THE CONCEPTION OF BUDDHIST NIRVĀṆA

(A long with Sanskrit Text of Madhyamaka-Kārikā)

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with

Comprehensive Analysis & Introduction

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VARANASI-5.
Th. Stecherbalsky had rare insight into the Indian Philosophy in general, and Buddhist Philosophy in particular. His "Concepts of Buddhist Nirvana" has been out of print for more than four decades.

Shri Kishore Chand Jha, the enterprising proprietor of Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, decided to reprint it. The editing of the book was entrusted to me. The language of the book was, at some places, found to be faulty. I have corrected these grammatical and idiomatic mistakes which appeared to be glaring. It was not thought proper to take too much liberty with the original book. Some expressions, which are not very satisfactory, but do not mar the sense, have been allowed to stand as they are.

I have added "An Analysis of Contents" by reading which the reader may get a gist of the entire book. The original of the Madhyamaka Kārikās and Chandrakīrti's commentary which have been translated by Stecherbalsky has been appended at the end of the book to enhance the utility of the book, so that the reader may be able to profit by a comparative study of the translation and the original Samhāra.

I have provided a somewhat long Introduction to the book so that the average reader may get a general idea of the main features of Madhyamaka Philosophy. Shri Kedar Nath Maha, Lecturer in Indian Philosophy and Comparative Religion in Banaras Hindu University obtained for me a copy of Stecherbalsky's book through the courtesy of Dr. N. K. Devraj, Head of the Philosophy Department of Banaras Hindu University. I am thankful to both of them for this generous help.

My thanks are also due to Shri Prana Lal Dhamna, B.A., M.Litt., the scholar who undertook the onerous task of preparing the index.
and to Shri Abhushan Bhattacharya M.A. who helped me in the proof-correction of a part of the book.

It is hoped that the book together with the Introduction and the Sanskrit original will prove to be a handy guide to the Madhyamaka Philosophy.

In spite of the best care, a few misprints have crept in for which we crave the indulgence of the readers. A list of the main misprints together with their corrections has been given at the end of the book.

In the Introduction M. K. stands for Madhamaka Kärkäs and P. P. for Prasannapadā commentary on Madhyamaka Kärkäs by Candrakirti.

Jaideva Singh
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INTRODUCTION

Mahāyāna and Hinayāna

There are two aspects of Mahāyāna Philosophy, viz. the Madhyamaka Philosophy or Śūnyavāda and Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda. Here we are concerned only with Madhyamaka Philosophy or Śūnyavāda.

Generally there are three names current for Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. The three names for the former are Southern Buddhism, Original Buddhism, and Hinayāna, and those for the latter Northern Buddhism, Developed Buddhism and Mahāyāna. The first two names are given by European scholars. Southern and Northern Buddhism are names used on Geographical basis. European scholars called Buddhism prevalent in countries to the north of India, viz., Nepal, Tibet, China, Japan etc., Northern Buddhism and that prevalent in countries to the South of India, viz., Ceylon, Burma, Siam etc. Southern Buddhism. This division is not quite correct, for, according to Dr. J. Takakusu, the Buddhism prevalent in Java and Sumatra which lie in a southern direction from India is similar to that prevalent in the North.

The division ‘original and developed Buddhism’ is based on the belief that Mahāyāna was only a gradual development of the original doctrine which was Hinayāna, but this is not acceptable to Mahāyānists. Japanese scholars maintain that the great Buddha imparted his teachings to his pupils according to their receptive capacities. To some he imparted his exoteric teachings (vyakta-upadeśa) containing his ‘phenomenological perception’, to more advanced pupils he imparted his subtle esoteric teachings (gūhya-upadeśa) containing his ‘ontological perception’. The Buddha generally gave an outline of both the teachings, and both were developed by the great ācāryas. It is, therefore, a misnomer to call one ‘original Buddhism’, and another ‘developed Buddhism.’ Both the
teachings were delivered simultaneously. The esoteric teachings may be called well-known Buddhism and the esoteric less known, the latter being subtler than the former.

We have, however, to find out how the terms Hinayāna and Mahāyāna came into vogue. According to R. Kimura, the Mahāsaṅghikas had retained the esoteric teachings of the Buddha and were more liberal and advanced than the Sthāviras. In the Vanālī Council, the Mahāsaṅghikas or the Vajjians monks were excommunicated by the Sthāviras for expressing opinions different from those of the orthodox school, and were denounced as 'Pāpa Bhikkhus' and 'Adhammavādins.' The Mahāsaṅghikas, in order to show the superiority of their doctrines over those of the Sthāviras, coined the term Mahāyāna (the higher vehicle) for their own school, and Hinayāna (the lower vehicle) for the school of their opponents. Thus the terms Mahāyāna and Hinayāna came into vogue. It goes without saying that these terms were used only by the Mahāyānists.

Three Phases in Buddhism

Three phases can be easily marked in Buddhist philosophy and religion.

1. The Abhidharma Phase from the Buddha's death to 1st Century A. D.

This was the realistic and pluralistic phase of Buddhism. The method of this school was one of analysis. The philosophy of this period consisted mostly of analysis of psycho-physical phenomena into dharmas (elements) saṁskṛta (compounded or conditioned) and asaṁskṛta (uncompounded or unconditioned). The main interest in this period was psychological-soteriological. The dominant tone of this school was one of rationalism combined with meditation practices. The language used in this period was Pāli, and the school is known as Hinayāna.

2. Development of Esoteric Teachings

The second phase consisted of the development of the esoteric teachings of the Buddha which were current among the
Mahāsanghikas, simultaneously with the Ābhidharmic phase. The main interest in this period was ontological-soteriological. The dominant tone of this school was one of supra-rationalism combined with yoga. The main attempt was to find out the Svabhāva or true nature of Reality and to realize it in oneself by developing Prajñā. The language used was Samskṛta or mixed Samskrta. This school was known as Mahāyāna. The earlier phase was known as Madhyamaka philosophy or Śūnyavāda, the later as Yogācāra or Vījñānavāda. This phase lasted from 2nd century A. D. to 500 A. D.

3. Development of Tantra

The third phase was that of Tantra. This lasted from 500 A. D. to 1000 A. D. The main interest of the period was cosmical-soteriological. The dominant feature of this school was occultism. The main emphasis was on adjustment and harmony with the cosmos and on achieving enlightenment by mantric and occult methods. The language was mostly Samskrta and Apabhramśa. The main Tantric schools were Mantrayāna, Vajrayāna, Sa液压ayāna, Kālacakrayāna.

Here we are not concerned with the first and third phase. We are concerned only with the earlier phase of the second period. Stcherbatsky has provided a translation only of the first and twenty-fifth chapters i.e. the chapter dealing with causality and that dealing with Nirvāṇa of the Madhyamaka Śāstra or the Madhyamaka-Kārikas of Nāgārjuna together with the commentary of Candrakīrti. In the Introduction, an attempt is made to give a brief resumé of the Madhyamaka system as a whole.

Madhyamaka Śāstra · Life of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva

The Madhyamaka philosophy is contained mainly in the Madhyamaka Śāstra of Nāgārjuna and the Catuh-Śataka of Āryadeva.

Books on Mahāyāna Buddhism were completely lost in India. Their translation existed in Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan. Mahāyāna literature was written mostly in Samskṛta
and mixed Samskṛta. Scholars who had made a study of Buddhism hardly suspected that there were books on Buddhism in Samskṛta also.

Mr. Brian Houghton Hodgson was appointed Resident at Kāthamāndu in Nepal in 1833, and served in this capacity up to the end of 1843.

During this period, he discovered there 381 bundles of manuscripts on Buddhism in Samskṛta. These were distributed to various learned societies for editing and publication. It was then found out that the Buddhism in the Samskṛta manuscripts was greatly different from that of the Pāli Canon, and that the Buddhism in China, Japan, Tibet etc. was very much similar to that of the Samskṛta works. Among the Samskṛta manuscripts was also found the Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna together with the commentary known as Prasannapada by Candrakīrti. This was edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin and published in the Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV. St Petersburg, Russia in 1912. An earlier edition of this book was published by the Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, in 1897 and edited by Śaraccandra Śāstri. This was full of misprints. Poussin consulted this book, but he also used two other manuscripts, one from Cambridge and another from Paris. He also checked up the text of the Kārikās and the commentary with the help of Tibetan translation. Dr P. L. Vaidya utilised Poussin's edition and brought out in 1960 Madhyamaka Śāstra of Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti's commentary in Devāgāri character. This has been published by Mithilā Vidyāpītha, Darbhanga. Stcherbatsky had utilized Poussin's edition in writing out his Conception of Buddhist Nīrāvaṇa.

The Buddha used to characterize his teaching as madhyamī pratītyā (the middle path). When Nāgārjuna evolved his philosophy, he seized upon this important word, and called his philosophy Madhyamaka (madhyamavā madhyamaka) or Madhyamaka-śāstra. The followers of this system came to be known as Mādhyamika (madhyamakān adhyate vidanti va
Madhyamikāḥ. The correct name for the system is Madhyama-
maṇa, not Madhhyamika. Madhyamika means the believer in or follower of the Madhyamaka system.

Under the title of Madhyamaka śāstra, Nāgarjuna wrote out his philosophical teaching in over 400 kārikās in anusṭubha metre, divided into 27 chapters.

Nāgarjuna.

He was the teacher who developed and perfected the Madhyamaka system. He flourished in the second century A.D. He was born in a Brahmin family in Āndhradeśa probably in Vidaibha (Berāra). Śrīparvata and Dhānyakataka were the centres of his activities in the south. In the north, he carried on his activities in many places of which Nālandā is said to be the most prominent. He was also connected with Amarāvatī and Nāgarjunakonda. Rājatarangini (11th Century A.D.) says that he was a contemporary of Huska, Juska and Kaniska.

According to the biography of Nāgarjuna, translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (about 405 A.D.), Nāgarjuna was born in a Brahmin family in Southern India, and studied the Vedas and other important branches of Brāhmaṇical learning. He was later converted to Buddhism.

One of his minor works, Suhrilkeha (Friendly Epistle) is said to have been addressed to the Āndhra king, Śatavāhana. Śatavāhana is, however, regarded not as the name of a particular king, but as the name of a family of Āndhra kings, founded by Suruka (vide, Ancient India, by R.C. Majumdar, P 183). Some scholars maintain that Suhrilkeha was addressed to Kaṇiska.

There is a legend associated with his name. Nāga means a serpent or dragon. Arjuna is the name of a tree. It is said that he was born under an Arjuna tree, and he visited the submarine kingdom of the Nāgas, where the Nāga king transmitted to him the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra which had been entrusted to the Nāgas by the Buddha.
The word ‘Nāga’ however, is symbolic of wisdom. The Buddha is said to have remarked, “The serpent is a name for one who has destroyed the osava (passions)” (Majjhima-Nikāya, I 23). The Nāgas may, therefore, have been certain Arhants to whom the prajñāpāramitā teachings may have been handed down. Nāgārjuna may have received the teachings from them.

The Buddhist Nāgārjuna should not be confused with the Chemist and Tāntrika Nāgārjuna who lived probably in the 7th century AD.

The Tibetans ascribe 122 books to Nāgārjuna, but only the following seem to have been his authentic works.

1. Madhyamaka-Sūtra, also known as Prajñā or Kārikā with a commentary, Akṣobhya by the author himself.
2. Vṛgahavyāvaranat with a commentary by the author.
3. Yuktiśasisā,
4. Śūnyatā-saṃpāda with a commentary by the author.
5. Prajñāyasamutpāda-āhāra with a commentary
6. Caturākṣa
7. Bhāvanākrama.
8. Suññakeha
10. Ratnāvali
11. Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra-Sūtra
12. Daśabhūmikābhāṣī-Sūtra.
13. Eka-loka-śāstra
14. Vāsamabhāsa-sūtra and Prakarana
15. Vyavahāra-siddhi

Only a few of these are available in the original. There is, however, a Tibetan translation of all these books.

Āryadeva or Ārya Deva

He was born in Sumhala (Ceylon) and became a pupil of Nāgārjuna. He travelled with him to various places and helped him greatly in propagating his doctrine.
His biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajiva in about 405 A.D.

His most famous work is Catuh-Śataka which consists of 400 Kārikās. He defended the teachings of Nāgārjuna, and criticized the philosophy of Hinayāna, Sāṅkhya and Vaiśēṣika. He was probably the author of Aksara-Śatakam. He is also said to have been the author of Hastavala-prakarana and Cittaviśuddhi-prakarana. Prof. Winternitz expresses his doubt whether Cittaviśuddhi-prakarana was his work.

It is said that he was murdered by the pupil of a heretical teacher whom he had defeated in disputation.

The Original Sources of Mahāyāna

The origin of Mahāyāna may be traced to an earlier school known as Mahāsaṅghika and earlier literary sources known as Mahāyāna sūtras.

1. Mahāsaṅghikas.

At the council held at Vaisālī (according to Kimura), certain monks differed widely from the opinions of other monks on certain important points of the dharma. Though the monks that differed formed the majority, they were excommunicated by the others who called them 'Pāpa Bhikkhus and Adhāmmavādins. In Buddhist history, these Bhikkhus were known as Mahāsaṅghikas, because they formed the majority at the council or probably because they reflected the opinions of the larger section of the laity. The Bhikkhus who excommunicated them styled themselves Sthaviras or the Elders, because they believed that they represented the original, orthodox doctrine of the Buddha. We have seen that the Mahāsaṅghikas coined the term Māhāyāna to represent their system of belief and practice, and called the Sthaviras Hinayāna.

Let us see what the main tenets of the Mahāsaṅghikas were. Their contributions can be summed up under four heads.
1. The Status of the Buddha

According to the Mahāsāṅghikas, the Buddha was not simply an historical person. The real Buddha was transcendental, supramundane eternal, infinite. The historical Buddha was only a fictitious person sent by Him to appear in the world, to assume a human body, to live like an ordinary human being and teach the dharma to the inhabitants of the world. The real Buddha is the Reality par excellence and will continue to send messengers to the world to teach the true dharma to mankind.

2. The Status of the Arhats

The Sthaviras had attributed perfection to the Arhats. The Mahāsāṅghikas maintained that the Arhats were not perfect, they were troubled by doubts and were ignorant of many things. They should not be held up as ideals. Rather those should be emulated as ideals who during aeons of self-sacrifice and struggle attained to Buddhahood.

3. The Status of Empirical Knowledge

According to the Mahāsāṅghikas, empirical knowledge could not give us an insight into Reality. Only Śānyātā which transcends all worldly things can give us a vision of the Real. All verbal statements give us a false view of the Real, they are mere thought-constructions.

4. The Unsubstantial Nature of the Dharmas

The Sthaviras believed that the pūdgala or a personal self was unsubstantial, but the dharmas or elements of existence were real entities. The Mahāsāṅghikas maintained that not only were the pūdgalas unsubstantial (pudgala-nārāyanā), but the dharmas (elements of existence) were also unsubstantial (dharma-nārāyanā). Every thing was unsubstantial (śānyā).

It will be seen from the above account that the germs of practically all the important tenets of Madhyamaka philosophy were present in the system of the Mahāsāṅghikas.
It is the Mahāsaṅghikas who first of all gave expression to Buddha’s ontological perceptions which were first embodied in the Mahāyāna sūtras and were ‘later developed’ into Mahāyāna philosophy and religion.

II. Literary Sources

In Buddhism, sūtra literature is said to contain the direct, oral teachings of the Buddha, and sāstra is said to contain the scholarly and philosophical elaboration of the direct teachings of the Buddha.

We have a large bulk of literary works known as Mahāyāna sūtras. Being sūtras, they claim to be the direct teachings of the Buddha. Such bulky volumes, obviously, cannot be the spoken word of the Buddha. They are the elaboration of some ‘semnal sūtras’ which are so deeply embedded in the voluminous Mahāyāna sūtra literature that it is now almost impossible to disentangle them.

The most important of these works are the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Prajñā-pāramitā is generally translated as ‘perfect wisdom’. The word ‘pāram-itā’ i.e. ‘gone beyond’ suggests that it would be better to translate Prajñā-pāramitā as ‘transcendent insight’ or ‘transcendent wisdom’. The Tibetans translate it in this way. In all countries where Mahāyāna is a living religion, the following Prajñā-pāramitā mantra is generally recited: “Gate, gate, pāramīgate, pārasamgate Bodhi, svāhā” i.e. “O wisdom which has gone beyond the beyond, to thee Homage”.

According to Dr. Edward Conze, the composition of the Prajñā pāramitā texts extended over about a thousand years which may be divided into four phases.

The first phase (C. 100 B.C. to A.D. 100) consists in the elaboration of the teaching in a basic text.

The second phase (C. A.D. 100-500) consists in the expansion of the teaching into three or four lengthy treatises.

The third phase (C. A.D. 300-500) consists in the abridgement of the treatises into a few shorter treatises.
The fourth phase (C. A. D 500-1200) consists in its condensation into Tantric dhāranis and mantras

(1) According to most scholars, the Asta sāhasrikā, consisting of 8,000 lines is the oldest of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. It had its origin probably among the Mahāsanghikas. The principal theme of this treatise is the doctrine of sūnyatā (void or emptiness).

(2) Asta-sāhasrikā seems to have been expanded in the three hundred years that followed into Śalasāhasrikā (of 100,000 lines), Pancavimsatisāhasrikā (of 25,000 lines) and Astādaśasāhasrikā (of 18,000 lines). The last one was translated by Lokakṣa in A. D 172.

(3) Now began the abridgement of the Prajñā-pāramitā literature. The earliest abridgements are the Hṛdaya-sūtra and the Vajracchedikā sūtra. The Vajracchedikā was translated into Chinese probably in the 5th century A. D. This translation was printed in China on 11th May, 868. This is said to be the oldest printed book in the world.

Abhisaṃkhyālakāra is said to be a summary of pañcavimsatisāhasrikā made by Maitreya-nātha, the teacher of Aśanga.

(4) Lastly Prajñāpāramitā was condensed into dhāranis and mantras. One of these, viz., Ekāksari says that the perfection of wisdom is contained only in one letter, viz., ‘a’. Ultimately Prajñāpāramitā was personified as a goddess to be worshipped.

Prajñāpāramitās are both philosophy and religion. They are not mere ‘philosophy’ in the Western sense of the word. In the West, philosophy cut itself adrift from religion and became a purely intellectual pursuit. In India, every philosophy was a religion, and every religion had a philosophy. Western religion became only a credal religion. Indian religion was a philosophical religion.

The principal theme of the Prajñāpāramitā literature is the doctrine of sūnyatā. The Hinayānists believed only in pūḍgalanaitrātmaya or the unsubstantiality of the individual. They classified Reality into certain dharmas or elements of existence.
and thought that the dharmas were substantially real. Prajñā—
pāramitā gives a knock-out to this belief. It teaches sara-
dharma sūnyatā, the unsubstantiality of all dharmas.

Phenomena are dependent on conditions. Being so depen-
dent, they are devoid of substantial reality. Hence they are
sūnya (empty).

Nirvāṇa being transcendent to all categories of thought is
Sūnyatā (emptiness) itself.

Both saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, the conditioned and uncondic-
tioned are mere thought-constructions and are so devoid of
reality (Sūnya).

Ultimate Reality may be called Sūnyatā in the sense that it
transcends all empirical determinations and thought-
constructions.

Prajñā or transcendent insight consists in ceasing to indulge
in thought-constructions. So Prajñā becomes synonymous with
Sūnyatā.

One, however, acquires insight into Sūnyatā not merely
by avowing it enthusiastically, nor by logomachy, but by
meditation on Sūnyatā.

One has to meditate on Sūnyatā as the absence of self-hood,
on the absence of substantiality in all the dharmas, on Sūnyatā
as even the emptiness of the unconditioned. Finally one has
to abandon Sūnyatā itself as a mere raft to cross the ocean of
ignorance. This meditation will, however, be ineffective unless
one has cultivated certain moral virtues.

Though this is a very brief summary of the Prajñāpāramitā
texts, it is enough to show that this kind of literature contai-
ned all the important elements of the Mahāyāna system.

Thus we see that the Madhyamaka system was developed
on the basis of the doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas and the
Mahāyāna sūtras known as Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.
The Madhyamaka Works and Schools

The Madhyamaka system of philosophy was developed mainly by Nāgārjuna. He was one of the greatest geniuses the world has ever known. The system of which he laid the foundation was developed by his brilliant followers. It had a continuous history of development from the second century A.D. up to eleventh century A.D.

Three stages of its development can be easily marked. In the first stage, there was a systematic formulation of the Madhyamaka philosophy by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. The second stage is one of division of the system into two schools the Prāsaṅgika and the Svālantrika. The third stage is one of re-affirmation of the Prāsaṅgika school.

First Stage-Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva (2nd Century A.D.)

Nāgārjuna was the author of a voluminous commentary on Prajñāpāramitā known as Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra. This was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (A.D. 402-405). The original is not available now. He, however, formulated his main philosophy in Prajñā-mūla or Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikās known also as Madhyamaka-Sāstra. His devoted pupil Āryadeva elaborated his philosophy in Caṅkṣa-sālaka. We have already seen what other books were written by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

Second Stage Nāgārjuna had used the technique of prāsaṅga in formulating his Madhyamaka philosophy. Prāsaṅga is a technical word which means reductio ad absurdum argument. Nāgārjuna did not advance any theory of his own, and therefore, had no need to advance any argument to prove his theory. He used only prāsaṅga-nākṣya or reductio ad absurdum argument to prove that the theories advanced by his opponents only led to absurdity on the very principles accepted by them. This implied that Reality was beyond thought-construction.
Buddhapālita who flourished in the middle of the sixth century was an ardent follower of Nāgārjuna. He felt that _prasanga_ was the correct method of the Madhyamaka philosophy and employed it in his teachings and writings. He wrote a commentary called _Madhyamakavārttika_ on the _Madhyamaka Sāstra_ of Nāgārjuna. This is available only in Tibetan translation. The original is lost.

A junior contemporary of Buddhapālita, named Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka maintained that the opponent should not only be reduced to absurdity, but _svatantra_ or independent logical arguments should also be advanced to silence him. He believed that the system of dialectics alone could not serve the purpose of pm-pointing the Absolute Truth.

He wrote _Mahāyāna-Karatala-ratna Sāstra, Mādhyamikakṛtyāya_ with an auto-commentary, called _Tarkajvalā, Madhyamārtha-Samgraha_ and _Prajñā-pradīpa_, a commentary on the Madhyamaka Sāstra of Nāgārjuna. Only a Tibetan translation of these works is available. Dr. L. M. Joshi transcribed the _Madhyamārtha-Samgraha_ into Nagari letters and translated it into Hindi which appeared in the Dharmadūta, Vol. 29, July-August, 1964.

N. Arjswámi Sāstrī has restored _Karatalaratna_ from the Chinese translation of Yuan Chwang into Sanskrit (Viśvabhāratī Santiniketan, 1949).

So we see that in the sixth century, nearly 400 years after the death of Nāgārjuna, the Madhyamaka school was split into two, viz. (a) Prāsaṅgika school, led by Buddhapālita and (2) Svātāntrika School, led by Bhāvaviveka.

Y. Kajiyama says that the problem which divided the Mādhyamikas was whether the system of relative knowledge could be recognised as valid or not, though it was delusive from the absolute point of view.

According to Yuan Chwang, Bhāvaviveka externally wore the Sāṃkhya cloak, though internally he was supporting the doctrine of Nāgārjuna.
Third Stage—In the third stage, we have two very brilliant scholars of the Madhyamaka system, viz. Candrakirti and Śāntideva.

A large number of commentaries (about twenty) was written on Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Śāstra. They are available only in Tibetan translation. Candrakirti’s prasannapadā commentary is the only one that has survived in the original Sanskrit. It seems to have elbowed every other commentary out of existence.

He flourished early in the seventh century A.D. and wrote several works. He was born in Samanta in the South. He studied Madhyamaka philosophy under Kamalabuddhi, a disciple of Buddhapālita and probably under Bhavya also. His prasannapadā commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Śāstra, has already been mentioned. He wrote an independent work, named Madhyamakāvatāra with an auto-commentary. He frequently refers to Madhyamakāvatāra in his Prasannapadā which goes to show that the former was written earlier than the latter.

He also wrote commentaries on Nagarjuna’s Śūnyatā: Saṃsāra and Yuktis Sāstra and on Aryadeva’s Catuḥsūtra. Two other prakāramas or manuals, viz., Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra and Pancaskandha were also written by him. Of all his works, only Prasannapadā is available in the original, other works are available only in Tibetan translation.

Candrakirti vigorously defends the Prāsangika school, and exposes the hollowness of Bhāvaviveka’s logic at many places.

He also supports the common sense view of sense-perception and criticizes the doctrine of the ‘unique particular’ (svalaksana) and perception devoid of determination (kalpanā-podha).

He has also criticized Vijnānavāda and maintains that consciousness (vijnāna) without an object is unthinkable.

Śāntideva was another great pillar of the Prāsangika school. He flourished in the seventh century A.D. According to
Tārānātha, Sāntideva was the son of King Kalyāṇavāman of Saurashtra and was the rightful successor to the throne. As a prince he was known as Sāntivarman. He was so deeply inspired by Mahāyānic ideal that he fled away from his kingdom and took orders with Jāideva in Nālandā after which he was known as Sāntideva.

He was the author of Śikṣa-samuccaya and Bodhicaryāvatāra. In the former, he has referred to many important Mahāyāna works, nearly 97 in number which are now completely lost. In the Bodhicaryāvatāra he has emphasized the cultivation of Bodhicitta. He was the greatest poet of the Madhyamaka school and his works evince a beautiful fusion of poetry and philosophy. He was the follower of the Prāsangika method and has criticized Viśṇūnavāda vehemently.

It may be said in passing that Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila represent a syncretism of the Madhyamaka system and Viśṇūnavāda and cannot be strictly called Mādhyamikas. Sāntarakṣita flourished in the eighth century A D. His great work was Tattvasaṅgraha (Compendium of Reality). His celebrated pupil, Kamalaśila wrote the Tattvasaṅgraha-panjiśā, a learned commentary on Tattvasaṅgraha.


We have seen that nearly all the important tenets of the Madhyamaka philosophy were already adumbrated in the Mahāsāṃghika system and Prajñāparamitā literature. Nāgārjuna only developed them. What was then the original contribution of Nāgārjuna? His original contribution was the dialectic that he evolved. He certainly threw new light on the various doctrines of Mahāyāna foreshadowed in the Mahāsāṃghika thought and Prajñāparamitā works, and provided a deeper and more critical exposition of those doctrines, but his most original contribution was the dialectic.
The mysterious silence of the Buddha on the most fundamental question of Metaphysics led him to probe into the reason of that silence. Was the Buddha agnostic as some of the European writers on Buddhism believe him to be? If not, what was the reason of his silence? Through a searching inquiry into this silence was the dialectic born.

There are well-known questions which the Buddha declared to be avyākta i.e. the answers to which were inexpressible. Candrakīrti enumerates them in his commentary on the MK. 22, 12.

He begins by saying “Iha caturdasa avyākta-vastūn bhagavatā urdīstūn”—The Lord announced fourteen things to be inexpressible”, and then mentions them in the following order:

1. Whether the world is (a) eternal (b) or not, (c) or both (d) or neither—4
2. Whether the world is (a) finite (b) infinite (c) or both (d) or neither—4
3. Whether the Tathāgata (a) exists after death, (b) or does not (c) or both (d) or neither—4
4. Whether the soul is identical with the body or different from it—2=14 in all

It will be seen that there are four alternatives in the first three sets of questions. There could be four alternatives in the last question also. These four alternatives formed the basis of Catuskots or tetra-lemma of Nāgārjuna’s dialectic. In each, there is (1) a positive thesis, opposed by (ii) a negative counter-thesis. These two are the basic alternatives. (iii) They are conjunctively affirmed to from the third alternative, and (iv) disjunctively denied to form the fourth.

The ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to these fundamental questions could not do justice to truth. Buddha called such speculations mere ‘dūthvāda (dogmatism), and refused to be drawn into them.
Nāgārjuna had before him the structure of these questions and Buddha's silence, refusing to give any categorical answer to such questions. Buddha used to say that he neither believed in Śūśvata-vāda, an absolute affirmation, nor in Ucchedavāda an absolute negation. His position was one of 'madhyamā prakṛpatā' (literally, the middle position).

Nāgārjuna pondered deeply over this attitude of the Buddha, and came to the conclusion that the reason of Buddha's studied silence in regard to such questions was that Reality was transcendent to thought. He systematized the four alternatives (antās or kotis), mercilessly exposed the disconcerting implications of each alternative, brought the antinomies of Reason luminously to the fore by hunting them out from every cover, and demonstrated the impossibility of erecting a sound Metaphysic on the basis of dogmatism or rationalism. Thus was his dialectic. The four alternatives were already formulated by the Buddha. His originality consisted in drawing out by the application of rigorous logic the implications of each alternative, driving Reason into a cul de sac and thus preparing the mind for taking a right-about-turn (paṛāvritti) towards prajñā.

To the unwary reader, Nāgārjuna appears to be either a cantankerous philosopher out to controvert all systems, or as a sophist trickster wringing from an unsuspecting opponent certain concessions in argument by artful equivocation and then chuckling over his discomfiture or as a destructive nihilist negating every view brusquely, affirming none.

On a more careful study of his dialectic, it will appear that none of these fears is true, that he is, in all sobriety, only trying to show up the inevitable conflict in which Reason gets involved when it goes beyond its legitimate province of comprehending phenomena, and enters the forbidden land of noumena.

The Meaning of Dialectic

What then does dialectic mean? In plain words, dialectic is that movement of thought which, by examining the pros
and cons of a question, brings about a clear consciousness of the antinomies into which Reason gets bogged up, and hnts at a way out of the impasse by rising to a plane higher than Reason.

**Structure of The Dialectic**

We have seen that the origin of the dialectic of the Mādhya-mika lay in the four alternatives in each anyātta problem followed by a mysterious silence on the part of the Buddha. Nāgārjuna clearly systematized these and formulated them into the catuskoti, tetralemma or quadrilemma, also called the four-cornered negation. The structure of the clearly articulated dialectic finally stood thus:

The first alternative of the tetralemma consisted of (i) a positive thesis, the second of (ii) a negative counter-thesis, the third of (iii) a conjunctive affirmation of the first two, the fourth of (iv) a disjunctive denial of the first two.

**The Technique of the Dialectic**

The technique of the dialectic consisted in drawing out the implications of the view of the opponent on the basis of the principles accepted by himself and thus showing the self-contradictory character of that view. The opponent was hoisted with his own petard. He was reduced to the position of absurdity when the self-contradictory consequences of his own assumptions were revealed. The dialectic was thus a rejection of views by *reductio ad absurdum* argument. Technically this was known as *pravanga*.

**The Purpose of The Dialectic**

The purpose of the dialectic was to *disprove* the views advanced by others, not to prove any view of one’s own. He who advances a view must necessarily prove it to others whom he wants to convince; he who has no view to advance is under no such necessity. Nāgārjuna states clearly in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (St. 29) that no one can find fault with the Mādhya-mika, for he has no view of his own to advance.
"Yadi kācana prajñā syān me tata eva me bhaved dosah. Nāsti ca mama prajñā tasmān navaṣṭi me dosah"

"If I had a thesis of my own to advance, you could find fault with it. Since I have no thesis to advance, the question of disproving it does not arise".

The dialectic was directed against the dogmatists and rationalists who maintained a definite view about Reality. By exposing the hollowness of their logic and the self-contradictory consequences of their assumptions, Nāgārjuna wanted to disprove the claims of Reason to apprehend Reality. Candrakirti puts the whole position very clearly in the following words:

"Nīrupaṭṭika-paksābhyyuyupgamāt svāmānām eva ayam visamvādayan na saknoti paresam yaśayam adhātum iti. Idameva vāyataram dīsanam yaduṣa svāpratīṣṭhānāthasadbhūtāsamarth-yan iti" (P.P. p.6) "By his illogical assumption, the opponent only contradicts himself, and is unable to convince others. What could be more self-convicting than the fact that he is unable even to prove the premises on the basis of which he advances his arguments".

Nāgārjuna mercilessly demolished every philosophical opinion of his time, not because he derived a sadistic pleasure in doing so, but because he had a definite purpose. Negatively the dialectic was meant to prove that Reality could not be measured by the three-foot rule of discursive thought. But this was not all. It had some positive suggestions. Firstly, phenomen onal or empirical reality is a realm of relativity, in which an entity is śūnya or mś-suabhāva i.e., devoid of independent reality.

Secondly, one can comprehend Reality by rising to a plane higher than logical thought i.e., the plane of prajñā.

Thirdly, Reality cannot be expressed in terms of the 'is'—'is not'—dichotomising mind.
The Application of the Dialectic

Nāgārjuna rigorously examines all philosophical theories that were held by the thinkers in his time. He turns the battery of his dialectic against concepts like causality, motion and rest, the āyatahas, the skandhas, the ātman etc.

Stcherbatsky has included only his criticism of causality and nirvāṇa, for they are the most important. We shall, therefore, confine our observations only to these two. We shall consider Nāgārjuna's examination of the concept of causality here, and his examination of Nirvāṇa under a separate heading.

Nāgārjuna fires the first shot against causality, for that was the central problem of philosophy in his days.

Examination of Causality

Applying his tetralemma to causality, Nāgārjuna says that there can be only four views about causality, viz. (1) view of svata uññatih, the theory of self-becoming (2) parata uññatih, i.e., production from another (3) dvabhyaṁ uññatih i.e. production from both-from itself and from another (4) anhetna uññatih i.e. production without any cause, production by chance.

(1) Svata uññatih—This means that the cause and effect are identical, that things are produced out of themselves. Nāgārjuna, had evidently in view the Satkāryavāda of Śāmkhya, while criticizing the autogenous theory of causality.

The Mādhyamika's criticism of this theory may be summarized thus.

(1) If the effect is already present in the cause, no purpose would be served by its re-production. The Śāmkhya may say that though the effect may be present in the cause, its manifestation (abhyaktas) is something new. Thus, however, does not mean that the effect is a new substance. It only means that it is a new form or state of the substance. But this difference of form or state goes against the identity of the underlying substratum.
(n) If it is said that the cause is partly actual, and partly potential, it would amount to accepting the opposed natures in one and the same thing.

If the cause is wholly potential, it cannot by itself become actual without an external aid. The oil cannot be got out of the seed, unless it is pressed by a crusher. If it has to depend on an external aid, then there is no svata utpattih or self-production. This amounts to giving up sākāryavāda.

(m) If the cause and effect are identical, it would be impossible to distinguish one as the producer of the other.

The identity view of cause and effect (Sākāryavāda) is, therefore, riddled with self-contradiction.

(2) Parata Utpattih. This means that the cause and effect are different. This view is known as asati kāryavāda. This was held by the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas or the Hīnayāṇists in general. Nāgārjuna had obviously these in view while criticizing this heterogeneous view of causality.

His criticism of this view makes out the following important points

(i) If the cause is different from the effect, no relation can subsist between the two. In that case anything can be produced from anything.

(ii) The Hīnayāṇist believed that with the production of the effect the cause ceased to exist. But eī hypothesi causality is a relation between two. Unless the cause and effect co-exist, they cannot be related. If they cannot be related, causality becomes meaningless.

(iii) The Hīnayāṇist believed that the effect is produced by a combination of factors. Now for the co-ordination of these factors, another factor would be required, and again for the co-ordination of the additional factor with the previous one, another factor would be required. This would lead to a regressus ad infinitum.
(3) Dvādhyāṃ upatish—This theory believes that the effect is both identical with and different from the cause. This is a combination of both Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda, and so contains the inconsistencies of both. Besides this would invest the real with two opposed characters (identity and difference) at one and the same time.

(d) Aheinah Upatish—This theory maintains that things are produced without a cause, by chance. The Svabhāvavādins-Naturalists and Sceptics believed in such a theory. If no reason is assigned for the theory, it amounts to sheer, perverse dogmatism. If a reason is assigned, it amounts to accepting a cause.

Having exposed the inherent inconsistency in all the above views, Nāgārjuna comes to the conclusion that causality is a mere thought-construction superimposed upon the objective order of existence. In the words of Kant, causality is only a category of mind.

**Distinguished Between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna**

There are several aspects of Buddhist philosophy and religion in which Mahāyāna differs from Hinayāna. In what follows, we shall deal mostly with the Madhyamaka system of Mahāyāna.

(1) Difference in the Interpretation of Pratītyasamutpāda—The doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda is exceedingly important in Buddhism. It is the causal law both of the universe and the lives of individuals. It is important from two points of view. Firstly, it gives a very clear idea of the impermanent and conditioned nature of all phenomena. Secondly, it shows how birth, old age, death, and all the miseries of phenomenal existence arise in dependence on conditions, and how all the miseries cease in the absence of these conditions.

We have seen what view the Madhyamikas held of causality. Since Pratītyasamutpāda was the universal causal law, the Madhyamikas undertook a critical examination of this law.
Their interpretation of this law differs considerably from that of Hinayana-Pratityasamutpada is generally translated as ‘conditioned co-production’ or ‘interdependent origination’.

According to Hinayana, pratityasamutpada means “prati pratit ittyânam nirmânam samutpâdah” i.e. “the evanescent momentary things appear”. According to it, pratitya-samutpada is the causal law regulating the coming into being and disappearance of the various elements (dharmas).

According to the Madhyamika rise and subsidence of the elements of existence (dharmas) is not the correct interpretation of pratityasamutpada.

As Candrakirti puts it “hetupratyayapekso bhavanam utpadah pratityasamutpadaarthah” (P.P., p. 2) i.e. pratityasamutpada means the manifestation of entities as relative to causes and conditions.

The Hinayânists had interpreted pratityasamutpada as temporal sequence of real entities between which there was a causal relation.

According to the Madhyamika, pratityasamutpada does not mean the principle of temporal sequence, but the principle of essential dependence of things on each other. In one word, it is the principle of relativity. Relativity is the most important discovery of modern science. What science has discovered to-day, the great Buddha had discovered two thousand five hundred years before. In interpreting pratityasamutpada as essential dependence of things on each other or relativity of things, the Madhyamika means to controvert another doctrine of the Hinayânist. The Hinayânists had analysed all phenomena into elements (dharmas), and believed that these dharmas had a separate reality of their own. The Madhyamika says that the very doctrine of pratityasamutpada declares that all the dharmas are relative, they have no separate reality (svabhava) of their own. Nis-svabhava is synonymous with śunya i.e. devoid of real, independent existence. Phenomena are devoid (śunya) of independent reality. Pratityasa-
mutpāda or Interdependence means Relativity, and Relativity connotes the unreality (śūnvalī) of the separate elements.

Candrakīrti says, "Tadatra-nirroddhādyastavādeśana-vāyasād pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih āhārthāḥ (P P. P 2) i.e., "The subject matter or the central idea of this treatise is pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih characterized by eight negative characteristics."

The importance of pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih lies in its teaching that all phenomenal existence, all entities in the world are conditioned are devoid of (śūnya) real, independent existence (vabhāva).

As Nagārjuna puts it "Nah vabhāva bhāvanāṃ pratiṣṭhayaṃvā Vidyate" (M. K 1, 5)—"There is no real, independent existence of entities in the pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih conditions." As Dr E Conze puts it "All the concrete content belongs to the interplay of countless conditions" (Buddhist Thought in India, P. 240).

Nagārjuna sums up his teaching about pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih in the following words

"Apriṣṭhayaṃ samvitpānam dharmaṃ kaścinna vidyate Yasmāt tasmāt asānyoh dharmaṃ kaścinna vidyate" (M. K., 24, 19) "Since there is no element of existence (dharma) which comes into manifestation without conditions, therefore there is no dharma which is not śūnya (devoid of real, independent existence)."

The pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih becomes equivalent to śunya or relativity Nagārjuna says "Yah pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih śunya tām pracaksamāho" (M K 24, 18) "What is pratiṣṭhayaṃ satprātih that we call śunya?"

Śūnya or śunya is the most important concept of Madhyāma-maka philosophy. We shall, therefore, consider it under a separate heading in the sequel.
1. **Difference in the concept of Nirvāṇa**

The following points regarding Nirvāṇa are common between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.

1. Nirvāṇa is inexpressible. It has no origin, no change, no decay. It is deathless (*amṛtā*)

2. It has to be realized within oneself. This is possible only when there is complete extinction of craving for sense-pleasure.

3. Personal self as such ceases in Nirvāṇa. Access to Nirvāṇa is possible only on the extinction of the personal self.

4. It is a peace (*śāma* or *upāśama*) that passeth understanding.

5. It provides lasting security.

The word ‘nirvāṇa’ literally means ‘extinguished’ and therefore ‘tranquil’.

The Buddha is said to have made the following remark about Nirvāṇa:

“There is an Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, Uncompounded; for if there were not this Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, Uncompounded, there would be apparently no escape from this here that is born, become, made, and compounded” (Udāna VIII.3)

This goes to show that Nirvāṇa is not annihilation. In Samyutta Nikāya (1069-76), there is a long dialogue between Upāsiṇa and Buddha about Nirvāṇa. In that dialogue, the following two statements made by the Buddha are very important:

“Acci yathā vātavegena khitto
attam paleti, na upeti saṅkham
evam muni nāmakāyā vimutto
attam paleti, na upeti saṅkham”

“As flame blown out by wind goes to rest, and is lost to cogni-
zance, just so the sage who is released from name and body, goes to rest and is lost to cognizance'.

"Atthan-gatassa na pamaṇam atthi,
yena nam vajju, tam tassa n'atthi,
sabbesu dhāmmesu samūhatesu
samūhata vādapatthā pi sabbetī'

"There is no measure to him who has gone to rest, he keeps nothing that could be named. When all dhammas are abolished, all paths of speech are also abolished".

Both Hinayānists and Mahāyānists would concur in these beautiful descriptions of Nirvāṇa. It is only on the stepping-stone of our dead selves that we can rise to Nirvāṇa. As Suzuki puts it "Nirvāṇa according to Buddhists, does not signify an annihilation of consciousness nor a temporal or permanent suppression of mentation, as imagined by some, but it is the annihilation of the notion of ego-substance and of all the desires that arise from this erroneous conception" (Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism pp. 50-51).

We shall now turn to the difference in the interpretation of Nirvāṇa between the two.

(1) The Hinayānists believe that Nirvāṇa is eternal (sītya), blissful (sukha).

The Madhyamika says that there can be no predication of Nirvāṇa.

(2) Hinayānists believe that it is something to be acquired. Madhyamikas believe that it is not something to be acquired.

Nāgārjuna describes Nirvāṇa in the following words:

"Aparahīnam asampāptam anucchinnam abakvatam
Aniruddham annatpannam etan nirvānam ucyate"

(MK. 25, 3)

"Nirvāṇa is that which is neither abandoned nor acquired, it is neither a thing annihilated, nor a thing eternal, it is neither destroyed nor produced"
To quote Candrakīrti "Sarvāprapañcōpurṣaṃsadivalaksanam nirvāṇam" (P.P. p.2). Nirvāṇa connotes the cessation of all talk about it, the quiescence of phenomenal existence, and the attainment of the highest good.

3. The Vaibhavīka thinks that Nirvāṇa is a positive entity (bhāva). Nāgārjuna says that the Hinayānist believes Nirvāṇa to be unconditioned. To say it is unconditioned (asamskrita), and yet a positive entity (bhāva) amounts to self-contradiction, for a positive entity which is not dependent on conditions cannot be discovered. If it is not bhāva, it cannot be abhāva (total cessation) either, for abhāva is a relative word. There can be abhāva only when previously there is bhāva. Moreover cessation (abhāva) is an event, occurring in time. It would make Nirvāṇa transitory.

Candrakīrti in his commentary on Madhyamaka kārikā gives a relevant quotation from Ārya Ratanāvali.

"Na cābhāvo' pi nirvāṇam kuta evāsya bhāvanā
dhāvābhāvaparāmarṣa-kśayo nirvāṇam ucyate"  

P.P. p. -29)

"Nor is Nirvāṇa abhava (non-ens). How do you entertain such an idea? Nirvāṇa is really complete cessation of such consideration as bhāva (ens) or abhāva (non-ens) of the real".

It is above the relativity of existence and non-existence.

Candrakīrti clinches the whole issue by saying "Takaśca sarvakalpanā kṣaya rūpam eva nirvāṇam" (P. P. p. 229) Nirvāṇa or Reality is that which is absolved of all thought-constructin.

4. The Hinayānist thinks that Nirvāṇa is the apposite of samsāra (phenomena). Nāgārjuna says that there is no difference between Nirvāṇa and samsāra.

Na samśāraśya nirvāṇāt kuncid asti viśeṣanam
Na nirvānasya samsārāt kuncid asti viśeṣanam

(Mk 25, 19)

"Nothing of phenomenal existence (samsāra) is different from nirvāṇa, nothing of nirvāṇa is different from phenomenal existence".
"Nirvāṇaya ca yuḥ koth kothiḥ samsaranasya ca
Na layor antaram kinsil susūkṣaman aṭī śiyate"
(Mk. 25, 20)

"That which is the limit of Nirvāṇa is also the limit of
samsāra; there is not the slightest difference between
the two".

"Ya ājanaśvibhūva upūḍāya pratītya vā
So' pratītya anupūḍāya nirvānāṁ uparāyate"
(Mk 25, 9).

"That which when appropriating or relative (upūḍāya) or
dependent (pratītya vā) wanders to and from (ājanaśvī-
bhūva) is declared to be Nirvāṇa when not depending
(apratītya) or not appropriating or relative (anupūḍāya)"

To sum up, there are two main features which distinguish
the Mādhyamika conception of Nirvāṇa from that of the
Hinayānist.

(1) The Hinayānist considers certain defiled and condi-
tioned dharmas (elements) to be ultimately real, and also cer-
tain undefiled and unconditioned dharmas to be ultimately
real. According to him, Nirvāṇa means a veritable change of
the discrete, conditioned existences (samskīra dharmas) and
defilements (kleśas) into unconditioned (asamskīra) and undefiled
dharmas. The Mādhyamika says that Nirvāṇa does not mean
a change in the objective order, the change is only subjective.
It is not the world that we have to change, but only ourselves
If the kleśas (defilements) and the samskīra dharmas (condi-
tioned existences) were ultimately real, no power on earth
could change them. The change is in our outlook, it is a
psychological transformation, not an ontological one Suzuki
sums up the Mādhyamika position about Nirvāṇa in the
following words "Theoretically, Nirvāṇa is the dispersion of
the clouds hovering round the light of Bodhi. Morally, it is the
suppression of egoism and the awakening of love (karunā).
Religiously it is the absolute surrender of the self to the will of
the Dharmakāya". (Outlines of M. Buddhism, p 369) It may be
added that ontologically it is the Absolute itself. "Nirvāṇa is not something which can be abandoned or acquired, neither a thing annihilated nor a thing eternal; it is neither destroyed nor produced". (MK. 25, 3). No change can be effected in the Absolute or Reality. It is as it has always been. A change has to be effected only in ourselves.

2. The Absolute and the Empirical, the Noumenon and the Phenomena, Nirvāṇa and Samsāra are not two sets of separate realities set over against each other. The Absolute or Nirvāṇa viewed through the thought-constructions (vikalpa) is samsāra, the world or samsāra viewed sub specie aeternitatis is the Absolute or Nirvāṇa itself.

It may be said in passing that much of the confusion regarding Nirvāṇa is due to the fact that the same word Nirvāṇa is used for the psychological change consequent on the extinction of craving and the sense of ego, and also for the ontological Reality or the Absolute. It should be borne in mind that Nāgārjuna is using the word Nirvāṇa throughout the twentieth chapter of the Madhyamaka kārikā in the sense of the Absolute Reality and it is from this standpoint that his criticism has been levelled against the Hinayānist.

3. Difference in Ideal

The ideal of Hinayāna is Arhatship or Arhantship; the ideal of Mahāyāna is that of the Bodhisattva. To put it in simple English, the ideal of Hinayāna is individual enlightenment, the ideal of Mahāyāna is universal enlightenment.

The word 'yāna' is generally translated as way, path or vehicle. In his "Survey of Buddhism", Bhikshu Sangharakṣita suggests 'career' for 'yāna'. This seems to be the best English equivalent for 'yāna'.

There were three yānas known to Early Buddhism, viz., Śrāvaka-yāna, Pratyekabuddha-yāna and Bodhisattva-yāna

Śrāvaka (Pāli-Sāvaka) literally means 'hearer'. The name was given to the Disciple who having heard i. e., learned the
truth from the Buddha or any of his disciples aims at Arhatship. Arhat or Arhant means the status of the holy man who has won enlightenment. The word ‘Arhat’ means etymologically ‘worthy’. Another meaning that is suggested in some Buddhist books is ‘one who has slain (han) the enemies (an) the kleśes or defilements.

Pratyekabuddha (Pāli, Paścimabuddha) is one who in ‘solitary singleness’, in independence of all external support, attains Arhatship. The word ‘pratyeka’ means ‘private’ ‘individual’, ‘single’ ‘solitary’. He does not share with others his hard-won knowledge of the means for the attainment of Nirvāṇa. He believes that others too, driven by the stern reality of the miseries of life, may some day take to the holy path, but does not bother to teach or enlighten them.

The above two adepts represent the ideal of individualism. They consider enlightenment as an individual not a social or cosmic achievement.

The Bodhisattva (Pāli, Bodhisatta) seeks supreme enlightenment not for himself alone but for all sentient beings. Bodhisattvavāna has for its aim the attainment of Supreme Buddhahood. It is, therefore, also called the Buddhavāna or Tathāgatavāna. The word ‘bodhi’ means ‘perfect wisdom, supreme enlightenment’. The word ‘sattva’ means ‘essence’. The word ‘bodhi’ is untranslatable. It is the reflex of the consciousness of Dharmakāya in human beings. A Bodhisattva is one who has the essence or potentiality of perfect wisdom or supreme enlightenment, who is on the way to the attainment of perfect wisdom. He is a potential Buddha. His career lasts for aeons of births in each of which he prepares himself for final Buddhahood by the practice of the six perfections and the stages of moral and spiritual discipline (dāśabhūms) and lives a life of heroic struggle and unremitting self-sacrifice for the good of all sentient creatures.

Bodhisattva has in him bodhi-citta and pramādhanabala. There are two aspects of bodhi-citta, viz. prajñā (transcendental
wisdom) and Karunā (universal love). Prajñāhānapāla is the inflexible resolve to save all sentient creatures. These are the three aspects of Dharmakāya (The Absolute Person-alized) as reflected in the religious consciousness of Bodhisattva. Prajñā is the highest expression of the cognitive side, karunā is the highest expression of the emotive side, and pramdhānapāla is the highest expression of the volitional side of consciousness. Bodhisattva thus develops all the aspects of consciousness.

Bodhicitta is the most important characteristic of Bodhisattva. On the basis of Nāgarjuna’s ‘Discourse on the Transcendentality of the Bodhicitta’, Suzuki gives a detailed description of bodhicitta in his Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It may be summarized thus:

1. The bodhicitta is free from all determinations—the five skandhas, the twelve āyatana and the eighteen dhātus. It is not particular, but universal.

2. Love is the essence of the Bodhicitta. Therefore, all Bodhisattvas find their raison d’être in this.

3. The bodhicitta abiding in the heart of sameness (samātā) creates individual means of salvation (upāya).

The Bodhisattva has to pass through ten stages of development (dasa dhātus), viz. (1) pramāṇātī (delight) which he feels in passing from the narrow ideal of personal Nirvāṇa to the higher ideal of emancipating all sentient creatures from the thraldom of ignorance (2) vimalā negatively ‘freedom from defilement’, positively ‘purity of heart’ (3) prabhaśārī the penetrating insight into the impermanence of all things, (4) atisamātī In this the Bodhisattva practises passiosity and detachment and burns the twin coverings (āvaranas) of defilement and ignorance (5) sudurjayā—In this he develops samatas—the spirit of sameness, and enlightenment by means of meditation. (6) abhinivāsa or Face to Face. In this the Bodhisattva stands face to face with Reality. He realizes the sameness of all phenomena, (7) āsramā or the far-going.
In this he acquires the knowledge that enables him to adopt any means for his work of salvation. He has won Nirvāṇa, but without entering it, he is busily engaged for the emancipation of all (8) acalā or the immovable — In this, the Bodhisattva experiences the anupattika-dharma-ksānti or acquiescence in the unoriginatedness of all phenomena. He knows in detail the evolution and involution of the universe. (9) Sādhumāñc — In this he acquires comprehensive knowledge, unfathomable by ordinary human intelligence. He knows the desires and thoughts of men and is able to teach them according to their capacities, (10) dharmamogha. In this he acquires perfection of contemplation, knows the mystery of existence, and is consecrated as perfect. He attains Buddhahood.

The ideal of Hinayāna was Arhatship or attainment of personal enlightenment. The ideal of Mahāyāna was Bodhisattvayāna. Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddayāna, according to Mahāyāna aimed at mere individual enlightenment which was a narrow ideal. Bodhisattvayāna aimed at universal enlightenment. It was the destiny of every individual to become a Buddha. The Bodhisattva ideal of Mahāyāna was higher (mahā), that of Hinayāna was inferior (hina).

The difference in the spiritual ideal of the two is expressed in yet another way. The ideal of Hinayāna is Nirvāṇa, the ideal of Mahāyāna is Buddhahatva, the attainment of Buddhahood. The Mahāyānist does not consider the attainment of Nirvāṇa to be the highest ideal, but the attainment of Buddhahatva i.e.prayā (transcendental might) and karuṇā (universal love) to be the highest ideal.

4. Difference regarding the means for the attainment of Nirvāṇa

The Hinayānist believes that by the realization of prāgala-navrāṁya (not-self or unsubstantiality of the person), one could attain Nirvāṇa.

The Mahāyānist maintains that it is not only by the realization of prāgala-navrāṁya, but also by the realization of dharma-navrāṁya (i.e. that all the dharma or elements of
existenc are unsubstantial, devoid of any independent reality of their own) that one really attains Nirvāṇa.

According to Mahāyāna, the realization of both pudgala-nairūrāmya and dharma-nairūrāmya is necessary for the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

5. Difference regarding the removal of the āvarāyas or obstacles

Closely connected with the above is the question of the removal of the āvarāyas.

The Hinayānist says that man is unable to attain Nirvāṇa, because Reality is hidden by the veil (āvarana) of passions, like attachment, aversion, delusion (kleśāvarana). The Kleśāvarana acts as an obstacle in the way of the realization of Nirvāṇa. The kleśāvarana has, therefore, to be removed before one can attain Nirvāṇa. The Kleśas, however, depend for their activity on the belief of an identical personal self (satkāyadṛśī). It is only by realizing pudgalanairūrāmya i.e. the non-reality or unsubstantiality of a personal self that the Kleśas or the obstacles can be removed, and only when the kleśas are removed can Nirvāṇa be attained. The removal of Kleśāvarana is thus connected with the realization of pudgalanairūrāmya. The Hinayānists consider the removal of Kleśāvarana alone as sufficient for the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

The Mahāyānist says that Reality is veiled not only by Kleśāvarana but also by jñeyāvarana or the veil that hides true knowledge. The removal, therefore, of jñeyāvarana is also necessary. This is possible by the realization of dharmanairūrāmya or dharmanairūrāmya, the egolessness and emptiness of all elements of existence.

Just as the removal of kleśāvarana is connected with the realization of pudgalanairūrāmya, so the removal of jñeyāvarana is connected with the realization of dharmanairūrāmya.

The Mahāyānist maintains that the removal of kleśāvarana alone is not sufficient for the attainment of full freedom; the removal of jñeyāvarana is also necessary.
6 Difference in the Concept of Dharma

The Hinayānists believed in certain ultimate reals, called dhammas. The word ‘dharma’ in this sense is difficult to translate. It is sometimes translated as ‘things’. It should be borne in mind that dhammas are not ‘things’ in the sense of the crude data of common sense, ‘Elements of existence’, ‘ultimate reals’—these are better translations of dhammas. Hinayāna believes that the world is composed of an unceasing flow of certain ultimate dhammas which are simple, momentary and impersonal. Most of them are Sanskṛta (dhammas with signs), and some are asamskṛta (dhammas without signs).

According to Mahāyāna, these dhammas are not ultimate realities at all, but only mental constructs. Mahāyāna pointed out that even the so-called ultimate sanskṛta and asamskṛta dhammas are dependent upon conditions and so relative. Being relative, they are Śūnya (devoid of reality).

7. Difference in the Concept of Buddhology

The rūpakāya of the Buddha was simply the visible physical body. Neither Hinayāna nor Mahāyāna accepted this as the real Buddha.

Earlier Buddhism had also developed the idea of nirvāṇa-kāya which was a fictitious body which the Buddha could assume by his yogic power whenever he liked and by means of which he could appear anywhere. There is no difference of view regarding this body also between the Hinayānist and the Mādhyamika.

The difference lies in the concept of the dharma-kāya of the Buddha. The highest conception regarding the dharma-kāya reached by Hinayāna was that it was the sum total of the qualities (dhammas) of the Buddha. When a follower takes refuge in the Buddha, it is in this Buddha-nature that he takes refuge. He does not take refuge in Gautama Buddha who is dead and gone.
The Mādhyamika developed the concept of dharmakāya in a different way.

The concept of sambhoga-kāya was the contribution of the Yogācārins. We shall study the concept of these kāyas under a separate heading.

8. Hinayāna was intellectual, Mahāyāna devotional also

Hinayāna was entirely intellectual. The main concern of the Hinayānist was to follow the eight-fold path chalked out by the Buddha. In Hinayāna, it was the human aspect of the Buddha which was emphasized.

In Mahāyāna, Buddha was taken as God, as Supreme Reality itself that had descended on the earth in human form for the good of mankind. The concept of God in Buddhism was never as a creator but as Divine Love that out of compassion embodied itself in human form to uplift suffering humanity. He was worshipped with fervent devotion. The devotion of the Mahāyānist gave rise to the art of sculpture and painting. Beautiful statues of the Buddha were carved out, and excellent imaginative pictures representing him and the various aspects of his life were painted. Mahāyāna maintained that the arduous path of prajñā (transcendental wisdom) was meant only for the advanced few, for the average man it was devotion to the Buddha which would enable him to attain Nirvāṇa. Buddha was worshipped in the form of Avalokiteśvara, Amitābha and the future Buddha, Maitreya.

9 Hinayāna pluralistic, Mahāyāna non-dualistic

The philosophy of Hinayāna was one of radical pluralism, that of Mahāyāna was undiluted non-dualism.

10. Hinayāna rationalistic, Mahāyāna mystic

The approach to truth adopted by Hinayāna was one of mystically-tinged rationalism, that adopted by Mahāyāna was one of super-rationalism and profound mysticism.
Main Features of Madhavamkha Philosophy

(I) Śūnya-Śūnyatā

The most striking feature of Madhavamkha philosophy is its ever-recurring use of Śūnya and Śūnyatā. So central is this idea to the system that it is generally known as Śūnyavāda, i.e., the philosophy that asserts Śūnya as the characterization of Reality.

Śūnya is a most pernicious word in Buddhist philosophy. Non-Buddhists have interpreted it only as nihilism. But that is not what it means.

Etymologically it is derived from the root ‘śū’ which means ‘to swell, to expand’. Curiously enough, the word Brahman is derived from the root ‘brh’ or ‘brh’ which also means ‘to swell, to expand’. The Buddha is said to be seated in Śūnya tattva, in the Śūnya principle. The word ‘Śūnya’ seems to have been used in an ontological sense in such contexts. The implication of the etymological signification of the word does not seem to have been fully worked out.

According to some scholars, the word ‘Śūnya’ has no ontological signification. It has only a soteriological suggestion. But the word Śūnya has obviously been used also in an ontological sense with an axiological overtone and soteriological background.

In the ontological sense, Śūnya is the void which is also fulness. Because it is nothing in particular, it has the possibility of everything. It has been identified with Nirvāṇa, with the Absolute, with Paramārtha-sat (the Supreme Reality), with Tattva (Reality). What is the Śūnya-tattva? This is what Nāgārjuna has to say.

Aparapratyayam śūntam prapañcaiv aprapañcait
Nirvākalpam avānārtham etat tattvasya laksanam

(M.K., 18, 9)

(1) It is ‘aparapratyayam’. It is that experience which cannot be imparted to any one by another. It has to be realized by every one for himself.
(2) It is śāntam. It is quiescent, unaffected by the empirical mind.

(3) It is āprapaścādrāṇaḥ aprapāṇcitam i.e. inexpressible by the verbalising mind. It is non-de-terminate.

(4) It is nirvīkālpam i.e. it is transcendent to discursive thought.

(5) It is anānārtham. It is non-dual.

Sānyatā is an abstract noun derived from Śunya. It means deprivation and suggests fulfilment.

The words Śunya and Sānyatā will best be understood in connexion with svabhāva. Svabhāva literally means ‘own being’. Candrakirti says that this word has been used in Buddhist philosophy in two ways:

1. The essence or special property of a thing, e.g., ‘heat is the s abhāva or special property of fire’. It ydham yam padārtham na vyabhicareti, sa tasya svabhāva iti vyapādiyate, aprapāntaḥbaddhātitā” i.e. “In this world an attribute which always accompanies an object, never parts from it, that, not being indissolubly connected with any thing else, is known as the svabhāva or special property of that object” (PP. 105)

2. Svabhāva (own-being) as the contrary of parabhāva (other-being). Candrakirti says, “sva bhūvah svabhāva tāt yasya pādārthaḥasya yadātmīyam rāpan tat tasya svabhāva iti” (P. P p. 115)

“Svabhāva is the own-being, the very nature of a thing”. Nagarjuna says akṛtrimah svabhāvo hi niraśekṣah paratra ca (M. K. 15, 2) “That is really svabhāva which is not brought about by anything else, unproduced (akṛtrimah), that which is not dependent on, not relative to any thing other than itself, non-contingent, unconditioned (niraśekṣah paratra ca)”.

The Mādhyamika rejects the first meaning of svabhāva and accepts only the second. Candrakirti says clearly “kṛtrimasya parasāśeṣasya ca svabhāvatvam nestam”. We do not accept that as svabhāva which is brought about by, contingent on, relative to something else”. The first sense is not acceptable,
for even the so-called *svabhāva* or essential property of a thing is *kārmika* and *sāpeksa*, contingent and relative. Even the heat which is the special property of fire depends on so many conditions—a match, or a lens, fuel, or the friction of two pieces of wood. It is, therefore, not *svabhāva* in the highest sense of the word. In one word *svabhāva* is the Absolute reality, whereas everything else, all phenomena are *parabhāva* (relative).

The word *Śūnya* has to be understood from two points of view, viz. (1) from the point of view of phenomena or empirical reality, it means *svabhāva-Śūnya* i.e. devoid of *svabhāva* or independent, substantial reality of its own, (2) from the point of view of the Absolute, it means *prapañca-Śūnya* i.e. devoid of *prapañca* or verbalisation, thought-construction and plurality.

(1) We shall consider the word *Śūnya* in its first signification at first. We have discussed the word *svabhāva* at length so that we may be able to understand clearly the word *Śūnya* when used in connexion with phenomenal reality or with *dharmas* (elements of existence). In this context *Śūnya* invariably means *svabhāva-Śūnya*, i.e. empty or devoid of independent, substantial reality. There is not a single thing in the world which is unconditionally, absolutely real. Everything is related to, contingent upon, conditioned by something else. The long discussion of causality or *pratītyasaṃsūtpāda* in Madhyamaka Śāstra is only meant to show that not a single thing in the world exists in its own right, nothing has an independent reality of its own. Every thing is conditioned by something (*pratītyasamutpāna*). The world is not Reality. It is a realm of relativity. That is why Nāgārjuna says “yah *pratītyasaṃsūtpādhah* sūnyām tām *pracaksmahe*” There is no real production there is only manifestation of a thing contingent on causes and conditions. It is this conditioned co-production that we designate as *Śūnyatā*”. There is no real causal relation between entities, there is only mutual dependence bet-
ween entities which means in other words that entities are
devoid of independent self-hood (svabhāva). Causal relation,
therefore, does not mean a sequence of realities but only a
sequence of appearances. Every thing in the world is depre-
dent upon the sub-total of its conditions. Things are merely
appearances. Hence pratītya-samutpāda is equated with śūnyatā
or relativity. The world is not a conglomeration of things.
It is simply pro cess, and things are simply events. A 'thing'
by itself is 'nothing' at all. This is what is meant by the
śūnyatā or emptiness of all dharmas.

(ii) Now let us see what Śūnyatā means from the stand-
point of the Absolute. From the standpoint of the Absolute,
śūnyatā means 'prapañca avyapañcatam' that which is devoid
of, completely free of thought-construction, anūnārtha, that
which is devoid of plurality. In other words, śūnyatā as
applied to taktra signifies that it is

(i) inexpressible in human language.

(ii) that 'is', 'not is', 'both is' and 'not is', 'neither is' nor
'not is'—no thought-category or predicate can be
applied to it. Is is transcendent to thought.

(iii) that it is free of plurality, that it is a Whole which
cannot be sundered into parts

Axiological significance of Śūnyatā

Śūnyatā is not merely a word of ontological signification.
It has also an axiological implication. Since all empirical things
are devoid of substantial reality, therefore they are 'worth-
less.' It is because of our ignorance that we attach so much
value to worldly things. Once 'Śūnyatā' is properly under-
stood, the morbid craving for the mad rush after a thing
that

'Like snow upon the Desert's dusty face,
Lighting a little hour or two-is gone'

ceases, and we experience the blessing of peace
Soteriological significance of Śūnyatā

Śūnyatā is not merely an intellectual concept. Its realization is a means in salvation. When rightly grasped, it leads to the negation of the multiplicity of the dharmas and to detachment from the ‘passing show’ of the tempting things of life. Meditation on Śūnyatā leads to prajñā (trascendental wisdom) which brings about the emancipation of the aspirant from spiritual darkness. Nāgārjuna puts the quintessence of his teachings about Śūnyatā in the following verse:

"Karmakleśa-ksayān-mokṣah, karmakleśa vikalpaḥ
Te praṇaṇcāḥ praṇaṇcasmīti śūnyatāyām nirādhyate"

(M. K. 18.5)

"Emancipation is obtained by the dissolution of selfish deeds and passions. All selfish deeds and passions are caused by imaginative constructs which value worthless things are full of worth. The vikalpas or imaginative constructs are born of praṇaṇca, the verbalizing, imaging activity of the mind. This activity of the mind ceases when Śūnyatā, emptiness or hollowness of things is realized."

Śūnya as the symbol of the inexpressible

Śūnya is used in Madhyamaka philosophy as a symbol of the inexpressible. In calling Reality Śūnya, the Madhyamika only means to say that it is avācyā, anabhūtpa, i.e. inexpressible. In the very first verse of Madhyamaka Karika, Nāgārjuna makes the standpoint of Śūnyavāda luminously prominent. The standpoint consists of the eight ‘Nos’:

"Ansvrotham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvatam
Anekārtham anānārtham anagamam anumgamam"

It is (1) anivrodham, beyond destruction (2) anutpādam-beyond production (3) anucchedam-beyond dissolution (4) aśāsvatam-beyond eternity, (5) anekārtham-beyond oneness, (6) anānārtham-beyond plurality (7) anagamam-beyond ingress (8) anumgamam-beyond egress."
In short, Reality is beyond the dichotomies of the intellect. It is inexpressible. The word 'śūnya' (or śūnyatā) has been used in this system, now and then, as indicative of inexpressibility (avācyatva avyākta).

Śūnyatā — not a theory

We have seen that the Madhyamika uses the dialectic as a criticism of all dṛṣṭis (theories) without any theory of his own. By the use of his dialectic, he reaches the conclusion that all the dharmae are śūnya or avissvabhava i.e. devoid of any independent, substantial reality.

It may be thought that śūnyatā itself is a theory. But this would be a misreading of the Madhyamika’s position. Śūnyatā is not a theory. It is at once the awareness of the impotence of Reason to realize Truth and the urge to rise to a level higher than Reason in order to realize it. When the thinker lets go his foothold on discursive thought, it is only then that he can mount to something higher.

The purpose of śūnyatā is beautifully put by Nāgārjuna in the following verse:

"Atra brūmaḥ śūnyatāyām na tvam vetti prayañanaṃ
Śūnyatām śūnyatārtham ca tat evam vivahyate"
(M. K. 24, 7)

“You do not know the purpose of śūnyatā. śūnyatā is not used as a theory just for the sake of śūnyatā”. In explaining the purpose of śūnyatā Candrakīrti says that it is meant to silence the incessant cogitation of the verbalizing mind (pratoñcata śūnyatāyām anuvāhyate). Śūnyatā is taught not for its own sake, but for leading the mind to Reality by restraining its conceptualizing tendency. It is an expression of aspiration, not of theory.

Śūnyatā — not nihilism

It is contended by some that śūnyatā is sheer negativism. It denounces everything and has no positive suggestion to offer. śūnyatā does not lead us anywhere. It is rank nihilism.
The Mādhyamika dialectic leading to Šūnyatā is not mere negativism. It does not simply negate all affirmations about Reality; it also negates all negations about Reality. It says Reality is neither sat (existent) nor asat (non-existent). It only asserts that the Absolute is inaccessible to thought; it does not say that the Absolute is a non-entity. It only maintains that the Absolute is realized in non-dual, transcendentental wisdom. It vehemently pleads for the realization of the absolute Truth. Nagarjuna says “paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādhigamyate” i.e., “without realizing the absolute Truth, one cannot attain Nirvāṇa”.

The Mādhyamika only negates all views about Reality; it does not negate Reality itself. It cannot, therefore, be called nihilism. As Dr. Murty puts it “No-doctrine,—about—Reality does not mean no—Reality doctrine”. “Šūnyatā is negative only for thought, but in itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the Absolute. It may even be taken as more universal and positive than affirmation” (CPB, p. 160).

Candrakīrtti vehemently protests against the Mādhyamika being called nihilist (nāstika). He says that the Mādhyamika only points to the relativity of things, and that his doctrine transcends both affirmation and negation (P. P. p. 156-157).

Šūnyatā—not an end in itself

Nāgārjuna warns that one should not make a fetish of Šūnyatā. It is not an end in itself. It is only a means to lead the mind up to päraśā (transcendental insight), and should not be bolstered up as an end in itself. The following verse of Nāgārjuna expresses this idea beautifully.

“Šūnyatā sarvadṛśtināṃ prakāśa mārasanam jñānah.
Yeśām in śūnyatā ārṣtām asādhyān bābhāstre”

(M. K. 13, 8)

“Šūnyatā was declared by the Buddha for dispensing with all views or ‘isms’. Those who convert Šūnyatā itself into another ‘ism’ are verily beyond hope or help”
Candrakīrti in commenting on the above refers to a remark of the Buddha about Śūnyatā made to Kāśyapa. The Buddha said to him “O Kāśyapa, it would be better to entertain the personalistic view (pudgala drsī) of the magnitude of mount Sumeru than to hug the Śūnyatā view of the nihilist (abhāvābhinveshīkasya). Him I call incurable who clings to Śūnyaṭā itself as a theory. If a drug administered to a patient were to remove all his disorders but were to foul the stomach itself by remaining in it, would you call the patient cured? Even so, Śūnyatā is an antidote against dogmatic views, but if a man were to cling to it for ever as a view in itself, he is doomed.’’

Elsewhere Buddha is said to have remarked that Śūnyatā is to be treated like a ladder for mounting up to the roof of praṇā. Once the roof is reached, the ladder should be discarded.

Nāgārjuna, again warns unequivocally in the following verse, against the wrong use of Śūnyatā.

“Vināśayati dur dīsti sūnyatā mandamedhasam Darpa yathā āgṛhitā viśyā vā dusprasadhitā”

(M K. 24, 11)

“Just as a snake caught at the wrong end by a dull-witted fellow only kills him or a magic wrongly employed ruins the magician, so too Śūnyatā wrongly used by a man who does not understand its implications only ruins him”.

Meditation on Śūnyatā

It has already been said that Śūnyatā is not simply an intellectual concept but an aspiration. In order to perfect this aspiration, one has to meditate on twenty varieties of Śūnyatā. They are too long to be given here.

2. Prajñāparamitā

The second important feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism is the practice of praṇāparamitā.
Meditation on the sūnyatā (emptiness) is only a preparation for the spiritual discipline of prajñāparamitā. Prajñā is superrational. It is transcendent insight. Prajñā knows reality as it is (prajñā yathābhūtan artham prajñāḥ). The main aim is to acquire prajñā. It is only by attaining prajñā that we can know Truth. Prajñā cannot be attained by the chattering academician 'sickled over with the pale cast of thought', nor can it be attained simply by putting on the wishing cap. It can be attained only by arduous self-discipline and self-culture. Prajñāparamitā is usually translated as perfection of wisdom, but it really means 'transcendent wisdom' (prajñā pāramitā-sā). There are six spiritual qualities that have to be acquired. Prajñāpāramitā is a blanket term for all these qualities. They are 1. dāna (charity), 2. śīla (withdrawing from all evil deeds), 3. kṣānti (forbearance), 4. virya (enthuseiasm and exertion), 5. dhyāna (concentration), 6. prajñā (transcendental insight). The first four are moral qualities. Their development prepares one for the practice of dhyāna. Dhyāna or meditation or jhana or concentration or samadhi, etc., or the practice of the six prajñāpāramitās. The highest development of the Bodhisattva consists in acquiring bodhicitta which has two aspects, viz. (1) śīnyata or prajñā and (2) Karuna. We have already seen what śīnyata or prajñā is. Karuna is usually translated as compassion or commiseration, but it is better to translate it as universal love as Suzuki has done.
Prajñā or transcendent wisdom and Karunā or universal love constitute Buddhahood.

4. Buddhism

In Hinayāna, the Buddha was simply a human being who by his own effort became enlightened and divine. In Mahāyāna, it is Divinity itself that incarnates itself in a Buddha and descends to earth to impart the highest teaching about man’s destiny as an act of grace.

Mahāyāna evolved the concept of three bodies of the Buddha, viz. (1) Nirmāṇa-kāya (2) Dharma-kāya and (3) Saṃbhoga-kāya. The Saṃbhoga-kāya or the body of bliss was a concept evolved later by the Yogācārinś. The Mūlāyāmān̄kās speak only of two bodies of the Buddha, viz. Dharma-kāya and Nirmāṇa-kāya.

Dharma is a most protean word in Buddhism. In the broadest sense it means an impersonal spiritual energy behind and in every thing. There are four important senses in which this word has been used in Buddhist philosophy and religion:

1. Dharma in the sense of one ultimate Reality. It is both transcendent and immanent to the world, and also the governing law within it.

2. Dharma in the sense of scripture, Doctrine, Religion. as the Buddhist dharma.

3. Dharma in the sense of righteousness, virtue.

4. Dharma in the sense of “elements of existence”. In this sense, it is generally used in plural.

Dharma in the word Dharma-kāya is used in the first sense, viz. ultimate Reality. The word kāya in this context is not used in the literal sense of body, but in the sense of asthāya or substratum, in the sense of unity, organised form Dharma-kāya means, ‘the principle of cosmic unity’. It is not merely an abstract philosophical concept, but an ‘object of the religious consciousness’.
Dharmakāya

_Dharma or dharmatā is the essence of being, the ultimate Reality, the Absolute. The Dharmakāya is the essential nature of the Buddha. As Dharmakāya, the Buddha experiences his identity with Dharmatā or the Absolute and his unity (samaṇa) with all beings. The Dharmakāya is a knowing, loving, willing being, an inexhaustible fountain-head of love and compassion._

When Buddha’s disciple, the monk Vakkali was on his death-bed, he expressed his ardent desire to see the Buddha in person. On that occasion, the Buddha remarked “He who sees the Dhamma sees Me. He who sees Me sees the Dhamma.” This statement of the Buddha gave rise to the conviction that the real Buddha was the Dharma, not the historical Gautama known as the Buddha, and thus the idea of Dharmakāya was developed. The Mahasanghikas conceived of Buddha as lokottara or Dharmakāya (transcendental) and Śākyamuni only as Nrmanakāya or a phantom body conjured up by the Dharmakāya for bringing the message of Dharma to ignorant humanity.

_Dharmakāya is the essential transcendental aspect of the Buddha. Dharmatā is the ultimate impersonal principle Dharmakāya is the ultimate universal person. There is a slight resemblance between the Brahman and Īśvara of Vedanta and Dharmatā and Dharmakāya of the Mādhyamika. Dharmatā is like the Vedantic Brahman and Dharmakāya is something like the Vedantic Īśvara, but there is also a good deal of difference between the two. In Vedānta, Īśvara in association with Māyā creates, sustains and withdraws the universe Dharmakāya has no such function. The function of Dharmakāya is to descend out of his deep wisdom and love, to earth as a Buddha in order to teach the Dharma and uplift erring humanity. He is Divine and yet not God. for in every system the function of creation of the universe is associated with God. Buddhism does not believe in any such_
God. Suzuki puts the idea of God in Buddhism in the following words. “Buddhism must not be judged as an atheism which endorses an agnostic, materialistic interpretation of the universe. Far from it, Buddhism outspokenly acknowledges the presence in the world of a reality which transcends the limitations of phenomenality, but which is nevertheless immanent everywhere and manifests itself in its full glory, and in which we live, and move and have our being” (Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism P. 219)

Dharmakāya is identified with the Absolute and is also connected with the phenomenal. Therefore it is Dharmakāya alone that can descend to earth as the saviour of mankind.

Whenever Dharmakāya decides to come down to earth in human form, he conjures up a phantom body called Nirmānakāya. Nirmānakāya is the body assumed by Dharmakāya whenever he decides to come down to earth to save mankind. It is through this that he incarnates in a human form, as a Buddha, as the saviour of mankind. The actual physical body of the Buddha is the Rūpakāya. It will thus be seen that Buddhism is not an historical religion like official Christianity. The Buddha is not the founder of a religion. He only transmits Dharma which is eternal. There have been many Buddhas before, and there will be many Buddhas in the future.

When a Buddhist takes refuge in the Buddha, it is the eternal Dharmakāya Buddhas whom he takes refuge.

Nirmānakāya

It has already been said that Nirmānakāya is a body assumed by the Buddha in order to establish contact with the world in a human form. Dharmakāya is also known as Svābhāvika kāya or the essential, natural kāya of the Buddha. The Nirmānakāya is assumed for the time being for a specific purpose. The Rūpakāya or the actual physical body of the Buddha is visible to everyone. The Nirmānakāya is visible only to adepts.
Significance of the Concept of Madhyama Pratipad

The Buddha used to say that Truth did not lie in the extreme alternatives but in the middle position (madhyama pratipad). Hinayānists generally used the concept of madhyama pratipad in the ethical sense, in the sense of neither taking too much food nor too little, neither sleeping too much, nor too little etc.

The Mādhyamikas interpreted madhyama pratipad in a metaphysical sense. Says Nāgārjuna

"Kāryānāvānāde ēśāte nāśāte caborayam
Pratipadādhām bhagavata bhāvābhāvāvai bhāvāvina"

(M K 15, 7)

"In the Kāryānāvānā-sūtra, the Lord who had the right insight into both bhāva (ens) and abhāva (non-ens) rejected both the extreme alternatives of ‘is’ and ‘is not’.

In commenting on this, Candrakīrti has quoted the relevant passage in the Kāryānāvānā-sūtra which is accepted as an authority by all the Buddhists. In this, Buddha says to Kāśyapa "O Kāśyapa, ‘is’ is one extreme alternative, ‘not is’ is another extreme alternative. That which is the madhyama position is intangible, incomparable, without any position, non-appearing, incomprehensible. That is what is meant by madhyama pratipad (the middle position) O Kāśyapa. It is perception of Reality (bhūta pratyavakṣa)" (P. p. p. 118). Nāgārjuna takes his stand on this authoritative statement of the Buddha. The word madhyama is not to be taken in its literal sense of ‘in between’ or a ‘mean between the two’. As is clear from the adjectives ‘intangible, incomparable, incomprehensible etc., madhyama pratipad (the middle position) means that Reality is transcendent to the antinomies of Reason, the dichotomies of thought, and cannot be ‘cabinced, caged and confined’ in the alternatives of ‘is’ and ‘is not’. It is on this basis that Nāgārjuna called his philosophy madhyama-maka, i.e. pertaining to the transcendent."
The Absolute and Phenomena

There are many words used for the Absolute or Reality in Madhyamaka philosophy. Tathatā (suchness) śūnyatā, nirvāṇa, advaya (non-dual), anuttāpanna (unproduced), nirvāṇakāla (the realm of non-discrimination), dharmatā (the essence of being, the true nature of Dharma), anabhinītya (the inexpressible tattva (thatness) niśprapāñca (free of verbalisation and plurality), yatadvaita (that which really is) Satya (Truth, bhūta-tathatā or bhūtātā (the true reality), tathāgata-garbha (the womb of Tathāgatas), aparapiśānta (reality which one must realise within oneself), Dharmakāśa etc. Each word is used from a particular standpoint.

Throughout the Madhyamaka śāstra, Nagarjuna has been at pains to prove that the Absolute is transcendent to both thought and speech. Neither the concept of bhāva (ens) nor abhāva (non-ens) is applicable to it. Nagarjuna advances the following reason for the inapplicability of these concepts.

"Bhāva-vastavat na Nirvāṇam jārāmaranadalakṣanaṁ
Prasagāyati bhāvo hi na jārāmaranam vinaṁ"

(M. K. 25, 4)

"Nirvāṇa or the Absolute Reality cannot be a bhāva or positive ens, for in that case it would be subject to origination, decay, and death; there is no empirical existence which is free from decay and death. If it cannot be bhāva, far less can it be abhāva, (non-existence), for abhāva (non-existence) is only a relative concept (absence of bhāva) depending upon the concept of bhāva". As Nagarjuna puts it

"Bhāvasya cedāprasiddhābhāvo navā naiva siddhyāt
Byāvasya hyanyatābhāvo abhāvo bravye jañāh"

(M. K. 15, 5)

"When bhāva itself is proved to be inapplicable to Reality, abhāva cannot stand scrutiny, for abhāva is known only as the disappearance of bhāva".
When the concepts of bhāva (empirical existence), and abhāva (the negation of bhāva) cannot be applied to the Absolute, the question of applying any other concept to it does not arise, for all other concepts depend upon the above two. In one word, the Absolute is transcendent to thought, and because it is transcendent to thought, it is inexpressible.

"Niruttamabhādālavyam nucite cittagocare.
Anupannāniruddhā hi nirvānamva dharmatā"

"What cannot be an object of thought cannot, a fortiori, be an object of speech. The Absolute as the essence of all being is neither born, nor does it cease to be."

Candrakirti says "Paramārtha hi āryāṇāṃ tuṣṇīmbhāvaḥ (P P p. 19) "To the saints, the Absolute is just silence: i.e. it is inexpressible".

Phenomena have no independent, substantial reality of their own. Relativity or dependence is the main characteristic of phenomena, and that which is relative is not real in the highest sense of the word. The Absolute is the Reality of the appearances.

The Absolute and the world are not two different sets of reality posited against each other. Phenomena viewed as relative, as governed by causes and conditions constitute the world, and viewed as free of all conditions are the Absolute. The Absolute is always of uniform nature Nirvāṇa or the Absolute Reality is not something produced or achieved. Nirvāṇa only means the disappearance of the fabrications of discursive thought.

If the Absolute is beyond all thought and speech, how can the Absolute be described, how can there be any teaching about the Absolute? The answer is—Phenomena do not completely cut us off from Reality. Phenomena are appearances, and appearances point to their Reality. The veil gives a hint of that which is veiled.
Condrakirti quotes a saying of the Buddha,
"Anakśarasasya dharmasya trutiḥ kā devanā ca kā
Śrūyate deśyate cāpi samāropādanakṣerāḥ"

"How can there be any understanding or teaching of that
which is wordless (i.e. inexpressible)? That can be under-
stood and taught only by samāropa-an ascribed mark." Phenom-
ena serve as the 'ascribed mark' of Reality. Phenomena are
like an envelope that contains within it an invitation from
Reality. The superimposed character (samāropa) of pheno-
mena veils the noumenon; when that superimposed character
is uncovered, when the veil is removed, it only reveals
Reality. The philosophy of Śūnyata is meant only to help
uncover the veil.

_Samvriti and Paramārtha satya_

Are phenomena wholly unreal? Nāgārjuna says they have
reality of a sort. They are samvṛti satya; they are the appea-
tance of Reality. Appearance points to that which appears.
_Samvṛti_ is appearance, cover or veil. _Samvṛti_ or cover is not
a mere gossamer floating about in vacuo. _samvṛti_ covers
paramārtha (absolute reality). Nāgārjuna says:

"Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadaśanā
Lokasamvṛti satyam ca satyam ca paramārthatāh"

(M. K. 24, 8)

"The Buddhas teach the Dharma by resorting to two
truths, _samvṛti_- satya (empirical truth) and _paramārtha_-satya
(absolute truth)."

So important is the distinctions that Nāgārjuna maintains
that no one can understand the teaching of the Buddha who
does not know this distinction.

"Ye nayorna viśiṣṭān viśhāgam satyayordvayok
Te tatvam na viśiṣṭān gambhiram Buddhakāsane"

(M. K. 24. 9)

"Those who do not know the distinction between these
two truths cannot understand the deep significance of the
teaching of the Buddha."
Candrakîrti explains samvrti in the following way:

"Samantādvaranam samvrtiḥ. Ajñānam hi samantāt-sarva
padarthatattvavacchādanāḥ samvrtityaivyate."

(P. p. p. 215)

"That which covers all round is samvrti. Samvrti is ajñāna
(primal ignorance) which covers the real nature of all things". Phenomena are characterized as samvrti, because they throw a veil over Reality. At the same time they serve as a pointer to Reality as their ground. Samvrti-satya is vyāvahārika satya i.e. pragmatic or empirical reality. Paramartha-satya is absolute reality. Two truths—Samvrti and paramartha, however, do not connote two different spheres to which they are applied. The Absolute comprehended through the categories of thought is phenomena and phenomena stripped of these categories are the Absolute.

Candrakîrti mentions three senses of 'samvrti':

(1) Samantāt sarvapadarthatattvavacchādanāḥ samvrtiḥ

(P. p. p. 215)

Samvrti is that which covers all round the real nature of things. Candrakîrti calls it ajñāna (the primal ignorance). Samvrti is due to ajñāna or avidyā and is identical with it. It is the primal ignorance that throws a veil over Reality.

(2) Paraśparasambhavanam vā samvrtirvanyonyasamādhyena

(P. p. p. 215)

Samvrti is mutual dependence of things or their relativity. In this sense, it is identical with phenomena.

(3) Samvṛth samketo lokavāyādhah Sa ca

abhidhānābhidhēya-ñānaṇeyādilaksanah.

(P. p. p. 215)

What is conventionally accepted by people at large is samvrti.

All these senses are mutually connected. The first one is the primary sense, but each of these senses has an importance from the point of view of empirical reality.

Samvrti or pragmatic reality is the means (upāya) for reaching Reality which is the goal (upēya). Nāgārjuna
expressly mentions the importance of vyavahāra or empirical reality in attaining paramārtha or absolute reality. Says he:

Vyavahāranāśritya paramārtho na deśyate
Paramārthamanāgamya nirvānam nādhigamyate

(M. K. 24. 10)

"Without a recourse to pragmatic reality, the absolute truth cannot be taught. Without knowing the absolute truth, nirvāna cannot be attained"

Commenting on this, Candrakirti says:

"Tasmāt nirvānādhiṣṭamopāyaḥ eva śyāmaṇaḥ paścāvāsthitā
dharmatis ādāseva abhyupēyā bhūjanam iva saṅkarthinē"

(P P P. 216)

"Therefore, inasmuch as samvrti as characterized as a means for the attainment of Nirvāna, it should be adopted, just as a pot is to be used by one desirous of water". Samvrti is upāya (means), paramārtha is upēya (goal),

There are two kinds of samvrti—(i) loka-samvrti and (ii) aloka samvrti. (i) Loka samvrti refers to the common empirical objects recognized as real by all as, for example, a jar, a piece of cloth etc, (ii) Aloka samvrti refers to objects experienced under abnormal conditions. Illusory objects, distinet perceptions caused by diseased or defective sense-organs; dream objects etc. are cases of aloka samvrti. These are aloka samvrti—non-empirical, for they are unreal even for the empirical consciousness.

Prajñākaramati has designated loka samvrti as tathya samvrti (true samvrti) and aloka samvrti as mithyā samvrti (false samvrti). The former is like the vyāvahārika satya, and the latter like the tīrthabhāṣṭaka satya of the Vedantists—just as aloka samvrti is unreal for the empirical consciousness, even so loka samvrti is unreal from the transcendental point of view. Samvrti is called satya (true or real) by courtesy, for there cannot be degrees in Truth. Paramārtha or the Absolute Reality alone is truly real.
The texts or teachings of the Buddha bearing on paramartha satya or the Absolute Reality are called nityārtha (primary or direct) and those bearing on saṃvṛth satya are called nayārtha (secondary, indirect) by the Mādhyamaka.

Tathatā—Tathāgata

We have seen that dharmatā or tathatā is the word used in Madhyamaka philosophy for the Absolute Candrakirti says, "Yā sā dharmānām dharmatā nāma sava tattvavāpam" (P. P. p. 116). "That which is the essential being of all elements of existence is the nature of Reality". It is tathatā, it is Reality such as it is. In the words of Bradley, we can only say that it is, not what it is. According to Candrakirti—"tathābhāvo'nkārṇivam sadava sīhānyā" (P P. p. 116) "The thatness of Reality consists in its invariability, in its remaining for ever as it is".

Tathatā is the Truth, but it is impersonal. In order to reveal itself, it requires a medium. Tathāgata is that medium. Tathāgata is the epiphany of Reality. He is Reality personalized. Tathāgata is an amphibious being partaking both of the Absolute and phenomena. He is identical with Tathatā, but embodied in a human form. That is why Tathatā is also called Tathāgatagarbha (the womb of Tathāgata).

The word Tathāgata is interpreted as tathā+gata or tathā+-gata i. e. 'thus gone' or 'thus come' i. e. as the previous Buddhas have come and gone. This, however, does not throw much light on the concept of Tathāgata. There is one verse in the Mahābhārata which, it seems to me, removes completely the obscurity surrounding this word.

"Sakuntānoopāvākahā matsyānāmiva codake
Padam yathā na drṣyate tathā jñānavidām gatāh"
(Saṁtṛparva, 181, 12)

"Just as the footprints of birds flying in the sky and of fish swimming in water may not be seen

So or thus is the going

of those who have realized the Truth."
This very word tathā-gaṭi (only a different form of tathā-gata) is used for those perfect beings whose foot-prints are untraceable. The word ‘untraceable’ is used for Tathāgata in Majjhimanikāya Vol. I. p. 140, P. T. S. ed. "tathāgatam ananuvijjoti vādāmi" i.e. I declare that Tathāgata is ananuvijja (skt-ananuvijjyā) i.e. whose track is untraceable, who is above all the dichotomies of thought.’ In the Dhammapada also, the Buddha has been called apāda (trackless) in ‘‘tām Buddhāmanantagocaram apadam kena ādāna nesattā’’ (verse 179). Again in the verse 254 of the Dhammapada, the word Tathāgata has been used in connexion with ‘ākūse ādāna nathā’ . It appears that Tathāgata only means ‘thus gone’ ‘so gone’ i.e. trackless, whose track cannot be traced, by any of the categories of thought.

The Mahābhārata is considered by some scholars to be pre-Buddhist. Whether it is pre-Buddhist or post-Buddhist, tathāgata seems to have been used for those who had realized Truth and were trackless.

Whatever the origin of the word, the function of Tathāgata is clear. He descends on earth to impart the light of Truth to mankind and departs without any track. He is the embodiment of Tathatā. When the Buddha is called Tathāgata, his individual personality is ignored; he is treated as a ‘type’ that appears from time to time in the world. He is the earthly manifestation of Dharma. The Tathāgata who has gone beyond all plurality and categories of thought (sarvāpratapacāra) can be said to be neither permanent nor impermanent. He is untraceable. Permanent and impermanent can be applied only where there is duality, not in the case of the non-dual. And because Tathatā is the same in all manifestation, therefore all beings are potential Tathāgatas. It is the Tathāgata within us who makes us long for Nibbāna and ultimately sets us free.

Śūnyatā and Karunā are the essential characteristics of Tathāgata. Śūnyatā in this context means prajñā (transcendental insight). Having Śūnyatā or prajñā, Tathāgata is identical with Tathatā or Śūnya. Having karunā, he is the saviour of all sentient beings.
We have seen the main features of Madhyamaka philosophy. It is both philosophy and mysticism. By its dialectic, its critical probe (prāṣaṅgāpādāna) into all the categories of thought, it relentlessly exposes the pretensions of Reason to know Truth. The hour of Reason’s despair, however, becomes the hour of Truth. The seeker now turns to meditation on the various forms of śūnyatā, and the practice of prajñāpāramitā. By moral and yogic practices, he is prepared to receive the Truth. In the final stage of Prajñā, the wheels of imagination are stopped, the discursive mind is stilled, and in that silence Reality (bhūta tathatā) stoops to kiss the eye of the aspirant, he receives the accolade of prajñā and becomes the knower—erant of Truth. There is no greater certainty than that of the mystic and equally there is no greater impotence laid upon him in giving expression to the Truth which he has received on that dizzy summit of experience. It is an experience of a different dimension—Spaceless, timeless, nirvikalpa (beyond the province of thought and speech). Hence it cannot be expressed in any human language. The question is put at the logical level of Reason, the answer is found at the supralogical, suprarational level of prajñā which one can mount to only by a life of moral and spiritual discipline. The Madhyamaka system is neither scepticism nor agnosticism. It is an open invitation to every one to see Reality face to face.

