1175776 189.4 T45b V.2 Thomas Aquinas Basic writinos Kansas city Kansas city, missoun Books will be issued only on presentation of library card. Please report lost cards and change of residence promptly. Card holders are responsible for all books, records, films, pictures or other library materials checked out on their cards, BASIC WRITINGS' OF Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume Two Kdited and Annotated, with an Introduction, by Anton C. Pegis Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University Graduate School RANDOM HOUSE • NEW YORK Frst Printing Nihil obstat Arthur J. Scanian, Censor Librorum Imprimatur * Franpis J, Sbkllman, u.il Archbishop, New York February ii, 1944. COPYRIOIIT, I94S» random HOimK, INC. PUBLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN PANADA BY ^ RANDOM HOUSE OF CANADA LIMITED MANXTFACTURF4) IN THE UNTTED KTATES AF GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume I GOD AND THE ORDER OF CREATION Summu 77/rr)/o/;/Vv/, Fart I (complete) I. Otnu THK mVINK tFKITY (qQ, 1-26) 5 II. c;0|3; tilK mviNK PKK.SONH (qQ. ■ 27-43) III. CW-.ATI0\ IX OKNKIUI. (W- 44-49) ^26 IV. THK AXt;PI.S (m. 50-64) 480 V. ‘UIF. WORK THE SIX DAYS (qO- 65-74) 609 VI. MAX im. 75nS()) 682 VIE OX THE FIRST MAM (gi,). ()0-I02) 864 Vin. THE DIVINE iiOVEKNMKNT (OQ. IO3-II9) 950 Volume 1 1 MAX AND THE CONDUCT OP LIFE Cummti Ctmim GV;i//7n' (III, (Tapters 1 - 113 ) IX. THE END OF MAM (CH. I-63) 3 X. MAN AMD THK PROVIDENXT: OF C.OD (c'H. 64-03) 113 Si^mnm 77ioi%/oi, First Fart of the Second Fart Xf. HOMAN ACTS (OQ. 6“2l) 225 XH. HAIIITS* VIRTOE.S AND VK'KS (qQ. 49-i^9) xiio TAW I'gg. c|o-ioH) 742 XIV, ORAOE (gg. 109-04) 979 Summu Tkeolu^iat, Second Fart of the Second Part XV. FAITH (c)g* 07) loss CONTENTS Volume II MAN AND THE CONDUCT OF LIFE IX. THE END OF MAN. TEXT: Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, Chapters 1-63. PAGE CHAI^TER I FOREWORD. 3 2 THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END. 5 3 THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD. 7 4 THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS. 9 5-6 ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT WITHOUT INTENTION [anD THEIR SOLUTION], 10, 7 THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE. 13 8-9 ARGUMENTS WHEREBY IT IS SEEMINGLY PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING [AND THEIR SOLUTION]. 14 3 0 THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD. 1 7 11 THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD. 21 12 THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD. 22 13 THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND. 23 14 THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE. 24 15 THAT THERE IS NO HIGHEST EVIL. 25 16 THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD. 26 17 THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD. 27 18 HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS. 29 19 THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD. 30 20 HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS. 30 21 THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD INASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE. 33 2 2 HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RE- SPECTIVE ENDS. 34 23 THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS IS FROM AN INTEL- LECTUAL PRINCIPLE. . 37 24 HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD. 41 2 5 THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTELLECTUAL SUB- STANCE. 43 26 DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF TFIE WILL? 47 27 THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES. 51 28 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONORS. 53 29 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN GLORY. 54 30 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WEALTH. 55 vii viii CONTENTS PACE CHAPTER 31 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WORLDLY POWER. 56 32 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN GOODS OF THE BODY. 56 33 THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES. 57 34 THAT man’s ultimate HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF THE MORAL VIRTUES. 57 35 THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE. 58 36 THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART. 59 37 THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEM- PLATING GOD. 59 38 THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MA- JORITY. 6 1 39 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION. 62 40 THAT man’s HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD BY FAITH. 64 41 IS IT POSSIBLE FOR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPA- RATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF THE SPECU- LATIVE SCIENCES? 65 42 THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUB- STANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER. 69 43 THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES^ IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVERROES. 72 44 THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IMAGINED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS. 76 45 THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPA- RATE SUBSTANCES. 77 46 THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF. 79 47 THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE. 82 48 THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE. 84 49 THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES. 87 50 THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD. 90 51 HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE. 92 52 THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE. 93 53 THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE. 95 54 ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE, AND THEIR SOLUTION. 97 55 THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE. 99 CONTENTS IX PAGE CHAPTER 56 THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING GOD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM. 100 57 THAT EVERY INTELLECT OP ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION. 102 58 THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER. 103 59 HOW THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS. 104 60 THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE. 106 61 THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE. 107 62 THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOREVER. 108 63 HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN’S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED. Ill X. MAN AND THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. TEXT: Summa Contra Gentiles, Book. Ill, Chapters 64-113. CHAPTER 64 THAT GOD GOVERNS ALL THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE. 113 65 THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN BEING. 116 66 THAT NOTHING GIVES BEING EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY god’s POWER. 118 67 THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF their OPERATING. 120 68 THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE. 121 69 CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS. 123 70 HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT, 129 71 that the DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS. 130 72 that the DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTIN- GENCY FROM THINGS. 133 73 THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE LIB- ERTY OF CHOICE. 134 74 THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FORTUNE AND CHANCE. 136 75 THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENTS. 137 76 THAT god’s PROVIDENCE CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDI- ATELY, 140 77 THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES. 143 78 THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREA- TURES ARE RULED BY GOD. 145 79 THAT LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER. 146 80 ON THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO ONE AN- OTHER. 147 X CONTENTS PACE CHAPTER 8 1 ON THE ORDERING OF MEN TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO OTHER THINGS. 82 THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 83 CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING. 155 84 THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES DO NOT ACT ON OUR INTELLECTS. 1.56 85 THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF ()UR WILLING AND CHOOSING. 159 86 THAT CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN THIS LOWER WORLD DO NOT RE- SULT OF NECESSITY FROM THE ACTION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 163 87 THAT THE MOVEMENT OF A HEAVENLY BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR CHOOSING BY VIRTUE OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME SAY. 167 88 that created separate substances CANNOT BE THE DIRECT CAUSES OF OUR ACT OF CHOOSING AND WILLING, BUT GOD ALONE. 1 68 89 THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL, AND NOT ONLY THE POWER OF THE WILL, IS CAUSED BY GOD. 170 90 THAT HUMAN CHOICE AND WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE. 171 91 HOW HUMAN AFFAIRS MAY BE REFERRED TO HIGHER CAUSES. 173 92 HOW A MAN MAY BE SAID TO BE FORTUNATE, AND HOW HE IS ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES. 174 93 IS THERE SUCH A THING AS FATE, AND WHAT IS IT? 179 94 OF THE CERTAINTY OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE. 180 95-96 THAT THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USEFULNESS OF PRAYER. 184 97 HOW THE DISPOSITION OF PROVIDENCE IS ACCORDING TO A PLAN. 189 98 HOW IT IS POSSIBLE, AND HOW IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOR GOD TO DO SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE. 193 99 THAT GOD CAN WORK OUTSIDE THE ORDER IMPOSED ON THINGS, BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT THEIR PROXIMATE CAUSES. 194 100 THAT WHAT GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF NATURE IS NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE. 197 1 01 ON MIRACLES. 198 102 THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES. 199 103 HOW SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO WONDERS WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TRULY MIRACLES. 201 104 THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DO NOT RESULT ONLY FROM THE INFLUENCE OF HEAVENLY BODIES. 204 105 WHENCE THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DERIVE THEIR EFFICACY. 206 106 THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH GIVES EFFICACY TO THE PRACTICES OF MAGIC IS NOT GOOD ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. 209 107 THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHOSE ASSISTANCE IS EMPLOYED IN THE MAGIC ARTS IS NOT EVIL IN ITS NATURE. 210 CONTE^iTS xi PAGE CHAPTER I08 ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO SIN IN THE DEMONS. 213 109 THAT THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE DEMONS, AND HOW THIS IS POSSIBLE. 215 no SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS. 218 111 THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL MANNER. 219 1 12 THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE GOVERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, AND OTHER CREATURES AS DIRECTED TO THEM. 220 1 13 THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS DIRECTED TO ITS ACTIONS BY GOD NOT ONLY IN WHAT BEFITS THE SPECIES, BUT ALSO IN WHAT BEFITS THE INDIVIDUAL. 223 XI. HUMAN ACTS. TEXT: Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions 6-21. Q. 6 ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY. 225 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN HUMAN ACTS? 226 2 WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 228 3 WHETHER THERE CAN BE VOLUNTARINESS WITHOUT ANY ACT? 229 4 WHETHER VIOLENCE CAN BE DONE TO THE WILL? 230 5 WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? 232 6 WHETHER FEAR CAUSES WHAT IS VOLUNTARY ABSOLUTELY? 233 7 WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? 235 8 WHETHER IGNORANCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? 236 Q. 7 ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS. 239 ART. I WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE IS AN ACCIDENT OF A HUMAN ACT? 239 2 WHETHER THEOLOGIANS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE CIRCUM- STANCES OF HUMAN ACTS? 240 3 WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PROPERLY SET FORTH IN THE THIRD BOOK OF THE EthicS? 242 4 WHETHER THE MOST IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE why AND in what the act consists? 243 Q. 8 ON THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS. 245 ART. I WHETHER THE WILL IS OF GOOD ONLY? 245 2 WHETHER VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS? 247 3 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SAME ACT TO THE END AND TO TFIE MEANS? 248 Q, 9 ON THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL. 250 ART. I. WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT? 250 2 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? 252 3 WHETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF? 253 4 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? 254 s WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY BODY? 255 6 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY GOD ALONE, AS EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? 257 CONTENTS xii PAGE Q. 10 ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED, 259 ART. y WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED TO ANYTHING NATURALLY? 259 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY ITS OBJECT? 261 3 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE LOWER APPETITE? 262 4 WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE EXTERIOR MOVER WHICH IS GOD? 264 Q. 11 ON ENJOYMENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL, 266 ART. I WHETHER tO enjoj IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER? 266 2 WHETHER TO ENJOY BELONGS TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE ALONE, OR ALSO TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 267 3 WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE LAST END? 268 4 WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE END POSSESSED? 270 Q. 12 ON INTENTION. 272 ART. I WHETHER INTENTION IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL? 272 2 WHETHER INTENTION IS ONLY OF THE LAST END? 273 3 WHETHER ONE CAN INTEND TWO THINGS AT THE SAME TIME? 274 4 WHETHER THE INTENTION OF THE END IS THE SAME ACT AS THE VOLITION OF THE MEANS TO THE END? 275 5 WHETHER INTENTION BEFITS IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 277 Q. 13 ON CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO THE MEANS TO THE END. 278 ART. I WHETHER CHOICE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL OR OF THE REASON? 273 2 WHETHER CHOICE IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 279 3 WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END OR SOMETIMES ALSO OF THE END? 281 4 WHETHER CHOICE IS OF THOSE THINGS ONLY THAT ARE DONE BY US? 282 5 WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF POSSIBLE THINGS? 283 6 WHETHER MAN CHOOSES OF NECESSITY OR FREELY? 284 Q. 14 ON COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE. 286 ART. I WHETHER COUNSEL IS AN INQUIRY? 286 2 WHETHER COUNSEL IS OF THE END, OR ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END? 287 3 WHETHER COUNSEL IS ONLY OF THINGS THAT WE DQ? 288 4 WHETHER COUNSEL IS ABOUT ALL THINGS THAT WE DO? 289 5 WHETHER COUNSEL PROCEEDS BY WAY OF RESOLUTION? 291 6 WHETHER THE PROCESS OF COUNSEL IS WITHOUT END? 292 Q. 15 ON CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELA- TION TO THE MEANS. 294 ART. I WHETHER CONSENT IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE OR OF THE APPREHENSIVE POWER? 294 2 WHETHER CONSENT IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 295 3 WHETHER CONSENT IS DIRECTED TO THE END OR TO THE MEANS TO THE END? 296 CONTENTS xiii PAGE 4 WHETHER CONSENT TO THE ACT BELONGS ONLY TO THE HIGHER PART OF THE SOUL? 297 Q. 16 ON USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO THE MEANS TO THE END. 299 ART. I WI-IETHER USE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL? 299 2 WHETHER USE IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 300 3 WHETHER USE CAN APPLY ALSO TO THE LAST END? 301 4 WHETHER USE PRECEDES CHOICE? 302 Q. 17 ON THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL. 304 ART. I WHETHER COMMAND IS AN ACT OF THE REASON OR OF THE WILL? 304 2 WHETHER COMMAND BELONGS TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? 305 3 WHETHER USE PRECEDES COMMAND? 306 4 WHETHER COMMAND AND THE COMMANDED ACT ARE ONE ACT, OR DISTINCT? 307 5 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE WILL IS COMMANDED? 309 6 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE REASON IS COMMANDED? 310 7 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE IS COM- MANDED? 311 8 WHETHER THE ACT OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL IS COMMANDED? 313 9 WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE EXTERNAL MEMBERS ARE COM- MANDED? 314 Q. 18 ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL. 317 ART. I WHETPIER EVERY HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD, OR ARE THERE EVIL ACTIONS? 317 2 WHETHER TPIE GOOD OR EVIL OF A MAN^S ACTION IS DERIVED FROM ITS OBJECT? 319 3 WHETHER man’s ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM A CIRCUM- STANCE? 320 4 WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END? 321 5 WHETHER A HUMAN -ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL IN ITS SPECIES? 322 6 WHETHER AN ACT HAS THE SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END? 324 7 WHETHER TPIE SPECIES DERiyED FROM THE END IS CONTAINED UNDER THE SPECIES DERIVED FROM THE OBJECT AS UNDER ITS GENUS OR CONVERSELY? 325 8 WHETHER ANY ACT IS INDIFFERENT IN ITS SPECIES? 327 9 WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL ACT CAN BE INDIFFERENT? 329 10 WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE PLACES A MORAL ACT IN A SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL? 330 11 WPIETHER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAKES AN ACT BETTER OR WORSE PLACES A MORAL ACTION IN A SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL? 332 Q. 19 ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL. 334 ART. I WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT? 334 XIV CONTENTS PAGE 2 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT ALONE? 335 3 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON REASON? 337 4 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE ETERNAL LAW? 338 5 WHETHER THE WILL IS EVIL WHEN IT IS AT VARIANCE WITH ERRING REASON? 339 6 WHETHER THE WILL IS GOOD WHEN IT ABIDES BY ERRING REASON? 341 7 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL, AS REGARDS THE MEANS, DEPENDS ON THE INTENTION OF THE END? 343 8 WHETHER THE DEGREE OF GOODNESS OR MALICE IN THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE OF GOOD OR EVIL IN THE INTENTION? 344 9 WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON ITS CON- FORMITY TO THE DIVINE WILL? 346 10 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE HUMAN WILL, IN ORDER TO BE GOOD, TO BE CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL AS REGARDS THE THING WILLED? 347 Q. 20 ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTS. 350 ART. I WHETHER GOODNESS OR MALICE IS FIRST IN THE ACT OF TFIE WILL, OR IN THE EXTERNAL ACT? 350 2 WHETHER THE WHOLE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE EXTER- NAL ACT DEPEND ON THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL? 351 3 WHETHER THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE EXTERNAL ACT ARE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE INTERIOR ACT? 352 4 WHETHER THE EXTERNAL ACT ADDS ANY GOODNESS OR MALICE TO THAT OF THE INTERIOR ACT? 354 5 WHETHER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXTERNAL ACT IN- CREASE ITS GOODNESS OR MALICE? 356 6 WHETHER ONE AND THE SAME EXTERNAL ACT CAN BE BOTH GOOD AND EVIL? 357 Q. 21 ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE. - 359 ART. I WHETHER A HUMAN ACT IS RIGHT OR SINFUL IN SO FAR AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL? 359 2 WHETHER A HUMAN ACT DESERVES PRAISE OR BLAME BY REASON OF ITS BEING GOOD OR EVIL? 361 3 WHETHER A HUMAN ACT IS MERITORIOUS OR DEMERITORIOUS IN SO FAR AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL? 362 4 WHETHER A HUMAN ACT IS MERITORIOUS OR DEMERITORIOUS BEFORE GOD ACCORDING AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL? 364 XII. HABITS, VIRTyES AND VICES. TEXT: Summa Theologicaj I-II, Questions 49-89. Q. 49 ON HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE. 366 ART. I WHETHER HABIT IS A QUALITY? 366 2 WHETHER HABIT IS A DISTINCT SPECIES OF QUALITY? 368 CONTENTS XV PAGE 3 WHETHER HABIT IMPLIES ORDER TO AN ACT? 371 4 WHETHER HABITS ARE NECESSARY? 372 Q. so ON THE SUBJECT OF HABITS. 375 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS A HABIT IN THE BODY? 375 2 WHETHER THE SOUL IS THE SUBJECT OF HABIT ACCORDING TO ITS ESSENCE OR ACCORDING TO ITS POWER? 377 3 WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY HABITS IN THE POWERS OF THE SENSITIVE PART? 379 4 WHETHER THERE IS ANY HABIT IN THE INTELLECT? 380 5 WHETHER ANY HABIT IS IN THE WILL? 382 6 WHETHER THERE ARE HABITS IN THE ANGELS? 383 Q. SI ON THE CAUSE OF HABITS AS TO THEIR FORMATION. 386 art. I WPIETHER ANY HABIT IS FROM NATURE? 386 2 WHETHER ANY HABIT IS CAUSED BY ACTS? 388 3 WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CAUSED BY ONE ACT? 390 4 WHETHER ANY HABITS ARE INFUSED IN MAN BY GOD? 391 Q. 52 ON THE INCREASE OF HABITS. 393 ART. I WHETHER HABITS INCREASE? 393 2 WHETHER HABIT INCREASES BY ADDITION? 397 3 WHETHER EVERY ACT INCREASES ITS HABIT? 399 Q. S3 HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED AND DIMINISHED. 400 ART. I WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CORRUPTED? 400 2 WHETHER A HABIT CAN DIMINISH? 402 3 WHETHER A HABIT IS CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED THROUGH MERE CESSATION FROM ACT? 404 Q. 54 ON THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS. 406 ART. I WHETHER MANY HABITS CAN BE IN ONE POWER? 406 2 WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS? 408 3 WHETHER HABITS ARE DIVIDED INTO GOOD AND BAD? 409 4 WHETHER ONE HABIT IS MADE UP OF MANY HABITS? 410 Q. 55 ON THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE. 412 ART. I WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A HABIT? 412 2 WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS AN OPERATIVE HABIT? 414 3 WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A GOOD HABIT? 415 4 WHETHER VIRTUE IS SUITABLY DEFINED? 416 Q. 56 ON THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE. 419 ART. I WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN A POWER OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUB- JECT? . 419 2 WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE IN SEVERAL POWERS? 420 3 WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 421 4 WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS ARE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 423 XVI CONTENTS pa(;e 5 WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS OF APPREHENSION ARE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 425 6 WHETHER THE WILL CAN BE A SUBJECT OF VIRTUE? 426 Q. 57 ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 429 ART. I WHETHER THE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT ARE VIRTUES? 429 2 WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY THREE HABITS OF THE SPECULA- TIVE INTELLECT, VIZ., wisdom, scicncc AND understanding? 431 3 WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL HABIT art IS A VIRTUE? 433 4 WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A DISTINCT VIRTUE FROM ART? 434 5 WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A VIRTUE NECESSARY TO MAN? 436 6 WHETHER eubulia^ synesis and gnome are virtues annexed TO prudence? 438 Q. 58 ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLEC- TUAL VIRTUES. 440 ART. I WHETHER EVERY VIRTUE IS A MORAL VIRTUE? 440 2 WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE DIFFERS FROM INTELLECTUAL VIR- TUE? 441 3 WHETHER VIRTUE IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL? 443 4 WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITHOUT INTELLEC- TUAL VIRTUE? 445 5 WHETHER THERE CAN BE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE WITHOUT MORAL VIRTUE? 446 Q. 59 THE DISTINCTION OF THE MORAL VIRTUES IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS. 449 ART. I WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE IS A PASSION? 449 2 WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITH PASSION? 450 3 WHETHER SORROW IS COMPATIBLE WITH MORAL VIRTUE? 452 4 WHETHER ALL THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE ABOUT THE PASSIONS? 454 5 WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITHOUT PASSION? 455 Q. 60 HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER. 457 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE? 457 2 WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT OPERATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT ARE ABOUT PASSIONS? 458 3 WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE ABOUT OPERA- TIONS? 450 4 WHETHER THERE ARE DIFFERENT MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT DIF- FERENT PASSIONS? 451 5 WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORD- ING TO THE VARIOUS OBJECTS OF THE PASSIONS? 463 CONTENTS xvii PAGE Q. 61 THE CARDINAL VIRTUES. 455 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED CARDINAL OR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES? 466 2 WHETHER THERE ARE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES? 467 3 WHETHER ANY OTHER VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED PRINCIPAL RATHER THAN THESE? 468 4 WHETPIER THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER? 470 5 WHETHER THE CARDINAL VIRTUES ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO POLITICAL VIRTUES, PERFECTING, PERFECT AND EXEMPLAR VIRTUES? 472 Q. 62 THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES. 475 ART. I WHETHER THERE ARE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? 475 2 WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUES? 476 3 WHETHER FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY RECK- ONED AS THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? 477 4 WHETHER FAITH PRECEDES HOPE, AND HOPE CHARITY? 479 Q. 63 THE CAUSE OF THE VIRTUES. 481 ART. I WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN US BY NATURE? 481 2 WHETHER ANY VIRTUE IS CAUSED IN US BY HABITUATION FROM OUR ACTS? 483 3 WHETHER ANY MORAL VIRTUES ARE IN US BY INFUSION? 484 4 WHETHER VIRTUE ACQUIRED BY HABITUATION PROM OUR ACTS BELONGS TO THE. SAME SPECIES AS INFUSED VIRTUE? 486 Q. 64 ON THE MEAN OF VIRTUE. 488 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? 488 2 WHETHER THE MEAN OF MORAL VIRTUE IS A REAL MEAN, OR A MEAN OF REASON? 490 3 WHETPIER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? 491 4 WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN? 492 Q. 65 THE CONNECTION OF THE VJRTUES. 495 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER? 495 2 WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY? 498 3 WHETPIER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT THE, MORAL VIRTUES? 500 4 WHETHER FAITH AND HOPE CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY? 501 5 WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT FAITH AND HOPE? 503 Q. 66 ON EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES. 505 ART. I WHETHER. ONE VIRTUE CAN BE GREATER OR LESSER THAN AN- OTHER? ' 505 2 WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES, THAT ARE TOGETHER IN ONE MAN, ARE EQUAL? 507 xviii CONTENTS PAGE 3 WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE BETTER THAN THE INTEL- LECTUAL VIRTUES? 4 WHETHER JUSTICE IS THE CHIEF OF THE MORAL VIRTUES? 510 5 WHETHER WISDOM IS THE GREATEST OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES? 6 WHETHER CHARITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES? Q. 67 ON THE DURATION OF THE VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE. 516 ART. I WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE? 516 2 WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE? 3 WHETHER FAITH REMAINS AFTER THIS LIFE? 519 4 WHETHER HOPE REMAINS, AFTER DEATH, IN THE STATE OF GLORY? 522 5 WHETHER ANYTHING OF FAITH OR HOPE REMAINS IN GLORY? 524 6 WHETHER CHARITY REMAINS, AFTER THIS LIFE, IN GLORY? 525 Q. 68 ON THE GIFTS. * 527 ART. I WHETHER THE GIFTS DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES? 527 2 WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAN FOR SALVATION? 530 3 WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE HABITS? 532 4 WHETHER THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE SUIT- ABLY ENUMERATED? 533 5 WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONNECTED? 536 6 WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST REMAIN IN HEAVEN? 537 7 WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE SET DOWN BY ISAIAS IN THEIR OR- DER OF DIGNITY? 539 8 WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE GIFTS? 541 Q. 69 ON THE BEATITUDES. 543 ART. I WHETHER THE BEATITUDES DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS? 543 2 WHETHER THE REWARDS ASSIGNED TO THE BEATITUDES BE- LONG TO THIS LIFE? 544 3 WHETHER THE BEATITUDES ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED? 546 4 WHETHER THE REWARDS OF THE BEATITUDES AI^E SUITABLY ENUMERATED? 550 Q. 70 ON THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST. 552 ART. I WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST WHICH THE APOSTLE ENUMERATES IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS ARE ACTS? 552 2 WHETHER THE FRUITS DIFFER FROM THE BEATITUDES? 554 3 WHETHER THE FRUITS ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED BY THE APOSTLE? 554 CONTENTS xix PAGE 4 WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONTRARY TO THE WORKS OF THE FLESH? 557 Q. 71 ON VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES. 559 ART. I WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO VIRTUE? 559 2 WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO NATURE? 561 3 WHETHER VICE IS WORSE THAN A VICIOUS ACT? 562 4 WHETHER SIN IS COMPATIBLE WITH VIRTUE? 563 5 WHETHER EVERY SIN INCLUDES SOME ACT? 565 6 WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS a word, deed Or de- sire contrary to the eternal law? 567 Q. 72 ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS. 569 ART. I WHETHER SINS DIFFER IN SPECIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OB- JECTS? 569 2 WHETHER SPIRITUAL SINS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CARNAL SINS? 570 3 WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCE TO THEIR CAUSES? 572 4 WPIETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SIN AGAINST GOD, AGAINST ONESELF, AND AGAINST ONE’S NEIGHBOR? 574 5 WHETHER THE DIVISION OF SINS ACCORDING TO THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT DIVERSIFIES THEIR SPECIES? 575 6 WHETHER SINS OF COMMISSION AND OMISSION DIFFER SPE- CIFICALLY? 577 7 WHETHER SINS ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SINS OF THOUGHT, WORD AND DEED? 579 8 WHETHER EXCESS AND DEFICIENCY DIVERSIFY THE SPECIES OF SINS? 580 9 WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY ACCORDING TO DIFFER- ENT CIRCUMSTANCES? 582 Q. 73 ON THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER. , 584 ART. I WHETHER ALL SINS ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER? 584 2 WHETHER ALL SINS ARE EQUAL? 586 3 WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS VARIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS? 587 4 WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS DEPENDS ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE VIRTUES TO WHICH THEY ARE OPPOSED? 589 5 WHETHER CARNAL SINS ARE OF LESS GUILT THAN SPIRITUAL SINS? ^90 6 WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF A SIN DEPENDS ON ITS CAUSE? 592 7 WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE AGGRAVATES A SIN? 593 8 WHETHER SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF ITS CAUSING MORE HARM? ' 595 9 WHETHER A SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT IS COMMITTED? 597 XX CONTENTS PAGE 10 WHETHER THE EXCELLENCE OF THE PERSON SINNING AG- GRAVATES THE SIN? 599 Q. 74 ON THE SUBJECT OF SIN. 601 ART. I WHETHER THE WILL IS A SUBJECT OF SIN? 601 2 WHETHER THE WILL ALONE IS THE SUBJECT OF SIN? ‘ 602 3 WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE SENSUALITY? 603 4 WHETHER MORTAL SIN CAN BE IN THE SENSUALITY? 60S 5 WHETHER SIN CAN BE IN THE REASON? 606 6 WHETHER THE SIN OF LINGERING DELECTATION IS IN THE REASON? 607 7 WHETHER THE SIN OF CONSENT TO THE ACT IS IN THE HIGHER REASON? 608 8 WHETHER CONSENT TO DELECTATION IS A MORTAL SIN? 610 9 WHETHER THERE CAN BE VENIAL SIN IN THE HIGPIER REASON AS DIRECTING THE LOWER POWERS? 613 10 WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN THE HIGHER REASON AS SUCH? 614 Q. 75 THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL. 617 ART. I WHETHER SIN HAS A CAUSE? 617 2 WHETHER SIN HAS AN INTERNAL CAUSE? 618 3 WHETHER SIN HAS AN EXTERNAL CAUSE? 620 4 WHETHER ONE SIN IS A CAUSE OF ANOTHER? 621 Q. 76 THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR. 623 ART. I WHETHER IGNORANCE CAN BE A CAUSE OF SIN? 623 2 WHETHER IGNORANCE IS A SIN? 624 3 WHETHER IGNORANCE EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER? 626 4 WHETHER IGNORANCE DIMINISHES A SIN? 628 Q. 77 THE CAUSE OF SIN ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE AP- PETITE. 630 ART. I WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A PASSION OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? 630 2 WHETHER THE REASON CAN BE OVERCOME BY A PASSION, AGAINST ITS KNOWLEDGE? 632 3 WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION SHOULD BE CALLED A SIN OF WEAKNESS? 635 4 WHETHER SELF-LOVE IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY SIN? 636 5 WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE OF THE FLESH, CONCUPISCENCE OF THE EYES AND PRIDE OF LIFE ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS CAUSES OF SIN? ' 637 6 WHETHER SIN IS DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF PASSION? 639 7 WHETHER PASSION EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER? 640 8 WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION CAN BE MOR- TAi? 642 CONTENTS XXI PAGE Q. 78 ON THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE. 644 ART. I WHETHER ANYONE SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE? 644 2 WHETHER EVERYONE THAT SINS THROUGH HABIT SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE? 646 3 WHETHER ONE WHO SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE SINS THROUGH HABIT? 647 4 WHETHER IT IS MORE GRIEVOUS TO SIN THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE THAN THROUGH PASSION? 649 Q. 79 ON THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN. 651 ART. I WHETHER GOD IS A CAUSE OF SIN? 651 2 WHETHER THE ACT OF SIN IS FROM GOD? 653 3 WHETHER GOD IS THE CAUSE OF SPIRITUAL BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART? 654 4 WHETHER BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART ARE DIRECTED TO THE SALVATION OF THOSE WHO ARE BLINDED AND HARD- ENED? 656 Q. 80 ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, THE DEVIL. 658 ART. I WHETHER THE DEVIL IS DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OF MAN^S SINNING? 658 2 WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN BY INTERNAL INSTIGATIONS? 660 3 WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN OF NECESSITY? 661 4 WHETHER ALL THE SINS OF MEN ARE DUE TO THE DEVIL’s SUGGESTION? 663 Q. 81 ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, MAN. 664 ART. T WHETHER THE FIRST SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENT IS CONTRACTED BY HIS DESCENDANTS, BY WAY OF ORIGIN? 664 2 WHETHER ALSO OTHER SINS OF THE FIRST PARENT OR OF NEARER ANCESTORS ARE TRANSMITTED TO THEIR DESCENDANTS? 667 3 WHETHER THE SIN OF THE FIRST PARENT IS TRANSMITTED, BY WAY OF ORIGIN, TO ALL MEN? 669 4 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN WOULD BE CONTRACTED BY A PERSON FORMED MIRACULOUSLY FROM HUMAN FLESH? 670 5 WHETHER IF EVE, AND NOT ADAM, HAD SINNED, THEIR CHIL- DREN WOULD HAVE CONTRACTED ORIGINAL SIN? 671 Q. 82 ON ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE. 673 ART. I WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS A HABIT? 673 2 WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORIGINAL SINS IN ONE MAN? 674 3 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS CONCUPISCENCE? 676 4 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS EQUALLY IN ALL? 677 Q. 83 ON THE SUBJECT^ OF ORIGINAL SIN. 679 ART. I WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS MORE IN THE FLESH THAN IN THE SOUL? “ 679 xxn CONTENTS PACJE 2 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS IN THE ESSENCE OE THE SOUL RATHER THAN IN THE POWERS? 3 WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN INFECTS THE WILL BEFORE THE OTHER POWERS? 4 WHETHER THE AFORESAID POWERS ARE MORE INFECTED THAN THE OTHERS? Q. 84 ON THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN SO FAR AS ONE SIN IS THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER. ART. I WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE ROOT OF ALL SINS? 2 WHETHER PRIDE IS THE BEGINNING OF EVERY SIN? 3 WHETHER ANY OTHER SPECIAL SINS, BESIDES PRIDE AND AVA- RICE, SHOULD BE CALLED CAPITAL? 4 WHETHER THE SEVEN CAPITAL VICES ARE SUITABLY RECKONED? Q. 83 ON THE EFFECTS OF SIN: CONCERNING THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE. ART. I WHETHER SIN DIMINISHES THE GOOD OF NATURE? 2 WHETHER THE ENTIRE GOOD OF HUMAN NATURE CAN BE DE- STROYED BY SIN? 3 WHETHER WEAKNESS, IGNORANCE, MALICE AND CONCUPIS- CENCE ARE SUITABLY RECKONED AS THE WOUNDS OF NATURE CONSEQUENT UPON SIN? 4 WHETHER PRIVATION OF MODE, SPECIES AND ORDER IS THE EFFECT OF SIN? 5 WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER BODILY DEFECTS ARE THE RESULT OF SIN? . 6 WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER DEFECTS ARE NATURAL TO MAN? Q. 86 ON THE STAIN OF SIN. ART. I WHETHER SIN CAUSES A STAIN ON THE SOUL? 2 WHETHER THE STAIN REMAINS IN THE SOUL AFTER THE ACT OF SIN? 681 683 684 686 686 687 689 690 694 694 696 698 699 700 702 70S 705 706 Q. 87 ON THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT. 708 ART. I WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT IS AN EFFECT OF SIN? 708 2 WHETHER SIN CAN BE THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN? 709 3 WHETHER ANY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT? 711 4 WHETHER SIN INCURS A DEBT OF PUNISHMENT INFINITE IN QUANTITY? 712 5 WHETHER EVERY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISH- MENT? 714 6 WHETHER THE DEBT, OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER SIN? 715 7 WHETHER EVERY PUNISHMENT IS INFLUCTED FOR A SIN? 716 8 WHETHER ANYONE IS PUNISHED FOR ANCJ^HER’S SIN? 718 Q. 88 ON VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN. 721 ART. I WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS FITTINGLY CO-DIVIDED AGAINST mortal SIN? 721 CONTENTS XXlll PAGE 2 WHETHER MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN DIFFER GENERICALLY? 723 3 WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS A DISPOSITION TO MORTAL SIN? 725 4 WHETHER A VENIAL SIN CAN BECOME MORTAL? 726 5 WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE A VENIAL SIN TO BE MORTAL? 723 6 WHETHER A MORTAL SIN CAN BECOME VENIAL? 730 Q. 89 ON VENIAL SIN CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. 732 ART. I WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAUSES A STAIN IN THE SOUL^ 732 2 WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE SUITABLY DESIGNATED AS WOod, hay AND stubble} 733 3 WHETHER MAN COULD COMMIT A VENIAL SIN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE? 735 4 WHETHER A GOOD OR A WICKED ANGEL CAN SIN VENIALLY? 737 5 WHETHER THE FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE SENSUALITY IN UNBELIEVERS ARE MORTAL SINS^ 738 6 WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN ANYONE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ALONE? 740 XIII. LAW. TEXT: Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions 90-108. Q. 90 ON THE ESSENCE OF LAW. 742 ART. r WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON? 742 2 WHETHER LAW IS ALWAYS DIRECTED TO THE COMMON GOOD? 744 3 WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT TO MAKE LAWS? 745 4 WHETHER PROMULGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO LAW? 746 Q. 91 ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW. 748 ART. I WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW? < 748 2 WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW? 749 3 WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW? 750 4 WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW? 752 5 WHETHER THERE IS BUT ONE DIVINE LAW? 754 6 WHETHER THERE IS A LAW IN THE jomes OF SIN? 755 Q. 92 ON THE EFFECTS OF LAW. 758 ART. I WHETHER IT IS AN EFFECT OF LAW TO MAKE MEN GOOD? 758 2 WHETHER THE ACTS OF LAW ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED? 760 Q. 93 THE ETERNAL LAW. * 762 ART. I WHETHER THi^gETERNAL LAW IS A SUPREME EXEMPLAR EX- ISTING XN%0J ^ ' 762 2 WHETHER THI^'^ETERNAL LAW IS KNOWN TO ALL? 764 3 WHETHER EVERY LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW? 765 4 WHETHER NEO^SSARY AND ETERNAL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? 766 xxiv CONTENTS PAGE 5 WHETHER NATURAL CONTINGENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETER- NAL LAW? 768 6 WHETHER ALL HUMAN AFFAIRS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW? 769 Q. 94 THE NATURAL LAW. 772 ART. I WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS A HABIT? 772 2 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL PRECEPTS, OR ONLY ONE? 773 3 WHETHER ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE NATURAL LAW? 775 4 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS TPIE SAME IN ALL MEN? 777 5 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE CHANGED? 779 6 WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE ABOLISHED FROM THE HEART OF MAN? 780 Q. 95. HUMAN LAW. 782 ART. I WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR LAWS TO BE FRAMED BY MEN? 782 2 WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW? 784 3 WHETHER ISIDORE’S DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE LAW IS APPROPRIATE? 785 4 WHETHER ISIDORE’S DIVISION OF HUMAN LAW IS APPROPRIATE? 787 Q. 96 ON THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW. 790 ART. I WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE FRAMED IN A COMMON WAY RATHER THAN IN THE PARTICULAR? 790 2 WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO REPRESS ALL VICKS? 791 3 WHETHER HUMAN LAW PRESCRIBES THE ACTS OF ALL THE VIRTUES? 793 4 WHETHER HUMAN LAW BINDS A MAN IN CONSCIENCE? 794 . 5 WHETHER ALL ARE SUBJECT TO LAW? 796 6 WHETHER HE WHO IS UNDER A LAW MAY ACT OUTSIDE THE LETTER OF THE LAW? 797 Q, 97 ON CHANGE IN LAWS. gOO ART. I WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY? 800 2 WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD ALWAYS BE CHANGED WHEN- EVER SOMETHING BETTER OCCURS? 801 3 WHETHER CUSTOM CAN OBTAIN THE FORCE OF LAW? 802 4 WHETHER THE RULERS OF THE PEOPLE CAN DISPENSE FROM HUMAN LAWS? g04 Q. 98 ON THE OLD LAW. g06 ART. r WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GOOD? $06 2 WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS FROM GOD? 808 3 WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GIVEN THROUGH THE ANGELS? 810 CONTENTS 4 WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE JEWS ALONE? 5 WHETHER ALL MEN WERE. BOUND TO OBSERVE THE OLD LAW? 6 WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS SUITABLY GIVEN AT THE TIME OE MOSES? Q. 99 ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW. ART. I WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ONLY ONE PRECEPT? 2 WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS MORAL PRECEPTS? 3 WHETHER THE OLD LAW COMPRISES CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS BESIDES MORAL PRECEPTS? 4 WHETHER, BESIDES THE MORAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS THERE ARE ALSO JUDICIAL PRECEPTS? 5 WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ANY OTHERS BESIDE THE MORAL, JUDICIAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? 6 WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE ‘INDUCED MEN TO THE OBSERVANCE OF ITS PRECEPTS BY MEANS OF TEMPORAL PROM- ISES AND THREATS? Q. 100 ON THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW. ART. I WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BELONG TO THE LAW OF NATURE? 2 WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW ARE ABOUT ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES? 3 WHETHER ALL TPIE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW ARE REDUCIBLE TO THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE? 4 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER? 5 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY SET FORTH? 6 WHETHER THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE GIVEN IN THE PROPER ORDER? 7 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY FORMULATED? 8 WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE DISPENSABLE? 9 WHETHER THE MODE OF VIRTUE FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE LAW? 10 WHETHER THE MODE OF CHARITY FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE DIVINE LAW? 1 1 WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO DISTINGUISH OTHER MORAL PRECEPTS » OF THE LAW BESIDES THE DECALOGUE? 12 WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW JUSTIFIED MAN? Q. 101 ON THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES. ART. I WHETHER THE NATURE OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS CON- SISTS IN THEIR PERTAINING TO THE WORSHIP OF GOD? 2 WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS ARE FIGURATIVE? XXV PAGE 811 813 815 817 817 818 820 821 823 825 827 827 829 830 832 834 838 840 842 844 846 848 853 853 853 855 XXVI CONTENTS PAGE 3 WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANY CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS? 4 WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW ARE SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO SACRIFICES, SACRED THINGS, SACRAMENTS AND OBSERVANCES? Q. 102 ON THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS. 861 ART. I WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CAUSE FOR THE CEREMONIAL PRE- CEPTS? 2 WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS HAVE A LITERAL CAUSE OR MERELY A FIGURATIVE CAUSE? 862 3 WHETHER A SUITABLE CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CERE- MONIES WHICH PERTAINED TO THE SACRIFICES? 864 4 WHETHER SUFFICIENT REASON CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CEREMONIES PERTAINING TO HOLY THINGS? 871 5 WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY SUITABLE CAUSE FOR THE SACRA-: MENTS OF THE OLD LAW? 883 6 WHETHER THERE WAS ANY REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THE CERE- MONIAL OBSERVANCES? 898 Q. 103 ON THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS. 908 ART. I WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE LAW WERE IN EXISTENCE BEFORE THE LAW? 908 2 WHETHER, AT THE TIME OF THE LAW, THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW HAD ANY POWER OF JUSTIFICATION? 910 3 WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW CEASED AT THE COMING OF CHRIST? 912 4 WHETHER, AFTER CHRIST’S PASSION, THE LEGAL CEREMONIES CAN BE OBSERVED WITHOUT COMMITTING MORTAL SIN? 914 Q. 104 - ON THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS. 919 ART. I WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE THOSE WHICH DI- RECTED MAN IN RELATION TO HIS NEIGHBOR? 919 2 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE FIGURATIVE? 921 3 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BIND FOREVER? 922 4 WHETHER IT ,IS POSSIBLE TO ASSIGN A DEFINITE DIVISION OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS? 924 Q. 105 ON THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS. 926 ART. I WHETHER THE OLD LAW ENJOINED FITTING PRECEPTS CON- CERNING RULERS? 926 2 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE SUITABLY FRAMED AS TO THE RELATIONS OF ONE MAN WITH ANOTHER? 930 3 WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS REGARDING FOREIGNERS WERE FRAMED IN A SUITABLE MANNER? 940 4^ WHETHER THE OLD LAW SET FORTH SUITABLE PRECEPTS ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD? 944 CONTENTS xxvii PAGE Q. 106 ON THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. 949 ART. I WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS A WRITTEN LAW? 949 2 WHETHER THE NEW LAW JUSTIFIES? 951 3 WHETHER THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD? 952 4 WFIETHER THE NEW LAW WILL LAST TILL THE END OF THE WORLD? 954 Q. 107 ON THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD. 957 ART. 1 WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS DISTINCT FROM THE OLD LAW? 957 2 WHETHER THE NEW LAW FULFILLS THE OLD? 960 3 WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS CONTAINED IN THE OLD? 963 4 WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS MORE BURDENSOME THAN THE OLD? 964 Q. 108 ON THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW. 967 ART. I WHETHER THE NEW LAW OUGHT TO PRESCRIBE OR PROHIBIT ANY EXTERNAL ACTS? 967 2 WHETPIER TI-IE NEW LAW MADE SUFFICIENT ORDINATIONS ABOUT EXTERNAL ACTS? 969 3 WHETPIER THE NEW LAW DIRECTED MAN SUFFICIENTLY AS REGARDS INTERIOR ACTIONS? 972 4 WHETHER CERTAIN DEFINITE COUNSELS ARE FITTINGLY PRO- POSED IN THE NEW LAW? 976 XIV. GRACE. TEXT: Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions 109-114. Q. 109 ON THE EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ACTS, NAMELY, THE GRACE OF GOD. 979 ART. I WHETHER WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN KNOW ANY TRUTH? 979 2 WHteTHER MAN CAN WILL OR DO ANY GOOD WITHOUT GRACE? 981 3 WI^ETHER BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS AND WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS? 983 4 WHETHER MAN, WITHOUT GRACE AND BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS, CAN FULFILL THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE LAW? 985 5 WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE WITHOUT GRACE? 986 6 WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE? 987 7 WHETHER MAN CAN RISE FROM SIN WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE? 989 8 WHETHER MAN WITHOUT GRACE CAN AVOID SIN? 991 9 WHETHER ONE WHO HAS ALREADY OBTAINED GRACE CAN, OF HIMSELF AND WITHOUT FURTHER HELP OF GRACE, DO GOOD AND AVOID SIN? 993 xxviii CONTENTS pa(;e 10 WHETHER MAN POSSESSED OF GRACE NEEDS THE HELP OF GRACE IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE? 994 Q. no ON THE GRACE OF GOD, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE. 996 ART. I WHETHER GRACE POSITS ANYTHING IN THE SOUL? 996 2 WHETHER GRACE IS A QUALITY OF THE SOUL? 998 3 WHETHER GRACE IS THE SAME AS VIRTUE? 999 4 WHETHER GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT, OR IN ONE OF THE POWERS? 1001 Q. Ill ON THE DIVISION OF GRACE. 1003 ART. I WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SANCTIFYING GRACE AND GRATUITOUS GRACE? 1003 2 WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE? 1005 3 WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PREVENIENT AND SUBSEQUENT GRACE? 1006 4 WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED BY THE APOSTLE? 1008 5 WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS NOBLER THAN SANCTIFYING GRACE? 1010 Q. 112 ON THE CAUSE OF GRACE. 1012 ART. I WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE? 1012 2 WHETHER ANY PREPARATION AND DISPOSITION FOR GRACE IS REQUIRED ON MAN’S PART? 1013 3 WHETHER GRACE IS NECESSARILY GIVEN TO WPIOEVER PRE- PARES HIMSELF FOR IT, OR TO WHOEVER DOES WHAT HE CAN? 1014 4 WHETHER GRACE IS GREATER IN ONE THAN IN ANOTHER? 1016 5 WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE HAS GRACE? 1017 Q. 113 ON THE EFFECTS OF GRACE. 1020 ART. I WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS THE RE- MISSION OF SINS? 1020 2 WHETHER THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS REQUIRED FOR THE RE- MISSION OF GUILT, i.e,, FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UN- GODLY? 1022 3 WHETHER FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY THERE IS REQUIRED A MOVEMENT OF FREE CHOICE? 1023 4 WHETHER A MOVEMENT OF FAITH IS REQUIRED FOR THE JUS- TIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY? 1025 5 WHETHER FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY THERE IS REQUIRED A MOVEMENT OF FREE CHOICE AGAINST SIN? 1026 6 WHETHER THE REMISSION OF SINS OUGHT TO BE RECKONED AMONG THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR JUSTIFICATION? 1028 7 WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY TAKES PLACE IN AN INSTANT OR SUCCESSIVELY? 1029 CONTENTS XXIX PAGE 8 WHETHER THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS NATURALLY THE FIRST OF THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY? 1032 9 WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS GOD’S GREATEST WORK? 1034 10 WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS A MIRACU- LOUS WORK? 1035 Q. 114 ON MERIT, WHICH IS THE EFFECT OF CO-OPERATING GRACE. 1038 ART* I WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT ANYTHING FROM GOD? 1038 2 WHETHER ANYONE WITHOUT GRACE CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE? 1040 3 WHETHER A MAN IN GRACE CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE CON- DIGNLY? 1041 4 WHETHER GRACE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF MERIT THROUGH CHARITY MORE THAN THROUGH THE OTHER VIRTUES? 1042 5 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT FOR HIMSELF THE FIRST GRACE? 1044 6 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT THE FIRST GRACE FOR ANOTHER? 1045 7 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT RESTORATION AFTER A FALL? 1046 8 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT THE INCREASE OF GRACE OR CHARITY? 1048 9 WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT PERSEVERANCE? 1049 10 WHETHER TEMPORAL GOODS PALL UNDER MERIT? 1050 XV. FAITH. TEXT: Summa Theologica, II-II, Questions 1-7. Q. 1 ON THE FAITH. 1055 ART. I WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH IS THE FIRST TRUTH? 1055 2 WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH IS SOMETHING COMPLEX, SUCH AS A PROPOSITION? 1056 3 WHETHER ANYTHING FALSE CAN COME UNDER FAITH? 1058 4 WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH CAN BE SOMETHING SEEN? 1059 5 WHETHER THOSE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH CAN BE AN OBJECT OF SCIENCE? 1061 6 WHETHER THOSE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO CERTAIN ARTICLES? 1063 7 WHETHER THE ARTICLES OF FAITH HAVE INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME? 1065 8 WHETHER THE ARTICLES OP FAITH ARE SUITABLY FORMU- LATED? 1067 9 WHETHER IT IS SUITABLE FOR THE ARTICLES OF FAITH TO BE EMBODIED IN A SYMBOL? 1070 lO WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE SOVEREIGN PONTIFF TO DRAW UP A SYMBOL OF FAITH? 1072 XXX CONTENTS PAGE Q. 2 ON THE INTERIOR ACT OF FAITH. 1074 ART. I WHETHER TO BELIEVE IS TO THINK WITH ASSENT? 1074 2 WHETHER THE ACT OF FAITH IS SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED AS BELIEVING GOD, BELIEVING IN A GOD, AND BELIEVING IN GOD? 1076 3 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION TO BELIEVE ANY- THING ABOVE THE NATURAL REASON? 1077 4 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO BELIEVE THOSE THINGS WHICH CAN BE PROVED BY NATURAL REASON ? 1079 5 WHETHER MAN IS BOUND TO BELIEVE ANYTHING EXPLICITLY? 1080 6 WHETHER ALL ARE EQUALLY BOUND TO HAVE EXPLICIT FAITH? 1082 7 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SALVATION OF ALL THAT THEY SHOULD BELIEVE EXPLICITLY IN THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST? 1083 8 WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION TO BELIEVE EX- PLICITLY IN THE TRINITY? 1086 9 WHETHER TO BELIEVE IS MERITORIOUS? 1087 10 WHETHER REASONS IN SUPPORT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE LESSEN THE MERIT OF FAITH? 1088 Q. 3 ON THE EXTERIOR ACT OF FAITH. 1091 ART. I WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF FAITH? * 1091 2 WHETHER CONFESSION OF FAITH IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION? 1092 Q. 4 ON THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH. 1094 ART. I WHETHER THIS IS A FITTING DEFINITION OF FAITH: jaith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not? 1094 2 WHETHER FAITH RESIDES IN THE INTELLECT? 1097 3 WHETHER CHARITY IS THE FORM OF FAITH? 1098 4 WHETHER FORMLESS FAITH CAN BECOME FORMED, OR FORMED FAITH, FORMLESS? 1099 5 WHETHER FAITH IS A VIRTUE? 1101 6 WHETHER FAITH IS ONE VIRTUE? 1103 7 WHETHER FAITH IS THE FIRST OF THE VIRTUES? 1104 8 WHETHER FAITH IS MORE CERTAIN THAN SCIENCE AND THE OTHER INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES? 1106 Q. S CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH. 1108 ART. I WHETHER THERE WAS FAITH IN THE ANGELS, OR IN MAN, IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATE? 1108 2 WHETHER IN THE DEMONS THERE IS FAITH? 1110 3 WHETHER A MAN WHO DISBELIEVES ONE ARTICLE OF FAITH CAN HAVE FORMLESS FAITH IN THE OTHER ARTICLES? 1111 4 WHETHER FAITH CAN BE GREATER IN ONE MAN THAN IN ANOTHER? ‘ 1113 CONTENTS xxxi PAGE Q. 6 ON THE CAUSE OF FAITH. 1115 ART. I WHETHER FAITH IS INFUSED INTO MAN BY GOD? 1115 2 WHETHER FORMLESS FAITH IS A GIFT OF GOD? 1116 Q. 7 ON THE EFFECTS OF FAITH. 1119 ART. I WHETHER FEAR IS AN EFFECT OF FAITH? 1119 2 WHETHER FAITH HAS THE EFFECT OF PURIFYING THE HEART? 1120 INDEX MAN AND THE CONDUCT OF LIFE THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES THIRD BOOK CHAPTER I FOREWORD The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods. For the Lord will not reject people. For in His hands are all the ends of the earth. and the heights of the moun- tains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land (Ps. xdv. 3 seqg.) We have shown in the preceding books that there is one First Being, pos- sessing the full perfection of all being, Whom we "call God, and Who, of the abundance of His perfection, bestows being on all that exists, so that He is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover He bestows being on others, not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of His will, as we have shown above.’^ Hence it fol- lows that He is the Lord of the things made by Him, since we are masters over those things .that are subject to our will. Now it is a perfect dominion that He exercises over things made by Him, for in making them He needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of His work. For He is the universal efficient cause of all being. Now everything that is produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent, because the good and the end are the proper object of the will; and therefore whatever proceeds from a will must needs be directed to an end. But each thing attains its end by its own action, which action needs to be directed by him who endowed things with the principles whereby they act. Consequently God, Who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all things with being, must needs be the Ruler of all, Himself ruled by none; nor is any thing to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there any thing that does not owe its being to Him. Therefore, as He is perfect in being and causing, so He is perfect in ruling. The effect of this ruling is seen to differ in different things, according to the difference of natures. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to Him and reflect His image. Hence, not only are they directed, but they direct themselves to their ap- pointed end by their own actions. And if in thus directing themselves they " C. G., 11 , 23. 3 4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES be subject to the divine ruling, they are admitted by that divine ruling to the attainment of their last end; but they are excluded therefrom if they direct themselves otherwise. Others there are, lacking intelligence, which do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another. Of these some, being incorruptible, even as they are not subject to defect in their natural being, so neither do they wander, in their own actions, from the direction to their appointed end, but are subject, without fail, to the ruling of the supreme ruler. Such are the heavenly bodies, whose movements are invariable. Others, however, being corruptible, are subject to defects in their natural being; and yet this defect is supplied to the advantage of another, since when one thing is corrupted, another is generated. Likewise, they fail from their natural direction in their own actions, and yet this failing is compensated by some resultant good. Whence it is clear that not even those things which are seen to wander from the direction of the supreme ruling, escape from the power of the supreme ruler; for just as these corruptible bodies are created by God, so too’ are they perfectly subject to Him. There- fore, considering this, tjhe Psalmist, filled with the divine spirit, in order to give us an illustration of the divine government, first describes to us the perfection of the supreme governor, — as to His nature when he says, God; as to His power, when he says, a great Lord, implying that He needs no one for His power to produce its effect; as to His authority, when he says, A great king above all gods, since, although there be many rulers, yet are all subject to His rule. Secondly, he describes to us the manner of this government. He describes it as regards intellectual beings, which, if they submit to His rule, receive from Him their last end which is Himself; and therefore he says. For the Lord will not reject His people. As regards things corruptible which, albeit at times they wander from their proper mode of action, never escape the power of the supreme ruler, he says. Because in His hands are all the ends of the earth. And as regards the heavenly bodies, which transcend the highest summits of the earth (that is, of cor- ruptible bodies), and always maintain the order of the divine government, he says. And the mountain heights are His. Thirdly, he assigns the reason for this universal government, for the things that God made must needs be governed by Him. To this he refers when he says, For the sea is Ilis, etc. Since, then, in the First Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and, in the Second, of the perfection of the divine power, inasmuch as He is the creator and lord of all: it remains for us in this Third Book to treat of His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as Pie is the end and governor of all. We must therefore proceed in this wise, so as first to treat of Him as the end of all things; secondly of His universal government, inasmuch as He governs every creature;^ thirdly, of that special government, whereby He governs creatures endowed with intellect.^ =^Ch. 64* ®Ch. III. EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END 5 CHAPTER II THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END Accordingly we must first show that every agent, by its action, intends an end. For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends; for when this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended. This may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter, as to this, whether that which tends to an end be endowed with knowledge or not; for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow’s flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate, since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating pro- ceeds from heat, and cooling from cold; and therefore actions are dif- ferentiated by their active principles. Action sometimes terminates in something made, as for instance building terminates in a house, and healing in health; while sometimes it does not so terminate, as for instance, in the case of understanding and sensation. And if action terminates in soniething made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards the thing made; while if it. does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It, follows therefore that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself^ some- times a thing made by the action. Again. In all things that act for an end, that is said to be the last end beyond which the agent seeks nothing further; and thus the physician’s action goes as far as health, and when this is attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go; or else actions would tend to infinity, which is im- possible, for since it is not possible to pass through an infinite medium^ the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore every agent acts for an end. ~T3oreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must needs result either in something made, or not. If the result is some- thing made, the being of that thing made will follow after an infinity of actions. But that which presupposes an infinity of things cannot possibly be, since an infinite medium cannot be passed through. Now impossibility of being argues impossibility of becoming, and that which cannot become, it is impossible to make. Therefore it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing for the making of which an infinity of actions is presupposed. Aristotle, Post. Ami., I, 22 (82b 38). 6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES If^ however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active powers (for instance, if a man feels that he may imagine, and imagines that he may understand, and understands that he may will), or according to the order of objects (for instance, I consider the body that I may consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God). Now it is not possible to pro- ceed to infinity, either in active powers (as neither is this possible in the forms of things, as is proved in Metaph, ii,^ since the form is the principle of activity), or in objects (as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above) ^ Therefore it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity, and consequently there must be some- thing, upon whose attainment the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore ev ery a gejit a^cts for an end. Further. In things that act for an end, whatsoever comes between the first agent and the last end, is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to something determinate, and if its action, as stated, pro- ceeds to infinity, the active principles must needs proceed to infinity; which is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate. Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intellect. Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intellect act for an end, since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and they act through such a preconception; for this is to act by intellect. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural agent there pre-exists the likeness of the natural effect, by virtue of which the action is determined to the appointed effect; for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Therefore, even as that which acts by intel- lect tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore every agent acts for an end. Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end, for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not ap- pointed ; and thus we find fault with a physician if he fail to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly, and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the ca^e of monstrosities. Therefor e every agent, wh^^Lacmrdmio. mtune,^- or according to ant,, Qj .P^bting of Wpurpose, acts for an end. Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent td many effects does not produce one rather than another* Therefore, from that which is indifferent to ^Aristotle, Metaph,, I a, 2 (994, 6). ®C. G.. I, 42. EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD 7 either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end. There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention, such as scratching one’s beard, and the like. Whence some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end. — But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves an end. Playful actions are sometimes an end, when one plays for the mere pleasure of play; and sometimes they are for an end,- as when we play that afterwards we may study better. Actions done with- out attention do not proceed from the intellect, but from some sudden act of the imagination, or some natural principle; and thus a disordered humor produces an itching sensation and is the cause of a man scratching his beard, which he does without his intellect attending to it. Such actions do tend to an end, although outside the order of the intellect. Hereby is ex- cluded the error of certain natural philosophers of old, who maintained that all things happen by the necessity of matter, thus utterly banishing the final cause from things.^ CHAPTER III i/" THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD Hence we must go on to prove that every agent acts for a good. For that every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends to something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent, since the agent would not tend to it save because of some fittingness thereto. BuLlhat.. which is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good. Further. The end is that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover comes to rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very no- tion of good to be the term of appetite, since goo(^isJ^^pk}^cLaf .0V£r.y appetit$? Therefore all action and movement is for a good. Again. All action and movement would seem to be directed in some way to being, either for the preservation of being in the species or in the individual, or for the acquisition of being. Now this itse lf, namely, being, is a,good ; and for this reason all thinjgs desir^^^ Therefore all action and movement Is loFa good. Furthermore. All action and movement is for some perfection. For if the action itself be the end, it is clearly a second perfection of the agent. And if the action consist in the transformation of external matter, clearly the Aristotle, 11 , 8 (198b 12), ® Aristotle, Eth,, 1 , i (iog4a 1), 8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES mover intends to induce some perfection into the thing moved, towards which perfection the movable also tends, if the movement be natural. Now we saj^that this is to bje good, namely, to be perfect. Therefore every action andTnovement is for a good. Also. Every agent acts according as it is actual. Now by acting it tends to something similar to itself. Therefore it tends to an act. But an act has the nature of good, since evil is not found save in a potentiality lacking act. Therefore every action is for a good. Moreover. The intellectual agent ‘acts for an end, as determining for itself its end; whereas the natural agent, though it acts for ^n end, as was proved above, ^ does not determine its end for itself, since it knows not the nature of end, but is moved to the end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not determine the end for itself except under the aspect of good; for the intelligible object does not move except it be con- sidered as a good, which is the object of the will. Therefore the natural agent also is not moved, nor does it act for an end, except in so far as this end is a good, since the end is determined for the natural agent by some appetite. Therefore every agent acts for a good. Again. To shun evil and to seek good are of the same nature, even as movement downward and upward are of the s^me nature. Now we observe that all things shun evil, for intellectual agents shun a thing for the reason that they apprehend it as evil, and all natural agents, in proportion to their strength, resist corruption which is the evil of everything. Therefore all things act for a good. Again. That which results from the agent’s action outside his intention, is said to happen by chance or luck. Now we observe in the works of nature that either always or more often that happens which is best: thus in plants the leaves are so placed as to protect the fruit; and the parts of an animal are so disposed as to conduce to the animal’s safety. Therefore, if this happens outside the intention of the natural agent, it will be the result of chance or luck. But that is impossible, because things that happen always, or frequently, are not by chance or fortuitous, but those which occur seldom.^ Therefore the natural agent tends to ti^t which is best; and much more evidently is this jo with the intellectual agent. Therefore every agent intends a good in acting. Moreover. Whatever is moved is brought to the term of movement by the mover and agent. Therefore mover and moved tend to the same term. Now that which is moved, since it is in potentiality, tends to an act, and conse- quently to perfection and goodness; for by its movement it passes from potentiality to act. 'Hijeref o£e moyer and agent by moving and acting always intend a good. Ch. 2. Aristotle, Phys., 11, 5 (196b ii). EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL 9 Hence the philosophers in defining the good said: The good is the object of every appetite; and Dionysius says that all things desire the good and the best}- CHAPTER IV THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS It follows from the above that evil is incidental to things beside the inten- tion of an agent. For when the result of an action differs from the intention of the agent, it is clear that such result occurs unintentionally. Now evil d iffers from gQfld^Jduch«£very a^^ intends. Therefore evil happens without intention. Also. Defect in effect and action results from defect in the principles of action. Thus a monstrosity results from a defect in the seed, and limping results from a curvature of the leg. Now an agent acts according as it is possessed of active power, and not according as it suffers from defective power. And according as it acts, it intends the end. Therefore it intends an end corresponding to its power. Hence whatever.. fQUows.XQxresponding to the defective power will be outside the agent’s intention. And this is. evil. Tha’efore' evil occurs without intention. Again. The movement of the thing moved has the same tendency as the motion of the mover. Now the thing moved tends per se to good, but to evil it tends accidentally and unintentionally. This is most evident in genera- tion and corruption. For matter, while it underlies one form, is in potenti- ality to another form, and to the privation of the form which it has already. Thus, when it is under the form of air, it is in potentiality to the form of fire and the privation of the form of air. And the transformation of matter terminates in both at the same time: in the form of fire by reason of fire being generated, and in the privation of the form of air by reason of the air being corrupted. But the intention and appetite of matter is not towards the privation, but towards the form. For it does not tend towards the impossible, and it is impossible for master to be alone under a privation, whereas it is possible for it to be under a form. Therefore it is uninten- tional that it terminate in privation; but it terminates therein in so far as it attains the form which.it intends, the necessary result of which is the pri- vation of the other form. Therefore in generation and corruption the trans- formation of matter is directed per se to the form, and privation results unintentionally. And the same must needs apply to all movements, so that in every movement there is generation and corruption in some respect. For instance, when a thing is changed from white to black, a white thing is ^De Div. Norn,, IV, 4 (PG 3, 699). 10 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES corrupted and a black one results. Now the good is according as matter is perfected by the form, and potentiality by its proper act; while evil is according as it is deprived of its proper act. Consequently, whatever is moved intends in its movement to attain some good ; and it attains evil with- out its intention. Hence, since every agent and mover tends to the good, evil occurs without the intention of the agent. Moreover. In those things that act by intellect or any kind of judgment, intention follows apprehension, because the intention is towards that which is apprehended as an end. Accordingly if something is attained that has no species in the apprehension, it will be outside the intention. For instance, if one were to intend to eat honey, and were to eat gall thinking that it was honey, this will be outside the intention. But every intellectual agent tends to something in so far as he considers it under the aspect of good, as we have shown above.^ Therefore if this be not a good but an evil, it will be without intention. Therefore that which acts by intellect does not work evil except unintentionally. Therefore, since to tend to a good is common to intellectual and natural agents, evil does not ensue from the intention of an agent except without that intention. In this sense Dionysius says that evil is unintentional and involuntary ? CHAPTERS V AND VI ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT WITHOUT INTENTION [aND THEIR SOLUTION] There are, however, some objections that would seem to run counter to this conclusion. [1] For that which occurs without the intention of the agent is said to happen fortuitously, by chance and seldom. But evil is not said to happen fortuitously and by chance, nor does it occur seldom but always or fre- quently. For in the physical order generation is always accompanied by corruption. And in voluntary agents sin is of frequent occurrence, since it is as difficult to behave virtuously j as to find the center of a circle, as Aristotle states.® Therefore it would seem that evil is not an unintentional occurrence. [ 2 ] Again. Aristotle says expressly that vice is voluntary,^ and he proves this from the fact that a man does an injustice voluntarily (and it is ab- surd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions voluntarily does not wish to be unjust, and that he who rapes voluntarily does not wish to be incontinent), and again from the fact that legislators punish evil-doers as ^ Ch. 3. ^De Div. N om,, IV, 32 ; 35 (PG 3, 732 ; 736) . ^ Op. cit.. Ill, 5 (1112b 16). Eth., II, 9 (1109a 24). EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL ii doing evil voluntarily. Therefore evil would seem not to be unintentional or involuntary. [3] Further. Every natural movement has an end intended by nature. Now corruption is a natural movement, even as is generation. Therefore its end, which is privation having the aspect of evil, is intended by nature; even as are the form and the good, which are the end of generation. [Chapter VI] In order that the solution of the arguments here given may be made clear we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. In a substance there is evil through its lack- ing something natural and due to it. For, that a man have not wings is not an evil to him, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man have not fair hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he have no hands, which are natural and due to him, if he be perfect; and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due; and consequently the character of evil is always in a privation thus understood. Matter, since it is in potentiality to all forms, is adapted by nature to all of them, yet no one is due to it; since it c^n be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter; for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly, the privation of such a form, in relation to matter, is not an evil to matter; but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is an evil (and thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil for fire). And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except inasmuch as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject wherein it is, it will be an evil absolutely. Otherwise it will be the evil of something, but not absolutely. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil abso- lutely; but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil ab- solutely, but an evil of the air. On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must needs be an evil absolutely. Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or by chance, as the jirst argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or by chance. Thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitqus nor by chance, but it would be by chance if such a result were to occur seldqm. Therefore the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue outside the intention of the generator, follows nevertheless always, since the presence of one formis always accompanied by the privation of another. Therefore 12 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES corruption does not ensue by chance, nor even seldom; although sometimes privation is not an evil absolutely, but the evil of some particular thing, as was stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the Jung generated of that which is due to it, it will be by chance and an evil ab- solutely, as in the birth of monstrosities. For this does not follow of neces- sity from that which was intended, but is opposed thereto; since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated. Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect m the active power. Hence if the agent’s power be defective, this evil ensues without intention ; yet it will not be by chance, because it follows^ of necessity from such an agent (provided always that the agent in question always or fre- quently suffers this defect) . But it will be by chance if this* defect seldom accompanies this agent. ^ , In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow; for movement is not caused by universes but by •singulars, among which actions are found. Hence, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of the good dictated by the reason, moral evil ensues not by chance, but either always or fre- quently: as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery: wherefore the evil of adultery is not by chance. It would, how- ever, be a chance evil, if sin were to ensue seldom from what he intends* as in one who, while aiming at a bird, kills a man. That anyone should intend such goods which frequently result in privation of a good dictated by the reason is due to the fact that many live according to sense; for sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place: and privation of the good dictated by the reason ensues from many goods of that kind. Hence it follows that, although evil is without intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states, accidentally however and not per se. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake. But the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it absolutely. For instance, the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety, intends not the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo, not ab- solutely, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the sake of obtain- ing a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it absolutely, but for the sake of something in particular. In the same way, therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary, as the throwing of a ship’s cargo into the sea. The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of cor- ruption is never found without the change of generation; and consequently neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE 13 nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of genera- tion, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of water. Accordingly, nature intends directly that there should be air, but it does not intend that there should not be water except in so far as this is involved by the existence of air. Therefore priva- tions are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally, whereas forms are intended directly. From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil absolutely is utterly with- out intention in the operations of nature, for example, the birth of mon- strosities; but which is evil, not absolutely, but relatively, is intended by nature, not directly, but accidentally. CHAPTER VII THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE From this it follows that no essence is evil in itself. For evil, as we have said,^ is nothing else but the 'privation of what is connatural and due to anyone; for the term evil is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is the non-existence of something in a substance? Therefore evil is not a real essence. Again. Each thing has being according to its essence. Now in so far as it has being, it has a share of good ; for if good is what all desire ^ being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore a thing is good in so far as it has an essence. But good and evil ar^e opposed to each other. Therefore nothing is evil in so far as it has an essence. Therefore no essence is evil. Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner, neither can it be something made, since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore nothing is evil as to its essence. Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what. is like it and becoming to it. Now everything by acting intends a good* as we proved above.^ Therefore no being as such is evil. Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of a thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must needs flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance; although perchance it may not be natural to some other substance. Thus heat is natural to fire, whereas it is ^Ch. 6. ^Aristotle, Metaph,, III, 2 (1004a 16), ®Ch. 3. 14 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil, since it is the priva- tion of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence, whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore no essence is evil in itself. Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form, since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the character of goodness, for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends ; and it is the act whereby whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore evil has not an essence. Further. Being is divided by act and potentiality. Now act, as such, is a good, because in so far as a thing is in act, it is perfect. Again, potentiality is a good, for potentiality tends to act, as may clearly be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary thereto. Moreover it is in the same genus as act. Furthermore privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore everything that is, in whatever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is a good. Therefore evil has not an essence. Again. It has been proved in the Second Book of this work that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God;^ and we have shown in the First Book that God is perfect goodness.^ Since,’ then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hence it is that it is said {Gen, i. 31) : God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; and {Eccles, iii. ii): Ee hath made all things good in their time; and (i Tim, iv. 4) : Every creature of God is good. Again, Dionysius says that evil is not a thing that exists^ namely, per se, nor is it something in things that exist, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.® Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature. CHAPTERS VIII AND IX ARqUMENTS WHEREBY IT IS SEEMINGLY PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING [and their solution] It would seem that certain arguments militate against the aforesaid state- ment. [i] For each thing derives its species from its proper difference. Now evil is a specific difference in certain genera, namely in moral habits and ^C. G,, II, 15. ®C. G., I, 28 and 41. ^De Div. Nom,, IV, 20-21 (PG 3, 721). EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE 15 acts; for just as virtue according to its species is a good habit, so the con- trary vice is an evil habit according to its species. The same applies to virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore evil gives certain things their species. Therefore it is an essence, and is natural to certain things. [2] Further. Each of two contraries is a nature, for if it expressed nothing, one of the contraries would be a pure privation or negation. But good and evil are said to be contraries. Therefore evil is a nature. [3] Again. Aristotle in his Categories says that good and evil are genera of contraries} Now every genus has an essence or nature, for there are no species or differences of non-being, so that what is not cannot be a genus. Therefore evil is an essence and a nature. [4] Also. Whatever is active is a thing. Now evil as such is active, for it counteracts and corrupts good. Therefore evil as such is a thing. [5] Moreover. Whatever can be more or less must be a thing admitting of degrees, since negations and privations do not admit of being more or less. Now among evils we find one to be worse than another. Therefore, seemingly, evil must be a thing. [6] Furthermore. Thing and being are convertible terms. Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it is a thing and a nature. [Chapter IX\ These objections, however, are easily solved. For evil and good in morals are said to be specific differences, as the first argument stated, because moral matters depend on the will; for a thing comes under the head of morals so far as it is voluntary. Now the will’s object is the end and the good. Hence moral matters are specified by their end, even as natural actions are specified by the form of their active principle, for in- stance, the action of heating is specified by heat. Since, then, good and evil are predicated in respect of the universal direction to an end, or the priva- tion of that direction, it follows that in morals the first differences are those of good and evil. Now for one genus there must be one first measure; and the measure in morals is reason. Consequently good and evil in moral mat- ters must depend on the end appointed by reason. Accordingly, in morals, that which derives its species from an end that is in accord with reason is said to be specifically good; and that which derives its species from an end discordant from reason is said to be specifically bad. And yet this end, though it sets aside the end appointed by reason, is nevertheless some kind of good, such as a pleasurable object of the senses, or something similar, so that in some animals this end is good, and even in man when it is mod- erated by reason. Also it happens that what is evil for one is good for an- other. Therefore evil, so far as it is a specific difference in the moral genus, does not denote a thing essentially evil; but it rather denotes something that is good in itself, but evil for man, in so far as it removes the order of reason, which is man’s good. From this it follows that evil and good are contraries according as they are applied to the moral genus. But they are ^ Cat., XI (14a 24). i6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES not contraries in their absolute signification, as the second objection stated, but evil is a privation of good so far as it is evil. In the same way we may understand the saying that evil and good, taken in the moral order, are genera of contraries, on whith the third objec-^ tion was based. For of all moral contraries, either both are evil, as prodi- gality and stinginess, or one is good and the other evil, as liberality and stinginess. Hence moral evil is both a genus and a difference, not through being the privation of a good appointed by reason (whence it is called evil), but through the nature of the action or habit that is directed to an end incompatible with the right end appointed by reason. Thus a blind man is a human individual, not as being blind, but as being this particular man; and irrational is a difference of animal, not through the privation of reason, but because of the particular nature to which privation of reason is consequent. It may also be said that Aristotle asserts evil and good to be genera, not in his own opinion, since he does not number them among the ten first genera in each of which some contrariety is found, but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who affirmed that good and evil are supreme genera and first principles.