — ^Another reason was in order to show that bodily worship was not accepted for its own sake; and so they were restrained from offering sacrifices 'anywhere and ever3nvhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multi- plication of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law. As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, consist- ing in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there were, even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed' for the people to gather together for the praise of God; just as now there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue, since the very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual ; and so with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant. Reply Obj. 4. Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to the worship of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the Holy of Holies, and was placed to the west; the other was called the Holy Place, which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly, there are two reasons for this distinction. One is according as the tabernacle is ordained to the worship of God. For the different parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was tailed the Holy of Holies signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances; while that part which is called the Holy Place signified the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors (de- noting the four elements), viz., of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e., flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying water, because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signify- ing air, because it has the color of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, sig- nifying fire; — and this because matter composed of the four elements is a veil between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e., the Holy of Holies; whereby we are taught that man’s final perfection consists in his entering into that world. But into the outward tabernacle, i.e., the Holy Place, the priests entered every day, whereas the people were admitted, 876 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 4 only to the court; for the people are able to perceive material things, the inner nature of which only wise men by dint of study are able to discover. But with regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the Old Law, as the Apostle says {Heh. ix. 6, seq,)] because into that tabernacle the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices. But the inner taber- nacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law, which is a kind of beginning of the glory to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this was signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. — ^The veil betokened the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz., that of linen, to designate purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. — ^With regard to the state of the Old Law, the people and the priests were situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices which were offered in the court, whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided from the court by a veil, because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the people, while they were known to the priests; though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament, as it is said in Ephes. iii. 5. Reply Obj. 5. Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law for the exclusion of idolatry, because, all the Gentiles, in reverence to the sun, worshipped towards the east.^"^ Hence it is written {Ezech. viii. 16) that certain men had their hacks towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the rising of the sun. Accord- ingly, in order to exclude this, the tabernacle had the Hcfly of Holies to westward, that they might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to Ps, Ixvii. 5: Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name. Reply Obj. 6. Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in connection with the divine worship. And because, as was already observed, the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things, viz., the ark of the testament in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had blossomed, and the tables {Eeb. ix. 4) on which were ^^Cf. Moses Maimonides, Guide, III, 45 (p. 355). Q. 102. Art. 4 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 877 written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two cherubim that looked one towards the other, and over the ark was a stone table, called the propitiatory, raised above the wings of the cheru- bim, as though it were held up by them, and appearing, to the imagina- tion, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called the propitia- tory, as though the people received thence propitiation at the prayers of the high-priest. And so it -^^as held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God ; while the ark of the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. — These three things denote three things in that higher world. And first, God Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of Him was used, in order thus to denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent His^seat, since, namely, the creature, which is beneath God, as the seat is beneath its occupant, is comprehensible. — Again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at peace with one another, according to Job xxv. 2: Who maketh peace m , . , high places. For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to be- token the multitude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to worship but one God. — Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the intelligible exemplars of whatsoever takes place in this world, just as the likenesses of effects are included in their causes, and the models of works of art in the artisan. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three things of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, denoted by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these three signified three divine attributes, viz., wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna, — both by reason of its sweet- ness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was granted to man (and that is why it was preserved as a memorial of the divine mercy). — ^Again, these three things were represented in Isaias’ vision. For he saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated, and the seraphim standing by, and he saw that the house was filled with the glory of the Lord; and so the seraphim cried out: All the earth is fidl of His glory (Isa. vi. I, 3). — ^And thus, the images of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment, but as a sign of their function, as was stated above. The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained three things^ viz., the altar of incense, which was directly opposite the ark; the table of proposition, with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the northern side; and the candlestick, which was placed towards the south. These three things seem to correspond to the three SyS THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 4 which were enclosed in the ark, and they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly; because, in order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp the exemplars of things, it was necessary to express them more manifestly than they are in the divine or the angelic mind. Accordingly, the candlestick betokened, as a sensible sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables in intelligible words. The altar of incense signified the office of the priests, whose duty it was to bring the people to God; and this was signified also by the rod. For on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to God. For it is written {Apoc. viii. 3) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the justijications oj the saints {cf, ibid. xix. 8]. Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer tabernacle, by the altar of incense; for the priest is the mediator between God and the people, governing the people by divine power, denoted by the rod, and offering to God 'the fruit of His government, i,e., the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. — ^The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna did; but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. — ^Again, the candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was placed to the north, because the south is the right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as is stated in De Caelo et Mundo ii.;^^ and wisdom, like other spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs to the left, according to Prov. iii. 16: In her left hand riches and glory. Now priestly power is mid- way between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom, because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed. A more literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness of the Law; and so it is -written (Exod. xxiv. 12): I will give thee two tables oj stone, and the Law, and the commandments which 1 have written, that thou mayest teach them to the children of Israel. — The rod of Aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood of Aaron; and hence it is written {Num. xvii. 10) : Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token oj the rebellious children of Israel. — ^The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of Israel in the desert; and hence it is written {Exod. xvi. 32) : Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed you in the wilderness. — ^The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple; for the magnificence of a house de- pends on its being well lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes, to signify the seven planets, wherewith the whole Caelo, II, 2 (285b 16). ^’^Antiquities, III, 7 (IV, 404). Q. 102. Art. 4 ' CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 879 world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south, because for us the course of the planets is from that quarter. — ^The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet'Smelling smoke; and this both out of reverence for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are more appreciated. — The table was placed there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple; and so, as is stated in Matt, xii. 4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on the table in remembrance of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory, in order to exclude an idola- trous rite. For the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of the moon; and that is why it is written {Jerem. vii. 18) : The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven. In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were offered to God; and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present in the court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. Now this altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the court, to exclude idolatrous worship; for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols. The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the rela- tion of the tabernacle to Christ, Who was foreshadowed therein. Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the propitiatory, since He is a propitiation for our sins (j John ii. 2). So, too, this propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written {Heb, i. 6): Let all the angels of God adore Him. — ^He is also signified by the ark, because, just as the ark was made of setim wood, so was Christas body composed of most pure members. More- over, it was gilded, for Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e.'. His holy soul, having manna, i.e., all the fullness of the Godhead {Coloss. ii. 9). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e.. His priestly power; for He was made a . , . priest forever {Heb. vi. 20). And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is the giver of the Law. — ^Again, Christ was signified by the candlestick, for He said Himself {Jo. viii. 12) : I am the Light of the world; while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the table, because He is our spiritual food, according to /(?. vi. 41, 51 : 7 aw the living bread] and the twelve loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or, again. 88o THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA • Q. 102. Art. 4 the candlestick and table may signify the Church’s teaching and faith, which also give enlightenment and spiritual refreshment. — ^Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. For all works of virtue must be offered by us to God through Him, both those whereby we afflict the body (which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts), and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ by the spiritual desires of the perfect (on the altar of incense, as it were, according to Heb. xiii. 1$: By Him therefore let us offer the sacri- fice of praise always to God ) . Reply Obj. 7. The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the min- isters who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was at the beginning of the Law (Exod, xx. 24, ff), when the Lord commanded them to make an altar of earth, or at least not of hewn stones; and again, not to make the altar high, so as to make it necessary to go up to it by steps. This was in detestation of idolatrous worship, for the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded {Deut, xvi. 21): Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God] since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees, because of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. — There was also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh, as regards His humanity (and this is to make an altar of earth), and again, in regard to His divinity, we must confess His equality with the Father (and this is not to go up to the altar by steps). Moreover we should not couple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness. But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry. There- fore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, for this would make it conspicuous to all the people; and the altar of incense of gold, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry. Since, however, the reasons for the precept. Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar, is stated to have been lest thy nakedness be discov- ered {Exod. XX. 26), it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry; for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people.^^ But later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency; and so without any danger the altar could be placed so high that the priests, when offering sacrifices, would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but movable. “Cf. Maimonides, Guide, III, 45 (p. 357). Q. 102. Art. 4 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 881 Reply Obj. 8. The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end, and^ covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors, viz., twisted linen, violet, purple and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, how- ever, covered the sides only of the tabernacle, while the roof of the taber- nacle was covered with violet-colored skins, and over this there was an- other covering of rams’ skins dyed red, and over this a third made of goats’ hair, which not only covered the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside. The literal reason for these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle, that it might be held in reverence. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the sidereal heavens y which is adorned with various stars j the curtain of goats^ skin signified the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red denoted the empyrean heavens j where the angels are; the violet skins ^ the heaven of the Blessed Trinity?'^ The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of Christ, who compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors, because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the four virtues: for the twisted linen, as the Gloss observes, signifies the flesh reftdgent with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions shining forth with the love of God and our neighbor P The coverings of the building designate prelates and doc- tors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life (sig- nified by the violet-colored skins); who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom (denoted by the skins dyed red) ; and who should be austere of life and patient in adversity (betokened by the curtains of goats’ hair, which were exposed to wind and rain) , as the Gloss observes.^^ Reply Obj. 9. The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence, being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. — ^The figura- tive reason is that this sanctification signified the sanctification of the liv- ing tabernacle, i.e., the faithful, of whom the Church of Christ is composed. Reply Obj. 10. Under the Old Law, there were seven temporal solemni- ties, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from Num, xxviii. and xxix. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and evening; and this continual feast of an abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of divine beatitude. Of the temporal feasts, the first was that which was repeated every week. This was the solemnity of the Sabbath, celebrated in remembrance of the ^ Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast,, Exod., cap. 58 (PL igS, 1179). ^ Glossa ordin. (I, 180F).— St. Bede, Be Tahernaculo, II, 2 (PL 91, 425). Glossa ordin. (I, 181C; 182E). — Cf. St. Bede, De Tahernaculo, II, 3; 4 (PL 91, 430; 435). 882 THE SUMMA THEOL-OGICA Q. 102. Art. 4 work of the creation of the universe as we have said above.^*^ — Another solemnity, viz., the New MooUj was repeated every month, and was ob- served in remembrance of the work of the divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon, and hence this feast was kept at the new moon; but not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. — ^And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human race, and hence the feasts were repeated more frequently. The other five feasts were celebrated once a year, and commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially on that people. For there was the feast of the Passover ^ in the first month, to commemorate the bless- ing of being delivered out of Egypt. The feast of Pentecost was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of the Law. — The other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of Trumpets , in remembrance of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they blew. — The feast of Trumpets was a kind of invitation that they prepare themselves to keep the following feast, which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast of Expiation, in remembrance of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God for- gave the people’s sin of worshipping the calf. After this was the feast of Scenopegia or of Tents, which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence, during this feast, they had to take the jruits of the fairest tree, i.e., the citron, and trees of dense foliage, i.e,, the myrtle, which is fragrant, and branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook, which retain their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise, to signify that God had brought them through the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. — On the eighth day another feast was observed, of Assembly and Congregation, on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship; and it signified the uniting of the people and the peace granted to them in the Land of promise. The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, Who is the Lamb of God, according to Heb, xiii. 8: Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day, and the same forever . — ^The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest given to us by Christ, as is stated in Heb, iv. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ’s preach- ing and miracles. The feast of Pentecost signified the descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching of ^ Q. 100, a. 5. Q. 102. Art. s CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 883 the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Chris- tian people from sins. The feast of Tents signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. — ^The feast of Assembly and Congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the king- dom of heaven, and so this feast is described as most holy {Levit. xxiii. 36). These three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue, until they come to see God, as is stated in Ps. Ixxxiii. 8. Fifth Article WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY SUITABLE CAUSE FOR THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD LAW? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. For those things that are done for the pur- pose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters, since it is written {Deut. xii. 31): Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God; for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the Lord abhorreth. Now worshippers of idols used to knive them- selves to the shedding of blood; for it is related (j Kings xviii. 28) that they cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood. For this reason the Lord commanded [Deut. xiv. i) : You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead. Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed by the Law {Levit. xii. 3). Obj. 2. Further, those things which are done for the worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity-, according to Ps. xxxiv. 18: / will praise Thee in a grave people. But it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was unfittingly commanded {Exod. xii. 1 1 ) that they should eat the Paschal lamb in haste. Other things, too, relative to the eating of the lamb, were prescribed, which seem altogether unreasonable. Obj. 3. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the sacra- ment of the Eucharist, according to i Cor. v. 7: Christ our Pasch is sacri- ficed. Therefore there should also have been some sacraments in the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the New Law, such as Con- firmation, Extreme Unction, Matrimony and so forth. Obj. 4. Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God’s creatures; and every crea- ture of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanks- 884 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. $ giving (j Tim. iv. 4). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection. Obj, 5. Further, it is written {Ecclus. xxxiv. 4): What can be made clean by the unclean? But the ashes of the red heifer, which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean; for it is stated (Num. xix. 7 seq,) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean until the evening] and likewise he that burnt her, and he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders. Obj. 6. Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another; nor can man be cleansed from sin by means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the sins of the chil- dren of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry them away into the wilderness; while they were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water {Levit. xvi.). Obj. 7. Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house, as is laid down in Levit. xiv. Obj. 8. Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Lord ordered (Exod. xxx. 18 seq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple; and that He commanded {Num. viii. 7) the Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their flesh. Obj. 9. Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the higher and lower priests, as is stated in Levit. viii., and the Levites, according to Num. viii. 5, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices and bodily oblations. Obj. 10. Further, as is stated in i Kings xvi. 7, Man seeth those things that a f pear, hut the Lord beholdeth the heart. But those things that ap- pear outwardly in man are the disposition of his body and his clothes.^'"^ Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the higher and lower priests, as is related in Exod. xxviii. It seems, more- over, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from the priesthood because of defects in the body, as stated in Levit. xxi. 17, seq.: Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God ... if he be blind, if he be lame, etc. It seems, there- fore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable. On the contrary, It is written {Levit. xx. S): I am the Lord that sanctify ^ Moses Maimonides, Guide, III, 45 (p. 357). Q. 102. Art. 5 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS S85 you. But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written {Ps, dii. 24) : Thou hast made all things in wisdom. Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man. I answer that^ As we have stated above, the sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way, to depute them to the worship of God.^® Now the wor- ship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of di- vine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of the Old Law, certain things concerned the whole people in general, while others belonged to the ministers in a distinctive way. In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was establish- ment in the state of worshipping God; and this establishment was brought about, — for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one was ad- mitted to any of the legal observances, — and for the priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the par- taking of the paschal banquet, to which no uncircumcised man was ad- mitted, as is clear from Exod. xii. 43, seq.\ and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship, viz., of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were insti- tuted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses, and also expia- tions from sins ; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted. And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God according to that time, and figura- tive, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ (as we shall see by taking them one by one). Reply Ob], i. The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle {Rom. iv. 9, seq.) thus: He received the sign of circumcision^ a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being uncircumcised ^ because, namely, we are told that unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice , for the reason that against hope he believed in hope, i.e., against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, that he might be made the father of many nations, when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this declaration and imitation of Abraham’s faith might be fixed firmly ^ Q. loi, a. 4. 886 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 5 in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh such a sign as they could not forget; and so it is written {Gen, xvii. 13) : My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant. This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child is very tender, and so might be seriously injured, and is considered as something not yet firmly knit; and hence neither are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision because of the pain; and also lest the parents, whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their children from circumcision , — k second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member. — A third motive may have been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body. — The Lord’s prohibition extended only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols; and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking. The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be brought about by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the dead. And since all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us, through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. ii): You are circumcised in Christ with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the fleshy hut in the circum- cision of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Reply Obj. 2. The literal reason for the paschal banquet was to com- memorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence, by cele- brating this banquet, they declared that they belonged to that people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were de- livered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb’s blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that they were departing from the rites of the Eg5q)tians who worshipped the ram. Hence, by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, they were delivered from the danger of extermination which threatened the Egyptians. Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed them to go forth speedily, as is related in Exod. xii. 33 ; and there was the danger that any- one who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyp- tians. Their haste was shown in two ways. First, by what they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign that it could not be leavened j the Egyptians pressing them to depart (Exod. xii. 39) ; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone thereof, because in their haste there was no time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: You Q. 102. Art. 5 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 887 shall gird your reins ^ and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste {Exod, xii. 1 1 ) ; which clearly designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the command: In one house shall it be eaten, neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house {Exod. xii. 46) ; because, namely, through their haste, they could not send any gifts of it. The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, for the sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ, according to i Cor. v. 7: Christ our pasch is sacrificed. The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on the transoms, signified faith in Christ’s Passion in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Pas- sion we are delivered from sin and death, according to i Pet. i. 18: You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious blood ... of a lamb un- spotted. The partaking of its flesh signified the eating of Christ’s body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ’s Passion or charity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ’s body, according to J Cor. V. 8: Let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth. The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins, which is required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity, and the shoes of their feet are the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pas- toral authority: and it was commanded that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e., in the Catholic Church, and not in the conventicles of heretics. Reply Obj. 3. Some of the sacraments of the New Law had correspond- ing figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is a sacra- ment of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written (Col. ii. II, 12): You are circumcised ... in the circumcision of Our Lord Jesus Christ; buried with Him in Baptism. In the New Law the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacra- ment of Penance in the New Law corresponds to all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fullness of grace, there would be no corresponding sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fullness had not yet come, since the Law brought no man to perfection (Heb. vii. 19). The same ap- plies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate prepa- ration for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ with the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence, under the Old Law, it was allowable to 388 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102, Art. 5 give a bill of divorce, which is contrary to the nature of a sacrament. Reply Obj, 4. As was already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship, which is twofold, viz., spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to God, and corporeal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations and so forth. Now men are hindered in spiritual worship by sins^ whereby men were said to be pol- luted, for instance, by idolatry, murder, adultery or incest. From such pollutions men were purified by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin, but that they signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in the figurative sacrifices. The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily un- cleannesses, which were considered in the first place as existing in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, dwelling- place and vessels. In man himself, uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself, and partly from contact with unclean things. Any- thing proceeding from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto; and consequently, since death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption of the humors, which break out ex- ternally and infect other persons, therefore, lepers also were considered unclean; again, so were women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of conception) ; and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal pollution or to sexual intercourse. For every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever. Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these unclean- nesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence due to those things that belong to the divine worship, both because men are not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things, and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility Moreover, in some of these, the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of com- ing in contact with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid idolatrous worship, because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes emploved ^ Moses Maimonides, Guide, III, 47 (p. 367). Q. 102. Art. s CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 889 human blood and seed. All these bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occa- sion of the uncleanness in question. The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were fig- ures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse signifies the un- cleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical doctrine, both because heretical doc- trine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false as not to have some truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood de- notes the uncleanness of idolatry, because of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies the uncleanness of empty words, for the seed is the word of God {Luke viii. 1 1 ) . The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman in child- birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is sensual- ized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touch- ing an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in an- other’s sin, according to 2 Cor, vi. 17: Go out from among them^ and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing. Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any way by an un clean man became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the super- stition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or look, as Rabbi Moses states of a woman in her periods.^^ The mystical sense of this was that to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike {Wis. xiv. 9). There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in them- selves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefac- tion and corruption in the flesh, so, too, through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy, whereby a house or a gar- ment was deemed to be unclean; and this both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as was stated above, and because the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written {Num. xix. 15): The vessel that hath ^Ibid. (p. 368). no 890 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 5 cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean. The cause of this unclean- ness was that anything unclean might easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at the pre- vention of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call Janoe. The figurative reason for these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woollen garment denoted the wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover nor binding betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline. Refly Ob]. 5. As was stated above, there was a twofold uncleanness in the Law: one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body, and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an un- clean thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily expiated. For the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all cor- ruption is due to sin, and signifies sin; whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling of a certain water, of which water we read in Num. xix. For there Gqd commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to Osee iv. 16: Israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer] and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee x. 5: [They] have worshipped the kine of Bethaven. And in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp ; in fact, whenever sacri- fice was offered up in expiation of the multitude, of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, the priest dipped his finger in her blood, and sprinkled it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times] for the number seven signifies a complete totality. Further, the very sprin- kling of blood pertained to. the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise, it was burnt by fire, either because God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire, or to denote that idolatry, together with all that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being de- Q. 102. Art. s CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 891 liver ed to the flames. To this burning were added cedar-wood^ and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed, to signify that, just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried, so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: That they may be reserved for the multitude of the children of Israel (Num. xix. 9). Or, according to Josephus, the four elements are indicated here.