We saw at the outset that the ideal of Mahāyāna is the Bodhisattva. We shall conclude this brief summary of Madhyamaka system with the following words of Sangharakshita: “Buddhism may be compared to a tree. Buddha’s transcendental realization is the root. The basic Buddhism is the trunk, the distinctive Mahāyāna doctrines the branches, and the schools and sub-schools of the Mahāyāna the flowers. Now the function of flowers, however beautiful, is to produce fruit. Philosophy, to be more than mere barren speculation, must find its reason and its fulfillment in a way of life, thought should lead to action. Doctrine give birth to Method. The Bodhisattva ideal is the perfectly ripened fruit of the whole vast tree of Buddhism. Just as the fruit encloses the seed, so within the Bodhisattva Ideal are recombined all the different and sometimes seemingly divergent elements of Mahāyāna.” (A Survey of Buddhism, P 432)
THE CONCEPTION OF BUDDHIST NIRVANA
ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

Preliminary

Before the rise of Buddhism, there was a variety of views about the survival of the individual after death. Materialists denied survival of the individual after death in any form. Some adherents of the sacrificial religion believed in a blissful existence in paradise. Some believed that the individual would enjoy supreme bliss by the dissolution of its personality in an impersonal all-embracing Absolute. Some believed in an eternal individual soul which would return to its original condition of a pure spirit after many rebirths.

Buddha adopted a middle course. He agreed with the Eternalists that there was an accumulation of merit through a series of progressive rebirths, but he denied that there was any eternal spiritual principle. He did not believe in any permanent substance. He considered the world-process to be an appearance of discrete evanescent elements. His was a system of radical Pluralism.

Buddha had reduced Reality to discrete elements of matter and mind without any permanent substance or a permanent personality. Therefore it became difficult for him to explain moral law without a personality on whom the law would be binding or salvation without the existence of some one who would reach that goal.

Buddha attempted to solve the problem by emphasizing the attainment of "quiescence" as the highest bliss. According to him, the goal of man was to escape from the movement of phenomenal life into absolute quiescence in which all mental activity was stilled for ever. The name for this quiescence was Nirvāṇa. The term was pre-Buddhistic used in the sense of the dissolution of the personal in the universal whole (brahma-nirvāṇa). The means of attaining this was Yoga.
According to some scholars early Buddhism was merely Yoga, and lack of permanent individual, Nirvana etc. was invented by later Buddhism. These scholars interpret Yoga as vulgar magic. Yoga is, however, not magic but a well-developed technique of concentration.

Yoga brings about a 'condition of quiescence' A personality (Pudgala) which, in other systems, is considered to be a permanent spiritual principle (Atman), is according to Buddhism, only a bundle of elements or forces (Sanskāra-Samatha) and a stream of thought (Sañcana). It contains nothing permanent, or substantial, it is anatma. Some of the elements are constant, some appear only under certain conditions.

Among the constantly present elements, there are two precious ones, viz., praṇā or the faculty of appreciative analysis and samādhi or the faculty of concentration. When fully developed, praṇā becomes transcendent wisdom (praṇā anālā). Life in ordinary men is controlled by ignorance (avidyā) which is not a constant faculty and can be eliminated (phraṇśna).

The moral progress of man is the outcome of a struggle, in man between the good (kusala) and the evil (akusala) inclination. The presence of defiling ignorance (avidyā) together with its disturbing qualities (kleśas) makes the whole stream of thought (santāna) impure.

The disturbing or defiling faculties (kleśas) are divided into two classes, (1) those that can be remedied by insight (ārśiheya) and (2) those that can be remedied only by concentrated attention (bhavanā-heya). In the path of Nirvana, bhavanā is the most decisive step. It can transport the individual into a higher realm of existence.

Existence is divided into two distinct spheres the mystic world or saṁñjīva, and the gross world of carnal desire or kāma-dhātu. The latter includes hells, earth and the heavens where gods are living and enjoying themselves in a human way.
The mystic worlds are further divided into two classes—those in which the denizens possess ethereal bodies, and those in which they do not possess any physical bodies. The purely spiritual realms (arūpa-dhātu) are four. Their denizens are engrossed in contemplation (saṃśāpatti) out of the three incentives of human action on earth, viz., wealth, love and duty (artha-kāma-dharma), the last alone continues its unimpeded sway in the mystic’s world

III Mystic Intuition (Yogi-Pratyakṣa)

It is contended both in Hinayāna and Mahāyāna that in a mystic trance, the mystic sees in a moment the construction of both the gross and the mystic worlds as vividly as if they were an experience of direct sense-perception. But the picture given by Hinayāna and Mahāyāna mystics is entirely different. The Hinayāna mystic views the universe as an infinite continuity of single moments in gradual evolution towards ‘Final Extinction.’ The Mahāyāna mystic sees another picture corresponding to the theoretical teaching of that system.

The preparation for salvation consists of (1) a preliminary course of acquiring moral qualities (sambhāra mārga), (2) a subsequent course of training (prayoga mārga), (3) insight into essential truths (drṣṭi mārga). Drṣṭi mārga means insight into the four truths of the saṁt (Evāvaś ārya satyānti), viz., (1) phenomenal existence (duḥkha) (2) its driving force (saṁmādaya) (3) its extinction (uśrodha), and (4) the means for the final extinction (uśrodha-mārga).

In Hinayāna, the process of illumination is described in two aspects (1) that of feeling (2) that of knowledge. The feeling is one of satisfaction (ksanti ruci). This is followed by knowledge or intuition which means the vision of the elements of existence (dharma-jñāna).

In later times when the study of Abhidharma was superseded by that of logic and epistemology, direct cognition was defined as containing no synthetic thought (kalpanāpāda). The four truths were at first ascertained by sound logic
(4)

(Pramāṇena vinnāsata), and then suddenly perceived as vividly as a grain of corn on the palm of the hand. In Mahāyāna, the preparation consisted in a course of negative dialectic after which the intuition of the transcendental truth, springs up as an inward conviction (pratyāhāra-vedya).

Buddhist yoga was an inseparable part of the belief in a pluralistic universe of separate elements (dharma-s) gradually evolving towards extinction. All yoga practices which did not have this philosophical aim were condemned by the Buddha.

All the systems of philosophy in India excepting Mīmāṃsā believed in yoga as a means for ‘transition out of the phenomenal into the absolute’

IV. Buddha’s Belief in Personal Immortality

‘Immortal’ is one of the epithets used for Nirvāṇa Does immortality connote blissful existence among the forefathers in heaven? Or does it connote the paradise of Amitābha? The epithet ‘Nirvāṇa’ does not mean any of these things. Nirvāṇa is ‘beyond all imaginable spheres, it is the absolute limit.’ It simply means changeless, lifeless, deathless condition; it connotes a state in which there is neither birth nor death. “People enter paradise by being re-born in it, they disappear for ever in Nirvāṇa by being extinct.”

V. Was Buddha An Agnostic?

Buddha maintained a studied silence regarding some fundamental metaphysical questions e.g., ‘Is the world beginningless or has it a beginning, is it finite or infinite, what is the condition of the saint after death or what is the nature of the Absolute?’ Buddha either did not answer such questions at all or declared them as futile.

Scholars like N de la Vallée Poussin and B Keith interpret his silence as due to ignorance, but the fact is that fundamental reality cannot be explained in terms of the discursive intellect. Buddha maintained that the very effort of the intellect to confine truth to a simple ‘either-or’ to extremes
is bound to prove futile, the truth lies in the middle path. It cannot be described in terms of the human language which is the product of analytical intellect. It is ‘unspeakable’ ‘indescribable’. Non-duality is above words.

VI. The Position Of The Later Schools Of Hinayāna

Scholars like N. de la Vallée Poussin divide the history of Buddhism into three main periods, viz., a period of primitive faith, a period of confused ideology and a period of scholasticism. Such scholars have only attempted to construct the history of Buddhism on lines parallel to the Western Church.

Such a division of Buddhism is artificial. It is preferable to keep to the broad divisions of Buddhism into early or Hinayāna and later or Mahāyāna and the Saurāntikas as a transitional school.

Scholasticism is used in two senses, viz., (1) philosophy in the service of religion (2) excessive subtlety and artificiality in philosophical constructions. Scholasticism in Buddhism is to be taken in the second sense. The Vaibhāsikas were scholastic in this sense. The Saurāntikas were in favour of simplification.

Mahāyāna may be assigned to the 1st Century A. D. and the decline of Hinayāna in the North to the 5th Century A. D. The Saurāntikas occupied an intermediate position between the extreme Mahāyānists and the “school men” Finally they coalesced with the Mahāyānists forming the school of Yogācāra-Saurāntika.

The Vaibhāsikas considered Nīrūna to be something real (vastu), the Mahāyānists and the Saurāntikas maintained that it was only nominal, it was nothing real by itself, it was merely the cessation of all personal life.

Poussin has given interesting details of the controversy regarding Nīrūna, but he has missed the meaning of the controversy. The Vaibhāsikas did not maintain that Nīrūna was a kind of paradise as Poussin seems to think, but that the
annihilation of all life (niruddha) the essence of Nīrūṇa was a reality (niruddha-satyā, vāstu) i.e. 'a materialistic lifeless reality'. The Sautrāntikas adhere to the Mahāyāna conception which consists in identifying Nīrūṇa with the living world itself. They deny the reality of that materialistic kind of Nīrūṇa which was maintained by the Vaibhāṣikas.

**VII The Double Character Of The Absolute**

Nīrūṇa may be said to be the equivalent of the Absolute With regard to Nīrūṇa, there are two diametrically opposed views both in Brāhmanical and Buddhist philosophies.

Nīrūṇa is considered to be either eternal annihilation or eternal life. The various views may be represented clearly in the following tabular form.

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<th>Schools</th>
<th>Views</th>
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<td>In Muktī, there is mere sat or existence without cetor consciousness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early Buddhism and the Vaibhāṣika school</td>
<td>Nirvāṇa is a reality (dharma, vāstu) but without any consciousness (yasmin satr cetaso vimukṣah)</td>
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<td>Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Yoga</td>
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<td>Mahāyāna and Sautrāntikas</td>
<td>Buddha has a glorious, all-embracing cosmic body (dharma-kāya)</td>
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<td>Early schools of Hinayāna and the Vaibhāṣikas</td>
<td>Both Samsāra and Nirvāṇa are real separately</td>
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<td>Yogācāra or Vīpākanavāda</td>
<td>Samsara is unreal, Nirvāṇa is real.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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VIII. The Vaibhāṣikas

They may be considered to be the representatives of the Sarvāstivādins or Early Buddhism in general. Their views may be summed up in the following words. Existence has a dual aspect, viz. (1) transient and phenomenal (2) eternal and absolute. The phenomenal aspect may be analysed into matter, mind, and forces, the eternal into Space and Nirvāṇa.

There are two sets of elements of the phenomenal life, viz. (1) the one representing their everlasting nature (dharma-svabhāva), (2) the other representing their momentary manifestation in actual life (dharma-lakṣana). When all manifestations are stopped and all forces become extinct, only lifeless residue remains. This is similar to the undifferentiated Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya. It must, however, be remembered that the Sāṅkhyas admitted both eternal Matter and eternal Souls, but the Buddhists denied Soul.

The Vaibhāṣika maintains that Nirvāṇa is an entity (dharma) which remains when consciousness becomes extinct.

IX. The Sautrāntikas

According to the Sautrāntikas, Nirvāṇa was the absolute end of all manifestation known to us, the end of passion and life (Klesa-Janmanoh ksayah), without any positive counterpart. They denied any residue or substance in which life was extinguished. In other words, like all the Mahāyānists, they denied materialistic Nirvāṇa.

They neither admitted the monistic spiritual principle (ālaya-vijñāna) of the idealistic Mahāyānists, nor the principle of relativity (śūnya-vāda) of the Mādhyamikas.

It appears from the works of the famous Sautrāntika, Vasumitra that according to this school, there were two kinds of elements (skandha)—those which were subject to total extinction, and a subtle consciousness which survived after Nirvāṇa, and of which the former were but a manifestation.
X. The Yogācāras

This was an idealistic school founded by Āryāśaṅga in the 4th, 5th Century A. D.

The Yogācāra School is divided into two (1) Āryāśaṅga and his followers (2) Dignāga and his followers. According to Āryāśaṅga, \textit{alaya-vyāna} is a store-consciousness in which the \textit{seeds} (\textit{bīja}) of all future ideas and the traces of all past deeds are stored up. It is not the Absolute. It belongs to the phenomenal part of existence, because all the results of \textit{karma} are stored therein.

From their predecessors, the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras adopted the theory of the relativity and consequent unreality, (\textit{śūnyata}=\textit{niḥsvabhāvata}) of all individual existence, of all plurality, with the difference that they introduced different degrees of this unreality.

According to this school, individual ideas were unreal, since they were merged in the unique reality (\textit{parinisphanna}) of the Absolute (\textit{tathatā}=\textit{dharma-tā}). This was called their unreality in the absolute sense (\textit{paramārtha niḥsvabhāvata}). The Absolute was immanent in the phenomenal world, neither different, nor non-different (\textit{nānya, nānanya}). It was a pure consciousness, undifferentiated into subject and object (\textit{grāhya-grāhaka-rañña}). It is identified with the cosmic body (\textit{dharma-kāya}) of the Buddha.

Both Vasubandhu and Asanga ultimately adopted the idealistic view, according to which all separate elements were relative, not real in themselves, but real only when regarded \textit{sui specie aeterntatis}.

Hinayāna regarded both Samsāra and Nirvāṇa as realities, Yogic power achieved the transition from Samsāra into Nirvāṇa.

According to Mahāyāna, the Absolute was immanent in the world. So there was no need to convert the \textit{samskṛta-dharmas} into \textit{asamskṛta-dharmas}. There was only a change of aspect when Nirvāṇa was attained.
The Yogi viewed every separate object as unreal separately, but real sub specie aeternitatis.

Dignāga analysed reality into the concrete and the individual (ścalaksana), a point-instant (ksana) in which existence and cognition, object and subject coalesce.

XI. The Mādhyamikas

The Mādhyamika system of philosophy and dialectics is the main foundation of the Mahāyāna religion. The Mahāyāna religion differs from early Buddhism in many respects and has several points of contact with Brāhmaṇical religion.

The Mādhyamika system of philosophy is represented as extreme nihilism. Kumārila, Vācaspatmiśra and Śaṅkara have all condemned it as downright nihilism. Japanese scholars have, however, never committed the mistake of regarding its philosophy as nihilism or pure negativism.

XII. The Doctrine of Causality in The Hinayāna

Hinayāna contains an analysis of existence into its component elements, and establishes a certain number of ultimate data. It transforms soul into a stream of continuously flowing discrete moments of viśñāna, vedanā, samyñā, samāskāra etc. Matter (rūpa) is also considered to be a flow of momentary flashes without any continuant stuff. It admits only the reality of sense data and the elements of mind.

Its conception of causality, viz., pratiyāsa-samutpāda is in consonance with its conception of reality which could neither move nor change, but could only appear and disappear. Pratiyāsa-samutpāda can hardly be called causation in the sense in which it is usually understood. It really means dependently co-ordinated-origination or dependent existence. According to it every momentary entity springs into existence in co-ordination with other moments. Its formula is *‘asmin sati idam bhavati* there being this, there appears that! According to this, there could be neither causa materiae, nor causa efficiens. An entity is not really produced, it is simply co-ordinated.
Apart from the momentary entities called \textit{namarūpa}, Hinayāna believes in two unchanging entities viz. space and Nīrvāṇa. It considers both Samsāra and Nīrvāṇa, as realities, somehow interconnected in a whole.

\textbf{XIII. The Doctrine Modified in Mahāyāna}

The main distinctions between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna are the following

(1) According to Mahāyāna, the Real was that which possessed a reality of its own (\textit{sva-bhūva}), which was not produced by causes (\textit{akriyaka}=asamskrīta), which was not dependent upon anything else (\textit{paratra upāpekṣa})

(2) In Hinayāna, the elements, although interdependent (\textit{samskrīta}=pratītyasamutpāna), were real (\textit{vastu}). In Mahāyāna, all elements, because interdependent, were unreal (\textit{śunya}=svabhāva—śunya)

(3) In Hinayāna, every whole (\textit{raitis=avayavā}) is regarded as a nominal existence (\textit{prayāptaṣat}) and only the parts or ultimate elements (\textit{dharma}) are real (\textit{vastu}). In Mahāyāna, all parts or elements are unreal (\textit{śunya}) and only the whole of all wholes (\textit{dharmanāt=ākāya}) is real.

According to Mahāyāna, Reality (\textit{tattva}) is ‘uncognisable from without, quiescent, undifferentiated in words, unrealisable in concepts, non-plural’.

(4) In Hinayāna, the individual (\textit{pudgala}), the self (\textit{ātmā}) was resolved in its component elements (\textit{skandha}=\textit{ayatana}=\textit{ākāya}), there were no real personalities (\textit{pudgala}=\textit{nārāhyā}), but a congeries of flashing forces (\textit{samskāra-samāhāra}).

In Mahāyāna we have, on the other hand, a denial of real elements (\textit{dharma-nārāhyā}), and an assertion of the absolute Whole (\textit{dharma-kāya})

In Hinayāna, we have a radical pluralism, in Mahāyāna, we have a radical monism.
XIV. The Doctrine of Relativity

Mahāyāna gives a new interpretation of pratītya-samutpāda. It maintains that whatsoever is dependent or relative cannot be considered as ultimate reality.

The central conception in Early Buddhism is a plurality of ultimate elements (dharmas). The central conception of Mahāyāna is their relativity (śūnyatā). The word śūnya can best be translated by ‘relative or contingent’ and the term śūnyatā by ‘relativity or contingency’. The entire Mahāyāna literature goes to show that the term śūnya is a synonym of dependent existence (pratītya samutpāda) and means not something ‘void’, but something ‘devoid’ of independent reality (svabhāva-śūnya). Śūnya has two implications, viz. (1) that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality (2) and that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (uṣṭrapancā). Concept or speech (uṇkalpa) can give us only a distorted view of reality; it can never seize it.

XV. The Real Eternal Buddha

Mahāyāna does not believe in the Hinayānistic conception of Buddha having a real existence of his own. According to Mahāyāna, Buddha is above every possible determination (uṣṭrapancā). The real Buddha must be perceived directly by intuition. Those who dichotomise him as eternal or non-eternal, existent or non-existent, relative or non-relative, omniscient or non-omniscient are misled by words. Buddha must be regarded as the cosmical order (dharmaṭā), his Body is the Cosmos (dharmaṭā). It is impossible to know the essence of the Cosmos conceptually.

XVI. The New Conception of Nirvāṇa

Early Buddhism and Vaibhāsikas regarded Space and Nirvāṇa as ultimate realities on the ground that they possessed a character (dharma), a reality (vastu), an individuality (svalaksana), an existence of their own (svabhāva). These con-
tentions were rejected by the Sautrāntika on the ground that they did not possess any such reality.

The Mādhyamikas also rejected those contentions because of their new definition of reality (anāpattah vabhāvah). The Mādhyamika’s conception of Relativity (ṣūnyatā) covered everything, the conditional as well as the eternal elements of the Vaibhāsikas. The new interpretation of the principle of Relativity (pratītya-samutpada) made the Hīnayānistic Absolute also relative, and according to Mahāyāna, whatever was relative was false, transient and illusory.

The unique reality, according to Mahāyāna, cannot be characterised in words (anuvacaniya), but a hint of it may be found in the following descriptions. It is the Whole of all wholes, it is the element of all elements (dharmañām dharmaṁ or dharma-dhāti), as their relativity (ṣūnyata), as ‘thisness’ (udanā), as ‘suchness’ (lathata) as the suchness of existence (bhāta-lathatā), as the matrix of the Lord (lathagata-garbha) and as Buddha’s Cosmic Body (dharma-kaya). In the last conception, Buddhism becomes at once pantheistic and theistic, or as Prof. Anesaki puts it, Cosmotheistic.

The great Mahāyānist, Nāgārjuna gives a new orientation to Nirvāna. The Vaibhāsika maintained that Nirvāna was something real (dharma) in which consciousness and life were extinct for ever, the Sautrāntika believed that it was the simple cessation of the world process. In both cases, something real was assumed to exist before Nirvāna and to disappear afterwards. This made Nirvāna a product of causes (samskṛta) Nāgārjuna asserted that there was not a shade of difference between the Absolute and the Phenomenal, between Nirvāna and Śāṃskṛta. The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process, it is the phenomenal.

XVII. Is Relativity Itself Relative?

The main problem for Mahāyāna is “Is Relativity itself relative?” Obviously the concept of Relativity depends upon its opposite—the Non-relative. It should be borne in mind that
the principle of Relativity is invoked to destroy all theories and to replace them by direct mystic intuition, not by a new theory. Candrakirti, the commentator on Nāgārjuna’s “Madhyamaka-sāstra” puts it beautifully “Relativity is here the common characteristic of all the elements (dharma) of existence. That is our view. But since there is no element which would be non-relative, Relativity itself, for want of those objects with which it could be contrasted, becomes as man as a mirage, as a garland of flowers in the sky”.

Relativity (śūnyatā) may be used to understand that all existence is relative and when that is understood, the theory of Relativity should be discarded.

Middle path in Early Buddhism meant middle course between materialism uchchodayā and the doctrine of Eternal Soul (śāvatavāda). In Mahāyāna, Middle path comes to mean Relativity.

XVII. Parallel Developments in Buddhism and Brāhmaṇism

Just as Mahāyāna moved towards radical Monism, even so Brāhmaṇism moved towards radical Monism. It is most probable that Mahāyāna is indebted to some Upanisadic influence. Gaudapāda and Śankara have been, in their turn, influenced by the dialectic of Nāgārjuna.

XIX. European Parallels

To characterize Nāgārjuna as a ‘nihilist’ as some scholars have done would be misleading, for his condemnation of Logic is only part, and not the principal one, of his Philosophy.

Prof Kerth and Prof M. Walleser suppose that Nāgārjuna denies even the empirical reality of the world. This is because they have missed the positive counterpart of his negativism, the identity of Dharmakāya and Brahman. Nāgārjuna’s philosophy was certainly opposed to rationalism, European or Indian, which believes that Reality could be known by logical reason.

Prof. H. Jacobi has suggested a comparison between Zeno of Elea and Nāgārjuna. The similarity was not limited only
to their dialectic. Nagarjuna’s philosophy points to a Whole which, when characterized in limited particulars leads to the antimony of reason. Particulars are merely relative (Sūnya). Zeno also devised his “sophisms” to prove the impossibility of motion, and to lead the thinker to Parmenides’ conception of the world as a motionless whole.

There are remarkable coincidences between Nāgārjuna’s negativism and Bradley’s condemnation of the concepts of things and qualities, relations, space and time, change, causation, motion, the self etc. Bradley may be characterized as genuine Mādhyamika.

A similarity may be found between Hegel’s dialectic method and that of Nāgārjuna. Hegel challenges common sense to point some object which is certainly known for what it is, and solves the question by stating that all we know of the object is its “thisness”, all its remaining contents being merely relation. This is also the meaning of tathatā or “suchness”, and, as we have seen, sūnyatā only means Relativity. Both philosophers assume us that Negativity (sūnyatā) is the soul of the Universe. Reducing the world of fact to a realm of universal relativity this implies that everything cognizable is transient and illusory.

A similarity may also be noticed between the Mahāyānaist conception of Buddha’s Cosmical Body as the unique substance and Spinoza’s conception of God as the only substance.

It will be seen, therefore, that it will not be correct to characterize Nāgārjuna as a “Nihilist”. All that Nāgārjuna was at pains to show was that logic was incapable of giving us an idea of the Absolute, and that we can have a knowledge of the Absolute only by direct mystic intuition.

**XX. The Position of Nyāya-Vaiśesika**

In the conception of Mokṣa of Nyāya-Vaiśesika a similarity to the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa may be noticed. The highest goal of life, according to Nyāya-Vaiśesika, is Moksa or Āpāvarga in which there is neither consciousness as
we know it here down on Earth nor bliss. Vātsyāyana, the great commentator on the Nyāya-sūtras says that such a goal could hardly be acceptable to the average man. He puts the aversion of the average man to such a goal in the following words. “Is it possible that an enlightened man should favour a final Release in which there is neither bliss nor consciousness?” And he answers the question by a counter-question—“Is it possible that an enlightened man should not favour the idea of a final Release where all turmoil of life is stopped for ever and where there is no consciousness about it?”

The goal of Indian philosophical systems is Moksa or Nirvāṇa. They start with the conception of whole (sarvam) which is divided into phenomenal life and the Absolute (Samsāra and Nirvāṇa.) The phenomenal part is further analysed into its actual condition (duḥkha), its driving force (duḥkha-samudaya), its extinction (nirodha), and the means for acquiring this extinction (niroaha-mārga) It is not only Buddhism which preaches these four truths. This scheme is accepted by almost all the Indian philosophical systems.

Both in Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Buddhism, phenomenal life is designated as duḥkha. It is wrong to translate it as suffering, misery or pain, since it covers such items as inanimate matter, the five objects of sense etc.

In both the systems, the analysis of existence into its elements is undertaken in order to determine the means by which all the forces of life must be brought to a standstill.

There is another general feature of practically all the systems of Indian philosophy. They believe in a central force which keeps life going in all the worlds. This general force (karma) is resolved into special ones called illusion, desire and aversion. They produce germs of future action which bring about the continuation of phenomenal life. The decisive and final step which stops empirical life for ever, and transfers the individual into the Absolute is Yoga.
The Nyāya-Vaśesika system assumes a limited number of substances with then changing qualities. In this system, the soul of the individual is an eternal substance, it is ubiquitous and conterminous with space. Knowledge is produced in it by contact with buddhi or the internal organ. By the power of Yoga, buddhi is kept back from all contact with the soul. No consciousness is then produced, all phenomenal life is annihilated, but the substance of the soul reverts in Moksa (liberation) to its original and natural condition (svātāpāvasiḥa).

There is a controversy between the Nyāya-Vaśesika systems and Vedānta regarding the condition of the liberated soul. The Vaśesikas maintain that it is a cessation of all life, just as there is cessation of fire when all life is exhausted. According to them, there is no eternal bliss and eternal consciousness in moksa as Vedānta maintains. Since all objects of knowledge have disappeared for ever in moksa, if there is any joy in that condition, it would be joy without anything to be enjoyed, if there is any knowledge in that condition, it would be knowledge without knowing anything. Such feeling and such knowledge would be as good as non-existent (sthitopy asthitān na viśsyaṃ).

The only meaning of Moksa or Nirvāṇa according to Nyāya-Vaśesika is the annihilation of phenomenal life. This closely resembles the conception of Nirvāṇa of the Vaibhāśika school of Buddhism. The Nirvāṇa of the Mahāyānists and the Sautrāntikas, however, resembles the conception of Moksa entertained by the Vedāntists.

XXI Conclusion

The following stages may be marked in the Buddhist conception of the Absolute.

(1) In the 6th century B.C. there was a great effervescence of philosophical thought among the non-brāhmanical classes in India. Buddha at that time proposed a system denying the existence of eternal soul and reducing phenomenal existence.
to a conglomerate of separate elements, evolving gradually towards final extinction.

(2) Only some schools remained faithful to this ideal of lifeless Nirvāṇa and an extinct Buddha.

(3) In the 1st century A.D. Buddha was converted into a superhuman, living principle. This system of thought was probably influenced by the Upanisads. Buddha now became converted into a full-blown Brahman and its personification was worshipped under the name of a Cosmical Body (*dharma-kāraka*), Samantabhadra, Vairocana and others.

(4) The Mahāśamghikas and Vatsiputriyas assumed a kind of consciousness surviving in Nirvāṇa.

(5) The philosophical doctrine of the old school stuck to the conception of separate elements of matter, mind and forces, and investigated the method of their gradual extinction in the Absolute.

(6) The Sautrāntikas cut down the list of artificially constructed elements, cut down Nirvāṇa itself as a separate entity, and thus constituted a transition Mahāyāna.

(7) The philosophy of the new religion is an adaptation of Vedānta. It became monistic.

(8) This monistic philosophy was divided into two different schools. One school known as Viṣṇunāvāda maintained that there was store-consciousness (*ālaya-viṣṇūna*) of which all phenomenal life was a manifestation. This school made a good deal of contribution to Logic. The other school denied the possibility of cognizing the Absolute by logical methods. It declared all plurality to be an illusion, and nothing short of the Whole to be Reality which could be known only in mystic intuition.

(9) The transitional Sautrāntika school merged in the 5th Century A.D. in the idealistic school of Mahāyāna and produced philosophers like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. According to it, Nirvāṇa was a pure spiritual principle in which
subject and object coalesced, and the force of transcendental illusion (vāsanā), producing the phenomenal world disappeared.

(10) In the 7th century A.D., the relativistic school (Śūnyavāda) of early Mahāyāna received a fresh impulse.

(11) The Vijnānavāda and Śūnyavāda now influenced Vedānta which adapted its methods for its own purpose.

A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

By

Nāgārjuna

Prefatory

Nāgārjuna has written three works on Buddhist Theory of Relativity (Śūnyatā), viz Madhyamaka Śāstra, Yuktisastikā and Śūnyatā-saptati.

The first work is divided into 27 chapters. It is his main work. It calls into question the various concepts of philosophy accepted by Hinayāna and other systems, and proves that they are all relative, and that Reality cannot be established intellectually. It indirectly establishes Non-dualism (advaita).

Nāgārjuna is also the author of Vṛgāra-vyāvārtti (The Refutation of Contests). It is doubtful whether some other works attributed to him were really written by him. It is also doubtful whether Nāgārjuna, the metallurgist-chemist, and Nāgārjuna, the philosopher are the same person. His pupil and successor, Āryadeva wrote Cātuḥśataka, and Hastavālaprakarana. Both flourished in the 2nd century A.D., and both belonged to South India.

In the 5th Century A.D., the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu developed the realistic school of Mahāyāna, known as Vijnānavāda or Yogācāra.
The śūnyavāda school of Mahāyāna is divided into two—
(1) that of Nāgārjuna and his followers that totally condem-
ned Logic for understanding the Absolute and (2) that of
Bhavya and his followers who advocated independent argu-
ments to support the tenets of Nāgārjuna. The first is known
as Mādhyamika-Prāśangika the second is known as Mādhyamika-Svātantrika.

In the 7th century A. D. arose Candrakīrti who, by his
learned commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka Śāstra
cast the Svātantrika school into the shade and firmly estab-
lished the Prāśangika school.

The following periods may be marked in the development
of the philosophy of Mahāyāna :

(1) 1st century A.D.—The rise of Mahāyāna—ālaya-
Veśāna and tathātā admitted by Aśvaghoṣa.

(2) 2nd century A. D.—The theory of Universal Relativity
(Śūnyatā) formulated by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva

(3) 3rd and 4th century—No particular philosophical
activity.

(4) 5th century—The idealistic interpretation of Asanga
and Vasubandhu.

(5) 6th century A. D.—A split in the Śūnyavāda school
between the Mādhyamika—Prāśangika and the Mādhyamika
Svātantrika

(6) 7th century A.D.—Final establishment of the
Mādhyamika-Prāśangika school by Candrakīrti
EXAMINATION OF CAUSALITY

I. Preliminary

What is the subject-matter of this work? Nāgārjuna gives a hint of it in the prayer given in the beginning of the work. It is the Principle of Relativity (pratītya—samutpāda or Śūnyatā or anta-duvaya-vahita-vatva)—the principle that nothing (in the Universe) can disappear or arise, or has an end or is eternal or is identical with itself, nor is there anything differentiated (in itself) and that there is no motion, whether towards us or away from us. In one word, everything is relative.

The aim of this work is Nirvāṇa which may be characterized as the bliss of the quiescence of all plurality.

The universe of apparent plurality is governed by the principle of Relativity or pratītya-samutpāda.

II. The Meaning of Pratītya-samutpāda

‘Pratītya’ is formed by the preposition ‘pāt’ (towards) the root ‘i’ (moving, approaching). The preposition modifies the meaning of a verb. Therefore pratītya here means ‘reaching’ in the sense of ‘dependent’ or ‘relative’. The word samutpāda means ‘appearance, manifestation’. The whole word pratītya-samutpāda, therefore, means ‘the manifestation of separate entities as relative to their causes and conditions’ (hetu-pratītyapekṣa bhūvanām utpādah pratītya samutpādānīlakah).

III. The Meaning of this Term in Hinayāna

Śrīlābha and other Hinayānists explain pratītya-samutpāda in a somewhat different way. They say that ‘ṣya’ is a taddhita or a derivative derived from the noun ‘ṣī’ which means disappearance. ‘ṣya’, therefore, means ‘fit to disappear’. The preposition ‘pratīt’ is used in the sense of viptā; e repetition implying continuous or successive action. Thus according to
them-pratītyasamutpāda means śruti prati slyānāṃ vināśnāṃ samutpādah: i.e. appearance of everything bound to disappear i.e., everything momentary. So their explanation comes to this—The evanescent momentary things appear.

IV. The Hinayānist Interpretation Rejected

The Hinayānist interpretation may do in a passage of the Scripture like the following:

"Pratītyasamutpādam O Bhiksavo deśayisyāmes" i.e. "O Bhikṣus, I shall teach you pratītya samutpāda", but in a passage like the following, the Hinayānist interpretation will utterly fail—"Caksuḥ pratītya vijnāna catupadyate caksurvijnānam" i.e. "visual consciousness appears when coordinated with the faculty of vision and colour."

But the interpretation which we propose viz. 'appearances coordinated with conditions, appearances relative to conditions' applies in all cases.

V. The Opinion of Bhāvanvēka Refuted

Bhāvanvēka misquotes the opinion of Mahāyānists, and then on the basis of that misquotation alleges that the Mahāyānists mean by 'prati' vipāsā or generalisation. This is wrong. The Mahāyānists, as we have already pointed out, mean by pratītya-samutpāda 'relative existence' 'appearance relatively to conditions' and this applies both to generalisation and single cases.

VI. Bhāvanvēka’s Criticism Unsound

Bhāvanvēka interprets the explanation Pratītya prāpya literally as 'reaching' and then criticises by saying that there are no two things here reaching each other. But his criticism is not to the point, for prāpya in this context means 'āpekṣya' i.e. 'relatively 'being dependent'.

VII. The Definition of the Term By Bhāvanvēka

Bhāvanvēka interprets 'pratītyasamutpāda' in the following way, 'if this is, that appears'. It is not right to treat it.
as a disjunctive judgement. Although 'pratītya-samutpāda' consists of two words, it is not right to suppose that each refers to a different object.

Bhāvaviveka again treats 'pratītyasamutpāda' as a conventional expression (rūdhā). This too is not right.

At last Bhāvaviveka, explains 'pratītyasamutpāda' as 'this being, that becomes.' In this way, he ultimately accepts our explanation.

VIII The Principle of Relativity The Law of All Pluralistic Existence

By the doctrine of 'pratītya-samutpāda', Buddha teaches that all entities in life are relative. Nothing disappears, and nothing new appears.

The essence of Relativity is Nirvāṇa, the Quiescence of Plurality, for which there are no words.

The doctrine of Relativity is the Central teaching of Buddha.

IX. Causality Denied

Causation which is imagined in other systems (as a real production) appears either as a new manifestation of the same (continuant) stuff, or as an effect of separate factors, or as a result of both or as proceeding at random. Nāgārjuna maintains that none of these theories is right.

X Identity of Cause And Effect Denied

Buddhāpalita rightly says that entities do not arise out of their own selves, since such origination would serve no purpose, and since an absurd consequence will follow that everything is eternally arising.

XI Bhāvaviveka Assails The Comment of Buddhāpalita

Bhāvaviveka has raised an objection against the above interpretation of Buddhāpalita, saying that his comment misses the mark, because
(1) neither a reason nor an example is given,
(2) objections are left unanswered,
(3) it is a mere deduction ad absurdum.

XII. The First Objection Of Bhāvaviveka Answered.

In saying that the cause is the self, you seemingly main-
tain that one's own self is once more produced. There is no
sense in a new production of what already exists, and there
would be infinite regress. But according to the Mādhyamika
method of dialectics, a reason with an example is not needed.
He is interested only in showing the absurdity of conflicting
views.

XIII. The Second Point Of Bhāvaviveka Rejected

The accusations of the opponent (viz. Sāṃkhya) were abso-
lutely out of place. It was, therefore, not incumbent upon
Buddhapālita to refute them. So Bhāvaviveka's assertion that
'objections are left unanswered' is irrelevant.

XIV. The Mādhyamika Method Explained

Bhāvaviveka says that Buddhapālita has given no valid
argument to prove his thesis. Bhāvaviveka does not realize
that the method of the Mādhyamika is different. He does not
vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. It
is enough for him if he shows that his opponent is not capable
of establishing his thesis.

XV. Buddhapālita's Comment Vindicated from the Stand-
point of Formal Logic.

On close consideration, it will be found that Buddhapālita
has actually given an independent argument to prove his the-
sis. It stands thus:

Entities do not arise out of themselves.

Because such origination would serve no purpose. Here the
word 'such' refers to a new origination of something by itself
(already) existing.
This argument may be expanded in the following way —
Thesis—An entity does not require a second production.
Reason—Because it exists
Example—Just as a jar

Major premise—Whatsoever exists does not require to be produced once more.
Bhāvaviveka is, therefore, not right in saying that Buddhapālita has given no independent argument to prove his thesis

XVI. The Answer of The Sāṅkhya Virtually Repudiated
By Buddhapālita

Buddhapālita has clearly shown that in the case of a manifested jar, it would be absurd to maintain the identity of cause and effect. Regarding a non-manifested jar, it is all the more clear that it cannot be produced, for it has been shown that entities do not arise of their own self.

It is clear, therefore, that Buddhapālita has pointed out the contradictions in the Sāṅkhya theory of causality by an independent argument.

XVII. Some Minor Points Explained

The argument against the Sāṅkhya may have also been formulated by Buddhapālita in another way, viz.,
Thesis—All physical entities do not arise out of themselves.
Reason—Because they always exist in their own essence
Example—Just as the eternal spirit does

It might be said that the Sāṅkhya is not affected by the denial of origination, for he maintains that causality consists in a new manifestation of an existing stuff. But origination also means manifestation, for both origination and manifestation have the common feature of representing something that was formerly unperceived and became perceived after.

XVIII. The Third Structure of Bhāvaviveka Answered.
The Denial of one View does not imply the Acceptance of the contrary.

It is wrong on the part of Bhāvaviveka to suggest that the repudiation of the Sāṅkhya theory of causation by a mere


deduction ad absurdum involves acceptance of the opposite theory, viz., that cause and effect represent two different substances.

The only result of our deduction is to repudiate the theory of our opponent. It is not at all implied that we accept the converse of the theory.

XIX. Examination Of Bhāvaviveka's Formal Argument Against The Sānkhya.

Bhāvaviveka has composed the following syllogism to combat the Sānkhya theory of Causality.

Thesis—Mental phenomena, if considered from the transcendental standpoint, are no new productions of the same substance.

Reason—Because they exist.

Example—Just as the conscious principle of the Sānkhya which is an eternal unchanging entity.

Major Premise—Whatsoever already exists is not a new self-production.

In this syllogism, what is the use of the qualification 'from the transcendental standpoint'? We deny the identity of cause and effect from the phenomenal point of view also.

Therefore the formal argument of Bhāvaviveka is faulty.

XX. Bhāvaviveka's Argument Assaulted From The Standpoint Of Formal Logic.

From the standpoint of formal logic, Bhāvaviveka's argument contains either pākṣādoṣa (faulty thesis), since it will refer to something, i.e. transcendental reality of mental phenomena which he himself does not accept as real or ērāya asidādaḥ hemu doṣa (faulty reason) which will then refer to something equally unreal.

The argument is wrong, either from the standpoint of its author for whom separate mental phenomena are not real,
or from the standpoint of those to whom it is addressed, because they do not admit any difference between phenomenal and absolute reality

XXI. Another Attempt of Bhāvaviveka To Vindicate His Argument.

Bhāvaviveka says that the fallacy pointed out in his argument will not be correct, since he is taking the syllogism in question as referring in general terms to the relation between a fact (e.g., mental phenomena) and one of its characteristics (viz., existence) without taking into consideration the special theories about the nature of mental phenomena or the essence of existence.

As in the case of the evanescent character of sound, only the relation of this characteristic to the characterized substratum in general terms is taken into account, even so in the present case, the mere fact that there is some substratum (called sensations), should be taken in general, without entering into details whether it be a phenomenal or absolute existence.

Bhāvaviveka's argument is not sound, for in the present case it is just the existence of such a general substratum that is denied. It is denied even by Bhāvaviveka himself. His aim is to deny Causality. In denying every causality, he is, at the same time, denying its substratum (the caused thing), the substance of the thing produced, converting it in a thing which owes its existence to mere illusion.

Since for the transcendentalist, in what he considers to be absolutely real, there is no room for non-reality, Bhāvaviveka's syllogism would be meaningless. He takes the phenomenal visual sensations and other mental phenomena as a minor term (the subject of his deduction). He thus cannot escape the criticism that his thesis is logically impossible, since it refers to a non-entity, or that his middle term is contradictory, since it appertains to an unreal substratum The syllogism would be equivalent to the assertion that non-existing things do not arise out of themselves, because they exist.
XXII. Bhavaviveka Also Avails Himself Of the Argument That for the Monist All Individual Existence is Unreal.

When the Hīnayānist maintains that 'causes and conditions which produce mental phenomena really exist' Bhāvaviveka assails his argument on the ground that if the word 'cause' in the above statement is taken in the phenomenal sense, the reason has no ultimate reality, if it is taken in the transcendental sense, then as Nāgārjuna has pointed out, there is altogether no efficient causality.

By adopting this line of argument, Bhāvaviveka has himself admitted the unreality of every reason from the transcendental standpoint.

In certain other syllogisms given by Bhāvaviveka, the middle term is faulty.

In another case, Bhāvaviveka admits that the transcendentalist has to forego usual logical methods.

In certain other syllogisms adduced by Bhāvaviveka, one may notice the unreality of the reasons.

XXIII. Another Formal Error in the Syllogism Of Bhāvaviveka

The reason, viz., "because the mental phenomena exist" is uncertain from the standpoint of the Sāṇkhya.

XXIV. The Madhyamika Repudiates His Opponent on Principles Admitted By Him.

It may be objected that all the arguments of the Māhyamika will also be wrong, because the reasons adduced by him will either be non-entities themselves, or they will represent something pertaining to a non-entity.

The Mādhyamika says is reply that he does not resort to direct proof by syllogism. His arguments are advanced on the basis of the principles admitted by his opponents and they are meant only to repudiate the tenets of his opponents.
XXV. Logical Refutation On The Basis Of Facts Admitted By Only One Party.

If logical refutation is to be done on principles admitted by only one party, it must be on the basis of the principles admitted by yourself, not on the basis of principles admitted by your opponent.

XXVI. Denial of Causality Through A Separate Substance.

Entities do not arise out of something different from them. Because they do not pre-exist in something else, they cannot be produced out of it.

Buddhāpālita rightly says that entities cannot arise out of something different from them, since it would follow that every thing could then arise out of any thing.

Bhāvaviveka assails this by saying that it is mere *deductio ad absurdum* but we have shown above that a *deductio ad absurdum* is a valid proof.

XXVII. Combined Causality Denied

Nor do entities arise out of both ocontiuant stuff and separate factors, since all the incongruity attaching to each of these hypotheses separately will be applicable to their combination.

XXVIII. No Pluralistic Universe Without Causation

As Buddhāpālita has said the entities of this world can not arise without any cause, since everything would then be possible at any time, and in any place.

Bhāvaviveka's criticism of this point is entirely trivial.

XXIX. Causality Through The Will of God.

Nor can God be said to be the cause of this world, for God also is to be included in one of the alternatives already discussed and dismissed.

Therefore the doctrine of Dependent Origination (or Relativity) with its characteristics of no real origination etc. is established.
XXX. Mahāyāna And Hinayāna Contrasted.

The Hinayānists say that if the principle of Dependent Origination is to be interpreted only as a principle of Relativity, and not real Causality, how are the deliverances of Buddha to be explained, for they assume Causality.

Buddha says that the forces of life are influenced in this world by illusion and desire. When these are suppressed in Nirvāṇa, they become extinct. This suggests the reality of the force of illusion and of Nirvāṇa.

Similarly there are other utterances of Buddha which go to show that he believed in real Causality.

The Mahāyānists reply that it is for this very reason that Nāgārjuna has composed this Treatise on Relativity in order to show the real and conventional meaning of the scriptures. All the utterances of Buddha mentioning the principle of Dependent Origination do not refer to the pure essence of the objects which reveals itself when the darkness of our ignorance is dispelled.

There are other utterances of Buddha which refer to absolute reality, e.g.,

"The permanent Reality, Brethren, is Nirvāṇa. All the combined forces of phenomenal life are illusion" etc.

XXXI. The Direct And Indirect Meaning of Buddha’s Words.

It must be borne in mind that certain words of the Buddha are mārtha i.e. they have a direct meaning, and certain words are neyārtha i.e. they have only indirect or conventional meaning.

In general terms, it must be said that those discourses which have been delivered in order to teach the path of salvation (mārgāvalārāya) are neyārtha* (conventional), those which are delivered in order to teach the final result (phalāvalārāya) are also neyārtha* (metaphorical or conventional)

* Stcherbatsky considers the discourses delivered to teach the final result to be mārtha. The text published by the Mithštā vidyāśāṭha calls this also neyārtha. Probably Stcherbatsky had a different reading before him.
those discourses which specify the entrance into that kind of final Deliverance which is Relativity, where there is no separate object, no profound meditation, no volition, no birth, no causation, no existence, no Ego no living creature, no individual soul, no personality, and no lord are 

 stm̥rtha (having direct meaning)

This is why in order to show that doctrine which admits causality is wrong, Nagarjuna has undertaken to consider the doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda or Dependent Origination

XXXII. How Is The Moral Law To Be Vindicated in An Unreal world?

If there is no real causation, and the plurality of the elements of life is a mere illusion, it will follow that wicked actions do not exist and so the moral law will become useless in an unreal world.

The answer is that so long as one is steeped in the world of duality, in illusion, the moral law has its usefulness. Once one has risen above duality, above the pairs of opposites, above illusion, he does not need to be regulated by a law.

Illusion is a condition of complete error in regard to all elements of existence. So long as illusion is not perceived as illusion, it becomes reality to us.

Hell and heaven are the product of imagination. Just as in sleep we dream that we are suffering from the horrors of hell, but on awakening find that there was no hell, even so illusion is like the state of sleep, and in that condition we experience all the suffering, but once we are awakened to reality, there is no suffering whatsoever.

The separate entities of the phénomenal world have no real independent existence of their own. To people who are misled by their own subjective illusions, they become a source of moral defilement.
XXXIII. The Twelve Membered Causal Series Refers to The Phenomenal World.

The Hinayānist objects that if there is no causation, how is the causal series taught by Buddha to be understood? The reply of the Mādhyamika is that it is the phenomenal point of view (samvṛti), it is not absolute reality (taitvam). Phenomenalism is only the fact of Universal Relativity (Praṇītya-samutpāda mātram).

XXXIV. Controversy About the Validity of Logic.

Logician—You cannot assert the separate entities are not caused. If you have the right to say that all elements of existence are uncaused, others have a right to maintain that whatsoever exists has a cause.

Mādhyamika—Ours is a system of Universal Relativity. There is no room in it for an assertive judgement.

Logician—But your proposition, viz., 'entities arise neither out of themselves, nor out of something different, not out of both, nor at random, looks like a definite assertion.

Mādhyamika—This statement of ours appears decisive to simple people who interpret everything according to arguments familiar to them, but not to saints who can intuit absolute reality.

Logician—Do saints believe in no argument?

Mādhyamika—Saints remain silent about the Absolute.

Logician—If saints do not use arguments how do they convey their idea of the Absolute to simple folk?

Mādhyamika—Saints do not use their own arguments. They just use the arguments that appeal to simple folk and convey the truth by methods which simple folk can understand.

Logician—But causality exists because such is our direct experience.

Mādhyamika—But a man suffering from ophthalmia has
the direct experience of a double moon. Even so the direct experience of a man suffering from ignorance is misleading.

It has been proved by the negative method that entities of the phenomenal world have never originated. It will now be shown in the light of Relativity that particular characteristics of the so-called real entities are not real.

XXXV. Controversy with The Buddhist Logician Continued

The Buddhist Epistemologists maintain that they are only giving a scientific description of what just happens in common life, in regard to the sources of knowledge and their respective objects; they do not consider their transcendental reality. The Nāyāyikās have given wrong definitions Therefore they consider it their duty to give the right ones.

The Mādhyamika replies that Nāgārjuna in his "Repudiation of Contests" rightly says that if every cognition of an object depends on reliable sources of knowledge, and these sources being objects cognised by us in their turn depend on other sources of knowledge, we shall be landed into a regressus ad infinitum.

XXXVI. Critique of the Notion of An Absolute Particular Point-instant.

The Logician says that by essence we need not mean a characteristic but the object characterized. The Mādhyamika replies that firstly this is not the commonly accepted notion of essence. Secondly if it is suggested that the point-instant is characterized by our awareness of it, then it would mean that the single point-instant contains a double aspect—the thing characterized and its characteristic. There will then be a double particular essence, one of which will be the thing characterized and the other will be the characteristic. If our awareness of the point-instant represents its characteristic, the thing characterized i.e., the objective side of the relation will represent something different from its characteristic. If it is maintained that this second aspect is in its turn also a
thing characterized, it will then require some other thing as a characteristic. This will lead to regressus ad infinitum.

XXXVII. Introspection

The Logician says that the consciousness which represents our awareness of a point-instant is apprehended by introspection. It thus contains inherent objectivity and immanent cognizability.

The Mādhyamika says that the theory of Introspection has already been refuted in Mādhyamakāvatāra. Consciousness arises when there is an object. Does it mean that consciousness is one thing and the object another or that they are identical? In the first case, we shall have a double consciousness. If they are identical, it is not possible to cognize consciousness through consciousness. Consciousness cannot know itself as an object.

XXXVIII. The Discussion About The Point-instant Resumad

The Mādhyamika puts a further question. Is in the thing which is its own essence any difference between the essence and the thing possessing that essence or is there none? In the first case, the essence will be different from the thing, and it will cease to be its essence, and the thing being detached from its essence will just be nothing.

If the thing and its essence are identical, the thing characterized ceases to be characterized.

The Logician says that just as Mādhyamika asserts that ultimate reality is unspeakable, even so it can be said that the relation between the thing characterized and its characteristic is unspeakable.

The Mādhyamika says that unspeakability cannot apply to a dichotomy like “this is the characteristic; this is the thing characterized”. It has been proved that both the alternatives taken independently are unreal.
XXXIX Is There A Cognizer?

The question now is whether there is a cognizing agent. The Logician says that he does not admit the reality of a cognizing soul, but the element of pure sensation may be considered as an agent.

The Mādhyamika says that even pure sensation cannot be taken as an agent, for the function of pure sensation is to indicate the mere presence of something.

XL Vindication of Phenomenal Reality

The gist of the long argument in this section is the following.

The Logician maintains that there is such a thing as svalaksana or the thing-in-itself which does not involve any possessive relation, but is only a conventional verbal expression as in ‘the head of Rāhu’. Just as in this expression, the head is not something separate from Rāhu and possessed by him, but Rāhu is nothing else except the head itself, even so we can say that “solidity is the exclusive essence (svalaksana) of solid bodies.”

The Mādhyamika says that the cases are not similar. In the first case (viz, head of Rāhu), it is only a conventional way of speech. In the latter case, there cannot be solid bodies apart from the sense-datum of resistance (kāthmyūdi). There is no substance in solid bodies over and above the quality of resistance. Substance and quality are merely correlative terms. The substance has no separate, independent existence apart from the quality. In the example viz head of Rāhu, there is no mutual interdependence of two phenomenal realities. Therefore this example cannot be applied to substance and quality.

The thing-in-itself (svalaksana) is no exception to the law of Universal Relativity. The phenomenal is real only in the sense of relative reality.
XLII. The Definition of Sense Perception

Dignāga and his followers define perception as Kalpanāpodho i.e. pure passive sensation free from any constructive thought. The Mādhyamika criticizes this definition on the ground that this is mere abstraction. In actual concrete perception, there is always an element of thought. Therefore from the phenomenal point of view the common-sense view of perception (as that which is present to the senses) is the correct one.

XLII. The Hinayāna Theory of Causation Examined

The Hinayānists says that out of the four-cornered dialectic of the Mahāyānists, he agrees with three, viz. (1) that entities cannot arise out of themselves (na svata utpātih), (2) that they cannot arise out of both sources (na dvādhyaṃ utpātih) i.e. out of pre-existing stuff and separate agents.) (3) that they cannot come into being at random i.e. without any cause (na ahetuḥ), but he says he cannot concur in the fourth alternative viz., that they cannot arise out of something separate from them (na parata utpātih).

The Hinayānist avers that the Buddha himself said that existing things are produced by causes, and that the causes are different from the things produced. There are only four conditions or pratyayas which being about anything viz (1) its cause or hetu (2) its objective condition or ālambana (3) the immediately foregoing condition for the production of the result samanantara and (4) the decisive or predominant condition which is efficient to bring about the result or adhīpata-pratyaya. There is no fifth condition like God, Time etc. Entities arise under these conditions which are not identical with the thing produced.

The Mādhyamika says that entities are also not produced out of conditions which are separate from them (naparata utpātih). If the produced entities had any pre-existence in the causes and conditions which are separate from them, then alone could they appear out of them, but they are not perceived to be pre-existing. Therefore the conditions of an
entity do not contain any real existence of the result. If the effect is different from the cause, there would be lack of relation between the two. In that case, anything may produce anything whatsoever.

**XLIII The Existence of Separate Energies Denied**

There are some philosophers who maintain that entities may not be produced out of other entities, called causes; they may originate through special energies. For instance the organ of vision, colours etc. may not be producing visual sensation; there may be some energy inherent in them that may be producing this sensation. Similar is the case with physical energy e.g. heat producing cooked rice.

The Madhyamika says that the plea of energy also will not do. If the supposed energy appears when the sensation already exists, it is useless. Nor can the existence of an energy be assumed in the causes previous to the sensation produced, for the energy cannot take shape as long as the result is absent. Nor can the existence of an energy be possible at the moment of production, for a thing is either produced or not produced. There is no existence between these two moments. Therefore, no such energy production of effects exists.

**XLIV. Causation Is Not Co-ordination**

The Hinayanaist says that whether causes possess energy or not, the fact remains that entities, such as sensation, arise in co-ordination with other entities, e.g. the organ of vision. This is all that is meant by saying that the existence of an organ of vision etc. are the conditions under which a visual sensation etc. can arise.

Nagarjuna says that upto the moment when the so-called result, e.g., visual sensation arises, the organ of vision etc. will be only non-causes, and nothing can be produced out of non-causes.

Nagarjuna urges a further argument. An organ of vision etc. is supposed to be the causes of visual sensation etc., but the
question that arises is—whether there are causes of existing sensation or of a sensation not yet existing. If a sensation is already existing, it is useless to assume some cause producing it. If it is non-existing, how can it have a cause? If it is said that it is called cause in anticipation, for the present it is only a latent force, the reply of the Mādhyamika is that the assumption of latent energy has already been examined and shown to be hollow.

XLV. The Cause-Conditions

Nāgārjuna is now examining the four cause-factors of the Hīnayānist. The first is the hetu-pratyaya or cause-condition.

The Hīnayānist says that the notion of a cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya) is very well established. It is agreed on all hands that a cause-condition is that which produces or effects something. Therefore cause must be accepted.

The Mādhyamika says that the existent (Ens) is not produced, because it exists. The non-existent (non-Ens) cannot be produced, because it does not exist. The two together cannot be produced because they are mutually contradictory. Since there is no production of effects, there is no sense in accepting causes.

XLVI. The Object—A Condition of Mental Phenomena

The second condition-factor of the Hīnayānist is alambana Pratyaya or objective counterpart. Nāgārjuna says that pure, indefinite sensation (citta), and definite mental phenomena (Cātita) are said to have an objective counterpart or objective condition (of the mental element). The question is whether the objective condition is assumed for sensation already existing or for sensation not yet produced. If the sensation is already existing, the objective condition is useless. If the sensation is not yet existing, it would be absurd to imagine that it combines with an object.

It may be asked how is it then that a sensation or mental phenomena refers to an object. Nāgārjuna replies that this is only sāmārtha or empirical not pāramārthika or absolute.
XLVII. The Causa Materials Denied

The third condition-factor of the Hinayānīst is samanantara pratyaya or the disappearance of the immediately preceding condition.

It is maintained by the Hinayānīst that the disappearance of the immediately preceding condition is the cause of the following effect, e.g., when the seed is destroyed i.e. when the seed as seed disappears then does the sprout appear. Nāgārjuna says that if the seed disappears, it becomes non-existent. How then can a non-existent factor be the cause of any thing whatsoever?

XLVIII The Special Cause Also Denied

The fourth condition factor of the Hinayānīst is adhīpati pratyaya or predominant or special condition.

According to Hinayānā, an adhīpati pratyaya or predominant condition is that special factor which being present, the effect inevitably follows.

The Hinayānīst says that it is a matter of common knowledge that a piece of cloth is produced out of threads, so the existence of threads is a necessary condition for the existence of a piece of cloth.

The Mahāyānīst says that the cloth exists neither in the threads, nor in the weaver's brush, nor in his loom, nor in the shuttle, nor in the pins nor other causes taken singly, and from a plurality of causes a plurality of effects would be expected. Since the cloth does not exist in any one of its parts singly, it does not exist in all of them taken together. Since there is no such thing as an effect in the strict sense of the word, the existence of causes as separate entities cannot be admitted.

The Hinayānīst says that the result is not something outside its causes, the presence of the whole complex of the causes of a given event is equivalent to the production of the event.
The Mādhyamika says that the so-called causes are themselves not independent realities. They have no svabhāva ‘own being’ or independent realities.

So there is no such thing as a cause-possessing result.

The Hīnayānist says that it is admitted by all that there is regularity in the world according to which certain facts are co-ordinated and others are not so co-ordinated. The cloth is co-ordinated with straw, and the mat is co-ordinated with straw, not with threads.

The Mahāyānist says that from the transcendental point of view, neither the event, nor the cause has an independent reality of its own. All things in the world are only relative.

CHAPTER XXV

Examination of Nirvāṇa

1. The Hīnayānist Nirvāṇa Rejected

According to Hīnayāna, personalities that have lived a pure life and have acquired knowledge of the elements of existence as taught by the Buddha can attain Nirvāṇa. There are two kinds of Nirvāṇa—(1) Sopādhiśesa Nirvāṇa—Nirvāṇa in lifetime in which the residual substratum of the five upādānaskandhās remains and (2) Nirupādhiśesa Nirvāṇa without any residue.

These two kinds of Nirvāṇa are possible only when there is nirodha or suppression of (1) kleśas (defilements, obstructions) in the sopādhiśesa Nirvāṇa and of (2) skandhās (groups of elements making a personality) in the nirupādhiśesa Nirvāṇa. If every thing is śūnya (devoid of independent reality), there would be neither kleśa nor skandha by whose Suppression Nirvāṇa may be attained.

The Mādhyamika says that if the kleśas and (skandhās) are absolutely real, if they have an “own-being” (svabhāva) of their own, then their “own-being” (svabhāva) cannot disappear. If they cannot disappear, now can there be Nirvāṇa on the Hīnayānist assumption?
The Mādhyamika does not advance a conception of Nirvāṇa consisting in the annihilation of the elements. Hence this incongruity cannot apply in his case.

II. The Mahāyānīstic Nirvāṇa

According to the Mādhyamika, Nirvāṇa is that indefinable essence which can neither be extinguished as e.g. a desire, nor which can be attained as, e.g. a reward for renunciation, nor which can be attained as, e.g. a reward for renunciation, nor which can be annihilated, as, e.g. all the active elements of life, nor which is eternal, as e.g. an absolute principle, which cannot really disappear, nor which can be produced Nirvāṇa really means the Quiescence of all plurality (Prapanchopasama).

Suppression of desire or the elements of existence etc. is simply a false construction of our imagination. It is really the suppression of the false construction of our imagination which is Nirvāṇa.

Desire, illusion etc. have no real existence in the absolute sense even in the phenomenal condition of life.

III Nirvāṇa Not An Ens (a particular existing entity)

There are people who imagine that Nirvāṇa is a particular kind of existence (bhāva).

Nāgārjuna says that Nirvāṇa is not a particular kind of existence (bhāva) Every existence is invariably connected with decay and death. If Nirvāṇa is a bhāva (an existing entity) that would also be subject to decay and death.

All particular bhāvas (existing entities) are produced If Nirvāṇa is a bhāva, that would also be produced. All are agreed that Nirvāṇa is not a particular kind of production.

IV. Nirvāṇa is Not-Ens (non-existing entity)

It may be said that if Nirvāṇa is not an Ens, it must a non-Ens (abhāva), for it consists in the fact that the defiling elements (kleśas) and their consequence, the individual existence is stopped.
Nāgārjuna says that this is impossible. If it is maintained that Nirvāṇa is the absence of defiling elements and individual existence, then the impermanence of the defiling elements and personal existence would attach to Nirvāṇa. It would follow that impermanence is Nirvāṇa.

Again if Nirvāṇa is considered to be a non-Ens (abhāva), it cannot be independent, for every non-Ens (abhāva) is dependent on its positive counter-part (bhāva).

V. Nirvana Is The World Viewed Sub specie Aeternitatis

The phenomenal world consists of birth and death, appearance and disappearance. All the so-called entities of the phenomenal world are either dependent upon conditions (i.e. they are real) just as long as real relatively to short or they are produced, just as the sprout is produced by the seed. In both cases when the continuity of birth has ceased, it is called Nirvāṇa. This cessation of phenomenal life is one view of Nirvāṇa. The Mādhyamika says that mere cessation of aspect can neither be considered as an Ens (bhāva), nor a non-Ens (abhāva). So Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens.

A second view of Nirvāṇa is the following. Some followers of the Buddha e.g. Sarvāstivādins maintain that in the universe, there is no abiding central principle, that the world-process consists in the procession of co-ordinated energies. When all causal laws cease to operate when all energies are extinct, there is Nirvāṇa.

There is a third view of Nirvāṇa like that of the Vātsīputrīyas which maintains that there is a central principle termed ‘personality’ (pudgala) which passes from one existence into another. It is neither momentary nor eternal. It goes on evolving. When the evolution of this principle stops, it is said to have entered Nirvāṇa.

Regarding the second and third view also, Mādhyamika says that whether it be co-ordinated energies or some central principle, called “personality”, the mere fact of their evolu-
tion being stopped can neither be characterized as an Ens, nor a non-Ens.

Nirvāṇa (Absolute) and Samsara (phenomenal world) are not two separate realities, nor two states of the same reality. the Absolute viewed through thought-forms is the phenomenal world, the phenomenal world free of the thought-forms is Nirvāṇa or the Absolute. Nirvāṇa or the Absolute is the phenomenal world viewed sub specie aeternitatis:

VI. Nirvāṇa Is Not Both Ens And Non-Ens together

Some, as for example the Vaibhāvikas assume a double character in Nirvāṇa. It is a non-Ens (abhava) in so far as the defiling elements (kleśas) and the elements of existence are extinct in it. and in itself this lifeless condition is an Ens (bhava) So it is both an Ens and a non-Ens together.

The Mādhyamikā says that this double character is impossible. A final Deliverance (from phenomenal life), and the energies (of phenomenal life) cannot be the same.

If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens, it would be relative to the totality of causes and conditions. It would thus not be the Absolute. Both Ens (bhava) and non-Ens (abhava) are relative to each other. Nirvāṇa is not within the realm of relativity. It is uncaused.

Again since Ens and non-Ens are mutually incompatible like light and darkness, Nirvāṇa cannot be both Ens and non-Ens.

VII Nor Is Nirvana A negation Of Both Ens And Non-Ens Together.

Some may that Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens. No one knows what a real Ens or non-Ens is. Therefore their negation is absurd.

VIII The Real Buddha, What?

Just as all the alternatives of the four-cornered dialectic are inapplicable to Nirvāṇa, even so they are inapplicable to the Buddha.
IX. Ultimate Identity Of The Phenomenal And The Absolute.

Ultimately there is no difference between the phenomenal and the Absolute. The phenomenal in essence being nothing but the Absolute, it is impossible to imagine either its beginning or its end.

X. The Antinomies.

All the theories about these questions are inconsistent. They are mere antinomies of reason. The phenomenal and the Absolute are merged quiescent in the unity of the Whole. None of the alternatives of the four-cornered dialectic has ultimate reality. Every thing is "relative". Therefore questions about the finite and the infinite, identity and difference, eternity and non-eternity are meaningless.

XI. Conclusion

Our bliss consists in the cessation of all conceptualization about Reality, in the quiescence of plurality. The Buddha really did not preach any doctrine about separate elements
I. PRELIMINARY.

Although a hundred years have elapsed since the scientific study of Buddhism has been initiated in Europe, we are nevertheless still in the dark about the fundamental teachings of this religion and its philosophy. Certainly no other religion has proved so refractory to clear formulation. We are confronted with an intricate terminology about whose meaning a variety of interpretation is current and which is often declared to be untranslatable or incomprehensible. In despair, some scholars were led to the conclusion that a religion or a philosophical system in India is not what it is in Europe, it is not a clear-cut construction of consistent speculation. It is always vaguely indefinite, a display of dreamy thoughts about whose meaning their authors themselves are not quite sure. In a recent work M. de la Vallée Poussin has undertaken to reconsider the question about, the meaning of the Buddhist ideal of Nirvāṇa, and he warns us from the outset that we have not to expect something very illuminating from the Indian sources.

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1 The late Professor G. Bühler gathered from a long intercourse with Indian pandits in their own country a quite different impression. He used to repeat to his pupils when perplexed by some difficult texts, "was ein Brahmane gemacht hat, das muss heraus". for very often it is something simple and clear, but expressed in a technical scientific terminology.


3 Op cit., p XXI-XII.
merly he confesses, the idea of Nirvāṇa seemed to him vague enough, but recently he has completely changed his opinion upon this subject and thinks that even the hazy speculations which he was trying to disentangle are but later additions, that at the beginning Nirvāṇa meant a simple faith in soul’s immortality, its blissful survival in a paradise a faith emerging from practices of obscure magic.

In the following pages we will try to test the arguments by which this new interpretation is supported, and append some considerations about the vicissitudes of this Buddhist conception of the Absolute and the changes which, in our opinion, it underwent during the first thousand years of its history.

II BUDDHISM AND YOCA

In the VI-V century B.C. at the time immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism, India was seething with philosophic speculation. A great variety of views and systems were springing up and actively propagated among the different classes of its population. Materialistic doctrines, denying every survival of the individual after death and every retribution for his moral or immoral deeds were widely spread. The orthodox Brahmanical community was also divided. A part of it stuck to the old sacrificial religion which promised to its votaries the reward of a blissful existence in a celestial paradise. Another part of

1 This period coincides with a period of philosophic activity in China and in Greece, cf P. Masson Ourseb ‘La Philosophie Comparee, p 56
it favoured, from an early date, a monistic view of the universe, and interpreted the reward of supreme bliss as the dissolution of the personality in an impersonal all-embracing Absolute. Later on some Brahmanical circles developed the idea of an eternal individual soul which after having been bound up in many existences would return to its genuine condition of a pure spirit as a reward for accumulated merit.

Between the materialists who denied retribution and the eternalists who imagined a return to a pure spiritual condition, Buddha took a middle course. From the eternalists he borrowed the doctrine of a gradual accumulation of spiritual merit through a series of progressing existences, but he was averse to their doctrine of an eternal spiritual principle.

As far as we can understand his philosophic position, it seems that he was deeply impressed by the contradiction of assuming an eternal, pure, spiritual principle which, for incomprehensible reasons, must have been polluted by all the filth of mundane existence in order, later on, to revert to its original purity. He was thus led to a denial of every permanent principle. Matter and mind appeared to him as split in an infinite process of evanescent elements (Dharmas), the only ultimate realities, besides space and annihilation. The conception of an impersonal world-process was probably prepared by the idea of an impersonal unique substance of the world, as developed

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in the Upaniṣads. The analysis of the world, into its elements of matter and mind, was, probably, to a certain extent, prepared by the work of the Sāṅkhya school. The originality of Buddha’s position, consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and converting the world-process in, a concerted appearance of discrete evanescent elements. Forsaking the monism and the dualism of the Sāṅkhyaśa, he established a system of the most radical pluralism. That the essence and the starting point of Buddhism were speculative appears very clearly, if we give credit to the records about the other wandering teachers who were the contemporaries of Buddha and often engaged in controversies with him. The questions at issue between them were of a speculative nature. Ethical questions, the explanation of retribution, were predominant, but they always were narrowly linked together with some system of ontology and some doctrine of a final release.

If we make an effort wholly to realise the position of a philosopher to whom the universe presented itself as an infinite process of separate elements of matter and mind, appearing and disappearing, without any real personalities, nor any permanent substances, and if we bear in mind that this philosopher was eagerly seeking for a theoretical basis on which to establish morality, we must confess that for our habits of thought, his position was not an easy one. Striving to escape the contradiction of eternity, of monism.

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1 Cf. the information about the wandering teachers collected by B C Law, Historical Gleanings, ch II and III (Calcutta, 1922).
and of Materialism he was landed in what from our standpoint, was a fresh contradiction, the contradiction of a mere 'law without a personality on whom this law would be binding, and of a salvation without altogether the existence of somebody entitled to reach that goal which we, more or less, generally understand under salvation.

We will better understand the solution at which Buddha arrived, if we take into account a specific Indian habit of mind, its idea of quiescence as the only real bliss which life can afford. The Buddhist saint (ārya) regards the life of the worldling as an unhappy existence of constant turmoil. His aim is to escape from the movement of phenomenal life into a state of absolute quiescence—a condition in which all emotion and all separate thought is stopped for ever. The means of attaining this quiescence as profound meditation (yoga), the technique of which was developed in India at a very early date.

The picture of the universe which suggested itself to the mental eye of the Buddha represented thus an infinite number of separate evanescent entities in a state of beginningless commotion, but gradually steering to quiescence and to an absolute annihilation of all life, when all its elements have been, one after another, brought to a standstill. This ideal received a multitude of designations among whom the name of Nirvāṇa was the most appropriate to express annihilation. The term was probably pre-Buddhistic and was formerly applied to the Brahmanical ideal of the
dissolution of the individual in the universal whole (brahma-nirvāṇa)¹.

The reward for a virtuous life and a strict observance of all religious duties consisted for the orthodox Brahmin in a blissful survival in heaven. For the Brahmanical monist it consisted in being merged in the impersonal absolute. The Buddhist could promise nothing else than quiescence of life and its final annihilation, a result which, taken by itself, was not very remote from what was offered by simple materialism. The latter promised annihilation after every life. Buddha promised likewise annihilation but after a long series of efforts in virtue and concentrated meditation. This result could not but strike as strange, not to European scholars alone. Although the denial of a soul as a separate substance is quite familiar to them, yet they were not prepared to find it clearly stated at so early a date, in so remote a country and not in a system of scepticism, but in a religion. Numerous were also the Indian voices which protested against such radical denial of personal identity.

In the Buddhist community itself, it provoked opposition which grew ever stronger and resulted, 500 years after the demise of the master, in what may be called a quite new religion, reposing on a quite different philosophic foundation.

¹ Of the information by E Senart in Album Kern, p 101, and J Dahlman, in Nirvāṇa (Berlin 1896) and in Die Stārvikya Philosophie (Berlin 1902) Senart's characteristic "un simple équivalent de brahma" is right, as will be seen, in regard of the Mahāyānistō Nirvāṇa only
The apparent contradictions of early Buddhism have been variously explained. It was assumed either that Buddha did not care for speculation or that he, like many other founders of religion, was incapable of clear logical thinking. We are now presented with an attempt to reconstruct a kind of Buddhism which had no speculative tendencies at all and to ascribe the philosophic part of it to a later date to which the final constitution of the Pali canon belongs.

It is thus assumed that there has been a primitive Buddhism, very much different, even, as it would seem quite contrary to what later on finds its expression in the Pali canon. Pessimism, nihilism, soul-denial, psychology without a soul, annihilation as ultimate end, all these features that mark out Buddhism among other religions, Indian as well as non-Indian, did not exist. It was the Buddhism of Buddha himself which was so radically different from anything that appeared later, in historical times, as Buddhism. The consequence of the hypothesis of a simple creed preceding historical Buddhism, is an attempt to interpret the latter in the light of the former.

But if all, or almost all, the doctrines contained in our oldest documents are later inventions, what is it then that Buddha has taught and what in the III and II century B.C.—for this is probably the date which is assigned to the Pali canon in its final form—was superseded by another, reconstructed, Buddhism We have a definite answer. It is Yoga. This only

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1 pp. 17, 27, 32-34, 46, 52, 115-116, 125, 129, 132, etc
partly solves the difficulty, because if we are asked what Yoga is, we are told that one feels uneasy when asked such a question, "arisen de plus malaise?" Nevertheless, on the next page, we are informed that Yoga is nothing but vulgar magic and thaumaturgy coupled with hypnotic practices. This would mean that Buddha was not a follower of some philosophic system in the genre of Patanjali's where the psychology of trance plays a conspicuous part for the solution of definite problems, but that he was an ordinary magician who certainly did not think of denying the existence of a soul or of establishing a psychology without a soul, or of being a pessimist. Not only is it asserted that yoga practices existed in India previously to the rise of Buddhism—this of course, is very probable—but it looks as though the author were prepared to maintain that Buddhism itself, the genuine Buddhism of Buddha, nay, that even the Pali canon contains nothing but obscure thaumaturgy. How else could one understand the following very explicit delverances? "The 'yoga out of which Buddhism was produced had no speculative tendencies' (p. 53), i.e., it was "a technical routine in itself quite foreign to every moral religious or phi-

1 A similar tendency is displayed in another recent book, A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon (Oxford, 1923). Buddhism is here represented as a product of a "barbarous age" (p. 267), Buddha as a "magician of a trivial and vulgar kind" (p. 29) Buddhist philosophical conceptions as lacking "both system and maturity, a fact historically reflected in the Negativism of the Mahayana' (p. 4).
losophic view' (p. 12) It was, in a word, magic and thaumaturgy. "In this condition, i.e., in the condition of a yoga without speculative tendencies, "has the Buddhism of the Hinayāna remained, beginning from the Mahāvagga up to Buddhaghosa, viz. it was a yoga almost without any alluv" (p. 53)²

Here we beg leave to remark that the case of Indian philosophy would really be a desperate one if

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1 Similar opinions were expressed by H. Beck 'Der ganze Buddhismus durch und durch nichts als Yoga,' (Buddhismus, II, p 11) Ed Lehmann (Buddhismus p 49) Å. Soderblom (La vie future, p. 397 f), F. Heuler (Die Buddhistische Versenkung, p. 7 et passum) They are all more or less mystics They imagine to have found in Buddhism something congenial with their own emotions' Buddhist mysticism is for them hardly distinguishable from Christian devotion, (cp Heuler, op cit, p 31 f, p 61 f, p. 66) The identification of Buddhism and Yoga by M. de la V. P seems to be inspired by quite different feelings, he therefore converts Buddhism into magic or sorcery.

2 M. de la Vallee Poussin tries to impress his readers that he finds himself in agreement with M. E Senart, as far as I can see, with but little foundation The origin of Buddhism was formerly sought in some kind of Upanisad ideology or some Sāṃkhya ideas M Senart has shown, (R H R mt 42, p 345) that the coincidences with the yoga of Patañjali are much more numerous and striking Although this work is now proved (by H Jacobi, see J A O S 31, I ff) to be much later, than M. Senart assumed and, in some points at least, had itself been influenced by Buddhism, nevertheless the coincidences pointed out by M. Senart are solid facts which nobody is likely to deny. They can be now supplemented, in that sense the yoga ideas have found their way into many other Indian systems as well Senart's main result (ibid p 364) I understand to refer to pre-Buddhistic conditions
a conception so familiar in it, so fundamental, so thoroughly developed in every possible detail, a conception to which a whole system is specially devoted, were something vague and undefinable. Yoga is defined as concentrated thought (samādhi) or fixing the attention on a single point (ekāgratā) and doing it persistently (punah punah cetasi nivṛśanam). It is synonymous with dhyāna and samāpatti which mean the same. According to a peculiarity of the Sanskrit language all these terms can be used in an objective sense (karma-sādhana) in an instrumental sense (karaṇa-sādhana) or in a locative sense (adhi-karaṇa-sādhana). Yoga and samādhi thus mean

1 The subtle difference between these terms assumed in Y S II 29 and III 2-4, 11, rendered by Prof. J. H. Wood as "singleness of intent, contemplation and concentration," as well as the definition of yoga as the "restriction of the fluctuantuma of the mind-stuff" ibid. I 2 are a peculiarity of that system. Prof M. Anesaki and Prof J. Takaku, ERE S V dhyāna, assume that samādhi is the result, arhatship, and dhyāna one of the means. But that is against Ab Kesab ad VIII 1, where samāpatti-dhyāna "concentration" is distinguished from upapatti-dhyāna "existence in a mystic world." That samādhi has also a general meaning is clear from its position among the citta māhā-bhūmikās where it is defined as citta ekāgratā, cf. my Central Conception, p 100. Then concentrated meditation here on earth is contrasted with in itself in an imagined higher world of eternal trance the terms

1 A simila apatti sums par huing-pa, cf. below the opinion of

1. Keith, Bi, 14 1923) But confusion wrought by the inadequate translation of the barous age as "sūrṣāra te likewise due to a failure of realizing its vulgar kind" ("ter, it either means a force, samskriyate anena both system bhūya-kāri, or it means an element, samskriyate arma Negativism of}
either the concentrated thought itself, as a psychical condition, or this same thought, as the method through which the condition has been created, or as the place where it has been produced. It is usual to apply in the latter sense, as a designation of the mystic worlds, where the denizens are eternally merged in trance, the term *samāpatti*. It is applicable to all the eight planes of mystic existence, of whom the denizens are, so to say, born mystics. In this sense the term is contrasted with the worlds of gross bodies and carnal desire (*kāma-dhātu*) where the denizens possess thoughts non-concentrated, disturbed. Thus is its more general acception. In a more special sense it is applicable to the four highest planes of existence alone, the immaterial worlds (*arūpa-dhātu*). It then is contrasted with the four lower mystic worlds which are specially called the four *dhyānas*. The word *samādhi* has also a general and a special sense. It can mean the usual faculty of concentrated attention, or it may mean cultivated, developed concentration. It then becomes a mystical power which can transfer the meditator into higher worlds and change life altogether. Yoga is usually applied in the latter kind of connotation, but it would not be inconsistent with the spirit of Sanskrit language to use it in all the three senses: (*yugyate etaditi yogah*, *yugyate anena iti yogah*, *yugyate asmīn iti yogah*). A complaint, if any, can be only about the detailed and subtle precision with which this notion is analysed, not about its vagueness. For supernatural power the term *ṣiddhi* is used. But, of course, when concentration is
supposed to produce supernatural -mystic- powers; then, by a metaphor, the former may be mentioned instead of the latter. The context will always indicate to the careful reader what is the meaning intended.

Very far from being vulgar magic and thaumaturgy, the Buddhist teaching about Yoga contains the following philosophic construction which, in my opinion, the historian of philosophy cannot regard nor fail to appreciate.

- Its fundamental idea consists in the fact that concentrated meditation induces a condition of quiescence. The meditative man is the opposite of the active man. Life is then dissected into active elements (samskāras) with a view to be one after the other reduced to final quiescence and extinction.

A personality (pudgala), in which other systems imagine the presence of a permanent spiritual principle, a soul (ātmā) is in reality a bundle of elements or forces (samskāra-samāha) and a stream of thought (santāna). It contains nothing permanent or substantial, it is anātma. This means that according to the general idea of radical pluralism, the spiritual part of an individual consists of separate elements (dhāma), just as its physical frame consists of atoms. Although separate, these elements are linked together by causal laws (hetu-piyaṭaya). Some of them

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1 The theory of separate elements (dhāma) is exposed in detail by Prof. O. Rosenberg, Problems of Buddhist Philosophy (now translated into German from Russian by his widow (Heidelberg 1924) and also by myself in my "Central Conception of Buddhism" (London 1928, R.A.S.)
always appear simultaneously, they are satellites (sahabhā). Or they follow one another in consecutive moments, they are then homogeneous (nityanda-phala); they constitute chains of moments (kṣaṇa-santāna). The law of causation is therefore called the law of dependently-together-origination (pratityu-sam-utpāda). The number of psychical elements (arūp-vo-dharmāḥ) at every given moment of an individual life is variable. It may be very considerable, because undeveloped; dormant faculties are also reckoned as actually present. This circumstance has even provoked gibes from the side of Sautrāntikas in regard to the impossibility of an actual co-existence of so huge a quantity of separate elements at a single moment. However some of them are constant, always present every moment, others appear only under certain conditions. Faculties of ten different kinds¹ are supposed always to be present. They are termed the general faculties (citta-mahā-bhūmika). Among them we find the faculty of concentration samādhi or yoga. They are morally indifferent. To them are added either a certain number of faculties morally good, or a certain number of faculties morally bad. But not only do the elements which combine in one moment vary in number, they can vary also.

¹ Yaśomitra, ad Ab’ Kośa II 40, computes that, if in the first moment 27 dharmas are present, there will be 486 elements in the sixth one, and so on, ut ananta-dravyā (Prāpinah) pratsantāna-saśīrakṣaye bhavaṃ. If these elements were resistant stuff, says Vasubandhu, there would be not enough room for them in the whole universe.
in intensity (utkarsa). In a certain individual\(^1\), at a certain time, a certain element may predominate, while in another individual or at another time in the same individual another element may reach prominence\(^2\).

Among the constantly present elements, there are two exceedingly precious ones which, when given the proper opportunity of full development become predominant and change the character of the individual and his moral value altogether. They are the faculty of appreciative analysis (prajñā) and the faculty of concentrating our thoughts upon the single point to the exclusion of all other disturbing considerations and occurrences, it is just samādhi or yoga. These elements may be quite undeveloped and insignificant. Prajñā is then called mati, but it is the same faculty. When fully developed it becomes transcendent wisdom (prajñā amalā). Life in ordinary men is controlled by ignorance (avidyā) which is the reverse of prajñā, but not its mere absence. It is a separate element which can be and, in every ordinary man really is, present at the same time with his dormant faculty of wisdom. But it is not a constant faculty; it can be suppressed (pralāṣya) and thrown out of the mental stream altogether which then becomes purified or saintly (ārya).

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\(1\) Of the tables appended to my ‘Central Conception’ p 100

\(2\) We accordingly say ‘I remember’, ‘I wish’, but this does not mean that at the moment when I wish I do not think, or that in the moment when I remember I do not wish. All mind is regarded consisting at every moment of an assemblage of mental atoms, faculties (samskāra) elements (dharma).
Now, the moral law or moral progress or moral education of mankind is conceived as a struggle within the stream (santuṇa) between the good (kusala), the noble faculties of man and his bad (akuśala) defiling inclinations. Since the elements are ex hypothesi separate and momentary, they cannot really influence one another. Nevertheless the presence of defiling ignorance and other disturbing qualities makes the whole stream impure. All the elements are then impure, even the central element, bare consciousness, or pure sensation (vijnana), becomes affected (kleśa, sāsrava). A special law of causation (sarratraga-ḥeti) is imagined to account for the fact that the elements of the stream are either all of them pure in the saint, or all impure (kleśa) in the ordinary man.\(^1\)

It is part of the system; it is also a deep belief in all Buddhist countries that the noble and sublime faculties will finally, in the long run, triumph. The defiling faculties (kleśa) are divided into two classes, so far as one class can be remedied by insight so to say, by reason, and the other by concentrated attention only. The first are called dīstī-ḥeya, the other bhāvanā-ḥeya.\(^2\) It is of course a natural, and even a trivial, fact that some of our shortcomings and vices can be eradicated by knowledge, and others by concentrated attention only. But the faculty of concentration, if fully developed, has a greater force.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Ab Kota, II 54, 57; IV 12.

\(^2\) Ind. I 40

\(^3\) When samādhi has reached full development, it becomes the predominant element in the bundle of elements (samālārasamāha)
then becomes a mystic power. It can stop life altogether. In the path of salvation, it is the last and most decisive step. It can also transfer the individual into a higher plane of existence. He is then reborn or transferred into the realm of ethereal (accha, bhāsavana) bodies, into the sphere of purified matter (ūpuphātu), or into the still higher regions of pure spirits (aīṣupu-dhātu).

Here we forsake the ground of reality and enter into the worlds of the mystic. From this point of view, existence is divided into three different spheres. The division is in reality bipartite, into the mystic worlds (samā-patti) and into the non-mystic ones, i.e. our gross worlds of carnal desire, (kāma-dhātu). The latter includes the hells, earth and the lower heavens, where the gods are living and enjoying themselves in a very human way. The position which is assigned to the gods in this sphere is very characteristic for the Buddhist as well as for the Jaina religions. These gods are not superior beings in a moral sense. For the sake of moral progress and salvation, the condition of man is preferable. Speaking technically, the gods of the kāma-dhātu represent assemblages of elements of all the 18 categories (dhātu). Not a single one of them is brought to a standstill by yoga. They are full of passions and are superior to man by

which make up an individual. The single term samādhi may then be used for this element together with its satellites, it then becomes synonymous with the individual or the 5 skandhas.

cp Ab Kośabh ad VIII 1 The same applies to the developed prajñā

4 Cp Ab Kośabh, ad II 12
their power, but not by their conduct\textsuperscript{1}. The mystic worlds are further divided into two classes, those in which the denizens possess ethereal bodies and those in which they have no physical frame. The faculty of concentration (samādhi, yoga) has here attained predominance, it has become the central element; the others are their satellites. Imagination has built up above the heavens of the carnal gods a series of mystic worlds. They correspond exactly to the degrees of trance which are gradually reached or supposed to be reached, by the mystic. The purely spiritual realms (arūpa-dhātu) are four. Their denizens are merged in contemplation (samāpatti) of some unique idea, either the idea of the infinity of space, or of the infinity of thought, or of the void, or in a dreamy semi-conscious state. Their condition is nearly catalepsy, a state where consciousness is quite arrested. The worlds of ethereal bodies are also four in number, exactly corresponding to the initial four degrees of trance (āhyaṇa) and are accordingly designated as the worlds of the first, the second, the third and the fourth āhyaṇa.

Whereas our material frame consists of elements of 18 kinds, four of them are in abeyance in the worlds of ethereal bodies. The sense-data of smell and taste and the corresponding two sets of sensations do not exist. It is because these beings do not want any hard food, no food which is taken piecemeal, chewed and swallowed\textsuperscript{2}. Their nutrition is spiritual. Here imagination evidently is founded upon the fact that the mystic, when deeply engaged in meditation,

\textsuperscript{1} The higher planes of these carnal gods, however, are morally purer than the lower ones; they gradually approach to the still higher moral standard of the worlds of trance, cp. Ab. Kośa III. 70.

\textsuperscript{2} Ab Kośa I 30, III, 39.
forgets all about his meals. Therefore olfactory and gustatory sense-data lose their raison d'être. They are by the mystic power of yoga extinct altogether. But the physical organs, the nose and the tongue remain, because, their absence would make the body ugly. All the bodies are beautiful, one is mutilated. Their faculties of sight and audition are unlimited, they possess āsya-cālsaḥ and āsya-śrotosm. Their tactile sensations are the same as the characteristic agreeable feeling of bodily ease and lightness (prasrābādha) which produces levitation in the mystic. Their movements are, therefore, extremely swift and dexterous. But the faculties of smelling and taste are absent altogether, because their food is immaterial. They have no need for clothes; they are born with a light ethereal covering that lasts all their very long life through. Neither do they want any dwellings. Every newborn finds a house provided for him by karma, i.e., by nature. The phenomenon of sex is spiritualised. The bodies are without the members of physical procreation. This does not make them mutilated. Gross sexual passion does not exist at all. But total indifference does neither exist. The feelings are delicate. The birth of a new being is quite free from all pain and filth. The newborn child does not come out of the matrix of a female, it is apparitional (upapāduka). Those who happen to be nearest to the place of his birth are his parents. No government, of course, is needed in such a community, because there are no crimes, no gross passions. Total absence of passion would mean total absence of volitions, and thus, according to the Indian conceptions, would stop life altogether; it would be Nirvāna. But all the feelings have a mild form. The feeling of hatred (pratiṣṭha) is totally absent. Other feelings are veiled indifference (mṛtya-avyāpṛta).

1 They have, as a monk in Mongola expressed himself in a conversation with me, telescopes and telephones
2 Ab Kōṣa, III 70
3 Ibid. III 71
4 Ibid. III. 98
5 A full account of the Buddhist heavens and their denizens is given in Prof. H. Kirfel, Die Kosmographie der Inden (Bonn, 1920),
The imagination of the man who has drawn this picture, whether it be Buddha or another, seems to have been guided by the idea that manual work is the curse of humanity. Therefore a state is imagined where there is no need for it, because food, clothes and homes are naturally provided. The other debasing feature of mankind, the gross sexuality of love, is quite absent. Thus from the three incentives of human action on earth, wealth, love and duty (artha-kama-dharma) the last alone continues its unimpeded sway in the mystic world. However, there is no absolute equality between the denizens. There are lofty and ordinary characters. The quality of being a "worldling" (prthag-jana) can occasionally appear in these regions. At least some of the schools are quarrelling about this question. The details of this picture have given rise to a great deal of controversy, and even now we can come across Buddhist monks who will, with extraordinary vivacity, debate some of the moot points.

The Abhidharma discusses the question whether in order to possess all supernatural forces existing in the mystic worlds it is a necessary condition to be p. 190 ff, but their connection with the degrees of absorption in yoga-meditation is mentioned only in regard to the 4 sampattis on p 198. Cp also B C. Law, Heaven and Hell (Calcutta 1925).

The Vātsiputriyas explained the fact that person having reached in a higher world the condition of a Saunt (ārya) could sometimes nevertheless fall back into ordinary humanity and become again a common worldling, by the circumstance that some element of this common worldliness (prthagjanatva) was left dormant in him, it had not been quite eradicated at the time when he became a saint, op. Ab. Kosabh I 40 II 40.
clearly seen out of the following discussion in the Abhidharma.

"It has been determined that 18 kinds (ākāya) of elements are cooperating in making up life in all the three spheres of existence. It is then asked how many cooperate in the whole worlds of gross bodies, how many in the worlds of ethereal bodies, and how many in the spiritual worlds. It is answered—18 in the first, 14 in the second and 3 in the last. All the 18 elements combine in creating life in the sphere of gross bodies. "They combine" means that they are inseparable from it, they constitute this world. In the plane of etheric bodies, the fragrant and savoury stuff, as well as the corresponding sensations (vyādāna) are excluded. They represent physical food (kavati-lāra-ākāra). But ethereal bodies belong to beings who can live without such food; they have no desire for it. The olfactory and gustatory sensations are thus absent, because their objects—that physical food which contains the fragrant and savoury stuff—do not exist.

"Objection. But in this case neither the resistant stuff would exist in these worlds, since it is also a part of the nutriment stuff?

"Answer. That part of it alone exists which is not nutriment.

Objection: The fragrant and the savoury stuffs are in the same condition (a part of them is not nutriment)?

"Answer. The resistant stuff is necessary as a support for the sense faculties, as a support for the bodies and as clothes for them. But for the fragrant and savoury stuffs there is no necessity, because there is no physical food. Therefore, since the instantaneous for such food is absent, neither do the corresponding stuffs exist (i.e. they are not produced by Karma). The case of the resistant stuff is different.

"Opinion of Śrīlābhasa: If some body here (on earth) by concentrated meditation reaches ecstasy, he continues to see colours.

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2 Cp. the tables in Central-Conception, p. 97.
to hear sounds and his sense of touch is agreeably affected by some special tangible stuff which is produced simultaneously with the production in him of a high degree of levitation (prasadādi), but odours and tastes are in abeyance. For this reason, when beings are reborn in these worlds of trance, the first three sense data exist, but smells and tastes are absent."

It is seen out of this passage that the conditions of life in the sphere of ethereal bodies are imagined by transferring personal mystic experiences into a separate plane of existence.

A very interesting discussion then follows about that driving force of nature called kārma which, in this connection, corresponds to our conception of evolution, or elan vital.

It produces, according to a regular plan and answering to necessities, all the varieties of life in the plane of gross bodies and mutatis mutandis in the imagined planes of existences constructed according to mystic experiences.

Such is the theory of Yoga in Hinayāna. It is quite different in Mahāyāna where the philosophic

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3 What confusion arises from a wrong translation of the term kārma appears clearly from M de la V P.'s translation of this passage, Ab Kośa II 30, p. 56 "Quelle est la cause de la naissance d'un organe, sinon un certain acte commandé par un désir relatif à cet organe". This can only mean that there has been once upon a time, a man who evidently did not possess this organ, or did possess no organs at all, but he manifested a desire to possess some and committed an action in consequence. After that all men, who peacefully existed without any organs at all, suddenly acquired them. No wonder that Indian philosophy, when presented in such a garb, ceases to be attractive. About kārma in Buddhism cp O. Rosenberg, Problems, XVI.
foundation is different. All the devices which are employed for helping the mind to concentrate upon a single point are more or less the same in all philosophic systems. There is absolutely nothing Buddhistic in them\(^1\). The psychological fact of concentration which is at the bottom of them is a very simple one\(^2\).

When carried on systematically they induce special mystic states of mind. Patañjali has given their explanation according to the principles of Sānkhya philosophy. In Hinayāna Buddhism they are explained in a manner fitting the system of radical pluralism, i.e., that theory of separate elements (dhvamsa) which has been established with a view to their gradual extinction in Nirvāṇa. Very characteristic for Bud-

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\(^1\) Fr. Heuer, op. cit. p 47, following Prof. Rhys Davids, thinks that (brahmanical) yoga is predominantly physical and hypnotic, whereas the Buddhist method of meditation is intellectual and moral. I would not venture to endorse this opinion. In this respect the difference, if any, is negligible. Heuer evidently overlooks, in his Buddhist fervour, the devotion to God (īśvara-pranidhāna) of the brahmanical Yogi. The process of moral purification of the latter is very vividly described by Prof. S. N. Desgupta, The Study of Patanjali, p 142 ff. (Calcutta, 1920) and his other works.

\(^2\) The late Prof. O. Rosenberg has himself practised some yoga-meditation in a Zen Monastery in Japan. He used to compare the agreeable feeling of ease which he then experienced to the effect produced by music, especially when executed personally. Attention is then fixed and a light feeling of ecstasy makes you forget all troubles of life. The warlike Samurai before going to war used to go through a course of yoga-experiences in some Zen monastery, and thus had the most beneficial influence upon their moral condition in strengthening their courage and endurance.
dhism is the system of heavens or paradises in which, at their middle and highest stages, imaginary beings are lodged, who are also called gods, but are nothing but born mystics, beings in whom the condition of trance is a natural one. This distinguishes Buddhism from all other religions and philosophical systems. It is also inseparable from the conception of the Hinayānist Nirvāṇa or the so-called Nirvāṇa of the Śrāvakas. According to the teaching of some schools the highest cataleptic states of trance are eternal (asamskrta), i.e. they do not differ from Nirvāṇa. But, according to the majority of schools, Nirvāṇa is beyond even that. It is the absolute limit of life, the extinction even of this kind of the thinnest vestige of consciousness which is still left in the highest of all imaginable worlds of cataleptic trance.

III. MYSTIC INTUITION (YOGA-PRATYAKṢA)

Apart from the above described general function of Yoga, there is another special kind of it, the subjective counterpart of the first. It then appears as the mystic intuition of the true condition of the universe. The Buddhist saint is supposed, in a moment of mystic illumination, suddenly to perceive the whole construction, with its gross and mystic worlds, as vividly as if it were a direct sense perception. As a psycholo-

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1. It is interesting to note that the gods of Epicurus are also quiescent, inactive and also possess ethereal bodies of a special atomic structure.
2. C.P. Kathā-vatthu, VI 4. The yogācāras likewise reckon catalepsy among the asamskrta elements.
gital' process, it is equally taught in Hinayāna and in Mahāyāna, but its content, the picture which reveals itself at this moment, is quite different in both systems. It corresponds to their theoretical parts, to the system of pluralism which is taught in Hinayāna and to the monist view which is the central conception of Mahāyāna, as will be seen later on. For, although a sudden illumination, it does not come without preparation. The future saint has gone through a long course of moral training and he has carefully studied all the details of the philosophical construction, when in the moment of sudden illumination what he had before tried to understand only theoretically, comes up before him with the vivacity of living reality. Beginning with this moment he is a saint, all his habits of thought are changed. He directly views the universe as an infinite continuity of single moments in gradual evolution towards final extinction. In Mahāyāna, the Bodhisattva sees directly or feels inwardly, quite another picture, corresponding to the theoretical teaching of that religion. The path towards salvation is therefore divided in a preliminary path of 'accumulating merit (sambhāra-mārga), in a subsequent course of training (prayoga-mārga) and in 'the path of illumination (drṣṭi-mārga). The

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2 M. C. Rhys Davids (Dhamma-sangāni Transl., p. 256, n. 2) calls it a "mental awakening", "intellectual conversion", "a certain vantage-point for mind and heart from which the Promised Land of Nirvāṇa was caught sight of, and the fact of impermanence first discerned", Under "the fact of impermanence" the theory of the impermanent dharmas must be evidently understood. A postural description of drṣṭi-mārga, which is the same as sūtra-āpattikhyala, is found in D N L. 76 ff.
latter is momentary. It is technically called perception of the four truths, such perception being the exclusive property of the saint (ārya). Therefore they are called the four truths of the Saint (āryasya satyāni). They express the general view that there is a phenomenal existence (duḥkha), its driving force (samudaya), there will be final extinction (nirodha), and there is a path towards it (mārga). In this general form the four truths are accepted by all Indian systems. There is absolutely nothing Buddhistic in them. Their meaning changes according to the content which is put into them, according to what is understood under phenomenal life (duḥkha) and under extinction (nirvāṇa). Within the pale of Buddhism, these conceptions have, at a certain date, undergone a radical change. In early Buddhism they correspond to a pluralistic universe, in Mahāyāna to a monistic one.

In Hīnayāna, the process of illumination is described as a double moment, it consists in a moment of feeling and a moment of knowledge. The feeling is satisfaction (kṣānti-ruci), after which in the next following moment comes intuition, the vision of the elements of existence (dharma-jñāna). The intuition

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1 About the “four truths” in Nyāya-Vaśesaka see below.
2 It is saṁskāra-duḥkhatā or pariṇāma-duḥkhatā the counterpart of asaṁskṛta-nirodha, cp Ab Kosabh. VI. 3. This kind of duḥkha is much nearer to our ordinary conception of joy, than of suffering.
3 In Nyāya-Vaśesaka the yogin perceives at that moment of illumination the atoms and all categories directly, cp. Praśāsṭpa., p. 187 7.
refers at first to the surrounding gross world, and then, as is always the case, it is transferred to the imagined worlds of trance (anvaya-jñāna). Thus in sixteen consecutive moments the intuition of the future saint has run through the whole universe its real and imaginary worlds, and has viewed them in the light of four stages of their evolution towards quiescence. The supreme moment of illumination is the central point of the teaching about the path to salvation. An enormous literature especially in Mahāyāna is devoted to this conception of mystic intuition.

When in later times the study of Abhidharma has been superseded by the study of logic and epistemology, the mystic perception of the saint has retained its place among the different categories of direct cognition which were then established. Direct cognition was then defined as containing no synthetic thought (kalpanāpada). It was pure sensation which could apprehend an indefinite moment of sensation only. The four truths, i.e. ontology, were, at first studied and ascertained by sound logic (pramāṇena uññēsita) and then suddenly perceived as vividly as a grain of corn on the palm of the hand.

1 About the 16 moments of Ab Kośa, VI 18, 25 ff and M de la V, Vp. in his edition of Madhy. vi, p 497 n. 4
2 The text book for the study of this part of Mahāyāna is the Abhisamayālankāra of Maitreya-Asanga, of which 21 Indian commentaries alone existed besides a huge indigenous Tibetan literature. Among the seat of the "yellow caps" the chief commentary studied is the Lam-rim-chen-po-by the great Tson-kh-pa, partly translated into Russian by G. Tsukoff
3 Op. Nyāya-bundu and tīkā, p. 11 (B B. VII)
The number of moments was then reduced to three. In the Mādhyamika system, where logic was denied altogether, the preparation consisted in a course of negative dialectic, after which the intuition of the transcendental truth springs up as an inward conviction (pratyātma-vedya)\(^1\). In both the philosophic systems which are represented in Buddhism—the pluralism of the Hinayāna and the monism of Mahāyāna—there is a course of preparation and meditation and a moment of sudden illumination\(^2\).

If we now try to answer the question about the age and the history of this Buddhist doctrine of Yoga, we must, first of all wholly appreciate the fact that it is an inseparable, inherent part of the pluralistic universe of separate elements (duharma) gradually evolving towards extinction\(^3\). The possibility is

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\(^1\) Mādhyā. vi p 493-11

\(^2\) According to H Bergson (De l’imagination philosophique) every great philosopher has once had a vision of the universe to which he then remains faithful the rest of his life in a series of attempts to formulate it ever clearer and clearer. This will then be the dṛṣṭi-mārga of that philosopher. In the life of Kant, it will be the time when after the year of literary activity and meditation, the central conception of the Critique of Pure Reason revealed itself to him and he then wrote, “das Jahr 69 gab mir grosses Licht.” The rest of his life was indeed spent in repeated attempts at a clear formulation of that vision. The preceding study and meditation were, so to say, his sambhāra and prayogamārga.

\(^3\) It has been supposed that the four dhyānas are of an earlier date than the four samāpattis, op Heier, op cit, p. 43 ff. The conception of ethereal existences in the Rūpa dhatu as consisting of 14 dhātus only, because they did not want any physical food is evidently a rationalisation of the myth about the descent of
not excluded, as we have stated elsewhere, that the germ of this theory is older than Buddha himself. In any case there is no historically authenticated Buddhism without this theory, without the mystic worlds and, its inherent part, the philosophic and moral aim; all sorcery and thaumaturgy, the Brah- 
matical sacrifices not excepted, were strongly condem-
med by Buddha. They were considered as one of
the cardinal sins. The details of the condition
in the worlds of the mystic and the degree of mystic concentration have always given opportunities to much scholastic contro-
versy between the schools. We can safely assert that within the pale of Hinayana
Buddhism there is no place for trivial sorcery.

\[\text{man from one of the Buddhist mystic worlds where the devas lived on roc-\text{\v{e}t}}.\text{op. D. N. III. 84 3. The full theory probably existed already at the time of the formation of the Pali Canon.}

\text{2 Central Conception. p. 55 ff.}

\text{2 Op. the article on Buddhist Magic in ERE where mysticism, magic and popular superstition are not sufficiently distinguished. In the Bhr.

\text{3 If every supernatural world or power, imagined by the mystic is represented as magic, then of course Hinayana will be full of magic but Christianity, especially that which believes in miracles, will neither escape a similar reproof. The indirec-

\text{3 ff. Heier should therefore be more properly characterized as mystical imagined powers, with the proviso that "of the reality or unreality of the mystic's world we know nothing" (B. Russell, Esoteric World, 1921. p. 20). Very interesting are the explana-

\text{3 in, op. cit. p. 33 ff.}
The psychology of trance is indeed a characteristic feature of many Indian systems, not of Buddhism alone. It appears almost inevitably in that part of every Indian system which is called "the path" (mārga) in which the means of a transition out of the phenomenal world into the Absolute are considered. With the exception of the orthodox Mīmāṃsakas and the materialists, every system in this part, but not in others, contains a certain amount of mysticism. The Jainas had their teaching about Yoga. Even the realistic and theistic Nyāyānikas, when feeling it difficult to explain the transition into the Absolute, i.e., from samsāra into nirvāṇa, have recourse not to God, but to Yoga. However, just as the European mind is not altogether and always free from mysticism, so is the Indian mind not at all necessarily subject to it. Not to speak about numerous materialistic doctrines, the orthodox Mīmāṃsakas themselves held about Yoga an opinion which probably represents just what all of us, so far as we are not mystics, think about it, viz. that Yoga is sheer imagination, just as any other ordinary fantasticism. Considering that the Mīmāṃsakas are the oldest philosophical system in India whose roots go down into the Vedic age, we at once can measure the exact value of the "historical method" which finds it highly improbable that in India, at the time of Buddha, nothing but vulgar magic and thaumaturgy could exist.

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1 About the place Yoga occupies in the system of Nyāya Vaiśesika see below,
2 Cf Śloka-vārt, on pratyakṣasūtra, 32
It is the common lot of every philosophy or religion to reach a point where further explanation becomes impossible. A higher and mystical principle is then invoked, because the usual methods have failed to give satisfaction. With Descartes and Leibnitz it is God, with many Indian systems, it is Yoga as a mystical power. An appeal to this power plays a considerable part in Buddhism, but not otherwise.

IV. BUDDHA’S BELIEF IN PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

Additional arguments in favour of an unphilosophic primitive Buddhism are derived from the occurrence in the Pāli Canon of the word "immortal" among the epithets of Nirvāṇa, the interpretation of the passages where Buddha is reported to have given no answer at all when questioned about Nirvāṇa, the occurrence in later literature of the term reality (सौन्दर्य) in connection with Nirvāṇa.

A short examination of the value of these additional arguments will not be out of place.

The practical as well as the theoretical part of Buddhism converge towards the idea of an extinction of all the active forces of life in the Absolute. This Absolute. Nirvāṇa accordingly receives in emotional passages an overwhelming mass of epithets orlarıa among which the term "place of immortality" occurs several times. But what is this immortality? Is it the immortality of Vedic times? The blissful existence
among the forefathers in heaven? Or is this hypothetical immortality, something like the paradise of Amitābha. Or something like the paradise of later Vaiśnauism? Not the slightest indication. Because indeed the word occurs only as an epithet of Nirvāṇa—annihilation. There is no deficiency, as we have seen, of paradises in the Buddhistic outlook. But Nirvāṇa is beyond all imaginable spheres, it is the absolute limit. The words "immortal place" simply means changeless, lifeless and deathless condition, for it is explained as meaning a place where there is neither birth (i.e. rebirth) nor death (i.e. repeated death).

1 M. de la V. P evidently thinks that all religious developments start with an idea of a surviving immortal soul, a theory that has been exploded as far as Indian religions are concerned. Dr. Paul Tuxen in the Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes selskab Hist-phil. Meddleser, II 5 Forestillinger om Sæulen i Rgveda, has proved that such an idea is quite absent from the Rgveda. In the oldest Upamāsads the surviving homunculus is represented as a congeries of 5 elements which dissolve at death and then a new combination of them springs into being. It is not impossible to see in them the forerunners of the Buddhist 5 skandhas.

The idea of a soul, in our acceptance of the term, appears in the metnical Upamāsads and is contemporaneous with the rise of Sāṅkhyā and Jaina, probably also with some kind of pre-Buddhistic Buddhism, cf. H. Jacoby, Gottesidee, p. 7 ff. and my Central Conception, p. 65 ff.

2 The epithet "place of immortality" is also used in connection with Nirvāṇa in Brahmanical systems which adopt a lifeless Nirvāṇa, of Vētayāyana, (ed. Vīzan) p. 30. It means a place where there is no death, it does not mean a place where there is eternal life. It is likewise called a place where there is no birth, "na jayate, na mihate, na mihate iva anatam iva vuccati" (Comm. Khuddaka, p. 180) just as birth always means rebirth, death means reitered death, cf. Oldangerg, Buddha, p. 46.
People enter paradise by being reborn in it, they disappear for ever in Nirvāṇa by being extinct.

V. WAS BUDDHA AN AGNOSTIC?

Another additional argument is drawn out of a new interpretation of very well-known passages in the Canon where Buddha is reported to have answered a series of metaphysical questions by sheer silence. It is literally an argument a silentio. Considering these questions more closely, we see that they are metaphysical questions such as: is the world beginningless or has it a beginning, is it finite or infinite, what is the condition of the soul after death, this ast question meaning, what is the nature of the Absolute. When these questions were addressed to Buddha on a certain occasion by a certain interlocutor, it has once happened that either no answer at all was forthcoming, or it was declared that the questions were futile. Scholars, Indian and European, ancient and modern, did not find much difficulty in harmonizing this occasional “agnosticism” with the main lines of the teachings of the Pali Canon. So scholars went all the length of comparing these reserved questions with a series of topics declared insoluble in modern critical philosophy. There is indeed some similarity.  

However M de la Vallée Poussin explains Buddha’s silence by his incapacity in the philosophical field.

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1 They are questions which “human reason in its natural progress must necessarily encounter”, (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, transi by Max Muller, p 340) Sp O Franke, Kant u die altu- dische Philosophie, in “Zur Erinnerung an Emanuel Kant” (Halle, 1904), p 137-8
He did not know what to answer! He was prepared to answer the question of the existence of an eternal soul in the affirmative if his interlocutor preferred so, if not, he did not mind denying it (p. 119). This is confirmed by a reference to Kumārila-bha who is quoted by Vasubandhu in the course of a very long discussion about the cardinal tenet of all Buddhists, the "personalists" (pudgalavādins) not excluded, i.e. the non-existence of a substantial soul. This tenet is discussed here in a masterly way with perfect clearness and every possible detail. Buddha denies an eternal soul as against the eternalist, but maintains moral responsibility as against the materialist. Both extremes are declared to be follies against which the doctrine of Buddha is directed. He has sought and found a "middle path" which evades the dangers of both extremes. How then could such a categorical denial and emphatic protest against two extremes be turned into a connivance in them? This is as much a riddle as the conversion of the Pali Canon into a manual of thaumaturgy. It would be interesting to know when did Buddha "teach to some persons the existence of self" (p. 119), i.e., a full blown ātmavāda or satkayadrsti?

In many systems, ancient and modern, eastern and western, the reality in itself, the pith of reality, is declared to be something incognisable. It is,

1 The same explanation is given by B. Keith, op. cit., p. 63
therefore, quite natural to find in the sūtra literature, where the style of popular discourses is adopted, the device of impressing upon the audience the mystic-character of the Absolute by silence. The Mahāyāna sūtras do not tarry in characterising it as “unspeakable”, “unknowable”, “undefinable” etc. A long discussion of the essence of the absolute is given in the Vimalakīrti-sūtra. The question is tackled from different sides, and when Vimalakīrti is at length asked to summarise, he remains silent, whereupon Bodhisattva Manjuśrī exclaims, “Well done well done, non-duality is truly above words!”.

Nor is this feature limited to Buddhist literature. The Vedāntins resorted to the same device when wishing to bring home the transcendental character of their advaita-brahma. Sankara reports a case when the question about the essence of Brahma was reiterated three times without eliciting any answer. At last, when it was asked, “Why don’t you answer?” the reply was, “I do answer (so by silence), but you do not understand me”. Is it permissible to draw the conclusion that Vimalakīrti and those men to whom Sankarācārya refers had themselves no reasoned opinion about the Absolute or that they were quite indifferent and prepared to answer just as the questioner preferred, in the affirmative or in the negative?

1 Cf. Suzuki, Mahāyāna, p. 106-7
2 Ad V S III 2 17
3 Vasubandhu (dīkṣā Kosā. V 22) reports that it was a rule of dialectics at the time of Buddha to answer by silence these questions which were wrongly formulated, e.g., all questions regarding
VI. THE POSITION OF THE LATER SCHOOLS OF THE HINAYĀNA

M. de la Vallée Poussin insists that in order to escape obscurity we must construct an outline ("un schéma d’ensemble) of the history of Buddhism, that this outline must harmonize with the general conception we have about the history of ancient India. and that questions of detail become at once settled, if they find their place in this historical outline (p. XX). This scheme seems to be the following one. There was in the beginning a simple faith in soul and immortality and a primitive teaching of an indefinite character, mainly of obscure magic. After that a mixed period supervened when this simple creed was contaminated with confused ideology, and this allows us to ask the question whether Buddhism at that period was not agnosticism. At last Buddhism received a superstructure of inane scholasticism and we have a scholastic period in Buddhism, just as we have one in mediaeval Europe.

Primitive faith, a period of agnosticism and a period of scholasticism,—we at once see wherefrom

\footnote{The properties of non-existing thing Prof. H. Oldenwerg rightly remarks on another occasion. Upanisaden p. 133 "Die eigentliche Sprache dieser Mystik, wie aller Mystik, ist Schweigen."}

\footnote{This general conception of the history of India is apparently mentioned as implying the opinion of the author about the social milieu (p. 107) in which nothing but obscure magic could possibly originate, an opinion fully shared by Prof. Keith. It would be interesting to know the opinion of both these authors about the milieu in which the grammar of Pānini, this one of the greatest productions of the human mind, originated.}
the scheme is borrowed. It is an attempt to construct
the history of Buddhism on parallel lines with the
history of the Western Church.

What the primitive faith and the supposed agnost-
icism represent we have already seen.

Now what is scholasticism? It is either (1) philos-
ophy in the service of religion or (2) excessive
subtlety and artificiality in philosophicoal construc-
tions. Buddhism, early or canonical, is contrasted
with Buddhism later or scholastic (p. 46). This leads
to the supposition that the school, e.g. of the Vaibhäsikas
represented in its teaching something substantially
different from the early canonical schools. But, as a
matter of fact, the Vaibhäsikas are only the con-
tinuators of one of the oldest schools, the Sarvāstivādins.
They derive their name from the title of a huge
commentary upon the canonical works of this school
and follow in philosophy generally the same lines
as did the original school. Quite different is the
position of the second school, the Sautrāntikas. It is
really a new school, a precursor or contemporary of
that momentous change which splits the history of
Buddhism into two quite distinct periods. It is,
therefore, preferable to keep to the broad lines of the
old division of Buddhism into early or Hinayāna and
later or the Mahāyāna, and to admit the existence of a
transitional school in the Sautrāntikas.

1 But on p 128 M. de la Valée Poussin mentions the " nihilist
scholasticism" as the scholasticism of the canon.

2 Another transitional school between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna
is the so called Satya-siddhi school of Harivarman known only
from Chinese sources, cf Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist
We readily think that there was a considerable growth of scholasticism in early Buddhism, but it is scholasticism in the second sense. Since the simple faith in immortality never existed, it is impossible to speak of its being blurred or contaminated by scholasticism. Early Buddhism started from a sound philosophical idea of ultimate realities (dharmas). Some of these elements are highly artificial constructions. Early Buddhists and their continuators, the Vaibhāṣikas, have paid a heavy tribute to that innate tendency of the human mind to infer difference of things from a difference of words. The Sautrāntikas most decidedly opposed this tendency, they sharply distinguished nominal realities (prajñāpāti at) from ultimate data. They accordingly mercilessly cut down the lists of elements adopted in the schools of early Buddhism and by the Vaibhāṣikas. They thus reduced them exclusively to a list comprising sense data and the primitive data of mind. It is therefore, quite wrong to throw them into the same bag with the Vaibhāṣikas. They are, if anything, anti-scholastic. Their role may be usefully compared with that of Occam's Razor in European philosophy. They even can be more properly called a critical school, a name which their continuators, the Yogācāra Sautrāntika school fully deserves. But these already belong to the Mahāyāna. If we roughly assign the beginning of Mahāyāna to the I century A.D. and the decline of Hinayāna in the North to the V century, we shall have

Thought p 172 ff (Calcutta, 1912), O. Rosenberg, Problems, p 271
about five hundred years when both these tendencies kept the field. The Sautrāntikas apparently began by taking an intermediate position between the extreme Mahāyānists\(^1\) and the “school men.” Then the battle that raged during 500 years was reaching to its end, they coalesced with the Mahāyānists who had won the battle and formed with them the hybrid school of Yogācāra-Sautrāntika. Among the ultimate realities of the earlier lists which were declared by the new movement, i.e., by both the Mahāyānists and the Sautrāntikas to be nominal we find Nirvāṇa (nirodha).

It was known long ago that the Viśīṇa and the Sautrāntika schools were engaged in a dispute regarding the nature of Nirvāṇa. The first maintained that it was something real (vastu), the second objected that it was nothing real by itself, that it was merely the cessation of all personal life. The exact meaning of this issue could, of course, be fully appreciated only if the complicated arguments of both contending schools would have been known. Our information about the Viśīṇikas is much more ample now, and we can represent in detail the argumentation which led to the tenet of Nirvāṇa as a reality. About the other school, the Sautrāntikas, our information is still indirect.

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\(^1\) This Vaiśṇavendra himself hints, cf. my Soul Theory, p. 352 and M de la V p. 3 transl. IX, p. 273. Vaiśṇavendra who himself favoured this school, as well as his pupil and commentator Dignāga, are already Mahāyānists and have partly adopted Viśīṇavādins views. They call themselves Viśīṇavādins although in the cardinal point of absolute reality they partly adhere to the Sautrāntika view (cf. Nyāyabutikātattā ed. B. B. p. 19).
The works of the early Sautrāntikas, Kumāralābha, Śrīlābha, Mahābhandanta, Vasumitra and others are still inaccessible. Vasubandhu can be taken as the exponent of the latest phase of this school, when it was about to coalesce with the Mahāyānists. However, enough is known to allow a definite conclusion about their supposed “denial” of Nirvāṇa and the meaning of their answer to the Vaibhāṣikas.

M de la Vallée Poussin thinks that his hypothesis about a pre-canonic Buddhism consisting of a simple faith in immortality and yoga practices, as well as his interpretation of the passages where Buddha is reported to have answered some metaphysical questions by silence—that both these hypotheses are fully borne out by the position which the later schools take regarding Nirvāṇa (p. 132). When it is called a “reality” he declares it to be a confirmation of the existence (some 500 years ago) of that simple faith in immortality which, by a similar method, he has discovered in early Buddhism. We find in his book (pp. 136-148) many interesting details about the battle that raged between the two schools in the 5th century A.D., but unfortunately the meaning of the controversy has entirely escaped his attention, since it is exactly the reverse of what he assumes it to be. The Vaibhāṣikas did not maintain that Nirvāṇa was a kind of paradise, but that the annihilation of all life (nirōdha), the essence of Nirvāṇa was a reality (nirōdha-satya, vastu), i.e. a materialistic lifeless reality. The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, admit the existence of Buddha’s Cosmical Body (dharma-kāya), i.e. they adhere to the Māhayāna conception which consists
in identifying Nivāna with the living world itself. Therefore, just as the Mahāvīrinīts, they deny the reality of Nivāna as a separate element which transcends the living world. It is a denial of the reality of that materialistic kind of annihilation which was favoured by the Vaibhāṣikas.

VII THE DOUBLE CHARACTER OF THE ABSOLUTE

With regard to Nivāna the Absolute, Indian philosophy, just as in a broader sense, the philosophy of mankind, is divided between two diametrically opposed solutions. The absolute end is either eternal death, or it is eternal life. The first is materialism, the second some kind of idealism. Both theories are represented in India in Buddhism as well as in Brāhmanism. The theory of eternal death is represented on the Buddhist side by early Buddhism and the Vaibhāṣikas, on the Brāhmanical side, as will be seen later on by the early Nāgāra-Valśeṣika. The theory of eternal life is represented in the Buddhist side by the Mahāyāna and its precursors on the Brāhmanical side by the Vedānta, Sānkhya, Yoga and the later Nāyāyikas. Nivāna is a reality (dharmarūpa) in the sense of a materialistic, lifeless (yassun

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2 I find in modern popular works attempting to biology the conception of a lifeless Nirvāna and the term itself applied to describe that condition of the universe which will obtain when all energies will be exhausted (entropy). There is assumed a biological 'Lusttreib' and a 'Todestreib', the first would correspond to kehyopadeya hunapurāna, the second to sarvam keṣam or sarvam dukhhaṇa ep Signa Freud, Jenček des Lustprincip (Vienna 1923), pp 52 80
sati ce'aso vimokṣaḥ, acetanaḥ)\(^2\) reality in the majority of the schools of early Buddhism and in the Vaibhāsika school. They are also atheists and treat their Buddha as essentially human.\(^2\) Such reality is denied by all those schools which adhere to the conception of a divine Buddha, i.e. by the Mahāyānists and their precursors in the Hinayāna. The conception of Buddha's Cosmical Body (dharmakāya) is shared by all the schools of Mahāyāna and by the intermediate school of the Sautrāntikas. According to the modern Mongol's way of expressing it, in Hinayāna the supreme Buddha (burhan-bagsch) has no body, in the Mahāyāna and with the Sautrāntikas he has a Body, and a better one (than before becoming Buddha), a glorious, all-embracing Body.

As regards the reality or ideality of Nirvāna the relative position of the contending schools may be roughly represented in the following schematic way:—

Vaibhāsika and early schools—both saṁsāra and nirvāṇa real.

Mādhyamika—both saṁsāra and nirvāṇa unreal (sc. separately unreal).

Sautrāntika—saṁsāra real, nirvāṇa unreal (sc. separately unreal. Yogācara or Vijñānavāda—saṁsāra unreal, nirvāṇa real). The meaning of this scheme will emerge from the arguments advanced by each of the schools.

\(^{1}\) Cp. Madhy vi p 525 9. cp. transl in the Appendix

\(^{2}\) Thus, of course, does not mean that exceptional, supernatural powers were not ascribed to him, but he belonged to the manuṣyaloka.
VIII. THE VAIBHĀSIKAS

As mentioned above, they are the continuators of the early school of the Sarvāstivādins and may be here treated as the representatives of early Buddhism in general. Their tenets which concern us at this place are the following ones: Existence is of a double kind, either transient and phenomenal, or eternal and absolute. Both parts are then analysed into their elements, classified as elements of matter, mind, and forces for the phenomenal part, and as space and Nirvāṇa for the eternal one. The elements of phenomenal life are divided into past, present and future, and are all conceived as realities the past and the future ones are as real as the present ones. This leads to the construction of two sets of elements, the one representing the everlasting nature (dharmasvabhāva), the other their momentary manifestation in actual life dharmalaksana. It is clear that this theory brings the Sarvāstivādin very near to the Sāṅkhya system which assumes an eternal matter and its momentary manifestations. Therefore, students are specially warned not to confound both doctrines, and not to overlook their difference.

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1 This theory of the double set of elements is very clearly analysed by O. Rosenberg in his Problems, cf IX and XVIII. Had M. de la V. P. devoted to this book all the attention it deserves he never would have maintained that the Nirvāṇa of the Vaibhāsikas is a paradise. Judging by his sweeping and unfair remark on p. XXI he has entirely misunderstood this remarkable book.


3 When pressed to give details about this lifeless condition of dharmasvabhāva the Vaibhāsikas confess their ignorance, ibid., p. 75 and 90.
When all manifestations are stopped, all forces extinct, remains the lifeless residue. It is impersonal, eternal death, and it is a separate element, a reality, the reality of the elements in their lifeless condition. This reality is very similar to the reality of the Sāṅkhya's undifferentiated matter (prakṛti), it is eternal, absolute death.¹ The Sāṅkhyaśas were dualists, and admitted besides eternal matter eternal souls, but the latter, as is well known, the Buddhists very energetically denied. Cāndrakirti refers to the Vaibhāsika view in the following way. "If Nirvāṇa is a reality per se (bhāva), it cannot be a simple extinction. Of course, it has been declared that consciousness is extinct (vimuktaka) in nirvāṇa, just as a light becomes extinct (when fuel is exhausted,) but for us extinct life is not an entity (bhāva)." To this (the Vaibhāśikas) answer "You must not understand nirvāṇa to be the extinction of passion (and of life), but you must say that the entity (dharma) called nirvāṇa is the thing in which passion and life are extinct. The extinction of light is a mere example, and it must be interpreted as pointing to that (inanimate) thing which remains when consciousness is extinct."²

We need not insist that the school was atheistic and genuinely denied the reality of a substantial soul, whereas the Mahāsāṃghikas, Vātsiputriyas,

¹ Or something quite undefinable, niḥsaṁtātātām niḥśadaśad niḥśadaśaḥ avyātām akṛtām pradhānam, Y. S. Vyāsa II 19.
² Yātman saty cetasa vimukto (=nirodho) bhavati, ibid. 525. 9., op. translation in the Append.
Sautrāntikas and Mahāyānists denied it one way and admitted it in another. The state of Nirvāṇa, as imagined by the Vaibhāsikas, affords some points of similarity with that state of the universe which modern science imagines will exist when all energies will be worked out, they will exist, since energy itself (so. dharma-svabhāva) 1 is eternal, but they will not work. A condition in which all energies are extinct cannot be spiritual.

Of course simple materialism goes under the name of uccchedavāda, against which Buddha is reported to have made an emphatic protest. But simple materialism in India as elsewhere, is nirvāṇa at every death (dehochedhamovah). 2 without retribution for one's deeds in future life. The complicated system of worlds imagined by Buddha, through which the elements composing individual existences are gradually, one after the other, reduced to a state of quiescence and extinction, until in final nirvāṇa all are extinct—is nothing but the realisation of the moral law. The worlds are "produced" by karma, which corresponds to a conception of evolution going on under the influence of an accumulation of moral merit. 3 Simple materialism leaves no room for the working of this

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1 European mystics, of course, put all the variety of the Indian speculations about Nirvāṇa into the same bag and declare that negative for our reason, it is emotionally very positive indeed, "dem Gefühl nach ein Positivum starkster Form", of Heiler, op cit p 41, following R. Otto, Das Heilige.

2 Sarvadarsā, p 3 (B Ind)

3 Op O Rosenberg, Problems XVI.
law. But neither does, according to Buddha, an eternal spiritual principle leave room for it. The moral law conduces through a very long process of evolution the living world into a state of final quiescence where there is no life but something lifeless, inanimate.¹ In this sense, the Vaibhāṣikas outlook resembles the materialism of modern science.²

IX THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

This school, as mentioned above, had quite different tendencies. They denied that the past and future elements really existed in the same sense as the present ones did. They took much more natural view. The past is what did exist, and the future is what will exist after not having existed. They consequently rejected the double set of elements, the eternal essence and the manifestations, and admitted the

¹ All the references adduced by M. de la V. P. from Sanghabhadra and Ab., Kosā, II, 55 only assert that nirvāṇa, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, was a vastu, but not that it was living or spiritual.
² Prof M. Anesaki, Nichiren (Cambridge, 1916) p. 137 ff evidently alludes to the Vaibhāṣikas when asserting that Buddhism includes a materialistic school, or a school which its opponents characterised as materialistic. As a curiosity it may be added that when the educational authorities of the newly founded republic of Burnats in Transhukaha started an antireligious propaganda, they first of all assaulted the doctrine of transmigration in its popular form and insisted on the fact that modern science favours a materialistic view of the universe. The Buddhist monks, who are Mahāyānists, retorted in a pamphlet in which they developed the view that materialism is not unknown to them, since the Vaibhāṣikas maintained that after Nirvāṇa, every life ceases for ever.
reality of these manifestations alone. Nirvāṇa was the absolute end of the manifestations, the end of passion and life (kleśa-jnānmanor ksayah), without any counterpart. It decidedly insisted upon the fact that nirvāṇa means only the end of the process of life, without any lifeless substance (dharma) as the residue or the substratum in which life has been extinguished. Nirvāṇa thus loses its materialistic character. The denial of the Sautrāntikas is no denial of Nirvāṇa in general not a denial of an idealistic absolute. There is no Buddhism possible without Nirvāṇa, since without Nirvāṇa means without a Buddha. But the Sautrāntikas denied the materialistic Nirvāṇa, just as all the Mahāyānists did.

The original works of the Sautrāntika school, as mentioned above, are not yet accessible. The school probably contained a great variety of philosophical constructions. The later Sautrāntikas coalesced with the Mahāyānists and formed the hybrid schools of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra and Mādhyamika-Sautrāntikas.¹ This fact alone proves that on the vital questions of Nirvāṇa and Buddha they closely adhered to later Buddhism and can be characterised as a transitional school. From Tibetan sources² we know that they admitted the doctrine of dhammakāya, i.e., of a divine Buddha, and this solves the question, because this dogma is the common characteristic of all the schools of the Mahāyāna. They differed from the latter in that they admitted the reality of the phenomenal

¹ Wassulef, Buddhism, pp 321 ff
² Ibid p 286
world which with them included only sense-data, consciousness and volition. The momentary flashes to which these entities were reduced were nevertheless conceived as real, not illusions, and their total extinction in Nirvāṇa was maintained. They neither admitted the monastic spiritual principle (ālaya-vyāna) of the idealistic Mahāyānists, nor the principle of relativity (śūnyavāda) of the Mādhyamikas. What their line of argument was we know from the work of Vasumitra upon the early schools\(^1\). The author was himself a Sautrāntika and closes his work with an enumeration of their principal tenets, such tenets that were shared by all the adherents of the school. We find here (under No 3) their tenet that there are two kinds of elements (skandhas). Besides those which are subject to total extinction at the time of Nirvāṇa, there is a subtle consciousness which survives after Nirvāṇa and of which the former are but a manifestation\(^2\). We have here the germ of the ālaya-vyāna of the Yogācāras. If later on the Sautrāntikas objected to this tenet, they probably did it only because, in the Yogācāra system, it involved the illusory character of the external world, whereas the Sautrāntikas stuck to its reality. Most probably they were in this point only the continuators of the Mahāsāṃghikas, i.e.

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\(^1\) Samaya-bheda-uparacana-cakra, transl for the first time by Wassilieff in his Buddhism. A new English translation with copious and very instructive notes by J. Masuda appeared in Asia Major, II 1 pp. 1-78

\(^2\) This is also known from Tibetan sources, cf. Wassilieff op. cit p. 273.
they adhered to that tendency which at an early date manifested itself among the schools of the Hinayāna and represented a protest against the treatment of Buddha as essentially human and against the theory of his total disappearance in a materialistic Nirvāṇa. Since every school of the Mahāyāna interpreted dharmakūya according to their own ideas in philosophy, the Sautrāntikas likewise interpreted it as a personification of their subtle consciousness.

X. TJE YOGĀCĀRAS

This was an idealistic school founded by Āryasanga in the IV-V Century A.D.

Idealistic views (vyāna-vāda) have appeared in the history of Buddhistic philosophy several times and at different places. We have, first of all cano-

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1 It thus appears that Prof. H. Kern, Manual, p 123, was right in maintaining that “among old sects the Mahāsamghikas entertained views agreeing with the Mahāyāna.” It is also clear that the Vātsiputraīyas (Vajjiputtakas) established their pudgalavāda with no other aim than that of supporting the doctrine of a supernatural, surviving Buddha from the philosophical side. Indirectly this proves how philosophically the genuine primitive Buddha must have been. The very character of the argument of the Vātsiputraīyas in favour of the pudgala is suggestive. It was neither a dharma—thus they could not maintain, so fresh was its categorical denial by the Master in memory—but neither was it something different from a dharma. It was already inexpressible at that time. Had not the denial of the ātmā been so categorical, the Vātsiputraīyas would have certainly invented another, and not so twisted an argument in support of their belief in a supernatural Buddha. Cf Ab Kośa, IX and my Soul Theory, p 830.
technical works like the Lāṅkāvatārasūtra and others, which are written in imitation of the Upanisads, in a style intentionally averse to precision. And then we have the three systems of Āśvaghōsa, Āryāśanga and Dīgnāga. As Mahāyānists, they are all monists and believers in the Cosmical Body of the Buddha. But in the process of realisation of this unique substance they all admit the existence of one initial or store consciousness ālaya-vyāṇa in addition to that indefinite consciousness (citta = manas = vyāṇa) which was admitted in the Hinayāna, and

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1 In the Lāṅkāvatāra, p. 182-36 (ed Tokyo 1924) more than 20 different opinions about Nirvāṇa are mentioned. The first evidently alludes to the opinion of the Hinayānists and the last looks like the opinions of the Yogācāras. All are rejected on the score that Nirvāṇa is indefinable. It is the Mādhyamika view. But the majority of the solutions there mentioned evidently never existed, and those that existed are so formulated that it is difficult to recognise them. It is a fanciful literary composition Āryadeva's comment transl. by G. Tucci, T'oung Pao XXV, p 16 ff, looks like forgery by some incompetent pandit. The Tibetan Estan-hgyur, as already noticed by Wasmieij, is also full of forged tracts ascribed to Āśvaghōsa, Nāgāruṇa and Āryadeva. The last solution, p 184, 1 15, ff, which in the sūtra is evidently mentioned pour la bonne bouche is not to be discovered at all in the enumeration of the comment. It has not escaped the perspicacity of E. Burnouf, Introduction (2) p 462, that this last solution, although seemingly rejected, was the one favoured by the author. I find no mention of E. Burnouf's translation and comment in the article of G. Tucci.

2 That vyāṇa-sandha is nothing else than nirvākalpam yañānam and sanjñā sandha nothing else than samkalpam yañānam as stated in my Central Conception, p 18-19, is now corroborated by Udayana, Parñuddha, p 213-14 (B I)
they all deny the reality of the external world. They thus reduce all the elements (dharma) of Hinayâna to modes of one single conscious principle. Aśvaghosa’s system\(^1\) is in all essential points the same as the Mâdhyamika’s, but it accepts the theory of an “All-conserving mind” (ālaya-vyâhāna), as a stage in the evolution of “Suchness” (tathatâ) in which consciousness is awakened\(^2\).

The Yogācāra school is divided into the ancient one, or the followers of Āryāsanga, and the new one, or the followers of Dignâga. The first\(^3\) established their idealistic views on a new interpretation of the old Abhidharma Āryāsanga himself composed a Mahâ-yânustic Abhidharma,\(^4\) where the number of elements (dharma) is increased from 75 to 100. The ālaya-vyâhāna is here a new element, a store-house, a real granary, where the seeds (bîja) of all future ideas and the traces of all past deeds are stored up. However, it is not the Absolute. It belongs to the phenomenal

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\(^1\) Whether this Aśvaghosa, a Mahâ-yânist, is the same as the author of Buddhacarita has been doubted. About this system cp Suzuk. Discourse on the Awakening of the Faith (Chicago, 1900) and Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddh Thought, p 252 ff. (Calcutta, 1912)

\(^2\) Suzuki, Op cit p 151

\(^3\) A clear exposition of Āryāsanga’s system is to be found in the Trîmikâ of Vasubandhu with a comment by Sthiramati; ed by Sylvain Lévi (Paris 1925) Op Yamakami Sogen, Op cit 210 ff. Op, B Keith, Buddhist Phil, p 242 ff where all the literature is indicated. A still earlier (third) school of that name is mentioned, cf Wosslef, Dharmatâ, p. 76.

\(^4\) Abhidharma-samuccaya, Bstan- bgyur, Mdo, vol. 32
part of existence because all the results (vipāka)\(^1\) of \textit{karma} are there stored up. This store-consciousness in this system occupies a position analogous to the primitive matter (pradhāna)\(^2\) of the Śāṅkhya school. All individual objects and ideas are regarded as its modifications (pariṇāma) by the Śāṅkhya. The Yogācāras likewise regard all separate ideas as modifications of their store-consciousness. This represents a disguised return from the theory of a stream of thought to the doctrine of a substantial soul\(^3\). In the stream of thought, every preceding moment of the consciousness is the cause of the next following one. This relation called \textit{samanantara-pratyaya} is now replaced by the relation of the store-consciousness (ālaya) to its modifications (pariṇāma)\(^4\).

But in the Śāṅkhya system both the Primitive Matter and its modifications were realities. The Yogācāras regarded both as unreal. From their predecessors, the Mādhyamikas, they adopted the theory of the relativity and consequent unreality (śūnyatā-māsvabhāvatā) of all individual existence\(^5\), of all plurality, with that difference that they introduced different degrees of this unreality. First of all, individual ideas were unreal because they

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\(^1\) Cp Truṅskī, p 18.21.
\(^2\) Ibid p 36. 9
\(^3\) Cp my Central Conception, 35.
\(^4\) Truṅskī p 34. 5. ff. This is Śhiramati’s view about ālaya. Other views were entertained by Nanda, Dignāga and Dharmapāla.
\(^5\) Cp Schefner, Tāranātha. p. 301.
\(^6\) Ibid. p. 41-2.
were logical constructions (parikalpitā) without any adequate reality corresponding to them in the external world. This was called their essential unreality (laksana-mhsvabhāvatā). They were nevertheless contingently real (paratantra) in the sense that they obeyed to causal laws (pratitya-samutpāda). This was called their causal unreality or relativity (ūtpattinihsvabhāvatā). They were at least unreal (individually as far as they were merged in the unique reality (paramspānna) of the Absolute (tathatā-dharmatā). This was called their absolute unreality (paramārtha-mhsvabhāvatā) as individual entities. It was the same as their reality in the Absolute, their reality, so to say sub specie aeternitatis: The Absolute thus became immanent to the phenomenal world, it was neither different, nor undifferent (nānya-nānanya). As an assemblage of individual ideas it was different, but viewed as an organic whole it became identical. It was a spiritual Absolute (citta-dharmatā), pure consciousness, undifferentiated into subject and object (grāhya-grāhakarāhata). It is the essence of Reality (dharmadhātu) and it is, therefore, identified with the Cosmical Body (dhāma-kāya) of the Buddha. All the numerous synonyms which are used to characterise this concep-

1 Tr&māk& p 41 14
2 Ibid p 41-18 op p 16 16 vijnānam pratitya-samutpānnavād dravyato'stu
3 Ibid p 41 23-4
4 Ibid p 40 6
5 Ibid p 42 16
6 Ibid p 40 4
7 Ibid p 43 25
tion in other schools can be applied to it.¹ The yogin in his mystic intuition is supposed to possess a direct cognition of this undifferentiated pure consciousness (advayalaksanam vyâpita-mâtram).²

In the closing chapter of his Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu mentions the Mahâyânist view that all separate elements, the dharmas of the Hînayâna, have no ultimate reality³. At that time he rejects this view, but later on, near to the close of his long life, he changes his stand-point, and accepts the idealistic theory of his elder brother Asaṅga. Asaṅga himself seems also to have, at a certain period of his life, fluctuated between the two main lines in which Mahâyâna was split⁴. But at the end of their career both brothers definitely settled in the conviction that the Universe was a logical construction⁵, that all its separate elements were relative not real, in themselves, but that they possessed another reality, the parinampanna, a reality in the Absolute; they were real when regarded sub specie aeterintatis. The Theory of Salvation, of this transition from saṁsāra

¹ Trûnśikâ p 41 26  
² Ibid p 43 20  
³ Cp the translation of M de la V. P, IX p 273 and my Soul Theory, p 353.  
⁴ According to the Tibetans, among the five works of Maitreya-Asaṅga some are written from the Yogâcâra standpoint, some from Mâdhyamika-svâtantra and one from the Mâdhyamika-prâsaṅgika view.  
⁵ Trûnśikâ, XVII, sarvasmâ vyâpita-mâtrakam, and Sthûramati remarks p 35, that sarvasmâ includes both the phenomenal world and the Absolute, sarvam ut tavadhaâukam asâmisram ca;
into nirvāṇa, out of the phenomenal world into the Absolute—this greatest puzzle of the Indian mind—underwent a complete change as a consequence of the change in the ontological view. In Hinayāna where, as we have seen, both samsāra and nirvāṇa were considered as realities, the mystic power of yoga was called upon to achieve the transition out of the one into the other. Actual experience of trance in meditation suggested to the Buddhist philosophers that yoga was capable of arresting some functions of the senses and of the intellect. And since the world was analysed in bits of senses and sense data, it seemed only logical to admit that yoga could achieve the task of arresting the life of the universe forever.

The great change produced by the Mahāyāna consisted in the view that the absolute was immanent in the World. There was consequently no need of converting the elements of the phenomenal world into eternal elements, the saṃskṛta-dharmas into asaṃskṛta-dharmas, the samsāra into nirvāṇa. The change consisted in the change of aspect. The mystic power of yoga was now invoked not in order to produce a real change in the constitution of the Universe but in order to replace the wrong ideas of unsophisticated humanity by an intuition of what was absolutely real. To the yogi, the world appeared in a quite different aspect, he viewed every separate object as unreal separately, but real sub specie aeternitatis. For him the elements (dharmas) of the Universe needed no conversion into eternal ones, they were themselves eternally “quiescent”.
The Hinayānistic conception of separate elements (dharmas) which were active in phenomenal life and quiescent (Sānta) or extinct (niruddha). in Nirvāṇa was, according to the Yogācāras, contrary to reason. If they were real they could not disappear totally. They were, accordingly, declared to have been always quiescent, quiescent or extinct from the outset (ādi-’ānta)³ To regard them as active, in the transcendental sense, is an illusion In that sense, it can be asserted, that nirvāṇa is real and samsāra unreal.

In the system of Dignāga, the old Abhidharma is forsaken altogether and replaced by logic and epistemology Dignāga started with the reform of the Brahmanical logic (nyāya) and adapted it to Buddhist ideas. His analysis of cognition resulted in the conception of an extreme concrete and individual (svalakṣaṇa), the root, or, so to say, the differential of cognition, a point instant (ksaṇa) in which existence and cognition, object and subject, coalesce ² The concept

³ Cf Mahāyānasūtrakāra, ed Sylvain Lévi (Paris 1907), XI 51 tral ibid (Paris 1911) “ils (les dharmas) sont originalement en Paśc et en état de Par-Nirvāna” Cf St Schayer. Die Erlösungslehren der Yogācāras nach dem Sūtrālambkāra des Asaṅga, Z fur Indologie, II, 1 p 99, ff. The idea that all elements are originally quiescent (sānta = nirvṛata) so eternally extinct, an idea leading to the theory of everything being real sub specie aeternitatis is likewise expressed by Nagārjuna, Madhyamikas, VII, 16—Pratītya yaḥ yad bhavati tat tac chāntam svabhāvatāh

² A very interesting and rather subtle discussion between Candrakīrti and Dignāga about the point-instant in which existence and cognition are supposed to coalesce is found in M. vṛ p 59 ff, transl. in the Appendix Cp my Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, ch. VII.
tion of this idealistic school regarding Nirvāṇa may be gathered from the closing words of Dharmakīrti in his “Examination of Solipsism.” The question is asked how is the omniscience of Buddhas to be understood of the Buddhas which are the personification of pure consciousness undifferentiated into subject and object, and it is answered that the ‘penetration of the Buddhas into every existing object is something inconceivable, it is in every respect beyond what we may express in speech or cognize in concepts.’

XI THE MĀDIHYAMIKAS

This system of philosophy and dialectics is the foundation of the Mahāyāna religion. Although other systems—the realism of the Sarvāstivādins and the idealism of the Yogācāras—are also studied in the monastic schools of the countries where this religion flourishes, nevertheless the Mādihyamika system is generally regarded as the true background of the religious feelings of its votaries. For it must be allowed that the Mahāyāna is a truly new religion, so radically different from Early Buddhism that it exhibits as many points of contact with later Brahmanical religions as with its own predecessor. Prof. O Rosenberg calls it a separate “church” and compares its position with the Roman Catholicism versus Protestantism. The difference is even more radical since the new religion was obliged to produce a new canon of Scriptures.

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1 Sāntānāntramsiddhi, edited by me in the B.B. and translated into Russian in the series.
2 O Rosenberg, Probleme der B. Philosophie, XIX.
It never has been fully realised what a radical revolution had transformed the Buddhist church when the new spirit which however was for a long time lurking in it arrived at full conclusion in the first centuries A.D. When we see an atheistic, soul-denying philosophic teaching of a path to personal Final Deliverance, consisting in an absolute extinction of life, and a simple worship of the memory of its human founder,—when we see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a Supreme God, surrounded by a numerous pantheon and a host of Saints, a religion highly devotional, highly cremonious and clerical, with an ideal of Universal Salvation of all living creatures, a Salvation by the divine grace of Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas, a Salvation not in annihilation, but in eternal life,—we are fully justified in maintaining that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break between new and old with the pale of what nevertheless continues to claim common descent from the same religious founder. Yet the philoso-

1 Very characteristic is also the fact that Buddhist art of the ancient period represented Buddha by an empty place or a symbol which later on is replaced by a divine figure of the Apollo type. Notwithstanding Prof. Grunwedel's contrary view (Buddhistische Kunst, 1st ed. p. 68) the only explanation seems to be that the total disappearance of Buddha in Nirvana was thus given pictorial expression.

2 The two churches coexisted peacefully in the same monasteries, because the Buddhists very wisely always made allowance for human nature which sometimes feels inclination towards a simple rationalistic Low Church and sometimes is attracted towards a devotional and magnificent High Church. They divided huma-


phical system which is the foundation of this new religion is usually represented as the extreme expression and the logical consequence of that pessimism and skepticism by which Early Buddhism is supposed to have been inspired. It is characterised as "complete and pure nihilism", as the "legitimate logical outcome of the principles underlying ancient Buddhism". It is accused of teaching that "all our ideas are based upon a non-entity or upon the voids". It is represented as a "negativism which radically empties existence up to the last consequences of negation", a doctrine whose conception of reality was one of "absolute nothingness". The Madhyamikas are called

...
the most radical Nihilists that ever existed.\(^1\) When compared with Vedānta, it has been asserted that negation has a positive counterpart in that system, whereas there is none in the Mādhyamika. Negation in the latter is represented as its "exclusive ultimate end (Selbstzweck).\(^2\)

The opponents of Mahāyāna in India describe it much in the same manner. Thus Kumārila accuses the Mādhyamikas not only of denying the existence of external objects, but of denying the reality of our

view, viz, that Nāgārjuna's real object was to show that the intellect "condemns itself as inadequate just as it finds hopeless antinomies in the world of experience". As prof Keith very well knows, Nāgārjuna is not the only philosopher who adhered to such a line of argument, very celebrated men have done that. Why then should Nāgārjuna's main conceptions be "difficult and obscure" (ibid)?\(^2\) He also hits the right mark when he points to a primitive, non-differentiated reality, identified with Buddha's Cosmical Body (dharma-kāya), as the central conception of Mahāyāna. He even finds (ibid p 225) much more reality and activity in this conception than in the absolute of the Vedānta with which it is so strikingly similar. How are these views to harmonize with the conflicting opinions of the same author e.g. p 261 where it is asserted that for Nāgārjuna the world was "absolute nothingness"; that it was "utterly unreal" I am at a loss to explain. Or does prof Keith suppose that Nāgārjuna did not admit the doctrine of Dharmakāya, or that, having admitted it, he did not fully realise its consequences, or that "the positive side of the Mahāyāna" (p 257) is a later development out of its negative side?\(^2\)

\(^1\) I. Wach, Mahāyāna, p 58
\(^2\) M Walleser, Der altere Vedānta, p 42 "Selbstzweck is explidity denied by Nāgārjuna, XXIV, 7 and many other places."
ideas as well.¹ Vācaspatamitra is full of respect towards Buddhist logicians but for the Mādhyamikas he has only remarks of extreme contempt he calls fools,² and accuses them of reducing cognition to nothing ³ Sankara accuses them of disregarding all logic and refuses to enter in a controversy with them. The position of Śāṅkara is interesting because, at heart, he is in full agreement with the Mādhyamikas, at least in the main lines since both maintain the reality of the One-without-a-second, and the multitude of the manifold. But Śāṅkara, as an ardent hater of Buddhism, would never confess that. He therefore, treats the Mādhyamika, with great contempt, but not on the score of a “denial of the existence of our ideas”, or of maintaining “absolute nothingness,” but on the charge that the Mādhyamika denies the possibility of cognising the absolute by logical methods (pramāṇa) Vācaspatamitra in the Bhāmats rightly interprets this point as referring to the opinion of the Mādhyamikas.

¹ Ślokavārttika, Nirālambanavāda, 14. In fact, the Mādhyamikas denied the validity of the pramāṇas and maintained that external and internal were correlative terms which are meaningless beyond this correlation, see below p 49
² devānām-prīya, of Tātpy-taka, p 341 23 469 9
³ Ibid ad N S IV 1 28 sarva-sūnyatve khyātur abbāvāt khyāter abbāvah Vācaspati knows that they deny abbāva just as much, and in the same sense, as they deny bhūva, of Bhāmata ad V S II 2 32 na ca nistattvatava tatvam bhāvānām, tathā sati hi tattvabhāvah syāt, solapi ca visūram nasahata ity uktam. bhavadhū He also knows that to transform every thing into abbāva is tantamount to endow non-reality with reality, to have a vigrāhavān abbāvah ibid 389 22 But this does not prevent him from repeating popular accusations.
that the logic is incapable to solve the question about what existence or non-existence really is. This opinion Śankara himself, as is wellknown, shares. He does not accept the authority of logic as a means of cognising the Absolute, but he deems it a privilege of the Vedānta to fare without logic, since he has Revelation to fall back upon. From all his opponents he requires strict logical methods. It must be added

1 Of Deussen, System des Vedanta p 99, Śankara ad V. S. II 2 28. The Mādhyamika demes the validity of logic. e of discursive conceptual thought, to establish the ultimate truth. On the charge that in doing so he himself resorts to some logic, he replies that the logic of common life is sufficient for showing that all systems contradict one another and that our fundamental conceptions do not resist scrutiny, cf Vācaspati, Tātparya-tīkā, p 249—avisarga-siddhayā pramāṇa itaresām pramāṇam prata-sūdyate This is exactly the standpoint which is developed with such infinite subtlety and ingenuity by Śrīhara in his Khandaka-khanda-khādyā where he openly confesses that there is but little difference between Buddhism and Vedānta, a circumstance which Śankara carefully conceals. But in later works, e.g., Vedāntaparbhāsa, or Nyāyamakaranda, different pāramāṇas are established as proofs for the existence of brahman. When commenting upon the V. S. II 2 28 Śankara, in combating Buddhist idealism resorts to arguments of which he himself does not believe a word, since they are arguments which the most genuine realist would use. He thus argues not evamatena, but paramatam ātṛtya, a method very much in vogue among Indian pandits. Deussen's interpretation of this point, op cit page 260, as intended to vindicate vyavahāra satya is a misunderstanding, since the Buddhist never denied the vyavahāra or samvṛti. Against M. Sallewer's Der alten Vedānta p 43 opinion that the objectivity of our ideas themselves is meant, it must be pointed out that the Buddhists did not deny the jñānākara, and Śankara clearly states that external objects, not ideas are meant—tasmad ārth-jñānayor bhedah.
that the Japanese scholars, Suzuki, Anesaki, Yamakami Sogan and others who have a direct knowledge of what Māhāyāna is have never committed the mistake of regarding its philosophy as nihilism or pure negativism.

We will now shortly refer to the main lines of the philosophy of the Hinayāna in order better to show the radical change produced by the spirit of Mahāyāna and thus to elicit the aim of its philosophy.

XII THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY IN THE HINAYĀNA

In a previous work¹ we have characterised Early Buddhism (Hinayāna) as a system of metaphysics which contained an analysis of existence into its component parts, and established a certain number of ultimate data (dharma). Every combination of these data was then declared to represent a nominal, not an ultimate reality. A substantial Soul was thus transformed into a stream of continuously flowing discrete moments of sensation or pure consciousness (vijñāna), accompanied by moments of feeling, of ideation, volition (vedanā-samñā-samsākāra) etc. Matter (rūpa) was conceived on the same pattern, as a flow of momentary flashes without any continuant stuff, but characterised by impenetrability, and representing the senses (āyatana 1-5) and sense data (āyatana 7-11). The world was thus transformed into a cinema. The categories of substance, quality and motion—for momentary flashes could possess no motion-}

¹ The Central Conception of Buddhism.
were denied but the reality of sense data and of the elements of mind, was admitted. All these elementary data were conceived as obeying causal laws. But the conception of causality was adapted to the character of these entities which could neither change nor move, but could only appear and disappear. Causation was called dependently-coordinated-origination (pratītya-samutpāda), or dependent existence. The meaning of it was that every momentary entity sprang into existence, or flashed up, in coordination with other moments. Its formula was "if there is this, there appears that." Causality was thus assumed to exist between moments only the appearance of every moment being coordinated with the appearance of a number of other moments. Strictly speaking it was no causality at all, no question of one thing producing the other. There could be neither a causa efficiens, since one momentary entity, disappearing as it did at once, could not influence any other entity. So the formula was supplemented by another one "not from itself (causa materiae), not from something foreign (causa efficiens), nor a combination of both does an entity spring up," it is coordinated, it is not really produced." Apart from

1. The same formula in the Pāh Canon (Majjh. II. 28 etc.) in the Ab. Kosa, III 18 and 28 and Madhy. vi. p. 10 In the latter instance asmin sati idam bhavatu, hrasve dirgham yathā sati, the formula clearly refers to coordination, not to causation.

2. Samy. II 113 and Madhy Kar I. 1. XII. 1

these momentary entities the system admitted eternal unchanging elements, Space and Nirvana, the latter representing some indefinite essence (dharma-sva-bhāva), of these forces which were active in phenomenal life, but are now extinct and converted into eternal death. Thus both the phenomenal world and this kind of an absolute, both samsāra and nirvāṇa, were conceived as realities, somehow interconnected, linked together in a whole (sārvam), but in an ideal whole, having as a combination of elements, only nominal existence.

XIII THIS DOCTRINE MODIFIED IN MAHĀYĀNA

Now, the Mādhyamika system started with an entirely different conception of reality. Real was what possessed a reality of its own (sva-bhāva), what was not produced by causes (akītaka-asamkīta), what was not dependent upon anything else (paratra

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1 If I am not very much mistaken, this view of causality viz. that there is, properly speaking, no real causality, that this notion should be cancelled altogether and replaced by a law of coordination between point-instants, is not quite a stranger to modern science and philosophy, cf. B. Russell, On the Notion of Cause, in Mysticism and Logic p. 194. The Buddhist conception of causality would thus be something similar to the conception of a function in mathematics, "funktionelle Abhängigkeit", such a view of causality as was entertained in Europe by D’Alembert, Comte, Claude Bernard, Avenarius, E. Mach and others, cf. the references on Ester, Handworterbuch der Philosophie, p. 333. We hope to devote before long a special article to this question.

2 Op. my Central Conceptions p. 6 and below p. 54 n. 6
nirapeksa) In Hinayāna, the elements, although inter-dependent (sanskṛta = pratiyāyasamutpanna), were real (vastu). In Mahāyāna all elements because interdependent, were unreal (śūnya = svabhāva-śūnya). In Hinayāna every whole (rāsi = avayavin) is regarded as a nominal existence (praṇāpatisat) and only the parts or ultimate elements (dharma) are real (vastu). In Mahāyāna all parts or elements are unreal (śūnya), and only the whole, i.e. the whole of the wholes (dharmatā = dharma-kāya), is real. The definition of reality (tattva) in Mahāyāna is the following one—"uncognisable from without, quiescent, undifferentiated in words, unrealisable in concepts, non-plural—this is the essence of reality". A dependent existence is no real existence, just as borrowed money is no real wealth. The theory that all real existence can last only for a moment, since two mo-

1 Madhy Kar XV In the sequel, the references with Roman figures will refer to chapter and kārikā of Nāgājuna's Mādhyamika Śāstra, and the references in Arabic figures to Candrakirti's comment B B IV

2 It is clear that we have here that conception of a substance independently existing which is well known to the students of European philosophy, op Spinoza's definition of substance as quod in se est et per se concipitur". This conception resulted either in establishing the theory of a harmonia generaliter stabilit in order to explain the interdependence of the monads, or to the view that there is only one unique substance The latter view is taken in Mahāyāna, the former in Hinayāna, where the harmony between monads is established by karma as a special force (samskāra), the force παράκτοντων, the πρῶτον, xaraxovn, the πρῶτον, παράκτοντων

3 Ibid XVIII 9

4 Ibid p 263 3 Kālika-āyācitakam
XIV THE DOCTRINE OF RELATIVITY

In Mahāyāna, we are thus faced by a new interpretation of the old Buddhist principle of the dependently-coordinated-existence of the elements (dhammāṇāṃ pratītya-samutpāda). It is now being declared that whatsoever is dependent or relative cannot be considered as an ultimate reality, and this feature is then pressed to its last extreme. In Hinayāna-existence was bifurcated in conditioned and unconditioned (samskṛta and asamskṛta), both being realities. Neither of them is now considered as ultimately real, and both are brought under the higher unity of Relativity. The central conception in Early Buddhism is the idea of a plurality of ultimate elements (dhammas). The central conception of Mahāyāna is their relativity (śūnyatā). The Buddhists themselves contended that the idea of ultimate elements (sāndhāyata-daṭṭhavālī), of their interdependence (pratītya-samutpāda) and of the "Four Truths of the Saint are admitted in both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. But in the first they are referred to the reality of separate elements and in the second they are interpreted as meaning their relativity, or non-reality.¹

¹ The germ of the idea that the elements of existence, because interdependent, are not real can be found in some passages of the Pāli Canon. This Candrakirti himself admits (Mādhy. avat p 22 lōffB B IX). But it does not in the least interfere with the fact that Hinayāna is a system of radical pluralism, all dhammas, even Nirvāṇa, are vastu whereas Mahāyānaism is a monistic system (advaya-nityapāñca). It is quite impossible to maintain that Hinayāna is an advata-system. But if the Mādhyamika system is characterised as negativism, and every-
Since we used the term 'relative' to describe the fact that a thing can be identified only by mentioning its relations to something else and becomes meaningless without these relations implying at the same time that the thing in question is unreal we safely, for want of a better solution can translate the word śūnya by relative or contingent and the term śūnyatā by relativity or contingency. This is in any case better than to translate it by 'void' which signification the term has in common life but not as a technical term in philosophy. That the term śūnya is in Mahāyāna a synonym of dependent existence (partitya samutpada) and means not something void but something "devoid" of independent reality (svabhāva-śūnya), with the implication that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality and with thing negative is thrown into the same bag then it is not difficult to discover in Majjh N 1 1, a full blown prajñā-paramitā, and to maintain that "es ist ein Irrtum anzunehmen, in alten Buddhismus sei etwas anderes als Negativismus gelehrt worden" as prof B Otto Franke has done, op Ernst Kuhn Memorial Volume, p 332ff (Munchen 1916). It is also difficult to say what the contention of M de la V P that "there is a great deal of Madhyamika philosophy in the Pāli Canon" (R E VIII p 334) exactly means.

1 The notion of Relativity is thus taken in a generalised sense, just as Aristotle himself uses it in the Metaphysics, where he treats Ad aliquid, not as one among the distinct categories, but as implicated with all the categories (op G Grote, Aristotle, ed Bsin p 83) and although he does not maintain that the relative is unreal, but he declares it to be Ens in the lowest degree (ibid p 85) The question whether Ens is itself relative he leaves unsolved.
the further implication that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (prapāñca). since they can only bifurcate (vikālpa) reality and never directly seize it—this is attested by an overwhelming mass of evidence in all the Mahāyāna literature. That this term never meant a mathematical void or simple non-existence is most emphatically insisted upon. Those who suppose that śūnya means void are declared to have misunderstood the term. they have not understood the purpose for which the term has been introduced d. “We are relativists. we are not negativists” insists Candrakīrti.

The text book of the Madhyamika school opens by something like a hymn in honour of Dependent Origination or Relativity It can be rendered thus:

The perfect Buddha, the Foremost of all Teachers I salute!
He has proclaimed the principle of Relativity.
The principle that nothing (in the Universe) can disappear,

Nor can anything new) appear.

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1 Ibid 491 1—pravāsīsa-prapāñca-upāsāmārtham śūnyatā upadyayate ; XXIV 18—yāh pratyay-samutpadāḥ śūnyatam tām prakāsmahe : p. 593.12-yo ’am pratyaya-samutpadahetupratrayān apekṣya rūpa-vijnānādhiṁ prādūr bhūvah sa svabhaveṇa anutpādaḥ . .sā śūnyatā ; p. 504. 3-yah pratyaetc-adhinaḥ sa śunya ukto 403 1-asūnyam—apratiyaya- samut-pannam : p. 591 6—ha sarva bhūvānaḥ—apratiyaya- samutpannata eva chāṃyatram sakalena sāstreṇa pratipāditaṃ etc. etc.

2 Ibid. XXIV. 7 p. 490 11 na cāpi śūnyatāyām yat prayajanam tud vijñāsi

3 Ibid 368. 7
Nothing has an end,
Nor is there anything eternal,
Nothing is identical (with itself),
Nor is there anything differentiated,
Nothing moves, neither hither, nor thither.
It is (Nirvāṇa), the blissful quiescence,
Of every (possible) Plurality

XV THE REAL ETERNAL BUDDHA
COGNISED IN MYSTIC INTUITION

Applying this method to the Hinayānist conception of an extinct Buddha, representing nevertheless an eternal lifeless substance (svabhāva or dharma), Nāgārjuna flatly denies the reality of the latter, notwithstanding all the reverential feelings which the idea must have evoked. Buddha is conceived in the Hinayāna as the ultimate goal of the world’s progress, realised in a continuous stream of existences (bhāva-samātati). He can really exist so far this progress really exists, but an independent existence of both is impossible, because, being interdependent, they are correlative and hence not absolutely real. Just as a man suffering from an eye-disease perceives a double moon in the sky, just so does the inveterate ignorance of mankind dichotomise every reality. Only ignorance can imagine that the Hinayānist Buddha has real existence of his own. Never did the Buddhas

1 M. vr. p. 11-13
2 Ibid. p. 432 ff
3 Ibid. p. 432-10
4 The Hinayānistic Buddha is not real, he has no svabhāva, cp. XXVII. 2, 4, 16, but the Mahayanistic one has a svabhāva. The synonym of dharma-laya is svabhāva-laya.
declare that either they themselves or their elements really did exist. But, of course, it is not for the unsophisticated simple man that the Hinayanaistic Buddha is devoid of any existence. Not being able to withstand the hci's roar of Relativity, the Hinayanaist, the man of a poorly religious enthusiasm, runs away, like an antelope into the dark forest of Realism. But the Mahayanaist's denial does not mean that every hope of salvation must be given up because that Buddha who is above every possible determination (nisprapañca) is not denied. The Mahayanaist, when maintaining that the Buddha, as conceived in Hinaya, is not absolutely real (abhava), if he wishes to state the whole truth (avipavita), must confess that he cannot even assert so much. Strictly speaking he can assert neither that the Buddha is relational, nor non-relational, nor both at once, nor neither. Such characteristics are also conventional (prayapti). They are imputed characteristics (āropit vyavahāra). The real Buddha must be perceived directly by intuition. The reserved questions, the impossibility to answer whether the world is finite or infinite and whether the Buddha survives after Niraya are referred just to this impossibility.

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1 Ibid p. 443 2 of XXV 24
2 Ibid 442 13
3 Svādhimukha-dandra, ibid p. 443. 1
4 Ibid p. 442 13
5 Ibid p. 443. 11
6 Ibid p. 443 13
7 Ibid p. XXII 11
8 Ibid p. 444 4
of whatsoever determination. If you insist that there is a Buddha you must concede that after Nīvāna there is none. But if you realise the relativity of the conception, never will the question about his existence occur. You, Buddha is merged quiescent in nature and beyond every possible determination. Those who proceed to dichotomise him as eternal or non-eternal, existent or non-existent, relative or non-relative, omniscient or non-omniscient are all misled by words. They have no direct intuition (na paśyantī) of the Absolute Buddha. Just as a man who is blind from birth cannot see the sun, just so are men in the throes of conventional conceptions they do not perceive the Buddha directly. But wish to detail (prapācaṣayantī) him conceptually. Only by them can He not be seen directly (aparolsa-unīti). Buddha must be regarded as the cosmical order (dharmaṭaḥ) his Body is the cosmos (dharmaṭi). The essence of the cosmos is incognisable. It is impossible

1 Ibid p. XXII 12
2 Ibid p. XXII 14
3 Ibid p. 448 1
4 Ibid p. XXII 15
5 Ibid p. 448 10
6 Ibid p. 448 10
7 Ibid p. 448 9 Such a definition of sense perception. pratyajñam aparolsam (sc artha nac jñāna) is opposed by Candrabhand to the definition of Dignāga pratyajñam tālpanāpodhāna of M. vr p. 71 10 It has been later accepted by the Vedāntins (cp Vedāntaparaibhasā) and others; Brahma the Absolute, is then declared to be cognised by sense-perception by pratyajñā.
to know what it is conceptually¹. The reality of Buddha is the reality of the universe and as far as the Buddha has no separate reality (niḥsvabhāva), neither the Universe has any, apart from him. All the elements of existence, when sifted through the principle of Relativity become resplendent² All the millions of existences (bhūtakotī) must be regarded as the body of the Buddha manifested in them. This is Relativity, the climax of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā)³

XVI THE NEW CONCEPTION OF NIRVĀṆA

Space and that kind of eternal death which was termed Nirvāṇa were entered in the list of ultimate realities by the schools—Early Buddhism and theVaibhāsikas on the score that they possessed a character (dharma), a reality (vastu), an individuality (sva-iksana) an existence (bhāva) of their own (sva-bhāva). Since they fitted into the current definition of reality (sva-bhāva-dhāvanīḥ dharmāḥ) they were cancelled by the Sautrāntikas on the consideration that they did not possess any such separate reality. They also were cancelled by the Mādhyamikas in consequence of the new definition of reality (anupakṣaḥ sadabhave). This new weapon proved much more efficacious than the Occam Razor of the Sautrāntika especially as it was wielded by the Mādhyamika with unflinching

¹ Ind p 448 15
² Prakīrti-prabhasavāh sarvadharmāḥ prajñāpāramatā-paripūrṇaḥ
   Ind p 444 9
³ Jatāyata-Lūyo bhuta-koti-prabhānta drastavya yad uta prajñā-
   pāramita Astas 94—14.
resolve His conception of Relativity (śūnyatā) covered everything, all the conditional as well as the eternal elements of the Vaibhāṣika list. Indeed the idea of an absolute becomes meaningless if there is nothing to set against it. It then loses every individuality or reality (sva-bhūva). And vice versa the phenomenal ceases to be phenomenal if there is nothing non-phenomenal with which it is contrasted. With this new interpretation of the principle of Relativity (pratītya-samutpādaśūnya) the Hinayānic Absolute becomes just as relative as all other ultimates of this system.

Very far reaching consequences had inevitably arisen from this newly adopted principle. The whole edifice of early Buddhism was undermined and smashed. The Nirvāṇa of the Hinayānists, their Buddha, their ontology and moral philosophy their conceptions of reality and causation were abandoned, together with the idea of the ultimate reality of the senses and sense data (rūpa), of the mind (citta-caitī), and of all their elements of matter, mind and forces. "Nowhere and never" says Candrakīrti, "have Buddhhas preached the reality of the soul or of these Hinayānistic elements". All the constructions so laboriously built up by the schools of Early Buddhism had to be relinquished with the only exception of the principle of dependently-coordinated-existence (pratītya-samutpāda) in its new interpretation as Relativity (śūnyatā). The textbook of the School devotes a
chapter to every conspicuous item of the constructions of Early Buddhism, and destroys it by the same weapon for whatsoever is relative is false, transient and illusory.

The fortunes of Mahāyāna were greatly assisted by the wonderful style in which Nāgārjuna couched his celebrated aphorisms. Notwithstanding the somewhat monotonous method by which he applies to all the conceptions of Hinayāna the same destructive dialectics, he never ceases to be interesting, bold, baffling, sometimes seemingly arrogant. And this method of endless repetition of the same idea, although in different connections, impresses the student with the overwhelming all-embracing importance of the principle of Relativity. In their Tibetan garb, owing to the monosyllabic cutting precision of this wonderful language, the aphorisms become, if possible, still more eloquent than in the original, and are, up to the present day, studied in the monastic schools, and repeated by the monks with rapturous admiration. Sometimes like terror is inspired by this insistent and obstinate denial of all, even the most revered and cherished notions of the Hinayānists. "What are we to do, exclaims Áryaveda, the next best Founder of the doctrine, "nothing at all exists". "Even the name of the doctrine inspires terror".

However it is only the Hinayānists and all pluralists in general that need to be afraid of Nāgārjuna's dialectic.

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2 Ibid. Kar. 289
tions. He does not assail, but extols the idea of the cosmical body of Buddha. He extols the principle of Relativity and destroys through it every plurality, only in order to clear up the ground and establish on it the unique, undefinable (anuvacanīya) essence of being the one-without-a-second. According to the principle of monistic philosophy, consistently applied, all other entities have only a second hand, contingent reality they are borrowed cash.

Thus unique reality, although declared to be uncharacterisable (anuvacanīya), has been variously characterised as the “element of the elements” (dharma-mānām dharmanā) or (dharma-dhātu) as their relativity (sānyatā), as “thisness” (sāmatā), as then “relation to thisness” (sāmatyāyata), as “suchness” (tathatā), as the “suchness of existence” (bhūta-tathatā) as the matrix of the Lord (tattvāgata-garbha) and lastly as the “cosmical body of the Lord”, as Buddha’s Dharma-kāya. In this last attribution, the unique essence of the universe becomes personified and worshipped under the names of Vairocana, Amitābha, the Goddess Tārā and others, as a supreme God Buddhism becomes.

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1 Prof. H. Kern, Manual, p. 127 seems also to have been terror-stricken. He exclaims with what sounds like genuine solace, “there is no birth, there is no Nirvāna! etc.” and makes responsible for this disaster “the principles underlying ancient Buddhism.”

2 The terms prajñā-pāramitā and abhavamaya, when used in an objective sense (karma-sādhana), mean the same. The Yogācāras would add as synonymous atita-dharmanā, vinayapatimātratā, parinimmopanatā cp Trimsikā, p. 42.
at once pantheistic and theistic. or as prof. M. Anesaki prefers to put it cosmotheistic.1

Buddha and Nirvāṇa are different names for the same thing. But Nāgārjuna treats the same thing under four or five different headings his object being to show that whatever be the verbal designation (piśa-pāṇca=vāl)2 from whatever side the problem of the absolute be tackled, the result is the same. If the phenomenal world is not real, neither can it have a real end.4 To suppose that the phenomenal world really existed before Nirvāṇa, in order to be changed so as not to exist after Nirvāṇa is an illusion which must be given up the sooner the better.5 Whether we take the Vaiibhāṣika view and maintain that Nirvāṇa is something real (dharma) in which consciousness and life are extinct for ever or if we with the Sautrāntika, admit that it is the simple cessation of the

1 In a very interesting book prof. M. Anesaki, Buddhist Art in its relation to Buddhist Ideals, (Boston and New York, 1915) shows how the perfection of that Japanese art which has evoked the admiration of the world is due to the influence of Mahāyāna ideals to this genuine feeling of communion with the eternal, all-pervading principle of life, the Dharmakāya realised by the artist in mystic intuition in every flower, every plant and every living creature he was painting. Is it not strange that the philosophy which establishes these ideals has been so utterly misunderstood by European scholarship?

2 M vr 373 9
3 Ibid p 175
4 Ibid XXVI 1
5 Ibid p 522 6
6 Ibid p 225 10
world process, in both cases something real is assumed to exist before Nirvana and to disappear afterwards. This makes Nirvana not only relative but a product of causes (samskāra). In full accordance with the idea of a monistic universe, it is now asserted that there is not a shade of difference between the Absolute and the phenomenal, between nirvāṇa and samsāra. The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process it is the phenomenal. Nagārjuna declares, 

"ya ājāvamjāvibhāva upādāya pratītya vā so 'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadīṣyate."

This may be rendered thus—"having regard to causes or conditions (constituting all phenomena, we call this world), a phenomenal world, this same world, when causes or conditions are disregarded, i.e. the world as a whole, sub specie aeternitatis is called the Absolute."

**XVII  IS RELATIVITY ITSELF RELATIVE?**

**CONDEMNATION OF ALL LOGIC FOR THE COGNITION OF THE ABSOLUTE**

But the principle of Relativity (sunnata) did not prove an entirely safe foundation for the New Buddhism. A danger lurked in it which was likely to bring the whole construction in jeopardy. Just as the Absolute of early Buddhism could not escape from the

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1. *Klesa-janmanor abhāvaḥ*, *ibid.* p 527 7
fate of being declared relative, just so was Relativity itself relative\(^1\); it clearly depended upon its opposite, the non-relative, and without this contrast it was likely to lose every meaning. Nāgārjuna did not shrink before this danger and faced it with the same audacious spirit as he was wont to do. This principle, the pivot of the system, is called upon in order to destroy all theories and to replace them, as we have seen above, by direct mystic intuition, not in order to replace it by a new theory. As a theory it is just as bad as the old ones, it is even much worse. “If something non-relative,” says Nāgārjuna,\(^2\) “did really exist, we would then likewise admit the existence of the relative, but there is absolutely nothing non-relative; how then can we admit the existence of the relative (or the truth of Relativity).” “Relativity”, explains Candrakīrti, “is here the common characteristic of all the elements (dharmas) of existence. That is our view. But since there is no element which would be non-relative, Relativity itself, for want of these objects with which it could be contrasted, (becomes as inane as a mirage), as a garland of flowers in the sky.” Does this mean that Relativity should be rejected? No, “because the Buddhas have taught that to realise the relativity of all

\(^1\) I find the question whether Relativity is itself relative mentioned by B Russell. \((A B C \ of \ Relativity, \ p \ 14)\) and declined with the remark that it is absurd. Nevertheless the question exists and cannot be dismissed on such grounds, the more so by an author from whom we learn that “whosoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities.” \((Problems \ of \ Philosophy, \ London \ 1921, \ p. \ 31)\)

\(^2\) Ibid. \ XIII 7
artificial conceptions is the only way to get rid of them. But if people then begin to cling to this very concept of Relativity, they must be called irreclaimable."¹ "It is," explains Candrakīrti² "as if somebody said, "I have nothing to sell you"", and would receive the answer, "All right, just sell me this your absence of goods for sale."

We read in the Ratnakīta,³ "I declare those are rotten, and many times rotten who having conceived relativity, cling to it (as a new theory). It is much better to cling to the false idea of a really existing personality (puñgala), notwithstanding it is a blunder of Himalayan dimensions, than to cling to this doctrine of relativity which (in this case would be) a doctrine of the void (abhūva)... It is as if a doctor⁴ administered a powerful remedy which would remove all the ailments of the patient, but could not afterwards be expelled from the abdomen. Do you think that the patient would be really cured? No, he would suffer even much more than he did suffer before."

The characterisation of reality as Relativity is resorted to in extremis for want of any other expedient. It is a verbal characterisation, it takes into account the necessities of speech (śabdam upādāya prajñaptih)⁵. The Sautrāntika made use of the conception of a nominal entity (prajñaptisat), as has been mentioned above,

¹ Ibid XIII 8
² Ibid p 247 6
³ Ibid p. 248 7
⁴ Ibid p 248 11
⁵ Ibid XXIV 18, XXII 11, p 215. 1,2 86. 1
when combating the artificial constructions of early Buddhism. This conception was extended by the Mahāyānists so as to cover all elements without exception. Sense data, consciousness, feeling, volitions were declared by the Sautrāntika as ultimate realities. But Nāgārjuna did not spare them. They became all relative and nominal, and relativity itself was but a nominal “middle path” of approaching reality. Middle path meant in early Buddhism steering between materialism (ucchēdaṇḍā) and the doctrine of an eternal soul (āsvatattā). Its positive content was the doctrine of separate elements (dharma). In Mahāyāna this term changes its meaning and becomes synonymous with Relativity (śūnyatā). Relativity is the middle path.

XIX. PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN BUDDHISM AND BRAHMANISM

That the evolution from Hinayāna to Mahāyāna ran parallel with the movement which in other Indian religions at the same epoch led to the establishing of their pantheons and their supreme deities of Śiva and Viṣṇu, is quite obvious. The Brāhmanical religions were likewise founded on a background of pantheism, on monism with the Śaivists, and a somewhat mitigated one with the Vaishnavites. Both tendencies represented old traditions based on explicit, though contradictory, utterances of the Upanisads. That the Mahāyāna is indebted to some Aryan influence is most

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1 Ibid XXIV 10. Therefore Mādhyaṃkāśāstra must be translated “A Treatise on Relativity.”
probable. That Gaudapāda and Śankara have been, in their turn, influenced by the dialectic of Nāgārjuna can hardly be denied. But it is at present impossible to exact something definite about the strength of these influences, their time and their place. A Mahāyānistic tendency seems to have manifested itself very early in the Buddhist schools. Part of the community was not satisfied to see in Buddha an essentially human nature, and felt restive before the idea of his total disappearance in Nirvāṇa. Some centuries later this tendency reaches full conclusion and a great man, Nāgārjuna, gives lustre and popularity to a new church. Its philosophy made volte-face from pluralism to monism.

XIX. EUROPEAN PARALLELS

To assign to Nāgārjuna his place among the great philosophers of humanity is not so much the task of the Indianist, as of the general historian of philosophy. But until the texts are made accessible in translations, intelligible to him, we cannot expect him to guide us. The Indianist finds himself obliged tentatively to do it himself in comparing the ideas he comes across in India with what may be found similar in the vast field of European philosophy. In characterising the Indian philosopher as "nihilist", rationalist, pantheist or realist some comparison is already involved. If

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¹ The two translations by Prof. M. Walser, Die Mittlere Lehre, (Heidelberg 1911 and 1912) are extremely useful for the study of the texts, they would have been still more useful if comparative indices were added to them. But being literal we doubt they could convey any definite impression in the mind of a philosopher.
A. Barth, E. Senart and others have protested against premature and misleading comparisons, it is only because they were inclined to find between the Indian philosopher and his European associate more points of divergence than of similarity, but to find divergence means already to compare. To characterise Nāgārjuna as a "nihilist", means to make a misleading comparison, since his condemnation of logic is only one part, and not the principal one, of his philosophy. In order to understand a philosopher there is no better method than the one proposed and so brilliantly applied by H. Bergson, i.e. to dissect him in different parts which by themselves will not be the philosopher in question, but which summarised will help us to understand him.¹

Upon the Indian side we must first of all point to the almost absolute identity with Vedānta, as a probable consequence of his indebtedness to Aupanisada tradition. If Prof. A. B. Keith and Prof. M. Walleser suppose that Nāgārjuna stops at negation, or denies even the empirical reality of this world, it is only because his real aim, the positive counterpart of his negativism, the identity of dharmakāya and Brahma, has escaped their attention. It follows from this identity that all the points of contact which Prof. Deussen has really found, or imagined to have found, between Schopenhauer and Vedānta, will equally apply to Nāgārjuna. This philosophy was most decidedly opposed to rationalism, to those systems, modern or ancient, Indian or European, which asserted the capacity of human rea-

¹ De l' intuition philosophique de Metaph. 1911
son to cognise things as they really are. He even present this incapacity to the utmost and challenges the claims of logic with greater emphasis than any philosopher ever has done. Other remarkable parallelisms may be pointed out which refer to the step taken by Nāgārjuna from pluralism to monism. Whether the systems operated with the conception of an independent substance and assumed the existence of separate, though harmonising, monads, or assumed a perpetual stream of passing events, the next step is to imagine one all-embracing indivisible substance. Thus, as we have seen, is the position of Mahāyāna versus Hinayāna. It has been paralleled in Greece by the position of Parmenides versus Heracleitus. The step was repeated in modern German philosophy. Prof. H. Jacoby has already suggested\(^1\) a comparison between Zeno of Elea and Nāgārjuna. We may add that the similarity was not limited to their dialectic. Zeno, as is now known, devised the celebrated "sophisms" in order to prove the imposibility of motion, and in support of Parmenides' conception of the world as one motionless whole\(^2\).

Very remarkable are then the coincidences between Nāgārjuna's negativism and the condemnation by Mr. Bradley of almost every conception of the everyday world, things and qualities, relations, space and time, change, causation, motion, the self. From the Indian standpoint Bradley can be characterised as a genuine Mādhyamika. But above all these paralle-

\(^1\) A O J XXI 1, p. 1
\(^2\) Cf. Bertrand Russell External World, p. 167 ff
lasm we may perhaps find a still greater family likeness between the dialectical method of Hegel and Nāgārjuna’s dialectics Hegel in his Phenomenologie des Geistes\(^1\) challenged common sense to point out some object which is certainly known for what in our experience, it is, and solves the question by stating that all we really know of the object is its “thisness”, all its remaining content is relation. This is the exact meaning of the tathātā, or of “suchness”, of the Mahāyānist, and Relativity, as we have seen is the exact meaning of the term śūnyatā. We further see the full application of the method which maintains that we can truly define an object only by taking explicit account of other objects, with whom it is contrasted, that debarring this contrast the object becomes “devoid” of any content, and both the opposites coalesce in some higher unity which embraces them both. The facts are knowable only as interrelated and the universal law of Relativity is all that is properly meant by reality. Both philosophers assure us that negativity (śūnyatā) is the soul of the universe, “Negativität ist die Seele der Welt.” Reducing the world of fact to a realm of universal relativity this implies that every thing cognizable is false, transient and illusory, but that the constitution of the real world depends upon this very fact. Even sensations and sense data (rūpa)\(^2\) which first appeared as ultimate realities we then gradually discover to stand in relations without which they prove to be meaningless. Relativity, or negativity, is really the Soul of the universe.

\(^1\) For the English Phrasing of Hegel’s principles I am indebted to Baldwin’s dictionary.
\(^2\) Ibid IV 1
Some more points of similarity will be easily detected between Nāgārjuna and every monistic philosophy, the more so between him and those philosophers who, like Niccolaus Cusanus, G. Bruno and others, insist upon the negative method of cognising the Absolute. It will hardly be denied that the Mahāyānist conception of Buddha's cosmic body as the unique substance is very similar to Spinoza's conception of God as the only substance. *Deus sive substantia Deus sive natura*. Although Spinoza's *intuitus* of everything particular *sub specie aeternitatis* is supposed to be a rational capacity of the intellect and Nāgārjuna's intuition is mystic, nevertheless both lead to the same result.

These several points of similarity should, as a matter of course, be taken for what they are worth. For one thing, they might preclude the characteristic of a 'nihilist' to be applied to Nāgārjuna. The chief divergence between him and his European colleagues in monism is that he did not believe in logic, at least for the ultimate aim of cognising what reality in itself is. Hegel and Bradley seem to believe in the efficiency of their logic. It did not occur to them that their logic would sublate itself if applied to their own results. Nāgārjuna was fully aware of this fact. Therefore abandoning logic altogether he betook himself to direct mystic intuition of the Absolute the One-without-a-Second. This step, or jump, from a condemned logic to direct intuition, has been made by many philosophers and in our own days it has a very eloquent exponent in the person of M H Bergson.
XX. THE POSITION OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

The estrangement which befell many scholars at the idea of annihilation as the ultimate goal of a religion would perhaps never have been so strong if it had been known that Buddhism was by no means the only Indian system which had arrived at such conclusions. Besides a series of systems of a decidedly materialistic tinge, the orthodox Nyāya-Vaiśeśika system adhered to the conception of an absolutely lifeless Nirvāṇa. This annihilation of all life is here called final deliverance (mokṣa) or Absolute End (apavarga) and is characterized as a kind of “super bliss” (nīlīsreyasa). “Is it possible”, asks Vātsyāyana, “that an enlightened man should favour a final Release in which there is neither bliss nor consciousness”? And he should not favour the idea of a final Release where all turmoil of life is stopped for ever and where there is no consciousness about it,” “This release,” he says, “is tranquillity where everything is given up. everything has ceased to exist, and therefore a great deal of depression, horrors, and sin are extinct.” Jayanta exclaims likewise. “Is it possible that reasonable men should make efforts in order to reduce themselves to a stone-like (animate) condition?” and gives the same reply.

All Indian philosophical systems professed to be doctrines of salvation. They, therefore, start from the

1 Cf. S. N. Dasgupta’s History of Indian Philosophy p. 362 ff.
2 Nyāyasūtra 1, 1, 2 and 22.
3 Nyāyabhāṣya p 9 (Vīśvan)
4 Nyāyamañgali p 509 (Vīśvan)
conception of a whole (sarvam)\(^1\) which is then split into two halves, phenomenal life and the Absolute (samsāra and nirvāṇa) The phenomenal part is further divided into an analysis of its actual condition (duḥkha), its driving forces (duḥkha-samudaya) and their gradual extinction (mārga). When this extinction ‘nirṛṭha’ is reached, life merges into the Absolute about whose essence a variety of constructions exist These four topics, the four “noble truths” as the term has been very inadequately translated and represented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism, contain,—in reality, no doctrine at all\(^2\) It is only a scheme for

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\(^1\) That sarvam, in its technical sense, does not include nirvāṇa, as M de la Valée Poussin asserts, op cit p 139, is quite wrong. Sarvam means “sarvam jñeyam” which is but another name for the 12 āyatanas (corresponding to the 12 prameyas of Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.9 Nirvāṇa is included in āyatana No 12 ‘dhamma’ of My Central Conception appendix II, 106 p, the elements E 2-3 This is also clear from Śamyutta IV 15 where “sabba” is used in its technical sense, sabba-vaggo, sabbam vobhi ḫaśrayessaṁ “The passage in Majjhima I, 3 contains no statement about this topic at all The classification of the elements into 12 āyatanas and into 16 dhātus includes nirvāṇa, the one into skandhas (with classification) does not, op also Trundhā p 36, sarvam in tran-dhātulam asaśrayaṁ ca

\(^2\) This clearly appears from the fact that the ‘truths’ are explicitly admitted in the Sāmkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika systems and implicitly in all the others Within the pale of Buddhism they cover two opposite theories, the dharma = pudgala-nārāṭmya theory of the Hinayāna and the śūnyatā = dharma-nārāṭmya theory of Mahāyāna, cf above p 41 They are a classification of the elements in four stages as viewed by the Saut, the ārya, of Madh utti, p 127, āryānām eva tat satyam, and Ab Kosā,
philosophical constructions and is accepted as such by all Indian systems without exception. They cover indeed, the Indian conception of philosophy Uddyotakara says, “these are the four topics which are investigated by every philosopher in every system of metaphysics”. Accordingly every philosophical system must contain an analysis of the elements of life, a doctrine about its driving forces, a doctrine of the Absolute and a doctrine about the method to be followed in order to escape out of phenomenal life and become merged in the Absolute Phenomenal life receives in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the designation of duhkha, just as in Buddhism. It is very inadequate to translate this term by suffering, misery, pain etc., since it covers such items as inanimate matter, the five objects of sense, colours, sounds, tastes and tactile phenomena.

VI, 2 and the tables appended to my Central Conception The editors of the P.T.S Pali Dicet think that ārya has a “racial” meaning, ārya-pudgala would then mean, not the same as anāsavaśāsah or marga-satya, but something like “a noble gentleman”, but T W Rhys Davids rightly translates it “Arhat” in D N 1 37, of Dialogues I 51

1 Nyāyāvārttī, ed B I p 13 etām catvary arthapadām sarvāsādhyātmavādyāsa sarvācāryaṃ varṇyanta iti.

2 Vātsyāyana says that duhkha, means janna, (ad N S, I 1 22) and Vācaspāti explains, duhkhalabhākṣaarme sarve cārīdaya ucyante, and warns against confounding it with suffering, “mukhyam eva duḥkham iti bhramo mā bhūt, the same is pressed by Jayanta, na ca mukhyam eva duḥkham bādhānāsrabhayam avamasyate. Lat iti tataḥbhavam tu tataḥbhavam tu tataḥbhavam ca sarvam eva. Nyāyamaṇiyārya Vizian,” p 506 and Madhyavait, p 127 tha hi pāṇcopādāna-śāṅkhaḥduḥkham ity ucyate Exactly the same definition in
These are not the objects to which the term suffering can be safely applied in our language, if we are to escape confusion. Bliss itself is entered into the classification of existence (duḥkha) as one of its 21 items. And this is quite natural because there is no eternal bliss neither in early Buddhism nor in Nyāya-Vaisheshika, if the "super-bliss" of disappearing into an eternal senseless condition be excepted. The classification into 21 items is but a slight modification of the Buddhist classification into 16 component parts of existence (dhātu). One reason why this term has been chosen as a designation of phenomenal life is that philosophy seeks a way out of it. Philosophy is the science of the Absolute, of Nyāya. For every philosopher, all phenomenal life is something that must be shunned, it is heya. The analysis of existence into its elements, as has been stated above, is undertaken in order to determine the means by which all the forces of life must gradually, one after the other, be brought to a standstill.

It is likewise a general feature of all Indian systems that they assume the existence of a central force which

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Samyutta N., III, 47 It is a technical term, the equivalent of the first ārya-satya and of the sārava-dharmāh, "suffering" is duḥkhavedanā, a quite different thing, it has another place in the system under vedanā-sandhā of Ab. Kośa VI To confound them is a mistake just as to confound rūpa-āyatana with rūpa-sandhā (the latter includes 10 āyatanas, or the 3 dhātus, or the 6 indriyas with the 22 indriyas, or the 75 dharmas, etc. the 18 dhātus Of M. C Rhys David B Psych p 83

2 Another classification of every cognizable thing into 12 prameyas, of Nyāyasūtra, 1 1 9 corresponds, to a certain extent, to the Buddhist classification into 12 āyatanas
keeps life going in this world, nay in all the imaginable worlds. This general force (*karma*) is resolved into the special ones, termed illusion, desire and aversion. They produce germs of future actions and until they are neutralized by corresponding methods, they will always produce a continuation of life. Illusion is neutralised by philosophic insight, but the decisive and final step which stops empirical life for ever and transfers the individual into the Absolute is achieved by Yoga, i.e. by that mystical power which is produced by absorption in intense concentrated meditation. These conceptions represent a characteristic Indian habit of thought. We meet them everywhere. Their origin is certainly not to be sought for in the Yoga system of Patañjali which has been proved to be a very late production about 800 years later than the origin of Buddhism. Their most primitive and crude form appears in the Jaina system. The defiling elements of illusion, desire aversion etc. are here represented as a kind of subtle matter which through the pores of the skin flows into the body and fills it up like absorbed medicine or like a bag filled with sand.\(^1\) By taking vows, by ascetic and meditative practices, the entrance into the body is shut up, the inflow ceases, and the individual becomes purified. In all other systems this process is spiritualized, and instead of an “inflow” of defiling matter

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\(^1\) Cf. *Taittirāhādhyānasūtra*, VI. 2. ff, VIII 2 transl by H. Jacob Z.D.M.G. LX. Cf. also the detailed and very clear exposition of the complicated Jaina theory in H.V.Glassenapp, *Der Jaimismus* (Berlin 1923) p. 158 ff. The passions are imagined as a kind of tar by which the fluent matter is glued with the soul, ibid. VI. 5.
we have an “influence” (āsarve) of defiling psychical elements which is being stopped by insight and meditation. All elements of existence are in the Buddhist system, as mentioned above, divided in such that can be extinguished by philosophic knowledge, and such that can be extinguished by mystical absorption only. The first class includes wrong views, under which item the naïve realism of ordinary men is understood. Desire, passion and even the physical elements of matter can be extinguished for ever only by the force of absorption. Although the Nyāya-Vaścika system favours a naïvely realistic view of the universe, it has no other means of reaching Nīvara than the mystical power of Yoga. “The details about this matter,” says Vātsyāyana, “will be found in special yoga manuals.”

1 Samudaya-satyabr -heya-hetu) consists in Nyāya just as in Buddhism of avidyā-tyrnic, cf. Nyāyavārttikā, p. 4 13. It is specified that these elements are also included in duḥkha (i.e. in the upādānasandhas)—tad dhētas ca duḥkham ultam, ibid. Their respective antidotes (i.e. mārga) consist on both sides of praṇā and Saññādhi, Vats, Śūra, V. 17-13 Praṇā is characterised as dharma-pravīcaka (cf. Vatsyāyana ad VI 2 417 which corresponds to the Buddhist dharma-pravīcaya (Abh Kosa).

2 Nyāyabhasya ad IV 2 46 Although the prasāntīyāna is analogous to pratibhāsāntī-nrodha of the Buddhists, its procedure is different. By the unlimited mystic power of Yoga innumerable “magic bodies” mṛmāna-lāya, must be created at once, to stone in them for endless former deeds and thus to reach Final Extinction, Cf. Tātpratyabhāsa p. 6 This Prof A B Keith (Indian Logic and Atomism p 260) calls “vulgar thaumaturgy.” According to such phrasing Dr. H. Beck, who interprets even the knowledge of duḥkha-satyabr as a vision of ethereal bodies (Buddhismus 2 II p. 89 f.), would be called a magician. Usually these men are called mystics.
Any question about the efficiency of this method is answered by stating that the power of Yoga is unlimited. The Nyāyasūtras mention a characteristic objection from some sceptic mind. A man, says he, may be intensely absorbed in meditation, so as to forget everything which exists about him. He may retire into a lonely place, a forest, a cave, a sandy beach, and there practise meditation until every perception of the external world has ceased. Nevertheless when external phenomena of exceptional force, as e.g. a thunderstorm, overcame him, he will awake out of the most intense meditation. Why could not the same happen to him in the moment he is about to attain Final Release, if this is to be attained by such meditation? The objection is answered by pointing to the mystical power of trance which stops all energies of life for ever. After that no living bodies, no feeling and no cognitions can exist.

We thus see that an appeal to the mystical power of yoga is a common feature of many Indian philosophical systems. It is needed to fill up the place of the four main subjects which are another general feature of the Indian systems. The originality of each system lies in its Ontology, its theory of cognition, its conception of the Absolute, and the details of its construction of a path leading to final release. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system assumes a limited number of substances with their changing qualities. The soul of the individual is here represented as an eternal substance, it is ubiquitous and coterminus with space. Knowledge is produced in it by a special contact with an internal organ of physical nature.
When the body is removed from one place to another, feelings and ideas are produced in a new part of the same motionless substance by its occasional contact with the internal organ which follows the movement of the body. Soul is thus a semi-material ubiquitous substance similar to space and time which in this system are equally conceived as separate ubiquitous substances. This construction facilitates the transition out of phenomenal life with its feelings and cognitions into the Absolute, which is the Absolutely senseless and lifeless state of this very substance. By the power of absorption the internal organ is kept back from all contact with the soul and the senses. No consciousness is then produced, all life is annihilated but the substance of the soul reverts in Nirvāṇa to its original and natural condition (svarūpāvasthā). The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were at an early date engaged in a controversy with the Vedāntins about the condition of the liberated soul. The Vaiśeṣikas maintained that it was simply a cessation of all life, just as a cessation of fire when all fuel is exhausted.

1 Faddegon, Vaiśeṣika System, p 272-3 thinks the this Soul was imagined “as really moving.” This is quite impossible since it represents a unity and is omnipresent (vibhū, parama-mahat, ibid VII 1 22) Cf also Nyayabinduśāra ed B B p 65 mukhyācātma sarvasayāt

2 In his vindication of a substantial Soul Faddegon op. cit, apparently assumes that the Vaiśeṣikas imagined the soul as a conscious substance, just as the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntins did. But the consciousness (buddhi) is in that system only a guna of the ātman, it appears occasionally through a special contact. The soul in itself (svarūpāvasthāyām) has neither consciousness, nor feeling.
What is this internal bliss and what is this eternal consciousness, they ask, which constitute the essence of the eternal spiritual principle according to the Vedântins? Since all objects of knowledge have entirely disappeared for ever in Nirvâna, it is a joy without something to be enjoyed, and it is knowledge without knowing anything. Such feeling and such knowledge, even if they existed, would be as good as if they never existed at all (sthitopy asthitân na viśisyate). "But then," asks an objector, "your soul would be as lifeless as a stone." The Vaiśeṣika concedes the argument, although he seems to prefer, as a sort of image mediatrice, the comparison with space.

A question is next asked which gives expression to that feeling of estrangement which is so strong when we think of annihilation as an ultimate goal. "No wise men will ever strive to attain final deliverance (moksa-nirvâna) if, after all consciousness and life have been annihilated, it becomes similar to a piece of rock (śilā-sakala-kalpa) if it is indistinguishable from a stone (pāśāṇa-nirvânakâh), if it is inanimate.

Nyâyalandât, p. 286 (Vizian, cf Nyâyamañjarî, 510 1. 12–3.

Ibid. That the pure essence of a Soul, or of the substance that produces consciousness is itself as lifeless (jâda) as a stone seems to be here an extreme consequence drawn by the objector, the comparison with space as an ubiquitous substance, is more adequate.


Cf. Nyâyamañjarî, p 508 f and Nyâyataparyadhipika, p. 282 (ibid.) cp. Nassadhiya, XVI, 76 multaya yah śilâtvâya sûtra mune .... Gotamam...
(yāda)," "But says the author, wise men do not exert themselves for bliss alone. Experience shows that they also exert themselves to escape pain, as when they, e.g. "avoid being stung by thorns." Phenomenal life being here comparable to pain, the result is that the annihilation of it alone is the ultimate aim of man on earth. Thus ultimate annihilation, and thus lifeless substance receive the epithet of the place of Immortality (āmityu padam) the same epithet which final annihilation receives in early Buddhism. Its eternal unchanging character is thereby emphasized.

Nor was this analogy between the theories of the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas ignored by the latter. We find in the Nyāyamāyāyinī of Jayanta the following very characteristic deliverance "By nivāna and similar expressions the Buddhists mean the absolute end (apavarga) which is either (in Hinayāna) the annihilation of the flow of consciousness, or (in Mahāyāna) a flow of pure (objectless) consciousness. (The first) solution—annihilation—is even more pitiful than the condition to which soul is reduced in nivāna according to the Naiyāyikas, since it does not leave to the soul even a stonelike condition. But in one point we agree with the Buddhists, viz. that there is a difference between the essence of the soul by itself and the form in which it appears in its reciprocal action with other objects. A constant change of (this substantial)

1 Nyāyasāra p. 40

2 Nyāyabhāṣya pl 30 cf likewise p 31-34 where the controversy with Vedānta is already in full swing
soul (as maintained by the Buddhists) is "absolutely inconceivable; it must be rejected as impossible, just as (the converse theory of the Buddhist about the sound, viz. that) sound is a substance (sc. atóme)"

The Nivrāna of the old Nyāya-Vaśesika school is thus lifeless and similar to the Nivrāna of the Vaibhāsika-Buddhists. On the other hand, the Nivrāna of the Māhāyānists to which the Sastrāntikas adhered, has the same pantheistic character as the Nivrāna of the Vedāntins.

XX CONCLUSION

The probable theory of the Buddhist conception of the Absolute is, therefore, the following one.

1 In the VI century B.C. there was a great effervescence of philosophical thought among the non-brahmanical classes of India, and a way out of phenomenal life was ardently sought for, the majority of

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1 In later theistic Nyāya final deliverance is reached by the direct contemplation of God, and the condition of the liberated Soul is defined as blissful, cf. Nyāyasūtra, p. 40 and Nyāyatāt-paryādīpīka, p 293. Both the Vaśesika and the Nyāyānaka systems were originally atheistic, cf. H. Jacob, Die Gottheit des den Indern, (Bonn 1923) p. 37 ff. and Faddegon, op. cit. p 165 and 364. That the idea of an eternal God could not easily tally with the system is seen from the embarrassment to decide whether it should be classed as a muktātman or not. The question is solved, in agreement with Yogasūtra I 24 b, admitting that the quality of consonance, which is only accidental in Souls, becomes eternal in God, cf. Nyāyākanda, 58 (Vizian) and Nyāyavārttika p 469. Both theistic and atheistic Nyāyānaka existed at Śrīharsa's time, cf. Naisadhiya XVII 75 and 77.
the solutions having a materialistic tinge Buddha at that time proposed, or accepted, a system denying the existence of an eternal soul, and reducing phenomenal existence to a congeries of separate elements evolving gradually towards final extinction.

2 To this ideal of a lifeless Nirvāṇa and an extinct Buddha some schools remained alone faithful. A tendency to convert Buddha into a superhuman, eternally living principle manifested itself early among his followers and led to a schism.

3 This tendency gradually developed until in the I century A.D. it ended into the production of a luxuriant growth of a new canonical literature. It then adopted, probably borrowing from some Aupnishad school, the Brahmanical ideas of a pantheistic Absolute, of a spiritual and monistic character. After this Buddhistic adaptation of the Vedānta, Buddha was converted into a full blown Brahman and its personification worshipped under the names of a Cosmical Body (dharmakāya), Samantabhadra, Vairocana and others.

4 The philosophical doctrine of the old church stuck to the central conception of separate elements of matter, mind and forces, composed lists of them with a view to investigate the method of their gradual extinction in the Absolute.

5 Among the early schools the Mahāsāṃghikas, Vātsiputriyas and others already assumed a kind of consciousness surviving in Nirvāṇa.
6. They were followed by a school with critical tendencies, the Sautrāntikas, which cut down the list of artificially constructed elements, cut down Nirvāṇa itself as a separate entity and transferred the Absolute into the living world, thus constituting a transition to Mahāyāna.

7. The philosophy of the new religion is an adaptation of the Vedānta system. It forsook the pluralistic principle altogether and became emphatically monistic.

8. It then took a double course. It either assumed the existence of a store-consciousness of which all phenomenal life was but a manifestation. This school is the sequel of cultivated logic. The other school denied the possibility of cognising the Absolute by logical methods; it declared all plurality to be an illusion, and nothing short of the whole to be the reality directly cognised in mystic intuition.

9. The transitional school of the Sautrāntikas coalesced in the V century A.D. with the idealistic school of the Mahāyāna and produced India's greatest philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. With regard to Nirvāṇa, it assumed the existence of a pure spiritual principle, in which object and subject coalesced, and, along with it, a force of transcendental illusion (vāsanā) producing the phenomenal world.

10. Contemporaneously with this highest development of Buddhist philosophy, in the VII century A.D., the relativist school of early Mahāyāna received
a fresh impulse and a revival of popularity. This led to the formation of new hybrid schools.

11. The very high perfection to which the philosophy was brought by both the idealistic and relativistic schools of Buddhism could not but influence all philosophical systems of India, and we see in the next period the old Vedānta remodelled and equipped with fresh arguments by an adaptation to it of the methods elaborated in the Vijñānavāda and Śānyavāda schools of Buddhism.
APPENDIX

A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

By

NĀGĀRJUNA

CHAPTERS I AND XXV

(Translated)

A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

By

NĀGĀRJUNA

PREFATORY

Nāgārjuna is the author of three different works upon the Buddhist Theory of Relativity (śūnyatā). A fundamental (mūla), complete work, Mādhyamika-Śāstra, and two short summaries-Yukti-sastikā and Sūnyatā-saptati.

The complete work contains about 400 aphorisms divided into 27 chapters. The first chapter is devoted to a critique of the conception of Causality. It reduces our every-day conception of it and all realistic theories ad absurdum and thus indirectly establishes Monism (advaita). The rest of the work is filled with the application of this result to every separate item.
of the Hinayānist philosophical system. Nāgārjuna is also the author of two short tracts dealing with the method of negative dialectics adopted by him. One of them "The Refutation of contests" "vigrahavyāvartani" is very often quoted.

Whether he is the author of numerous other works which go under his name, and whether he is the same personality as the Celebrated metallurgist, chemist and alchemist Nāgārjuna is very doubtful. His

1 The following is the list of subjects treated, ch I on Causality, II on Motion, III on the sense-faculties, (mdrya), IV on the elements of existence (skandha) V, on the component elements (dhātu) of an individual, VI on Passions (rāga), VII On momentariness (samskṛta=trulaksami) VIII on Agent and Action (Karma-kāraka), IX On the unreality of the preceding moment (pūrva), X On the relation of fire and fuel, XI on the Infinite (pūrvāparakotu), XII On the unreality of all the phenomenal world (duhkha=pañcopādānaskandha,) XIII On the unreality of all the forces (asmakāra) of life, XIV On the unreality of relations (samsarga), XV On the notion of Essentia (svabhāva), XVI On Bondage and Deliverance, XVII On Karma and its results, XVIII On the doctrine of a Soul (ātman), XIX On the notions of origin and end (sambhara-vibhāva), XX On time, XXI On the notion of a totality of causes (sāmagrī, XXII On the reality of Buddha, XXIII On logical incongruity (viparayāsa), XXIV on the "Four Truths", XXV On Nirvāṇa, XXVI On the Twelve Stages (ndāna) in the development of an individual life, XXVII on false dogma (drṣṭa).

2 There is an old tradition according to which the authentic works of Nāgārjuna are six, but there is no agreement about how this number is composed. Generally admitted are (1) Mūla-mādhyaṃka-Śāstra, also called Prajñā-mūla, 8 celebrated men have commented upon it, Nāgārjuna himself, Buddhāpātha, Bhavya, Candrakīrti, Devasārma, Gunaśri, Gunamati
pupil and successor Āryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, has composed an independent treatise about the same subject, also in 400 aphorisms. But following another, more systematic arrangement.

About the date of both these authors there is till now no absolute certainty, but the II century A.D. is generally accepted as most probable. Although both were born in the South, the scene of their activity is Northern India, during the best time of Kushan empire.

and Sthūramati, (2) Yukta-saṣṭikā, a very condensed statement of the theory, its composition, Wassiljeff thinks, possibly preceded the composition of the main work, (3) Śūnyatā-saptati a short poem on Relativity with the author's own comment, (4) Vigrha-vyāvartani, also with comment, a work on logic already mentioning the four pramāṇas of the Nāryāyikas, (5) Vaidalyasūtra and prakarana, self defence of Nāgārjuna against the charge of perverting logic. The sixth is according to Bu-ston a work which is not translated Tha-snad-grub-na, "A vindication of empirical Reality." However others reckon, instead of it, Akutobhaya, a comment upon the mūla-kārikās. But Wassiljeff remarks (in his "Review of the Mādhyamika literature" Mss museu As Petrop.) that "the authenticity of this work was doubted even by the credulous Tibetans" Candrakīrti evidently held that Nāgārjuna did not write any comment upon the mūla-kārikās, cf. text, p 23-6, but Avalokiteśvara, commenting upon Prajñā-pradipa calls it rān-hgrel. Besides these works the Besan-hgyur contains (1) Mahāyāna-vimākā, in 20 verses, (2) Akṣara-sātaka in 3 lines and (3) Pratikṣya-samutpāda-hṛdaya, in 5 lines, renewed attempts to express with utmost shortness the main conception of a monistic (akṣyam) motionless Universe. They probably are spurious.
After that, there was a break in the development of the Mādhyamika philosophy. During two centuries we hear of no prominent personalities and no works dealing with it. It seems as though it were partly fallen into oblivion. It is impossible otherwise to explain the total silence of Buddhaghosa about it.

During the next period, the golden age of Indian civilization, the age of the Gupta empire in Northern India, the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu appear in the V century as the champions of a somewhat modified Monism which receives in their hands an idealistic interpretation.

The scene of the development of the Mādhyamika philosophy after that shifts to the South. We witness there in the VI century AD a powerful revival of the genuine, uncompromising Relativism of Nāgārjuna. Contemporaneously with the pupils of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati and Dignāga, two very celebrated men, who were working, the one of Vallabhi in Surat, the other mainly in Orissa, two equally celebrated champions of the Mādhyamika system, the Masters (ācārya) Buddhapālita and Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka,¹ appear in the South. The Mahāyāna Monism becomes now definitely split into the idealistic school in the North—the Yogācāras, and the relativistic one in the South. The latter is again divided into the followers of Buddhapālita and the followers of Bhavya.

The condemnation of all logic for the cognition of the Absolute was final in the first of these schools.

¹ Perhaps Bhavyaviveka = legs-'ldan-hbyed
it admitted no bonafide argument at all, but undertook it only to show hopeless inconsistency in whatever logical argument would be produced by its opponents. This school received the name of Mādhyaṃka-Praśaṅgika. The other school the followers of Bhavya thought it necessary to supplement the short rules of Nāgārjuna by independent (svatāntara) arguments constructed in accordance with the rules of logic. This school received the name of Mādhyaṃka-Svātāntrika. Bhavya is a very subtle logician. He perhaps, more than any other one deserves to be compared with Zeno of Elea. Some of his baffling sophisms made his name celebrated in the Buddhist world. His school had success and was more numerous than the school of Buddhapālita in the beginning. But in the VII century A.D. the Master Candrakīrti appears as a mighty champion of the purely negative method of establishing Monism. He succeeds in driving Bhāvaviveka's school into the shade and finally settles that form of the Mādhyaṃka System which is now studied in all monastic schools of Tibet Mongolian where it is considered to represent the true philosophical basis of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

We can thus establish the following periods in the development of the philosophy of the Mahāyāna

(1) I century A.D. the rise of Mahāyāna, Ālayavijñāna and tathatā both admitted by Āśvaghoṣa.

(2) II century, the theory of Universal Relativity (śānyatā) formulated by Nāgarjuna and Āryadeva.

(3) III and IV centuries a gap.
(4) V century, the idealistic interpretation of Asanga and Vasubandhu.

(5) VI century, a split between the idealistic and relativistic schools, Sthiramāta and Dignāga as representing the first, Buddhāpūlita and Bhāvaviveka the second.

(6) VII century, final establishment of the Mādhyamika system in its extreme form by Candrakīrti.

We now give the translation of the first chapter of the treatise of Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti’s comment. All the protagonists of the development just sketched together with some representatives of the brahmānical systems will be here seen at work. From the rest of the work the chapter about Nirvāṇa has been chosen as an illustration of the method which is in turn applied to every philosophic conception.

In our translation we have endeavoured to avoid, as far as possible literal renderings when they convey no clear meaning, in order to escape what M. A. Barth has called “traductions infidèles a force d’êtres littéraux” Sanskrit scientific works are not supposed to be read, but to be studied, their style is laconic and their technical terms suggestive of a wide connotation. Their translation, in order to be compre-

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Footnote 1: Candrakīrti has given to his comment the title of “The Clear-worded” (prasanna-pada) probably not without some dose of irony, since, as prof Wassuoff attests, its extreme dialectical subtlety, especially in the first chapter, is equalled by no other work in the whole domain of northern Buddhist literature.
hensible should be, to a certain extent, an explanation. The literal rendering, when, needed is given in a footnote. The sanskrit text has been edited by M.de la Vallee Poussin in the Bibliotheca Buddhica. The division into small sections has been introduced by the translator in order to facilitate a vue d'ensemble.
A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

DEDICATION

The Perfect Buddha,
The foremost of all Teachers I salute.
He has proclaimed
The principle of Universal Relativity,
'Tis like blissful (Nirvāṇa),
Quiescence of Plurality —
There is nothing disappears,
Nor anything appears,
Nothing has an end,
Nor is there anything eternal,
Nothing is identical with itself,
Nor is their anything differentiated,
Nothing moves,
Neither hither nor thither.
CHAPTER FIRST.

EXAMINATION OF CAUSALITY.

I.

There absolutely are no things,
Nowhere and none, that arise (anew),
Neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self,
Nor out of both, nor at random.

II

Four can be the conditions
(Of everything produced).
Its cause, its object, its foregoing moment,
Its most decisive factor

III

In these conditions we can find
No self-existence of the entities.
Where the self-existence is deficient,
Relational existence also lacks.

IV

No energies in causes,
Nor energies outside them
No causes without energies,
Nor causes that possess them.

V.

Let those facts be causes
With which coordinated other facts arise,
Non-causes will they be,
So far the other facts have not arisen.
Neither non-Ens nor Ens
Can have a cause.
If non-Ens, whose the cause?
If Ens, whatfore the cause?

Neither an Ens nor a non-Ens,
Nor any Ens-non Ens
No element is really turned out.
How can we then assume
The possibility of a producing cause?

A mental Ens is reckoned as an element,
Separately from its objective (counterpart)
Now, if it (begins) by having no objective-
counterpart.
How can it get one afterwards?

If (separate) elements do not exist,
Nor is it possible for them to disappear.
The moment which immediately precedes
Is thus impossible. And if it is gone,
How can it be a cause?

If entities are relative,
They have no real existence
The (formula) "this being, that appears"
Then loses every meaning
XI.

Neither in any of the single causes
Nor in all of them together
Does the (supposed) result reside.
How can you out of them extract
What in them never did exist?

XII.

Supposing from these causes does appear
What never did exist in them,
Out of non-causes then
Why does not appear?

XIII.

The result is cause-possessor,
But causes are not even self-possessors
How can result be cause-possessor,
If of non-self-possessors it be a result?

XIV.

There is, therefore, no cause-possessor,
Nor is there an effect without a cause.
If altogether no effect arises,
(How can we then distinguish)
Between the causes and non-causes?

Finished the Examination of Causality, the first chapter of the Treatise on Relativity.
CHAPTER XXV

EXAMINATION OF NIRVĀṇA.

I

If everything is relative,
No (real) origination, no (real) annihilation,
How is Nirvāṇa, then conceived?  
Through what deliverance, through what annihilation!

II.

Should everything be real in substance,
No (new) creation, no (new) destruction,
How should Nirvāṇa then be reached?
Through what deliverance, through what annihilation?

III

What neither is released, nor is it ever reached,
What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternity,
What never disappears, nor has it been created,
This is Nirvāṇa. It escapes precision.

IV.

Nirvāṇa, first of all, is not a kind of Ens,
It would then have decay and death,
There altogether is no Ens.
Which is not subject to decay and death.

V.

If Nirvāṇa is Ens,
It is produced by causes.
Nowhere and none the entity exists
Which would not be produced by causes.

VI.

If Nirvāṇa is Ens,
How can it lack substratum,
There whatsoever is no Ens
Without any substratum.

VII.

If Nirvāṇa is not an Ens,
Will it be then a non-Ens?
Wherever there is found no Ens,
There is neither a (corresponding) non-Ens.

VIII.

Now, if Nirvāṇa is a non-Ens,
How can it then be independent?
For sure, an independent non-Ens
Is nowhere to be found

IX.

Coordinated here or caused are (separate) things,
We call this world Phenomenal;
But just the same is called Nirvāṇa,
When from causality abstracted.

X.

The Buddha has declared
That Ens and non-Ens should both be rejected.
Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens
Nirvāṇa therefore is conceived.
XI.
If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens, Final Dehverance would be also both, Reality and unreality together, This never could be possible.

XII.
If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens, Nirvāṇa could not be uncaused. Indeed the Ens and the non-Ens Are both dependent on causation..

XIII
How can Nirvāṇa represent An Ens and a non-Ens together? Nirvāṇa is indeed uncaused, Both Ens and non-Ens are productions.

XIV.
How can Nirvāṇa represent (The place of Ens and non-Ens together—As light and darkness m one spot) They cannot be simultaneously present.

XV
If it were clear, indeed, What an Ens means, and what a non-Ens. We could then understand the doctrine. About Nirvāṇa being neither Ens nor non-Ens.

XVI
If Nirvāṇa is neither Ens nor non-Ens, No one can really understand
This doctrine which proclaims at once
Negation of them both together.

XVII.
What is the Buddha after Nirvāṇa?
Does he exist or does he not exist,
Or both, or neither?
We never will conceive it.

XVIII.
What is the Buddha then at life time?
Does he exist, or does he not exist,
Or both, or neither?
We never will conceive it.

XIX.
There is no difference at all
Between Nirvāṇa and Saṁsāra,
There is no difference at all
Between Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa.

XX.
What makes the limit of Nirvāṇa
Is also then the limit of Saṁsāra.
Between the two we cannot find
The slightest shade of difference.

XXI.
(Insoluble are antinomic) views
Regarding what exists beyond Nirvāṇa,
Regarding what the end of this world is,
Regarding its beginning.
XXII.
Since everything is relative (we do not know),
What is finite and what is infinite,
What means finite and infinite at once,
What means negation of both issues?

XXIII
What is identity, and what is difference?
What is eternity what non-eternity,
What means eternity and non-eternity together,
What means negation of both issues?

XXIV
The bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,
In the quiescence of Plurality.
No (separate) Reality was preached at all,
Nowhere and none by Buddha

Finished the Examination of Nirvāṇa, the twenty-fifth
Chapter of the Treatise on Relativity
THE CLEARWORDED

A Comment Upon

NĀGĀRJUNA'S TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

by

CANDRAKĪRTI

THE CLEARWORDED

DEDICATION

To that Nāgārjuna I bow who has done away all recourse to the abode of Duality.¹

Who has emerged out of the ocean-like (all-embracing) Spirit of the Supreme Buddha.²

¹ The method of adopting a middle course (madhyamā pratīpada) between the two opposite extremes from which the Mādhyamika school has received its name is differently applied in Hinayāna e.g., S N. III 135. It is there a term designating the central conception of Hinayāna, a middle course between “everything exists and nothing exists,” meaning that a limited catalogue of ultimate elements (dharma) exists in interdependence (pratītya samutpāda). In mahāyāna, it is synonymous with the central conception of the Mādhyamikas and means there the idea of Relativity of Negativity (madhyamā pratīpada-sūnyata-pratītya-samutpāda) op. XXIV 19. The first terms are declared by Candrakīrti p. 604 13 to be viśesa-samyānas i.e., different manners of expressing the same idea, anta-dvaya-rahitatva-sarvasvabhāvānupatī-pratītya-samutpāda-sūnyā-sūnyatā-upādāya-prajñāpti-madhyamā pratīpada. As usual the first word of the work is significant. It refers to its main idea. The translation of mādhyamika-śāstra as The Doctrine of the Middle Path (Die Mittlere Lehre) is ambiguous since there are different middle paths.

² Sambuddha-dhi-sāgāra refers evidently to the doctrine of dharmakāya.
Who mercifully has explained the deeper meaning of the treasury\(^1\) of the religion, according to his own conceptions of it. \(1.4.\)

Whose philosophic fire consumes even now the fuel of opposed systems and burns down the darkness in the heart of simple mankind. \(1.5.\)

Whose words, containing incomparable knowledge, (like) a host of arrows, completely destroy the army of our foes (and deliver us from the bonds of phenomenal) existence. \(2.1.\)

Whose words assume the majesty of rule over the denizens of all the three spheres of existence\(^3\), the Buddhist converts and the gods. \(2.2.\)

Having made my salutation to that Nāgārjuna, I am proposing to write an explanation of his aphorism in clear sentences containing the right explanation unobscured by the fires of dialectics.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Read kōśasya with the Thā
\(^2\) i.e.—the world of carnal desire (kāma-dhātu), the heavens of ethereal beings (rūpa-dhātu) and the heavens of pure spirits (arūpa-dhātu).
\(^3\) This is a jëar at Bhāvaviveka who below p. 31. is called a champion of logic (tārāka) It does not mean that dialectical subtleties will be avoided, but that all arguments will be indirect. The word tarkānala evidently alludes to Tarkāvyāla the title of Bhāvaviveka’s work
CHAPTER FIRST

EXAMINATION OF CAUSALITY

I. PRELIMINARY

The treatise which will be here expounded is that which begins with the statement "there is neither a causa materialis, nor a causa efficiens, nor are the things of the Universe a product of the combination of both these causes". The question now arises how does this doctrine affect (us), what is its subject matter and what its aim. The connection of the treatise with us is the following one. (In a previous work), "Introduction to the Mādhyamika System", we have elicited that in order to attain the supreme knowledge of a Buddha, the first step to be taken is an initial vow of devoting oneself to the Final Deliverance of all living creatures, (this vow harmonising with a monistic view of the Universe, and inspired by a

1 Lāṭ, p. 25. "not from self, not from other, not from both". op. mfra, p 93

2 'Sambandha' discussed at the beginning of every scientific work means usually its relation to the subject matter, Nyāya-bāndu, p 215 (B.B) Here it refers to the importance of the work for the Salvation of mankind

3 Mādhyamika-avatāra The Tib transl ed by de la Vallee Poussin in B.B IX and partly translated in the Mus on 1907 1910 and 1911
feeling of Great Commiseration.) Our revered Master Nāgārjuna was himself wholly equipped with the (true) unflinching method of (our monistic system revealed in the predication about) the "Climax of Wisdom"2, and he graciously has condescended to lay it down in a treatise for the enlightenment of others.

(Indeed a philosophic treatise should contain a doctrine of Salvation, it then "rules and it saves") "It rules over all our enemies, our passions It saves us from the misery and from phenomenal existence (altogether). Those two advantages are not to be found in other philosophic doctrines".

(Therefore the teaching of Nāgārjuna should appeal to every one)

(What is the subject matter)

The master himself (discloses it in his initial prayer). He hints at the idea which will be developed during the whole treatise and at its aim. He tries to impress upon us that it will be a grand and fundamental treatise,3 because it will present this idea in a

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1 The Mahāyānist Great Commiseration (mahākarunā) differs from the Hinayānic one, it agrees with monism. This means that the Mahāyānist strives for the weal of all living beings, op Suzuki, Mahāyāna p 292 ff Madhy. av p 69 ff. The Tibetans make a distinction between the Mahāyānist conception thugs-ye-chen-po and the Hinayānic one, sum-ye-chen-po in Sanskrit the same word in used
2 prajñā-pāramitā, one of its synonyms is śūnyatā.
3 māhātmyam sa śāstrasya. The ideal scientific work for India is the Grammar of Panini with the Mahābhāṣya of Patanjali. A māhaśāstra is a śāstra, possessing māhātmya i.e. treating the subject with the thoroughness exhibited by both these authors in their great work
thorough\(^1\) and unflinching manner. Since this central idea of the whole treatise cannot be separated from the Mahāyānist’s conception of a Buddha,\(^2\) Nāgārjuna in making his initial salutation to him, the Supreme Teacher, alludes to the cause that induced him to compose this treatise and says:—

(Buddha has proclaimed) the monistic Principle of Relativity\(^3\), the principle that nothing in the Universe can disappear, nor can anything new arise, nothing has an end, nor is there anything differentiated in itself, there is no motion, neither towards us, nor from us, etc. etc. everything is relative.

The subject matter the central idea of the treatise is the monistic principle of Relativity characterised by these eight negative characteristics, nothing disappears, etc. The aim of the treatise is indicated in the same salutation. It is Final Deliverance, Nirvāṇa, which is characterised as the bliss of Quiescence of every Plurality\(^4\).

The salutation itself is expressed by the words “I praise this highest of all Teachers”.

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1 sam-prakāśana-samyak prakāśana.
2 Buddha’s Cosmical Body dharma-kāya, is the unique transcendental essence of the Universe and it is synonymous with śūnyatā, cp de la V. P. the three Bodies, J.R A S. p. 952.
3 pratītya-samutpāda-śūnyatā-advayatva-rahitavā.
4 On Mahāyānistic Nirvāṇa see above and Suzuki, op. cit p 339. ff. m S Sahayer, Die Mahāyānistischen Erloshungslehren (Munchen 1921)
This is first of all, the general meaning of the first two stanzas. We are now going on to give in detail the meaning of every word.

"To disappear" means to be evanescent. The split (of all existence into discrete) point-instants is here meant.

(Nothing new can arise), to "arise" means cutting off the stream of (consecutive point-instants)\(^1\)

"Eternal" means perpetual, existing, through all times.

(Non-identical) Being indentical means not being separate, not being discrete.

(Non-differentiated) Differentiated means being different, i.e. discrete.

"Motion hither", means the motion of distant objects into a near remote place.

II. THE MEANING OF PRATITYA SAMUTPĀDA ACCORDING TO THE AUTHOR

The first part of the term consists of the gerund of the root 'i' and the preposition 'prati'. The root 'i' means motion, the preposition 'prati' means 'reaching'. But the preposition (when added to a verbal root) modifies its meaning. It has been said that "the meaning of the verbal root is changed by the preposition as if it were violently dragged into another place just as the sweet waters of the Ganges (change their savour when reaching) the waters of the ocean". Therefore the word pratitya, being a gerund, means

\(^1\) prabandha-ksana-santāna
"reaching" in the sense of being dependent (or relative). The word samutpāda means appearance, manifestation. It comes from the verbal root 'pad' which with the preposition 'samut' has this meaning. Thus the term pratītya-samutpāda (in our system) conveys the idea of a manifestation of (separate) entities as relative to their causes and conditions\(^1\).

III. THE MEANING OF THIS TERM IN HĪNAYĀNA.

Others, (Śrīlābha and other Hīnayānists),\(^2\) maintain that pratītya-samutpāda means (appearance and immediate) disappearance of everything. The verb 'i' means to go, to disappear; 'itya' is the participle, meaning "fit to disappear." The preposition 'prati' generalises. 'Pratītya' is thus (not a gerund), but a derivative noun (meaning that everything is moment-

\(^1\) hetu-pratyaya-apekṣa.

\(^2\) In the sūtras of the Hīnayāna the term applied to the doctrine about the twelve consecutive degrees in the development of an individual life (sc. of the skandhas), from prenatal forces saṁskāra up to the continuation of life, after death (jāta) But this, according to the 'abhidharma', is only a special case of the general law of inter-dependence as a synonym of all saṁskṛt-dharma, op. my Central Conception p 28. The formula of this inter-dependence "thus being, that becomes, from this arises that" has then been criticised, because the generalized formula, since it refers to all elements, to those also that exist simultaneously, the meaning of a consecution will not be quite correct. Therefore Śrīlābha proposed his interpretation, according to which the first part of the term is a participle, not a gerund and does not imply consecution, but simultaneity and evanescence. Op. Ab. Kośa-bhāṣya, and III 28 In this treatise pratītya-samutpāda is treated in the first chapter, the 13 mudānas quite separately in the 26th.
The evanescent momentary things appear—that is their explanation.

IV. THE HĪNAYĀNIST INTERPRETATION REJECTED

This interpretation fits very well such passages of the Scripture as the following one, "O Brethren, I will teach you the Dependent Origination (of everything). Those who will get an insight into it, will have grasped the teaching of the Buddha, etc." The sense of generalisation and the suggested grammatical composition of the term can be accounted for. But in other passages there is altogether no generalisation, because a single particular case is directly referred to e.g., in the following words, "visual consciousness appears when co-ordinated with the faculty of vision and a patch of colour". In this expression "in co-ordination with the faculty of vision" the word "in co-ordination" takes into account the one single flash of consciousness, produced also from one single moment of the faculty of vision. There is no generalisation.

But the interpretation which we propose applies in both cases. The meaning of relativity applies when the word 'pratītya' does not refer to a single case. It then means relative existence in general, origination relatively to something else. It also can be applied when a particular single occasion is referred to, for in that case we interpret it as meaning "with reference

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1 This is the same criticism which is already mentioned by Vasubandhu, op cit ad III 29

2 eka-vijñānopatti
to the faculty of vision, in co-ordination with this faculty, having regard for this faculty,—visual consciousness appears”.

If we take the word ‘itya’ as a derivative adjective, then the above sentence “visual consciousness arises in co-ordination with the faculty of vision and some colours” will altogether change its meaning. This word, if not a gerund and when not the first part of a compound, must appear in its reflected form (pratītyam). The meaning of the sentence would then be the following one, “all visual consciousness is evanescent (pratītyam) in regard to the faculty of vision and the colours”. This is impossible, therefore it must be taken as a gerund and indeclinable. We will then get for the whole term the meaning of dependent origination, or relative, unreal existence.

V. THE OPINION OF BHĀVAVIVEKA

Now, another author, Bhāvaviveka, dealing with this topic begins by quoting opposed opinions and then goes on to refute them. He quotes in the following way “One party The Mahāyānist Buddhāpālita, explains the term ‘pratītya-samutpāda’ as meaning “manifestation, dependent on every cause”, or relative existence”. They assume that the preposition ‘prati’ has a generalising sense, the verbal root ‘i’ the sense of relativity, the word samutpāda the sense of existence or origination. Another party the Hinayānist Śrīlābha, maintains that pratītya-samutpāda’ means ‘the appearance of all immediately disappearing things”.

1 pratītya-samutpādaya pratītyasya (ksamikasya) samutpādayah.
2 Lit “eye-evanescent sensation and colours”.
First of all, we notice here a remarkable incapacity of quoting foreign opinions with anything like precision. How is that? Because that party which interprets the word ‘pratītya’ as indicating relativity, does not give to the preposition ‘pratī’ a generalising sense, nor does it give to the verb ‘i’ by itself, the meaning of being relative. It on the contrary explains the preposition ‘pratī’ as meaning relativity, and then takes the whole composite word ‘pratītya’ as meaning like wise relativity.\(^3\)

Now, if we take pratītya-samutpāda as meaning “relative existence” then it will cover both cases, where the generalised meaning is wanted and where a single case is meant. When it takes into account all possible things then the generalised meaning is applied in the following way, “in every case, dependent upon a corresponding complex of causes and conditions, something exists, i.e. it arises, in coordination with them”,\(^3\) But when a single thing is referred to, then

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1. See p 7 6-3 1 “But one who quotes the explanation of others thus, since the preposition means generalisation, it means ‘reaching’ and the word samutpāda means ‘becoming’, with reference to such and such cause reaching, becoming, thus one party, in every case origination of evanescent things is pratītya-samutpāda, thus the other party”

2. But they never have given to the root the meaning of prāpti as imputed p 7-6

3. This is also mentioned by Vasubandhu loco cit and Yaśomitra, as the interpretation of Śrīlābha. The interpretation pratītya-prāpya is also criticised in the Ab. Kośād ad III 20, but on different grounds. It is supposed to suggest a consecution of elements, and to leave out of account the interdependence of simultaneously existing elements
there is no need for applying the generalising meaning, we then understand it to mean that, e.g. some visual consciousness has arisen. in co-ordination with some momentary flash of the faculty of vision and some colour. But the Master Bhāvaviveka maintaining that we assume generalisation in all cases has betrayed his incompetence to quote the opinion which he combats.

VI. BHĀVAVIVEKA'S CRITICISM OF BUDDHAPĀLITA'S COMMENT

The following criticism of our definition by Bhāvaviveka is likewise unfounded. He thinks that our interpretation of the sentence “visual consciousness arises when co-ordinated with the sense of vision and some colour” is wrong, because we have expressed this inter-dependence by the word “reaching”, prati-tya-prāpya, one thing springs up when “reaching” the other. “There are here (says he) no two things ‘reaching one another’. We cannot understand this criticism. What is the reason adduced? He says that if one thing is not attained, not “reached”, how is the other to originate? There is no argument. It is mere begging the question.¹ But perhaps his real

¹ Lit. p. 9 10 9 1 “And this is wrong on the part of Bhāvaviveka. He says and moreover it is not right to maintain the relation to in reaching the eye and the colours, visual sensation arises, because two things (reaching one another are here) impossible.” Just as the immoralised fault is nonsense why? Because how is it that one thing will arise when the other is not attained, not reached? these words of Bh are a bare postulate without any argument.” On p 9 I read with the Mas Katham anava (ga) to prāpya sambhavah, and on p. 8 preferably stacoyuktam.
argument is the following one. Consciousness being-mental and the sense of vision physical, the first cannot be reached by the second. Experience teaches that only material things can be reached by the sense of vision. But this is a trivial objection. The term reaching is used in Scripture when the attaining of spiritual aims is in question, e.g., "this recluse has reached the goal". Others reject the criticism upon the score that reaching is synonymous with being dependent. Our common Master Nāgārjuna has himself used it in this sense (in his Yuktisāstikā) "if something springs up after having reached this or that, (i.e., if something is dependent upon this and that), it is not really produced by those conditions".

VII. THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM BY BHĀVAVIVEKA

As to the opinion pleaded by Bhāvaviveka himself, it is also not quite correct. Indeed he gives the term pratītya-samutpāda the meaning of "of being relative to something else" in the sense of a disjunctive judgement, "if this is, that appears," "because this has appeared, that will appear." Although the word "dependent origination" consists of two words, it is not right to suppose that each refers to a different object. The

1 Bhāvaviveka here partly returns to the interpretation already contained in the Hinayānasūtras (e.g., M. N. III 63), but of course its meaning is quite changed. Formerly it referred to real elements (dharmas), now it means śūnyatā, or unreal dharmas—

2 The difficulty arising from the interpretation of the term as involving a disjunctive sentence is also mentioned by Vasubandhu, op. cit. ad III 28.
parts are only mentioned with a view to etymological explanation.

Bhāvaviveka further says, “pratītya-samutpāda” is thus named without any regard to its being composed of two words, we can take it as a conventional expression for Relativity just as the expression “the forest ornament” is used to designate something utterly useless, without any connection either with forest or with ornament”.

This also misses the mark, since our Master admits the term to have a meaning which harmonises with the meaning of its parts. Indeed he says, “whatsoever appears as relative to this and that is not really existent”.

At last Bhāvaviveka explains the term to mean (mere Relativity), “this being, that becomes, e.g. as far as there is something short, there is also something long”. Does he not admit exactly (not independently, but) as far as it is coordinated to the short, as relative to the short, as dependent upon the short. Thus Bhāvaviveka rejects with one hand what he accepts with the other. This is not right, but we will not insist upon this point.

VIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY THE LAW OF ALL PLURALISTIC EXISTENCE

Thus it is that Buddha wished to put in a strong light¹ (the principle of Relativity), i.e. the fact that entities are produced only in the sense of being co-or-

¹ paridipayata-parito dipayata.
ominated 1 He, therefore, maintains that nothing is produced at random, neither from a unique cause, nor from a variety of causes; he denies that they are identical with their causes, that they are different from them, or that they are both (partly identical and partly non-identical) By this negative method he discloses the true relative character of all the relative entities of everyday life. 2 This is the relative existence or dependent origination, because nothing really new is produced. From the transcendentalist's point of view, it is a condition where nothing disappears, nor something new appears etc, and in which there is no motion 3 It is a condition characterized by the eight

1 hetu-pratyaya-aveksa, pratiya-samutpada is here synonymous with sunyata-anta
2 svaya-rahitata-advanta, and although it is the contrary of samvrtta, it is here called samvrtah pratiya-samut-paddah meaning that pratiya-samutpammadva or advanta or sunyati is the real condition which is covered or hidden behind the phenomenal world; the samvrtta (It is a karmasodhana, i.e., samvyayate etid iti samvrtta, not a karana-sodhana, i.e., not samvyayate anema.)
3 The aya or aya-pudgala is the Buddhist Saint who has entered the path of Salvation, has become srota-appa, has reached insight (driti-marga) of reality as it reveals itself to the philosopher. In Hinayana, it is the man who has acquired the intellectual habit of seeing every where only separate, discrete, evanescent elements (dharmat-anatma). He has got rid of the impression of stability which the world produces upon the ordinary man.

In Mahayana, as is seen from this passage, it is the man who has acquired a monistic view of the Universe, he has cognized the pratiya-samutpada as sunyata-dharm-nairatmya From the phrasing of this and many other passages, it clearly appears that the Mahayanaistic Saint, the aya and the Bodhisatava,
above mentioned characteristics, nothing disappears etc.\textsuperscript{1} The whole of this treatise is intended by its author to prove that the condition of interdependence or the principle of Relativity does not allow for something in the Universe to disappear, nor for something new to appear.

The principle of Relativity being the central law of all existence can be characterised by an infinite number of finite characteristics,\textsuperscript{2} but only eight have possesses, in addition to his nornal achievement his Mahā-
vāśastic bodhi-uttā-utpāda, the practice of the pāramitās, the attainment of bhūmis and the Mahāyānistic Great Commis-
seration, as a foundation of all this, a monistic view of the Universe, secured by yogi-pratyaksa. It constitutes the omniscience,
sarvajñatā, of the Bodhisattva which together with the sarva-
ākāra-jaññatā of the Buddha is the main idea of the abhisamaya
or prajñapāramitā in Aryasanga’s interpretation. This
sarvajñatā is accordingly very different from our conception of Omiscience. We find a very interesting exposition of these
topics in Vasacaptmśrā’s Nyāyakanikā, the sarvajña-vāda
begins p. 110-16 (Reprint from the Pandit), the Buddhist
yogipratyaksa p. 147 ff the brahmanical yogabhūmata-sarvajña
p. its refutation sva-matena p. \textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{2}} ff \text{Nyāyaka}-abhumata-yogi-pratyaksa.

\textsuperscript{1} Int p. 10 12 11 2 “By this negation the concealed essence of the covered entities is disclosed as it exists. And now just this concealed pratitya-samutpāda is characterised by eight characteris-
tics, non disappearance etc. Since, as it has not been produced
in its own essence, there is in it with reference to the ārya, no
disappearance, up to “there is no motion out”

\textsuperscript{2} Up Spinoza’s idea that the essentia Dei is equal to infinite number of finite attributes or modēs. Here we have exactly
the same thought expressed by the Indian Monist, viz (Buddha-
dharma-kāyasys-śūnyatāyāh) anantavivēscma-samabhāve

\text{...}
been selected, because they are predominant in the sense of having given opportunities for discussion.

It is also called Nirvāṇa, the Quiescence or equalisation of all plurality, because when it is critically realised there is for the philosopher absolutely no differentiation of existence to which our words and concepts could be applied. That very essence of Relativity is called Nirvāṇa the Quiescence of Plurality, for which there are no words.

Thoughts and feelings do not arise in this (undifferentiated whole), there is no subject and no object of knowledge, there is consequently no turmoil like birth, old age and death, there is eternal bliss.

Since the principle of Dependent Origination as it is here defined (as meaning the Relativity of existence) represents the direct object of the process of instruction,

\[1\] yathāvasthita darśana
\[2\] āryāṇām p 90 no, 4
\[3\] prapañcō vākoṣ. M vr, p 373 9 the reality ursupraptica-anirva-
\[4\] citta-caittāh
\[5\] this idea of bliss as equivalent to absence of suffering is the same as in the Nyāya system, p 54 ff. It coincides with the Vedānta idea by the conception of all plurality-being merged in a unique all-embracing substance. It is also a spiritual substance because dharma-kāya is spiritual (jñāna). According to Deussen, System des Vedānta, p 228-9 ānanda with Śankara also means Freiheit von biden, op ibid p 160 Nevertheless the Buddhists would probably not characterise their śūnyatā as ānanda which carries a flavour of worldliness.
it is in the dedicatory verses alluded to as the object of Buddha's teaching:—

The perfect Buddha,  
The foremost of all Teachers I salute,  
He has proclaimed  
The principle of (Universal) Relativity.  
'This like blissful Nirvāṇa,  
Quiescence of Plurality.  
There nothing disappears,  
Nor anything appears,  
Nothing has an end,  
Nor is anything eternal,  
Nothing is identical (with itself),  
Nor is there anything differentiated,  
Nothing moves,  
Neither hither, nor thither.

Buddha alone has rightly taught the doctrine of Relativity, because he has conceived it in the manner here described. Our Master Nāgārjuna having realised that tall divergent doctrines are nothing but foolish talk (as compared with this doctrine of Buddha) gives expression to his deep feeling of devotion and praises the Buddha by inserting the characteristic. He is the foremost of all Teachers.

IX. CAUSALITY DENIED

In such a Universe nothing can disappear. The denial of extinction comes first. This is to illustrate the fact that it is not in every respect established that
every thing must first appear and then disappear. Indeed it will be stated below.—
If birth comes first,
Decay and death comes later,
We will then have a birth
Without decay and death,
And what is born will be immortal.

Therefore there is no hard and fast rule that everything must first appear and then disappear. The author now intends to explain the principle of that Relativity which implies the denial of extinction and other characteristics. But he thinks it more convenient to begin with the denial of origination, i.e., of causality, because the denial of extinction etc., will become after that an easy task.

Causation which is imagined in other systems as a real production appears either as a new manifestation of the same continuant stuff, or as an influence of separate factors, or as the result of both a continuant stuff and separate factors, or as proceeding at random without any regulation. The author decides that one of these theories is in the right.

Never at all nowhere and none
Are the things that arise
Out of self, of non-self, or both,
Or at random.¹

(The meaning of the words is here the following one, "At all" means at any time "somewhere" means the place, it is equivalent to in whatever place, something means the objects situated on the place, is it
equivalent to some things. All this is denied—never nowhere and none. The meaning is the following one: Never, nowhere and nothing is found which is produced out of its own self. And in the same way the three next predicates, out of non-self, out of both, without a cause must be interpreted.

It can be objected that an undesirable consequence will follow, (if we lay stress upon the negation and maintain that entities do) not at all arise out of themselves. It will follow that they arise out of some non-self, (i.e. out of the factors separate from them). No, this will not follow, since only a simple negation is expressed, (without any implied affirmation of the contrary). Production out of something separate will likewise be denied.

X. IDENTITY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT DENIED

The argument against self-origination, (i.e., against the preexistence of the effect in its material cause) must be constructed upon the same lines which we have sketched in our "Introduction to the Mādhyamika system".

We find there the following statement.

Thus,

No real advantage (will accrue)
If something will be born (that already exists).
If (something really) does exist,
Its own repeated birth is quite a nonsense.

1 prasanga
2 prāṣṭijya-pratisedha
3 M. av (B.B.) IX vi 8.
The Master Buddhapālita makes the following comment. "Entities do not arise out of their own self, since each origination would serve no purpose, and because the quite absurd consequence would follow that everything is eternally arising. Indeed if things exist, there is no need to produce them once more, and supposing an existing thing could be (once more) produced, never would it be non-nascent".

XI. BHĀVAVIVEKA ASSAIS THE COMMENT OF BUDDHAPĀLITA

Some philosophers viz Bhāvaviveka have raised objections against this interpretation of Buddhapālita. His comment, (they maintain) misses the mark, because,

(1) neither a reason nor an example is given,
(2) objections are left unanswered,
(3) it is a mere deduction ad absurdum, (consequently) in contrast (with the denial) expressed, a contra-thesis and a contra-reason will emerge (by implication). It will then follow that entities are produced out of something essentially separate from them, since this will serve a purpose, and since this will prevent eternal new production of the same already existing thing.

1 atiprasanga-
2 prasanga-vākyā
3 ibid., p.15, 1-2 "Through an obversion of the subject stated, when the contrary subject, as a predicate and its appurtenance,
XII. THE FIRST OBJECTION OF BHAVAVIVEKA ANSWERED

We consider all this attack to be ill founded. For what reason? Regarding the first objection, viz. that no independent reason and no example are given, we answer that this is not to the point. Why, because the position is the following one. An opposing party (the Sāṅkhya System) advocates the identity of cause and effect,\(^1\) and is invited to explain, what may be the use of causation in regard to something already existent. In saying that the self is the cause, you seemingly maintain that one’s own self is once more produced. Now, we do not understand the meaning of a new production of what already exists. Moreover, we see the danger of an infinite regress. The newly produced thing will be as long as it exists again and again produced and so on ad infinitum.\(^2\)

But you, (the Sāṅkhya) do not really mean to maintain that an existing thing is once more produced, neither do you admit an infinite series\(^3\) of self-productions. It follows that your theory of a substantial identity between cause and effect is absurd.\(^4\)

\(^1\) svata utpattih, satkāryam.
\(^2\) It would be similar to the Hinayānist and Yogācāras, ‘view sarvam kṣanikam’.
\(^3\) anavasthā.
\(^4\) nirupapattika.
and expressed as it is, it runs against your own intentions.

Now, (you think) that if (the Sāṅkhya) our opponent, is assailed merely in this way, he will not yield (to our onslaught), and an (other) reason with example is needed in order to make it (more) efficacious. But if you have detected a self-contradiction (in the argument of your) opponent and he nevertheless persists (in his errors) neither will he be reduced to silence by new arguments and examples, for his obstinacy is due to his impudence and it is not worth our while to carry on a disputation with a fool.

The Master. Bhāvaviveka betrays indeed a certain bias for syllogistic reasoning. He would like a syllogism to be introduced at the wrong place. But according to the Mādhyaṃkika method of dialectics an independent argument is never needed. This method consists in producing a contrathesis and then balancing two conflicting views without admitting either of them. It has been said by Āryadeva,  

- If I neither admit a thing’s reality,  
- Nor unreality, nor both (at once),  
- Then, to confute me  
- A long time will be needed  

In the “Repudiation of Conflicts”. (the manual of Nāgārjuna), it is likewise stated,

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1 The Sāṅkhya admits both utpāda and svata, i.e. he admits that tat eva upadyate, but he does not wish it to be an absolute identity, thus he is in conflict with himself there is sva-upagama-virodha.

2 Lit p 16 45 "who has no thesis, is, is not is is-not, his confutation even long it is impossible to tell" Cp Catuhśataka, XVI 25.
When I have theses (of my own to prove), I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving) But I have none, I cannot be accused (Of being inconsistent).
If I did (really) cognise some (separate) things, I could then make an affirmation or a denial Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred)¹
But these (separate) things do not exist for me² Therefoe I cannot be asailed on such a basis.

XIII THE SECOND POINT OF BHĀVAVIVEKA VIZ. THAT THE ANSWER OF THE SĀNKHYA IS LEFT UNNOTICED BY BUDDHAPĀLITA, REJECTED

Thus it is that since the Madhyamika is not obliged to have an argument of his own in which he believes, why do you require Buddhapālita to confute the Sāṅkhya by an independent argument, like the one produced by yourself, viz. that "the mind and the sense faculties³ are not necessarily⁴ identical to

¹ Adi in 16-10 refers to probably anumāna
² i.e., for the Monist.
³ adhyātmika-āyatana are the six subjective bases of our cognitions. i.e., for sense faculties and pure, undifferentiated consciousness (vijnāna), cp My Central Conception p 7 All mental phenomena are, according to the Sāṅkhya System, essentially physical, products of the evolution of Matter and, in this sense, they are identical with their cause or, as this is here expressed, produced out of their own self, out of the same substance Bhāvaviveka sets forth against this theory a regular syllogism, which will be analysed by Čandrakirti in the sequel, p. 25
⁴ From the Tiṃnes-te, cp. M. vr, p. 174.
their cause? The Sāṅkhya, indeed, has responded to this argument in the following way,

"What is the meaning of your argument? Do you deny an identity between cause and effect because an effect is really a new manifestation of the same matter, or because you deny the identity of matter itself? If it is the first, then you bring against us a point which we never doubted, (we agree that the effect is a new manifestation of a continuant stuff). If it is the second, then it is you, Buddhāpālita, who are contradicting yourself, not I, because even you, the Monist, must agree that every product necessarily preexists in its cause."

1 Lat. p. 12 1 18.1. "What is here the meaning of the thesis? It is ‘from self’ as containing the result of from self’ as being the cause. If (from the self) as being the cause it is contradiction, since everything having originatin originates as being necessarily existent as a cause."

2 Buddhāpālita first accuses the Sāṅkhya of self-contradiction by imputing to him the idea that an already existing thing is once more produced, although it already exists. The Sāṅkhya answers by accusing Buddhāpālita of self-contradiction on the score that a Monist must admit the identity of cause and effect. The Vedānta, indeed, admits satkārya-vāda.

3 The Sāṅkhya maintains that, since Matter is eternal, every thing is identical with it as far as it is an impermanent manifestation of this permanent Matter. He does not deny the evolution of this Matter into different forms. The objection of Buddhāpālita is unfair, because the Sāṅkhya never denied the variety of the manifestations. If na svatah = na Kāraṇātmakaṁ, this will contradict the principle of satkāryavāda, therefore, na svatah if na kāryātmakaṁ, the Sāṅkhya will agree, he will say sarvam kāraṇātmakaṁ vidyate, kāryātmakaṁ (kāryam-ūvṛbhāvah) na vidyate.
(To this retort of the Sāṇkhya, Bhāvaviveka requires that Buddhāpālita should give a reply). But how can we (Mādhyamikas who do not believe in logic altogether) produce an argument like the one produced by Bhāvaviveka about the transcendental reality of all mental phenomena? This argument the Sāṇkhya could indeed declare either trivial, because he never doubted it, or self-contradicting because it really implies

kāraṇe nāsti vṛvidah, kāram sat, kārye tu mahān vṛvidah. The Vaśesika maintains that in the effect even the stuff is different, although related by samavāyi-kāraṇa. The Hinayānist Buddhist denies the existence of a continual stuff altogether. The Mādhyamika's intention is to show the hopeless mutual contradictions of all these views and thus indirectly to establish Monism. By leaving the main issue, the difference between origination and manifestation, intentionally in the dark, by taking the expressions svata utpādah "origination out of one's own self", satkārya "preexistence of the result" literally Buddhāpālīta secures a dialectical triumph. Bhāvaviveka wishes to improve the position of the Mādhyamika by producing a sound argument.

1 This argument of Bhāvaviveka is given below, text. p 26.1

For the Sāṇkhya, all mental phenomena and the intellect are of a physical nature, but an eternal, unchanging, motionless Spiritual Principle is reflected in them. Bhāvaviveka, as a monist, assimilates all mental phenomena, from the transcendental point of view, to this eternal unique principle. The Sāṇkhya replies that this is not a refutation, but a corroboration of an identity between cause and effect, and that it is a self-contradiction, since it at the same time denies and accepts this identity. For Buddhāpālīta, it is enough to point to the contradiction between utpāda and vidyamānātva, he, from his transcendental point of view, neither believes in the one, nor in the other. Op. p. 105. Art XVIII.
the identity of cause and effect. Why should we bother about imputed irrelevance or this imputed self-contradiction? Therefore, since these accusations of the opponent are absolutely out of place, it was not incumbent upon our revered Buddhapālita to refute them.¹

**XIV THE MĀDHYAMIKA METHOD EXPLAINED**

But perhaps we must understand Bhāvaviveka to mean the following thing. Since the Mādhyamika does not admit any valid reason, thesis or example, and cannot produce any independent argument, let us concede that he is incapable himself of proving what he would like to prove, viz. that there is no real causation out of the same stuff. We also admit that it is impossible for him to combat the tenet of the opponent by an argument based upon facts the reality of which both parties admit.

However, in accusing your opponent of contradiction, you must yourself take your stand upon an argument which, in your own opinion,² would be free of those logical errors to which a thesis, a reason or an

¹ *Lat* 18 1-3 "How can we have a reason, because they exist,—a reason that would either be a proof of the proved or a contradiction, for the refutation of whose proving the proved or its contradictory character we should take pains." Therefore, since he is quite unaffected by the accusations pronounced by the opponent, revered Buddhapālita is not obliged to expatiate upon their refutation. If we accept the sanskrit, not the Tibetan, text of the last sentence so omitting na and the of prasangika, it will mean, "therefore revered Buddhapālita is obliged to expatiate upon a refutation of them only when he is himself affected by the accusations of the opponent."

² Svata eva.
example is liable. But Buddhapālita has given no reason and no examples, neither has he shown his capacity of avoiding the logical errors pointed out by the Sāṅkhya. Therefore, the accusation that he has proved nothing by his deduction ad absurdum stands.

To this we answer: this is not right. Why? Because of the following considerations. Certainly, when some one is vindicating an assertion, he is desirous to convince other people, just as he is convinced himself. He must prove to his opponent the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusion.

It is indeed a general rule that the opponent should be at length induced to agree with that very line of argument which the respondent himself has set forth in order to prove his own thesis. But the case of the Mādhyamika is quite different. He does not vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. He has no bona fide reasons and examples of which he himself is convinced. He sets forth a thesis of his own and undertakes to prove it only so far as it runs parallel and destroys the argument of his opponent.

He thus brings assertions which cannot be proved. He is in conflict even with himself. He certainly cannot convince his opponent of (this imagined thesis).

But can there be a more eloquent refutation of an opponent than the proof that he is not capable of establishing his own thesis? Is there really any necessity to produce new counter arguments?

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1 nṛrupapātikā-pākṣa-  
2 anumāna-bādha-
XV BUDDHAPĀLITA'S COMMENT VINDICATED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FORMAL LOGIC

However if you insist that this must be necessarily done and require that the contradiction in the tenet of the opponent should be disclosed by an independent argument, we maintain that Buddhapālita has done it. If you ask, how is that? We answer: he has said, "Entities do not arise out of themselves,

Because such origination would serve no purpose,

Here the word "such" refers to a new origination of something by itself already existing.

The following words contain a comment upon this short statement ¹ "If something already exists in its own real individuality, it does not need to be produced once more." This sentence points to the example,² i.e., an analogous case admitted by the opponent where both the reason and the predicate coexist e.g., an existing jar. The reason is indicated by the words "existing in its own individuality", and the predicate

¹ read p 203 tasya grahnaka-vākyasya. What a grahanaka-vākyam is appears clearly from Tātparyatikā, p 145 16 and an overwhelming multitude of similar phrasing in all Nyāya literature. The argument is first stated laconically (grahanaka) and then developed (vivaraṇa).

² The example is always a very important part of the Indian syllogism, parārthānumāna. It points to the particular facts on which the general rule or the major premise is established. Apart from such formal syllogism, Indian logic knows a simple inference from one particular to another one, svārthānumāna, it is a simple inference by analogy which is considered as representing the essence of thought or of synthesis in general.
is indicated by the words "because such origination would serve no purpose." We thus shall have the following regular syllogism—

Thesis. An entity does not require a second production.

Reason. Because it exists.

Example. Just as a jar.

Major Premise. Whatsoever exists does not require to be produced once more.

We can indeed express a syllogism in two different ways, e.g., we can express it thus—

Thesis. The word is not an eternal substance.¹

Reason. Because it is produced.

Major premise. Whatsoever is produced is not eternal.

But we can put it also in another way:—

Major premise. Whatsoever is produced is known to be non-eternal.

Example. As for example a jar.

Minor premise. The word is produced.

Conclusion. Therefore, being produced, it is not eternal.

¹ The school of the Mimāmsakas imagined that the word was an eternal transcendental substance, somewhat similar to the Platonic idea. The uttered word was then only its particular manifestation. The logicians and all other schools of philosophy denied the existence of the eternal word on the score that the word which we know from experience is an impermanent production. To illustrate the rules of logic this example is as popular in the whole East, as the deduction of Socrates' mortality is the current example of the first form of the syllogism in the West.
In this instance the reason (middle term) reveals itself in the minor premise, "the word is produced", where the application of the middle term to the minor is indicated.

This is (just what Buddhapālita has done) in the present case. (He has said)

Entities do not arise of the own self,

Since the production of what already exists is not needed

He might have put the same argument in another form —

**Major premise**  Whatsoever already exists does not want to be produced

**Example**  As e.g., this jar standing before us.

(Minor premise  It already exists)

(Conclusion. It needs no second production).

The jar in its (potential) condition in a lump of clay is an example (by contrast)\(^1\), since it needs to be really produced. But if you mean the jar which already exists by itself, such a jar is not produced once more. Thus it is that the reason (i.e., the middle term in Buddhapālita's syllogism) is the fact of direct individual existence, a fact which precludes a second origination of the existent, it is expressed (in the minor premise, the so-called) application\(^2\) of the middle

\(^1\) Instead of reading, 'tathā ca' it would be preferable to read 'na tu', but tathā ca' is also possible, since a vaidharmya-drstānta is also sometimes introduced in this way. After avasthāyām a *cheda* must be inserted

\(^2\) *upanayana*
term to the minor, and thus it is that Buddhapālita has really elicited in the argument of the Sāṅkhya a contradiction. He has done it just by an independent argument of his own. How is it then that you accuse him of giving neither a reason, nor an example?

XVI. THE ANSWER OF THE SĀṅKHYA VIRTUALLY REPUDIATED BY BUDDHAPĀLTIA

We have thus shown that the accusation of Buddhapālita for not having produced a regular syllogism with a reason and example is not sound. But only not this. Equally unfounded is the accusation of not having repudiated the double stricture of the opponent, (sc. The Sāṅkhya, who accuses him either of telling nothing new, of contradicting himself). (Virtually he has repudiated the Sāṅkhya also). How is that? The Sāṅkhya maintains that if our denial of identity between cause and effect only means that the effect is a new manifestation of the same stuff, this he has himself always admitted. Yes, but the Sāṅkhya never admitted that causation consists in a manifested jar, a jar standing before us, being once more manifested and it is just manifested jar, in its ready form, that we take as an example when we prove the absurdity of the idea of an identity between cause and effect.

Regarding the non-manifested jar, the jar in its potential condition as a lump of clay, it is clear

1 Lit “because its form or essence, rūpa-svarūpa is established as an example”, cp the Tib transl
2 sākta-rūpāpanna
fortiori, from our point of view it cannot be produced. How is it then possible to accuse our thesis of falling in with the Sāṅkhya view, and how is it possible to accuse our argument of being self-contradictory?

To summarize our opinion, Buddhāpalita has pointed out the contradiction in the Sāṅkhya theory of causality not only by a deduction *ad absurdum*, but also by an independent argument. Nevertheless the faults imputed to him do not exist. It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that he has not answered the accusations of the Sāṅkhya. The whole onslaught (of Bhāvaviveka) is therefore absolute nonsense.

XVII. SOME MINOR POINTS EXPLAINED

It might be objected that the example of a jar is not convincing enough. The rule may apply for the production of a jar out of clay, and not apply to the production of a piece of cloth out of threads. No, because we say a jar etc., etc. By the etc. the inclusion of every possible object which can originate is indicated.

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1. Viśrūṣṭa-sādhya, a qualified predicate, a predicate *a fortiori*, anabhūvya-ārūpa-anupatti-kārana-ārūpa-kāryasya anupattanā pariṣṭhita

2. Lit. the objection of a faculty thesis of the proved

3. Lit.—"Therefore if there is also an objection (sodanā) of contradiction by a self-argument (-svānānāna, i.e., even admitting that Buddhāpalīta has produced a real argument, since the faults as they have been depicted do not exist, the non-refutation of the faults mentioned by the opponent is quite impossible. Thus this critique is quite incongruous. Thus should be well known."
There is not the slightest possibility to doubt (that the rule might not apply to a cloth etc.

The argument (against the Sāṅkhya) may have also been formulated (by Buddhapālita) in another way, viz.

(Thesis). All physical entities do not arise out of themselves.

(Reason) Because they always exist in their own essence, (i.e., because Matter is eternal).

Example—Just as the (eternal) Spirit does.

The Sāṅkhya who advocates the identity of cause and effect must accept this argument for that very reason that he advocates this identity which is here exemplified by his changeless Spirit. This example of the Spirit whose eternal identity the Sāṅkhya admits may have also been quoted by Buddhapālita in order to combat the Sāṅkhya view¹.

It might be maintained that the Sāṅkhya is not affected by this denial of origination. He vindicates the theory that causality consists in a new manifestation of an existing stuff. However the term origination may also have the meaning of manifestation.

Indeed both origination and manifestation have the common feature of representing something that was formerly unperceived and became perceived after.

¹ Lit “Or else the following other way of formulation Entities which are not Spirit, i.e. are physical, for the advocate of self-origination, for that very reason, do not originate out of themselves, because they exist in their own self, just as the individual Soul. Thus this example can be quoted”.
Therefore, a new manifestation can also be called a new origination.

It then becomes impossible for the Śāṅkhya to maintain that he is not affected by the denial of an identity between a cause and its effect.¹

It may be asked, how is it possible to deduce all these considerations of detail out of the short statement of Buddhapālita, since he does not mention them?² We answer: His words are full of profound meaning. In a concise manner they include the above-mentioned details. When analysed they reveal their own self in these details. We do not invent something that is not included in them.²

XVIII THE THIRD STRicture OF BHĀVAVIVEKA ANSWERED. THE DENIAL OF ONE VIEW DOES NOT IMPLY THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OTHER

Bhāvaviveka maintains that the repudiation of the Śāṅkhya theory of causation by a mere deduction

¹ Lat. "Although the denial of origination does not repudiate the maintainer of manifestation, nevertheless by using the word origination in the sense of manifestation, since by the similarity of non-perception before and perception after just a manifestation is expressed by the word origination, the denial is not non-repudiatory."

² Lat. "How is again this detailed analysis (vyraṣṭavācāra) attained without an expression of the meaning as it is here told? If this is asked, then this is answered. These sentences, full of meaning, are very much meaning, they are turned out (pravṛttī) in summarising the meaning as it has been told and, being commented upon, they give birth to their own self, the meaning as is here told, thus nothing is imagined which is not really assumed."
involves acceptance of the opposite theory, viz. that cause and effect represent two different substances. This is wrong, Because the converse theory will be again charged to the same account of the same opponent, not to our account¹ since we have declared that we have no theory of our own. We, therefore, cannot be accused of contradicting our own principles. But if the many objections that have been already raised against the opponent are accrued by charging to his account the counterpart of our deduction, we really will only welcome it.²

The Master Buddhāpielita is a faithful adherent of the method of Nāgārjuna. How can we possibly pronounce something inadvertently³ that would give an opportunity to his opponent? When a philosopher who denies the reality of single objects, deduces ad absurdum the conception of their reality,⁴ how can he be charged with the counterpart of this deduction? Our words are not policemen? They cannot deprive us of our liberty. Words possess a power to express something, but they are controlled by the intention⁵ of the speaker. Therefore the only result of

¹ Both prasanga and tad-viparyaya are used together to prove the same thesis m, e.g. Sarvadars, p 21. (Poona 1924)
² Lat “And the more faults of the opponent are deduced through a deduction of the contrary of (his, Sc Buddhāpielita’s) deduction, the more desirable will it indeed be for us”
³ sāvakaśām
⁴ Lat deduces ad absurdum “the maintainer of reality”, the realist (sa-svabhāva-vādin).
⁵ We would expect either uvaṣayā or uvaḥsām anu vakṣyante.
our deduction is to repudiate the theory of our opponent. Our acceptance of the converse theory is not at all therewith implied.

Our common Master Nāgārjuna, when combatting opposed opinions, has very often had recourse just to a deduction *ad absurdum*, without ever admitting its positive counterpart.

E.g. —

We find nothing (called empty) Space,
Before its essence has (here) been determined.
If it would previously to this determination preexist,
It would be Space without an essence

Supposing all the causes of some matter taken off,
And we would call it matter none the less,
It would be matter without causes
But nowhere without causes any matter does exist

This does not at all imply that Nāgārjuna admitted the existence of caused matter.

Another example —

Nirvāṇa is no separate entity,
Or else it would be subject to decay and death.
There is no separate entity
That never would decay and never die.

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1 Lit "There is no accepted deduction (arthāpatti) being the contrary of the unacceptable deduction (prāsanga)"

2 M. s. V. I. It does not follow that Nāgārjuna admits the existence of a real space

3 M. s. IV 2

4 M. s., XXV. 4 If the converse conception be that of a Nirvāṇa immanent in the world and eternal, Nāgārjuna admits it op. ibid XXV 9
Bhavaviveka.—But these are aphorisms. The sentences of our Master contain profound intentions. They can be variously tackled and give rise to a variety of syllogistic formulation.

Answer. Why, to be sure, should not the comment of Buddhapālita which does not contain any syllogistic formulation be accepted just in this sense, as the only faithful rendering of Nāgārjuna's intention. (Bhāvaviveka). It is the business of the writers of detailed commentaries to make detailed statements about the syllogistic formulations implied in the aphorisms. (Answer). This is not always the case. Our Master has written a commentary upon his own manual of dialectics, "The Repudiation of Contests," but he did not indulge in it in syllogistic formulations. You are, indeed merely parading with your cleverness in the science of dialectics. Although you pretend to be an adherent of the Mādhyamika system, you nevertheless compose independent syllogistic arguments. But for such a logician, as you would like to appear, the Mādhyamika method is only a very great encumbrance.

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1 artha-vākyā.
2 parikalpyante.
3 or method, nyāya.
4 This statement can be interpreted as an indirect indication that Candrakīrti knew nothing about a commentary written upon the mūla-kārikas by Nāgārjuna himself. It would follow that the work called Akutobhaya is a forgery as suggested by Wassilieff.
It makes him pile up mistake upon mistake. How is that?

XIX. EXAMINATION OF BHĀVAVIVEKA'S FORMAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE SĀNKHYA

To combat the Sānkhya theory of Causality you have composed the following syllogism.

(Thesis), Mental phenomena, if considered from the transcendental standpoint of the Monist, are no few productions out of the same substance.

(Reason) Because they exist
(Example) Just as the Conscious Principle of the Sānkhya which is an eternal unchanging entity

(Major premise). Whatsoever already exists is not a new self-production

Now, in this syllogism, by you so formulated, what is the use of the qualification “from the transcendental standpoint of the Monist”?

Bhāvaviveka. If we take our stand on pheno-

1 Lit., "Merely through the desire of displaying the own proficiency in the science of dialectics, the use of independent syllogisms (prayoga-vākya) although having accepted the Mādhyamika system, is an indirect indication (upalakṣyate) of such a logician who is in a very high degree the receptacle of an assemblage of many mistakes".

2 ādhyātmikānyā āyatanānā

3 Lit. "Here the syllogism which has been thus stated, as absolute reality the internal bases do not arise out of self, since they exist, just as consciousness, what for again in it the qualification "as absolute reality" has been assumed?"
menal reality we cannot deny origination of mental phenomena. If this were denied, it wold follow that the contrast which we assmue between the absolute thing in itself and phenomenal reality does not exist.\footnote{1}

Answer. This is not right, because we deny the identity of cause and effect\footnote{2} from the phenomenal point of view also, It is corroborated by the following words of the Scripture\footnote{3}.

"This sprout which springs up from a seed is not produced out of itself, neither is it produced out of non-self, nor out of both, nor without a cause. It is neither created by God\footnote{4}, nor by Time, nor from the Atoms, nor from Primitive Matter\footnote{5}, nor by Nature,\footnote{6}.” Here is another text. “The sprout doesnot belong to the seed, neither is the seed identical with the sprout, nor is it non-identical. It is a manifestation of that unique Reality\footnote{7} which neither can be determined as anihilation\footnote{8}, nor as one of the Eternal Principles”\footnote{9}.

And in this treatise the author will make the following statement,

\footnote{1} Lit “And if denied the admitted repudiation (bādha), of the phenomenal by the absolute would not be entailed (read prasangāt)”
\footnote{2} svata utpatti
\footnote{3} From Sālistamba-sūtra, cf Śīksāsamuc, p. 219. 10 ff.
\footnote{4} līśvara
\footnote{5} prakṛti
\footnote{6} svabhāva
\footnote{7} dharma
\footnote{8} uccheda.
\footnote{9} Such as god, time, atom, matter, nature, etc. all with capitals.
Whatever relatively does exist
Is really not what it appears to be.
But neither is it something else.
Therefore it neither has an end,
Nor has it a beginning.\(^1\)

(Bhāvaviveka). The qualification ("from the standpoint of transcendental reality") has been introduced into the above syllogism in consideration of the opinion held by the opponent.

(Answer). This is a wrong method, because we do not admit his construction,\(^2\) even from the point of view of phenomenal reality\(^3\). Non-Buddhists are absolutely lacking the right understanding of the division between both realities, the transcendental and phenomenal one. It is, therefore, much better to repudiate them, from both these standpoints. I would think it a great advantage. The above qualification is thus out of place, even if it is introduced in order to distinguish the view taken by the author from the view of the opponent or from the ideas of simple people.

As to simple people they do not understand what self-origination means. For them also the qualification

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\(^1\) Ms XVII, 10 pratītya-sūnyā-sāsvata- "beginning" op XXV. 21 of Kant's solution of the first antinomy, viz that the world is neither finite, nor infinite because "a phenomenon does not exist by itself" op, cit p 410 ff

\(^2\) vyavasthā

\(^3\) It is not right to maintain that the Śrāvikhyā's view of phenomenal reality is admissible with the qualification that from the transcendental point of view it will be an illusion
is useless. Unsophisticated people simply admit that an effect is produced by a cause. They do not enter into such considerations as to whether the effect is identical with the cause or not.

Our Master Nāgārjuna has really established the same thing viz. that we must avail ourselves of the everyday idea of causality without any hope to explain it metaphysically. It is, therefore, clear that the qualification is absolutely senseless

XX. BHĀVAVIVEKA’S ARGUMENT ASSAILED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FORMAL LOGIC

However let us agree and admit that the qualification might have been introduced in order to intimate that phenomenal causality is not denied. The syllogism of Bhāvaviveka will then nevertheless be formally deficient, since its example, the Spirit, and its reason, the fact of “the existence” of mental phenomena, will both be ultimately unreal. We will then have either the logical error of a faulty thesis, since it will refer to something (sc. the mental phenomena) which the author of the syllogism himself, from his own monistic point of view does not accept as real,¹ or we shall have the logical error of a faulty reason,² (viz the fact of the existence or reality of

¹ This *pālsa* *dosa* would be probably classified by Dīganṭa as *anumāna-mrākṛta*, cp Nyāyabuddha, p 59 1 (B B) VII.
² About the āraya-asiddha hetu-*dosa*, of Nyāyabuddha, p 64 16. The logic of Dīganṭa forbids deductions from facts which the author of the syllogism, from his own point of view, does not admit as real. op. *ibid*, p. 63 13 f
mental phenomena) which will then refer to something equally unreal.

Indeed (Bhāvaviveka) himself being a Mādhyamika does not admit the transcendental reality of separate mental phenomena and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing.

Bhāvaviveka. This does not matter, since we admit the phenomenal reality of the sense of vision etc.

Answer. But then, who is qualified by the words “from the transcendental standpoint”? 

Bhāvaviveka. If considered from the transcendental point of view the existence of the phenomenal sense faculties and of empirical consciousness is not real.

The qualification is introduced in order to specify the kind of causality which is denied.

Answer. Then you ought to have expressed yourself otherwise. You ought to have spoken exactly thus: “the supposed phenomenal reality of the sense-faculties etc is no reality in the transcendental sense.”

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1 Lat “of the basis of the sense of vision (oksas-ayatana) and other subjective bases of cognition i.e. ādhyātmika-ayatana”

2 utpatti

3 caksurādī

4 citt (http://www.mysite.com) is indicated among caksurādī as āyatana of My Central Conception p 96
But your expression is different. However, even supposing you would have expressed yourself properly, nevertheless you would not have escaped the logical error of a faulty thesis since it would then have referred to empirical sensations, i.e., something quite unknown to your opponent. For the Sāukhya indeed all sensations are absolutely real. He has altogether no nominal (or empirical) realities.

Thus it is that the argument is wrong either from the standpoint of its author, for whom the separate mental phenomena are not real, or from the standpoint of those to whom it is addressed, because they do not admit any difference between phenomenal and absolute reality.

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1 The expression that "from the transcendental standpoint the sensations do not rise out of themselves" can be understood as meaning the transcendental sensations are not identical with their causes. But transcendental sensations do not exist from the monist's point of view. Hence for him it will be a syllogism composed about a non-existing thing.

2 Lit., p 28 1-3 "And even if told, since the opponents admit exclusively a really existing faculty of vision etc., and do not admit nominal realities, it will be a faculty thesis whose substratum will be unreal for the opponent. Thus it is not right.

3 According to the logic of Dignāga, a discussion must start from facts admitted by both parties, cp Nyāyabindu, p. 62 3. Sensations real in the absolute sense do not exist for the Monist. The difference of sensations empirically real is unknown to the Sāukhya, for him all sensations are real. Hence, accordingly as we take it, the syllogism of Bhāvaviveka will refer either to something not admitted by the respondent himself, or to something not admitted by his opponent.
XXI. ANOTHER ATTEMPT OF BHĀVAVIVEKA TO VINDICATE HIS ARGUMENT

But be that as the case may, we may envisage the syllogism in question as referring in general terms just to the relation between a fact, (the mental phenomena) and one of its characteristics, viz. existence, without enlarging upon the special theories which might be entertained by both parties about the nature of mental phenomena or the essence of existence when it is inferred that words are non-eternal the general relation of this characteristic to the characterized fact is alone referred to. Indeed the work of inference would become quite impossible, if the special view entertained in different systems were to be taken into account. There are no two systems which agree on the question about the nature of sound. If we admit with the Hinayāna Buddhist that sound is a secondary thing or element of matter, dependent upon the four universal elements,¹ this will not be admitted by his opponent the Vaishēsika, because he, on the contrary, maintains that the sound is a quality of ether. It is not a substance. This again the Buddhist does not admit on his own behalf. Similarly when the Vaishēsika undertakes it to prove that the word is non-eternal, he can be asked whether he means the word as a physical product, or the word as a manifestation of an eternally existing substance. The first is not admitted by his opponent the Mīmāṃsaka who postulates the existence of a special eternal substance of which the spoken words are

¹ Cp My Central Conception.
nothing but separate manifestations. The second is not accepted by the Vaiśesika himself.

The same applies mutatis mutandis to every philosophic issue. If you admit that the destruction of an object must have a cause, this will not be accepted by Buddhist on his own behalf, since he maintains that every existence consists of discrete moments which are evanescent by themselves, without a cause. But if he alludes to uncaused invisible destruction going on at every moment this will not be admitted by his opponent, the Vaiśesika.

Therefore, just as in the case of the evanescent character of the sound, only the relation of this characteristic to the characterized substratum, in general terms, is taken into account, just so in the present instance, the mere fact that there is some substratum called sensations, should be taken in general, without entering into details, whether it be a phenomenal or an absolute existence.

Answer—This is not so, since in the present case, it is just the existence of such a general substratum that is denied. It is denied by no one else than Bhāvaviveka himself. His avowed aim is here to deny Causality. However, just in denying every causality, he at the same time et prof des its substratum, the caused thing, the substance of the thing of the thing produced, converting it in a thing which owes its existence to a mere illusion. Illusion and reality are indeed opposites. The pluriverse as it

1 yathā-sambhavam
2 Cp Nyāyabindu, p 33 6 ff
appears before the unsophisticated eyes of mankind is either logically inconsistent or it is a reality\(^1\).

If it is logically inconsistent\(^2\), and if this plurality which is not the real condition of the universe is wrongly apprehended by us as real, if it is a false impression in the mind of the perceiver\(^3\), then there is in this plurality not the slightest bit of what is absolutely real\(^4\). But if there is no transcendental illusion, if it is not a mirage\(^5\), if we perceive a real\(^6\)

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\(^1\) We find here an eloquent expression of that genuine conviction very much spread, even in our days, among the pandits of India who have studied the various systems of their country that Monism is superior to all other systems by the fact of reaching the limit of all philosophic construction. The realism of Nyāya-vaisēnika and Mīmāṃsā, the dualism of the Sānkhya, the radical pluralism of Hīnayāna Buddhism all were engaged in constructing a skeleton of the Universe out of a limited number of ultimate data and have then stopped before them, refusing to go deeper into them and to reduce them to their still deeper root. Should they have embarked on a further analysis of those ultimate principles at which they had arrived they would have inevitably landed in Monism. Only in Monism does philosophic analysis reach its real limit "yathā yathā vicāryate tathā tathā brahmaṁ eva ekaṁ sarvaṁ paryavasayati." In modern philosophy as far as I am aware, a similar view has been taken by Ladd, Introd to Philos p 403

\(^2\) viparyāśa

\(^3\) Lit “Like non-existing hair etc by the ophthalmic”

\(^4\) sad-bhūta-pudārtha-leśa a hint at Dignāga’s kasana—svaL-at-sana—parmanātha— and at his claim to have vindicated phenomenal reality op below text page 66 ff

\(^5\) Lit “like real hair etc by the non-ophthalmic”

\(^6\) Read bhūtam, instead of abhītām
pluriverse, not the one constructed by our imagination, then there is not the slightest vestige of something unreal in pluralism, nothing at all to justify the claim that a phenomenal reality has been established by us.

Our venerable Master Nāgārjuna has therefore said:

If I did really organize some separate things, I could then make an affirmation or denial, Upon the basis of these things perceived or inferred.

But these separate things do not exist for me. Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis.

Since it is so, since (transcendental) illusion is one thing and (transcendental) reality another; since for the transcendentalist,

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1 Lat p. 30 15 Because just when the denial of origination is here intended to be a characteristic to be established, just then the negation of the characterised, of its substratum, which has reached its own existence only through an illusion, is admitted just by himself. Different are indeed illusion and non-illusion. Therefore, if, owing to illusion, non-Enās is taken as Enās, just as by the ophthalmic (non-existing) hair, etc then wherefrom would even a bit of a really existing thing be apprehended? But if through non-confusion, the real, non-imaged is perceived, like by the non-opthalmic (real) hair, etc then wherefrom the perception of even a bit of a non-really-existing thing, so as then there would be phenomenalism (saṃyutta)??

2 This stanza from the Vighraha-vyāvartanī has been quoted above, text—p 16 9.

3 vidusām, they are identified with the āryas.
in what he considers to be absolutely real, there is no room for non-reality, what is then the meaning of Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism? He takes the phenomenal visual sensations and other mental phenomena as a minor term, (the subject of his deduction) He thus cannot escape from the criticism that his thesis is logically impossible, since it refers to a non-entity, or that this middle term is contradictory, because it appertains to an unreal substratum. The syllogism would be equivalent to the assertion that non-existing things do not arise out of themselves, because they exist.

As to the analogy with the discussions about the nature of the word, it does not exist. In those discussions there always is an agreement between every pair of contending view about what sound, in general, and what evanescence in general, are, without entering into details about the nature of sound.

There is no such agreement between the radical Relativist¹ and the non-Relativist or Realist², in regard to what visual sensations in general are, either from the phenomenal or the transcendental point of view. For this reason the two cases are not comparable.

All that has been said about the logical impossibility of a thesis which refers to a non-entity is applicable mutatis mutandis as the proof of the futility of the conception of “existence” as a logical reason.

¹ śūnyata-vādin
² atśūnyata-vādin
XXII. BHĀVAVIVEKA ALSO AVALS HIMSELF OF THE ARGUMENT THAT FOR THE MONIST ALL INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE IS UNREAL

Such is the force of this argument\(^1\) that even Bhāvaviveka himself, this champion of logic\(^2\), is obliged to admit the condemnation of logic which we have exposed. He examines the following syllogism.

**Thesis.** The cause and conditions which produce mental phenomena\(^3\) really exist.

**Reason** Because this has been declared by Buddha Major premise. Whateover has been declared by the Buddha is true\(^4\).

**Example.** As e.g., his statement that Nirvāṇa is Final Quiescence.

This syllogism has been advanced by a Hinayānīst opponent of Bhāvaviveka. He replies by the following criticism. “In what sense do you think, the word ‘cause’ is here used? Has Buddha spoken from the phenomenal point of view or from the transcendental one?\(^5\)

If it is taken in the phenomenal sense, the reason has (so it seems) no ultimate reality for Buddha himself.

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1 The argument, namely that for a consistent Monist every separate thing and every separate reason is ultimately unreal

2 tārākā

3 ādhyātmika-āyatana.

4 Lit., “indeed what and how is taught by the Buddha to exist, it is so”

5 paramārthataḥ
But supposing it is taken in the sense of something transcendentally real, then we must remember the following words of Nāgārjuna:

Neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens,
Nor any Ens-non-Ens,
No element\(^1\) is really "turned out"\(^2\).
How can we then assume,
The possibility of a producing cause\(^3\)

"Since causation\(^4\) of things, whether real or unreal or partly real and partly unreal, is excluded, there is no such thing as a really efficient cause."
This is the meaning of the words of Nāgārjuna.

"Therefore from the transcendental point of view\(^5\) there is altogether no efficient causality\(^6\). Every reason you may adduce will be either ultimately unreal or contradictory."

By adopting this line of argument against the Hīnayānist, Bhāvaviveka has himself admitted the unreality of every reason from the transcendental standpoint of the Relativist. Thus all logical demonstrations are smashed, since in all such syllogisms reasons are adduced which in the opinion of the opponent are founded on real fact, but in the op-

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\(^1\) dharma
\(^2\) nirvartiye
\(^3\) nirvartala
\(^4\) sāt-saś-tāt-lātya pratyayatva, t.e., neither sātśātya-nor asatśātya-vāda is admitted
\(^5\) paramārthakataḥ
\(^6\) nirvartiya-nirvartalatva
union of the Relativist himself they are all ultimately unreal\(^1\).

In the following two syllogisms of Bhāvaviveka the middle term must likewise be declared faulty, on the score that it is meaningless from the Monist's transcendental point of view. E.g

Thesis. Mental phenomena\(^2\) do not really\(^3\) arise from corresponding causes, separate from them.

Reason. Because these are separate entities.

Major premise. Whatsoever is a separate substance cannot really be a cause.

Example. As the causes of a jar\(^4\) (which are not real in the absolute sense).

Or another example,

Thesis. The causes which in the opinion of our opponents,\(^5\) produce mental phenomena\(^6\) are not understood to be causes in the absolute sense.

Reason. Because they are separate entities.

Major premise. Whatsoever is a separate entity is not a cause in the absolute sense.

\(^{1}\) *La*., p-31 11-13 "Since thus he even himself by this method has admitted the unreality of the reason, therefore in all syllogisms which have middle terms suggested by attributes of real entities, since just by themselves reasons etc., are unreal so all demonstrations are killed."

\(^{2}\) dhyātmika-āyatana, lit "the six subjective bases of cognition \\

\(^{3}\) paramārthatāk

\(^{4}\) Read ghatasya

\(^{5}\) Read parāvah instead of pare.

\(^{6}\) *La*., "The six subjective bases of cognition. the faculty of vision (caksuha) etc.,"
Example As e.g., the threads, the loom, the weaver etc are not the causes of cloth from the transcendental point of view.

The reason “because they are separate entities” is not a valid middle term, since for the author of these syllogisms himself it has no ultimate reality.

Another example where Bhāvaviveka implicitly admits that the transcendentalist has to forego usual logical methods, is the following one He is desirous to show that the reason given by his opponent the Sautrāntika, is wrong, because it represents a fact whose ultimate reality he, as a consequent Relativist, does not accept. The argument of the Sautrāntika runs thus

Thesis. Internal facts¹ i.e., mental phenomena really arise i.e., they have a real existence.

Reason. Because they produce purposive actions directed towards the same objects as our thoughts have been directed to.

Major premise Whatsoever is efficient is real² Bhāvaviveka repudiates this conclusion by quoting the following parallel argument.

Thesis. The yogi, when merged in ecstatic meditation perceives by his supernatural faculty of vision the ultimate reality, he then apprehends causation, motion etc. as they really are³.

¹ adhyātmikā bhāvan
² The definition of reality (paramārtha-sat) as efficiency (arika-kriyā-kārita) is accepted by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, cp Nyāya-budh, p 13 15. It is also shared by the Sautrāntikas, cp Nā Tipp. p 19
³ In the Sāntānāntara-uddhi, Art 90 (B B XI), Russian transl. p 47. Dharmakīrti denies the yogi to perceive the ultimately real.
The reason adduced is the same as in the foregoing syllogism, viz. "because they produce purposive actions directed to the same objects as his thoughts have been directed to." In this argument, says Bhāvaviveka, the reason does not represent a real fact from the transcedental point of view.

It is moreover unreal, says he, because motion does not exist\(^1\). Since there is no real causation, motion cannot exist.\(^2\)

Now this method by which Bhāvaviveka here combats the argument of his opponent can be *mutatis mutandis* applied to his own deductions which he produced bonafide, viz.,

**Thesis. The future does not exist in an absolute sense\(^3\)**

**Reason. Because it represents time\(^4\).**

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1. In Hinayāna, motion is denied (*na gatu niśāt*, Ab Kośa IV 1) since it represents in reality a serial of separate momentary productions (*urvantara-utpāda*), as in a cinema. In Mahāyāna, motion is denied because all the moments are relative (*svabhāva śūnya*).

2. Lit—p, 32 3 7 "Just as he has said when rebutting the unreality (*asaddhārthata*) of this reason given by an opponent, viz." internal facts, (bhāvāh) are necessarily (*eva*) produced, since they produce actions characterised as possessing their objects;" now it is being proved that for the meditating Yogi who by his eye of wisdom sees the real path of existence (*bhāva-yāthāmya*) origination, motion etc. exist in the absolute sense (*paramārthataḥ*), then there is unreality of the reason, because they produce actions characterised as possessing their objects, and motion is denied just because origination is denied.”

3. Lit "The not-run is not at all being run in the absolute sense.”

4. *adhibhavan*
Example: Just as the past time does not exist.

Major premise: Whatever is "time" does not represent an ultimate reality.

To this syllogism we may likewise apply the structure that the reason "time" represents nothing real to the author of the syllogism himself.

The student will be now able himself to extend the critique here expounded upon the unreality of the reason adduced by Bhāvanīveka in the following three syllogisms.

1. Thesis: The operating sense of vision does not perceive colour.

Reason: Because it is a sense of vision in general.

Example: Just as a non-operating sense of vision always is.

Major premise: Whatever is a sense of vision does not necessarily perceive colour.

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1. *sābhāgaṃ* instead of *sātryum*  
   *Sābhāga = sva-karma-ārt*,  
   *cp A. Kośa*, 1–39

2. *tatsābhāgaṃ = a-sva-karma-āg*,  
   *cp Ab Kośa* 139

3. For the monist, according to Candrākirti, it would have been sufficient to deny a real perception of colour on the score that all separate facts have no ultimate reality for a consequent Monist, or only a second hand reality (*paratantra*) for a Yogācāra, *cp above* p 33. But Bhāvanīveka apparently tries to corroborate this view by something like a formally correct syllogism. He seemingly has detected in the judgment "the eye is a colour-perceiving organ" the same contradiction as really appears if the copula be taken in the sense of an equation. The eye thus does not perceive colour because it does not always perceive it, perception is not its essence (*svabhāva*) as e.g. the quality of being resistant is the essence of the hard stuff.
2. Thesis. The organ of vision does not apprehend colours

Reason Because it is physical.\

Example. Just as any physical object, e.g. a jar etc.

Major premise. Whatevver is physical does not apprehend colours.

3. Thesis. The solid bodies do not really possess solidity.

Reason Because they represent Matter.

Example. Just as the gaseous bodies.

Major premise Whatevver is Matter is not always a solid body.

1 bhautika
2 rūpa, the first rūpa=the rūpa-āyatana, the second probably= rūpa-skandha
3 Here Bhāvaniveka has recourse to an idea of the Nyāya-Vaśesaka school (bhautikāṃ māryāṇa) in order to undermine the fact that colours are perceived through the eye. According to Candrakirtti this is quite superfluous for a believer in Universal Relativity (śūnyatā=niḥsvabhāvatā), and moreover constitutes a vaunt in formal logic, since the reason, the physical character (bhautika) of the organ has no real force from the point of view of the author of the syllogism, it is asiddha svatāh
4 mātī=prthvī, cp my Central Conception p. 13
5 bhūta=maḥā-bhūta- cp , ibid. 99.
6 Solidity (Lāṣāna) is the essence, lāṣāna of the solid bodies. All the work of predication being relative, it can, from this point of view, be maintained that the solid body is not solid, so is not solid by itself, but only in relation to others. This is a case of the lāṣāna-niḥsvabhāvatā or śūnyatā, cp Trumākā- p. 32 For Candra-kirti, it is enough to point out this general conception in order to establish the relativity and consequent unreality of the
XXIII. ANOTHER FORMAL ERROR IN THE SYLLOGISM OF BHĀVAVIVEKA

Moreover the reason "because they (sc mental phenomena) exist"¹ is uncertain from the standpoint of the opponent (The syllogism of Bhāvaviveka is directed against the Sānkhya who admits a double kind of existence, the eternal, changeless existence of the Spirit and the changing existence of Matter) It is therefore uncertain) whether the words "mental phenomena do not arise out of themselves because they already exist" mean that they exist eternally² like the Spirit³, or whether the words "because they already exist" refer to that kind of orignation which is exemplified by the orignation of jars and other physical existence in general, an orignation which represents a change in a permanent stuff, since according to this system mental changes are in themselves physical⁴.

¹ Idea of a solid stuff. But Bhāvaviveka wishes apparently to construct a formal syllogism on the same basis as the first one, i.e., he finds a contradiction in the sentence "a solid stuff is a stuff" on the score that there are stuffs that are liquid and gaseous. These three syllogisms are celebrated among the Tibetan schoolmen as baffling arguments establishing Relativity (ānyatā) according to the system of the Svātantrikas founded by Bhāvaviveka.

² Cp above, p 26 1 sattvāt=vidyamānātvaṁ
³ It "should not arise," i.e. not change. The Spirit of the Sānkhya is changeless.

⁴ "Because they exist, this reason is uncertain, what? should the (six) mental bases (of cognition), because they exist like the Spirit not arise out of self, or like jars etc., they should arise out of a self?"
It may be objected (that the adduced example, the identity of matter in physical objects) like jars etc., is a *petitio principii*¹ and therefore the argument is not uncertain, but wrong². However this is not so, because the argument is stated not in conformity with our view, but from the standpoint of the Sāṅkhya, where mental phenomena indeed have a double nature, they are physical in themselves and at the same time, they are the reflection of the eternal changeless Spirit.

XXIV. THE MĀDHYAMIKA REPUDIATES HIS OPPONENT ON PRINCIPLES ADMITTED AS VALID BY THE SAME OPPONENT

But it may be objected that our own argument will then be liable to just the same criticism which we apply to the arguments of our opponents. All our arguments will be also wrong, because the reasons which will be adduced will either be non-entities, themselves, or they will represent something appertaining to a non-entity. When both parties are guilty of the same fault, it cannot be charged to the account of one of them alone. All thus our attack on logic will thus become unfounded.

To this we reply. Thus objection affects only those who, being Mādhyaikas. nevertheless, like Bhāvaviveka, have recourse to *bona fide* arguments³. But we do not resort to direct proof by syllogism. Our arguments can have only the result of repudiating

¹ sādhy-sāma
² not *anālāntika*, but *asiddha*, cp Nyāyabindu. p. 62,
³ *svatantra-anumāna*
the tenets of our opponents, for us they are not valid by themselves.

Supposing some one maintains that the eye perceives external objects. He will then be repudiated on principles which he himself admits. You maintain, he will be told, that the eye lacks the capacity of introspection which, in your opinion, is invariably concomitant with the capacity of apprehending external objects.

Now, we will assail it by a counter argument. Major premise. Wherever introspection is absent, cognition of external objects is also absent.

Example e.g., in physical objects like jars etc.

Minor premise The eye lacks the capacity of introspection, it is physical.

Therefore it cannot cognize external objects.

Thus it is that the perception of an external object like a patch of blue colour is in conflict with the fact that the eye itself is deficient in self-perception. This contradiction in the argument of our opponent has been disclosed by another argument which is valid from the standpoint of the opponent himself.

This alone is elicited by our syllogism. How is then the above mentioned accusation possible? How can it be maintained that our deduction contains the same flaw which we have found in the argument of our opponent?

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\(^1\) svātma-adarśana-dharma
XXV. LOGICAL REFUTATION ON THE BASIS OF FACTS ADMITTED BY ONLY ONE PARTY

Bhāvaviveka. It is true that for us Monists all individual facts possess no reality. However a discussion is possible even then when an argument is combatted on the basis of a principle admitted by one of the parties.

Answer. Yes, but it must be done on the basis of principles admitted by yourself, not on the basis of principles admitted by your opponent.

Thus\(^1\) is what happens in everyday life. Indeed, sometimes in common life two contending parties appoint somebody to judge them, and according to his verdict the gain or the loss is settled. Sometimes the disputant himself declares that he has won or lost. But never is this question of gain and loss to be settled by the enemy. What is good in common life is equally right in logic, because scientific logic is exclusively concerned with an examination of the principles which underlie purposive action in common life\(^2\).

For this very reason some logicians have maintained that an argument cannot be exploded on the basis of the principle admitted by the opponent, because it is just these principles, by him admitted, that it is intended to reject.

Of course, Dignāga thinks that a demonstration or a refutation can be valid, if it is carried on principles admitted by both parties, not by one of

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\(^1\) Read exam instead of eva p. 35.1

\(^2\) Cp text and Nyāyabindu p. 3.5.
them only. If admitted by one of them only, it will be inconclusive. But even he must make allowance for the just mentioned method prevailing in common life and admit the validity of arguments which start from principles admitted only by one party.

Indeed he admits that when discussions are going on about religious matters, you cannot repudiate the Scriptures adopted by your opponent on the basis of some other Scriptures which would be adopted by both parties. As to individual judgments which are going on in every man's consciousness, they are guided exclusively by what people themselves think right, not by what both parties, a respondent and his possible opponent, may agree upon.

Therefore the standpoint of strict logic is to no purpose. The Buddhas have favoured their converts, who were not versed in the science of logic, with arguments which suited the occasion. Enough about this subject. Let us continue our comment.

XXVI DENIAL OF CAUSALITY THROUGH A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE

Neither do entities arise out of something different from them just because from the monistic point of view the different does not exist. This

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1 Ibid III 58. (p 62).
2 svārthānumāna corresponds to our judgement, it includes every cognition which is not a direct passive sense perception.
3 or "just because entities do not exist in something else (= para-snun abhāvād eva)" as e.g., the cloth in the threads, the jar in the clay etc.
point will be elicited later on\(^1\), when it will be expressed that "what belongs to the things themselves, their own essence, does not belong to their causes and (conditions)\(^2\)."

Therefore, just because they do not pre-exist in something else, they cannot be produced out of it. Moreover the impossibility of a substantial break\(^3\) between cause and effect can also be established on the lines which we have laid down in our "Introduction to the Mādhyamika System" where it is said\(^4\),

If, to be sure, a thing were "other" in regard to causes,

Deep darkness would then be produced from light\(^5\)

Then surely everything could be produced out of anything,

Since "otherness" is just the same in causes and non-causes.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) cp aphorism 1, 3

\(^2\) Iat 36, 4 "The own existence, (svabhāta), of entities (bhāvinām) is not found in their condition, etc "cp mṛka 13

This is the Vaśesaka view, the cloth is something different from the sum total of the threads, the jar something over and above the sum total of the atoms of clay, etc,

\(^3\) parata utpattih, 36. 10

\(^4\) Madhy av, VI 14

\(^5\) When causality is understood as a regularity of succession, the day will be the cause of the following night and night would produce the following day, a question that has been often discussed in European philosophy.

\(^6\) Among all considerations which tend to undermine our usual conceptions of causation this one is considered by the Tibetans to be the strongest, they say it is as solid as diamond
The Master Buddhāpañcita comments, "entities cannot arise out of something essentially different from them, since it would follow that everything could arise out of anything."

The Master Bhāvaviveka assails this comment. "It is nonsense. He says, because the argument contains its own destruction, since (1) it is mere deductio ad absurdum, (2) it conflicts with the point previously established. Indeed in taking the counterpart of the reason and of the predicate we will have the following argument, "since everything must arise out of something and the origination out of non-self is rejected, entities must then arise either out of themselves or out of self and non-self combined, or without a cause, otherwise (really) everything would arise out of anything."

It is not nonsense. We have shown above that a deductio ad absurdum is a valid proof. As to the accusation that Buddhāpañcita in confuting the tenet of his opponent has indirectly invalidated his own previously established point, it is trivial. We will not again take pains to refute this.

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1 p 37 2 read sādhana-duṣanāntah i.e. ity asya sādhana-sya dūsana
2 p. 37 4 read with the Tibetan asamgatārtham nāsti.
3 The Vaiśeṣika who maintains parata utpatti
4 so paradūsananā svadūsananāṁ svadūśanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāṁ svadūṣanāmó
XXVII COMBINED CAUSALITY DENIED

Neither do the entities arise out of both (a continuant stuff and separate factors,) since all the incongruity attaching to each of these hypotheses separately will then attach to their combination.

But then both causes may perhaps work alternately, not simultaneously? No, since if they are not fit to produce something separately, (they neither will be fit to produce something alternately). Indeed it will be stated later on that—

The world\textsuperscript{1} could be a product,
From a double set of causes,
If separately they were efficient.\textsuperscript{2}

XXVIII NO PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE WITHOUT CAUSATION

But neither can the separate entities of this world arise without a cause. The incongruities which would follow on such an assumption will be pointed out later on, where it will be said,

If there be no causation,
All difference will vanish
Between a cause and its effect.\textsuperscript{3}

In our Introduction to the Mādhyamika System, we have also indicated the following incongruity,

Nothing at all could we perceive
In a universe devoid of causes,
It would be like the colour and the scent.
Of a lotus growing in the sky.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} duḥkha
\textsuperscript{2} M s., XII 9.
\textsuperscript{3} VIII 4
\textsuperscript{4} M av., VI 100.
The Master Buddhapālita comments "Entitias, says he, "neither can arise without a cause, since everything would then be possible at any time, and in any place."

This also has been assailed by Bhāvaviveka. He says, "this is again a mere deductio ad absurdum and it can be turned into the contrary, if the meaning of the argument be disclosed by taking the counterpart of the reason and of the predicate. You say "entities are not without a cause, since otherwise everything could appear at any time and at any place." I say, "entities must have a cause, since everything springs up at a definite time and in a definite place, and because as experience proves efficient causes produce new result." Therefore the comment of Buddhapālita on this point is wrong, because it contains the same mis-conception as his comment on the foregoing points.

As opponents¹ we will repeat that this criticism misses the mark. Its refutation has been made above.

XXIX CAUSALITY THROUGH THE WILL OF GOD

It may be supposed that this critique of the usual notion of causality is intended in order to introduce God or similar transcendental supreme cause. But this is also impossible, because God must be included in one of the alternatives discussed, according to the idea we entertain about his essence. He is either

¹ The same use of the term apara as above. text p 96
immanent in the world, or transcends it, or he is both simultaneously immanent and transcendent.

Thus it is established that there is no causality in the ultimate sense. The dependent Origination (or Relativity) with its eight characteristics of no real origination etc. is thus established.

XXX MAHĀYĀNA AND HĪNAYĀNA CONTRASTED

An objection is here raised by the Hīnayānist. If it is so, he says, if your interpretation of the principle of Dependent Origination as a principle of Relativity involving that there is no real Causality is correct, how are the deliverances of Buddha to be explained which run against such a theory. Indeed it has been declared,

(1) "The forces\(^1\) of life are influenced in this world by illusion and desire. When illusion and all desires have been suppressed in Nirvāṇa, these forces are extinct,"\(^2\) This suggests the reality of the force of illusion and of Nirvāṇa.

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\(^1\) samskāra.

\(^2\) This is the abridged formula of pratītya-samutpāda as applied to the development of an individual life in 12 consecutive stages, the so called prākarṣikā or āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda. Its first part corresponds to the direct order (anuloma) of the members, its second part to their reversed (pratiloma) order. This abridgment clearly reveals the simple meaning of the formula as it is understood in all Buddhist countries. Cp. O Rosengerg, rPobleme, ch XVI and my Central Conception. p. 28 n3.
(2) All elements\(^1\) of life,
   They all appear and disappear;
   As soon as they appear they vanish.
   Their final stoppage is the only bliss
   And further:——

(3) "Whether some elements of existence have appeared or whether they have not appeared, there is, according to the teaching of the Buddhas no controlling conscious Agent who makes them either appear or not appear, remains unchallenged just this eternal essence of what the elements really are, (their causal interconnection )\(^2\)

\(^1\) सादृश्यार्थ for सामाज्य-धर्मा

\(^2\) This is the celebrated formula of प्रतिष्ठ-समुदपदा in its generalised sense as given in the शालिस्वर-सूत्रा, it is very often quoted, cp references in M de la V P 's text edition, p. 40 n 1. The second तथागतानाम must be dropped and the first understood with तदभवविन्य परसर, p. 41 8 in the sense of तथागतानाम मात्र लत "whether according to the Buddhas the dharmas originate or if they do not originate, this their essence necessarily stands". The notion of causality, as well as the idea of a gradual evolution by karma, of the world towards Nirvāṇa, the absence in this process of any controlling conscious Will, all this is included in the connotation of the term dharma itself. Therefore dharma as an element of existence and dharmas as the doctome about these elements are expressed by the same word. The formula is found in Hinayānistic as well as in Mahāyānistic literature. Madhavacārya, borrowing from some Buddhist source, gives it a Hinayānist interpretation (धर्मान्याम कार्य-कारण-रिपानाम) Candrapāci takes it as a comprehensive formula admitting both doctrines, it very well suits his aim in this place, since he wishes to establish that the Hinayā-
(4) "There is one fundamental law for the subsistence of living beings, that is their fourfold nutrition"

(5) "There are two mental elements which protect the world, humility and the sense of justice."

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The Buddhist view is the simpler one and the Mahāyānist the deeper one. In Astas Prajñāp p. 573 ff and in Bodhicaryāvatār it is given a Mahāyānist interpretation as a denial of causation and of plurality. The meaning of the formula may then be freely rendered thus: "Whether we, with the Hinayānists, decide that according to the teaching of the Buddhas there is a causality between the separate elements of existence or whether we, with the Mahāyānists, decide that there is none, the eternal essence of elements stands as a unity." At the time when the theory of a kārana-ketu was established in the Abhidharma, this theory which implies a universal link of a special causality between all the elements of the Universe, past, present and future, at that time the Mahāyānistic Monism was already foreshadowed.

1 Here dharma is not used in the Buddhist technical sense of an element. It is not one of the 75 dharman. The conception of food as an abstract principle of keeping life going is unrelated from the Upanishads (cp Jacob, Concordance, s.v. anna.) The food is physical in the realms of gross bodies. It is spiritual, consisting of sensations (sparśa), volitions, (cetanā) and consciousness (vijñāna) in the mystical worlds of the real bodies and pure spirits.

2 Here dharma is used in the technical sense, since hri and aparāpā are included in the 75 dharman. The prominence given to these moral forces (samkhāras) is natural, since the reverse of them, irreverence and indifference for justice, are supposed to be the deepest root of every immoral deed, cp My Central Conception p. 101, 102. Their definition is a shade different in the Trimsikā p. 27.
(6) "There is a descent from another world in to this one, and a departure from this one into another one."

Thus it is clear that Buddha has taught a principle of Dependent Origination which is not incompatible with the disappearing of some things and the appearing of others. How can you assert that it does not interfere with your principle of Relativity?

It is just for this reason, because Scripture mentions a principle of Dependent Origination meaning that some elements disappear (when others appear), it is for this very reason that our Master Nagarjuna has composed his Treatise on Relativity, in order to show the difference between the real and the conventional meaning of the Scripture. All the above utterances which mention a principle of Dependent Origination along with real causation do not refer to the pure essence of the objects which reveals itself when the darkness of our ignorance in philosophy is dispelled. On the contrary, it refers to that condition of the world which reveals itself to the mental eyes whose vision is vitiated by the darkness of illusion.

There are other utterances of Buddha which, on the contrary, refer to the absolute reality:

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1 i.e., first of all, out of this would into one of the mystic one. For the identification of all these quotations cp. the notes of M. de la V. to his edition.

2 Read vrudhyate instead of nrudhyate

3 Read āsrava (so vega āsrava) instead of anāsrava.

4 Maññacyāna = praṇāja-caksuh.
1. "The paramount Reality, Brethren, is Nirvāna, it is not a clandestine Reality. All the combined forces of phenomenal life are illusions."

2. There is in this world, neither Reality, nor the absence of Illusion. It is surreptitious Reality, it is cancelled Reality, it is a lie, childish babble, an Illusion."

Further,
All matter is a piece of foam, all feeling is a babble.
A mirage all ideas are, a (hollow) plantain trunk the forces,
The sunlike Buddha has declared
(All) consciousness is but illusion.
Attentive, mindful day and night,
The recluse full of courage,
By contemplating (separate) elements,
Should penetrate into Quiescence,
The bliss where all the energies repose
5. "Because all elements that are active in the process of life contain nothing real, Plurality is an illusion."

1 "The element having the characteristic of not being some stolen good," i.e. the nonrelative
2 This stanza is found in Samyutta N III 142 where the illusion regarding the 6 skandhas must be understood as referring to the theory of pudgala-navrāmya. Here evidently Candrakīrti takes it as referring to the theory of dharma-navrāmya
3 dharma—samskṛta-dharma—samskāra
4 A very frequent proposition referring to the theory of dharma-navrāmya
XXXI THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT MEANING OF BUDDHA'S WORDS

For the sake of those, who, having no thorough knowledge of the intention contained in the different utterances of Buddha, fall into doubt whether a particular expression refers to the absolute truth or whether it does depart from it with a special intention, and for the sake of those who, owing to their slow wits, mistake a metaphorical expression for the real intention; for the sake of both these classes of men needing instruction is this treatise composed, in order to dispel doubt and misconception by the way of argument and references to Scripture.

The arguments have been exposed above in commenting upon the aphorism “entities do not arise out of themselves”

The Scriptural references are given by Nāgārjuna in the following chapters, e.g.

The stolen goods are of no use,  
This has been said by Buddha,  
And all the forces in this world  
Are stolen goods, They are illusion ¹

And further,  
This world has neither beginning nor an end,  
We do not see its first extremity  
The great ascetic has declared,  
It has no first, it has no last ²

¹ Ms XIII 1  
² Ms XI 1
And further, when speaking to Kātyāyāna, the Buddha did elicit,

What is existence, non-existence what?
He then denied both issues,
The possibility of affirmation and negation.¹

In these and similar aphorisms of Nāgārjuna Scripture is quoted.

Some supplementary scriptural evidence is here appended. In the discourse with Aksayamati we find the following statement. "What are the scriptural texts which have a conventional meaning, and what are those which have a direct meaning? Those discourses which have been delivered in order to teach the path of salvation are metaphorically expressed. Those discourses which are delivered in order to teach the Final Result are expressed with precision. Wheresoever you find a text specifying the entrance into That kind of Final Deliverance which is Relativity, where there is no separate object, no profound meditation, no volition, no birth, no causation, no existence, no Ego, no living creatures, no individual Soul, no personality and no Lord—they are called texts having direct meaning. Thus, O Reverend Sāriputra, is called keeping to the precise meaning of the Scripture and not to their metaphorical expressions".

Further it is stated in the Samādhirājasūtra,

A man who knows the difference
Of the precise meaning of Scripture,

¹ MS XV. 7
Knows in what sense the Relativity\textsuperscript{1} Has been conceived by Buddha
When on the contrary, the personality,
The Being, the Spiritual Self are spoken of,
He knows that all the elements are then
Conventionally taken

Therefore, in order to show that the doctrine which
admits causality etc is a wrong doctrine, our Master
Nāgārjuna has undertaken to reconsider the doctrine
of Dependent Origination.

XXXII HOW IS THE MORAL LAW TO BE
VINDICATED IN AN UNREAL WORLD

Now, the following objection will eventually be
made If the Master has composed this treatise in
order to prove that there is no real causation and
that the plurality of the elements of life is a mere
illusion, then, considering that what is an illusion does
not really exist, it will follow that wicked actions do
not exist and if they do not exist, neither do miser-
able lives exist, nor any virtuous actions are possible,
and without them no happy life Without the happy
and unhappy lives, there will be no phenomenal world\textsuperscript{2}
and thus all endeavours towards a better life will be
absolutely fruitless We answer We teach the illu-
sion of existence as an antidote against the obstinate
belief of common mankind in the reality of this world,
we teach its real true truth. But for the Saints,\textsuperscript{3}
there is no need for that They have reached the goal.

\textsuperscript{1} Śūnyatā
\textsuperscript{2} santāra
\textsuperscript{3} ārya
They apprehend no plurality, nothing that could be illusion or non-illusion. And when a man has thoroughly realised the pluralistic illusion of all separate entities, there is for him no Moral Law. How can there be any virtuous actions for him, or any phenomenal life? The question whether an entity exists or does not exist will never occur to him.

Accordingly Buddha has declared in the "Ratnakūta Discourse", O Kāśyapa, if we search for consciousness we do not find it. What is not to be found is not to be perceived. What is not to be perceived is neither past, nor future, nor present. What is neither past, nor future, nor present has no separate reality. What has no reality has no causation. What is uncaused cannot disappear. But an ordinary man follows wrong views. He does not realize the illusive character of separate elements. He obstinately thinks that the contingent entities have a reality of their own. Swayed by this inveterate belief in the reality of separate things, he takes action and as consequence of this he migrates through this phenomenal world. As long as he takes his stand on such confusion, he is not fit to attain Nirvāṇa.”

But although the reality of these separate entities is an illusion, they nevertheless can produce either moral defilement or purification, just as the magical apparition of a beauty inspires passion to those who

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1 svabhāvataḥ
2 ādhyātma-ābhānaveśa, it regards the dharmas as real.
3 Karma, technically it means that blind biotic forces (karma)
0 parate, seemingly through him
have not realized her nature, and just as a vision evoked by the Buddha is a cause of moral purification for those who have practised the roots of virtue

Thus it is stated in the "Discourse with the Didhāsaya" "It is similar, 0 noble son, to somebody watching a magical show. He contemplates the vision of a pretty woman and his heart fills with passion. Feeling shy before the audience, he gets up from his seat and disappears After having left, he tries to persuade himself that the woman was ugly, that it is even no real personality, but an assemblage of elements impermanent, disquieting and illusive etc"

The following is stated in the Vinaya "An engineer might construct a mechanical doll with the form of a beautiful young woman It was not a real woman, but the workmanship was so perfect that it appeared as a real beauty, and an artist painter really fell in love with it. Just so it is that phenomena, although having no separate reality of their own, are nevertheless efficient producers either of moral pollution or moral purification for simple people

We find in the Ratnakūtasūtra the following story "At that time there were five hundred monks who did not understand the preaching of the Buddha They did not go deep into it They had no fervour for it They then stood up from their seats and went away The Buddha on this occasion produced a magical vision of two recluse on the path by which

1 yantra-āṭa
2 Cp-Wasshew, p 157.
the monks were receding. The five hundred monks then reached the place where the two apparitional recluses were standing. Having met them they spoke unto them. “Where are both the Reverend Fathers going.”? The magical monks answered. “We are retiring to the woods. There we will live enjoying the delightful feeling of trance. We cannot penetrate the doctrine taught by the Buddha, we cannot go deep into it. We feel no devotion. we fear it. we are trembling before it.” Then the five hundred monks spoke. “Neither we can penetrate into the doctrine taught by the Buddha, nor can we go deep into it, nor are we devoted to it. We fear. we tremble. we have got quite in a tremble. Therefore we too will go to the woods and live there enjoying the delightful feeling of trance.” The magical monks spoke. “Therefore, O Reverend ones. we shall be united. we shall not quarrel. Above all duties for the monk, not to quarrel is the paramount.” What do the Reverend ones think to get rid of?” They answered. “We think to get rid of covetousness, of hatred and of infatuation.” The two magical monks spoke. “But are the Reverend ones really possessed of covetousness, hatred and infatuation which they want to forsake?” They answered. “They are not to be perceived, neither in us internally, nor in the things externally, nor in the space between both. Nor can they indeed arise without having been imagined.” The magical monks spoke. “Therefore, O Reverend ones, do not imagine them, do not fancy them. And if the Reverend ones will not imagine, will not fancy them. they will neither love nor hate. The man who neither loves
nor hates, is called dispassionate. Merit, O Reverend ones, neither migrates, nor finally disappears. Trance, Wisdom, Deliverance, the intellectual awakening of the first glimpse of Nirvāṇa—they do not migrate, nor do they disappear, they are the elements, O Reverend ones, through which Nirvāṇa is suggested. But in themselves, O Reverend ones, these elements are also relative, they have no essence. You must forget, O Reverend ones, even the idea of a separate Final Nirvāṇa. Do not produce conceptions about what is only an idea. For him who very much thinks about an idea as an idea, this idea becomes a prison. O Reverend ones you must enter that mystic condition where all concepts and all feelings are extinct. We tell you that a recluse who is merged in such a trance has reached the climax after which no further progress is possible." After that these five hundred recluses got their minds delivered from all bonds, even from dispassionate bonds. Having got their minds thus enlightened, they approached the place where the Buddha was dwelling. After having approached, they saluted the feet of the Lord in touching the ground with their heads and sat aside."

"The Reverend Subhūṭi then spoke to the recluses thus. "O Brethren, where did you go, whereas form are you coming?" They answered. "O Reverend Subhūṭi, the system taught by the Lord does not allow for moving to some place nor for coming from some places." Subhūṭi spoke. "Who is your tea-

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1. vimukti-māṇḍapa-darśana
2. śūnya
cher?" They answered. "That one who never was born and never will disappear." He asked "In what spirit has philosophy been taught to you?" They answered. "The goal was neither Bondage nor was it Deliverance." He asked. "Who has drilled you?" They answered "That one who neither has a body nor a mind." He asked. "What was the method of your preparation. They answered. "Neither that of foregoing ignorance nor that of acquiring knowledge," He asked. "Whose disciples are you?" They answered. "Of that one who has not reached Nirvāna'," who has not attained the Supreme Enlightenment." He asked. "Who are your fellow disciples?" They answered. "Those who never appear in one of the three planes of existence." He asked. "O Brethren, how long will it take you to reach Supreme Nirvāna? They answered. "We will have reached it when all the magical bodies created by The Buddhas will vanish." He asked. "How have you reached the goal?" They answered. "By analysing the idea of Self and the idea of Mine." He asked. "How have you got rid of passions?" They answered. "By the utter annihilation of all the elements of life." He asked. "How have you challenged the Tempter?" They answered. "By disregarding the tempter who is inherent in the elements of our individuality," He asked. "How have you been communicating with your Teacher?" They answered. "Neither bodily, nor vocally, nor

1 *paramāsya*. These demals evidently refer to the Hinayānistic conceptions of Nirvāna.
mentally." He asked. "How have you discharged your charity obligations?" They answered. "By taking nothing, by receiving nothing," He asked. "How have you escaped rebirth?" They answered. "By evading both annihilation and eternity." He asked. "How have you reached the goal of charity?" They answered. "By being absolutely averse to every property." He asked. "What are you going in for?" They answered. "We are going in for the same aim as all apparitional existences created by Buddha."

"During this meeting when Subhūti was starting questions and the recluses giving answers, 800 monks got rid even of their dispassionate bonds\(^1\) and 32000 men had their spiritual eyes cleared of all dust and filth, with regard to the reality of all elements of life."

Thus it is that the two magical apparitions which had no real existence, which were magically created by the Buddha have laid down the foundation for the purification of five hundred recluses.

It is also declared in the Vajramanḍadhāraṇī,\(^2\) Thus it is, O Manjuśrī, that and conditioned by an effort of a man's hand by a piece of wood and by attrition, smoke appears, and fire appears. But this conflagration is neither in the piece of wood, nor in the attrition, nor is it included in the effort of the hands. Even so it is, O Manjuśrī, that in the individuality called man one feels bewildered by an illusive unreality. The conflagration of lust, the conflagration of hatred and the conflagration of infatua-

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\(^1\) I.e. they became āryas

tion are produced. But this conflagration is not inside him, neither is it in the objects outside him, nor in the intermediate space between both. Again, O Mañjuśrī, what we call illusion, why is it so called, Illusion, O Mañjuśrī, is a condition of complete error in regard to all elements of existence. The axiom of this Dhāranī is that all elements are like the hells.” When asked “How is it O Buddha, that this is the maxim?” He answered. “The hells, O Mañjuśrī, are produced by imagination. Fools and simple people are cheated by error and illusion.” He asks “Wherefrom, O Blessed one, do the hells descend?” Buddha answers. “From the Space do the hells descend.” “Do you think, O Mañjuśrī, that the hells are produced by our imagination or do they exist as a separate reality?” He answers. “The transmigration of our Soul into the hells, into animals and into ghosts is fancied by the imagination of fools and simple people. By error and imputation, they imagine that they suffer, that they live a life of misery in these three inferior planes of existence.”

“These tortures of the hell exist, O Blessed One only as far as I imagine them. Let us, e.g., suppose, O Blessed One, that somebody in a dream imagines himself gone down to the hell. He will then imagine that he is cast in an iron vessel, boiling amidst blazing fires, quite filled with many human beings.¹ There he will be tormented by a strong, acute, intense pain. This awful suffering he will imagine in his mind. He nevertheless will be frightened, will be terror-stricken.

¹ eka-pauruse, cp Tib
Having then awakened,\(^1\) he will cry out "Oh, how awful, how awful." He will be distressed and lament. His friends, acquaintances and relatives will ask, "who has made you suffer so much"? He will reply to these friends, acquaintances and relatives. "I have suffered the tortures of the hell.” He will then revile and repeat, "I am suffering the tortures of the hell, and you ask me to tell you who has made me so suffer". Then these friends, acquaintances and relatives will address the man in the following way. "Be not afraid, O man, you were asleep, you have not left this house.” He will then regain memory and think, "Yes, I have been asleep, this is all wrong, it is my imagination. And he will again recover his good spirits”

"Thus it is, O Blessed One, that this man dreaming in sleep has imagined, through a wrong imputation, that he has been in the hell. It is in the same manner, O Blessed One, that all simple and foolish people are saturated with an imagined sexual appetite. They construct for themselves the idea of a woman as the target of their desires. Having constructed it, they imagine that they enjoy themselves in her company. To such a foolish and simple man it occurs, "I am a man, she is a woman, she is my wife.” His mind is overcome by lust and delight, he allows his mind to indulge in pleasure. Moved by such feelings he might produce a row, a dispute, an altercation. His senses become obscured, he breathes hate. With these illusions he then imagines himself passing away

\(^1\) samānah "with self assurance". according to Tib.
and suffering in the hells during many thousands of eons. The friends, acquaintances and relatives of this man, O Blessed One, will speak to him in the following way. “Don’t fear, don’t be frightened, O man. You were asleep, you did not leave this house.”

“O Blessed One, it is just according to this relativity of the phenomenal world that the divine Buddhas have preached their doctrine to the living creatures who are imbued with the fourfold¹ illusion of the world’s reality.” “There is here (in this world, they teach) neither man nor woman; no living creature, no Soul, no Spirit, no Personality. All this plurality of the ultimate elements² of existence is an illusion. They do not exist. They are misleading, they are like a trick, they are like a dream, they are like magic, they are like the reflection of the moon in water, etc.” Having received this instruction of the Buddha the living creatures perceive the plurality of elements without their enticement, without their illusive character, without considering them as separate existences, without this covering of plurality. They pass away with their mind merged in Space. After having passed away they will be completely merged in the Final Reality of Nirvāṇa.³ Thus, O Blessed One, do I regard the hells.”

It is also said in the “Questions of the Venerable Upāli”,⁴ “I have seen the many terrors of the hell,

¹ i.e., the illusions of a real self, its bliss, its purity, its permanence. Cp. Yoga-sūtra II 5.
² Sarva-dharmāḥ
³ Nirvāṇa-sesa nirvāṇa-dhātu.
⁴ This work is quoted in Śiksā-samuccaya as an authority on confession, p. 164, 168, 178, 290.
by which thousands of creatures are tortured. But there are no creatures in this world who after death go to the tortures of the hell. There are there no swords, no arrows and no spears, by which torture is inflicted in imagination they fancy them falling upon their bodies. There are no real weapons. And in the heavens delightful golden palaces decorated with beautiful variegated flowers appear before us, but nobody has constructed them. They are also constructed by imagination. The simple man constructs them in imagination. The foolish sticks to these constructed conceptions. Whether we stick to them or do not stick to them, they are not real. These our conceptions are like *fata morgana.*"

Thus it is proved that these separate entities of the phenomenal world have no real independent existence of their own. To simple people who are misled by their own subjective illusions, they become a source of moral defilement in this life. In our "Introduction into the Mādhyamika System", we\(^1\) have explained at length how it is that objects which have no reality of their own can nevertheless produce either moral defilement or moral purification. There it can be learnt

XXXIII THE TWELVE MEMBERED CAUSAL SERIES REFERS TO THE PHENOMENAL WORLD

To this the Hinayānists objects. If there is altogether no causation, if things arise neither out of them-

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\(^1\) The tenor of this work in general is probably meant
selves, nor out of something extraneous, nor out of both these sources, nor at random, how is the causal series preached by the Buddhas to be understood, how is it that he has declared that as long as illusion has not been extinct by knowledge and meditation, prenatal forces will always produce new lives?\(^1\)

\(^1\) The last but one chapter of the Mādhya. śāstra is devoted to the examination of the formula of the twelve membered Causal series. It is there given the following interpretation. There is in the world a craving for life (punar-bhavārum) produced by an illusion (avidyā) which can be stopped by the tattvadāsaṃ In Mahāyāna, it is the Saint who intuits the world sub specie aeternitatis. In Hinayāna, it is the Yogi who really stops all the function of life and coverts it into an eternal death. Under the influence of such illusion prenatal forces (samsālāra=karma) produces new life (ujjñāna), an embryo (nāma rupa=panca-skanda) is formed (lakṣaṇa nāmarupam nesucyate), which gradually develops the senses (sādāyatanā), sensation (sparśa), feeling (vedana), sexual appetite (trṣṇā), the habits underlying (upādāna) life, life itself (bhava=new karma), and, after death, a new birth, old age and death again. The formula represents the rotation of the phenomenal life (duḥkhā) in which there is no eternal principle, which is kevala=anāttaka=12 āyatanas, with the implication that it can be completely stopped, without any residue of life, in Nīrṇāṇa. If its connection with the theory of the separate elements (dharmas) and their total extinction in Nīrṇāṇa, ultimately through yoga, is overlooked, the formula simply states that living beings come and go, are born and die. Cp. O Rosenberg, Problems, ch XVI. The interpretation of Nāgārjuna is virtually the same as is current in all Buddhist countries, cp. Aung, Co., pendium, p. 259, ff. In prof. B. Keith's interpretation op. cit. p. 99 ff. the simple formula is converted into a heap of absurdities.
We answer. This is the phenomenal point of view,\(^1\) it is not absolute reality.\(^2\)

The realist. Please tell, how is phenomenalism proved?\(^2\)

Mādhyamika. Phenomenalism is nothing but the expression of the fact of Universal Relativity.\(^3\) It cannot be established otherwise than by denying the four theories of causation just examined, since they necessarily imply the realistic view\(^4\) of a plurality of substances having their own reality. But if we take our stand upon Universal Relativity,\(^3\) the cause and effect, being correlative, have neither of them any absolute existence. Realism\(^4\) is thus repudiated.

Accordingly it has been said,\(^5\)
Philosophers assume phenomenal world,\(^6\)
Either as self-produced or as non-self produced,
Or causeless or both self and non-self made.
But you have proved, it is contingent\(^7\)
And it will be stated in this treatise later on,\(^8\)
So far as there are effects, there is a cause
So far as there is a cause, there are effects,
We cannot realize,

For their reality another reason

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\(^1\) samytriḥ, or this is “the covering”, “the face of it”

\(^2\) tatvam

\(^3\) āditypratyayatā-mātram\(=\)pratyaya-samutpāda-mātram, op. text, transl p 153

\(^4\) sa-svabhāva-vādah

\(^5\) Lokatta-stava, 19, Bstan-ḥyur, Bṣād, I (M dela V P

\(^6\) duhkha

\(^7\) pratiṣṭha-jā.

\(^8\) VIII 12
Just the same has been declared by Buddha himself in the following words,

"The theory of separate elements implying the denial of personal identity means that "this exists so far as that exists", "if this has appeared that will appear". e.g., prenatal forces exist so far as illusion and desire have not been stopped, a new life is produced so far there are prenatal forces which produce it, etc. etc."

XXXIV. CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF LOGIC

A vehement protest is raised by some philosophers against this condemnation of logic. "You

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1 dharma sanāketa=pudgala-navrāmya=12 āyatana, op Central Conception, p. 28
2 pudgala-navrāmya=anātma
3 Thus very ancient formulation, cp, Majjh M., III 63, is given a realistic interpretation in Hinayāna and a transcendental one in Mahāyāna, cp above p 40
4 vijnāna In the first period of the development of the embryo it is dormant (samamūrcchita), until sensation (sparśa) appears. In a bird's egg, as long as it has not lost vitality, there is vijnāna according to the principles of pratitya-samutpāda. When the term is mistranslated as "thought", "pensee" etc confusion inevitably arises Prof Keith, op cit p 101, has imagined that it is "visible". Visible is termed in the Pali Canon "samadassana". Among the 75 ultimates there is only one, the rūpa-āyatana, i.e. colour, which is visible, cp Dīgha N. III 217, Ab Koṭah, I 28
5 pari-codana
6 Thus and the following discussion refers to the pramāṇaviniścaya-vāda of Dignāga and others. The first step in the vindication of logic has been made by Bhāvaśekra. But he remained a Mādhyamika. The pramāṇa-viniścaya-vāda is exposed by Vā-
maintain." they say" that separate entities are not caused (in the absolute sense). Now, is this assertion founded on argument, or is it not founded on argument? If you admit that it is founded on argument, you are obliged to answer the following questions: How many are the sources of our knowledge? What is their essence? What is their scope? What is their origin? Have they arisen out of themselves, out of something extraneous, out of both, or out of nothing? But if your denial of causation is not founded on argument, it must be rejected, because our cognition of an object depends upon the method by which it is cognized. If something is not known, it cannot become known otherwise than by appropriate methods. If these methods do not exist, neither will cognition ever be arrived at. How is then your explicit assertion possible? You cannot assert that the separate entities are not caused. Or else just the same reason which allows you to maintain that nothing is caused will also allow me to maintain the contrary, viz. that every single thing exists. And just as you assert that all our elements of existence are uncaused, 1 I will maintain that whatsoever exists has a cause. 2

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1 anutpannāḥ sarva-dharmāḥ (dharma=bhūva)
2 sarva-bhāvotpattīḥ
"Or perhaps, you do not really believe that nothing is being produced, you tell it just for the sake of cavilling? But then you will never persuade your opponent to believe a theory you do not yourself believe. The composition of this treatise will then serve no purpose, and the denial of Pluralism will not have been really made."

Madhyamika. We answer: If our system did allow assertive judgments implying the transcendental reality of a substratum, the question would then arise whether these judgments are founded on sound method or not. However, there is no place for them in a system of Universal Relativity. The reason for that is just the following one. If problematic judgements regarding reality were admitted as possible, we would then be obliged to admit the counterpart, the possibility of corresponding assertions. But we also absolutely deny the possibility of problematic judgments regarding the transcendental reality of a substratum, how could we then make the correlative assertions, since they would not be correlative with other unexisting member of the relation. It would be like the length and the short-ness of an un-existing thing, e.g. the horn of a donkey. Therefore, since we do not make any such assertion, where are the things for the sake of whose reality we should so much imagine the existence of the sources of right knowledge? And how could we establish

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1 sarva-bhāva apratsuddhāḥ
2 Read tādavuddho
3 Lit., p. 52, 4 "We answer: If we would have what you call assertion, it would be produced either by right cognition or not
their number, their essence and their respective objects? How could we decide whether they originate out of non-self, out of both, or without a cause? It is not our business to answer all these questions.

The logician. You thus insist that you make no assertion whatsoever. But we hear from you a purely right cognition. But we have none. Why? Here, when non-assertion is possible, its counterpart, an assertion relative to it, might exist. But when we, first of all, don’t have any non-assertion, then wherefrom the counterpart, the assertion? Since it would be disregarding the other part of the relation, just as the length and the shortness of the donkey’s horn. And when there thus is no assertion, then for the sake of whose reality (siddhi) we would very much imagine (parikalpa) sources of right knowledge? mācaya≡ādhyāyasāya vikalpa, op-Tātparyat. p 88 22 vikalpa is an assertion of the form “Thus is that” sa evāyaṃ, op. N b t tipp. p 23 4, where the element “thus” refers to the “Hoe Aliquid” interpreted by Dignāga as the “thing in itself” (svakṣaṇa). The judgment is regarded as synthetic (kalpanā≡nāma-pūta-yaṣanā) and as dialectical (vikalapa-dilemma) mācaya evidently means a problematic judgment. It means either≡asmanmata, or≡satyam tūṇyatāyām. Op. N b. 69 22. If where it is stated that when something is cognized (paricchedya) it means that it is contrasted (uṣvancaḥdhyaya) with its counterpart. For both parties every assertion (mācaya= kalpanā) has a counterpart (pratipalasa), it is a dichotomy (śvarūdāhikaraṇa), it is relational (apekṣā), dialectical (vikalopa) if the counterpart (sambandha-antara≡pratipalasa) is missing, an assertion is impossible, since it would be without a counterpart, non-relative (nimāpekṣā). But for the Logician, every relation, as e.g. short ad long has an indirect (paratantara) reality in the underlying “thing in itself” (svakṣaṇa). Thus for the Mādhyamika is like the horn of a donkey. His point seems here to be that Relativity is itself relative.
position which looks like a definite assertion, viz. that entities arise neither out of themselves, nor out of something different, nor out of both, nor at random. How is that to be explained?

The Mādhyamika. We answer. This our statement appears decisive to simple people who try to understand it according to arguments familiar to them, but not to the Saints who can intuit absolute reality.

The Logician Do you really mean to say that these Saints believe in no argument?

The Mādhyamika. Who can say whether they have or not any arguments? About the Absolute the Saints remain silent. How is then a conversation with them on this subject possible? How can we then decide whether there are arguments or not? The Logician If the Saints do not enlarge upon arguments, how do they manage to bring them home to simple people the idea of the Absolute?

The Mādhyamika. When the Saints are engaged in a conversation with simple folk, they do not really

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1 māscatā-rūpaṃ vākyamupapatitah = pramāṇam.
2 The Buddhist Saint (ārya) is here the equivalent of the Monist who by mystic intuition (yogic-pratyakṣa) has reached a direct vision of the world sub specie aeternitatis, he has entered the dyeta-mārga, op. above p. 90. He has absolutely no judgments (māscaya), strictly speaking not even the assertion of Relativity (śūnyata) op above p. 49
3 paramārthaḥ
4 prapañca = vāk, M vr p 373 91Lit “Therefore wherefrom the possibility there of speech, so that there would be either argument or no argument”.
exhibit their own arguments. They take the arguments which are just the arguments that appeal to simple men, they provisionally admit them as a convenient method for the instruction of others, and thus give instruction to common people by just those methods which simple men can understand.

Just so it is that men influenced by sensuality invert the real condition of things. The real impurity in the body of a female they overlook. They imagine a non-existing beauty of its forms and are tormented by it. In order to liberate them from their passion, a person magically created by Buddha or a god may depict to them the impurities of the body which therefore were concealed from them under the idea of its beauty. This body, they will say, is covered with hair and contains other impurities in the intestines. These men will then get rid of their conviction that it was a beauty and attain impassibility.

Just the same happens here. Common mankind whose power of vision is obstructed by the darkness of ignorance imputes to separate entities a reality which they do not possess, a reality which for the Saint does not exist at all. It then happens that these ordinary men are tormented by some particular thing which they somehow imagine to exist. The

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1 The āsana-bhāvanā is here alluded to, the practice of the yogins to concentrate upon the repulsive, loathsome particulars of every animal life.

2 Cit p 58 1-3 "Just so here likewise, the worldlings are very much tormented (subject to leśtas) having imputed to something some inverted essence of entities, because their mental eyes are obstructed by the darkness or ophthalmia of ignorance, an essence whose substance is in every respect unperceived by the Saints."
Saints then try to rouse their skepticism by some argument which would appeal to them. E.g., supposing the Sāṅkhya proves his tenet of identity between an effect and its material cause, the Monist then says, "If the jar did really exist in the lump of clay, it would never have needed to be produced out of it once more". This will be acquiesced in. He then concludes, "If something exists before its production, it need not be produced once more, because it exists". Thus the Sāṅkhya will be confuted in a way intelligible to everybody.

Similarly will it be said against the converse theory of the Vaiśeṣikas who admit a break between the effect and its material cause, "You agree that a sprout cannot be produced out of blazing coal because the latter is different, we then must conclude that it neither originates out of seeds etc., which are usually represented\(^1\) as their cause, since they also are different\(^2\).

\(^1\) *vivakṣa*

\(^2\) In order to save the reality and substantiaity of separate objects the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the effect is absolutely different (\*atyanta-bhūna\*) from its material cause, and that the whole contains something in addition, over and above its parts. But this does not prevent them from maintaining that the parts are inherent (\*samaveta\*) in the whole. The Mādhyamika here resorts to his "diamond-like argument against Causality, "If the effect is different, there is no causation, if it is partly different and partly non-different the difficulty will be double". This of course should not prevent him from making use of the everyday conception of Causality when needed.
The Logician may at last maintain that causality exists because such is our direct experience ¹.

Mādhyamika This also is wrong because of the following argument:

Thesis This direct experience is misleading

Reason Because it is experience

Example Just as the direct experience of a double moon by a man suffering from ophthalmia

Consequently it is wrong to oppose our argument on the basis of direct experience, since the reliability of the latter remains to be proved ².

We have thus established in the first chapter of our work that the separate entities of the phenomenal world have never originated and do not exist. And we have proved this by our negative method. We first assume the reality of something impossible and then condemn it ³.

The remaining parts of the treatise are now concerned with details. They are devoted to the repudiation of all possible characteristics of reality, wheresoever they have been assumed to exist. It will be shown that in the light of Relativity, all these particular characteristics are not ultimately real, e.g.,

¹ anubhava
² sadhya-sama
³ Lot, p. 58 10, "Therefore unproduced are the entities, thus, first of all, by counterargument, by imputation of a contrary essence, the first chapter is composed."
neither a moving object, nor the point to be reached,\(^1\) nor motion\(^2\) itself do really exist.\(^3\)

***XXXV. CONTROVERSY WITH THE BUDDHIST LOGICIAN CONTINUED***

However there is still a question to be considered, viz. the theory of our Buddhist epistemologists. "We are only giving, they maintain, a scientific description of what just happens in common life, in regard to the sources of knowledge and their respective objects. We do not consider their transcendental reality.\(^4\)

The Mādhyamika asks. But what is the upshot of such a description, does it lead to the cognition of the Absolute?\(^2\)

The Logician No, but bunglers in logic, the Nāryāyikas have given wrong definitions of logical processes and we have then given the right ones.

\(^1\) gatavya, cp II 25

\(^2\) C II is devoted to the denial of motion. It is noteworthy that a splendid opportunity offered itself here to Nāgārjuna to repeat, in some form or other, some of Zeno of Elea's deductions of our usual conception of motion ad absurdum. The Greek philosopher was also a monist; he was anxious to prove that motion is impossible, because he followed Parmenides in denying plurality. There is no trace of Nāgārjuna having known them.

\(^3\) Lit., p 58 12-13, "in order to teach that without exception every characteristic of pratītya-samutpāda does not exist." In this phrasing pratītya-samutpāda becomes a synonym of reality (śūnyakhyā pratītya-samutpādah). Since it is synonymous with śūnyatā, cp p. 431, it is quite clear that this latter term means reality, and not voidness, the voidness refers to all its determinations which have only empirical reality.

\(^4\) It seems that the first chapter originally ended with the words pratītyadanaṁthaṁ, p 58 12-13. The following discussion with a follower of Dignāga looks like a later addition.
The Mādhyamika. This also is beyond the mark, we will reply, because if the realistic logicians, the Naiyāyikas, are bad logicians, and have given wrong definitions of logical processes, then there must be a gap between what humanity at large imagines about the essence of cognition and what the realists are teaching. Then alone will your emendatory work prove promising. But this is not the case. Your work, therefore, is a quite useless occupation.  

Lit p 59 1-3 "This is wrong. If indeed bad logicians have produced inverted definitions, common mankind would have the reverse of what is being defined, for the sake of it there could be some fruitfulness of the endeavour. But it is not so. Therefore the endeavour is quite useless." The Naiyāyikas, in their conceptions about the categories of existence and the ways of cognising them, follow the every-day conceptions of common humanity. Now, if the Buddhist Logician, who is here represented as likewise adhering to the every-day logic, has really no other aim than to correct the logic of the Naiyāyikas, there must be divergence between the latter and the common life views, otherwise the—Buddhist would have nothing to correct in these theories of the Naiyāyikas. But "it is not so", i.e. the Naiyāyika views are much nearer to the conception of simple humanity than what the Buddhists are teaching about logical questions. Therefore if the Buddhist really intends to remain on empirical ground, his "endeavour is quite useless", he has nothing better to do than to accept the logic of the Realist. Thus the Mādhyamika has done. He accepts the categories of existence and the modes of cognising them (the 4 pramāṇas) of the Naiyāyikas, as well as the theory that our sense faculties (saṃkalpa) can apprehend the universal as well as the particular things. He accepts all this with the proviso that it is empirical cognition which has nothing to do with the cognition of the Absolute, and which, from the transcendental stand-point is an illusion (saṃsarga), since it is relative (śūnya), not absolute (not paramārtha-satya). As to
Moreover the criticism directed against epistemology by Nāgārjuna in his “Repudiation of Contests”

Dīghanāga’s school, it is true that it investigates that kind of cognition which is not contradicted by experience, which is *samvādaka*, and defines reality i.e., ultimate reality, as efficiency. They have the right to maintain that in their logic they partly remain on empirical ground. But they establish a sharp distinction between the “pure” object (*sūḍḍha-artha*) “pure synthesis, or reason” (*sūḍḍha-kāla-paṇca*), pure sensation (*sūḍḍha-pratyakṣa-kṣam= nirukalpākam*) and empirical definite cognition (*nāścaya= adhyavasāya*). With regard to the latter there is no divergence, hardly any, between the logic of the Nāyākyas and the Buddhists, *prāpya-visaye (=adhyavasate) nāśc uṇādah*. But with regard to the former, the divergence is decisive, *grāhyavisaye (=paramārtha sat) tu mhn uṇādah*. In pure sensation we cognize the pure object, the “thing in itself” *sva-laksāna*, the point-instant *lāna*, the focus of efficiency. Here we part with the empirical ground, the “the thing in itself” cannot be cognised empirically (*nāścena na prāpyate*), but it is reached in pure sensation (*aps tu vyānena=pratyakṣena= nirukalpakaṇa*). It is a kind of limit, a kind of “Grenzegriff” (*loka-maryādā*), and the logicians who have established it are transcendentalists (*atypata-loka-maryādā*). It is as much the central conception in Dīghanāga’s system as Relativity (*sūnyatā*) is the central conception of the Mādhyamikas and pluralism (*dharma*ḥ) the central conception of Hinayāna. All these points will be put in a clearer light in the notes to my translation of the Nyāyabudhūiṣa, shortly to appear in the B B translation series. But it is necessary to keep them in mind in order to understand the next following discussion between Dīghanāga and Candrakīrti about the essence of this “thing in itself”. The attitude of the Mādhyamikas towards realism corresponds to the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards the plam empiricism of Aristotle. Both the Mādhyamikas and the Roman Catholic Church were hostile to critical systems, they preferred realism, with the proviso that it had nothing to do with the cognition of the Absolute which is cognised by revelation or by intuition.
must not be forgotten. He there asks, "If every cognition of an object depends upon reliable sources of knowledge, these sources being in their turn objects cognised by us, on whom do they depend? If they are also cognised through other sources of knowledge, we shall be landed into a regressus ad infinitum". As long as this fundamental criticism has not been cleared away, all your talk about having given the right definition of logical processes is nothing.

But never mind, let us consider your views more closely. You maintain that there are two sources of knowledge, sensation and intellection, two only, and that this corresponds to the double essentia of every thing existing, the particular (or the unique) and the universal. We will then ask, the thing possessing this double essentia, does it also exist or does it not?

1 The originality of Dignaga's system of logic consists in the doctrine which admits two distinct sources of knowledge two only. He calls them perception and inference, but they differ very widely from what is usually understood by these terms in logic and psychology. They exactly correspond to the double character of everything existing, the particular and the universal. The particular again is not the concrete object usually so designated, but the absolutely particular, the unique, the thing which neither has extension (dvāranānugata), nor has duration (Kālānānugata) it is the thing in itself (svatāsa) apart from anything else (sāvato vyāvitta, tralokya-nyāvitta) the point-instant (lāsana). By sense-perception (pratyakṣa) the knowledge corresponding to this point-instant is understood. It is a moment of pure sensation in which no synthesis or integration at all has been produced, (lalpanāpodha). Every synthetic process of thought is contrasted with the direct cognition by the senses, as an indirect cognition or inference. Dignaga's inference thus embraces, besides our
If it does, we must then have a supplementary object of cognition, a third kind of it. What happens then to your two sources of knowledge established in exact correspondence to the double character of existence? And if the thing possessing this double essence does not exist, the double essence itself will remain in the air, unsupported by something possessing it. What will then the double knowledge mean? Nāgārjuna will state in the sequel,¹

Without at all any characteristic
The thing itself becomes impossible
And if impossible the thing will be,
Characteristics likewise are impossible.

XXXVI. CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF AN ABSOLUTE PARTICULAR POINT–INSTANT

But (says the logician) we should not interpret the notion of a particular essence as an essence possessed.

¹ V. 4
by something, but we should avail ourselves of the
grammatical rule allowing us to interpret this term
as meaning the thing itself which possesses that
essence?  

The Mādhyamika answers. Even so, even sup-
posing that you are right, if it really means the thing
possessing that essence, nevertheless a thing cannot
be characterised by its own self. That by which it is
characterised must be instrumentally related to it,
it must be different from the thing itself which is the
object of this instrumental relation. Our criticism of
the notion of an absolute particular stands.

The criticism is wrong, the Logician will then
answer. We assume that sensation through which
the particular essence reveals itself is instrumentally
related to it, but nevertheless it is immanent in it.
We thus escape your criticism.

Mādhyamika. Our criticism stands, we will answer,
indeed, we are here adhering to the usual conception
of what a particular essence is.

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1 Lit. p 60, 1-3 “Further let it be that a characteristic or essence
is not that by which it is characterised, but according to Pāṇini,
III 3 13, by making the iyut to stand for the object, a character-
istic is the characterised.”

2 Lit. p 60 2-3 “Thus also, since it is not possible that this should
be characterised by that, and since by what this is characterised,
its instrument, is a different thing from the object, there is just
the same fault.”

3 Lit p 60 4-5 Further it may be that this is not a fault, since
cognition is instrumental, and since this instrumentality is inclu-
ded in the absolute particular”. Jñāna is here used in its widest
comprehension, it then includes not only pure sensation (vy-
śāṇa) but, according to Buddhists and Vedāntins, vedanā,
sukhādi as well.
The particular essence of something, in our opinion, is that essence which is the exclusive characteristic of the thing, a characteristic which it does not share with anything else. Take, e.g. the following definitions.

1. Resistance is the exclusive characteristic of solid bodies.
2. Feeling is the reaction pleasant or unpleasant produced by an object.
3. Consciousness is awareness in every single case of some object present to our mind or sense.¹

This means that by such exclusive characteristics something is characterised. But you brush aside this generally known and far-spread interpretation, and admit another one, according to which essence means not the characteristic, but the characterized ²

However if you imagine that the absolutely particular, the point-instant is characterised by our awareness of it, this can only have the following meaning. The single point-instant contains a double aspect, the thing characterised and its characteristic. This, strictly speaking will be a double particular essence, one of them will be the thing characterised, and the other will be the characteristic. If our awareness of the point-instant represents its characteristic,

¹ For these definitions of prthvi, vedanā and vyādha see my Central Conception, p. 13-19.
² It p. 60 7. "Having waivered off the well known and followed etymology, you assume an object-production" Before the word pravādhaka, p 60 7, a cheda must be inserted.
the thing characterised. i.e., the objective side of the relation will nevertheless represent something different from its characteristic. our criticism stands.

Moreover the Logician may point to the general Buddhist denial of all substance behind the changing sense-data. The quality of existence in solid bodies etc is but a sense datum, revealed in our sensation, it is just the subjective part of that relation, and it does not differ from its particular essence, it is not something revealed by the sensation itself.

The Mādhyamika But then this moment of sensation itself will never be objective, and then it never will be cognised, because a particular point-instant can be cognised only under the condition of its being objective in regard to our consciousness. In that case the following qualification must be added to your statement about the double essence of everything cognizable, the particular one and the universal one: “One particular essence of the point-instant will be cognizable, that one which we here have called the characterized aspect of it. Its other particular

1 Lat m p 60 7-61 2 “By conceiving an instrumental essence in sensation, the following is expressed, just the particular essence has objectively, the character of being an instrument belongs to another particular essence, therefore if the particular essence in sensation is an instrument there should be an object different from it, thus there is the same fault.”

2 Lat p 61 3-4 “Further it might be that the hardness etc. which is contained in earth etc being apprehended by sensation, it (so, hardness) is just the object of that (so, sensation) and it is not different from the particular essence.”

3 vajñāna-svalaksana
essence will not be cognizable, that one which we have
called the characterizing aspect of it".

But if you go on to maintain that this second
aspect is in its turn also a thing characterized, it will
then likewise require some other thing as a characteris-
tic. And if you in this case imagine a further step in
awareness, an awareness of awareness as its character-
istic, you will incur the danger of an infinite regress in
addition to the fault of disregarding the relation of
substance and quality".

XXXVII INTROSPECTION

The Mādhyamika. But then you have your
theory about Introspection According to the theory,
that consciousness which represents our awareness of a
point-instant of reality is apprehended by introspection.
It thus contains inherent objectivity (and immanent
cognizability).

The Mādhyamika. We answer In our "Intro-
duction to the Mādhyamika System," we have already
referred at length to this theory of Introspection. That

1 Lat p 66 6-9 "Some particular essence which is designated
what is characterized' is object of cognition, some is not object
of cognition which is designated 'what is characterized through
it'. Further it also is object-production Then its different
instrument must exist If the instrumentality of another knowl-
edge is with an effort (pāra-kalpaṇa), the fault of an infinite re-
gress is incurred."

2 Lat p 61 10-11 "Then you suppose that there is self cons-
sciousness, therefore, objectivity existing because of apprehension
through self-consciousness, there necessarily (eva) is inclusion
in cognizability."

3 VI 73 (p 167, ff)
one particular essence (the point-instant) is charac-
terised by another one, (i.e. by our awareness of it),
and the latter by introspection—this is impossible.¹

Moreover the criticism of Nāgārjuna which we
have mentioned above¹ remains That very moment
of consciousness cannot be real without having an
essence of its own, it cannot exist (without it) And
if on the other hand there is nothing of which it is the
essence, the latter (i.e., the essence), having no support,
will have no opportunity to realize itself. What
becomes then of introspection which is supposed to
apprehend such consciousness which is itself
impossible² ²

Accordingly it is said in the “Questions of Rat-
nacaṭṭha;”³

“Considering consciousness he the Bodhisattva
investigates⁴ the stream of thought,⁵ and asks where-
from does it come The following occurs to him.
Consciousness arises, if there is an immanent object.

¹ Text, p 59 10 trans pl 142
² Lat p 62 1-3 “Moreover this very knowledge, for sure, not
being real separately from the particular essence and therefore
being impossible, and in the absence of the thing characterized,
not being able to operate as a characteristic without any sub-
stratum, altogether does not exist, thus wherefrom self-con-
sciousness?”
³ Translated partly by Burnouf, Introduction, p 500.
⁴ Notwithstanding the Tibetan, we prefer here to read with
Burnouf cullam samanupāsyān, just as in the sequel, p 62 7.
63 6. asamanupāsyān could only mean not having yet fully real-
lized, what consciousness is (i.e. not having yet attained upa-
śyana), he investigates .”
⁵ culla-ḏhārā, Burnouf—“le têrêchant (de la pensee)”
Does that mean that consciousness is one thing and the object another, or that they are identical? In the first case we shall have a double consciousness. But if they are identical, how is then consciousness to be cognized through consciousness? Consciousness cannot apprehend its own self. The trenchancy of a sword cannot cut its own trenchancy. The tip of a finger cannot touch that very tip. Similarly this, consciousness cannot be conscious of its own self.

"Thus it is that when a Saint is thoroughly attentive, when he is engaged in the spiritual exercise of the Mahāyānistic application of mindfulness towards his own consciousness, then it appears to him as undefinable. It neither has an end nor a beginning. It is not changeless, it is not causeless, it does not conflict with the interdependence of the elements, but it is neither identical, nor non-identical, neither with itself, nor with others. He then cognizes this stream of thought, of thought as thin as a creeper, the thought-element, indefinite thought, non-manifested thought, imperceptible thought, thought as a thing in itself. He intuits this (unspeakable thought) as "Thusness", the unique Reality of the Universe, he does not suppress it."

1 yonikā prayukta
2 This is the third smity-upasthāna exercise. That the Mahāyānistic exercise is meant is clear, because it results in identifying one's own consciousness with tathātā=būnyatā.
3 Cp M-vi p 536 15, pūrūnatam samāsṛtya  dhvīh.
4 cutta-svalaksana, Burnouf—la pensee "contene en elle-meme".
5 Lat. p. 63.5 "He does not produce Annihilation", sc, as the Yogen in Hinayāna is supposed to do.
"Such is the analysis of thought which he realises and intuits. This, o noble son, is the Bodhisattva's exercise of application of mindfulness consisting in the consideration of what in our consciousness represents its essence”.

XXXVIII THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE POINT-INSTANT RESUMED

We thus reject Introspection. We now return to the single moment of sensation which was supposed to be characterized by self-awareness. Since there is no such self-awareness, when we say that it is a "thing in itself," a thing characterised exclusively by itself, what do we mean, who is characterized by whom?  

And then we ask, is there here in this thing which is its own essence any difference between the essence and the thing possessing that essence, or is there none? In the first case, the essence will be different from the thing, and it will cease to be its essence. It will be in same condition as any other thing which is not supposed to be its essence. Similarly the thing being different from its essence, it will not be the thing possessing that essence, just as any other thing which also does not.

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1 The Logician. Dignāga, posits as absolutely real, (paramārtha sat), unimagined (anāropita) existence, the single moment (ksana) of existence which is then supposed to coalesce with the single moment of sensation characterized by self-awareness. This moment cannot be characterized by something else, since this would convert it in a relational existence. It is characterized by itself (swa-lak-sana), it is the "thing in itself". But for the Mādhyamika, it is relational nevertheless.
possess it. And then, if the essence be different from the thing, the thing will be severed from its essence, and the result will be that being detached from its own essence it will be nothing, a non-entity like a flower in the sky. Now, supposing the thing and its essence are identical. In that case the thing characterized ceases to be characterized, since it has coalesced with its own characteristic, it loses its separate existence, just as the characteristic also loses its own separate existence. Neither does the essence retain its separate existence, because it has coalesced with the thing characterized. Just as the latter which has then lost its own Self it becomes also lost.

Accordingly it has been said,\(^1\)

Characteristic from the thing is different? The thing is then without characteristic.

And if both are identical,

'Tis clear, You have declared.

That neither really does exist

And there is no middle course to be taken between identity and otherness, if you wish to establish the reality of the thing characterized and its characteristic. The author will state this in the following verse.\(^2\)

Supposing thus we have two things
They are not really one, nor are they two,
What are they then indeed?

How can we their reality assume?

The Logician further makes the following suggestion. Just as the Mādhyaṃka asserts that ultimate

\(^1\) Lokāttā-stava, 11 (M. de la. V.P.)

\(^2\) II 21
reality is something unspeakable, we shall also say that the relation between the thing characterized and its characteristic is something unspeakable and thus establish their reality.¹

Mādhyamika. This is impossible—Unspeakable reality is assumed by us when we have proved that a dichotomy does not resist scrutiny. Indeed, a dichotomy is untenable when it is proved that we cannot independently cognize “this is the characteristic, this the thing characterized”. We then conclude that both are unreal.

But to establish the reality of both the members of a dichotomy, as unspeakable, is impossible.

XXXIX IS THERE A COGNISER ²

Further, after having discussed the question whether our knowledge can be regarded as playing the part of an instrument through the medium of which an object becomes cognized, it is natural to ask the question whether there is something playing the part of a cognizing agent in this process of cognition, because neither an instrument, nor an action, nor its object are

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¹ Lit p 64 10-11 “Other wise (ucyate to be omitted cp. Tsh) their reality (siddhi) could be established as unspeakable². It is not so. Indeed unspeakableness, for sure, appears when a mutual split cannot be thoroughly realized.” parasa vā-varṣī “is here the same as devakī-larana or vilāpa, a division of something into A and non-A involving the so called infinite judgement. Such dichotomy is then called also vilāpa and identified with kālpāna, “arrangement”, (gyanā) it then covers, directly or indirectly, the whole range of thought, the active element of cognition. Cf m. vr. p 350 12 ff”

² Lit p 64 10-11"
possible without an agent, just as the action of cutting-wood is impossible without an agent.

Logician. We do not admit the reality of a cognising Soul, but the element of pure, indefinite sensation\(^1\) may be imagined as playing the part corresponding to some sort of agent.

Mādhyamika. Even that sort of agent cannot be acquiesced in, because according to your theory, the function of pure sensation in the process of cognition is to indicate the mere presence of something. The object is, after that, qualified by other mental processes.\(^2\) It is indeed a tenet accepted by you that “pure sensation\(^3\) apprehends the pure object, its qualities\(^4\) are apprehended by other mental processes”.

Indeed an instrument, (an object and an agent) is assumed to be a real instrument, a real object and a real agent, when there is one single action accomplished by a variety of factors. We may then admit that every one of these factors performs some special function of its own, and thus becomes a component part of the principal action by the production of some change or of new qualities in its object.\(^5\) But here,

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1. citta, 1 citta viññāna. op. Central Conception. p. 16.18
2. caittasa—caittasūcitta-samprayukta-samskāra, op. ibid. p. 18.
3. viññāna citta, op. ibid. p. 36.
4. Tib. read dei khayad-par .... ...
5. Lat p 65 4-5. “When one principal action is performed, instrument etc. possess instrumentality etc. because we admit their membership through the medium of producing qualities and actions for themselves respectively”. The action of cooking rice, e.g., consists in fetching fuel, pouring water into the kettle, putting on fire; throwing the rice into the vessel, etc. All
between definite cognition\(^1\) and pure sensation,\(^2\) there is no such central action. On the contrary every part has its own separate function. There is an independent action of indicating the mere presence of something, it is performed by pure sensation and there is another separate action of cognizing the qualities of the object. This is performed by constructive thought. It thus becomes impossible to impute the part of an instrument to qualifying thought,\(^3\) and the part of an agent to pure sensation. Therefore, your theory that in the absolutely particular essence of existence, there is an immanent objectivity and an immanent instrumentality cannot be saved. Our criticism stands.

But perhaps the Hinayānist will, to a certain extent, concede this point about the agent, because he also maintains that there is altogether,\(^4\) no real agent, since according to Scripture, all elements\(^5\) into which existence is analysed represent separate momentary flashes, there is between them no Soul,\(^6\) agent, or

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\(^1\) jñāna=svikalpaka-jñāno=artha-vibhāsa-paricchitt\(\)
\(^2\) vijnāna=viśīla=manas=arth-mārtha-paricchitt\(\)=nirvikālpa-
\(^3\) jñāna=sattā-mātra-pradarśana
\(^4\) jñānasya
\(^5\) sarvābhāvāt
\(^6\) sarvā-dharmāh
\(^*\) anātmānāḥ, the ātman in this context covers our notions of
\(^1\) Soul and of substance, cp M\(\) tr p. 437 4.
contingent stuff. Indeed impersonal motions and processes are clearly going on in nature without any conscious agent.

Mādhyamika. You have quite misunderstood the Scriptural teaching about the separate momentary elements of existence. Neither do these separate elements really exist. We have made this clear in our "Introduction into the Mādhyamika System".¹

XL VINDICATION OF PHENOMENAL REALITY

Logician. Further, it is also possible to explain the fact that the expression 'svalakṣaṇa' the thing in itself, the thing characterized only by its own self, does not involve any possessive relation by assuming that the relation is merely verbal. A relation or characterisation,² is possible even when there is no real characteristic beyond the characterized, e.g. when we speak about the body of a statue and the head of Rāhu, although there is nothing in the statue besides its body, and nothing in Rāhu beyond just a head. Is it not just the same as when we use the expression "solidity is the exclusive essence of solid bodies"? We use the possessive expression although there is nothing which could be called a solid body over and above this exclusive essence. (sc, the sense-datum of resistance.)³

¹ e.g. Madhyavat, VI 68 ff
² vaśceta-vāśya-bhāva
³ Lkt p. 66.1-3 "Further, also, it may be that in the body of a statue, the head of Rāhu, even if there is no characteristic beyond a body and a head, there is a relation of characteristic
Mādhyamkā. It is not so. Both cases are not comparable. Indeed the words body and head are used in connection with other features usually coexisting with the, e.g. brains etc.¹ in the head, hands etc.² (with the body). Therefore if a representation arises whose object is suggested by these words taken by themselves, we naturally expect to find the usually coexisting parts also. The questions “whose is the body”? “Whose is the head,” naturally suggest themselves. And if some one is desirous to indicate that in the present case, the usual appurtenances are absent,³ he repudiates the expectations (of his interlocutor) by using words according to their conventional meaning in life, where they suggest such really existing appurtenances ⁴ But in the other case, no relation

¹ Buddhyāśī
² buddhy-upagananah for upajāta-buddhikī, or “āलambana-buddhi-upagana, (so purusah)”
³ Read p 66 6—veśasaśāntara-sambandha, and in the Tib khyad par-gzhan
⁴ Lat p 66 3-7 Indeed, since the words body and head are used in association (śāpelsatā-pravattāvā) with other coexisting things, thoughts, etc. hands etc a man who produces a thought intent upon only the words body and head is always (eṣa) in expectation of the coexisting other things, “whose the body”, “whose the head”⁵ And another man, wishing to discard the connection with other appurtenances, cuts off the expectation of his interlocutor (pravattātuk) by availing himself of expressions suggestive (āhāramā) of the non-existing appurtenances of the statue of Rāhu, expressions which agree
or characterization at all is possible, because there altogether are no solid bodies over and above the sense-datum of resistance.

Logician. Non-Buddhists assume a separate reality of substance (and quality).

Are you not maledictory, in order to do them pleasure, to assert that the use of adjectives in speech is quite all right, that it corresponds to a real relation?

Mādhyamika. No, indeed, for you it is not admissible to introduce into your system such categories as have been imagined by non-Buddhists on very poor grounds, or else you will be obliged equally to admit

with their import in every day life. Thus is natural. But here Prat-kartuk-na vastu-kartuk, the "supposed agent" of the possessive relation, or the counterpart of such relation, prat-kartuk-pratyoginah. (the expectation) of the counterpart."

1. prthivyādi
2. lāthmyādi
3. tārthika
4. laksya C assails the doctrine of the absolute sva-kalasana on the ground that there must be a laksya behind the laksana and this reminds the realistic doctrine of the Vāisasikas about a relation of inherence (sāmkhyā) between substance and quality, a relation which no Buddhist has ever admitted to be real. The suggestion of the Logician is evidently ironical, it is a jest at the fact that the Mādhyamika prefers the realistic logic of the Nāyānikas and rejects the reforms of the Buddhist logicians.

5. tad-anuśravha
6. vṛtattva-abhidhāna
their number of additional sources of cognition and other things also

The Logician. But is not our example of a merely verbal relation just the same as the generally admitted among Buddhists fact of the nominal personal identity (in every individual's life).

Mādhyamika No, it is not the same. Your example refers to an expression, not to a theory. The possessive relation as a mode of expressing oneself in every-day conversation, without enquiring into its reality, exists. In speaking there is a possessor of a body. The statue we say, possesses its own body. And here is a Rāhu, the possessor of a head which is his possession, but in speech only. This your example proves nothing.

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1 C admits the four pramāṇas of the Naiyāyikas, op. below, text p 75 with the proviso that they will not help in the cognition of the Absolute. He here answers the gibe of the Logician with a counter gibe. He apparently wishes to say, "I can admit the realistic logic without forsaking my transcendental doctrine, but you cannot. For you the acceptance of the Naiyāyika doctrine about the sources of our knowledge (pramāṇa) would mean that you would be obliged to give up your doctrine of the double aspect of existence your two sources of knowledge, your "thing in itself" in fact all your epistemology."

2 prajñāpati, a cheda is needed after prajñāpātha

3 pūdgala, the personality is different at every moment, its identity is a mental construction, it is an entity purely nominal (prajñāpātha-sat = śabda-mātrām)

4 Lat p 67 3-5 "Moreover like the nominal entity prajñāpti of a person etc. Because there exists the characteristic, being a part of usual conversation, well known without pondering, the characteristic of the statue, the possessor (upādātya) of the
Logician. However there is here nothing else than a mere body and a mere head, no possessors of them, they are the only objects apprehended. The example is quite all right.

Mādhyaṁika. It is not at all so. Your example is taken from common conversation; it refers only to what holds good in a conversation in which there is no philosophic investigation of reality and the usual categories are accepted as real without scrutiny. Quite different is the case when the relation of substance and its appurtenances is philosophically considered. The notion of a substance, indeed, when critically examined, contains nothing real over and above the corresponding sense data. Nevertheless the conventional thinking of common life assumes it to exist. It imputes it to the underlying reality of the groups of sense-data and mental phenomena. But

possession of its own body, (eva-stra) and because Rāhu, the possessor of the possession of a head, exists, this example is not suitable.” Although it incidentally happens that there is no real possessive relation, nevertheless the expression is wrong, since in other cases the relation exists. The relation of substance and quality can be condemned on other, philosophical grounds, not on the ground of the adequate expression.

1 Lat p. 67 7-8 “It is not so, since in common-life-conversation there is no investigation of reality (sūkṣma)cartra) going on and the categories of common life exist without scrutiny”

2 atman, cp anatman=12 ayatana=sense data and the mind, but no substance, atmanabdo’ya svmadvā-śabda-paryayā. M. vr p. 437.4.

3 skandha.
your example does not mean that the same applies to the statue and to Rāhu.

That there is thus no substance, in solid bodies over and above the quality or sense-datum of resistance is proved by philosophical criticism. It is true that a quality cannot be imagined without the support of some substance, but this is just what we call the surface, or phénominal reality. Substance and quality are correlative terms, our Master Nāgārjuna has established their reality in that sense, i.e. as a reality of mutual correlation, none of them is real separately.

The Mādhyamika continues. This point is of capital importance; if must necessarily be conce-

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1 Lit p 67 9 “There is no such establishing of the example on the score that the same applies to the teṣa and to Rāhu.”
2 laksya
3 prthivyādī
dhīnyādī
5 epidakṣyānam nāsti
6 laksana
7 samuṣṭa eva iti
8 siddhi
9 Lit p 67 11-12 “Nevertheless the Master has established the reality, siddham (of the phenomenal world of the samsuṣṭa) by the reality, (siddhyā) of them both in-as-much-as they are mutually dependent upon one another.” The idea of C is that the “thing in itself” svaśāsanam is no exception to the law of Universal Relativity. The phenomenal here is an equivalent of the relative. In the example of the Lady and the statue or Rāhu and his head, there is no mutual independence of two phenomenal realities, but simply a wrong verbal expression.
If it is not conceded, viz. if it is not admitted that phenomenal means relative, it will prove impossible to separate the phenomenal from what is logically consistent and therefore real, and then every thing will be absolute reality, since there will be no difference, there will be no phenomenal reality at all. You must not indeed think that the body of a statue and similar relations are the only cases where a thing, upon investigation, reveals itself as merely verbal and non-existing. We will prove in our fourth chapter that colour, feeling and other fundamental sense-data are likewise relational constructions and are impossible by themselves. Does it mean that we must deny their phenomenal reality, just as we deny even the phenomenal reality of e.g. a separate body in the statue?

This is impossible. Therefore your vindication of the absolute, relationless "thing in itself" and the example adduced to illustrate it is wrong.

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1 Int, p 67 12 "Of all necessity, (ca avadāranam), this must be admitted so it is a point of capital importance that the world, as it is conceived phenomenally and Relativity are equivalents.

2 From these words, we must conclude that whatsoever is for C logically consistent (yad, yad upapannam) represents not phenomena, but absolute reality, (na tat samvritā) But since nothing short of the whole is logically consistent and real (the definition of reality, above p 41) all particular objects are relative and logic dealing with them stands condemned.

3 tattvam-eva

4 skandha-parikalpā

5 This is a brilliant piece of very subtle dialectics about the conception of a thing is itself C's aim is to prove that it is also relational since it is a thing characterised by itself, and contrasted
The Logician. Now, what is the use of such cavilling? There is a general agreement between us.

with a thing characterized not by itself, but by non-self Dig-nāga, tries to prove by an example that the supposed relation is merely an inadequate expression C begins by criticising the the example. The relation, says he (gañhābhisandhiḥ), between e.g. the elements of personality, (pudgala) and the personality itself is not the same as the relation between the body of a statue and its possessor. In the first case, we have a possessive relation, the identity reveals itself on philosophic examination, in the second there is no relation at all, but only a wrong expression, C now discloses his aim (vābhīprāyaṁ udghātayati) and vindicates the phenomenal reality of the relation of substance and quality, and at the same time he vindicates, upon Kantian lines, the necessity of assuming a transcendental reality which however, he imagines on monistic lines. The body or bodily frame of a statue, is but an irregular and perverse manner of speaking, it means as much as "the statue of the statue" would mean. There is no real possessive relation. But in such expressions as the "resistance of solid bodies" or "the elements of a personality" there is a real possessive relation as far as phenomenal reality goes and its categories of substance and quality are regarded. It is not until philosophical analysis (vitarka) has condemned this relation as involved in contradictions and logically untenable (anupapāna) that we are obliged to reject it as ultimately unreal, whether reality be defined as efficiency (arthā-krīyā-lārṇa), or as independent (anupēlsa) existence in itself (sva-bhāva, svatālsana). But empirically there is absolutely nothing cognizable which would not involve this relation. The "thing in itself" (svatālsana) which by Dignāga is supposed to represent the absolute reality, outside every kind of relation, C holds equally to involve a double relation, first of all a moment of objective reality corresponding to the moment of pure sensation, and then the relation of "the thing" to its characteristic "in itself", since this characteristic has a meaning only if contrasted with or
Indeed I do not in the least maintain that all our familiar conceptions of cognition and cognizable represent absolute truth. I also deny the ultimate reality of the categories of substance and quality, but by this my epistemology¹ I claim to have established upon a logical foundation that condition of the external world which humanity at large believes to be real.²

relative to, the thing "not in itself", i.e. the general, the universal. The general and the extreme particular are thus correlative terms the one is no more absolute than the other. This non-absolute, this being relative (prasāra-apekṣa), means the same as being phenomenal (sāmyrti). If we do not accept that, there will be no line of demarcation between the phenomenal and the absolutely real, C thus maintains that he has both a phenomenal reality, (sāmyrti) and a transcendental one, sāmurya; whereas Duguḍa, in admitting the absolute reality of the "thing in itself", undermines this line of demarcation and has, as a matter of fact, no phenomenal reality at all. It would be of some interest to compare this doctrine of a thing itself, (sva-lakṣaṇa), with the doctrine of Kant. The argument that if we do not admit any absolute reality then the phenomenal will cease to be phenomenal and will itself become absolute (tattvam eva syāt, na sāmyrtib) is quite the same as with Kant, as well as the conception that the thing in itself is a non-representable" Kant is fully aware that his conception of a "thing in itself" is relatives it is, in his words, "a correlatum to the unity of the manifold in sensuous intuition" (Critique of Pure Reason, trans! by Max Muller, p 204) For Candarkirti "being correlative" means "having no reality in itself (sva-lakṣaṇa), he thus charges the "thing in itself" with being also phenomenal, and he maintains that there is no other phenomenality than relativity.

¹ amunā nyāyena.
² ika-prasiddhiḥ.
Mādhyamika. It is for me to ask you, what is the use of your sophistry? You only explain the origin of some perverse expressions current in common life. As to phenomenal reality, leave it alone, albeit its existence and shape is founded on mere confusion. It nevertheless is useful for accumulating those fundamental virtues which bring final Deliverance to those who strive after it. It has some value only, as long as the philosophic comprehension of the absolute reality is not attained. But you, by your wrong logic, destroy the foundation of this phenomenal reality.

The refinement of your intellect is led the wrong way, so far as the difference between what is absolutely real and what is only conventionally real is concerned. You are apparently establishing phenomenalism upon a logical basis in one point by assuming the underlying “thing in itself”, but at the same time you are undermining it by your wrong logic in all other points.

Now I come with a theory which really explains the importance of empirical reality.

I take my stand on our usual unsophisticated conceptions, and then I set forth a series of arguments of which every one is intended to destroy some part-

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1 This is the Mādhyamika method of saving the moral law under phenomenalism. The phenomenal world is not real, but useful, since by accumulating merit and knowledge (both are inseparable) in it, we cognize its unreality. As far as I can see, this means that the phenomenal world, although unreal is nevertheless partly real. Whether this method is a better one than the construction of a categorical imperative in a phenomenal surrounding, must be left for the specialists to decide.

2 Perhaps to read anyāyato nyāto nāsayat
cular usual conception of mankind. By this method, I thoroughly undermine the usual views. It is only that I, like a venerable authority, am keeping back from neglecting the rules of usual decent behaviour (i.e., of logic), but I do not undermine these rules, i.e. I do not deny their empirical reality.  

Therefore, if it is true that you are also taking

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1 Lat. p 68 7-69 2 "We will also say the same! What for is this subtlety which introduces us into an expression of common life? Let it stand, first of all, for yonder "surface," (samvid) which has reached an existence of its individuality, (atma-bhava) through logical inconsistency, (uparysi) it is a cause of accumulating the fundamental virtues which bring salvation to those who are desirous of Deliverance, (let it stand) until the knowledge of the Absolute, (tattva-adhyama) is reached. But you, by your pernicious sharp understanding of the division between phenomenal and absolute realities, after having introduced consistency, (upapatti) into some points (kvacit) you destroy this division by wrong logic (anyayatah). But here I come, because I know how to establish phenomenalism (samvidsatya) taking my stand just on the philosophy, (paksa) of common sense, (laulya), I take one argument (upapatti-uniram) which is adduced for the critique (nirakarana) of phenomenal reality and refute it by another (parallel) argument; like a mentor loka-vrddha— I call to order, (mvariyami), just yourself, whenever you set aside the rules of decency, (acara) accepted in the world, [second sense, "like an anointed authority on logic, known throughout the world, I am only refuting you whenever you depart from the ground of common sense (locaacara), but I do not deny phenomenal reality.]" Thus Candrakirti maintains, 1) that the phenomenal world and the world of Relativity are equivalents and 2) since logic is in any case doomed as a means of cognizing the Absolute, he prefers simple realistic logic to a transcendental logical doctrine.
your stand upon empirical reality\(^1\) in assuming your
two essences, the strictly particular and the universal,
you are obliged to admit the existence of a stuff which
is characterized by these essences themselves Our
criticism thus stands, i.e., the criticism of the conception
of an ultimate particular is not refuted However,
if we take our stand on transcendental absolute reality
then indeed we will deny the separate existence of a
characterised substance. But then we will also deny
both these your essences, and both your sources of
knowledge

And moreover you maintain that speech is not a
source of knowledge and that the meaning of our
words in purely negative,\(^2\) you do not admit that

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\(^1\) Op above text p 58 14 p 140

\(^2\) According to the Indian grammarians and realistic logicians, a
sentence contains an expression of an action associated with
an agent and factors (Lakṣa) or circumstances This theory of
speech the Madhyamika accepted with the aforesaid proviso.
But the school of Dharmaka have a special theory of
their own about the meaning of words according to which
words express only relations, or mutual negations (Apoha=
parasapara-viś豁 = anya-vyāvṛtti = vyavaccheda = pariccheda)
between point-instants Reality is even characterised as
that what can never be expressed in speech (paramārtha-sūt=
svaśaksana = pratyakṣa = nirvikalpa-sa = bhājya) The
Madhyamika here hints at this theory and sets forth the
argument that if speech could express nothing real, nothing
positive no actions agents etc., then it would be impossible
for people to enter into conversation This remark is of
course more of a glib gibe and unfair, since the Madhyamika's
own ultimate reality is also inexpressible in speech (nispā-
panca = anabhājya = anupāliya = prapanca = vāl) Bāt Candra-
analysis of our speech which implies the reality of actions, factors and their connection. This indeed is a very great disaster. When you speak, you make use of these very words which express actions, factors and their connection, but you yourself do not admit the reality of their meaning, of these actions, these agents etc. Alas! your attitude is influenced by mere desires.

And if, as we have shown, the duality of every thing cognizable is a moot point, then we must agree

krtā thinks that no improvement in the logic of the Realists is needed, no critical theory of cognition, no “thing in itself” and no negative theory of speech (apōka) The logic of the Nairāyikas can be accepted wholesale for the phenomenal aspect of the world, and for the Absolute, no logic at all is needed. The school of Dīg-nāga, as well as the Hinayānists, can maintain that they also admit a double aspect of life, one on the surface (samvrti) and one ultimate (paramārtha) or concealed (samvṛta) cp Ab. b koāa, V 12, but C is persuaded that his vindication of an empirical reality has a greater force. The Mādhyamikas are the inventors of the doctrine of a double truth which they probably contrasted with the “four truths” of the Hinayāna cp Madhyā, XXIV, 8. This is also partly the reason why the Mādhyamikas, and their followers the Vedantins, deem it permissible freely to use the arguments of Nairāyikas when combating Buddhist Idealism, cp above p 38n, 3. At Śrīharṣa’s time, when the enemy is no more the Buddhist, but the Nairāyika, this attitude changes.

1 Read pravṛttatā C. is here playing with the double meaning of “vṛtta” “desire” and “tenet”, “Your behaviour is bound by such theories as are merely fantastical desires”. i.e. you are not acting in accordance with your tenets, if speech is only apōka you ought not to speak at all.”
with those who admit other sources of knowledge, besides sensation and thought, as e.g. Revelation etc., since these sources of knowledge are not devised with a view strictly to agree with the duality of everything cognizable, the particular and the universal.

XLI. THE DEFINITION OF THE SENSE PERCEPTION

Madhyamika Further your theory of an extreme particular as the "thing in itself", is wrong, because your definition\(^1\) of sense-perception, through which it is supposed to be apprehended is deficient. It is too narrow, it does not cover such every-day expressions as the "jar is a perception", i.e. the physical object before us is perceived and these usual expressions of the ordinary man\(^2\) should likewise be taken into account. Therefore your definition is wrong.

The Logician It might have been wrong, but for the following considerations. Perceived are directly the sense data, e.g. a patch of dark colour etc. They make up the physical object, the jar. Sense perception, as a source of knowledge, distinguishes only that. But the cognition of the physical object which is a mental construction resulting from

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\(^1\) The definition here alluded to is Dignāga's definition "sense-perception is quite free from all synthetic operation of thought" (kalpanāpodha), op Nyāyabindu, p 6 15

\(^2\) an-ārya, the non-Samā "The Buddhist saint, being a philosopher who has changed all usual habits of thought, directly realizes that what he perceives are only momentary sense-data, the remainder is construction. Dignāga's definition may be a right description of his perception, but will not cover the usual view."
sense-perception is likewise called sense-perception by a metaphor. Such metaphors we find in Scripture, e.g. when it is stated that the advent of Buddhas is a weal, instead of stating that it produces weal. We impute to the cause what really belongs to the effect. Just so, by a converse metaphor, from the cause to the effect, we say that the physical object, the jar, is perceived, while only its causes, the sense data, are really perceived.

Mādhyamika. To assume a natural metaphor in such cases as the perception of a jar is impossible. Quite different is the case of the advent of a Buddha. Indeed a birth, i.e. the process of a birth, is held in ordinary life as the reverse of pleasure (It is not the blissful Quiescence of the Forces of life) It is essentially produced through the cooperation of a plurality of biotic forces. It is a cause of very much pain. By itself it is anything but a weal. Nevertheless it is here called a weal. There is a contradiction. In such cases, we assume a metaphor. The advent of a

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1 Lat, p. 70 1-3. "But let it be. The blue etc., the substratum of the jar, are evident, since they are being determined by perceptive cognition. Hence just as by imputing the effect to the cause, it is said that the birth of Buddha is agreeable, so the jar, although its causes are the evident blue etc., by imputing the cause to the effect, is called a perception."

2 sanskṛta-laksana-subhāka, "it has the essence of the forces of life," about the four forms (sanskāra) which are called sanskṛta-laksana op. my Central Conception, p. 39. There is no other weal for the Buddhist as the Quiescence i.e. extinction of all life in an Absolute.

3 asambuddha eva.
Buddha, although also painful by itself, is nevertheless a weal, because it produces the weal of Quiescence in Nirvāṇa. The case is different with a perceived jar. We have no such separate thing as an invisible jar which could be called perceived metaphorically.

The Logician. On the contrary, just because there is no jar over and above the corresponding sense-data, it is convenient to maintain that its perceptibility is a metaphor.

Mādhyamika If you take it so, the metaphor is still less possible, because the object which you metaphorically endow with perceptibility does not exist at all. You cannot speak about the sharpness of the horns on the head of the donkey even metaphorically. Moreover, if you assume that the jar which is a part of our every-day experience is perceived by us in a metaphorical sense, because there is no such jar over and above the sense-datum of a dark patch of colour etc then you are bound to take the next step and condemn the patch of dark colour as well, since it also does not exist over and above the sense-datum of something resistant. Then, please, assume that the patch of dark

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1 Lit p 70 9 "Because there is no substratum for what is being used as a metaphor" In the first case, the really, existing sense-data were the substratum, and physical object jar superimposed upon them. It was answered that you cannot superimpose a thing you nowhere have perceived. In the second the relation has been reversed and it is supposed that the non-existing jar is the substratum upon which the sense-data are superimposed. This is still less possible.

2 Lit 70 11 "there is no blue etc beyond earth etc"
-colour is also perceived in a metaphorical sense. This has been expressed in the following verse.\(^1\)

Just as there is no jar
Beyond its colour,
Just so there is no colour
Beyond resistance.\(^2\)

Therefore this and similar usual expressions are not covered by your definition of perception. It is quite deficient, since it does not cover the whole of its subject matter. Now, from the transcendental point of view,\(^3\) we equally condemn the perception of the physical objects, the jar, as well as the perception of the sense data, blue etc. On the contrary, from the empirical view of every-day life, we must admit that the jar is perceived. This has been expressed in one of the four hundred verses of Āryadeva in the following manner,

A transcendentalist\(^4\) will never say
“We see a patch of colour, not a jar,”
Or a “jar is present before us”.

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1. Catubhāṣṭaka XIV 14
2. Lit p 71 2 "just so there is no colour beyond wind etc. Earth, wind etc are the four fundamental elements of Matter, (mahā-bhūta), which are cognized exclusively by touch, (sparśāvyaya-āyatana), thus colour, (rūpa-āyatana-) is here reduced to a tactile phenomenon. Op. the contention of modern empiricism which reduces our notion of Matter to sense-data and the sense-data to the one fundamental sensation of resistance. About Matter offering resistance (supratāghan) to sight, op Ab. Kosabh ad. 1.39.
3. tattva-vid-apeśayā.
4. tattva-vid.
In following just this line of argument
His sovereign mind will equally deny
The soft, the fragrant and the sweet.¹

There is, however, another explanation of what
perception really means The word perception simply
means a thing which is not beyond the range of our
sense (It does not mean its cognition through our
senses) An object which is present and faces us is
thus called a perception² Jars, patches of blue colour
and similar physical objects are called perceptions when
they are not beyond the range of sight A perception
thus means an object which has been approached
by our senses.³ The corresponding definite cognition
is also called perception by a metaphor, because it is
the cause which makes the object evident, just as we
speak of a “straw fire” or “husk fire” metaphorically,
instead of saying fire producing burning straw or
burning husk.

¹ Catuhśataka, XIII, 1-2
² The origin of this definition—pratyakṣam aparokṣam “perception
is the object not beyond our ken,” can be traced in the Brh ar.
Upanishad, III 4.1 and III 5.1 It is adopted in the later
scholastic Vedānta, cp Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p 12 (Bombay 1900
Venkatāśvar). It is also mentioned by Udayana, Parśuddhi,
p. 647 (B I) It seems probable that the Mādhyaṃkāsa have
borrowed it from the Vedāntins To the Mādhyaṃkas, it suggests
the omni-presence of Buddha’s dharmā-lāyā, just as to the
Vedāntins it suggested the omnipresence of ‘aparokṣam brahma’
cognized by mystic intuition Cp. above. p 45.
³ Int. p 70 10-11 By meaning “in it the sense is approached,
the perceptibility of jars, blue etc not being beyond the ken,
it is established.”
There is a philosopher who has given the following interpretation of the term perception. Perception is that kind of knowledge which exists in close connection with each sense faculty (This could also mean that sense knowledge is a knowledge about the senses, a knowledge whose objects are the senses.) This interpretation is wrong, because sense perception is not a knowledge about the senses, it is a knowledge about the objects of the senses. If his interpretation were correct, we should speak not of sense perception, but of "object-perception" or of "thing-perception".

Be it as the case may be, we find in the Abhidharmakosa the following explanation. Sensation is produced by a double cause, the sense faculty and its object. Nevertheless it receives its name only through one of its causes, the organ in which the corresponding sense faculty is lodged, because sensation changes in degree, according to the changes by which the faculty may be affected. To sharp or feeble faculties correspond sharp or feeble sensations. We then have visual and other sensations. Thus, although a perception changes with every object, nevertheless it receives its

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1 The definition of Praśastapāda is here alluded to, cp Praśastapāda p 186 12. The etymological explanation of the Nyāyārikas does not differ materially, cp Nyāyāvatāra p 30 4. Nyāyābudha, p. 6 4 makes a difference between the etymology and the real meaning.

2 visaya-visaya.

3 vyādāna

4 Ab. Kosā. I 45

5 Lat p 72 5-7 "Thus although it exists with reference to every object, nevertheless, it will be sense perception, because, existing as lodged in every sense-organ, sensation is designated by its residence."
name according to the place where it is lodged. It exists as lodged in different sense organs, it is thus sense-perception (not object-perception). It is customary to name a thing by its specific cause, e.g. the sound "of a drum", although it is also the sound of the sticks, the sprout "of barley" although it is also the sprout of the soil etc.

Mādhyamika. There is no analogy between the example of the sound of a drum and the above-mentioned designation of sense perception instead of object-perception. If sensation be specified according to the object, one could specify our sensations as colour-sensations etc. But we could not specify in this way all the six kinds of sensations, since mental or intellectual sensation is a sixth kind of sensation, which is apprehending the same object simultaneously with the external sense. Indeed, if we include in the term sensation all its six varieties, beginning with the visual ones and including the intellectual ones, we might be quite uncertain what to think when some one would mention the term (visual) sensation. We will not know whether it means only the sensation produced by the external sense, or it is meant to include the corresponding internal sensation, the mental reaction also. But if we specify sensations according to the organ in which they are lodged, although mental sensation can refer to the same object to which visual and other sensations likewise refer, nevertheless their mutual distinction will in that case be clearly established (if they were called

1 mālāyati-sūtyāna
2 mānasa
according to their object, since the object can be the same when different sensations are meant, confusion would arise).

However, in this case you are merely concerned with giving a definition of what the sources of knowledge are. You accordingly assume that sense-knowledge is simply that kind of knowledge where all constructive thought is brushed aside, (it is pure passive sensation)¹ Just the contrast with thought is in your opinion its characteristic. No purpose is served by naming its varieties according to their specific causes²

¹ *kalpanāpodha* is the celebrated definition of Dignāga discussed almost in every Indian philosophical work—It makes a difference between the first moment in every perception, it is then pure sensation, it is passive, involving absolutely no thought-creation. But the next step which is also perception, represents the construction of an image by synthetic thought. (*vkalpana anugamya*) The distinction has a great importance for Dignāga, because he thinks that in this pure sensation, this so to say, "rame Samlichkeit", the "pure object" (*siddha-artha*), the "thing in itself" (*svałeśāṇa*) reveals itself to our consciousness. It is interesting to compare the controversy between Eberhard and Kant on a similar question. Eberhard assumed that he was opposing Kant when he maintained that the "thing in itself" reveals itself in our sensations (Einfühlungen), but Kant conceded the point "nun ist das eben (viz dass die Dinge an sich der Samlichkeit ihren Stoff geben) die beständige Behauptung der Kritik," *op. Ueber, eine Entdeckung, nach der etc p.* p 35 (Krahmann)

² Lat. 73 4-6 "But here, with a view to expressing the essence of the sources of cognition (*pramāṇa*), the absence of synthesis (*kalpanā*) alone is admitted as perception, because the peculiarity of this mode of cognition is found in its difference from constructive (dichotomism, *vikalpāya*) cognition, by naming it according to its special cause, no usefulness is indicated."
Now, the number of the sources of our knowledge exactly corresponds to the number of the cognized categories of existence. You have established the character of both your sources of knowledge in strict correspondence with the double character of the cognizable. To this strict correspondence they owe their existence and their shape. You should, therefore, remain always faithful to your principle of designating cognition only according to its object. To name it according to the organ of sense would serve no purpose (from your standpoint).

However, the Logician may vindicate his interpretation by the following consideration: The word sense-perception is generally known to every one. The word sense-perception is not used as a designation of what we here have in our mind. For this reason, we adhere to the interpretation that the term sense-perception means perception through the sense-organs, through the place where the sensations are lodged, it does not mean the perceived object.

The Mādhyamika answers: This is true, the word perception is very well known in common life, and we,

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1 Lit 73 6-8 "And since the existence of the number of the sources of cognition is dependent upon the objects of cognition and because the essence of such two sources of cognition has been established which have attained their shape (ātmabhāva) and existence (sattā) exclusively by conforming to the double form of the cognizable, the designation through the sense-organ helps nothing, thus or in every respect the designation just by the object is the right one."
not you, are using it just in what sense it is used in common life. Your interpretation is made with utter disregard of what is established as real in common life. Generally known in your interpretation is only the utter disregard of what is really generally known, because in your interpretation, as pure sensation, it would not even mean perception.

And moreover, since you give to the term a generalizing sense of what is present in all sensations, the case of single moment of visual sensation, which is produced by a single moment of the faculty of vision, will not be covered by your definition. And then, if a single moment of perception will thus (according to this

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1 *pratyälsa* means also an object "evident", present.

2 Int p 73 4. "well known could be your distortion, (irväsādra) of the term "well known" and therefore it would not be thus sense-perception." The *pratyälsa* in Dignāga’s and Dharma-kirti’s interpretation, meaning as it does a moment of pure, undifferentiated sensation, represents, indeed, something quite unknown in common life. The divergence between the common idea of perception and Dignāga’s conception of pure sensation is much more considerable than the divergence between it and the Mādhya-mīkā-Vedānta definition of perception as the thing perceived, since the Sanskrit term for perception (*pratyälsa*) is a word very commonly used in the sense of a thing present, evident, perceived. Dharmottara himself calls that kind of pure perception which is imagined by Buddhist something "hardly existing" *asat-kalpa*, cp Nyāya-buddha p. 16. This retort of the Mādhya-mīkā is, nevertheless, not quite fair, because the follower of Dignāga, when maintaining that perception is not the object, but its cognition, does not refer to pure sensation, but to perceptive cognition which includes a moment of sensation.
definition) not be perception, neither will a number of them be perception ¹

Now, you maintain that sense-perception is only that kind of cognition which is quite free from any participation in it of constructive thought. However with such pure sensation alone you will not be able to converse with your fellow beings. Nevertheless you pretend to analyse the course which cognition and its object take in common life. It follows that that sort of sense-knowledge which you assume, (so pure sensation) is quite useless.

Madhyamika. You are also vindicating your theory of perception by referring to Scripture where it is stated that “a man, having a visual sensation of a patch of blue colour apprehends blue, but does not know that it is blue”, the definite knowledge is produced by a subsequent operation of contrasting blue with not blue.² But in your opinion this scriptural deliverance

¹ Lit. p 73 3-4 “And there will be no perception-character (pratyakṣa-sāta) of one visual sensation, (caṣṣur-nirūpāsa), possessing an underlying (āpratiksa) single moment of the sense-faculty (āgriya-ālaśa), because of the absence of the meaning of generalisation (vipaśa)”

² This very important text from an unknown āgama is mentioned already by Dignāga in his pramāṇa-samuccaya-vyutth, I 4, as a quotation from the abhidharma (choes-mnon-palas) in support of the theory. This could prove that Dignāga’s theory of pure sensation was foreshadowed in previous Sautrāntika works. Kamalaśīla examines it at length in his Nyāya-buddhāvīra-pakṣasamśastra (Bstan-lgyur, Mdo CXI, f 112 ff.) Vasubandhu’s definition of pratyakṣa is quite different, cp Pramāṇa-samuccaya I 15, and Nyāyavārttika, p 42
is not meant to give any definition of sense-perception. It only is meant to notify that the sensations of the five external sense-organs alone, without the participation of a conscious element, remain unconscious. Sensation which is absolutely bare of every element of synthetic thought cannot be maintained to represent perception, even on the basis of Scripture. This would be wrong.

Therefore from the empirical,¹ (not from the transcendental), point of view, everything without exception is called present,² (i.e. a perception), when it is directly perceived by the senses, whether it be your strictly particular essence or the general essence of the thing³ (possessing these both essences). A perception is thus determined as meaning the object of perception together with its cognition.⁴ The double moon and similar illusions will not be sense-perceptions, if compared with the cognitions of a man with a normal capacity of vision, but for the man suffering from ophthalmia, it will be just his sense-perception.

As regards cognition of objects lying beyond the range of our senses, it is produced by a perceived mark which is invariably concomitant with them. It is called inference.

The words of specially qualified persons who directly perceive transcendental things⁵ are called Scripture.

¹ lokā
² aparāksa
³ lokasya
⁴ Jñānena saha, according to Dignāga pratyakṣa, when pure (śuddha) is not jñāna, but Dharmakirti brings it under the head of samyag-jñāna, cp Tātparyat, p. 102 17
⁵ atindrayārtha
If something that has never been experienced is cognized through a description, so far as it has been declared to be similar to another thing which has been experienced by us—this is called analogy, e.g. when we are told that a gavaya whom we have never seen is some animal similar to a bull.

By these four methods of cognition is our knowledge of objects determined and our actions guided in common life.¹

But if we are then asked on what transcendental basis four of these methods of usual cognition repose, we will be obliged to confess that their reality is relative.² The cognizable things exist so far as cognitions exist and vice versa, cognitions exist so far as the cognizable objects exist.

But in no case is there any independent absolute

¹ These are exactly the four sources of knowledge admitted by the Realists, the Naiyāyikas
² paraporāceptive siddha=śūnya
³ Here Candrakīrti winds up this remarkable controversy with Dignāga by admitting realistic logic in the empirical field, but not in the transcendental, and by rejecting Dignāga's reform which, although professing to be a logic of common sense (lauḥika), aimed at establishing a transcendental reality of the "thing in itself." For describing the fact that phenomenal reality is established in his system on a firm basis, he uses two words, it is satya "a truth," and it is siddha, "established as a reality." However, it is a "surface truth" (samuti-satya) and it is "established as a relative reality" (prasparāceptive siddha), not absolutely (na tu svabhāvena) Dignāga retorts that he has also two realities, the relative reality of all our conceptions and the absolute reality of the "thing in itself." Indeed the followers of Āryasanga and Dignāga are frequently characterised...
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reality\(^1\) either of our cognitions, or of the objects cognised. Therefore let us be satisfied with the usual view of the phenomenal world, just as it is cognised by us from experience.\(^2\)

Enough of this discussion.
Let us revert to our subject matter.

as being also Mādhayamikas (i.e., relativists) because they adhere to the doctrine that all of our conceptions have merely a relative value (paratantā). But Candracārtti insists that Dignāga’s "thing in itself" is also relative, that he has thus failed to grasp the real profound meaning of the doctrine of the two realities. the Relativity is the "surface" of the Absolute, it has its real stand as such a surface. Therefore in ch-XXV 9 and XXV 20 Nāgārjuna will emphatically assert the essential identity of the Absolute and the Phenomenal, of Nirvāṇa and Samsāra, cp translation below, p 200, The Absolute of Nāgārjuna and Candracārtti has thus a certain similarity with the "Ensamnn of Parmenides, whereas the "thing in itself" of Dignāga has some points of similarity with the Hoc Ahquid (铤meid idam) of Aristotle. The Mādhayamika view can be clearly realized out of the following equations. (1) samaṃrtā (surface) = parasparāpeksā (relativity) = lokā = laukika-vyavastha = prapaśca (pluralism) = pratyā = samutpāda = (dependently-together-origination) = śūnyatā = niḥsvabhavatā = saṃsāra = Dharma-kāya = the manifested world = omni-presentia Dei phænomenon (2) samaṃrtā ("under the surface") = anapeksā = (nonrelative) = paramārtha (absolute) = nis-prapaśca (non-plural) = anirvācānyā = advata (monistic) = pratītīya-samutpāda (i.e., Samvrtah pratītya-samutpadah) = śūnyata i.e. Sāmyṛtā śūnyatā = sasvabhāvatā = tathātā = dharmatā = nirvāṇa = Dharma-kāya = the world sub specie aeterntatis.

\(^1\) svabhāvikā siddhāh.

\(^2\) yathādṛṣṭam = dṛṣṭam anabhiramya—
The Sublme Buddhas have also preached their doctrine in adapting it just to the habits of thought of common humanity

XLII  THE HINAYANA THEORY OF CAUSATION EXAMINED.

From our correligionists Hinayanists, we receive regarding this our denial of causation the following reply. We agree with you, they say, that entities cannot arise out of themselves, so far the production of a thing already existing out of its own self is useless. That entities cannot arise out

1. laukīlam darśana, "philosophy of common sense" as opposed to darśana, real philosophy

2. suavyuṣṭa

3. About the general idea of Causality, (pratītya-samutpāda) in Hinayāna cp above p 39. About its special application to the evolution of life in 12 consecutive stages, cp O Rosenberg, Problems, Ch-XIV, My Central Conception, p 281 and above p, 134. The schools of Hinayāna were, moreover, engaged in classification of varieties of coordination between the separate momentary elements in which existence had been split. They thus established different pratīyayas of the pratītya-samutpāda. The classification into four varieties here mentioned belongs to the school of the Sarvāstivādins. It has been supplemented by a further classification into six different hetus, which probably is later than Nāgārjuna, since it is not mentioned by him. The Pāh school had devised a classification into 21 pratīyayas. The full theory of the Sarvāstivāda is given in Ab Kośa, II 50ff. Pratīyaya when contrasted with hetu means condition in general, and hetu cause (special). Otherwise both these terms are very often used as synonyms. All the very interesting details of their connotation can be realised only through a careful study of the abhidharma.
of both sources i.e. out of a pre-existing stuff and separate agents is also true, since one half of this solution is invalidated, by our denial of a pre-existing substance.

The last eventuality, viz. that every thing exists at random without any causal link at all, is absolutely poor. It is quite right to dismiss it without much consideration. But if you also maintain that neither are existent things caused by something separate from them, this we do not admit. The Buddha has specified that existing things have causes producing them and that these causes are substantially different from the thing produced.

The Hinayāna maintains

II Four can be the conditions.
Of everything produced
Its cause, its object, its foregoing moment,
Its most decisive factor
There is no fifth condition.

Among them, the cause is what turns out ² Such is the definition. Therefore, if one entity turns out the other, i.e. if their mutual position is similar to that of a seed versus a sprout, ³ it is called its cause, this is the first condition, the cause in general sense. If something when being produced, is intent upon an object, something else,

1 adhāpatya = adhāpati-pratyaya —
2 mārvartṭaka
3 The seed is the adhāpati-pratyaya = kārana-hetu = asadādharana-kāraṇa of the sprout, cp p 85 17, here it exemplifies a condition in general
as e.g. a sensation which is always intent upon an object, the latter is called its objective condition.

The foregoing condition for the production of a result is the evanescence of its material cause e.g. the foregoing destruction of the seed is a condition for the production of the sprout.

The decisive or predominant condition is that decisive fact which being efficient, the result (inevitably) appears. Such are the four kinds of possible conditions.

If there be other circumstances, previous, contemporaneous or posterior to an event, they are all to be included in one of these categories. A supreme Deity and similar transcendental conditions do not exist. Therefore the author puts limit “there is no other, fifth kind of condition.” Entities arise under these conditions which are not identical with the thing produced. In such sense there is production (or coordination with) things other than the thing produced.

We answer. Neither are entities produced out of (or coordinated with) conditions which are substantially separate from them.

III In these conditions we can find,
No self-existence of the entities,
Where self-existence is deficient,
Relational existence also lacks.

If the produced entities\(^1\) had any pre-existence\(^2\)

1 bhūvdhām kāryānām
2 utpādat purvam sattvam
at all, in their own causes and conditions which are something different from these entities themselves whether in all the combination of them or in some of them separately or both in all of them and in every one of them, or (even if they existed) somewhere outside the combination of their causes and conditions then alone could they appear out of them But this is not so They do not pre-exist. If they did, they would have been perceived, and their new production would have been useless. Therefore the conditions and causes of an entity do not contain any real existence of the result.\(^1\) If they do not contain its real existence, neither do they contain its relational existence\(^2\) Existence, relation, production,\(^3\) are synonyms. Production out of something extraneous means relation\(^4\) to it, (some kind of pre-existence in it). This is impossible. Therefore it is wrong to maintain that entities can be produced out of conditions which are different from them.

But then the Hinayānist would maintain that the produced entities, such as a sprout etc. do not really exist in their cause, such as seeds etc. as long as the latter have not undergone any change. (But when they are changed the result appears). Otherwise the latter would appear without any cause altogether. (This is what they call their relation to other entities which are their causes).

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\(^1\) *svabhāva*

\(^2\) *parabhāva*

\(^3\) *bhavana, bhāva, upādā
g*  

\(^4\) *bhāva, cp in lārga-lāraṇa-bhāva.*
But in what sense\(^1\) are we to understand the "otherness"\(^2\) of causes and conditions. When both Maitra and his help-mate are present, we can assert that they are two separate entities which depend upon one another in producing a piece of work together. But this kind of co-existence is not found between a sprout and a seed. Therefore when results do not possess such separate existence of their own, their relation, the "otherness" of the sprout in regard to the seed, is absent. The designation of it as "other" becomes meaningless and this alone makes production out of something extraneous impossible.

The Hinayānāist's appeal to Scripture betrays his utter ignorance of its real intention. Never did the Buddhas preach something contrary to reason\(^3\). What the real aim of their doctrine is we have indicated above, we have namely indicated that the doctrine of causality refers to the phenomenal world.\(^4\)

## XLIII. THE EXISTENCE OF SEPARATE ENERGIES DENIED

When the philosopher who maintains the origination of entities out of other entities which are their causes, has been thus dismissed, another one sets forth a theory of origination through special

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\(^1\) kmapêkṣam.
\(^2\) paratva.
\(^3\) yukt-avruddha.
\(^4\) cp above text-p 54:10
energies.\textsuperscript{1} The organ of vision, colours and the other causes of the visual sensation are not producing it directly. They are called causes because they call forth an energy\textsuperscript{2} capable of producing sensation. This energy\textsuperscript{3} then actually produces visual sensation. Thus the causes, as separate entities, do not produce sensation. Its real producer\textsuperscript{4} is a corresponding energy, an energy inherent in the causes\textsuperscript{5} and creative\textsuperscript{6} of sensation. Analogous is the physical energy of heat\textsuperscript{7} which produces e.g. cooked rice.

We answer:

IV. No energies in causes,
Nor energies outside them
No causes without energies,
Nor causes that possess them.

If an energy producing sensation does really exist, it must be associated with such causes as the organ of vision etc. But this is impossible. Why? Because we will then be asked whether this assumed energy is supposed to appear when this sensation already exists, or before it or simultaneously with

\textsuperscript{1} Nāgārjuna avails himself of the term kṛyā (=jani-kṛyā in the sense of energy or function. Later it is replaced by the term vyāpāra which is also used by Candrakīrti, cp p 329-16—
\textsuperscript{2} jani-kṛyā.
\textsuperscript{3} kṛyā.
\textsuperscript{4} vyāpāra-janika.
\textsuperscript{5} pratyayavatī
\textsuperscript{6} vyāpāra-jani-kṛyā
\textsuperscript{7} Read paañ-kṛyā.
it? The first alternative must be rejected. If the sensation is already produced, the energy is useless. The energy is supposed to produce something. But if it is already produced, what has the energy to do? This has been expressed in our Mādhyamika Introduction thus—

The second birth of something born
Should never be admitted, etc.

Neither is the existence of an energy to be assumed in the causes previously to the sensation. This we have expressed in the same work thus, ²

This energy cannot take shape,
As long as the result ³ is absent.

Neither is the existence of an energy just at the moment of production possible, because a thing is either produced or not yet produced, there is no existence between these two moments. It has been said—

What is being produced is not produced,
Because it’s only half-produced
Or else all things without exception
Would nascent always be ⁴

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¹ Ma 1VI 8
² IbID CI 29 cp Mvr p 545
³ *Lakṣṭha nyāša*, lit “without the maker” so without the result as maker or shaper of the energy. The future *vyāśa* is here envisaged as the shaper, (karma-Lūkala) of its own producer
⁴ Lit p 80 3-4 “Because the nascent is half-born, the nascent is not born. Otherwise the condition of being nascent would attach (prasayyate) to everything”
Since the assumed energy cannot be located in any one of the three times (past, present and future,) it does not exist altogether. Nāgārjuna, therefore, says,

No energies in causes.

We have commented upon this point in our Mādhyamika Introduction, when explaining that,

Without something characterized

There can be no characteristic feature, etc.\(^1\)

Indeed the non-existing son of a barren woman cannot be characterized as the possessor of a cow, since he neither did nor does, nor will exist. (The non-existing energy cannot appertain to a cause.)

But then an energy might perhaps exist alone without being the possession of a cause? This is also impossible.

No energy outside the causes.

If, therefore, there is no energy in the causes, there neither can be any energy outside them, it would then be an uncaused energy. If there is no separate cloth beside the threads composing it, this does not mean that the cloth pre-exists somewhere else, in some straw.\(^2\) Consequently no energy producing entities does really exist.

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\(^1\) Ibid VI 57 The possessive relation is here represented in an inverted manner. Instead of speaking of causes or objects possessing energies, the author speaks of energies possessing causes (pratyayavatā kriyā), he means "belonging to causes".

\(^2\) vivara
If this is the case, if it is impossible to assume energies, then perhaps the causes alone, without possessing any energies will be sufficient for the production of entities. It is answered.

No causes without energies

If energies do not exist, then the causes will be bereft of energy, they will not be efficient, they will not be causes. How then will they produce something?

But if causes really produce something, they must be necessarily possessors of energy.

To this it is answered,

Nor causes are there that possess them.

The existence of energies is thus denied. It then becomes clear that causes cannot be possessors of non-existing energies.

What has been here said about an energy producing sensation, equally applies to the energy of heat and other physical energies. Thus the word "production" is itself devoid of any meaning.

XLIV. CAUSATION IS NOT CO-ORDINATION.

To this the Hinayanist replies. We are not in the least affected by your examination of the question whether the causes are possessors of energy or not. We are satisfied with establishing the fact that entities, such as sensation, arise in a

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1 Lit. p 81.2 "The word 'not' is the connection with the subject-matter, i.e. the negation must be taken out of the preceding sentence. The word "vta" puts emphasis."

2 Read paci-kriya
certain co-ordination with other entities,⁴ e.g. the organ of vision etc. (This is all we mean, when we assert that the existence of an organ of vision etc. is the condition under which a visual sensation etc. can arise)

Nāgārjuna now states that this co-ordinational theory of causation is also wrong.

V Let those facts be causes,  
With which co-ordinated other facts arise,  
Non-causes will they be,  
So far the other facts have not arisen

If sensation is an entity whose origination is co-ordinated with a faculty of vision and other conditions, and these co-ordinations are called causes, is it not evident that up to the moment when this so-called “result” the sensation, has really arisen, what can the organs etc. represent but non-causes? They are as good as non-causes! That is the idea of Nāgārjuna. And nothing can be produced out of its non-causes. e.g. oil cannot be pressed out of sand corns.

But the following objection is then raised. They begin by being non-causes, but they are afterwards converted into causes by combining with some other concomitant conditions. This also won’t do. Because concomitant condition, concomitant with something which is not yet a condition, can be considered as a condition only if the other fact is really a condition. We are in this case

⁴ pratyayaṇa pratiṣyā
faced by the same difficulty as before. Therefore this explanation cannot be accepted.

An organ of vision and an object are here assumed to represent the causes producing visual sensation. But are they the causes of an existing sensation or are they the causes of a sensation not yet existing? It is anyhow an impossibility Nāgārjuna says,

VI. Neither non-Ens, nor Ens
   Can have a cause

Why?
   If non-Ens, whose the Cause?
   If Ens, what for the Cause?

Non-Ens, i.e. a non-existing thing, how could it have a cause? Its cause is perhaps so called in anticipation? It will produce the result at some future occasion No
   Referring to a future fact
   We give a name anticipating,
   But never will this future come
   Without a force that latentlly is present.¹

The incongruities² (resulting from assuming latent forces) have been indicated above.³

But if a thing is really existent, if it is present, if it has taken shape, it is absolutely useless to imagine some causes producing it

¹ M. av VI 58 Lit "There is for it no futurity without a force"
² doṣa
³ op. above. p. 167 ff
XLV. THE CAUSE CONDITION

After having represented that conditions\(^1\) in general are not really causes, since they have no capacity to produce effects, Nāgarjuna now proceeds to consider their varieties separately and to show that none of them singly is really a cause.

The following objection is raised by the Hīnayānists. If you are right, he says, there can be no conditions at all. But the notion of a condition is very well established, since we have a definition of its essence. The definition of the cause-condition\(^2\)

\(^1\) It would have been strictly correct to translate pratyaya "condition" or "co-ordinate" and hetu-pratyaya cause-condition or simply cause. But adhipati-pratyaya is even more of a cause than hetu-pratyaya which, therefore, is sometimes called sahakari-pratyaya. (Sarvadars p. 39 Poona 1924). Only the alambana and samanantara-pratyayas can be distinguished as "conditions." It is, therefore, impossible always to distinguish between these two terms. Yaśomitra accordingly, says, ad Ab. Kośa. II. 50, hetunām ca pratyayānām ca ko viśesah? na kaścit.

\(^2\) hetu-pratyaya, the first of the four pratyayas. This classification of conditions into four varieties is not what to our requirements should be a strictly systematic classification, all members are not exclusive of one another. Thus the general condition is contrasted with the special one (adhipati) but it includes the two others which are only its varieties. It also embraces 5 causes of the hetu-classification, 1) sahāga-hetu, relation of homogeneity between the preceeding and the following moments of the same thing, producing the illusion of its duration, or moral homogeneity among the subsequent elements of a personality. This hetu-classification is also unsystematical, because the sixth class, the kārana-hetu has two varieties, the efficient and the non-efficient one (nus-beas, nus-med), the first is the same as the predominant condition adhipati-pratyaya or asadharana-kāraya, the second is an expression of the dependence of a given point-instant upon the condition of the whole Universe (sarve dharmaḥ) cp. above p 41. n. 6. 2-3) sahabhi and samprayakta-hetu, relations of co-existence according to which some elements of Matter and Mind never appear alone, but always together, (4) vipaka-hetu which is another name for karma and (5) sarvārtha-hetu, moral homogeneity among coexisting elements Cp. Ab. Kośa. II 50 ff.
which is here accepted, is the following one. A cause is what "turns out." If something be altogether a non-Ens, the definition of its essence could never be given, it would be as though (some one were to teach us about the essence of a non-existing) son of a barren woman.

We answer. The producing condition (i. e., the cause), would exist if its essence were something real. (But this is not the case), since,

VII Neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens,
Nor any Ens-non-Ens,
No element is really "turned out."
How can we then assume
The possibility of a producing cause?

Producing means creative. If an element which can be produced would really be produced, then a creative cause would produce it. But it is not being (really) produced, since there is altogether no such thing that needs to be produced, whether Ens or non-Ens or (something including both) Ens and non-Ens.

Indeed Ens is not produced because it exists. Neither is non-Ens, since it does not exist. Nor Ens-non-Ens, since such mutually contradicting (characteristics) cannot exist in one thing, and because, if they did, they would be subject to both the above strictures together. So it is that, since there is no production of effects (from the Monist's point of view), neither are there any creative causes.

2 Lit., what "turns out" (nātvartaka).
Consequently the argument that causes must exist because their essence (or function) has been defined does not hold good in the present case.

XLVI THE OBJECT, A CONDITION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA.

The author now proceeds to deny the (second condition), the condition consisting in the fact that (every mental phenomenon) has an objective counterpart (upon which it is intent).

VIII A mental Ens is reckoned as an element,
Separately from its objective counterpart.
Now if it begins by having no objective counterpart.

How can it get one afterwards?

What are the elements\(^1\) of existence which are here in the Hīnayanist's system characterised as possessors of an objective counterpart?\(^2\) Consciousness, (i.e., pure, indefinite sensation)\(^3\) and definite mental phenomena.\(^4\) Such are the words of Scripture. When consciousness is awakened, or definite mental phenomena produced, they are intent\(^5\) upon some object (which transcends them), whether it be a patch of colour or some other object corresponding to the sensation. These are then called the objective conditions\(^6\) of those mental elements.

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\(^1\) dhārma.
\(^2\) sālambana.
\(^3\) citta.
\(^4\) caitta.
\(^5\) sālambanena utpadyante.
\(^6\) sālambana-pratyaya.
It is now asked, is this objective condition imagined for sensation already existing, or for sensation not yet produced? In the first case the objective condition becomes useless. Indeed the objective condition is assumed in order to account for the production of this element,\(^1\) (sensation). But this element then really exists before the objective cause has begun to operate.

Indeed in this case the element (consciousness) would be established as existing by itself, separately from its objective cause. Why would we then imagine it influenced by an external object?

Thus consciousness and similar elements would appear as existent and real, separately from their objective counterparts. Then it would simply be your fancy to call them possessors of an objective counterpart\(^2\). They would have altogether no (real) relation to objects.

Now let us examine the other alternative. We then imagine that a sensation not yet existing has already an object. This is also impossible. Because an element which has been entered into the system of elements separately from its objective counterpart is, in any case, an existing element. But (to imagine) an unexisting element combining with an object is quite impossible.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) dharma.
\(^2\) sālambana.
\(^3\) Lit. p. 84, 9-10. "This also is impossible, because it is stated in the aphorisms "without an object really etc. an existing element is taught in the system." "Indeed the non-existing has no combination with the object."
The first sentence of the above verse must be supplemented thus—"you call possessor of an object" a mental Ens which in the system is reckoned as an element separately from its object.

The second sentence of the verse contains a question,

Now if it begins by having no objective counterpart How can it get one afterwards?

This is the reason expressed in the form of a question. The meaning is the following one If an element cannot exist without being intent upon an object, if it is not real, wherefrom will then the object appear? If the object-maker is absent, neither can the object exist.

But then how are we to understand the Scriptural evidence that mind and mental phenomena must have an object? The question is trivial. Yes they have an object, if the rule be considered from the empirical standpoint of contingent reality, not from the transcendental standpoint of absolute reality.

XLVII THE CAUSA MATERIALS DENIED

Nāgārjuna next proceeds to destroy the notion of an immediately preceding moment of a chain of homogeneous momentary existences which by the

1 Lit. p. 85.4 "The word atha for a question. Why?—for the reason."
2 abhāva
3 adesa
Hīnayānist is reckoned as a special condition. He says,

IX If separate elements do not exist, Nor is it possible for them to disappear. There is no moment which immediately precedes.

And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

The definition of the immediately preceding homogeneous condition is here (in the Hīnayāna) the following one. The immediately preceding destruction of the material cause is a condition of the production of the result. The following must be considered. When in a monistic system all entities, all supposed results, are viewed as non-produced, as e.g., a sprout is not considered as a

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1 This condition corresponds roughly to the samanāya-kārana of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; it represents the upādāna, the substratum of every appearing element. In the realistic systems, the causa materialis is the continuant substance in the new production. But all Buddhists deny the existence of continuant substances and reduce them to chains of discrete moments, every preceding moment representing the upādāna of the following one. The preceding moment is supposed to have vanished when the next one appears.

2 Precedes a grammatical explanation. Lit., p. 86, 1-3. “Here, in the last half of the verse, the quarters must be transposed. Moreover the word “and” is at the wrong place, it should stand after the word śruttā. The reading will then be, “if it has disappeared, how is it a cause? Therefore “the foregoing” is not admissible. It has been thus expressed for the sake of versification”

3 dharma.

4 i.e. existing sub specie aeternitatis.
new origination,\(^1\) then it is clear that from this standpoint, the disappearance of the cause, the seed in its last moment, is impossible. In this case, there is no disappearance of the material cause, and therefore how can there be a moment representing the immediately preceding condition for the production of the sprout?

But the Hīnayānist maintains that all existence being a chain of discrete moments, the disappearance of the seed must have happened before the result has appeared. However, if the seed is destroyed, converted into non-existence, what is then supposed to represent a cause of the sprout? Or what is the cause that has destroyed the seed? Both are without a cause. This is expressed in the words,

And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

The word "and" refers to a non-produced sprout.\(^2\) Indeed, since it is assumed that the sprout is not yet produced at the moment when the seed has already disappeared, both these events the disappearing of the seed and the appearing of the sprout are without a cause. For this reason, an immediately foregoing separate momentary existence as a cause is an impossibility.

Another explanation of this verse is the following one.

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\(^1\) but as a mode of the unique substance (tathātā=dharmakāya) of the Universe.

\(^2\) It is the habit of Indian commentaries to interpret the particle 'and' as an indication of some additional circumstance.
In the first aphorism of this treatise. viz.—
There absolutely are no things,
Nowhere and none, that arise anew,
Neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self,
Nor out of both, nor at random.
the notion of origination has been cleared away altogether.

The present aphorism simply refers to that general denial and draws the consequence that—
If separate elements never appear,
Nor is it possible for them to disappear.
There is no moment which immediately precedes. ¹

As to the explanation of the last sentence of the aphorism, viz.
And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?
it remains then just the same as before.

XLVIII THE SPECIAL CAUSE ALSO DENIED

Nāgārjuna now goes on to deny the existence of a predominant condition ² and says,

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¹ i.e., there is no momentary existence which immediately disappears in order to make room for the next moment.
² This variety of causation is probably the precursor of the nimmūlakāraṇa, asādhāraṇa kāraṇa, sadhakatama kāraṇa or kāraṇa of the Nyāya-Vaśeṣika. The eye, e.g., is the adhipatipratyaya of a visual sensation. But it cannot be identified with our causa efficiens because such a conception has, strictly speaking, no place in the Buddhist system. Causation in the world-process is imagined as quite impersonal, the separate bits of reality are following one another automatically. Karma itself is a separate element, it is not personal in theory. All results are therefore automatic, the natural outflow ‘nispyāṇa-phala’ of conditions. Some results are very characteristically called anthropomorphich (purusa-lāra-phala-purusottma vā kṛta), they are also conceived as automatic, but only appearing as though they were produced by a conscious will. Cf. Ab. Kośa. II 56 ff.
If entities are relative, they have no real existence. The formula "this being, that appears." Then loses every meaning.

The definition of the predominant condition is here in Hinayana the following one. A predominant condition is that special fact which being present the result inevitably appears. But since all separate entities from the Monist's point of view have only a relative origination and no real independent existence, the definition of causation expressed in the words "this being, that appears" then loses every meaning. What is indeed the meaning of the word "this" which is supposed to point to a cause, and what the meaning of the word "that" which is supposed to point to its result? It is true, a definition is given, but Causality is not thereby established.

The Hinayanaist makes the following objection. After having observed that a piece of cloth is produced out of threads, we conclude that the existence

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1 māsvabhava=śunya.
2 adhipati-pratya.
3 bhāvānām.
4 pratisya-samuppannata=śnyata.
5 svabhava-abhāva=śnyata.
6 Lit., p. 67, 1-3. "Since there is non-existence of self-existence of the entities because of their Dependently-together-origination, wherefrom that which is pointed to by "this" as a cause, wherefrom that which is pointed to by "that" as a result? Therefore, albeit from a definition, there is establishment of their conditions."
of threads etc. is a necessary condition for the existence of a piece of cloth.

We answer. From the standpoint of transcendental reality, it is just the production of such separate results as cloth etc. that is ultimately denied. How can we then admit that their supposed conditions are really causes? That the production of such results as cloth etc. is ultimately unreal, this Nāgārjuna makes clear in the following words,

Neither singly in anyone of these conditions,
Nor together in all of them
Does the supposed result reside.
How can you out of them extract,
What in them never did exist?

The cloth, indeed, does not exist neither in the threads, nor in the weavers brush, nor in his loom, nor in the shuttle, nor in the pins or other causes taken singly. We do not perceive in them any cloth. Moreover from a plurality of causes a plurality of effects would be expected. And since the cloth does not exist in any one of its parts taken singly, it neither does exist in all of them, in the threads etc., taken together.

If we would admit that every single cause contributes its part to the general result, we should be obliged to admit that one result is produced piece-meal.

Therefore since there are really no results, neither can the existence of causes as separate entities be admitted.

1 svaraśpatah
2 svabhāvataka.
Supposing from these causes does appear
What never did exist in them.
This is what the Hīnayānist maintains.
Out of non-causes then
Why does it not appear?
The result does not pre-exist in these things
which admittedly are not its causes. And we have
seen that it neither does pre-exist in those things
which admittedly are its causes. Why then is a
piece of cloth never produced out of straw and
other things which admittedly are not its causes?
From the standpoint of ultimate reality\(^1\) we
then deny the production of results altogether.

The Hīnayānist makes here the following
objection. If the result were really one thing and
its causes something separate, then we would under-
stand your solicitude about the question whether
the result pre-exists in the causes or not? But the
result is not something outside its causes. On the
contrary, it includes them in itself, the presence
of the whole complex of all the causes of a given
event is equivalent to the production of the latter.
Nāgārjuna says,

The result a cause-possessor,
But causes not even self-possessors.
How can result be cause-possessor,
If of non-self-possessors, it be a result.

You maintain that there is a possessive relation
between a result and its causes, i.e., that the result

\(^1\) svartāpataḥ = tattvataḥ
is simply a modification\textsuperscript{2} of its causes. This is wrong, because these supposed causes do not possess their own selves, i.e. they are no real causes.\textsuperscript{3}

It is asserted that a piece of cloth consists of threads. The cloth then could be a reality if the threads themselves had ultimate reality.\textsuperscript{5} But they consist of parts.\textsuperscript{4} They are themselves modifications of their own parts, they are no ultimate realities.\textsuperscript{5} Therefore what is the use of maintaining that the result designated as a cloth consists of threads, when these threads themselves are no ultimate realities,\textsuperscript{6} they are not “self possessors”?\textsuperscript{7} This has been expressed in the following aphorism,

\begin{quotation}
Cloth is existent in its threads,
The threads again in something else.
How can these threads, unreal themselves,
\textbf{Produce reality in something else ?}\textsuperscript{8}
\end{quotation}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} \textit{pratipaya-vikārāḥ}.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{apratyaya-svabhavaḥ}.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{svabhava-siddha}.
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{amśumaya}, possessing particles or filaments.
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{asvabhava-siddha}.
\textsuperscript{6} \textit{asvabhava}.
\textsuperscript{7} \textit{asvayamānaya}.
\textsuperscript{8} This is against the Vaiśesika view that the reality of the whole is conditioned by the reality of the parts in which the whole is supposed to inhere, the atoms being the ultimate, eternal reality. For the Mādhyamikas atoms will be relative realities, constructed realities \textit{samvritī}. For the identification of this stanza cf. M. de la V. P.’s note in his ed.
\end{flushleft}
XIV There is, therefore, no cause-possessor,
Nor is there a result without a cause.
Nor causes are there, nor non-causes,
If altogether no results.

Therefore there is no cause-possessing result.
Then perhaps there may be a result without causes? No, there is no result outside its material cause. If the reality of a piece of cloth is not sufficiently explained by the reality of its component parts the threads, this does not mean that it will be explained any better by the reality of the straw of which mats are made.¹

The Hīnayānist objects. Let us admit for the sake of argument that there are no results i.e., no production and no pre-existence of supposed results²

¹ Lit. p. 89.9 "If there is no cloth consisting of threads how can there be one consisting of vīrāna straw?"

² The theory of the non-existence or the non-pre-existence of the result in its causes, (mā bhūt phalam=asat-phalam=asat-kāryam) is also admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas, but they admit a new creation (ārambha) of the results by the causes. The Hīnayānists have substituted for a notion of efficient causality (utpāda) a notion of coordination, (pratītya-samutpāda) and converted efficient causes (hetu, kārana), into conditions or coordinates (pratyaya). At the same time they have here converted every entity, every durable object, into a series of discrete momentary existences following one another with strict regularity. They have thus replaced causality by a regularity or uniformity in nature (pratyaya-niyama). The Mahāyānist rejects this theory from the standpoint of absolute reality, but this does not prevent him from accepting the realistic view for phenomenal reality, cp. above p. 163.
There is, however, a regularity¹ in the phenomenal world according to which some facts appear as coordinated and others are not so coordinated. You yourself admit it. Indeed you ask us the following question: if there are no results produced by causes and if all existence consists of discrete moments following one another why it is that certain facts appear only after those with which they are serially coordinated, why is it that they do not appear with the same evidence² after facts with which they are not serially coordinated? By putting this question you implicitly admit a strict regularity in the phenomenal world. If the supposed results, called a cloth or a mat, were not existent, their coordinates, the threads and the straw, would never have been called causes. In this sense we the Hīnayānists maintain the reality of results.³

We answer There would have been a real result, if conditions and non-conditions themselves really existed. We would then distinguish that, given a certain result, such and such facts are not its conditions. But if we critically examine⁴ these

¹ nīyama.
² abhiśravartate=abhimukham pravartate.
³ Lit. p 89 10-12. “Here he says, let there be no result, but there is a regularity of conditions and non-conditions. Accordingly you say “if a non-existent result appears after its conditions, after its non-conditions also why does it not evidently appear”? “And if the result called cloth or mat does not exist, the conditionality of the conditions, of the threads or the straw, is impossible.”
⁴ mṛdayamāna.
conceptions, they reveal themselves as non-real. Therefore,

No causes are there, no non-causes,
Since altogether no result.\(^1\)

Thus we conclude that there is no coordination\(^2\) among separate entities, when considered from the transcendental point of view.\(^3\)

Accordingly it is stated in the Arya-Ratnakara-sutra,\(^4\)

Where the adept of Relativity\(^5\) himself is lost,
What vanishes like a bird’s flight in air,
What independently nowhere exists,
Will never be a cause producing something!
What independently at all does not exist,
How can it have a cause,\(^6\) without itself existing,
Without itself existing, how can it be efficient?\(^7\)
Such is Causality as taught by Buddha.

All supposed forces\(^8\) are like mountains,\(^9\)
They are immovable and firmly seated,

\(^1\) Lit. p. 90.1 “Causes and non-causes is a (dvandva) compound.”

\(^2\) samutpāda-pratītya-samutpāda. The first chapter thus winds up with a rejection of the Hinayānistic pratītya-samutpāda.

\(^3\) svabhavataḥ=tattvatāḥ.

\(^4\) cp. L. Feer, Index du Kandjou, P. 248.

\(^5\) śunya-vid. cp. Tib

\(^6\) para-paccayaḥ, possibly as bahuvrīki.

\(^7\) Lit. “give birth to something else.”

\(^8\) sara-dharma=sarve samkārāḥ, the totality of all the active elements of existence.

\(^9\) or “motionless”, acala.
Not changing, never suffering, ever quiescent
Unconscious\(^1\) are they like aerial Space.
Just as a mountain can be never shaken
So motionless are all the elements\(^2\) of nature,
They never go and never come.
Thus should we have understand these elements
Revealed by the Victorious Buddha.
And moreover,
This one Reality Eternal,\(^3\)
Has been revealed by the Victorious Buddha,
The lion of this mankind:
It is not born, it does not live\(^4\)
It does not die, does not decay,
And merged\(^5\) in it are all the beings!
If something has no essence in itself,
How can it then receive an essence from without?\(^6\)

There are, therefore, no things internal,
There also are no things external.

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\(^1\) ajānakha Tib šes-pa-med-pa does not mean that dharma-
\(^2\) dharmakāya is an unconscious materialistic principle, but that no
\(^3\) individual things are cognized, since they are lost in the
\(^4\) all-embracing whole, cp. 185. n. 3.
\(^5\) dharmatā.
\(^6\) dharma evidently in the sense of dharmakāya=dharmatā=
\(^7\) tathātā. But the meaning of dh āra “the doctrine of
\(^8\) Buddha” is also suggested
\(^9\) upapadyā, here probably in the sense of sthita as a member
\(^10\) of the series utpāda, sthūta, jarā, anityatā.
\(^11\) nīvēsaya=Tib. bkod-pa=samnusṣa “arrangement”, i. e., the
\(^12\) whole is an arrangement of parts, the parts disappear in
\(^13\) the whole
\(^14\) para-bhāvatu.
But everywhere is present our Lord.  
This absolute condition for Quiescence 
Where every individual disappears, 
Has been revealed by the real Buddha.  
There is in it no individual life whatever. 
There you will stroll from birth delivered! 
You will then by your Saviour, 
And you will save the hosts of living beings! 
There is no other Path discernable whatever. 
There you will live, from birth delivered, 
And free yourself, deliver many beings! etc.

Finished the "Examination of Causality" the first chapter of the "Clear worded" Comment upon Relativity, the work of the venerable Master Candrakirti.

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1 Lit., 91 4-5 "With whom some self-existence is not found, through something it is not reached as other-existence, it is not being reached neither from within, nor from without, in it is the Lord inherent." nātha-dharma-kāya; nivesayi in the same sense as in 91.2.

2 The term gati signifying the six kinds of worldly existence is here applied to Nirvāṇa which is not a gati, but the ultimate aim of all gatis.

3 The term su-gata is here evidently being interpreted as the man who has entered the "best gati", i.e., who is lost in the Absolute.

4 voharasi is here also used pointedly for a condition which is the negation of vyavahāra, but at the same time the ultimate aim of all vyavahāra.

5 gati.
CHAPTER XXV

EXAMINATION OF NIRVĀṆA

I. THE HĪNAYĀNISTIC NIRVĀṆA REJECTED

On this subject Nāgārjuna says,

I. If everything is relative, ¹
No real origination, no real annihilation,
How is Nirvāṇa then conceived?
Through what deliverance,² through what annihilation?³

With regard to this point the Buddha has taught that personalities⁴ who have lived a pure life and have been initiated into Buddha’s religion,⁵ who have acquired a knowledge of ontology, i.e., of the elements of existence as taught in that religion,⁶ can attain a double kind of Nirvāṇa, a Nirvāṇa at lifetime, being an annihilation with some residual substratum, and a final Nirvāṇa, being an annihilation without any residue.

¹ śūnya.
² prahāna.
³ nirodha.
⁴ pudgala
⁵ tathāgata-śāsana-pratipanna.
⁶ dharma-anu-dharma-Śrāvīpattiyukta; noteworthy the use of the term ‘dharma’ in its two chief significations side by side, the first dharma refers to the doctrine, or religion, the second to the 75 elements of existence, or ontology.
The first of them is conceived as something attainable by a complete deliverance\textsuperscript{1} from the whole catalogue of the defiling elements,\textsuperscript{2} e. g., the illusion of personal identity,\textsuperscript{3} desires\textsuperscript{4} etc. etc. A substratum is what underlies all these defiling agencies, it is the inveterate instinct of cherishing one's own life.\textsuperscript{5} The word "residual substratum" thus refers to that foundation of our belief in personal identity\textsuperscript{6} which is represented by the ultimate elements of our mundane existence,\textsuperscript{7} which are systematized in five different groups. A residue is what is left. A substratum is left in a partial Nirvāṇa. It exists with a residual substratum, hence its name.

What is the thing in which there still is a residue of personal feeling? It is Nirvāṇa. It is a residue

\textsuperscript{2} prahāna.
\textsuperscript{3} klesa-gana.
\textsuperscript{4} avidyā.
\textsuperscript{5} rāgādī.
\textsuperscript{6} atma-sneha.
\textsuperscript{7} atma-prajñāpi.

upadāna-skandha=sārava-dharmāḥ, the elements of mundane existence as contrasted with the elements composing the Saint and the Buddha; skandha can be translated as "element" and as "group of elements" because three skandhas (vedana, samyag, vipaścāna) contain one dharma each, reṇa-skandha contains 10 dharmas, and samaskāra-skandha the remaining 59 ones, except the eternal ones asamskṛta, not included in this classification at all; skandha is also a group in the sense of containing past, present, future etc. dharmas cf. my Central Conception, p. 6
consisting of the pure elements\(^1\) of existence alone, delivered from the illusion of an abiding personality\(^2\) and other stealthy defilers,\(^3\) a state comparable to that of a town in which all criminal gangs have been executed. This is a Nirvāṇa at lifetime with some residue of personal feeling.

A Nirvāṇa in which even these purified elements themselves are absent is termed final Nirvāṇa, a Nirvāṇa without any residue of personal feeling, because of the idea that here\(^4\) the residue of personal feeling is gone, it is impersonal. It is a state comparable to that of a town (destroyed), a town which, after all the criminal gangs have been executed, has been itself also annihilated. It has been said about this Nirvāṇa.

The body has collapsed,
Ideas\(^5\) gone, all feelings vanished,
All energies\(^6\) quiescent,
And consciousness\(^7\) itself extinct.
And likewise,
With his body still at life,

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\(^1\) skandha-mātraka=anāsrava-dharmāk
\(^2\) sat-kāya-drṣṭi.
\(^3\) kleśa-taskara.
\(^4\) nir-upadhu-śesā is thus an adhikarana-sādhana madhyamapada-lopin composite word implying that when all the elements of life are gone, there still remains something lifeless in what there has formerly been life, cp. below p. 525-6
\(^5\) hdu-ses=sanāt.
\(^6\) hdu-byed = samskāra.
\(^7\) rnam-par-ses-pa = vyūhāna.
(285)

The Saint enjoys some feeling,
But in Nirvāna, consciousness\(^2\) is gone,\(^3\)
Just as a light (when totally extinct.)

This lifeless Nirvāna, without any residue, is
attained through an extinction of all elements of
life.\(^3\)

The Mahayanist. Now, how are we to under-
stand the possibility of this double Nirvana?

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\(^1\) cetah=viśṭāna-skandha.
\(^2\) vimokṣah=nivṛttiḥ. cp. p. 525. 7.
\(^3\) skandhānām nirodhāti. These two Nirvānas are well known in
European science since the time of Childers. Of them only
the second is the real and final Nirvāna. It is defined by
Childers, according to the Pali school, as annihilation of
all the skandhas. But the classification of existence as
skandhas does not include niroda or asamskṛta-dharma. The
Sarvāstivādins and Vaibhāsikas, as we have seen, assume
this niroda to represent a separate reality—satya, vastu,
dharma, it is a lifeless dharma-svabhāva as contrasted with
the living dharma-laksana-samskarāh. The Mahāyānist,
from his higher, monistic point of view, brushes both
these Nirvānas aside. But there cannot be the slightest
doubt that Nāgārjuna accepts their contingent reality.
He thus has three Nirvānas. The first represents the
world sub specie aeternitatis, it is defined below, XXV 9.
The second is the condition of the Mahāyānistic Saint, the
ārya, the bodhisattva. The third corresponds to his
disappearance in final Nirvāna. The first alone is ulti-
mately real. The two others are immanent in it; they are
not separately (svabhāvatah) real. To these three Nirvānas,
the Yogacāras have added a fourth one, called by them
apratisthita-nirvāna altruistic Nirvāṇa, it represents the pure
condition of their eternal Conscious Principle, that prin-
ciple which they have inherited from the Sautrāntikas and
The Hinayanist Nirvana is only possible through the annihilation of desires and all active elements producing life. If everything is relative, if nothing really originates, nothing really disappears, where is the source of illusion and desires, where all the elements which must vanish, in order that Nirvana should take place? It is therefore, clear that separate entities must really exist, in order that something should really vanish.

To this the following aphorism is an answer.

II Should everything be absolutely real, No real creation, no real destruction, the latter from earlier schools with similar theistic tendencies, the Vatsypūrtiyas and the Mahāsanghkās, cp. above p. 30 and J. Masuda, Der Idealismus der Yogācāra Schule, p 52 ff. (Heidelberg, 1926.). According to consequent Mahāyānism, this fourth Nirvāna should be also regarded as merely an aspect of the first, but this question appears never to have been finally answered, at least among some of the followers of that school. It is a moot point among the Tibetans, even now, whether the Absolute of an author like Dharmakīrti represents a Conscious Principle (śes-pa) or Impersonal Eternity (rtag-pa). According to the early Yogācāras, the dharma-kāya is divided into svabhāva-kāya (no-bo-ḥid-sku) and jñāna-kāya (je-ḥes-kyi-sku), the first is the motionless (aṇīya) substance of the Universe, the second is aṇīya. i.e. changing, living.

1 kīṭa.
2 skandha.
3 ṭhāna.
4 klesāḥ = avidyā-trṣne.
5 skandhāḥ.
6 bhavānām svabhāvah, "non-relative, absolute existence."
7 aṅkaya.
How is Nirvāṇa then conceived?
Through what deliverance, through what annihilation?

If the defiling elements¹, or all the elements in general,² are independent entities, existing in themselves,³ since it is impossible for them to be deprived of their own reality, how can they be annihilated, in order that through this annihilation Nirvāṇa should be reached? Therefore Nirvāṇa is equally impossible from the standpoint of the Realists.⁴ But the Relativists⁵ do not admit a Nirvāṇa consisting in annihilation of all elements in general, nor do they admit a partial Nirvāṇa consisting in an annihilation of the defiling elements alone. Therefore they are not responsible for the just mentioned incongruity,⁶ The Relativists, in consequence, can never be accused of assuming a kind of Nirvāṇa which is logically impossible.

II THE MAHAYANISTIC NIRVĀṆA, WHAT?

If, to be sure, the Relativists admit neither a Nirvāṇa consisting in the extinction of illusion and desire,⁷ nor a Nirvāṇa consisting in the extinction of all elements of life, what is then their idea

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¹ kleśa.
² skandhanam=samśkrta-dharmānāṁ=samśkārānām
³ svabhūvenanyavasthita.
⁴ svabhāva-vādin.
⁵ śānyatā-vādin.
⁶ teśām ayam adosāḥ.
⁷ kleśa=avidyā-itśne.
of Nirvāṇa? The following aphorism gives the answer.

III. What neither is released, nor is it ever reached,
    What neither is annihilation, nor is it
        eternality,
    What never disappears, nor has it
        been created,

This is Nirvāṇa (World's Unity, the
        Inexpressible)

That (undefinable essence) which can neither be extinguished as, e. g., a desire, nor can it be attained, as e. g., a reward for renunciation; which neither can be annihilated, as e.g., all the active elements of our life.\(^1\) nor is it everlasting,\(^2\) as a non-relative\(^3\) absolute principle; which cannot really\(^4\) disappear, nor can it be created; that something which consists in the Quiescence\(^5\) of all Plurality,\(^6\) that is Nirvāṇa.

Now, if the Universe is really such a Unity, if it is no Plurality,\(^7\) how is it then that our imagination has built up defilers\(^8\) i.e. an illusion of personal

\(^1\) skandhādīvat.
\(^2\) sāsvata or nīya "beginningless."
\(^3\) aśūnyavat, as the svalaksana of the Yogācāras, the Nirvāṇa of the Hīnayānists, the pradhāna of the Sānkhyas etc. etc. They are all aśūnya in that sense that their adepts suppose them to be absolute, non-relative.
\(^4\) svabhāvataḥ.
\(^5\) upaśama
\(^6\) sarva-prapanca.
\(^7\) mūsdra-prapañca.
\(^8\) kleśa-kalpanā.
identity and desires through a suppression of which Nirvāṇa is supposed to be attained? Or how is it that our imagination has built up separate elements through the annihilation of which Nirvāṇa reveals itself? As long as these constructions of our imagination\(^1\) exist, Nirvāṇa cannot be reached, since it is reached just through a suppression of all Plurality.

The Hīnayānīst objects. Be that as the case may be, let us admit that neither the defiling elements, nor the elements in general exist when Nirvāṇa is reached. However, they must exist on this side of Nirvāṇa, i.e., before Nirvāṇa is reached. In that case Nirvāṇa will be possible through their total annihilation.

We answer. You are haunted\(^2\) by illusion, get rid of it!

For a real Ens which exists as an independent-entity\(^3\) can never be converted into an one-ntity. Therefore those who are really desirous to attain Nirvāṇa must first of all get rid of this imagined Plurality. Indeed Nāgārjuna himself will state that there is no line of demarcation, with the Phenomenalworld on this side and the Absolute on the other.

Where is the limit of Nirvāṇa,
'T is also the limit of Saṁsāra,
There is no line of demarcation,

\(^1\) kalpanaḥ.
\(^2\) grāha.
\(^3\) svabhāvato vidyamāna.
No slightest shade of difference between them.¹

Thus it should be realized that nothing is really suppressed in Nirvāṇa, and nothing is really annihilated. Nirvāṇa consists merely in the suppression of absolutely all the false constructions of our imagination. This has been stated by the Buddha himself in the following words,

Real ultimate elements² can never be annihilated,
The things that in this world do not exist,
They never did at all exist.
Those who imagine existence along with non-existence Will never realize phenomenal³ (Plurality’s) Quiescence

The meaning of this stanza is the following one. In the Absolute,⁴ i.e., in that principle which is final Nirvāṇa⁵ without any residue (of phenomenal life altogether), all elements of existence have vanished, because all of them, whether they be called defilers,⁶ or the creative power of life,⁷ or individual existences,⁸ or groups of elements, they have all totally vanished. This

¹ XXV. 20.
² dharmāḥ.
³ duḥkha = samsāra, cp. p. 523. 13
⁴ mṛgīta
⁵ nirvāṇa-dhātu.
⁶ kleśa.
⁷ karma.
⁸ janma.
all systems of philosophy admit, i. e., that the Absolute is a negation of the Phenomenal.

Now, these elements which do not exist there, in the Absolute, they really do not exist at all; they are like that kind of terror which is experienced when, in the dark, a rope is mistaken for a snake and which dissipates as soon as a light is brought in. These elements of our life, called illusion and desire, their creative force and the consequent individual lives,\(^2\) have no real existence in the absolute sense,\(^3\) even at any time in the phenomenal condition of life.\(^4\) Indeed, the rope which in the dark has been mistaken for the serpent, is not really in itself a serpent, since it is not apprehended by sight and touch, whether in the light or in the darkness, as a real serpent would necessarily be.

How is it then that it is called phenomenal reality?\(^5\)

We answer. Obsessed by the unreal devil of their "Ego" and their "Mine" the obtuse men and common worldlings imagine that they really perceive separate entities which in reality do not exist, just as the ophthalmic sees before himself hair, mosquitoes and other objects which never did exist. It has therefore been said,

\(^1\) sarva-vādīnā.
\(^2\) kleśa-karma-jñamānti.
\(^3\) tattvataḥ.
\(^4\) saṃsāra-avasthāyām.
\(^5\) saṃsāra.
Those who imagine existence along with non-existence. Will never realize phenomenal Plurality's Quiescence.

Those who assert existence, the Realists who imagine that there is a real existence of separate entities,¹ are the followers of Jaimini, Kanāda, Kapila and others up to the realistic Buddhists, the Vaibhāsikas.²

Those who deny future existence are the Materialists ³ who are firmly rooted in a destiny leading them to hell. The others are the Sautrāntikas who deny the existence of the past and the future,⁴ deny the existence of such a separate element as the moral character of the individual,⁵ deny the existence of forces which are neither physical nor

¹ bhāva-sadbhāva-kalpanāvantah.
² It is noteworthy that the Sautrāntikas are not mentioned among the Realists; it is just because they are half-realists. In addition to what has been said above, p. 29 ff. about the position of the Sautrāntikas, it must be mentioned that Bodhidharma and many others characterised this school as Mahāyānistic, because of its moral philosophy. But their opinion was rejected, since the founders of the two main schools of the Mahāyāna, i. e., Nāgārjuna and Āryasanga, did not share it (Cp. Lankya-hu-tuk-ia, Grub-mtshah. trans by M. Gorsky, Ms. Mus. Ās. Petr.). The total silence about Vedānta is also to be noted.
³ nāstika, they deny retribution, moral responsibility cp. p. 28.
⁴ Cp. My Central Conception p. 42.
⁵ avyāpti to be corrected from vyāpti, p. 523.11 cp. ibid. p. 6, 7,99.
mental,¹ but admit the reality of all other separate elements. Or they are the Yogacaras, the Idealists who deny the existence of individual things so far as they represent logical constructions of our thought,² but admit 1. their contingent reality so far they obey causal laws³ and 2. their final reality so far they are merged into the Universal Whole.⁴

The phenomenal world,⁵ or the phenomenal life⁶ will never reach final Quiescence neither for the Realists,⁷ nor for the Negativists,⁸ (nor for partial Realists). Indeed,

A man, suspecting he has taken poison,

Faints even when there is no poison in
his stomach.

Swayed by the care of Ego and of "Mine",
Eternally he comes and dies,
Without real knowledge.⁹ about his Ego¹⁰

Therefore it should be known that nothing is
suppressed in Nirvāṇa and nothing annihilated.

¹ viprayukta-samskara=rāga-citta-viprayukta-samskara, cp. ibid, p. 21.
³ paratantra, cp. ibid.
⁴ pārmanipama, cp. ibid.
⁵ dukkha=paśca-upādāna-skandhāḥ.
⁶ samsāra.
⁷ astivādin.
⁸ nāstivādin.
⁹ bdag-de-'dus-šes-yon-ṣag = pad-atma-samyla.
¹⁰ from the Tib.
The essence of Nirvāṇa consists merely in the extinction of all constructions of our productive imagination. ¹

Accordingly we find it stated in the Ratnāvali²
Nor is Nirvāṇa non-existence.
How can such an idea³ come to you?
We call Nirvāṇa the cessation
Of every thought of non-existence and existence.

III NIRVĀṆA NOT AN ENS.

The following aphorisms are directed against those who not being able to realize that Nirvāṇa is simply the limit of all constructions of our productive imagination continue to imagine a kind of Nirvāṇa which either represents reality or non-reality or both or neither.

IV Nirvāṇa, first of all, is not a kind of Eṇs,
It would then have decay and death.
There altogether is no Eṇs
Which is not subject to decay and death
There are indeed philosophers who have a preconceived idea⁴ that Nirvāṇa must be something positive.⁵ The following is their line of argument. According to our system,⁶ they say, there is a positive thing which represents a barrier,⁷ a

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¹ sarva-kalpanā-ksaya.
² Ratnāvali or Ratnamālakā, a work ascribed to Nāgārjuna.
³ bhūvanā.
⁴ abhinivṛṣṭa.
⁵ bhāva.
⁶ iha.
⁷ nirodhatmakāḥ padārthakā.
definite limit\(^1\) for the existence of a stream\(^2\) of defiling elements, creative actions and consequent existences.\(^3\) It is comparable to a dam checking a stream of water. This is Nirvāṇa. We know from experience\(^4\) that a thing\(^5\) without having a reality of its own\(^6\) could not be efficient.\(^7\) in that way.

The Sautrāntika objects. It has been declared that absolute indifference,\(^8\) the extinction of desires which are associated with life,\(^9\) of enjoyment that this kind of blank,\(^10\) is Nirvāṇa. What in itself is a mere Extinction\(^11\) cannot be envisaged as a kind of Ens.\(^12\) It has been just declared,

But in Nirvāṇa consciousness itself is gone.

Just as a light when totally extinct.

To regard the extinction of the light of a lamp as a kind of Ens is logically impossible.\(^13\)

The Vaibhāṣika answers. Your interpretation of the words "extinction of desire", as meaning "extinct desire" is wrong. The right interpretation

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\(^1\) nyaya-roḍha=nirodha=nirvāṇa.
\(^2\) santāna
\(^3\) klesā-karma-janma.
\(^4\) ārjate.
\(^5\) dharma.
\(^6\) vidyāmaṇa-svabhāva.
\(^7\) kārya-kārin.
\(^8\) virāga.
\(^9\) nandīrāga-sahagata-irṣṇā
\(^10\) nirodha.
\(^11\) kṣaya-mātram.
\(^12\) bhāva.
\(^13\) nopapadyate.
is the following one. "That thing in which desire is extinct" is called extinction of desire. It can then be asserted that when that ultimate entity which is called Nirvāṇa is present, every desire and consciousness are extinct. The extinction of the light of a lamp is a mere example. And even this example must be understood as an illustration of the idea that consciousness is quite extinct in something that continues to exist.

Our Master Nāgarjuna now examines the consequences of the theory which determines Nirvāṇa as a kind of existence Nirvāṇa is not a positive thing he says. Why? Since it would follow that it must possess the characteristics of decay and death, because every existence is invariably connected with decay and death. He means, it would not then be Nirvāṇa, (the Absolute), since like our life it would be subject to decay and death.

In order to make sure this very point, that every life is invariably connected with the marks of decay and death, the Master says, there is no existence without decay and death. Indeed, that thing which is without decay and death is not at all an Ens, it is a mirage, as e.g., flowers in the sky. They never decay and never die, hence they do not exist.

Moreover,

1 dhārma.
2 vimokṣa.
3 viśūndati–skandhāḥ.
4 Read avyabhicārīlam.
V. If Nirvāṇa is Ens,
   It is produced by causes.
   Nowhere and none the entity exists
   Which would not be produced by causes.
Thesis. If Nirvāṇa is a kind of Ens, it would then be produced by causes.
Reason. Because it is an Ens.
Example. Just as consciousness and the other elements of our life.
The contraposition\(^1\) of the major premise will result in the following sentence: What is not produced by causes does not exist, like the horns on the head of a donkey. Pointing to this the author says,
   Nowhere and none the entity is found
   Which would not be produced by causes.
The word nowhere refers to location, the place or the time. It might be also taken as referring to a philosophic system. The word none refers to the located thing, whether it be an object of the external world or a mental phenomenon.
Moreover,
VI If Nirvāṇa is Ens.
   How can it lack substratum?
   There whatsoever is no Ens
   Without any substratum.
If, in your opinion, Nirvāṇa is a positive entity, it must repose on a substratum, it must have a root in the totality of its own causes. But such a definitely located\(^2\) Nirvāṇa is accepted by nobody.

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\(^1\) vyātireka.
\(^2\) upādāya.
the contrary, Nirvāṇa is the Absolute. It does not repose on any substratum. Therefore, if Nirvāṇa is an Ens, how can it be an Ens without any substratum? Indeed,


Example. Just as consciousness and other elements of existence. The contraposition of the major premise is further adduced as a reason,

There whatsoever is no Ens
Without any substratum.

IV NIRVĀṆA IS NOT A NON-ENS.

The Satuttāntika now suggests. If Nirvāṇa is not an Ens, because of the incongruity which has been elicited, it must be a non-Ens, since it consists merely in the fact that the defiling elements and their consequence, the individual existences, are stopped. We answer. This is also impossible, because the following has been declared.

VII. If Nirvāṇa is not an Ens,
Will it then be a non-Ens?
Wherever there is absence of an Ens,
There neither is a non-Ens.

If it is not admitted that Nirvāṇa is an Ens, if the thesis “Nirvāṇa is an Ens” is rejected, then perhaps Nirvāṇa might be a non-Ens? The author’s idea is that it neither can be a non-Ens.

If it be maintained that Nirvāṇa is the absence of defiling elements and individual existences pro-

\(^1\) dosa-prasanga.
duced by them,² then it would result that the impermanence of these defiling elements and personal existences is Nirvāṇa. Indeed, the cessation of these defiling agencies and the end of personal existences can be envisaged as nothing but their own character of impermanence. They always have an end. Thus it will follow that impermanence is Nirvāṇa. And this cannot be admitted, since in that case Final Deliverance will be attained automatically,³ the teaching of a Path towards Salvation, would be useless. Hence this is quite inadmissible.

Moreover,

VIII. Now, if Nirvāṇa is a non-Ens,
   How can it then be independent?
   For sure an independent non-Ens
   Is nowhere to be found.

A non-Ens, whether it be here the impermanence or cessation of something, is constructed in our thought and expressed in speech,⁴ as a characteristic appertaining to some positive counterpart.⁵ Absolute non-existence indeed is similar to the non-existence of horns on the head of a donkey. It is not known to be impermanent. We imagine⁶ a characterised thing as relative⁷ to some charac-

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¹ kleśa-janmanor abhānavah.
² ajatamsa
³ prayāgyate.
⁴ bhavan upadāya.
⁵ prayāgyate.
⁶ adhitiya.
teristic, and *vice versa* a characteristic as being relative to something characterized. The work of characterisation\(^1\) being thus relational,\(^2\) what is impermanence or cessation without an entity characterised by it? Non-existence must, therefore, be imagined along with a counterpart\(^3\). Therefore, if Nirvāṇa is a non-Ens, how can it be an Absolute\(^4\) Nirvāṇa?

This argument might be formulated as follows

**Thesis.** Nirvāṇa can be a non-Ens only as relative to some positive counterpart.

**Reason.** Because it is a non-Ens.

**Example.** Just as the destruction of a jar is relative to this jar.

In order to make this clear it is added,

For sure, an absolute\(^4\) non-Ens

Is nowhere to be found.

An objection is raised. If indeed it is maintained that an absolute non-Ens is impossible, then, e.g., the negation of a son of a barren woman must also be related\(^5\) to a positive counterpart in the shape of the real son of a barren woman.

**Answer.** Who has established that the son of a barren woman etc. is a non-Ens? Just the contrary has been said above.\(^6\)

\(^1\) *lakṣya-lakṣana-praṇīta*.
\(^2\) *paraspara-apaksaka*.
\(^3\) *upādāya*.
\(^4\) *anupādāya*.
\(^5\) *upādāya abhayak*
\(^6\) XV. 5.
If something is not settled as an Ens
Neither can it be settled as a non-Ens,
What people call a non-Ens
Is nothing but a change in Ens.

Thus the son of a barren woman is not really a non-Ens, a negation as something real. It has indeed been declared that,

The empty space, the horns of asses,
The sons of barren women
Are spoken of as non-Ens
The same refers to all imagined Ens$^1$,

But this should be understood as a mere denial of the possibility to imagine them as real, not as conceiving them as a negation, because positive counterparts to which they could be related do not exist. The “son of a barren woman” are mere words. They do not correspond to any reality which could be cognized, which could either be an Ens or a non-Ens. How can a thing whose concrete reality has never been experienced be imagined either as existing or as not existing. Therefore it should be known that the son of a barren woman is not a real negation. Thus it is settled,

$^1$ bhāveṣu-kalpanā.

$^2$ Buddhist logic has established a very detailed and thorough theory of negation, where it is proved that every negative judgement is founded in a negative experience, on a possible perception which has not happened (anupā-labdhi). It is, therefore, always related to some positive substratum, cp. Nyāyabindu II. 26 ff.
there can be no non-Ens without a positive counterpart.¹

V. NIRMĀṇA IS THIS WORLD VIEWED SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS.

It is now asked, if Nirmāṇa is neither Ens nor is it non-Ens, what is it indeed? We answer. The godlike Buddhas have made about this point the following declaration,

IX Coordinated here or caused² are separate things,

¹ anupādāya, this kind of upādāna is termed in the Nyāya system a pratityogun. This realistic system admits absolute non-existence (ayanta-abhāva) and relative non-existence (anyonya-abhāva)

² From their Buddhist point of view the terms pratitya “relative to a cause” and upādāya, “relative to a substratum” are equivalents. The realistic Vaiśeṣika system imagines that the substratum (upādāna) is a cause (sama-ṇaṭi-kāraṇa) really producing (ārambhaka) the result. In Hīnayāna, the real existence of a durable substratum of a stuff or substance, is denied and the duration of the object is converted into an uninterrupted sequence of momentary flashes without any substratum, every preceding movement is the substratum (upādāna-bhāta) of every following one. Cause and effect are thus declared to be correlated concepts, just as the long is correlated with the short (dīrgha-hrasva-vat,) causation is replaced by coordination, and the causes converted into coordinates. Nāgārjuna here says that whether we, with the Vaiśeṣikas, imagine causation as a production of one thing by the other (pratitya), or whether we, with the Hīnayānists, imagine mere-ordination (upādāya) there nevertheless is a Whole (sv jñi nāv) in which these causes and coordinates are
We call this world phenomenal.
But just the same is called Nirvāṇa,
When viewed without Causality, without Coordination.

The phenomenal world is here the run of life, hither and thither, the come and go of life, the concatenation of births and deaths. The phenomenal world is imagined as existing in the sense that its separate entities are dependent upon a complex of causes and conditions, they are relatively real as, e.g., the long is real as far as there is something short with which it is contrasted. Sometimes they are imagined as produced by causes, e.g., the light is supposed to be produced by the lamp, the sprout is conceived as produced by a seed etc. But in any case, whether it be only imagined as relatively coordinated, or whether they be considered as produced by causes, when the continuity of birth and death has ceased, when there are neither relations nor causality, this same world as motionless and eternal is then called Nirvāṇa. Now, the mere

merged

Otherwise, pratiṣṭya as a part of the term pratiṣṭya-samutpāda refers to also causation in the sense of coordination, it then is synonymous with upādāya, but here both terms are contrasted from a special viewpoint.

1 hetu-pratiṣṭya-sāmagrī. Since among the hetus we must include the kārana-hetu; the state of the whole Universe with respect to a given point-instant is included in the totality of its causes and conditions.

2 Lit p 529 5-7. “In any case whether it be established that it is imagined (prajñāpyate) as coordinated (upādāya), or produced as caused (pratiṣṭya), in any case the non-
cessation of aspect can neither be considered as an Ens, nor as a non-Ens. Thus it is that Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens.

Another interpretation of this aphorism is also possible; it would then intimate that the manner of conceiving Nirvāṇa by the Hīnayānists is much the same, although they aver that their Nirvāṇa is an Ens.

They indeed maintain either, like the Sarvāstivādins, that there is in the Universe no abiding central principle at all, that the world-process consists in the evolution of coordinated energies. They maintain that this world in which every momentary origination and every destruction,

operation (oprañcāta), of this duration of a lineage of births and deaths, whether as non-caused or as non-coordinated, is established as the Nirvāṇa." The non-operation or cessation of an imagined construction (prajñapti = kalpanā) is nothing but a change of aspect, Nirvāṇa is thus the Universe sub specie aeternitatis.

1 The anātman principle is an equivalent of samskāraḥ sansaranti, cp. my Central Conception p. 25. 52 etc.

2 sansaranti.

3 sam-skāraḥ = sambhūya-kārnā. It would be incorrect to surmise that samskāraścandha is alone meant, although the chief samskāra, karma or cetanā, the élan vital, the biotic force which arranges the coordination of all other elements, is first of all meant. But vedanā and samyāti are samskāras, and vyāti and rūpa are, according to the rules of the 12 membered pratītya-samutpāda, always included in every life. From this whole passage, it appears clearly that the Buddhist conception of samskāra and samskritāva is but another name for pratītya-samutpānnavatva cp. ibid, p. 28.
obeys, in every case, causal laws,\(^1\) when these causal laws have ceased to operate,\(^2\) when all energies are extinct,\(^3\) is called Nirvāṇa\(^4\)

Or they (like the \(V\) āstūpāryas) maintain that there is such a central principle, termed by them "personality"\(^5\) which migrates out of one existence into another. It escapes definition.\(^6\) It neither is the eternal Soul of the Brāhmaṇa, nor is it momentary\(^7\) like the energies of the Buddhists. Phenomenal life consists in its coming and going\(^8\), dependent every time upon a changing substratum\(^9\) of elements. It then evolves obeying causal laws\(^10\)

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\(^1\) \(pratītya pratītya \text{ na} \ upadā \text{ ca.}\)

\(^2\) \(opratītya\)

\(^3\) \(opraśaratāmah\).

\(^4\) This absolutely lifeless something representing the picture of the Universe in which all energies are extinct reminds us, to a certain extent, of the final condition of the Universe as represented by modern science according to the Law of entropy, cp. above p. 26.

\(^5\) \(paudgala\).

\(^6\) \(aśāya-\)

\(^7\) \(aṃtiya\).

\(^8\) \(ājñām jātihāna\).

\(^9\) \(taḥ tād uṣātām uṣṭiṇa\).

\(^10\) \(upādāya \text{ pravartate} = \text{ pratītya} \text{ pravartate}, \text{ sc it obeys the laws of causation or coordination. The theory of the Vāstūpūrṇtṛyās about an abiding personality (} \text{paudgala}) \text{, which they nevertheless do not consider as a reality (} \text{dharma}) \text{ or a Soul (} \text{atman} \text{), is exposed with detailed argumentation by Basubandhu, ab. Kosa.} \text{ X I and above. p. 51. n 1.}\)
This very principle which evolves on the basis of changing elements, when the time comes for it to assume no new substratum and its evolition stops, is said to have entered Nirvāṇa.

Now, whether it be coordinated energies alone, or some central principle like the one called "personality" it is clear that the mere fact of their evolution being stopped can neither be characterised as an Ens, nor as a non-Ens.

And further,

X. The Buddha has declared
That Ens and non-Ens should be both rejected.

1 upādāya pravartamanāh.
2 idānām.
3 anupādāya.
4 apravartamanāh.
5 Lit. p. 529. 9-530.2 “Otherwise, those who have the tenet that the forces (samskāra) are migrating, for them it is said that in every-case-coordinated-origination and destruction is Nirvāṇa when going on without coordination. But for those for whom the personality (pudgala) is migrating, for them this personality, being indefinable as to whether it is eternal or non-eternal, possesses a coming and going when reposing on different substrata; it is then going on upon a substratum; this very (personality) which is going on (pravartamāna) upon different substrata is now called Nirvāṇa when it no more is going on upon a substratum.”
6 samskāraḥ.
7 pudgala.
8 This clearly is an answer to those Hinayānists who maintain that their Nirvāṇa is an Ens. (vastu. dharma).
Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens. Nirvāṇa therefore is conceived.

On this point, it is stated in Scripture, "O Brethren, those who seek an escape out of this phenomenal existence in a kind of new existence or in annihilation they have no true knowledge." Both should be rejected, the craving for eternal life and the craving for eternal death. But this Nirvāṇa is the only thing which the Buddha has characterised as the thing not to be rejected. On the contrary, he has declared it to be the only thing desirable. But if Nirvāṇa had been eternal existence or eternal death, it also would have been rejectable. However it is not rejectable.

Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens. Nirvāṇa therefore is conceived.

VI NIRVĀṇA IS NOT BOTH ENS AND NON-ENS TOGETHER.

There are some Vaibhāṣikas who assume a double character in Nirvāṇa. It is a non-Ens so far it is the place in which the defiling elements and the elements of existence in general are extinct. But in itself this lifeless place is an Ens. The author

1 bhava.
2 vibhava.
3 aprahātanya.
4 bhava.
5 abhava.
6 This is the Vaibhāṣika view about the reality of Nirvāṇa without but a little change in its formulation. It is here examined once more in order to fill up the scheme of the quadrilemma.
now proceeds to state that such double Nirvāṇa is impossible.

XI. If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens, Final Deliverance would be also both, Reality and unreality together. This never could be possible.

If Nirvāṇa had the double character of being both an Ens and a non-Ens, then Final Deliverance would be both a reality and unreality. It would then follow that the presence\(^1\) of the energies\(^2\) of life and their extinction, both represent Final Deliverance. However a Final Deliverance from phenomenal life and the energies of phenomenal life cannot be the same.\(^3\) Therefore, says the author, this is impossible.

And further,

XII If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and a non-Ens, Nirvāṇa could not be uncaused.

Indeed the Ens and the non-Ens are both dependent on causation.

If Nirvāṇa would have the double character of an Ens and a non-Ens, it would be then dependent, it would be relative to the totality of its causes and

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\(^1\) ātma-lābha.

\(^2\) samskāra.

\(^3\) Probably the Vaiśeṣika theory about the dharma-rośabha is here alluded to. According to their theory, some lifeless residue of the samskāras or dharma remains in Nirvāṇa, but there manifestation (dharma-laksāna) is stopped for ever. We would then have in Nirvāṇa samskāras somehow existing and non-existing at the same time, cp. My Central Conception, p. 42-95.
conditions, it would not be the Absolute. Why? Because both these Ens and non-Ens are conditioned. Considering that the Ens is the counterpart of the non-Ens and vice versa the non-Ens is the counterpart of the Ens, both Ens and non-Ens are necessarily dependent existences. They are not absolute. If Nirvāṇa were not the absolute, it could then be partly an Ens and partly a non-Ens. But it is not so. Therefore this is impossible.

And further,

XIII. How can Nirvāṇa represent
An Ens and a non-Ens together.
Nirvāṇa is indeed uncaused,
Both Ens and non-Ens are productions.

An Ens is caused, since it is produced by the totality of its causes and conditions. A non-Ens is likewise caused, since 1. it arises as the counterpart of an Ens, 2. because it has been declared in Scripture that decay and death, are consequent

1 hetu pratīyāyā, sāmagrīm upādāya bhavat.
2 anupādāya-sat = paramārthasat.
3 upādāya = pratītya = sāpeksa = śānya.
4 upādāya = sāpeksa = pratītyogitāka.
5 Read bhāvac caḥbhāvacena.
6 anupādāya-sat = paramārthasat
7 asamśkṛtam = na kṛtam.
8 samskrita = kriyaka.
9 hetu-pratīyāyā, sāmagrī, sambhāto-.
10 samskrita.
11 pratītya = upādāya = pratīgyin.
upon a birth.¹ Thus if Nirvāṇa were essentially an Ens or a non-Ens it could not be uncaused, it would be necessarily caused. However, it is not admitted to be caused. Therefore Nirvāṇa cannot be both Ens and non-Ens together.

Let it be so. Let Nirvāṇa itself not be Ens and non-Ens together. Perhaps it may be the place where Ens and non-Ens are found together. However this is also impossible. Why? Because,

XIV. How can Nirvāṇa represent
The place of Ens and of non-Ens together?
As light and darkness in one spot
They cannot simultaneously be present.

Since Ens and non-Ens are mutually incompatible, they cannot possibly exist together in one place, in Nirvāṇa. Therefore it is said,

How can Nirvāṇa represent
The place of Ens and non-Ens together?
The interrogation means that this is absolutely impossible.

VII NOR IS NIRVĀṆA A NEGATION OF BOTH ENS AND NON-ENS TOGETHER

The author now proceeds to consider the fourth part of the quadrilemma, and indicates the incongruity of assuming that Nirvāṇa is a negation of both Ens and non-Ens. He says:

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¹ This simple statement that non-existence is dependent upon previous existence is here given the form of a Scriptural evidence, because it corresponds to the two last members of the 12 membered pratītya-samutpāda, stating that death follows upon a birth.
XV. If it were clear indeed
What an Ens means and what a non-Ens,
We could then understand the doctrine
About Nirvāṇa being neither Ens nor non-Ens.

The judgment² that Nirvāṇa is not an Ens would be possible, if we know that there is a real Ens, then by its negation Nirvāṇa would be determined. If we know that there is a real non-Ens, then by its negation we would also understand what the judgment means, that Nirvāṇa is not an Ens. But since we neither know what an Ens nor a non-Ens really are, we can neither understand their negations.² Therefore the result at

¹ kalpanaḥ=yatana.
² From this and the following aphorisms it results that the fourth part of the quadrilemma, viz. that Nirvāṇa is neither Ens nor is it non-Ens, represents the solution favoured by the Mādhyā-mīka. Indeed since Ens in aphorism IV and non-Ens in aphorism VIII are conceived empirically, as referring to such entities which conform to causal laws, it is evident that transcendental or absolute existence which is contrasted with both these Ens and non-Ens, can be nothing but their simultaneous negation. Since this kind of reality cannot be expressed in terms of our language, since it is anurūcaya, the fourth part of the quadrilemma is likewise denied, but in terms which are altogether different from those used in denying the three first parts of the quadrilemma. This especially appears from the comment upon aphorism VI It is explicitly stated above, under aphorism IX. comment p. 530.3 that both in the Hīnayānistic and in the Mahāyānistic conception, Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens, since it is transcendental and inexpressible in terms of human language.
which we have arrived, viz. that Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens, even this negative result cannot be accepted as logically consistent.¹ This also must be rejected.

And moreover,

XVI. If Nirvāṇa is neither Ens, nor is it non-Ens,
Who can then really understand
This doctrine which proclaims at once
Negation of them both together.

If it is imagined² that this Nirvāṇa neither has the essence of a non-Ens, nor has it the essence of an Ens, where is the man to understand this? Who indeed can understand, who can grasp, who can proclaim the doctrine that Nirvāṇa represents such a double negation?

But if there is nobody to understand this here, in this world, perhaps there, in Nirvāṇa, someone exists who is capable to realize³ it? Or is this also impossible? If you admit it, you will be also obliged to admit the existence of an eternal Soul⁴ in Nirvāṇa. But this you do not admit, since the existence of a Soul, or consciousness without any substratum,⁵ independent of causal laws you do not admit.

But if there is nobody in the Nirvāṇa-world, if Nirvāṇa is altogether impersonal, by whom will

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¹ nopaṇḍyaṇe.
² kahyate.
³ pratipatta.
⁴ ātman.
⁵ nirupādāna = asamskrta = paramārthaśānt.
it then be realized that there really is a Nirvāṇa of such description? If it is answered that those who remain in the phenomenal world\(^1\) shall cognize it, we will ask, shall they cognize it empirically\(^2\) or metaphysically\(^3\)? If you imagine that they will cognize Nirvāṇa empirically, this is impossible. Why? Because empirical consciousness apprehends separate objects.\(^4\) But Nirvāṇa is the whole. There

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\(^1\) samsarāvasthāḥ = prthivyānā aryaś ca.

\(^2\) vyāhātāna.

\(^3\) jñānena viññāna as viññāna-skandha is contrasted in Hīnayāna with samjña. The first means pure sensation, and even something still more primitive, potential sensation, since sensation is sparśa. Samjña as we have seen above, text. p. 65.5 can be replaced by jñāna. We have then a contrast between viññāna and jñāna, the first meaning undeveloped and the second-developed cognition. The relation between these two terms is here, to a certain extent, similar to what it is in the Bhagavadgītā, whereas the early Upanishads make no difference between them, cp Brh. 3. 9. 28, Tait 2. 5. 1, 3. 5. 1, Katha, 3-13 Tait 2. 1. 1. In Buddhism, however, viññāna is not empirical cognition, but sensation, and jñāna, as is quite clear from the context, means transcendent or absolute knowledge, savas-prapāṇca-atita. The Tibetans usually translate this kind of jñāna not by their ordinary ses-pa, but by ye-ses, i.e. highest knowledge. Viññāna again, in this context, does not mean pure sensation, but empirical knowledge, knowledge founded upon pure sensation.

\(^4\) The definition nimittalambana or nimittagrāhin, or nimittauddhahanam is given to samjña, and not to viññāna, whose definition is prativijnapatikṛ, cp, My Central Conception. p. 16. But here this difference does not matter, since both viññāna and samjña are equally nimitta-grāhin when con-
are no separate objects in Nirvāṇa. Therefore, first of all, it cannot be cognised by empirical consciousness.

But neither can it be cognized by transcendental knowledge. Why? Because transcendental knowledge should be a knowledge of universal Relativity. This is the absolute knowledge, which is essentially eternal, beginningless. How can this knowledge which is itself undefinable grasp the definite judgment "Nirvāṇa is negation of both Ens and non-Ens"? Indeed, the essence of absolute knowledge is such that it escapes every formulation.