^ Under each of them he placed ten supreme contraries, so that we have the good which is limited, which is equal, which is one, which is on the right hand, the male, the resting, the straight, the luminous, the square, and lastly, the good; while under evil he placed the unlimited, the unequal, the manifold, the left-hand, the female, the moving, the crooked, the darksome, the oblong, and lastly, the evil. In the same way, and in several passages of his works on logic, he employs examples according to the opinions of other philosophers, as being probable at the time. Moreover, this saying contains a certain amount of truth, for it is im- possible that a probable statement should be utterly false. Now of all con- traries one is perfect, while the other is incomplete, as containing some kind of privation. Thus, white and hot are perfect, while cold and black are imperfect, as indicating a kind of privation. Since then incompleteness and privation are a kind of evil, while every perfection and completeness comes under the head of good, it follows that in contraries one seems to be com- prised under good, while the other approaches to the notion of evil In this way good and evil seem to be genera of all contraries. In this way too it is clear how evil is opposed to good, which was the line taken by the fourth objection. Because in so far as form and end, which have the aspect of good, and are the true principles of action, involve priva- tion of a contrary form and end, the action that is consequent upon this form and end is ascribed to privation and evil; accidentally however, since privation, as such, is not a principle of action. Rightly therefore does Dionysius say that evil does not oppose good, except by virtue of a good, and ^Cf. op. cit., IV (ib 25). "Cf. Metaph., I, 5 (986a 26). EVIL IS CAUSED BY GOOD 17 in itself it^ is powerless and weak}- as not being a principle of action. Evil, however, is said to corrupt good, not only as acting by virtue of a good, as was explained, but formally by itself; even as blindness is said to corrupt the^ sight, through being the very corruption of sight. In the same way, whiteness is said to color the wall, because it is the very color of the wall. A thing is said to be a greater or lesser evil by reason of its distance from the good. For thus it is that things which imply privation admit of degrees, as inequality and unlikeness ^ and thus, to be more unequal is to be more distant from equality, and to be more unlike is to go further from likeness. Therefore that is said to be more evil which is more deprived of good, as being more distant from good. But privations are subject to increase, not as having a kind of essence, as do qualities and forms, as the fifth argument presumed, but through the increase of the cause of privation. Thus air is more dark according as the light is impeded by the interposition of more obstacles, for thus it is further removed from a participation of light. Again, evil is said to be in the world, not as though it had an essence, or were some thing, as the sixth argument supposed, but according as a thing is said to be evil with evil; even as blindness and privation of any kind is said to be, because an animal is blind with blindness. For being is predicated in two ways, as the Philosopher teaches.^ First, as indicating the essence of a thing, and thus it is divided into the ten categories. In this way no priva- tion can be called a being. Secondly, as denoting the truth of judgment. In this way evil and privation are called a being, inasmuch as a thing is said to be deprived by a privation. CHAPTER X THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD We may conclude from .the foregoing that evil is not caused except by a good. For were some evil caused by an evil, since evil does not act save by virtue of a good, as was proved above,^ it follows that good itself is the primary cause of evil. Again. That which is not, is not the cause of anything. Therefore every cause must be some being. Now evil is not a being, as was shown above."^ Therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. Hence if evil be caused by something, this must be a good. Again. Whatever is properly and by itself the cause* of something in- tends its proper effect. Hence, if evil by itself be the cause of something, it would intend its proper effect, namely, evil. But this is false, for it has been . Div. Nom., IV, 29 (PG 3, 729), ^ Metaph., IV, 7 (lojya 8).~Cf. St. Thomas, In Metaph,, V, lect. 9. ® Ch. 9. ^ Ch. 7. i8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES shown that every agent intends a good.^ Therefore evil by itself is not the cause of anything, but only accidentally. Now every accidental cause is reduced to a per se cause. But good alone can be a per sc cause, and evil cannot be a per se cause. Therefore evil is caused by good. Further. Every cause is either matter, or form, or agent, or end. But evil cannot be either matter or form, for it has been shown above that being, whether actual or potential, is a good.^ Neither can it be an agent, since a thing acts inasmuch as it is actual and has a form. Nor again can it be an end, since it is without intention, as we have shown/^ Therefore evil cannot be the cause of a thing, and if anything be the cause of an evil, that evil must be caused by a good. Since, however, evil and good are opposite to each other, and one oppo- site cannot be the cause of the other except accidentally (thus a cold thing causes heat, as is stated in Physics viii.'^), it follows that good cannot be the effective cause of evil except accidentally. In the physical order, this accident may be on the part of the agent, or on the part of the effect. It is on the part of the agent, as when the agent's power is defective, with the result that the action is defective, and the effect deficient. And thus when the power of the digestive organ is defec- tive, the result is imperfect digestion of the food and an indigested humor, which are physical evils. Now it is accidental to the agent as such that its power be defective, for it acts, not as having a defective power, but as having some power; for if it lacked power altogether, it would not act at all. Accordingly, evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, inas- much as the agent’s power is defective. Hence it is said that evil has not an efficient, but a deficient, cause; because evil does not follow from an active cause, except in so far as this cause is defective in power, and in this respect it is riot effective. — ^And it comes to the same if defect in the action and the effect results from a defect in the instrument, or in any thing else required for the agent’s action: as when the motive power causes a limp because of crookedness in the leg; for the agent, acts by both its power and its instrument. On the part of the effect, evil is caused by good accidentally, either on the part of the matter of the effect, or on the part of its form. For if the matter be indisposed to receive the impression of the agent, the effect must needs be defective. Thus a deformed offspring results from an indis- position of matter. Nor is it imputed to defect in the agent, if it fail to transform an indisposed matter to perfect actuality; for to each natural agent there is appointed a power in proportion to its nature, and if it go not beyond that power, it will not on that account fall short of its power, but only when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature. On the part of the effect’s form, evil occurs accidentally in so far as one form necessarily involves the privation of another; and therefore the gen- ^ Ch. 3. ^ Ch. 7. ^ Ch. 4. ^Aristotle, Phys., VIII, i (251a 33). EVIL IS CAUSED BY GOOD 19 erating of one thing is necessarily followed by the corruption of another. But this evil is not an evil of the effect intended by the agent, as was made clear above, ^ but of the other thing. Accordingly it is evident that evil is caused only accidentally by a good. — And the same applies to things produced by art, for art, in its work, copies nature,^ and faults occur in both in the same way. In morals, however, the case would seem to be different. For moral fault does not apparently follow from a defective power, since weakness of power either wholly excludes, or at least diminishes, moral fault; since weakness does not deserve punishment, which is due to guilt, but rather mercy and pardon, seeing that moral fault must be voluntary and not necessary. But if we consider the matter carefully, we shall find that there is a likeness in one respect, and unlikeness in another. There is unlikeness in that moral fault is considered in the action alone, and not in some produced effect, for moral virtues are directed not to making but to doing. But the arts are directed to making, for which reason it has been stated that faults occur in them in the same way as in nature. Therefore moral evil is considered as resulting, not from the matter or form of the effect, but only from the agent. Now, in moral actions four active principles are to be found in due order. The first of these is the executive power, namely the motive power, whereby the members are moved to execute the will’s command. Hence this power is moved by the will which is a second principle. And the will is moved by the judgment of the apprehensive power, which judges that a particular thing is good or evil, which are objects of the will, the one moving to pursuit, the other to flight. Again, the apprehensive power is moved by the thing ap- prehended. Hence the first active principle in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive power; the third is the will; and the fourth is the motive power, which carries out the command of reason. Now the act of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil. For these external acts do not belong to morals, except according as they are voluntary. Therefore if the act of the will be good, the external act will also be good, and evil, if it be evil. And there would be nothing savoring of moral evil if the defect in a defective external act has nothing to do with the will; for limping is not a moral, but a physical, evil. There- fore a defect in this executive power either wholly excuses or diminishes moral fault. — ^Again, the act whereby the thing moves the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault; for the visible object moves the sight ac- cording to the natural order of things, and so too does every object move a passive power. — Again, considered in itself, the act of the apprehensive power is 'devoid of moral fault, since a defect therein either excuses or diminishes moral fault, in the same way as a defect in the executive power; for weakness and ignorance equally excuse or diminish sin. — It follows, ^Ch. 6. ^Aristotle, Phys., II, 2 (194a 22). 20 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES then, that moral fault is found first and chiefly in the sole act of the will, and an act is properly called moral precisely because it is voluntary. There- fore the root and origin of moral fault is to be sought in the act of the will. But there is a difficulty, seemingly, attendant upon this inquiry. For since a defective act results from a defect in the active principle, we must presuppose a defect in the will to precede the moral fault. And if this defect be natural, it will always adhere to the will, so that the will must be guilty of moral fault whenever it acts. But acts of virtue prove this to be false. But if the defect be voluntary, it is .already a moral fault, whose cause will still remain to be sought; and thus the reason will carry on indefinitely. Accordingly, we must say that the defect already existing in the will is not natural, lest it follow that the will sins in every act; and that neither is it by chancy or fortuitous, for then there would ‘be no moral fault in us, since chance events are unforeseen and outside the domain of reason. Therefore it is, voluntary. Yet it is not a moral fault, — lest we be forced to proceed indefinitely. How this may be, remains to be considered. The perfection of every active principle depends on a higher active prin- ciple, since the second agent acts through the power of the first. While, therefore, the second agent remains subordinate to the first, it acts unfail- ingly; but it fails in acting if it happen to stray from the order of the first agent: as in the case of an instrument that falls short of the first agent^s movement. Now it has been said that, in the order of moral actions, two principle's precede the will, namely, the apprehensive power, and the ap- prehended object, which is the end. And since for each movable there is a corresponding proper motive power, every apprehensive power is not the motive force due to every appetitive power, but this one belongs to this, and another to that. Accordingly, just as the proper motive power of the sensitive appetite is the apprehensive power of the senses, so the proper motive power of the will is the reason itself. Again, since the reason is able to apprehend many goods and many ends, and each one has its proper end, the will also must have as its end and first mover, not any, but a definite good. Hence when the will tends to its act, through being moved by the apprehension of reason presenting to it its proper good, a right action follows. But when the will breaks away at the apprehension of the sensitive power, or even of the reason which presents some good other than its proper good, there follows in the will’s act a moral fault. Consequently, the sin of action is preceded in the will by a failure of order to reason, and to its proper end: to reason, as when the will, on the sudden apprehension of a sense, tends to a good that is pleasurable to sense; —to its due end, as when, by deliberating, the reason arrives at stome good which is not good either now or in some particular way, and yet the will tends to that good as though it were its proper good. Now this failure of order is voluntary, for it is in the will’s power to will or not to will. Again, 21 EVERY EVIL RESIDES IN A GOOD it is in the will’s power that the reason actually consider the matter, or cease from considering it, or that it consider this matter, or that. Nor is this failure of order a moral evil, for if the reason were to consider nothing, or to consider any good whatever, as yet there is no sin, until the will tends to an undue end; and this itself is an act of the will. Accordingly, both in the physical and in the moral order it is clear that evil is not caused by good except accidentally. CHAPTER XI THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD From what we have said it can be shown that every evil resides in some good. For evil cannot exist by itself, since it has no essence, as was proved above.^ Therefore evil needs to he in some subject. Now every subject, as it is a substance, is a good, as is evident from what has been said.^ There- fore every evil is in a good. Also. Evil is a privation, as we have shown.® Now privation and the lacking form are in the same subject. But the subject of a form is a being in potentiality to that form, and this being is a good, for potentiality and act are in the same genus. Therefore privation, which is an evil, is in some good as its subject. Moreover. A thing is called evil because it injures,^ and this only because it injures a good, for it is good to injure evil, since the corruption of evil is good. Now it would not injure a good formally, unless it were in that good; and thus blindness is hurtful to a man in so far as it is in him. Therefore evil must be in a good. Again. Evil is not caused except by good, and then only accidentally.® Now whatever is accidental is reducible to that which is per se. Conse- quently, together with the evil effect that is caused accidentally by a good, there must be some good which is the per se effect of that good, so as to be the foundation of that evil; because what is accidental is founded on what is per se. Seeing, however, that good and evil are mutually opposed, and that one of two opposites cannot be the subject of the other, but expels it, someone at a cursory glance might think it unreasonable to state that good is the subject of evil. And yet it is not unreasonable, if the truth be sought thoroughly. For good, even as being, is predicated universally, since every being, as such, is good, as we have shown.^ Now it is not unreasonable that non-being ^Ch. 7. ^Ihid. ® Ch. 9. * St. Augustine, EwcHf., XII (PL 40, 237). '^Ch, 10. ®Ch. 7. 22 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES should have being for its subject, for every privation is a non-being, and yet its subject is a substance, which is a being. But non-being is not in a being opposed to it as in its subject. For blindness is not universal non- being, but a particular kind of non-being, namely privation of sight, and therefore it is not in sight, as its subject, but in an animal. In like manner, evil has for its subject not the opposite good (for it is the privation of this good), but some other good. Thus moral evil is in a natural good; and an evil of nature, namely, privation of a form, is in matter, which is a good as a being in potentiality. ' CHAPTER XII THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD It is clear from the foregoing that however much evil be increased it can never destroy good entirely, since there must always remain the subject of evil, as long as evil remains. Now the subject of evil is a good.^ Therefore, some good must always remain. But seeing that evil may be increased indefinitely, and that good is al- ways diminished by the increase of evil, it would seem that good is de- creased by evil indefinitely. Now a good that can be diminished by evil must needs be finite, because infinite good is incompatible with evil, as we proved in the First Book.^ Seemingly, therefore, a good is sometimes wholly destroyed by evil, since if something is subtracted indefinitely from the finite, this must at length be destroyed through such subtraction. Nor may it be said, as some say, that if the subsequent subtraction be made in the same proportion as the preceding one, and continue thus in- definitely, the good cannot be destroyed, as may be seen in the division of a continuous quantity. Thus if from a line two cubits long you subtract half, and from the remainder subtract half, and continue thus indefinitely, there will always remain something to be divided. But in this process of division that which is subtracted afterwards must always be less in quan- tity; for half of the whole which was subtracted at first is greater in abso- lute quantity than half of the half, albeit the same proportion remains. This, however, in no way applies to the diminution of good by evil. For the more a good is diminished by an evil, the weaker it becomes, and thus it will be more capable of diminution by the subsequent evil. Again, this subsequent evil may be equal to or greater than the previous one, and hence it will not happen that a smaller quantity of good will always be subsequently subtracted from the good, even if the same proportion be observed. ^Ch. ii: ^C. G.,I,39. EVIL HAS SOME CAUSE 23 We must therefore find a different solution. It is clear from what has been already said that evil entirely destroys the opposite good, as blind- ness destroys sight/ and yet there must needs remain the good which is the subject of that evil. Now this subject, as such, has the aspect of a good, considered as in potentiality to the actuality of the good which is removed by the evil. Therefore, the less it is in potentiality to that good, the less good will it be. Now a subject becomes less in potentiality to a form, not indeed by the mere subtraction of some part of that subject, nor by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality, but by the fact that the poten- tiality is hindered by a contrary actuality from reaching to the actuality of the form; and thus according as heat is the more increased in a subject, the less is that subject potentially cold. Therefore good is diminished by evil more by the addition of its contrary than by the subtraction of good. This applies also to what we have said of evil. For we have said that evil happens outside the intention of the agent,^ which always intends some good, the result of which is the exclusion of some other good opposed thereto. Hence the more we increase that intended good, the result of which is an evil outside the agent ^s intention, the more the potentiality to the contrary good will be diminished. And it is thus that the diminution of good by evil increases. Now this diminution of good by evil cannot go on indefinitely in the physical order. Because all physical forms and powers are limited, and reach a certain term beyond which they cannot reach. Consequently neither can a contrary form, nor can the power of a contrary agent, be increased indefinitely, so as to result in the indefinite diminution of good by evil. On the other hand, this diminution can proceed indefinitely in moral matters. For the intellect and will have no limit fixed to their actions, since the intellect can proceed indefinitely in understanding: wherefore the mathematical species of numbers and figures are infinite. In like manner, the will goes on indefinitely in willing, since he who wills to commit a theft can so will again, and so on to infinity. Now the more the will tends to unfitting ends, the more difficult is it for it to return to its proper and fitting end; as is evident in those who have acquired a vicious habit through sinning frequently. Hence the good of natural aptitude may be diminished indefinitely by moral evil ; and yet it will never be entirely destroyed, and will always accompany the nature that remains. CHAPTER XIII THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND It can be shown from what precedes that although evil has no per se cause, yet every evil must needs have an accidental cause. "Ch. II. ''Ch.4. 24 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILEwS For whatever is in a thing as its subject must needs have a cause, since it results either from the principles of the subject, or from some external cause. Now evil is in good as its subject, as was shown above.^ Therefore evil must have a cause. Again. That which is in potentiality to either of two opposites is not actualized by either except by some cause, for no potentiality actualizes itself. Now evil is the privation of that which is connatural and due to any- one;^ since it is because of this that a thing is said to be evil. Therefore evil is in a subject that is in potentiality to evil and its opposite. Therefore evil must have some cause. Moreover. Whatever is in a thing in addition to its nature supervenes through some other cause; for whatever is natural to it is permanent, un- less something else be in the way. And thus a stone is not borne upwards, unless someone throws it, and water is not heated unless something makes it hot. Now evil, in whatever subject it be, is always there in addition to the nature of that subject, since it is the privation of what is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil must always have a cause, either per sc or accidental. Further. Every evil follows upon some good;'^ and thus corruption fol- lows upon generation. Now every good has a cause, except the First Good, in which there is no evil, as was proved in the First Book.'^ Therefore every evil has a cause, from which it results accidentally. CHAPTER XIV THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE From the same premises it is clear that although evil is not a per se cause, it is nevertheless an accidental cause. For if A is the cause of B per se, whatever is accidental to A is the accidental cause of B. Thus white, which is accidental to the builder, is the accidental cause of the house. Now every evil is in some good,*'^ and every good is in some way the cause of something. For matter is in a way the cause of form, while the converse is in a way also true; and the same applies to the agent and the end. Therefore there does not follow an indefinite sequence in causes, if each thing be the cause of something else, because the circle observed in causes and effects is com- posed of various kinds of cause. Therefore evil is an accidental cause. Again. Evil is a privation, as was shown above.^^ Now privation is an accidental principle in movable things, even as matter and form are per se principles.'^ Therefore evil is an accidental cause of something. ■^Ch. II. ^Ch. 7. "Ch. 10. *C. G., I, 39. ^Ch. ii. <»Ch. 7. ^Cf. Aristotle, Pkys., I, 7 (190b 26). THERE IS NO HIGHEST EVIL 25 Moreover. From a defect in the cause there follows defect in the effect. Now defect in a cause is an evil. And yet it cannot be a per se cause, since a thing is not a cause in that it is defective, but in that it is a being; for were it wholly defective, it would be the cause of nothing. Therefore evil is a cause of something, not per se, but accidentally. Further. If we run through all the kinds of cause, we find that evil is an accidental cause: in the species of efficient cause, because defect in effect and action results from a defect in the efficient cause; in the species of material cause, because a fault in the effect arises from indisposition in the matter; in the species of formal cause, because every form is accompanied by the privation of the opposite form; and in the species of final cause, because evil is united to an undue end, inasmuch as the due end is hindered thereby. It is therefore evident that evil is an accidental cause, and cannot be a cause per se. CHAPTER XV THAT THERE IS NO HIGHEST EVIL It follows from this that there cannot be a highest evil, that is the prin- ciple of all evils. For a highest evil must needs exclude the association of all good, just as the highest good is that which is wholly disconnected from all evil. Now there cannot be an evil entirely apart from good, for it has been proved that evil resides in some good.^ Therefore nothing is supremely evil. Again. If anything be supremely evil, it must be essentially evil, even as the supreme good is that which is essentially good. But this is impossible, since” evil has no essence, as was shown above.^ Therefore it is impossible to suppose a supreme evil that is the principle of evils. Also. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. Now every evil is caused by a good, as we have proved.^ Therefore evil is not a first principle. Further. Evil does not act except by virtue of a good, as we have proved.^ But a first principle acts by its own power. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle. Moreover. Since that which is accidental is subsequent to that which is per se/* the accidental cannot be first. Now evil does not occur except acci- dentally and unintentionally, as we have proved.® Therefore evil cannot be a first principle. Again. Every evil has an accidental cause, as we have shown.'^ But a first ^Ch. II. ®Ch, 7. ®Ch. 10. *Ch. 9. ® Aristotle, Phys., II, 6 (198a 7). ®Ch.4. ^Ch. 13. 26 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES principle has no cause, either per se^ or accidental. Therefore evil cannot be the first cause in any genus. Furthermore. A per se cause precedes one that is accidental. But evil is none but an accidental cause, as we have proved.^ Therefore evil cannot be a first principle. Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees, who maintained the ex- istence of a highest evil, that is the first principle of all evils.^ CHAPTER XVI THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD Accordingly if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above, it follows that good is the end of each thing. For everything is directed by its action to some end; for either the action itself is an end, or the end of the action is also the end of the agent: and this is its good. Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good, for the philosophers define good as the object of all appetite.^ Therefore the end of everything is a good. Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and wherein it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection is moved towards it, as far as in it lies; and if it have that perfection, it rests therein. Therefore the end of a thing is its perfec- tion. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore every thing is directed to good as its end. Further. Things that know the end and things that do not know the end are equally directed to the end; although those which know the end are moved thereto per se, whereas those which do not know it tend thereto as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end are always directed to a good as their end; because the will, which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. There- fore those things also that do not know the end are directed to a good as their end. Therefore the end of all is a good. ^Ch. 14. ^Cf. St. Augustine, De Haeres., 46 (PL 42, 34). ®Ch. 3. g., Aristotle, Eth., I, i (1094a 2). ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO GOD 27 CHAPTER XVII THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD From the foregoing it is dear that all things are directed to one good as their last end. For if nothing tends to something as its end, except in so far as this is good, it follows that good, as such, is an end. Consequently that which is the supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one supreme good, namely God, as we have shown in the First Book.^ Therefore all things are directed to the highest good, namely God, as their end. Again. That which is supreme in any genus is the cause of everything in that^ genus? Thus fire which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in other bodies. Therefore the supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all things good. Therefore He is the cause of every end being an end, since whatever is an end is such in so far as it is good. Now the cause that a thing is so is itself more so? Therefore God is supremely the end of all things. Further. In every genus of causes, the first cause is more a cause than the second cause, since the second cause is not a cause save through the first. Therefore that which is the first cause in the order of final causes must needs be more the final cause of each thing than the proximate final cause. Now God is the first cause in the order of final causes, for He is supreme in the order of good things. Therefore He is the end of each thing more even than any proximate end. Moreover, In all ordered ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end. Thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man, and is given to him that he may be purged, and he be purged that he may be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are ordered in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, which is the cause of all goodness; and so, since good has the nature of an end, all things are ordered under God as preceding ends under the last end. Therefore God must be the end of all. Furthermore. The particular good is directed to the common good as its end, for the being of the part is for the sake of the being of the whole.^ So it is that the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man? ^ow the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on Him; and the good, whereby each thing is good, ^C. G., I, 42. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I a, i (993b 22). ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 2 (72a 28). ^Aristotle, Polit., I, 4 (1254a 9). ® Aristotle, Eth., I, 2 (1094b 9). 28 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, namely God, as their end. Again. Order among ends is consequent on the order among agents. For just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so all the ends of sec- ond agents must be directed to the end of the supreme agent, since what- ever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are ordered by the first agent to its own end. Now the first agent in all things is God, as we proved in the Second Book,^ And His will has no other end but His own goodness, which is Himself, as we showed in the First Book.^ Therefore all things, whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are ordered to God as their end. But this applies to all things, for, as we proved in the Second Book,^ there can be nothing that has not its being from Him. Therefore all things are ordered to God as their end. Moreover. The last end of every maker, as such, is himself, for what we make we use for our own sake; and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else, it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure, or his virtue. Now God is the producing cause of all things: of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as we have explained above. ^ Therefore He is the end of all things. And again. The end holds the primary place among causes, and it is from it that all other causes derive their actual causality; since the agent does not act except for the end, as was proved.^ Now it is due to the agent that the matter is brought to the actuality of the form, and therefore the matter is made actually the matter, and the form is made the form, of this particu- lar thing, through the agent^s action, and consequently through the end. The later end also is the cause that the preceding end is intended as an end; for a thing is not moved towards a proximate end except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the last end is the first cause of all. Now it must nec- essarily befit the First Being, namely God, to be the first cause of all, as we proved above.^ Therefore God is the last end of all. Hence it is written {Prov, xvi. 4): The Lord hath made all things for himself; and {Apoc, xxii. 13), / am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, " C. G,, 11 , IS. ^ C. G., I, 74. ® C. G., II, IS. " Ibid, ® Ch. 2. C. (?., 11, IS. HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS 29 CHAPTER XVIII HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS It remains to ask how God is the end of all things. This will be made clear from what has been said. For He is the end of all things, yet so as to precede all in being.^ Now there is an end which, though it holds the first place in causing in so far as it is in the intention, is nevertheless last in execution. This applies to any end which the agent establishes by his action. Thus the physician by his action establishes health in the sick man, which is nevertheless his end. There is also an end which, just as it precedes in causing, so also does it precede in being. Thus, that which one intends to acquire by one’s motion or action is said to be one’s end. For instance, fire seeks to reach a higher place by its movement, and the king seeks to take a city by fighting. Ac- cordingly, God is the end of things as something to be obtained by each thing in its own way. Again. God is at once the last end of things and the first agent, as we have shown.^ Now the end effected by the agent’s action cannot be the first agent, but rather is it the agent’s effect. God, therefore, cannot be the end of things as though He were something effected, but only as something already existing and to be acquired. Further. If a thing act for the sake of something already in existence, and if by its action some result ensue, then something through the agent’s ac- tion must accrue to the thing for the sake of which it acts; and thus sol- diers fight for the cause of their captain, to whom victory accrues, which the soldiers bring about by their actions. Now nothing can accrue to God from the action of anything whatever, since His goodness is perfect in every way, as we proved in the First Book.^ It follows, then, that God is the end of things, not as something made or effected by them, nor as though He obtained something from things, but in this way alone, that He is obtained by them. Moreover. The effect must tend to the end in the same way as the agent acts for the end. Now God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as .though He gained something by His action, but as bestowing something thereby; since He is not in potentiality so that He can acquire something, but solely in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow. Things there- fore are not ordered to God as to an end to which something will be added'; they are ordered to Him to obtain God Himself from Him according to their measure, since He is their end. G.,1, 13. ^Ch. 17. ]0 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XIX THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD From the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, creatures are made like unto God. Therefore, if all things tend to God as their last end, so as to acquire His goodness,^ it follows that the last end of things is to become like unto God. Moreover. The agent is said to be the end of the effect in so far as the effect tends to be like the agent; and hence it is that the form of the genera- tor is the end of the act of generation? Now God is the end of things in such wise as to be also their first producing cause. Therefore all things tend to a likeness to God, as their last end. Again. Things give evidence that they naturally desire to be;'^ so that if any are corruptible, they naturally resist corruptives, and tend to where they can be safeguarded, as the fire tends upwards and earth downwards. Now all things have being in so far as they are like God, Who is self- subsistent being, since they are all beings only by participation. Therefore all things desire as their last end to be like God. Further. All creatures are images of fhe first agent, namely God, since the agent produces its like? Now the perfection of an image consists in representing the original by a likeness to it, for this is why an image is made. Therefore all things exist for the purpose of acquiring a likeness to God, as for their last end. Again. Each thing by its movement or action tends to some good as its end, as was proved above.^ Now a thing partakes of good in so far as it is like to the first goodness, which is God. Therefore all things, by their movements and actions, tend to a likeness to God as to their last end. CHAPTER XX HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS From what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to be- come like God. Now, that which has properly the nature of an' end is the good. Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God inas- much as He is good. Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God, even though each thing imitates the divine goodness according to its own manner. For the divine goodness is simple, being, as it were, all in one. ^Ch. i8. 2 Aristotle, Phys., II, 7 (i'9Sa 26). "Aristotle, Eth,, IX, 7 (n68a s) ; 9 (1170a 26). ^Aristotle, De Gener,, I, 7 (324a ii). "Ch. 16. HOW THINGS IMITATE GOD 31 For the divine being contains the whole fullness of perfection, as we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God’s being is His perfect goodness; for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God, as though the sum total of His goodness were God’s very being. Again, the divine being is the substance of the ex- isting God.^ But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the Second Book that no created substance is its own being.^ Therefore, if a thing is good so far as it is, and if no creature is its own being, none is its own goodness, but each one is good by participating in goodness, even as by participating in being it is a being. Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and actuality: such, namely, as are com- petent, by the mere fact that they exist, to be actually and to be good. But in others, the substance is composed of matter and form, and such are com- petent to be actually and to be good, though it is by some part of their being, namely, their form. Accordingly, God’s substance is His goodness, whereas a simple substance participates in goodness by the very fact that it exists, and a composite substance participates in goodness by some part of itself. In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in re- spect of being. For in some substances composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potentiality of matter, in such a way that the matter retains no potentiality to another form, and consequently neither is there in any other matter a potentiality to this same form. Such are the heav- enly bodies, which exhaust their entire matter. — In others’ the form does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, so that the matter retains a poten- tiality to another form, and in another part of matter there remains poten- tiality to this form; for instance in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in sub- stance, it is clear that, together with this form which does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potentiality of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potentiality to some- thing else, for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality and since evil is the privation of good, it is clear that in this last order of sub- stances, good is changeable, and has an admixture of the opposite evil; which cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore the sub- stance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness. " C. G„ I, 28. C. G., I, 2iff. " C. G., n, 15. ^Aristotle, Phys., Ill, i (201a 10). 32 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of the substance com- posed of matter and form. For since matter considered in itself is being in potentiality, and since form is its act; and, again, since a composite sub- stance has actual existence through its form, it follows that the form is, in itself, good, the composite substance is good as having its form actually, and the matter is good as being in potentiality to the form. And although a thing is good in so far as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is being only potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order, for a thing is said to be good, not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end; but even though it has not attained the end, so long as it is directed to the end, for this very rea- son it is said to be good. Accordingly, matter cannot be called a being abso- lutely, in so far as it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being; but this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, because of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being; for which reason Dionysius says that the good includes both existing and non-existing things?- For even non-existent things (namely, matter, considered as subject to privation) seek a good, namely, to exist. Hence it follows that matter is also good, for nothing but the good seeks the good. In yet another way the creature’s goodness falls short of that of God. For, as we have stated, God, in His very being, contains the supreme per- fection of goodness. But the creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many, because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Therefore, in respect of one and the same thing, virtue, wisdom and opera- tion are predicated of God; but of creatures, they are predicated in respect of different things, and the further a creature is from the first goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that, although the first and highest good is utterly simple, and although the substances nearest to it in goodness ap- proach likewise thereto in simplicity, yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher. Elements, for instance, are simpler than animals and men, because they are unable to reach the per- fection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain. From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness according to the manner of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Therefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness. Thus a man who, being despoiled of virtue, is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely, as a being, and as a man; but he is not said to be ^De Div. Norn., IV, 7 (PG 3, 704). HOW THINGS IMITATE GOD 33 good absolutely, but rather evil. Accordingly, in every creature to be and to be good are not the same absolutely, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, whereas in God to be and to be good are absolutely one and the same. If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God’s goodness as its end; and if a thing is like God’s goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its good- ness; and if furthermore the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved: it is clear that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are accidental thereto and belong to its perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing’s perfection. CHAPTER XXI THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD INASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE It is^ clear from the foregoing that things have a tendency to be like God also in that they are causes of others. For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now, by its opera- tion, one thing is the cause of another. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness in this also, that they are causes of other things. Again. Things tend to be like God in so far as He is good, as was stated above.^ Now it is out of His goodness that God bestows being on others, for all things act inasmuch as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek to be like God in this respect by being causes of others. Moreover. Order towards good is itself a good, as we have shown above.^ Now every thing, in so far as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good; for good alone is caused per se, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved.''^ Therefore to be a cause of others is a good. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing’s tendency is to a divine likeness, since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things. Again. That the effect tends to be like the agent amounts to the same as that the agent causes its likeness in its effect; for the effect tends to the end towards which it is directed by the agent. Now the agent tends to as- similate the patient to itself not only in respect of its being, but also in re- spect of its causality; because the agent gives to its natural effect not only those natural principles whereby it subsists, but also those whereby it is a cause of other things. Thus, the animal, when begotten, receives from its ^Ch.20. ^Ibid, "Ch. 10. 34 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES begetter both the power of self-nourishment, and the power of generation. Therefore the effect tends to be like the agent not only as to its species, but also as to its being the cause of other things. Now things tend to be like God, even as effects tend to be like the agent, as was proved aboved Therefore things have a natural tendency towards a divine likeness in this, that they are causes of other things. Moreover. A thing is most perfect when it is able to produce its like, tor that light shines perfectly which gives light to others. Now whatever tends to its own perfection tends to a divine likeness. Therefore a thing tends to a divine likeness from the very fact that it tends to be the cause of other things. Since, however, a cause as such is higher than its effect, it is evident that to tend in this way to a divine likeness, so as to be a cause of other things, belongs to the more perfect among beings. Furthermore. A thing is perfect in itself before being able to cause an- other, as we have stated already. Hence to be the cause of other things is a perfection that is last to come to a thing. Since, then, the creature tends to a divine likeness in many ways,^ this remains last, that it seek a likeness to God by being a cause of others. Therefore Dionysius says that it is of dll things most godlike to be God's co-operator in which sense the Apostle says ( J Cor, iii. g): We are God's coadjutors. CHAPTER XXII HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ENDS It may be shown from the foregoing that the last means whereby a thing is directed to its end is its operation; in various ways, however, according to the variety of operations. For some things have an operation whereby they move something else (e.g., heating and cutting)^ and some have an opera- tion in being moved by another {c.g., being heated and being cut). Some ^operations are a perfection of an actually existing operator, and do not tend to the transmutation of something else: in the former respect these differ from passion and movement, and in the latter from an action which effects a transmutation on some external matter: as an instance of such an operation we have understanding, sensation, will. Hence it is clear that things which are set to move or operate only, without moving or making any thing themselves, tend to the divine likeness in that they are perfect in themselves; while those which make and move, as such, tend to a divine likeness in that they are causes of other things; and that those which move through being moved tend to the divine likeness in both ways. "Ch. 19. "Ch. 20. ^De Cael. Bier,, III, 2 (PG 3, 165). THE DIRECTION OF THINGS 35 The lower bodies, in so far as they are moved with natural movements, are considered to be moved only, and not to move except accidentally. For if a stone in its descent puts into motion something that stood in its path, it is an accident; and the same applies to alteration and other movements. Therefore the end of such movements is that they attain to a divine like- ness in the point of their being perfect in themselves, as having their proper form and their proper place. The heavenly bodies, however, move because they are moved; so that the end of their movement is to attain to a divine likeness in both respects, (i) As regards their own perfection this is true, inasmuch as a heavenly body may be actually where previously it was potentially. — Nor does it for this reason attain less to its perfection, although it retains its potentiality to be where it was before. For in the same way primary matter tends to its perfection by acquiring actually the form which before it had potentially, although it ceases to have the one which before it had actually. For thus matter receives successively all the forms to which it has a potentiality, so that its whole potentiality is actualized successively; which could not hap- pen all at one time. Therefore, since a heavenly body is in potentiality to a particular whereabouts, even as primary matter is to a particular form, it attains to its perfection by the fact that its entire potentiality to a particu- lar whereabouts is successively actualized, which could not happen simul- taneously. ( 2 ) Inasmuch as they move by moving, the end of their movement is the attainment of a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. Now they are the causes of other things by causing generation and corruption and other movements in this lower world. Accordingly the movements of heavenly bodies, in so far as they cause motion, ar^ directed to generation and corruption in the world beneath them. And it is not unfitting that the movements of heavenly bodies conduce to the generation of these lower things, although these inferior bodies are less noble than the heavenly bodies, since the end should be of greater account than the means. For the generator’s action tends to the form of the generated, and yet that which is generated is not of greater worth than the generator, but, in univocal agents, is of the same species with it. For the generator intends as its ulti- mate end not the form of the generated (which form is the end of genera- tion), but the likeness to the divine Being in the perpetuation of the spe- ‘ cies, and the diffusion of His goodness, by bestowing its specific form on others, and being the cause of other things. Likewise, the heavenly bodies, although more noble than the lower bodies, nevertheless intend by means of their movements the generation of the latter bodies, and to bring to actuality the forms of things generated; not indeed as though this were their ultimate end, but as a means whereby to attain to an ultimate end, namely the divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. We must take note, however, that a thing, according as it participates in 36 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES a likeness to God’s goodness, which is the object of His will, so too has it a share in a likeness to God’s will, whereby things are brought into being and preserved. The higher beings, however, participate in a likeness to the divine goodness in a more simple and universal manner; but the lower be- ings, in a more particular and divided way. Hence between heavenly and lower bodies we observe a likeness, not of equality, as in things belonging to the same species, but as that which is to be observed between the uni- versal agent and a particular effect. Consequently, just as in this lower world the intention of the particular agent is confined to good of this or that species, so the intention of the celestial body is inclined to the common good of the corporeal substance, which by generation is preserved, multiplied and increased. But since, as was already stated, everything moved tends as such towards a divine likeness in order to be perfect in itself, and since a thing is perfect in so far as it becomes actual, it follows that the intention of every thing that is in potentiality is to tend to actuality by way of move- ment. Hence the more an act is more final and more perfect, the more is the appetite of matter inclined to it. Therefore the appetite whereby mat- ter seeks a form must tend towards the last and most perfect act to which matter can attain, as to the ultimate end of generation. Now certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For primary matter is in potentiality, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potentiality to the form of a mixed body; and that is why elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potentiality to a vegetative soul, for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potentiality to the sensitive, and the sensi- tive to the intellective.^This is proved by the process of generation, for in generation we have first the fetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life. After this no later or more noble form is to be found in things subject to generation and corruption. There- fore the last end of all generation is the human soul, and to this does mat- ter tend as its ultimate form. Consequently, the elements are for the sake of the mixed body, the mixed body for the sake of living things, and of these plants are for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man. Therefore man is the end of all generation. And since the same thing is the cause of generation and preservation in things, the order of the preservation of things is in keeping with the afore- said order of their generation. Hence we find that mixed bodies are pre- served by the qualities becoming to the elements; plants are nourished by mixed bodies; animals derive their nourishment from plants; and some tha\ are more perfect and powerful from the imperfect and weak. As for man, he employs all kinds of things for his own use: some for food, some for clothing Hence by nature he was made naked, as being able to make him- self clothes from other things; even as nature provided him with no suit- THE MOTION OF THE HEAVENS 37 able nourishment except milk, so that he might supply himself with food from a variety of things. Some things also he employs as a means of transit, for he is inferior to many animals in swiftness and endurance, as though other animals were furnished for his needs. Over and above this, he employs all things endowed with a sensitive life for the perfection of his intellectual knowledge. Wherefore of man is it said in Psalm viii. 8, in words addressed to God: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet. And Aris- totle says that man has a natural dominion over all animals.^ If, therefore, the movement of the heavens is directed to generation, and if all generation is directed to man as the last end of this genus, it is evi- dent that the end of the movement of the heavens is directed to man as its last end in the genus of things subject to generation and movement. Hence it is said {Deut. iv. 19) that God made the heavenly bodies for the service of all the nations. CHAPTER XXIII THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS IS FROM AN INTELLECTIVE PRINCIPLE It can also be shown from the foregoing that the first principle that causes the movement of the heavens is intellective. For nothing that acts according to its own species intends a form higher than its own, since every agent intends its like. Now a heavenly body, in so far as it acts by its own movement, intends the ultimate form, which is the human intellect, which is higher than any corporeal form, as we have proved above.- Therefore the body of the heavens acts to the effect of generation, not in respect of its own species, as the principal agent does, but in respect of the species of some higher intellectual agent, in relation to which the body of the heavens is like an instrument in relation to a principal agent. Now the heavens acts to the effect of generation, inasmuch as it is moved. Therefore the body of the heavens is moved by some intellectual substance. Again. Whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another, as we proved above.^* Therefore the body of the heavens is moved by another. Now this other is either wholly separated from it, or else it is united to it, so that what is composed of the heavens and its mover is said to move it- self, inasmuch as one part thereof is moved and the other is mover. If this be the case, then since whatever moves itself is living and animate, it fol- lows that the heavens is animate. And it is animate not otherwise than with an intellectual soul, for it could not be animated with a nutritive soul, since in the body of the heavens there is no generation or corruption; nor Polit., I, 5 (i2S4b 9). "Ch. 22. . "C. G., I, 13. 38 THE SUMMA CO'NTRA GENTILES with a sensitive soul, since the body of the heavens has no variety of organs. Therefore it follows that it is moved by an intellectual soul.— If, on the other hand, it be moved by an extrinsic mover, this will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it does not cause movement without being moved, for no body moves unless it be moved, as was shown a!)Ove.’ Hence this too will require to be moved by another. But as it is not possible to have an infinite series of bodies, we must come to some incorporeal first mover. Now that which is utterly separated from a body must be intellec- tual, as we have shown.- Therefore the movement of the heavens, which is first among corporeal beings, is caused by some intellectual substance. Moreover. Heavy and light bodies are moved by their generator and by that which removes obstacles, as is proved in PhyslCs^ viii;** for it is impos- sible that their form be mover and the matter moved, for nothing is moved except a body. Now, as the elemental bodies are simple, and there is no composition in them, except that of matter and form, so too are the heav- enly bodies simple. Hence, if they be moved in the manner of heavy^and' light bodies, it follows that they are moved per sc by their generator, and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle. But this is impossible, for these bodies cannot be generated, because there is no contrariety in them, and their movements cannot be hindered. Therefore these bodies must needs be moved by beings that cause movement by a power of apprehen- sion. This power cannot be sensitive, as we have proved. Therefore it must be an intellective power. Further. If the principle of the movement of the heavens be nature alone, without any kind of apprehension, it follows that it must be the form of the heavenly body, as is the case with the elements; for although simple forms do not cause movement, they are f^rinciples of movements, since natural movements, like all other natural properties, follow from them. Now it is impossible that the heavenly movement follow the form of the heavenly body as its active principle. For the form is the principle of local movement inasmuch as to a particular body, in respect of its form, is, due a particular place, to which it is moved by virtue of its form, which tends to that place; and because the generator gives this form, it is said to be a mover. Thus, it is due to fire, in accord with its form, to be in a higher place. Now one place is not more due to a heavenly body because of its form, than another. Therefore nature alone is not the principle of the heavenly rhovement; and consequently the principle of its movement must be something that moves it by apprehension. Again. Nature always tends to one thing, and therefore things that come from nature come always in the same way, unless they be hindered, which does not happen frequently. Therefore that which is essentially varied in form cannot possibly be an end towards which nature tends. Now move- ment is essentially such, for that which is moved, as such, is conditioned ^C. G., II, 20. ^c. G., I, 44. ^Phys., VIII, 4 (255b 35). THE MOTION OF THE HEAVENS 39 otherwise now and before} Consequently nature cannot intend movement for its own sake. Therefore it intends through movement to obtain rest which is related to movement as one to many; for a thing is at rest which is conditioned in the same way now as before} Accordingly, if the move- ment of the heavens were from nature alone, it would be directed to some kind of rest; whereas the contrary is the case, for movement is unceasing. Therefore the movement of the heavens is not from nature as its active prin- ciple, but from an intelligent substance. Also. In every movement that is from nature as its active principle, if approach to a particular term be natural, recession from that term must be unnatural and contrary to nature. Thus, a heavy body naturally seeks a lower place, and recedes therefrom unnaturally. Therefore, if the move- ment of the heavens were natural, since it tends to the west naturally, it would be contrary to nature for. it to return from the west to the east. But this is impossible, for nothing in the movement of the heavens is violent or unnatural. Consequently, it is impossible for nature to be the active principle of the movement of the heavens. Therefore its active principle is some apprehensive power, which must be an intelligence, as we have proved above. Therefore the body of the heavens is moved by an intellec- tual substance. And yet we must not deny that the movement of the heavens is natural. For a movement is said to be natural, not only, because of its active principle, but also because of its passive principle. This is evident in the generation of simple bodies, since such generation cannot be called natural in relation to the active principle. Because for a thing to be moved naturally hy an active principle, it must have this active principle within itself, for nature is a principle of movement in a thing in which it is;^ whereas the active principle in the generation of a simple body is separate. Therefore it is not natural by reason of its active principle, but only by reason of its passive principle, namely matter, wherein there is a natural appetite for its natural form. Accordingly, the movement of the heavenly body, as to its active principle, is not natural, but voluntary and intellec- tual, while. as to its passive principle it is natural, since a heavenly body has a natural inclination for that movement. This is made clear if we consider the relation of a heavenly body to its place. For a thing is passive and moved according as it is in potentiality, and it is active and moves according as it is in a state of actuality. Now a heavenly body, considered in its substance, is found to be potentially in- different to any place, even as primary matter is indifferent to any form, as we have stated.'* But it is otherwise with a heavy or light body, which, considered in itself, is not indifferent to any place, and has a definite place appointed to it by reason of its form. Therefore the nature of heavy and ^ Aristotle, I (224b i). Op. cit.,Y, 6 (229b 23). ^ Op. cit., II, i (192b 23). ^Ch. 22. 40 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES light bodies is the active principle of their movements, while the nature of a heavenly body is the passive principle of its movement. Consequently, we must not think that it is moved by violence, like heavy and light bodies, which are moved by us through our intellect. For heavy and light bodies have a natural aptitude for a movement contrary to that with which they are moved by us; and so they are moved by us violently, although the movement of an animaPs body, whereby that body is moved by the soul, is not violent to that body as animated, although it is violent in so far as that body is something heavy. On the other hand, the heavenly bodies have no aptitude for a contrary movement, but only for that where- with they are moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is both voluntary, as regards its active principle, and natural, as to its passive principle. That the movement of the heavens be voluntary in relation to its active principle is not inconsistent with the fact that it is one and uniform, as we might think from the fact that the will is indifferent to many things and is not determined to any one. For just as nature is determined to one course by its power, so is the will determined to one by its wisdom, by which the will is unerringly directed to one end. It is evident from the foregoing that neither approach to any one place nor recession therefrom is contrary to nature. For this happens in the movement of heavy and light bodies for two reasons. First, because the intention of nature, in heavy and light bodies, is determined towards one place, and therefore just as a body tends thereto naturally, so does it recede therefrom against nature; secondly, because two movements, one of which approaches a given term and the other recedes therefrom, are contrary. If, however, we take not the last but a middle place in the movement of heavy and light bodies, both approach thereto and recession therefrom are natu- ral; for the whole movement comes under the intention of nature, and the movements are not contrary, but are one and continuous movement. It is the same in the movement of heavenly bodies, because the inten- tion of nature is not towards one determinate place, as we have said already. Moreover, the movement with which a body moved in a circle recedes from any given place, is not contrary to the movement with which it approaches towards it, but is one and continuous movement; so that any given point in the movement of the heavens is like a middle point, and not like the term in a straight movement. Nor does it make any difference, as to the present question, whether a heavenly body be moved by an intellectual substance united to it, which would be its soul, or by a separate substance. Nor does it make any difference whether each heavenly body be moved by God immediately, or none, and each be moved by the intermediary of created intellectual sub- stances; nor whether only the first heavenly body by God immediately, and HOW THINGS ACT FOR AN END 41 the others through the intermediary of created substances: so long as we admit that the movement of the heavens is caused by an intellectual sub- stance. CHAPTER XXIV 1/ HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD If, as we have shown/ the body of the heavens is moved by an intelligent substance, and if the movement of the body of the heavens is directed to generation in this lower world, it follows that the generations and move- ments of these lower bodies proceed from the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent bears on the same thing as that of the instrument. Now the heavens is the cause of the movements of lower bodies by reason of its movement, with which it is moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is as an instrument of an intelligent substance. Therefore the forms and movements of lower bodies are caused by an intelligent substance and intended by it as by a principal agent, and by the body of the heavens, as by an instrument. Now the species of things caused and intended by an intellectual agent must pre-exist in his intellect, just as the forms of the products of art pre- exist in the intellect of the craftsman and flow thence into his work. Con- sequently, all forms that are in these lower bodies, and all their movements, flow from intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance or substances. Hence Boethius says that forms which are in matter origi- nated in forms that are immaterial? Iii this respect the saying of Plato is verified, that separate Forms are the principles of forms that exist in mat- ter although Plato held them to be per se subsistent, and to be the im- mediate cause of the forms of sensible bodies, whereas we hold them to exist in an intellect, and to cause lower forms through the movement of the heavens. Now since whatever is moved by anything per se, and not accidentally, is directed thereby towards the end of its movement, and since the body of the heavens is moved by an intellectual substance; and since, furthermore, the body of the heavens, by its movement, causes all movement in this lower world:— it follows of necessity that the body of the heavens is di- rected to the end of- its movement by an intellectual substance, and conse- quently all lower bodies to their respective ends. Accordingly, it is easy to understand how natural bodies devoid of knowledge are moved and act for the sake of an end. For they tend to an ^ Ch. 23. 'De Trin,, II (PL 64, 1250). ® CL Aristotle, Metaph., I, 6 (987b 7) . 42 . THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES end as directed thereto by an intelligent substance, in the same way as an arrow, directed by the archer, tends to the mark. Because as the arrow receives its direction to a fixed end through the impulse of the archer, so, too, natural bodies receive an inclination to their natural ends from their natural movers, from whom they derive their forms, powers and movements. Therefore it is also clear that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance, because an effect is ascribed more especially to the direction of the first mover towards the end than to the instruments which receive that direction. For this reason the operations of nature are seen to proceed to the end in an orderly manner even as do the operations of a wise man. It is therefore evident that even things devoid of knowledge can work for an end, can desire the good with a natural appetite, and can seek a divine likeness as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, the former or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, since a thing is good in so far as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tends to a divine like- ness, since a thing is like God in so far as it is good. Now this or that par- ticular good is so far appetible as it bears a likeness to the first goodness. Therefore the reason why a thing tends to its own good is because it tends to a divine likeness, and not vice versa. It is clear therefore that all things seek a divine likeness a.s their last end. A thing’s own good can be understood in several ways. First, in the sense that it is proper to that thing on the part of the individual. Thus an animal desires its own good when it desires food, whereby its existence is preserved. — Secondly, as being proper to that thing on the part of its species. Thus an animal desires its own good, in so far as it desires to beget offspring and to feed them, as well as whatever else conduces to the preservation or defense of the individuals of its species. — ^Thirdly, on the part of the genus. And thus an equivocal agent, for instance the heavens, desires its own good, in causing. — Fourthly, on the part of a likeness of analogy of effects to their cause. Thus God, Who is outside a' genus, gives being to all things !)eccmse of His own goodness. This clearly proves that the more perfect a thing’s power, and the higher its degree of goodness, the more universal is its desire for good, and the greater the range of goodness to which its appetite and operation extend. For imperfect things extend no further than their own individual good; perfect things extend to the good of the species; more perfect things, to the good of the genus ; and God, Who is most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Therefore it is said by some, not without reason, that goody as such, is diffusive,^ because the better a thing is, the further does the outpouring of its goodness extend. And since in every genus that which is most perfect is the exemplar and measure of all that belongs to that ^Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div. Nom., IV, i (PG 3, 693). THE END OF INTELLECTUAL BEINGS 43 genus , it follows that God, Who is most perfect in goodness, and pours forth his goodness most universally, is in His outpouring the exemplar of all things that pour forth goodness. Now one thing becomes a cause of another by pouring forth its own goodness into that other. And so it is again evident that whatever tends to be the cause of something else, tends to a divine likeness, and yet tends to its own good. Consequently, it is not unfitting to say that the movements of heavenly bodies, and the actions of their movers, are in a way for the sake of these bodies that are generated and corrupted, and less noble than they are. For they are not for the sake of these as their last end; but by intending the generation of these, they intend their own good, and the divine likeness as their last end. CHAPTER XXV THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTEL- LECTUAL SUBSTANCE Now, seeing -that all creatures, even those that are devoid of reason, are directed to God as their last end, and that all reach this end in so far as they have some share of a likeness to Him, the intellectual creature attains to Him in a special way, namely, through its proper operation, by under- standing Him. Consequently this must be the end of the intellectual crea- ture, namely, to understand God. For, as we have shown above, ^ God is the end of each thing, and hence, as far as it is possible to it, each thing intends to be united to God as its last end. Now a thing is more closely united to God by reaching in a way to the very substance of God; which happens when it knows something of the divine substance, rather than when it reaches to a divine likeness. Therefore the intellectual substance tends to the knowledge of God as its last end. Again. The operation proper to a thing is its end, for it is its second per- fection ; so that when a thing is well conditioned for its proper operation it is said to be fit and good. Now understanding is the proper operation of the intellectual substance, and consequently is its end. Therefore, what- ever is most perfect in this operation is its last end; and especially in those operations which are not directed to some product, such as understanding and sensation. And since operations of this kind take their species from their objects, by which also- they are known, it follows that the more per- fect the object of any such operation, the more perfect is the operation. Consequently to understand the most perfect intelligible, namely God, is the most perfect in the genus of the operation which consists in under- ^ Aristotle, Metaph., I a, i (993b 23). ^Ch. 17. 44 the summa contra gentiles standing. Therefore to know God by an act of understanding is the last end of every intellectual substance. Someone, however, might say that the last end of an intellectual sub- stance consists indeed in understanding the best intelligible object, but that what is the best intelligible for this or that intellectual substance is not .ab- solutely the best intelligible ; and that the higher the intellectual substance, the higher is its best intelligible. So that possibly the supreme intellectual substance has for its best intelligible object that which is best absolutely, and its happiness will consist in understanding God ; whereas the happiness of any lower intellectual substance will consist in understanding •some lower intelligible object, which however will be the highest thing understood by that substance. Especially would it seem not to be in the power of the human intellect to understand that which is absolutely the best intelligible, because of its weakness; for it is as much adapted for knowing the supreme intelligible as the owVs eye for seeing the sun} Nevertheless it is evident that the end of any intellectual substance, even the lowest, is to understand God. For it has been shown above that God is the last end towards which all things tend.^ And the human intellect, al- though the lowest in the order of intelligent substances, is superior to all that are devoid of understanding. Since then a more noble substance has not a less noble end, God will be the end also of the human intellect. Now every intelligent being attains to its last end by understanding it, as we have proved. Therefore the human intellect attains to God as its elid, by understanding Him. Again. Just as things devoid of intellect tend to God as their end by way of assimilation, so do intellectual substances by way of knowledge, as clearly appears from what has been said. Now, although things devoid of reason tend towards a likeness to their proximate causes, the intention of nature does not rest there, but has for its end a likeness to the highest good, as we have proved,^ although they are able to attain to this likeness in a most imperfect manner. Therefore, however little be the knowledge of God to which the intellect is able to attain, this will be the intellect's last end, rather than a perfect knowledge of lower intelligibles. Moreover. Everything desires most of all its last end. Now the human intellect desires, loves and enjoys the knowledge of divine things, although it can grasp but little about them, more than the perfect knowledge which it has of the lowest things. Therefore man^s last end is to understand God in some way. Further. Everything tends to a divine likeness as its own end. Therefore a thing’s last end is that whereby it is most of all like God. Now the intel- lectual creature is especially likened to God in that it is intellectual, since this likeness belongs to it above other creatures, and includes all other like- nesses. And in this particular kind of likeness it is more like God in under- ^ Aristotle, Metaph., I a, i (993b g). “Ch. 17. *'Ch. 19. THE END OF INTELLECTUAL BEINGS 45 standing actually than in understanding habitually or potentially, because God is always actually understanding, as we proved in the First Book.^ Furthermore, in understanding actually, the intellectual creature is espe- cially like God in understanding God; for by understanding Himself God understand all other things, as we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore the last end of every intellectual substance is to understand God. Again. That which is lovable only because of another is for the sake of that which is lovable for its own sake alone; because we cannot go on in- definitely in the appetite of nature,. since then nature’s desire would be in vain, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite number of things. Now all practical sciences, arts and powers are lovable only for the sake of some- thing else, since their end is not knowledge, but work. But speculative sci- ences are lovable for their own sake, for their end is knowledge itself. Nor can we find any action in human life that is not directed to some other end, with the exception of speculative consideration. For even playful actions, which seem to be done without any purpose, have some end due to them, namely that the mind may be relaxed, and that thereby we may afterwards become more fit for studious occupations; or otherwise we should always have to be playing, if play were desirable for its own sake, and this is un- reasonable. Accordingly, the practical arts are directed to the speculative arts, and again every human operation, to intellectual speculation, as its end. Now, in all sciences and arts that are mutually ordered, the last end seems to belong to the one from which others take their rules and prin- ciples. Thus the art of sailing, to which belongs the ship’s purpose, namely its use, provides rules and principles to the art of ship-building. And such is the relation of first philosophy to other speculative sciences, for all others depend thereon, since they derive their principles from it, and are directed by it in defending those principles; and moreover first philosophy is wholly directed to the knowledge of God as its last end, and is consequently called the divine science.^ Therefore the knowledge of God is the last end of all human knowledge and activity. Furthermore. In all mutually ordered agents and movers, the end of the first agent and mover must be the end of all, even as the end of the com- mander-in-chief is the end of all who are soldiering under him^ Now of all the parts of man, the intellect is the highest mover, for it moves the appe- tite, by proposing its object to it; and the intellective appetite, or will, moves the sensitive appetites, namely the irascible and concupiscible. Hence it is that we do not obey the concupiscence, unless the will command ; while the sensitive appetite, when the will has given Its consent, moves the body. Therefore the end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. Now the intellect's end and good are the true,^ and its last end is the first truth. ^ 6!., I, 56. "C. G.,1,49. Eth., VI, 2 (1139a 27). ® Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (983a 6). Aristotle, 46 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES. Therefore the last end of the whole man, and of all his deeds and desires, is to know the first truth, namely, God. Moreover. Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever he sees; and so through wondering at what they saw, and not knowing its cause, men first began to philosophize, and when they had discovered the cause they were at rest. Nor do they cease inquiring until they come to the first cause; and then do we deem ourselves to know perfectly when wc know the first cause?- Therefore man naturally desires, as his last end, to know the first cause. But God is the first cagse of all things. Therefore man’s last end is to know God. Besides. Man naturally desires to know the cause of any known effect. But the human intellect knows universal being. Therefore it naturally de- sires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in the Second Book.^ Now one has not attained to one’s last end until the natural desire is at rest. Therefore the knowledge of any intelligible object is not enough for man’s happiness, which is his last end, unless he know God also, which knowledge terminates his natural desire as his last end. Therefore this very knowledge of God is man’s last end. Further. A body that tends by its natural appetite to its place is moved all the more vehemently and rapidly the nearer it approaches its end. Hence Aristotle proves that a natural straight movement cannot be towards an indefinite point, because it would not be more moved afterwards than before.^ Hence that which tends more vehemently to a thing afterwards than before is not moved towards an indefinite point but towards some- thing fixed. Now this we find in the desire of knowledge, for the more one knows, the greater one’s desire to know. Consequently, man’s natural de- sire in knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be none other than the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man’s last end. ^ N ow the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called hap- piness or beatitude, for it is this that every intellectual substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or hap- piness of any intellectual substance is to know God. Hence it is said {Matt. v. 8): Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God] and {Jo. xvii. 3): This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God. Aristotle himself agrees with this judgment when he says that man s ultimate happiness is speculative, and this with regard to the highest object of speculation."^ ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 3 (983a 25). "C. G., 11 , 13. ^ De Caelo, I, 8 (277a 18) X, 7 (1177a 18). . » V // /. HAPPINESS AND THE WILL 47 CHAPTER XXVI DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL? Since the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone might think that man’s last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing God, but in loving Him, or in some other act of the will towards Him; [i] espe- cially since the object of the will is the good, which has the nature of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the na- ture of an end except in so far as it also is a good. Therefore, seemingly, man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will. [2] Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, which per- facts operation as beauty perfects youth, as the Philosopher says.^ Hence, if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect. [3] Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake, so that it is never desired for the sake of something else; for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely, that it be sought for its own sake. Therefore, seemingly, the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect. [4] Moreover. All agree in their desire of the last end, for it is a natural desire. But more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge. [s] Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect, for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his in- tellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Therefore, seemingly, the action of the will is more noble than the action of the intellect. There- fore, it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect. But this can be clearly shown to be impossible. For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature according to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is found diversely in diverse things. This diversity, how- ever, arises from the fact that things are diversely related to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite; those that have a sensitive knowledge have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised; and those X, 4 (1174b 31), THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 48 which have intellectual knowledge have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely, the will. The will, therefore, in so far as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand, the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual nature. Therefore, beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the will. Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is natu- rally prior to the acts of those powers, even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved. Now the will is such a power, for the appe- tible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will’s object is naturally prior to its act, and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will. Besides. Inwall those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is bfouiht to bear on its own act. For if the intellect understands that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands; for this very act of understanding, which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on forever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way, the first thing willed cannot be the very act of willing, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intellectual nature is. beatitude or happiness; because it is for its sake that we will whatever we will. Therefore, happiness cannot consist in an act of the will. Further. The truth of a thing’s nature is derived from those things which constitute its substance; for a true man differs from a man in a picture by the things which constitute man’s substance. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will; because, whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no differ- ence to the will in its desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or not. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an^act of the intellect rather than of the will. Again. If an act of the wfU' were happiness itself, this act would be an act either of desire, or love, or delight. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to what it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end. — ^Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not, because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not; and if the love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this HAPPINESS AND THE WILL 49 arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end, and another to love it; for love was imperfect before we possessed the end, and perfect after we obtained possession. — Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight, whether we are conscious of possessing it actually, or call to mind our previous possession, or hope to possess it in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end. — Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially. Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this' is not true. For the desirability of a delight depends on what gives rise to the delight, since that which arises from good and desir- able operations is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and de- sirability are from something else, and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness. Moreover. The right order of things agrees with the order of nature, for in the natural order things are ordered to their end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly ordered to necessary ends: for instance, to the use of food that is ordered to the preservation of the individual, and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species; since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these neces- sary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end. Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it, so too natural bodies have a natural inclina- tion to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place. For if it were nature’s chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inclination; but it gives the inclination so that the body may tend towards its proper place, and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it. Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will. Besides. If a thing haye something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end. Thus, for those whose end is money possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the last end of the intellectual substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beati- tude. And this is understanding, since we cannot will what we do not under- 50 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES stand. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect; it is not an act of the will. From what has been said we can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that hap- piness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the ^rst argument reasoned. OnUhe contrary, the fact that it is the first object of the will shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said. Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever must be the end of that thing, as the second objection argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first, it perfects a thing that has its species; secondly, it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfec- tion of a house, considered as already having its species, is that to which the species ^^house” is directed, namely to be a dwelling; for one would not build a house but for that purpose, and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand, the perfection that conduces to the species of a house is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance, its substantial principles ; and also that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance, the buttresses which are made to support the building; as well as those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the beauty of the house. Accordingly, that which is the per- fection of a thing, considered as already having its species, is its end; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand, whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species is not the end of that thing; in fact, the thing itself is its end, for matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, whatever preserves the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, although it perfects the animal, is not the animal’s end, but vice versa. And again, whatever adapts a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attain- ment of its proper end, is not the end of that thing, but vice versa; for instance, a man’s comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says that they conduce to happiness instrumcntally } — Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends (thus, eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual) ; but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing’s species, since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Hence the Philosopher says that Bth.f I, 8 (1099b 2); 9 (1099b 28). HAPPINESS IS NOT BODILY PLEASURE 51 delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth, for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth and not vice versa. Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the third objection argued. Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end, since delight arises from the attain- ment of the end. Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intel- lectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto ; because those things that are outside us are better known to the majority, in that human knowl- edge takes its beginning from sensible objects. The suggestion put forward by the fifth argument, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter’s motive power, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will first and per se, for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, namely, as the act of understanding is itself apprehended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, with the result that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never desire understanding, did not the intellect first apprehend its understanding as a good. — ^And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving presupposes the end, for the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. It is therefore clear that the intel- lect is higher than the will absolutely, while the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense. CHAPTER XXVII THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex. It has been shown that according to nature’s order pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely.^ Therefore, if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations ^Op. cit., X, 4 (1174b 31). " Ch. 26. 52 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above are not the last end ; for they are directed to certain manifest ends: eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of chil- dren. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them. Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite, for it moves the sensitive appetite, as was stated above.^ But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved." Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite. Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man, for it is an abuse of terms to speak of brute animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are com- mon to man and brute. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them. The last end is the most noble of things belonging to a reality, for it has the nature of that which is best. But the aforementioned pleasures do not befit man according to what is most noble in him, namely, the intellect, but according to the sense. Therefore happiness is not to be located in such pleasures. Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now the above pleasures consist in man’s bfeing united through his senses to things beneath him, namely, certain sensible things. Therefore we must not assign happiness to such pleasures. Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate; for other- wise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures are not in themselves man’s good. But the highest good is good of itself, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore such pleasures are not man’s highest good, which is happiness. Again. In all per^se predications, if A be predicated of B absolutely, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B. Thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing will heat most. Ac- cordingly, if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much would be very good. But this is clearly false, because it is considered sinful to use them too much; besides, it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not per se man’s good, and human happiness does not consist in them. Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being ordered to happi- ness.^ If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue, for the act of temperance ^Ibid. Ibid. ' ^Cf. Aristotle, Eth., I, 12 (iioib 14). HAPPINESS IS NOT HONORS 53 is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures ; whence that act takes its name. Therefore man’s happiness is not in these pleasures. Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above. ^ We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things, and consequently with- draw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures. Flereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans who ascribed man’s happi- ness to pleasures of this kind. In their person Solomon says {Eccles. v. 17) : This thcj'ejo 7 'e hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labor . . . and this is his portion] and (Wis. ii. 9) : Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy, for this is our portion, and this is our lot. The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted. For they pretended, that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table. Hence they are called ^Chiliastaef " or believers in the Millennium. The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted, who pre- tend that the reward of the righteous consists in such pleasures. For happiness is the reward of virtue. CHAPTER XXVIII THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONORS From the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man’s highest good, or happiness, consist in honors. For man’s ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect operation, as we have shown above.'^ But man’s honor does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him respect.*^ Therefore man’s happiness must not be placed in honors. Again. That which is for the sake of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honor, for a man is not rightly honored, e*x- cept because of some other ‘good in him. For this reason men seek to be honored, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them; so that they rejoice more in being honored by the great and the wise. Therefore we must not assign man’s happiness to honors. ^Ch. 17. ^St. Augustine, De Haeres , 8 (PL 42, 27). ^Ch, 25. Cf. Aris- totle, Eth., I, 5 (1095b 25). 54 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, or else they would not be praiseworthy. Therefore happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man's power to secure honor, rather is it in the power of the man who pays honor. Therefore happiness is not to be assigned to honors. Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honor, and yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honored. Therefore it is better to become worthy of honor, than to be honored. Therefore honor is not man's supreme good. Furthermore. The highest good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore that which is in possession of the highest good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honor. There- fore honor is not man's supreme good. CHAPTER XXTX THAT man’s happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN GLORY Therefore it is evident also that man’s supreme good docs not consist in glory, which is the recognition of one’s good name. For glory, according to Cicero, is the general recognition and praise of a personas good name} and, in the words of Ambrose, consists in being well known and praised? Now men seek praise and distinction through being famous, so that they may be honored by those whom their fame reaches. Therefore glory is sought for the sake of honor, and consequently if honor be not the highest good, much less is glory. Again. Those goods are worthy of praise, whereby a man shows himself to be ordered to his end. Now he who is directed to his end has not yet reached his last end. Therefore praise is not bestowed on one who has reached his last end; rather does he receive honor, as the Philosopher says.*^ Therefore glory cannot be the highest good, since it consists chiefly in praise. Besides. It is better to know than to be known, because only the higher realities know, whereas the lowest are known. Therefore man’s highest good cannot be glory, which consists in a man’s being known. Further. A man does not seek to be known except in good things; in evil things he seeks to be hidden. Therefore, fo be known is good and de- sirable, because of the good things that are known in a man. Therefore these good things are better still. Consequently glory, which consists in a man’s being known, is not his highest good. ^De Inventione, II, 55 (p. 150^). ""Cf. St. Augustine, Contra Maximin., II, (PL 42, 770). ^ Eth., I, 12 (iioib 24). WEALTH IS NOT HAPPINESS 55 Moreover. The highest good must needs be perfect^ for it satisfies the appetite. But the knowledge of one’s good name, wherein glory consists, is imperfect, for it is beset with much uncertainty and error. Therefore glory of this kind cannot be the supreme good. Furthermore. Man’s highest good must be supremely stable in human things, for it is natural to desire unfailing endurance in one’s goods. Now glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable, since nothing is more changeable than human opinion and praise. Therefore such glory is not man’s highest good. CHAPTER XXX THAT man’s happiness does not consist in wealth Hence it is evident that neither is wealth man’s highest good. For w ealth is not sougM except for the sake of something else, because of itself it ^o^gbod, but only when we use it, whether for the support of the body or for some similar purpose. Now the highest good is sought for its own, and not for another’s sake. Therefore wealth is not man’s highest good. Again. Man’s highest good cannot consist in the possession or preserva- tion of things whose chief advantage for man consists in their being spent. Now the chief advantage of wealth is in its being spent, for this is its use. Therefore the possession of wealth cannot be man’s highest good. Moreover. Acts of virtue deserve praise according as they lead to happiness. Now acts of liberality and magnificence, which are concerned with money, are deserving of praise because of money being spent rather than because of its being kept; and it is from this that these virtues derive their names. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the possession of wealth. Besides., Man’s highest good must consist in obtaining something better than man. But man is better than wealth, since wealth is something di- rected to man’s use. Therefore man’s supreme good does not consist in wealth. Further. Man’s highest good is not subject to fortuned For things that are fortuitous escape the forethought of reason, whereas man has to attain his own end by means of his reason. But fortune occupies the greatest place in the attaining of wealth. Therefore human happiness ‘does not consist in wealth. ■ Moreover* This is evident from the fact that wealth is lost unwillingly; also because wealth can come into the possession of evil persons, who, of necessity, must lack the highest good. Again because wealth is unstable. Other similar reasons can be gathered from the arguments given above.^ ^ Mth., I, 9 (1099b 24). ^ Ch. 28ff. S6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XXXI ^ THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WORLDLY POWER In like manner, neither can worldly power be man’s highest happiness, since in the achievement thereof chance can effect much. Again, it is un- stable, and not subject to man’s will; and it is often obtained by evil men. These are incompatible with the highest good, as was already stated.’^ Again, Man is said to be good especially according as he approaches the highest good. But in respect to his having power, he is not said to be either good or evil, since not everyone who can do good deeds is good, nor is a person evil because he can do evil deeds. Therefore the highest good does not consist in being powerful. Besides, Every power implies reference to something else. But the high- est good is not referred to anything further. Therefore power is not man’s highest good. Moreover. Man’s highest good cannot be a thing that one can use both well and ill; for the better things are those that we cannot abuse. But one can use one’s power both well and ill, for rational powers can be directed to contrary objects? Therefore human power is not man’s good. Further. If any power be man’s highest good, it must be mo.st perfect. Now human power is most imperfect, for it is based on human will and opinion, which are full of inconstancies. Also, the greater a power is re- puted to be, the greater number of people does it depend on; which again conduces to its weakness, since what depends on many is in many ways destructible. Therefore man’s highest good does not consist in worldly power. Consequently man’s happiness does not consist in any external good, for all external goods, which are known as fortuitous goods, are contained under those we have mentioned.^ CHAPTER XXXII / THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN GOODS OF THE BODY Like arguments avail to prove that man’s highest good does not consist in goods of the body, such as health, beauty and strength. For they are com- mon to good and evil, they are unstable, and they are not subject to the will. ^ Ch. 28ff. ^Aristotle, Metaph,, IX, 2 (1046b 25). ® Ch. 28ff. 57 HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THE SENSES Besides. The soul is better than the body, which neither lives nor pos- sesses these goods without the soul. Therefore, the soul’s good, such as understanding and the like, is better than the body’s good. Therefore the body’s good is not man’s highest good. ^ Again. These goods are common to man and other animals, whereas hap- piness is a good proper to man. Therefore man’s happiness does not con- sist in the things mentioned. Moreover. Many animals surpass man in goods of the body, for some are fleeter than he, some more sturdy, and so on. Accordingly, if man’s highest good consisted in these things, man would not excel all animals; which is clearly untrue. Therefore human happiness does not consist in goods of the body. CHAPTER XXXIII THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES By the same arguments it is evident that neither does man’s highest good consist in goods of his sensitive nature. For these goods, again, are common to man and other animals. Again. Intellect is superior to sense. Therefore the intellect’s good is better than that of the sense. Consequently man’s supreme good is not seated in the senses. Besides. The greatest sensual pleasures are those of the table and of sex, wherein the supreme good must needs be, if seated in the senses. But it does not consist in them. Therefore man’s highest good is not in the senses. Moreover. The senses are appreciated for their utility and for knowledge. Now the entire utility of thq senses is referred to the goods of the body. Again, sensitive knowledge is ordered to intellectual knowledge, and hence animals devoid of intellect take no pleasure in sensation except in reference to some bodily utility, in so far as by sensitive knowledge they obtain food or sexual intercourse. Therefore, man’s highest good which is happiness is not seated in the sensitive part of man. CHAPTER XXXIV THAT man’s ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF THE MOPAL VIRTUES It is clear that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral activities. For human happiness, if ultimate, cannot be directed to a further end. But all moral activities can be directed to something else. This is clear from 58 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES a consideration of the principal among them. Because deeds of fortitude in time of war are directed to victory and peace; for it were foolish to go to war merely for its own sake.^ Again, deeds of justice are directed to keep- ing peace among men, for each man possesses with contentment what is his own. The same applies to all the other virtues. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in moral deeds. Again. The purpose of the moral virtues is that through them we may observe the mean in the passions within us, and in things outside us. Now it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of man’s life, since both passions and external things can be directed to something less. Therefore it is not possible that the practice of moral virtue be man’s final happiness. Further. Since man is man through the possession of reason, his proper good, which is happiness, must needs be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Now that which reason has in itself is more proper to reason than what it effects in something else. Seeing, then, that the good of moral virtue is a good established by reason in something other than itself, it cannot be the greatest good of man which happiness is; rather this good must be a good that is in reason itself. Moreover. We have already proved that the last end of all things is to become like God.^ Therefore that in which man chiefly becomes like God will be his happiness. Now this is not in terms of moral actions, since such actions cannot be ascribed to God, except metaphorically; for it is not befitting to God to have passions, or the like, with which moral virtue is concerned. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions. Furthermore. Happiness is man’s proper good. Therefore that good, which of all goods is most proper to man in comparison with other animals, is the one in which we must seek his ultimate happiness. Now this is not the practice of moral virtue, for animals share somewhat either in liberality or in fortitude, whereas no animal has a share in intellectual activity. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral acts. CHAPTER XXXV '/ THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT 'CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE It is also evident from the foregoing that neither does man’s happiness consist in the act of prudence. For acts of prudence are solely about matters of moral virtue, Bu.t hu- « ^ Cf. Aristotle, Eth., X, 7 (1177b 9) . - Ch. 19. HAPPINESS IS THE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD 59 man happiness does not consist in the practice of moral virtue.^ Neither therefore does it consist in the practice of prudence. Again. Man’s ultimate happiness consists in man’s most excellent opera- tion. Now man s most excellent operation, in terms of what is proper to man, is in relation to most perfect objects. But the act of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect objects of intellect or reason; for it is not about necessary things, but about contingent practical matters.^ Therefore its act is not man’s ultimate happiness. Besides. That which is ordered to another as to its end is not man’s ulti- mate happiness. Now the act of prudence is ordered to another as to its end, both because all practical knowledge, under which prudence is com- prised, is ordered to operation, and because prudence disposes a man well in choosing means to an end, as may be gathered from Aristotle.^ Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in the practice of prudence. Furthermore. Irrational animals have no share of happiness, as Aristotle proves."^ Yet some of them have a certain share of prudence, as may be gathered from the same author.^ Therefore happiness does not consist in an act of prudence. CHAPTER XXXVry THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART It is also evident that it cannot consist in the practice of art. For even the knowledge of art is practical, and so is directed to an end, and is not the ultimate end. Besides. The end of the practice of art is the thing produced by art, and such a thing cannot be the ultimate end of human life, since it is rather we who are the end of those products, for they are all made for man’s use. Therefore final happiness cannot consist in the practice of art. CHAPTER XXXVII / THAT man’s ultimate- HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEMPLATING GOD Accordingly, if man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in external things, which are called goods of fortune; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive part; nor as regards the intellec- ^ Ch. 34. ^Cf. Aristotle, Eth., VI, 5 (1104a 35). ^ Op. cit., VI, 13 (1145a 6). '^Op cit., I, 9 (1099b 33). ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, i (980a 30). 6o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES tual part, in terms of the life of moral virtue; nor in terms of the intellectual virtues which are concerned with action, namely, art and prudence:— it remains for us to conclude that man^s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth. For this operation alone is proper to man, and it is in it that none of the other animals communicates. Again. This is not directed to anything further as to its end, since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake. Again. By this operation man is united to beings above him, by becom- ing like them; because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in the separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever. Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it. Further. All other human operations seem to be ordered to this as to their end. For perfect contemplation requires that the body should be dis- encumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and of prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which the whole governance of the civil life is directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations appear to serve those who contemplate the truth. Now, it is not possible that man’s ultimate happiness consist in contem- plation based on the understanding of first principles; for this is most im- perfect, as being most universal, containing potentially the knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human inquiry, and come? to us from nature, and not through the pursuit of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object, since happiness must consist in an opera- tion of the intellect in relation to the most noble intelligible objects. It fol- lows^ then that man’s ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things. ^ It is therefore evident also by way of induction that man’s ultimate hap- piness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.^ ^ Ch. 25 . HAPPINESS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 6i CHAPTER XXXVIII/ THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWL- EDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MAJORITY It remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ulti- mate happiness of an intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other prin- ciples of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book,’’^ or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things run their course according to a fixed order, and since there cannot he order without a cause of order, men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who orders the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration; just as, when we see a man in motion, and performing other works, we perceive that in him there is some cause of these operations which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of soulj but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question. Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness. For the activity of the happy man must be without any defect; but this knowledge of God is subject to an admixture of many errors. Thus, some believed that there was no other governor of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; and so they said that the heavenly bodies were gods. — Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they thought that their movements and natural operations were not introduced into them by an external governor, but that the order in other things was caused by them. — ^And some, deeming huma!n acts not to be subject to any but a human rule, decjared that men who cause order in other men were gods. — Evidently this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness. * Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as to their end; indeed, it is in every- one almost right from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God. Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness; nay, those who lack it and seek it are praised. But he who lacks the aforesaid knowl- edge of God is seemingly very much to be blamed, since it is a very clear ^ C. G., 1, 10. 62 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES sign of a man’s dullness of perception if he fail to perceive such evident signs of God; even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, under- stood not that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm (xiii. i : lii. i ) : The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. Therefore it is not this knowledge of God which suffices for happiness. Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in terms of what is proper to it, is most imperfect. Such is the knowledge which is had of man from the fact that he is moved; for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only potentially, because the proper is only potentially con- tained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man’s highest good must needs be in terms of what exists actually, and not in terms of what exists only potentially ; since potentiality perfected by act has the character of a good. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness. CHAPTER XXXIX W THAT man’s happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION There is also another knowledge of God, higher than the one just men- tioned, which is acquired by means of a demonstration, and which ap- proaches nearer to a proper knowledge of Him; for by means of a demon- tration many things are removed from Him, so that in consequtmcc we understand Him as something apart from other things. For demonstration proves that God is immovable, eternal, incorporeal, utterly simple, one, and the like, as we have shown in the First Book. Now we arrive at the proper knowledge of a thing not only by affirmations, but also by negations. For just as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so is it proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. Yet there is this difference between these two modes of proper knowledge, that when we have proper knowledge of a thing by affirmations we know what that thing is, and how it is distin- guished from others; whereas when we have proper knowledge of a thing by negations, we know that it is distinct from others, but remain ignorant of what it is. Such is the proper knowledge of God that can be obtained by demonstrations. But neither does this suffice for man’s ultimate happiness. For things belonging to one species for the most part attain to the end of that species, because nature achieves its purpose always or nearly always, and fails in a few instances because of some corruption. Now happiness is the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. There- fore happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to some whereby they be deprived of it.^ Few, how- ^ Cf. Aristotle, Eth., I, 9 (1099b 18). HAPPINESS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 63 ever, attain to the possession of the aforesaid knowledge of God by way of demonstration, because of the obstacles to this knowledge mentioned at the beginning of this work.^ Therefore this knowledge is not essentially man’s happiness. Again. To be actual is the end of that which exists potentially, as was made clear above. “ Therefore happiness, which is the last end, is an act free of any potentiality to a further act. Now this knowledge of God that is acquired by way of demonstration is still in potentiality to a further knowledge of God, or to the same knowledge, but by a better way: because those who came afterwards endeavored to add something to the knowledge of God besides, that which they found handed down to them by those who preceded them. Therefore such knowledge is not man’s ultimate happiness. Further. Happiness excludes all unhappiness, for no man can be at the same time happy and qnhappy. Now deception and error have a large place in unhappiness, since all naturally avoid them. But the aforesaid knowl- edge of God is subject to the admixture of many errors, as evidenced by many who knew some truths about God through demonstration, yet, fol- lowing their own opinions, when they lacked proof, fell into many errors. And if there were some who by the way of demonstration discovered the truth about divine things, without any admixture of error in their opinions, it is evident that they were very few. This fact is not in keeping with hap- piness, which is the common end. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not seated in such knowledge as this. Moreover. Happiness consists in a perfect operation. Now perfect knowl- edge requires certitude, and that is why we cannot be said to know unless we know what cannot be otherwise, as is stated in Post. Anal, But the aforesaid knowledge is beset with uncertainty, as is clear from the diversity among sciences about divine things elaborated by those who endeavored to discover something about God by the way of demonstration. Therefore ultimate happiness does not consist in such knowledge. Besides. When the will has obtained its last end, its desire is at rest. Now the ultimate end of all human knowledge is happiness. Therefore happiness is essentially, that knowledge of God the possession of which leaves no knowledge to be desired of anything knowable. Such, however, is not the knowledge which the philosophers were able to have about God by the way of demonstration; because even when we have this knowledge, we still desire to know other things — things that we do not yet know by means of this knowledge. Therefore happiness does not consist in such a knowledge of God. Furthermore. The end of everything that exists in potentiality is that it be brought to actuality; for to this does it tend by means of the movement with which it is moved to its end. Now every potential being tends to be- coming actualized as far as possible. For there are things in potentiality ^C. G., I, 4. ^Ch. 20, 22. ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 2 (72a 17). 64 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES whose whole potentiality is reducible to act: the end of such things is that they be wholly actualized. Thus, a heavy body that is outside its medium is in potentiality to its proper place. There are also things whose potential- ity cannot be actualized all at once, — for instance primary matter : so that by its movement it seeks actualization by various forms in succession, which cannot be in the matter at the same time because of their diversity. Fur- thermore, our intellect is in potentiality to all intelligibles, as was stated in the Second Book.^ Now it is possible for two intelligible objects to be in the possible intellect at the same time according to the first act which is science^ although perhaps not in respect of the second act which is con- sideration. Accordingly, it is clear that the whole potentiidity of the pos- sible intellect can be actualized at one time; and consequently this is re- quired for its ultimate end, which is happiness. But the aforesaid knowl- edge, which can be acquired about God by the way of demonstration, does not accomplish this, since when we have it we still are ignorant of many things. Therefore such a knowledge of God does not suffice for ultimate happiness. CHAPTER XLJ THAT man’s happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH There is yet another knowledge of God, in one respect superior to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely, that whereby God is known by men through faith. Now this knowledge surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration in this respect, namely, that by faith we know certain things about God which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work.2 But not even in this knowledge of God can man’s ultimate hap- piness consist. For happiness is the intellect’s perfect operation, as was already de- clared.® But in knowledge by faith, the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards the contribution of the intellect, although it is most perfect on the part of the object; for the intellect in believing does not grasp .the object of its assent. Therefore neither does man’s hap- piness consist in this knowledge of God. Again. It has been shown that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will.« Now in knowledge by faith, the will has the leading place; for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it, because it so wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth. Therefore man’s final happiness does not consist in this knowledge. ^C.G., 11, 47. ’’C.G.,I,s. “Ch.2S. ‘Ch. 26. MAN’S KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 65 Besides. A believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself ; so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man would not believe in what is unseen by him, and proposed to him by another, unless he thought this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed than he himself has who sees not. Either therefore the judgment of the believer is wrong, or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we can- not proceed thus indefinitely, for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude, since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself, to give certitude to the faith of believers. Now, in reality, it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work;^ and yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in such knowledge. There is therefore some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowl- edge of faith, whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, as when we believe Christ, or whether he receives the truth from him who sees it immediately, as when we believe the Apostles and Prophets. Since, then, man’s happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith. Moreover. Since happiness is the last end, the natural desire is set at rest thereby. But the knowledge of faith does not set the desire at rest, but inflames it; for everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of faith. Further. The knowledge of God has been declared to be the end inas- much as it unites us to the last end of all, namely, God. Now the knowledge of faith does not make the thing believed to be perfectly present to the in- tellect, since faith is of absent, and not present, things. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor, v. 6, 7) that so long as we walk by faith ^ we are pilgrims front the Lord, Yet faith makes God to be present to love, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to the saying of Ephes. hi. 17: That Christ may dwell by faith in our hearts. Therefore the knowledge of faith cannot be man’s ultimate happiness. CHAPTER XLI IS IT POSSIBLE POR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF the SPECULATIVE SCIENCES? An intellectual* substance has yet another knowledge of God. For we have said in the Second Book that the separate intellectual substance, by know- ing its own essence, knows both what is above it and what is below it, in a ^C. G„ 1 , 7. 66 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES way proportionate to its substance.^ This must especially be the case if that which is above it be its cause, since the likeness to the cause must be found in the effect. Hence, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as was proved above,- it follows that separate intellectual sub- stances, by knowing their own essence, know God Himself by way of some kind of vision; for the intellect knows by way of vision the thing whose likeness is in the intellect, in the same way as the likeness of the thing seen corporeally is in the sense of the one seeing. Whatever intellect, therefore, apprehends a separate substance by knowing its essence, sees God in a higher way than He is known by any of the kinds of knowledge mentioned above. Accordingly, since some have deemed man’s ultimate happiness to be in this life, for the reason that he knows separate substances,'^ we must in- quire whether in this life man be able to know separate substances. It is a point that may well be questioned. For our intellect, according to its present state, understands nothing without a phantasm, which stands in the same relation to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colors to the sight, as was made clear in the Second Book.‘^ Hence if, through the intel- lectual knowledge which is acquired from phantasms it be possible for any of us to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be possible for ^someone in this life to understand these same separate substances; and in consequence, by seeing these separate substances, he will participate in that mode of knowledge by which the separate substance, by understanding itself, understands God. If, on the other hand, by knowledge derived from phantasms, it be altogether unable to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be impossible for man in the present state of life to ac- quire the above mode of knowing divine things. The possibility of succeeding in understanding separate substances, through knowledge derived from phantasms, has been explained by some in various ways. Avempace maintained that by the study of the speculative sciences it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of separate substances from understanding those things which we know through phantasms.^* B’'or we are able by the action of the intellect to extract the quiddity of a thing which has quiddity without being its own quiddity. For the intellect is natu- rally adapted to know any quiddity as such, since the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is. Now if that which is first understood by the possible intellect is something that has a quiddity, we can, by the possible intellect, abstract the quiddity of the thing first understood; and if this quiddity has again a quiddity, it will be again possible to abstract the quid- dity of this quiddity. And since we cannot go on indefinitely, we must stop somewhere. Therefore by way of analysis our intellect can arrive at know- C. G., II, 96ff. ^C. G.j II, 15. ®Cf. Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 36 (VI, i75r ff). ^C. G., II, 59 and 74. ‘’Cf. Averroes, ibid. (VI, I77v-i78r). MAN^S KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 67 ing a quiddity that has no quiddity; and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Consequently, through its knowledge of these sensible things, acquired from phantasms, our intellect can arrive at understanding sep- arate substances. He goes on to prove the same conclusion by another and similar way. Thus, he lays down that that which we understand of a thing, for instance, of a horse, is multiplied in me and in you only through the multiplication of the spiritual species, which are diverse in you and me. It follows, then, that an understood thing which is not clothed with any such form is the same in you and me. Now, as we have proved, the quiddity of the under- stood thing, which our intellect can abstract, has no spiritual and indi- vidual species; for the quiddity ‘of the thing understood is not the quiddity of an individual, whether corporeal or spiritual, since the thing understood, as such, is universal. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to under- stand a quiddity of which the thing understood is one for all. Such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to know separate substances. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, these explanations are frivolous. For since the thing understood as such is universal, the quiddity of such a thing must be the quiddity of a universal, namely, genus or species. Now the quiddity of the genus or species in the case of sensible things, the intel- lectual knowledge of which we acquire through phantasms, includes both matter and form. Consequently it is quite unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which is simple and immaterial. Therefore it is impossible to understand the quiddity of a separate substance through understanding the quiddity of a sensible thing. Again. A form that, as to its very being, cannot be separated from a par- ticular subject is not of the same kind as a form which, in its being, is sep- arated from a particular subject, although both may be considered apart from that particular subject. For magnitude is not the same kind of thing as a separate substarice, unless we suppose that there are separated magni- tudes midway between the Forms and sensible things, as some Platonists have maintained. But the quiddity of a genus or, species in the case of sen- sible things cannot be separated, in its very being, from a particular indi- vidual matter; unless, perhaps, as the Platonists think, we suppose the essences of things to exist separately, which Aristotle has refuted.^ Conse- quently, the aforesaid quiddity is altogether different from separate sub- stances, which are in no way in matter. Therefore it does not follow, from the fact that these quiddities are understood, that separate substances can be understood. Moreover. If we grant that the quiddity of a separate substance is of the same kind as the quiddity of the genus or species in the case of sensible things, it cannot be said to be of the same specific kind, unless we say that '^Metaph., I, 9 (990b i). 68 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES the essences of these sensible things are the separate substances themselves, as the Platonists maintained. It follows that they are of the same kind only according to the nature of quiddity as quiddity, which is the common nature of genus and substance. Consequently, by means of these quiddities we shall understand nothing about separate substances except their remote genus. Now by knowing the genus, we do not therefore know the species, except potentially. Therefore it will not be possible to understand a separate substance through understanding the quiddities of these sensible things. Besides. A separate substance differs more from sensible things than one sensible thing from another. But understanding the quiddity of one sen- sible thing does not suffice for understanding the quiddity of anolhcT; for a man who is born blind is quite unable, through understanding the quid- dity of sound, to understand the quiddity of color. Much less, therefore, will anyone, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible substance, be able to understand the quiddity of a separate substance. Further. If, again, we hold that separate substances move the spheres, through whose movements are caused the forms of sensible substances, even this mode of knowing separate substances through sensible things does not suffice for knowing their quiddity. Because from the effect we know a cause either in the point of likeness between cause and effect, or in so far as the effect indicates the power of the cause. In the point of likeness, we do not gather from the effect the nature of the cause, unless agent and effect be of one species; and this is not the case with separate substances and sensible things. In the point of power, it is again impossible unless the ef- fect equal the power of the cause; since then the whole power of the cause is known from the effect, and the power of a thing indicates its substance. But this cannot apply to the situation in question, because the powers of separate substances surpass all the sensible effects that our intellect under- stands, even as a universal power surpasses a particular effect. It is there- fore impossible, through understanding sensible things, to arrive at the understanding of separate substances. Moreover. Whatever intelligible things we are able to come to know by means of inquiry and study belong to one or other of the speculative sci- ences. Accordingly, if through understanding the natures and quiddities of these sensible things we succeed in understanding separate substances, it follows that we would understand separate substances through one or an- other speculative science. Yet we do not find this to be the case, for no speculative science teaches what any separate substance is, but only the fact that it is. It is therefore not possible to succeed in understanding sep- arate substances through understanding the natures of sensible things* And if it be said that such a speculative science is possible, although it has" not yet been discovered, the objection is empty, since it is not possible, from any principles known to us, to arrive at understanding the aforesaid substances. Because all the proper principles of any science whatever de- THE ERROR OF ALEXANDER 69 pend on the first indemonstrable self-evident principles, the knowledge of which we acquire from sensible things, as is stated in Post. Anal, ii.^ But sensible things do not sufficiently lead to the knowledge of immaterial beings, as we have proved by the preceding arguments. Therefore no sci- ence is possible whereby one may be able to attain to the understanding of separate substances. CHAPTER XLII THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER Alexander supposed the possible intellect to be subject to generation and corruption, as being a disposition of human nature resulting from the mix- ture of the elements, as we have seen in the Second Book.^ Now it is not possible for a power of this kind to rise above material things. And so he maintained that our possible intellect can never attain to the understanding of separate substances; but he also held that, according to our present state of life, we are nevertheless able to understand separate substances.® He endeavored to prove this as follows. Whenever a thing is completed in its generation, and has reached the ultimate perfection of its substance, its proper operation, whether action or passion, will also be completed; for even as operation follows substance, so does perfection of operation follow perfection of substance. Hence an animal, when quite perfect, is able to walk by itself. Now the habitual intellect, which is nothing else but the in- telligible species formed by the agent intellect, and residing in the possible intellect, has a twofold operation. One is to make things potentially under- stood to be actually understood, — and this operation it has through the agent intellect, — ^while the other is to understand what is actually under- stood; for it is these two things that man is able to do by an intellectual habit. Accordingly, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, both of these operations will be completed in it. Now whenever the intellect acquires new species it reaches the complement of its generation. And so its generation must necessarily be completed eventually, unless there be an impediment, since no generation tends to the infinite. Therefore, eventually, both operations will be completed in the habitual intellect, by its making all things potentially understood to be understood actually, — ^which is the com- plement of the first operation; — and by understanding all things intelligible, both separate and not separate. But since, according to the opinion of Alexander (as we have stated), the possible intellect is unable to understand separate substances, he means ^Aristotle, Post. Anal, 11 , 18 (99b 20). ^C. G., II, 62. —Cf. Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 5 (VI, i62r-i63r). ^Cf. Averroes, ibid. 70 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES that we shall understand separate substances by the habitual intellect, in so far as the agent intellect, which according to him is a separate substance, will become the form of the habitual intellect and be united to us. The re- sult will be that we shall understand through it even as now we understand through the possible intellect. And since it is in the power of the agent intellect to make actually understood things which are potentially under- standable, and to understand separate substances, in that state we shall understand separate substances, as well as all non-separate intelligible things. According to this explanation, by this knowledge which we derive from phantasms, we attain to the knowledge of a separate substance; not as though the phantasms themselves and the things understood from them were a means for knowing separate substances, as happens in the specula- tive sciences, which was the position of the previous opinion,^ hut in so far as the intelligible species are in us a kind of disposition to this particular form which is the agent intellect. This is the first point of difference be- tween these two opinions. Consequently, when the habitual intellect becomes perfect through these intelligible species produced in us by the agent intellect, the agent intellect itself becomes a form united to us, as stated. And he calls this the acquired intellect, which, they say, Aristotle held to come from the outside. And so, although man’s ultimate perfection is not seated in the speculative sciences, as the previous opinion maintained, yet by them man is disposed for the attainment of his ultimate perfection. This is the second point of difference between the second and first opinions. Thirdly they differ in this, that, according to the first opinion, our understanding of the agent intellect is the cause of its union with us. Whereas, in the second opinion, the reverse is the case, since it is because it is united to us as a form that we understand it and other separate sub- stances. But there is no reason in these statements. For the habitual intellect, like the possible intellect, is supposed by Alexander to be subject to generation and corruption. Now, according to him, that which is eternal cannot be- come the form of that which can be generated and corrupted; for this is why he maintains that the possible intellect, which is united to us as a form, is subject to generation and corruption, while the agent intellect, which is incorruptible, is a separate substance. Since, then, according to Alexander, the agent intellect is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the agent intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect. Again. The form of the intellect, as intellect, is the intelligible, just as the form of the sense is the sensible; for the intellect does not receive a thing, properly speaking, except intelligibly, as_ neither does the sense, except ^Ch. 41. THE ERROR OF ALEXANDER 71 sensibly. If, then, the agent intellect cannot become an intelligible through the habitual intellect, it cannot possibly be its form. Besides. There are three ways in which we are said to understand by means of something. First, we understand by means of the intellect, which is the power that elicits this operation. And so the intellect itself is said to understand, and the very act of the intellect in understanding becomes our act of understanding. — Secondly, we understand by means of the intelligible species. By it we are said to understand, not as though the species itself understood, but because the intellectual power is actualized by it, just as the power of sight is by the species of color. — Thirdly, as by a medium through the knowledge of which we arrive at the knowledge of something else. If, then, man at length understands separate substances through the agent intellect, it must be in one of these ways. It is not in the third way, because Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands the agent intellect. — Nor is it in the second way, be- cause to understand by means of an intelligible species is ascribed to the intellectual power that is informed by that species; but Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands sep- arate substances. Consequently we cannot possibly understand separate substances by means of the agent intellect in the same way as we under- stand things by means of an intelligible species. — ^And if it is as by an in- tellectual power, it follows that the agent intellect’s act of understanding is the man’s act of understanding. Now this cannot be unless the substance of the agent intellect and the substance of the man become one in being; for it is impossible that there be identity of operation where there is diver- sity of substances. Hence the agent intellect will be one in being with man; but not one in being accidentally, because the agent intellect would then be, not a substance, but an accident; as for instance color added to a body makes a unity in being that is accidental. It remains, then, that the agent intellect together with man makes one being substantially. Therefore, it will be either the human soul or a part of it, and not a separate substance, as Alexander maintained. Therefore the opinion of Alexander does not explain how man can understand separate substances. Moreover. If the agent intellect at any time becomes the form of this particular man, so that he be able to understand by means of it, for the same reason it may become the form of some other man who will likewise understand by its means. It will then follow that at the same time two men will understand through the agent intellect as through their own form. But this means that the agent intellect’s act of understanding is the act of understanding of the man who understands by its means, as was already stated; and consequently two men who understand will have one act of understanding. Which is impossible. Moreover his argument is altogether frivolous. First, because, when the 72 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES generation of a genus is perfected, its operation must be perfected, yet in keeping with the mode of that genus, but not of a higher genus; for when the generation of air is perfected, it has generation and c(>mij)lelc upward movement, yet not so as to be moved towards the place of fire. So, too, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, its operation, which is to understand, will be complete, according to its mode, liut not according to the mode of understanding in separate substances, so as to understand separate substances. Consequently, from the generation of the habitual in- tellect it cannot be concluded that at some time man will understand sep- arate substances. Secondly, because it belongs to the same power to complete an operation and to perform it. Consequently, if the perfection of the habitual intellect’s operation be to understand separate substances, it follows that the habitual intellect sometimes understands separate substances. But Alexander does not hold this; for it would follow that to understand separate substances comes to us through the speculative sciences, which are comprised under the habitual intellect. Thirdly, those things that begin to be generated for the most part be- come completely generated; for all generations of things are due to deter- minate causes, which produce their effects either always or in the majority of cases. If, then, completeness of action follows completeness of generation, it is necessary that complete operation should follow things generated, al- ways or most frequently. And yet those who study in order that the habit- ual intellect may be engendered in them do not succeed in understanding separate substances, either in most, or in all, cases. In fact no one has boasted of having attained to this point of perfection. Therefore the per- fection of the habitual intellect is not to understand separate substances. . CHAPTER XLIII THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES, IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVKRROES As the greatest difficulty presented by Alexander’s opinion was that he sup- posed the habitual intellect to be altogether corruptible, Averroes thought to offer an easier proof that at times we understand separate substances, in that he deemed the possible intellect to be incorruptible and substantially separate from us, just as the agent intellect.'^ First, he shows the necessity of admitting that the relation of the agent intellect to those principals which we know naturally is either that of agent to instrument or that of form to matter. For the habitual intellect, whereby we understand, has for its activity not only that which consists in under- ^In De Anima, III, comm. 5 (VI, i64r). THE ERROR OF AVERROES 73 standing, but also that which consists in producing the actually understood; for we know by experience that both are in our power. Now “to produce the actually understood'’ indicates more especially the habitual intellect than to understand,” because it is necessary to produce the actually under- stood before one understands it. Now, in us certain things are made actu- ally understood naturally, and not by study or by choice: the first in- telligible principles. But it does not belong to the habitual intellect to make these actually understood, for it belongs to it to make actually under- stood those things which we know by study. Rather are the first intelligibles a beginning of the habitual intellect; and so Aristotle gives the name of understanding to the habit of these principles.^ They themselves are made actually understood by the agent intellect’ alone, but by them other things aie made actually understood which we know by study. Accordingly, to make those things which are actually understood by derivation, is an act both of the habitual intellect, as to first principles, and of the agent intellect. Now one action does not proceed from two principles unless one of them be compared to the other as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. Consequently the agent intellect must be compared to the first principles of the habitual intellect either as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. How this may be possible he explains as follows. Since the possible in- tellect, according to his opinion, is a separate substance, ^ it understands the agent intellect and other separate substances, as well as the first principles of speculative knowledge; and consequently it is the subject of both. Now whenever two things come together in one subject, one of them is as the form of the other ; just as, since color and light are in the diaphanous body as their subject, one of them, namely light, must be the form of the other, namely color. And this is necessary when they afe mutually ordered, but not when they are united accidentally in the same subject, as whiteness and music. Now the objects of speculative knowledge and the agent intellect are mutually ordered, since these understood speculative truths are made actually understood by the agent intellect. Therefore the agent intellect is related to these understood speculative truths as form to matter. Conse- quently, since these same truths are joined to us by phantasms, which are a kind of subject thereof, it follows that the agent intellect also is joined to us, as being the form of these truths. When, therefore, these truths are in us potentially only, the agent intellect is joined to us potentially only. When some of these truths are in us actually and some potentially, the agent in- tellect is joined to us actually in part, and potentially in part. Then it is said to be moved towards the above union; for the more things are made actually understood in us, the more perfectly is the agent intellect joined to us. And this progress and movement towards union is effected by study in the speculative sciences, through which we acquire true knowledge, and false opinions are put aside, which are outside the order of this movement, VI, 6 (1141a 7). "Cf. C. G ., II, 59. 74 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES just as monstrosities are outside the order of natural operation. Therefore men help one another towards this progress, just as they help one another in the speculative sciences. And so when all potential knowledge has become actual in us, the agent intellect will be perfectly joined to us as a form, and we shall understand perfectly by it, just as now we understand perfectly by the habitual intellect. Consequently, since it belongs to the agent intellect to understand separate substances, we shall then understand separate sub- stances, just as now we understand speculative knowledge. This will be man’s ultimate happiness, wherein man will be as a sort of God} That this explanation is of no account whatever is made clear enough by what we have already said; for it is based on many suppositions that have been already disproved. First, we have shown above that the possible intellect is not a substance separate from us in being.- Hence it does not follow that it is the subject of separate substances; especially since Aristotle asserts that the possible in- tellect is the power of becoming all things so that seemingly it is the sub- ject of such things only as are made to be understood. Again. It has also been proved above that the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul,*-^ to which Aristotle assigns the operation of making things to be actually understood} which lies in our power. Hence it does not follow that understanding by means of the agent intellect is the cause of our being able to understand separate substances; or else we would always understand them. Further. If the agent intellect is a separate substance, it is not joined to us except by means of species made to be actually understood, according to his explanation; just as neither would the possible intellect be united to us, even though the possible intellect is related to those species as matter to form, while the agent intellect, on the contrary, is related to them as form' to matter. Now the species which are made to be actually understood are joined to us, according to him, because of the phantasms, which stand re- lated to the possible intellect as colors to the sight, but to the agent intellect as colors to the light, as may be gathered from the statement of Aristotle.^* Now we cannot ascribe to a stone, in which there is color, either the action of seeing, so that it see, or the action of the sun, so that it give light. There- fore, according to this opinion, we cannot ascribe to man either the action of the possible intellect so that he understand, or the action of the agent intellect, so that he understand separate substances, or that he make things to be actually understood. Besides. According to this opinion, the agent intellect is not supposed to be joined to us as a form, except through its being the form of the prin- ciples of understanding, whose form it is stated to be also because the agent ^In De Anima, III, comm. 36 (VI, i79r-i8or). ®C. G., II, 59. ^De An,, ni, s (430a 14) . ^ c. G., II, 76. ** De. An., Ill, 5 (430a 15) . ” Ibid. (430a 16) . THE ERROR OF AVERROES 75 intellect and these principles have an action in common, namely, to make things actually understood. Consequently, it cannot be a form to us, except in so far as the principles of knowledge have an action in common with it. But these principles have no share in the action which it has of under- standing separate substances, because they are species of sensible things; unless we return to the opinion of Avempace, that the quiddities of sep- arate substances can be known by means of what we know of the sensible world. Therefore in no way can we understand separate substances by this means. Moreover. The agent intellect bears a different relation to the principles of knowledge, of which it is the cause, and to separate substances, of which it is not the cause, but which it only knows, according to his theory. There- fore, if it be joined to us through being the cause of the principles of knowl- edge, it does not follow that it .is joined to us in so far as it knows separate substances. Quite the contrary, his argument clearly contains a fallacy of accident. Again. If we know separate substances by means of the agent intellect, this is not in so far as the agent intellect is the form of this or that principle of understanding, but in so far as it becomes a form in us; for it is thus that we are able to understand by its means. Now it becomes a form in us also by means of the first principles of understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore from the very beginning man can understand separate substances by means of the agent intellect. If, however, it be said that the agent intellect does not become a form in us perfectly by means of some principles of understanding, so that we be able to understand separate substances: — the sole reason for this is because these principles of understanding do not equal the perfection of the agent intellect in understanding separate substances. But not even all the in- telligible truths combined together equal this perfection of the agent intel- lect in understanding separate substances; since all of them are not in- telligible except in so far as they are made to be actually understood, whereas the latter are intelligible by their very nature. Therefore, although we shall know all the intelligible truths, it does not follow that the agent intellect will become a form in us so perfectly that we understand separate substances by it. Otherwise, if this be not required, we shall have to admit that by understanding anything intelligible we also understand separate substances. 76 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XLIV THAT man’s ultimate HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IMAGINED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS But it is likewise impossible to allow that man’s happiness consists in such a knowledge of separate substances as the above mentioned opinions main- tained.^ For that is futile which is for an end that cannot be secured. Since, then, man’s ultimate end is happiness, to which his natural desire tends, it is impossible to assign man’s happiness to that which he cannot obtain; or else it would follow that man was made in vain, and that his natural desire is empty, which is impossible. Now it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for man to understand separate substances, according to the above mentioned opinions. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in such a knowledge of separate substances. Again. In order that the agent intellect be united to us as a form, in such a way that by it we may understand separate substances, it is required that the generation of the habitual intellect be complete, according to Alex- ander or that all the speculative truths be actualized in us, according to Averroes.^ Both of these opinions come to the same, because the habitual intellect is engendered in us in so far as speculative truths are actualized in us. Now all the species of sensible things are understood potentially. There- fore, in order that the agent intellect be joined to a man, it is necessary that he actually understand by his speculative intellect all the natures of sen- sible things, and all their powers, operations and movements. But it is im- possible for a man to know all this through the principles of the speculative sciences, whereby we are moved to the union with the agent intellect, as they themselves say; for it is not possible to acquire knowledge of all these things, from knowing those which come under the perception of our senses, whence the principles of the speculative sciences are derived. Therefore it is impossible for any man to arrive at this union in the way assigned by them; and consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in such a union. Besides. Granted that it be possible for man to be united to the agent intellect in the manner suggested, it is clear that such a perfection is ob- tainable by very few; so much so that neither they nor any others, how- ever much they be advanced and skilled in the speculative sciences, have dared to boast of having obtained this perfection. In fact, all of them have confessed to ignorance of many things: thus Aristotle, speaking of the quad- rature of a circle,^ and of the principles of the order of the heavenly bodies "Cf.ch.41ff. "Ch.42. ®Ch.43. vn (7b3i). OUR KNOWLEDGE O’F SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 77 states that he can give only probable arguments;^ and he leaves to others to decide what is necessary in these bodies and their movers.^ Now happi- ness is a common good, to which many can arrive, unless they be prevented, as Aristotle says.^ This is true also of any natural end of a species, namely, that it is obtained by the majority of the members of that species. There- fore man’s ultimate happiness cannot consist in the aforesaid union . It is clear that Aristotle, whose opinion the philosophers in question en- deavored to follow, did not hold that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a union of this kind. For he proves that man’s happiness is an operation of his own according to perfect virtue.^ That is why he had to treat specially of the virtues, which he divided into moral and intellectual. Furthermore, he proves that man’s ultimate happiness consists in speculation.^ Hence it follows that it is not seated in the act of a moral virtue, nor of prudence or art, even though these are intellectual virtues. Consequently, it must be an operation according to wisdom, which is the chief of the three remaining intellectual virtues, namely, wisdom, science and understanding, as he proves in Ethics vi.® For which reason he declares that the wise man is a hs-ppy man."^ Now according to him wisdom is one of the speculative sci- ences, the head of the others] and at the beginning of the Metaphysics he gives the name of wisdom to the science of which he purposes to treat in that work.^’ Clearly, therefore, the opinion of Aristotle was that tlie ultimate happiness, which man is able to obtain in this life, is that knowl- edge of divine things which can be acquired through the speculative sci- ences. But that other way of knowing divine things, not through the specu- lative sciences, but by a kind of natural process of generation, was invented by some of his commentators. CHAPTER XLV THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES Since then in this life separate substances cannot be known by us in the ways mentioned above, it remains for us to inquire whether we be able to understand separate substances in this life in any way at all. Themistius seeks to prove that this is possible by an argument a fortioriP For separate substances are more intelligible than material things, since the latter are intelligible in so far as the agent intellect causes them to be actu- ally understood, whereas the former are intelligible in themselves. If, there- Cmlo, II, 5 (288a 2). '^Metaph., XI, 8 (1073b 2). ^Eth., I, 9 (1099b 19). ^Op, cit., I, 13 (1102a 5). ^Op. cit., X, 7 (1177a 18). " 0 ^, czL, VI, 6 (1141a 3). Op. dl., X, 8 (iiyga 32) . Op. czL, VI, 7 (1141a 16) ^Metaph.,l,i (981b 26). ^”Cf. Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm 36 (VI, 176V). 78 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fore, our intellect understands these material things, much more is it adapted to understand separate substances. This argument must be appraised in the light of the various opinions about the possible intellect. For if the possible intellect is a power inde- pendent of matter, and has its being apart from the body, as Averroes maintains, it will follow that it has no necessary relation to material things; so that the more a thing is intelligible in itself, the more will it be intelligible to the possible intellect. But then it would seem to follow, since we under- stand from the beginning by means of the possible intellect, that we under- stand separate substances from the beginning: which is clearly false. (Aver- roes seeks to avoid this difficulty, as we have explained above in setting forth his opinion, which we proved to be false.^) If, however, the possible intellect is not separate from the body in its very beginning, from the very fact that it is united in being to such a body it has a necessary relation to material things, so that only through them can it acquire knowledge of other things. Hence it does not follow, if sep- arate substances be more intelligible in themselves, that they are more intelligible to our intellect. This is pointed out by the words of Aristotle. For he says there that the difficulty of understanding those things is in us and not in them; because our intellect stands in relation to things most evi- dent as the eye of the owl to the sunlight? Consequently, seeing that we cannot arrive at understanding separate substances through understanding material things, as we have proved,^ it follows that our possible intellect can in no way understand separate substances. This appears again from the relation of the possible to the agent intellect. For a passive power is in potentiality to those things only which are in- cluded in the range of its proper active principle; for every passive power has a corresponding active power in nature, or otherwise a passive power would be useless, since it cannot be brought to actuality, except by an active power. Hence we find that the sight is receptive only of colors, which are illumined by the light. Now the possible intellect is a power in a certain sense passive, and therefore it has its corresponding agent, namely, the agent intellect, which stands in relation to the possible intellect as light to the sight. Consequently, the possible intellect is in potentiality to those in- telligible objects only which have been made so by the agent intellect. Hence Aristotle, in describing each intellect, says that the possible intellect is the power to become all things, while the agent intellect is the power of making all things : ^ so that the power in either case refers to the same ob- jects, being active in the one and passive in the other. Since, then, separate substances are not made actually intelligible by the agent intellect, and only material things are so made, it follows that the possible intellect extends to these alone. Therefore we cannot understand separate substances through it. ^Ch. 43- ^ Metaph., I a, i (993b 9). Ch. 41. An., Ill, 3 (430a 14). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 79 Therefore Aristotle employed a fitting example, for the owPs eye can never see the light of the sun. And yet that is why Averroes tries to weaken this example, saying that the likeness between our intellect in relation to separate substances, and the owFs eye in relation to the sun’s light, is one of difficulty, not of impossibility.^ He proves this as follows. Because if it were impossible for us to understand things intelligible in themselves, namely separate substances, they would be without purpose, just as to no purpose would a thing be visible, if it could not be seen by any sight. Now this argument is clearly of no account. For even though these sub- stances be never understood by us, yet they are understood by themselves; so that not without purpose would they be intelligible, as neither is the sun uselessly visible, — to continue Aristotle’s comparison — because the owl cannot see it, since man and other animals can see it. Accordingly, if we suppose the possible intellect to be united in being to the body, it cannot understand separate substances. It makes a difference, however, what we hold with regard to its substance. For if we suppose it to be a material power subject to generation and corruption, as some have maintained,^ it follows that by its very substance it is confined to the understanding of material things. Consequently it would not in any way be able to understand separate substances, since it itself could not possibly be separate. — On the other hand, if the possible intellect, although united to the body, is incorruptible and independent of matter in its being, as we have proved above, ^ it follows that its confinement to the understanding of material things befalls it through its union with the body. And so, when the soul shall be separated from the body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are intelligible in themselves, namely separate sub- stances, by the light of the agent intellect, which in the soul is like the intellectual light that is in separate substances. This is what our Faith holds about our understanding separate sub- stances after death, and not in this life. CHAPTER XLVI ’ THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF A CERTAIN difficulty would seem to arise against what we have been saying, because of a passage of Augustine which must be carefully discussed. For he says: Just as the mind gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses, so does it acquire knowledge of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it also knows itself through itself, since it is '•Averroes, In Metaph., II, comm, i (VIII, 14V). '^Cf. ch. 42. ®C. G., II, 79ff. 8o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES incorporeal }■ For it would seem to follow from these words that the soul understands itself through itself, and that, by understanding itself, it under- stands separate substances; and this is contrary to what we have proved. We must, accordingly, inquire how the soul understands itself through itself. Now it cannot possibly be said that by itself it understands its own essence. Because a knowing power is made actually knowing by something in it whereby it knows. And if this be in it potentially, it knows poten- tially; if it be in it actually, it knows actually; and if it be in a middle way, it knows habitually. Now the soul is always actually present to it- self, and never only potentially or habitually. Therefore, if the soul knows its own nature through itself, it will always understand actually what it is; and this is clearly false. Again. If the soul, through itself, understands its own nature, since every man has a soul, every man will know what his soul is; which is evidently untrue. Moreover. Knowledge that results from something implanted in us by nature is itself natural: e.g., the indemonstrable principles which are known through the light of the agent intellect. Accordingly, if through the soul itself we know what the soul is, we shall know it naturally. But no one can err in things that we know naturally, for no one errs in the knowledge of indemonstrable principles. Hence no one would err about what the soul is, if the soul knew this through itself. But this is clearly false, since many have maintained the soul to be this or that body, and some, that it consisted in number or harmony.^ Therefore the soul does not know its own nature through itself. Besides. In every order that which is per se precedes and causes that which is through another? Accordingly, that which is known per se is known before all things that are known through something else, and is the principle through which they are known: e.g,, first principles in com- parison with conclusions. Therefore if the soul, through itself, knows its own nature, this will be known per se, and consequently it will be known first, and will be the principle whereby other things are known. But this is clearly false, for science does not postulate what the soul is as being some- thing already known, but proposes it as a point of inquiry from other sources. Therefore the soul does not, through itself, know its own nature. But it is clear that neither did Augustine intend this. For he says that when the soul seeks s el j -knowledge, it does not seek to see itself as though it were absent, but to discern itself as present; not to know itself, as though it knew not, but in order to distinguish itself from what it knows to be something else? Whereby he gives one to understand that through itself the soul knows itself as present to itself, but not as distinct from other things. Hence he says that some erred in not distinguishing the soul from ^De Tnn., IX, 3 (PL 42, 963). "Cf. C. G., II, 63, 64. Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (257a 32). ^De Trin., X, g (PL 42, 980). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 8i things that are different from it.^ Now through knowing what a thing is, one knows it as distinct from others. That is why a definition, which states what a thing is, distinguishes the thing defined from all others. Conse- quently, Augustine did not mean that the soul, through itself, knows what it is. Neither did Aristotle mean this. He says, in fact, that the possible intel- lect understands itselj even as it understands other things? Because it understands . itself by means of an intelligible species, by which it is brought to actual intelligibility. For, considered in itself, it is only poten- tially an intelligible being. Now nothing is known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act. Hence separate substances, whose substance is as something actual in the genus of intelligibles, under- stand through their very substances what they are; whereas our possible intellect understands what it is through the intelligible species by which it is made actually understanding. And so Aristotle shows the nature of the possible intellect from the act of understanding, namely, that it is un- mixed and incorruptible^ as we explained above.^ Accordingly, Augustine means to say that our mind loiows itself through itself inasmuch as it knows that it is. For, by the very fact that it perceives itself to act, it perceives that it exists; and since it acts through itself, it knows through itself that it exists. In this way, then, the soul, by knowing itself, knows of the separate substances that they are; but not what they are, which is to understand their substance. For when either by demonstration or by faith we know about separate substances that they are certain intellectual substances, in neither way could we receive this knowledge, unless our soul derived from itself the knowledge of an intellectual being. Consequently, we must use the science about the soul’s intellect as a principle on which to establish all our knowledge about separate substances. But it does not follow, if by the speculative sciences we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, that by means of these sciences we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what separate substances are; because our understanding, by which we arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, is far removed from the intelligence of a separate substance. Nevertheless, through knowing what our soul is, we are able to go so far as to know some remote genus of the separate substances; but this is not the same as to understand their substance. And just as through the soul itself we know that the soul is, inasmuch as we perceive its acts, and seek by a study of its acts and their objects to know what it is, through the principles of speculative sciences, so, too, con- cerning those things that are in our soul, namely its powers and habits, we know indeed that they are, inasmuch as we perceive their acts, but what they are we gather from the nature of these same acts. ^Op, cit.f X, 6 (PL 42, 978). ^Ve An., Ill, 4 (430a 2). c. G., n, 59ff. ^ Ihid. (429a 2). 82 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XLVII THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE If, in this life, we are unable to understand separate substances by reason of our intellect’s connatural relation to phantasms, much less can we see the divine essence in this life, since it is far above all separate substances. We may take it as a sign of this, that the more our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more it is withdrawn from sensible things. Now the divine substance is the ultimate term to which contempla- tion can reach, and hence the mind that sees the divine substance must be wholly freed from the corporeal senses, either by death or by rapture. Therefore it is said in God’s person {Exod. xxxiii. 20) : Man shall not sec me, and live. If it is stated in Holy Scripture that some have seen God, we must under- stand this to have been either through an imaginary vision — or even a bodily vision, when the presence of the divine power is shown by corporeal species, whether appearing externally, or formed internally in the imagina- tion, or by gathering some intellectual knowledge of God from His spiritual effects. A difficulty, however, arises through some words of Augustine which would seem to imply that we are able to understand God in this life. For he says that with the sight of the soul we see in the eternal truth, from which all temporal things have been made, the form according to which we are and according to which we effect something, in ourselves or in bodies, with a true and right reason; and it is from the same source that we conceive and possess a true knowledge of things.'^ Again he says: If we both see that what you say is true, and that what I say is true, where, 1 ask, do we see this? Surely, neither I in you, nor you in me, hut both of us in the immutable truth itself which transcends our minds? Again, he says that we judge of all things according to the divine truth and again: We must first know the truth by which other things can be known? re- ferring, it would seem, to the divine truth. It would seem, then, from his words, that we see God Himself Who is His own truth, and that through Him we know other things. Other words of his would seem to point to the same conclusion. In De Trin. xii he says: It is the office of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas which, unless they were above the human mind, would surely not he unchangeable? Now un- ^De Trin., IX, 7 (PL 42, 967). ^Confess., XII, 25 (PL 32, 840). ^ De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 148). I, 15 (PL 32, 883). De Tnn., XII, 2 (PL 42, 999). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD’S ESSENCE 83 changeable and eternal ideas cannot be elsewhere than in God, since, ac- cording to the teaching of Faith, God alone is eternal. Accordingly it would seem to follow that we can see God in this life, and that, through seeing Him and the ideas of things in Him, we judge of other things. Yet it is not to be believed that Augustine, by these words, meant that we are able in this life to see God in His essence. We must therefore inquire how, in this life, we see that unchangeable truth, or these eternal ideas, and how we judge of other things according to this truth. Augustine allows that truth is in the soul,^ and therefore it is that he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul not only in the same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence, or as He is in all things by His likeness (in so far, namely, as a thing is true according as it approaches to a likeness of God), for then the soul would not be higher than other things in this respect. It is there- fore in the soul in a special way, inasmuch as the soul knows truth. Ac- cordingly, just as the soul and other things are said to be true in their nature according as they are likened to that supreme nature, which is truth itself, since it is its own understood being, so too, that which is known by the soul is true so far as it contains a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. Therefore a Gloss on Ps. xi. 2, Truths are decayed from among the children of men, says that as from one man^s face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth? Now although different things are known, and different things believed to be true, by different people, yet some truths there are in which all men agree, such as the first principles both of the speculative and of the practical intellect, inasmuch as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men. Consequently, when a mind knows with certitude anything at all, and by tracing it back to the principles by which we judge of everything, comes to see it in those principles, it is said to see all such things in the divine truth or in the eternal ideas, and to judge of all things according to them. This explanation is confirmed by Augustine’s words: The speculations of the sciences are seen in the divine truth, even as these visible things are seen in the light of the sun? For it is evident that these things are not seen in the body of the sun, but by the light, which is a likeness of the solar brilliance reflected in the air, and cast upon such bodies. Therefore, from these words of Augustine we cannot conclude that God is seen in His essence in this life, but only as in a mirror; and to this the Apostle witnesses as regards the knowledge of this life (i Cor. xiii. 12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner. And though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God in a higher way than creatures of lower degree, yet the knowledge ^ Solil., II, 19 (PL 32, 901). ^ Cf. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalm, super XI, 2 (PL 36, 138) ; Peter Lombard, In Psalm, super XI, 2 (PL 191, iSS). ^ SoUl., I, 8 (PL 32, 877). 84 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES of God that can be gathered from the human mind does not transcend the genus of the knowledge gathered from sensible things; since even the soul knows what it itself is through understanding the natures of sensible things, as we have already stated.^ Consequently, even in this way God is not known in higher manner than the cause is known from its effect. CHAPTER XLVIII THAT man’s ultimate HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE Seeing, then, that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowl- edge of God whereby He is known by all or many in a vague kind of opin- ion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby He is known in the specu- lative sciences through demonstration, nor in that knowledge whereby He is known through faith, as we have proved above;- and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in His essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God through that which is nearest to Him, so to say, as we have proved ; and since we must place, our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown — it is impossible for man’s happiness to be in this life. Again. Man’s last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more; because if he still has a move- ment towards something, he has not yet reached an end wherein to be at rest. Now this cannot happen in this life, since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him (for this is natural to man), unless perhaps there be someone who understands all things. Now in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone that was a mere man, seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved.'"*^ Therefore man’s ulti- mate happiness cannot possibly be in this life. Besides. Whatever is 'in motion towards an end has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein. Hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man naturally desires. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently, unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When, therefore, a man acquires happiness, he also ac- quires stability and rest; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a nec- essary condition of happiness. Hence the Philosopher says: We do not look " Ch. 45, 46 . " Ch. 38 ff. Ch. 45. ^Ch. 37. ” Ch. 45. ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE 85 upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon} Now in this life there is no sure stability, since, however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in- the operation, whatever it be, in which happiness consists. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness can- not be in this life. Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being; for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end. Hence we see that animals which live but a short time are perfected in a short time. But if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue, ^ whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative mat- ters, wherein man’s ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved;^ for hardly is man able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life, and then, in the majority of cases, but a short space of life remains to him. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. - Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good, or else it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil; just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life, and not only fro'm evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For there is no one who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions ; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, wherein virtue con- sists,^ either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another ; or who at least is not ignorant of what he would wish to know, or does not feel doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore no man is happy in this life. ^ Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it, not only shun- ning it at the moment when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot obtain not to die. Therefore it is not possible for man to be happy in this life. ^ Besides. Ultimate happiness consists, not in a habit, but in an operation, since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore man cannot be entirely happy in this life. Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. There- fore its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death, since it is possible for every man in this life to I, 10 (iioob s). ^Op, cit., X, 7 (1177a n). ®Ch. 37. * Cf. Aristotle, Eth.f n, 6 (iio6b 24). 86 THE SUMMA CONTRA 'GENTILES encounter sickness, whereby he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue, e.g.^ madness and the like, which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness therefore always has sorrow naturally connected with it, and consequently it will not be perfect happiness. But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect, namely, in separate substances, and that in man it is imperfect, and by a kind of participation. For man can arrive at a full understanding of the truth only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and he fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved. Therefore neither is happiness, in its perfect nature, possible to man; but he has a certain participation of it, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle’s opinion about happiness. Hence, in- quiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfec- tion are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness absolutely, but in a human way.^ We must now show that this explanation does not remove the foregoing arguments. For although man is below the separate substances according to the order of nature, he is above irrational creatures, and so he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further. Thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place, and when an animal enjoys sen- sible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more, therefore, when man has obtained his last end, must his natural desire be at rest. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore in this life man does not obtain hap- piness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore he must obtain it after this life. Again. Natural desire cannot be empty, since nature does nothing in vain? But nature’s desire would be empty if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man’s natural desire can be fulfilled. But not in this life, as we have shown. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is after* this life. Besides. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection, it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are always in motion and tending towards perfection; because those who follow make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as is also stated in Metaph, ii,'"^ Therefore in the knowledge of truth man is not sit- uated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since, then, as Aristotle himself shows, ^ man’s ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently ^Op. cii., I, 10 (iioia i8). ^Aristotle, De Caelo, 11 , ii (291b 13), ® Aristotle, Metaph,, I a, i (993a 31). ^Eth,, X, 7 (1177a 18). SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AND GOD’S ESSENCE 87 in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot pos- sibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life. Moreover, Whatever is in potentiality tends to become actual, so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of all the forms of things, and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently, it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows all things, at least all these material things. But man cannot obtain this through the speculative sciences, by which we know truth in this life. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. For these and like reasons, Alexander and Averroes held that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that human knowledge obtained through the speculative sciences, but in that which results from a union with a separate substance, which union they deemed possible to man in this life.^ But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through the speculative sciences, he maintained that man attains to a happiness which is not perfect, but a human one. Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, shall be freed from these straits if we hold, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the Second Book.^ Therefore man’s ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which the human mind possesses after this life, a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reward in heaven {Matt. v. 12) and states {Matt. xxii. 30) that the saints shall be as the angels, who always see God in heaven {Matt. xviii. 10), CHAPTER XLIX THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM .BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES We must now inquire whether this same knowledge, whereby separate substances and souls after death know God by their own essences, is suf- ficient for their ultimate happiness. In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first show that to know God in this way is not to know His essence. Cf. ch. 42, 43. ^C. G., II, 81. 88 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES It is possible to know a cause from its effect in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and char- acter of the cause. This happens in the sciences which prove the cause from the effect. — Secondly, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect. Thus a man is seen in a mirror because of his likeness. This way differs from the first, because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, of which one is the cause of the other; for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. In the second way, however, there is one sight of both, because, while seeing the effect, we see the cause therein at the same time. — Thirdly, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: e.g.^ if a box had an intel- lect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect what the cause is, unless the effect be equal to the cause, and express the whole power of the cause. Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not however in the first way, because then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another ; and also in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God’s power, as we have shown in the Second Book."^ Therefore they can- not see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge. Besides. The intelligible likeness, whereby a thing is understood in its substance, must be of the same species, in fact it must be its species ; even as the form of the house, which is in the architect’s mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species. For we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature, indeed, not even of the same genus, as we showed in the First Book.^ Therefore a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature. Further. Every created thing is limited to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created. Moreover. Every intelligible species, through which the quiddity or es- sence of a thing is understood, comprehends that thing in representing it. And so the words signifying what a thing is are called terms and definitions. But no created likeness can possibly represent God thus, since every created likeness belongs to some determinate genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the First Book.^ Therefore it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created likeness. " C. G., II, 22. " C. G., I, 2S. " C. G., 1, 28, 43. "C. G., I, 23. SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AND GOD’S ESSENCE 89 Further. It was^ proved in the First Book that God’s substance is His being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the Second Book.- Therefore the essence of a separate sub- stance is not a sufficient means whereby God may be seen in His essence. And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows of God that He is, that He is the cause of all things, that He is above all and far removed from all, not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able somewhat to obtain, because from His effects we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause of other things, sur- passing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point' of our knowledge in this life in which, as Dionysius says, we are united to God as to something unknown? This happens when we know of Him what He is not, while what He is remains utterly unknown. Hence, in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses {E>xod. XX. 21) that he went to the dark cloud wherein God was. Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate sub- stances, that know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God, than the effects through which we know God. There- fore separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists. — ^Again. Since by negations we come by any way what- ever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as was stated above,^ the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propin- quity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of Him; just as he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now separate substances know more things than we do, and things that are nearer to God; and consequently by their intellect they remove from God more things and things nearer to God than we do. Therefore they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we; although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance. Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed, the better the knowledge one has of his eminence. Thus, although a peas- ant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has busi- ness, he does not realize the king’s exalted position, as one who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king ^ C. G., I, 22. "C. G., 11 , 52. Myst. TUol., I, i (PG 3, 997)- "Ch. 39. 90 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES to be placed ; although neither of them may comprehend the height of the kingly rank. Now we know none but the lowest things, and consequently, although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, since they know the highest orders of things, and also that God is higher than them all. Again. It is clear that the causality and power of a cause are all the bet- ter known, according as more and greater effects of it are known. There- fore it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, even though we know God to be the cause of all. CHAPTER L THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL ICNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD Now it is not possible that the natural desire of a separate substance rest in such a knowledge of God. For whatever is imperfect in a species seeks to acquire the perfection of that species. Thus, whoso has an opinion about a matter, and therefore an imperfect knowledge about it, for this very reason is spurred to the desire for certain knowledge about it. Now the aforesaid knowledge which separate substances have about God, which does not include a knowledge of His substance, is an imperfect kind of knowledge; for we do not deem ourselves to know a thing if we do not know its substance. Hence, the chief point in knowing a thing is to know what it is. Therefore this knowledge, which the separate substances have about God, does not set their appetite at rest, but spurs it on to the vision of the divine substance. Again. The knowledge of effects is an incitement to know the cause. Therefore it was that men began to philosophize because they sought the causes of things.^ Therefore the desire for knowledge naturally implanted in all intellectual substances does not rest unless, having acquired the knowledge 'of the substance of the effects, they know also the substance of their cause. Consequently, since separate substances know that God is the cause of all the things whose substances they see, their natural desire does not rest, unless they see God^s substance also. Besides. As knowing why a thing is so [propter quid] is related to know- ing whether it is so [quia], so knowing what a thing is [quid is re- lated to knowing whether it is [an For the question why a thing is so seeks the means of demonstrating that a thing is so, 04., that the rhoon is in eclipse. So, too, the question what a thing is seeks a means of dem- onstrating whether a thing is so. Such is the teaching of Post. Anal, ii.^ Now we observe that those who know that a thing is so naturally seek to " Ch Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982b 12). ® Aristotle, Post. Anal., 11 , x (89b 22). NATURAL DESIRE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES 91 know the why of its being so. Therefore those who know that a thing exists naturally seek to know what it is; and this is to know its essence. There- fore the natural desire for knowledge is not set at rest by that knowledge of God whereby it is known that He exists. Further. Nothing finite can set the intellect’s desire at rest. This is proved from the fact that the intellect, given any finite thing, strives to go beyond it ; so that, given a finite line of any length, it strives to apprehend a longer. So, too, in the case of numbers. This is the reason why we can add indefinitely to numbers and mathematical lines. Now the excellence and power of any created substance is finite. Therefore the intellect of a sepa- rate substance is not satisfied with knowing separate substances, however excellent they be, but still tends by its natural desire to understand the substance which is of an infinite excellence, as we proved in the First Book concerning the divine substance.^ Moreover. Just as there is a natural desire for knowledge in all intellec- tual natures, so there is in them a natural desire to rid themselves of igno- rance or nescience. Now separate substances, as has been stated,^ know in the manner already mentioned that God’s substance is above them, and above everything that they understand; and therefore they know that the divine substance is unknown to them. Therefore their natural desire tends to understand the divine substance. Besides. The nearer a thing is to its end, the greater the desire with which it tends to that end. Hence we see that the natural movement of bodies is increased towards the end. Now the intellects of separate sub- stances are nearer to the knowledge of God than ours, and consequently they desire to know God more intensely than we do. And however much we know that God is, and other things mentioned above,^ we still go on desiring and seek to know Him in His essence. Much more therefore do separate substances desire this naturally; and consequently their natural desire is not satisfied with the above-mentioned knowledge of God. Hence we conclude that the ultimate happiness of a separate substance does not consist in the knowledge whereby it knows God by its own sub- stance, since its desire still leads it on to the substance of God. It also clearly follows from this that ultimate happiness is to be sought nowhere else but in an operation of the intellect, since no desire leads us so high as the desire of knowing the truth. For all our desires, whether of pleasure or of anything else that man wants, can be satisfied with other things ; whereas the aforesaid desire does not rest until it has reached God, the supreme cause and maker of all. Hence Wisdom fittingly says {Ecclus. xxiv. 7) : / dwell in the highest places j and my throne is in a pillar of a cloud. It is also written {Prov. ix. 3) that Wisdom by her maids inviteth to the tower. They should blush, then, who seek man’s happiness in the lowest things, when it is placed on such a height. ^C. G., I, 43. “Ch. 49- 92 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LI HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE Since, then, it is impossible for a natural desire to be empty (and it would be, were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance, for all minds desire this naturally) , we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen through the intellect, both by separate intel- lectual substances, and by our souls. It is sufficiently clear, from what has been said, what manner of vision this is. For we have proved that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect by means of any created species.^ Therefore, if God’s essence is to be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it through the divine essence itself; so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision. Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular sub- stance unless it be actualized by a species informing it, which is the likeness of the thing understood, someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God through the divine essence as an intelligible species. For the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the First Book that God cannot be the form of anything.- In order to understand this truth, we must note that a self-subsisting substance is either a form alone, or a composite of matter and form. Ac- cordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else, because the form therein is already confined to that mat- ter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which so sub- sists that it is yet a form alone, can be the form of something else, pro- vided its being be such that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the Second Book;^ If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything, because by its very being it is determined in itself, just as ma- terial things are determined by their matter. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God, for, since truth is consequent upon being,^ that alone is its own truth, which is its own being ; and this belongs to God alone, as we have proved in the Second Book.^‘ Con- sequently, other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject; for each of them is a true ^ Ch. 49. ^ C. G., I, 26ff. ® C. G.y 11 , 68. * Cf. Aristotle, Metaph,, I a, x (993b 30 ). ^C,G,yll,lS, NO CREATURE CAN SEE GOD NATURALLY 93 thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. It is therefore clear that the divine essence* can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands; which cannot be said of the essence of any separate substance. And yet it cannot be the form of another thing through its natural being. For it would follow that, once united to another being, it would constitute one nature; which is impossible, since the divine essence is in itself perfect in its own nature. But an intelligible species, in its union with the intellect, does not consti- tute a nature, but perfects the intellect for understanding; and this is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence. This immediate vision of God is promised to us in Holy Scripture ( i Cor, xiii. 12) : We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. It would be impious to understand this in a material way, and imag- ine a material face in the Godhead; for we have proved that God is not a body.^ Nor is it possible for us to see God with a bodily face, since the eyes of the body, which are situated in the face, can see only bodily things. Thus then shall we see God face to face, because we shall see Him imme- diately, even as a man whom we see face to face. It is through this vision that we become most like God, and participators of His blessedness, since God understands His substance through His es- sence, and this is His blessedness. Therefore it is said (i John hi. 2) : When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; because we shall see Him as He is. Again, our Lord said {Luke xxii. 29, 30) : I dispose to you, as My Father hath disposed to Me, a banquet, that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom. Now these words cannot be understood as refer- ring to bodily food and drink, but to that which is taken from the table of Wisdom, of which Wisdom says {Prov. ix. 5) : Eat my bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you. Accordingly, to eat and drink at God’s table is to enjoy the same blessedness as that which makes God happy, and to see God as He sees Himself. CHAPTER LII THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE However, it is not possible for any created substance to attain, by its own power, to this way of seeing God. For that which is proper to the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher nature to which it properly belongs. Thus water cannot become hot except through the action of heat. Now to see God through His essence is proper to the divine nature, ’ C. G., 1 , 27. 94 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES since to operate through his own form is proper to each operator. There- fore no intellectual substance can see God through the divine essence, unless God Himself bring this about. Again. A form proper to A does not become B’s except through A’s agency, because an agent produces its like by communicating its form to another. Now it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine essence itself become the form by which the intellect understands, as we have proved.^ Therefore no created substance can attain to that vision, except through the divine agency. Besides. If any two things have to be united together so that one be formal and the other material, their union must be completed by an action on the part of the one that is formal, and not by the action of the one that is material; for the form is the principle of action, whereas matter is the passive principle. Now in order that the created intellect see God’s sub- stance, the divine essence itself must be united to the intellect as an intel- ligible form, as we have proved. Therefore no created intellect can attain to this vision except through the divine agency. Further. What is so of itself is the cause of what is so through another r Now the divine intellect sees through itself the divine substance, for the divine intellect is the divine essence itself, by means of which God’s sub- stance is seen, as we proved in the First Book.*^ But the created intellect sees the divine substance through the divine essence as through something other than itself. Therefore this vision cannot be acquired by the created intel- lect, except through the action of God. Moreover. Whatever exceeds the limits of a given nature, cannot be ac- quired by that nature except through the agency of another; and thus water does not flow upwards unless it be moved by something else. Now it is beyond the limits of any created nature to see God’s substance, because it is proper to every created intellectual nature to 'understand according to the mode of its substance. But the divine substance cannot be thus under- stood, as we proved above.'^ Therefore no created intellect can possibly attain to a vision of the divine substance except by the agency of God, Who surpasses all creatures. Hence it is said (Rom, vi. 23): The grace of God is life everlasting. For we have proved that man’s happiness consists in seeing God, which is called life everlasting.® Now we are said to obtain this by God’s grace alone, because that vision surpasses the ability of every creature, and it is im- passible to attain thereto except by God’s gift; and when such things are obtained by a creature, it is put down to God’s grace. And so our Lord says (Jo, xiv. 21): I will manifest myself to him, ^Ch. sx. ‘"Cf. Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (257a 3X), " Ch. so. “C. G, I, 45. ^ Ch. 49. CREATURES NEED GOD’S AID TO SEE HIM 9S CHAPTER LIII THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ES- SENCE To SO sublime a, vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the divine goodness. For it is impossible that the proper form of anything become the form of another, unless this other bear some resemblance to the thing to which that form properly belongs. Thus light does not actualize a body which has nothing in common with the di- aphanous, Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate to it; for these three, understanding, means of understanding and object understood are one in God. Therefore that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except because the created intellect participates in some divine likeness. Therefore this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen. Again. Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be raised through some disposition to the capacity for this form; for every act is realized in its proper potency. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Therefore, in order that the divine essence become the in- telligible species of a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised to that capacity by some higher disposition. Besides. Tf two things, after not being united, become united, this must be either because both are changed, or only one. Now if we suppose that some created intellect begins to see the divine essence, it follows, from what we have said,^ that the divine essence comes to be united to that in- tellect as an intelligible species. But it is impossible that the divine essence be changed, as we have proved.^ Therefore this union must begin through a change in the created intellect, and this change can consist only in the fact that the created intellect acquires some new disposition. — The same con- clusion follows if we suppose some created intellect to be endowed from the outset of its creation with such a vision. For if, as we have proved,^ this vision exceeds the ability of nature, it is possible to conceive any created intellect as complete in the species of its nature without its seeing God’s substance. Consequently, whether it see God from the beginning, or begin to see Him afterwards, its nature needs something to be added to it. Further. Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be strengthened in two ways. ^Ch. 51. 13. "Ch.S2. 96 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES First, by a mere intensifying of its power. Thus, the active power of a hot thing is increased by the intensity of the heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action of the same species. Secondly, by the addition of a new form. Thus the power of a diaplaanoiis body is strengthened so that it can give light, through its being made actually lucid by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order to accomplish an operation of another species. Now the natural power of the created in- tellect is not sufficient for the vision of the divine substance, as we have shown.^ Therefore its power needs to be increased in order that it attain to that vision. But increase through intensification of the natural power is insufficient, because that vision is not of the same kind as the natural vision of the created intellect; which is clear from the distance separating the things seen. Therefore there must be an increase of the intellectual power through its receiving a new disposition. Now, owing to the fact that we derive our knowledge of intelligible be- ings from sensible things, we transfer the terms employed in sensible knowl- edge to our intellectual knowledge; especially those terms that pertain to the sight, which of all the senses is the highest and most spiritual, and therefore most akin to the intellect. It is for this reason that intellectual knowledge is called sight [visio]. And because bodily sight is not effected without light, those things which serve for the perfection of intellectual vision are called light; and so Aristotle compares the agent intellect to light, because the agent intellect makes things actually intelligible, even as light somehow makes things to be actually visible.- Accordingly, the dispo- sition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance is rightly called the light of glory; not indeed because it makes the object actually intelligible, as the light of the agent intellect does, but because it makes the intellect able to understand actually. This is the light of which it is said {Ps. xxxv. lo) : In Thy light wc shall see light j i.e., the light of the divine substance. Again it is said {Apoc. xxii. 5 [cf. xxi. 23]): The city, namely of the Blessed, hath no mod of the sun, nor of the moon ... for the glory of God hath enlightened it. Again it is said {Isa. lx. 19) : Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee; but the Lord shall be unto thee for an everlasting light, and thy God for thy glory.— Pox this reason, too, since in God to be is the same as to understand, and because He is to all the cause of their understanding, He is said to be the light {Jo. L 9): That was the true light which enlightencth every man that cometh into this world] and (i John i. 5) : God is light. Again {Ps. ciii. 2) : Thou . . . art clothed with light as with a garment. — For this reason, too, both God and the angels are described in Holy Scripture in figures of fire, be- cause of the splendor of fire {Exod. xxiv. 17; Acts ii. 3; Ps. ciii. 4), '^Ihid. ^De An., Ill, 5 (430a 15). GOD’S ESSENCE CAN BE SEEN 97 CHAPTER LIV ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE, AND THEIR SOLUTION Someone will object against the foregoing: [ I ] No^ additional light can help the sight to see things that surpass the natural ability of corporeal sight, since the sight can see only colored things. Now the divine substance surpasses every capacity of a created intellect, more even than the intellect surpasses the senses’ capacity. Therefore no additional light can raise the created intellect to see the divine substance. [2] Again. This light, that is received into the created intellect, is some- thing created. Therefore it also is infinitely distant from God, and conse- quently such a light cannot help the created intellect to see the divine substance. [3] Besides. If the aforesaid light can do this for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine substance, since every intellectual substance, for the very reason that it is intellectual, bears a likeness to God, the nature itself of an intellectual substance will suffice for it to see God. [4] Further. If this light is created, since there is no reason why that which is created should not be connatural to some creature, there might possibly be a creature that would see the divine substance through its con- natural light. But the contrary of this has been proved.^ [5] Moreover. The infinite, ds such, is unknown? Now we proved in the First Book that God is infinite.^ Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through the light in question. [6] Again. There should be a proportion between the one understand- ing and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between the cre- ated intellect, even perfected by this light, and the divine substance; for there still remains an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot be raised by any light to see the divine substance. By these and like arguments some have been induced to maintain that the divine substance is never seen by a created intellect. This opinion both destroys the rational creature’s true happiness, which can consist in nothing but the vision of the divine substance, as we have proved,^ and is contrary to the authority of Holy Scripture, as appears from what we have said.^ Therefore it should be rejected as false and heretical. Now it is not difficult to answer the above arguments. For the divine substance is not so outside the range of the created intellect, as to be abso- lutely beyond its reach, as sound is to the sight, or an immaterial substance to the senses. For the divine substance is the first intelligible, and the prin- ^ Ch. 52. ® Aristotle, Thys., I, 4 (187b 7). ® C. G., I, 43. ^ Ch. 50. ® Ch. 31. 98 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES ciple of all intellectual knowledge. Rather, it is outside the range of the created intellect as exceeding its power, just as the highest sensibles are outside the range of the senses. Therefore the Philosopher says that our intellect stands in relation to the most evident things as the owVs eye docs in relation to the sun} Therefore the created intellect needs to be strength- ened by some divine light in order to be able to see the divine substance. This solves the jirst argument. Moreover, this light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not because of its affinity to the divine substance, but because of the power which it receives from God to produce such an effect; even though in its being it is infinitely distant from God, as the second argument stated. For this light unites the created intellect to God, not in being, but only in understanding. Since, however, it belongs to God Himself to understand His substance perfectly, the light in question is a likeness of God in this that it perfects the intellect for seeing the divine substance. Now no intellectual substance can be like God in this way. For since no created substance’s simplicity is equal to the divine simplicity, it is impossible for the created substance to have its entire perfection in one subject: for this is proper to God, as we proved in the First Book,- Who is being, understanding and blessed in re- spect of the same reality. Consequently, in the intellectual substance, the created light through which it is raised to the beatific vision of God differs from any light whereby it is perfected in its specific nature and under- stands proportionately to its substance. Hence the reply to the third argu- ment is clear. The fourth argument is solved thus. The vision of the divine substance surpasses all natural power, as was shown. Consequently the light whereby the created intellect is perfected in order to see the divine substance must needs, be supernatural. Nor can the fact that God is infinite be an obstacle to the vision of the divine substance, as the fifth objection argued. For He is not said to be infinite by way of privation, as is quantity. The infinite of this kind is quite logically unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form, which is the principle of knowledge. But God is said to be infinite negatively, as a per sc subsistent form that is not limited by being received into matter. There- fore, that which is infinite in this way is in itself most, knowable. There is, furthermore, a proportion between the created intellect and understanding God, a proportion not of a common measure, but of a rela- tion of one thing to another, such as of matter to form, or cause to effect. In this way there is no reason against there being in the creature a propor- tion to God, consisting in the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, as well as of an effect to its cause. Therefore the solutiop of the sixth objection is clear. ^Metaph,, I a, i (g93b 9). ^ C. G., I, 28. CREATURES CANNOT COMPREHEND GOD 99 CHAPTER LV THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE The mode of any action whatever depends on the efficacity of its active principle, for that which has the stronger heat imparts greater heat. Hence it is that the mode of knowledge also must depend on the efhcacity of the principle of knowledge. Now the light mentioned above is a principle of knowing God,^ since thereby the created intellect is raised to the vision of the divine substance. Accordingly, the mode of the divine vision must be commensurate with the power of this same light. But this light is far short in strength of the clarity of the divine intelligence. Therefore it is impossible that the divine sub- stance be seen through the aforesaid light as perfectly as it is seen by the divine intellect. Now the divine intellect sees this substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible, because the truth of the divine substance and the clarity of the divine intellect are equal, nay more, are one. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly by the aforesaid light see the divine sub- stance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. Now whoever knows a thing so as to comprehend it, knows it as perfectly as it is knowable. For whoever knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, as a matter of opinion based on probable reasons, because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend it; but only he does who knows it as a scientific conclu- sion, through the means that cause that conclusion. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance. Again. A finite power cannot in its operation rise to the level of an in- finite object. Now the divine substance is something infinite in coinparison .with every created intellect, since every created intellect is limited to a certain species. Therefore the vision of a created intellect cannot possibly rise to the level of the divine substance in seeing it, namely, by seeing the divine substance as perfectly as it is visible. Therefore no created intellect comprehends it. Further. Every agent acts perfectly so far as it perfectly participates in the form that is the principle of action. Now the intelligible form by which the divine substance is seen is the divine essence itself ; and although it be- comes the intelligible form of the created intellect, the created intellect does not grasp it as much as it can be grasped. Therefore it does not see it as perfectly as it can be seen. Therefore it is not comprehended by the crea1?fed intellect. » Besides. Nothing comprehended goes beyond the limits of the one com- ^ Ch. 53- 100 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES prehending. Consequently if the created intellect were to comprehend the divine substance, this would not exceed the limits of the created intellect; which is impossible. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly com- prehend the divine substance. We do not however say that the divine substance is seen, yet not com- prehended by a created intellect, as though something of it were seen and something not seen; for the divine substance is utterly simple. But we say it because it is not seen as perfectly by the created intellect as it is visible, even as one who holds a demonstrated conclusion as an opihion is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is, scientifically, although there be no part of it that he does not know. CHAPTER LVI THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING COD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM Hence it is clear that, though the created intellect may see the divine sub- stance, it does not know all that can be seen in the divine substance. For then alone does it necessarily follow that, if one principle be known, all its effects are known through it, when that principle is comprehended by the intellect; because a principle is then known as to its whole power, when all its effects are known from it. Now other things are known through the divine essence as effects are known from their cause. Consequently, since the created intellect cannot know the divine substance so as to com- prehend it, it does not follow that, because it sees it, it sees also all that can be known through it. Again. The higher the intellect the more it knows, — either a greater num- ber of things, or at least more about the same things. Now the divine in-, tellect surpasses every created intellect, and consequently it knows more things than any created intellect. Yet it does not know things except through knowing its own essence, as we have proved in the First Book.^ Therefore more things are knowable through the divine essence than any created intellect can see through it. Besides. The measure of a power is according to what it can do. Conse- quently , to know all that a power can do is the same as to comprehend that power. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can com- prehend it any more than it can comprehend its essence, as we have proved above. Neither, therefore, can a created intellect know all that the divine power can do. Yet all the things that the divine power can do are knowable through the divine essence, because God knows them all, and not otherwise I, 49. ®Ch. 56. WE CANNOT SEE GOD'S ESSENCE WHOLLY loi than through His essence. Therefore a created intellect, by seeing the divine essence, does not see all that can be seen in the divine substance. Moreover. No cognitive power knows a thing except under the aspect of its own proper object ; and thus by sight we do not know a thing except as colored. Now the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, namely, the substance of a thing, as is stated in De Anima iii.^ Consequently what- ever the intellect knows of a thing, it knows it through the knowledge of its substance, so that whenever by demonstration we become acquainted with the proper accidents of a thing, we take as principle what that thing is, as is stated in Post. Anal, i.^ On the other hand, if the intellect knows the substance through the accidents (according to the statement in De Anima i, that accidents are a great help in knowing what a thing is^) this is acci- dental, in so far as the knowledge of the intellect arises from the senses, and so by knowing the accidents as perceived by the senses we need to arrive at knowing the substance. For this reason this does not occur in mathematics, but only in physics. Consequently, whatever cannot be known in a thing by knowing its substance must remain unknown to the intellect. Now by knowing the substance of one who wills, we cannot arrive at know- ing what he wills, because the will does not tend altogether naturally to that which it wills ; and for which reason will and nature are said to be two active principles. Therefore the intellect cannot know what a person wills, except perhaps from certain effects; and thus if we see a person working willingly, we know what he willed. Or again from a cause; and thus God knows what we will, as also other of His effects, in that He is the cause of our willing. Or again by someone indicating his will to another, as when by speaking he makes known his likes and dislikes. Since, then, many things depend on God’s simple will, as we have partly shown above,^ and will show yet more clearly further on,^ although the created intellect may see the divine essence, it does not know all the things that God sees through His substance. Someone may object to what has been said, that God’s substance is some- thing greater than all the things He can do, or understand, or will, except Himself; and therefore if the created intellect can see God’s substance, much more can it know all that God either understands, or wills, or can do, except Himself. But if we consider carefully, to know a thing in itself is not the same as to know it in its cause, since there are things which are easy to know in themselves, but not easy to know in their causes. It is true, then, that to know God in Himself is more than to know anything else besides Him, if this can be known in itself. But it belongs to a more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance and to see its effects therein, than to know the ^Aristotle, De An., Ill, 4 (429b 10). — Cf. St. Thomas, In De An., Ill, lect^ 8. ^Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 4 (73a 37). ® Aristotle, De An., I, i (402b 21). ^C. G., 1,81. ®Ch. 64ff. 102 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES divine substance without seeing its effects in it. Now it is possible to see the divine substance without comprehending it. But it is not possible to know all that can be known in that substance without comprehending it, as we have proved. CHAPTER LVII THAT EVERY INTELLECT OF ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION Since, as we have proved,^ the created intellect is raised by a kind of supernatural light to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intellect of so low a degree in its nature that cannot be raised to this vision. For we have proved that this light cannot be connatural to any creature,^ but surpasses every created nature in its power. Now that which is done by a supernatural power is not hindered by any diversity of nature, since the divine power is infinite; and so in the miraculous healing of a sick man, it matters not whether he ail much or little. Consequently, the diversity of degrees in the intellectual nature does not prevent the lowest in that nature from being raised by the aforesaid light to that vision. Again. The highest intellect in the order of nature is infinitely distant from God in perfection and goodness, whereas its distance from the lowest intellect is finite; for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite thing and another. Consequently the distance between the lowest created intellect and the highest is as nothing in comparison with the distance be- tween the highest created intellect and God. Now that which is as nothing cannot cause an appreciable variation. Thus, the distance between the center of the earth and the human eye is as nothing in comparison with the dis- tance between the human eye and the eighth sphere, compared with which the earth occupies the space of a mere point; for which reason no appre- ciable variation arises from the fact that astronomers use the human eye as the center of the earth in their demonstrations. It makes no difference, therefore, what intellect be raised by the aforesaid light to the vision of God, whether it be of the highest, or of the lowest, or of a middle degree. Beside^. It was proved above that every intellect desires naturally to see the divine substance.^ Now natural desire cannot be empty. Therefore every created intellect can arrive at the vision of the divine substance, without any obstacle arising from the lowliness of its nature. Hence it is that {Matt, xxii., 30) our Lord promises men the glory of the angels: They shall be^ He says, speaking of men, like the angels of God in heaven. Again, {Apoc. xx [cf. xxi. 17]) it is stated that the measure of a man is that of an angel. For this reason nearly everywhere in Holy Scripture ^Ch. S3. ""Md. ^Ch.so. GOD CAN BE SEEN MORE AND LESS PERFECTLY 103 angels are described in the form of men, either wholly, as the angels who appeared to Abraham in the likeness of men {Gen. xviii. 2), or in part, as may be seen in the animals {Ezech. i. 8) of which it is said that they had the hands of a man under their wings. Hereby is removed the error of those who said that, however much the human soul be raised, it cannot attain to an equality with the higher intellects. CHAPTER LVIII THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER Because the mode of operation follows from the form that is the principle of operation, and the aforesaid light is a principle of the vision whereby the created intellect sees the divine substance, as we have proved,^ it follows that the mode of the divine vision is in keeping with the mode of this light. Now it is possible that there be various degrees of participation in this light, so that one be more perfectly illumined than another. Therefore it is pos- sible that, of those who see God, one may see Him more perfectly than an- other, even though both see His substance. Again. In whatever genus there is one thing higher than the others, we shall find degrees according as these others approach more or less to that thing; and thus things are more or less hot according as they approach to fire which is supremely hot. Now God sees His own substance most per- fectly, inasmuch as He alone comprehends it, as we have proved above.^ Therefore, of those who see Him, one sees His substance more perfectly than another, according to their greater or lesser approach to Him. Besides. The light of glory raises one to the divine vision for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine intellect, as we have stated.® Now a thing may be more or less like to God. Therefore it is possible for one to see the divine substance more or less perfectly. Further. Since there is proportion between the end and things directed to the end, it follows that things directed differently to an end participate in that end differently. Now the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have shown.^ But intellectual sub- stances are not all equally prepared for that end, for some are more virtu- ous, some less; and virtue is the way to happiness. Consequently, there must be diversity in the divine vision, in that some see the divine substance more perfectly, some less perfectly. Hence, in order to indicate this differ- ence in happiness, our Lord says {Jo. xiv. 2) : In my Father's house there are many mansions. ^Ch.53. "Ch.55. Ch. 53. "Ch.50. 104 the SUMMA contra GENTILES Hereby loo is excluded the error of those who say that all rewards are equal. Again, just as the mode of vision indicates a diversity of degrees among the blessed, so the object of the vision shows that their glory is the same; for each one’s happiness consists in his seeing God’s substance, as we have proved. The same thing then makes them all happy, but they do not all de- rive an equal happiness therefrom. Hence it does not stand in the way of what has been said that our Lord declares {Matt,xx, lo) the laborers in the vineyard to have received the same wage, namely, a penny, although they did not work equally; because the same thing is appointed as a reward to be seen and enjoyed, namely, God. Wherein it must also be observed that corporeal and spiritual movements are somewhat contrary to each other. For all corporeal movements have the identically same first subject, but their ends are diverse; whereas spiritual movements, namely intellectual apprehensions and acts of the will, have various first subjects, but one identical end. CHAPTER LIX HO'W THOSE W'HO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS Now since the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intel- lectual substance, as we have proved,^ and since the appetite of everything that has obtained its last end is at rest, it follows that the natural appetite of the intellectual substance that sees the divine substance must be entirely at rest. Now the natural desire of the intellect is to know all the genera, species and powers of things, and the whole order of the universe; as is evident from the fact of man’s pursuit of all these things. Therefore every- one that sees the divine substance knows all the things mentioned above. Again. Intellect and sense differ, as is clear from De Anima iii,^ in that sense is destroyed or weakened by powerful sensibles, so that afterwards it cannot perceive weaker objects, whereas the intellect, through not being destroyed or weakened by its object, but only perfected thereby, afWr it has understood a higher intelligible, is not less but more able to understand other intelligibles. Now the highest in the genus of intelligibles is the divine substance. Consequently, the intellect which by the divine light is raised to see the substance of God is a jortiori perfected by the same light so as to see all other intelligibles in the universe. Besides. Intelligible being is not of less, but may be of greater, extent than physical being ; for the intellect is naturally adapted to understand all the things in the universe, as well as things that have no physical being, such as negations and privations. Consequently, anything required for the ^ Ch. 50. ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 4 (429a 14). HOW THOSE SEEING GOD SEE ALL THINGS 105 perfection of physical being, that and even more is required for the perfec- tion of intelligible being. Now the perfection of intelligible being is realized when the intellect has reached its last end, even as the perfection of physi- cal being consists in the very making of a thing. Therefore God makes known to the intellect, which,sees Him, all the things that He has made for the perfection of the universe. Moreover. Although of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another, as we have shown, ^ yet each one sees Him so perfectly that all his natural capacity is filled ; indeed, the vision itself surpasses all natu- ral capacity, as was proved above.^ Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance must needs know in the divine substance all the things to which his natural capacity extends. Now the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowledge of all genera and species, and the order of things. Therefore everyone that sees God will know these things in the divine substance. Hence the Lord’s answer to Moses’ request to see the divine substance {Exod, xxxiii. 19 )- I ’will show thee all good] and Gregory says: What know they not who know Him that knows all?^ If we consider carefully the foregoing, it is clear that those who see the divine substance in one sense see all things, and in another sense do not. For if by all we understand those things that belong- to the perfection of the universe, it is evident from what has been said that those who see God see all things, as the arguments just adduced prove. For as the intellect is, in a sense, all things,^ whatever belongs to the perfection of nature belongs also to the perfection of intelligible being; and for this reason, according to Augustine, all things made by the Word of God that they might subsist in their respective natures, were made likewise in the angelic intelligence so as to be understood by the angels.^ Now, to the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, their properties and powers, because the intention of nature is directed to the specific natures, since individuals are for the sake of the species. Consequently, it belongs to the perfection of an intel- lectual substance to know the nature, powers and proper accidents of every species ; and therefore it will obtain this in the final beatitude through the vision of the divine essence. — Moreover, through its knowledge of natural species, the individuals contained in these species are also known by the intellect that sees God, as may be gathered from what has been already said of the divine and angelic knowledge.^ On the other hand, if by all we understand all that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intellect sees all things in the divine substance, as we have shown.'^ This may be considered in respect of several things. "Ch. 58. "Ch. 52. “St. Gregory, DiaL, 11 , 33 (PL 66, 194). ^ De An,, III, 5 (430a 14). De Genesi ad Litt., II, 8 (PL 34, 269). ® C. G., I, 69; 11 , 96ff. " Ch. 56. io6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES First; as to those things which God can make, but neither has made nor ever will make. For all such things cannot be known without comprehending His power, which is impossible for any created intellect, as we have proved.^ Hence it is said {Job. xi. 7, seqq .) : Per adventure thou wilt under- stand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven^ and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. For these things are said, not as though God were great in dimensive quantity, but because His power is not limited to all that are seen to be great, so that He be unable to make greater still. Secondly, as to the reasons of things made, which reasons cannot all be known by an intellect without its comprehending the divine goodness. Be- cause the reason for every thing made is taken from the end which the maker has in view. Now the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness, and therefore the reason for things made is that the divine good- ness may be diffused in things. Hence, a man would know all the reasons of created things, if he knew every good that can accrue to things according to the order of divine wisdom ; and this would be to comprehend the divine goodness and wisdom, which is impossible to any created in- tellect. Therefore it is said (Eccles. viii. 17): / understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God. Thirdly, as to the things whiclx depend on God’s will alone, such as predestination, election and justification, and whatever belongs to the creature’s sanctification. Hence it is said ( i Cor. ii. ii) : No man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. CHAPTER LX THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE Since we have shown that the created intellect, which sees the divine sub- stance, sees therein all the species of things;- and since whatever is seen in one species must needs be seen at once and by one vision, because vision must correspond to the principle of vision, it follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance sees all things, not successively, but at once. Again. The supreme and perfect happiness of the intellectual nature con- sists in seeing God, as was proved above.'"^ Now happiness results, not from a habit, but from an act, since it is the ultimate perfection and last end. Consequently, whatever we see in the beatific vision of the divine substance is all seen by us actually, and therefore not one thing after another. ^ Ch. 55 ^ Ch. 59. « Ch. 50. THE VISION OF GOD AND ETERNAL LIFE 107 Besides. Whenever a thing arrives at its last end, it is at rest, since all movement is toward the attainment of an end. Now the last end of the in- tellect is the vision of the divine substance, as was shown above.^ There- fore the intellect that sees the divine substance does not pass from one in- telligible thing to another. Therefore whatsoever it knows in this vision, it considers it all actually. Moreover. In the divine substance the intellect knows all the species of things, as we have proved.^ Now of some genera there are an infinite num- ber of species, for instance of numbers, figures and proportions. Therefore the intellect sees an infinite number of things in the divine substance. But it would not see them all unless it saw them at one time, because it is not possible to pass through the infinite. Consequently all the intellect sees in the divine substance, it sees at once. Hence Augustine says: Our thoughts will not then be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another, hut we shall see all we know by one glance? CHAPTER LXI THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE It follows that by the aforesaid vision the created intellect is made a par- talcer of eternal life. For eternity differs from time in that the latter has its being in a kind of succession, whereas the former is all simultaneously.^ Now it has already been proved that there is no succession in the vision in question,® and that whatsoever is seen in it, is seen at once and at a glance. Therefore this vision takes place in a kind of participation of eternity. Moreover this vision is a kind of life, because the act of the intellect is a kind of life.® Therefore by that vision the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life. Again, Actions take their species from their objects. Now the object of the aforesaid vision is the divine substance in its very being, and not in some created likeness, as we have shown.'’^ But the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the aforesaid vision con- sists in a participation of eternity. Besides. If an action takes place in time, this is either because the prin- ciple of the^action is in time (for instance, the actions of natural things are temporal), or because of the term of the action (for instance, the ac- tions which spiritual substances, which are above time, exercise on things subject to time). Now the vision in question is not subject to time on the "Ch. S9.. ^De Tnn., XV, 16 (PL 42, 1079)- ' Cf. Boethius, De Consol., V, prose 6 (PL 63, 838). ^ Ch. 60. ^ Eth., IX, 9 (ii 7 oa 18). ’ Ch. 30. io8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES part of the thing seen, since this is an eternal substance; nor on the part of the medium of vision, which is also the eternal substance; nor on the part of the seer, namely the intellect, whose being is independent of time because it is incorruptible, as we have proved.^ Therefore this vision is according to a participation of eternity, as altogether transcending time. Further. The intellectual soul is created 07 i the border line between eternity and time, as is stated in the Book of Causes and was explained above,""* because it is the last in order among intellects, and yet its substance stands above corporeal matter, and is independent thereof. On the other hand, its action, in respect of which it comes into conjunction with lower and temporal things, is itself temporal. Consequently, its action, by reason of which it comes into conjunction with higher things that are above time, partakes of eternity. Especially does this apply to the vision in which it sees the divine substance. Therefore by this vision it enters into a participation of eternity; and for the same reason, so too does any other created intellect that sees God. For this reason our Lord says {Jo. xvii. 3) : This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God. CHAPTER LXII THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOEEVER It follows from what has been said that those who obtain ultimate happi- ness from the divine vision never fall away from it. Because whatever at one time is, and at another time is not, is measured by time, as is stated in Physics iv.^ Now the vision in question, which makes intellectual creatures happy, is not in time but in eternity.^ Therefore no one, having once become a partaker thereof, can lose it. Again. The intellectual creature does not arrive at its last end except until its natural desire is at rest. Now just as it naturally desires happiness, so does it desire perpetuity of happiness; for, since it is perpetual in its substance, that which it desires for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, it desires to have always. Consequently happiness would not be its last end unless it endured forever. Besides. Whatever is possessed with love causes sorrow if it be known that at length it will be lost. Now since the vision in question, which makes the possessor happy, is supremely enjoyable and desirable, it is supremely loved by those who possess it. Therefore they could not but be sorrowful if they knew that they would lose it some time. But if it were not perpetual, they would know this, for it has been shown that in seeing the divine sub- " C. G., II, 55, 79. " De Causis, II (p. 162) . * C. G., II, 68. * Aristotle, Phys., IV, 12 (22Jb 28). ®Ch. 6j. THE VISION OF GOD IS ETERNAL 109 stance, they know also other things that exist naturally;^ and hence much more do they know the conditions of that vision, whether it be perpetual or about to cease eventually. Therefore they would not possess that vision without sorrow. Consequently it would not be true happiness, which should insure man from all evil, as we have proved.^ Moreover. That which is naturally moved towards a thing as the end of its movement, is not moved away from it except by violence; as a heavy body, when it is projected upwards. Now it is clear from what has been said that every intellectual substance tends to that vision with a natural desire.^ Therefore it cannot fall away from it except by violence. But noth- ing is taken away by violence unless the power of him who takes it exceeds that of him who caused it. Now the cause of the divine vision is God, as we have proved.'^ Consequently, as no power exceeds God’s, it is impossible for that vision to be taken away by violence. Therefore it will last forever. Further. If a man ceases to see what he saw hitherto, this will be either because he loses the ability to see — as when a man dies, or becomes blind, or is hindered in some other way ; or because he wishes no longer to see, — as when we turn our eyes away from a thing we saw before; or because the object is withdrawn. And this is invariably true, whether we speak of sen- sitive or of intellective vision. Now the intellectual substance that sees God cannot lose the ability to see God, either through ceasing to exist, since it is immortal, as we proved above;-''' or through failure of the light by which it sees God, since that light is received incorruptibly, on the part both of the recipient and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy that vision, for it knows its ultimate happiness to consist in that vision, even as it can- not but desire to be happy. Nor will it cease to see through the withdrawal of the object, because that object, which is God, is unchangeable, nor does He withdraw Himself more than we withdraw from Him. Therefore it is impossible for this beatific vision ever to cease. Again. It is impossible for a man to wish to give up a good which he is enjoying, except because of some evil that he thinks to be attached to the enjoyment of that good, which enjoyment, at least, is an obstacle to a greater good; for just as the appetite desires nothing except under the as- pect of a good, so does it shun nothing except as an evil. But in the enjoy- ment of that vision there cannot be any evil, since it is the greatest good to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor is it possible that one who enjoys that vision deem any evil to be in it, or anything to be better than it, because the vision of that Supreme Truth excludes all false opinion. Therefore it is impossible that the intellectual substance which sees God ever desire to lose that vision. Moreover. The reason why we become weary of what we enjoyed hitherto is that it causes some kind of change, by destroying or diminishing one’s power. Hence fatigue is incidental to the exercise of the sensitive powers, " Ch. 59. " Ch. 48 . " Ch. so. " Ch. 53- " C. G., II, SS- no THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES through the action of the sensible objects on the bodily organ (in fact, the power may be altogether destroyed by too powerful an object) and after a time they are loth to enjoy that which hitherto had been a pleasant sensa- tion. For the same reason we become weary in mind after long or concen- trated thought, because powers that employ organs of the body are sub- ject to fatigue, and in this life it is not possible to give the intellect to thought without employing those organs. Now the divine substance does not corrupt but, more than anything, perfects the intellect. Nor does any action performed by a corporeal organ concur in the vision of God. There- fore it is impossible for anyone to be weary of seeing Him, when they have once enjoyed the sight of Him. Further. Nothing can be wearisome that is wonderful to him that looks on it, because as long as we wonder at it, it still moves our desire. Now the created intellect always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect can comprehend it. Therefore the intellectual substance cannot possibly become weary of that vision; and consequently it cannot, of its own choice, desist from it. Besides. If two things were united before, and afterwards become sepa- rated, this must be the result of a change in one of them ; because just as a relationship does not begin except through a change in one of the relatives, so does it not cease except through a fresh change in one of them. Now th^e created intellect sees God through being, in some way, united to Him, as was proved above.^ Consequently, if that vision cease, through the cessation of that union, this must result from a change either in the divine substance or in the intellect of the one who sees it. But neither of these is possible, since the divine substance is unchangeable, as we proved in the First Book ; 2 and the intellectual substance is raised above all changes, when it sees the divine substance. Therefore it is impossible to lapse from the hap- piness of seeing God. Furthermore. The nearer a thing is to God, Who is utterly unchangeable, the less changeable and the more enduring is it; so that certain bodies, through being far distant from God, cannot last for ever, as is stated in De Gener. ii.^"^ But no creature can come nearer to God than one who sees His substance. Therefore the intellectual creature that sees the divine substance becomes, in a very high degree, unchangeable. Therefore it can never fall away from that vision. Hence it is said (Ps, Ixxxiii. 5): Blessed arc they that dwell in Thy house, 0 Lord: they shall praise Thee for ever and ever; and elsewhere (Ps. cxxiv. 1): He shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. Again {Isa. xxxiii. 21) : Thy eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed: neither shall the nails thereof be taken away for ever, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken, because only there our Lord is magnificent; and {Apoc. hi. 12): Ch. SI. "C. G., I, 13. ® Aristotle, De Gener., II, 10 (336b 30). ULTIMATE HAPPINESS FULFILLS ALL DESIRE iii He that shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go out no more. Hereby is excluded the error of the Platonists who said that souls after being separated from the body, and obtaining ultimate happiness, begin to desire reunion with the body, and that when the happiness of that life is ended, they are plunged once more into this life of unhappiness; and again that of Origen, who maintained that souls and angels can return from blessedness to unhappiness.^ CHAPTER LXIII HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN’S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED It is evident, from what has been said, that in this happy state, which re- sults from the divine vision, man’s every desire is fulfilled (according to Ps. cii. S, Who satis fieth thy desire with good things) and his every end achieved. This is clear to anyone who considers man’s various desires in the particular. There is a desire in man, as an intellectual being, to knowjhe^jruth, and men pursue this desire by the pursuit of the contemplative life. And this will be most clearly fulfilled in that vision, when the intellect, by gazing on the First Truth, will know all that it naturally desires to know, as we have proved above.^ , . There is also a desire in man as a rational be|ng j:apable of„regulat ing things beneath him, and he pursues this desire in the occupations of the active’and 'dvicTife. The chief object of this desire is that man’s entire life be regulated in accord with reason, namely, that he may live according to virtue; because the end of every virtuous man in all his actions is the good of his own virtue, — that of the brave man, for instance, that he may act bravely. Now this desire will then be wholly fulfilled, because the reason will be in the full flood of its power, being enlightened with the very light of God lest it stray from righteousness. Consequent to his life as a citizen, there are also certain goods that man needs for his civic actions. Such is a position of honor, through inordinate desire of which men become proud aM'ambiHoi^^ by this vision men are raised to the highest position of honor, because, in -a way, they are united to God, as we have proved above.*'^ Hence, even as God Himself is the King of ages, so the Blessed united to Him are said to be kings (Apoc. XX. 6): They shall reign with Christ. ^ . There is another desirable thing consequent to the civic life, and this is ^Origen, Peri Archon, II, 3 (PG ii, 242-243). “Ch. 59. ®Ch. 51. II2 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES to b e well known, through inordinate desire of which men are said to be desirous of vain glory. Now by this vision the Blessed become well known, not in the opinion of men, who can both deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge both of God and of all the Blessed. Hence this happiness is many times described as glory in Holy Scripture, Thus it is said in the Psalm (cxlix. 5): The saints shall rejoice in glory. There is yet another desirable thing in the civic life, and this is riches, through inordinate desire of which men become ilHbeRil and unjust. Now in that happy state there is a sufficiency of all goods, inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy Him Who contains the perfection of all goods. Hence it is said (Wis. vii. ii) : All good things came to me together with her; and again {Ps. cxi. 3) : Glory and wealth shall be in his house. There is a third desire in man, common to him and' other animals, namely the desire for the of pleasu re, and this men pursue especially by leading a voluptuous life, and through lack of moderation become intem- perate and incontinent. Now in that blessedness there is the most perfect pleasure, all the more perfect than the pleasure of sense, which brute ani- mals can enjoy, as the intellect is above the senses; and also as the good, in which we shall delight surpasses all sensible good, is more penetrating, and more continuously delightful; and as that pleasure is freer from all alloy of sorrow, or trouble of anxiety, of which it is said {Ps. xxxv. 9): They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, and Thou shall make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. There is also the natural desire, common to all things, whereby all seek to be preserved in their being, as far as possible; and through lack of mod- eration in this desire, men become timorous, and spare themselves over- much from strenuous work. This desire will be altogether fulfilled when the Blessed obtain perfect immortality, and security from all evil, according to Isa, xlix. 10 and Apoc, xxi. 4 [cf. vii. 16] : They shall no more hunger or thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat. It is therefore evident that intellectual substances by seeing God attain to true beatitude, when their every desire is satisfied, and when there is a sufficiency of all good things, as is required for happiness, according to Aristotle.! Hence Boethius says that happiness is a state of life made per- fect by the accumulation of all goods? In^ this life there is nothing so like this ultimate and perfect happiness as the life of those who contemplate the truth, as far as that is possible in this life. Hence the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of that final beatitude placed man’s ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life.^ For this reason, too. Holy Scripture com- mends the contemplative rather than other forms of life, when our Lord said {Luke x. 42) : Mary hath chosen the better part, namely the contem- '"PiK X, 7 (1177a 24). Consol., Ill, prose 2 (PL 63, 724). ® Cf. Aristotle, X, 7 (1177a 18). THE EXISTENCE OF PROVIDENCE 113 plation of truth, which shall not be taken from her. For the contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come; while the active and civic life does not transcend the limits of this life. CHAPTER LXIV THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE From what has been laid down in the preceding chapters, it has been suf- ficiently proved that God is the end of all things; and from this we may further conclude that by His providence He governs or rules all things. For whenever certain things are ordered to a certain end, they are all subject to the disposal of the one to whom chiefly that end belongs. This may be seen in an army, since all the parts of the army, and their actions, are directed to the good of the general, namely, victory, as their ultimate end; for which reason the government of the whole army belongs to the general. In the same way, that art which is concerned with the end dictates and gives laws to the art which is concerned with things directed to the end: thus, statecraft rules the military art, and this directs the art of horse- manship; and the art of sailing directs the art of ship-building. Since, then, all things are directed to the divine goodness as their last end, as we have shown above, ^ it follows that God to Whom that goodness belongs chiefly as being substantially possessed, understood and loved, must be the gov- ernor of all things. Again. Whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for that end. Now it has been shown above that whatsoever has being in any way is an effect of God,^ and that God makes all things for an end which is Himself.^ Therefore He uses everything by directing it to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore God, by His providence, is the governor of all. Besides. It has been shown that God is the first unmoved moverA Now the first mover moves no less than do second movers; more so, indeed, be- cause without Him they do not move other things. But all things that are moved, are moved for an end, as was shown above.'^ Therefore God moves each thing to its end. Moreover He moves them by His intellect, for it has been proved above that He acts, not by natural necessity, but by intellect and will.^ Now to rule and 'govern by providence is nothing else but to move certain things to their end by one^s intellect. Therefore God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved to their end, whether they be moved corporeally, or spiritually, as the seeker is said to be moved by the object desired. ^Ch. 17. "C. G., IF IS. I, 81; 11 , 23 fl “C. G.. I. 1^. *C. G., I, 13. ^Ch. 2. "C. G, II4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Moreover. It was proved that natural bodies are moved and work towards an end, although they have no knowledge of an end, from the fact that always or nearly always that which is best happens to them, nor would they be made otherwise if they were made by artd Now it is impossible that things without knowledge of an end should act for an end, and attain to that end in an orderly manner, unless they be moved to that end l)y one who has knowledge of the end; just as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer. Therefore the whole operation of nature must be directed by some knowledge. This must be traced back to God mediately or imme- diately; because every subordinate art and knowledge must take its prin- ciples from a higher one, as may be seen in the speculative and practical sciences. Therefore God governs the world by His providence. Further. Things distinct in their nature do not converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yet they all converge into one order, with some things acting on others, and some helping or directing others. TherefQ.re there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe. Moreover. Natural necessity cannot be alleged as the reason for the various phenomena to be observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies; for the movements of some are more numerous than, and wholly different from, the movements of others. Therefore the ordering of their movements must come from some providence, and consequently so must the ordering of all those movements and operations, here below, that are ordered by the movements of the heavens. Besides. The nearer a thing is to its cause the greater share it has in the effect. Therefore if we observe that a thing is the more perfectly shared by certain individuals, according as these are nearer to a certain thing, this is a sign that this thing is the cause of that which is shared in various de- grees; and thus, if certain things are hotter according as they are nearer fire, this shows that fire is the cause of their heat. Now we see that things are all the more perfectly ordered according as they are nearer to God. For in the lower bodies, which are farthest removed from God by imlike- ness of nature, we sometimes find defects from the ordinary course of na- ture, as in monstrosities and in other chance happenings; whereas this never happens in the heavenly bodies, although they are changeable in a certain degree, nor in the separate intellectual substances. Therefore God is the cause of the entire order of things, and consequently He is the gov- ernor of the whole universe by His providence. Further. As we proved above, God brought all things into being, not by natural necessity, but by His intellect and will. Now His intellect and will can have no other ultimate end but His goodness, that is, to bestow His Ch.3. THE EXISTENCE OF PROVIDENCE 115 goodness on things, as was shown above.^ Now things partake of the divine goodness by way of likeness, in being themselves good. But the greatest good in the things made by God is the good consisting in the order of the universe, which is most perfect, as the Philosopher says,^ with whom divine Scripture also agrees {Gen. i. 31): God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good; whereas of each single work it was said simply that they were good. Consequently, that which is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the order of the things of which He is the cause. But to govern things is nothing else but to impose order on them. Therefore God by His intellect and will governs all things. Moreover. Whoever has an end in view cares more for what is nearest to the last end, because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of God’s will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe; because every particular good of this or that thing is ordered to it as to its end, just as the less perfect is ordered to that which is more perfect, even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequently that which God cares for most in created things is the order of the universe; and therefore He governs it. Again. Every created thing attains its ultimate perfection by its proper operation, because a thing’s ultimate end and perfection must be either an operation or the term or effect of an operation (the form, whereby a thing is, is its first perfection, as it is stated in De Anima ii ^). Now the order among effects, according to distinction and grades among natures, issues from divine wisdom, as we showed in the Second Book.^ Therefore, so, too, does the order also among the operations, whereby things approach nearer to their ultimate end. But to direct the actions of things to their end is to govern them. Therefore God, by the providence of His wisdom, governs and rules things. Hence Holy Scripture acclaims God as Lord and King, according to Psalm xcix. 2 : The Lord, He is God, and Psalm xlvi. 8 : God is the King of all the earth; because the king and lord is he whose office it is to rule and govern subjects. Therefore Holy Scripture ascribes the course of events to the divine command {Joh ix. 7) : Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and shutteth up the stars, as it were under a seal] and {Ps. cxlviii. 6 ) : He hath made a decree and it shall not pass away. Hereby is refuted the error of the ancient naturalists, who held that everything happens from the necessity of matter; whence it followed that all things happen by chance, and not by the ordinance of Providence. ^C. G., I, 75ff. ^Metaph., XI, 10 (1075a 12). ^Aristotle, De An., II, i (412a 28). ^C.G.,II,4S- THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES li6 CHAPTER LXV THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN BEING From the fact that God governs things by His providence, it follows that He preserves them in being. For whatever is required in order that certain things obtain their end belongs to the government of those things, because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God, namely, the divine good- ness, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist. For inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine good- ness, which is the end of all .things, as we have proved.^ Therefore it be- longs to divine providence that things be preserved in being. Again. The cause of a thing must needs be the same as the cause of its preservation, because preservation is nothing else than its continued being. Now we have shown above that God is the cause of being for all things by His intellect and will.^ Therefore by His intellect and will He preserves things in being. Besides. No particular univocal agent can be absolutely the cause of its species. Thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But, properly speaking, the individual is the cause of the individual. Now this individual man exists inasmuch as human nature is in this particular matter which is the principle of individuation. There- fore the individual man is not the cause of a man except in so far as he is the cause of the human form being in this particular matter. Now this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is conse- quently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there must needs be some per se active cause of the human species; as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally. The same applies to all other species of natural things. This cause is God, either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown that He is the first cause of all things.'^ Consequently He must stand in relation to the species of things in the same way as in nature the individual generator to generation, of which He is the per se cause. But generation ceases when the generator’s action ceases. Therefore all the species of things would cease, were the divine operation to cease. Therefore by His operation He preserves things in being. ^ Ch. 19. ^ c. G., II, 23ff. ^ C. a, 1, 13 ; 11, 15. THE CONSERVATION OF THINGS BY GOD 117 Moreover. Although moveraent may aiEfect an existing thing, it is some- thing additional to the thing’s being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except in so far as it is moved, because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves.^ Therefore no body is the cause of a thing’s being, as such; but it is the cause of a thing’s being moved towards being, that is, of its becoming. Now the being of a thing is par- ticipated being, since no thing is its own being, save God, as we have proved above." Consequently, God, Who is His own being, must be first and essentially the cause of all being. Accordingly, the divine operation stands in the same relation to the being of things as the movement of a corporeal mover to the being made and the being moved of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore a thing cannot pos- sibly continue to exist except through the divine operation. Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God. For art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature; a house, for instance, by the solidity of the stones. Therefore all natural things continue to exist only by the power of God. Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it become part of the nature of the effect. For the forms of generated things, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, since they become natural to them. In like manner, the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they become part of nature, whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not for always, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand, that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus in no way remains after the action of the agent; and thus light does not re- main in the diaphanous body after the cause of light has been removed. Now being is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the First Book.^ Therefore nothing could continue to remain in being, if the divine operation were to cease. Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God fi’om eternity.^ According to either explanation it is necessary to say that things are preserved in being by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their being as jwell as their non-being must result from the divine will; because He permitted things not to be when ^Phys., VII, 2 (243a 3). " C. G., I, 22 ; 11, 15. « C. G., I, 22. ^ Cf. C. G,, II, 3iff ; De Pot., I, 5 ; III, i ; III, 4-5 ; 5 . T., I, q. 44, a. 2. ii8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES He so willed, and caused them to be when He so willed. Therefore they exist so long as He wills them to exist. Therefore His will is the preserver of things. — If, on the other hand, things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their being is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore He preserves things in being by His operation. Hence it is said {Heh. i. 3): Upholding all things by the word of His power. Augustine, too, says: The power of the Creator, and the strength of the Almighty and All-upholder, is the cause of every creature* s subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from His creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone; whereas the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew His support.'^ Hereby is refuted the position of certain Moslem theologians,- who in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation; as though a thing did not need an active cause except while in the process of being made. — And so some of them are stated to have maintained that the indi- visible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone, according to them, have any permanency, would be able for a time to remain in being, if God were to withdraw His government from things. — Some of these even say that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of ceasing-to-be. — All of which is plainly absurd. CHAPTER LXVI THAT NOTHING GIVES BEING EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY GOD^S POWER It is evident from what has gone before that all inferior agents do not give being except in so far as they act by God’s power. Nothing gives being except in so far as it is a being in act. Now God preserves things in being by His providence, as we have proved.*^ There- fore it is by God’s power that a thing causes being. Again. When several different agents are subordinate to one agent, the effect that proceeds from them in common must needs be ascribed to them in so far as they are unitec^ together in partaking of the movement and power of that agent; for many things do not make up what is one, except in '^De Genesi ad Litt., IV, 12 (PL 34, 304). - Cf, Maimonides, Guide, I, 73 (p. 124). ® Ch. 63. THINGS ACT IN GOD’S POWER 119 so far as they are one. Thus it is clear that all the men in an army work in order to bring about victory; and this effect they bring about. inasmuch as they are subordinate to the general, whose proper effects the victory is. Now it was shown in the First Book that the first agent is God.^ Since, then, being is the effect common to all agents, for every agent makes a thing to be actually, it follows that they produce this effect in so far as they are subordinate to the first agent, and act by its power. Besides. In all ordered active causes, the last thing in the order of gen- eration and the first in the intention is the proper effect of the first cause. Thus the form of a house, which is the proper effect of the builder, comes into being after the cement, stones and timber have prepared the way, which is the work of the subordinate workmen who are subject to the builder. Now in every action actual being is the chief thing intended, and is the last thing in the order of generation; because, when it is obtained, the agent ceases to act, and the passive principle ceases to be acted upon. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first cause, namely God, and whatever gives being does so in so far as it acts by the power of God. Moreover. Among the things that can be reached by the power of a secondary agent, the limit in goodness and perfection is that which comes within its range through the power of the first agent; because the second- ary agent’s power receives its complement from the first agent. Now the most perfect of all effects is being, since every nature and form is perfected through being actually, and is compared to being actually as potency to act itself. Therefore being is what secondary agents produce by the power of the first agent. Besides. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being, for all others are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first agent, and all other agents produce it by the power of the first agent. Furthermore secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the first agent, produce, as their proper effects, the other perfections which determine being. Furthermore. That which is such by its essence is the proper cause of that which is such by participation. Thus fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now God alone is being by His essence, while all other things are beings by participation; for in God alone being is His essence. Therefore the being of every existing thing is His proper effect, so that whatever brings a thing into being does so in so far as it acts by God’s power. Therefore it is said (Wis. i. 14): God created, that all things might he] and in several passages of Holy Scripture it is stated that God makes all things. — Again, in the Book of Causes it is said that not even an intelli- gence gives being except in so jar as it is something divine,^ i.e., in so far as it acts by God’s power. ^ C. G., I, 13. " Dc Causis, I (p. 162). 120 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LXVII THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OPERATING Hence it is clear that in all things that operate God is the cause of their Operating. For everything that operates is in some way a cause of l)eing, either of substantial or of accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God’s power, as has been shown. ^ Therefore everything that operates acts by God’s power. Again. Every operation consequent upon a certain power is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect to cause. Thus the natural movement of heavy and light bodies is consequent upon their form, whereby they are heavy or light; and hence the cause of their movement is said to be the generating agent, which gave them their form. Now all the power of any agent whatsoever is from God as from the first principle of all perfection. Therefore, since all operation is consequent upon some power, it follows that God is the cause of every operation. Moreover. It is clear that every action that cannot continue after the influence of a given agent has ceased is from that agent. Thus, the visi- bility of colors cannot continue after the action of the sun has ceased to illumine the air, and therefore without doubt it is the cause of the visibility of colors. The same applies to violent motion, which ceases when the vio- lence of the impelling force has ceased. Now since God not only gave being to things when they first began to exist, but also causes being in them as long as they exist, by preserving them in being, as we have proved,^ so not only did He give them active powers when He first made them, but is always causing these powers in them. Consequently, if the divine influence were to cease, all operation would come to an end. Therefore every opera- tion of a thing is reduced to Him as to its cause. Besides. Whatever applies an active power to action is said to be the cause of that action; for the craftsman, when he applies the forces of nature to an action, is said to be the cause of that action, — as the cook is the cause of cooking, which is done by fire. Now every application of power to action is chiefly and primarily from God. For active powers are applied to their proper operations by some movement of the body or of the soul. Now the first principle of either movement is God. For He is the first mover, wholly immovable, as we have proved above.^ Likewise every move- ment of the will, whereby certain powers are applied to action, is reduced to God as to the first object of appetite, and to the first willing cause. There- ^Ch.6s. ^C.(?.,I,i3. ' Ch. 66. GOD IS EVERYWHERE 121 fore every operation should be ascribed to God as to its first and principal agent. Further. In all ordered active causes, the causes that follow must always act by the power of the first. Thus, in natural things the lower bodies act by the^ power of the heavenly bodies; and in voluntary things all the subordinate craftsmen act in accordance with the direction of the master craftsman. Now, in the order of active causes, God is the first cause, as we proved in the First Book.^ Consequently all the lower active causes act by His power. But the cause of an action is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which does it; just as the principal agent is more the cause of an action than the instrument. Therefore God is more the cause of every action than even secondary active causes. Further. Every operator is directed through its operation to its ultimate end, since either the operation itself is its last end, or the thing done, namely, the effect of the operation. Now it belongs to God Himself to direct things to their end, as we have proved.^ Therefore we must conclude that every agent acts by the power of God, and consequently it is He who causes the actions of all things. Hence it is said {Isa. xxvi. 12) : Lord^ Thou hast wrought all our works in US] and {Jo. xv. 5) : Without Me you can do nothing] so, too {Philip, ii. 13): It is God. who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. For this reason Holy Scripture often as- cribes natural effects to the divine operation, because it is He Who works in every agent, natural or voluntary, as it is written in Job x. 10, ri: Hast Thou not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews] and again in Psalm xvii. 14: The Lord thundered jrom heaven, and the highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire. CHAPTER LXVIII THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE From this it is evident that God must be everywhere and in all things. For the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as 'the Philoso- pher proves.'^ Now God moves all things to their actions, as we have proved.^ Therefore He is in all things. Again. Whatever is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, is in some way in contact with it ; for a body is located somewhere by contact of dimensive quantity, while an incorporeal thing is said to be somewhere by contact of its power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Accordingly, an incorporeal being stands in relation to being somewhere by its power, as a body to ^Ibid. "Ch. 64. yhys., VII, 2 (243a 3)- "Ch. 67. THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES being somewhere by dimensive quantity. And if there were a body having infinite dimensive quantity, it would of necessity be everywhere. Conse- quently, if there be an incorporeal being with infinite power, it must needs be everywhere. Now we proved in the First Book that God has infinite power.^ Therefore He is everywhere. Besides. As an individual cause is to an individual effect, so a universal cause is to a universal effect. Now the individual cause must needs be present to its proper effect. Thus fire by its substance gives out heat, and the soul by its essence gives life to the body. Since, then, God is the uni- versal cause of all being, as we proved in the Second Book,- it follows that wherever being is to be found,, there also God is present. Furthermore. If an agent be present to but one of its effects, its action cannot extend to other things except through that one, because agent and patient must be simultaneous. Thus the motive power moves the various members of the body not otherwise than through the heart. Consequently, if God were present to but one of His effects, such as the primum mobile^ which is moved by Him immediately, it would follow that His action could not extend to other things except through that first effect. But this is incongruous. For if the action* of an agent cannot extend to other things except through some first effect, the latter must be equal to the agent as regards the agent’s whole power, or else the agent could not use its whole power. And so we see that all the movements which the motive power is able to cause can be performed by the heart. Now there is no creature through which can be done everything that the divine power is capable of doing; for the divine power surpasses infinitely every created thing, as we proved in the First Book.^ Consequently it is incongruous to say that the divine action does not extend to other things except through some first thing. Therefore He is present, not in one effect only, but in all His effects. — For it would amount to the same if someone were to say that He is in some, and not in all; because no matter how many divine effects we take, they will not suffice to carry into effect the execution of the divine power. Moreover. The active cause must needs be joined together with its proxi- mate and immediate effect. Now in each thing there is a proximate and immediate effect of God. For we proved in the Second Book that God alone can create.^ Now in each thing there is something caused by crea- tion: in bodies, there is primary matter; in incorporeal beings there is their simple essence. This is clear from what we have said in the Second BookA Accordingly, God must be present in all things at the same time, especially since those things which He called into being from non-being are continually preserved in being by Him, as we have proved.^’ Therefore it is said {Jer. xxiii. 24): / fill heaven and earth] and {Ps. cxxxviii. 8) : If I ascend into heaven^ Thou art there: if I descend into hell, Thou art present. "C. G., I, 43. "C. G., 11 , 15. «C. G., I, 43^ C..G., n, 21. G., II, THE CAUSALITY OF THINGS 123 Hereby is removed the error of some who said that God is in a definite part of the world, for instance in the first heaven, and in the eastern por- tion, so that He is the principle of the heavenly movement. — Yet this state- ment of theirs might be upheld, if rightly understood; so that the meaning be, not that God is confined to some particular part of the world, but that according to the order of nature all corporeal movement begins in one particular part under the divine motion. For this reason Holy Scripture specially describes God as being in heaven, according to Isa. Ixvi. i : Heaven is My throne j and Ps. cxiii. 16: The heaven of heavens is the Lord/Sj etc. — However, the fact that God works in the lowest bodies some effect outside the ordinary course of nature, which cannot be wrought by the power of a heavenly body, shows clearly that God is immediately pres- ent not only to the heavenly body but also to the lowest things. But we must not think that God is everywhere in such a way as to be distributed throughout local space, with one part of Him here, another there; for God is everywhere wholly, since, being utterly simple, He has no parts. Nor is He simple in the way that a point is simple. For a point is the term of a continuous quantity, and consequently occupies a definite place therein ; so that one point cannot be elsewhere than in one indivisible place. But God is indivisible as existing altogether outside the genus of continu- ous quantity. Consequently He is not necessitated by His essence to a definite place, great or small, as though He needed to be in some place; for He was from eternity before there was any place. Yet by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in a place, because He is the universal cause of being, as we have stated. Accordingly, He is wholly wheresoever He is, because He reaches to all things by His simple power. And yet again we must not think that He is in things as though mingled with them; for we proved in the First Book that He is neither the matter nor the form of anything.^ But He is in all things after the manner of an agent. CHAPTER LXIX CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS This conclusion was an occasion of error to some who thought that no creature has an active part in the production of natural effects; so that, for example, fire would not heat, but God would cause heat at the pres- ence of fire. They maintain the like in the case of all other natural effects.^ They have endeavored to confirm this error with arguments, by show- G.f I, 17, 27. ^Cf. Averroes, In Metaph., IX, comm. 7; XII, comm. 18 (VIII, io9r; 143V). 124 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES ing that no form, whether substanital or accidental, is brought into being except by the way of creation. Because forms and accidents cannot be made out of matter, since matter is not a part of them. Hence, if they be made, they must be made oyt of nothing, and this is to be created. And since creation is the act of God alone, as we proved in the Second Book,^ it would seem to follow that God alone produces both the substantial and accidental forms in nature. The opinion of certain philosophers agreed in part with this position. For, seeing that whatever is not per se must result from that which is per se, it would seem that the forms of things, which do not exist by themselves but in matter, result from forms that are by themselves without matter; which would mean that forms existing in matter were participations of forms that are without matter. For this reason Plato held that the species of sensible things are certain separate Forms, which are causes of being for the things of sense, in so far as these partake of the Forms.- Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms emanate from the agent intellect? But as to accidental forms, he held them to be dispositions of matter, resulting from the action of lower agents disposing the matter; and in this he avoided the absurdity of the previous opinion. A sign of this ap- parently was that no active power can be found in these bodies except an accidental form, active and passive qualities, for instance; and these would not seem capable of causing substantial forms. Moreover in this sublunary world we find certain things that are not generated from their like: animals caused through putrefaction, for in- stance. Therefore, apparently, the forms of these are caused by higher principles. And in like manner other forms, some of which are much more perfect. Some, too, find proof of this in the inadequacy of natural bodies for action. Because the form of every natural body is joined to quantity. Now quantity is an obstacle to action and movement, a sign of which they see in the fact that the more we add to the quantity of a body, the heavier it becomes, and the slower its movement. Whence they conclude that no body is active, but that all bodies are purely passive. They also attempt to prove this from the fact that every patient is recipient to the agent, and that every agent, save the first which creates, requires a subject inferior to itself. But no substance is inferior to a body. Therefore seemingly no body is active. They add also that corporeal substance is the most removed from the first agent, and therefore they do not see how the active power can reach as far as corporeal substance. They maintain, therefore, that, as God is purely active, so corporeal substance, being the lowest thing of all, is purely passive. For these reasons, then, Avicebron held in the Fount of Life that ^C. G., II, 21. "Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., I, 9 (990a 34). ^Metaph., IX, 5 (foL THE CAUSALITY OF THLNGS 125 no bocty is active, but that the power of a spiritual substance pervading through bodies produces the actions which seem to be performed by .bodies.^ Moreover certain Moslem theologians are said to have argued that even accidents are not the result of corporeal activity, because an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Hence they deem it impossible for heat to pass from a hot body into another body so as to heat it. What they say is that all such accidents are created by God.^ However, many absurdities arise from the foregoing positions. For if no inferior cause, above all a body, is active, and if God works alone in all things, then, since God is not changed through working in various things, no diversity will follow among the effects through the diversity of the things in which God works. Now this is evidently false to the senses, for from the application of a hot body there follows, not cooling, but only heating, and from human seed only a man is generated. Therefore the causing of inferior effects is hot to be ascribed to the divine power in such a way as to withdraw the causality of inferior agents. Again. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom that anything should be done in vain in the works of a wise man. But if creatures did nothing at all towards the production of their effects, and God alone wrought every- thing immediately, other things would be employed by Him in vain for the production of those effects. Therefore the above position is incompatible with -divine wisdom. Besides. He who gives something essential, gives whatever accompanies it ; and thus, the cause that gives gravity to an element, gives it downward movement. Now to make something actual results from being actual, as we see to be the case in God; for He is pure act, and is also the first cause of being in all things, as we proved above.^ If therefore He bestowed His like- ness on others in respect of being, in so far as He brought things into being, it follows that He also bestowed on them His likeness in respect of being causes, so that creatures too should have their proper actions. Further. The perfection of the effect indicates the perfection of the cause, since a greater power produces a more perfect effect. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore things created by Him must needs re- ceive perfection from him. Consequently to detract from the creature’s perfection is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature exercises an action for the production of an effect, much is de- tracted from the perfection of the creature; because it is due to the abun- dance of its perfection that a thing is able to communicate to another the perfection that it has. Therefore this opinion detracts from the divine power. Moreover. Just as it belongs to the good to produce a good, so it belongs to the highest good to make a thing best. Now God is the highest good, as '^Fons Vitae^ II, 9 (p. 41) ; III, 44, 45 (p. 177, 179-180). ^ Cf. Maimonides, Guides 1,73 (P. 125). 126 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES we proved in the First Book.^ Therefore it belongs to Him to make all things best. Now it is better that the good bestowed on someone should be common to many than that it should be proper to one: since the com- mon good is always considered more godlike than the good of one only? But the good of one becomes common to many if it flows from the one to the others, and this can be only when the one, by its own action, commu- nicates it to them; but if it has not the power to transmit it to others, that good remains its own property. Accordingly, God communicated His good- ness to His creatures in such wise that, one thing can communicate to another the good it has received. Therefore it is derogatory to the divine goodness to deny to things their proper operations. Again. To take order away from creatures is to deny them the best thing they have, because, though each one is good in itself, together they are very good because of the order of the universe; for the whole is always bet- ter than the parts, and is their end. Now if we take away action from things, the order among things is withdrawn; because things differing in nature are not bound together in the unity of order, except through the fact that some are active and some passive. Therefore it is unfitting to say that things have not their proper actions. Besides. If effects be produced not by the act of creatures but only by the act of God, the power of a created cause cannot possibly be manifested by its effect, since the effect is no indication of the cause’s power, except by reason of the action which proceeds from the power and terminates in the effect. Now the nature of a cause is not known from its effect except in so far as this is an indication of its power which results from its nature. Consequently if creatures have no action for the production of effects, it will follow that the nature of a creature can never be known from its effect: so that all knowledge in the philosophy of nature would be denied us, for it is there that demonstrations from effects are chiefly employed. Further. By induction it can be proved that like produces like. Now that which is produced in lower things is not a mere form, but a composite of matter and form; because every generation is out of something, namely, matter j and to something, namely, form. Therefore the generating cause must be, not a mere form, but composed of matter and form. Therefore the cause of forms which exist in matter is not the separate species of things, as the Platonists maintained, nor the agent intellect, as Avicenna said, but an individual composed of matter and form. Again. If action is consequent upon being actual, it is unreasonable that the more perfect act be deprived of action. Now the substantial form is a more perfect act than the accidental. Consequently, if the accidental forms in corporeal things have their proper actions, much more has the substan- tial form an operation proper to it. But this action does not consist in disposing matter, because this is effected by alteration, for which acci- ^ C. G.j I, 41. ^Aristotle, Eth., I, 2 (1094b 9). THE CAUSALITY OF THINGS 127 dental forms suffice. .Therefore the substantial form of the generating cause is the principle of the action whereby the substantial form is intro- duced into the thing generated. The arguments they adduce are easily solved. For since a thing is made that it may be, just as a form is called a being, not as though it itself had being, but because by it the composite is, so neither is the form made, properly speaking, but it begins to be through the fact that the composite is brought from potentiality to the act which is the form. Nor is it necessary that whatever has a form by way of participation receive it from that which is a form essentially; for it may receive it im- mediately from something having a like form in a like manner, namely, by participation (though it may act in the power of that separate form, if there be any such) ; and thus like agent produces like effect. Nor does it follow, because every action of inferior bodies is effected through active or passive qualities, which are accidents, that nothing, save accidents, results from those actions; for even as those accidental forms are caused by the substantial form, which together with matter is the cause of all the proper accidents, so do they act by virtue of the substantial form. Now that which acts by virtue of another produces an effect like not only to itself, but also, and more, to that by virtue of which it acts. Thus the action of the instrument reproduces in the work done the likeness of the art. Hence the action of accidental forms produces substantial forms, inas- much as they act instrumentally in the power of substantial forms. As to animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused in them through the agency of a body, namely, a heavenly body, and that is the first principle of alteration; consequently in this lower sphere whatever acts dispositively to a form must act by virtue of that body. That is why the power of the heavenly body suffices, without an univocal agent, for the production of certain imperfect forms; whereas for the production of more perfect forms, such as the souls of perfect animals, a univocal agent is required besides the celestial agent. For such animals are not produced otherwise than by seed, and hence Aristotle says that man and the sun generate man} Again, it is untrue that quantity is an obstacle to a form’s activity, except accidentally, namely, in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter. Now a form which exists in matter, through being less actual, has less active power; so that the body which has less matter and more form, fire, for instance, is more active. But if we suppose the measure of action of which a form existing in matter is capable, then quantity favors an increase rather than a decrease of action. For the greater the fiery body, supposing the heat to be equally intense, the more heat does it give; and supposing an equally intense gravity, the greater a heavy body is, the more rapid will be ^ Phys ., 11, 2 (194b 14). 128 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES its natural movement, and for the same reason the slower will its non- natural movement be. Accordingly, the fact that heavy bodies are slower in their non-natural movements, through being of greater quantity, is no proof that quantity is an obstacle to action, but rather that it is a help to its increase. Again, it does not follow that all bodies must be without action, because, in the order of things, corporeal substance is of the lowest kind; since even among bodies one is higher, more formal and more active than another, as fire in comparison with lower bodies, and yet not even the lowest body is excluded from activity. For it is clear that a body cannot be wholly active, since it is composed of matter, which is being potentially, and form which is act. For a thing acts according as it is actual, and therefore every body acts according to its form, to which the other body, namely, the recipient, is compared, according to its matter, as subject, inasmuch as its matter is in potentiality to the form of the agent. If, on the other hand, the matter of the active body be in potentiality to the form of the passive body, they will be mutually agent and recipient, as in the case of two elementary bodies; or else, one will be purely active and the other purely passive in relation to it, as a heavenly body compared to the elementary body. Ac- cordingly, a body acts on a subject, not by reason of its entirety, but by reason of the form by which it works. Nor is it true that bodies are most removed from God. For as God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him according as they are more or less in act or potentiality. Hence, of all things that is most distant from God which is pure potentiality, namely, primary matter, which is therefore purely passive and in no way active. On the other hand, bodies, being composed of matter and form, approach to a likeness to God inas- much as they have a form, which Aristotle calls a divine tiling;^ and there- fore they act inasmuch as they have a form, and are passive inasmuch as they have matter. Again, it is absurd to say that a body is not active because accidents do not pass from one subject to another. For when we say that a hot body gives heat, we do not mean that the identical heat which is in the heater passes into the heated body; but that by virtue of the heat in the heater, another heat, individually distinct, which previously had been in it poten- tially, becomes actual in the heated body. For the natural agent does not transmit its own form into another subject, but reduces the receptive sub- ject from potentiality to act. Consequently, we do not deny creatures their proper actions, although we ascribe all the effects of creatures to God, as operating in all things. ^Phys., I, 9 (192a 16). GOD AND NATURAL AGENTS 129 CHAPTER LXX HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT Some find it difficult to understand how the effects of nature are ascribed to God and to the natural agent. For it would seem impossible that one action should proceed from two agents. Hence if the action productive of a natural effect proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God. Again. If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is super- fluous to do it by means of several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices. Since, then, the divine power suffices to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ, for the pro- duction of the same effects, the powers of nature also; or, if the forces of nature suffice, it is superfluous for the divine power to work for the same effect. Besides. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Therefore, it seems impossible that God produce the same effects as natural things. However, these arguments offer no difficulty if we consider what has been already said. For two things may be considered in every agent, namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts. Thus fire by its heat makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent de- pends on the power of the higher agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or ap- plies it to action. Thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect, although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently, the action of the lower agent must not only proceed from the lower agent through the agent^s own power, but also through the power of all the higher agents, for it acts by the power of them all. Now just as the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of the effect; because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the power of the supreme agent is found to produce the effects of itself, as though it were the immediate cause, as may be seen in the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. Accord- ingly, just as it is not unreasonable that one action be produced by an agent and by the power of that agent, so is it not unreasonable that the same effect be produced by the inferior agent and by God, and by both immediately, though in a different way. 130 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES It is also evident that there is nothing superfluous if a natural thing produce its proper effect and God also produce it, since a natural thing does not produce it except by God’s power. Nor is it superfluous, if God can produce all natural effects by Himself, that they should be produced by certain other causes; because this is not Swing to the insufficiency of His power, but to the immensity of His good- ness, by which it was His will to communicate His likeness to things not only in the point of their being, but also in the point of their being causes of other things. For it is in these two ways that all creatures in common have the divine likeness bestowed on them, as we proved aboveJ — In this way, too, the beauty of order is made evident in creatures. It is also clear that the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part were effected by God and part by the natural agent ; but the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways, just as the whole of one and the same effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent. CHAPTER LXXI THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS From the foregoing it is also clear that the divine providence, which gov- erns things, does not prevent corruption, defects and evil from being in the world. For the divine government whereby God works among things does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown." Now, a defect may occur in an effect through a defect in the secondary active cause, without there being any defect in the first agent. Thus there may be a defect in the work of a craftsman, who is perfect in his craft, because of some defect in the instrument; even so, a man with a healthy locomotive power may limp, through no fault in the locomotive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly, in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found because of defects in the secondary agents, even though there is no defect in God Himself. Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things unless there were degrees of goodness, so that, namely, there be some things better than others; or else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover, this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and, what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the elimi- ^Ch. 20, 21. "^Ch. 69 fE. PROVIDENCE AND EVIL 131 nation of multitude, since it is because things differ from one another that one is better than another: e.g,, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently, if there were absolute equality among things, there would be but one created good ; which is clearly deroga- tory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness ; and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Therefore the perfection of the uni- verse requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things gov- erned. Therefore it does not belong to the providence of God to exclude from things completely the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility, because that which can fail, at times does fail; and this very failure is evil, as we have proved.^ Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to remove evil entirely from things. Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed according to their mode, for in this consists the justice of the regime. Consequently, even as it would be contrary to the nature of human rule, if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties, — except perhaps for a time, because of some particular urgency, — so it would be contrary to the notion of God^s gov- ernment, if He did not allow creatures to act in accordance with the mode of their respective natures. Now because things thus act according to the mode of their natures, corruption and evil result in things ; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether. Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil, except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above Now it does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good; for thus many goods would be ban- ished from the universe. And so, if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like, a consequence of which is the evil of the burning of combustible things, the good consisting in the generation of fire and its preservation in its species would be done away. Therefore it is not part of the divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things. Further. There are in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils. Thus there would be no patience of the righteous, if there were no ill-will of the persecutors; nor would there be any place for a vindicating justice, were there no crimes; and even in the physical order there would be no generation of one thing, unless there were corruption of another. Consequently, if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by the divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good things. This ought not to be, since good is more ^Ch. 7 - "Ch. 3, 4. 132 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES powerful in goodness than evil is in malice, as was shown above. ^ There- fore evil should not be utterly excluded from things by the divine provi- dence. Again. The good of the whole is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore it belongs to a prudent governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole. Thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground, that the whole house may stand firm. Now if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of the universe would be much dimin- ished, since its beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from the failure of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. Therefore evil should not be excluded from things by the divine providence. Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, are directed to man^s good as their end. But if there were no evils in the world, man’s good would be lessened considerably, both in his knowledge, and in his desire or love of the good. For his knowledge of the good is increased by compari- son with evil, and through suffering evil his desire of doing good is kindled; and thus the sick know best what a great good health is, and they, too, are more keen about it than those who have it. Therefore it does not be- long to the divine providence to exclude evil from the world altogether. Hence it is said {Isa. xlv. 7) : / make peace and create evil; and {Amos iii. 6) : Shall there be evil in the city, which the Lord hath not done? Hereby is refuted the error of those who, through observing the presence of evil in the world, said that there is no God. Thus Boethius introduces a philosopher who asks: If there be a God, whence comes cvil?'^ On the contrary, he should have argued: If there is evil, there is a God. For thei*e would be no evil, if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil; and there would be no such order, if there were no God. Moreover, by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that the divine providence extends to this corruptible world, because they observed that many evils occur in it. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God’s providence, because no de- fects and no evils are to be found in them. So, too, there is also removed an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place under the providence of a good God. The doubt, also, of some is solved, namely, whether evil deeds are from God. For since we proved that every agent produces its action in so far as it acts by the power of God,^ and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions; and since, again, we proved that evil and defect in things ruled by the divine providence result from the condition of the sec- ' Ch. II, 12. ^De Consol., I, prose 4 (PL 63, 625). ®Ch. 66. PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENCY 133 ondary causes, wiiich may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes. But in so far as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God; even as a limp is from the locomotive power in so far as it has movement, but in so far as it has a defect it is from the crooked- ness of the leg. CHAPTER LXXII THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTINGENCY EROM THINGS Just as the divine providence does not altogether banish evil from the world, so neither does it exclude contingency, nor impose necessity on things. For we have already proved that the operation of providence, whereby God operates in the world, does not exclude secondary causes, but is ful- filled by them inasmuch as they act by God’s power J Now certain effects are said to be necessary or contingent in relation to their proximate, not to their remote, causes. Thus, for a plant to bear fruit is a contingent effect because of the proximate cause, which is the power of germination, that can be hindered and fail; although a remote cause, namely the sun, is a cause that acts of necessity. Since, then, among proximate causes there are many that can fail, not all the effects subject to the divine providence will be necessary, but many of them will be contingent. Again. It belongs to the divine providence that the possible degrees of being be fulfilled, as was made evident above Now being is divided into contingent and necessary, and this is an essential division of being. There- fore, if the divine providence excluded all contingency, not all the degrees of being would be preserved. Besides. The nearer things are to God, the more they partake of a like- ness to Him; and the further they are from Him, the more they fail in their likeness to Him. Now those things that are nearest to God are alto- gether immovable. Such are the separate substances which' approach near- est to a likeness to God, Who is utterly immovable. On the other hand, such beings as are nearest to them and are immediately moved by those that are unchangeable retain a certain degree of immobility in that they are always moved in the same way (for instance, the heavenly bodies). Con- seciuently, those beings that come after the foregoing, and are moved by them, are further removed from the divine immobility, so that they are not always moved in the same way; and in this the beauty of order is evident. But every necessary being, as such, never varies. Therefore it would be "Ch. 71. " Ch. 6 off. 134 the SUMMA contra GENTILES incompatible with the divine providence, to which it belongs to establish and preserve order among things, if all things happened of necessity. Moreover. That which is of necessity is always. Now nothing corruptible is always. Therefore, if the divine providence requires all things to be nec- essary, it would follow that nothing in the world is corruptible, and conse- quently neither is anything generable. Hence the whole realm of things subject to generation and corruption would be withdrawn from the world. Now this detracts from the perfection of the universe. Further. In every movement there is some generation and corruption, since in a thing that is moved, something begins to be, and something ceases to be. Consequently, if all generation and corruption were banished, through the elimination of all contingent things, as we have just proved, all move- ment and all movable things would as a result be taken away. Besides. If the power of a substance be weakened, or if it be hindered by a contrary agent, this argues some change in that power. Consequently, if the divine providence does not banish movement from things, it will prevent neither the weakening of their power nor the impediment arising from the resistance of another agent. Now it is because that power is some- times weakened and hindered that nalure does not always work in the same way, but sometimes fails in that which belongs to a thing according to its nature, so that natural effects do not follow of necessity. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to impose necessity on the things governed. Moreover. In things that are fittingly ruled by providence, there should be nothing in vain. Since, therefore, it is evident that some causes are con- tingent, seeing that they can be hindered from producing their effects, it is clearly inconsistent with providence that all things should happen of neces- sity. Therefore the divine providence does not impose necessity on things, by excluding contingency from them altogether. CHAPTER LXXIII THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE LIBERTY OF CHOICE Hence it is also clear that providence does not exclude the liberty of the will. ‘ For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfec- tion of the things governed, whether it be to attain it, or increase it, or preserve it. Therefore whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence^ rather than what is part of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, contingency in causes arises from imperfection and de- ficiency, because by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always produce, unless there be an impediment due either to weakness PROVIDENCE AND LIBERTY OF CHOICE 135 ^ power, or to some extrinsic agency, or to the indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result^ but generally produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand, it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not limited to one effect; indeed, the will has it in its power to produce this or that effect, and consequently is undeter- mined to either. Therefore it belongs to the divine providence to preserve the liberty of the will, more than contingency in natural causes. Moreover. It belongs to the divine providence to use things according to their rnode. But the mode of a thing^s action is in keeping with its form, which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determined, because the will acts through a form appre- hended by the intellect, since it is the apprehended good that moves the will as its object. Now, precisely, the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms. That is why the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to exclude the liberty of the will. Again. The things governed are brought to a fitting end by the govern- ment of providence ; and so Gregory of Nyssa says of the divine providence that it is God’s will from which all existing things receive a fitting end?- Now the last end of every creature is to attain to God’s likeness, as we proved above." It would therefore be inconsistent with the divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God’s likeness in that he acts freely, for we have proved that there is free choice in God.® Therefore providence does not deprive the will of liberty. Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore whatever would deprive things of many goods does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of liberty, many goods would be done away, for no praise would be given to human virtue, since virtue would be as nothing if man did not act freely ; there would be no justice in rewarding or punishing, if man were not free in acting well or ill ; and there would be no prudence in taking counsel, which would be of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore it would be against the nature of providence to deprive the will of liberty. Hence it is said {Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel] and again {ibid,, 18) : Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him. Hereby is removed the opinion of the Stoics who held that all things happen of necessity according' to the order of infallible causes, which order the Greeks called eEptaptxevY].^ ^Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XLIII (PG 40, 792), “Ch. 19. ^ C. G., I, 8S. ^Neinesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXVII (PG 40, 752). 136 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LXXIV THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FORTUNE AND CHANCE It is also evident from what has been said that the divine providence docs not remove from the world fortune and chance. Fortune and chance are said of things that happen seldom. If nothing happened seldom, all things would happen of necessity; because those things that happen more frequently than not differ from necessary things in this alone, that they may possibly fail in a few instances. Now it would be against the nature of the divine providence if all things happened of necessity, as we proved above.^ Therefore it would also be against the na- ture of the divine providence if nothing happened in the world fortuitously and by chance. Again. It would be against the nature of providence if things subject to providence were not to act for an end, since it is the part of providence to direct all things to their end. Furthermore, it would be contrary to the perfection of the universe, were there nothing corruptible, nor any power subject to failure, as we proved above.^ Now it is owing to the fact that an agent acting for the sake of some end fails to attain that end, that certain things happen by chance. Therefore it would be against the nature of providence, and the perfection of the world, if nothing happened by chance. Besides. The number and diversity of causes result from the ordering of divine providence and disposition. Now given a diversity of causes, it must happen sometimes that one concurs with another, so that one is either hindered or assisted in producing its effect. But chance occurrences are due to the concurrence of two or more causes, when some end which was not intended happens from the concurrence of some cause. For instance, the finding of his debtor by one who went to market to buy something hap- pened because the debtor also went to market. Therefore it is not against the divine providence that there be fortuitous and chance happenings in the world. Moreover. That which is not, cannot be the cause of any thing. Therefore a thing must stand in relation to being a cause in the same way as to being. Hence the diversity of order in causes must be in keeping with diversity of order among things. Now it belongs to the perfection of the world that there should be in it not only substances, but also accidents. Because things which have not their ultimate perfection in their substance must needs acquire some perfection by means of accidents, which accidents will be all the more numerous, as the things themselves are more distant from God’s "Ch. 72- ^'Ch. 71. PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENT SINGULARS 137 simplicity. Now if a subject has many accidents, it follows that it is a being accidentally, since subject and accident, or two accidents in one subject, are one and being accidentally: e.g.j a white man^ and a musical white thing. Therefore the perfection of the world requires that there should also be accidental causes. But that which results accidentally from a cause is said to occur by chance or fortuitously. Therefore it is not against the nature of providence that some things happen by chance or fortune. Further. It belongs to the order of the divine providence that there be an order and a gradation among causes. Now the higher a cause is above its effect, the greater its power, so that its causality extends to a greater number of things. But the intention of a natural cause never extends fur- ther than its power, for such an intention would be in vain. Consequently the intention of a particular cause cannot possibly extend to all possible contingencies. Now it is because things happen outside the intention of the agent that things occur by chance or fortuitously. Therefore the order of the divine providence requires the presence of chance and fortune in the world. Hence it is said {Eccles. ix. ii): / saw that ... the race is not to the swift, etc,, but time and chance in all, namely, here below. CHAPTER LXXV THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENTS From what we have proved it is evident that the divine providence reaches to each individual among things subject to generation and corruption. For the only reason for excluding such things from providence would seem to be their contingent nature, and the fact that many of them are chance or fortuitous occurrences; for in this alone do they differ from in- corruptible realities and from the universals of corruptible things, with which it is said that providence is concerned. Now providence is not incon- sistent with contingency, chance and fortune, as neither is it with voluntary action, as we have proved.^ There is no reason, therefore, why providence should not be about such things, even as it is about incorruptibles and uni- versals. Besides. If God^s providence does not extend to these singular things, this is either because He does not know them, or because He is unable or unwilling to care for them. But it cannot be said that God does not know singulars, since we have proved that He has knowledge of them.^ Nor can it be said that God. is unable to care for them, since His power is infinite, ^Ch. 72ff. ^C.G.,1,65. 138 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES as we proved above.^ Nor, again, can it be said that these singulars are incapable of being governed, since we see them to be governed by the ef- forts of reason, a? is evident in man, or by natural instinct, as is evident in bees and many brute animals, which are governed by a kind of natural instinct. Nor, finally, can it be said that God is unwilling to govern them, since His will is the universal cause of all good, and the good of things governed consists chiefly in the order of government. Therefore it cannot be said that God has no care for these singulars. Besides. Every secondary cause, by the mere fact of its being a cause, attains to a likeness to God, as was proved above.“ Now it is to be uni- versally observed that things which are productive have the care of the things they produce; and thus, animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care of the things of which He is the cause. Now He is the cause even of these singulars, as was proved above.'^ Therefore He has care of them. Further. It was proved above that God acts in created things, not from natural necessity, but by His will and intellect.*^ But things that are done by will and intellect are subject to providence, which seems to consist in ruling things by the intellect. Consequently the things done by God are subject to His providence. But it has been proved that God works in all second causes, and that all their effects are to be referred to God as their cause, so that whatever is done in these individuals is His own work.’"’ Con- sequently, these individual things, their movements and operations, are subject to the divine providence. Again. A man’s providence is foolish if he cares not for those things without which the things he cares for cannot be. Now it is clear that if all individuals ceased to exist, their universals would likewise cease. There- fore if God cares only for universals, and neglects these individuals alto- gether, His providence will be foolish and imperfect. If, however, someone say that God cares for these individuals so far as to preserve them in existence, but no further, this is quite impossible, since whatever happens to individuals concerns their preservation or their cor- ruption. Consequently, if God cares for individuals as to their preservation. He cares also for whatever happens to them. Yet someone can say that the mere care of universals suffices for the preservation of individuals in being, since each species is provided with the means of self-preservation for every individual of that species. Thus ani- mals were given organs for taking and digesting food, and horns for self- protection; and the usefulness of these organs does not fail except in a few cases, since that which is of nature produces its effect either always or more frequently. Hence all the individuals could not cease to exist, although some might. "C. G,, II, 22. Ch. 21. “C. 15. * C. G., II, 23f£. “ Ch. 67. PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENT SINGULARS 139 But, according to this way of reasoning, whatever happens to individuals will be subject to providence, even as is their preservation in being; for nothing can happen to the individual member of a species that cannot in some way be referred to the principles of that species. Accordingly, indi- viduals are not more subject to the divine providence as to their preservation in being than they are in other matters. Moreover. The order of things in relation to the end is such that accidents are for the sake of substances, in order that the latter may be perfected by them. And in substances, matter is for the sake of the form, since it is through the form that matter has a participation in the divine goodness, for the sake of which all things were made, as we proved above.^ Hence it is evident that the individual is for the sake of the universal nature. A sign of this is that where the universal nature can be preserved in one indi- vidual, there are not many individuals of one species: e,g., the moon and sun. Now since providence has the ordering of things to their end, it follows that to providence belong both the end and the things directed to the end. Therefore, not only universals, but also individuals, are subject to the divine providence. Again. The difference between speculative and practical knowledge is that speculative knowledge and what is connected with it is perfected in the universal, whereas what pertains to practical knowledge is perfected in the particular. For the end of speculative knowledge is truth, which con- sists first and of its very nature in the immaterial and universal; whereas the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is about individual things. Hence the physician does not heal a universal man, but this particu- lar man, and the whole of medical science is directed to this. Now it is clear that providence belongs to practical knowledge, since it directs things to their end. Therefore God^s providence would be most imperfect if it extended no further than universals and did not reach individuals. Besides. Speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are known better than individuals; and that is why the knowledge of the most universal principles is common to all. Yet the more perfect in speculative knowledge is he who possesses not only a universal, but also a proper, knowledge of things; since he who knows a thing only universally knows it only potentially. For this reason the disciple is led from the universal knowledge of principles to the proper knowledge of conclusions by the teacher, who is possessed of both knowl- edges, just as a thing is brought from potentiality to act by that which is in act. A fortiori, therefore, the more perfect in practical knowledge is he who directs things to actuality not only universally but also in particular. Consequently, the divine providence, being supremely perfect, extends to in- dividuals. "Ch. 17. 140 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Moreover. Since God is the cause of being as being, as we proved above, ^ it follows that His providence must care for being as being, since He gov- erns things inasmuch as He is their cause. Therefore, whatever exists, no matter in what way it exists, is subject to His providence. Now individuals are beings, and more so than universals, because universals do not exist by themselves, but only in individuals. Therefore the divine providence is also concerned about individuals. Further. Creatures are subject to the divine providence as being directed thereby to their end, which is the divine goodness. Therefore participation in the divine goodness by creatures is the work of the divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. There- fore the divine providence must extend also to them. Hence it is said {Matt. x. 29) : Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your F other j etc.; again {Wis. viii. i): She reacheth . . . from end to end mightily , that is, from the highest creatures to the lowest. Moreover, the opinion is refuted of some who said {Ezech. ix. 9): The Lord hath forsaken the earthy and the Lord seeth noty and of those who asserted {Job xxii. 14) : He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven. Hereby is refuted the opinion of some who maintained that the divine providence does not extend to these individual things, — an opinion ascribed by some to Aristotle, although it cannot be gathered from his words. CHAPTER LXXVI THAT god’s providence CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDIATELY Now some have granted that the divine providence reaches to these indi- vidual things, but through certain intermediary causes. For Plato, ac- cording to Gregory of Nyssa,- posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme. God, who cares first and foremost for His own, i.e. spiritual and intellectual beings, and then for the whole world, as regards genera, species and the universal causes, i.e., the heavenly bodies. The sec- ond consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato ascribed to the gods who circulated in the heavens, while Aristotle ascribes the causality of such things to the oblique circle.^ The third providence he places over things per- taining to human life, and he ascribes it to certain demons who dwell in the neighborhood of the earth and, according to him, are in charge of human ^C. G.y II, 15. ^Nemesius, De Nat. Bom., XLIV (PG 40, 793). ^ De Gener., n, 10 (336a 32). THE IMMEDIACY OF PROVIDENCE 141 actions. However, according to Plato, the second and third providence de- pend on the first, because the supreme God appointed those of the second and third class as governors. This opinion accords with the Catholic Faith in so far as it refers uni- versal providence to God as its first author. But it seems contrary to the Faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to the divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down. For God has immediate knowledge of individuals as knowing them, not merely in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the First Book.^ Now it seems incongruous if, knowing individuals, He did not desire their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is the source of all goodness. Consequently, just as He knows individuals im- mediately, so He establishes order among them immediately. Again. The order established by providence in the things governed is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor; just as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one sub- ordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly, supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God; in fact, all perfections proceed from Him into other things in descending order, as we proved above. ^ And the order of things must be in the gov- ernors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual; or else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more, therefore, is the order of individuals under the con- trol of the divine providence. Besides. In things ruled by human providence, it is to be observed that someone is placed at the head, who has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them; while he himself does not devise the order of minor affairs, but leaves this to others lower than himself. Now this is owing to a defect on his part, inasmuch as he is ignorant of the conditions of particular matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of every thing because of the labor and delay required for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God, for He knows all individual things, nor does He require labor or time in order to understand them, since by under- standing Himself, He knows all other things, as we proved above. ^ There- fore He Himself devises the order of all individuals, and consequently His providence extends to all individuals immediately. ^ C. G., I, 65ff. ^ C, G., I, 38ff. ® C. G., I, 46. 142 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Moreover. In human affairs, lesser officials by their own skill devise the ordering of the things committed to their government by the chief gov- ernor. This skill they do not receive from the chief, nor its use, for if they received it from the chief, the ordering would be done by the superior, and they would no longer be devisers of this ordering, but executors. Now from what has been said it is clear that all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intelligent being by the supreme God;^ nor can any intellect under- stand anything except by God's power, even as neither does any agent act except in so far as it acts by God's power. Therefore God Himself cares for all things immediately by His providence, and whoever is said to govern under Him is the executor of His providence. Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower providence, even as the statesman gives rules and laws to the commander in chief of the army, who in turn gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Con- sequently, if there be other providences subordinate to the highest provi- dence of the supreme God, God must give the second and third governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, He gives universal rules and laws or particular. If He gives them universal rules, since universal rules are not always applicable to particular cases, especially in matters that are sub- ject to movement and change, it would be necessary for these governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently, they would exercise judgment on the rules given to them, as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them. Now this is impossible, because such a judgment belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and the dispensation from their observance belong to Him Who made the law. Accordingly, judgment concerning universal rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief ; and this would not be possible unless He concerned Himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, He should be the immediate governor of such things. — If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes imme- diately from the divine providence. Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the ar- rangements made by thei lower governors, as to whether they be fitting or not. Consequently, if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor, it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them; which would be impossible if God did not consider the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore He personally cares for individuals bv Himself. Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by ^Ch. 67. PROVIDENCE AND SECONDARY CAUSES 143 Himself, this is either because He despises them or, as some say,^ lest His dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is absurd. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things, than in oper- ating in them. Consequently, if God works in all things, as was proved above, ^ and if, far from being derogatory to His dignity, on the contrary, this belongs to His all-pervading and supreme power, it is in no way con- temptible in Him, nor does it besmirch His dignity, if His providence ex- tends to these individual things immediately. Further. Every wise man, who uses his power providently, moderates that use in his actions, by directing the purpose and extent of that use ; or else his power would not be subject to his wisdom. Now it is clear from what has been said that the divine power, in its operations, extends to the lowest things.^ Consequently, divine wisdom directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they are to result therefrom, even in the very lowest of things. Therefore God Himself, by His providence, im- mediately plans the ordering of all things. Hence it is said {Rjom. xiii. i): Those that are, are ordained of God] and again {Judith ix. 4): Thou hast done the things of old, and hast de- vised one thing after another, and what thou hast designed hath been done. CHAPTER LXXVII THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES It must be observed that two things are required for providence, an order and an execution of the order. The first is the work of the cognitive power, and so those that are more perfect in knowledge are said to order others. For it belongs to the wise man to order The second is the work of the operative power. Now these two are in inverse proportion to each other. For the ordering is the more perfect according as it extends to the smallest things, whereas the execution of the least things belongs to a* lower power, proportionate to the effect. In God we find the highest perfection as to both, since in Him is the most perfect wisdom for ordering, and the most perfect power for operation. Consequently, He it is Who by His wisdom disposes all things even the very least in their order; but He executes the least or lowest things by means of other inferior powers, through which He operates, as a universal and higher power through an inferior and particular power. It is fitting, therefore, that there should be inferior active powers to execute the divine providence. "Cf. Averroes, In Metaph., XII, comm. 37; 52 (VIII, isov; 158V). ^Ch. 67!?. ^ Ibid. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982a iS)> 144 the SUMMA contra GENTILES Again. It was proved above that the divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes.^ But whatever is effected by the operations of secondary causes is subject to the divine providence, since God directs all individual things by Himself, as was proved above.- Therefore secondary causes execute the divine providence. Besides. The stronger the power of an agent, the further does its opera- tion extend; and thus, the greater the fire, the more distant things docs it heat. But this is not the case with an agent that does not act through an intermediary, because everything on which it acts is close to it. wSincc, then, the power of the divine providence is supreme, it must bring its operation to bear on the most distant things through certain intermediaries. Further. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and various executors of his rule, for the greater the number of his subordinates of various degrees, the more complete and extensive is his dominion shown to be. But no government can compare with the divine in point of dignity. Therefore it is fitting that the execution of the divine providence be com- mitted to agents of various degrees. Moreover. Suitable order is a proof of perfect providence, for order is the proper effect of providence. Now suitable order implies that nothing be allowed to be out of order. Consequently, the perfection of the divine provi- dence requires that it should reduce the excess of certain things over others to a suitable order. Now this is done by allowing those who have less to benefit from the superabundance of others. Since, then, the perfection of the universe requires that some share more abundantly in the divine good- ness, as we proved above, ^ the perfection of the divine providence demands that the execution of the divine government be fulfilled by those beings which have the larger share of divine goodness. Again. The order of causes excels the order of effects, even as the cause excels the effect consequently it is a greater witness to the perfection of providence. Now if there were no intermediary causes to execute the divine providence, there would be no order of causes in the world, but of effects only. Therefore the perfection of the divine providence requires interme- diary causes for its fulfillment. Hence it is written {Ps. cii. 21) : Bless the Lord, all ye His hosts: you ministers of His who do His will; and {Ps. cxlviii. 8) : Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfill His word, ^Ch. 69ff. “Ch. 76. ®C. G., 11, 45. PROVIDENCE AND INTELLECTUAL CREATURES 145 CHAPTER LXXVIII THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREATURES ARE RULED BY GOD Since it belongs to the divine providence that order be preserved in the world, and since suitable order consists in a proportionate descent from the highest to the lowest, it is proper that the divine providence should reach the most distant things according to a certain proportion. This proportion consists in this, that just as the highest creatures are subject to God and governed by Him, so the lower creatures are subject to, and are governed by, the higher. Now of all creatures the highest is the intellectual, as was proved above.^ Therefore, the very nature of the divine providence de- mands that the remaining creatures be ruled by rational creatures. Again. Whatever creature executes the order of the divine providence, does so in so far as it shares in the power of the supreme providence; just as the instrument has no movement except in so far as, through being moved, it shares in the power of the principal agent. Accordingly, those things which have a larger share in the power of the divine providence are the executors of the divine providence in regard to those whose share is smaller. Now intellectual creatures have a greater share in this power than others, because, while providence requires both the disposition of order, which is effected by a cognitive power, and execution, which is the work of the operative power, rational creatures share in both powers, whereas other creatures have only the latter. Therefore, all other creatures are ruled, under the divine providence, by rational creatures. Moreover. To whomsoever God gives a power, it is given in relation to the effect of that power; for then are all things disposed in the best way, when each one is directed to all the goods that it has a natural aptitude to produce. Now the intellectual power by its very nature is a directive and governing power. Hence we see that when they are united in the one sub- ject, the operative power follows the rule of the intellectual power: e.g,, in man the members of the body move at the will's command. The same may also be seen if they be in different subjects; since those men who excel in the operative power need to be directed by those who excel in the intellec- tual po,wer. Therefore the nature of the divine providence requires that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures. Again. Particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers, as may be seen both in art and in nature. Now it is evident that the intellectual power is more universal than any other operative power because it contains universal forms, whereas all operative powers proceed only from (?.,II, 46. 146 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES a form belonging to the operator. Therefore all other creatures must be moved and ruled by intellectual powers. Moreover. In all ordered powers, that one is directive of another which has the better knowledge about the plan to be followed. Thus we may ob- serve in the arts that the art which is concerned with the end (whence is taken the entire plan of the work to be produced) directs and governs the art that is immediately productive of that work: for instance, the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding, and the art which gives the form governs the art which prepares the material. On the other hand, the instru- ments, through having no knowledge of any plan, are governed only. Since, then, intellectual creatures alone are able to know the plan of the ordering of creatures, it belongs to them to rule and govern all other creatures. Further. That which is through itself is the cause of that which is by an- other. Now intellectual creatures alone act through themselves, since they are masters of their own actions through the choice of their wills; whereas other creatures act through natural necessity, as being moved by another. Therefore intellectual creatures by their operations move and rule other creatures. CHAPTER LXXIX THAT LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER Since some intellectual creatures are higher than others, as we have shown, ^ the lower intellectual natures must needs be governed by the higher. Again. The more universal powers move the particular powers, as was already stated.^ But the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as we have proved.^ Therefore they rule the lower intellectual na- tures. Besides. The intellectual power that is nearer to the principle is always found to be the ruler of the intellectual power that is more distant from the principle. This is evident both in the speculative and in the practical sci- ences. For the speculative science that receives its principles of demonstra- tion from another is said to be subalternate to it, and the practical science that is nearer to the end, which is the principle in practical matters, is the master science in comparison with the more distant. Since, then, some in- tellectual substances are nearer to the first principle, namely, God, as we have shown,^ they will be the rulers of the others. ^ Moreover. The higher intellectual substances receive the influence of the divine wisdom more perfectly, since each one receives something according to its mode. Now all things are governed by the divine wisdom, so that ^ C. G., II, 91, 95. "Ch. 78. *C.G.,n, 98. *C. CP., 11 , 95. THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS 147 those which have the greater share of divine wisdom govern those which have the smaller share. Therefore the lower intellectual substances are gov- erned by the higher. Therefore the higher spirits are called both angels j inasmuch as they direct the lower spirits, by annunciation as it were, for angels are so called as being messengers; and minister Sj inasmuch as by their operation they execute, even in corporeal things, the order of the divine providence, be- cause a minister is like an animate instrument, according to the Philoso- pher.^ And so it is said {Ps. ciii. 4) : Who makest thy angels spirits, and thy ministers a burning fire. CHAPTER LXXX THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS TOWARDS ONE ANOTHER Since corporeal beings are governed by spiritual beings, as we have proved,^ and since there is an order among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. Now the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power. But the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body. Therefore the higher intellec- tual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power, and consequently are not united to bodies, whereas the lower intellectual substances have limited powers which depend on certain corporeal instru- ments for their work, and consequently need to be united to bodies. And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposition of things, in that they are acquainted with the plan of the order, even as regards individuals, by receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance, made by God, reaches to the lowest intellectual sub- stances. As it is said (Job xxv. 3) : Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise? On the other hand, the lower in- tellects do not receive this manifestation so perfectly as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of the divine providence left to their exe- cution, but only in a general way; and the lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so, that the human intel- lect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most universal things. Accordingly, the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question. This perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them; just as we have I, 4 (1253b 29). ®Ch. 78. 148 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES said above that the universal knowledge of the disciple is brought to per- fection by means of the specific knowledge of the teacher.^ Hence it is that Dionysius, speaking of the highest intellectual substances which he assigns to the first hierarchy or holy sovereignty , says that they are not sanctified by means of other substances, hut that they are placed by God Himself immediately around Him, and as far as possible close to Ilis immaterial and invisible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemn plate the intelligible models of His works] and by these, he says, the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed? Hence the higher intellects receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge. Now in every disposition of providence, the ordering itself among effects is derived from the form of the agents, since the effect must needs proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. But it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the disposition of providence is the end ; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of the effects. Con- sequently, in the ordination of the intellect the most important thing is that the nature of order be considered in the end] the second thing is that the na- ture of order be considered in the form] while the third thing is that the dis- position itself of the order be known in itself and not in a higher principle. Therefore the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, just as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding; and the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements preparing the way for the form, just as the art of ship- building governs the handiwork of the builders. Consequently, there is a certain order among the intellects which take from God Himself an immediate and perfect knowledge of the order of the divine providence. The first and highest perceive the nature of the provi- dential order in the last end itself which is the divine goodness. Some of them, however, perceive more clearly than others; and these are called Seraphim, i.e,, fiery or setting on fire, because fire is used to designate the intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their fervent and intent activity towards God, and their leading of lower things to God as their end? The second place belongs to those that know perfectly the nature of the providential order in the divine form; and these are called Cherubim, which signifies fullness of knowledge, for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Therefore Dionysius says that their name indi- cates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty? The third grade is of those that contemplate the disposition of divine judgments in itself; and they are called Thrones, because the throne is sig- ^Ch. 75. Caeh Eier., VII, 2 (PG 3, 208). ^ Op. cit., VII, i (PG 3, 205). ^Ibid. THE ORDERING OF THE ANGEL'S 149 nificative of judicial power, according to Ps. ix. 5: Thou hast sat on the throne^ who judgest justice. Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are God-hearers and ready for the obedient fulfillment of all divine undertakings} ^ What has been said, however, must not be understood as though the divine goodness, the divine essence and the divine knowledge of the dispo- sition of things were three distinct things, but in the sense that there is a different consideration of God according to these different attributes. Again. There must be order among even the lower spirits who receive from the higher spirits a perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. Because the higher ones among them are also of a more universal power of understanding, so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes; but those beneath them, from more particular causes, for a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies would be of a higher in- tellect than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly, those spirits that are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God, the supremely universal cause, and particular causes, are themselves between those who are able to consider the nature of the aforesaid order in God Himself and those who need to consider it in particu- lar causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy which, according to him, governs the lowest hierarchy, just as it is governed by the highest.^ Again. Among these intellectual substances also there must be some kind of order, since the universal disposition of providence is distributed, first of all, among many executors. This work belongs to the order of Domina- tionsj because to command what others execute belongs to one having do- minion. Hence Dionysius says that domination signifies a certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection} Secondly, it is distributed by the operator and executor in reference to many effects. This is done by the order of Virtues, whose names, as Dionyi^us says in the same passage, designates a certain strength and virility in carrying out the divine opera- tions, without so much as swerving, through weakness, from the divine movement. Hence ii is evident that the principle of universal operation belongs to this order: so that apparently the movement of the heavenly bodies belongs to this order also, from which as from universal causes par- ticular effects ensue in nature. That is why they are called powers of heaven in Luke xxi. 26, where it is said: The powers of heaven shall be moved. To the same spirits seems to belong the execution of those divine works which are done outside the order of nature. For these are the high- est of God’s ministries, and hence Gregory says that the Virtues are those spirits through which miracles are frequently wrought} And if there be ^Op. cit., VIII, 1 (PG 3, 237). ^Tn Evang., horn. 34 (PL 76, 1251). 150 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES anything else of a universal and prominent nature in the fulfillment of the divine ministry, it is fittingly ascribed to this order. Thirdly, the universal order of providence, once established in its effects, is guarded from confusion by curbing the things which might disturb that order. This belongs to the order of Powers. Therefore Dionysius says in the same place that the name Powers implies a well-established order ^ without confusion j in the dimne undertakings] and so Gregory says that it belongs to this order to check contrary powers?- The lowest of superior intellectual substances are those that receive from God the knowledge of the order of the divine providence as knowable in relation to particular causes. These are placed in immediate authority over human affairs. Of them Dionysius says: This third rank of spirits presides, in consequence, over the human hierarchy? By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes that are sub- ordinated to man and serve for his use, as we have already explained.'^ Among these also there is a certain order. For in human affairs there is a common good, namely, the good of the city or of the nation,’^ and this seems to belong to the order of Principalities. Hence Dionysius says in the same chapter that the name Principality indicates leadership in a sacred order. Hence mention is made {Dan. x. 12-20) of Michael the Prince of the Jews, of a Prince of the Persians, and of a Prince of the Greeks. And thus the government of kingdoms, and the change of supremacy from one nation to another, must belong to the ministry of this order. It would also seem part of their office to instruct those men who are in positions of au- thority in matters pertaining to the administration of their office. There is also a human good, not common to many, but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: e.g., those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like. This belongs to the Archangels, of whom Gregory says that they announce the highest things? Thus we call Gabriel an Archangel, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, which is an article of faith for all. There is also a human good that belongs to each one singly. This per- tains to the order of Angels, of whom Gregory says that they announce minor matters.^ Hence they are called guardian angels according to Ps. xc. 11: He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. Therefore Dionysius says that the Archangels are between the Principali- ties and the Angels, because they have something in common with both: with the Principalities, inasmuch as they lead the lower angels, and rightly so, because in human affairs matters of restricted interest must be regu- lated according to those that are of common interest; and with the Angels, because they announce to the Angels, and through the Angels, to us, for it -^Ihid. ^De Gael. Hier., IX, 2 (PG 3, 260). ^Ch. 71. "Cf. Aristotle, Eih,, I, 2 (1094b 8). ^In Evang., bom. 34 (PL 76, 1250), '^THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS 151 is the duty of the latter to announce to men what concerns each individ- ual} For this reason the lowest order has received as proper the name common to all, because, that is to say, its duty is to announce to us imme- diately. And so the name Archangel is, as it were, composed of both, since Archangel means a Principal Angel, Gregory, however, assigns the ordering of the heavenly spirits differ- ently.- For he places the Principalities among the spirits of the second rank, immediately after the Dominations, and the Virtues among the low- est, above the Archangels. But to one who considers the matter carefully, the difference is but small. For, according to Gregory, the Principalities are not placed over nations but over good spirits, as holding the principal place in the execution of the divine ministry. For, says he, to he principal is to stand in a higher place than others} According to the explanation given above, we said that this belonged to the Virtues. — As for the Virtues, ac- cording to Gregory they are assigned to certain’ particular operations when, in some special case, outside the usual order of things, miracles have to be wrought. In this way they are fittingly numbered among the lowest angels. Both explanations have the authority of the Apostle. For he says {Ephes. i. 20, 21): Setting Him, namely Christ, on his right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion, where it is clear that in the ascending order he places the Powers above the Prin- cipalities, and the Virtues above these, and the Dominations above the last named. This is the order adopted by Dionysius. But speaking of Christ to the Colossians (i. 16) ..he says: Whether thrones or dominations or princi- palities or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him. Here we see that beginning with the Thrones, in a descending order, he places the Dominations under them, beneath these the Principalities, and lower still the Powers. This is the order adopted by Gregory. Mention is made of the Seraphim in Isa. vi. 2, 6 ; of the Cherubim, Ezech. i. 3 ; of the Archangels, in the canonical epistle of Jude (9) : When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, etc.; and of the Angels, in the Psalms, as was already observed. In all ordered powers there is this in common, that the lower all work by the power of the higher. Hence what we have stated as belonging to the order of Seraphim, all the lower angels accomplish by the power of the Seraphim; and the same applies to the other orders. '^De Gael. Bier., IX, 2 (PG 3, 257). ^ In Evang., horn. 34 (PL 76, 1249). (PL 76, 1251). Ibid. 152 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER LXXXI ON THE ORDERING OF MEN TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO OTHER THINGS In compaxison with other intellectual substances, the human soul holds the lowest place, because, as we have already stated,^ when it is first cre- ated it receives the knowledge of the order of the divine providence only in a general way; whereas, in order to acquire a perfect knowledge of that order in the particular, it needs to start from things themselves, in which the order of the divine providence is already established in detail. Conse- quently the human soul needs bodily organs, so as to be able to receive knowledge from corporeal things. But because of the weakness of its intellectual light, it is unable to acquire from things a perfect knowledge of what concerns man without the help of higher spirits; for God so dis- poses that the lower spirits reach perfection through the higher, as we have already proved.- Since, however, man has some share of intellectual light, brute animals, which have none at all, are subject to man according to the order of the divine providence. Hence it is said {Gen. i. 26) : Let ms make man to our own image and likeness, that is to say, inasmuch as he is an intelligent being, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth. Brute animals, though bereft of intellect, yet, since they have some kind of knowledge, are placed by the order of the divine providence above plants and other things devoid of knowledge. Hence it is said {Gen. i, 29-30) : Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth. Among those that are wholly bereft of knowledge, one thing is placed before another according as one is more capable of action than another. For they have no share in the disposition of providence, but only in the execution. And since man has both intellect and sense, and bodily power, these are ordered to one another, according to the disposition of the divine provi- dence, in likeness to the order to be observed in the universe. For bodily power is subject to the powers of sense and intellect, as carrying out their commands; and the sensitive power is subject to the intellectual power, and is controlled by its rule. In the same way, we find order among men. For those who excel in intel- lect are naturally rulers, whereas those who are less intelligent, but strong in body, seem made by nature for service, as Aristotle says in his Politics? ^ Ch. 80. ® Ch. 79. spoilt., I, 5 (1254b 2$). THE ORDERING OF MEN 153 The statement of Solomon (Prov. xi. 29) is in agreement with this: The fool shall serve the wise; as also the words of Exodus (xviii. 21, 22) : Pro- vide out of all the people wise men such as fear God . . . who may fudge the people at all times. And just as in the works of one man there is disorder because the intel- lect is obsequious to the sensual power, while the sensual power, through the indisposition of the body, is drawn to the movement of the body, as is evident in those who limp: so, too, in human government disorder results when a man is set in authority, not because of his excelling in intellect, but because he has usurped the government by bodily force, or because he has been appointed to rule through motives of sensual desire. Nor does Solomon omit to mention this disorder, for he says {Eccles. x. 5, 6) : There is an evil that I have seen under the sun^ as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince; a fool set in high dignity. Now the divine provi- dence is not denied by a disorder of this kind. For it results, by God^s per- mission, from a defect in the lower agents, just as we have said of other evils. ^ Nor is the natural order wholly perverted by such a disorder, for the government of fools is weak, unless it be strengthened by the counsels of the wise. Hence it is said {Prov. xx. 18) : Designs are strengthened by counsels f and wars are to be arranged by governments; and (xxiv. 5, 6): A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety when there are many counsels. And since the counsellor rules him who receives his coun- sel, and, in a sense, governs him, it is said {Prov. xvii. 2) that a wise serv- ant shall rule over foolish sons. It is therefore evident that the divine providence imposes order on all things, and thus the Apostle says truly {Rom. xiii. i ) that the things which are of God are well ordered. CHAPTER LXXXII THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES Just as in intellectual substances some are of higher and some of lower degree, so too in corporeal substances. Now intellectual substances are governed by higher substances, so that the disposition of the divine provi- dence may reach down proportionately to the lowest things, as we have already said.^ Therefore, in like manner, bodies of lower degree are ruled by those of a higher. Again. The higher a body is as regards its place, the more formal it is; and hence it is reasonably the place of a lower body, because form con- ^Ch. 71. "Ch. 78ff.. 154 the SUMMA contra GENTILES tains even as place does. Thus water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. Now the heavenly bodies have a higher place than all others. Therefore they are more formal and consequently more active than all other bodies. Therefore they act on lower bodies, and consequently the latter are ruled by them. Besides. That which in its nature is perfected without contrariety is of more universal power than that which in its nature is not perfected with- out contrariety. For contrariety arises from differences which determine and contract the genus, and therefore in the conception of the intellect, inasmuch as it is universal, the species of contraries are not contrary to one another, since they coexist in the intellect. Now the heavenly bodies are perfected in their respective natures without any contrariety, for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold, whereas lower bodies are not perfected in their respective natures without any contrariety. This is proved by their movements, for there is no contrary to the circular move- ment of the heavenly bodies, so that there can be nothing violent in them; whereas there are movements contrary to that of the lower bodies: c.g., downward movement is contrary to upward movement. Iherefore the heavenly bodies have a more universal power than lower bodies. Now universal powers move particular powers, as we have proved.^ Therefore the heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies. Moreover. We have shown that all other things are ruled by intellectual substances.^ Now the heavenly bodies resemble the intellectual substances more than other bodies do, inasmuch as they are incorruptible. Moreover, they are nearer to them, inasmuch as they are moved by them immediately, as we have shown above. ^ Therefore lower bodies are ruled by them. Further. The first principle of movement must be something unmoved. Consequently, things that approach nearest to immobility must be the movers of others. Now the heavenly bodies approach nearer to the immo- bility of a first principle than do lower bodies, for they have but one species of movement, namely local, whereas other bodies have all manner of move- ments. Therefore the heavenly bodies move and rule the lower bodies. Again, In each genus the first is the cause of that which comes after. Now the movement of the heavens is the first of all movements. First, be- cause local movement precedes all others. — It precedes time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in Physics viii.‘^ It precedes in nature, because without it there could be no other, since a thing cannot be in- creased without a previous alteration, whereby that which was dissimilar is transformed and assimilated; nor can there be alteration without a pre- vious change of place, since in order that there be alteration, the cause of alternation must become nearer to the subject altered than it was before. — And it precedes in perfection, because local movement does not cause a thing to vary in respect of something inherent, but only in respect of some- 78. ®Ch. 80. ^ Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 7 (260b 29). DIVINE GOVERNMENT: CONCLUSION 155 thing extrinsic; and for this reason it belongs to a thing already perfect. Secondly, because, even among local movements, circular movement holds the first place. It is first in time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in Physics viii.^ It is first by nature, because it excels in simplicity and unity, since it is not divided into beginning, middle and end, but is all middle, as it were. And it is first in perfection, because it returns to its principle. Thirdly, because only the movement of the heavens is always regular and uniform, since in the movements of heavy and light bodies the speed increases towards the end if the movement be natural, and decreases if the movement be violent. Therefore the movement of the heavens must be the cause of all other movements. Further. As that which is absolutely immovable is in comparison with movement absolutely, so is that which is immovable in respect of a par- ticular kind of movement, in comparison with that particular movement. Now that which is absolutely immovable is the principle of all movement, as we have proved.^ Therefore that which is immovable in respect of altera- tion is the principle of all alteration. But of all corporeal things the heav- enly bodies alone are unalterable, and this is proved by their disposition, which is always the same. Therefore the body of the heavens is the cause of alteration in all alterable things. But in this lower world alteration is the principle of all movement, because alteration leads to augmentation and generation, and the generator is an essential mover in the local move- ment of heavy and light bodies. Consequently, the heavens must be the cause of all movement in these lower bodies. Therefore it is evident that lower bodies are governed by God by means of the heavenly bodies. CHAPTER LXXXIII CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING From all that has been proved hitherto, we are able to conclude that, as regards the design of the order to be imposed on things, God governs all things by Himself.^ Therefore Gregory, commenting on Job xxxiv. 13 {What other hath He appointed over the earth?) says: He who created the world by Himself governs it by Himself]^ and Boethius says: God rules all things by Himself alone^ As to the execution, however, He gov- erns the lower by means of the higher things: — ^bodily things by means of spiritual things,^ and hence Gregory says: In this visible world nothing ^op. cit,, vm, 8 (261b 27). ^C. G., I, 13. '^Ch. 77. ^ Moral, XXIV, 20 (PL 76, 314). ^De Consol, III, prose 12 (PL 63, 777). Ch. 78. 156 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES can he ruled except by means of the invisible creature] '—the lower spirits by the higher,^ and hence Dionysius says that the intelligent heavenly substances first of all shed forth the divine enlightenment on themselves, and bestow on us manifestations which surpass our capacity]'^-— nuA the lower bodies by the higher,^ and hence Dionysius says that the sun con- tributes to the generation of visible bodies, as also to life itself, by means of nourishment, growth and perfection, by cleansing and renewing themJ^ Of all these together Augustine says: As the grosser and lower bodies arc ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power, so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the sinful rational spirit by the righteous rational spirit!' CHAPTER LXXXIV THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES DO NOT ACT ON OUR INTELLECTS From what has been said it is at once clear that the heavenly bodies can- not be the causes of what belongs to the intellect. For it has already been shown that the order of divine providence requires lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher.'^' Now the intellect, according to the order of nature, surpasses all bodies, as we have already proved;'^ Consequently, the heavenly bodies cannot act directly on the intellect. Therefore they can- not be the direct cause of what belongs to the intellect. Again. No body acts except through movement, as is proved in Physics viii.'^ Now things that are immovable are not caused by movement, because nothing is the result of the movement of an agent except when the agent, while in motion, moves the patient. Consequently, things that are wholly outside movement cannot be caused by the heavenly bodies. But what ])e- longs to the intellect is, properly speaking, wholly outside movement, as the Philosopher states.^'' In fact, the soul becomes prudent and wise through being free from movement, as he says in the same place. It is not possible, therefore, that the heavenly bodies be the direct cause of what belongs to the intellect. Besides. If nothing be caused by a body except in so far as the body causes movement through being moved, it follows that whatever receives an impression from a body must be moved. Now nothing is moved except a body, as is proved in Physics vi.^"'- Therefore whatever receives an impres- sion from a body must be either a body or a bodily power. But it was proved in the Second Book that the intellect is neither a body nor a bodily power Therefore the heavenly bodies cannot directly act on the intellect. ^Dial, IV, 6 (PL 77, 329). "Ch. 79. ^De Gael Hier., IV, 2 (PG 3, iSo). ^ Ch. 82. Div. Nom., IV, 4 (PG 3, 697, 700). ”De Trin., Ill, 4 (PL 42, 873). "Ch. 78fl «C. G., II, 49ff- ‘'Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 6 (2S9b 7). Op. cit., VII, 3 (247b i) . Op. cit., VI, 4 (234b lo) . “ C. G., II, 49ff. MAN^S INTELLECT AND HEAVENLY BODIES 157 Further. Whatever is moved by a thing is reduced by it from poten- tiality to act. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something intact. Therefore every agent and mover must be, in some way, in act with regard to those things to which the passive or moved subject is in potentiality. But the heavenly bodies are not actually intelligible because they are singular sensibles. Since, then, our intellect is not in poten- tiality except to what is actually intelligible, it is impossible for the heav- enly bodies to act directly on the intellect. Moreover. A thing’s proper operation follows its nature, which generated things acquire by generation, together with their proper operation. This may be seen in heavy and light things, which have their proper movement as soon as they are generated, unless there be an obstacle; and for this reason the generator is said to be a mover. Consequently, that which, as regards the cause of its nature, is not subject to the action of the heavenly bodies, cannot be subject to them in respect of its operation. Now the intel- lectual part of man is not caused by any bodily principles, but is entirely from an extrinsic source, as we proved above.^ Therefore the operation of the intellect is not directly subject to the heavenly bodies. Again. Things caused by the heavenly movements are subject to time, which is the measure of the first heavenly movement? Therefore those things that wholly abstract from time are not subject to heavenly move- ments. Now the intellect in its operation abstracts from time, as also from place; for it considers the universal which abstracts from here and now. Hence the operation of the intellect is not subject to heavenly movements. Further. Nothing acts outside its species. Now the act of understanding transcends the species and form of any corporeal agent, since every cor- poreal form is material and individuated ; whereas the act of understanding is informed by its object which is universal and immaterial. Consequently, no body can understand by means of its corporeal form. Much less, therefore, can any body whatsoever cause in another the act of understanding. Besides. A thing is not subject to that which is beneath it in respect of that by which it is united to things above it. Now our soul, inasmuch as it is intelligent, is united to intellectual substances, which in the order of nature are above heavenly bodies; because our soul cannot understand except in so far as it derives its intellectual light from those substances. Therefore the intellectual operation cannot be directly subject to the heav- enly movements. Moreover. We shall find a confirmation of this if we consider what phi- losophers have said in the matter. The natural philosophers of old, e.g,, Democritus, Empedocles and others, held that intellect does not differ from sense, as is stated in Metaph. iv^ and De Anima iii.^ Hence it followed that, as sense is a corporeal power resultiiig from a corporeal transmuta- ’ C. G., 11 , 86 ff. ’'Aristotle, Phys., IV, 14 (223b 17)* ® Aristotle, Metaph., IV, 5 (xoo9b 13). ‘‘Aristotle, De An., Ill, 3 (427a 21). 158 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES tion, so likewise was the intellect. Therefore they said, as the transmutation of the lower bodies follows transmutation of the higher bodies, that intel- lectual operation follows the movements of the heavenly bodies. In the words of Homer: The intellect of gods and men on earth is even as their dajf which comes from the father of men and godsf^ — namely, the sun, or rather Jupiter, whom they called the supreme god, understanding by this the whole heavens, as Augustine says.^ Hence, too, followed the opinion of the Stoics who said that intellectual knowledge is caused by images of bodies being imprinted on the mind, just as a mirror, or a page, receives the imprinted characters without any action on its part, as Boethius relates.^ According to this opinion, it fol- lowed that our intellectual notions were chiefly the result of impressions received from heavenly bodies; and consequently it was chiefly the Stoics who held that man’s life was bound by a kind of fatal necessity. — This opinion, however, is shown to be false, as Boethius says in the same refer- ence, by the fact that the intellect is capable of composing and dividing, compares the highest with the lowest, and knows universal and simple forms, — none of which is within the capacity of bodies. Consequently, it is evident that the intellect does not merely receive the images of bodies, but is possessed of a power that transcends bodies; for the external senses, which receive only images of bodies, do not extend to the things mentioned above. All subsequent philosophers, however, distinguished intellect from sense, and assigned, not bodies, but immaterial things as the cause of our knowl- edge. Thus Plato ascribed this to the Forms and Aristotle to the agent intellect. From all this we may gather that to say that the heavenly bodies are the cause of our knowledge is a sequel to the opinion of those who held that intellect does not differ from sense, as Aristotle also observes.'^ Now it is evident that this opinion is false. Therefore, manifestly false is like- wise the opinion of those who maintained that the heavenly bodies are the direct cause of our knowledge. For this reason Holy Scripture assigns as the cause of our knowledge, not a body, but God {Job xxxv. lo, ii) : Where is God who made me; who hath given songs in the night; who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air? Again {Ps. xciii. lo) : He that teacheth man knowledge. Nevertheless, we must observe that, although the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of our knowledge, they can contribute something indi- rectly towards it. For though the intellect is not a power of the body, yet in us the operation of the intellect cannot be exercised without the opera- tion of bodily powers, namely, the imagination, the memory and the cogita- ^ Odyssey, XVIII, 136^. • ^ De Civit. Dei, IV, ii (PL 41, 121). “De Consol., V, verse 4 (PL 63, 850). ^De An., Ill, 3 (427a 21). FREE CHOICE AND HEAVENLY BODIES 159 tive power, as we have already shown.^ Hence it is that when the activity of these powers is hampered by some bodily indisposition, the activity of the intellect is also hampered, as may be seen in cases of frenzy, lethargy and the like. For the same reason, goodness of disposition in a man's body fits him to understand easily, inasmuch as these bodily powers are strength- ened by such a disposition. Therefore it is said in De Anima ii, that It is to be observed that men of soft flesh are of quick intelligence? Now the disposition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movements. For Augustine says that it is not altogether absurd to ascribe the mere differ- ences between bodies to the influence of the stars and Damascene says that the various planets produce in us various temperaments j habits and dispositions? Consequently, the heavenly bodies contribute indirectly to the goodness of our understanding. Thus, even as physicians are able to judge of a man's intellect from his bodily temperament, as a proximate disposition thereto, so too can an astrologer, from the heavenly movements, as being a remote cause of this disposition. In this sense we can approve of the saying of Ptolemy: When Mercury is in one of Saturn^ s regions at the time of a man^s birth j and he is waxing j he bestows on him a quick in- telligence of the inner nature of things? CHAPTER LXXXV THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR WILLING AND CHOOSING It is also evident from the foregoing that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing. For the will is in the intellectual part of the soul, according to the Phi- losopher.^ Therefore, if the heavenly bodies cannot make a direct impres- sion on bur intellect, as we have proved,'^ neither will they be able to influ- ence the will directly. Moreover. All choice and actual willing in us is caused immediately through an intellectual apprehension, for the apprehended good is the ob- ject of the will.^ Therefore there cannot ensue perverseness of choice, un- less the judgment of the intellect err in the particular object of choice, as the Philosopher states.^ But the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our intellectual apprehension. Therefore neither can they be the cause of our choice. Further. Whatever takes place in this lower world, through the influence G., II, 68. ® Aristotle, De An., II, 9 (421a 26). ^ De Civit. Dei, V, 6 (PL 41, 146). ^De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893). ® Ptolemy, Centiloquium, verbum 38. ^De An., Ill, 9 (432b 6). '^Ch. 84. ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433a 16). ^ Eth., VII, 3 (1147a i). i6o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES of heavenly bodies, happens naturally, since the things here below are natu- rally subordinate to them. If, therefore, the heavenly bodies have any influ- ence on our choice, this must happen naturally; so that, in fact, man natu- rally chooses to perform his actions, even as brute animals perform theirs from natural instinct, and as inanimate bodies are moved naturally. Con- sequently, there not be two active principles, namely, the free and the natural, but only one, namely, nature. But Aristotle proves the contrary.^ Therefore it is untrue that the influence of the heavenly bodies is the cause of our choice. Besides. Things that happen naturally are brought to their end by deter- minate means. Hence they always happen in the same way, for nature is determined to uniformity. But man’s choice tends to the end in various ways, both in morals and in things made by art. Therefore man’s choosing does not come from nature. Again. Things which are done naturally, for the most part are done rightly, since nature fails but seldom. Consequently, if man chose by na- ture, his choice would be right for the most part; which is clearly false. Therefore man does not choose naturally, although this would be the case if his choice were subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies. Further. Things of the same species do not differ in those natural opera- tions which result from the specific nature. Hence each swallow makes its nest in the same way, and every man equally understands the first prin- ciples which are known naturally. Now choosing is an operation that re- sults from the human species. Consequently, if man chose naturally, all men would choose in the same way; and this is evidently untrue, both in morals and in things made by art. Moreover. Virtue and vice are proper principles of choice, because the virtuous and the vicious man differ through choosing contraries. Now political virtues and vices are not in us by nature but by habituation. The Philosopher proves this from the fact that we acquire the habit of those pperations to which we are accustomed, especially from childhood.- Our choosing therefore does not come from nature, and consequently, it is not caused by the influence of the heavenly bodies, whose effects happen naturally. Again. The heavenly bodies make no direct impression except on bodies, as we have shown.'"^ Consequently, if they are the cause of our choosing, this will be by an impression made either on our bodies or on external bodies. Yet in neither way can they be a sufficient cause of our choosing. For the objective presentation of some corporeal thing cannot be the suf- ficient cause of our choice, since it is clear that when a man meets with something that pleases him, be it meat or woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose these things, whereas the intemperate is. Again, no possible change wrought in our bodies by an impression of the heavenly '^Phys., n, 5 (196b 16). II, i (1103a 19). ''‘Ch. 84. FREE. CHOICE AND HEAVENLY BODIES i6i bodies can suffice to cause us to make a choice. For all that results there- from are certain passions, more or less violent, and passions, however vio- lent, are not a sufficient cause of choosing, since the same passions lead the incontinent to follow them by choice, and fail to induce the continent man. Therefore it cannot be said that the heavenly bodies cause our choice. Further. No power is bestowed on a being without a purpose. Now man has the power of judging and of taking counsel about all matters relative to his own actions, whether in the use of externals, or in giving a loose or a tight rein to his internal passions. But this would be of no use, if our choice were the result of the heavenly bodies and not in our own power. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our choice. Besides. Man is naturally a political or social animal} This is evident from the fact that one man does not suffice for himself if he live alone, because the things are few wherein nature makes adequate provision for man, since she gave him his reason by means of which he might provide himself with all necessaries of life, such as food, clothes and so forth, for the production of which one man is not enough. Therefore man has a natural inclination to live in society. Now the order of providence does not deprive a thing of what is natural to it; rather is each thing provided for according to its nature, as we have said above.^ Therefore man is not so made by the order of providence as to be deprived of social life. Yet he would be deprived of it, were our choice to proceed from the influence of the heavenly bodies, like the natural instinct of other animals. Moreover. Laws and precepts of conduct would be useless were man not the master of his own choice; and useless, too, would be punishments and rewards for the good and the wicked, if it were not in our power to choose this or that. And yet, if there were not such things, there would be at once an end to society. Consequently, man is not so made according to the order of providence that his choice should result from the movements of the heavenly bodies. Again. A man’s choice is of good and evil things. Hence, if our choosing were the result of the movements of the stars, it would follow that the stars are the essential cause of wicked deeds. But that which is evil has no natu- ral cause, since evil results from a defect in a cause, and has no essential cause, as we have proved.^ Therefore it is impossible that our choice be the direct and essential effect of the heavenly bodies. Someone, however, might endeavor to meet this argument by saying that every evil choice results from the desire of some particular good, as we have proved above. ^ Thus the choice of the lustful man arises from his desire for a good consisting in sexual pleasure ; and some star causes move- ment to this general good. In fact, this is necessary for the generating of animals; and this common good was not to be omitted because of the ^Aristotle, I, 7 (1097b ii)' ^Ch. 71. * Ch. 4ff. ^ Ch. s and 6. 162 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES particular evil of an individual who, through this instigation, chooses an evil. But this reply is not sufficient if we suppose the heavenly bodies to be the essential cause of our choice by making direct impressions on our intel- lect and will. For the impression made by a universal cause is received in a thing according to that thing’s mode. Consequently, the effect of a star, which causes a movement towards pleasure connected in an ordinate man- ner with generation, will be received into a thing according to the mode proper thereto. Thus we see that various animals have various ways and various times of coming together, as becomes their nature, as Aristotle remarks.^ Hence the intellect and will receive the impression of that star according to their mode. Now when a thing is desired according to the mode of the intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice, which is always evil through not being according to right reason. Therefore if the heavenly bodies were the cause of our choice, we should never make an evil choice. Further. No active power extends to things above the species and nature of the agent, because every agent acts through its form. Now, to will, as also to understand, transcends every corporeal species; for just as our intel- lect understands the universal, so our will tends to the universal: e.g., we dislike every kind of thief, as the Philosopher says.- Therefore the act of the will is not caused by a heavenly body. Besides. Things directed to an end are proportioned to that end. Now, our choice is directed to happiness as to the last end. And this does not consist in bodily goods, but in the union of our soul, through the intellect, with divine things. This was proved above to be the case both according to the teaching of Faith and according to the teaching of the philoso- phers.^ Therefore the heavenly bodies cannot be the cause of our choice. Hence it is said (Jer. x. 2, ^): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven which the heathens fear; for the laws of people are vain. Thus is refuted the opinion of the Stoics,'^ who held that all our actions, even our every choice, are governed by the heavenly bodies.— This is also said to have been the opinion of the Pharisees among the Jews of old.^^— And the Priscillianists were also guilty of this error, as is stated in De Haeresibus,^ This was also the opinion of the ancient physicists, who held that intel- lect does not differ from sense.’^ Therefore Empedocles, as quoted by Aris- totle, said that the will of mafi, like that of other animals , is strengthened presently, i.e., according to the present moment, by the movement of the heavens which is the cause of time. We must observe, however, that although the heavenly bodies are not the Fwi. V, 8 (542a i). II, 4 (1382a 6) . ^ Ch 25ff Cf ch. 84. ^ Josephus, Antiquities, XIII, 5, 9 (VII, 3x0, 3x2). « St. Augustine, De Haeres., 70 (PL 42, 44)- ^ Cf. ch. 84. ^ De An,, III, 3 (427a 22). THE HEAVENLY BODIES AND CONTINGENCY 163 direct cause of our choosing, by making a direct impression on our will, nevertheless indirectly they do occasion our choice, through making an impression on bodies. This happens in two ways. First, the impression made by a heavenly body on bodies other than our own may be an occa- sion of our making a particular choice. Thus, when through the action of the heavenly bodies the air becomes intensely cold, we choose to warm ourselves by the fire, or to do something similarly befitting the moment. Secondly, they may make impressions on our own body. Now when the body is affected, movements of the passions arise, either because such im- pressions make us liable to certain passions (for instance, the bilious are prone to anger), or because they produce in us a bodily disposition that occasions a particular choice (thus, when we are ill, we choose to' take medicine). — Sometimes, too, the heavenly bodies are a cause of human acts, when through an indisposition of the body a person goes out of his mind, and loses the use of reason. Such persons are not capable of choos- ing, properly speaking, but they are moved by a natural instinct, like brute animals. It is evident, however, and we know by experience, that such occasions, whether exterior or interior, are not a necessary cause of choice ; since man can use his reason to reject or obey them. But those who follow their natural bent are in the majority, and few, namely, the wise alone, are those who avoid the occasions of ill-doing and who follow not the impulse of nature. Hence Ptolemy says that the soul of the wise man assists the work of the stars and that the astrologer cannot read the stars unless, he knows well the bent of the mind and the natural temperament \ and that the astrologer should not express himself in detail hut only in general terms?’ For the majority do not resist their bodily disposition, and so the impression of the stars takes effect in them; but not always in this or that individual who, it may happen, uses his reason to resist that inclination. CHAPTER LXXXVI THAT CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN THIS LOWER WORLD DO NOT RESULT OF NECESSITY FROM THE ACTION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES Not only are the heavenly bodies unable to necessitate man’s choice, but even corporeal effects do not proceed from them of necessity. For the impressions of universal causes are received by their effects according to the mode of the recipient. Now the things of this lower world are fluctuating and changeable, both by reason of matter, which is in po- ^Ptolemy, Centiloquiwnf verbum 8. ^ Op, cit,, verbum i. THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 164 tentiality to several forms, and because of the contrariety of forms and powers. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies are not received with necessity by these lower bodies. Again. A remote cause does not lead to a necessary result, unless the middle cause be also necessary. In a syllogism, for instance, if the major premise be a necessary proposition, and the minor a contingent proposi- tion, the conclusion that follows is not necessary. Now the heavenly bodies are remote causes, and the proximate causes of the effects here below are the active and passive powers in the bodies of this lower world; and these are not necessary, but contingent, causes, for they can fail in a few in- stances. Therefore the heavenly bodies do not produce necessary effects in these lower bodies. Besides. The heavenly bodies are always moved in the same way. Con- sequently, if the heavenly bodies produced a necessary effect on these lower bodies, there would be no variety in the things that happen in this world. Now, they are not always the same, but only for the most part. Therefore they do not happen necessarily. Moreover. Many contingents do not make one necessary thing, since, just as each one of them by itself may fail in its effect, so too may all of them together. Now it is evident that in these lower bodies each thing that happens through the influence of the heavenly bodies is contingent. There- fore the things that happen here below through the influence of heavenly bodies are not necessarily connected with necessity, since it is evident that each one of them may be hindered. Further. The heavenly bodies are natural agents and therefore require matter on which to act. Consequently, their action does not remove what is required by matter. Now the matter on which the heavenly bodies act is the bodies of this lower world. And since these are by nature corruptible, they can fail in action just as they can fail in being, so that their nature requires that they should produce their effects without necessity. There- fore the effects of the heavenly bodies on the bodies of this lower world do not result of necessity. Perhaps someone will say that the effects of the heavenly bodies must necessarily follow, and yet potentiality is not therefore removed from this lower world, because each effect is in potentiality before it comes into being, and is then said to be possible; but when it is in act, it passes from potentiality to necessity. The whole of this process is subject to the heav- enly movements, and consequently a given effect is not prevented from being at some time possible, although it is necessary that it be at length produced. In fact, Albumasar tries to defend the possible along these lines in the First Book of his Introductorium. But the possible cannot be defended in this way. For there is one kind of possible which follows from that which is necessary. Because that which must be necessarily, is possible; since what cannot possibly be, is impos- THE HEAVENLY BODIES AND CONTINGENCY 165 sible, and that which is impossible, necessarily is not. Consequently [if what is necessary is not possible] what must necessarily be, must neces- sarily not be: which is impossible. Hence it is impossible that the same thing should be necessarily, and yet that at the same time it should be impossible for it to be. Therefore the possible follows from the necessary. But it is not this kind of possible that we need defend against the con- tention that effects result of necessity; we must rather defend the possible which is contrary to the necessary , in the sense in which we say that that is possible which can be and not be. Now a thing is not said to be possible or contingent merely because it is at one time potential and at another time actual, as the foregoing reply supposes; since thus, even in the heavenly movements there is possibility and contingency. For the sun and moon are not always actually in conjunction or opposition, but sometimes actually and sometimes potentially: and yet these are necessary phenomena, since such matters are subject to demonstration. But the possible or contingent that is contrary to the necessary is of such a nature that there is no neces- sity for it to be, when it is not. And the reason for this is that it does not follow necessarily from its cause. Thus we say that it is contingent that Socrates will sit, whereas it is necessary that he will die, because the latter results from its cause necessarily, but not the former. Consequently, if it follows necessarily from the movements of the heavenly bodies that their effects will result at some time, there will be nothing possible or contingent contrary to that which is necessary. We must observe, however, that Avicenna, having a mind to prove that the effects of the heavenly bodies result of necessity, offers the following argument.^ If an effect of the heavenly bodies is hindered, this must be due to some cause either voluntary or natural. Now every cause, whether voluntary or natural, is reducible to some heavenly principle. Therefore even the impediment to the heavenly bodies’ effect results from some heav- enly principles. Consequently, if we take the whole heavenly order at once, it is impossible for its effect ever to fail. Whence he concludes that the heav- enly bodies must necessarily produce effects in this lower world, both vol- untary and natural. This argument, as Aristotle observes,^ was employed by some of the ancierits who denied the existence of chance and fortune, for the reason that every effect has its determinate cause, and that given the cause the effect follows of necessity; so that, since everything happens necessarily, nothing can be referred to chance and fortune. He solves this argument by denying the two propositions on which it is based.^ One is that given any cause whatsoever ^ the effect must follow of necessity. For this is not true of every cause, since even the essential, proper and sufficient cause of a certain effect may be hindered through the '^Metaph., X, i (fol. loSra). ‘"^Phys , 11, 4 (iQSb 36). ® Aristotle, Metaph,, V, 3 (1027a 8). i66 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES entrance of another cause, so that it fails to produce that effect. — The other proposition which Aristotle denies is that not everything that exists in any way whatever has a per se cause, but only that which exists per se,‘ and things which exist accidentally have no cause at all. For instance, that a man be musical is to be ascribed to a cause, but that he be musical as well as white is not due to any cause. Because whatever things concur because of some cause are mutually related by reason of that cause; whereas accidental things are not mutually related, and consequently 'they are not the result of a per se active cause, but are merely an accidental result. Thus it is accidental to the teacher of music that his pupil be a white man, since it is outside his intention, for his intention is to teach one who is recep- tive of instruction. Accordingly, given any particular effect, we shall say that it had a cause from which it did not necessarily result, because it might have been hin- dered by the accidental concurrence of another cause. And although we may trace that concurrent cause to some higher cause, we cannot ascribe to any cause the concurrence itself that proved to be a hindrance. Conse- quently, we cannot say that the hindrance to this or that effect is to be traced to some heavenly principle. Therefore we cannot say that the effects of heavenly bodies happen of necessity in this lower world. Hence Damascene says in the Second Book that the heavenly bodies do not cause the generation of things that are made, nor the corruption of things that are destroyed]'^ because, that is to say, their effects do not follow of necessity. Aristotle likewise says that many things betokened by corporeal things, even heavenly bodies, by water for instance or wind, do not happen. For if a stronger movement arise than that which presaged the future, the latter fails in its effect; even so, we often renounce our first intent, though it he well conceived, because of other and better beginnings? Ptolemy also says: Again, we must not think that the things which occur through the influence of higher beings are inevitable, like those which hap- pen by divine decree and are altogether unavoidable, and such as do actually and necessarily occur? He says again in the Centiloquium: These princi- ples which I give you are midway between the necessary and the possible."^ ^ De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893). ^Cf. De Divin. per Somn., 11 (463b 23). ® Ptolemy, Quadripartitum, I, 2. * Ptolemy, Centiloquium, verbum i. HEAVENLY MOTION AND FREE CHOICE 167 CHAPTER LXXXVII THAT THE MOVEMENT OF A HEAVENLY BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR CHOOSING BY VIRTUE OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME SAY We must observe, however, that Avicenna also holds that the movements of the heavenly bodies are the causes of our choice, not merely by being its occasion, but even as a per se cause.^ For he holds the heavenly bodies to be animate, and hence, since the movement of the heavens proceeds from its soul, and is the movement of a body, it follows that just as, inas- much as it is a body’s movement, it must have the power to transform bodies, so, inasmuch as it comes from a soul, it must have the power to make impressions on our souls. Hence the movement of the heavens is the cause of our acts of will and choice. The position of Albumasar would seem to come to the same, according to the First Book of his Intro duct orium? But this position is unreasonable. Because any effect that is caused by an agent through an instrument, must be proportionate to the instrument as well as to the agent; for we do not employ any instrument for any effect. Consequently, it is not possible to produce by means of an instru- ment an effect which is utterly outside the scope of its action. Now it is altogether beyond the scope of a body’s action to affect the intellect or will, as was proved above,^ 'except perhaps indirectly by making an im- pression on the body, as we have said.^ Therefore it is impossible for the soul of a heavenly body, if it have one, to make an impression on the intellect and will by means of the movement of that heavenly Body. Moreover. The particular active cause, while acting, bears a resemblance to the universal active cause, and imitates it. Now if a human soul were to make an impression on another human soul through an action of the body, as when it reveals its mind by means of vocal signs, the bodily action that proceeds from the one soul does not reach the other soul except by means of the body; for the vocal sounds affect the organ of hearing, and thus, being perceived by the sense, its meaning reaches the understanding. Consequently, if the celestial soul makes an impression on our soul by means of a corporeal movement, its action will not reach our soul except through a change effected in our body. But this does not cause our choice, but only occasions it, as we have shown above.^ Therefore the movement of the heavens is not the cause, but only the occasion, of our choice. Again. Since mover and moved must be simultaneous, as is proved in '^Metaph., X, i (foL loSrb). ^Cf. P. Duhem, Le systeme du monde^ II, pp. 374- 376. "Ch. 84ff. ^Ibid, ^Ibid, i68 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Physics vii/ it follows that movement must come from the first mover to the last thing moved in a certain order, so that, namely, the mover moves that which is distant through that which is nearest. Now our body is nearer to the body of the heavens, which is supposed to be moved by the soul united to it, than our soul, which is not related to the body of the heavens except through its own body. This is proved by the fact that separated intellects are not related to the body of the heavens, except perhaps as a mover to that which it moves. Therefore the impression of a heavenly body that originates in its soul does not reach our soul save through our body. But our soul is not moved in response to the movement of the body, except accidentally, nor does choice result from an impression made on the body except as occasioned thereby, as we have said. Therefore the movement of the heavens cannot be the cause of our choice on the hypothesis that it is from the soul of the heavens. Besides. According to the opinion of Avicenna and certain other philoso- phers, the agent intellect is a separate substance which acts on our souls in so far as it makes what is potentially intelligible to be understood ac- tually.^ Now this is the result of abstraction from all material conditions, as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book.'^ Consequently, that which acts directly on the soul does so, not by means of a corporeal movement, but rather by abstraction of everything corporeal. Therefore the soul of the heavens, if it have a soul, cannot be, through the movement of the heavens, the cause of our acts of choosing or understanding. By the same arguments it can be proved that the movement of the heavens is not the cause of our choice by the power of a separate sub- stance, if anyone suppose the heaven not to be animate, but to be moved by a separate substance. CHAPTER LXXXVIII THAT CREATED SEPARATE SUBSTANCES CANNOT BE THE DIRECT CAUSES OP OUR’ACTS OP CHOOSING AND WILLING, BUT GOD ALONE We must not think, however, that the souls of heavenly bodies, if there be any,^ or any separate intellectual substances, can directly impel our will or cause our choice. For the actions of all creatures are subordinate to the divine providence j so that they are unable to act outside its laws. Now it is a law of providence that everything is moved immediately by its proximate cause. Conse- quently, unless this order be observed, the higher created cause can neither ^Aristotle, Phys., VII, 2 (243a 3). "Cf. C. G., II, 76. « ‘C. G., II, 70. C. G,, TI, 50, 59. SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AND HUMAN CHOICE 169 move nor act.^ But the proximate moving cause of the will is the apprehended good, which is its object, and the will is moved by it as sight is by color. Therefore no created substance can move the will except by means of the apprehended good in so far, namely, as it shows it that a particular thing is good to do , and this is to persuade. Therefore no created substance can act on the will, or cause our choice, except by way of persuasion. Again. A thing is naturally moved by, and passive to, that agent by whose form.it can be reduced to act; since every agent acts by its form. Now the will is made actual by the appetible object, which satisfies the movement of its desire. But the will’s desire is satisfied by the divine good alone as its last end, as we have proved above.^ Therefore God alone can move the will as an agent. Besides. The natural inclination (which we call the natural appetite) of inanimate things for their proper end is like the will or intellectual appe- tite in intellectual substances. Now a natural inclination cannot be given except by the maker of nature. Therefore the will cannot be inclined to anything except by the maker of the intellectual nature. But this belongs to God alone, as we have proved above.^ Therefore He alone can incline our will to anything. Moreover. As is stated in Ethics iii, a violent action is one in which the principle is external, and the one who suffers violence contributes nothing? Consequently, if the will be moved by an external principle, its movement will be violent; — and I speak of being moved by an external principle that moves as an agent, and not as an end. Now the violent is opposed to the voluntary.' Therefore it is impossible that the will be moved by an external principle as an agent, but every movement of the will must come from within. But no created substance is united to the intellectual soul in its inmost being except God alone. Who alone is the cause and sustainer of its being. Therefore the movement of the will can be caused by none but God alone. Further. Violent movement is contrary to natural and voluntary move- ment, because both of these must be from an internal principle. But an external agent does not cause a natural movement except in so far as it causes an internal principle of movement to be in the movable thing. Thus, the generator, that gives the form of gravity to the generated heavy body, gives it a natural downward movement. And nothing else external can move a natural body without violence, except perhaps indirectly, as that which removes an obstacle, for such a thing makes use of natural move- ment or action rather than causes it. Therefore that agent alone can cause a movement of the will without violence which causes the internal prin- ciple of that movement, namely, the power itself of the will. And this is God, Who alone creates the soul, as we proved in the Second Book.^ There- fore God alone can move the will, -as an agent, without violence. "Ch. 37. ^C. G., II, 87. "Aristotle, Eth., Ill, i (mob i). " C. G., II, 87. lyo THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES This is expressed in the words of Prov, xxi. i: The heart of the King is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it\ and Philip. ii. 13: It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, accord- ing to His good will. CHAPTER LXXXIX THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL, AND NOT ONLY THE POWER OF THE WILL, IS CAUSED BY GOD Some, nevertheless, unable to understand how God can cause in us the movement of the will without prejudice to the liberty of the will, have tried to give a false exposition to the authorities quoted.’- They say, in fact, that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, by causing in us the power to will, and not by causing us to will this or that. This is the exposition of Origen who defended free choice in a sense contrary to the aforesaid authori- ties.^ Apparently this was the source of the opinion of some who maintained that providence does not regard things subject to free choice, namely, our elections, but only external happenings. For he who chooses to get or do something, for instance, to build or get rich, is not always able to succeed ; and so the outcome of our actions is not subject to our free choice, but is ordained by providence. But the authority of Scripture is in manifest opposition to all this. For it is said {Isa. xxvi. 12): 0 Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us. Hence we receive from God not only the power to will, but also our very operations. Further. The very words of Solomon, Whithersoever He will He shall turn it, show that the divine causality extends not only to the will, but also to its act. Again. Not only does God give things their powers, but it is also true that nothing can act by its own power, unless it act by His power, as we proved above.^ Therefore man cannot use the power of will given to him, except in so far as he acts by God’s power. Now that by whose power the agent acts, is the cause not only of the power but also of the act. This is apparent in the craftsman, by whose power the instrument acts, even though it may not have received its own form from the craftsman in ques- tion, and is merely applied by him to action. Therefore God is the cause not only of our will but also of our willing. Further. Order in spiritual beings is more perfect than in corporeal beings. Now in corporeal beings every movement is caused by the first ^Peri Archon, III, i (PG ii, 293). ® Ch. 67 and 70. Cf. end of ch. 88. DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND HUMAN CHOICE 171 movement. Therefore in spiritual beings every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is God’s. Besides. We proved above that God is the cause of every action, and that He works in every agent.^ Therefore He is the cause of the movements of the will. Again. Aristotle argues in the same sense as follows.^ There must be some cause which explains the fact that a person understands, takes coun- sel, chooses and wills, because everything new must have a cause. Now if the cause of these acts was another act of counsel and another act of will, since in such things we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come at length to something first. And this first thing must be something better than the reason. Now nothing but God is better than the intellect and the reason. Therefore God is the first principle of our acts of counsel and will. CHAPTER XC THAT HUMAN CHOICE AND WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE Hence it follows that human will and choice are subject to divine provi- dence. For whatsoever God does. He does according to the order of His provi- dence. Therefore, since He is the cause of our choice and will, these are subject to divine providence. Moreover. All corporeal beings are governed by means of spiritual beings, as we have shown above.^ Now spiritual beings act on corporeal beings by their will. Consequently, if the acts of choice and the movements of the will in intellectual substances are not the concern of God’s providence, it follows that corporeal beings also are withdrawn from His providence, so that there will be no providence at all. Besides. The higher a thing is placed in the universe, the more must it participate in the order in which the good of the universe consists. Hence Aristotle reproaches the ancient philosophers for admitting chance and fortune in the scheme of the heavenly bodies, but not in the things of the lower world.^ Now intellectual substances hold a higher place than cor- poreal substances. Therefore if corporeal substances, as regards their es- sence and operation, are included in the order of providence, much more so are intellectual substances. Again. Those things which are nearest to the end are more subject to the order whereby things are directed to the end, since by their means even other things are ordered to the end. Now the actions of intellectual sub- ® JSt/j. Eudem,, VII, 14 (1248a i8). " Ch. 78. ^Phys., II, 4 (196a 25). ^Ibid, 172 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES stances are raore intimately ordered to God as their end than the actions of other things, as we have proved above.^ Therefore the actions of intel- lectual substances come under the order of providence, whereby God di- rects all things to Himself, more than the actions of other things. Further. The government of providence proceeds from God’s love for the things created by Him; for love consists chiefly in this, that the lover desires the good of the beloved?' Consequently, the more God loves a thing, the more it comes under His providence. This is the teaching of Holy Scrip- ture, Ps. cxliv. 20, where it is said: The Lord keepeth all them that love Him] and the Philosopher also says that God cares most for those who love the intellect, as being His friends.^ From this we may again conclude that He loves intellectual substances most of all. Therefore their acts of will and choice are the object of His providence. Moreover. Man’s interior goods, which depend on his will and action, are more proper to man than external goods, such as acquiring wealth, and the like. Hence a man is said to be good in respect of the former and not of the latter. Consequently, if human choice and the movements of man’s will do not come under divine providence, but only external happenings, it will be truer to say that human affairs are not the concern of providence than that they are. But the former saying is put into the mouth of blas- phemers {Job xxii. 14): He doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven] and {Ezech, ix. 9): The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not] and {Lament, iii. 37): Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not? Some passages in Holy Scripture might seem to give utterance to that opinion. Thus it is said {Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made man from the begin- ning and left him in the hand of his own counsel] and further on (17, 18) : He hath set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him. Again {Deut. xxx. 15): Consider that I have set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil— But these words indicate that man has free choice, not that his choice is withdrawn from divine providence. Likewise the statement of Gregory of Nyssa, in his book On Man: Providence regards those things that are not in our power, and not those that are,^ and the saying of Damascene, who followed him, in the Second Book, that God preknows but does not predetermine the things which are in our power, ^ are to be understood as meaning that the things which are in our power are not subject to the divine predetermination in such a way as to be necessitated thereby. ^ ^ Ch. 25 and 78. "Aristotle, Rhetor., II, 4 (1380b 35)- ^ m., X, 8 (1179a 29). Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XLIV (PG 40, 813). ® De Fide Orth., II, 30 (PG 94, 972) , HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HIGHER CAUSES 173 CHAPTER XCI HOW HUMAN AFFAIRS MAY BE REFERRED TO HIGHER CAUSES From what has been proved we are able to gather how human affairs are to be referred to higher causes, and do not happen by chance. For acts of choice and movements of will are under the immediate gov- ernance of God.^ Human knowledge, however, as pertaining to the intellect, is directed by God through angelic intermediaries;^ while things pertaining to the body, whether internal or external, and adapted to man’s use, are governed by God by means of the angels and heavenly bodies.^ There is one general reason for this. Because every thing that is multi- form, changeable and defectible must be referred to a principle that is uniform, unchangeable and indefectible. Now everything connected with us is multiform, changeable and defectible. For it is clear that our choice is made in many different ways, since dif- ferent people choose different things in different circumstances. Again, our choice is changeable, both through the instability of the soul, which is not firmly fixed on the last end, and because things themselves surrounding us change. That man’s choice is defectible is proved by his sins. On the other hand, the divine will is uniform, since by willing one thing God wills all things, and is unchangeable and indefectible, as we proved in the First Book."^ Therefore all movements of will and choice must be reduced to the divine will, and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our willing and choosing. In like manner, our understanding is manifold, since from many sen- sible things we gather into one, as it were, the intelligible truth. It is also changeable, since by movement it passes from one thing to another dis- cursively, proceeding from the known to the unknown. Again, it is de- fectible, through admixture of imagination and sense, as the errors of men testify. — On the other hand, the knowledge of the angels is uniform, because they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fount of truth, namely, God.^ It is also unchangeable, because they see the truth about things, not by proceeding discursively from effects to cause or vice versa, but by simple intuition.^ It is also indefectible, since they see intuitively the very natures or quiddities of things in themselves, about which the intellect can- not err, as neither can the senses about their proper sensible objects; whereas we figure out the nature of a thing from its accidents and effects. Therefore, our intellectual knowledge must be ruled by the knowledge of the angels. ^Ch. 85ff. "Ch. 79. "Ch. 78 and 82. ® C. G., 11 , 96ff. ^C. G., I, 13 and 75. ®Ch. 80. 174 the SUMMA contra GENTILES Again. As to human bodies and the external things of which men make use, it is evident that they are blended together and contrary to one an- other in many ways, that they are not always moved in the same way, because their movements cannot be continual, and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption. — But the heavenly bodies are uniform, being simple and devoid of all contrariety. Also, their movements are uniform, continual and unchangeable. Nor can there be corruption or alteration in them. Consequently, our bodies, and whatever else serves for our use, must be ruled by the movements of the heavenly bodies. CHAPTER XCII HOW A MAN MAY BE SAID TO BE FORTUNATE, AND HOW HE IS ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES It may be seen from what has been said how a man is said to be fortunate. For a man is said to have good fortune when something good happens to him outside his intention:^ e.g., when a man, while digging in a field, finds a treasure which he was not seeking. Now a man, while working, may do something outside his own intention, yet not outside the intention of someone above him: e.g., if a master sends a servant to a place whither he had already sent another servant without the knowledge of the former, the finding of the latter is unintentional to the former, but not to the master who sent him; and therefore, although in relation to this servant the meet- ing is fortuitous and by chance, it is not so in relation to the master, but is intentional. Since, then, man, as to his body, is subordinate to the heav- enly bodies, as to his intellect, to the angels, and as to his will, to God, it is possible for something to happen outside the intention of man, 'which is nevertheless according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the influ- ence of the angels, or even of God. And although God’s action alone has a direct bearing on man’s choice, nevertheless, the angel’s action has a cer- tain bearing on man’s choice by way of persuasion; and the action of a heavenly body by way of disposition, inasmuch as the corporeal impres- sions of the heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose us to choose in certain ways. Accordingly, when, through the influence of higher causes, in the aforesaid manner, a man is led to choose such things as turn to his profit without his being aware of their utility by his own reason; and when, be- sides this, his understanding is enlightened from the light of intellectual substances to the effect of doing those same things; and when, too, through the divine operation his will is inclined so as to choose that which is profit- able to him, without knowing why it is so, — he is said to be fortunate. On the contrary, he is said to be unfortunate when, through the influence ^Aristotle, Magna Moralia, II, 8 (1207a 28). HOW MAN IS CALLED FORTUNATE 175 of higher causes, his choice is inclined to contrary things; as it is said of someone xxii. 30): Write this man barren, a man that shall not prosper in his days. Yet herein we must observe a difference. For the impressions of the heavenly bodies on our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the body. Consequently, from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, one is said not only to be fortunate or unfortunate, but also to have a good or a bad natural disposition, in which sense the Philosopher says that to be fortunate is to have a good natural disposition.^ For it is incon- ceivable that the fact of one person choosing what is useful and another what is hurtful, without their knowing it, be due to any difference in understanding, since the nature of the intellect and the will is the same in all; because a formal diversity would cause a specific diversity, whereas a material diversity causes a diversity according to number. Consequently, in so far as the human intellect is enlightened for the purpose of operation, or the will instigated by God, a man is not said to be well disposed by nature, but to be well guarded or well governed. Again. Another difference is to be observed here. For the operation of an angel. and of a heavenly body merely disposes a man to choose, whereas the operation of God gives accomplishment to his choice. And since the disposition arising from a quality affecting the body, or from the per- suasion of the intellect, does not necessitate his choice, man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines him; whereas he always chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is some- times frustrated, according to Jer. li. 9: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed, and much more so the influence of the heavenly bodies; whereas divine providence never fails. Yet another difference must be observed. For a heavenly body does not dispose a man to choose, except in so far as it affects our bodies, so that a man is influenced in his choice in the same way as he is led by his pas- sions to choose; and hence every disposition towards choosing, resulting from the influence of the heavenly bodies, is in the manner of a passion, as when one is led to make a certain choice through hate, love, or anger and the like. — On the other hand, a man is disposed by an angel to make a certain choice by way of intellectual consideration, without passion. And this happens in two ways. Sometimes man’s understanding is enlightened by an angel so as to know only that a certain thing is good to do, without being instructed as to the reason for its being good, which depends on the end. Consequently sometimes a man thinks it good to do a certain thing, and yet were he asked why, he would answer that he did not know? Hence when he achieves the useful end, to which he had given no thought, it will be fortuitous for him. Sometimes, however, he is instructed by the angel (1207a 35), ^ lUd . (1207b i). 176 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES who enlightens him, both as to the goodness of a thing to be done, and as to the reason why it is good, which depends on the end. And so, when he achieves the end to which he looked forward, it will not be fortuitous. — It must also be noted that the active power of a spiritual nature surpasses that of a corporeal nature in being wider in its scope even as it is higher in its kind. Consequently, the disposition caused by a heavenly body does not extend to all those things that come under the scope of man’s choice. Again. The power of the human soul or even of an angel is restricted in comparison with the divine power, which extends universally to all beings. Hence some good can happen to a man both outside his intention, and out- side the influence of heavenly bodies, and also outside the angelic enlight- enment, but not outside divine providence which is the governor, even as it is the maker, of being qua being, and hence must hold all things in its power. Consequently, some good or evil may happen to a man by chance both in relation to himself, and in relation to heavenly bodies, and in rela- tion to the angels, but not in relation to God. For in relation to God, not only in human affairs but in all things whatsoever, there then can be noth- ing fortuitous or unforeseen. But since fortuitous things are those which are unintentional, and since moral goods cannot be unintentional, because they are founded on choice, in relation to them no man can be described as fortunate or unfortunate, although one may say that in relation toward goods he has by nature a good or evil disposition, when through the natural dispositions of his body he is inclined to the choice of virtue or vice. With regard to external goods, which can accrue to man outside his intention, he may be described both as having a natural disposition for them, and as having good fortune^ and as governed by God^ and as guarded by the angels. Man receives yet another assistance from higher causes, with regard to the performance of his actions. For whereas man has the power to choose and to pursue what he has chosen, in either case he is sometimes helped by higher causes, and sometimes hindered: with regard to his choice, as we have said, in so far as a man is either disposed to choose a certain thing through the influence of heavenly bodies, or enlightened as it were through the guardianship of angels, or inclined through the operation of God; — with regard to the execution, in so far as man receives from some higher cause the strength and the efficacy to accomplish his choice. These things may come not only from God and the angels, but even from heavenly bodies, in so far as the said efficacy resides in a body. For it is evident that even inanimate bodies receive certain forces and abilities from the heavenly bodies, even besides those which result from the active and pas- sive qualities of the elements (which qualities themselves, without any doubt, are subject to the heavenly bodies) . Thus that the magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a heavenly body, and in the same way certain stones and plants have other hidden powers. Therefore there is no reason HOW MAN IS CALLED FORTUNATE 177 why one man should not receive, through the influence of a heavenly body, a certain efficacy for certain corporeal effects, that is not possessed by another man: e.g.^ a physician for healing, a farmer for planting, a soldier for fighting. But this efficacy is bestowed on men by God much more per- fectly for the purpose of accomplishing their works. Accordingly, as re- gards the first kind of assistance, which man receives in choosing, God is said to direct him; as to the second, He is said to strengthen him. These two assistances are indicated in the Psalms (xxvi. i), where it is said, in reference to the first: The Lord is my light and my salvation j whom shall I jear? and in reference to the second: The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid? There is, however, a twofold difference between these two assistances. The first is that man is assisted by the first both in things subject to his power, and in others; whereas the second assistance extends only to those things for which man’s power is adequate. Thus, if a man, while digging a grave, find a treasure, this does not result from any power of his; and hence with a view to such a result a man may be assisted through being instigated to seek where the treasure is, but not by receiving the power for finding treasures. But that a physician heal, or that a soldier conquer in battle, may result both from assistance received in the choice of means adapted to the end, and from the power received from a higher cause for the success of their actions. Hence the first assistance is more universal. — The other difference is that the second assistance is given for the purpose of accomplishing what one intends to do. Therefore, since the fortuitous is unintentional, a man cannot, properly speaking, be said to be iortunate through receiving such assistance, as he can through receiving the former kind of assistance, as we have shown above. Now, a man is fortunate or unfortunate sometimes when he acts alone, as when he finds a hidden treasure while he is digging; and sometimes through the concurrent action of another cause, as when a man, while going to market intent on buying, meets a debtor whom he did not expect to meet. In the first instance, the man was assisted to his good fortune solely in that he was directed in the choice of something to which a profit was accidentally attached outside his intention. In the second instance, both agents need to be directed to choose an action or movement resulting in their mutual encounter. There is yet another observation to be made about the foregoing. For it has been said that the happening of good or bad fortune to a man is from God, and may be from a heavenly body, inasmuch as man is led by God to choose a thing to which some advantage or disadvantage is attached which the chooser had not expected, and in so far as he is disposed by a heavenly body to make such a choice. This advantage or disadvantage, in reference to man’s choice, is fortuitous; in reference to God, it is not for- tuitous ; whereas it is so in reference to the heavenly body. This is proved lyS THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES as follows. An event does not cease to be fortuitous until it is referred to a per se cause. Now the power of a heavenly body is an active cause, not by way of understanding or choosing, but by way of nature; and it is proper to nature to tend to one thing. Accordingly, if a certain effect is not one thing, no natural power can be its per se cause. Now when two things are united together accidentally, they are one, not really, but only accidentally. Therefore no natural cause can be the per se cause of such a conjunction. Suppose, then, that the man in question is led through the impression of a heavenly body, as by a passion, as we said before, to dig a grave. Now the grave and the place of the treasure are not one thing save accidentally, because they have no mutual connection. Consequently, the power of the heavenly body cannot cause an inclination per se to this effect considered as a whole, namely, that the man in question should dig a grave and a place where a treasure is. But one that acts through the intel- lect can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelli- gent being to direct many things to one. It is also plain that a man who knew the treasure to be there might send another, who knew it not, to dig a grave in the same place, so that he might "find the treasure unintention- ally. Accordingly, such fortuitous events, when referred to the divine caus- ality, cease to be fortuitous, but not when they are referred to a heavenly body. The same argument shows that a man cannot be fortunate in every pos- sible way through the influence of a heavenly body, but only in this or that respect. When I say in every way, I mean that a man is not by nature such that, through the influence of a heavenly body, he chooses always or nearly always those particular things to which some advantage or disad- vantage is accidentally connected. For nature is directed to one thing only, and the things in regard to which man is fortunate or unfortunate are not reducible to something one, but are indeterminate and infinite in number, as the Philosopher says,^ and is evident to the sense. Therefore it is impos- sible for anyone to be of such a nature as invariably to choose those things which have some advantage incidental to them. But one may be inclined by a heavenly body to choose something to which an incidental advantage is attached, and by some other inclination, to choose something else, and by yet a third inclination, to choose yet another thing, but not by one inclination to choose them all. But man can be directed to all things by one divine disposition, ^Phys., 11 , 5 (196b 28). WHAT IS FATE? 179 CHAPTER XCIII IS THERE SUCH A THING AS FATE, AND WHAT IS IT? We may gather from the foregoing what we should think about fate. For observing that many things happen in this world accidentally^ if particular causes be taken into consideration, some have maintained that such things are not subject even to any superior causes. According to this opinion, there is no such thing as fate. Others, however, have tried to refer such things to certain higher causes, from which, according to some plan, they proceed in an orderly way. These held that there is fate, as though things which appear to happen by chance were effata, that is, foretold or preordained by someone to be. Some of these pretended to ascribe all contingent occurrences of this world to the causality of heavenly bodies, not excluding human elections, and they held that all such things are subject to the directing force of the stars, which force they called fate. This opinion is impossible and contrary to faith, as we have already shown.^ Others, however, wished to assign to the direction of divine providence all such things as appear to happen by chance in this lower world. Hence they maintained that all these things are subject to fate, for this was the name given by them to the disposition which divine providence causes to be in things. Hence Boethius says that fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, by which providence connects each one with its proper order? In this definition disposition stands for order] the words inherent in things are included to differentiate fate from providence, because the order as existing in the divine mind and not yet impressed on things is providence, but as already expressed in things, is called fate; changeable is added to show that the order of providence does not deprive things of contingency and changeableness, as some maintained. In this sense, to deny fate is to deny divine providence. Since, however, we should not use even names in common with unbelievers, lest use of the same expressions be the occasion of error, the faithful should not use the word fate, lest they seem to agree with those who, having false notions about fate, subject all things to a necessity imposed by the stars. Hence Augustine says: If anyone gives the name of fate to God^s will or power, let him keep his opinion, hut hold his tongue f and Gregory says to the same effect: Far be it from the minds of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.^ ^Ch. 84ff. ^De Consol, IV, prose 6 (PL 63, 815). 41, 141). ^In Evang., I, horn. 10 (PL 76, 1112). De Civit. Dei, V, i (PL i8o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER XCIV OF THE CERTAINTY OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE A DIFFICULTY, howcver, arises from what has been said. For if all, even the contingent, happenings of this lower world are subject to the divine providence, it would follow, apparently, that either providence is uncer- tain, or all happenings necessary. [1] For the Philosopher proves that if we suppose every effect to have a per se cause, and again that given any per se cause, we must of necessity grant the effect, it will follow that all future events happen of necessity.^ For if every effect has a per se cause, every effect will be reducible to some cause either present or past. Thus, if it be .asked whether a certain man will be killed by robbers, this effect is preceded by a cause which is his being met by the robbers; and this effect is again preceded by another cause, .namely, that he went out ; and this again was preceded by another cause, namely, that he went to fetch some water ; and this by another cause, namely, that he was thirsty; and this was caused by his partaking of salt meat; which he is either eating now or has already eaten. Accordingly, if, given the cause, we must necessarily grant the effect, if he eats the salt meat, he is of necessity thirsty; if he thirsts, it is necessary that he wish to seek water;' and if he wish to seek water, that he leave his house; and if he go out, that the robbers meet him; and if they meet him, that they kill him. Therefore from first to last, it is necessary that this eater of salt meat be killed by robbers. The Philosopher concludes, then, that it is untrue that, given the cause, the effect must of necessity be also granted, since some of these causes may be ineffective. Nor again is it true that every effect has a per se cause; because that which is accidental, namely, that the man who wants water should meet some robbers, has no cause. This argument proves, then, that all effects reducible to a per se cause, whether present or past, from which, if it is posited, the effect follows of necessity, happen themselves of necessity. Either, therefore, we must say that not all effects are subject to the divine providence (and thus providence would not extend to all things, contrary to what was proved above^), or we must say that, granted providence, it is not necessary for its effects to fol- low (and then providence will not be .certain), or that all things must needs happen of necessity. For providence is not only in the present and the past, but from eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal. [ 2 ] Further. If the divine providence is certain, this conditional propo- sition must be true: If God foresaw this, it will be. Now the antecedent of this proposition is necessary, for it is eternal. Therefore the consequent is '^Metaph., V, 3 (1027a 29). ®Ch. 64. THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE i8i necessary, because whenever the antecedent of a conditional proposition is necessary, the consequent is likewise necessary; so that the consequent is like a conclusion of the antecedent. Now whatever follows from the neces- sary is itself necessary. Accordingly, if the divine providence is certain, all things must happen of necessity. [3] Moreover. Supposing a thing to be foreseen by God, for instance, that so and so will be king. Either then it is possible for it to happen that he does not reign, or it is not possible. If it is not possible for him not to reign, then it is impossible; and therefore it is necessary that he will reign. On the other hand, if it is possible that he will not reign, then, since given « possibility nothing impossible follows, it remains that it is not impos- sible for the divine providence to fail; for we are here saying that the divine providence does fail. Consequently, it follows, if all things are foreseen by God, that either the divine providence is uncertain, or that all things hap- pen of necessity. ^ [4] Again. Tully argues thus A If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. If this be true, then all things are subject to fate. If all things are subject to fate, nothing is subject to our power, and the choice of the will is non-existent. Therefore, if the divine providence is cer- tain, there is no free choice. And it will also follow that there is no such thing as a contingent cause. [5] Besides. The divine providence does not exclude intermediary causes, as we have proved.^ But some causes are contingent and defectible. Therefore an effect of the divine providence may Jail. Therefore God^'s providence is uncertain. In order to solve these difficulties, we must recall some points already laid down, so as to make it clear that nothing escapes the divine provi- dence; that the order of the divine providence is utterly unchangeable; and that, notwithstanding, it does not follow that whatever results from the divine providence must happen of necessity. First, we must observe that as God is the cause of all existent things, by giving them their very being, the order of His providence must needs in- clude all things; because to those things to which He has given being, He must grant a continuance of being, and He must grant perfection in the last end.^ Now in everyone that exercises providence there are two points for con- sideration,'^ namely, forethought about the order of things, and establish- ment of the premeditated order in the things subject to providence. The former pertains to the cognitive power, and the latter to the operative power. There is this difference between them, that in the forethought given to the order, providence is so much the more perfect, as its order is more able to reach the most minute things. For it is owing to our defective knowl- edge, which cannot comprise all individual things, that we are unable to ^De DivinaL, 11 , 7 (P- 71^). ®Ch. 77 * "Ch. 64ff " Ch. 77 i 82 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES arrange beforehand all the particulars in those matters that are subject to our direction. Now a man is considered more fit to make provision accord- ing as his foresight extends to more particulars; but one whose foresight extends only to general considerations has but a small share of prudence. The same may be observed in all productive arts. On the other hand, as regards the causing of the premeditated order to be in things, the provi- dence of the governor is the higher in order and perfection, according as it is more universal, and brings about the realization of its fore- thought through more ministers; for the organization itself of the sub- ordinate ministers has a large place in the order of providence. — Now God's providence must be supremely perfect because He is absolutely and universally perfect, as we proved in the First Book.^ Consequently, in His providence He orders all things, even the most trivial, by the eternal forethought of His wisdom: and whatsoever things operate, do so as instru- ments moved by Him,^ and serve Him obediently, so as to bring forth into the world the order of providence excogitated, as it were, from eternity. — And if all things that are capable of action must needs act as His minis- ters, it is impossible that any agent hinder the execution of the divine provi- dence by acting contrary thereto. Nor, again, is it possible for the divine providence to be hindered through a defect in any agent or patient, since every power, active or passive, is caused in things according to God’s dis- position.^ Again, it is impossible for the execution of the divine providence to be prevented through a change in the author of providence, since God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved.^ It follows, therefore, that the divine providence cannot possibly fail. Secondly, it must be observed that every agent aims at a good, and at a greater good so far as it is able, as we have proved.^' Now, good and better are not the same as considered in the whole and as considered in the parts.^ For in the whole, the good consists in the integrity which results from the order and composition of the parts. Consequently, for the whole it is better that there be disparity of parts, which is necessary for the order and per- fection of the whole, than that all the parts be equal, with each part on a level with the most excellent part; whereas each part of inferior degree would be better, considered in itself, if it were on the same level as a higher part. Take, as an example, the human body. The foot would be a more excellent part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye; but the whole body would be more imperfect, if it were deprived of the service of the foot. Accordingly, the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent; for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can, whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently, a defect is outside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. Thus the generation of a female is clearly outside the " C. G., I, 28. " Ch. 67. ® Ch. 70. * C. G., I, 13. Ch. 3. « Ch. 71. THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE 183 intention of a particular nature, namely, of this particular force in this particular seed, the tendency of which is to make the embryo as perfect as possible; on the other hand, it is the purpose of universal nature, namely, of the power of the universal cause of generation in inferior beings, that a female be generated, which is a necessary condition for the generation of many animals. In like manner, corruption, diminution and every defect is in^the purpose of universal nature, but not of the particular nature; be- cause each particular thing shuns defect and, for its own part, aims at perfection. It is clear, then, that the particular agent aims at the greatest possible perfection of its effect in its kind ; while the universal nature aims at a particular perfection in a particular effect, for instance, the perfection of a male in one effect, that of a female in another. Among the parts of the whole universe, the first distinction to be observed is between the contingent and the necessary.^ For the higher beings are necessary, incorruptible and unchangeable, and the lower a thing is, the more it falls short of this condition; so that the lowest are corruptible in their very being, changeable in their disposition, and produce their effects, not of necessity, but contingently. Therefore every agent that is a part of the universe has a tendency to persist in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect; while God, Who governs the universe, intends to establish some of His effects by way of necessity, and others by way of contingency. Accordingly, He adapts various causes to those effects, to some necessary, to others contingent causes. Therefore it belongs to the order of the divine providence, not only that such and such an effect be produced, but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect be produced contingently. Consequently, some of the things subject to the divine providence are nec- essary, and some contingent; they are not all necessary. — It is therefore evident that, though the divine providence is the per se cause of a partic- ular future effect, and though it is present and past, yet more truly eternal, it does not follow, as the first argument pretended, that this particular effect necessarily will be; for the divine providence is the per se cause that this particular effect will happen contingently. And this cannot fail. Hence it is also clear that this conditional proposition is true: If God foresaw that this would happen, it will be so, as the second argument stated. But it will be as God foresaw that it would be. Now, He foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows infallibly, then, that it will be contingently and not of necessity. It is also clear that if this thing, which we suppose to be foreseen by God as future, be of a contingent nature, it will be possible for it not to happen considered in itself; for it is foreseen in such a way as to be contingent, and possible not to be. Yet the order of the divine providence cannot fail to enable this future thing to happen contingently. Thus the third argu- ment is solved. Consequently, we may say that the man in question will not ^Ch. 72. i 84 the SUMMA contra GENTILES reign if we consider the statement in itself, but not if we consider it as foreseen. Again. The argument advanced by Tully appears of small account in the light of what we have said. For seeing that not only effects but also causes and modes of being are subject to the divine providence, as is clear from the foregoing, it does not follow, if all things are ruled by the divine provi- dence, that nothing is under our control; for they are so foreseen by God as to be freely done by us. Nor can the defectibility of second causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, deprive the divine providence of certainty, as the fifth objection argued. For God Himself works in all things according to the decree of His will, as we proved above.^ Consequently, it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing. Such arguments as might be used to prove the necessity of things fore- seen by God from the certitude of His knowledge were solved above when we were treating of the divine knowledge.- CHAPTERS XCV AND XCVI THAT THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USEFULNESS OF PRAYER We must also observe that, as the unchangeableness of providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it exclude the useful- ness of prayer. For we do not pray that the eternal disposition of His provi- dence may be changed, since this is impossible, but that He may grant what we desire. For it is fitting that God should assent to the holy desires of the rational creature; not that our desires have the effect of changing a God Who is unchangeable, but as an effect befitting His goodness in granting our de- sires. Because, since all things naturally desire the good, as we have proved,''^ and since it belongs to the supereminence of the divine goodness to bestow being and well-being on all things in a certain order, it follows that He fulfills, according to His goodness, the holy desires of which our prayers are the expression. Again. He who causes a thing to move should lead that thing to the end. Hence a thing is moved to its end, attains to that end and rests therein through one and the same nature. Now every desire is a movement to a good, and it cannot be in a thing except it come from God, Who is good in His essence, and the source of goodness; for every mover moves to its like. Therefore it belongs to God, according to His goodness, to bring to a fitting " Ch. 67 ; C. G., II, 23. ^ C. G., I, ch. 63ff. " Ch. 3. PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER 185 issue the fitting desires which are expressed by means of one’s prayers. Besides. The nearer things are to their mover, the more effectively do they receive the mover’s impression. Thus things which are nearer to a fire are more heated thereby. Now intellectual substances are nearer to God than inanimate natural substances. Consequently, the impression of the divine motion is more efficacious in intellectual substances than in other natural substances. Now natural bodies participate in the divine motion to the extent that they receive therefrom a natural appetite for the good, as well as the fulfillment of that appetite, which is realized when they attain to their respective ends. Much more therefore do intellectual substances attain to the fulfillment of their desires which are proffered to God in their prayers. Moreover. It is essential to friendship that the lover wish the desire of the beloved to be fulfilled, inasmuch as he seeks his good and perfection. Hence it has been said that friends have but one will} Now we have proved that God loves His creature,^ and so much the more as it has a greater share of His goodness, which is the first and chief object of His love.^ Hence He wills the desires of the rational creature to be fulfilled, since of all creatures it participates most perfectly in the divine goodness. Now His will is perfective of things, because He is the cause of things through His will, as was proved above.^ Therefore it belongs to God’s goodness to fulfill the rational creature’s desires, as laid before Him in prayer. Besides. The creature’s good flows from the divine goodness, according to a certain likeness. Now it is a most praiseworthy trait in a man if he grant the request of those whose petition is just, since for this reason he is said to be liberal, clement, merciful and kind. Therefore it belongs in a special manner to the divine goodness to grant holy prayers. Therefore it is said in the Psalm (cxliv. 19) : He will do the will of them that fear Him, and He will hear their prayers and save them] so too our Lord says {Matt. vii. 8): Every one that asketh receiveth: and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. [Chapter XCVI] And yet it is not unfitting that sometimes the peti- tions of those who pray be not granted by God. For it was proved that God fulfills the desires of the rational creature inasmuch as the good is the object of the creature’s desire. Sometimes, however, it happens that what we seek is not a true good but an apparent one, and is, absolutely speaking, evil. Such a prayer, therefore, cannot be granted by God; and hence it is said {Jas. iv. 3): You ask and you receive not, because you ask amiss. Again. It was shown to be fitting that God fulfills our desires, because He moves us to desire. Now the thing moved is not brought to the end of its movement by the mover unless the movement continue. Accordingly, if the ^Sallust, Catiline, XX (ed. A. Ahlberg, Leipsig: B. G, Teubner, 1919), p. 16. ® C. G., I, 75 - " C. G., I, 74. " C. G., II, 23ff. i86 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES movement of desire be not continued by repeated prayer, it is not unfitting that the prayer be ineffectual. Thus our Lord says {Luke xviii. i ) that wc ought always to pray and not to faint] and (i Thess, v. 17) Apostle says: Pray without ceasing. Further. We proved that God fittingly fulfills the desire of the rational creature inasmuch as the creature approaches to Him. Now a man ap- proaches to God by contemplation, devout affection, and humble and firm resolution. A prayer, therefore, that lacks these conditions in its approach to God does not deserve to be granted by Him. Hence it is said in the Psalm (ci. 18): He hath had regard to the prayer of the humble] and {Jas i. 6) : Let him ask in faith j nothing wavering. Moreover. We have proved that God grants the prayers of the devout on the score of friendship. Consequently, if a man rejects God’s friendship, his prayer is unworthy of being granted. Hence it is said {Prov. xxviii. 9) : He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination] and {Isa. i. 15): When you multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood. It is on the same principle that sometimes a friend of God is not heard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends. Thus it is said {Jer. vii. 16) : Therefore do not thou pray for this people, nor take to thee praise and supplication for them; and do not withstand me, for I will not hear thee. It happens, too, sometimes that through friendship a man refuses his friend’s request, because he knows it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him; even as a physician will sometimes refuse a sick man what he asks, knowing that it is not good for regaining his health. There- fore, since it has been proved that Godj for love of the rational creature, fulfills the desires set forth in his prayers, we must not be surprised if some- times He does not fulfill the prayers of those even who are most dear to Him, that He may accomplish what is best for the welfare of the suppliant. That is why He did not remove from Paul the thorn in his flesh, though thrice he prayed for this, because He foresaw that this would be good for him by keeping him humble, as is related in a Cor. xii. 8, 9. Hence also our Lord said to some {Matt. xx. 22): You know not what you ask] and {Rom. viii. 26) it is said: For we know not what we should pray for as we ought. For this reason Augustine says: The Lord is good, for often lie grants not what we want, that He may give what we want more)' It is clear, then, from what has been said, that prayers and holy desires are the cause of some of the things done by God. Now it has been shown that God’s providence does not exclude other causes;^ rather indeed does He dispose of them so that the order appointed by His providence may be established in things. Consequently, second causes are not opposed to providence; in fact, they accomplish the effect of providence. Accordingly, ^Episi. XXXI, I (PL 33, 121). ^Ch. 77. PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER 187 prayers are efficacious before God; yet they do not upset the unchangeable order of the divine providence, since even the granting of each suppliant’s prayer is included within the order of the divine providence. To say, there- fore, that we must not pray that we may obtain something from God, be- cause the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we must not walk in order to arrive at a place, nor eat that we may have nour- ishment; all of which is clearly absurd. By the foregoing there is removed a twofold error about prayer. For some have said that prayer has no fruit. This was asserted both by those who, like the Epicureans, utterly denied the divine providence, and by those who, like certain Peripatetics, withdrew human affairs from the provi- dence of God ; ^ and again by those who with the Stoics contended that all things subject to providence happen of necessity For it follows from all these opinions that prayer produces no fruit, and that consequently all wor- ship of the Godhead is in vain. There is an allusion to this error in Malach. iii. 14: You have said: He lahoreth in vain that serveth God. And what profit is it that we have kept His ordinances y and that we have walked sorrowful before the Lord of hosts? On the other hand, some have contended that the divine ordinance can be changed by our prayers. Thus the Egyptians said that fate was averted by prayers, certain images, incensings or incantations. Certain passages in Holy Scripture would seem at the first glance to admit of being taken in this sense. For it is related (Isa. xxxviii. 1-5) that Isaias, at God’s com- mand, said to King Ezechias: Thus saith the Lord: Take order with thy housCy for thou shalt die, and shalt not live\ and that after Ezechias had prayed, the word of the Lord came to Isaias saying: Go and say to Ezechias ... I have heard thy prayer . . . behold I will add to thy days fifteen years. — ^Again (Jer. xviii. 7, 8) it is said in the name of God; / will sud~ denly speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them. And (Joel ii. 13, 14): Turn to the Lord your God; for He is gracious and merciful. . . . Who knoweth hut He will return and forgive? These passages, if taken in their superficial sense, lead to an incon- gruous result. For, in the first place, it follows that God’s will is change- able. Also, that God acquires something in the course of time. Further, that things happening in time to creatures cause something that is in God. These are all impossible, as appears evidently from what has already been laid down.^ They are also contrary to Holy Scripture which contains the expression of infallible truth. For it is said (Num. xxiii. 19) : God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should he changed. Hath He said then, and will He not do? Hath He spoken, and will He not fulfill? " Cf. the end of ch. 75- ' Cf. the end of ch. 73- ^ C. G., I, isff. i88 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Again (i Kings xv. 29) : The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance ; for He is not a man that He should repent. And {Malach. iii. 6) : / am the Lord and I change not. Now it suffices to consider carefully what we have said above for one to realize that every error occurring in the present matter is due to one’s over- looking the difference between the universal and the particular orders. For, since all effects are ordered one to another, inasmuch as they have one common cause, this order must needs be the more universal as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause, which is God, must of necessity include all things. There is nothing therefore to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner; because there is outside that order something that can change it. Therefore it is not strange that the Egyptians, who reduced the ordering of human affairs to the heavenly bodies, held that fate, having its origin in the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and rites; because outside and above the heavenly bodies there is God, Who can hinder the heavenly bodies from producing the effect which was to have taken place in this lower world as a result of their influence. — But outside that order which includes all things, it is not possible to assign a thing whereby the order depending on the universal cause can be subverted. For this reason the Stoics, who reduced the ordering of all things to God as the universal cause, held that the order appointed by God is utterly unchangeable. But these again failed to consider the universal order, in that they held prayers to be altogether useless, thus implying that man’s volitions and desires, which lead him to pray, are not included in that universal order. For, when they say that, whether we pray or not, the result is the same because of the universal order of things, it is clear that they exclude the suppliant’s prayers from that order. For if they were contained in that order, effects would fol- low through the divine ordinance from these prayers in the same way as they follow through other causes. Accordingly, to deny the efficacy of prayer is to deny the efficacy of all other causes. And if the imchangeable- ness of the divine order does not deprive other causes of their efficacy, neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer. Therefore prayers have value, not as though they bring about a change in the order appointed from eter- nity, but as included in that very order. On the other hand, there is no reason why the particular order of an inferior cause should not be changed by God through the efficacy of prayer; for He transcends all causes, so that He is not bound by the order of any cause, but on the contrary all necessity imposed by the order of a lower cause is subject to Him, because it originated from Him. Accordingly, when some change is brought about by prayer in the order of inferior causes established by God, God is said to return or to repent] not that His eternal ordinance is changed, but that some effett of His is changed. Hence Greg- ory says that God changes not His mind, although at times He changes THAT PROVIDENCE HAS A PLAN 189 His judgment‘s not that judgment, mark you, which expresses His eternal decree, but that which expresses the order of lower causes, in keeping with which Ezechias was to die, and a nation was to be exterminated for its sins. Such a change of judgment is described metaphorically as repentance in God, inasmuch as He behaves like a penitent, who shows himself penitent by changing his behavior. In the same way. He is said figuratively to be angry j inasmuch as by punishing He does what an angry man does,^ CHAPTER XCVII HOW THE DISPOSITION OF PROVIDENCE IS ACCORDING TO A PLAN From what has been said, one can see clearly that things are arranged by divine providence according to a plan. For we have proved that God, by His providence, directs all things to His goodness as their endj^ not indeed as though His goodness gains any- thing from the things that are made, but in order that the likeness of His goodness may be impressed on things as far as possible."^ But since every created substance must needs fall short of the perfection of the divine good- ness, it was necessary, in order that the divine goodness might the more perfectly be bestowed on things, that there should be diversity among them, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one individual thing might be more perfectly represented in various ways by things of various kinds. Thus when man finds that he cannot adequately express an idea by one word, he uses several words so as to express his idea in several ways. In this too we are able to consider the eminence of the divine perfection, since perfect goodness, which in God exists in a united and simple manner, can- not be in creatures otherwise than in many ways and many subjects. Now things are diversified through having diverse forms whence they derive their species. Consequently, the reason for diversity in the forms of things is taken from the end. But the plan of the order in things is taken from the diversity of forms. Because, as it is from the form that a thing has its being, and as a thing, in so far as it has being, approaches to a likeness to God, Who is His own simple being, it follows of necessity that the form is nothing else than a divine likeness existing by participation in things. Therefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, rightly says that it is something godlike and desir- able.^ Now a likeness to one simple thing cannot be diversified except because the resemblance is more or less close, or more or less distant. Now the closer a thing approaches to the divine likeness, the more perfect ^ Moral, XVI, 10 (PL 76, 1127). ®Cf. C. G., I, 91. " Ch. 64. ‘^Ch. iSff. Phys., I, 9 (192a 17). 190 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES it is. Consequently, a difference in forms must be according as one is more perfect than another; for which reason Aristotle likens definitions, whereby the natures and forms of things are indicated, to numbers among which species are diversified by addition or subtraction of unity.^ We are thus given to understand that diversity of forms requires a diverse degree of perfec- tion. This is evident to anyone who studies the natures of things. For, if he consider carefully he will find that the diversity of things is made up of degrees, since above inanimate bodies he will find plants, and above these irrational animals, above these intelligent substances, and in each one of these he will find diversity according as some are more perfect than others; sb much so, that the highest members of a lower genus appear to be close to the higher genus, and conversely: e.g., animals that cannot move are like plants. Hence Dionysius says that divine wisdom has joined together the last things of higher degree to the first things of lower degree? Therefore it is clear that the diversity of things requires that all be not equal, but that there be order and degrees in the universe. From the diversity of forms, whence things derive their specific differ- ences, there follows also the difference of operations. For since things act according as they are actual (because those things that are in potentiality, as such, are devoid of action), and since a thing is actual by its form, a thing’s operation must needs follow its form. Accordingly, if there be diverse forms, these must have diverse operations. Furthermore, since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper action, it follows that there must be diverse proper ends in things, although there is one common end of all. Moreover. From the diversity of forms there results a diversity in the relation of matter to things. For since forms are diverse according as some are more perfect than others, some of them are perfect to the extent of being subsistent and complete in themselves, having no need of the assist- ance of matter. Whereas some are unable to subsist perfectly by them- selves, and require matter to uphold them, so that what subsists is not a form only, nor matter only — ^which by itself is not an actual being — but something composed of both. Now matter and form would be unable to concur in making one thing unless they were mutually proportionate. But if they need to be propor- tionate, it follows that diverse matters correspond to diverse forms. Con- sequently, certain forms require simple, while others require composite, matter; and to diverse forms there must correspond a diverse composition of parts, in keeping with the species and operation of the form. From the diverse relation to matter there results diversity of agents and patients. For since a thing acts by reason of its form, and is receptive by reason of its matter, it follows that things which have more perfect and ^Metaph., VII, 3 (1043b 34). " De Div, Norn., VII, 3 (PG 3, 872). THAT PROVIDENCE HAS A PLAN 191 less material forms, act on those that are more material and have more imperfect forms. Again. From the diversity of forms, matters and agents there results diversity of properties and accidents. For since substance is the cause of accident, as the perfect of the imperfect, it follows that diverse proper acci- dents must result from diverse substantial principles. Moreover, since di- verse agents produce diverse impressions on patients, it follows that a diversity of agents must result in a diversity of accidents proceeding from their activity. From what has been said, then, it is clear that it is not without reason that the divine providence has appointed to creatures diverse accidents, actions, passions and orders. Therefore Holy Scripture ascribes the forma- tion and government of things to the divine wisdom and prudence. Thus it is said {Prov, hi. 19, 20) : The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth: He hath established the heavens by prudence. By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew. Again {Wis. viii. i) it is said that divine wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily, and or- der eth all things sweetly] and (xi. 21): Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight, where by measure we are to understand the quantity, mode, or degree of perfection in each thing; by number, the multitude and diversity of species resulting from the various degrees of perfection; and by weight the various inclinations of things to their re- spective ends and operations, as well as the agents and patients, and such accidents as result from a diversity of species. In this same order wherein we find the plan of the divine providence, we have stated that the first place must be assigned to the divine goodness, as being the last end, which is the first principle in practical matters; and after this comes the multiplicity of things, the establishment of which needs a diversity of grades in forms and matters, agents and patients, actions and accidents. Accordingly, as the fundamental principle of the divine providence, absolutely speaking, is the divine goodness, so the funda- mental principle in creatures is their multitude, to the making and pres- ervation of which all other things are seen to be subordinated. In this sense Boethius, it would seem, fittingly said that number seems to have been the aim of nature in the original formation of things} We must, however, observe that the practical and speculative reasons partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that as speculative rea- son starts from a principle and employs means to reach the intended con- clusion, so the practical reason begins from some first principle and through certain means arrives at the intended operation or product of operation. In speculative matters, the principle is the form and the es- sence; whereas in practical matters it is the end, which sometimes is a form, at other times something else. Moreover, the principle in speculative Arith., I, 2 (PL 6j, 1083). 192 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES matters must always be necessary, whereas in practical matters it is some- times necessary and sometimes not. Thus it is necessary that man desire happiness as his end, but it is not necessary that he desire to build a house. Likewise in demonstrations, that which follows is always a necessary se- quel to that which precedes, but in practical matters not always, but only when the end cannot be obtained except by the way indicated. Thus he who would build a house must needs get some wood; but it depends on his absolute will, and not on his will to build a house, that he gets pine. Accordingly, that God loves His own goodness is something necessary, but it does not necessarily follow from this that it should be embodied in creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without this. Consequently, although the divine goodness is the reason why creatures were originally brought into being, yet this depends on the absolute will of God.— Sup- posing, however, that God wishes to communicate His goodness to His creatures by way of likeness as far as it is possible, this is the reason why creatures are of diverse kinds; although there is no necessity for this di- versity being according to this or that degree of perfection, or this or that number of things. — ^And supposing it to be God’s will to establish a par- ticular number in things, and to bestow on each thing a particular measure of perfection, this is the reason why a particular thing has such and such a form and such and such matter; and so on in like manner. It is therefore clear that the dispensations of providence are according to a certain plan, and yet this plan presupposes the divine will. Accordingly a twofold error is refuted by what we have said. First, there is the error of those who maintain that all things are the result of God’s absolute will without any plan. This is the error of the Moslem theologians, as Rabbi Moses relates,^ according to whom the sole reason why fire heats rather than chills is because God so wills. Secondly, there is included the error of those who assert that the ordering of causes pro- ceeds from the divine providence by way of necessity,^ Both of these views are false, as is clear from what has been said. There are, however, certain expressions of Scripture that would seem to ascribe all things to God’s absolute will. But such things are said, not to remove any plan from the dispensations of providence, but to show that God’s will is the first cause of all things, as we have already shown. Such are the words of the Psalm (cxxxiv. 6) : Whatsoever the Lord pleased j He hath donOj and of Job ix. 12: Who can say: Why dost Thou so? and of Rom. ix. 19: Who resisteth His will? Augustine likewise says: God^s will alone is the first cause of health and sickness, reward and punishment, grace and retribution.^ Accordingly, if we be asked the wherefore of a particular natural effect, we can assign the reason to some proximate cause, provided, however, that Maimonides, Guide, III, 25 (p. 308) . Cf. ch. yaff ; ch. 94. « De Tnn., Ill, 3 ; 4 (PL 42, 872; 873). GOD AND THE ORDER OF PROVIDENCE 193 we refer all things to the divine will as their first cause. Thus if it be asked: Why was the wood heated in the presence of fire? we reply: Because to heat is the natural action of fire, and this because heat is its proper acci-^ dent and this results from its proper form — and so on until we come to the divine will. Hence if we reply to the question Why was the wood made hot? by saying: Because God so willed, we shall answer rightly, if we intend to trace the question back to its first cause, but incorrectly if we intend to exclude all other causes. CHAPTER XCVIII HOW IT IS POSSIBLE, AND HOW IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOP GOD TO DO SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE ODDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE From what has been said we are able to consider a tvi^ofold order: the one, dependent on the first cause of all things, and hence embracing all; the other, a particular order, dependent on some created cause, and comprising such things as are subordinate to that cause. The latter order is manifold, in accordance with the diversity of causes to be found among creatures. Yet one such order is subordinate to another, even as one cause is subor- dinate to another. Consequently, all particular orders of causes are com- prised under, and are derived from, that universal order found in things in so far as they are dependent on the first cause. We have an example of this in political affairs. For there is a certain order among all the mem- bers of a household according as they are subject to the head of the house; again, the head of the house and all the other heads of houses in the same city have a certain order among themselves, and in relation to the governor of the city; and he again, together with all the other gov- ernors in the kingdom, is subordinate to the king. This universal order, according to which all things are ruled by the divine providence, may be considered in two ways: namely, with regard to the things subject to that order, and with regard to the plan of the order, which depends on the principle *of the order. Now we proved in the Second Book that the things themselves, which are ordered by God, do not proceed from Him as from an agent that is necessitated by nature or by anything else, but rather proceed from His absolute will, especially as regards the original establishment of things.^ Consequently, there are other things that God can do besides those which are comprised under the order of divine providence, since His power is not limited to them. On the other hand, if we consider the aforesaid order with respect to the plan that depends on the principle, then it is not possible for God to do ^ C. G., II, 23 if. 194 the SUMMA contra GENTILES anything outside that order. For this order, as we have proved,^ proceeds from the knowledge and will of God directing all things to His goodness as their end. Now, it is not possible that God do anything that is not willed by Him, since creatures proceed from Him, not by nature, but because He wills them to, as we have proved. Nor is it possible for anything to be done by Him that is not included in His knowledge, since nothing can be willed that is not known. Nor, again, is it possible for Him to do anything as regards creatures, that is not directed to His goodness as its end, since His goodness is the proper object of His will. Likewise, since God is utterly unchangeable. He cannot possibly will that which He did not previously will, or begin to know something anew, or direct it to His goodness. There- fore God can do nothing but what is comprised in the order of His provi- dence, even as He can do only what is subject to His operation. And yet, if we consider His power absolutely. He can do other things besides those that are subject to His providence or operation; but He cannot do what has not been eternally contained in the order of His providence, because He is unchangeable. Through failing to observe this distinction some have fallen into various errors. Some, in an endeavor to extend to things themselves the unchange- ableness of the divine order, said that all things must of necessity be as they are; so much so, that some declared that God is able to do only what He does.^ Against this we have the words of Matt. xxvi. 53 : Cannot I ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels? Others, however, thinking in their carnal wisdom that God, like carnal man, is inconstant of will, ascribed the changeableness of things subject to the divine providence to changeableness in the divine providence itself. Against this it is said {Num. xxiii. 19) : God is not as a man that he should lie; nor as the son of man that He should he changed. Others again withdrew contingent things from the divine providence. Against these it is said {Lament, iii. 37) : Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not? CHAPTER XCIX THAT GOD CAN WORIC OUTSID-E THE ORDEE IMPOSED ON THINGS, BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT THEIR PROXI- MATE CAUSES It remains to be proved that God can act outside the order imposed on things by Himself. ^ Ch. 97. ^ Cf. St. Thomas, De Pot., q. i, a. 5. THAT GOD CAN ACT WITHOUT SECOND CAUSES 195 For the order imposed on things by God is that lower things be moved by the higher, as was shown above.^ Now God can act independently of this order. In other words, He can by Himself produce an effect in inferior things, without a higher agent doing anything towards that effect. For the agent that works by natural necessity differs from the agent that acts by will in this, that the effect cannot result from the former except according to the mode of its active power. Hence the agent which has very great power cannot produce immediately a small effect, but produces an effect proportionate to its power. In this effect, however, there will sometimes be less power than in its cause, so that at length through many intermediaries a small effect results from the highest cause. But it is not so in the agent that acts by its will. Because the agent that acts by its will can at once, without any intermediary, produce any effect . that does not surpass its power. Thus the most perfect craftsman can produce a work such as an imperfect craftsman would produce. Now God works by His will, and not by necessity of nature, as we proved above.^ Therefore He can produce lesser effects, that are produced by inferior causes, immediately without their proper causes. Again. The divine power is compared to all active powers as a universal power to particular powers, as is clear from what has been said above.^ Now an active universal power may be determined to the production of a particular effect in two ways. First, by a particular intermediary cause. Thus, the active power of a heavenly body is determined to the effect which is the begetting of a man by the particular power seated in the semen; just as the power of a universal proposition in a syllogism is deter- mined to a particular conclusion by the assumption of a particular prop- osition. Secondly, by an intellect which apprehends a particular form and produces it in the effect. Now the divine intellect knows not only its own essence, which is like a universal active power, nor only universal and first causes, but also all particular causes, as we have proved above.^ Therefore God can produce immediately every effect that is produced by any par- ticular agent. Further. Since accidents accompany the substantial principles of a thing, it follows that he who is the immediate cause of the substance is able to produce in a thing whatever accompanies the substance; for the generator, which gives the form, gives likewise all the resultant properties and movements. Now we have shown that God, in the original production of things, brought all things into being immediately by creation.^ There- fore He can move any being to a given effect independently of intermediate causes. Besides. The order of things comes from God into things according as it is preknown in His intellect. So, too, in human affairs we see that the head of the state imposes on the citizens the order preconceived by him. Now ^ Ch. 83 and 88. ^ C. G., II, 23^. ® Ch. 67. C. G., I, 50. " C. G., II, 21. 196 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES the divine intellect is not necessarily limited to this particular order, so as to be unable to conceive any other, since even we are able by our intellect to apprehend another order; for it is intelligible to us that God might make a man of earth and not of seed. Therefore God can produce an effect with- out the inferior causes to which that effect is proper. Moreover. Although the order imposed on things by the divine provi- dence reflects the divine goodness in its own particular way, yet it does not reflect it perfectly, since the creature’s goodness does not reach to an equality with the goodness of God. Now, that which is not perfectly rep- resented by one copy can be represented again in some other way. Now the representation of the divine goodness in things is the end of their pro- duction by God, as was above stated.^ Therefore God’s will is not confined to this particular order of causes and effects, as though He could not choose to produce an effect in lower things immediately and independently of other causes. Further. All creatures are more subject to God than man’s body is to his soul; for the soul is proportionate to the body as its form, whereas God surpasses all proportion to the creature. Now sometimes, when the soul imagines a thing and is strongly drawn towards it, there results a change in the body in the direction of health or sickness, independently of any action on the part of those bodily principles whose natural function is to cause sickness or health in the body. Much more, therefore, by the divine will can an effect be produced in creatures independently of the causes which in the course of nature produce that effect naturally. Further. According to the order of nature, the active powers of the ele- ments are subordinate to the active powers of the heavenly bodies. Now the power of a heavenly body sometimes produces an effect proper to elemental powers without the action of an element. Thus the sun heats without the action of fire. Much more, therefore, can the power of God produce the ef- fects of created causes without any action on their part. If, however, anyone were to say that, since God has implanted this order in things, He cannot produce in them effects apart from their proper causes without a change in Himself, he can be answered by referring to the very nature of things. For the order imposed on things by God is in terms of that which is wont to occur in things for the most pari, but it is not every- where in terms of what always occurs, because many natural causes pro- duce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since some- times (though seldom) it happens otherwise, whether because of a de- fect in the power of the agent, or through indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency: as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man. Yet the order of providence does not therefore fail or change, because the fact itself that the natural order, established according to what happens for the most part, may at times fail, is subject to the divine provi- ^Ch. Ip. GOD DOES NOT ACT CONTRARY TO NATURE 197 dence. Therefore, if it be possible for the natural order to be changed by a created power from that which is of frequent to that which is of rare occur- rence, without any change in the divine providence, much more can the divine power at times work apart from the order assigned by God to nature, with- out prejudice to His providence. In fact, He does this sometimes in order to manifest His power. For by no other means can it better be made mani- fest that all nature is subject to the divine will, than by the fact that He sometimes works independently of the order of nature; for this shows that the order of things proceeded from Him, not through natural necessity, but through His free will. Nor should it be deemed a slight argument that God should produce something in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men, since it was shown above that all corporeal creatures are in some way directed to the intellectual nature as their end,^ while the end of the intellectual creature itself is the knowledge of God, as we have proved.^ It is not strange, then, if some change be wrought in a corporeal substance, in order to bring the intellectual nature to the knowledge of God. CHAPTER C THAT WHAT GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF NATURE IS NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE It would seem, however, necessary to observe that, although God some- times does something outside the order assigned to things, yet He does nothing contrary to nature. For since God is pure act, whereas all other things have some admixture of potentiality, it follows that God must be compared to all things as the mover to the thing moved, and as the active to the potential. Now, when that which in the natural order is in potentiality with regard to a certain agent, is acted upon by that agent, this is not contrary to nature absolutely, although sometimes it is contrary to that particular form which is cor- rupted by such action. Thus when fire is generated, and air is corrupted through the action of the fire, both generation and corruption are natural. Consequently, whatever is done by God in created things is not contrary to nature, although it may seem to be contrary to the order proper to a particular nature. Again. Since God is the first agent, as we have proved,^ all subsequent agents are as His instruments. Now the purpose of an instrument is to serve the action of the principal agent while it is being moved by it. Hence the matter and form of an instrument must be such as to be suitable for the action intended by the principal agent. Hence it is not contrary, but most ^Ch. 22. "Ch. 25. ^C. G., I, 13. 198 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES becoming, to the nature of an instrument to be moved by the principal agent. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature that creatures be moved by God in any way whatsoever, since they were made that they might serve Him. Further. Even in corporeal agents we observe that the movements re- sulting in inferior bodies from the influence of higher bodies are neither violent nor unnatural, although they may seem unsuited to the natural movement which the inferior body has as proper to its form. For we do not say that the ebb and flow of the sea is a violent movement just because it results from the influence of a heavenly body, even though the natural movement of water is only in one direction, namely, toward the center. Much less, therefore, can whatsoever God does in any creature be described as violent or unnatural. Besides. The first measure of every essence and nature is God, just as He is the first being, which is the cause of being in all other things. Since, then, we judge of everything by its measure, we must regard as natural to a thing that whereby it is conformed 'to its measure. Hence, whatever is implanted in a thing by God is natural to that thing. Therefore, if some- thing else be implanted by God in that same thing, it will not be unnatural. Moreover. All creatures are compared to God as works of art are com- pared to the artist, as appears from what we have already said."^ Hence all nature is the work of the divine art. Now it is not inconsistent with a work of art that the artist make some alteration in his work, even after giving it its first form. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature if God does something in natural things other than that which occurs in the ordi- nary course of nature. Therefore Augustine says: Godj the creator and author of all natures, does nothing unnatural; because, to each thing that is natural which is caused by Him from whom is all measure, number and order in nature? CHAPTER Cl ON MIRACLES These works, however, that are sometimes done by God outside the usual order assigned to things are wont to be called miracles, because we are astonished [admiramur] at a thing when we see an effect without know- ing the cause. And since at times one and the same cause is known to some and unknown to others, it happens that, of several who see an effect, some are astonished and some not. Thus an astronomer is not astonished when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows the cause; whereas one who is ignorant of this science must needs wonder, since he knows not the cause. G., II, 24. "Contra Faust., XXVI, 3 (PL 42, 480). GOD AND MIRACLES 199 There foie it is wonderful to the latter but not to the former. Accordingly, a thing is wonderful absolutely when its cause is hidden absolutely. This is what we mean by a miracle, something, namely, that is wonderful in itself and not only in respect of this person or that. Now God is the cause which is absolutely hidden from every man. For we have proved above that in this state of life no man can comprehend Him by his intellect.^ Therefore, properly speaking, miracles are works done by God outside the order usually observed in things. Of these miracles there are various degrees and orders. The highest degree in miracles comprises those works wherein something is done by God that nature can never do. For instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still, that the sea be divided and make way to passers by. Among these also there is a certain order. For the greater the work done by God, and the further it is removed from the capability of nature, the greater the miracle. Thus it is a greater miracle that the sun recede than that the waters be divided. The second degree in miracles belongs to those whereby God does some- thing that nature can do, but not in the same order. Thus it is a work of nature that an animal live, see and walk; but that an animal live after being dead, see after being blind, walk after being lame, this nature can- not do, but God does these things sometimes by a miracle. Among these miracles, also, there are degrees, according as the thing done is further removed from the power of nature. In the third degree of miracles God does what is wont to be done by the operation of nature, but without the operation of the natural prin- ciples: e,g., when by the power of God a man is cured of a fever that nature is able to cure; or when it rains without the operation of the prin- ciples of nature. CHAPTER CII THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES From what has been said it can be shown that God alone can work miracles. For whatever is entirely subject to an order cannot do anything above that order. Now every creature is placed under the order established in things by God. Therefore no creature can do anything above that order (which is to work miracles). Again. When a finite power produces the proper effect to which it is limited, it is not a miracle although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand that power. Thus to an ignorant person it is wonder- ^Ch. 47. 200 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fill that the magnet attracts iron, or that a small fish should stop a ship. Now every creature’s power is limited to one definite effect, or to a few. Therefore, whatever is done by the power of any creature whatsoever can- not properly be described as a miracle, although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand the power of that creature. But that which is done by the power of God, which, being infinite, is incomprehensible, is truly a miracle. Moreover. Every creature requires in its action a subject on which to act; for it belongs to God alone to make something out of nothing, as we proved above.^ Now that which requires a subject in its action can do only those things to which that subject is in potentiality; for the agent acts on the subject in order to bring it from potentiality to act. Therefore, just as a creature cannot create, so neither can it do in a thing save what is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles wrought by God, something is done in a thing that is not in that thing’s capacity; for in- stance, that the dead live again, that the sun recede, that two bodies occupy the same place. Therefore such miracles cannot be wrought by any created power. Further. The subject acted upon is ordered both to the agent that re- duces it from potentiality to act, and to the act to which it is reduced. Accordingly, just as any particular subject is in potentiality to some deter- minate act, and not to any act, so it cannot be brought from potentiality to a determinate act except by some determinate agent; for agents must needs differ according as they introduce different acts. Thus, whereas air is potentially fire or water, one agent makes it to be actually fire, and another makes it to be actually water. Likewise it is clear that corporeal matter is not brought to a perfect actuality by the sole action of a uni- versal power, but there must be some proper agent by which the action of the universal power is determined to a particular effect. Nevertheless, cor- poreal matter can be brought to a less perfect actuality by the universal power alone, without a particular agent. Thus perfect animals are not formed by the power of a heavenly body alone, but determinate seed is necessary; whereas the power of a heavenly body, without any seed, suf- fices for the generation of certain imperfect animals. Accordingly, effects produced among these lower things, if they be of a nature to be wrought by universal higher causes, without the action of particular inferior causes, can be produced in this way without any' miracle. Thus it is not a miracle that animals be formed from putrefaction without seed. But if they be not of a nature to be produced by superior causes alone, then particular in- ferior causes are required for their perfect formation. Now there is no miracle if an effect be produced by a higher cause by means of its proper principles. Therefore it is altogether impossible for miracles to be wrought by the power of the higher creatures. ^ C. G., 11 , 1 6 and 21. SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES AND WONDERS 201 Moreover. Seemingly these amount to the same: — the production of a work out of a subject; — the production of that to which the subject is in potentiality; — and the orderly production of something through definite intermediary stages. Because a subject is not in proximate potentiality to the ultimate effect, until it has arrived at the middle stage. Thus food is not in immediate potentiality flesh, but only when it is changed into blood. Now every creature needs a subject in order to produce something, nor can it produce other than that to which the subject is in potentiality, as we have shown. Therefore it cannot produce anything without bringing the subject to actuality through definite intervening stages. Therefore miracles, which consist in something being done without observing the order in which it is naturally feasible, cannot be worked by the power of a creature. Also. There is a natural order to be observed in the various kinds of movement. The first is local movement, and hence it is the cause of other movements, because in every genus that which is first is the cause of all that follows in that genus. Now every effect that is produced in this lower world must needs result from some generation or alteration. Consequently, it must be caused through something that is moved locally, if it be the effect of an incorporeal agent which, properly speaking, is incapable of local movement. But no effect that is caused by incorporeal substances through corporeal instruments is a miracle, since bodies have no operation that is not natural. Therefore, created incorporeal substances cannot work miracles by their own power; and much less corporeal substances^ whose every action is natural. Therefore it belongs to God alone to work miracles. For He is above the order which contains all things, as one from whose providence the whole of this order is derived. Moreover, His power, being absolutely infinite, is not determined to any special effect, nor to the producing of its effect in any particular way or order. Therefore it is said of God in the Psalm (cxxxv. 4) : Who alone doth great wonders. CHAPTER CHI HOW SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO WONDERS WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TRULY MIRACLES Now it was the opinion of Avicenna that matter is more obedient to sepa- rate substances in the production of an effect than to contrary agents in matter. Hence he states that sometimes, at the apprehension of the afore- said substances, an effect ensues in this lower world, such as rain, or the healing of a sick person, without any corporeal agent intervening. 202 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES He regarded as a sign of this the fact that when our soul is of strong imagination, the body is affected by mere thought aloned Thus a man, while walking on a plank at a height, easily falls, because through fear he imagines himself to fall; whereas he would not fall, were the plank placed on the ground, so that he would not fear to fall. It is also clear that the body is heated at a mere apprehension of the soul, for instance in lustful or angry persons; or again, becomes cold, as happens in those who are seized with fear. Sometimes, too, through a strong apprehension, it is inclined to some illness, for instance fever or even leprosy. In this way, says he, if the soul be pure and not subject to the passions of the body, and strong of apprehension, not only its own body is obedient to its apprehension, but even external bodies; so much so that a sick man is healed, or something similar occurs, at its mere apprehension. He holds this to be the cause of fascination, namely, because a certain person’s soul, being deeply affected with malevolence, exercises a baneful influence on some- one, especially on a child, who by reason of the softness of the body is most impressionable. Hence he maintains that much more, without the action of a corporeal agent, do certain effects result in these lower bodies, at the apprehension of the separate substances, which he considers to be the souls or movers of the spheres. This theory is consistent enough with other opinions of his.^ For he holds that all substantial forms emanate from a separate substance into these lower bodies, and that corporeal agents merely dispose matter to receive the impression of the separate agent. But this is untrue according to the teaching of Aristotle, who proves that the forms which are in matter do not come from separate forms, but from forms in matter; for thus it is that we find a likeness between the maker and the thing made.'* Moreover. The comparison with the soul’s impression on the body does not advance his theory very much. For no impression is made on the body as a result of an apprehension, unless united to the apprehension there be some emotion, as of joy, fear, desire, or of some other passion. Now these passions are accompanied by a certain definite movement of the heart, from which there results a change in the entire body, either in terms of local motion, or in terms of some alteration. Hence it still remains that the apprehension of a spiritual substance does not affect the body, except by means of local movement. As to his remark about fascination, this does not happen because the apprehension of one affects immediately the body of another; but because the apprehension affects the conjoined body through the movement of the heart, the influence of which reaches even to the eye, which is able to work evil on an external object, especially if it be easily impressionable, — as the eye of a woman in her menses infects a mirror.^ ^Avicenna, De An,, IV, 4 (fol. 2ovb). ® Avicenna, Meiaph., IX, 5 (fol. io5rv). ^ Met aph., VI, 8 (1033b 26). ^ De Somno, 11 (4S9b 29). SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES AND WONDERS 203 Accordingly, except through the local movement of a body, a created spiritual substance cannot, by its own power, induce any form into cor- poreal matter, as though matter, obedient to it, were to assume the act of some form. For it is in the power of a created spiritual substance that a body should be obedient to it in respect of local movement. Now by mov- ing a particular body locally, it applies certain natural forces to the pro- duction of certain effects ; just as the art of the smith applies fire to make the iron malleable. But this is not miraculous, properly speaking. It fol- lows, therefore, that created spiritual substances do not work miracles by their own power. And I say by their own power, because nothing prevents these substances from working miracles in so far as they work by divine power. This indeed may be seen from the fact that, as Gregory states, one order of angels is especially deputed to the working of miracles.^ He also says that certain saints sometimes work miracles by power ^ and not merely by intercession.^ We must observe, however, that when angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce certain definite effects, they employ them as instruments, just as a physician uses certain herbs as instruments for the purpose of healing. Now from an instrument there proceeds an effect, not only in proportion to its power, but also in excess thereof, inasmuch as it acts by the power of the principal agent. Thus a saw or an axe could not produce a bedstead except through being applied by craftsmanship for that particular effect ; nor could natural heat produce flesh, except by the power of the vegetative soul that employs it as an instrument. It is therefore fit- ting that certain higher effects should result from these same natural things, as a consequence of the fact that spiritual substances employ them as instru- ments. Accordingly, although such effects cannot be called miracles absolutely, since they result from natural causes, yet they are wonderful to us in two ways. First, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects by spiritual substances in a way that is strange to us; even so the works of skillful craftsmen seem wonderful to others who do not see how the work is done. — Secondly, because the natural causes employed for the production of certain effects are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances; and this comes nearer to the nature of a miracle. ^ Cf. ch. 80. ^Dial, 11 , 31 (PL 66, 190). 204 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER CIV THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DO NOT RESULT ONLY FROM THE INFLUENCE OF HEAVENLY BODIES There were some who said that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done, not by certain spiritual substance’s, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practice works of this kind observe the position of the stars. They are also assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power. But this is in contradiction with the apparitions [in the works of ma- gicians]. For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above,^ it is impossible for effects- that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature; for instance, answers are given about stolen goods, and the like, and this could not be done except through an intellect. Therefore it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body. Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear speaking to men and reasoning about various matters. Therefore such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies. If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present, not accord- ing to the external sense, but only according to the imagination: — this is, in the first place, evidently untrue. For imaginary forms do not appear to anyone to be actual things unless he is alienated from his external senses; since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality, ex- cept the natural judgments of the senses be fettered. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary. Besides. No imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired capability of his intellect. This is evident in dreams, since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it fre- quently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the capability of his intellect, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes true answers are given in mat- " Ch. 84. MAGIC AND THE HEAVENLY BODIES 205 ters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary, or at least this is the work of some higher intellect, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings. Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect, since it is natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to any- thing, cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works. For instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are un- locked, that a certain man becomes invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore this cannot be done by the power of the heavenly bodies. Further. The reception, through the power of the heavenly bodies, of that which follows, implies the reception of what precedes. Now movement of its very nature follows from having a soul, since it is proper to animate things to move themselves. Therefore it is impossible for an inanimate being to be moved by itself, through the power of a heavenly body. Yet it is stated that by the magic art a statue is made to move of itself, or to speak. Therefore it is not possible for the effects of the magic art to be caused by the power of a heavenly body. And if it be said that the statue in question is endowed with some vital principle by the power of the heavenly bodies, this is impossible. For the principle of life in all living things is the substantial form, because, as the Philosopher says, in living things to be is to live?- Now it is impossible for anything to receive anew a substantial form, unless it lose the form which it had previously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of an- other? But in the making of a statue no substantial form is discarded, and there is only a change of shape, which is an accident, since the form of copper or something of the kind remains. Therefore the statue in question cannot possibly be endowed with some vital principle. Further. If anything is moved by a principle of life, it is necessarily en- dowed with sense, for the principle of movement is sensation or under- standing. But understanding is not found without sensation in generable and corruptible things. Now there cannot be sense where there is not touch, nor touch, without an organ of mean temperature. Such a temperature, how- ever, is not found in the stone or wax or metal out of which the statue is made. It is not possible, therefore, that statues of this sort should be moved by a principle of life. Besides. Perfect living beings are generated not only by a celestial power, but also from seed, for man and the sun generate man;^ and such as are generated by a celestial power alone without seed, are animals formed by putrefaction, belonging to a lower grade than the others. Ac- cordingly, if these statues be endowed with a vital principle by a celestial ^De An., II, 4 (4isb*i3). (194b 14). Aristotle, Phys., Ill, 8 (208a 10). Op. cit., II, 2 2o6 the SUMMA contra GENTILES power alone, so as to move themselves, it follows that they belong to the lowest grade of animals. And yet this would be false if they worked by an intrinsic principle of life, since among their operations some are of a high degree, for they give answers about hidden things. Therefore it is not pos- sible that their operations and movements proceed from a principle of life. Again. We sometimes find a natural effect produced by the power of the heavenly bodies without the operation of art. Thus, although one may try to produce frogs, or something of the kind, by means of some artifice, frogs do happen to be produced without any artifice. Consequently, if these statues, that are made by necromancy, are endowed with a vital principle by the power of heavenly bodies, it will be possible for them to be formed without the operation of art. But this is not the case. Therefore it is evi- dent that such statues have not a principle of life, nor are they moved by the power of the heavenly bodies. Hereby is removed the opinion of Hermes who, according to Augustine, expressed himself thus: As God is the cause of the heavenly gods, so man fashions the gods that reside in temples, satisfied to live near men. 1 refer to those animated statues, endowed with sense and spirit, that do great and wonderful things, statues gifted with knowledge of the future, and that foretell by dreams and many other things; who afflict men with ailments and heal them, who bring sorrow and joy to them according to their merits} This opinion is also refuted by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm (cxxxiv. 15 seqq.) : The idols of the Gentiles are silver and gold, the works of men^s hands. They have a mouth but they speak not . . . neither is there any breath in their mouths. Yet we must not absolutely deny the possibility of some kind of efficacy being in these things through the power of the heavenly bodies; but only for such effects as some lower bodies are able to cause by the power of the heavenly bodies. CHAPTER CV WHENCE THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DERIVE THEIR EFFICACY <• It remains for us to inquire whence the magic arts derive their efficacy: a question that will present no difficulty if we consider their mode of opera- tion. For in the practice of their art they make use of certain significative words in order to produce certain definite effects. Now, words, in so far as ^De Civit.JDei, VIII, 23 (PL 41, 247). THE CAUSE OF THE EFFICACY OF MAGIC 207 they signify something, have no power except as derived from some intel- lect, either of the speaker, or of the person to whom they are spoken: from the intellect of the speaker, as when an intellect is of such great power that it can cause things by its mere thought, which the voice serves to convey, as it were, to the things that are to be produced; from the in- tellect of the person to whom the words are addressed, as when the hearer is induced to do some particular thing when his intellect receives the sig- nification of those words. Now it cannot be said that these significative words uttered by magicians derive any efficacy from the intellect of the speaker. For since power follows essence, diversity of power indicates di- versity of essential principles. But man’s intellect is invariably of such a disposition that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it is able by its mere thought to cause things. Consequently, if there be any men that are able of their own power to transform things by words ex- pressive of their thoughts, they will belong to another species, and it would be an equivocation to call them men. Further. By learning we acquire, not the power to do a thing, but the knowledge of how to do it. Yet some, by learning, are rendered able to perform these magic works. Therefore they must have only knowledge, 'and not the power, to produce these effects. But suppose someone were to say that these men, by the influence of the stars, are born with the aforesaid power, while others are excluded from it; so that however much the others, who are born without this power, may be instructed, they cannot succeed in performing these works. To this we must reply, first that, as was shown above,^ the heavenly bodies cannot make an impression on the intellect. Therefore a man’s intellect cannot, through the influence of. the stars, receive a power whereby the vocal ex- pression of its thoughts is productive of something. And if it be said that the imagination likewise produces an effect in the utterance of significative words, and that the heavenly bodies can act on the imagination, since its operation is performed by a bodily organ: — this does not apply to all the results produced by this art. For we have shown that these effects cannot all be produced by the power of the stars Neither, therefore, can anyone by the power of the stars receive the power to produce these effects. Consequently, it follows that these effects are accomplished by an in- tellect to whom the discourse of the person- uttering these words is ad- dressed. We have an indication of this in the fact that the significative words employed by the magician are invocations, supplications, adjura- tions, or even commands, as though he were addressing another. Again. Certain characters and definite figures are employed in the ob- servances of this art. Now a figure cannot be the principle of either action or passion, or else, mathematical bodies would be active and passive, There- " Ch. 84. Ch, 104. 208 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fore matter cannot, by deiSnite figures, be disposed to receive a certain natural effect. Therefore magicians do not employ figures as dispositions. It remains, then, that they employ them only as signs, for there is no third solution. But we make signs only to other intelligent beings. Therefore the magic arts derive their efficacy from another intelligent being, to whom the magician’s words are addressed. And if someone were to say that certain figures are appropriated to certain heavenly bodies, and hence that the lower bodies are determined by certain figures to receive the impressions of certain heavenly bodies: — this does not seem to be a reasonable statement. For the patient is not directed to receive the impression of the agent, except through being in potentiality. Hence those things alone determine it to receive a particular impression, that cause it to be somehow in potentiality. Now figures do not cause matter to be in potentiality to any particular form, because a figure, as such, abstracts from all matter and sensible forms, since it is something mathematical. Therefore a body is not determined by figures or characters to receive the influence of a heavenly body. Besides. Certain figures are appropriated to the heavenly bodies as their effects, for the figures of the lower bodies are caused by heavenly bodies. Now, the aforesaid arts do not use characters or figures as produced by the heavenly bodies; in fact, they are produced by the man practicing the art. Therefore the appropriation of figures to certain heavenly bodies has nothing to do with the question. Further. As we have shown, matter is in no way disposed to form by means of figures. Hence the bodies on* which these figures are impressed are as capable of receiving the influence of heavenly bodies as are other bodies of the same species. Now, that an agent act on one rather than another of several equally disposed things, by reason of something appropriated to be found in it, is a mark of its operating, not by natural necessity, but by choice. Hence it is clear that these arts which employ figures in order to produce certain effects derive their efficacy, not from something that acts by nature, but from some intellectual substance that acts through its in- tellect. This is also proved by the very name character which they apply to these figures; for a character is a sign. Thereby we are given to under- stand that they employ these figures merely as signs shown to some intel- lectual nature. Since, however, in the products of art, figures are like specific forms, someone might say that there is no reason why, through the influence of a heavenly body, some ppwer should not shape the figure that gives an image its species, not indeed as a figure, but as specifying the product of art, which acquires this power from the stars. But as to the letters that form an inscription on a statue, and other characters, nothing else can be said of them, but that they are signs. Therefore they are directed to only THE CAUSE OF MAGIC IS NOT VIRTUOUS 209 some intellect. ^This is also proved by the sacrifices, prostrations and other similar practices, which can be nothing else than signs of reverence shown to an intellectual nature. CHAPTER CVI THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH GIVES EFFICACY TO THE PRACTICES OF MAGIC IS NOT GOOD ACCORDING TO VIRTUE We must furthermore inquire what is this intellectual nature by whose power these works are done. And in the first place it is plain that it is not good and praiseworthy. For it is the mark of an ill-disposed intellect to countenance things con- trary to virtue. Now this is what happens in these arts, for they are often employed in order' to further adultery, theft, murder and like malefices; and therefore those who practice these arts are called malefics. Therefore the intellectual nature on whose assistance these arts depend is not well disposed according to virtue. Again. It is not the mark of an intellect well disposed according to virtue, to befriend and assist men of evil life, rather than any upright man. Now those who practice these arts are generally men of evil life. Therefore the intellectual nature from whose assistance these arts derive their efficacy is not well disposed according to virtue. Further. It is the mark of a well disposed intellect to guide men towards those goods that are proper to man, namely, the goods of reason. Conse- quently, to lead men away from these, and to draw men to goods of the least worth, shows a mind of evil disposition. Now by these arts men progress, not in the goods of reason, which are the sciences and the virtues, but in goods of least account, such as the discovery of stolen goods, the capture of thieves, and so forth. Therefore the intellectual substances, whose assistance these arts, employ, are not well disposed according to virtue. Moreover. There is a certain deception and irrationality in the works of these arts; for they require a man indifferent to lustful pleasure, whereas they are frequently employed to further lustful intercourse. But there is nothing irrational or contradictory in the work of a well-disposed intellect. Therefore these arts do not employ the assistance of an intellect that is well disposed as to virtue. Besides. It is an ill-disposed intellect that is incited by the commission of crime to lend his assistance to another. But this is done in these arts, for we read of innocent children being slain by those who practice them. 210 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Therefore the persons by whose assistance such things are done have an evil intellect. Again. The proper good of the intellect is truth. Since, therefore, it be- longs to good to lead others to good, it belongs to any well-disposed intel- lect to lead others to truth. In the works of the magicians, however, many things are done by which men are mocked and deceived. The intellect whose help they use, therefore, is not morally well disposed. Further. A well-disposed intellect is allured by truth in which it takes delight, but not by lies. The magicians, however, in their invocations make use of various lies, whereby they allure those whose help they employ. For they threaten certain impossible things, as for instance that, unless the one who is called upon gives help, he who invokes him will shatter the heavens or displace the stars, as Porphyry narrates in his Letter to Ane- bontesA Those intellectual substances, therefore, with whose help the works of the magicians are performed, do not seem to be intellectually well disposed. ’Moreover. That a superior should be subject as an inferior to one that commands him, or that an inferior should allow himself’ to be invoked as a superior, would seem to indicate a person of an ill-disposed intellect. Now, magicians call upon those whose assistance they employ, as though these were their superiors, and as soon as they appear they command them as inferiors. In no way therefore do they appear to be of a well-disposed intellect. Hereby is removed the error of the pagans, who ascribed these works to the gods. CHAPTER evil THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHOSE ASSISTANCE IS EMPLOYED IN THE MAGIC ARTS IS NOT EVIL IN ITS NATURE It is impossible that there be natural malice in the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed in the practice oT the magic arts. For if a being tends to something by its nature, it tends to it not acci- dentally but essentially, as a heavy body tends downwards. Now if these intellectual substances are evil essentially, they tend to evil naturally and, consequently, not accidentally but essentially. But this is impossible, for we have proved that all things tend essentially to good, and nothing tends to evil except accidentally Therefore these intellectual substances are not naturally evil. Again. Everything that exists must be either cause or caused, or other- ^Cf. St. Augustine, De Civit, Dei^ X, ii (PL 41, 290). ®Cli. 3ff, 2II —BUT IT IS NOT EVIL IN NATURE wise there would be no order between it and other things. Hence the sub- stances in question are either causes only, or are also caused. If they be causes, since evil cannot cause a thing save accidentally, as was proved above,^ and since whatever is accidental must be traced to something es- sential, it follows that there must be in them something preceding their malice, whereby they are causes. Now in each thing it is the nature and essence that comes first. Therefore these substances are not evil by nature. The same follows if they be caused. For no agent acts except by intend- ing some good. Therefore evil cannot be the effect of a cause except acci- dentally. Now that which is caused only by accident cannot exist naturally, since every nature has a definite mode of coming into being. Therefore it is impossible for the substances in question to be evil by nature. Besides'. Every being has its own being according to the mode of its nature. Now to bCj as such, is good, a sign of which is that all things desire being. Consequently, if these substances were evil by nature, they would have no being. Moreover. We have proved that nothing can exist that does not have being from the first being and that the first being is the highest good.^ Since then every agent, as such, produces its like, whatever proceeds from the first being must be good. Therefore the aforesaid substances, in so far as they exist, and have a certain nature, cannot be evil. Further. There cannot possibly exist a thing that is altogether deprived of a participation in good; for since the good and the appetible are the same, if a thing were utterly without a share in good, there would be noth- ing appetible in it. But its own being is appetible to each thing. Conse- quently, if anything be described as evil in its nature, this must be, not be- cause it is absolutely evil, but because it is evil to this being, or in some respect. Thus poison is not evil absolutely, but to one to whom it is harm- ful; and hence one man’s poison is another man’s meat. Now this happens because the particular good that is proper to one is contrary to the par- ticular good that is proper to another; and thus heat, which is the good of fire, is contrary to cold, which is the good of water, and destroys it. Accordingly, that which by its nature is directed, not to this or that good, but to good absolutely, cannot possibly, even in this way, be called evil by its nature. Now such is every intellect, because its good is in its own opera- - tion, the object of which is the universal, and things that exist absolutely. Therefore no intellect can be evil in its nature, either absolutely or in rela- tion to something else. Again. In every intellectual subject,, the intellect moves the appetite, according to the order of nature, because the proper object of the will is the understood good. Now the good of the will consists in its following the intellect. Thus, in man, the good is that which is according to reason, and whatever is outside this is evil. It is according to a natural order, there- ^ Ch. 14. " C. G., 11 , IS. " C. G., I, 4x. 212 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES fore, that an intellectual substance wills the good. Consequently, it is im- possible that the intellectual substances, whose assistance is employed by magical arts, be naturally evil. Besides. Since the will tends naturally to the understood good, as its proper object and end, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally, evil, unless its intellect err naturally in its judgment of good. Now there can be no such intellect, because false judgments in the acts of the intellect are like monstrosities in natural things, for they are not according to, but outside, nature; since the good and natural end of the intellect is the knowledge of truth. Therefore there cannot be an intel- lect that is naturally deceived in its judgment of truth. Neither, conse- quently, is it possible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil. Further. No cognitive power fails in the knowledge of its object, save be- cause of being defective or corrupted, since by its very nature it is di- rected to the knowledge of that object. Thus the sight does not fail in the perception of color, unless the sight itself be injured. Now every defect and corruption is outside nature, because nature aims at the being and perfection of a thing. Therefore no cognitive power can fail in the right judgment of its object. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore there cannot be an intellect that errs naturally in the knowledge of truth. Neither, therefore, can any will fall away naturally from the good. This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (i Tim, iv. 4) : Every creature of God is good; and {Gen. i. 31) : God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. Hereby also is removed the error of the Manicheans who held that these intellectual substances, which we are wont to call demons or devils, are naturally evil. There is also removed the error described by Porphyry in his Letter to Anebontes, where he says that some are of the opinion that there is a genus of spirits, to whom it belongs to grant the prayers of magicians, spirits naturally deceitful, appearing under all kinds of' forms, pretending to be gods, or demons, or souls of the departed. It is they who cause all these effects that seem either good or evil. As to those effects that are really good, they give no assistance; in fact, they know nothing about them. But they counsel evil, and impugn and sometimes hinder those who are intent on leading a virtuous life; they are full of presumption and arro- gance; they delight in vanities, and are fascinated by flattery.'^ These words of Porphyry indicate clearly enough the malice of the demons, whose assistance the magic arts employ. In this alone are his words reprehensible that he states this malice to be natural to the demons. ^ Cf. St. Augustine, De Civil. Dei, X, ii (PL 41, 289). SIN IN THE DEMONS 213 CHAPTER CVIII ARGUMFNTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO SIN IN THE DEMONS Since malice in the demons is not natural to them, and since it has been proved that they are evil,^ it follows of necessity that the evil in them is voluntary. Accordingly, we must inquire how this can be, for it would seem altogether impossible. [1] For we proved in' the Second Book that no intellectual substance is naturally united to a body, except the human soul ^ (or according to some, the souls of the heavenly bodies,^ which it is unfitting to deem evil, since the movement of heavenly bodies is most orderly, and, in a sense, is the prin- ciple of the entire natural order) . Now every other cognitive power, except the intellect, employs animate corporeal organs. Therefore the substances in question cannot have any cognitive power besides the intellect. There- fore whatever they know they understand. Now one does not err in what one understands, since all error results from lack of understanding. There- fore there can be no error in the knowledge of such substances. But there can be no sin in the will without error, because the will always tends to the apprehended good ; so that unless there be error in the apprehension of good, there cannot be sin in the will. Therefore it seems that there can be no sin of the will in those substances. [2] Again. In man, sin occurs in the will about matters of which we have true knowledge in general, through the fact that the judgment of the reason is hindered by a passion that shackles the reason in a particular instance. But there can be no such passions in the demons, because passions belong to the sensitive part of the soul, which exercises no operation with- out a corporeal organ. Consequently, if these separate substances have a right knowledge in general, it is impossible for their will to tend to evil through defective knowledge in a particular matter. [3] Moreover. No cognitive power is deceived about its proper object, but only about one that is extraneous. Thus, the sight is not deceived in its judgment about colors; whereas deception may occur if a man judge by sight of taste, or of the species of a thing. Now the proper object of the in- tellect is the quiddity of a thing. Consequently, there can be no deception in the knowledge of the intellect, if it were to apprehend the mere quid- dities of things; but all deception of the intellect would seem to occur through its apprehending the forms of things mingled with phantasms, as is the case with man. But this mode of knowledge is not in intellectual sub- stances that are not united to bodies, since there can be no phantasms apart "C. G.,II, 90. "C. G., I, 70, ' Ch. 106. 214 the summa contra gentiles from a body. Therefore there can be no error in the knowledge of separate substances, and consequently neither can there be sin in the will. [4] Besides. In man, falsehood occurs in the work of the intellect com- posing and dividing, because the intellect does not apprehend the quiddity of a thing absolutely, but composes something with the apprehended thing. Now in the operation whereby the intellect apprehends the essence, false- hood does not occur except accidentally, in so far as, in this operation also, there is a certain mixture of the work of composing and dividing by the intellect. This happens because our intellect attains to the knowledge of the quiddity of a thing, not at once, but in a certain order of inquiry. Thus, at first we apprehend animal, then we divide it by opposite differ- ences, and setting one of these aside, add the other to the genus, until we come to the definition of the species. In this process there may be false- hood, if we take as a difference of the genus one that is not a difference of the genus. Now, to proceed thus to the knowledge of the essence of a thing belongs to an intellect that proceeds discursively from one thing to another by reasoning; but it is not becoming to separate intellectual sub- stances, as we proved above.^ Seemingly, therefore, there can be no error in the knowledge of such substances. Consequently, neither can there be sin in their will. [5] ^ Moreover. Since nothing desires other than its own good, it would seem impossible for that which has but one single good, to err in its appetite. For this reason, although faults happen in natural things through some defect occurring in the execution of the appetite, they never happen in the natural appetite. For a stone always tends to a lower place, whether it reach it or be hindered. Now, in man, sin happens in the act of appetite, because, as our nature is composed of spiritual and corporeal elements, there is more than one good in man; for one thing is his good in relation to the intellect, another is his good in relation to the senses, or even in relation to the body. But among these various things that are man’s goods, there is an order, so that what is of less account must be subordinate to that which is of more account. Hence, sin of the will occurs in man when, in defiance of this order, he desires that which is good for him in a restricted sense in preference to that which is good absolutely. But this composition and diversity of goods is not in separate substances. In fact, their every good is in relation to the intellect. Therefore, seemingly, no sin of the will is possible in them. " [6] Again. In man, sin of the will results from excess or deficiency, between which virtue stands. Consequently, in matters that do not admit of excess and deficiency, but only of the mean, the will cannot sin. Hence no man can sin in desiring justice, since justice itself is a kind of mean. Now separate substances cannot desire other than intellectual goods, for it is absurd to say that beings by nature incorporeal desire corporeal goods, or ^C, G,, II, loi. HOW SIN IN THE DEMONS IS POSSIBLE 215 that those which have no senses desire sensible goods. But in intellectual goods there can be no excess, for by their very nature they are a mean be- tween excess and deficiency. Thus the truth is a mean between two errors, one of which is on the side of excess, the other on that of deficiency (and that is why sensible and corporeal goods are in the mean in so far as they are according to reason). Therefore, seemingly, separate intellectual sub- stances cannot sin through the will. [7] Moreover. An incorporeal substance is, seemingly, more remote from defects than a corporeal substance. Now no defect can occur in those corporeal substances that are remote from contrariety, namely, the heavenly bodies. Much less, therefore, can any sin occur in separate sub- stances that are remote both from contrariety, and from matter, and from movement, which seem to be the sources of any possible defect. CHAPTER CIX THAT THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE DEMONS, AND HOW THIS IS POSSIBLE That sin of the will is in the demons is clear from the authority of Scrip- ture. For it is said (i John hi, 8) that the devil sinneth from the beginning] again it is said {Jo, viii. 44) that the devil is a liar, and the father of lies, and that he was a murderer from the beginning] and it is also said {Wis, ii. 24) that by the envy of the devil, death came into the world. If anyone chose to follow the opinions of the Platonists,^ he would easily explain the above arguments. For they assert that the demons are living beings with a body composed of air] and so, since they have a body united to them, there can be a sensitive part in them. Hence they ascribe to them passions which in us are a cause of sin, namely, anger, hate and the like. That is why Apuleius says that they are susceptive in mind. Moreover. Independently of their being united to bodies, as the Platonists hold, perhaps yet another kind of knowledge might be assigned to them besides that of the intellect. For, according to Plato, the sensitive soul also is incorruptible,^ so that it must have an operation in which the body does not concur. Consequently, nothing prevents the operation of the sensitive soul, and therefore the passions, from being in an intellectual substance, even though it be not united to a body. Hence the same source of sin is found in them as in us. But both of these explanations are impossible. For it has been proved above that, with the exception of human souls, no other intellectual sub- stances are united to bodies.^ And that the operations of the sensitive soul ^ Cf. St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, VII, i4ff. (PL 41, 239). " C, G., II, 90. " Cf. C. G,, II, 82. 2i6 the SUMMA contra GENTILES are impossible apart from a body is clear from the fact that when a sen- sorial organ is destroyed, one operation of sense is destroyed. Thus sight ceases with the loss of an eye. For this reason, as soon as the organ of touch, which is necessary to the constitution of the animal,^ is destroyed, the animal must die. In order to solve the question proposed,^ then, we must observe that, just as there is order among active causes, so too among final causes; so that, namely, the secondary end depends on the principal end, even as the secondary agent depends on the principal agent. Now a fault occurs in active causes when the secondary agent departs from the order of the principal agent; just as, when the leg fails to accomplish the movement commanded by the appetitive power through being crooked, the result is a limping gait. In the same way, therefore, in final causes also, when the secondary end is not subordinate to the principal end, there is sin in the will, the object of which is the good and the end. Now every will naturally desires that which is the proper good of the one willing, namely, perfect being, nor can it will anything contrary to this. Accordingly, no sin of the will can occur in anyone willing whose proper good is the ultimate end, which is not subordinate to any other end, and to which all other ends are subordinate. Such a willing being is God, whose being is the highest good, which is the ultimate end. Therefore in God there can be no sin of the will. But in every other voluntary being, whose proper good must needs be subordinate to another good, sin of the will can occur, if we consider such a voluntary being in his nature. For, though there be a natural inclination of the will in every voluntary being to will and love his own perfection, so that he cannot will anything contrary thereto, yet it is not naturally im- planted in him so that he directs his perfection to another end unfailingly; since the higher end is not his proper end, but that of the superior nature. Therefore it is left to his choice to direct his own perfection to a higher end. For beings endowed with a will differ from those which are not so endowed, in that the former direct themselves and what is theirs to an end, and are therefore said to have free choice; whereas the latter do not direct themselves to an end, but are directed by a higher agent, being, as it were, moved to the end by another’s action, and not by their own. Hence there could be sin in the will of a separate substance, from the fact that he did not direct his own good and perfection to his last end, but adhered to his own good as his end. And since rules of action must needs be taken from- the end, the consequence is that, through making himself his own end, he pretended to submit other things to his rule, and that his will was not subject to another higher than himself. But this belongs to God alone. In this sense then we are to understand that he desired to be equal to God [Isa. xiv. 14] ; not that his good might be equal to the divine Aristatle, De An., II, 2 (413b 4). ^l.e, the question in ch. 108. HOW SIN IN THE DEMONS IS POSSIBLE 217 good, because such a thing could not come into his mind, and because by desiring it he would be desiring not to be, since the distinction of species is according to the various degrees of things, as is clear from what has been said above. -Now, the will to rule others, and the refusal to submit one^s will to the ruling of a superior, is the will to be supreme and, so to say, not to be subject; which is the sin of pride. Hence it is fittingly said that the dernon s first sin was pride . — But as from one error concerning a principle various and manifold errors result, so from the first disorder in the demon’s will, there arose all manner of sins in his will: both of hate towards God as resisting his pride and most justly punishing his fault; and of envy towards man ; and of many such sins. We must also observe that, as the proper good of a thing is subordinate to several higher goods, he who wills is free to depart from the order of one superior, and not from the order of another that is either higher or lower than the former. Thus, a soldier who is subordinate both to his king and to his general, can direct his will to the good of the general, and not that of the king, or mce versa. But if the general depart from the order of the king, the will of the soldier will be good, if he depart from the will of his general, and direct his own will to his king; and the will of the soldier who obeys the will of his general against the will of his king will be evil, because the order of the lower principle depends on the order of the higher. Now, separate substances are not only subordinate to God, but one of them is subordinate to another, from the first to the last, as we proved in the Second Book.^ And since in every voluntary being under God there can be sin of the will, if such a being be considered in his nature, it was possible for one of the higher separate substances, or even the highest of all, to sin in his will. And this indeed is not improbable, for he would not have rested in his good as his end unless that good were very perfect. Possibly, then, some of the lower separate substances, of their own will, directed their good to him, thus departing from the divine order, and so sinned even as he did; while others, adhering by the movement of their will to the divine order, rightly departed from the order of the one who sinned, although he was higher than they according to the order of nature. In the Fourth Book we shall show how in either case their wills persevere in goodness or malice unchangeably.^ For this regards the punishments or rewards of the good or wicked. There is, however, this difference between a man and a separated sub- stance, that in one man there are several appetitive powers which are subordinated one to the other. But this is not the case with separate sub- stances, although one substance is subordinated to another. Now sin occurs in the will whenever the inferior appetite rebels. Just as sin, therefore, would be brought about in a separate substance either by its being turned aside from the divine order or because an inferior substance is turned aside " Cb. 97. ' C. G., 11, 95. ' C. G., IV, 92ff. 2i8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES from its order to a superior one (which latter remains under the divine order), so in a man sin occurs in two ways. It occurs in one way from the fact that the human will does not direct its proper good to God ; and this sin is common both to man and to separate substances. It occurs in another way from the fact that the good of the lower appetite is not regulated with regard to the higher, as for instance when we will the delights of the flesh, towards which the concupiscible appetite tends, not in accordance with the rule of reason. This kind of sin is not found in separate substances. CHAPTER CX SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS Consequently it is not difficult to solve the objections that have been raised.^ [1-4] For we are not forced to say that there was error in the intellect of the separate substance because he judged a good not to be good; the error consisted rather in not considering the higher good to which his own good should have been referred. For his will, through being intent on his own good, could be the cause of this lack of consideration, since it is free to the will to turn to this or that.^ [5] It is also clear that he desired but one good, and that was his own good; but his sin consisted in his disregarding the higher good, to which his own should have been directed. For just as in us there is sin through our desiring inferior goods, those, namely, of the body, outside the order of reason, so in the devil was there sin through his not referring his own good to the divine. ^ [6] It is also clear that he ignored the mean of virtue, inasmuch as he did not submit to the order of his superior. Thus he gave to himself more than his due, and to God less than was due to Him as the sovereign rule to whose order all things should be subject. Consequently, it is evident that in this sin the mean was not missed through excess of passion, but merely through inequality of justice, which is concerned with operations. For in separate substances there can be operations, but passions not at all. [7] Nor does it follow that, because in the higher bodies there can be no defects, there can be no sin in separate substances. Because bodies and all irrational beings are acted upon, and do not put themselves in action, for they have no dominion over their actions. Therefore they cannot escape the first rule that puts them in action and moves them, unless they be un- able to receive adequately the rectitude of the supreme rule, owing to an indisposition of matter. Therefore the higher bodies, in which there cannot be any indisposition of matter, can never fall from the rectitude of the ^ Ch. 108, " Cf. St, Thomas, De MolOf q. i, a. 3, RATIONAL CREATURES AND PROVIDENCE 219 first rule. But rational or intellectual substances are not only acted upon, but also move themselves to their own actions. And this applies to them all the more, according as their nature is the more perfect, since the more perfect a thing’s nature, the more perfect is its power for action. Conse- quently, the perfection of their nature does not. prevent the possibility of sin in them in the manner explained above, namely, through adhering to them- selves, and disregarding the order of the superior agent. CHAPTER CXI THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL MANNER From what has been proved up to now,^ it is evident that the divine providence extends to all things. And yet there must be some special aspect of providence to found in the case of intellectual and rational creatures, over and above other creatures. For they surpass other creatures both in the perfection of their nature, and in the excellence of their end: in the perfection of their nature, because the rational creature alone has domin- ion over its action, since it moves itself freely to act, whereas other crea- tures are moved to their proper actions rather than act themselves, as was proved above in the excellence of their end, because the intellectual crea- ture alone by its own operation attains to the last end of the universe, namely, by knowing and loving God, whereas other creatures cannot attain to the last end except by a certain participation of His likeness. Now, actions vary in kind according to the diversity of end and of their subject matter. Thus in art the operations vary according to the difference of end and matter; for a physician acts differently to expel sickness, and to con- firm health; and differently, again, in bodies of different temperament. In like manner, in the government of a state, a different kind of order must be observed according to the different status of the subjects, and according to the different ends to which they are directed; for there must be a different rule for soldiers to make them ready to fight, and for craftsmen that they may be able to work. Accordingly, there is one kind of order whereby ra- tional creatures are subject to the divine providence, and another whereby other creatures are subject to it. ^ Ch. 64ff. " Ch. 47. 220 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES CHAPTER CXII THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE GOVERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, AND OTHER CREATURES AS DIRECTED TO THEM In the first place, then, the very condition of the rational creature, as having dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake; whereas the condition of other things, that have no dominion over their actions, shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. For that which acts only when moved by another is like an instrument, whereas that which acts by itself is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required, not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it. Hence, whatever ds done for the care of instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end; whereas any action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly, intellectual creatures are ruled by God as though He cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures. Again. That which has dominion over its own act is free in its action, because he is free who is his own master whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act is subject to slavery. There- fore every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake; but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accord- ingly, the divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature. Moreover. Whenever things are directed to a certain end, if any of them are unable of themselves to attain to the end, they must needs be directed to those that attain to the end, which are directed to the end for their own sake. Thus the end of the army is victory, which the soldiers ob- tain by their own action in fighting, and they alone in the army are re- quired for their own sake; whereas all others, to whom other duties are assigned, such as the care of horses, the preparing of arms, are requisite for the sake of the soldiers of the army. Now it is clear from what has been said that God is the last end of the universe,^ Whom the intellectual natiir«e alone obtains in Himself, namely, by knowing and loving Him, as wa.s proved above. ^ Therefore the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake. ^Aristotle, Metaph., I, 2 (982b 26). ^Ch. 17. ®Ch. 25!!. RATIONAL CREATURES AND PROVIDENCE 221 Further. In every whole, the principal parts are requisite on their own account for the establishment of the whole, while the others are required for the preservation or betterment of the former. Now, of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they ap- proach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore the divine providence pro- vides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake. Besides. It is clear that all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, since the whole is not for the sake of the parts, but the parts for the sake of the whole. Now intellectual natures are more akin to the whole than other natures; because, in a sense, the intellectual substance is all things, inasmuch as by its intellect it is able to comprehend all things, whereas every other substance has only a particular participation of being. Consequently, God fittingly cares for other things for the sake of in- tellectual substances. Besides. Whatever happens to a thing in the course of nature happens to it naturally. Now we see that in the course of nature the intellectual sub- stance uses all others for its own sake: either for the perfection of the in- tellect, which sees the truth in them as in a mirror; or for the execution of its power and the development of its knowledge, in the same way as a craftsman develops the conception of his art in corporeal matter; or, again, to sustain the body that is united to the intellectual soul, as is the case in man. It is clear, therefore, that God cares for all things for the sake of intellectual substances. Moreover. If a man seeks something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because what is per se, is always] whereas if he seek a thing for the sake of something else, he does not of necessity seek it always but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it. Now, as we proved above, things derive their being from the divine will.^ Therefore whatever is always is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always is willed by God, not for its own sake, but for another's. Now intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible. They are, moreover, unchangeable, except in their choice. Therefore, intellectual substances are governed as it were for their own sake, while others for the sake of intellectual substances. The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion, since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, in so far as one part serves another. Thus in the human body, it is clear that the lungs be- long to the body's perfection, in that they serve the heart; and hence there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the whole animal. In like manner, that other natures are for the sake of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of ^ C. G., II, 23. 222 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES the universe; for without the things required for the perfection of the in- tellectual substance, the universe would not be complete. Nor again does the fact that individuals are for the sake of the species argue against what has been said. Because, through being directed to their species, they are directed also to the intellectual nature. For a corruptible thing is directed to man, not for the sake of only one individual man, but for the sake of the whole human species. Yet a corruptible thing could not serve the whole human species, except in terms of its own entire species. Hence the order whereby corruptible things are directed to man requires that individuals be directed to the species. When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by the divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also re- ferred to God and to the perfection of the universe. Accordingly, they are said to be provided for for their own sake, and others for them, because the goods bestowed on them by the divine providence are not given them for another’s profit. Wherea's those bestowed on others are in the divine plan in tended for the use of intellectual substances. Hence it is said {Deut. iv. 19) : Lest thou see the sun and the moon and the other stars, and being deceived by error, thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven] and {Ps. viii. 8) : Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen; moreover, the beasts also of the field] again {Wis. xii. 18): Thou, being master of power, judgest with tranquillity, and with great favor disposest of us. Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill brute animals; for by the divine providence they are intended for man’s use according to the order of nature. Hence it is not wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noe {Gen. ix. 3): As the green herbs I have de~ livered all flesh to you. And if any passages of Holy Scripture seem to forbid us to be cruel to brute animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young {Deut. xxii. 6], this is either to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings; or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another; or because of some signification, as the Apostle expounds [i Cor. ix. 9] the prohibition against muzzling the ox that treadeth the corn {Deut. xxv. 4] . RATIONAL CREATURES AND PROVIDENCE 223 CHAPTER CXIII THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS DIRECTED TO ITS ACTIONS BY GOD NOT ONLY IN WHAT BEFITS THE SPECIES, BUT ALSO IN WHAT BEFITS THE INDIVIDUAL ^ Hence it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God, not only in what befits the species, but also in what befits the individual. For everything is for the sake of its operation, since opera- tion is the ultimate perfection of a thing. Therefore each thing is directed to its action by God, according as it is subject to the divine providence. Now the rational creature is subject to the divine providence as being for its own sake governed and cared for, and not, as other corruptible creatures, for the sake of the species only. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, whereas the ra- tional creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear.^ Ac- cordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake, not only of the species, but also of the individual. Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species, have not the power to act or not to act; since whatever results from the species is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species, and we have no choice about what is natural. Hence, if man were directed in his actions only in reference to what befits the species, he would not have the power to act or not to act, but he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their attions, not only in accord with what befits the species, but also in accord with what befits the individual.. Moreover. As we have proved above, the divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least.^ Therefore whatever things have actions outside the inclination of the species, must in such actions receive from the divine providence a direction beyond that which pertains to the species. But many actions are found in the rational creature, for which the inclina- tion of the species is not sufficient; and a sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore the rational crea- ture must be directed to its actions by God, not only in accord with what befits the species, but also in accord with what befits the individual. Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity. For He made each creature such that He knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through His government. Now the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions, not only in accord with what befits the species, "Ch. 112. "Ch. 75if. 224 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES but also in accord with what befits the individual. For it has intellect and reason, and hence is able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times and places. Therefore the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions, not only in accord with what befits the species, but also in accord with what befits the individual. Besides. The^’ational creature is subject to the divine providence in such a way, that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence; so that it is capable of exercising providence and government in relation to others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they participate in providence only by being subject to it. Now through being capable of providence, a man can direct and govern his own actions also. Therefore the rational creature participates in the divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing; for it gov- erns itself in its own actions, and also other things. Now every lower provi- dence is subject to the divine providence as to the highest providence. Therefore the government of a rational creature’s acts, as personal acts, belongs to the divine providence. Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now the rational soul is capable of per- petuity, not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore the acts of a rational creature are directed by the divine providence, not only in so far as they belong to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal. Hence it is that, though all things are subject to the divine providence, yet Holy Scripture ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner, ac- cording to Ps. viii. 5: What is man that thou art mindful of him? and I Cor. ix. 9: Doth God take care of oxen? These things are said because God watches over man’s actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts. THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART Question VI ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY {In Eight Articles) Since therefore happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must as a consequence consider human acts in order to know by what acts we may obtain happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtain- ing it. But because operations and acts are concerned with what is singular, consequently, all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in the particular. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider, first, what is universal; and, secondly, what pertains to the particular.^ In treating of what is universal in human acts, the points that offer them- selves for our consideration are (i) human acts themselves; (2) their principles.^ Now of human acts some are proper to man, while others are common to man and animals. And since happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called pas- sions of the soul.^ The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (i) What makes a human act? (2 ) What distinguishes human acts? ^ And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, be- cause the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary. First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately;^ thirdly, those acts which are volun- tary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.^ Furthermore, because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, ac- cording to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first ^ 5 , J-., II-II. "Q. 49. ®Q. 22. ^Q. 18. ®Q,8. "Q. 17. 225 226 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6. Art. i consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circum- stances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary^ Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? (2) Whether in irrational animals? (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any act? (4) Whether violence can be done to the will? (5) Whether violence causes involuntari- ness? (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness? (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? First Article WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN HUMAN ACTS? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary which has its principle within itself j as Gregory of Nyssa,® Damascene^ and Aristotle^® declare. But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him, since man’s appetite is moved to act by the appetible object which is outside him, and which is as a mover unmoved}-'^ Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts. Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher proves that in animals no new move- ment arises that is not preceded by another and exterior motion.^^ But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from outside man, and therefore there is nothing volun- tary in them. Obj. 3. Further, he that acts voluntarily can act of himself. But this is not true of man, for it is written {Jo. xv. 5) : Without Me you can do noth- ing. Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts. On the contrary, Damascene says that the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation}^ Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts. / answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts is within the agent, or in that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone; whereas, when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move them- selves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved acts or is moved for an end, as was stated above, those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of move- ^ Q. 7- ® Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 728) . ® De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953)* Ill, I (iiiia 23). Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433b ii). ^Phys., VIII, 2 (253a ii). ^^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953). I, a. 2. 227 Q. 6. Art. i VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ment for an end. Now in order that a thing be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is so moved by an intrinsic principle that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless, the prin- ciple of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in some- thing else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Therefore such things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And, consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, i.e., that they act and that they act for an end, the movements and acts of such things are said to be voluntary; for the term voluntary signifies that their movements and acts are from their own in- clination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle,^® Greg- ory of Nyssa^^ and Damascene, the voluntary is defined not only as hav- ing a principle within the agent, but also as implying knowledge. There- fore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found. Reply Obj. i. Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless, it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle; for it is not of the nature of the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. — Nevertheless, it must be observed that a principle of move- ment may happen to be first in a genus, but not first absolutely. Thus, in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is the body of the heavens, which nevertheless is not the first mover abso- lutely, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic prin- ciple of the voluntary act, i,e., the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement. Reply Obj. 2. New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a mo- tion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an animabs senses are confronted with something sen- sible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing the approach of the stag through its movement, begins to be moved to- wards the stag. — Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animabs body, for example, through cold or heat; and when the body is thus affected by the motion of an exterior body, the sensitive appetite likewise, which is the power of a bodily organ, is moved ^Eth., m, I (iiiia 23). "®Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 728), Fide Orth., H, 24 (PG 94, 953). 228 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6 . Art. 2 accidentally. Thus, it happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as was stated above, for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement. Reply Obj. 3. God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; for every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with na- ture that the movement of nature be from God as the First Mover, inas- much as nature is an instrument of God moving it, so it is not contrary to the character of a voluntary act that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless, both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it belongs to the nature of both that they should proceed from a principle within the agent. Second Article WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For voluntary is so called from voluntas [will]. Now since the will is in the reason,^® it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them. Obj. 2. Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters of their actions; for they act not, but rather are they acted upon, as Damascene says.^^ Therefore there is no voluntary act in irrational animals. Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says that voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.^^ But neither praise nor blame befits the acts of irrational animals. Therefore such acts are not voluntary. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary?'^ The same is said by Gregory of Nyssa^^ and Damascene.^^ 1 answer that, As was stated above, it is of the nature of a volun- tary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowl- edge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold, perfect and imper- fect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And -such a knowledge of the end belongs to none but the rational nature. — But imperfect knowledge of Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). ^ De Fide Orth., II, 27 (PG 94, 960). Op. at., II, 24 (PG 94, 953). "^Eth., Ill, 2 (iiiib 8). Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 729). ^ De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 956) Q. 6. Art. 3 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 229 the end consists in a mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such a knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power. Consequently, perfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary in its perfect nature, inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the- end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. — But imperfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary in its imperfect nature, inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Therefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature, whereas the imperfect voluntary belongs also to irra- tional animals. Reply Ob j. i. The will is the name of the rational appetite, and conse- quently it cannot be in beings devoid of reason. But the term voluntary is derived from voluntas [will^^ and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge. Reply Oh], 2. The fact that man is master of his actions is due to his being able to deliberate about them; for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposites, the will can proceed to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as was stated above. Reply Ob], 3. Praise and blame attach to the voluntary act according to the perfect notion of the voluntary, which is not to be found in irrational animals. Third Article WHETHER THERE CAN BE VOLUNTARINESS WITHOUT ANY ACT? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will itself. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act. Obj. 2. Further, just as one is said to will by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to will. But not to will causes involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases. Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is part of the nature of the voluntary, as was stated above. But. knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act. On the contrary, The term voluntary is applied to that of which we 230 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 6. Art. 4 are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore, just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will. I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly, in which sense some- thing proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts: e,g,, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly, in which sense something proceeds from another through the fact that this other does not act. Thus the sinking of a ship is attributed to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer. — But we must take note that the cause of what follows from the failure to act is not always the agent as not acting, but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship, or if the ship’s helm were not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be attributed to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm. Since, then, by willing and acting, the will is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting, this not-willing and not-acting is im- puted to the will as though proceeding from it. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act, and this sometimes without an outward act, but with an interior act, for instance, when one wills not to act, and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act. Reply Obj. i.^We apply the term voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its agent, but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its non-agent. Reply Oh']. 2. Not to will is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of I’-do-not-will. Consequently, just as when I say I do not will to read, the sense is, / will not to read, so not to will to read is the same as to will not to read; and in this sense not to will causes involuntariness. — Secondly it is taken as a sentence, and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense not to will does not cause involuntariness. Reply Obj. 3. Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will, namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to will and to act. And then, just as not to will and not to act, when it is time to will and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider. Fourth Article WHETHER VIOLENCE CAN BE DONE TO THE WILL? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there ^ sornethmg, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him. Q. 6. Art. 4 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 231 ^ Obj. 2. Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active prin- ciple, when it is^ changed by it. But the will is a passive power, for it is a moved mover Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active prin- ciple, it seems that it is sometimes compelled. Obj. 3. Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature, as is clear of the will’s movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says.^^ Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled. On the contrary, Augustine says that what is done voluntarily is not done of necessity Now whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity, and consequently what is done by the will cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act. I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, to will; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power: e.g., to walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be exe- cuted by means of the power of locomotion. As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will’s command. But as to the will’s own proper act, vio- lence cannot be done to the will. The reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceed- ing from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently, it is contrary to the nature of the will’s own act that it should be subject to compulsion or violence; just as it is also contrary to the nature of the natural inclination or the movement of a stone to be moved upwards. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In like manner, a man may be dragged by force, but it is contrary to the very notion of violence that he be thus dragged of his own will. Reply Obj. i. God, Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. xxi. i: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it. But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will. Reply Obj. 2. It is not always a violent movement when a passive sub- ject is moved by its active principle, but only then when this is done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise, every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural and vio- lent; whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433a 9; b 16). ^ De Fide Orth., IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196). ^ De Civil, Dei, V, 10 (PL 41, 152), 232 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 6. Art. 5 of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner, when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary. Reply Obj. 3. That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, is nevertheless appre- hended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit. Fifth Article WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? We proceed thus to the Fijth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in terms of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as was shown above. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness. Obj. 2. Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene^'^ and the Philosopher^^ say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. Obj. 3. Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will, for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards, or when a man contorts his members in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. On the contrary. The Philosopher^^ and Damascene^® say that things done under compulsion are involuntary. I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas the violent is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowl- edge violence effects something against nature, so in things endowed with knowledge it effects something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural, and, in like manner, that which is against the will is said to be involuntary. Therefore violence causes involuntariness. Reply Obj. i. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said that not only the act which proceeds immediately from the will is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as was stated above. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence, and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness. De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953). ^ Eth., Ill, i (iiiia 20). (1109b 35). Fide Orth., 11 , 24 (PG 94, 953). ^ Ihid. Q. 6. Art. 6 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 233 Reply ObJ. 2. Just a,s that is said to be natural which is according to the inclination of nature, so that is said to be voluntary which is accord- ing to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active principle: e.g., it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle, because, namely, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle. Thus, the movement of the heavens is said to be natural by reason of the natural aptitude in the body of the heavens to receive such movement, although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner, an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wills to act; sec- ondly, in regard to passion, as when one wills to receive an action from another. Hence, when action is inflicted by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, this is not violent absolutely ; for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary. Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,^^ the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless in a way natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not absolutely, but relatively. — The same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his members in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. For this is violent relatively, i.e,, as to that particular member; but not absolutely, i.e,, as to the man himself. Sixth Article WHETHER FEAR CAUSES WHAT IS INVOLUNTARY ABSOLUTELY? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that fear causes what is involuntary abso- lutely. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will in the present, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes what is involuntary absolutely. Therefore fear too causes what is involuntary absolutely. Obj. 2. Further, that which is of itself such, remains such, whatever be added to it. Thus what is of itself hot, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear is involun- tary in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear it is involuntary. Obj. 3. Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect ; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such abso- lutely. Thus, what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some ^^Phys., VIII, 4 ( 2 S 4 h 14). 234 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6. Art. 6 respect, but what is necessary without qualification is necessary abso- lutely. But that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely; and it is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely. On the contrary j Gregory of Nyssa^^ and the Philosopher^^ say that such things as are done through fear are voluntary rather than involuntary . I answer that, As the Philosopher says,^^ and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book On Man,^^ such things as are done through fear are of a mixed character, being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared. But if the matter be considered rightly, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary absolutely, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be absolutely according as it is in act ; but according as it is only in the apprehension, it is not so absolutely, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars, and since the singular, as such, is here and now, that which is done is in act in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. Hence that which- is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; and thus, the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of danger, and so it is clear that it is voluntary absolutely. And hence it is that what is done out of fear has the nature of what is voluntary, because its principle is within. — But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this exists only according to our consideration of things; and consequently it is involun- tary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circum- stances of this or that particular case. Reply Obj. i. Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion; whereas what is done through fear becomes voluntary because the will is moved towards it, although not for its own sake, but because of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done because of some- thing else voluntary; since the voluntary is not only what we will for its own sake as an end, but also what we will for the sake of something else as an end. It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly, whereas in what is done through fear, the will ^"Cf. Nemesius, De Nat, Bom., XXX (PG- 40 , 721). Eth., Ill, i (iiioa 12). ^'Ibid. ^Ci. Nemesius, De Nat. Bom., XXX (PG 40, 721). Q. 6. Art. 7 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 235 does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa sayS;^^ in order to ex- clude things done through fear, a violent action is defined not only as one whose principle is from the outside, but with the addition, in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all; for the will of him that is in fear does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear. Reply Oh]. 2. Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them: e.g., a cold thing, or a white thing; but things that are such relatively vary according as they are compared with different things. F or what is big in comparison with one thing is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were, absolutely; But also for the sake of something else, as it were, relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing, which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another. Reply Obj. 3. That which is done through fear is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done; but it is involun- tary under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threat- ening. Consequently, this argument proves rather the opposite. Seventh Article WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — Objection i.'It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes involun- tariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too. Obj. 2. Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also. Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But con- cupiscence impairs knowledge, for the Philosopher says that delight, or the lust of pleasure, destroys the judgment of prudence. Therefore con- cupiscence causes involuntariness. On the contrary, Damascene says: The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret?'^ But neither of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness. 1 answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but, on the contrary, makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be volun- tary from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of con- ^^Ibid. (PG 40, 720). Eth., VI, 5 (1140b 12). ^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94 , , 953 )' 236 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 6. Art. 8 cupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary. Reply Obj. i. Fear has reference to evil, but concupiscence has refer- ence to good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good har- monizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than con- cupiscence to cause involuntariness. Reply Obj. 2. He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from con- cupiscence, e.g.j an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; rather his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Ac- cordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is in no way involun- tary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now. Reply Obj. 3. If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet, prop- erly speaking, it would not make the act involuntary, because in beings bereft of reason there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge is not com- pletely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken away en- tirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example, not to act or not to will, and in like m.anner not to consider; for the will can resist the pas- sion, as we shall state later on.^^ Eighth Article WHETHER IGNORANCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntari- ness. For the involuntary act deserves pardon, as Damascene says.^^ But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to i Cor. xiv. I j any man know not, he shall not be known. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness. Obj. 2. Further, every sin implies ignorance, according to Prov. xiv. 22: They err, that work evil. If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary; which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that every sin is voluntary Obj. 3. Further, involuntariness is not without sadness, as Damascene ®"Q, 10, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7. ""Te Fide Orth.,. 11 , 24 (PG 94, 953). Relig., XIV (PL 34, 133). ^De Vera Q. 6. Art. 8 VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 237 says.^^ But some things are done out of ignorance, but without sadness. For instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involun- tariness. On the contrary j Damascene^^ and the Philosopher^^ say that what is done through ignorance is involuntary. I answer that. If ignorance cause involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above. But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a three- fold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, concomitantly ; in another, consequently] in a third way, antecedently. Concomitantly^ when there is ignorance of what is done, but so that even if it were known, it would be cfone. For then ignorance does not induce one to will this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done and not known. Thus, in the example given, a man did indeed will to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher states,^® does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will; but it causes non-voluntariness, since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is consequent to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary; and this happens in two ways in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of the voluntary. First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance, as when a man wills not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin, according to Job xxi. 14: We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. And this is called affected ignorance. — Secondly, ignorance is said to be volun- tary, when it regards that which one can and ought to know, for in this sense not to act and not to will are said to be voluntary, as was stated above. And ignorance of this kind happens either when one does not ac- tually consider what one can and ought to consider (this is called igno- rance of evil choice, and arises from some passion or habit), or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have ; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one ought to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways ignorance is voluntary, it can- not cause what is involuntary absolutely. Nevertheless it causes involun- tariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowl- edge. Ignorance is antecedent to the act of the will when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would not will otherwise. ' ^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953)* ^Ihid. (mob 25). ^ Eth., Ill, I (iiioa i). Ibid. 238 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 6. Art. 8 Thus a man ifiay be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, with the result that he does that which he would not do if he knew of that circumstance. For instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes what is involuntary absolutely. From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. The sec- ond, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as was stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will. Question VII ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS {In Four Articles) We must now consider the circumstances of human acts, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) What is a circumstance? (2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts? (3) How many circumstances are there? (4) Which are the most important of them? First Article WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE IS AN ACCIDENT OE A HUMAN ACT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says that a circumstance is that from which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument} But oratorical argu- ments are derived principally from things pertaining to the substance of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments.^ Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. Obj. 2. Further, to be in is proper to an accident. But that which sur- rounds [cir cumstat'] is rather out than in. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human acts. Obj. 3. Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of acts. On the contrary y The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher calls the circum- stances particular things,^ i.e.y the particular conditions of each act. There- fore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts. / answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher,^ names are the signs of our concepts, it must needs be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge pro- ceeds from the more known to the less known. Accordingly, with us, names of more known things are transferred so as to signify less known things. Hence it is that, as is stated in Metaph. x.,^ the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally to all kinds of opposition; ^De Invent., I, 24 (p. 31^). ^Cicero, Topica, III (pp. 457-428). ^ Eth., Ill, I (mob 33). ^ Perih., I (i6a 3). . ® Aristotle, Metaph., IX, 4 (1055a 9). 239 240 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 7. Art. 2 and, in like manner, names that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies, which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that the name circumstance has passed from located things to human acts. Now in located things, that is said to surround something which is out- side it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. But what is outside a thing’s substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Therefore the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents. Reply Obj. i. The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and, secondly, from the circumstances of the act. So, too, a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or from motives of greed, or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted it is said pointedly that the orator adds strength to Ms argument^ as though this were something secondary. Reply Oh']. 2. A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing; and thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject; thus, whiteness is an accident of the musical inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. Arid in this sense circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts. Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, an accident is said to be the acci- dent of an accident from the fact that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation to one another: e.g., whiteness and music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are re- lated to one another, as when the subject receives one accident by means ‘of the other: for instance, a body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another, for we speak of color as being in the surface. Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances, that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent other- wise than through the act: e.g., place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act: e.g., the manner in which the act is done. Second Article WHETHER THEOLOGIANS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that theologians should not take note of Q. 7. Art. 2 CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 241 the circumstances of human acts. For theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts, for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, Uy that which is outside it, but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts. Obj. 2. Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents, and so the Philosopher says that no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophis- try. Theiefore the theologian has not to consider circumstances. Obj. 3. Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian’s business to consider circumstances. On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be invol- untary, according to Damascene’^ and Gregory of Nyssa.^ But involun- tariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theo- logian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian. / answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the theo- logian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers human acts inasmuch as man is thereby directed to happiness. Now everything that is directed to an end should be proportioned to that end. But acts are proportioned to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. — Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse; and this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on.^ — Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be vol- untary or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circum- stances, as was stated above.^® Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances. Reply Obj. i. The good that is directed to the en(^ is said to be useful, and this implies some kind of relation; and so the Philosopher says that the good in the genus ‘relation' is the useful. Now, in the genus of relation a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it; as may be seen in the expressions right and left, equal and unequal, and the like. Accord- ingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, noth- ing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to things that attend them extrinsically. ^Op. cit., V, 2 (1026b 3), De Fide Orth., 11 , 24 (PG 94, 953). ®Cf Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXI (PG 40, 724). °Q. 18, a. 10 and ii; q. 73, a. 7. 6, a. 8. ^ Eth., I, 6 (1096a 26). 242 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 7. Art. 3 Reply Obj, 2. Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such acci- dents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances, although, as we have stated above, they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art. Reply Obj, 3. The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the statesman and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and pas- sions. To the statesman and to the orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however, because where the orator persuades, the statesman judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs in all the aforesaid ways, since to him all the other arts are subservient; for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and statesman he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment. Third Article WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PROPERLY SET FORTH IN THE THIRD BOOK OF THEETF/C^? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethics iii.^^ For a circumstance of an act is described as some- thing outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. There- fore there are only two circumstances, namely, when and where, Obj, 2. Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circumstances are included under one, which is the mode of acting. Obj. 3. Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accord- ingly, neither who, nor why, nor about what, are circumstances, since who refers to the efficient cause, why to the final cause, and about what to the material cause. On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethics iii.^® / answer that, In his Rhetoric^^ Tully gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliiSf cur, quomodo, quando — Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when, ^Op. cit., Ill, I (iiiia 3). ^^Ibid. Invent., I, 24 (p. 32'’). Q. 7. Art. 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 243 For in acts we must take note of who did it, by what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how and when he did it. But Aristotle in Ethics iii.^^ adds yet another, namely, about what, which Tully includes in the circumstance what. The reason for this enumeration may be considered as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inas- much as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either as a measure, as time and place, or by qualifying the act, as the mode of acting. It touches the effect when we consider what is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance why] as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance about what] as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance who] and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance by what aids. Reply Obj. i. Time and place surround [circumstant] the act as a meas- ure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way ac- cording as they are extrinsic to the substance of the act. Reply Ob], 2. The mode well or ill is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a special circumstance: e.g., that a man walks fast or slowly, that he strikes hard or gently, and so forth. Reply Obj. 3. That condition of the cause on which the substance of the act depends is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another’s property, for this belongs to the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circum- stances which are considered in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act valiantly for the sake of the good of the virtue of fortitude, is not a circumstance; but it is if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance what] for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a cir- cumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him, heal him or harm him, these are circumstances. Fourth Article WHETHER THE MOST IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE WHY AND IN WHAT THE ACT CONSISTS? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i.- It would seem that these are not the most important cir- Ill, I (i Ilia 4). 244 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 7 . Art. 4 cumstances, namely, the circumstances why and in which the act is^ as is stated in Ethics iii.^^ For place and time seem to be the circumstances in which the act is, and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most important circumstances. Obj. 2. Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance. Obj, 3. Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the person that does it, while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. There- fore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest importance. On the contrary^ Gregory of Nyssa says that the most important cir- cumstances are why it is done and what is done}'^ I answer that, As we have stated above, acts are properly called human inasmuch as they are voluntary Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz., the circumstance why, and the second in importance is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz., the circumstance what he did. As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these. Reply Obj, 1, By those things in which the act is the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself.^® Therefore Gregory of Nyssa, as though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter^s term, in which the act is, substitutes, what is done?^ Reply Obj, 2. Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Therefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end. Reply Obj, 3. The person that dohs the act is the cause of that act, inas- much as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act. But the other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act. — As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act. (iiiia 18). "^Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXI (PG 40, 728). ""Q. I, a. I. III, I (iiiia 18). ^ Ci. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXI (PG 40, 728). Question VIII ON THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS {In Three Articles) We must now consider the different acts of the will, and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.^ Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end. We must therefore consider (i) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means.^ And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end: viz., volition^ enjoyment and intention^ we must consider (i) volition; (2) enjoyment;^ (3) intention.^ — Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (i) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will moved (3) How is it moved Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will is of good only? (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means? (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means by the same movement? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS OF GOOD ONLY? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power is relatfed to opposites, for instance, sight to white and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil. Obj, 2. Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite courses, according to the Philosopher.'^ But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason j as is stated in De Anima iii.® Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently it is not confined to good, but extends to evil. Obj, 3. Further, good and being are convertible. But the will is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we will not to walk, or not to speak; and, again, at times we will future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only. ^Q. 17. ®Q. 13 ®Q. II. ^Q. 12. 9, ®Q. 10. '^Metaph., VIII, 2 (1046b 8). ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). 24s 246 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 8. Art. i On the contrary y Dionysius says that evil is outside the scope of the will, and that all things desire good? 1 answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason for this is that the appetite is nothing else than the inclination of a being desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing in- clined. Since^ therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says that the good is that which all desire?^ But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellectual or rational appetite, called the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing, so the animal or the voluntary appetite tends to the apprehended good. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is -requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Therefore the Philosopher says that the end is a good, or an apparent good}^ Reply Ob], i. The same power is related to opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and to evil, but to good, by desiring it, and to evil, by shunning it. There- fore the actual desire of good is called will \volition\, meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now speaking of will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as nolition; and so just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil. Reply Obj. 2. A rational power is not directed to all opposites but to those which are contained under its proper object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now the object of the will is the good. There- fore the will can be directed to such opposites as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and the like; for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good. Reply Obj. 3. That which is not a being in nature is considered as a being in the reason, and so negations and privations are said to be beings of reason. In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good, and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Therefore the Philosopher says that to lack evil has the nature of a goodP ^De Div, Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 732) ; cf. op. cit., IV, 10 (PG 3, 708), Eth., I, I (1094a 3). ^Phys., II, 3 (i9Sa 26). ^ Eth,, V, i (1129b 8), Q. 8. Art. 2 THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 247 Second Article WHETHER VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS? We proceed thus to the’Second Article : — Objection i. It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says that volition is of the end, while choice is of the means}^ Obj. 2. Further, For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul?-"^ Now the end and the means are in different genera of good, because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus quality, or action, or passion] whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to an end, is in the genus relation}^ There- fore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means. Obj. 3. Further, habits are proportioned to powers, since they are their perfections. But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art.^hus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the art of the helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means. On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle ground and arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle ground through which one arrives at the end^ or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means. I answer that. The term voluntas [wilt] sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [volition]. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which the nature of its object may be found in any way whatever. Thus the sight extends to all things what- soever that are in any way colored. Now the nature of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means. If, however, we speak of will in so far as it is properly the name of an act, then, strictly speaking, it is of the end only. For every act denomi- nated from a power designates the simple act of that power. Thus, to understand designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Therefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Therefore the will is directed to them only in so far as it is directed to the Op. cit., Ill, 2 (iiiib 26). ^^Op. cit., VI, I (1139a *8). Op. cit., I, 6 (1096a 26). THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 248 Q. 8. Art. 3 end; so that what it wills in them, is the end. So, too, to understand is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, Lc., first prin- ciples; but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. Now in morals the end is what principles are in speculative mat- ters.^® Reply Obj, i. The Philosopher is speaking of the will as signifying the simple act of the will, not as signifying the power of the will.^^ Reply Obj. 2. There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are mutually independent. For instance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not mutually independent, but are as that which is of itself and that which is in relation to another. Now such objects are always referred to the same power. For instance, the power of sight per- ceives both color and the light by which color is seen. Reply Obj. 3. Not everything that diversifies habits diversifies the powers, since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider .the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the end as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and the means that belong properly to that art. Third Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SAME ACT TO THE END AND TO THE MEANS? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means. For according to the Philosopher, where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one}^ But the will does not will the means save for the sake of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act. Obj. 2. Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it wills the end and the means. Obj. 3. Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle ground to the terminus. But the means are in com- parison to the end as the middle ground is to the terminus. Therefore it is Op. cit., VII, 8 (1151a 16). Op, cit., Ill, 2 (iiiib 26). 2 (117a 18) ^^Top., Ill, Q. 8. Art. 3 THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 249 the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the means. On the contrary j Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act. / answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are willed only for the end, it is evident that the will can be moved to the end without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Accordingly, the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved, by one and the same movement, to the end, as the reason for will- ing the means, and to the means themselves. But it is another act by which the will is moved to the end absolutely. Sometimes, too, this act precedes the other in time, for example, when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards, deliberating by what means to be healed, he wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect, for at first a man understands the principles in themselves, but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the con- clusions because of the principles. Reply Ob], i. This argument holds according as the will is moved to the end as the reason for willing the means. Reply Obj. 2. Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like manner, whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not conversely. Reply Obj. 3. In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle ground, and the end as the terminus. Therefore, just as natural movement sometimes stops on the way and does not reach the terminus, so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But in willing it is the reverse, for it is through [willing] the end that the will comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions through the principles which are called means. Hence it is that sometimes the intellect understands a means and does not proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means. The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above. For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else; and so the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other, but not conversely. Question IX ON THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL {In Six Articles) We must now consider what moves the will, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will is moved by the intellect? (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite? (3) Whether the will moves itself? (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle? (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body? (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. cxviii. 20 {My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications) : The intellect flies ahead , the desire follows sluggishly or not at all; we know what is good, but deeds delight us not} But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect; for the movement of the movable results from the motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. Obj. 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will as the imagination in representing the ap- petible object to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not move the sensitive appetite; indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all.^ Therefore neither does the intellect move the will., Obj. 3. Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect, for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. On the contrary, The Philosopher says that the appetible is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.^ I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things. For that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is found to be in potentiality to different things in two ^Enarr. in Psalm., super CXVIII, 20, serm. VIII (PL 37 1532) De An., Ill, 3 (427b 23). ^Op. cit.. Ill, 6 (433b 10; b 16). 250 ^ Aristotle, Q. 9 Art, i WHAT MOWES THE WILL 251 ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus, the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not; and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs there- fore a mover in two respects: viz., as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the sub- ject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting; while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified. The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above,^ the principle of this motion lies in the end. Hence it is that the art, which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding? Now the good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the ends and the per- fections of every other power are included under the object of the will as particular goods; and the art or power, to which the universal end belongs, always moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particu- lar ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good — i.e., the order of the whole army — ^by his com- mand moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company. On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are speci- fied, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it. Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity. Reply Obj. 2. Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither docs the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desir- ability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practi- cal intellect.^ Reply Obj. 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect. I, a. 2. ® Aristotle, Phys., II, 2 (194b 5). (432b 26); 10 (433a 17). ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 252 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 9. Art. 2 Second Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensi- tive appetite. For to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive, as Augustine says.'^ But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite, just as sense is less excellent than intel- lect. Therefore, the sensitive appetite does not move the will. Obj. 2. Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore, it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect. Obj. 3. Further, as is proved in Physics viii., the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion.^'^ But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will. On the contrary, It is written {Jas. i. 14): Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will. I answer that, As we have stated above, that which is apprehended un- der the nature of what is good and befitting moves the will as an object. Now that a thing appear to be good and fitting happens from two causes, namely, from the condition either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation, and hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or un- fitting. Therefore as the Philosopher says: According as a man is, such does the end seem to him? Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Therefore, according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected; and thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm-. It is in this way that the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object. Reply Obj. i. Nothing hinders that which is better absolutely and in itself from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly, the will is absolutely more excellent than the sensitive appetite; but in respect of the De Genesi ad Litt., XH, 16 (PL 34, 467). ^ Eth., Ill, 5 (1114a 32). Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (2S7b 23). Q. g. Art. 3 WHAT MOVES THE WILL 253 man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent. Reply Obj. 2. Men’s acts and choices are concerned singulars. Therefore, from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases. Reply Ob’], 3. As the Philosopher says/<^ the reason, in which resides the will, moves the irascible and concupiscible powers by its command, not, indeed, by a despotic rule, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal and political rule, as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both the irascible and concupiscible parts can move counter to the will, and, accordingly, nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times. Third Article V^HETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act, whereas what is moved is in potentiality; for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality , in so jar as it is in potentiality}'^ Now the same is not in potentiality and in act in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself. Ob’p 2. Further, the movable is moved when the mover is present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false. Obj. 3. Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as was stated above. If, therefore, the will moves itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. There- fore the will does not move itself. On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself. / answer that, As was stated above, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will’s object. Now, as we have stated above, the end is in the order of appetibles what a principle is in the order of intelligibles.^^ But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of a principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act as to its knowledge of conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means. Reply Obj. i. It is not in the same respect that the will moves itself and is moved, and so neither is it in act and in potentiality in the same respect. I, 2 (1254b 5). ^Aristotle, Phys., HI, i (201a 10). 8, a. 2. 254 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q 9. Art. 4 But in so far as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act concerning the means, so as to will them actually. Reply Ob], 2. The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, by which it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly, it does not follow that it is always moving itself. Reply Oh], 3. The will is moved in the same way by the intellect and by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object, whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end. Fourth Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by anything ex- terior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is of the nature of the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is of the nature of the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior. Obj. 2. Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above.^^ But the violent act is one the principle of which is outside the agent}"^ Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior. Ob], 3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior. On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as was stated above. But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior. 1 answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must likewise hold it to be moved by some exterior principle. For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at an- other time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, which previously it did not will. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as was stated above, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it can- not do this without the aid of counsel. For when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician; and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be '"Q. 6, a. 4. ^"Aristotle, Eth., Ill, i (iiioa i). Q. 9 - Art. 5 WHAT MOVES THE WILL 255 healed. And if the will moved itself to will this^ it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Therefore we must, of necessity, sup- pose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eude- mian Ethics}^ Reply Obj. i. It is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent; but it is not necessary that this inward principle be a first principle unmoved by another. Therefore, though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless, its first principle is from the outside. Thus, too, the first principle of natural movement, namely, that which moves nature, is from the outside. Reply Obj. 2. For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add, without the concurrence of him that suffers violence. This does not , happen when the will is moved by an exterior prin- ciple; for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this move- ment would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible, since then the will would will and not will the same thing. Reply Obj. 3, The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say, as a proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Therefore it needs to be moved by an- other as first mover. Fifth Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY BODY? We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved by Physics viii.^® But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, when previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uni- form according to its nature. Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine the lower bodies are moved by the higher. But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will. ^ Eth. Eudem., VII, 14 (1248a 14). Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 9 (265a 27); cf. op. cit., IV, 14 (223b 18). ^'^De Trin., Ill, 4 (PL 42, 873). 2s6 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 9. Art. 5 Obj, 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so if the heavenly bodies could not move man’s will. There- fore the human will is moved by a heavenly body. On the contrary, Damascene says that the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts}^ But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies. / answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its exterior object, that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are sub- ject to the movements of the heavenly bodies. But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence directly on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act.^^ But this is impossible. For the will, as is stated in De Anima iii., is in the reason,^^ Now the reason is a power of the soul not bound to a bodily organ, and so it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse; for things incorporeal and immaterial have a power that is more formal and more universal than any corporeal things. Therefore it is impossible for a heav- enly body to act directly on the intellect or the will. For this reason Aristotle ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from the sense,^^ the theory that such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on^^ (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally by the heavenly bodies — ix., when those bodies are moved, whose acts they are. But since it has been stated that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, in so far, namely, as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite. Reply Obf. i. The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial sub- stance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be re- duced to the movement of the heavens as to its cause. Reply Obj, 2. The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement is somewhat due to the in- ^De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893). “Cf. H. Denifle, Chartularium, no. 432, error 4 (I, 487). Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). Empedocles: cf.. Aristotle, De An., Ill, 3 (427a 21). ^Ibid. (427a 25), —Homer, Odyss., XVIII, 136. Q. 9. Art. 6 WHAT MOVES THE WILL 257 fluence of heavenly bodies; — also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; — and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something: 6.g., when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from the outside, not on the part of an inward instigation. Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ.^^ Therefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural temperament. Now the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Con- sequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of the heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says, the wise man governs the stars^"^ as though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and in no way sub- ject to the movement of the heavens, to such effects of the heavenly bodies. Or, as Augustine says: We must con jess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits?"^ Sixth Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY GOD ALONE, AS EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE? We proceed, thus to the Sixth Article : — > Objection j. It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its su- perior; and thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man’s will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle. Obj. 2. Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man’s intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who illumines it, as Dionysius says.^® For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel. Obj, 3. Further, God is not cause of other than good things, according to Gen. i. 31: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. If, therefore, man’s will were moved by God alone, it would never be ^S.T., I, q. 84, a. 6 and 7. ^ Centiloguium, verba 4-8. — Cf. also St. Albert, In II Sent,, d. XV, a. 4 (XXVII, 276). ^ De Genesi ad Litt., II, 17 (PL 34, 278). ^De Gael. Hier,, IV, 2 (PG 3, 180). 258 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 9. Art. 6 moved to evil ; and yet it is the will by which we sin and by which we do the right, as Augustine says.^"^ On the contrary, It is written {Phil, ii. 13) : It is God Who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish. I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as is also natural movement. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the nature of the thing moved, yet that alone which is in some way the cause of a thing’s nature can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone’s nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by none other than the cause of its nature. Therefore it is said in Physics viii. that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.^^ Accordingly, man en- dowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause ; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle which is not the cause of his will, is impossible. But the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone through creation, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Therefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good, while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good; and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence, neither can primary matter, which is in potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent. Reply Obj. 1, An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies. Reply Obj. 2. Man’s intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man’s knowl- edge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from the outside, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 3. God moves man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal mo- tion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is a true or apparent good. Nevertheless, some- times God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later ^Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 596). Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4 (25sb 35). ^ S. T., I, q. 90, a. 2 and 3. ®®Q. 109, a. 2. Question X ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED {In Four Articles) We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? (2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object? (3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite? (4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? First Article WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED TO ANYTHING NATURALLY? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i . It would seem that the will is not moved to anything natu- rally. For the natural agent is co-divided with the voluntary agent, as is stated at the beginning of Physics ii.^ Therefore the will is not moved to any- thing naturally. Obj. 2. Further, that which is natural is in a thing always, as being hot is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the will. Obj. 3. Further, nature is determined to one thing, whereas the will is related to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally. On the contrary. The movement of the will follows the act of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally. I answer that, As Boethius says,^ and the Philosopher also,^ the term nature is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense, nature is either matter or the material form, as is stated in Physics ii.^ In another sense, nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it according to its substance; and this is what is in a thing essentially. Now whatever does not belong to a thing essentially is reduced to something, which belongs to that thing essentially, as to its principle. Therefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect, for the principles of intellectual knowl- ^ Aristotle, Phys., II, i (192b 8) ; 5 (196b 21). ^ De Duah. Nat., I (PL 64, 1341)- ^Metaph., IV, 4 (1014b 16). ^Aristotle, Phys., H, i (193a 28). 259 260 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. lo. Art. i edge are naturally known. In like manner, the principle of voluntary move- ments must be something naturally willed. Now this is the good in general, namely, that to which the will tends naturally, in the same way as each power tends to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstration to things intelligible; and, speaking gen- erally, it is all those things which belong to the one willing according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. There- fore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers, such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect, and to be and to live and other like things which regard his natural well-being, — all of which are included in the object of the will as so many particular goods. Reply Obj. i. The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another, for some things happen ilaturally and some are done volun- tarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determined to one thing. But since the will is founded in some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent; just as what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a subsequent cause. For in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes voli- tion, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally. Reply Obj. 2. In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as con- sequent upon form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural, as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality; for form is act, whereas matter is po- tentiality. Now movement is the act of that which is in potentiality.^ Therefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in the case of natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move up- wards, but only when it is outside its own place. And in like manner, it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God’s will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition. Reply Obj. 3. Something one always corresponds to nature, proportioned to it. For to that which is nature generically there corresponds that which is one in genus; to nature considered in the species there corresponds that which is one in species ; and to individuated nature there corresponds some- thing that is individually one. Since, therefore, the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, there corresponds to it naturally a common unity, namely, the good, just as to the intellect likewise there corresponds a com- ^Op. cit., Ill, I (2Qia 10), Q. 10. Art. 2 HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 261 mon unity, namely, the true, or being, or essence. Now under the good which is common there are contained many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined. / Second Article T' ^ ^ WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY ITS OBJECT? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Objection 1. It seems that the will is moved of necessity by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to the movable, as is stated in De Anima hi.® But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the mov- able of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of neces?*./ by its object. Obj, 2. Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intel- lect; and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as was stated above. But the intellect is moved of necessity by its object. Therefore the will also is moved of necessity by its object. Obj. 3. Further, whatever one wills is either the end, or something or- dained to the end. But, it would seem, one wills an end necessarily, because it is like a principle in speculative matters, to which one assents of neces- sity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; and so it seems that we likewise will the means necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object. On the contrary. Rational powers, according to the Philosopher, are directed to opposites.*^ But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as is stated in De Anima iii.® Therefore the will is directed to op- posites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites. / answer that. The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man^s power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight under the aspect of color actually visible. Therefore, if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight neces- sarily, unless one turns one’s eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus would not see it. ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433b 10; b 16). Metaph., VIII, 2 (1046b 8). ® Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 5). 262 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. io. Art. 3 Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so good is the object of the will. Therefore if the will be offered an object which is good uni- versally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. — ^And since the lack of any good whatever is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing is such a good that the will Cannot not-will it ; and this is happiness. But any other particular goods, in so far as they are lack- ing in some good, can be regarded as non-goods; and, from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view. Reply Obj, i. The sufficient mover of a power is none other than that object that in every respect possesses the nature of the mover of that power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true; but not by that which may be either true or false, viz., by that which is contingent, as we have said of the good. Reply Obj. 3, The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good; so does whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as to be and to live, and the like. But other things, without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end; just as he who assents to a principle does not necessarily assent to the conclusions without which the principles can still be true. Third Article ^ WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE LOWER APPETITE? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a pas- sion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says {Rom. vii. 19) : The good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do; and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion. Obj. 2. Further, as is stated in Ethics hi., according as a man is, such does the end seem to him? But it is not in man’s power to cast aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man’s power not to will that to which the passion inclines him. ® Aristotle, Eth., Ill, 5 (1114a 32). Q. 10. Art. 3 HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 263 Obj, 3. Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause; and so the universal reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as is stated in De Anima iii.^*^ But as the universal reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sen- sitive appetite happens to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense. On the contrary^ It is written {Gen. iv. 7) : Thy lust shall he under thee^ and thou shalt have dominion over it. Therefore man’s will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite. I answer that, As we have stated above, the passion of the sensitive ap- petite moves the will in so far as the will is moved by its object^^ — inas- much as, namely, through being disposed in such and such a way by a pas- sion, a man judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who, through violent anger or concupiscence, become mad or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; for such passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such men the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow of necessity the impulse of their passions; for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will. Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom ; and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly, in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in man, and the passion alone holds its sway, or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow passion. Reply Obj. i. Although the will cannot prevent the movement of con- cupiscence from arising (of which the Apostle says [Rom. vii. 19] : The evil which I will not, that 1 do — i.e., I desire) , yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire, or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence. Reply Obj. 2. Although there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive, sometimes man is entirely disposed in one way throughout his whole soul, and this either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the virtuous, or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in madmen. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of the reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be Aristotle, De An., Ill, ii (434a 19). ^Q. 9, a, 3. 264 the SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. io. Art. 4 led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously affected according to the .various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, ^han it does according to a passion. Reply Obj. 3. The will is moved not only by the universal good appre- hended by the reason, but also by the good apprehended by sense. There- fore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone, as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion. Fourth Article VTHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE EXTERIOR MOVER WHICH IS GOD? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — Objection i. It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God can- not be resisted, because His power is infinite; and so it is written {Rom. ix. 19) : Who resisteth His will? Therefore God moves the will of necessity. Obj. 2. Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills natu- rally, as was stated above. But whatever God does in a thing is what is natural to it, as Augustine says.^^ Therefore the will wills of necessity every- thing to which God moves it. Obj. 3. Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it, because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of neces- sity. On the contrary, It is written {Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Therefore He does not of necessity move man’s will. I answer that. As Dionysius says, it belongs to the divine providence, not to destroy, but to preserve the nature of things?-^ Therefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions, in such a way that from neces- sary causes, through the divine motion, effects follow of necessity, but from contingent causes effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle that is not determined to one thing, but having an indif- ferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally. Reply Obj. i. The divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is “ Contra Faust., XXVI, 3 (PL 42, 480). ^De Div. Norn., IV, 33 (PG 3, 733 ) Q. 10. Art. 4 HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 265 fitting to the nature of that thing. Hence, it would be more repugnant to the divine motion for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature. Reply Ob]. 2. That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it; for thus is something becoming to a thing, accord- ing as God wills it to be becoming. Now He does not will that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing, that it be subject to the divine power. Reply Obj. 3. If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible absolutely. Consequently, it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily. Question XI ON ENJOYMENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL {In Four Articles) We must now consider enjoyment [fruitio'\j concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? ( 2 ) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals? (3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? (4) Whether it is only of the end possessed? > o First Article A WHETHER TO ENJOY IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. It would seem that to enjoy does not belong only to the ap- petitive power. For to enjoy [frui] seems nothing else than to receive the fruit [fructum capere] . But it is the intellect, in whose act happiness con- sists, as was shown above^ that receives the fruit of human life, which is happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the intellect. Obj. 2. Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection. Thus the end of sight is to know the visible, of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite. Obj. 3. Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object; and for the same reason, in- tellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive power, and not to the appetitive power. On the contrary j Augustine says: To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to some- thing for its own sake? But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore to enjoy likewise is an act of the appetitive power. / answer that, Fruitio [enjoyment] and fructus [fruit] seem to refer to the same thing, one being derived from the other; but which was derived from which matters not for our purpose, though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses; and that is why it seems that the term fruition is derived from sensible fruits. Now sensible ^ Q. 3, a. 4. ^De Doct. Christ., I, 4 (PL 34, 20) ; De Trin., X, 10; ii (PL 42, 981 ; 982). 266 Q. II. Art. 2 ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 267 fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce last, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. But the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. There- fore it is evident that fruition [enjoyment] is an act of the appetitive power. Reply Oh], i. Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly, the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. It is therefore as a good that the vision of God is enjoyed. Hence, the intellect attains this end as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving towards the end and enjoying the end attained. Reply Oh'], 2. The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the common, as was stated above.^ Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore-® the ap- petitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end. Reply Oh'], 3. In delight there are two things, the perception of what is befitting, which belongs to the apprehensive power, and satisfaction with what is offered as befitting, which belongs to the appetitive power, in which the nature of delight is fulfilled. Second Article WHETHER TO ENJOY BELONGS TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE ALONE, OR ALSO TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS? We proceed thus to the Second Article : — Oh']ection i. It would seem that to enjoy belongs to human beings alone. For Augustine says that it is given to us men to enjoy and to use,^ There- fore other animals cannot enjoy. Oh], 2. Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to enjoy. Oh], 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so the natural appetite is beneath the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy, and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals. On the contrary, Augustine says: It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure,^ I answer that, As was stated above, to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the ®Q. 9, a. I. ^De Doct. Christ., I, 22 (PL 34, 25). ^ Lib. S3 Quaest., q. 30 (PL 40, 19). 268 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. u. Art, 3 achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things devoid of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way of execution, e.g,, that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, and a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Therefore, it is clear that things de- void of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end; but this is for those only that are endowed with knowledge. Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end is that by which we know not only what it is that is the end and the good, but also the universal nature of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known dn the particular. Such knowledge is to be found in irrational ani- mals, whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Conse- quently, enjoyment, in its perfect nature, belongs to the rational nature; to irrational animals, imperfectly; and to other creatures, not at all. Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment. Reply Obj, 2. Enjoyment need not be of the last end absolutely, but it can be of that which each one chooses for his last end. Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge. Reply Obj. 4. Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment.^ This is clear from his manner of speaking, for he says that it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy j that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they use. Third Article WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE LAST END? We proceed thus to the Third Article : — Objection i. It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord. But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in man. There- fore to enjoy is not only of the last end. Obj. 2. Further, What we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says {Gal. V. 22): The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace and other like things, which have not the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. Obj. 3. Further, the acts of the will reflect on themselves; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will, since it is the will ^Ibid, Q. II. Art. 3 ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 269 with which we enjoy, as Augustine says.*^ Therefore a man enjoys his en- joyment. But the last end of man is not enjo3mient, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. On the contrary, Augustine says: A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else? But the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone. I answer that. As we have stated above, the notion of fruit implies two things: first, that it