^® For cedar- wood was added to the fire, to signify the earth, because of its earthiness; hyssop, to signify the air, because of its smell; scarlet twice dyed, to sig- nify water, for the same reason as purple, because of the dyes which are taken out of the water: — thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both he that burned her, and he that gath- ered up the ashes, and he that sprinkled the water in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing of their clothes ; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water because of this kind of uncleanness, for otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him^ and so on indefinitely. The figurative reason for this sacrifice was that the red cow signified Christ in respect of his assumed weakness, denoted by the female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the red cow was of full age, because all Christ’s works are perfect, in which there was no blemish; and which had not carried the yoke, because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Christ for transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered to Eleazar the priest, because Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated without the camp, because Christ suffered outside the gate {Heb. xiii. 12). And the priest dipped his finger in her blood, because by the separation [i.e., of the blood from the red heifer], symbolized by the finger, the mystery of Christ’s Passion should be considered and imitated. It was sprinkled over against . . . the tabernacle, which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and this seven times, in token either of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ ^The Jewish War, V, 5, 4 (III, 264). 892 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 102. Art, 5 should be burnt with fire, i.e., they should be understood spiritually; for the skin and flesh signified Christ’s outward works, the blood denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds, and the dung betokened His weariness. His thirst, and all such things pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz., cedar-wood^ which denotes the height of hope or contemplation; hyssop, in token of humility or faith; scarlet twice dyed, which denotes twofold charity; for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning were gathered by a man that is clean, because the relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty of Christ’s death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation, because Bap- tism receives from Christ’s Passion the power of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water. This was the case either because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to death (whereby our sins are expiated), and this, until the evening, i,e., until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel will be converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, as Gregory says,^® and this until the evening, i,e., until the end of this life. Reply Obj. 6 . As was stated above, an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals; but since some were neglectful about expiating such sins and uncleannesses, or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation, it was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says {Heb, vii. 28), the Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity, it be- hooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron’s sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. — Then he offered two he-goats for the people, one of which was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal, and from its skin clothes are made having a pungent odor, so as to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it, so as to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleannesses of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the- destruction of sins. They were not, however, burnt on the altar, since none but holocausts were burnt thereon, but it was prescribed that they should be burnt outside the Pastor., 11 , 5 (PL 77, 34). Q. 102. Art. 5 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 893 camp, in detestation of sin; for this was done whenever sacrifice was of- fered for a grievous sin, or for a multitude of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness, not indeed to offer it to the demons (whom the Gentiles worshipped in desert places), because it was unlawful to offer aught to them, but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while com* fessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment of the people’s sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the forgiveness of the people’s sins was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened. The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, because of His power, by the ram, because He ia the Head of the faithful, and by the he-goat, because of the likeness oj sinful flesh {Rom, viii. 3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people, since both those of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ’s Passion. Their bodies were burnt outside the camp, because Christ suffered without the gate, as the Apostle declares {Heb, xiii. 12). The scape-goat may denote either Christ’s divinity which went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going to another place, but by restraining His power; or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue. With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned to the sacrifice of the red heifer. Reply Obj. 7. The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of Levit, xiv. 3, seq,, where it is said that the priest, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be purified. Consequently, the leper was already healed; but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest restored him to the society of men and to the worship of God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the priest erred in his judgment. Now this purification of a leper was twofold. For, in the first place, he was declared to be clean, and, secondly, he was restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, that is, after seven days. At the first purification, the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for hiifiself two living sparrows, . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop, in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory; 894 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 5 while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow which was immolated . . . over living waters. These four things he offered as an antidote to the four defects of leprosy. For cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was of- fered up against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numb- ness; and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the re- pulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former liberty. On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to the society of men, but only after having shaved all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin. Some of the blood of the sacri- fice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, and on the thumb of his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot ; because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz., blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth. The figurative reason was that the divine and human natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in likeness to His human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ's Passion. The other sparrow, in token of His impassible divinity, remained living, because divinity can- not die; and hence it flew away, for it could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal and hyssop, i.e., faith, hope and charity, as was stated above, was put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are bap- tized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e., his works, and all his hair, i.e,, his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the man to be cleansed is moistened with some of the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices, whether for sins or for trespasses. Reply Objs. 8 and 9. Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some special purification or consecration; and so they are commanded to be separated from other men, as being specially deputed, rather than others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. Hence three things were done Q. 102. Art. s CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 895 in the institution of ministers. For first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned and consecrated ; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and by certain sac- rifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as is stated in Levit, viii [c/. Num. viii. 7]. With regard to the high-priests and priests, the consecration was per- formed as follows. First, when they had been washed, they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of unction, to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others, just as oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body (according to Ps. cxxxii. 2: Like the frecious ointment on the head that ran down upon the heard, the beard of Aaron) . But the Levites received no other consecra- tion besides being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal, to denote that they should be obedient to God’s law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their right ear) ; and that they should be care- ful and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moisten- ing of the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, in remem- brance of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their consecration, the following sacrifices were offered: a calf, for sin, in remembrance of Aaron’s sin in fashioning the molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust, in remembrance of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of consecration, which was as a peace-offering, in remembrance of the delivery from Egypt through the blood of the lamb ; and a basket of bread, in remembrance of the manna vouchsafed to the people. In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were placed on their hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to the Lord; while the Levites were initiated to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary. The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be con- secrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ should be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ’s Passion, which is a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i,e., all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil 896 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. s of the Holy Ghost, and with the sprinkling of Christ’s blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfillment of their spiritual ministry. Reply Obj. 10. As was already stated, the purpose of the Law was to in- duce men to have reverence for the divine worship, and this in two ways: first, by excluding from the worship of God whatever might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals to be sacrificed, much more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Therefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect, since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason, it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in an indiscriminate way from any family, but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility. In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were ap- pointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. This indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. Secondly, he had a purple tunic, round the bottom 'of which were placed little bells and pomegranates of violet j and purple, and scarlet twice dyed. Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen; and on his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the same material ; -it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord commanded the Doctrine and Truth to be put in the rational; for certain matters pertaining to the truth of justice and doctrine were written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the vari- ous things which were about to happen to the children of Israel; and this they call the Truth and Doctrine. Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead, on which was inscribed the Lord’s name. Eighthly, there were the linen breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness, when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the lesser priests had four, viz., the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara. Q. 102. Art. 5 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 897 According to some,^^ the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe, as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the world; and so it is written {Wis. xviii. 24): In the robe of Aaron was the whole world described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic denoted the air by its color; its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its many colors, signified the sidereal heavens; the two onyx stones denoted the two hemi- spheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve precious stones on the breast are the twelve sighs of the zodiac; and they are said to have been placed on the rational because in heaven are the exemplars of earthly things, accord- ing to Job xxxviii. 33: Dost thou know the order of heaven, and const thou set down the reason [rationem\ thereof on the earth? The turban or tiara signified the empyrean, and the golden plate was a token of God, the gover- nor of the universe. The figurative reason is evident. For bodily stains or defects, wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various vices and sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, Le., he ought not to be ignorant; he must not be lame, i.e,, vacillating and uncer- tain of purpose; he must not have a little, or a great, or a crooked nose, i.e., that he should not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even exercise some base occupation, for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should have a broken foot or hand, i,e., he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a swelling either in front or behind, by which is signified too much love of earthly things; — if he be blear-eyed, i,e., if his mind is darkened by carnal affections, for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he have a pearl in his eye, i.e., if he presumes in his own estimation that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected if he have a continued scab, i.e., lustfulness of the flesh; also, if he have a dry scurf, which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeli- ness of the members, which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected if he have a rupture or hernia, through baseness rending his heart, though it appear not in his deeds. The vestments denote the virtues of God’s ministers. Now there are four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz., chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other things in addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in their thoughts, ^ Glossa ordin. (Ill, 38SE) ; Rhabanus Maurus, In Sap., HI, 17, super XVIII, 24 (PL 109, 758). 898 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q 102. Art. 6 and this was signified by the golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the short- comings of the people; this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals; because his doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace. Sixth Article WHETHER THERE WAS ANY REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THE CEREMONIAL OBSERVANCES? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances. For, as the Apostle says (j Tim. iv. 4), every creature of God is good, and nothing to he rejected that is received with thanksgiving. It was therefore unfitting that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean, according to Levit. xi. Obj. 2. Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are herbs; and so it is written {Gen, ix, s): As the green herbs have I delivered all flesh to you. But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being unclean, although some are most harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean. Obj. 3. Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be un- clean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean ; nor the fat which is engendered from blood. Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said {Matt, x. 28 ; [cf. Luke xii. 4] ) that those should not be feared that kill the body, since after death they have no more that they can do ; which would not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how its flesh is cooked. Consequently, there seems to be no reason in what is said, Exod. xxiii. 19: Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam. Obj. 5. Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord {Exod, xiii) . There- fore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in Levit. xix. 23: When you Q 102. Art. 6 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS S99 shall he come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision of them, i.e., the first crops, and they shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of them, Obj. 6. Further, clothing is something extraneous to man’s body. There- fore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to the Jews: for instance (Levit. xix. 19) : Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts', and {Deut, xxii. 5): A woman shall not be clothed with man^s apparel, neither shall a man use woman^s apparel] and further on (verse ii): Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of woollen and linen together. Obj. 7. Further, to be mindful of God’s commandments concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed {Deut. vi. 8, seq.) that they should bind the commandments of God as a sign on their hands; that they should write them in the entry', and {Num. xv. 38, seq.) that they should make to themselves fringes in the corners of their gar- ments, putting in them ribands of blue, that . . . they may remember . . . the commandments of the Lord. Ob'], 8. Further, the Apostle says (j Cor. ix. 9) that God doth not take care for oxen, and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals. There- fore without reason is it commanded {Deut. xxii. 6) : // thou find, as thou wolkest by the way, a bird^s nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not take the dam with her young] and {Deut. xxv. 4): Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn] and {Levit. xix. 19): Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind. Obj. 9. Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants. Much less, therefore, should any distinction have been made about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed {Levit. xix. 19) : Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds', and {Deut. xxii. 9, seq.) : Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds] and: Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together. Obj. 10. Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all sub- ject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to debar man from taking the silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed in the commandment of the Law {Deut. vii. 25, seq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in Deut. xxiii. 13, that they should dig round about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased of. Obj. II. Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one’s "friends; and so Tobias is commended for so doing {Tob. i. 20, seqq.) . In like manner, it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests {Levit. xxi.) . On the contrary. It is written {Deut. xviii. 14) : But thou art otherwise 900 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 6 instructed by the Lord thy God] from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted by God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause. I answer that, The Jewish people, as we have stated above, were especially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. And just as other things that are applied to the divine worship need to be marked in some particular way so that they be worthy of the worship of God, so too in that people’s, and especially the priests’, mode of life, there needed to be certain special things befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporeal. Now the wor- ship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery of Christ, so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to I Cor. X, 11: All these things happened to them in figures. Consequently, the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways: first, according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they fore- shadow something touching the Christian mode of life. Reply Ob], i. As was stated above, the Law distinguished a twofold pol- lution or uncleanness: one, that of sin, whereby the soul was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking, then, of the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; and so we read {Matt. xv. ii) : Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. These words are explained [verse 17] as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally, in so far as man partakes of them against obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence, or through their being an in- centive to lust, for which reason some refrain from wine and flesh-meat. If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean either because, like the pig, they feed on unclean things, or because their life is among unclean surroundings (thus certain animals, like moles and mice and such live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell), or because their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body.^^ Hence they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat- footed animals, i.e., animals having an uncloven hoof, because of their earthiness; and, in like manner, they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because such are very fierce and their flesh is very dry {e.g., the flesh of lions and the like). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl because of their exceeding hu- midity. In like manner, certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited because of their excessive moisture, such as eels and the like. They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, be- Moses Maimonides, Guide, III, 48 (p. 370). Q. 102. Art. 6 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 901 cause in such animals the humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced; for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof, noi are they too earthy, which is shown by their not having a fiat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, of which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. — ^Another reason was detestation of idolatry, because the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, or employed them for the purpose of sorcery; whereas they did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as was stated above. The third reason was to prevent excessive care about food; and so they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily and promptly. With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of any animal whatever without exception. Blood was forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as was stated above, and in order to shun the idolatrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be most ac- ceptable. Hence the Lord commanded the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth {Levit. xvii. 13). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled, because the blood of these animals would not be separated from the body, or because this form of death is very painful to the victim, and the Lord wished to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so that they should be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through being ac- customed to being kind to beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat, both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods, and because it used to be burnt in honor of God, and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses.^^ The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in Gen. xxxii. 32, where it is stated that the children oj Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew oj Jacob’s thigh and it shrank. The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins, in token of which those animals were prohibited. Hence Au- gustine says: Ij the swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean by nature, because all God^s creatures are good; yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain signijication. Thus, if you speak oj a foolish, and oj a wise man, each oj these expressions is clean considered in the nature oj the sound, letters and syllables oj which it is composed; Ibid. (p. 371). 902 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 6 but in signification j the one is clean, the other unclean?"^ The animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof is clean in signification. For division of the hoof is a figure of the two Testaments, or of the Father and Son, or of the two natures in Christ, or of the distinction of good and evil. For chewing the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound under- standing thereof, and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean. In like manner, those fish that have scales and fins are clean in significa- tion. For fins signify the heavenly or contemplative life, while scales sig- nify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness. — Of birds certain special kinds were forbidden.^^ In the eagle, which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden; in the griffon, which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcasses of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight among themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds that are ravens signify those who are blackened by their lusts, or those who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight for God’s cause, and at the same time are taken up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in daytime, denotes those who are clever in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which both flies in the air and swims in the water, signifies those who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism; or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong to prey on the poor.^® The screech- owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the stork.^^ It signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water; it may denote those who seek earthly profit through an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East; it has a long beak, and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it;^^ it is a figure of the miser, who is excessively ^ Contra Faust., VI, 7 (PL 42, 233). ^ Cf. Rhabanus Maurus, De Univ., VIII, i; 6 (PL III, 222; 240-255) ; St. Isidore, Eiymol, XII, 2; 17 (PL 82, 436; 459). ®®St. Albert, In De Anim., XXIII, tr. i, ch. 22 (XII, 482). Op. cit., XXIII, tr. i, ch. 22 (XII, 493) . «« Op. cit., VIII, tr. I, ch. 2 (XI, 427) . Op. cit., XXIII, tr. i, ch. 24 fXlJ, 497). Q. 102. Art. 6 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 903 careful in hoarding up the necessities of life. The coot has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking, for it swims like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land;^® it drinks only when it bites, since it dips all its food in water; it is a figure of the man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own will. The heron, commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose feet are swift to shed blood (Ps. xiii. 3). The plover, which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who, being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but earthly things. — Of fowls and quadrupeds, those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the fore-legs, so that they can leap, whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth; because those who abuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. — By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust and boldness in com- mitting sin. Reply Ob], 2. Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge, but the eating of flesh seems to have been introduced after the deluge; for it is written {Gen, ix. 3): Even as the green herbs have I delivered ,,, all flesh to you. The reason for this was that the eating of the products of the soil savors rather of a simple life, whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and overcareful living. For the soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord, and such products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very little effort; whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Conse- quently God, being wishful to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that are produced by the soil. — ^Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were not. The Reply to the Third Objection is dear from what has been said. Reply Obj, 4. Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of heart- lessness if the dam’s milk, which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. — ^It might also be said that the Gentiles, in celebrating the feasts of their idols, prepared the flesh of kids in this marmer, for the purpose of .sacrifice or banquet; and so {Exod, xxiii.), after the solemnities to be celebrated under the Law had been fore- told, it is added: Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam. The figurative reason for this prohibition is this: — the kid, signifying Christ, because of the likeness of sinful flesh {Rom, viii. 3), was not to be ^Jhid, (XII, 501). 904 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 6 seethed, ix., slain, by the Jews, in the milk of its dam, i.e., during His infancy. — Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e., the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e., should not be cajoled by flattery. Reply Obj. 5. The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck; or they burnt them for the purpose of sorcery Consequently [the Israelites] were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean. For in that country nearly all trees bear fruit in three years’ time, those trees, namely, that are cul- tivated either from seed, or from a graft or from a cutting; but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown, since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit, and the Law considered what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered to God; and from the fifth year onward they were eaten. The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that, after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of the Law, i.e., Christ, was to be offered to God. — Or again, that we should mistrust our first efforts, because of their imperfection. Reply Obj. 6. It is said of a man in Ecclus. xix. 27, that the attire of the body . . . shows what he is. Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished from other nations, not only by the sign of circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of attire. There- fore they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man’s apparel, or vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. For the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover, in the worship of Mars, women put on men’s armor; while, con- versely, in the worship of Venus men donned women’s attire — ^The sec- ond reason was to preserve them from lust, because the employment of various materials in the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. — It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform other duties of men; or that man should jnot adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. Reply Obj. 7. As Jerome says on Matt, xxiii. 6 , the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments Cf. Moses Maimonides^ Guide, III, 37 (p. 334). ^-Cf. op. cit., Ill, 37 (p. 335). CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 905 Q. 102. Art. 6 SO that the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations, Hence, in this way, they professed to he Jews; and consequently the very sight of this sign reminded them of their Law. When we read: Thou shalt hind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever before thy eyes, the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes;^"^ whereas the intention of the Lord in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e,, in their works, .and that they should be before their eyes, i,e,, in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intentioq which should accompany our every deed. — ^It may, however, be said that, be- cause they were a carnal-minded and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law. Reply Ob], 8. Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man’s affection be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God ,has subjected all things to man’s power, according to Ps. viii. 8: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet ; and it is in this sense that the Apostle says that God has no care for oxen, because God does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals. But if man’s affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals, for since the passion of pity is caused by the afflictions of others, and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a man practise a pitying affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men; and so it is written (Prov, xii. 10 ) : The just regardeth the lives of his beasts; but the bowels of the wicked are cruel. Consequently the Lord, in order to inculcate pity in the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practise pity even with regard to brute animals, and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to boil a kid in the milk of its dam] and to muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn] and to slay the dam with her young , — ^It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover, certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother bird with her young during incubation, and to em- ploy them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bring- ing up children. Another reason was because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young. As to the mingling of animals of diverse species, the literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation for the idolatry of ^ In Matt,, IV, super XXIII, 6 (PL 26, 17$) • (PL 26, 174) - 9 o 6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 102. Art. 6 the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce various effects, and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. — The second reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins. — ^The third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. For animals of different species do not easily breed, un- less this' be brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things. Therefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed, as is stated by Rabbi Moses, that men shall turn away their eyes from such sights. The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn, i.e., from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (i Cor. ix. 4, seqq.). — ^Again, we should not take the dam with her young, because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, i.e., the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e., the mother, for instance in all the cere- monies of the Law. It is also forbidden that beasts of burden, i.e., any of the .common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e., to have any con- nection, with animals of another kind, i.e., with Gentiles or Jews. Reply Obj. 9. All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians, in worshipping the stars, em- ployed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments; in order to represent the various conjunctions of the stars.^'^ — Or else all these min- glings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice. They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: Thou shall not sow thy field with different seeds, is to be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. — ^Likewise the field, i.e., the Church, must not be sown with different seeds, i.e., with Catholic and heretical doctrines. — ^Neither is it allowed to plough with an ox and an ass together] and thus a fool should not accompany a wise man in preaching, for one would hin- der the other. Reply Obj. 1 1 Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Therefore, in order to extirpate the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the temple, should not incur an uncleanness at the death of anyone except of those who were closely related to them, viz., their fat|ier or mother, and others. thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary, and so he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however nearly related to him. — ^They were also forbidden to marry a harlot or one that has been put away, or any other than a virgin, and this both because of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which ^®Cf. Maimonides, Guide, III, 37 (p. 337). ^^Op. cit., Ill, 49 (p. 377). op. cit.. Ill, 37 (p. 337). The answer to Obj. 10 is lacking in the mss. ^^Cf. Q. 102. Art. 6 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS 907 would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage, and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother’s shame, which was most ot all to be avoided when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of 1 0 a ry. or the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head and beard; and SO 1 IS written {Baruch vi. 30) : Priests sit in their temples having their garments ^ rent, and their heads and beards shaven. Moreover, in worship- ping their idols, they cut themselves with knives and lancets {3 Kings xviu 28). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary. The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely tree from dead works, t.e., sins. And they should not shave their heads, t.e., set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e., set aside the perfection of wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e., they should not incur the sin of schism. Question CIII ON THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS {In Four Articles) We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the ceremoniaL precepts were in existence before the Law? (2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification? (3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ? First Article WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE LAW WERE IN EXISTENTF BEFORE THE LAW? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies of the Old Law, as was stated above.^ But sacrifices and holocausts pre- ceded the law, for it is written {Gen, iv. 3, 4) that Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord, and that Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat, Noe also offered holocausts to the Lord {Gen. viii. 20), and Abraham did in like manner {Gen, xxii. 13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law. Obj, 2. Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the Law. For we read {Gen. xiii. 18) that Abraham . . . built an altar to the Lord] and {Gen. xxviii. 18) that Jacob . . . took the stone . . .'and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it. Therefore the legal cere- monies preceded the Law. Obj, 3. Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from Gen, xvii. 10. In like manner, the priesthood preceded the Law, for it is written {Gen, xiv. 18) that Melchisedech , , , was the priest of the most high God, Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law. Obj. 4. Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as was stated above.^ But this distinc- tion preceded the Law, for it is written {Gen, vii. 2, 3) : 0 / all clean beasts ^Q. loi, a. 4. ®Q. 102, a. 6, ad 1 . 908 Q. 103. Art. i DURATION OF THE CEREMONIES 909 take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean ^ two and two. Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law. On the^ contrary^ It is written (Deut. vi. i) : These are the precepts and ceremonies , . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you. But they would not have needed to be taught about these things if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law. / answer that. As is clear from what has been said, the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose/ namely, the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to exterior worship. But the fixing of the divine worship belongs to the ceremonies, just as the determining of our relations with our neighbor is a matter belonging to the judicial precepts, as was stated above Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by the authority of divine law, but ordained by human reason, so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instigation, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ’s mysteries, which were foreshadowed also by other things that they did, according to i Cor. x. ii: All . . . things happened to them in figure. Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies, because they were not as yet established by legislation. Reply Obj. 1 . The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all. Reply Obj. 2. They also established certain sacred things because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship. Reply Obj. 3. The sacrament of circumcision was established by com- mand of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an ob- servance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said {Jo. vii. 22) that cir- cumcision was not of Moses, but of his fathers. — ^Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence before the Law by human appointment, for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn. Reply Obj. 4. The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in ® Q. loi, a. 2 ; q. 102, a. 2. ^ Q. 99, a. 4. 910 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 103. Art. 2 vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written {Gen. ix. 3): Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you\ but only as to the offering of sacrifices, because they used only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating, it was not that it was considered illegal to eat such ani- mals, since this was not forbidden by any law, but from dislike or custom ; and thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake of them in others. Second Article WHETHER, AT THE .TIME OF THE LAW, THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW HAD ANY POWER OF JUSTIFICATION? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. For expiation for sin and consecration pertain to justification. But it is written {Exod. xxix. 21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and {Levit. xvi. 16) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated the sanctuary from the unclean- ness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justifica- tion. Obj. 2. Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justifica- tion, according to Ps. x. 8: The Lord is just and hath loved justice. But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to Levit. x. 19: How could I .. . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart? Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification. Obj. 3. Further, things relating to the divine worship pertain to the soul rather than to the body, according to Ps. xviii. 8: The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls. But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, as is stated in Levit. xiv. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Gal. ii. 21): If there had been a law given which could justify, Christ died in vain, i.e., without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not confer justice. I answer that. As we have stated above, a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law.^ One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other was bodily, which rendered a man unfit for divine wor- ship. Thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be un- clean; and so uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to ^Q. 102, a. 5, ad 4. Q. 103. Art. 2 DURATION OF THE CEREMONIES 911 cleanse, because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as reme- dies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says {Heb. ix. 13) that the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the flesh. And just as this uncleanness, which was washed away by such ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before [verse 10] justices of the flesh: justices of the flesh, says he, being laid on them until the time of correction. On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e., from the uncleanness of sin. The reason for this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, Who taketh away the sins of the world {Jo, i. 29). And since the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently, they could not cleanse from sin. Thus the Apostle says {Heb.x. 4) that it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away] and for this reason he calls them {Gal, iv. 9) weak and needy elements: weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, i.e., from the fact that they do not contain grace within themselves. However, it was possible, at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful to be united, by faith, to Christ incarnate and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ, of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed, for it is written {Levit. iv. 26; v. 16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him, as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. — ^It must be observed, however, that the very fact that the cere- monies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body was a figure of that expiation from sins which is effected by Christ. It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the cere- monies had no power of justification. Reply Obj. 1. That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, to the cleansing of the flesh, as the Apostle states {Heb, ix. X3), in token of that sanctification whereby Jesus gi2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 103. Aet. 3 sanctified the people by His own blood (ibid. xiii. 12) . — Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness of sin. Hence, even the sanctuary, which could not be the subject of sin, is stated to be expiated. Reply Obj. 2. The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obe- dience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed; not by reason of the things considered in themselves. Reply Obj. 3. Those ceremonies, which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the defile- ment of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed. Hence it is written (Levit. xiv. 3, 4) that the priest, going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be purified to offer, etc.; whence it is evident that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were em- ployed for the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. — They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water on which the priest had heaped curses, as is stated in Num. v. 19-27. Third Article WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW CEASED AT THE COMING OF CHRIST? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written {Baruch iv. i) : This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is forever. But the legal ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last forever. Obj. 2. Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to make this offering {Matt. viii. 4). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ’s coming. Obj. 3. Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, over and above the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased. Obj. 4. Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham’s faith; the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing of creation; and other solemnities, in remembrance of other divine favors, as was Q. 103. Art. 3 DURATION OF THE CEREMONIES 913 stated above.® But Abraham’s faith is always to be imitated even by us, and the blessing of creation and other divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore, at least circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased. On the contrary y The Apostle says {Coloss, ii. 16, 17) : Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come] and {Heb. viii. 13): In saying a new [testament], he hath made the former old, and that which decayeth and groweth old is near its end, I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were or- dained to the worship of God, as was stated above/ Now exterior worship should be in proportion to the interior worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the interior worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope both in heavenly goods and in the means of obtaining them, and in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. — ^Another state of the interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come, but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. — ^The third state is that in which both are possessed as present, wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, noth- ing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to the worship of , God will be figurative; there will be nought but thanksgiving and voice of praise (Isa, li. 3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed {Apoc. xxi. 22): I saw no temple^ therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb, Proportionately, therefore, the cere- monies of the first-mentioned state, which foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly goods are a thing of the present. Reply Obj. i. The Old Law is said to be forever unqualifiedly and abso- lutely as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts forever in respect of the reality which those ceremonies fore- shadowed. Reply Obj, 2. The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ’s Passion. Hence Our Lord said then: It is consum- mated {Jo, xix. 30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether -because their reality was fulfilled. As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ the veil of the temple was rent {Matt, ®Q. 102, a. 4, ad 10; a. 5, ad i. *Q. loi, a. i and 2. 914 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 103. Art. 4 xxvii. 51). Hence, before Christ’s Passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mys- tery of Christ had already begun, but was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies. Reply Ob'], 3. The literal reasons, already given,^ for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come, both that wor- ship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto. Reply Ob], 4. The faith of Abraham was commended in that he be- lieved in God’s promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations were to be blessed. Therefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham’s faith by means of cir- cumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz.. Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place -of circumcision, according to the saying of the Apostle {Coloss, ii. II, 12): You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism. As to the Sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the Lord^s Day, which recalls the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. — ^In like manner, other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities, because the blessings vouchsafed to that people foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ’s Passion and Resurrection; the feast of Pentecost, when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit; the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e., Christ, by the fullness of grace; the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of the Apostles; the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors; the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church Dedi- cation ; the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to the feast of the Angels, or even to the feast of All Saints. Fourth Article WHETHER, AFTER CHRIST’S PASSION, THE LEGAL CEREMONIES CAN BE OBSERVED WITHOUT COMMITTING MORTAL SIN? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that since Christ’s Passion the legal cere- monies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost, since by His fullness they were endued with power from on high ®Q. 102. Q. 103. Art. 4 DURATION OF THE CEREMONIES 915 {Luke xxiv. 49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost, for it is stated {Acts xvi. 3) that Paul circum- cised Timothy, and {Acts xxi. 26) that Paul, at the advice of James, took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giv- ing notice of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them. Therefore the legal cere- monies can be observed after the Passion of Christ without committing mortal sin. Obf. 2. Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church complied with this observance, for it is stated {Gal. ii. 12) that, when certain men had come to Antioch, Peter withdrew and separated himself from the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed after Christ’s Passion with- out committing mortal sin. Obj. 3. Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles should observe certain ceremonies of the Law; for it is written {Acts xv. 28, 29) : It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further bur- den upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed after Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin. On the contrary. The Apostle says {Gal. v. 2): If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s fruit. Therefore, after Christ’s Passion, it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies. I answer that. All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the in- terior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his inward faith by deeds as well as by words; and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old, yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in dif- ferent words, by us and by them. For by them was it said: Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son {Isa. vii. 14), where the verbs are in the future tense; whereas we express the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she conceived and bore. In like manner, the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer, whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully, so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching of Augustine, who says: It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, 9i6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 103. Art. 4 m truths oj which their sacraments were a kind of image; but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again, of which ow sacra- ments, in which Christians share, are the actual representation.^ Reply Obj. 1. On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome distinguished two periods of time.^^ One was the time previous to Christas Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. But immediately after Christ’s Passion, they began to be, not only dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding, but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest, but only by a kind of pious pretence, lest, namely, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretence, however, is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law; and thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health’s sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumcision. But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense in things per- taining to the salvation of the faithful, therefore, Augustine more fittingly distinguished three periods of time.^^ One was the time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead; another period was after the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz., from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead, indeed, because they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were converted from paganism to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but he was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who had been born a Gentile. The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted pagans were forbidden to observe the rites of paganism, was in order to show that there is a difference between these rites. For pagan ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time; ® Contra Faust., XIX, 16 (PL 42, 357) . Epist. CXII (PL 22,921) ~Cf. In Gal., I, super II, II (PL 26, 364)- Epist. LXXXII, 2 (PL 33, 280). 0 . 103. Art. 4 DURATION OF THE CEREMONIES 917 whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ’s Pas- sion, being instituted by God as a figure of Christ. Reply Obj, 2. According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to* the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle.^^ Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. — But Au- gustine disapproves of this solution.^^ For in the canonical Scripture (viz., Gal. ii. ii), wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter was to be blamed. Consequently it is true that Peter was at fault, and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin by observing the legal ceremonial for the time being, because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by exces- sive minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scan- dalize the Jews, with the result that he gave scandal to the Gentiles. Reply Obj. 3. Some have held that this prohibition of the Apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually,^^ namely, that the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things stran- gled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself. This opinion they gather from certain glosses, which expound these prohibi- tions in a mystical sense. — Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from paganism. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. xliv. 31 {The priest shall not ^at of anything that is dead): He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts.^^ But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden more than the others. We must therefore follow a third opinion,^® and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. For blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom, and the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth Gal.f I, super II, 14 (PL 26, 367). Epist. LXXXII, 2 (PL 33, 280). William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, IV, tr. i, q. 2 (244vb). ^In Ezech., XIII (PL 25, 464). Uncertain reference; but cf, note ii. THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 918 Q. 103. Art. 4 of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that not that which enter cth into the mouth defileth a man {Matt, xv. ii); and that nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving (i Tim, iv. 4). — ^WitE regard to fornication, a special prohibition was made, be- cause the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful. Question CIV ON THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS {In Four Articles) We must now consider the judicial precepts, and first of all we shall con- sider them in general; in the second place, we shall consider their reasons.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) What is meant by the judicial precepts? (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Their dura- tion. (4) Their division. First Article WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE THOSE WHICH DIRECTED MAN IN RELATION TO HIS NEIGHBOR? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For the judicial precepts take their name from judgment. But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subject to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. Obj. 2. Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral pre- cepts, as was stated above But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor, as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor. Obj. 3. Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one’s neighbor, as is stated above.^ But among the ceremonial precepts, there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken.^ Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor. On the contrary, It is reckoned {Ezech. xviii. 8) among other works of a good and just man that he hath executed true judgment between man and man. But the judicial precepts are so called from judgment. Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man. ^Q. los. ""Q. 99, a. 4. Q. 99, a. 4; q. loi, a. i. 919 ^ Q. 102, a. 6, ad i and 6. 920 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 104. Art. i / answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above, in every law some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided.^ These are called moral precepts, since human morals are based on reason. — ^At the same time, there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, consid- ered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue), but from some institution, divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When, therefore, the moral precepts are fixed by divine institution' in matters relating to man’s subordination to God, they are called ceremonial precepts; but when they refer to man’s relations to other men, they are called judicial precepts. Hence, there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz., first, that they refer to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force, not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution. Reply Obj. i. Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the com- munity at large and the government thereof. Consequently, the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law, but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge. Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the sole dictate of reason. Reply Obj. 3. Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith: e.g., that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also cere- monial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of their divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. For men are ordained to God as to their end, and hence it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave is his masters in all that he is, as the Philosopher says.^ Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself. All such precepts are moral, because the reason, which is the principle in moral matters, holds the same 95? a. 2; q. 99, a. 4. ^ Polit ., I, 2 (1254a 12). Q. 104. Art. 2 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 921 position in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. — Nevertheless, we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the rela- tions of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason, there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law. • Second Article WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE FIGURATIVE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figura- tive. For it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and the ceremonial precepts. Obj, 2. Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jew- ish people, so also were some given to other and pagan peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything. Obj, 3. Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our reason, as was stated above.'^ But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts, which, direct us in rela- tion to our neighbor, should not have been figurative. On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the alle- gorical and in the moral sense in Exodus xxi. I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and essentially, because, namely, it is instituted principally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figura- tive, since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might fore- shadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. — But some precepts are figurative, not primarily and essentially, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless, they did foreshadow something con- sequently, since, namely, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to i Cor, x. ii: All . . . things happened to them in figure. Reply Obj. i. The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as was explained above. ‘Q. loi, a. I, ad 2. 922 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 104. Art. 3 Reply Obj. 2. The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently, the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states.^ For this reason, even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative than those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense, but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men. Reply Obj. 3. In this people the direction *of man in regard to his neigh- bor, considered in itself, was evident to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason, and in this respect it was figurative. Third Article WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BIND FOREVER? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind forever. For the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice, since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now justice is per- petual and immortal (Wis. i. 15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind forever. Obj. 2. Further, divine institutions are more enduring than human insti- tutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind forever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the divine Law. Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says {Heb. vii. 18) that there is a setting aside of the former commandment^ because of the weakness and unprofit- ableness thereof. Now this is true of a ceremonial precept, which could not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh, as the Apostle declares {Heb. ix. 9, 10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were insti- tuted, viz., to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judi- cial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Heb. vii. 12) that the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law. But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. There- fore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force. I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind forever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ; yet not in the same way as the cere- monial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to ^Contra Faust., XXII, 24 (PL 42, 417). Q. 104 Art. 3 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 923 be not only dead, but also deadly^ to those who observe them after the coming of Christ, especially after the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead, indeed, because they have no binding force; but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin, unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law; for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above. For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and essentially, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. — On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force; for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as is stated in Gal. hi. 24. Since, how- ever, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith; for it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come. Reply Ob'], i. The obligation of observing justice is certainly perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind. Reply Obj. 2. The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force forever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is govern- ment by the rich, as the Philosopher shows.^^ Consequently, when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also. Reply Obj. 3. Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also. ®Cf. St. Augustine, Epist. LXXXII, 2 (PL 33, 283) ; St. Albert, In IV Sent., d. iii, a. 6 (XXIX, 73). ^"^Polit., IV, i (1289a ii; a 22). 924 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 104. Art. 4 Fourth Article WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ASSIGN A DEFINITE DIVISION OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that it is impossible to assign a definite division of the judicial precepts. For the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, .as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are used by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a definite division of the judicial precepts. Ohj, 2. Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no definite division of the judicial precepts. Obj, 3. Further, because there is a definite division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division by describing some as sacrifices, others as observances. But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have no definite division. On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial pfecepts, since thereby that people was ordered. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a definite division. I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, just as in every art there is a definite division in the rules of the art, so in every law there must be a definite division of precepts, or else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division according to the di- verse ways in which man is directed. Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people’s sovereign to his subjects; a second, of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners ; a fourth, of members of the same house- hold, such as the order of the father to his son, of the wife to her husband, of the master to his servant; and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law, For certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him; and this is one part of the judicial precepts. — ^Again, certain precepts are given for the relations of citizens to one another: e.g., about buying and selling, judgments and penalties; and this is the second part of the judicial precepts. — ^Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: e.g., about wars Q. 104. Art. 4 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 9^5 waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers; and this is the third part of the judicial precepts. — ^Lastly, cer- tain precepts are given relating to home life: e.g,, about servants, wives and children; and this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts. Reply Ob], i. Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number; and yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as was stated above. Reply Ob’], 2, The precepts of the decalogue hold the first place in the moral order, as was stated above, and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them. Reply Ob], 3. The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law. Q. 100, a. 3. Question CV ON THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS {In Four Articles) We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers. (2) Concerning precepts relating to the fellowship of one man with another. (3) Concerning those relating to foreigners. (4) Concerning those relating to domestic matters. First Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW ENJOINED FITTING PRECEPTS CONCERNING RULERS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. For as the Philosopher says, the ordering of the people depends mostly on the highest rule} But the Law contains no precept re- lating to the institution of the chief ruler, and yet we find therein pre- scriptions concerning the inferior rulers. Thus {Exod, xviii. 21): Provide out of all the people wise men, etc.; again {Num. xi. 16) : Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel] and again {Deut. i. 13): Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men, etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people. Obj. 2. Further, The best gives of the best, as Plato states.^ Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled by a king, because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the divine government, whereby God rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed {Deut, xvii. 14, 15)* When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him, etc. • Obj. 3. Further, according to Matt. xii. 25: Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate, a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the gen- eral well-being of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the king- (1278b 10). ^ trans. Cbalcidius, IX (p. 157): X (p. i<8).— Cf. Timamis (29A; 29E). 926 Qios.Art.i reason for the judicial precepts 927 dom to be divided under two kings, nor should this have been introduced even by divine authority, as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (j Kings xi. 29 seq.), Obj. 4. Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as is stated in Heb, v. i, so rulers are set up for tlie benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites of the Law: e.g., the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore, in like manner, certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people, especially since they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in Exod. xxiii. 8: You shall not take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just, Obj. 5. Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical law, for it is written (i Kings viii. ii) : This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with regard to the institu- tion of rulers. On the contrary. The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order. {Hum. xxiv. 5): How beautiful are thy tabernacles, 0 Jacob, and thy tents, 0 Israel. But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers. I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right order- ing of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government, for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduri^, as 'is stated in Politics ii.^ The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the Philosopher states,^ nevertheless, the first place is held by the kingdom, where the power of government is vested in one, and aristocracy, which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, wherein one is given the power to preside over all, while under him are others having governing powers. And yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all ; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e., government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers. Such was the form of government established by the divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of ^Aristotle, Polit., II, 6 (1270b 17). *Op. cit., Ill, 5 (1279a 32; b 4). 92g THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q 105. Art. i them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue, for it is written (Deut. i. 15) : / took out 0} your tribes men wise and honorable, and ap- pointed them rulers] so that there was an element of aristocracy. But it was a democratic government in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the people, for it is written (Exod. xviii. 21): Provide out of all the people wise men, etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people. Hence it is written {Deut, i. 13) : Let me have from among you wise men, etc. Consequently, it is evident that the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law. Reply Ob], i. This people was governed under the special care of God, and so it is written {Deut. vii. 6): The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people] and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray {N um. xxvii. 16) : May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude. Thus by God’s order Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God raised ... up a savior for the people, and that the spirit of the Lord was in them {Judges iii. 9, 10, 15). Hence the Lord did not leave even the choice of a king to the people, but reserved this to Himself, as appears from Deut. xvii. 15: Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose. Reply Obj. 2. A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man; for it is only the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the mids^of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes.^ Now perfect virtue is to be found in few. And, what is more, the Jews were in- clined to cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But after- wards when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with them, so to speak. He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel (j Kings viii. 7): They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them. Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning {Deut. xvii. 14, seqq.). He then determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord’s decision; and that they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare. Secondly, He prescribed how the king after his appointment should be- have, in regard to himself, namely, that he should not accumulate chariots ^ Eth ., IV, 3 (1124a 30). Q. 105. Art. I REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 929 and horses, or wives, or immense wealth, because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. — He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God, namely, that they should continually read and ponder on God’s Law, and should ever fear and obey God. — ^Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their subjects, namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths of justice. Reply Ob']. 3. The division of the kingdom, and the multitude of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions, especially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written {Osee xiii. ii) will give thee a king in My wrath] and {ibid, viii. 4) : They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not. Reply Ob']. 4. The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son, and this, in order that it might be held in greater respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest; for honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to^first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the other hand, the rulers, as was stated above, were chosen from the whole people, and hence had their own possessions, from which to derive a living; and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth, or to make too much show of magnificence, both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny arising from such things, and because, if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not tempt the ambition of the common people, and would not thus become an occa- sion of sedition. Reply Ob']. 5. That right was not given to the king by divine institution; rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is clear from what follows: And you shall be his slaves (i Kings viii. 17), which is significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules his subjects as though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from asking for a king; for the narrative continues: But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel. — It may happen, however, that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions, and may take many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weak 930 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE SUITABLY FRAMED AS TO THE RELATIONS OF ONE MAN WITH ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. For men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law, since it is written (Deut, xxiii. 24) : Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayst eat as many grapes as thou pleasest. Therefore the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man’s peace. Obj. 2. Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says.® But this was introduced by the Old Law, for it is written {Num. xxvii. 8) : When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision for the welfare of the people. Obj. 3. Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying and selling, as is stated in Politics i,'^ But the Old Law took away the force of sales, since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor {Levit. xxv. 28). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command. Obj. 4. Further, man’s needs require that men should be ready to lend, which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the pledges. Hence it is written {Ecclus. xxix. 10) : Many have refused to lend, not out of wick- edness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause. And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed {Deut. xv. 2): He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord; and {Exod. xxii. 15) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. Sec- ondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost. For it is written (Deut. xxiv. 10) : When thou shalt demand, of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge; and again (verses 12, 13) : The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently. Therefore the Law made insufficient provision in the matter of loans. Obj. 5. Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary, and so great caution should be observed in such matters. Hence it is stated in 2 Mach. iii. 15 that the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be ''Polit., II, 6 (1270a 23). Op. cit., I, 3 (i2S7a 14). Q. 105. Art. 2 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 931 keptj that He would preserve them safe, for them that had deposited them. But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to de- posits, since it is prescribed {Exod. xxii. 10, ii) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in this matter. Obj. 6. Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the ‘tenant to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard pre- scription {Levit. xix. 13) that the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning. Obj. 7. Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting that the Law {Deut.. xvii. 8, 9) should command them to go to one fixed place to ask for judg- ment on doubtful matters. Obj. 8. Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated {Deut. xix. 15) that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand. Obj. 9. Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault; for which reason also it is' written {Deut. xxv. 2) : According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be. Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain faults, for it is written {Exod. xxii. I ) that the thief shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep. Moreover, certain slight offenses are severely punished. Thus (Num. XV. 32, seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the Sabbath day; and {Deut. xxi. 18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned because of certain small transgressions, viz., because he gave himself to revelling . . . and banquetings . Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an un- reasonable manner. Obj. 10. Further, as Augustine says, Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment: indemnity, prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery.^ Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. Indemnity, as when a thief was condemned to make restitution five- fold or fourfold. Prison, as when {Num. xv. 34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. Stripes, as when it is said {Deut. xxv. 2), if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes, they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them. Public disgrace was brought on him who re- fused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took off his shoe from his foot, and did spit in his face {ibid. 9). It prescribed the death penalty, as is clear from Levit. xx. 9: S'e that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die. The Law also recognized the lex talionis, by pre- scribing {Exod. xxi. 24) : Eye for eye, tooth for tooth. Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punish- ments, viz., exile and slavery. ^ De Civit. Dei, XXI, ii (PL* 41, 725), 932 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Akt. 2 Obj. II. Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But brute animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable in punishing them {Exod, xxi. 29): Ij the ox . shall kill a man or a woman, it shall be stoned] and (Levit. xx. 16): The woman that shall lie under any beast shall be killed together with the same. Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one man with another were un- suitably regulated by the Law. Ob]. 12. Further, the Lord commanded {Exod. xxi. 12) a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a brute animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a brute animal. Therefore it is unfittingly pre- scribed {Deut. xxi. I, 4) that when there shall be found ... the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the an- cients of the nearest city shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off the head of the heifer. On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing {Fs. cxlvii. 20) that He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them. I answer that. As Augustine says, quoting Tully, a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and by community of welfare.^ Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under the guidance of those in au- thority, while others are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is subject to the power of an individual can be disposed accord- ing to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between one man and another and the punishment of evildoers depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess, and con- sequently their dealings with one another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving and so forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For it established judges, as is clearly indicated in Deut. xvi. 18: Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its gates, . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment. It also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to Deut. i. 16, 17: Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger: there shall he no difference of persons. It also removed an oc- casion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to accept bribes {Exod. xxiii. 8; Deut. xvi. 19). It likewise prescribed the number of Op. dt., II, 21 (PL 41, 67). — Cicero, De Re Publica, I, 25 (p. 24). Q. 105. Art. 2 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 933 witnesses, viz., two or three {Deut, xvii. 6; xix. 15) ; and it appointed cer- tain punishments for certain crimes, as we shall state farther on. But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the Philos- opher, that the things possessed should be distinct, and that the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors.^^ These three points were provided for by the Law. For, in the first place, the possessions themselves were divided among individuals; for it is written {Num. xxxiii. 53, 54): / have given you the land jor a pos- session, and you shall divide it among you by lot. And since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of possessions, as the Philosopher observes,^^ therefore, the Law provided a threefold remedy against the irregularity of possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally; and so it is written {Num. xxxiii. 54): To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser. A second rem- edy was that possessions could not be alienated forever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of possessions. The third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father’s brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as is recorded in Num. xxxvi. 6. Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things should belong to all in common. First, as regards the care of them, for it was prescribed {Deut. xxii. 1-4) : Thou shall not pass by, if thou seest thy brothers ox or Ms sheep go astray; but thou shall bring them back to thy brother. And in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed, on entering a friend’s vineyard, to eat of the fruit, but not to take any away. And, especially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them {Levit. xix. 9; Deut. xxiv. 19). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was commom property, as is stated in Exod. xxiii. ii and Levit. xxv. 4. Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer. Thus it is written {Deut. xiv. 28, 29): The third day thou shall separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled. And there was a transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently, it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of one man with another. Polit., II, 2 (1263a 25). ^Op. cit., II, 6 (1270a 23). 934 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 2 Reply Obj. i. As the Apostle says {Rom. xiii. 8), he that loveth Ms neighbor hath fulfilled the Law, because, namely, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their own goods to others, because, as is stated in i John iii. ly. He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others readily. Thus the Apostle (i Tim. vi. 18) commands the rich to give easily and to communicate to others. Now a man does not give easily to others if he will not suffer an- other man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should be lawful for a man, on en- tering his neighbor’s vineyard, to eat of the fruit there, but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of the peace; for among cultivated people the tak- ing of a little does not disturb the peace, in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give to one another. Reply Obj. 2. The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father’s estate except in default of male issue, failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless, the Law observed due caution in the mat- ter, by providing that those women who succeeded to their father’s estate should marry within their own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as is stated in Num. xxxvi. 7, 8. Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says, the regulation of possessions con- duces much to the preservation of a state or nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the pagan states that anyone should sell his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss. For if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the hands of a few, so that it might become necessary for a state or country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that, while provision was made for men’s needs by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger was removed by prescrib- ing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes. But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore the Law allowed them- to be sold in perpetuity, like movable goods. For the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of possessions, which could not be exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand, houses ^Op. cit., II, 4 (1266b 14). Q.I05.ART.2 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 935 situated, not in a town, but in a village that hath no walls, could not be sold in perpetuity, because such houses are built merely with a view to the cuL tivation and care of possessions; and so the Law rightly made the same pre- scription in regard to both {Levit. xxv.). Reply Oh]. 4. As was stated above, the purpose of the Law was to ac- custom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another’s aS' sistance, because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the matter not only of gratui- tous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers, for the latter kind of succor is more frequent and benefits the greater number. Now it granted facilities for this purpose in many ways. First of all by prescrib- ing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be less in- clined to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as is stated in Beut. XV. 7, seqq. — Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that, when this had been done, they should be restored at once. For it is written (Beut. xxiii. 19): Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury] and (xxiv. 6) : Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge, for he hath pledged his life to thee] and {Exod. xxii. 26): If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset. — Thirdly, by for- bidding them to be importunate in exacting pa3anent. Hence it is written {Exod. xxii. 25) : If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner. For this reason, too, it is enacted {Beut. xxiv. 10, ii): When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath ; and this both because a man’s house is his surest refuge, and so it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house, and because the Law does not allow the creditor to take away what- ever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. — Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease alto- gether after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those who could conveniently pay their debts would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender without cause. But if they were alto- gether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was for renewing the loan because of their need As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or deteri- orated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were hired for a consideration; for they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the lender, so that if tho animal 936 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 2 had been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained something by the loan which would no longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration, be- cause then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals , and hence he had no right to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated. Reply Obj, 5. The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. For the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e., either through a natural cause, for instance, if an animal held in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner whatever was left of the animal thus slain). But in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution, but only to take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion of fraud. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance, by theft, and then the depositary was bound to restitution because of his neglect. But, as was stated above, he who held an animal on loan was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it depreciated or died, because he was held responsible for less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of theft. Reply Ohj, 6. Workmen who offer their labor for hire are poor men who toil for their daily bread; and therefore the Law commanded wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire are wont to be rich, nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood; and consequently the compari- son does not hold. Reply Ob'], 7. The purpose for which judges are appointed among men is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among people in general; and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed (Deut, xvi. 18) that judges and magistrates should be appointed in each tribe, to judge the people with just judgment, — Secondly, a matter may be doubtful even among experts, and therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen by God, where there would be both the High-Priest, who would decide doubt- ful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship, and the chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments Q. I05.ART.2 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 937 of men; just as even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written {Dent. xvii. 8, 9) : If thou perceive that there he among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment j . . . and thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary, arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time. But such doubtful matters did not often occur for judgment; and so the people were not burdened on this account. Reply Obj. 8. In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing; and hence their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law com- manded that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished, as is stated in Deut. xix. 16, seqq. There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in token of the unerring truth of the divine Persons, Who are sometimes men- tioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Per- sons, and sometimes as three. As Augustine observes on Jo. viii. 17, In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is trueJ^ Reply Obj. 9. A severe punishment is inflicted not only because of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, because of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, because of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, because of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin; for men are not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, be- cause of the facility of committing a sin and of concealing it; for such sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing them. Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be ob- served, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin is com- mitted unwillingly, because then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is written {Deut. xxii. 25, seqq.) that a girl who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death, be- cause she cried, and there was no man to help her. But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet through weakness, as, for instance, when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished; and the punishment, accord- ing to true judgment, should be diminished also, unless perchance the “ Tract. XXXVI (PL 35, 1669)- 938 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 2 common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from committing such sins, as was stated above. — The second degree is when a man sins through ignorance, and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, because of his negligence in acquiring knowledge ; yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written {Levit, iv. 2): The soul that sinneth through ignorance, etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact, and not to ignorance of the divine precept, which all were bound to know. ^The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e,, through deliberate choice or malice; and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin. — ^The fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obsti- nacy; and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the commandment of the Law. Accordingly, we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently {Exod. xxii. 1-9). Hence, as regards theft of other things which can easily be safe- guarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields ; and so it happened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently, the Law inflicted a heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do ; and so a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And this holds unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in the thief’s possession; be- cause in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the case of other thefts. For there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Or, we might say, according to the Gloss, that a cow is usejul in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various pur- poses}'^ Therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was useful in four ways: for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool }^ — The unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank, but because of his stubbornness and rebellion, which were always punished by death, as was stated above. — ^As to the man who gathered sticks on the Sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the Sabbath to be observed, as a witness to the belief in the newness of the world, as was stated above.^^ And so he was slain as an unbeliever. Reply Obj. 10. The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz., for those which are committed against God, and for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one’s parents, adultery and incest. In the case of theft of other things, it inflicted punishment by Glossa ordin., super Exod., XXII, 1 (I, 169F), Ibid, (I, 170A). 100, a. Q. 105. Art. 2 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 939 indemnification, while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise for the sin of bearing false wit- ness. In other faults of less degree, it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace. The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission; and so he was punished by remaining a slave forever. — Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make restitution, as is stated in Exod. xxii. 3. The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law, be- cause God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other nations were given to idolatry; and so if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For this reason it is related (i Kings xxvi. 19) that David said to Saul: They are cursed in the sight of the Lordj who have cast me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods. There was, however, a restricted sort of exile; for it is written in Deut. xix. 4 that he that striketh his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall flee to one of the cities of refuge and abide there until the death of the high-priest. For then it became lawful for him to re- turn home, because, when the whole people thus suffered a loss, they forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer. Reply Obj. 11. Brute animals were ordered to be slain, not because of any fault of theirs, but as a punishment to their owners, who had not safe- guarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more se- verely punished if his ox had butted anyone yesterday or the day before (in which case steps might have been taken to avoid the danger) than if it had taken to butting suddenly. — Or again, the animal was slain in detesta- tion of the sin, and lest men should be made subject to horror at the sight thereof. Reply Obj. 12. The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares, was because the slayer was frequently from the nearest city;^”^ and so the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hid- den murder. This was brought about in three ways. In the first place, the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slay- ing of his beast, and if the murder were previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place where the heifer was slain remained un- cultivated. Therefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of that city would readily make known the murderer, if they knew who he was; and it would seldom happen but that some v;ord or sign would escape about Guide, III, 40 (p. 343). 940 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 3 the matter. — Or again, this was done in order to frighten people, in detesta- tion of murder. For the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life, and that by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the heifer, after being slain, was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place. Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ) which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e., it never knew the stain of revolt}^ The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil .is shown to be the arch- murderer. Third Article WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS REGARDING EOREIGNERS WERE FRAMED IN A SUITABLE MANNER? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said {Acts x. 34, 35) : In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to Him. But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God. There- fore it is unsuitably commanded {Dent, xxiii. 3) that the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord forever; whereas, on the other hand, it is prescribed {ibid, 7) to be observed with regard to certain other nations: Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother, nor the Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land. Obj. 2. Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power. But it is not a man’s fault if he is a eunuch, or if he is born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded {Deut. xxiii. I, 2) that an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shall not enter into the church of the Lord. Obj. 3. Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested; for it is written {Exod. xxii. 21): Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him, for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt; and (xxiii. 9) : Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt. But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law unsuitably per- Glossa ordin., super Deut. XXI, i (I, 354A). Q.I05.ART.3 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 941 mitted them {Deut. xxiii. 19, 20) to lend money to strangers for usury. Obj, 4. Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should show greater care and love for those things that are nearest to us, accord- ing to Ecclus, xiii. 19: Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himselj. Therefore the Lord unsuitably commanded (Deut. XX. I 3 “i 9 ) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down. Ob]. 5. Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably com- manded {Deut. XX. 5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for instance, a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who had married a wife. Obj. 6 . Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man’s fault if he be timid or faint-hearted, since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Deut. xx. 8). On the contrary j Divine Wisdom declares {Prov. viii. 8): All my words are just; there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them. 1 answer that ^ Man’s relations with foreigners are twofold, peaceful and hostile, and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed through their land as travel- ers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as new-comers. And in both these respects the Law made kind provision in its precepts ; for it is written (Exod. xxii. 21) : Thou shalt not molest a stranger \advenam '\ ; and again (ibid, xxiii. 9): Thou shalt not molest a stranger \peregrino~\. Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellow- ship and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was ob- served. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship; just as it was the law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher says.^^ The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners, not yet having the common good firmly at heart, might attempt something injurious to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations with the Jews (viz., the Eg37ptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob’s brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others (with whom their relations'had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; while the Ama- lekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred Ill, I (i2 7sb 23). 942 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 3 with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity; for it is written {Exod. xvii. 16) : The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation to generation. In like manner, with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause. Thus it is commanded {Deut, xx. 10) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an offer of peace. — Secondly, it enjoined that when once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising them God’s aid. — ^Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the way, should be sent home. — Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down the fruit-trees of that country. Reply Obj. i. The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul; for it is written {Exod. xii. 48) : If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in the land. But in temporal matters concerning the public life of the people, admission was not granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above, but to some, i.e,, the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e., the peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be deterred and refrain from sinning, so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain from similar crimes. Nevertheless, it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship because of some act of virtue. Thus it is related {Judith xiv. 6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, was joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred . — ^The same applies to Ruth the Moabite, who was a virtuous woman {Ruth iii. ii) ; although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be citizens, absolutely speaking. Reply Obj. 2, As the Philosopher says, a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, absolutely; secondly, in a restricted sense.^^ A man is a citizen absolutely if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen only in a restricted sense if he dwells within the state, even lowly people, or children, or old men, who are not fit to ^ Op, cit.y III, 3 (1278a 2). Q.I05.ART.3 REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS 943 enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common welfare. For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the ecclesia, i.e.j from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation ; for even among the pagans, those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher remarks.^^ — Nevertheless, in matters pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as neither were strangers, as we have already stated; for it is written {Isa, Ivi. 3): Let not the son 0} the stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak j saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree. Reply Obj, 2 ). It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the accept- ance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it because of the prone- ness of the Jews to avarice, and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a profit. Reply Ob'], 4. A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God’s people, whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities, which had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, because of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executors of divine justice; for it is written {Deut. ix. 5): Because they have done wickedly j they are destroyed at thy coming in, — ^The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected. Reply Ob], 5. The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting for two reasons. First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Therefore it was likely enough that because of this affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less brave in battle. — Secondly, because, as the Philos- opher says, it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp,^^ And so, lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them, and also lest the people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their mis- fortune, these men were taken away from the danger of death by being removed from the battle. Reply Obj, 6 , The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby, but lest the people might be the losers by their ^PoUt,, II, 6 (1270b i). ^Phys„ II, $ (197a 27). 944 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105. Art. 4 presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away. Fourth Article WHETHER THE OLD LAW SET FORTH SUITABLE PRECEPTS ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave is in every respect his mastefs property, as the Philosopher states.-^ But that which is a man’s property should be his always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command {Exod, xxi. 2) that slaves should go out free in the seventh year. Obj. 2. Further, a slave is his master’s property, just as an animal, e.g., an ass or an ox. But it is commanded {Deut. xxii. 1-3) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. xxiii. 15): Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee. Obj. 3. Further, the divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the human law. But according to human laws, those who ill-treat their serv- ants and maidservants are severely punished; and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore it is unfittingly com- manded (Exod. xxi. 20, 21) that he that striketh his bondman or bond- woman with a rod, and they die under his hands ... if the party remain alive a day ... he shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money. Obj. 4. Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son.^^ But the dominion of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his slave or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Exod. xxi. 7). Obj. 5. Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Deut. xxi. 18 seqq.) that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment. Obj. 6. Further, the Lord forbade them (Deut. vii. 3, seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations, and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted (i Esdras x.). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Deut. xxi. 10 seqq.). Obj. 7. Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Levit. xviii. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. xxv. 5) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife. ^Polit., I, 2 (i2S4a 12). -^Aristotle, Polit., I, 5 (1259a 37); 2 (1253b 8) ; III, 4 (1278b 32). Q.ios.Art.4 reason for the judicial precepts 945 Ob']. 8. Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow {Deut. xxiv. 1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and, besides, that he could not take her again to wife. Ob']. 9. Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law did not com- mand any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the sacrifice of jealousy in order to investigate a wife’s adultery [Num. v. 12 seqq.). Consequently, it seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household. On the contrary, It is written {Ps. xviii. 10) : The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves. 1 answer that. The mutual relations of the members of a household re- gard every-day actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher states.