Therefore the doctrine that Nirvāṇa is neither a non-Ens nor an Ens at once can be realized by no

1. Jñānena.
2. Śūnyatā-ālambana, it is clear that the absolute Reality sāmyata-śūnyatā) is here meant which underlies the Universe of Relativity (sāmīrya-śūnyatā). cp 164, n
3. anutpādam eva "quite beginningless, it is also the knowledge of the Universe in which there is no causality (anutpāda) This knowledge is also called Omniscience, sarvanatā=sarvanātākārjayatā = śūnyatā jñānam = prajñā pāramitā.
4. avidyāmāna-svārāpa, i.e. its character, svārāpa, is not to be found among our human kinds of knowledge
5. rūpa = svārāpa.
6. sarva-praṇaṭa-ātita, (praṇāṇa vāk, cp, M vr. p 379 9)
one. No one can realize it, no one can grasp it, no one can proclaim it, consequently it is logically impossible  

VIII. THE REAL BUDDHA, WHAT?

The author now proceeds to state that just as all the parts of the quadrilemma, are inapplicable to Nirvāṇa, just so are they inapplicable to the Buddha who enters Nirvāṇa, He says,

XVII. What is the Buddha after his Nirvāṇa?

Does he exist, or does he not exist?
Or both or neither?
We never will conceive.
Indeed it has been already stated.  
That one who firmly is convinced
That Buddha during lifetime did exist,
Will be convinced that after death
The Buddha cannot be existing.

Thus it is that we cannot imagine what has happened after the complete extinction of the Buddha, does he then exist, or does he not exist, after Nirvāṇa? Since both these solutions are unimaginable singly, they cannot be right both at once, neither is the negation of them both, therefore, imaginable.

Not alone are all these four solutions unimaginable with regard to Buddha after his demise, but

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1 *na yujgate = nopapadyate.*
2 Translated according to the version in XXII 13. p. 447.
3 *nabhata = na katyate.*
4 *niruddha.*
His real existence before Nirvàṇa is equally unimaginal.

XVIII. What is the Buddha then at lifetime?
Does he exist or does he not exist?
Or both or neither?
We never will conceive.

This is beyond our understanding, beyond our concepts. It has been shown in the chapter devoted to the examination of Buddhahood.

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1 Ch. XXII This chapter begins by stating that the Buddha is neither contained in the elements, (skandha) of a personality, nor is he something apart from them. (XX 1-2). It is the old formula of the Vatsiputriyas and, probably of all the early sects who have favoured the idea of a superhuman Buddha. If the Buddha consisted of elements (skandha) he would be anatmā. (XX. 3). On this occasion, Candrakīrti remarks that the term atman in this context is a synonym of substance, a real, independent or absolute substance (atma-sabdo'ram svabhava-sabda-paryāyak). If he were not Self-existent, he could not be the Buddha since Buddha means Self-existent, tathāgata—existent in reality, in absolute reality. He is then characterised as śunya and nis-prapaśca, the Inexpressible. Those who would attempt to give him a conceptual definition (prapaścayanti) are incapable of contemplating him by mystic intuition (na paśyantī tathāgatam) (XX. 20). The Reality, or Substantiality (svabhāva) of the real Buddha (tathāgata) is just the same as the real substance of the world (tathāgato tasyaśvabhāvas tasyaśvabhāvam idam jagat). And just as the phenomenal world is unreal (niḥsvabhāva), the personal Buddha is unreal just in the same degree (XXVII 16). Candrakīrti adds that the unreality or relativity of the phenomenal world has been established in the first chapter of this work. It is thus clear that Buddha is
IX. ULTIMATE IDENTITY OF THE PHENOMENAL AND THE ABSOLUTE

Just for this reason, since both are equally inconceivable,

XIX. There is no difference at all
    Between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra,
    There is no difference at all
    Between Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa.

Since it is impossible to imagine a real Buddha living in this world nor to deny it, and since it is regarded in a pantheistic light as deus sine substantia. This is the strictly monistic standpoint of consequent Mahāyānaism. The conception of the Buddha is here quite the same as the conception of God (Īsvara) in the advaita system of Śankara. The yogacāra school has, in this point as in others, deviated from strict Mahāyānaism. Just as it had established four kinds of Nirvāṇa, instead of the former three cp above, p. 185, it has also four kinds of Buddhas or four bodies of Buddhas and four kinds of absolute knowledge (bodhi). Here Buddha abiding in "altruistic" (apratisthita) Nirvāṇa appears as a real God, the personified Wisdom and Love. His Spirit is not that unique substance, undifferentiated into subject and object which is the essence of dharma-kāya or tathātā, but it is a living and sympathizing Spirit which distinguishes subject, object and the other separate things of the pluriverse by pratyavēksana-jñāna. The constructions of the early Yogacārā school regarding Nirvāṇa, Buddha and Bodhi are extremely artificial and evidently the product of a compromise between strict Monism and the theistic tendencies of the school, cp, Vinñatteva's comment upon the closing passage of (B. B.) where he seems not to be at one with Dharma Kṛiti, cp. also J. Masuda, cp. cit. p. 57
equally impossible to imagine a real Buddha after his Nirvāṇa nor to deny it, just for this reason there is no difference at all between the Phenomenal world and the Absolute. On analysis they reveal themselves as being just the same in their essence. For this very reason we can now understand the words of the Buddha when he spoke, "O Brethren! this phenomenal world consisting of birth, decay and death has no under limit." This is just because there is no difference between the Phenomenal and Absolute. Indeed,

XX. What makes the limit of Nirvāṇa,
Is also then the limit of Samsāra.
Between the two we cannot find
The slightest shade of difference
The phenomenal world being in its real essence nothing but the Absolute. It is impossible to imagine either its beginning, or its end.

X. THE ANTINOMIES.
But not alone that, the antinomies established by the Buddha are insoluble for the same reason.

XXI. Insoluble are antinomic views
Regarding the existence beyond Nirvāṇa,
Regarding the extinction of this world,
Regarding its beginning.

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1. ruṣa = svarūpa.
2. samsāra.
3. nirvāṇa.
4. Lit. p. 536. 1-2. The theories (ārṣṭayāḥ) beyond final extinction (mroḍha) "end etc.," "eternal etc." are directed (samāśrta) towards Nirvāṇa, the upper limit and the under limit.
All the theories about these questions are inconsistent\(^1\) (antinomies). Since the phenomenal world and the Absolute, are naturally merged quiescent\(^2\) in the Unity of the Whole.

By the indication\(^8\) contained in the words "after Nirvāṇa"; four theories are embraced, viz. 1. The Buddha exists after death; 2. after death the Buddha does not exist; 3. after death the Buddha exists and does not exist both at once; 4 after death the Buddha neither exists, nor does he not exist. These four theories are professed regarding Nirvāṇa.

The theories regarding the end of the world, are the following ones;— 1. the world has limit. 2. the world has no limit; 3 the world has and has not a limit; 4. the world neither has, nor has not a limit. These four theories exist regarding the upper limit i.e., the end of the world.

Not being able to know something about our future life or about the future of the living world, we imagine that the life of the world will be stopped. This theory establishes a limit to the living world. Similarly, the theory that the living world will have no end is produced by an expectation of a future life. Those who partly expect it and partly do not expect it profess a double theory. Those who deny both profess the

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1. nopapadaanta.
2. pratīti-sāniścaraṇa, sp. above. p. 3.
3. upalakṣana.
theory that the world-process neither has, nor has not any limit.

Regarding the beginning of the world there are likewise four theories. 1. It is eternal, i.e. it has no beginning. 2. It has a beginning. 3. It both has and has not a beginning. 4. It neither, has, nor has not beginning.

The theory that the world is beginningless is based upon the view that we ourselves, or the living world, previously existed. The opposite view leads to the theory about the world having a beginning. Those who are both convinced and not convinced of it will profess the theory that the world is both eternal and non-eternal. Those who neither are convinced, nor are they unconvinced will profess the theory that the world is either eternal, nor is it non-eternal.

How are the antinomies to be solved? If any one of these attributes by which the world is characterised as finite, infinite etc. possessed absolute reality in itself we would then understand

1 sāsvata means here, as appears from the context eternal in the sense of beginningless
2 dṛṣṭayah = anyākta-vastum.
3 katham yugyante.
4 pādayaḥ = artha = dharma means "any object", "everything," it contains here an allusion to the following sānyastu sarva-dharmesu but the predicates of finiteness, infinity, identity, otherness, etc., are more particularly aimed at, they are also dharmas.
5 kasci svabhāvah.
what its affirmation or negation\(^1\) means. But since we have established that there is no difference between the phenomenal world as constructed according to those ideas and the Absolute\(^2\) underlying it, therefore no one of these attributes has ultimate reality, indeed—

XXII. Since everything is relative\(^3\) we do not know

What is finite and what is infinite,
What means finite and infinite at once,
What means negation of both issues,

XXIII. What is identity, and what is difference,\(^5\)

\(^1\) bhāvabhāva-kalpanā = bhāvabhāva-yejanā, kalpanā in this context means as much as our judgment.

\(^2\) Lit. p. 537. 1-2. "How are these views possible? If anything whatever possessed some self-substance, by arranging it with existence and non-existence these views would be possible."

\(^3\) This identity must evidently be understood in the sense that the Unity of the Absolute is the reality underlying the mirage of plurality.

\(^4\) sānya.

\(^5\) This refers to the question of identity between the Ego and the body, it is usually formulated as a dilemma, whereas the antinomies regarding the end and the beginning of existence, as well as the question about existence after Nirvāna are formulated in the familiar Indian method of quadrilemma. Thus the consecrated traditional number of 14 insoluble points (anyakṛta-vastanti) concerning the four antinomies is arrived at. In XXVII. 4 ff. the question of personal identity between the present Ego, the past and the future one, is examined in
What is eternity, what non-eternity. What means eternity and non-eternity together, what means negation of both issues?

These fourteen points which by the Buddha were declared insoluble, will never be solved, because we do not know what reality in itself is. But those who imagine some kind of absolute reality, and, by either excluding or asserting it, establish these dogmatical theories, they are influenced by a pre-conceived bias. It prevents them from entering the right Path, leading to the city of Nirvāṇa, and binds them to the turmoil of phenomenal existence. This should be noted.

detail with the result that there is neither identity nor otherness.

1 or “without beginning,” Sārvata.

2 navu juyante.

3 asati bhava-svarupa, lit “because they are not self-substituent things.” Here again we must point out a remarkable analogy between the Indian and European philosophy with respect to the doctrine of antinomies and their solution. Kant thought that “these questions naturally suggest themselves to the human mind and he inevitably must encounter them”, and the explanation he sought in the fact that the objects of the phenomenal world are not “self-subsistent things”. cp. Critique of Pure Reason. (transl. by Max, Muller) p. 400.

4 bhava-svarupam adhyapya.

5 tadd-ugama-avgamatah.

6 abhinivisate.
XI CONCLUSION

An objection is raised. If this is so, will it not be possible to maintain that Nirvāṇa has been denied by the Buddha? Will not his doctrine be absolutely useless, this doctrine which establishes corresponding antidotes for every kind of worldly career in order to enable mankind to reach Nirvāṇa. It has been established by the Buddha who watches the infinite hosts of living beings in their worldly career, who unmistakably knows the real intentions of all the living world, who is quite given up to his feeling of Great Commiseration, who cherishes the denizens of all the three spheres of existence as only a unique son is cherished! We answer. This criticism would be right, if there were any absolutely real doctrine, or if there were any absolutely real beings which attend to this law, or if there were any absolutely real teacher, a divine Buddha. But since in a monistic Universe that does not exist, we are not hit by your accusation.

XXIV. Our bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,

In the quiescence of Plurality,

To nobody and nowhere no doctrine about separate elements

By Buddha ever has been preached!

1 svabhava-rūpa.

2 dharma is here used in both senses, a doctrine about dharms. Not a single one of the Hinayānistic dharms (elements of existence) has been taught by the real
In this case how can the reproach made above affect us! Our view is that Nirvāṇa represents Quiescence, i.e. the non-applicability of all the variety of names and non-existence of particular objects. This very Quiescence, so far as it is the natural (genuine) quiescence of the world, is called bliss. The Quiescence of Plurality is also a bliss because of the cessation of speech or because of the cessation of thought. It is also a bliss because, by putting an end to all defiling agencies, all individual are stopped. It is also a bliss because, by quenching all defiling forces, all instinct (and habits of thought) have been extirpated without residue. It is also a bliss because, since all the objects of

Buddha, since on p. 539. 1-2 it is stated that neither a defiling (sāmklēṣṭha) element, i.e. ignorance, and desire, nor a purifying one (vāyavadāmika), i.e. prajñā and samādhi, has been taught by the real Buddha, i.e. by the Buddha conceived as Dharma-lāya, the Cosmos. The whole catalogue of the dharmas is evidently meant, and their relativity and unreality from the transcendental point of view. But since Hinayāna is Pluralism, i.e. a doctrine about the elements, a Dharma about the dharmas, dharmānudharma, both meanings are no interwoven that in many contexts both will apply. On p. 537.13 the general meaning is evidently intended.

1. iha.
2. apravrtti.
3. praṇāṇa, praṇāṇo vak.
4. nimitta.
5. jānman.
6. vāsana, explained as parnam jñānam, but conceived as a cosmical Force transcendental illusion.
knowledge have died away, knowledge itself has also died.

When the divine Buddhas have entered blissful Nirvāṇa in which all Plurality has vanished, they are like regal swans soaring in the sky without any support, they are hovering in the wind produced by their two wings, the wing of accumulated virtue, and the wing of accumulated wisdom, or they are hovering in the wind of Space, that Space which is the Void. Then from this elevation, all separate objects having become undistinguishable, the Buddhas have not preached, neither about the defiling elements of life, nor about its purifying elements, neither in the divine worlds, nor in the human world, neither to gods, nor to men. This should be realized.

Accordingly it has been declared in the Āryatathāgataguhya—"The night, when, O Sāntamati, the Buddha has reached the highest absolute enlightenment, the night he was about to pass into

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1 asthāṇa-yogena.
2 pakṣa-pāta, the meaning of bias or fervour, towards a special doctrine is equally here intended.
3 punya-sambhāra.
4 jñāna-sambhāra.
5 akimcana, an illusion to the doctrine of śūnyata; the lofty Bodhisattva is hovering in the regions of Relativity, which is here poetically compared with the Void (svabhāva-sūngad).
6 sarva-nimitta-anāpalambha.
7 sāṃkheśka-dharma
8 vāyavādānika-dharma.
Final Nirvāṇa, at that occasion the Buddha did not pronounce even one syllable, he has not spoken, nor does he speak, nor will he speak. But since all living beings, according to the intensity of their religious fervour, appear as different characters with different aims, they imagine, the Buddha proferring on different occasions a variety of discourses. On separate occasions it occurs to them "this to his Buddha teaches us about such a topic," "We listen teaching about this topic." But the real Buddha is never engaged in thought-construction, in thought-division. O Śāntamati, the Buddhas is averse to all plurality which is produced by our habits of thought. that Plurality which is the cause of an entanglement of thought constructions and of the dismemberment of the world's Unity.

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1 yathādhumuktāh.
2 vidvādha-dhātu, dātu evidently in the sense of gṛha.
3 (mudha)-āśaya.
4 samajānanti.
5 or element, dharma.
6 i. e. dharma-kāya.
7 vāsūṇa=ḥṛṇam jñānam.
8 kalpanā=yojana-
9 vaṅkaṇa=dvaitākarana.
10 This is a purely Mahāyānist doctrine, viz. that Buddha, as soon as he became a real Buddha, did not speak, because human speech is not adapted to express, and human knowledge incapable to realize conceptually, that unique Substance of the Universe with which Buddha himself is identified as dharma-kāya and which appears directly to the intuition of the mystic. The logical value of the tenets sarvajñā na vākā and asarvajñā, vākā is analy-
Indeed,

Unspeakable unpronounceable are all elements, 
Relational, quiescent, pure.
Those are real Buddhas and Bodhisattvas
Who realize them in this their pure condition.

But if the Buddha has preached no doctrine of separate elements nowhere and to nobody, how is it then that we hear about his various discourses, constituting the Scriptures?

We answer. Mankind is plunged in the slumber of ignorance, they are as though in a dream, they have a wealth of constructive imagination. It occurs to them “this Buddha, this Lord over all gods, demons and human beings in all the three worlds, teaches us about this topic.”

Accordingly it has been said by Buddha,
The Buddha is but a reflexion
Of the pure’s passionless principle.
He is not real; he is not the Buddha.
’Tis a reflexion that all creatures see.

sed with much subtlety by Dharmottara in the Nyāya bindu, p. 66.19 ff and by Vacaspatimisra in the Nyāya kanikā, p. 110.- 16 and 112. 22 ff. M. de la V. P. /- 366, n I of his edition, thinks that this doctrine is in glaring contradiction with what is repeatedly stated in the Pali Canon. No wonder, since Mahāyāna is Monsim and Hinayāna Pluralism. Spinoza can hardly be expected to agree with Aristotle.

1 śāṇya.
2 kumāra = jina-putra.
3 sva-vikalpa-abhyudaya.
This is likewise explained at length in the chapter about the "Secret meaning of the Buddha’s words."

Since there is thus no separate teaching about separate elements, for the sake of reaching Nirvāṇa, how is it then possible to maintain that a kind of Nirvāṇa exists, because the discourses about the elements of existence really exist. Therefore it is established that this kind of Nirvāṇa does not really exist. Accordingly, it has been said by Buddha,

"The Ruler of the World has said
That this Nirvāṇa is not real Nirvāṇa;
A knot by empty space entwined
By empty space has been untied!"

And moreover, "Those who imagine that some‐
thing can appear and disappear, for then O Blessed
one, the real Buddha has not yet appeared! Those,
O Blessed one, who seek a realistic (definite)
Nirvāṇa, they never will escape out of the world‐
migrations! For what reason? Because, O Blessed
one, Nirvāṇa is the merger of all particular signs,"
the quiescence of every motion and commotion.
Ignorant indeed, O Blessed one, are all the those
men who having become recluses in the name of a

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1 the reading of to Mss. deśanānām is perhaps to be retained (abhidheya-bahutoṣṭ).  
2 dharma.  
3 bhāvataḥ = sva-bhāvataḥ i.e. not that Nirvāṇa which is immanent to the Universe.  
4 prasama.  
5 sava-nimittanām  
6 sava-inṣṭita-samṣṭita.
doctrine and discipline by them imagined.¹ are seeking for a realistic Nirvāṇa and have thus fallen down into a false doctrine which is not Buddhist. They think to win Nirvāṇa is the same as to get oil out of oil-seeds or butter out of milk! I declare, O Blessed one, that those who seek Nirvāṇa in the fact that separate elements of life will be absolutely extinct,² I declare, that they are not better then the most self-coneited gentiles.”

“A Master of Yoga,³ O Blessed one, the man thoroughly trained in Yoga does not really produce something new, nor does he suppress something existing,⁴ nor will he admit that something, some real element,⁵ can be attained, or seized by absolute knowledge.⁶ etc.”

Finished the Examination of Nirvāṇa, the 25th Chapter in the comment, upon Relativity by the Venerable Master Candrakīrti.

¹ svākhyaṇa.
² parinirvāṇa = parito niruddha.
³ Yogācāra, here in the general sense of a Mahāyānist, not in the sense of Master of Yogācāra school.
⁴ as the Hinayānist teaching about yoga-samādhi assumes, cp above p. 14 and Central Conception p. 51.
⁵ here dharma refers to the phala attained by mārga.
⁶ abhūsamāya = prajñā-paramitā.

★
(Containing the original of Dedication and Chapter I of the Translation.)

प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम्।

शाखाक्रमणे हन्नाक्रमणानां नाम:।

चौद्विन्द्रवाचकितस्वतः संहसौधीवसागरस्ववचनम्।
नन्दमोन्नयो गंगोर्मावं वथातुजुद्वं छवया जगान।।१।।

बल्क दश्यानम्यासन्ती परिाद्विमनन्दम्।

इन्द्रख्यां भोपस्य मानसां वमासि सच।।२।।

बस्त्यासमानवच्छदर्या निम्नलिन्ति न श्रेपभवाविर्रेतानाम्।
विन्धयुपप्र्या विमुद्धानां विनेल्याभोपस्य संवेदाचर्य।।३।।

नागांवुद्या अन्यिन्यत ततत्त्वातिरिक्तव विचृति करिष्ये।

वधानद्विकितवाचकितम् एवानिन्दान्याि इत्यादान्।।४।।

वच्छन्च संवतो सानि परशो न डाम्यान्। (१.३.) इत्यादि

वद्यानां मास्मान शाष्कम्। तत्त्व कालि संवन्धसार्वानाप्रयोजनानि इति प्रथ:,

मध्यकाव्यांत्राधिकोविधिना अन्यथा हुलालंकारं महाककशोपायकृः,

सरस्य थ्रमस्यस्माति नायकानान्तिनाथोंस्मिरित्वा हर्षा यथार्थाश्र-.

नागांवुद्या विनिस्थितिपरित्राश्चासतानाति:। तत्त्र कथा पराव-.

कोषाघालं शास्त्रप्रणामम्। इत्येक हाथिव्यासस्य संवन्धः॥
चन्द्रालिति वः कक्षापिपुवोशायनसंभाशेषे दुर्गीतितो भवारः। तपृशासनात्मायुजनघातचः शास्त्रसमेतदृश्य जान्यसमेते चायत। इति। स्वयमेव चाचार्योऽस्वयमावस्थास्मातामिष्टार्थं समजोयजुपुवशेषः, तदविपरीतसंस्कारेयने माहात्म्यसुधार्य तत्त्वबाधा-\\nव्याख्येरीकृताः परमसुपरे तद्भागायं शास्त्रप्राण्यानालिपिविशिष्ठं प्राणसं करुःकाम बाह्।—\\nअनिरोधसुपुशासनसुचेष्ठेशाश्चतमुः। अनेकाध्यसनानाथंमनागमसरिणमुः। व. प्रतीत्यसुपुशासनुः।\\nश्रवादिः। तद्ग्रामनिन्दोऽधिष्ठितचेष्टेनविषिष्टः। प्रत्यत्यसुपुशासनः शास्त्राव-\\nmिबेशार्थः। सच्छाप्रथोपससमाश्र्यप्रक्रियां निवार्यं शास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनं निर्दिष्टम्।\\n हे चन्द्रे चचत्ता चरम्।\\n\textit{हिमनेन प्राणाः।} इत्येष लाब्धच्चोदकास्य समुद्राभायाः।}\\nअववायाःस्तथिविभव्ये स तां निवार्यांनिरोधः। क्षणाधास्तथितो निरोध इत्ययते। तद्विपुवशेषः। भाषामाचोमणिमनन्त्रंत्रः। ज्ञातिचिन्तित्रेष्टः। भाषाविविधिचिरित्यः। शास्त्रः नित्यः। सर्वकाले स्थानु-\\nmित्यः। एकमाओऽत्वायस्तेत्येवकारोमित्यः। न पूण्यगित्यः। नासायें समारः। पूण्यगित्यः। ग्नातिठागमम्। विमुख्येशाश्चर्कोविभाषायां संगीताऎश्चागमानम्। निर्वार्यांगित्यः। विमुख्येशाश्चर्कोविभाषायां संगीताऎश्चागमानम्। यतःगित्यः। प्रति: प्रास्तवः। उपसर-\\nगोः धारण धात्वः। बलाद्यन्त्र नीते। गान्तसितस्मात्रः सारः स्थानात्मकः। प्रतीत्यसुपुशासनाः तयदात्म: भागार्पेशत्वाः। चतुर्युः। पदिः प्रात्याधारः इति समुद्याद्वेशः। सहुभावे चरते। तत्रतथा हृदुपलयाः। प्रातःभोजोऽरात्मकः सारः स्थानात्मः। प्रतीत्यसुपुशासनाः।}\\nअपरे हुः नुस्ते—इतिवर्ग्यं निवारः। इति साधव इत्यतः। प्रतिवी-\\npṣाः। इत्येव तद्विपरीतानन्त्रित्यः। भाषायनः। प्रतिः प्रति इत्यात्मा निवारा शिनाय समुद्राः। इति वर्णकल्पः। त्रिवा इति। चारे सूत्रसुपुशासनः प्रति इत्यात्मा निवारा शिनाय समुद्राः। इति इत्यात्मा निवारा शिनाय समुद्राः।}
एवूनपरेक्षा नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम्

इत्यवमादी विषये साधारणजीविकातिष्ठिने चवः प्रतिष्ठित प्रतिलेखनात: एक्षण्डुरिदंतुः हिस्तुकारकवेच्यातिविष्ठातोपप्रतिचारीयायां कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा। प्रतिलेखस्वतंत्रजीविकातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं द्वितै श्वेतम्रतिते अवशेषाच्यातिष्ठिने प्रतिलेखं कृतो वीपपार्थवा।
यथाप्रथम स्वमर्य न्यायस्थापितम्—“किं तत्तः, अतिसंशू सति इद्दं भंजति, अत्योत्तरादिविदुस्तुपचते, इति इद्दंप्रत्यवादः प्रतीत्त्वसमु-त्यावार्थ इति”, तदापि नोपपजये, अतीत्त्वसमुत्त्वादवृद्धियोऽप्रतेकंमर्यः-विशेषंनिश्चितम्यानन्तरात्, तदन्तुपादस्य च विविधविवशः।

अथापि लहिद्वः प्रवीत्त्वसमुत्त्वादशंभदमः पुले परवेत्त्वकः-दिववेष्टतयेऽऽतीत्रत्वस्मृ-त्याद्वृत्त्व आचार्याः

तत्त्वाद्विष्णुवनस्य नोपपज्वत् तत्त्यमात्रः।

इत्यभुवनमात्रः। अथ

धसिन्यस्वतितीवर्षि सति हस्ते दीर्घं यथा सति।

इति न्यायायनन्तरतः नदृ देवशामुपगाः सति, हस्तं प्रत्यवं, हस्तं प्रार्यं इत्यवम्पेश्य दीर्घं भवतीति। तत्त्वं श्रौङ्ग कृत्त्वे देवशामुप-गांन्ते । इति न युक्ते। इत्यतः प्रसज्ञे।

तदेव वेदांतपेश्य शाखानामप्रत्ययं परदीपवायता भक्तवात् अहे-लोकदेहतिविशदरसुमवत्वं स्तपरिभयक्ततः च भावानं निष्क्रियं मवति, तांकरणानं सांपुरानं प्रपोषां यथास्थिती सांपुरं हर्षप-झुलाएँ मवति। स पहुँचानी सांपुरं प्रवीत्त्वसमुपादः समावेशं-नुलग्नश्रृवं भार्याद्वारप्रेषणात् नातिसशंकारो विस्कर्ते भावास्मितकारो विस्बाधिते इत्यतिरिप्पासिद्धामितिविद्वौष्ठिविधिकं विशिष्टते। यथा च निरोधाद्-नो न सति प्रवीत्त्वसमुपादस्य तथा सकृत्त्वाश्रेण प्रतिप्राप-विध्वङ्गति।

‘अन्तन्तविशेषंसवेदपि प्रवीत्त्वसमुपादस्य भाद्रानायोपावानम् प्रार्थात्येत बिवासायमुर्त्त्वाः। यथाविशचप्रवीत्त्वसमुपादवृद्धं संप्रदृष्टि वायुगमार्फत्यविशदं अष्टपदिकः ज्ञात्वादवृद्धिविद्वारिति स एव प्रवीत्त्वसमुपादः प्रष्टकादेयाः इतुन्याच्यते।’

चित्रतांत्यां च शमिन्यस्मृति वायुगमार्फत्यविशदं सन्तापियं ज्ञात्वादवृद्धिविद्वारिति स एव प्रवीत्त्वसमुपादः प्रष्टकादेयाः इतुन्याच्यते।

अनिरोधगुण्यं नुपादमुनृष्टमवः।

अनेकाधिकार्यायं न्यायसम्बन्धमे।

दूसरे...


[मः यत्रतयस्मुत्तरां प्रपठोपपायम् रिक्षयम्।

वेस्यास्मात् संबंधतं वादतं चत्रम्। ॥ २ ॥

[मन्दसवलकै]

ष्ठोपपर्णितलिंगससुमतादाचर्माणि तथादाचर्ये वैस्याच्यापिकेते

tार्किकतृतिवं पुढः सर्वप्रवाहादाश्च बालप्राणार्वावेदव यतीन

प्रसादवृक्षत आचर्यां भूष्यो भगवनं विद्वेदयति—वदुतं तरिक्षिति।

अनं निरोधस्मु पूर्णं प्रतिवेदः उत्साहनिरोधयोऽध्वार्यावर्ते

स्थाया: सिद्धमार्थ रूपाविधिम्। वधविविहि—

पूर्णे जातिर्यिः भवेष्वरारण्याद्रवम्।

निर्भारारण्या जातिर्यित्वेव चातुर्यः ॥ [स० शा० ११३३]।

tतस्मानाय निमयमो यतृ पूर्व पृथुपापिन भविष्यत्यां पश्चापिनि

रोषेन्तियः।

इहानीमित्रोपाध्यायैविभिः प्रकाशित्वससुमतादाचर्मितिपिपादशिष्या

dुः प्रतिवेदेतिन्नरोधादिप्रतिवेदेश् सौकर्यं सत्यमान आचार्यं प्रसादमेवेदे

सादृश्यादिपिपादशामि। बौद्धो हि परे: परितल्यामान: स्वाभ: वा

परितल्येत्, परसः कमयान: अहेतुतो वा परितल्येत्। सूर्यम् च

नोपयचतः दिति निर्दिष्टायाहः—

न स्वतः नापि परते न ह्राम्या नापथेतुः।

उत्तमसा जातु विद्यान्ते भावाः: कबन्ध नैषान्तोऽवधिः। ॥ २ ॥

तृते जातिर्यिः कुदाचिदिर्यथः। कचिदः आधारवधिः

कबिच्छद्वेद्यथाः। केणकस्वयं आधीन्यान्ते: केषि चक्कुष्यायथः।

वत्सर्यैः संबन्धः—नैव स्वतं उपस्था जातु विद्याते भावाः, कबन्ध,

केषि। नैव प्रतिज्ञारमिति योज्यम्। ॥

नैव च—नैव स्वतं उपस्था इत्यवधार्यां परत उत्तमा इत्यन्तिन्ते

प्राप्तोति। न भावोति। प्रसक्क्रमितिपुण्यम् विवशिवित्वातः, परः

तोऽऽुपाध्याये प्रतिपे: श्रामानात्तथाः। चया चोपपस्य्या स्वतं उत्साहो न

संबंधिति, सा—

वस्मादिभिः तस्य भवने न गुणोवित्तय क्रिये—

आत्मस्य जनस्य पुनरेव च नैव गुप्तम्।

[सन्तकाव्याचाराः ६.८]
इत्यादिना मध्यमकाळातारादिश्यांनारेणाबलें

आचार्यं दुःदिक्षितवाह—न स्वः धत्तचांते भावः; दुःशक्तारि
विषयायोऽति; अतिशक्तारीं पावृणां पुनःस्वतः योजनसस्ति। अथ सममिती जावेत, न कदाचिन जावेत; इति

अथैते क्रूःणमाहं—दुःशक्तारि, ब्रह्मदानानिधिभिषेकरसंरुपां
पद्धिर्वर्षच। प्रसन्नानुत्तरमात्र पञ्चवार्षिकपद्धिर्वर्षां
विषयाय-साध्यतंत्रेण च परसंवारराजोन्मसांत्वस्वैत; जनमिति
( को ? ) थाण्डेचि क्षत्रानुपर्वोः स्वातुः

सर्वेषदुःस्वमसुक्ष्ममां वचं पद्यां। कथं छल्लव? तत
चाचाषुरं देवदुःस्वमसुक्ष्मानिधिभिषेकं, दुःशक्तारि। किं कारणाम? यस्मातः स्वतं जयतिस्मायुगमच्छनो श्रुबांच्छने—स्वतं इति देवदुःशक्तारि
चतुष्कोटी चौड़ैयाहं इति। न च विचारदर्श स्वरूपसाय योजनसभित विषयाम, अनुस्या च पद्यां। न च त्वचा चतुष्कोटी गुणकलाहं इत्यदेवजन
वस्या जयितितिन्त्रस्य। तस्मातिहितयतित्वम् च त्वादवः; उपायमां
पद्यां तिरीक्षखे। किंतु चौड़ैयाहं परो साध्यानांति यथो देवदुःशक्तारि
पद्यांसात्त्वस्य पद्यां। अथ उपायमां साध्यानांति च तीति; तथा निर्विवेकवाच देवदुःशक्तायामां नैः निर्विवेकवाच च। न
नर्यचक्रेन सहास्त्रांक निवाद इति। तस्मात्सर्वका प्रियामानावारणे
सेरात्तेन आचार्यं अकत्तरि जस्यानेत्र्युक्तमां प्रवेशादच। न च
मान्यतंत्रस्य तवं च कत्वतात्मुमां कः इति कुलं पक्षान्तरायुगमां
वभावात। तत्तत्त्वपद्धिर्वर्षां—

सद्भस्तस्वस्ववेचित यस्य परो न विचारेः
सप्तन्दखंश्यितेष्ठिन तस्य चतुष्कोट्वैः
( दुःशक्तक—१६ २५ )

विप्रह्यावर्तन्यां चोक्म—

यद्र्द फा च न विद्या प्रतिष्ठान्यं स्वतं तथा एव तत्से भवेहोः
नासित च सम प्रतिष्ठा तस्मायुगवाचि मे दोषः
यद्दि किंचिदुःशक्तस्य प्रतिष्ठानं निवादावेचि वा
प्रत्यूक्षाविशिष्ठ्विश्वददातान्येकोऽपत्तमः
[ विप्रह्यावर्तनि—२९ ३० ]
इति। यदा चैत्रम्यून्त्रात्रणामानुप्रहारितमण्ये सामप्रणरक, तवा कुळः "मान्यसिकायावतनानि वत वर्त्तमानि" इति प्रत्यया प्रतिक्रिया यथा साक्ष्यः प्रत्यव्यक्तिने। कार्यं प्रतिविरुद्धः यकार्य-सम्बन्धजन्तुत्र उत्तर काराक्वाया चिन्तयतु। भावम्? कार्यावत्त्रणात सिद्धान्तमय, काराक्वाया सिद्धान्तकार्यात विद्याधर्यात, काराक्वाया भिन्न-भिन्नस्मोरबाधितात् वस्त्रादिविदित। यद्योस्माकं विद्यामानवान-दिवित्वे हेदुप्रयोग सिद्धान्तस्य विद्याधर्या च स्वातः, यथा सिद्धान्तम-नय यस्य विद्याधर्या च परिवार चर्चा कर्तम्। तस्मात्-रोक्षनोपास्यद्यकृत्य वविदित्ताः भानाचयूदुपाधिनेन न बर्णनीयः।

अथापि स्वात्-मान्यसिकारः पश्चादादुप्रहारानिम्निन्ते। स्व-तन्त्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक, स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक ज्ञातिप्रतिपेक्षातिप्रतिप्रतिपादनां मा भूमिभविषितस्मृत वात्स्यवैचिन्य स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक प्रतिप्रतिपादकस्यनिम्नित्यक, परि-स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक प्रतिप्रतिपादकस्यनिम्नित्यक। भवां वदनकार्यात, वदनकार्यात चा प्रत्ययात् बोधित। परि-स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक प्रतिप्रतिपादकस्यनिम्नित्यक। परि-स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक। परि-स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक। परि-स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक। परि-स्वतंत्रात्रणामानुप्रहारानिम्नित्यक। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित। यथा उपकार्योद्विकल्प ततैवपरिनिष्टमित।
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मध्यमकाले
त्वमात्र उपन्यासिकाको हेतुः। एवमहापि—न स्वत उत्सर्जने
भावा; स्वातम सिद्धान्तानां पुनःस्वाकृतिवैधानिकः। इसे हि स्वातमा
विचारणं पुरुषोऽपि चतौर्दशि पुनःस्वाकृतिवैधानिकः द्यम; 
थथा व युद्धसवारत्वाध्यात्मापि वदि स्वातमा विचारणं चतौर्दशिकितमि
गन्यसे, तंत्रापि वस्त्र स्वातमा विचारणं नास्तुतः यत इति। एवं
स्वातमा विद्यमाने उपन्यासिक्यते पुनःकादाश्यालिपि
चारिण्य हेतुना स्वत एव वाक्यस्वात्मानविवेचनोऽद्वृत्तमवससुवियमे्ये।
तत्किर्मुच्ये व तद्युक्तं हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणाभिति? 

न च केष्ठेऽहेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति, परोदौपानिकार-
तोपो न संभवति। कर्म ज्ञाता? सांख्या हि नैच अभिन्यान्तस्य
पुरुषोऽपि चतौर्दशि परस्य पुनःप्रभावकितिकितमि। तत्विक च इसे
इव वृद्धान्तत्वेनोऽपि प्रज्ञाने, हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। एवं
कर्मात्मा चतौर्दशि विवेचनाविवेचनाभिमाणान्त संभवति। ततं
कर्मार्थोऽहेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। एवं
वाक्यस्वात्मानविवेचनाभिमाणान्त संभवति। तत्विकञ्जयः
विवेचनाभिमाणान्त संभवति। एवं

पदार्थकितकितिकितमि हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। एवं

तत्तवात्मा कार्यान्तकार्यान्तिकितमि हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति।

अधिधे। अधिधे। प्रयोगर्मर्गः—पुरुषप्रभावकितमि। श्वत
उत्सर्जनाय कर्माय तत् एव न स्वत उत्सर्जने। स्तवमा
विचारणम्। पुरुषवृत्ति। इव तत्तवात्मान् पुरुषवृत्ति। इति

वाक्यस्य प्रविष्टत्वेन उपस्थितत्वेन न भाषकः। तथोष्ठि
अभिन्यान्तस्य हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। श्वत
उत्सर्जनाय कर्माय तत् एव न स्वत उत्सर्जने। स्तवमा
विचारणम्। पुरुषवृत्ति। इव तत्तवात्मान् पुरुषवृत्ति। इति

वाक्यस्य प्रविष्टत्वेन उपस्थितत्वेन न भाषकः। तथोष्ठि
अभिन्यान्तस्य हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। श्वत
उत्सर्जनाय कर्माय तत् एव न स्वत उत्सर्जने। स्तवमा
विचारणम्। पुरुषवृत्ति। इव तत्तवात्मान् पुरुषवृत्ति। इति

वाक्यस्य प्रविष्टत्वेन उपस्थितत्वेन न भाषकः। तथोष्ठि
अभिन्यान्तस्य हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। श्वत
उत्सर्जनाय कर्माय तत् एव न स्वत उत्सर्जने। स्तवमा
विचारणम्। पुरुषवृत्ति। इव तत्तवात्मान् पुरुषवृत्ति। इति

वाक्यस्य प्रविष्टत्वेन उपस्थितत्वेन न भाषकः। तथोष्ठि
अभिन्यान्तस्य हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। श्वत
उत्सर्जनाय कर्माय तत् एव न स्वत उत्सर्जने। स्तवमा
विचारणम्। पुरुषवृत्ति। इव तत्तवात्मान् पुरुषवृत्ति। इति

वाक्यस्य प्रविष्टत्वेन उपस्थितत्वेन न भाषकः। तथोष्ठि
अभिन्यान्तस्य हेतुविद्यान्ताभिमाणान्त संभवति। श्वत
उत्सर्जनाय कर्माय तत् एव न स्वत उत्सर्जने। स्तवमा
विचारणम्। पुरुषवृत्ति। इव तत्तवात्मान् पुरुषवृत्ति। इति
प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नाम प्रयत्न प्रकरणम् 1

सावकाशवचनाभिधानिषेधतः, यथोत्तर परोक्षकाश व्यवस्थापते? निःस्वाभाविनाविदिन सत्सनाथायविदिन: प्रसन्ने ब्राह्म ( पि? ) चवाने कुलं प्रसन्नः चिरपिरीतार्थकम्प्लेत? न हि अभद्र: दृष्टिप्रीतिकास्वकारस्वस्वथापित, किं ताहि सत्यं श्रीकृष्णचरितमथुतविधीने गच्चेऽ। तद्वध्या प्रमणत्यातिश्रृष्टिः सत्यार्थकोषाभावसंग्रहाभावस्था नान्ति प्राकृतिकोषार्थविधि। तत्त्वा च आचार्यो रूपसा प्रसन्नप्रत्यक्षीकृतत्वमेव परम्परा निराकरोति सम। तदवध्या—

नाकाशं विचारे किंतुपुरुषाःकाशकल्पानावानः।
आकृत्सनं प्रसन्नमेव स्वाधूपूर्वं यदृत्वं किल्पानाम्।

[ म ९ ०-५.१ ]

रूपकारणथेनुक्ते रूपं प्रसन्नमेव।
आहितुकेन च अर्थस्यं: कविविधविधुतुक कवितव्युः।

[ म ९ ०-४.२ ]

भावसत्तास्य निर्विकालं जरामरणक्लिष्ठानम्।
प्रसन्नवेतस्तति समायो हि न जरामरणं चिना।

[ म ९ ०-२४.४ ]

इत्यादिनाः। अथ अर्थवाच्यवाच्यांचार्यवाच्यां महायते सति
अनेकवीर्याचार्यवाच्यांत्रिमेति । परिभक्तेऽते, आचार्यवृद्धाचार्यवाच्यांनान्यां
किल्पितादि न च वर्धमणे परिभक्तेऽते? ।

अथ वृद्ध— वृद्धिकारणमेव व्यायाम:। तत्रवेयाचार्यवित्तानां
मिधानमेके कल्पविचरितं, परम्परिन नास्ति। विक्रमस्वतमात्रा वृद्धिमेव
व्याचार्यवाच्यां महायाचार्यविद्यानां।

अपि। अति अति अवलोकनायमानमविचारिकीनस्मातामविचारिकीर्षतं। अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मोकर्मो ।

अथ कल्पनेहार्द्ध अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मानुमोचनस्याय: च अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मानुमोचनस्याय:। अथ कल्पनेहार्द्ध अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मानुमोचनस्याय:। अथ कल्पनेहार्द्ध अनेकोकर्मस्वकर्मानुमोचनस्याय:। ।

अथ स्वात्त:— वृद्धिकारणमेव व्यायाम:। तत्रवेयाचार्यवित्तानां
मिधानमेके कल्पविचरितं, परम्परिन नास्ति। विक्रमस्वतमात्रा वृद्धिमेव
व्याचार्यवाच्यां महायाचार्यविद्यानां।
"स चार्य बीजेवृक्षं घट्यधारो न स्वर्णद्वारो न परिधायी
नोभश्वतो नायिकेयस्मुखः केसरकावलिणुक्तस्मावनस्मु\।
\[ शाखितमस्युः \]
\[ दशस्यातः \]

tatha-
बीजस्य सतो ध्रुवधरो न च यो वीजु च चेति अनुरोः।
न च अनु ततो न चेति चेत्रसुलच्छेदं ध्रुवधरवर्मवता॥
\[ शाखितविश्वर-१२.१०२ \]

श्रापय दशाति—
प्रवीत्य ध्रुवधरिः न हि ताश्चदेव तदार्थाः।
न चालयुद्द्विजस्मायोऽखिरं नाथिः नाथ्यवतः॥
\[ म० शा०-१८.७ \]

\[ दशाः \]

परमत्रेषु विशेषणमिति चेति, ववस्युक्तम्। संहृत्यार्थि वद्य- व्यवस्थाममुक्तम्। सत्यधारा परित्वार्तारेिय परिश्रित एव हि तीर्थिका वायुभुव्यतारी निश्चित्त्वे तावद मुनि एव संसाराय इति। एवं परस्ते प्रश्नमिति विशेषणामिति च उपयोगे॥

न चापि नोकः स्वतं उत्त्वमि प्रविधिः, यत्सत्त्वदेशभयां विशेषण- पालत्वात् स्वातः। होको हि स्वतः परत इत्येक्तपेक्षां विचारनार्थ बनार्थां कारणत्काराचुक्ते इत्यात्मानमार्थां प्रविधिः। परस्तात्त्वायोऽखिरि व्यवस्थायमार्थाः। इति सर्वथा विशेषणवस्तुमेव निर्देशीयते॥

अधि च। यदि संचूत्य व्यतिसत्त्वपतिष्ठतियास्निकीस्तुम विशेषण- मृत्युपाबोध्योते, तदा स्वरूपसिद्धारायोऽवस्था, आश्रयसिद्धी का हेतुरोक्ष स्वातः। परमार्थनः स्ववस्थामुक्तवावनामाननमिति चेति, परस्त्रेषु इत्येवत्चृति कथ विशेषम्। नात्तय्यालं च च्छुर्वराजीनानं परमास्त्वन्त व्यतिसत्त्वपतिष्ठतो व्यवस्थायमास्त्वमिति चेति, एवं ताहि एवमेव बचन्नर्त्य स्वतः—संचूत्यास्त्व च च्छुर्वराजीनानमुक्तमार्थाः। न चेत्रसुलच्छेदेऽ इत्यः स्वरूपसिद्धारायो च च्छुर्वराजीनानमुक्तमार्थाः। प्रकृतिसत्त्वपतिष्ठतो परस्त्रेषु इति। प्रकृतिसत्त्वमिति नुस्मेवतः॥
तथ्यपरिप्रेक्ष्यम् नाम प्रत्येके प्रकरणम्।

अथ स्मायः—यथा अनित्यः शब्दः इति धर्मस्थानित्यसांसारिकेः
गुर्द्वाते न विशेषः, बिशेषगुणे हि सति अनुयानासुमेधयोवधारारामवः
स्वादः। तथा हि—यथि चावर्मधावांविति: शब्दो गृहिः ते स परस्परां
सिद्धः। अयाकारगुणो गृहिः ते स वौद्धम स्वतंत्रसिद्धः। तथा चैते
विक्रमश्च ज्ञानानिवारयो तत्वातृत्वम्यत् यथि कारयः शहऽव गृहिः
स परस्परांसिद्धः। अथ न्ययः, स वौद्धम स्वतंत्रसिद्धः। एवं वधार्मिकम् विचारादणेन
सिद्धः। तथा चैते स्मायः न वौद्धम स्वतंत्रसिद्धः। अथ न्ययः, स
परस्परांसिद्धः। तथा चैते तथा परमित्याः भास्मित्यसांसारिकाः
वधार्मिकम् विचारादणेन च ज्ञानानिवारयो तत्वातृत्वम् इति चेत् सारास्मायम्।
सत्यम्यैर्चैव अवक्रियाविद्वेशस्त वधार्मिकाः तथैव धर्मस्थानी
शास्त्रम् प्रयाससत्त्वानादानात्मकम् प्राचुर्यति: सवनावकर्मनाम
श्रीकलाः। सम्भवः हि प्रवृत्तसांसारिकाः। तथाः हि प्रवृत्तसांसारिकाः
वस्तुम् अस्तस्ते सप्तमी गृहिः, तैलिकिको न होऽ मोहसे च तत्तमुष्कुलसव
चिरकाः? यथा च अविनयांविनिवृत्तः नास्त्रातृत्वे विदैसिद्धिः
केत्यांनी, तथा वौद्धम गृहिः स्वतंत्रसिद्धाः। एवं वधार्मिकः
स्तुति: स्वातः। अथ एवः चांचार्याभास्मायः—

पदि किंतुपलमे च प्रवृत्ते यत्व निवृत्ते यत्व।
प्राचुर्यमात्मिनिर्भेलसमानमे दुस्मित्यम।।

[व० व्या--१०]

यथावैवेद् समि प्रवृत्तसांसारिकाः, तस्मि प्रवृत्तसांसारिकाः
सिद्धाः यथाः प्राचुर्यमात्मिनिर्भेलसमानायः
स्तुति: स्वातः। एवं एवः स्वतंत्रसिद्धाः।
वधार्मिकः, अस्तस्ते स्मायः स्वातः।
सच्चमकर्षणे

अयस्य परोपकारस्य साधनस्वेत्वं दूरपत्रमयिनिप्रितमनेन—को हि सच- 
वासितेऽप्पोवज्ञ हेतुः ? संद्रुपच बशा वधागतेन निर्देशः, च यतः 
परार्थत्वोद्वितीयां ? संस्कृत्या वेदृश्यं, स्वविद् हेतुवबनीसदृशयां। परमार्थमेते, 
न न्यारास तद्दस्यां निर्देशं बन्द्रा।

सवसदुभावायासकारामत्यत्वनिराकरणात्, तदा—
कथं निर्विक्षेत्रको हेतुवशेषं सन्ति हि अन्वये ॥

[ यो बावं—५७ ]

नैवासी निर्विक्षेत्रको हेतुवरित बायायर्तः। तत्त्र संस्तर्यस्य निविर्लवनिविर्लकत्ववाचिनि: भासित्वत् विनिर्धारिताः बा हेतुवरितः॥

वदन्यां वस्मेषेऽधुना न्यायेन हेतुवबनीसदृश्यकारानेन, वस्मेषेऽधुन्यकारानेन पञ्जगोपयस्तापनेषु स्वविद् एव हेतुवबनीस- 
सदृश्यकारानेन संगोपयस्य साधनानि व्याइन्याते। तवत्वा—न परमा- 
र्थमेते परेष्यात्वत्ववेशयां: शास्त्रावलिकावतवन्नम, परमार्ध, तत्त्वा 
पटस्य। अपबा—न परे परमार्थवेशन निबबिव्याः महत्त्राबाबांवायाय- 
कारानिर्विक्षेत्रकाः: प्रभूवशा इति प्रतीयन्ने, परत्वात्, तत्त्वा तत्त्वा-
दुःस्थ इति। परत्तविदिकार श्वस्य पवयितम्॥

वशा चालनं—श्लोक एव शास्त्रावलिकाभावा, तद्विभिविशिष्टमत्वासदृश्यवाकरणात्—तत्स्यं परामित्त्वस्य हेतुवबनीसदृश्य- 
विषयाः समुस्कर्म, अथ समाधित्वः भोगिनः प्रश्नावश्व, भाव- 
श्वसायन्यं पाप्यः स्वपादात्वस्य सन्निधि परमार्थवशे इति साधने, तदा 
तद्विभिविशिष्टमत्वासदृश्यवाकरणाविन्द्रतिः हेतुवबनीसदृश्यात्, तत्त्वावलिकाः 
निम्पेदार्विति। एवं सबक्कावादं परमार्थवेशनानां सेव गम्ये, अभद्रत्वात्, 
गतावलिता अभद्रत्वहेतुति: स्वविद् पवयितम्: श्वस्य पवयितम्॥

न परमार्थमेते: समभार चक्षु रूपं पहिति, चक्षुरघिन्यस्यवाबात्, 
तथा तत्त्वाभगम्। तथा—न चक्षु प्रेत्यो रूपम्, भौतिकात्, 
कटकायो। सारस्वाभावान् न भवे, मूर्तवात्, तथाविनिषाः हेतुववशिष्टयः: श्वस्य पवयितम्॥

सतर्ववशिष्ट चायं हेतुः परतोऽपक्षालिताः। कि सत्त्वात् चैतन्य- 
वचनाभ्यामिकानाववानाति स्वविद् उपमत्तम, च चाहै चताविविधाय, 
स्वव वचनाभ्यामिति चौदीनां सारस्वतवादानैवक्ष्विज्ञेति वेद, 
नवदेवम्, तत्त्वानिद्धानात्॥
प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नामं प्रथमं प्रकरणम्

तत्तु च यथा परक्षीयेष्वुमानेनु दूषणमाधुर्यम् एवं स्वामानोष्पि यथोक्ष्यूपमािसः संव स एव अशिवाधारसिद्धेत्तवादिऱ्वोः

ग्रामविचि स तत्त्र ब्रजवृद्धं त्रोपणमस्तात् न तद्विप्रस्तोत्रोऽस्मि तत्र विस्मितामृतस्मृतः जायते हि

अन्यस्यसृष्टिमास्तथव्रोध्यमानं ने न वर्ष स्वतन्त्रमुमानं स्वस्मीः परमाशिषा विद्यमेव फलवादस्मुद्भवमानानामु

तथा हि—पर्याक्रम चक्षुः प्रति हिती प्राधिवा

स कामद्रूपेष्टैवापतमानेन तिरक्षीये—चक्षुः च स्वामादृश्नयथानि

सिद्धसिद्धे च चक्षुः स्वामादृश्नयथानि

चालाकुमारी चालाकुमारी चालाकुमारी

समाधिनिः समाधिनिः समाधिनिः

तथा हि स्वामादृश्नयथानि

नोभमान्यति स्वप्राप्तिधीवर्धिते स्वषस्मि ततः समाधिकारवतः

सामाजिकोपयोगसण्यां विद्यमानानि स्वप्राप्तिधीवर्धिते स्वषस्मि ततः समाधिकारवतः

किं पुना—अन्यवरप्रसिद्धमान्यतुमानानाया

अति स्तवः च स्तवः प्रसिद्धेन न्रुवतमानाया

जोकत एवं वृहद्वाति कहरायसि

होके अप्राप्तिप्रवर्तिमाः प्रमाणीकृतवर्ष साधिनां वर्षेन जयो मवति परार

जयो वा, करारित्व स्वस्मानेन

परस्परेन न जयो नापि परार्जयो

यथा च होके, तथा न्यायोक्ति

लोकार्कशील लक्ष्यार्थसं कार्याचरे

प्रर्ततत्त्राया कहरायसि रात्रिवर्तिमाः प्रसिद्धिस्वभावानाया

प्रसिद्धिस्वभावानाया

प्रसिद्धिस्वभावानाया नरार्कर्षितानि

यथा सम्बन्धे—यथा वेदयनिविविधमाः स प्रमाणं दूषणं वा, नोभारप्रसिद्ध

संदिग्धगती विविधमाः तेनामि कहरायसि व्यवस्थाशुचयस्मानेन अपीते

किं च च च स्तवः प्रसिद्धेन अपेक्षिते

तथा हि नोभमान्यति स्वप्राप्तिधीवर्धिते स्वषस्मि ततः समाधिकारवतः

स्वप्राप्तिधीवर्धिते स्वषस्मि ततः समाधिकारवतः

परत्रोपक्रमे तोपरत्रे महाशि

परामायादेष्यम् पुष्चे

न हि स्वप्राप्तिधीवर्धिते प्रत्ययाविषयति

[ मो हार-१५ ]
सध्यर्यमकार्ये

इत्यत्र मतिपादविभूति। तदार्थ पराभावार्य नामिन पूर्त्त वस्तुते।

अपि च—

अन्यत्ततात्व यदि नाम परोक्षसविष्यः
आचेत वाहि वहुः स्विनोकथायाः
सर्वस्य जन्मच अभोवायः सर्वतः
हुल्यः परत्वसस्तिकेत्यजस्ति यस्मात्॥

[ सध्यर्यमकार्ये—६४६ ]

इत्याविना [ सध्यर्यमकार्ये ] पूर्त व्यक्तिप्रसिद्धिविपक्षेषः॥

आचार्यसुदूषणविहितस्व व्यापदेशः—० पूर्त वस्तुते मावा,
सर्वतृं वस्तुसंबन्धस्वात्त्। आचार्याभिषेकविषेकु दूषणांसुदूषणस्वः
वाक्यवाच्यां साध्यसाधनविपक्ष्यं जगत्। तत् सर्वस्य क्षत्रियो वा
वस्तुते मावा, कृतविन्दुस्मि। प्रदैवः इति आचार्यतिरिक्तः।
अन्यथा सर्वत्रं सर्वसंबन्धस्वातं इत्यत्र साध्यसुदूषणस्वात्त्
व्याप्तो संसाधनप्राधिनेति वाक्यसृष्टिःस्वतः।

[ इति ]। यदृच्छ्याजगायेः। पूर्णमेव विविध
पादित्वमेव दूषणां साध्याधिक्शितां परस्तितिकावयं
दुष्णान्वते वस्त्रिकिविन्दृष्टिः।

[ मू सर्षो—१२३ ]

हाम्याविनि नोत्त्रायने मावाः।। सर्वस्यस्मितिःविपक्षप्रस्वातः
प्रतेकसङ्गमादाचार्यांच्छन। वक्तक्षति हि—

स्मादविवाहाः प्रतयु दुर्लभ स्मादविपिन्तितां पदिः। इति॥

[ मू सर्षो—१२४ ]

अहेतुसोवपि नोत्त्रायने—
हेतुवस्ति कार्यं च कारणं च न विशेषे।

[ मू सर्षो—८४ ]

इति वक्त्यस्याणोपस्वाताः।
गुणेऽसे नैव च जगद्विहिते हेतुसुन्तयं
स्मादविक्षेत गगनोत्सववर्णगंध्री॥

[ सध्यर्यमकार्ये—६५६ ]

इत्याविद्योशस्वात्त।

आचार्यसुदूषणविहितस्वात्—अहेतुसो नोत्त्रायने मावाः।। सर्वा च
सर्वंसमे वस्तुसंबन्धस्वात्।। आचार्याभिषेकविषेकु दूषणांसुदूषणस्वात्
क्षत्रियो अस्ति वस्तुते वाच्यां विपरीतसाध्यसाधनसिद्धिक्षेत्रायं
इत्यत्र।। वदा वहुकुल वस्त्रिति—हेतुस वस्तुते मावाः।। क्षत्रियत
प्रत्ययरीका नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम्।

कुर्विक्षत् कस्यचिद्वर्तेऽः आरम्भसाफल्याच्छ। सेवं व्याख्या न शुका मायुक्तविद्वारतित्रि। तावेदवदुकम्, पूर्वेचिदित्वविहिरा० विद्वारे॥

वच्चापि ईश्वरानादिनायुससमस्रयं, तवापि न शुक्म्। ईश्वरादीनां स्वप्परोमयप्रक्रिया यथा युगमन्तरवाचारित्रि॥

वस्मात् प्रसाधिवेदानांवायुवाव इति। त्वादासंभाच्छ सिद्धोऽनुग्यावाचित्विषिद्यं प्रतीत्वसुवृत्ताद। इति॥

हक्राहः-युग्यावतादिविषिद्यं प्रतीत्वसुवृत्तादो न्यवचित्तो भविष्यते, शवति भगवीचुम्-अविचारम्यया संस्कारः। अविचारा-निरोचास्वर्त्तकाननिरोध इति, तथा—

जनित्यािश ते ( वत् ।) संस्कारा उत्ताद्विवचर्यिनः।

तवच हि निवश्यन् ते पैं न्युय्यमः शुक्॥

तथा-उत्ताद्विाता त्ततान्तनामुसावद्वृहा त्तागतानां स्वितेयैपा धम्मवणा धर्मता, एको धर्मः सत्त्वसितये यदृत चत्तवाव बाहुरात्, तथा-परस्यवाचिा-गमनस्मियोऽकाश परस्कक्तग्नातिर्दित, एवं निरोचातिरिषिद्यं प्रतीत्व-समुप्तादो पैनितो भविष्यत, स कष्ट न निः ( वि ।) कुर्विक्षत् इति। वत्त एवं निरोचात्विः प्रतीत्यसुवृत्तादिचयोपवृहन्ते, अत्र येवं चधित्र-समक्राणो भगवान्मायश्येऽन भें भेतोभिषिद्यं भागवद्रगवद्रमायश्येऽन्म।

तत्र च पते प्रतीत्यसुवृत्तादिचयो उक्तान् न ते भगवान्माय-विज्ञानाय सीवस्यसब्भवास्पृश्येः, किं तवति अविचारात्मिरोपपुख्नात्मित-वचनानात्विवचर्यनेत्रयाः।

तर्परुणानेश्वराः सुवृं भगवता-द्विविधि निर्भवः परस्म सत्त्व यदुद्व असोप्यप्रम निवाचणम, बहुपं संक्षराश्रानुगुण सोप्यप्रमणः इति।

तथा-नास्त्यत् तथा वा अस्वितथता वा। मोपप्यगप्यमेत्तसत्, अण्वय-धर्मसम्मेत्तस, सुपार्येत्तस सारेर्य वाल्लापिणी इति। तथा—

फिरिेक्षयपरस्त्य वृयण चेदना चुङ्खुदुर्गोजयः।

मरीचिसुमृषि संबा संस्कारः क्षणीनमः।

मायपरसपविज्ञानामाविचत्ववन्यता॥ इति॥

एवं धर्मवर्तिरीत्वाणो मिन्नरायधनीयणाः।

दिवा च चित्त च रात्रिः सम्ज्ञानसाधव विप्लवः।

प्रतिविषयेत्व श्रान्त संस्कारोपाम्यं ज्ञिनम्॥ इति॥
निराशकलंकावः धर्मार्यामिल्यादि॥
चतुर्थाष्ट्रेदेशनामापारणमिल्यावया संज्ञितः स्वातः-का ज्वन देशना वस्त्रायां, कातुं खट्ठ धारितिकारति, वधापि सन्दृश्युत्वत्वा नेवाया देशना नीतारूढश्वगच्छति, तन्मोहस्योरपि चिन्नेवज्ञन् ऐतायां ज्ञात्यामापण्या संज्ञामिल्याहालापारणां श्यामबिनिमानोदः॥
तवं "न स्वतः" [ म० शास १३ ] इश्वादिवना दुक्रिकवयित्वा॥ .

dनमः मोऽधर्मम् ज्ञात्यामिल्यानमुक्तम्।
सवे च मोऽधर्मामः संक्षारस्तेन ते सूपा॥
[ म० शास १३ १ ]

पूर्वः महायाते कोटिनेन्तुचा महासुमिः।
संसारोजनजारो मो हि नास्त्यारिद्वि पदिक्षिमु॥
[ म० शास ११ १ ]

कात्यायनाचारदेः च अति नास्ततिति चोभयु।
प्रसिद्ध सर्गकता भावायिणविभाषिः॥
[ म० शास १५ ७ ]

इश्वादिवना भागी चरितः॥
एक्कः च आर्थाङ्गमतिकूचे॥
कात्यायमुहितन्त: महायाते नेवायां: कात्यायमुहितन्त: महायाते नेवायां:। येच सूक्ष्णत्वं भाविकाव्याताराय निरिद्धाः। इम बच्चन्ते नेवायां:। येच सूक्ष्णत्वं भाविकाव्याताराय निरिद्धाः। इम बच्चन्ते नेवायां:। यावद ईयेन्त: सूक्ष्णारिद्विज्ञानिमिल्यान्तःकारणां निरिद्धाः। इम बच्चन्ते नेवायां:।

तथाच आर्थसमाविधारणां:॥

नीतार्थुपत्तान्तङ्किष्वेष जानिति
मुनोपिहित झुकोतन्तु सूक्ष्णः।

यस्मिन पुत्रः पुद्रुषस्यश्रवङ्कुशप नेवायायती जानिति सवेर्थमांस॥
[ समाविधानाः७३ ]

तस्मादुपादानिन् सुपार्यं रतिपादिविन्यं प्रतिवत्सुत्वाभाराजापुरस्त- शास्त्रवाचाराणां॥
नन्दु च—उत्तरादानीभावे सति यदि सच्यास्माणं सुवाल्मक्षितं
पादनाथमिद्रमाकावनारायणं; नन्वेव सति यन्नुसा न तदन्तिति न
सत्यकुशलात्ति कर्मणि, तद्भावाणि सति दुर्गा तथा; न सति कृष्णानि
कर्मणि, तद्भावाणि सति सुग्रानि; सुग्रासम्भवत्सवभवावनानि
नाति ससास, इति तर्भरम्बैथाथास्वम् स्वाव। वच्ये।। सद्वृतिः
सत्यप्रेयक्षा धोकेस्व इर्तसत्यसत्वभिनवेशत्व प्रिदिपक्षाभें शुचकायं
भावाणि प्रतिपाद्वेकस्माति।। नैव त्रायेः कुटकार्: धिर्मिदुपप्पमनो
ण्युष्माः अयुष्मा बो ख्यातिप्रापः अधि च।। येन हि सच्यास्माणं सुप्रावः
परिश्वरः क्षन्ति कस्य कर्मणि सति, संसारेन त्वाहि कस्य? न चाप्पि
кс्यपद्धतमस्य असत्व नालितवं चोपप्पमहे।। ययोक्तं भगवतः
अवर्तलक्षुतसूत्रे—

चिन्तं हि काव्यम् परिणामवेयमाणं न चम्म्ये।। ययो क्षम्ये ततापम्
हन्ते।। धन्तपापःमये तत्त्वेऽवादों न अनागं न प्रत्युपत्तम्।।
धन्तेनावा नानागं न प्रत्युपत्तम्।। वस्य नासिनि स्वाभावः।। चतुष्य
नासिनि त्वमाय, तस्य नास्युतारः।। चतुष्य नास्युतारः।। तस्य नासिनि
निरोधः।। इति विसः।।

गतु विपर्यासतानुसारस्मात्तित्वान्यावघ्तिं, प्रतीति स्वाभावं
स्वाभावसस्मितिविश्वेत्, स धर्माविशःसत्यात्तित्वात्तितिविशिष्टं। सन्
कर्माणि प्रयोक्तं, संसारेःपि संसारित, विपयासरसास्विध्वि
वम विगमजित्वम्यमुः।।

कं पुन—समुत्तमावः आपि पदार्थाः संकेत्त्वच्च्चायादानिविध्वि
मववः।। तथया सायायुमितत्वमाचारवैधव्ययमां, तस्यात्तितिर्दिः
उपायकुशलमूम्मात्त्वम्।। वच्ये हि श्रद्धाज्ञानवर्पःप्पप्पसूत्रे—

तथया कुष्ठुन्त् मायाकार्तवादः प्रस्तृपश्वित्वे मायाकार्तिविरा
दिन्यं हुः। कक्षमार्गप्रतिवेदित्वात्: पर्वष्चारवायनेन तत्यासाधार्यापः
कुसन्तु, सोपवकम्य तस्वेऽविद्यमुनावतो मनसि कृष्णात्, अण्तित्वो
दुस्थव: गृह्योजानावतो मनसि कृष्णात्।। इति विसः।।

विशेषं च—

इत्यस्य च—

वन्नकार्कथितं वन्नकुष्ठितं: समुत्तमुष्यतुन्त्वम् समुत्तमुष्यत्तित्तुण्ण
प्रतिमांषते, तथा च विशेषकार्य कामाराजावतीयं।। तथा मृगास्त:
भावा आपि माया वाच्यां संकेत्त्वच्च्चायादानिविध्वि मववः।।

तथव आर्यवर्त्तकुशुत्रे—

$2$
थथ खळू तांति पळूनावाणि सिद्धुळावाणि मंगळतो धर्मेपेक्षे-
नामन्युक्षेपवत्‌नामावासावत्तविद्विमुक्ष्यमानाति
जत्याधारानेहः
प्रकारानाति। अथ भागाणि [सरयं चेळावाणि] \( \text{थेन साधारणेते सिद्धो}
ग्राह्यते सा, \text{तस्मिन्} \text{मार्गे} \text{हौ सिद्ध सिद्धमिहितत:} \text{सा}।।

अथ तांति पळू सिद्धुळावाणि \( \text{थेन [साधारण]} \text{तो हौ सिद्ध}
[ निर्मितक्री] \text{तेनोपसकामनति} \text{सा}। \text{उपसङ्क्रम} \text{तांत्रिकन्‌-क्रमंकार}
अत्यन्ती गतिविध्यथाः? \text{निर्मितकारः} \text{विश्वाम}--\text{गतिविध्य} \text{आवारण्य}--
वत्तेवी, \text{तत्} \text{ध्यानसुरस्वर्भविद्वारेविद्यविविधानां}। \text{य येह} \text{भगावाणि धर्मं}
\( \text{दुसः} \text{तितो,} \text{तमां} \text{नवनराधो} \text{नावमागाहार्षे} \text{नाधिसुनुस्वाहे} \text{वदद्राभावे}
\text{तस्वाव}--\text{संतासामपञ्चायते}। \text{अथ वाणि पळू सिद्धुळावाणि}
\( \text{तसम्‌} \text{वध्याय}--\text{सुहृदन्तो नावनराधो} \text{नावमागाहार्षे} \text{नाधिसुनुस्वाहे} \text{दुसः}
\text{तितो सम्बासामपञ्चायते}। \text{तेन वध्याय}--\text{वध्याय}--\text{सुहृदन्तो}
\text{ध्यानसुरस्वर्भविद्वारेविद्यविविधानां}। \text{निर्मितकारः} \text{विश्वाम}--\text{तेन}
\text{हे} \text{आयुष्यान्}--\text{संगात्यामो} \text{न विद्विधानां}। \text{अविवाचितमा}
\text{हे} \text{आयुष्यान्}--\text{धर्मही} \text{धर्मोऽ}। ... \text{कर्मयुक्तम्‌}--\text{प्रहणाय} \text{प्रतिपा}।?
\text{तत्त्वाधारे}--\text{रागपुप्यमोहाः} \text{प्रहणाय} \text{वर्यं} \text{प्रतिपा}।।
\text{निपीतकावऽ}--\text{हे} \text{नुरायुष्यम्‌}--\text{संविचारे}--\text{रागपुप्यमोहाः} \text{धर्मा}
\text{मयापियं}--\text{तत्त्वाधारे}--\text{न देश्यस्त} \text{न बहिर्वा} \text{नोभमसन्तरे}
\text{शृङ्खलां}--\text{नापि} \text{देश्यपरिकल्पिता} \text{द्विधाने}। \text{निर्मितकावऽ}--
\text{तत्त्वाधारे}--\text{तेन} \text{हे} \text{आयुष्यान्तो} \text{मा} \text{कर्मयुक्तं} \text{मा} \text{विकर्मयुक्तं}। \text{वध्र}
\text{धायुष्यान्तो} \text{न कर्मयुक्तश्च} \text{न चिकित्यग्य,} \text{तदा} \text{न} \text{रक्षक} \text{न} \text{दर्शनश्च}।
\text{वध्र न} \text{रक्ष को} \text{न विरक} \text{सं} \text{शान्त} \text{मुख्ये}। \text{श्रीमहायुष्यान्तो} 
\text{संसर्गति} \text{न परिनिर्वाहिति}। \text{समाधिः प्रहा विद्धुळाविनिर्विधि‌}
\text{धान्यावर्णायुष्यान्तो} \text{संसर्गति} \text{न परिनिर्वाहिति}। \text{परिमहायुष्यान्तो}
\text{धर्मस्मिर्विचारं सुव्याहे}। \text{वध्रे} \text{स्वः} \text{शुन्यः} \text{प्रहणविविषीक}। \text{अद्यही}--
\text{धान्यावर्णायुष्यान्तो} \text{संहा} \text{शुद्ध} \text{परिनिर्वाहिति}। \text{मा} \text{वध्र धान्यावर्णायुष्यान्तो}
\text{संहा} \text{महायुष्यान्तो} \text{च्या} \text{च} \text{संहा} \text{वध्रे} \text{परिपुर्णस्थिति।} \text{ये} \text{हे} \text{संहा} 
\text{संहा} \text{परि}
\text{प्रबन्धानाति,} \text{संहा} \text{वध्रे} \text{संहा} \text{वध्रे} \text{तद} \text{व्यवस्थित।} \text{साकाते}--
\text{विनिर्वाहित्विनिर्देशसामायिको-}
\text{महायुष्यान्तो} \text{सामपञ्चायते}। \text{साकाते}--
\text{विनिर्देशसामायिको-सामपञ्चायते}
\text{सिद्धिरीत्युच्युतीकृत्यशिष्यमिति} \text{वध्रा}।।

अथ तेनां पळूनां सिद्धुळावाणामुपातावायुष्यावेद्येव्यिनितानि विद्यान्यमुख्यम्‌। \text{तत्त्विविशिष्टवाणि थेन}--
\text{साधारणोपसकामनति}। \text{उपसङ्क्रम कर्मयुक्तं} \text{पाद्ये} \text{खिररसाभिवन्धिके पत्रीलकु।}
प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नाम प्रयम प्रकरणम्

अथायुष्माद् युभृतिस्ताम् भिक्षुभ्रेतिवधोतरं— क्षत्रिय्योत्तरं गता:
कृतो बागातो! तेजोवृथन्—न करिण्य गस्यान् न कुन्तिभ्रात्रीगस्यान्
बदन्त सुपुष्पे भगवता भर्मो देवतात्। आह—को नामायुष्माद्
शास्त्रसा? आहुि—यो तोल्लो न परिनिर्भ्रस्या। आह—कर्षणम्
भिध्यां शुभं? आहुि—न वन्न्यान् न सोक्ष्यान्। आह—कैण चूरा
विनीताः! आहुि—यस्य न कावो न विलम्भुः। आह—कर्षण सूम्या महुष्माद्?
आहुि—नाविकचार्यान् न विबोधान्यात्। आह—कस्य चूरा
आश्चर्यसा? आहुि—चेन न प्रास्य नाभिशास्त्रुः। आह—कु थुष्माक्षे सम्राहाना
चारिणाः। आहुि—ये तैहातुके नोरपचार्यस्थ। आह—किर्यायेराण्।
सुधान्तसस्य परिनिर्भ्रस्या? आहुि—स्वर्य तथागतान्तिर्निर्मिताः परिनिर्भ्र
स्यात्। आह—कर्षण युभृम्याः कर्पणीयम्? आहुि—अहुिकारसमकार
परिभ्राता। आह—क्षणा युभृम्याः कैशाः। आहुि—अल्यावधकार
स्वर्यभर्माणाः। आह—किर्मो सुभृम्याणाः। आहुि—रुपमार्णा
नुपुष्पमाद्। आह—स्वर्य चूरा युभृम्याः शास्त्रसा? आहुि—न कायेन
न बाचन न मससा। आह—विषोभिताः युभृम्मिर्यक्षण्यमूलम्? क्षणाः?
आह—अभ्राहोत्स्वर्यसा। आह—उस्रीं युभृम्मिसा कस्याज्?
आहुि—अभ्राहोत्स्वर्यसा। आह—प्रतिप्रा युभृम्मिर्यक्षण्यमूलम्?
वश्स्स्। आह—स्वर्याविभ्रस्यार्यूपितिः। आह—चन्द्रायिण्य आयुष्मान्ता! आहुि—
चंद्रायिण्य आयुष्मान्ता! आह—किर्मो परिनिर्भ्रस्यार्यूपितिः। इति
व्यायस्य युभृम्मानि तथागतान्तिर्निर्मिताः। भिक्षुभ्रो पन्नानि
भिक्षुकानि व्यवधातन्तिर्निर्मिताः। श्रवणि।

दत्तेऽव युभृश्चार्याः तथागतान्तिर्निर्मिताः। भिक्षुभ्रो पन्नानि
भिक्षुकानि व्यवधातन्तिर्निर्मिताः।

वत्तं च वार्षिकप्रमण्डलाः घारणात्—

तथा युभृश्चार्याः फांसि च प्रतिप्रा मध्यानि च प्रतिप्रा पुरुषस्य
इल्लावार्याः। च प्रतिप्रा यूः। आहुिश्चार्याः अभिन्नविभ्रस्यार्यूपिताः। स
कायुष्मानि युभृश्चार्याः फांसि च प्रतिप्रा मध्यानि च प्रतिप्रा
पुरुषस्य इल्लावार्याः। इति वत्तं युभृश्चार्याः युभृश्चार्याः फांसि
च परिवाको नाध्यायाः न बाह्य वो नोच्यान्तरेण स्थितं।
तथथा भगवन् तस्य पुरुषसः मित्रम् सालोहिता एवं च; दृष्टि-मा में; सा मैहां, सो पुरुष। हूम्ही हि त्यम। न त्यमितो गृहम् कुटि-दिच्चितितः इति। एवंमेव दुःखा भगवन्तसङ्कीर्णविनिर्भयसिः गृहम् देशाति-नात्र स्वी न पुरुषोऽन सर्वोऽन न जीवो न पुढः न पुढः। विचित्र इदे सर्वस्मां। असन्त्र इदे सर्वस्मां। चिन्हिता इदे सर्वस्मां। सायोपसादे सर्वस्मां। स्वप्नोपसादे सर्वस्मां। लक्षणोपसादे सर्वस्मां। चक्षुचन्द्रोपसादे सर्वस्मां। इति विस्तरः। तेषां तथागतस्य चरमवेदिनां शुचा विगत्र-रागात् सर्वविपणः पद्धतिः। विगतमोहानः सर्वरागानः पद्धतिः अस्व-भावननाब्यावहः। ते शास्त्रस्थितेन चेतसा काँटः कुर्विनः। ते काङ्क्षान्त: समान निन्दयस्ते निर्वन्देयाचारः परिनिर्वानः। एव-सन्धां भगवान् नरकानां पद्धतिः। इति॥

एत्र च आयोपार्यपिपिण्यायाम्—

माय वस्तं नैचिर्वचः से
सत्त्वसहस्र सैवेवति नेके।

न च चिद्धस्त किंहः सत्त
यो चन्तु गच्छति घोरास्पायम्॥

न च कारकः कारण सनि
येद्हि क्षुदः अत्युत्सर्बः॥

कल्पवेशन तु पद्धति तत्र
काथि पतन्ति अपाचिति श्राहः॥

चित्रमोरस सज्ञितपुष्पा:
स्वाच्छिमान अवतिष्टि मनोगः॥

तेषष्ठिष्ठि कारकः नालिताह फक्षि
वेदचरि च स्वाच्छिति कल्पवेशन ॥

कल्पवेशन विकल्पितु लोकः
संहारं विकल्पितु वादः॥

सो च गहो अग्निहो अस्सुतो
आयोपचितसि हि विकल्पः॥

तद्वेद्येवेद्विवारद्मा नास्ति: स्वाच्छिमानविधिविध्वं चाणां
संहारं विकल्पसि मर्मि संसरे, इति स्थितम्॥
सध्वामकास्त्रे

चतुर्घापदयोऽनेन प्रतारीता संख्येववर्धानं तथा
वृद्धभावार्धस्त्रिप्रस्तावस्यस्यम्।

अनाहं-वय्यत: सत्व: परत: धम्मोहेषुवर्क नालिति भावानः
मुलायम्, तत: क्षमाविधिप्रत्ययः संस्कारा हस्तुकम् अधिवधानः
संस्कृतिरेष न तत्त्वम्।

किं संहास्तेवविस्तारं बलकरम्? इति प्रत्येकान्तात्रेण संहृतोः सिद्धिरुपुतात्मसे।
न हु पत्त्वोऽनंत्यमुःप्रमेयसंत्वभावाविप्रस्तायानम्
तच्च चायुक्तवात्। इति प्रत्येकान्तात्रेण अभूमे हि सति हृशुक्ष्यो-
रुणोत्तररक्षे वातात्मातिः स्वाभाविकी सिद्धिरिति नालिति सर्वभावावादः।
तात एवोकृः

स्वर्य कृत्त प्रकृति द्राम्योऽत्तेम्पर्कारम्।
तार्किकदेव्यं दुःखं त्वया तु च तत्त्वमप्रतिलम्य।

[ तत्त्वगतितत्वम्-९ ]

इत्यादि वक्तृतिः

प्रतीचय कार्यं कर्म तं प्रतीत्व च कार्यकम्।
कर्म प्रसत्वते नात्यस्तर्याम्: सिद्धिकारणम्। इति।

[ वर्षम-८. १२ ]

मिसारस्यावामनमैवेत्रोक्तम्-

तत्रात् वर्षसंकितो यथुत्तस्नयूर सतीदं मवर्तिः, अझोत्तालिनी-
द्वृक्तवचे, यथव वाविविधात्माः संस्काराः, संस्कृतप्रत्यः
विद्वान्तित्वाक्।

अत्र केवलपरिचोद्यवनिः-अहुसुक्तताम् भवाः इति किमयथ प्रभावानो
निदर्शय तत्त्वप्रभावान: ? तत्र शति प्रभावाणज इत्यते, तदैव वक्तव्यतःकिवि
प्रभावाति किन्तु ज्ञानपार्थ किमिकाराणि, किं सत्य ज्ञानाति किं परत
धम्मोहेषुद्वृक्तवचेत्। वाविविधात्माः, स न युक्ता, प्रभावालोकसा
स्वेयाकारभेवात्। अजानिगतो यथात् न विना प्रभावालेपचन्तं वर्णवर्ति
ी प्रभावावाणां दृष्टि रागानावाणां दृष्टि रागोपरिवर्त्यकारभेवात्
प्रभावावाणां दृष्टि। यथात् केवलनाधिकारकर्मानुसारथृतः
भवाः इति भविष्यानि, तत: एव ससापि सर्वभावाः सत्त्वाति। यथाति
चार्यै परिवर्तनं-अहुसुक्तताय सर्वभावाः इति, तथवै ससापि सर्वभावाति
वायोत्त्विनिःक्षिप्ताः। तथा नालिति निदर्श्योऽत्तुकाः सर्वभावाः
इति, तवाः स्वर्यमनिदिष्टतत् प्रभावानाः सर्वभावाः इति।

[ तत्त्वगतितत्वम्-९ ]
कठबोले। यदि कडिचित्रेची नामांकें स्थापत्ते, स प्रमाणं दो स्वयंप्रमाणं नाहीं। तर येथे त्यों किं न बळते? इत्यादि कडिचित्रेची स्थापत्ते सत्यत: विपक्षसूचे निष्कर्षेचं। यद्यव त्यांने त्यांचे त्यांच्या नामांकें स्थापत्ते, तर त्यांच्या नामांकें नाहीं। तर त्यांच्या दृष्टीमत्सूचे निष्कर्षेचं। स्वयं संबंधित सांगकेंने स्थापत्ते, व्यवहारसूचे इत्यदि त्यांचा। तर त्यांच्या दृष्टीमत्सूचे निष्कर्षेचं। त्यांच्या दृष्टीमत्सूचे निष्कर्षेचं।

तत्साधः निष्कर्षेचं स्थापत्ते स्वर्णम्। कर्म-पुनरुत्तमः निष्कर्षेचं व्याय-सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय-महत्तमांने मात्रतेचं न त्यांचा नामांकें पर्याप्त न हाते। नामांकें मात्रतेचं व्याय- सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते। किं तत्स्थापत्ते मात्रतेचं व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते।

तत्साधः निष्कर्षेचं स्थापत्ते स्वर्णम्। कर्म-पुनरुत्तमः निष्कर्षेचं व्याय-सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय- महत्तमांने मात्रतेचं न त्यांचा नामांकें पर्याप्त न हाते। नामांकें मात्रतेचं व्याय- सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते। किं तत्स्थापत्ते मात्रतेचं व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते।

तत्साधः निष्कर्षेचं स्थापत्ते स्वर्णम्। कर्म-पुनरुत्तमः निष्कर्षेचं व्याय-सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय- महत्तमांने मात्रतेचं न त्यांचा नामांकें पर्याप्त न हाते। नामांकें मात्रतेचं व्याय- सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते। किं तत्स्थापत्ते मात्रतेचं व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते।

तत्साधः निष्कर्षेचं स्थापत्ते स्वर्णम्। कर्म-पुनरुत्तमः निष्कर्षेचं व्याय-सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय- महत्तमांने मात्रतेचं न त्यांचा नामांकें पर्याप्त न हाते। नामांकें मात्रतेचं व्याय- सुपर्फिसन्मा व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते। किं तत्स्थापत्ते मात्रतेचं व्याय-सूचीते, तत्स्थापत्ते।
मध्यमकालीन

तुम्हारा मावा इस्लिए तांत्रिकविद्वत्ता स्वाभाविक धर्मप्रयोगक्रम की शाखा। इस्लिए अधिकांशीकों धार्मिक इंस्ट्रुमेंट्स को फॉर्मालिस्ट्स के साथ एकत्रित की जाती। प्राचीन डिवान, ज्यानविद्यालय, भक्ति, निरंतरता विश्वास निरंतरता, इति इति।

यथा स्वाति-ए एव प्रामाण्यवेदन्वचारो छाँटको उवाचमिति शाब्दो- पानुपुनितत्र इति, तवविद्वेश्यनंस्य तदहि कथा वाच्यम। हृदाकार्यं स नास्ति, विद्वीराधिवासपाविधानम्, विद्वायम्यां वस्मान्यह्यांमुक्तिमिति चेतु, यत्विन्युर्मु। तथ्या हि ह्रदाकार्यंविद्वीराधिवासपाविधानमानावतं, चहस्माधिपिरीवष्ट्रो लोकस्य स्वात, तद्यथा प्रयत्नसार्वभूत्वं स्वात्। न जैते-वयमु। इति त्वं वयमμं प्रयत्न इति॥

अपि च। तथ्या प्रत्याधारिनः प्रमेयानिहिमम्, वासि प्रामाण्यनि तेन परिस्थितायात् इत्याविद्नव विम्महयावर्तनया विहितो दोषः। तद्द्विन्युस्य वस्मान्यह्यां यत्विन्युर्मु, नास्ति।

क्षणासंपूर्णे च न क्षणायुंपि च। क्षणस्वात्तुपपचिं च क्षणस्वाधयात्मस्वप्नमः॥ इति॥

[ ७० शास-६४ ]

अथ स्वात-न क्षणये-नेतरिव अत्यान्त, क्षणमु, किं तदहि ‘क्षणयुतो भएतुं’ [ पां-३.१ ३ वृष्णि११३ ] इति कर्मणि लघु-क्षण यथवं क्षणं तदयति विवेकम्। धर्मशास्त्र कर्मावृत्तमेवाद्यन्त्यक्षणये, तस्य कर्मणि कर्मनात्मान्तः नानात्मानस्। एव दोषः॥

अथ स्वात-श्रापिनः करणत्वाचारस्य च वस्मान्यप्रत्यायात्मादश्रय इति, उच्चाये। इह स्वामान्यत्वाद्वारा वार्तादेव तत्त्व-वस्मान्य, तथा प्राथमिनः कः कः वेदानाथ विद्वान्यस्य विज्ञान्य सुविद्याविद्वान्यां च तद्यथा। तदहि तत्त्व-वस्मान्यः इति, क्षणा प्रतिद्वारातो च। स्वप्नस्वप्नमुः कर्मसाधनमुःध्यानच्छितम्। विज्ञानस्य च करणभावं प्रतिसाधनस्तुपुरुषो मयं तस्य स्वत्ववनस्य वस्मान्यार्थ करणाभावेयस्य। तत्त्व धन्य विद्वानस्य अत्यान्तः कर्ममु, तस्य व्यतिरिक्तेन कर्मणा। भविष्यमिति संवेद्व दोषः॥
प्रत्येकरीता नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम्।

अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्, अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्। तत्त्व द्वितीयम् प्रसंगेन विषयम् हामान्यक्षरं च इन्द्रजीवयुक्तम् प्रसंगेन विषयम् हामान्यक्षरं च इन्द्रजीवयुक्तम् नह्यैं ज्ञातसंगीतम्। अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

प्रायः इत्यतः अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

प्रायः इत्यतः अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

प्रायः इत्यतः अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

प्रायः इत्यतः अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

प्रायः इत्यतः अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।

प्रायः इत्यतः अभ्य स्वात्—यथाधिक्षिप्त सत्यमेव विश्वासार्थं तत्त्वज्ञानम्।
चक्षुणां भिन्नतवादचिक्ष्यवचिक्षणमपि न चक्षुम। तथा चक्षुप्रिन्नवचिक्षणस्य चक्षुणां निरपेक्ष चक्षुस्य स्वाताः। तत्स्य न चक्षुस्य चक्षुप्रिन्नवचिक्षणस्य पेश्त्वाश्च खुपुष्चवतु। अधारणामध्ये चक्षुभक्ष्यो, तथा चक्षुणां निरपेक्ष रितक्तवादचिक्षणस्यसामवेदीयो चक्षुस्य चक्षुस्य। चक्षुशाचर्यनितरितक्तवादचिक्षणस्यवाचस्यचक्षुप्रिन्नवचिक्षणमपि न चक्षुस्य स्वाताः। यथा चोक्तम—
चक्षुप्रिन्नवचिक्षणसन्यन्यचेतस्यचक्षुप्रिन्नवचिक्षणम।
तयोरभावोपनयते विरस्तं कृतत्वं त्वया। इति॥

[ सूक्तात्तत्तब-२१ ]

न च विना तत्त्वावलितेऽद्वेषतः चक्षुभक्षणसिद्धम् विचारणो अन्या गतिरिष्टिः।
तथा च वात्स्यति—
एकोभावेन वा सिद्धिनीनामभावेन वा अयोः।
न निधेऽ, तयोः सिद्धस्त कर्म तु खऽनु विचयेऽ इति॥

[ सौ ५८०-२४ ]

अधारणामध्ये—अवाच्यतया सिद्धिःशेषविष्णूति चेत, जैतवेयम।
अवाच्यतहि नाम परस्परविभागपरिश्रानामस्य सति भविष्ट। यथा च विभागपरिश्रानाम सति तत् इत्यद्वेषतः, इत्यद्वेषः परिश्रावासंभवे सति हयोगर्भास्य यथेऽ। तस्मादवाच्यवचिक्षणपि नासित सिद्धः॥

अपि च। यदि ब्राह्मणं कर्मं विपयवस्य परिच्छेदे, कः कहः। न च कस्यभान्त्रातिस्तवरङ्गराजानां संभवः सिद्धिक्रियायामिस। अयः चित्सव तत्र कर्तव्यं परिप्रेक्ष्ये, तद्वपि न तुकम, यस्माद्वर्धनात्रवृत्तयों चित्तास्य ल्यापास, अर्थविशेषवर्ष्यें जैतसानाम, ततराय्यं दृष्टिरिलोकानां तद्वच्छिते हु जैतसाम।

इत्यथापनमात्र। एकस्य च प्राधान्याया वाच्यात्र्याया वाच्यायाय वाच्याय गुणक्रियानित्वंचित्ताराजानायश्चाभण्डपमात्र करणार्थानां करणादित्यम। न चेष्टा नासितानामोपरक्या प्राधान्याया, च कहस्त, अर्थसार्वप्रिन्नवचिक्षण-श्राय स्या प्राधान्याया, ब्राह्मणं तु अर्थविशेषस्यप्रिन्नवचिक्षण प्राधान्याया नासिताय श्रायस्य करणां नापि चित्सव चहः त्वं। तत्र । च एवो दोषं॥

अथ यस्न-मान्यनातमात्रं सन्त्रोपर्यं इत्याथापनमात्र कर्तव्यं । चतुर्मान्यनातमात्रं च चतुर्मान्यनातमात्रं सन्त्रोपर्यं न्यपरिचः प्राधान्याया इति, एवत् च एवो दोषं। अधारणाय च ब्राह्मणाधारणायानां एवत्। एतद्वच्छिते अधारणायायानां।

अधारणाय चतुर्मान्यनातमात्रं सन्त्रोपर्यं च चतुर्मान्यनातमात्रं सन्त्रोपर्यं न्यपरिचः प्राधान्याया इति, एवत्।
एवढ प्रशिक्षणी, स्वाभाविक स्वाभाविकतिरिक्ती स्वाभाविक निर्माण संबंधांवेळी चित्रणानुसार नैतिकता, नैतिकता। अतुल्यतात। श्रीरामचन्द्रनाथोहिं उद्वेद्धार्थिक स्वाभाविक स्वाभाविक निरीक्षण संबंधांवेळी श्रीरामचन्द्रनाथ नैतिकता, नैतिकता। श्रीरामचन्द्रनाथोहिं उद्वेद्धार्थिक स्वाभाविक स्वाभाविक निरीक्षण संबंधांवेळी श्रीरामचन्द्रनाथ नैतिकता, नैतिकता।
परसार्थतत्त्विभागुद्विवधमुद्विद्वय कार्युपदपतिमित्वतार्थ अन्वायतो नायति। सोहे सङ्कुचिततत्त्वस्वाध्यायेन भाज्यीकृत पवेश पाणे सिखिता संघुरुपक्षरकोमुण्डलस्वप्ततित्त्वभाज्यीकृत एव पाणे निवर्त्यावत् लोकाचारात्मिकत्वमां म्हणतोपेश नवतर्यावत्।

तत्तव स एव होणः। अथ परसार्यः, तदा लघ्यावात्त्वक्षणाब्रम्यायि नात्तात्त्वै कृतः प्रसार्थत्रमः।

अथ अभवनेवाचिन्तिकारसत्त्वशृणुप्रक्षां भुवनप्रतीत्तिन्तता कियोति, तत्तत्त्वात्मित्तिकमः। वरेचं कियोकारसत्त्वशृणुप्रक्षां भुवनप्रतीतिन्तता कियोति, तत्तवाचिन्तिकारसत्त्व अनी भाग ज्ञानात्मको अनुभविते तत्र इण्ठामानः प्रतिविन्दुमात्रितम् (ढूणः।?) भवतः।

यदा चेत्र प्रमेयालक्ष्यमयस्थितं तदा स्वसामायणिकालक्षणाबिष्कणस्तेन स्वसामायणीयान्तर्वात्मम्। कि च घटं: प्रत्यक्ष सत्येवालिको प्रतीतत्त्वशृणुप्रक्षां ज्ञानात्मकात्मकान्तमां स्ववात्मानायत्त्वमां अनुभविता क्षणायथ्यो न युक्तमेवाः।

अथ स्यातः—ष्ट्रतेपादानीताः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षसमान्तरसिद्धकर्षुन्त्रस्मितः यत्नातः। तत्तवं सङ्करण कार्यं कार्योपचारः कृतत्वां गुणत्वा मुद्गाना मुख वचारो इत्य न्यपत्तिपथोः, एवं प्रत्यक्षसंबंधितिनिमित्तकोपिष्टं कार्यं कार्योपुचारः कृतत्वां प्रत्यक्षं इति न्यपत्तिपथोः। नेत्र्यिपणे उपचारो युक्तः। उपाधो हि लोके सुकृतिनिर्विहारेणोपक्षम्, स च संकृतवृश्चिकः स्वभावालक्षणादुपक्षरकहितकालाद्वृश्चमएव, स भूत इति न्यपत्तिपथोः। असाध्यं मेवेवेवेविपत्ये सुकृतेन उपचारः। घटं: प्रत्यक्ष इत्यत्र तुःस्त्र हि घटो नाम कश्चिदोऽल्लभाः पूर्वपुरुषवः भूण्यानायत्मकालक्षणात्मा। नीर्धारितितिर्लीत्ती धर्मसामायात्मकोपारिकं प्रत्यक्षसत्त्वतिकृताः नेत्रो, एषमं सत्त्वारुपकारो न युक्तः ज्ञात्त्वामानसात्मानसात्मा आदित्यायतः। न हि करविपणे सौन्दर्यपुण्यतिरीक्ते। अष्टिः च। लोकाचाराद्वृश्चमएव घटो हि नौर्धारितितिर्लीताः नात्तात्त्विकृतः कृत्वा तृतीयोपारिकं प्रत्यक्षत्वं परिलक्ष्यते, नेत्रेषु सति पूर्वितितिरिविभिन्ने। नौर्धारितिनिमित्तो नात्तात्त्विकृतो नीर्धारितितिर्लीताः प्रत्यक्षत्वं कलात्मकः। श्वेतोच्चम्—

रूपालिन्यतिरिविभिन्ने वच्चा, कुम्भो न विचारे।
वाच्यालिन्यतिरिविभिन्ने तत्ता रूपं न विचारे॥ इति॥

[ चतु तत्तक-१५१४]

नामांग्रहः च समासातितत्त्वमावस्तुत्त्वात् अवकोषः। सर्वोपकारः न्यायस्वामिनारदेशः।

लोके प्रत्यक्षवादय सति प्रथमाक्षरवस्तुपद्यसर्वस्रवणसर्वसंस्कारः।

कत्पनपोषणचः कालस्वयं प्रत्यः वहित्सुप्रमाणान्वेषः। वैच च लोकस्वयं संवर्णविद्वारः।

प्ररोक्तविषयं हु ब्राह्मणान्विनित्तार्थस्ि्वगुमानमू।

साधस्वातितित्वसिद्धां वायुवच्छ वागमानमू।

साहस्वातितित्वायुविद्वारः अन्तविच गवथे।

वाचि च परसङ्गु प्रेमकारः सिद्धति-सत्यु प्रमाणेषु ब्राह्मणार्थः। सत्यु प्रमाणेषु प्रमाणेषु।

आत्माः स्वव्यासः—ब्रह्मेतस्य न न्नम्बोधनी भावः। तद्भवतितितित्वायु प्रसङ्गेषु।

वाधृवज्जु स्वतः स्वप्रमाणार्थस्ि्वगुभ्यात्।
प्रत्ययपरीक्षा: नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम्।

शुक्ल । चतुः खल्कलिकः सब्रि परत इति, तद्वरुपम्, यथार्थस्तम्भवा
पव मयावत भावानाशुलावका निर्देशित ।

चत्वा: प्रत्यया । हृतुदा भूमन्त्रमतमतर्म।
तथावाक्षितम्य च प्रत्ययो नासित परर्म: ॥ ४ ॥

तत्त निःश्रेष्ठते हेषुरिति रूपः, यो हि यस्य निःश्रेष्ठते कविखमा
वेलाभिकाल: स तद्य हेषुरिति। तत्तमानो धर्मो वेलाभिकालानि:ः
धर्मो, स तद्य हेषुरिति। कारप्रयासान्तरे निःश्रेष्ठ: कारप्रयासान्तरे
प्रत्ययः, तथाभ चैव कारप्रयासान्तरे निःश्रेष्ठतोषुरितिः। यथार्थ
सति यथौरिति तथाभाक्षितेरिति। तै: चत्वा: प्रत्ययः। ये
चार्ये पुरुषोत्साहार्गाभावानुपत्तिः, ते चत्वा: चत्वा: अन्तः।
ईश्वरार्गार्गस्तु प्रत्ययः पव न संवृत्तिः। अतः मन्नाभास्वरूपे
नासित परर्म इति। वस्सादेशः परम्परेियो भावानाशुलावका
नासित परर्म इति। ॥ ५ ॥

अथोऽपि- नैच हि भावाना परस्मेियो। प्रत्ययेिय परर्मिति
वस्सादः

न हि स्वभावो भावाना प्रत्ययबिन्दु बिचः।

वविवकाने स्वभावे परस्मा: न बिचः। ॥ ६ ॥

इति। यदि हि हेषुरितिः परस्मेियो प्रत्ययेिय सवर्षेियो व्यासरेियो
हेषुरितिः सवर्षेियो अन्यतः वा कस्बूः भावाना कार्यात्मात्तात्मात्तात्मात्तात्मात्तात्तात्तात्
सवर्षः स्वातः, स्वातेिय स्वातः। न च चैव सवर्षेियो सवर्षः स्वातः।
यदि स्वातः, सवर्षः स्वातः, तथाभाक्षितः। तस्सादः
सादाचि भावाना प्रत्ययादिगुः स्वभावः। अविवकाने च स्वभावे नासित परर्माः।
सवर्षः भावः स्वातः, परस्मेिय स्वातः, परस्माः, स न बिचः।

वस्सादुक्कमेव परस्मेियो भावानाशुलावका

अथोऽपि भावाना कार्यानां कुरुक्षरावीगी केवलादिगुः प्रत्ययेिय सत्त
विवक्तकुलेपु नासित स्वभावे निःश्रेष्ठसंक्षेपात:॥

वविवकाने परस्मा प्रत्ययाकोणाम्। चित्रायाम्: यो हि स्वभावार्गार्गः
परस्मेियो परस्माः। न च चैव चैव चैव चैव चैव चैव चैव चैव चैव
वविवकाने। चत्वारेियो प्रत्ययां प्रत्यः। परस्मेिय: परस्माः, परस्माः, नासितः
परस्मेियावाक्षिते न परस्तः। सवर्षः इति। वस्सादः वविवकाने।
साधनखात्रें

भिक्षुकौ मरस्य। न हित तथातः युक्तिविरङ्कं चाक्षुसदाहरन्ति।
आगमस्य चामिस्यः प्रतीतौपचरितः।। ५ ।।

तदेव प्रत्येकं व्यावहारिनी प्रतिपदे क्रियावृत्तकारी मन्त्रस्यं च यकृत्यानुपादः प्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारिन्यं जननित। विषयां
जनिकारानुपादकवत्तात् प्रत्ययः। च च क्रिया विषयां जननी।
तस्मात्प्रत्ययवती विषयानजनिकानि विषयानजनिका, न प्रत्ययः।
यथा पचिक्रिया योगदन्तिः। चच्चते—

क्रिया न प्रत्ययवती

चदि क्रिया कारतम् स्वातः, सा चक्षुरारिविष्णः प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययं विषयं जननी।
न त्वस्य। कथा कहना? इति क्रियेमिहसमाणः जाते वा
विषयेऽरूप्ते, अज्ञाते वा जान्माते वा? तत्र जाते न युक्त।
क्रिया हि भावविलापिकाः। भावविलापिकाः, किस्म िनः क्रिया?
जातस्य जनमेः पुनरेऽ नैव युक्तम्।।

[पद्मकालात्—५४]

इत्यादिनं च साधनखातारे प्रतिपादितं। अज्ञातेऽपि न युक्ता,
कहै जिना जनितिः न च युक्तस्य।।

[पद्मकालात्—६१९]

इत्यादिचचनाद। वायुमानेति भावे क्रिया न समग्रति, जातात्त
व्यविस्मरे कृत्यानाधीन जायमानाभावाद। यथोक्तम्—
जायमानार्थे गजत्तावध्यायां न जाते।
अस्त्र वा जायमानं सर्वस्यें प्रसा। इति।।

[चदु-पत्रक—१५१६]

यदव्यादेशं स्थिते ताक्षेतु जनिकारः असंपर्कं, तस्मात्त्वस्य सा। अत
एवाद—क्रिया न प्रत्ययवती इति।

विशेषण नासित चिना विशेषम्।।

[पद्मकालात्—६१९]

इत्यादिनं प्रतिपादितंस्यमान्वयनायारे। न हि चन्द्रपुत्रो
गोमानित्युत्तिः।।

यथेष्ठम्, अप्रत्ययवती तत्त्व प्रतिपित्ति, प्रत्ययुपक्षिपित्यां—
नाप्रत्ययवती क्रिया।

यदा प्रत्ययवती नासित; तदा कथमप्रत्ययवती विषयं। स्वातः
न हि नादस्य। पदुः न युक्त इति वीरणमयो अनुस्मृताय। तस्मातिक्रिया
न भावजाथिका।।
प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नाम प्रययः प्रकरणम्।

अतः—यथेष्टः कित्या असंभवः प्रत्ययः साधियः जनकः सम्बिन्दूः भावानि प्रत्ययः। उच्यते—

प्रत्ययः नाकियावतः

यथा कित्या नासितः, तद्वा कित्यारिहितः अकित्यावतः निखिलः।

प्रत्ययः कच्छ्य जनकः? अथ अकित्यावतः एव जनकः इति, उच्यते—

कित्यावतः दस्य सन्त्युः। ९।।

नेति प्रक्कोत्तेन सिद्धविन्यः। उवाच कित्यावतः प्रत्ययान्तितः। चतुर्वेदीचित्रः कित्यावतः

प्रत्ययात्तितिः। यथा च विद्यानिनिकिष्टकः, दवर्प परिक्षीयकोपिः भावः ज्ञातः वैदिकश्च इति नासितः

कित्यावतः साधियानि प्रत्ययान्तिताम्बाराः अन्तःसिद्धान्ताम्बाराः। १०।।

अतः—किं न यथा कित्यावतः प्रत्ययः इत्यादिविद्विषारे? भस्माचार्यार्नेच मात्रात्मः प्रत्ययान्

विद्यानादन्तः। भावः ज्ञातः, दवर्प श्राण्यार्नेच मात्रात्मः प्रत्ययात्तितिः हस्याचार्यार्नेच विद्यानादन्तः।

पत्रध्वनिकत्याह—

उच्यते प्रतीत्येमातिनीमे प्रत्ययः। किल।

यावस्तेषष्ठति इस्मे तावज्यात्मा प्रत्ययः। कथम्। ११।।

वथि च चाहृत्यार्नेच प्रत्ययः मात्रात्मः प्रतीत्यम् विद्यानादन्तः इति कथम्। इस्मे प्रत्ययः दत्ते, नै च वाच्चार्यार्नेच मात्रात्मः कायः नोत्तते तवथिते चर्चिते

चाहृत्यार्नेच मात्रात्मः। इति कथम्। च चाहृत्यार्नेच मात्रात्मः।

अतः सत्यम्। खूँट्ठस्य प्रत्ययः सत्यः कित्यावतेम्यं प्रतीत्यमेव सत्यात्मः। कथम्। इति कथम्।

तत्रायत्ने चिह्नेति न युक्तात्मः। ११।।

किं च। इस्मे चाहृत्यार्नेच विद्यानादन्तः प्रत्ययः। कहित्यमानः। सर्वो वा अस्य फलस्थेरूः।

अस्य वा च न युक्ते। इत्याह—

नैवाचार्यात् सत्तः प्रतीत्येमातित्य युक्ते।

कस्मात्तिन्याय—

अस्य। प्रत्ययः कालभावस्य प्रत्येकं किर्मिः। १२।।
असतो द्वार्ष्य अविष्यताना सत्यं प्रत्ययः स्वातः ? भविष्यता लोपदेशो भविष्यतीति शेतूः, नैवम्—
भविष्यता शेषपदेशा इति:
शक्ति चिन्ता नातिस हि भविष्यतः

[भविष्यनामयाहै—६५८]

इत्याविनोक्षोपत्वात्। सतोषपि विधमानस्य अध्यक्षमनो निष्पक्षैव प्रत्ययकल्पना।

'एवं समस्तां प्रत्ययां कार्योत्तदनात्ताम्येवं अवभस्यत्वं-मुद्यायं अतः परं न्यस्तानामप्रत्ययत्वं प्रतिपावः

अत्राह—यथावेष्ट प्रत्ययानामप्रमंतः, तथा परं अस्तेष्व अध्यक्षो-पदेशाप्रत्ययस्थिति। तत्र निर्विर्यों हेतुविरिति अध्यक्षधुम्भते हेतुप्रत्ययः

नाचिन्यमानस्य अध्यक्षपदेशो खुको बन्ध्याभुल्लेवेविति।

चतुःस्थः स्वातः हेतुप्रत्ययेषो यत्र तस्य अध्यक्षः स्वातः। यस्मात्—

न समाजस वधसतो घर्मो निर्विर्यते यथा।

कथ निर्विर्यों हेतुविरिति सति हि युक्तते।

तत्र निर्विर्यकः उवाचः कथ निर्विर्यविषयों घर्मो निर्विर्यते, बद्धाचेतो हेतुविरितायेत। न दुः निर्विर्यते, सर्वसहुभावहुः प्रत्यय्यन्ताम्येव।

तत्र सत्र निर्विर्यों विधमानस्तवः। अस्तमिति अनिष्ययानस्तवः। सत्र-सत्रम्, परस्परविशेषविशेषकार्यस्यामिति, अभिव्यक्तिविशेषतः।

यद्य एवं अभिव्यक्तिविशेषतः हेतुप्रत्ययोरमो नातिस।

तत्रात्र

चत्वारं ध्यक्षसम्प्रमूलात्ति हेतुप्रत्यय इति, तदेव सति न युक्तते।

इदानीमानस्यायुक्तानीविशेषायाम्

अनालम्भन एवार्य सन्तो घर्म उपदेशये।

अनालम्भने घर्म कुत्र आलम्भन घुणः।

इदानि साधारणमायकायुक्तानीविशेषायाम्

कथे वस्मीति चैत्यास्तानं। चित्र-चैत्यास्तानं भेकाम्बरस्योत्तप्तती विधायों रूपायिस। वा तेषाम्बः कालम्बः प्रत्ययः।

अर्थं व विधायों वा परिपक्वेत अधिच्छानां वा।

तत्र विधायों नार्त्तस्वावलंबनम्। अर्थं हि उपस्थायमानस्यायुक्तानीविशेषायाम्।

चतुःस्थः स्वातः सन्तो घर्मो वधस्वातः अस्तिन्ते फिमस्य आलम्भनयोग्यो वर्णितिः।
प्रत्ययपरीक्षा नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम् ।

तेन, इत्यनाल्ल्ब्यन प्रत्यय सन् विचारानारं धर्मः प्रत्ययकारः। केवला साक्षर्वन इत्युक्तयते सबला विचारानारं धर्मः। स्वरूपाचरण सन् इति वाक्योऽवृत्ते।

अनाल्ल्ब्यन प्रत्ययः सन् धर्मः कविन्द्रः।

अवधिद्वः साक्षर्वन इति वाक्योऽवृत्ते।

अध्यायानान्तने धर्मः कुट अल्ल्ब्यन युनः।

अवधिद्वः प्रदोषे। कुट इति तेतो। तेनायस्त्री—अवशेषमान्ल्ल्ब्यने धर्मेऽक्षितः अविचारानारः मूः कुट अल्ल्ब्यनः। अल्ल्ब्यनकालायाः

वाल्ल्ब्यनसाध्यायाः इत्यथामिथयाः। कथा तथां साल्ल्ब्यनान्तिच्याचारः। कथा तथां साल्ल्ब्यनान्तिच्याचारः।

सादृश्येवकल्पः न परमाशिक्षितः।

इत्यादी सामान्यन्तराल्ल्ब्यनान्तिच्याचारः—

अनुपर्योगः धर्माः निरोधः नोपपदः।

नान्तरसम्म युक्तः निरुद्धः प्रत्ययकारः कः। ॥ १६॥

तस्म परिचये इत्योक्ष्यादिः पादन्तयोऽद्वारः, चस्मादग्निक्रमः निरुद्धः चेति । तैरायनः पाठः—निरुद्धः च प्रत्ययः कः । नान्तरसम्म युक्तः निरुद्धः प्रत्ययकारः कः।

तस्म परिचये इत्योक्ष्यादिः पादन्तयोऽद्वारः, चस्मादग्निक्रमः निरुद्धः चेति । तैरायनः पाठः—निरुद्धः च प्रत्ययः कः ।

तस्म परिचये इत्योक्ष्यादिः पादन्तयोऽद्वारः, चस्मादग्निक्रमः निरुद्धः चेति ।

तस्म परिचये इत्योक्ष्यादिः पादन्तयोऽद्वारः, चस्मादग्निक्रमः निरुद्धः चेति ।

नान्तरसम्म युक्तः निरुद्धः प्रत्ययकारः कः।

नान्तरसम्म युक्तः निरुद्धः प्रत्ययकारः कः। अथ औः।
न च व्यस्तसमस्तेषु प्रत्येक्षवस्ति तत्तत्वमु ।
प्रत्येक्षम्: कचं तन्च महेन्न प्रत्येक्षु यथाः ॥ १२ ॥
तन्त्र व्यस्तेषु वन्नुरुरोपसरसादकाविषु प्रत्येक्षेषु पत्रो नाति,
तत्रातुपथमान्त्वतः, कारणवद्वन्त्य वर्गवहुत्तमासकः।
समुद्वितेषु वन्नतादिशु नाति पत्रः, प्रत्येकमवन्तेषुविचारमान्त्वतः,
पक्षे कार्येन खण्डवा दण्डितमासत्तः। तस्मात्क्षणामान्न सन्न्व
प्रत्याः: स्वाभावता ह्यतः ॥ १३ ॥
अत्याशादिः तत्तेत्यः: प्रत्येक्षम्: प्रवृत्तते ।
इत्यभिमान: स्वातः—
अप्रत्येक्षम्योथिपि कस्मात्कल्यां नामभ्रमाते ॥ १४ ॥
अप्रत्येक्षम्योथिपि नातिः फलस्विति। अप्रत्येक्ष्योथिपि वीराणाधिम्: कस्मान्त्याभ्रमाते पत्र ह्यति नाति फलभ्रुतृति: स्वरूपतः ॥ १४ ॥
अत्राः—वदि अन्यतः पत्र स्वास्ये च प्रत्याः, तवा किं प्रत्येक्षेषु फलस्वितिः नास्त्तिः चिन्ता स्वातः। नातिः दु ल्यतिरिक्ता
फलम्। किं ताहि प्रत्यमयमेबचेति ॥ चच्चते—
फलः च प्रत्यमयम् प्रत्याविद्यात्तैवम्याः ।
फलमस्येक्षोऽस्त्रप्रत्यमयम् कथ्यम् ॥ १५ ॥
प्रत्ययारोक्ता नाम प्रथम प्रकरणम्।

यदि प्रत्ययमयं प्रत्ययविचारः फलमसिति व्यवस्थाप्यते, तद्युक्तम्।
ससाटेदपि प्रत्यया अस्त्यस्या क्षमत्यस्मात्तमः इत्य्रेणः। नतुमयोऽ
हि पद इत्युक्ते। स्थानः पत्रो यदि तत्वं एव स्वभावसिद्धः स्थूः।
तेष हि अभुतस्य अभुतविचारः न स्वभावसिद्धः। तत्वं हेम्योऽस्वयं
हेम्योऽस्वयं वतत्थः प्रत्ययम्, वत्तरः नतुमयं विनिध्वति।

पदः कारणः सिद्धः सिद्धः कारणभक्तम्।
सिद्धिन्विष्टः स्थती नात्ति चवयन्वयनेऽक्तथम्। हति ॥ ९ ॥

[ बृजतास्वति ]

तत्साधः प्रत्ययस्यः

गौः संविच्छिदे। अप्रत्ययस्य तर्कं अस्तु—

नाप्रत्ययस्यः फलम्।

संविच्छिदे

इति नतुमयो यदा पत्रो नात्ति, तद्र तु तत् वीरणस्यः स्वातः?
अनुचाई—सा मूच्तमस्य, प्रत्ययात्मकायत्वायस्मात् सिद्धते। तथा च
अचार्यः अव्यक्त्तिः। इति अस्तु फलं प्रत्ययं विश्लेषः। अचार्यः एव
क्षमानिर्मितेऽवत्ते हि। न चालसिद्धि फलं पद्धतिः पद्धतिः तत्रूस्त्रः
अप्रत्ययमयं प्रत्ययायुक्तम्, तवं फलमयप्तिनिः। यथिते। स्वात्तरः
यदि प्रत्ययात्मकः एव स्थूः। इति हि फलं इत्ये स्थते प्रत्ययः इति
स्वातः। तत्रच चिन्तार्थमयं नास्त्वैति—

फलोभावायप्रत्ययात्मकः कृतं। ॥ ९ ॥

प्रत्ययायप्रत्ययायप्रत्यत्तमः समस्त।। तत्साधः सवपदानं स्वभावः
सम्पत्तिविश्लेषः। यथोक्तायांवर्त्तकस्यः—

शुन्यविश्लेषः न हि विच्छिदर काचि
अन्तरोक्तिः प्रकृतिः वा पद्मसू।
यो न विच्छिदत सवभावः काचि
श्रेयो न जातु प्रर्थं भेलमिति। ॥
वस्त्र नैव हि सवभावः काचि
श्रेयोऽस्वयं परस्परः क्षमसू।
अस्तभावः पदं फलं जन्नितिः
पद्मवेछं स्वातेत्त स्वतिः। ॥
सच्चे धर्मे अचला दूरू लिखता
निर्विकार निश्चिह्नद्राहः किवा:।
अन्तरीक्षपथदुल्ल्यजानका
तथा सुविद्यति जर्ग अजानकम्॥
शैलपवेक्ष यथा अकल्पिया
एवं धर्मे अविकल्पिया सदा॥
नो च्यवति न पि चोपपस्यात
एवं धर्मेत जिनेन दृश्यता॥ इत्यादि॥

तथा—

यो न पि जाग्यति ना चुपचायी
नो च्यवति न पि जोश्वति धर्मः॥
तं जितु देशायति नदनःः
तत्रा निवेश्यति रसोऽवनः॥

वस्त्र समाः न विचल्यति कर्मः
तो परभावः केनाच भवः॥

नान्तरतः न पि चाहिरसः चा
वस्मियति तत्र निवेश्यति नाथः॥

श्रान्त गतिः कथितः कुःगतेन
तो च गति चरस्मियति काण्डः॥

तत्र च वैहसी गतिभुक्तः
मुक्कु मोचवासी चहस्तहांः॥ इति चित्तः॥ १६॥

इत्याचार्यैः चन्द्रकृतिप्रमाणविचाराः प्रसंगपवारध्यायं मध्यकदस्योः
प्रत्यपरीत्या नाम प्रथमं प्रकरणम्॥

—कृत्यं ज्ञानं—
निर्वाणपरीक्षा पञ्चविश्वंतरं प्रकरणम्।
(Containing the original of ch. XXV
of the translation)

अन्‌द्राह—

पदि शून्यमिदं सर्वमुव्यो नातिन्‌ न वयः।
प्रहारणादा निरोधाया कर्म निर्वाणान्वित्ते॥ १ ॥

इद्ध हि समस्तो विश्वमिदं बुद्धवेद्यवाचार्यानां
भौतिकमेवादितपतिपतिमुक्तानां प्रुद्धगानां ध्रुविभि निर्वाणवधविरङ्गमि
स्थायिक्षोऽनिर्धारितेऽपि च। तव निर्धारितं अनिर्दिष्टारात्रायनि
कल्याणमिति अभयं। दुंहिन्धिक्षोऽनिर्धारितेऽपि च। तव वर्धावतेऽ
सिद्धातिमेऽहेऽ इति धपितं। वर्धिष्ठुमेऽ आत्मप्रकृतिसमाचरणे
पञ्चमोपाध्यायम् च कह्यन्ते। हयेत्रत इति धर्मं। वर्धिन्धिक्षोऽ
वर्धिष्ठुमेऽ तव धर्मिन्धिक्षोऽ वर्धिष्ठुमेऽ इति स्थायिक्षोऽ
क्षति तत्‌ ॥ निर्वाणम्। तव स्वर्णभुक्ताधिष्ठानां के तरं सत्त्वविश्वमिदं
विश्वज्ञास्त्व रक्षितस्यार्थं तिद्धिवेश्वरात्रायनि
स्थितात्। तत्र तु निर्धारेण स्तुत्वपञ्चसक्तिम् नातिन्‌ वविश्व
रुपिन्धिक्षोऽनिर्वाणम्। निर्धारेण धर्मिन्धिक्षोऽ निर्वाणम्। निद्धारेन
श्वन्त्वचारणस्य भागात्मकस्य निन्द्रायणस्य च। वदेन्त्र च अविकृत्य
निवासे—

अभेदि कायो निरोधि सच्चा
वेदना पि ति व वहर्दु सच्चा।
चुपरससमय संखारा
विच्छिन्नमाध्यामम् वि ॥

तथा—

[चवा—८६] अर्न्मीनन कापेन वेदनास्यत्रम्।
प्रवेश्तेऽव निर्धारेण भिषोकस्तत्व चैत्यः। इति ॥

[चेक्या—१००६] तदेव निर्धारितं निर्धारणं सत्त्वात्
निरोधाया निरोधायः। एवत्तथे
ध्रुविभि निर्धारणं करं चुव्यते च वदि कड़ेऽनात् सत्त्वान्
च निरोधो
धैर्यसपनाशा

भवति ? यदा हु सर्वसिद्ध शून्यम्, नेव किंचित्तुः तदा नापि किंचित्ति-रूपये, तदा खूँटः कृष्णाः, कृतो च रूपाः। यथा निरोधे निर्वाणस्वादिति ? तस्मादित्वात् एव भावावान र्वयाव इति। ॥ १ ॥

अत्रथैव न्यून ययं परि सत्त्वावाचारणम्

यदान्तः सर्वसिद्धे नास्ति न वयः।

प्रत्यक्षात्मा निरोधात्मा कस्य निर्वाणसिद्धे। ॥ २ ॥

स्वभावेन हि व्यवस्थितानां केर्त्यानां स्नातानां च स्वभावस्य-पारित्वात् बुद्धं निर्वाणात्, अवसंविभुत्या निर्वाणस्वादिति | तस्मात्

स्वभावावाला नेव निर्वाणसूपचते। न न वृन्दपातावादनः स्नात्व-निवृत्तिशक्त्क्षणः केल्याशिविशिक्षणः च निर्वाणमिच्छिन्ति वत्सेवार्थम्

दोषः स्वादिति। अतः अग्निक्षमः पद्यस्तः शून्यस्वाधिनाम्। ॥ २ ॥

वद्य खलु वृन्दवातावादनः केल्यानां स्नातानां च शून्यशिशक्षणः

निर्वाणां नेेँच्छन्ति, किंतु इच्छन्ति ? जथ्यं—

अप्राप्तेमस्पांप्राप्तेमस्तुच्छन्नमशास्त्रक्षमः।

अनिर्भ्रतमुत्पन्तेत्रतिहितावाचारणम्। ॥ ३ ॥

श्य्ये नेव प्रह्यस्ते सर्वावेत्, नापि वाप्यः शास्यस्यस्विचरणः,

नाप्युप्रथमेव स्नातादिचरणः। ववापि न स्नितमसूत्वेत्। ततः स्वभाव

तोरास्याध्यायम् च चर्याध्यायमभावश्च निर्वाणमुक्तम्। ततुए

संसारितैत्वांविभया निर्वाणप्रकाशः केल्याकल्पना तेषा केल्यानां प्राध्यायाधिवृत्तिः भवेत्। कुतो च रूपम्बस्त्र दशं, चेष्य स्नातानां निरोधात्मा

वद्ये च। वद्य एताः कथमः! चर्यात्मे, वववासि निर्वाणविचारम्,

संसारप्रकाशसंविवाचारणमात्।

अथ स्वातः प्रश्य पिनिर्वाणः न चिन्ता केल्याः, न चापि स्नाताः।

तथापि निर्वाणात्मा विचारे। तत्तत्त्वम परिष्क्रमानिर्वाणम भविष्य-वोऽि। तत्त्वमे। स्वातः भवां, चैस्मानिर्वाणादेव स्थायोरो

विचारावानां न पुनर्भवः श्रवे कदः।। तस्मानिर्वाणानिर्मिभावात्

व्यवहृता कथमः। चध्यति हि—

निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः कोटिः संसर्गस्य च।

न द्योरकर्चे किंचित्तुभूमिश्चिपि विचारे। ॥ इति।

[ म० शा० - २५, २० ]
निर्वाणपरीक्षा पद्धतिकरतच्या प्रकरणमूळे

तर्केन निर्वाने न कस्यचित् ग्रहणं नापि कस्यचित्तिरोध इति
विषयम्। तत्तत्त्व निर्वाणसङ्कलपनात्मकयुत्प्रेष निर्वाणम्। उक्तं च
मगवावा—

निर्वाण न अन्तित धर्माः
ये नेह नास्तिनं ते जातु अस्तः।
नास्ति नास्तित्व च कल्पनाचतवा—
मेवं चर्चनान न हुँ ख शास्त्रीति॥ इति।

[ समाधिराजसूत्र–९ २६ ]

अस्त्य गााशावा अथसम्बन्धे–निर्वाणे भिक्षुप्रविभेदे निर्वाणवाती
धर्माः कळ्ळकर्मण्यन्मलक्षणाः स्फन्धानाः वा सर्वभा अस्तगामाव–
स्तत्त्व नास्ति, एवं च सर्वाधिनामस्संततमूळे। वे वर्तीयह धर्माः हहे
निर्वाणे न सत्त्व, अन्धोपेप्दाियािकसािरपवस्थरज्जुसप्ताधिबद्धतः, न
ते जातु अस्तः, न ते धर्माः कळ्ळकर्मण्यन्माविश्वयुः। काओिििििातः काहे
संसारार्ध्यामापि तर्कः विचारः। न हि रधुः अन्धकारार्ध्याः
स्फन्धाः सन्धोऽऽिति, सदामृतसप्ताधिक अन्धकारेऽऽिति तां त्रिकथेऽऽिति
कायकश्चुक्तायंसः। कर्तं तर्कः संसारः इति चैतुः, वचनः। आतमाः
त्वामाि्यािसुिमष्ठािना बाल्यममजनािािािस्फन्धाः अपि मािािा
सत्त्वः प्रतिििािन्ते वैसरूिरिकावाभिव अस्तगामाववस्थः॥ इति।
वैः—

नास्तितिन्वाणे च कल्पनाचतवा—
मेवं चर्चनान न हुँ खास्यति। इति।

अस्त्यतिन्वाणपरीक्षात्त्वा जैसन्निधकापाद्वीपिकाठोऽिी वैमाध
पिकपश्चन्तिनाः। नास्तितिन्वाणपरीक्षात्त्वा जैसन्निधकापाद्वीपिकाठोऽिी
वैमाधपिकपश्चन्तिनाः। तवन्यः च अन्तितात्त्वकस्तर्वतः विश्विश्विवर्गरस्तर्वतः
रात्ता नास्तिवािदिः भवत्त्वश्चात्त्विनां, विनिमतत्वस्तर्वत्तत्त्वतिवािदिः, परिक्लितस्तर्वतः
नास्तिवािदिः परिनिर्दिष्टस्तर्वतिज्ञांचतं चर्चाः न हुँ खास्यति। इति।

यथा श्रीधृश्येन विपस्सन अभ्यपेति
तो चापि कोऽऽित गन्तु आविष्ट पपचते।
एवमेव बाल्यपर्तो दिनाः

...........पापि लिवैये चवा अभूतो॥ इति।
वदेव न कस्मिन्सिद्धाणि प्रशान्तं नापि कस्मिन्सिद्धाऽपि इति विज्ञयम्।
ततः सर्वक्षणान्यायस्मात्वा निर्वाणम्। यथोक्तमार्गरथल्यामुः-
न चामानवोपधि निर्वाणं ज्वति एवाः परमम।
भावामार्गपराक्षेऽबो निर्वाणसुत्वते॥

इति ॥ ३ ॥

ते हु सर्वक्षणान्यायस्मात्वा निर्वाणमात्वा भावामार्गपराक्षेऽबो निर्वाणात्वा परिश्रमिति - ताबाः प्रति प्रेमते-
भावस्तवान्ति निर्वाणं ज्यामयान्तोक्षामुः।
प्रसन्नेतातिलित भावो हि न ज्यामयान्ति विना ॥ ४ ॥

तत्रेकेभवतो निर्वाणमात्वाति निर्वाणात्वाति - इत्य गुरुकर्म-\nअन्नसंतानामधुरितिमात्रावस्तुति च जोगवाहिनीस्वतः सुसेवत्सानायो निर्वाणात्वा पद्याः, तन्निर्वाणम्। न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना न च ज्यामयान्ति विना ॥

तथा-

प्रधोत्सैंव निर्वाणं निर्मोहक्षयं चेयसः।
इत्युक्तम्। न च प्रधोत्सैंव निर्वृत्तिः इत्युपचते। उच्यते। नैतिवेवी
विद्यां तुण्याया। क्षयं कुणाक्षयं कस्मि
fः किं वर्धी रूपाया। क्षयो-\nसिद्धिर्मिति निर्वाणाभ्या दर्शते सति सतिः न त्वमाक्षयं इति वक्तम्।
प्रधोपच दस्यान्तमात्रम्। तत्रापि हस्तस्य सति चेतसो विमोहो महाक्षयं निर्मोहक्षयं चेयसः।

एवं भावे निर्वाणव्यवस्थापि भावावः निर्मोहति-भावस्तवान्ति
निर्वाणम्। किं कारणम्। यस्मात् ज्यामयान्त्यम्। प्रसन्नेत् भावस्तव
ज्यामयान्त्यमात्राभिधारणितवः। चतुष्क निर्वाणमेव तन्न स्वतः, ज्यामयान्त्यमात्राभिधारणितवः।

तावेच ज्यामयान्त्यमात्रा भिन्नेति। तो हि ज्यामयान्त्रकेतवः। किं वावेएव एव न
संवेदना ज्यामयान्त्रकेतवः। ज्यामयान्त्रकेतवः। ॥ ५ ॥

किं पान्वते-
भावावः यदि निर्वाणं निर्वाणं संस्कृतं भवेत्।
नासंस्कृतो हि बिघ्ने भावः क्वचन क्वचन ॥ ५ ॥
किं चान्यतः
भवेदमाहौ भावश्च निर्वाणसुभं यत् ।
नातुपाद्य निर्वाणसुपाद्यरोमं हि तत् ॥ १२ ॥

यदि माहामाहरूं निर्वाण स्थानं, तदा हे भवेदमाहौत्सामीमहामाहौ आङ्गित्व सवेत, न भजतायाव। किं कारणं? यथा हे भवेदमाहौरोमं हि तत्। माहामाहरूं माहाव, माहाव चर्चावाय माहाव, इति चल्ला उभिवेदतः माहावं च माहावं च उपालवाच सववित, न भजतायाव। इत्य निर्वाणं सबेदू माहामाहरूम्। न चवेदवेदम्, इति न युक्ते भजतायाव। ॥ १२ ॥

किं चान्यतः।
भवेदमाहो भावश्च निर्वाणसुभं कथम्।
आरोमं च निर्वाणं माहामाहो च संस्कृतां ॥ १३ ॥

भाव्य हि स्वहेतेभ्यसाम्यसंभुतम् संस्कृतम्। भवेदमाहो
[ माहव] प्रवीम्य समूतस्तम्, जातिरत्यजामामण्यवचनाव संस्कृतम्।
तदाम हे माहामाहरूं निर्वाणं स्थात्, तदा न आरोमं
[किं च] संस्कृतस्तम्। यथा भवाम च संस्कृतस्तम्, तस्मात् माहामाहरूं
निर्वाणं युक्तं। ॥ १३ ॥

अथापि स्वातन्त्रेषु हि निर्वाणं माहामाहरूम्, किं वर्धि
निर्वाणं माहामाहवतित। प्रभुपि न युक्तम्। किं च। यथा-
भवेदमाहो भावश्च निर्वाणं उसयं कथम्।
[तयोरेकना नासिनित्वमालोकमोर्यथा] ॥ १४ ॥

भावामाहयोरणि परस्परविविधानोरेकनि निर्वाणे नासिनि सम्बन्ध
इति, अथसः

भवेदमाहो माहा निर्वाणं उसयं कथम्।

सैव भवेदलोकसहायः ॥ १४॥

ईश्वरी यथा सैव भावो भवेदमाहो निर्वाणं युक्तं, तथा
प्रतिपादयाहः

नैवमाहो नैव भावो निर्वाणमिति यावजना।

अभावे चैव भावे च सा लिङ्गेऽति लिङ्गविन्यति॥ १५ ॥
चत्र अभावः अनित्यता वा भावसुपादाय प्रज्ञयेते, खरविपणानीवास्मनितवातुपमः। दक्षणाशिषित ज्ञयं प्रज्ञयेते, दक्ष्यमाशिषित च दक्षण। अतः परस्यपैशिकः अन्यथा दक्षणाशिषितैः कुतो ज्ञयं भावास्थेऽः अनित्यता महविष्टत। तस्यतः भावकाव्योद्युताय भक्त्येते। ततो यदि अभावेऽनिर्विषयम्, तदु कथमनुपादाय निर्विषयं भवेत्? वपादायेऽतु, अभावत्वाहिनावर्तत। पत्तेः च स्वमस्यज्ञान् न भावमोक्षितो योज्युपादवाय विचारते इतिः।

यदि तत्त्वाति अभावः अनुपादाय नासिः, किंमिवानैसपुपादाय वन्यापुत्रानावोभिमा भविष्यति? केनविदुक्तपणं वन्यापुत्रादयोभिमा इति? उक्तः इति पुराणम्

भावत् बैद्यासिद्धिरभाषो नैव सिद्धिः।
भावत् हन्याभावाभवमां सब्रेवं जना।। इति।

[२० ७००-१५.१]

तस्मात वन्यापुत्रावदीलाभमायम्। शवचापवद्यः;
आपातः शरमुखः च वन्यापा: पुञ्छ क्रम च।
असन्तहमुद्दायनस्य तथा भावेऽव कल्पना।। इति,

[२५ ५०२-२.१९६, १०.५२२]

तत्तथापि मात्रकल्पनाभिविदेशमायम्, न अभावकल्पना, भावत्वासिद्धेदेवेति बिजेऽम्। वन्यापुत्र इति शब्दमात्रेमवेचावत् न अस्य
अथ: उपस्थते, यथार्थम् भाववस्तुयस्य वा स्वादिष्टि। करतः
अनुपक्षमार्थास्वभावो भावाभावकल्पना योहस्ते? तस्मात् न
वन्यापुत्रोभिमा इति बिजेऽम्। तत्त्व स्वतमेव न भावाभावितो
योज्युपादाय निर्विषयं इति ।

अतः-यदि भावो निर्विषयं न भविः, अभावोऽधिनि, किं तत्ति
निर्विषयार्थेः? उक्त्येत। इति हि भवविद्विनाशास्त्रे-  

य आजवंजवीरभाव उपादाय प्रतीत्वम् वा।
सोप्रतीत्यानुपादाय निर्विषयमूर्प्पिवर्त्ये।। ९।।

तत्र भाजवंजवीरभावः आणामण्नगरसघजनममपर्यन्तरस्वर्यः।
स चापसाधजवीरभावः कन्थचिन्हेऽपर्यन्त्यसाधनाभिविद्यमानस्य अस्तिः
साध्ये वैविद्यवर्त। कन्थचिन्हेऽपर्य इति प्रक्षण्येऽः प्राणस्मार्थेऽः
निर्वाणपरीक्षा पञ्चविश्लेषितम् प्रकरणम्

चीजाढूरवस्तुः। सर्वथा चचचयमुपदायन प्रकट्ये, चढळ वा प्रतीत्य जायते इति न्यवस्थायते, सर्वथास्य जन्मसमर्पणपर्यंपरप्रवचनः अप्रतीत्य वा अनुपदाय वा अप्रमुखितस्मिन्निर्णयितैः न्यवस्थायते। न च अप्रमुखितावर्गर्वावुमायो वैदिक परिलिपिं वार्त इति। पर्से न मायो नामायो निर्वाणम्।

आयधा। येषाम् संस्काराः संसर्गतीति पक्षः, तेषां प्रतीत्य प्रतीत् यु चताद्रः विनाशस्य, सोकस्तत्वा प्रत्यत्यमानो निर्वाणमिति कथयते। येषां हु पुद्राः। संसर्गति, तेषां तस्य नित्याविश्लेषनेनावतारघ्नेन तत्तदुपादानाः। वाचवन्यायः स चताद्र वर्तते, स नवोपादान्योपादाय प्रत्यत्यमानः सविश्वासीतिस्मुपदायान्वर्तमानो निर्वाणमिति न्यवपद्धतः। न च संस्कारानां पुद्राः वा अप्रमुखितानां मायोगमालो वैदिक व्यक्तिः। इत्यतोऽपि न भाव्यो नामायो निर्वाणमिति गुणयते। ॥ ९ ॥

किं चानन्दः—

प्रमाणं चान्नीच्छात्ता भवस्य विभवस्य च।

तस्मात् भाचे नामायो निर्वाणमिति गुणयते। ॥ १० ॥

तत्र सूत्र चक्षुः—ये केष्टिद्विवको भवेत् भवस्य निर्दर्शणं पर्यंपने निभेत वा, अप्रिज्ञानं [द्वे ७] तत्संगमिति। उभयं होतू विपरीतवयं भवे तत्ता निभेत तत्त्वं। न च तिच्छाद्वां प्रहारत्यमुकं भगवतः, किं वर्त अन्नदुहितम्। तत्तदि निर्वाणं स्वाभवत्वं भवाभवत्वं च, तद्यथ स्वाभवत्वं भवेत्। न च प्रहारत्यम्।

तस्मात् भाचे नामायो निर्वाणमिति गुणयते।

येषाम् परिवाराणस्य अभिवाचारप्रवचनं निर्वाणं च भाचवप्रवचनमुक्तिमेतिप्रवचने, तेषाम् प्रवचनमिति निर्वाणं नोपपद्धते, इति प्रतिपद्धतः—

भवेद्वाचे भावस्य निर्वाणमुमयं धर्म।

भवेद्वाचे भावस्य भोजस्तत्तच न गुणयते। ॥ ११ ॥

चढळ मायोगमालोपदायं निर्वाणं व्यापा, तत्वं मायोगमालोपदायं। तत्तदा वा संस्काराणामालोपदायं तत्तदा वा भिगम, स एसमं स्वाभवत्वं व्यापा। न च संस्कारां एवं मोहां इति सुविदयते। अत एवं एवं न गुणयते। इति ॥ ११ ॥
विन्ध्यपरीक्षा पञ्चविधालितमं प्रकरणम्

यदि विन्ध्य-भावं स्वातः, तद्वा विन्ध्य-भावं सर्षप्तं अवेत्, विन्ध्य-नान्दिवतं मात्सर्यादानं। यस्तू अर्थांश्च, नासी भावं, तथावस्था खर्विग-पाण्यब्रह्मितं ब्यांतिरक्षुपर्वपस्यांहं-नासीको द्विः विचारे भावं कचन कचन।

कचनेतविधिकरणे देवे काढे चिह्नान्ते ना। कचनेतविधिकरणे। आच्छादनमित्रो वाचात्शुकूस्मीको चेत्यनः। ॥ ५ ॥

किं चान्यत्-

भववच यदि विन्ध्यमान्युपावयात् तत्कथम्।

विन्ध्यमान्युपावयात् कर्मिनन्दा मांवो द्विः विचारे ॥ ६ ॥

यदि भवन्तेत्तस्म विन्ध्यमान्युपावयात् स्वातः, भुङ्गायात् भवेत्, पंक्तायात्-सायमातिशत भ्रेतित्वाः। न चैत्यन्युपावय विन्ध्यपिण्यते, किं वन्दे अतुपावयात्। तथावस्था विन्ध्यमान्युपावयात्, न कथ विन्ध्यमान्युपावयात्? नैव अतुपावयात् स्वातः, भववचात् विन्ध्यनान्दिवत। व्यांतिरक्षुपर्वकारणसाय-नासीको चेत्यनः हि चिह्नते इवत। ॥ ६ ॥

अत्यु-यदि भावो द्विः न विन्ध्यमान्यु, परथिविद्विद्वशस्यात्त, किं वन्दे अभाव एव विन्ध्यमान्यु, कमुरुस्तननिष्ठूतिमात्राविदिति? चैत्यनः।

एतराँयुक्तम्, वस्मात्--

यदि भावो न विन्ध्यमान्यु: किं भवस्यति।

विन्ध्यमान्यु तत्त्व मांवो न नाचाच्छन्त विचारे। ॥ ७ ॥

यदि भावो विन्ध्यमान्यु नेत्रेत्यति, यदि विन्ध्यमान्यु ह्वति नेत्रे, तद्रा किममात्रं सविध्यति विन्ध्यमान्यु? अभावध्रुव न सविध्यतीत्याः। कमुरुस्तननिष्ठूतिमात्र विन्ध्यमान्यु, परथिविद्विद्वशस्यात्। अवत्तत्त्व: हिं कमुरुस्तननिष्ठूतिमात्रान्यु, इत्यतः अवत्तत्त्व: विन्ध्यमान्यु स्वातः। न चैत्याच्छन्त, अंत्यतेऽत्त्व: सप्त-प्रसाहामाणिकः चेत्यनः। ॥ ७ ॥

किं चान्यत्-

यद्यमान्यु विन्ध्यमान्युपावयात्, तत्कथम्।

विन्ध्यमान्यु न ह्वाभास्नोढिति वोल्युपावय चिह्नान्ते। ॥ ८ ॥
निर्वाणपरिक्षा पद्मविशालतिरम प्रकरणम् । ४७ ।

श्री हि भावो नाम किवतः श्यामः, तदा तत्वलिपिः नैव भावो
निर्वाणसिद्धान्तेऽरण कल्पना, यदि किवदभावं स्यामः, तदा तत्वलिपिः
नैवासारो निर्वाणं स्यामः। तथा च मातामायावेव न सः, तदा
तत्वलिपिः नैवासारो निर्वाणम् स्यामः। तस्मात्काश्च भावे नैवासारो निर्वाणसिद्धि
च वल्लभां, सापि नौप्रभवस्य यथा । इति न उच्छेदतु॥ १५ ॥

कि चान्यते—

नैवासाराः नैव भावो निर्वाणं यदि विद्यते ।

नैवासाराः नैव भावं इति केन हक्क्यते ॥ १६ ॥

यद्य प्रतिलोचनं नैवासाराः नैव भावलेखकतिः कल्पये, केन
तद्वारा प्रतिलोचनं नैवासाराः निर्वाणसिद्धि जावये गुरूः
स्वामी स्वामिः च इति नाग्ने निर्वाणसिद्धि जावये गुरूः
च इति नाग्ने प्रतिलोचनं नैवासाराः स्वामिः। न च चेत्यम्
निर्वाणसिद्धिः नैवासाराः स्वामिः। अथ नाग्ने, केनैव द्विविषयं
निर्वाणसिद्धिः परिधिकार्यते । कर्मचाररस्स्यं परिधिकार्तिः चैत्, यदि
संसारावस्था परिधिकार्यते । यदि संसाराय
संसारावस्था परिधिकार्यते, च तथा नाग्ने
गुरूः स्वामिः स्वामिः। न च निर्वाणं प्रतिलोचनं, च तथा
गुरूः स्वामिः। यदि स्वामिः स्वामिः ।

कि गौरवम् । चस्मात्-सितामण्डित्वम् बिध्रामः, न च निर्वाणं
किंचित्संस्कृतस्पर्शति, तस्मात
व्याप्तवाचियातामण्यान्नालम्बन्स्यते ।

कि चान्यते—

तस्माद्भाजः नैवासाराः नैवासाराः प्रकरणम्
नैवासाराः प्रकरणम्।

नैवासाराः नैवासाराः प्रकरणम् ॥ १८ ॥

चरित्यां दिरीः लुकावाः भवतित्वं नोहन्ते ।

नैवासाराः नैवासाराः प्रकरणम् ॥ १७ ॥

मय वृद्धम्—

चन्द्रमावरिकृतन्त्र गुरु गुरुमति वधावा ।

नामतिः च तद्यथा चस्मात् निष्ठूः तत्स्य विक्षिप्तेः ॥

[ म० शा०-२२४२ ]
संध्यकक्षाणि

यथौ तात्त्व परं निरोधाविभृतं तथागतो न भवति चेति नोढः।
एव ध्यानावांखाऽवधुनभिष्मो नोढः। तथानायांवाहेव निमयानी
स्थिति नोढः न गृहे॥ १६॥

न च केवलं परं निरोधाविभृतं: प्रकारेभ्यांवांखा नोढः।
चचि च तित्तुमानोपि स्वगवानुः स्वभवत्रेव नोढः॥ १८॥

चथा नान्यं न चोठं तथा: तथागतपरीक्षणं अविवादितम्॥ १८॥
अत तथा—

न संसारस्य निर्वाणात्मकचिद्विद्विषोपणम्।
न निर्वाणस्य संसारात्मकचिद्विद्विषोपणम्॥ १९॥

स्मार्तिनिवृत्तपि महावन सब्बतीवेमाहिना नोढः। परिनिवृत्त
तोडः पि नोढः महालीयमाहिना। अत एव संसारनिवृत्यं: परसपर
रत्स नातिर कब्जालयेः। विषायमाण्योस्तुल्यफलताः। ब्रह्मचारी
सृजन्त भक्तवता: अनवरायो हि विलयो बाबजरममरणसंस्कार इति,
तदृपि अत एव एव पूर्वपरताः। संसारनिवृत्योविशेषत्वामामावात॥ १९॥

तत्त्वाति—

निर्वाणस्य च या कोटि: कोटि: संसारस्य च।

न च केवलं संसारस्य निर्वाणात्मकचिद्विद्विषोपणम् किञ्चिद्
विद्विषोपणम्॥ २०॥

परं निरोधाविभृतं: शाश्वताधावं वृष्णु।

निर्वाणपरायणं च पूर्वपरतं च समाख्यता:॥ २१॥

वा अथ अव एव नौप्रश्नं:। संसारनिवृत्योदभारथानि
अतिस्रुताल्पेक्षारस्तत्वाः॥

तत्र परं निरोधाविवृत्तनास्लोभस्येन चतवा: श्रंख्यं: परिरुक्त न:।
तथाया: अवति तथागत: परं मरणात:। न: मरणं तथागतं: परं मरणात:।
अवति च न मरणं च तथागत: परं मरणात:। तेव अवति न: न मरणं
तथागतं: परं मरणातिदिः। एतत्कारणो वृष्णु: निर्वाणपरायणे
प्रभुत्व॥

निर्वाणपरीक्षा प्रश्नविशिष्टपत्र प्रकरणम्

अन्तराला अर्ध हस्तां: तत्तथा—अन्तराला होकः, अन्तरवाच्य, अन्तवाढ़ानन्तवाच्य, न्यान्तवान्तच नान्तवान्तच होकः इति। प्रत्येक वाक्य समाधित्वात् अनुसरयते। तथा आत्मनो होकः वा अनात्मानुजस्वादन्तचपल्ल्या अन्तवाला होकः इति इत्येवं कल्पनेन अपरांतमाहृत्य व्याख्याते। इत्यादिप्रवत्य अपवर्ज्यं श्याभवम् प्रतिपद्यते। इत्यप्रवत्येन न्येवान्तवान्तच नान्तवान्तच व्याख्यान्तवान्तच अनुसरयते। तत्र अत्यश्चोऽहोकः वा अत्यश्च वसुस्वाध्यं पदवी वाहिन्योऽहोकः इति प्रतिपद्यते। इत्यादिप्रवत्येन न्येवान्तवान्तच नान्तवान्तच व्याख्यान्तवान्तच अनुसरयते।

शास्त्रः होकः, आश्चाल्योऽहोकः, शास्त्रात्मकाव्यस्त्र, नैव शास्त्रः नैवाल्योऽहोकः, इत्यादिप्रवत्य होकः इति प्रतिपद्यते। इत्यादिप्रवत्येन न्येवान्तवान्तच नान्तवान्तच व्याख्यान्तवान्तच अनुसरयते।

यदा हु स्तांतनिर्णयोपदेशः प्रतिपद्यतः, तदान—

१२।

वृहोऽछु वस्त्रसंस्कृता कामनतः किमततः।

किमतमल्लवच्च नात्मण्यान्तर्वच्च किम्।

कि तत् वच्च किमन्यायोऽक्षायतः किमशाहवतम्।

अवादवत् बाहजतः च कि ना नोभारमन्यायः।

चनुदीः अभावाद्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावाद्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः

अत्यावर्त्ताभावात् अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावान्यासार्थः अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात् अभावात्

यदा हुः—

४
मुख्यालयाते

सबोपल्लभोपणमः प्रपन्योपणमः विचः।
न कर्षाचित्तस्यचित्तशिरधुः बुख्तेन देखितः॥ २४ ॥

तत्र यथोक्तमां यथोक्तप्रपणसंहः॥ इति हि सर्वः प्रपणानि
नियित्तानि। य उपस्थोपप्रचित्ततिष्ठानामः॥ स एव चोपणमः प्रपणः-
चोपणान्तराचक्रः। चाचाचाच चाचाच अपश्रोपणामन्तरायुक्तेः
शिवः॥ शेषानमश्रृव्यः वा जननांप्रपणसः शिवः शिवः॥ शेषान-
म्याल्गेन वा प्रपणोपणानि नियित्तेप्राप्तशानामः शिवः॥ शेषान-
म्याल्गेन वा प्रपणोपणानि ज्ञानायुक्तः शिवः॥। यदा चैव सुधा
साहनः। सर्वप्रपणाल्गेन नियितः यथेऽतः शेषानमश्रृव्योगः
नमस्यकं हंसराजः। यत्रः स्वपणायानसार्योपणातासः वाक-
गाने यो गालस्यांबिेकनतवातः। तत्र सर्वनिर्देशप्राप्तमानः
कंच्छैपुपुर या मन्येरुः वा न कष्टचित्तेः वा। सुभवः वा न कर्षाः
सांस्कृतिकः या वैनवद्वारीकः वा तेषामेव इति विचेरे
यथसं। यथोरञ्जतात्यायुक्तः॥ "याँ च राजि झानसरो
तथागतोज्ञात्यां स्वस्वेनाग्रेवप्रमुखः॥ यां च राजिमुक्तायुरः
परिवर्त्यायुः। अत्रातने तथागतोज्ञात्यां नोीवात् न व्याख्यात
नापि प्रश्नाप्राप्त प्राप्त, यां च यथायुक्ताः। सर्वश्रृव्याः
नानायुक्तायुः वा।। विविधाः तथागतवां सिन्द्रवात् संज्ञाते।
तथासृंगे दुश्चौ गुरुभवित्तकं अर्थाय-गर्भस्यध्वस्यि
क्षेरं दुस्मारीयः च तथागतस्य प्रस्तुतस्य श्रुणमः। वत्र तथातो न
कल्याणः निर्विकल्याणः। सर्वस्यविकल्याणायुः धार्मिकः
हि झानसमते तथागत:॥। इति विशेषः॥

तथा—

अर्जुनकर्मः। सर्वशृव्यः झानविनिर्देशः॥
धर्मसमाधानः कुमारीः बुख्तेन सोऽच्छेदः॥

यद्य तत्त्वं न कं कं प्रचित्तस्यस्मिन् तदार्थेत् देशितः। तस्कृतविशिष्टे
धर्मसमाधानः कुमारीः बुख्तेन सोऽच्छेदः॥ इति इति। अर्जुनकर्मः
अवश्यकता देशिताः स्वतंत्राक्षरमाणीमाय विकल्याणायुः। अर्थातः
सर्वार्थशिरविशिष्टाः। इति धर्मसमाधानः देशिताः॥

तथागतो हि "प्रतिविषयसूतः
कुशलस्य धर्मसमाधानार्थः।"
नैवाच तथता न तथागतोत्तिति । चिन्त्य च संदृश्यति सर्वोऽके।॥ इति ॥

पुनः तथागतवाच्युपमापरिवर्त्तिः विश्लेषण क्षेत्रम्। तद्वष निर्विभाषिनः चर्मेदेशः अभावात् कृतः चर्मेदेशः। सद्भावेन निर्विभाषिनेऽन्तरायतं भविष्यति । दस्माङ्गिर्विभाषिनं पञ्चासीति विद्याम्। एकः च भगवानः—

अनिर्विभाषिनः इति निर्विभाषिनः छोटानाथः देखितम्।

आकाशेऽन्नागो अन्तिरक्षापैैव मोचितः।॥ इति ॥

तथा—न तेन भगवानं संसारसलिको से निर्विभाषिन भावः। पर्यंते। तत्कस्म हेतुः। निर्विभाषिनस्ति भगवन् यः प्रहारः शर्मनिर्मितानां साक्षात्प्रतिः सचिदीपामिक्षातानाम्। तत्वेऽन्नागः मोहुर्वा ये स्वाभावते चर्मेदेशर्ये प्रवचन तीर्थकर्त् निपतिता निर्विभाषिनं भावः। पर्यंते च तथया विहितेस्वतः हीराष्ट्रियः। आत्मन्तपरिनिषदेणु मां भगवानं सर्वशर्ममेऽ न निर्विभाषिनां साक्षात् धार्मिन्ति चालाहमाग्निमाहिमाभिकार्यां तीर्थकारिणिः। न व्याजवृव मोहाचारः सम्प्रभु प्रतिपत्ति कस्तेषुद्विमायेऽवादः चा निरोधः चा करोदिति, नापि कत्वचंद्रस्या प्राणिनिर्मिताम ताविष्यम्—

इत्यावर्षीचन्द्रकृतिनाथापदोपविवायाः प्रसंजयपार्थां सम्भवमेव निर्विभाषिनं नाम पञ्चासितिवर्गं प्रकरणम्॥

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Absolute Realities, 157.
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Saint, (ārya) The term ārya which in the Brahininacal Codes and all Brahmanical literature has the meaning of “noble in race” changed in Buddhism for this meaning
altogether and is used as a technical term for the designation of Buddhist Saint, 24, n. (cp, the similar change that Buddha wished to inculcate in the meaning of the term (Brahmin) Rhys Davids. Dialogues, 218 aarya-pudgala represents an assemblage of morally pure elements, 23; he is the man who has through accumulated virtue (punya-sambhara) and accumulated knowledge (jñana-sambhara) entered the Path of Illumination, (dṛṣṭimarga). consisting in a direct intuition of the real condition of the Universe, as Pluralism in Hinayana, as Monsim in Mahayana, 24, n. 4, 196. n. 1; is called the Yogin 24, n. the Yogacara, 311; His intuition called mystic intuition (yogi-pratyakṣa) 24 ff. All habits of thought changed, ibid. This intuition only felt internally (pratyātmavedya) cannot be expressed in words, 68 The real attitude of the Saint in the discussion about the Absolute should be silence 167. He nevertheless can adapt himself to the habitual ways of thinking and instruct mankind by arguments intelligible to them 167. All arguments will be negative and point out the hopeless contradictions in the usual ways of thinking, ibid.

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Soul, eternal, individual 2 denial of its existence as a separate substance in Early Buddhism, 6 as inanimate ubiquitous "stūnellike" substance in Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, 88
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Sources of knowledge only two, (intellect and senses) 141; the four sources of realistic logic accepted by the Mādhyamika, 251.

Space, a reality in Hinayāna, 51.

Speech, the Buddhist theory of speech (apoha) 233

Sphere of purified matter of ethereal bodies, 15 of pure spirits, 15 cp. s. v. Mystic worlds,

Substance denied 12 the unique substance of the world, 5

Śūnyāta means svabhāva-śūnyatā-paraspara-apekṣatā, or Relativity (q. c.) cp. Index. 7.

Thing in itself. The conception of an extreme concrete and particular, the absolutely particular, the thing characterised exclusively by its own self (sva-lakṣaṇa), the residue which remains when all constructions of thought and all relations have been dropped, is opposed by Dignāga as a kind of Absolute to the Universal Relativity and Unreality of Ānārakāśa, 215, Candrakīrti declares it also to be relative, 231; its double relativity, a with the corresponding cognition, b) with the Universal as the thing not in itself, 213, 231. Its similarity to the Hoc Aliquid of Aristotle, to the "thing in itself", of Kant, 246, n. to the "Thisness" of Hegel, 87

Time, its unreality, 273.

Truths (the four) of the Saint, 27; their meaning in Hinayāna and their meaning in Mahāyāna, 28, in Nyāya. Vaiśeṣika, 55; a scheme for philosophical construction accepted by all systems, 90-91, nothing Buddhistic in them, since they are accepted by all systems, ibid.

Upanishad, views, 4

Vaibhāsikas, continuators of the Sarvāstivādins, 40, 44, 27 ff. in a broader sense the name is applicable to all the 18 schools of Hinayāna, sc. all Hinayāna the Sautrāntikas excepted.

Vātsīputrīyās, their idea of a surviving personality, 305.

Yoga, I profound meditation, the means of attaining Quiescence, 4; is not magic, 8. Opinions of Keith, Beck, Lehman, Soderblom, Heier, de la Vallée Pousin, Sénart,
Woods, Anesaki, Takakusu, 9. The faculty of concentrating attention upon one point to the exclusion of all other objects (samâdhi), 9; considered as a separate faculty of the humana mind such as feeling, will, desire, ideas, attention, etc. 4. n. when cultivated induces hypnotic states ending in the catelepsy, (asamjâi-samâpatti), 11; considered to be one of the most precious human faculties, 14. Can mean the faculty, the resulting mental state and the different places (worlds) where it is more or less intensely practised, 11. Its synonyms dhyâna, samâpatti, ekâgrata, ibid.

Yoga, II, the mystic power produced by intense concentrated contemplation of a single point or idea, 15. This power capable of producing a radical change in the composition of individual existences by suppressing the operation of elements composing a normal existence, ibid. Individuals with a highly developed faculty of concentration and having much practised it considered to be purified, ibid. This power capable of transferring human beings out of this world of gross bodies into higher mystic worlds (q. c.) where it becomes the predominant faculty controlling the character of life and the composition of individual existences (the gradually reduced number of elements entering into cooperation for producing an individual personal life) 17. The ultimate end of this process of suppression in Nirvâna, 23. Buddhist yoga has nothing to do with magic and sorcery, 3 ff 8 ff. Yoga exercises in Zen monasteries in Japan, 24 n. Origin and history of the Buddhist doctrine of meditation, 27; its denial as a mystic power by the Mâmsâskas, 28; its importance in the Nyây Vaiśeṣika, system, 87.

Yogacaras, the school of 46, ff, their idea that all elements of life are eternally quiescent, 53 their conception of reality, 49; the synonym of a Mahâyânist 318.
TECHNICAL TERMS

Ati-prasanga, a generalized reductio ad absurdum, e.g. "if cause and effect are identical, everything will be eternally nascent, if they really are different, all things being different from one another, everything will be produced out of anything", 138.

Adhikarana-sadhana, a noun denoting the place where an action is going on, e.g. dhyāna from the root dhyāna, (to meditate) in the sense of a world of which the denizens possess thought-concentration as their normal condition, 7, 134.

Adhipati-pratyaya, a ruling or determining cause, e.g. the organ of vision in regard to visual sensation, 272 cp. samānāntara—ālambana,—and hetu-pratyaya.

Adhyāvasita-(visaya), see prāpya-visaya, 213.

Adhvan, transition; time; past, present and future, 69, 171.

Anaśeksaḥ sva-bhavaḥ, "one's own" independent existence, non-relative, absolute Īśa a conception corresponding to a certain extent, to Spinoza's Substance, 75.

Anāsāraṇa, "uninfluenced" by klesas q c. cp. āsarava 89, 186.

Anatma-(vāda) the theory maintaining that the Whole whether a Soul, a Psyche or a Substance, does not exist separately, over and above its separate elements (dharma) linked together by causal laws. This is the principal tenet of Hinayāna and Buddhism, synon. padgala nairūmya, pratiṣṭhatā-samutpāda (Hinayānic, dharmatā (Hinayānic) dharma-sanketa, skandha-āyatana-dhātavaḥ; etc. q. c. The converse theory, viz. the Whole really exists, but not the parts, is the central conception in Mahāyāna, 68, 201.

Anupākhyya, inexpressible in speech, beyond words and discursive concepts-anirvacaniya nisprapañca, 238.
Anupalabdha, negation of the hypothetically-assumed presence of something, e.g. there is on this place no jar, because if it were present it would be perceived, 301.

A theory of negative judgments very similar to that introduced into European Logic by Sigwart, cp. Logic, 3 p. 155. “die Verneinung setzt eine Zumuthung (äropa) voraus”, cp. Nyāya-bīndu, II 26 ff.

Anupadāya-sat, existence independent of any substratum uncaused, non-relative, absolute existence, 309.

Anubhava, immediate experience, as contrasted with philosóphic interpretation, 210

Anuikāntika (-hatu) inconclusive, indefinite argument, synon. savvyābhāṣa, 302.

Aṇya-vārtti (existence of an object established by) contrast with its negations, e.g. “blue colour is established and exists only in so far as there are non-blue colours”, synon. apoha, paraspara-apakṣa, svabhāva-śūnya, etc. 238.

Aṇava jñāna, a momentary mystic intuition of the “Four Truths” in the mystic worlds, i.e. of the elements out of which these worlds are constructed in accordance with special causal laws, 28.

Aparokṣa (—ariha) the presence of an object in one’s own ken, the essence of sense-perception according to Vedānta and Mādhyamika, 74.

Apratīṣṭhita (nirvāṇa) “altruistic” Nirvāṇa, cp. in the preceding Index s. v. Nirvāṇa, 185, 204 M de la V. P explains it (Museon, 1914, p. 34) as a Nirvāṇa into which a Buddha could have entered, if he did not prefer to remain in Samsāra, and to work for the Salvation of all living beings. A similar explanation is also current in Japan. O. Rosenberg, Die Welt anschaung des modernen Buddhismus p 30 J. Rahder, Daśabhūmikasūtra, p XXIV, thinks that the Mahāyānistic Buddha does not reside in ‘aprat’. n., “il est pas séparé du samsāra, ni ne se réjouit du nirvāṇa.” But a Buddha who does not reside in Nirvāṇa is not a complete Buddha in his
Dharmakāya. However aprat. n. is always represented as the highest form of Dharmakāya, the most perfect Mahāyānistic Nirvāṇa. It is contrasted with the Hinayānistic Nirvāṇa.

The latter is attained by the Saint for his own, personal salvation. It is "egoistic", The Mahāyānistic Buddha does not reside in that kind of Hinayānistic Nirvāṇa, his Nirvāṇa is altruistic and represents all-embracing Love and Wisdom as the highest manifestation of Dharmakāya, just as every creature and every object is also but a manifestation of it. The Tibetan Grubmthah is perfectly aware that the Mahāyānistic Buddha represents the motionless Cosmos and cannot be an active principle, but the empirically existing virtues are conceived as a special manifestation of the eternal principle; apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa is thus defined negatively, it is not a Nirvāṇa which is reached exclusively for one's own Salvation, it is altruistic (rañ kho-nai don-du-zh-ba-la mi-gnas=svār-thamātreṇa upaśame na pratiṣṭhitah). The manifestations of Love and Wisdom in the Universe are viewed as a special manifestation of the eternal Buddha and this is called the altruistic aspect of Nirvāṇa. The Hinayānist, i.e. the Śrāvaka and the Pratyeaka, are characterized as persons degraded by their bias for personal egoistic quietism (shi-mthar-lhun-bai gañ-zag=apaśamante pātāau pudgalau). Suzuki's words (Mahāyāna p. 345.) that the Buddha does not cling to Nirvāṇa etc. are apparently intended to suggest the same explanation as the one here given.

Abhisamaya, (1) In Hinayānā—prajñā-amalā, direct intuition of a monistic Universe (=prajñā-paramitā). Nāgārjuna in his Prajñā-mūla has taught Monism directly and the Mahāyānistic mārga indirectly. Maitreya-Asaṅga in his Abhisamaya-alamkāra, has taught this mārga directly; it is thus a synonym of prajñā-paramitopadesa or mārga, 78, 138.
Arahadhatu, immaterial plane of existence, the mystic worlds of pure spirits, 7, 10, 11, 81. The formula of individual existence in these worlds, includes three kinds (dhātu) of elements dhātu. (dharmāh) and (mano-vijñāna), cp. Central Conception, 10, 17, 120.

Arūpino dharmāh, non-material mental elements, 13.

Artha-ārthāya-kārita, efficiency of an ENS. existence characterized as efficiency in the schools of Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, 170.

Artha-vākyan, an aphorism implying a wide connotation, 155.

Avatāra, naive realism, as contrasted with prajñā-amañīā, "philosophic insight," 201, 283.

Avatāra-vastām, the four insoluble antinomies established by Buddha, (they are 14, according to the Indian mode of reckoning), 321.

Asamskṛta, not being produced by co-operating causes, eternal, absolute, (three such elements in the Sarvāstivādin system), 25, 69, 40, 283.

Ātman, (1) Soul, personality, 8, 31, etc.; the equivalent of pudgala according to most schools; different from it according to the Vātsiputṛīyas, (2) substance—(sva-bhāva), 226, 305.

Ātma-bhāva, Individual existence; ātman means here body, and is usually in this context translated into. Tib as lus, Cf. Buddhaghosa As 287, 240.

Ātma-labha, taking shape, actual existence, 199; ātma-bhāva-pratilabha, having a body in one of the three spheres of existence either as a gross or an ethereal or immaterial (mano-maya) body, cp. Rhys Davids, Dialogues I, 259.

Ādha-bhāta-dharma eternally quiescent existence, 57, a theory denying a real transition from the phenomenal into absolute existence and maintaining that the phenomenal world itself is the Absolute, if viewed sub specie aeternitatis. 169, 57
Adhyatamika-āyatana, the 6 internal bases of cognition, viz. consciousness (pure) and the 5 sense-faculties; the 160, 167 translation "mental phenomena" will be found applicable in many cases, although it is not quite correct, since samjñā, vedanā, saṃskāra are classified as bāhya-āyatana with regard to pure consciousness (manas),

Arambhava堆uated the "creative" theory of causality, advocated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, the reverse of the Sāṅkhya theory of an identity (tadātmya) between the cause and effect and of a mere change of manifestation (parināma-vāda), 217

Ārya, a Buddhist Saint, cp. prec. Index. s. v. Saint, 3. 9, 90 n, ārya-satya (—āryasya catvāri satyāni) the four aspects of the Universe (of its elements) as it appears to the Saint in mystic intuitions 5, 14, 27, replaced in Mahāyāna by two aspects (the phenomenal and the absolute).

Ālambana-pratyaya, the object of a cognition, viewed as a cause or a condition of every knowledge, 267

Ālambana, the agency producing the intentness of cognition upon an object, 269

Ālaya-vijñāna, the granary of consciousness, containing the "seeds" of all future ideas and the residue of all past thoughts and deeds, 49, 51, 52

Āsvasthika (or prakārāśa), pratītya-samutpāda q. c. 148

Āśraya-asūdha, devoid of a real substratum; e. g. the quality length of the (non-existing) horns of a donkey, 159

Āṣrana, originally a physical "influx" of the subtle desiring matter through the pores of the skin to fill up the Soul; in Buddhism, spiritual "influence" by kleśā q. c. from (root) √srū. Buddhaghoṣa derives Pali āsava from (root) √su, and interprets it etymologically as an "intoxicant," 299, 305

Idamī, tathāta, 28

Idaśpratītyata, causation in its Buddhist interpretation 47 cp. Index 6 sub. v. Causality.
Indriya 1) the six, 5 sense faculties and manas (pure sensation) the 22 agencies determining the shape or formulas of life in the different planes of ordinary or mystic existence, cp. 92, 104, 173 Ab Kosa, II. 1 ff.

Indriya-ksana, a moment of the operating sense-faculty, which together with a moment of the object and a moment of consciousness (vijñāna) produces actual sensation (the sparsa); before such actual sensation consciousness in an embryo is latent samāññichta, 250

Uccheda-nāda, the theory denying future life, Materialism in the sense of a denial of retribution and of a moral law; according to this theory every death is Nirvāṇa; Buddhism maintains that this theory does not lead to Nirvāṇa, but to the hell, 46, 83

Ukhāra, either growth (avayava-upacaya), or increased intensity, 14

Utpāda, production or causation, Mahayāna a synon. of existence (bhāva), of becoming (bhavana), and relation (bhāva), 140, 277

Upāptta, 1) being logically admissible, 155, 2) being reborn in one of the worlds, 14

Upāptta-dhyāna, being born in the lower 4 mystic worlds whose denizens possess ethereal bodies, 14 cp. samāññatt-dhyāna.

Upahāra, apparitional, born miraculously or according to special laws, 18

Upādāna, substratum, 281, 269, 270

Upādāna-skandha, sc. klesa upādāna-skandha, the elements of a personality as influenced by avidyā and trsna-sārava-dharmā-pūtha, 283

Upadaya, having a substratum, co-ordinated, caused, relative, 309

Upadaya-prajñāpti, a synonym of the Mahāyānistic madhyamā pratipad q. c. 119

Ekāgrata, the concentration of thought upon one point (samādhi), 10
Karana-sādhana, noun meaning the instrument of an action, 14

Karman, 1) volition and purposive action

following the volition (—cetana cetayitva ca karanaṁ, Ab. K. IV.), (2) the will of the Universe, the general force which keeps life going and models its forms in the different worlds, the etsa viśva, Every system of philosophy in India has its own construction regarding the origin, the essence, the operation, the immediate and the remote result of karman. It has accordingly a place assigned to it in the ontology of each system. The materialists deny its existence altogether, i.e. they deny the reality of an influence of past deeds, whether good or bad, upon man’s destiny. The Jains classify karman, among their elements of Matter. Gosāla admitted that volition is only half-karman since the real karman is physical, cp. D N I. 454. The Mīmāṃsakas analyse it into their conceptions of vidhi, bhāvanā, apūrva, niyoga etc. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system finds a place for it among the gunas where its different aspects can be recognized under the mental qualities of dharma, adharma, adṛśta and samskāra. The Buddhists place it into their samskāra-skandha where it originally held the place of a predominant ruling force of life (cp my Central Conception) p. 20. In the Sarvāstivādin list of ultimate realities it is classified as the citta-mahā-bhāma-saṁprajyotā-samskāra, under the name of cetana (will). cp. my Central Conception p. 19, 100.

Karma-sādhana, a noun meaning the object of an action, 10, 78, 132.

Kāleṇa, a mental act of linking together an indefinite something (Hoc Aliquid) either with a name or a universal or a quality or an action (enāma-jāti-ādi-yojanā), a judgment of the form “this is that” (sa evāyam), 137, 147. According to Sigwart, cp Logic. (3) I, p. 67 the judgments of the Form thus is Socrates, i.e. (sa evāyam) are also the fundamental form of all judgment. Hence it is identified with Vikalpa q. c. 204, 206, 224, 247.
Kalpanāpahā, a pure sensation without any participation of synthetic thought, 28, 214, 240.

Kleśa, morally impure elements (mental in Buddhism) physical in Jainism; illusion and desire (avidyā-trṣne) are the principal ones; when residues (sāṃskāra) of former deeds (karma) are moistened (abhrṣyandita) by them, they like "seeds" produce new existences (janma), 15, 208, 286.

Kārana-hetu, notion of a universal link between all elements of existence, past, present and future, also called sahakārī-ḥetu as contrasted with the adhipati-ḥetu q.e., this notion is a forerunner of Monism, 68, 303.

Kālānunugata, having no duration in time, point-instant, cp. desānunugata, 214.

Kṛjā, (=vyāpāra), energy supplying a link between the cause and the effect, such as the energy heat (paci-kriyā), 167-169.

Krṣana, a moment, point-instant, identified with the "thing-in-itself" 142, the differential of motion, its principle known to Indian astronomers and philosophers (=Ruci), 57, 68, 214, 222.

Krṣanti, satisfaction (=ruci)

Kharatva, resistance, 173.

Khyāti =jñāna =upalabdhi, 62.

Gati, (1) motion 115 (2) individual existence in one of the six kinds of bodies, 287.

Grahanaka-valya, a short statement to be developed (vivarana) in the sequel, 146.

Grāhīvāsaya, the prima facie object, the first moment in the cognition of an object, cp. prāpyāvīṣaya, 213.

Citta, pure consciousness or pure sensation, manas and vijñāna (sc. vijñāna-skandha), its synonyms in Hinayāna cp. Vijnāna, 76, 225.

Citta-mahā-bhāmakā, (dharma) the mental elements always represented in every conscious moment cp. Central,
Conceptions p. 100.

Cetana, will, conscious volition, a purposive action (karman q. c., 124 and 197.

Caitta, mental phenomena 304 (citta-samprayukata sampāra) cp. C. C.

Jñāna-kriya, energy, function 259, (vyāpāra)

Jñāna, (1) knowledge in general in the sense of mental phenomena 143, (2) definite cognition as contrasted with pure indefinite sensation (vijñāna. q. c. (3) transcendental metaphysical knowledge, 202. (4) omniscience (Tib. yes-šes) 207, 210.

Tat-sahāga, non-active non-operating sense faculty (=a-svā-karma-kṛta) cp. Sabhāga. 172

Tattva, absolute reality, (=tattvam eva) 154

Tathāta, “thisness” absolute reality, (many, synonyms) 68,87

Tatkalik-gatiḥ, the differential of a planet’s motion. 213

Duhkha, (1) vedana-duhkha suffering (2) pariñāma-duhkha, phenomenal existence (=upādana-skandha) cp. Pessimism in Index 6 181, 201

Drsti, (1) intuition, 16 (2) wrong view (=mithyā dṛṣṭi ), (3) antinomy, 261

Drsti-mārga, the path of illumination, momentary mystic intuition of the real condition of the universe, (yogipratyakṣa) q 16, 18, 26, 207

Deśanunugata, having no existence, a point-instant,

Dvaidhi-karana, dichotomizing (thought), thought operating by contrast of A with non-A 137, 207

Dharma, doctrine, (2) quality. (3) element of existence, 285, 280

Dharma-anu-dharma, a doctrine about elements or an element according to that doctrine 324, its connotation (dharma-sañketa) includes strict Uniformity of Nature (asmān-sati-idambhavati) 135; hence the translation 2 “norm” “normalism” which is not quite correct since norm is niyama-
dharmānām-niyama-pratyaya-niyama-pratītya - samut pāda, q. c. 4 a synonym of samkrata-dharma and samskāra q. c. 5) Nyāya-Vaiśesika, a meritorious action (=karman) 6) In Jainism, a special ubiquitous substance, the medium of motion.

Dharma-laya, The Cosmical Body of Buddha, i. e. the Cosmos regarded as the personification of the eternal Buddha, divided into svābhāva-kāya, which is amīta and jñāna-kāya which is amīta 123, 244, identified with Buddha'a final Nirvāṇa, 48, when mentioned in Hinayānistic lore (e. g. D. N., III 84, with the synonyms brahma-kāya and dharma-bhūta) it probably has no clearly Mahāyānistic connotation. Synon. tathātā.

Dhātu, has many different meanings which are summarized in the Baha-dhātuka-sūtra, the principal are 1) when three are reckoned, the 3 spheres or planes of existence of gross bodies (kāma-) of ethereal bodies, passim 2) when six are reckoned, the component principles of an existence in the material worlds, sc. the four general elements of Matter, (mahā-bhūta), ākāsa and vijñāna, this ākāsa is not the asamskrta ākāsa in the next classification and vijñāna here comprises all mental elements, it is also quite different from the vijñāna-dhātu of the next classification, cp. Ab. Kosa, I. 28 3) when eighteen are reckoned, a special division of all elements of existence into ten material and eight spiritual ones, (cp. Central Conception p. 9), 4) dhātu-gotra, 22, 92, 104, 321

Dhyāna- 1) concentrated contemplation (=samādhi—yoga); 2) a mystic world where the denizens normally possess thought-concentration, 11, 17, 29.

Nastika, when used by Buddhists as an invective means Materialism as a denial of Karman, i. e. of the moral law and of every survival after death.

Nik-svabhāva, having no independent existence of its own, relative, ultimately unreal—śūnya, 273
Nyāma, strict uniformity in nature, norm, causality between elements of existence, cp. dharma, 270

Nirodhavatya, 1) in Hinayāna, the reality of the Annihilation of all energies (saṁskāra), comparable with the idea of Entropy in modern science 41; 2) in Mahāyāna, the cessatin of all differentiation in a monistic Universe, 190 (sarva-kalpanā-kṣaya)

Nirmanakāya, the apparitional body of Buddha, Buddha in the docetic sense, 94

Nirvāna, cp. prec. Index.

Nirvāṇa-dhatu, ditto

Nir-vikalpaka, pure sensation, devoid of any synthesis or thought-construction, 238

Nisṛṣprapañca, inexpressible in speech and irrealizable in concepts,—the Absolute, 60, 71, 72, 238, 253, 258, 318.

Nisyanda-phala, natural result, automatic out-flow out of preceding homogeneous conditions (sabhāga-hētu), 8, 13, 372

Pakṣa, tenet, thesis, minor term in a Syllogism, 155

Pakṣa—doṣa, impossible thesis (=bādhīta viṣaya) 108

Pakṣa-dharma, minor premise (=upanaya), 139

Padartha, a thing, an entity, 294

Parata-utpatti, a break between cause and effect, production out of something different, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causality, extreme realism, involving ārambhavāda q. c. and the doctrine of samavāya as a semi-substantial universal substratum, a ubiquitous thing invented in order to bridge over the gap between a result and its material cause, 101, 179, 180

Paratantra, relative with the connotation attached to it in the Yogācāra school which admits the reality of relative things obeying causal laws, 54, 132, 206, 253, 293

Paramarthasat, existing in an absolute, non-relative, sense, 111, 170, 213, 222, 238
Paramārtha-satya, absolute reality as contrasted with samvrti-satya q. c. 212

Paraspara-apekṣa, mutually relative, relative, synon. śānya, pratītya-samutpanna, 252

Parikalpita-laksana, see laksana niḥsvabhāvata.

Parināma-duḥkhātā, the changing, impermanent or phenomenal world, synon. duḥkha-satya, or duḥkha, cp. duḥkha-vedanā-suffering. 27

Parintypana, absolute reality in a monistic sense with the connotation attached to it in the Yogācāra school, 64, 293

Pudgala-narātmya,—anātman, q. c. 68, 90, 187

Pudgala, the fleeting union of elements that make up, for a time only, an unstable individuality (Rhys Davids, Dialogues, 1260), synon. ātma-bhāva, santāna. Vatsīputriya and others assume kind of surviving pudgala; this tendency, the forerunner of Mahāyāna. 12, 68, 81, 230, 282, 306

Purusa-kāra-phala,=(purusena iva kṛta); anthropomorphic result, anthropomorphic conception of causation, 272

Prthivī, the resistant hard stuff in Matter, imagined as an atomic force of resistance, 217

Prati-vijñāpti, the momentary awareness of the presence of an object in one’s ken, 313

Prat-sankhyā-niruddha, the blank created by the extinction of element (dharma) through yoga, 94

Pratītya, different interpretations of the term, 124, 125, 128, 302

Pratītya-samutpāda, 1) Hinayāna, inter-connection according to causal laws of all the elements co-operating in the formulation of life, contrasted with adhistya-samutpāda (production at random) synon. pratyaya-nyama—niyama samskṛtavā—dharma—sanketa, 54; 2) in Mahāyāna, Relativity synon paraspara-apekṣata-svabhāva-śānyatsamvṛti; 3) its general formula in Sūlistamba-sūtra, in
Hinayānistic and Mahāyānistic interpretation, 185, 208
4) āvasthika or prākarṣika pr. s. utp.—12 nidāna, a
special case of the general law, its application to the
revolution of an individual life under the influence of
illusion (avidyā) and passion as long as they are not
extinct by philosophic insight (prajñā) and ecstatic medi-
tation and the mystic power (Yoga), derived from it.

Prenatal forces, (samskāra) then produce a new life (vijñā-
ṇa) in a matrix, it passes through an embryonic state
(nidāna), 4-7, develops into full life (n 8-10) decay and
death and is continued in a new life (n, 11-12) in a new
individual and so on without an end, until Nirvāṇa is
attained, which according to strict Hinayāna represents
a complete Annihilation of every life (Entropy). This
twelve-membered formula refers to the phenomenal
world, 253, 205.

Pratyakṣa, sense perception of object perceived, 79, 214, 228,
251.

Pratyaya-niyama, see niyama, 279.

Pratyaveksana-jñāna, a special kind of Omniscience with which
the Buddha, according to Yogācāras, is endowed when
representing apratisthita-nirvāṇa q. c. 317.

Prapāṭha, speech, (—vāk) the expression of conceptually
differentiated reality in words, 71, 258, 324.

Pramāṇa-viniscaya-nāda, vindication of logic, anti-skepticism,
the standpoint of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as opposed to
the Madhyamika school, 203.

Prayoga (—vākyā), formulation, syllogism, (—prayogānta), 156.

Prayoga-mārga, path of practice, the second division of the
Path of Salvation, 26.

Prasāṅga-vākyā. deductio ad absurdum, 138.

Prasājiya-pratisedha, a simple negation, not necessitating any
affirmation of the opposite, 137.

Prākārṣika, cp. āvasthika sc, pratitya-samutpāda, 183.
Prāhca-visayya, the object as cognized in a definite representation, the final object, synonym adhyavaseya-cp. grāhya-visaya, 213.

Bhāva, existence, "becoming (=bhavana) relation, production, - pass 257.

Bhāvanā, (1) profound meditation, (samādhi), 394.—vāsanā, karman.

Bhāvanā-heya, an element of existence to be neutralized or extirpated by profound Meditation, cp. 15 drṣṭi-heya.

'Bhāva-sadbhāva-kalpa, Realism, 292.

Bhānabhāva, affirmation and negation, 321.

Bhāta-mahābhāta, Matter 173.

Madhyama-pratīpada, the Middle Path, (1) in Hīnayāna, a middle course between materialism (uccheda-vāda) and the doctrine of an Eternal Soul, (ātma-vāda, āśvata-vāda), (2) in Mahāyāna, Relativity, śūnyātā, 81 n. the theory which maintains that the Relativity of all the objects of the empirical world is the surface, (samvrtu), of its monistic Essence, 119.

Mahā-karuna, Great Commiseration (Hīnayānistic, different from Mahāyānistic, 127.

Mahā-bhāta, the four fundamental elements or atomic forces of Matter; repulsion, cohesion, heat and lightness (or motion), 143.

Tathādhammukta, being in accordance with one’s religious fervour (either Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna) 326

Yoga, v. Index. 6 yogācāra, v. Index 6 10, 13, 12, 24, 329.

Rūpa, (1) svārūpa, essence, real essence, (2) rūpāyatana, colour and shape, the external basis (bahya āyatana) of visual cognition, (3) rūpa-skandha, the assemblage of all physical elements partaking in the constitution of an individual life, the elements of its body and of its external world, 116, 184 (4) rūpa-dhātu, the mystic worlds of ethereal (accha) bodies, 10, 81

Loksana-nih-mahāvāta, the unreality of logical constructions (prakalpita); according to the Yogācāras, 54.
Lokṣya-laksāṇa-pravṛtti, imagined entities as something continuant characterized by changing characteristics. 300.

Vāsana, the Yogācāra idea of karman, q. c. explained as pūrvaṁ jñānam and derived either from root vas ‘to perfume’ or from the cause of root vas ‘to live’. Vāsanaḥ bhāvanā to make live, to produce empirical existence, 326.

Vikalpa, dilemma, dichotomizing thought, the differentiation of the object into A and non-A, hence productive, imagination, thought in general and a synonym of kalpana q. c. 71, 206.

Vijñāna, (1) in Hinayāna synon of citta and manas, vijñāna-skandha = mana-śyatana = mano-dhātu, pure indefinite sensation, pure consciousness, the principle of every conscious life, 135, 148 149, 2) the third member of the 12-membered formula of pratītya-samutpāda, it is latently (sammūrcchita) present even in an egg as long as it has not lost its vitality; this vijñāna is regarded by the Yogācāras as an ālaya-vijñāna, by the Hinayānists and Mādhyamikas as a mano-vijñāna-dhātu; in the moment of conception the masculine and feminine sperma unite with Vijñāna under the influence of samskāras (=karman) the physical part of the new being comes from the parents, but the vijñāna element as causally connected with some previous existence, not necessarily that of the parents; this theory, possibly founded upon some observation, has led to the doctrine of reincarnation; vijñāna is here to be translated as “life”, “the vital principle” and must be distinguished from sensation, sparsa, which is a further step of the formula 260, 283 empirical knowledge, when contrasted, with absolute knowledge (jñāna=sarvajñātā=tīb ye-śes, 149, 202, 4) in the idealist Yogācāra system (vijñāna'-vāda) everything becomes vijñāna, it then means idea in general vijñāna-skandha, ditto, 296

Vipaka-hetu, moral causation, = karman, 265

Viprayukta-saṃskāra, forces which cannot be classified either as Matter or as Mind (=rūpa-citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), cp. Central Con. 1, 293.
Vaiyavadānīka-dharma, those elements of an individual life (santāna, pudgala) which have a purifying, soothing force, conducing to Nirvāṇa, e. g. prajñā and samādhi, 293.

Śātvata, eternal, beginningless (cp. pūrvāntam samāśrito-dvāṣṭi), 158.

Śūnyā, devoid of independent reality (=svabhāva-śūnya), dependent, relative, unreal; in Mahāyāna, a synonym of pratītya samutpāda, q. c. 321, 327.

Śūnyatā, Relativity, the theory that nothing short of the whole is real, the parts being always dependent are ultimately unreal; its synonym is pratītya-samutpāda, madhyamā pratītya, pratītya-pratipad, etc. 81 as samvṛt-śūnyatā q. c. represents the Absolute, 205, 325.

Sātvādāka, agreeing with experience, supported by successful purposive action=avisvādāka not contradicted by experience, cp. b. t. p. 213.

Sātvatī-satya, the surface reality, empirical reality, identified with Relativity, with the Dialectic of Being, 237, 252.

Samskāra, (1) the forces, the four forces, (samskrta-laksana) accompanying the appearance of every momentary existence (jāti-sthīti-jarā-anītya), (2) =viprayukta samskāra, q. c. (3) citta-samprayukta-samskāra=all mental phenomena, (4) a synonym of samskrta-dharma in general (5)=karman cp. Central Conception, p 201, 284.

Samjña, idea, conception produced by abstraction (nīmittaudgrahana), 304

Satya, truth, reality, four stages of reality in Hīnayāna and in all realistic systems, replaced by two stages in Mahāyāna, 55, 143.

Sanidassana, the visible=rūpayatana, q. c. 703,

Santāna, continuity or synthesis of moments of existence of either an element or an assemblage of elements, a personality (pudgala=ätman), 8, 9, 190.

Sabhāga. 1) hetu, homogeneity between cause and effect, 2)—indriya, active operating. efficient, =sva-karma-kṛt, 115, cp. tat-sabhāga, 179
Samanantara-pratyaya, the immediately preceding moment of every effect, its substratum (upādāna-kṣana), 53, 265

Samāpatti-dhyāna, being transferred in ecstatic meditation to one of the mystic worlds, 10

Sambhāra-mārga the accumulation of virtue and knowledge, the preparatory path to Salvation, 26

Sārṇa, a techn. term, denoting the totality of all elements of the Universe including the Absolute, 90

Sarvajñatā, Omniscience in the sense of an intuition of the Absolute, 133

Sa-svabhāva-nāda, Realism, 202

samvṛta, "under the surface,"; Relativity (pratītya-samutpāda=ṣūnyatā) is the "surface" (samvṛtti) of the absolute reality, this same absolute reality viewed as the thing lying "under the surface" is metaphorically also called pratītya-samutpāda or ṣūnyatā which, in this sense, becomes designation of the Absolute, and it is in this sense that Nirvāṇa the Absolute is declared to be the equivalent of Samsāra, the Phenomenal.

Sādhyā-sama, petitio principii, 175, 210

Sāṅkṣērika, associated with kleśa q. c. defiling, disquieting, relegating Nirvāṇa, 324

Sāmagrī (=hetu-kārana-sāmagrī), the sum total of causes and conditions relative to a given entity, the entire setting in which the thing exists, (J. S. Mill), 104

Sālambana, intentness upon an object as a characteristic of mind and mental phenomena, 267, 268

Sāsrava, see āsrava, 15

Skandha-āyatana-dhātavah, classification of the elements (dharma) of existence from different points of view,—anatman q. c. cp. Central Conception, p. 68

Sparśa, sensation as a mental element (citta-samprayuktasamskāra), the sixth member of the twelve member formula of life's development, it is sensation in which a
sense faculty and its object partake, it must be distinguished from vyāśa, the third member, which then represents the quite indefinite and even latent principle of life, 201, 313

Svabhāva-abhāva—nīshvabhāvatā, Śūnyatā, 273
Svalakṣaṇa, the "thing in itself", cp. prec, Index, 204, 213
Hinādhimukta—a Hinayānist, 60
Hetu—pratyaya, causes and conditions, terms also used as synonyms, 8, 303, 309
Heya-dharma, elements of phenomenal existence to be extinguished by the Saint, 14