^® Now the preservation of man’s life may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of the individual, i.e., in so far as man preserves his individual life. Now for the purpose of the preservation of life, considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life, in the handling of which he has need of servants. Secondly, man’s life is preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly, the mutual relations of the mem- bers of a household admit of a threefold combination: viz., that of master and servant, that of husband and wife, and that of father and son; and in respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them to be treated with moderation — both as to their work, namely, lest they should be burdened with excessive labor, and so the Lord commanded [Deut. v. 14) that on the Sabbath day thy manservant and thy maidservant should rest even as thyself] — and also as to the infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants to set them free {Exod. xxi. 26, 27). Similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone {ibid. 7, seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out free in the seventh year, taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes {ibid. 2, seqq.)] and furthermore it was commanded {Deut. XV. 13) that they should be given provision for the journey. With regard to wives, the Law made certain prescriptions as to the taking of wives in marriage: for instance, that they should marry a ^Op. cit., I, I (1252b 13). 946 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 105. Art. 4 wife from their own tribe xxxvi. 6), and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also, that a man should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without issue, as is prescribed in Deut, xxv. 5, 6, and this in order that he who could not have successors according to carnal origin might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women, namely, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith, and those of their near kindred, because of the natural respect due to them. — Furthermore it prescribed in what way wives were to be treated after marriage. Thus, it was prescribed that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime {Deut, xxii. 13, seqq.). Also that a man’s hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son {Deut. xxi. 15, seqq,). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away {Deut, xxiv. i). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife. With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith. Hence it is written (Exod, xii. 26 seqq.) : When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? you shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the Lord. More- over, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct; and so it is written {Deut. xxi. 20) that the parents had to say: He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery. Reply Ob], i. As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God, He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written {Levit. xxv. 39, seqq.): If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants, but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner ... for they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt: let them not be sold as bond- fnen\ and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely, but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they were set free. Reply Obj. 2. This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing some sin. Reply Obj. 3. With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not. For if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given his liberty; while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the servant died under the blow of his master. — If, however, the injury were not certain^ Q.ios.Arx.4 reason for the judicial precepts 947 but only probable, the Law did not impose any penalty as regards a man’s own servant: e,g., if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but after some days; for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free man, yet so that he did not die at once, but walked abroad again upon his staff, he that struck him was quit of murder, even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless, he was bound to pay the doctor’s fees incurred by the victim of his assault. But this was not the case if a man killed his own servant, because what- ever the servant had, even his very person, was the property of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being because it is his money. Reply Ob]. 4. As was stated above, no Jew could own a Jew as a slave absolutely, but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: 7 / any man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go out. Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to Levit. xxv. 39, 40: 7 / thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the serv- ice of bondservants ; but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner. Reply Obj. 5. As the Philosopher says, paternal authority has the power only of admonition,^® but not that of coercion, whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord com- manded the stubborn son to be punished by the rulers of the city. Reply Obj. 6. The Lord forbade them to marry strange women because of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry and become an adherent of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage; as was the case with Ruth whom Booz married. Therefore she said to her mother-in-law {Ruth i. 16): Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God. Accordingly, it was not permitted to marry a cap- tive woman unless she first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and mother, in token that she renounced idolatry forever. Reply Obj. 7. As Chrysostom says, because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother, thus affording a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, how- ever, ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should marry the wife of the deceased, because the offspring of this union would ^ Eth ., X, 9 (1180a 18) 948 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 105 Art. 4 not be looked upon as that of the deceased; and, moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the hotisehold of the de- ceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice because of his relationship, Hence it is evident that, in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother’s place. Reply Obj, 8. The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but because of the Jews’ hardness of heart, as Our Lord declared {Matt, xix. 8). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony Reply Ob], 9. Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since the eye of the adulterer ob- serveth darkness {Job xxiv. 15). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master, because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice; nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of an adulterous woman. ^ In Matt., horn. XLVIII (PG 58, 489). S, T., Ill, SuppL, q. 67. Question CVT ON THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF {In Four Articles) In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law, and in the first place we must consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law;^ thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) What kind of law is it? i.e., is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart? (2) On its efficacy, i,e., does it justify? (3) On its beginning, i.e., should it have been given at the beginning of the world? (4) On its end, i.e., whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place? First Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS A WRITTEN LAW? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i . It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth in writing, according to John xx. 31: But these are written that you may believe. Therefore the New Law is a written law. Obj, 2. Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law, according to Rom, ii. 14, 15: \The Gentiles\ do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have the work of the law written in their hearts. If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of nature. Obj. 3. Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament; for it is written {Wis. vii. 27) that divine wisdom through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets. Therefore the New Law is not instilled in our hearts. On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle, quoting the authority of Jeremias xxxi. 31, 33 {Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will pe^ct unto the house of Israel, and unto ^Q. 107. ^Q. 108. 949 950 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io6. Art, i the house of Juda, a new testament) says, explaining what this testament is {Heb, viii. 8, lo) : For this is the testament which I will make to the house of Israel ... by giving My laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them. Therefore the New Law is instilled in our hearts. ^ / answer that, Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it, as the Philosopher states.^ Now that which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through faith in Christ. Consequently, the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says {Rom. iii. 27): Where is .. . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith] for he calls the grace itself of faith a law. And still more clearly it is written {Rom. viii. 2 ) : The law of the spirit of life, in Christ lesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death. Hence Augustine says that, just as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful;^ and elsewhere in the same book: What else are the divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts but the very presence of His Holy Spirit?^ Nevertheless, the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of that grace. Such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law, and the faithful needed to be instructed concerning them, by word and by writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently, we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that secondarily it is a written law. Reply Obj. i. The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or by directing us to the use thereof. Thus, with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of Christas divinity or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith, through which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost; and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, for the world, i.e., worldly men, cannot receive the Holy Ghost {lo. xiv. 17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men in diverse ways. Reply Obj. 2. There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature; and thus the natural law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New ® Eth., IX, 8 (1169a 2) . ^De Spir. et Litt., XXIV (PL 44, 225) . ® Op. cit., XXI (PL 44, 222). Q. io6. Art. 2 THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL 951 Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to accomplish it. Reply Oh]. 3. No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ, either explicit or implicit. Now by faith in Christ man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently, whoever had the law of grace instiUed into them belonged to the New Testament. Second Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW JUSTIFIES? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is justified unless he obey God’s law, according to Heb. v. 9: He, i,e,j Christ, became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation. But the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it, for it is writ- ten {Rom. X. 16): All do not obey the Gospel. Therefore the New Law does not justify. Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased at its advent; for it is stated {Rom. iv. 15) : The Law worketh wrath, for where there is no law, neither is there transgression. But much more did the New Law increase transgression, since he who sins after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to Heb. x. 28, 2g: A man making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three wit- nesses. How much more, do you think,, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under-foot the Son of God, etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify. Obj. 3. Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to Rom. viii. 33: God that justifieth. But the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more than the Old Law did. On the contrary. The Apostle says {Rom. i. 16): I am not ashamed of the Gospel, for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth. But there is no salvation but to those who are justified. There- fore the Law of the Gospel justifies. I answer that, As we have stated above, there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz., the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says: There, i.e., in the Old Testament, the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the unjust might he afraid; here, i.e., in the New Testament, it is given in an inward manner, that they may be justified .^ — The other element of the Evangelical Law is second- ary, namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct ^Op. dt., XVII (PL 44, 218). 952 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io6. Art. 3 human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 6): The letter killeth, hut the spirit quickeneth^ which Augustine explains by saying that the letter denotes any writing that is external to man, even that of the moral pre- cepts such as are contained in the Gospel.'^ Therefore the letter even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the heal- ing grace of faith. Reply Obj. i. This argument is true of the New Law, not as to its prin- cipal, but as to its secondary, element, i.e., as to the dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing. Reply Obj. 2. Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin; for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not said to work wrath, namely, because as far as it is concerned, it gives man sufficient help to avoid sin. Reply Obj. 3. The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone, whereas He gave the New Law written in the fleshly tables of the heart, as the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. iii. 3). Therefore, as Augustine says, the Apostle calls this letter, which is written outside man, a ministration of death and a ministration of condemnation, whereas he calls the other letter, i.e., the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice; because through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to trans- gression.^ Third Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world. For there is no respect of persons with God {Rom. ii. ii). But all men have sinned and do need the glory of God {ibid. iii. 23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor to all. Obj. 2. Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in vari- ous times. But God, Who will have all men to be saved (i Tim. ii. 4), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of the Gospel Op. cit., XIV; XVII (PL 44, 215; 219). ^Op. cit., XVIII (PL 44, 219). Q. I06. Art. 3 THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL 953 should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the begin- ning of the world. Obj, 3. Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But God pro- vided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting to his power whatever was cre- ated for the sake of man {Gen. i. 26-29). Therefore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man from the beginning of the world. On the contrary, The Apostle says {i Cor. xv. 46): That was not first which is spiritual, hut that which is natural. But the New Law is most spiritual. Therefore it was not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world. / answer that. Three reasons may be assigned why it was jnot fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning of fihe world. The first is because the New Law, as was stated above, consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out of man through the ac- complishment of his redemption by Christ. Hence it is written {Jo. vii. 39) : As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. This reason the Apostle states clearly {Rom. viii. 2, seqq.) where, after spealcing of the Law of the Spirit of life, he adds: God sending His own Son, in the ' likeness of sinful flesh, of sin hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us. A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law, For a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; and thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle {Gal. iii. 24, 25): The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue. The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of grace, and so it behoved man first of all to be left to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that, through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This reason is set down by the Apostle {Rom. y. 20) : The Law entered in, that sin might abound, and when sin abounded grace did more abound. Reply Obj. i. Because of the sin of our first parents, mankind deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace; and so from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given, as Augus- tine states.^ Consequently, it does not follow that there is respect of per- sons with God, from the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as was stated above. ^Cf. Epist. CCVII, 5 (PL 33, 984). 954 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io6. Art. 4 Reply Ob]. 2. The state of mankind does not vary according to diver- sity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law avails for all places, but not for all times; although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 3. Things pertaining to the health of the body are of serv- ice to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy; whereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is lost through sin. Consequently the comparison will not hold. Fourth Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW WILL LAST TILL THE END OF THE WORLD? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law will not last till the end of the world. For, as the Apostle says (i Cor. xiii. 10), when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. But the New Law is in part, since the Apostle says {ibid, g): We know in part and we prophesy in part. Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect state.^® Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord {Jo. xvi. 13) promised His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church does not yet know all truth in the state of the New Testa- ment. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost.^^ Obj. 3. Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the Father and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, viz., the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent on begetting chil- dren; and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of the Son, viz., the state of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wis- dom (which is appropriated to the Son) hold a prominent place. There- fore, there will be a third state cortesponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the first place. Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said {Matt. xxiv. 14): This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the consummation come. But the Gospel of Christ is already preached through- out the whole world, and yet the consummation has not yet come. There- fore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is yet to come, as another Law.^^ On the contrary, Our Lord said {Matt. xxiv. 34) : / say to you that this generation shall not pass till all \these\ things be done] which passage ^°Cf. H. Denifle, Chartularium, no. 243 (I, 272). Cf. ibid. (I, 274') ibid. ^®Cf. ibid. (I, 272). Q. 106. Art. 4 THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL 955 Chrysostom explains as referring to the generation of those that believe in Christ}"^ Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of the world. / answer thatj The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law, and thus no other state will succeed this state of the New Law. For the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect than the state of the New Law, since nothing can approach nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to the last end. But the New Law does this, and so the Apostle says {Heh. x. 19-22): Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which He hath dedicated for us , let us draw near. Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end, the more perfect it is. In another way, the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times were altogether un- heeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various places, times and persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless, we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto, and especially the apostles who received the first-fruits of the Spirit, i.e,, sooner and more abundantly than others, as the Gloss expounds on Rom. viii. 23.^^ Reply Obj. i. As Dionysius says, there is a threefold state of mankind.^^ The first was under the Old Law, the second is that of the New Law, the third will take place, not in this life, but in heaven. But, just as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the state of the Gos- pel, so the present state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away, as it is said in that very passage {verse 12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. # Reply Oh]. 2. As Augustine says, Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord^s promise to give the Holy Ghost was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves.^'^ In like manner, the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes whom they held to be the Paraclete.^^ Hence none of the above accepted the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles, just as Our Matt., horn. LXXVIII (PG 58, 702). ^ Glossa interl. (VI, 191) ; Peter Lom- bard, In Rom., super VIII, 23 (PL 191, 1444). Eccles. Hier., V (PG 3, 501). Cf. St. Augustine, De Haeres., 26 (PL 42, 30) . Op. cit., 46 (PL 42, 38). 956 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q io6. Art. 4 Lord promised them a second time {Acts i. 5): You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence (which we read as having been fulfilled in Acts ii) . However, these foolish notions are refuted by the state- ment {Jo, vii. 39) that as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified ; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this excludes the senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time.^® Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation, those things, namely, that we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events, for this did not concern them, according to Acts i. 7: It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power. Reply Obj. 3. The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the Son, because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence Our Lord said {Jo. v. 46): If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also, for he wrote of Me, In like manner, the New Law corre- sponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 2: The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, etc. Hence we are not to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost. Reply Obj. 4. Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the Gospel: The kingdom of heaven is at hand {Matt. iv. 17), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. However, the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ; and thus the Gospel was preached throughout the whole world even at the time of the apostles, as Chrysostom states.^^ And in this sense the words that follow — and then shall the consummation come {Matt. xxiv. 14) — refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally. — Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, namely, the Church would be founded in every nation. And in this sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius,^^ the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but when it is, the consummation of the world will come. E.g.f the idea of the Abbot Joachim. Cf. above, the notes to objections 1-4. Matt., hom. LXXV (PG 58, 688). ^Epist. CXCIX, 12 (PL 33, 923). Question CVII ON THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD {In Four Articles) We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law? (2) Whether the New Law fulfills the Old? (3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old? (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law? - First Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS DISTINCT FROM THE OLD LAW? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. For both these laws were given to those who believe in God, since without jaith it is impossible to please God, according to Heb. xi. 6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the Gloss says on Matt. xxi. 9.^ Therefore the law is the same also. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says that there is little difference between the Law and Gospel, — fear and love? But the New and Old Laws cannot be differentiated in respect of these two things, since even the Old Law comprised precepts of charity: Thou shalt love thy neighbor {Levitt xix. 18), and: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God {Deut. vi. 5). — ^In like man- ner, neither can they differ according to the other difference which Augus- tine assigns, viz., that the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises,^ since even the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to Mark X. 30: He shall receive a hundred times as much ... in this time, houses and brethren, etc., while in the Old Testament they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to Heb. xi. 16: But now they desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country, which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the Old Law a law of works, and the New Law a law of faith {Rom. iii. 27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to Heb. xi. 39: Glossa ordin,, super II Cor., IV, 13 (VI, 66A). — Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm., super I, 14 (PL 36, 596). ^Contra Adimant.y XVII (PL 42, 159)* ^Contra Faust., IV, 2 (PL 42, 217). 957 958 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 107. Art. i All were approved by the testimony of faith ^ which he says of the patriarchs of the Old Testament. In like manner, the New Law is a law of works, since it is written {Matt, v. 44): Do good to them that hate you; and {Luke xxii. ig): Do this for a commemoration of Me, Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old. On the contrary, the Apostle says {Eeh. vii. 12): The priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law, But the priesthood of the New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct. I answer that, As was stated above, every law ordains human conduct to some end.^ Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways, considered from the point of view of the end. First, through being or- dained to diverse ends, and this diversity will be specific, especially if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear that movements differ in species through being directed to diverse terms, while according as one part of a movement is nearer to the term than another part, the diversity of perfect and imperfect movement follows. Accordingly, then, two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends. Thus a state-law, ordained to democratic government, would differ specifically from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another through one of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely. Thus, in one and the same state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good; and another law regulating the edu- cation of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on. We niust therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law, because they both have the same end, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to Rom, iii. 30; It is one God that justifietk circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith. ^Ac- cording to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the Old Law, because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says {Gal. iii. 24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says {Coloss, iii. 14) that it is the bond of perfection. Reply Obj. 1 , The unity of faith xmder both Testaments witnesses to the unity of end, for it has been stated above that the object of the theo- logical virtues, among which is faith, is the last end.^ Yet faith had a 90, a. 2; q. 91, a. 4. ^Q, 62, a. 2. Q. 107. Art. i THE TWO LAWS 959 different state in the Old and in the New Law, since what they believed as future, we believe as fact. Reply Obj. 2. All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits are directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause, for instance, by the threat of pun- ishment, or the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were imper- fect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the Law of fear, inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and it is likewise spoken of as contain- ing temporal promises. — On the other hand, those who are possessed of virtue are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not because of some extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law, which de- rives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is called the Law of love; and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, chiefly of charity. Ac- cordingly, such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something foreign, but as to something of their own. — For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as restraining the hand, not the will,^ since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will does not shrink absolutely from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness. Hence the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will. Nevertheless, there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises; and in this respect they belonged to the New Law, — In like manner, in the New Testament there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it was necessary, even under the New Testament, to lead to virtuous acts by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises. But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless, it did not confer the Holy Ghost, by Whom charity is spread abroad in our hearts {Rom, v. 5). Reply Ob 3. 3. As was stated above, the New Law is called the b faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very gracihe Old is given inwardly to believers; and for this reason it is called the gbove.^*^ faith.'^ Nevertheless, it consists secondarily in certain deeds, mor^m the sacramental; but the New Law does not consist chiefly in these hings ®Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., Ill, xl, i ( 11 , 734). 106, a. i and 2. THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 960 Q. 107. Art. 2 tilings, as did the Old Law. As to those under the Old Testament who through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament; for they were not justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says {Eeb, xi. 26)' that he esteemed the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians, Second Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW FULFILLS THE OLD? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law does not fulfill the Old. For to fulfill and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids or excludes the observances of the Old Law, for the Apostle says {Gal. v. 2) : If you be circumcised j Christ shall profit you nothing. Therefore the New Law is not a fulfillment of the Old. Obj. 2. Further, one contrary is not the fulfillment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary to precepts of the Old Law. For we read {Matt, v 27-32): You have heard that it was said to them of old: . . . Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery. Furthermore, the same evi- dently applies to the prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one’s enemies. In like manner, Our Lord seems to have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods {Matt. XV. ii): Not that which goeth into the mouth de filet h a man, but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. Therefore the New Law is not a fulfillment of the Old. Obj. 3. Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfill the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched the leper {Matt. viii. 3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise, He seems to have broken the Sabbath frequently, since the Jews used to say of Him {Jo. ix. 16) : This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath. There- fore Christ did not fulfill the Law, and so the New Law given by Christ is hot a fulfillment of the Old. Obj. 4. Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial and judicial, as was stated above.^ But Our Lord {Matt, v.) fulfilled the Law respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial pre- ^"^'^herefore it seems that the New Law is not a complete fulfillment of lod^T^^ Y. i^): I am not come to de- ® ^but to fulfill; and He went on to say {verse 18): One jot or one shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled. L 99 j a. 4. Q. 107. Art. 2 THE TWO LAWS 961 I answer that, As was stated above, the New Law is compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfills that which is lacking in the imperfect. Accordingly, the New Law fulfills the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. ^ Now two things in the Old Law offer themselves to our consideration, viz., the end, and the precepts contained in the Law. The end of every law is to make men just and virtuous, as was stated above Consequently, the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this, but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfills the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ s Passion. This is what the Apostle says {Rom. viii. 3, 4) : What the Law could not do .. . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . , . hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might he fulfilled in us. — ^And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2 Cor. i. 20: Whatever are the promises of God, in Him, i.e., in Christ, they are Wea! — ^Again, in this respect, it also fulfills what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written {Coloss. ii. 17) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ \ in other words, the reality is found in Christ. Therefore the New Law is called the law of reality, whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure. Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be circumcised and to ^fulfill the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being, according to Gal. iv. 4: Made under the Law. — In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act ; and* so Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury, and this is more safely avoided by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the pre- cepts of the Law by adding some counsels of perfection; and this is clearly seen in Matt. xix. 21, where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: One thing is wanting to thee: If thou wilt he perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast, etc. Reply Ohj. i. The New Law does not void the observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as was stated above.^^ Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Therefore, from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled when those things ® Q. 92, a. I. Q. 103, a. 3 and 4. 962 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q 107. Art. 2 were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed; for if they were to be observed, this would mean that something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way, the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled. Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says, those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law.^^ For what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. For the Law did not say: ‘Let him that wills, put his wife away,’ the contrary of which would he not to put her away. On the con- trary, the Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication.^^ The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as was stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably; whereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of one’s enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his sin. — ^As to discriminating among various foods, which was a ceremonial matter. Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed; but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as was stated above.^^ Reply Obj. 3. It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper because, by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as also by touching the dead, as was stated above.^^ But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. — By those things which He did on the Sabbath, He did not break the Sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel; and this both because He worked miracles by His divine power, which is ever active among things, and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the Sabbath; and again because through urgency He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the Sabbath. But He did seem to break the Sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the Sabbath ; which was contrary to the intention of the Law. Reply Obj. 4. The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in Matt. v. is because, as was stated above, their observance ^Contra Faust., XIX, 26 (PL 42, 364). ^Cf. St. Augustine, De Serm. Dorn., I, 14 (PL 34, 124S). ^®Q. 102, a. 6, ad i. Ibid.; a. 5, ad 4. Q. 107. Art. 3 THE TWO LAWS 963 was abolished by their fulfillment. — But of the judicial percepts He men- tioned that of retaliation; so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonish- ing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the New Law. Third Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS CONTAINED IN THE OLD? JVe proceed, thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old. For the New Law consists chiefly in faith, and so it is called the law of faith {Rom. iii. 27). But many points of faith are set forth in the New Law which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not contained in the Old. Ob], 2. Further, a Gloss says on Matt. v. 19 {He that shall break one of these least commandments) that the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the greater commandments, those contained in the Gospel.^® Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not contained in the Old. Obj. 3. Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, there- fore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that whoever had the Old Law had the New; so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is not con- tained in the Old. On the contrary, According to the saying in Ezech. i. 16, there was a wheel in the midst of a wheel, i.e., the New Testament within the Old, according to Gregory’s exposition.^® / answer that, One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually, as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually, as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; and thus a genus contains its species, and a seed contains the whole tree, vir- tually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old, for it has been stated that the New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence Chrysostom, expounding Mark iv. 28 {The earth of it- self bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear) expresses himself as follows: He brought forth first the blade, i.e., the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e., the Law of Moses; lastly, the full corn, i.e., the Law of the Gospel.'^'^ In this way, the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear. ^^Cf. St. Augustine, De Serm. Dorn., I, i (PL 34, 1231). In Ezech., I, horn. 6 (PL 76, 834). ^"Apparently not in St. John Chrysostom- 964 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. lo; Art. 4 Reply Ohj. 1. Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith is contained in the Old Testament as a mat- ter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. Accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law is contained in the Old. Reply Ohj, 2. The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old Law in so far as they are set forth explicitly. But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says that nearly all Our Lord^s admonitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: ^But 1 say unto you/ are to he found also in those ancient hooks/^ Yet, since they thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to injure our brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder. And it is with reference to declara- tions of this kind that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being coutained in the lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed. Reply Ohj. 3. What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly. Hence, after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had to be given. Fourth Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS MORE BURDENSOME THAN THE OLD? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom says: The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery; but the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust.^^ Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. Obj. 2. Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance of the Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from Deut. xxviii. 1-14; whereas many kinds of trouble befall those who observe the New Law, as is stated in 2 Cor. vi. 4-10: Let us exhibit ourselves as the minis- ters of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses, etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. Obj. 3. Something added is an added burden. But the New Law is some- thing added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury, while the New Law proscribed even swearing; the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his Contra Faust., XIX, 28 (PL 42, 366). -^^Op. cit., XIX, 23 (PL 42, 361). Cf. Pseudo-Chrysostom, Op. Imperf. in Matt., horn. X, super V, 19 (PG 36, 687). Q. 107. Art. 4 THE TWO LAWS 965 wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law forbade divorce alto- gether, as is clearly stated in Matt. v. 31 seqq.j according to Augustine’s exposition.^^ Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. On the contrary, It is written {Matt. xi. 28) : Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened-, which words are expounded by Hilary thus: He calls to Himself all those that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world.^^ And further on He says of the yoke of the Gospel: For My yoke is sweet and My burden light {Matt. xi. 30). Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the Old. / answer that, A twofold difficulty may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burden- some. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than the New, since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says, in reply to the queries of Januarius, that, whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public solemni- zation of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slaveys burden; so much so, that the state of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable?^ The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: e.g., that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and pleasure. It is this dif- ficulty that virtue solves, because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue, but through virtue it becomes easy to him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old, because the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue. And so the Philosopher also states that it is easy to do what a just man does, but that to do it in the same way, viz., with pleasure and promptitude, is' difficult to a man who is not just.^"^ Accordingly, we read likewise (i John v. 3) that His commandments are not heavy-, which words Augustine expounds by saying that they ere not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that loveth not?^ ^ De Serm. Dom., I, 14 (PL 34, 1248) ; Contra Faust., XIX, 23 ; 26 (PL 42, 361 ; 364) . ^In Matt., super XI, 28 (PL 9, 984). ^Epist. LV, 19 (PL 33, 221). ^ Eth., V, 9 (1137a 5). ^ De Nat. et Grat., LXIX (PL 44, 289); De Perfect. lust., X (PL 44, 302). 966 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 0 - 107. Art. 4 Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements. Reply Obj. 2. The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover, they are easily borne because of the love in which the same Law consists; since, as Augustine says, love makes light and nothing oj things that seem arduous and beyond our power Reply Obj. 3. The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine states. Accordingly, this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, but rather that it is a lighter burden. ^Serm. LXX, 3 (PL 38, 444). "" De Serm. Dorn., I, 17; 21 (PL 34, 1256; 1265) ; Contra Faust. j XIX, 23; 26 (PL 42, 362; 365). Question CVIII ON THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW {In Four Articles) We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works? (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts? (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man suffi- ciently? (4) Whether it adds counsels to precepts in a fitting way? First Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW OUGHT TO PRESCRIBE OR PROHIBIT ANY EXTERNAL ACTS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the king- dom, according to Matt. xxiv. 14: This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world. But the kingdom of God consists, not in exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Luke xvii. 21: The king- dom of God is within you] and Rom. xiv. 17: The kingdom of God is not meat and drink^ but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. There- fore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts. Obj. 2. Further, the New Law is the law of the Spirit {Rom. viii, 2). But where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty {2 Cor. hi. 17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any external acts. Obj. 3. Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the soul. But this is assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws, that the Old Law restrains the handj whereas the New Law restrains the soul?- Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about external acts, but only about interior acts. On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made children of light; and so it is written {Jo. xii. 36): Believe in the light that you may be the children of light. Now it is becoming that children of light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to Ephes. ^ Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., HI, 3 d, i (II, 734)- 967 968 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q io8. Art. i V. 8: You were heretojore darkness , but now light in the Lord. Walk ... as children of the light. Therefore the New Law had to forbid cer- tain external acts and prescribe others. I answer that, As we have stated above, the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that work- eth through love? Now men become receivers of this grace through God’s Son made man. Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written {Jo. i. 14) : The Word was made flesh, and after- wards: full of grace and truth] and further on: Of His fullness we all have received, and grace for grace. Hence it is added that grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Consequently, it was becoming that the grace which flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain ex- ternal sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. Accordingly, external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the sacra- mental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g., Baptism, the Eu- charist, and the like. In the second place, there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace; and in these we must observe a difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to, in- ward grace, which consists in faith that works through love. Such exter- nal works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law. Thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written {Matt. X. 32, 33); [Every one] that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father. . . , But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father. — On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with, faith that works through love. Such works are not prescribed or for- bidden in the New Law by virtue of its primitive institution; they have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e., Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must do or avoid. Therefore, in this respect also the Gospel is called the law of liberty, since the Old Law decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose. Reply Obj. 1. The kingdom of God consists chiefly in interior acts, but as a consequence all things that are essential to interior acts belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus, if the kingdom of God is interior justice, peace and spiritual joy, all external acts that are incompatible with jus- tice, peace and spiritual joy are in opposition to the kingdom of God, and consequently should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for “Q. 106, a. I and 2. Q. io8. Art. 2 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW 969 instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; and so the Apostle says before the words quoted: The kingdom of God is not meat and drink. Reply Ob], 2. According to the Philosopher, what is free is for the sake of Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature, since a habit inclines after the manner of a nature. If, how- ever, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according to some corruption affecting that nature. Since, then, the grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act rightly, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it. Accordingly,^ the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called the law of perfect liberty {Jas. i. 25). Reply Obj. 3, Thef New Law, by restraining the soul from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which ensue from inward movements. Second Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW MADE SUFFICIENT ORDINATIONS ABOUT EXTERNAL ACTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordina- tions about external acts. For faith that works through charity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal. v, 6: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything^ nor uncircumcision ^ but faith that worketh through charity. But the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law: e,g,j be- lief in the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law. Obj, 2. Further, in the Old Law not only sacraments were instituted, but also certain sacred things, as was stated above.^ But in the New Law, al- though certain sacraments are instituted, yet no sacred things seem to have been instituted by Our Lord (pertaining, for instance, either to the sancti- fication of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particu- lar feast) . Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about ex- ternal matters. ^ Metaph., I, 2 (982b 26). *Q. loi, a. 4; q. 102, a. 4. 970 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io8. Art. 2 Obj, 3. Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God’s ministers, so also were there certain observances per- taining to the people, as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law.^ Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed for the ministers of God, as may be gathered from Matt. x. 9; Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses, nor other things which are mentioned here and Luke ix. and x. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law. Obj. 4. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works. On the contrary. Our Lord said {Matt. vii. 24): Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock. But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ’s words contain all things necessary for man’s salvation. / answer that. As we have stated above, the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alo'ne as are essential for the reception or the right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace: viz.. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law (by the institution of the apostles and seventy- two disciples), Penance, and indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost, and we read that by His institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil {Mark vi. 13). These are the sacraments of the New Law. The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law; had noth- ing to add as regards external action, — The determination of these works in their relation to divine worship belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as was stated above.^ Therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace, wherein the Law consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man. Some of these determinations relate to subjects, as when a pre- cept is given to an individual; others, to superiors, temporal or spiritual, those, namely, that pertain to the common good. Accordingly, the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments and those moral precepts Q. loi, a. 4; q. 102, a 6. Q- 99j a. 4 - Q. I08. Art. 2 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW 971 which pertain to the nature of virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth. Reply Obj. i. Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we can- not attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is a rule of human action, as was stated above.*^ Therefore, in such matters as these, there was no need for any precepts to be given beyond the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed from the dictate of reason. Reply Obj, 2. In the sacraments of the New Law, grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ. Consequently, they had to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, or, again, in the celebration of the feasts. Therefore our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since they have not, of themselves, any necessary connection with inward grace. Reply Obj, 3. Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts, not as cere- monial observances, but as moral statutes. Now they can be understood in two ways. First, following Augustine, as being, not commands, but per- missions.^ For He permitted them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and the like, as being empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom they preached; and so He goes on to say: For the laborer is worthy of his hire {Luke x. 7) . Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation, for a preacher to take the means of livelihood with him, without accepting pay- ment from those to whom he preaches, as Paul did ( z Cor, ix. 4, seqq,) , Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men,^ they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time dur- ing which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ’s Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little children under Christ’s care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their superiors; and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of temporal things, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He established certain fixed modes of life, as, long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by their means become sufficiently practised. Hence He said {Luke xxii. 35, 26): When I sent you without purse and scrip and shoes ^ did you want anything? But they said: Noth- Q. 19, a. 3; q. 63, a. 2. Consensu Evang., XXX (PL 34, 1114), *^Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Horn, II, In Rom. XVI, 3, horn. 2 (PG 51, 199); St. Bede, In Luc., VI, super XXII, 35 (PL 92, 601), 972 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q io8. Art. 3 ing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip. For the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue. Reply Ob'], 4. Considered in themselves, judicial precepts likewise are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in re- gard to the common notion of justice. Consequently, Our Lord left the ju- dicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or tem- poral charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were misunderstood by the Phari- sees, as we shall state later on. Third Article WHETHER THE NEW LAW DIRECTED MAN SUFFICIENTLY AS REGARDS INTERIOR ACTIONS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of the deca- logue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly ful- filled only three of them, namely, with reference to the prohibition of murder, of adultery and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfill the other precepts. He directed man insufficiently. Obj, 2. Further, as regards the judicial precepts, our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing a wife, of punish- ment by retaliation and of persecuting one’s enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as was stated above.^® Therefore, in this respect. He directed human life insufficiently. Obj. 3. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial precepts, there were ceremonial precepts, about which Our Lord made no ordina- tion. Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently. Obj. 4. Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no- good deed for any temporal end whatever. But there are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man, and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-giving and prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods, ought we to shun the glory of human favor. Obj.^ 5. Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is in- stilled into man by nature, and this solicitude even other animals share with man; and so it is written {Prov. vi. 6, 8) : Go to the ant, 0 sluggard, and consider her^ ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gather eih her food in the harvest. But every command issued against* the inclination of nature is an unjust command, inasmuch as it is contrary 104, a. 4; q. 105, Q. io8. Art. 3 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW 973 to the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly for- bade solicitude about food and raiment. Obj. 6. Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps. xciii. 15: Until justice be turned into judgment. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment, and consequently that the New Law directed man insuf- ficiently in the matter of interior acts. On the contrary^ Augustine says: We should ‘take note that, when He said: ‘He that heareth these My words/ He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord, is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christianas life is formed}'^ I answer that, As is evident from Augustine’s words just quoted, the sermon which Our Lord delivered on the mountain contains the whole formation of the life of a Christian. Therein man’s interior movements are ordered. For after declaring that his end is beatitude, and after com- mending the authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man’s interior movements, first, in regard to man himself, secondly, in regard to his neighbor. This he does in regard to man himself in two ways, corresponding to man’s two interior movements in relation to any prospective action, viz., the volition of what has to be done, and the intention of the end. Therefore, in the first place, He orders man’s will in relation to the various precepts of the Law, by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works that are evil in themselves, but also from internal' acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the second place, He orders man’s intention by teaching that, in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth. Afterwards, He orders man’s interior movement in relation to his neigh- bor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to en^ust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy. Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfill the teaching of the Gospel, viz., by imploring the help of God, by striving to enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue, and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to hear His words. Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those pre- cepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand; and this affected chiefly those three precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false witness, because the movement De Serm. Dom., I, i (PL 34, 1231). 974 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io8. Art. 3 of anger tending to murder, and the movement of desire tending to adul- tery, seem to be in us to some extent from nature, but not the desire of stealing or of bearing false witness. — ^They held a false opinion about per- jury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin, but that oaths were of themselves to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them. Reply Obj. 2. The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial pre- cepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters, con- tained in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in them- selves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from strangers. Therefore our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife {Matt. v. 32) ; and to receive usury {Luke vi, 35), when He said: Lend, hoping for nothing thereby. In another way they erred by thinking that certain things, which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice’s sake, should be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one’s enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful because of the precept concerning punish- ment by retaliation; whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. Therefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet ^nore if necessary. — ^They thought, too, that movements of covetousness were lawful, because of those judicial precepts which pre- scribed restitution of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as was stated above whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Therefore Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if nec- essary. — ^They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, because of the commandments of the Law about the slaying of one’s enemies; whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfillment of justice, as was stated above,^^ not to satisfy hatred. Therefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to do good to them if neces- sary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding the mind to be pre- pared to fulfill them, as Augustine says.^^ Reply Obj. 3. The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they belong of themselves to the nature of virtue; whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law, but this was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becom- ingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On the other hand, the “ Q. los, a. 2, ad 9. Q. 105, a. 3, ad 4. De Serm. Dorn., 1 , 19 (PL 34, 1260) . Q. 108. Art. 3 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW 975 observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of the reality; and so, in regard to these precepts, He commanded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law was to be changed into a spiritual worship, as is evident from John iv. 21, 23, where He says: The hour comet h when you shall neither on this mount ain^ nor in Jerusalem^ adore the Father . . . but . . . the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth. Reply Obj. 4. All worldly goods may be reduced to three, namely, hon- ors, riches and pleasures, according to i John ii. 16: All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the fleshy which refers to pleasures of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, which refers to riches, and the pride of life, which refers to. ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former (Deut. xxviii. i): If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God, . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations] and in reference to the latter, we read a little further on {verse ii) : He will make thee abound with all goods. But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that we ought to serve God with these things as the end in view. Therefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory. And He mentions three works to which all others may be reduced, since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires comes under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor comes under the head of alms-giving; and whatever a man does for the worship of God comes under the head of prayer. He mentions these three especially, as they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. — ^In the second place, He taught us that we must not place our end in riches, when He said: Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth {Matt. vi. 19). Reply Obj. 5. Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solici- tude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Therefore He says: Lay not up for yourselves, etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things as to despair of God’s help; and so Our Lord says {ibid. 32): Your F cither knoweth that you have need of all these things. Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God’s help. Such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a man can- not add anything to his stature {ibid. 27) . Fourthly, we must not anticipate the time of anxiety, namely, by being solicitous now for the needs, not of the 976 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io8. Art. 4 present, but of a future time; and so He says {ibid. 34): Be not . . . solicitous for to-morrow. Reply Obj. 6 . Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he forbade inordinate judgment, as was stated above. Fourth Article WHETHER CERTAIN DEFINITE COUNSELS ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED IN THE NEW LAW? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fit- tingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel.^^ But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all. Obj. 2. Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees of the greater good. Therefore definite counsels should not be given. Obj. 3. Further, counsels pertain to the perfection of life. But obedience pertains to the perfection of life. Therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel. Obj. 4. Further, many matters pertaining to the perfection of life are found among the commandments, as, for instance, Love your enemies {Matt. V. 44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles {ibid. X.). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law, both because they are not all mentioned, and because they are not distinguished from the commandments. On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, accord- ing to Prov. xxvii. 9: Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart; and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul. But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful and becoming. I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given. So in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are fittingly added to the commandments, but not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal beatitude, to which end the New Law brings us forthwith ; but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious. Now man is placed between the things of this world and spiritual goods, wherein eternal happiness consists; so that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Therefore he that 14, a. 2. Q. 108. Art. 4 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW 977 cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the aforesaid end, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether, since he can, while using the things of this world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them. But he will attain more speedily thereto by giv- ing up the goods of this ’world entirely; and that is why the evangelical counsels are given. Now the^ goods of this world, which come into use in human life, consist in three things, viz., in external wealth, pertaining to the concupiscence of the eyes, in carnal pleasures, pertaining to the concupiscence of the flesh, and in honors, which pertain to the pride of life, according to i John ii. 16, and it is in renouncing these three altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes the state of perfection is based on these three; for riches are renounced by poverty, carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity, and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience. Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a par- ticular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he does good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if he forgives an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels. Reply Obj. i. The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all, but because some people are ill-disposed, it happens that they are inexpedient to some of them, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the evangelical counsels, al- ways makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty {Matt. xix. 21), He begins with the words: If thou wilt be perfect, and then He adds: Go, sell all thou hast. In like manner, when He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying {ibid., 12): There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven, He added straightway: He that can take, let him take it. And, again, the Apostle (1 Cor. vii. 35), after giving the coun- sel of virginity, says: And this I speak for your profit, not to cast a snare upon you. 97^ THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. io8. Art 4 Reply Obj. 2. The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the partic- ulaij but the goods which are unqualifiedly and absolutely greater in the universal, are fixed; and to these all the above particular goods may be re- duced, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 3. Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: And [let him] jollow Me {Matt. xvi. 24). For we follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to John x. 2 7 : My sheep hear My voice . . . and they jollow Me. Reply Obj. 4. Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings {Matt. v. and Luke vi.), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are neces- sary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as was stated above. — As to those matters which are set down in Matt. x. and Luke ix. and x., they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as was stated above. Hence they are not set down among the counsels. TREATISE ON GRACE Question CIX ON THE EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ACTS, NAMELY, THE GRACE OF GOD {In Ten Articles) We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e., God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do the right. First, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause thirdly, its effects.^ The first point of consideration will be threefold, for we shall consider (i) the necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence;^ (3) its division.^ Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry (i) Whether with- out grace man can know any truth? (2) Whether without God’s grace man can do or will any good? (3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things? (4) Whether without grace man can keep the command- ments of the Law through his natural powers? (5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life? (6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace? (7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin? (8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin? (9) Whether man, having re- ceived grace, can do good and avoid sin without any further divine help? (10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good? First Article WHETHER WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN KNOW ANY TRUTH? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For on i Cor. xii. 3 {No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost) the Gloss of Ambrose says: Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost. ^ Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. There- fore we cannot know truth without grace.- Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says that the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Who illumines, while reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye, and the eyes ^Q. 112. ^Q. 113. ®Q. no. Q. III. ® Peter Lombard, In I Cor., super XII, 3 (PL 191, 1651) ; cf. Glossa ordin. (VI, 52A). 979 gSo THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q, 109. Art. i of the mind are the senses of the soul.^ Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible thing without the sun’s light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth with- out divine light; and this pertains to the aid of grace. Obj. 3. Further, the human mind can understand truth only by think- ing, as is clear from Augustine.'^ But the Apostle says (2 Cor. hi. 5) : Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God. Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace. On the contrary, Augustine says 1 do not approve having said in the prayer: 0 God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths.^ Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. 1 . 12: Create a clean heart in me, 0 God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels. Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth. 1 answer that, To know truth is a certain use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle {Ephes. v. 13): All that is made manifest is light. Now every use implies some movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philoso- pher.^ But in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but also the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the body of the heavens. Hence no matter how per- fectly fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the body of the heavens. But it is clear that, just as all cor- poreal movements are reduced to the motion of the body of the heavens , as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the absolutely First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God. Now this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by a necessity of nature, as the motion of the body of the heavens. But not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. Hence the action of the intellect, or of any created being whatsoever, depends upon God in two ways: first, inas- much as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act. Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can effect in proportion to its own proper en- dowment; and beyond this act it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can heat only when heated by the fire. And thus, the human understanding has a form, viz., intelligible light itself, which of itself is ^ Solil., I, 6 (PL 32, 875). ‘ De Trin., XIV, 7 (PL 42, 1043). ^Retract., I, 4 (PL 32, 589) . ^ De An., Ill, 4 (429b 25) ; 7 (431a 4) . 981 Q. 109. Art. 2 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE sufficient for knowing certain intelligible truths, viz., those we can come to know through sensible things. Higher intelligible truths the human intel- lect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz., the light of faith or of prophecy, which is called the light of grace, inasmuch as it is added to nature. Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs divine help in order that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new illumination added to his natural light in order to know the truth in all things, but only in those that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do. Reply Oh'], 1, Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and to speak the truth; but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this takes place only with regard to knowing and speaking certain truths, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle was speaking. Reply Obj. 2. The material sun sheds its light outside us, but the intelli- gible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God’s illumination, whereby we are illumined to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required no further illumination, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge. Reply Ob'], 3. We always need God’s help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the intellect to act ; for to understand anything actually is to think, as is clear from Augustine.^® Second Article WHETHER MAN CAN WILL OR DO ANY GOOD WITHOUT GRACE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that man can will and do good without grace. For that is in man’s power of which he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as was stated above.^^ Hence man, of himself, can will and do good without the help of grace. Obj. 2. Further, any being has more power over what is according to its nature than (fver what is beyond its nature. Now sin is against nature, as Damascene says;^^ whereas the work of virtue is according to the nature of men, as was stated above.^^ Therefore, since man can sin of himself, much more would it seem that of himself he can will and do good. Trin., XIV, 7 (PL 42, 1043). i, a. i; q. 13, a 6. ^De Fide Orth., II, 4; 30 (PG 94, 876; 976) ; cf. op, cit., IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196). 7 L a. i. 982 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 109. Art. 2 Obj. 3. Further, the good of the intellect is truth, as the Philosopher sajs}^ Now the intellect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can perform its natural operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and will good. On the contrary j The Apostle says (Rom. ix. 16) : It is not of him that willeth, namely, to will, nor of him that runneth, namely, to run, hut of God that showeth mercy. And Augustine says that without grace men do nothing good when they either think or will or love or act}^ I answer that, Man’s nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is cor- rupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God, as First Mover, to do or will any good what- soever, as was stated above. But in the state of integrity of nature, as regards the sufficiency of operative power, man by his natural endow- ments could will and do the good proportioned to his nature, which is the good of acquired virtue; but he could not do the good that exceeded his nature, which is the good of infused virtue. But in the state of cor- rupted nature, man falls short even of what he can do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill all of it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, namely, so as to be shorn of every good of nature, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, perform some particular good, such as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing. In the same way, a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movement of one in health, unless by the help of medi- cine he be cured. Hence in the state of the integrity of nature, man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz., in order to do and will supernatural good; but in the state of corrupted nature he needs it for two reasons, viz., in order to be healed and, furthermore, in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the divine help that he may be moved to act well. Reply Obj. i. Man is master of his acts, both of his willing and not willing, because of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and since this cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man’s free choice is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, namely, by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter on Good Fortune.^^ Hence the mind even of an uncorrupted man is not so mas- VI, 2 (1139a 27). ^De Corrept, et GrQt.^ II (PL 44, 917). Eudem., VII, 14 (1248a 14). "" Cf. Etk. Q. 109. Art. 3 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE 983 ter of its act that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more needy is the free choice of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hin- dered from good by the corruption of its nature. Reply Obj. 2. To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now, as every created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be conserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into non- existence, unless it is conserved by God. Reply Obj. 3. Man cannot even know truth without divine help, as was stated above. And yet human nature is more corrupted by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth. Third Article whether by his own natural powers and without GRACE MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now of himself man cannot possess charity, since the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us, as it is said Rom. v. 5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things. Obj. 2. Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love anything more than itself is to tend to something above itself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself. Obj. 3. Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the highest love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the highest love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace, cannot love God above all things through his natural powers alone. On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natu- ral endowments.^'^ In that state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, or otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above him- self. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things. / answer that. As was said above in the First Part, where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, in the state of integral nature man could, by his natural power, do his con- natural good without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not with- Cf. above, S. T., I, q. 93, a. i. 984 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 109. Art. 3 out the help of God moving him.^^ Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even inanimate, according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. The reason for this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit [to be sought and loved] since all things act according as they are naturally fit, as is stated in Physics ii.^^ Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole. Hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good because of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says that God leads everything to the love of Himself?^ Hence in the state of integral nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end ; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupted nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it be cured by God’s grace, follows its private good, because of the corruption of nature. And so we must say that in the state of integral nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endow- ments in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God’s help moving him to it; but in the state of corrupted nature, man needs, even for this, the help of grace healing his nature. Reply Obj. i. Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him according as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover, charity adds to the natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue. Reply Obj, 2. When it is said that no nature can rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be directed to any object above itself; for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the propor- tion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act, for it is natural to every creature, as was said above. Reply Obj, 3. Love is said to be highest not only with regard to the degree of love, but also with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above. '^^S. r., I, q. 60, a. S. Aristotle, Phys,, II, 8 (199a 10). 10 (PG 3, 708). ""De Div. Norn,, IV, Q. 109. Art. 4 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE 98 s Fourth Article WHETHER MAN, WITHOUT GRACE AND BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS, CAN FULEILL THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE LAW? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfill the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says {Rom, ii. 14) that the Gentiles , who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law, Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace. Obj, 2, Further, Jerome says that they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man?^ Now what a man cannot fulfill by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfill all the commandments of himself. Obj, 3. Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart {Matt, xxii. 3 7 ) . Now man can fulfill this command by his natural powers, by loving God above all things, as was stated above. Therefore man can fulfill all the com- mandments of the Law without grace. On the contrary, Augustine says that it is part of the heresy of the Pelagians that they believe that without grace man can fulfill all the divine commandments,^^ I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. — The first regards the substance of works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of integral nature could fulfill all the commandments of the Law; or otherwise he would have been unable not to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfill all the divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the Law can be fulfilled not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i,e,, their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of integral nature, nor in the state of corrupted nature can man fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace. Hence, Au- gustine, having stated that without grace men can do no good whatever, adds: Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know?^ Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order to fulfill the commandments, as was stated above. Reply Obj, i. As Augustine says, do not be disturbed at his saying that ^Cf. Pelagius, Epist. I, 16 (PL 30, 32). ^De Haeres., 88 (PL 42, 47). ^De Corrept. et Grat., II (PL 44, 917). THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 986 Q. 109. Art. 5 they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made?"^ Reply Obj. 2. What we can do with the divine assistance is not alto- gether impossible to ns; for according to the Philosopher: What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves?^ Hence Jerome concedes that our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still always require God’s help?^ Reply Ob]. 3. Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfill the precept of the love of God according as it is fulfilled through charity, as was stated above. Fifth Article WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE WITHOUT GRACE? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that man can merit eternal life without grace. For our Lord says {Matt. xix. 17): If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments', from which it would seem that to enter into eternal life rests with man’s will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit eternal life of himself. Obj. 2. Further, eternal life is the wage or reward bestowed by God on men, according to Matt. v. 12: Your reward is very great in heaven. But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, ac- cording to Ps. Ixi. 13: Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach eternal life. Obj. 3. Further, eternal life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, can man attain to eternal life by his natural endowments, with- out grace. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. vi. 23): The grace of God is life everlasting. And, as the Gloss says, this is said that we may under- stand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life.^’^ 1 answer that, Acts leading to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active power, but only such as is proportioned to its power. Now eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above.^® Hence man, by his ^De Spir. et Litt., XXVII (PL 44, 229). ^ Eth., Ill, 3 (1112b 27). Cf. Pelagius, Libellus Fidei ad Innocentium (PL 45, 1718). ^ Glossa ordin. (VI, isF) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super VI, 23 (PL 191, 1412).— Cf. St. Augustine, Enchirl evil (PL 40, 282). ^Q. s, a. 5. Q. 109. Art. 6 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE 987 natural powers, cannot produce meritorious works proportioned to eternal life ; but for this a higher power is needed, viz., the power of grace. And thus, without grace, man cannot merit eternal life; yet he can perform works leading to a good which is connatural to man, as to toil in the fields , to drink ^ to eat, or to have friends, and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians?^ Reply Ob'], i. Man, by his will, does works meritorious of eternal life; but, as Augustine says in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.^® Reply Obj, 2. As the Gloss says upon Rom, vi. 23 {The grace of God is life everlasting ) : It is certain that everlasting life is meted to good works; but the works to which it is meted belong to God’s grace What is more, it has been said that to fulfill the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfillment may be meritorious, requires grace. Reply Obj. 3. This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can in no way reach ; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can in no way recover it, as the Philosopher observes.^^ Sixth Article WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection 1, It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing im- possible is laid upon man, as was stated above. But it is written {Zach, i. 3): Turn ye to Me . , . and I will turn to you. Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. Obj, 2. Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since, if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him grace; for it is written {Matt, vii. ii) that God gives His good Spirit to them that ask Him, But what is in our power, is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace. Obj. 3. Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz., that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace. Pseudo -Augustine, Hypognost., Ill, 4 (PL 45, 1624). ^ Ibid. Peter Lom- bard, In Rom., super VI, 23 (PL 191, 1412). ^De Caelo, II, 12 (292b 13). 988 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 109. Art. 6 Ob}, 4. Further, it is written {Prov, xvi. i) that it is the part of man to prepare the soul. Now an action is said to be the part of a man when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace. On the contrary j It is written {Jo, vi. 44) : No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him. But if man could pre- pare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man can- not prepare himself without the help of grace. I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold: — the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as was stated above. There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For it is in these two ways that we need the divine assistance, as was stated above. Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct its effect to its end; and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers. So, too, the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army — and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus, since God is absolutely the First Mover, it is by His motion that everything seeks Him under the common notion of good, whereby everything seeks to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says that God turns all to Himself, But He directs just men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. Ixxii. 28, it is good for Me to adhere to my God. And that they are turned to God can only spring from God’s having turned them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun prepares himself to receive the sun’s light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly. Reply Ob'], i. Man’s turning to God is by free choice; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free choice can be turned to God only when God turns it, according to Jer, xxxi. 18: Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God] and Lament, v 21: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted. ^ De Div, Nom., IV, 10 (PG 3, 708). Q. 109. Art. 7 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE 989 Reply Oh], 2. Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according tc John XV. 5: Without Me, you can do nothing. Hence when a man is said to dd what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God. Reply Oh], 3. This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed, since God is the First Mover Hence we need not go to infinity. Reply Obj. 4. It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does . this by his free choice. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above. Seventh Article 'WHETHER MAN CAN RISE FROM SIN WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace takes place without grace. But to rise from sin is presupposed to the illumination of grace, since it is written {Ephes. v. 14) : Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee. Therefore man can rise from sin without grace. Obj. 2. Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as was stated above.^^ Now man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace. Obj. 3. Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befit- ting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene.^^ Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice. On the contrary, The Apostle says {Gal, ii. 21 [cf. hi. 21]): For if there had been a law given which could give life, then Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature whereby he can be justified, Christ died in vain, i. 6 ,, to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore he cannot be justified by himself, i.e., he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice. ^Q. 71, a. ij ad 3 De Fide Orth., II, 4; 30 (PG 94, 876; 976) ; cf. op, cU., IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196). 990 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 109. Art. 7 I answer that, Man by himself can in no way rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as was stated above/^ to rise from sin is not the same as to cedse from the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was shown above/'^ viz., stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the adornment of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man’s nature is disordered because man’s will is not subject to God’s; and when this order is overthrown, the consequence is that the whole na- ture of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punish- ment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves eternal damnation. Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the adornment of grace comes from the illumination of the divine light, this adornment cannot be brought back, except God give His light anew. Hence a habitual gift is necessary; and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can be restored, man’s will can be subject to God, only when God draws man’s will to Himself, as was stated above. So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man’s Judge. And thus, in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift and as regards the internal motion of God. Reply Obj. i. To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free choice, as this act is required in order that man should rise from sin. Hence when it is said, Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee, we are not to thinh that the complete rising from sin precedes the illumination of grace; but that when man by his free choice, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace. Reply Ob']. 2. The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. The principle of this health is grace, which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by him- self, but requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection. Reply Ob'], 3. When nature is integral, it can be restored by itself to what is befitting and proportioned to it; but without exterior help it can- not be restored to what surpasses its limits. And thus human nature, un- done by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer integral, but corrupted, as was stated above; nor can it be restored, by itself, even to its con- natural good, and much less to the good of supernatural justice. ^ Q. 87, a. 6. Q. 85, a. 1 ; q. 86, a. i ; q. 87, a. i. Q. 109. Art. 8 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE 991 Eighth Article WHETHER MAN WITHOUT GRACE CAN AVOID SIN? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. For no one sins in what he cannot avoid j as Augustine says.^® Hence, if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible. Obj. 2. Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If, therefore, a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which is absurd. Obj. 3. Further, it is written {Ecclus. xv. i8): Before man is life and deaths good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him. But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace. On the contrary, Augustine says: Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer ^Lead us not into temptation^ {and they deny it who maintain that the help of God^s grace is not necesstary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all?^ I answer that-, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of integral nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the state of integral nature, man, even without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially, since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature — and in the state of integral nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless, he could not have done it without God’s help upholding him in good, since if this had been with- drawn, even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness. But in the state of corrupted nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought first in the mind, since the carnal appetite is not yet entirely healed. Hence .the Apostle {Rom. vii. 25) says in the person of one who is healed: I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin. And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, whose source is in the reason, as was stated above but man cannot abstain from all venial sin because of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary) f but not all, because, while he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above.*^^ ^ De Dmb. Anim., X; XI (PL 42, 103; 105) ; De Lib, Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1295). Perfect. lust., XXI (PL 44, 317). ^Q. 74, a. 4. 74, a. 3, ad 2. 992 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 109. Art. 8 SO; too, before man’s reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should always be actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says that a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins,"^^ and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of tlae sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man’s reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders oc- cur in the acts itself of the reason. For when man’s heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoid- ing of which a man strays from God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally; especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says,^^ although with the premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order. Reply Obj, 1. Man can avoid each but not every act of sin, ^except by grace, as was stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin. Reply Obj, 2 . Correction is useful in order that out of the sorrow of cor- rection may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that while the noise of correction is out- wardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden inspirations is inwardly also causing him to will, as Augustine says.^^ Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact that man’s will is required in order to abstain from sin; and yet it is not sufficient without God’s help. Hence it is written {Eccles, vii. 14): Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised. Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says, this saying is to be understood of man in the state of integral nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin.^® Hence he was able to sin and ^ot to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God’s assistance. ^ In Ezech., I, horn. 2 (PL 76, 915). ^ Eth., Ill, 8 (1117a 18). ^ De Corrept. et . Grat., I (PL 44, 921). Pseudo -Augustine, Hypognost., Ill, 2 (PL 45, 1621). 0 . log. Art. g THE NECESSITY OF GRACE 993 Ninth Article WHETHER ONE WHO HAS ALREADY OBTAINED GRACE CAN, OF HIMSELF AND WITHOUT FURTHER HELP OF GRACE, DO GOOD AND AVOID SIN? We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace can, by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfill what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imper- fect. Obj, 2. Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to i Cor. hi. i6: Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things without any further assistance of grace. Obj. 3. Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with equal reason he will need yet another grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is impossible. Hence, whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to work righteously and to keep free from sin. On the contrary, Augustine says that as the eye of the body, though most healthy, cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so neither can a man, even if he is most perfectly justified, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice But justificatibn is by grace, ac- cording to Rom. iii. 24: Being justified freely by His grace. Hence, even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously. / answer that, As was stated above, in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God — ^first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted hu- man nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritorious of eternal life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act. Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, that is, a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e., in order to be moved by God to act righteously; and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the divine motion;, secondly, for this special reason — ^the condition of the state of human nature. For, although ^De Nat. et Grat., XXVI (PL 44, 261). 994 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 109. Art. 10 healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves the law of sin {Rom. vii. 25). In the intellect, too, there remains the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written {Rom. viii. 26) : We know not what we should pray for as we ought \ since, because of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know our- selves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. ix. 14: For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain. Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For this reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God to say: Lead us not into temptation, and Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven, and whatever else is contained in the Lord’s Prayer pertaining to this. Reply Ob], i. The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence, if after having received grace man still needs the divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not com- pletely heal man, as was stated above. Reply Ob]. 2. The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and pro- tects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and protects us. Reply Obj. 3. This'argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace. Tenth Article WHETHER MAN POSSESSED OF GRACE NEEDS THE HELP OF GRACE IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE? We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help of grace to persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher.^^ Now since man is justi- fied by grace, he needs no further help of grace in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help of grace to have perseverance. Obj. 2. Further, all the virtues are infused together. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together with grace, perseverance is given when the other virtues are infused. Obj. 3. Further, as the Apostle says {Rom^ v. 20), more was restored to man by Christ’s gift than he had lost by Adam’s sin. But Adam received Eth., VII, I (1145b i) ; 9 (1151b 32). 99S Q. 109. Art. 10 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE what enabled him to persevere. Therefore, all the more is there restored in us by the grace of Christ the ability to persevere. And thus man does not need grace in order to persevere. On the contrary, Augustine says: Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power without His giving ii?^^ Now perseverance is besought even by those who are sanctified by grace; and this is seen when we say Hallowed be Thy name, which Augustine confirms by the words of' Cyprian.^® Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God. I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the Philosopher says.^^ Secondly, perseverance may be called a habit whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good until the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with grace, even as are continence and the other virtues. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the pre- ceding article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For grace is given to many to whom perseverance in grace is not given. Reply Obj. 1 . This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the second. Hence the solution of the second objection is clear. Reply Obj, 3 . As Augustine says, in the original state man received a gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering?'^ And thus, Christ’s gift is greater than Adam’s fault. Nevertheless, it was easier for man to persevere through the gift of grace in the state of innocence, in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is now. For the restora- tion by Christ’s grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere, but will be unable to sin. ^ De Dono Persev., II (PL 45, 996). Ibid,— Ci. also De Corrept. et Grat,, VI, 10 (PL 44, 922). ^EtK VII, 7 (iiSoa 13). Cf. De Corrept, et Grat., XII, 34 (PL 44, 937 )* Question CX ON THE GRACE OF GOD, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE {In Four Articles) We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether grace posits some- thing in the soul? (2) Whether grace is a quality? (3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue? (4) The subject of grace. First Article WHETHER GRACE POSITS ANYTHING IN THE SOUL? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace does not posit anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of man. Hence it is written {Gen, xxxix. 21) that the Lord gave to Joseph grace in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison. Now when we say that a man has the favor [gratiam] of another, nothing is posited in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is posited in him whose favor he has. Hence, when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is posited in his soul; but we merely signify the divine acceptance. 'Obj, 2. Further, as the soul quickens the body, so does God quicken the soul; and hence it is written {Deut, xxx. 20) : He is thy life. Now the soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore, likewise, nothing can come as a medium between God and the soul. Hence grace posits nothing created in the soul. Obj. 3. Further, on Rom. i, 7 {Grace to you and peace) the Gloss says; Grace, Le., the remission of sins.^ Now the remission of sins posits nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute sin, according to Fs. xxxi. 2: Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin. Hence neither does grace posit anything in the soul. On the contrary, Light posits something in what is illumined. But grace is a light of the soul, and hence Augustine says: The light of truth rightly' deserts the prevaricator of the law, and he who has been thus deserted be- comes blind? Therefore grace posits something in the soul. I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is usu- ally taken in three ways, First, for anyone’s love, as we are accustomed to ^ Glossd interl. (VI, 41) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super I, 7 (PL loi, 1316). ^ De Nat. et Grat., XXII (PL 44, 258). 996 Q. no. Art. i THE GRACE OF GOD 997 say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e,, that the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given gratis, according to which we are said to be grateful for benefits. Of these three, the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another gratis from the love wherewith he re- ceives him into his good graces. And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed gratis arises gratitude. Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace posits something in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the acknowl- edgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and. the grace of man. For since the creature’s good springs from the divine will, it is from the love by which God wills the good of the creature that some good comes in the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and hence man’s love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre- supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co- eternal with the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love of God towards the creature is looked at differently. For one is com- mon, whereby He loves all things that are {Wis. xi. 25), and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a partici- pation of the divine good; and according to this love He is said to love any- one absolutely, since it is by this love that God wills absolutely the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature. Accordingly, when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is sig- nified something supernatural bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless, the grace of God sometimes signifies God’s eternal love, in which sense it is also called the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously, and not from merits, predestines or elects some; for it is written {Ephes. i. 5) : He hath predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of the glory of His grace. Reply Obj. i. Even when a man is said to be in another’s good graces, it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other, even as anyone is said to have God’s grace; with this difference, however, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the divine love, as was said above. Reply Obj. 2. God is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the form, of itself, informs the matter or subject; whereas the agent informs the subject, not by its substance, but by the form which it* causes in the matter. Reply Obj. 3. Augustine says: When I said that grace was for the remis- 998 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. no. Art. 2 sion of sinSj and peace for our reconciliation with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general grace, but that the special name of grace signifies the remission of sins.^ Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God’s gifts pertain to grace. Further- more, the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us, as will appear later Second Article WHETHER GRACE IS A QUALITY OF THE SOUL? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality. Obj. 2. Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since We can do many things by grace to which nature is not equal, as was stated above.^ Therefore grace is not a quality. Obj. 3. Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains, since it is not corrupted; for in that case it would be reduced to nothing, just as it was created from nothing (hence it is called a new creature [GaL vi. 15] ), Therefore grace is not a quality. On the contrary, on Ps, ciii. 15 {That he may make the face cheerful with oil) the Gloss says: Grace is a certain splendor of soul, which wins the divine love? But splendor of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality. / answer that, As we have stated above, there is understood to be an effect of God’s gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God’s grace. Now it was stated that man is aided by God’s gratuitous will in two ways.'^ First, in- asmuch as man’s soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a move- ment of the soul; for motion is the act of the mover in the moved, as it is said in Physics iii.® Secondly, man is helped by God’s gratuitous will inas- much as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and this for the reason that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures whom He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of ^Retract XXV (PL 32, 624). ^Q. 113, a. 2. ®Q. 109. ^ Glossa ordin. (Ill, 240L).-- Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm,, super CIII, 15 (PL 37, 1369). '"Q. 109 a. I, 2 and 5* ® Aristotle, Phys., Ill, 3 (202a 13). Q. no. Art. 3 THE GRACE OF GOD 999 acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements. And thus it is that the movements whereby they are moved by God become connatural and easy for creatures, according to Wis, viii. i: she . . . ordereth all things sweetly. Much more, therefore, does He infuse into those whom He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good cer- tain supernatural forms or qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good. Hence the gift of grace is a quality. Reply Obj, i. Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just. Reply Ob ']. 2. Every substance is either the nature of the thing of which it is the substance, or it is a part of the nature, in which sense matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form ; it is rather an accidental form of the soul. Now what is in God substantially comes to be accidentally in the soul participating in the divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowl- edge. And thus, because the soul participates in the divine goodness im- perfectly, the participation of the divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Never- theless, inasmuch as it is an expression or participation of the divine good- ness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being. Reply Obj. 3. As Boethius says, the being of an accident is to inhere? Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it some- thing is ; and hence it is said to belong to a being rather than to be a being.^® And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be actually with this accident. In this sense, grace is also said to be created, in- asmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e.j are given a new being out of nothing, i.e., not from merits, according to Ephes. ii. 10, created in Jesus Christ in good works. Third Article WHETHER GRACE IS THE SAME AS VIRTUE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1 . It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says that operating grace is faith that worketh by charity. But faith that works by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is. a virtue. Cf . Pseudo-Bede, Sent., I, A (PL go, 968) . “ Aristotle, Metaph., VI, i (1028a 18) . Spir. et Litt., XIV, XXXII (PL 44, 217; 237). 1000 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. no. Art. 3 Ob]. 2. Further, what fits the definition fits the defined. But the defini- tions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since it makes its subject good, and his work good,^"^ and it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously ^ etc.^^ Therefore grace is a virtue. Obj. 3. Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the fourth species of quality, viz., form, which is the abiding figure of things, since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the third, since it is not a passion nor a passion-like quality, which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physics vii.;^*^ whereas grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the second species, which is natural power or impotence; for grace is above nature and is not concerned with good and evil, as is a natural power. There- fore it must be in the first species, which is habit or disposition. Now the habits of the mind are virtues; since even science itself is a virtue, after a manner, as was stated above.^^ Therefore grace is the same as virtue. On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since grace fore- runs charity, as Augustine says in his book On The Predestination of the Saints.'^^ Therefore grace is not a virtue. / answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in es- sence, and differed only logically; so that it would be grace according to which a man is pleasing to God, or which is given gratuitously, and it would be virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. The Master of the Sentences seems to have thought this.^'^ But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says, virtue is a disposition of what is perfect , — and 1 call perfect what is disposed according to its nature. Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing is spoken of in relation to an already existing nature, for everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts, of which we spoke above, are dispositions by which a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature by which he is a man; whereas infused virtues dis- pose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e., in relation to a participation of the divine nature, which is called the light of grace, according to a Pet. i. 4: He hath given us most great and most precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature. And it is in respect of re- ceiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. And thus, just as the natural light of reason is something different from the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the ^Cf. Aristotle, Eth., 11 , 6 (iio6a 15). ^Cf. above, q. 55, a. 4. Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3 (245b 3). 56, a. 3; q. 57, a. i and 2, "®Cf. Be Bono Persev., XVI (PL 45, 1018). Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxvii, 6 (I, 447). '^Phys,, VII, 3 (246a 13). 55. 1001 Q, no. Art. 4 THE GRACE OF GOD light of grace, which is a participation of the divine nature, is something different from the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light; and hence the Apostle says {Efhes. v. 8) : For you were hereto- fore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light. For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk in accordance with the natural light of reason, ^so the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace. Reply Oh], i. Augustine calls faith that worketh by charity grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested. Reply Obj. 2. Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its suitableness for some pre-existing nature, essential or participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in man, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 3. Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but rather a certain disposition which is pre- supposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root. Fourth Article WHETHER GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT, OR IN ONE OF THE POWERS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1 . It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says that grace is related to the will or to free choice as a rider to his horser^ Now the will or free choice is a power, as was stated above.^^ Hence grace is in a power of the soul as in a subject. Obj. 2. Further, Man^s merit springs from grace, as Augustine says?^ Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul. Obj. 3. Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false, since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace. Obj. 4. Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul, viz., neither the will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is unreasonable. On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But genera- Pseudo -Augustine, Hypognost., Ill, ii (PL 45, 1632). ^S. T., I, q 83, a. 2. ^ De Grat. et Lib. Arb., XI (PL 44, 889). 1002 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. no. Art. 4 tion terminates at the essence prior to- the powers. Therefore grace is in the soul’s essence prior to being in the powers. I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; for the soul’s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as was stated above.^^ But if grace differs from virtue,- it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature of virtue, as was stated above.^^ Hence it remains that grace, being prior to virtue, has therefore a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For just as man through his intellectual power participates in the divine knowledge through the vir- tue of faith, and through his power of will participates in the divine love through the virtue of charity, so also through the nature of the soul does he participate in the divine nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation. Reply Obj. i. Just as from the essence of the soul flow its powers, which are the principles of operations, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse — but not as an accident to a subject. And thereby is made clear the Reply to the second objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of the virtues, just as the essence of the soul is the principle of vital operations through the medium of the powers. Reply Obj. 3. The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul fol- lowing upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz., of brute animals and of plants. Consequently, it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; for this belongs to the essence of the soul inasmuch as it is of such a species. Reply Obj. 4. Since the powers of the soul are natural properties fol- lowing upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it were without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species; not that it would actually have these powers, but because of the species of suqh an essence, from which these powers naturally flow. ® Q. 56, a. I. Q. SS, a. I ; q. 56, a. i. Question CXI ON THE DIVISION OF GRACE {In Five Articles) We must now consider the division of grace, under which head there are five points of inquiry ; ( i ) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace? (2 ) The division of sanctifying grace into oper- ating and co-operating grace. (3 ) Its division into prevenient and subsequent grace. (4) The division of gratuitous grace. (5) On the comparison be- tween sanctifying and gratuitous grace. First Article WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SANCTIFYING GRACE AND GRATUITOUS GRACE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as is clear from what has been already stated.^ But man is not therefore pleas- ing to God because something is given him by God, but rather on the contrary ; for something is freely given by God because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying grace. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is not given because of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is co-divided against grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace, since it is found also outside the genus of grace. Obj. 3. Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us gratuitously, ac- cording to Rom. iii. 24: Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace. Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace. On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz., to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says {Ephes. i. 6): He hath graced us in His beloved Son. And with regard to the second {Rom. xi. 6) : And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more grace. Therefore grace can be distinguished by its having one only or both. ^Q. no, a. I. 1003 1004 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. ni. Aet. i I answer that, As the Apostle says {Rom. xiii. i), those things that are of God are well ordered. Now the order of things consists in this, that some things are led to God by others, as Dionysius says.^ And hence, since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God by others. According to this, consequently, there is a twofold grace: one, whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called sanctifying grace] the other is that whereby one man co-operates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called gratuitous grace, since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But since it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may co-operate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (/ Cor. xii. 7) : And the manifesta- tion of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility, i.e., of others. Reply Obj. 1. Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently, but for- mally, i.e., because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. i. 21. He hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light. Reply Obj. 2. Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways. First, as arising from merit; and this is referred to the person to whom it belongs to do meri- torious works, according to Rom. iv. 4: Now to him that worketh, the re- ward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. The second debt concerns the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, so that the divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. Hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense, but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in neither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of grace. Reply Obj. 3. Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something which also belongs to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace, which does not do this, keeps the coniinon name, as happens in many other cases ; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace. -De Cad. Hier., IV, 3 (PG 3, 181). Q. III. Art. 2 THE DIVISION OF GRACE 1005 Second Article WHETHER GRACE IS EITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into op- erating and co-operating grace. For grace is an accident, as was stated above.^ Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating. Obj. 2, Further, if grace operates anything in us, it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says on John xiv. 12 {the works that I do he also shall do) He Who created thee without thyself , will not justify thee without thyself A Therefore no grace ought to be called unqualifiedly operating. Obj, 3. Further, to co-operate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than does free choice, according to Rom. ix. 16: It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth j but of God that sheweth mercy. Therefore no grace ought to be called co-operating. Obj. 4. Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to co-operate are not opposed, for one and the same thing can both operate and co-operate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and co-operating. On the contrary j Augustine says: God, by co-operating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by co-operation with such as are willing, begins by operating that they may will.^ But the operations of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. There- fore grace is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating. I answer that, As was stated above, grace may be taken in two ways.^ First, as a divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us. Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence, in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God ; and it is with, reference to this that we speak of operating grace. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not attributed only to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of co-operating grace. Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is as something moved, and God is the Q. no, a. 2, ad 2. ^ Serm. CLXIX, ii (PL 38, 923) . " De Grat. et Lib. Arb., XVII (PL 44, 901). 109, a. 2, 3, 6 and 9; q. no, a. 2.. 1006 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. m. Art. 3 mover; and especially so when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another act, namely, the exterior act. Now since this act is commanded by the will, as was shown above, the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of co-operating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: He operates that we may will; and when we will. He co-operates that we may accomplish. And thus, if grace is taken for God’s gratuitous motion, whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating grace. But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form, the first of which is being, and the second, operation. Thus, the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. In this way, habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which proceed from free choice, it is called co-operating grace. Reply Obj. i. Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, even as whiteness makes a surface white. Reply Obj. 2. God does not justify us without ourselves, because while we are being justified we consent to God’s justice by a movement of our free choice. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect ; and hence the whole operation pertains to grace. Reply Obj. 3. One thing is said to co-operate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, under the presupposition of the end, grace co-operates with us. Reply Obj. 4. Operating and co-operating grace are the same grace, but they are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said. Third Article WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PREVENIENT AND SUBSEQUENT GRACE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into pre- venient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the divine love. But God’s love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to i John iv. lo: ’Q. 17, a. 9. Q. III. Art. 3 THE DIVISION OF GRACE 1007 Not as though we had loved God, hut because He hath first loved us. Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent. Obj. 2. Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. xii. 9: My grace is sufficient for thee. But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly di- vided into prevenient and subsequent. Obf. 3. Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite number of effects — one preceding another. Hence if it is with regard to these that grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. On the contrary, God’s grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are found in Ps. Iviii. ii: His mercy shall prevent me, and again, Ps. xxii. 6: Thy mercy will follow me. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into preven- ient and subsequent. / answer that. Just as grace is divided into operating and co-operating, according to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent, however we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us. Of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good ; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inas- much as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so grace may be called prevenient and subsequent because of the same effect viewed in relation to other and different effects. And this is what Augustine says: It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened ; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified.^ Reply Obj. i. God’s love signifies something eternal, and hence can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both pre- venient and subsequent. Reply Obj. 2. The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said of op- erating and co-operating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it per- tains to glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies imperfection. Reply Obj. 3. Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number, ^ De Nat. et. Grat., XXXI (PL 44, 264). ioo8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. m. Art. 4 even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless, all are reduced to some things determinate in species, and moreover all coincide in this, that one precedes another. Fourth Article WHETHER GRATUITOU'S GRACE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED BY THE APOSTLE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection 1 . It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God may be called a gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good of the body; and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence gratuitous graces can- not be contained under any certain division. Obj. 2. Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are justified by it, accord- ing to Rom. V, 1: Being justified therefore by faith. Hence it is not right to place faith among the gratuitous graces, especially since the other virtues, e.g.j hope and charity, are not so placed. Obj. 3. Further, the operation of healing, and speaking diverse tongues are miracles. For the interpretation of speeches pertains either to wisdom or to science, according to Dan. i. 17: And to these children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom. Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and the kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and science. Obj. 4. Further, as wisdom and science are gifts of the Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude and fear, as was stated above.® Therefore these also ought to be placed among the gratuitous graces. On the contrary, The Apostle says (/ Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10) : To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of mir- acles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches. I answer that, As was said above, gratuitous grace is ordained to this, viz., that a man may help another to be led to God. Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only ex- teriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace embraces what- ever a man needs in order to instruct another in divine things which are above reason. Now for this three things are required. First, a man must pos- sess the fullness of knowledge of divine things, so as to be capable of teach- ing others. Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, or ®Q. 68, a. 4. Q. III. Art. 4 THE DIVISION OF GRACE 1009 otherwise his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of presenting fittingly to his hearers what he knows. Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must first be certain of the principles of that science; and with regard to this there is jaith, which is certitude of invisible things, the principles of Catholic doc- trine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science; and hence we have the word of wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowl- edge of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of science, which is the knowledge of human things, since the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i. 20). Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what is proper to the divine power, and this in two ways. First, when the teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do in miraculous deeds, whether with respect to bodily health — and thus there is the grace of healing, or merely for the purpose of manifesting the divine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that the sea should be divided — and thus there is the working of miracles. Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and these are either future contingents — and thus there is prophecy, or also the secrets of hearts, and thus there is the discerning of spirits. But the capability of speaking can concern either the idiom in which a person can be understood, and thus there is kinds of tongues ; or it can con- cern the sense of what is said, and thus there is the interpretation of speeches. Reply Obj. i. As was stated above, not all the benefits divinely con- ferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that surpass the power of nature — e.g., that a fisherman should be replete with the word of wisdom and of science, and the like; and such as these are here set down as gratuitous graces. Reply Obj. 2. Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a super-eminent certi- tude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others concerning such things as belong to faith. With regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power, according as man is ordained thereby to God. Reply Obj. 3. The grace of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as special gratuitous graces. 1010 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. m. Art. 5 Reply Ob], 4. Wisdom and science are not numbered among the gratui- tous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e., inasmuch as man’s mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and science; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as was stated above.^® But they are numbered among the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of science and wisdom that a man can not only think rightly of divine things, but cari in- struct others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the word of wisdom and the word of Science that are placed in the gratui- tous graces, since, as Augustine says: It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting lije, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be defended against the un- godly."^^ Fifth Article WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS NOBLER THAN SANCTIFYING GRACE? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctify- ing grace. For the people^ s good is better than the individual good, as the Philosopher says.^^ Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as was stated above. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. Ob], 2. Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher says that justice is the most excellent of the virtues, since by it a man bears himself rightly also towards others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself, whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. Obj. 3. Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is com- mon to all; and thus to reason, which is proper to man, is nobler than to sense, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all the members of the .Church, but gratuitous grace is the' proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous, grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. On the contrary. The Apostle (i Cor. xii. 31), having enumerated the gratuitous graces, adds: And 1 shew unto you yet a more excellent way] and as the sequel proves, he is speaking of charity, which pertains to sancti- “Q. 68, a. I and 4. ^ De Trin., XIV, i (PL 42, 1037). ^Op, cit., V, I (1129b 27; b 32). ^ Eth., I, 2 (1094b 8) . lOII Q. III. Art. s THE DIVISION OF GRACE lying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous grace. I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is preparatory to the end; and thus by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. Hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace. Reply Ob'], i. As the Philosopher says, a multitude, e.g., an army, has a double good.^^ The first is in the multitude itself, viz., the order of the army; the second is separate from the multitude, viz., the good of the leader, and this is the better good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler. Reply Oh], 2. If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have sanctifying grace, it would follow that gratuitous grace was the nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that illumines is more excellent than that of some body that is lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause another to be united to God, which he himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which manifests the species by which it acts to produce heat in other things, is not more noble than the sub- stantial form of the fire. Reply Ob'], 3. To sense is ordained to reason as to an end, and hence to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison. ^^Metaph., XI, 10 (loysa ii). Question CXII ON THE CAUSE OF GRACE {In Five Articles) We must now consider the cause of grace, and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace? (2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part pf the recipient, by an act of free choice? (3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity? (4) Whether grace is equal in all? (s) Whether anyone can know that he has grace? First Article WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written {Jo, i. 17): Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Now, by the name Jesus Christ is understood not merely the divine nature assum- ing, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace. Obj. 2. Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace, * Obj. 3. Further, according to Dionysius, Angels cleanse, enlighten and perfect both lesser angels and menJ Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. On the contrary, It is written {Fs. Ixxxiii. 12) : The Lord will give grace and glory. I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the divine nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impos- sible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, by bestowing a partaking of the divine nature through a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should en- kindle. Gael. Bier., Ill, 2; IV, 2; VII, 3; VIII, 2 (PG 3, 165; 180 ,* 209; 240). 1012 Q. II2. Art. 2 THE CAUSE OF GRACE 1013 Reply Ob'], i. Christ’s humanity is an organ of His divinity j as Dama- scene says.^ Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the prin- cipal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ’s humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by the power of the divine nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ’s humanity are saving actions. Reply Obj. 2. Just as in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, under the principal agency of the divine power, so like- wise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to John iii. 5: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God, Reply Obj. 3. Angels cleanse, enlighten and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius says that this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of divine science? Second Article WHETHER ANY PREPARATION AND DISPOSITION FOR GRACE IS REQUIRED ON MAN’S PART? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man’s part, since, as the Apostle says {Rom. iv. 4), To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. Now a man’s preparation by free choice can be only through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace. Obj. 2. Further, whoever continues sinning is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who continue sinning grace is given,, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace while he was breathing out threat- enings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord {Acts ix. i). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man’s part. Obj. 3. Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in mat- ter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, for it is called a new creature {Gal. vi. 15) . But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as was stated above. Hence no prep- aration is required on man’s part to obtain grace. On the contrary, It is written {Amos iv. 12) : Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel] and (i Kings vii. 3) : Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. I answer that, As was stated above, grace is taken in two ways.^ First, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul ^De Fide Orth., Ill, 19 (PG 94, 1080). ^Cf. De Gael. Bier., VII, 3 (PG 3, 209). ^Q. 109, a. 2, 3, 6 and 9; q. no, a. 2; q. in, a. 2. 1014 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. II2. Art. 3 to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can be only in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God moving us to good, no prepara- tion is required on man’s part, anticipating, as it were, the divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of free choice, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace, is an act of free choice moved by God. And it is thus that man is said to prepare himself, accord^ ing to Prov. xvi. i : It is the part of man to prepare the soul] yet it is prin- cipally from God, Who moves the free choice. Hence it is said that man’s will is prepared by God {Prov. viii. 35), and that man’s steps are guided by God {Prov. xxxvi. 23). Reply Obj. I. A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed, but of glory, which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, which yet is from God’s motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen farther on.® Reply Obj. 2. Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written {Ecclus. xi. 23) : It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the' poor man rich. Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace sud- denly, according to John vi. 45: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. And thus it happened to Paul, since, sud- denly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace suddenly. Reply Obj. 3. An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of some other cause; and yet, look- ing to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So, likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about. TMrd Article WHETHER GRACE IS NECESSARILY GIVEN TO WHOEVER PRE- PARES HIMSELF FOR IT, OR TO WHOEVER DOES WHAT HE CAN? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever ®Q. 1 14, a. 2. Q. II2. Art. 3 THE CAUSE OF GRACE 1015 prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rom, V. I {Being justified , . . by. faith, let us have peace, etc.) the Gloss says: God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be in- justice with Him,^ But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. There- fore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity. Obj, 2. Further, Anselm says that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it.'^ But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on him of necessity. Obj. 3. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius.^ But the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace. On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, accord- ing to Jer. xviii. 6: clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand. But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily re- ceive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God. 1 answer that, As was stated above, man’s preparation for grace is from God, as mover, and from free choice, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways. First, as it is from free choice, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the mover, and thus it has a necessity^ — ^not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility — ^as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine, in his book On the Predestination of the Saints, that by God^s good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.^ Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to John vi. 45: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. Reply Obj. 1, This Gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meri- torious act of their free choice, already informed with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established. — Or if it refers to the movement of free choice before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man’s flight to God is by a divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail. Reply Obj. 2. The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but ® Peter Lombard, In Rom., super III, 21 (PL 19 1, 1360) . De Casu DM., Ill (PL 158, 328). ^De Div. Norn., IV, 20 (PG 3, 7 ^ 9 ) • ® Cf. De Dono Persev., XIV (PL 45, 1014). ioi6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 112. Art. 4 the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God’s, according to Osee siii. 9: Destruction is thy own, 0 Israel; thy help is only in Me, Reply Oh]. 3. Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily follow the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition. Fourth Article WHETHER GRACE IS GREATER IN ONE THAN IN ANOTHER? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the divine love, as was stated above.^^® Now it is written {Wis. vi. 8): He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all. Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is a maximum cannot be more or less. But grace is a maximum since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another. Obj. 3. Further, grace is the soul’s life, as was stated above.^^ But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace. On the contrary, It is written {Ephes. iv. 7) : But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. Now what is given in measure is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace. I answer that, As was stated above, habits can have a double magni- tude.^^ One concerns the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other is on the part of the subject, which participates more or less in the habit inhering to it. Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the highest good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly illumined by the light of grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself only inasmuch as his free choice is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various de- grees; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the uni- verse might be perfect. Hence, after the Apostle had said {Ephes. iv. 7) : To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ, having enumerated the various graces, he adds {verse 12): For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ. “Q. no, a. I. ^ Q. no, a. i, ad 2. 52, a. i and 2; q. 66, a. i and 2 . THE CAUSE OF GRACE Q. II2. Art. 5 1017 Reply Ob'], i. The divine care may be looked at in two ways. First, as regards the divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, secondly, it may be considered in those things which come to creatures by the divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts for some,* and lesser gifts for others. Reply Obj. 2. This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude in grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it ordains more or less to a greater or lesser participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remission both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects’ participation. Reply Ob]. 3. Natural life pertains to man’s substance, and hence can- not be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less. Fifth Article WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE HAS GRACE? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace is in the soul by its essence. Now the soul has most certain knowl- edge of those things that are in it by their essence, as appears from Au- gustine.^^ Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace. Obj. 2. Further, as science is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives science from God, knows that he has science, according to Wis. vii. 17: The Lord hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are. Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows that he has grace. Obj. 3. Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according to the Apostle {Ephes. v. 13), all that is made manifest is light. Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known. Obj. 4. Further, the Apostle says (/ Cor. ii. 12): Now we have re- ceived not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God. Now grace is God’s first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him. Obj. 5. Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham {Gen. xxii. 12): Now I know that thou fearest God, i.e., I have made thee know. But He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace. Genesi ad Litt., XII, 25; 31 (PL 34, 475; 479). ioi8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 112. Art. 5 On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. ix. i) : Man knoweth not whether he he worthy of love or hatred. Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God’s love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanctify- ing grace. I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing. First, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome w